

US AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

EVALUATION OF  
USAID/PERU'S DEMOCRACY EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

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**FINAL REPORT**

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**Management Systems International**

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## ***CHAPTER ONE – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY***

“Broader Citizen Participation in Democratic Processes” is USAID/Peru’s first Strategic Objective (SO1). To achieve that objective, four Intermediate Results (IRs) were framed as part of the 1997-2001 strategy:

- ◆ IR1: More Effective Selected National Institutions;
- ◆ IR2: Greater Access to Justice;
- ◆ IR3: Local Governments More Responsive to Their Constituents; and
- ◆ IR4: Citizens Better Prepared to Exercise Their Rights and Responsibilities.

Given the progressive weakening of the democratic system in the country, and the resistance of the Government of Peru to improving the effectiveness of state institutions, SO1 later shifted to a demand-driven strategy. Details were laid out in a December 1998 document titled: *Strategic Focus of the USAID/Peru Democracy Program for the 18-Month Period Leading up to the Year 2000* [congressional and presidential] *Elections (10/98-4/00)*. With that came a reduction of activities under IR1 and IR2. Since the total SO1 budget for the past three years has been about \$3 million in DA funds, to increase activities under IR3, the Mission requested additional resources of between \$3 and \$5 million in ESF funding to initiate a program of local government development outside the coca-growing region (already covered by the SO5 Alternative Development Program). However, that increase will not be forthcoming until at least the next fiscal year. Sub-activities under all IRs include initiatives in various thematic areas: human rights, conciliation services and legal assistance for the poor, women’s political participation, school-related civic education, and democracy and voter education.

To help prepare for the Mission’s strategic planning exercise, scheduled for later this year, the SO1 team contracted with Management Systems International (MSI) to conduct this evaluation which, while based on an examination of selected sub-activities, is also designed to assess progress at the level of SO1 and of its major umbrella project, *Citizen Participation and Access to Justice* (PARTICIPE). Recommendations from this evaluation are also designed to facilitate an in-depth Democracy and Governance Assessment (now being carried out by another MSI team) and the subsequent design of a new USAID strategy for democratic development in Peru.

Based on a review of relevant documents and interviews with key informants in Lima, Ayacucho, Trujillo, Tarapoto and Lamas, information related to the questions posed in the Scope of Work was collected from all counterparts selected for this evaluation, as well as from other grantees, donors and individual specialists. A careful analysis of the data gathered led to the findings contained in Chapter Three of this report. Part One of that Chapter presents findings organized by thematic areas at the level of the individual sub-activities studied. Part Two presents overarching findings at the level of PARTICIPE and SO1.

Based on an analysis of all findings, the evaluation team then drew overall conclusions and formulated recommendations, which are contained in Chapters Four and Five of this report.

The *Conclusions* reached by evaluators are as follows:

- A. Clearly, USAID/Peru's decision to emphasize a demand-based strategy for its Democracy Program during the period leading up to the year 2000 elections was a sound one. That determination greatly enhanced the Mission's potential for achieving SO1: "broader citizen participation in democratic processes."
- B. Of the current sub-activities examined, it is clear that those working in the area of human rights (Office of the Ombudsman, CNDDHH, IPEDEHP) have achieved significant impact on citizen awareness and participation, including male/female and Quechua-speaking sub-groups. Not only have these organizations achieved impressive results of their own, but they have actively coordinated their efforts, making for a whole greater than the sum of its parts.
- C. While many of the other sub-activities studied appear to be well on the way to meeting their respective goals, objectives and expected results, it is not possible at this time to gauge their impact on the civic/democratic awareness and participation practices of the intended beneficiary populations. This is due to several factors:
  - ◆ The impact of various sub-activities is directly related to the results of the April elections (PROMUJER, SER, Transparencia) and can only be measured once that process is completed;
  - ◆ In two cases (FORO Nacional/Internacional and the APOYO Institute), impact will be a function of the degree to which the agendas they have produced are considered by candidates and are discussed and espoused by newly-elected political leaders;
  - ◆ In other cases, the true impact on the awareness and participation practices of the beneficiary populations will not be known except in the mid- or long-term (CIDE/TAREA, Foro Juventud, IDS).
- D. The lowest degree of impact on citizen education and participation corresponds to those sub-activities that were designed to serve individual beneficiaries through conciliation services and free legal assistance, and do not undertake policy-related advocacy or dissemination efforts (Chamber of Commerce, IPRECON, APENAC, Ministry of Justice).
- E. With regard to the institutionalization of sub-activities within grantee organizations, there is no doubt that the desire to do so is strong. However, the ability of grantees to achieve this is mixed. Most participating NGOs have small amounts of funding available for this purpose, and many have already prepared proposals to obtain additional resources – either from USAID or other donors. Organizations that are well established and whose primary mission coincides with the sub-activities underway (Ombudsman's Office, CNDDHH, IPEDEHP, Manuela Ramos, Calandria, CESIP, SER, CIDE, TAREA, APENAC, Ministry of Justice) are most likely to institutionalize results.
- F. Increased communication and coordination among all SO1 counterparts could produce more effective results at the SO level by capitalizing on potential synergies. Meanwhile, there are

clear multiplier effects among those organizations using methodologies and practices pioneered by other grantees including, for example, IPEDEHP's training methodology and the election-related materials produced by *Transparencia* and SER.

- G. The cost-effectiveness of the various sub-activities is clearly a function of the size of the SO1 budget, the number of citizens reached and the efficacy of the program in terms of impact. On that basis, we must conclude that, to date, the most cost-effective interventions have been those related to human rights. Activities designed by IDS to use the electronic media for democracy education are promising in terms of their potential for reaching large numbers of citizens in a cost-effective manner. However, they are too new to have produced measurable results. Using fore-mentioned criteria, we conclude that the least cost-effective sub-activities are those that reach very small numbers of beneficiaries while not proactively advocating for policy change (Chamber of Commerce, IPRECON, APENAC, Ministry of Justice, APOYO Institute) and those that propose long-term solutions and involve a relatively limited number of beneficiaries (FORO Nacional/Internacional, CIDE/TAREA, Foro Juventud).
- H. Because of the diverse nature of, and results expected from, the various sub-activities supported under the four Intermediate Results (IRs), it is not feasible to assess overall impact at that level. This is further complicated by the fact that indicators lack consistency across similar programs; different variables are being tracked, which makes comparison especially difficult and creates an "apples and oranges" effect. Moreover, it is not clear that successful completion of the goals, objectives and expected results of the sub-activities reviewed under IR2 and IR4 will, in fact, produce the results expected at the IR level. Meanwhile, activities under IR1 and IR3 are too few to achieve any significant progress toward meeting those results as currently stated. A careful review and revision of IRs is needed to better match sub-activities with desired results.
- I. With regard to results at the level of the PARTICIPE program and the SO1 framework, because over two-thirds of available funding is dedicated to election-related indicators (with targets set for 2001), impact cannot yet be accurately assessed.
- J. The five-year post-electoral period will be a crucial time of transition in Peru – marked by both opportunities and challenges - during which to lay the groundwork for sustainable democratic institutions and strengthen civil society as a sector. There is an urgent need for carefully-planned strategies to maximize those opportunities and effectively deal with the challenges that will surely arise during this critical period if increased citizen awareness and participation are to be achieved.
- K. Because democratic governance affects all substantive initiatives, a more proactive effort within USAID/Peru to ensure that DG approaches are integrated into all areas of the Mission's portfolio, while not depending solely on the disproportionately small budget allocated to SO1, would help to ensure the success of all concerned and broaden citizen participation in democratic processes.

Based on the foregoing Conclusions, the team offers seven **Recommendations**:

1. The bulk of SO1 support should be targeted to the achievement of clear and specific results within the five-year period following the 2000 elections, rather than aiming for longer-term impact. IRs should be revised and re-aligned in accordance with this new focus. Citizen education through the media, particularly radio and television, along with the strengthening of civil society and participatory approaches to local governance should be given priority.
2. The SO1 team should take the initiative to achieve greater synergy among counterpart organizations, while strengthening the civil society sector, by creating incentives for increased cooperation among sub-activities. These might include support for a “*Centro de Encuentro de la Sociedad Civil Sobre Democracia*” to coordinate the sharing of materials and methodologies (to avoid duplication of effort), and organize capacity-building activities, such as discussion groups, retreats and site visits among counterparts, advocacy and other training, and so forth.
3. To reduce the management burden on SO1 team members, while providing more time for strategic thinking and planning, activities designed and implemented jointly by consortia of two or more organizations should be encouraged. A strong preference for such collaborative efforts or “umbrella projects,” especially those that pair Lima-based organizations with partners located in the provinces, with overall results frameworks and the regular collection of performance data, should be clearly stated in future calls for proposals. This does not mean to suggest that applicant organizations should be encouraged to merge; only that two or more independent entities join together in a single enterprise.
4. Because the need for democratic governance affects the potential for success of all activities and is a high priority for the U.S. Country Team, USAID Mission officials should ensure that democratic principles, such as transparency and citizen participation, are incorporated into all programmatic initiatives. They should also seek to develop increased cross-sectoral linkages between SO1 and other SOs, identifying and capitalizing on opportunities for joint activities in pursuit of complementary objectives.
5. Mission management should give special attention to the re-location and consolidation of efforts aimed at local government, moving those activities beyond SO5 in the pursuit of overall Mission goals while taking advantage of the successes achieved by the Local Government Development Project. This could be accomplished by placing all local government initiatives under SO1/IR3 (or whichever IR is most appropriate in the new DG strategy), with subdivisions for activities within coca-growing areas and those undertaken outside of those areas, similar to SO2/PRA/MSP activities.
6. If it is determined that work in the area of basic education is to continue, and sufficient resources become available, the Mission should consider creation of a separate education SO, along with appropriate performance and impact indicators to measure results related to basic education and the longer-term development of the country’s human resource base.

7. The DG Assessment Team should develop alternative political scenarios based on the results of the 2000 elections. These should include in-depth examinations of the three areas the evaluation team considers to be particularly important for USAID interventions within the next five years:
- ◆ the structure and dynamics of Peruvian civil society, as well as its potential for serving as a counterbalance to government and contributing to the process of democratization;
  - ◆ the policy and legal framework for decentralization, along with the strengthening of local government and citizen involvement at that level; and
  - ◆ the role of the media (particularly radio and television) in democracy education and public debate concerning policy issues.

## CHAPTER TWO – INTRODUCTION

### A. BACKGROUND

This report contains the results of an external evaluation of the democracy education activities supported by USAID/Peru's Office of Democratic Initiatives (ODI) between FYs 1997 and 1999 under its Strategic Objective No. 1: "Broader Citizen Participation in Democratic Processes." The evaluation took place between January 27 and April 7, 2000, and was conducted by Management Systems International (MSI) through a Task Order issued under its Democracy Analytic Services Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC).

To achieve the above-mentioned Strategic Objective (SO1), the Mission had identified four intermediate results (IRs) as part of the 1997-2001 strategy:

- ◆ IR1: More Effective Selected National Institutions;
- ◆ IR2: Greater Access to Justice;
- ◆ IR3: Local Governments More Responsive to Their Constituents; and
- ◆ IR4: Citizens Better Prepared to Exercise Their Rights and Responsibilities.

The SO1 annual budget for the past three years has been only about \$3.0 million (3-5% of USAID/Peru's total budget), despite the fact that democratic governance is reported to be a leading priority of the U.S. Country Team. In addition to this DA funding, the Mission requested between \$3 and \$5 million in additional ESF funding in FY 1999 to initiate under IR3 a program of local government development activities outside the coca growing region where SO5 currently implements its local government strengthening activity with some \$35 million in counternarcotics funding. However, it has since been learned that the additional ESF monies will not be forthcoming in the current fiscal year.

Activities in support of above IRs and the overall SO have been implemented under two large umbrella projects: "Participatory Democracy" (PARDEM, which ends on September 30, 2000), and "Citizen Participation and Access to Justice (PARTICIPE, which was authorized in March 1999). PARTICIPE was designed in response to SO1's shift to a more demand-based strategy in light of the progressive weakening of the democratic system in the country and the resistance demonstrated by the Government of Peru (GOP) to improving the effectiveness of state institutions. This, along with the upcoming congressional and presidential elections scheduled for April 9, 2000, motivated this strategic shift. The full rationale for this decision was laid out by the SO1 team in a December 1998 document titled, "*Strategic Focus of the USAID/Peru Democracy Program for the 18-Month Period Leading up to the Year 2000 Elections (10/98-4/00)*." PARTICIPE places special emphasis on IRs 2 and 4, and focuses on the most vulnerable groups in rural and marginalized urban areas of the country. Its end date coincides with the end of USAID/Peru's strategic plan in September 2001.

Another shift in SO1's approach was to move responsibility for the direction of various program components from large cooperative agreements with U.S. and Peruvian organizations to a more direct management mode. Those cooperative agreements had involved two U.S. PVOs: Catholic Relief Services (CRS) for implementation of a project titled, "Promotion of Justice and

Peace in Peru,” which focused on human rights and ended in December 1997; and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) for the Electoral Assistance Component, which also ended in December 1997. A third cooperative agreement was with a Peruvian NGO (Group of Analysis for Development, GRADE), which functioned as an “umbrella” organization in charge of identifying, selecting, funding, and monitoring ongoing civil society initiatives under IR4. The GRADE contract ended on January 31, 1998.

## **B. EVALUATION OBJECTIVE**

The Scope of Work (SOW) for this evaluation included two fundamental objectives:

1. Determine the impact and degree of influence of selected democracy education and awareness activities in terms of advancing the Mission’s democracy objective; and
2. Identify best practices, methodologies, lessons learned and make recommendations that will facilitate an in-depth Democracy and Governance Assessment and subsequent design of a new USAID strategy for democratic development in Peru.

To accomplish this, the evaluation team was asked to respond to a number of questions, including those related to the goals, objectives and expected results of selected sub-activities, the PARTICIPE project and the SO1 framework. Other questions related to the impact of sub-activities on the civic/democratic awareness and participation practices of the intended beneficiary populations, the relative institutionalization of sub-activities, their cost-effectiveness, and so forth. The SOW also specified that the data collection process would extend to three field sites outside of Lima. In addition to the written SOW, evaluators were also invited to review the management mechanisms employed by the SO1 team and make any suggestions deemed appropriate. (See [Annex A](#) for copy of the SOW and Evaluation Plan.)

It should be noted that for IR3, the SOW indicated that the evaluation might be limited to a review of the latest evaluation of the activity funded under the SO5 Alternative Development Program. However, a number of interviews, particularly with USAID/SO5 officials and counterparts in Ayacucho and Tarapoto, provided additional information on local government activities.

The Democracy and Governance Assessment referred to in the second objective was initiated in late February by another MSI team, and will not be finalized until after the April elections. At the conclusion of the evaluation team’s field work, the preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations presented to USAID were also made available to the assessment team.

## **C. TECHNICAL APPROACH/METHODOLOGY**

The overall technical approach used during this assignment consisted of the following major components:

1. Pre-arrival document review at home base. (January 21/26)
2. Arrival in Lima; Team Planning Meeting (TPM) and in-depth briefings by USAID; selection and review of additional documents; preparation of interview protocol; preparation/approval of evaluation plan, including identification of the organizations and field sites to be visited. (January 27/31)
3. Field work; discussions in Lima, Ayacucho, Trujillo, Tarapoto and Lamas with all sub-activity organizations earmarked in the SOW, plus other grantees, key informants and individual experts. (February 1/16)
4. Preparation of preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations; de-briefing at USAID. (February 17/18)
5. Departure from Peru; preparation and submission of draft evaluation report. (February 19/March 15)
6. Roundtable discussion of the draft report with evaluation team leader and one other team member at USAID/Peru; incorporation of USAID comments; production of final report in English and Spanish. (March 20/April 7)

Throughout the conduct of in-country activities, the team met frequently with SO1 managers to report on progress and seek further guidance or clarification on specific procedural and substantive matters. Since SO1 team members had collected and situated grant-related materials in an office within their work area, evaluators also visited the Mission to consult those documents.

As suggested in the SOW, in order to understand the link between activities over the period from FY1997 through FY1999 and the context within which they have taken place, the MSI team reviewed evaluation reports and case studies conducted under SO1's PARDEM activity (GRADE, CRS, IFES, IPEDEHP) and SO5's Alternative Development Program. (See **Annex B** for a full list of the documents reviewed.)

Evaluators met frequently among themselves on an informal basis to exchange news and views, while more formal TPMs were held at least once a week to permit in-depth sharing of information and impressions related to the objectives of the evaluation. At the final TPM, the team agreed on the preliminary results that were to be presented to USAID, and all team members participated in the de-briefing held at the Mission on February 18.

The methodology designed and employed by evaluators responded to the various tasks set out in the SOW. The sites visited outside of Lima were chosen at the suggestion of, and were approved by, USAID in view of the concentration of SO1 activities in those locations. In addition to individual interviews, on a number of occasions focus group sessions were held at field sites with participants of the various sub-activities selected. In every case, interviewees were invited to make recommendations concerning SO1's future strategy, based on their own experience and

their reading of the future political context. Where appropriate, those recommendations are included among the findings that emerged from the data collection process.

Initially, the team had planned to conduct interviews with 12 sub-activity organizations. However, that target was surpassed, and interviews were held with a total of 138 persons, including 27 organizations, four international donor institutions, various individual informants and two members of the Democracy and Governance Assessment team who reside in Lima. (See *Annex C* for a list of those contacted.)

#### **D. TEAM COMPOSITION**

Based on the SOW, MSI selected four highly-experienced program development/implementation/monitoring/reporting specialists who are fluent in both Spanish and English to serve on this team. Each team member has specific professional credentials and took responsibility for the most relevant facets of the data collection process. The team included:

|                         |   |
|-------------------------|---|
| Joan M. Goodin          | Team Leader & Senior Civil Society Specialist |
| J. Michele Guttmann     | Justice Sector Specialist                     |
| Lelia Mooney Sirotinsky | Civic & Voter Education Specialist            |
| José Martín Vegas       | Education Specialist & Logistics Coordinator  |

#### **E. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

Members of the MSI evaluation team wish to express our deep appreciation to USAID/Peru for the confidence placed in us and for giving us this opportunity to work with the SO1 team on such a challenging and interesting assignment. The support and guidance provided by the Chief of the Office of Democratic Initiatives, plus the ever-ready assistance of the entire SO1 team and other USAID personnel, made a huge task feasible in the time allotted.

Our sincere thanks go also to all counterpart organizations contacted for the spirit of cooperation with which they received our requests for interviews and information, and generally facilitated our work. Likewise, we are grateful to all other institutions and individuals contacted. A very special word of thanks goes to all those representatives and participants of the sub-activities examined in the interior of the country who took time to share their experiences and opinions with us. Without their views it would not have been possible to “ground-truth” many of our findings. We can honestly say that each of the individuals contacted enriched this experience and made a significant contribution to the overall results recorded here.

For each member of the MSI team, this opportunity to study first-hand the complexities of democratic governance in Peru, and to better comprehend its impact on the lives of the citizens of that country, has been a professionally enriching and personally satisfying experience. We are grateful to all who made this possible.

## CHAPTER THREE - FINDINGS

The first part of this Chapter provides findings related to the various sub-activities evaluated, which are grouped into thematic areas in order to provide a more comprehensive review of potential impact. In each case, the IR under which funding was provided is identified. Also identified are the sub-activities which were targeted for a full review during this evaluation, as well as those other sub-activities which were visited or contacted but not fully evaluated.

Based on the findings outlined in part one, the second part of this Chapter presents a set of overall findings related to sub-activity results at the level of PARTICIPE and SO1. It is on the basis of all findings that conclusions are then drawn and recommendations presented.

### PART ONE – SUB-ACTIVITIES EVALUATED

#### I. HUMAN RIGHTS [IR1, IR2 and IR4]

Overall, it appears that the sub-activities related to human rights have been the most effective of those funded under SO1, and were found to have had a greater impact on democracy education and citizen participation in Peru than any of the other areas examined. USAID, which has played an active role in promoting respect for human rights, has been a leading supporter of key human rights organizations, particularly the Office of the Ombudsman and two Peruvian NGOs. Initiatives supported by USAID in this area have sought to: promote the rights of marginalized groups, such as women and native communities; enhance public awareness and support for democratic institutions; and promote synergies between the Ombudsman's Office and civil society groups. The three organizations receiving support from USAID/SO1 that were contacted during this evaluation were found to be leading forces within the human rights community; not only have they achieved impressive results of their own, but they have actively coordinated their efforts, making for a whole greater than the sum of its parts. A fourth organization (the *Instituto de Defensa Legal, IDL*, which provides legal defense for persons unjustly accused of terrorism) was not included in this evaluation, as it was limited to democracy education activities.

The three organizations in question are: the **Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman** (*Defensoría del Pueblo*, which literally means Public Defender); the **Peruvian Institute of Education on Human Rights and Peace (IPEDEHP)**, and the **National Coordinator for Human Rights (CNDDHH)**. While the first two were reviewed and contacted, only CNDDHH was selected for evaluation.

A. The Office of the Ombudsman was created as an official, autonomous body in the 1993 Peruvian Constitution, which states that this Office is to “keep vigil over [citizens’] fundamental and constitutional rights.” As required, the Ombudsman was elected by a majority of Congress, and the Office became operational in 1996. The incumbent has proven to be an impartial, independent and effective promoter of citizens’ rights, and was the only public figure for whom all interviewees expressed respect, noting his honesty, courage and commitment. This Office receives approximately 30% of its budget from a variety of international donors. USAID, which provided early support to help establish the Office, has provided a grant totaling \$1,472,170 for the period from September 1996 to September 2001 under SO1/IR1. The purpose was to assist

in strengthening the Office and promote and protect key human rights in Peru, including the protection of innocent persons, the incorporation of gender in human rights initiatives and the rights of native communities. To decentralize this fledgling agency, USAID support was then targeted to assist in the establishment of 10 regional offices around the country by 2001 – starting from a baseline of five decentralized units in 1998. To date, nine such offices are in operation, including Ayacucho and Trujillo, which were visited by the evaluation team. It was reported that the majority of cases presented to the Ombudsman’s Office involve economic and social rights (i.e., pensions, child support, etc.), as well as complaints against municipal governments. In Ayacucho, it was reported that 60% of those who approach the Office do so because they simply do not know where else to go to register a complaint or file a claim. In those cases, the Office contacts the appropriate entity, to which the person is then referred.

The February 2000 report of a national survey on Democratic Values and Citizen Participation in Peru, conducted by the *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos* (IEP) shows the level of confidence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Among a representative sample of 1,751 citizens, the level of confidence increased from 48.8% in 1998 to 50.9% in 1999. The IEP report states that the Ombudsman’s Office is the institution of the State that arouses the highest degree of confidence among citizens.

### Observations

One question that surfaced during the course of this evaluation was the definition of human rights. During the 1970’s and 1980’s (the Shining Path terrorist period), murder, torture and other forms of physical violence were every day occurrences. Now that the war against terrorism and acts of blatant physical abuse are largely (though not entirely) a thing of the past, human rights are increasingly defined as economic, social and cultural rights. The Ombudsman and his staff favor this broader definition, and reported they are now also adding environmental rights to the list.

Another issue raised by various interviewees related to the fact that, though the Ombudsman presents an annual report to Congress, his recommendations are largely ignored. Therefore, the Office was seen to have little influence in the realm of legislation and policies aimed at protecting human rights. It was also reported that the Ombudsman prepares special reports and resolutions on relevant issues, and that several of his recommendations have been adopted by several sectors.

It was also explained that the term of the current Ombudsman expires in April 2001, and that even if he were to run for re-election (something he currently does not plan), Congress may not want him to serve another term, given how well he has performed as a check on the executive branch. This, it was felt by some, would lead to the decimation of the Office by the GOP. Other interviewees believed that, given the national and international visibility gained and the positive image it enjoys at home and abroad, plus its top-notch staff and existing programs funded beyond the current term, it will not be possible to dismantle the Office easily.

When asked for his views regarding the future, the Ombudsman expressed concern about the widening gap between citizens and their government, and recommended that the new SO1

strategy give priority to activities aimed at facilitating relations between civil society and selected government agencies (as opposed to the administration itself). He also felt that decentralization is a priority issue for the future (particularly after the new Congress takes office), and suggested that USAID support additional work with local governments and their constituents, perhaps through a small number of pilots outside of the coca-growing region. In principle, evaluators support these suggestions.

**B. IPEDEHP**, founded 15 years ago, is dedicated to training human rights promoters, working in some 18 parts of the country. Its total annual budget is approximately \$470,000, of which nearly half (\$200,000) is provided by USAID under SO1/IR4. A grant totaling \$754,195 has been provided for the period from April 1997 through September 2001 for the purpose of developing a network of human rights promoters throughout the country. IPEDEHP conducts three-day “train the trainer” workshops for local leaders to prepare them to act as human rights promoters and to train others. The organization has developed a highly participatory training methodology, which appears to have produced impressive results. Workshops, with 60 to 100 participants, are held in collaboration with local organizations (often members of CNDDHH), which help select community leaders who receive substantive and methodological training to enable them to replicate workshops in their communities. Reportedly, in 1999, promoters trained by IPEDEHP had disseminated human rights information among nearly 175,000 citizens. IPEDEHP reported that one unexpected outgrowth of the training program has been the development of a cadre of “*promotorcitos*” (young promoters). The head of IPEDEHP says she now must develop a plan for working with children.

IPEDEHP works in close collaboration with CNDDHH and the Office of the Ombudsman (representatives of which participate in all training events) and is highly regarded by that Office (which lauded IPEDEHP’s “mystique”), as well as by other NGOs, some of which reported using/adapting IPEDEHP’s training methodology for their own purposes.

### **Observations**

The IPEDEHP director pointed out that, thanks to the Ombudsman, CNDDHH and other activist NGOs, the topic of human rights is now “on the table” – something that was not true before. In terms of the definition of human rights, she pointed out that one area is human rights *defense* (for which the definition should be narrow) and another is human rights *education*, which should be broader. She explained the close, collaborative relations between IPEDEHP and CNDDHH, but felt that if an attempt is made to formally broaden the definition of human rights beyond torture, disappearances, intimidation and the like, it will not be possible to achieve unity within that network in the future. Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the CNDDHH appear to disagree with this assertion.

With regard to SO1’s future strategy, the head of IPEDEHP spoke positively about the Partners Retreat convened by the Mission Director last year, stating that USAID should promote such gatherings in order to urge counterparts from different sectors to join together in “intermediate agreements of cooperation.” She also recommended that USAID seek to influence authorities at the local level, and support the strengthening of political parties. Finally, she noted the

importance of forming human rights teams and explained that IPEDEHP would like to create a university level “Diploma in Human Rights” to prepare future leadership.

C. **CNDDHH**, founded in 1985, is a network of 61 groups of various kinds around the country (NGOs, committees linked to churches, community feeding programs, etc.). In July 1998, CNDDHH (which then had 50 members) received a two-year, institutional development grant from USAID of \$250,100 under SO1/IR2 in order to develop further its potential for effective outreach and influence. The total budget of \$292,100 includes \$42,000 in counterpart funds. According to the PARTICIPE Results Framework, it is expected that this sub-activity will increase the capacity of local CNDDHH affiliates to collect data on human rights abuses (particularly on torture) and advocate for redress of these abuses and improvements in the country’s human rights record. The indicator used is the percentage of local affiliates that report regularly on abuses to CNDDHH, with a target of 60% by 2001 from a baseline of zero in 1997. Given the e-mail, web site and training provided to affiliates through this sub-activity, CNDDHH appears well on its way to meeting this target.

The Coordinator has two types of members: Full Members (*Miembros Plenos*, of which there are 40) and 21 Permanent Invitees (*Invitados Permanentes*, which have voice but no vote). National Gatherings (*encuentros*) are held every two years to determine the direction the network will take in the ensuing period, accept or reject members, and elect the governing Council (*Consejo Directivo*). The Council, which is responsible for formulating the annual work plan, is made up of 13 Full Member organizations – six in Lima, and seven from the interior, elected for a two-year term. Council meetings are held monthly in Lima. In addition, CNDDHH has a number of Work Groups, including Juridical and International (which concentrates primarily on the UN and OAS, including Peru’s withdrawal from the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights), plus two broader groups dealing with economic, social and cultural rights, and non-discrimination. There is also a Permanent Committee of six - a sort of “rapid response” mechanism – which meets only when necessary. The Council names the Executive Secretary who, in turn, selects staff members, of which there are presently 10, all of whom work under one-year contracts.

CNDDHH Full Members include local human rights committees in 26 communities located in 14 departments of the country. Under the SO1 grant, CNDDHH has sought to: a) strengthen the 26 local committees by providing management and resource development training; b) collect information on the priority topics agreed upon at the VII National Gathering, with special emphasis on the issue of torture in preparation for the 1999 national CNDDHH campaign (torture was later ratified as the national issue for the ensuing period to 2001); 3) connect all local committees in an information network, using e-mail and a web page. These objectives have been pursued through a phased approach which began with preparations for and conduct of an organizational assessment carried out in each of the 26 sites. Following the collection of information related to the organizational capacity of each local committee and the local context, CNDDHH prepared a *Report on the Institutional Diagnosis Applied to 26 Full Members of the Coordinator* (based on SWOT analysis<sup>1</sup>), as well as a plan for the provision of individualized advisory services and the collection of information on complaints related to torture. Interviewees

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<sup>1</sup> SWOT analysis is a strategic planning technique which examines internal Strengths and Weaknesses, as well as external Opportunities and Threats.

noted that local committees are in the process of transition, stating that “rights are different in the post-terrorist period.” They also reported that these committees now tend to have closer relations with local government authorities, since they are called upon by citizens “to do everything.”

In the next phase (December 1998), CNDDHH installed computers and trained recipients in their use where needed (some 19 local committees). With regard to fund-raising, CNDDHH not only provides training, but also helps identify potential donors and endorses proposals developed by local committees. In 1999, six institutional development workshops were held. The next step in this process is to be two sets of three such workshops held in Arequipa and Chiclayo for each local committee (4-6 persons per committee) for the purpose of developing strategic plans. The first of these two-day events was scheduled for February 28-March 3. It was therefore not possible for the evaluation team to examine the success of this process, which is to end in mid May. CNDDHH reported that the main indicator they plan to use to measure the success of these workshops will be the development of strategic plans by local committees. This series of workshops is to be followed by a national meeting scheduled for July to coordinate local plans with the Coordinator’s national plan and create a vision for 2005. The final phase of this activity is to be an evaluation of the two-year USAID grant and formulation of a proposal for the next two years.

### **Observations**

By virtue of its participatory approach and active advocacy efforts both within and outside of the country, CNDDHH appears to have established a high level of national and international recognition, as well as significant citizen participation at the local level through its 26 committees. Clearly, development of the capacity of local committees to communicate by e-mail and to exchange information through the CNDDHH web page (which 35 NGOs have now become part of, and which by 1997 received some 5,000 hits per month) has been a significant contribution to strengthening this national human rights network from the bottom up. CNDDHH interviewees reported that they are committed to continuing this process of local institutional development, which will also strengthen the Coordinator itself. They spoke of the need to develop among citizens an awareness of their right to be respected as individuals, and to teach authorities respect for persons - for which the commitment of the military, police and others is needed. (The Ombudsman’s Office reported that, while the police force has been receptive to human rights training, this is not the case with the military.) CNDDHH interviewees recommended that the USAID SO1 team give priority to strengthening civil society, and that human rights be viewed in an broader, integrated fashion, including economic, social and cultural rights. This is at odds with the sentiments expressed by IPEDEPH.

## **II. CONCILIATION SERVICES AND LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE POOR [IR1 and IR2]**

SO1’s revised 18-month strategy up to the 2000 elections states under “Related Ongoing Activities” for IR2: “The Mission is currently supporting the Ministry of Justice’s conciliation and free legal clinics programs as well as conciliation activities implemented by NGOs in order to expand access to justice for marginalized populations throughout Peru.” The introduction of

conciliation programs in coca-growing areas to help reduce community conflict is also briefly mentioned as an integrated activity with SO5. However, this evaluation found that the conciliation and legal assistance programs reviewed failed to demonstrate an overall comprehensive or cohesive approach to the pertinent IRs (IR1, More Effective National Institutions; and IR2, Greater Access to Justice) that would clearly promote the democracy Strategic Objective.

Four SO1 sub-activities within this area were included in this evaluation: **the Ministry of Justice**, the **Lima Chamber of Commerce**, the *Instituto Peruano de Resolución de Conflictos, Negociación y Mediación (IPRECON)*, and the *Asociación Peruana de Negociación, Arbitraje y Conciliación (APENAC)*. The scope of these various programs is rather dispersed. Some activities appear to have been motivated by an anticipated major change in the Peruvian legal framework that has not developed as originally expected (as discussed below); thus, the somewhat piecemeal evolution of this programmatic area.

The PARTICIPE Results Framework identifies “Increased access to conciliation services through USAID-sponsored entities” as the expected result in this area. The Performance Indicators are 1) the total number of USAID-sponsored conciliation centers around the country (from a baseline of 17 in 1998 to a target of 24 in 2001); 2) the percentage of citizens who have heard of extra-judicial conciliation (from a baseline of 8.7% in 1998 to a target of 30% in 2001); and 3) the total number of conciliators trained (from a baseline of 600 in 1998 to a target of 4,000 in 2001). With regard to the second of these indicators, the 1999 national survey conducted by IEP showed an increase in the percentage of citizens who had heard of conciliation – up from 8.7% in 1998 to 13% in 1999. It is likely that USAID-supported initiatives played an important role in achieving this increase, though direct attribution is not possible to verify. The first and third indicators seem reasonably attainable within the allotted time frame. Perhaps the more salient overarching inquiry, however, is whether and to what extent an increased number of conciliators and conciliation centers will have a genuine, positive impact on the community, how that will promote SO1, and at what cost.

It became clear in the course of the evaluation that the conciliation and legal assistance programs supported under SO1 aim at resolving disputes that are unlikely ever to enter a courtroom, rather than to reducing case backlog so as to facilitate access into the formal justice system. Although most program efforts seem to have focused on training and education, and relatively little on actual dispute resolution, the vast majority of conflicts ultimately addressed relate to single mothers involved in domestic disputes over matters such as child support, visitation, and custody.

As general orientation, it is important to report on the status of the legal framework surrounding conciliation in Peru. A proposed new Conciliation Law was published in November 1997 and enacted in January 1998. The law purports to facilitate access to justice by requiring parties to engage in formal alternative dispute resolution efforts (i.e., conciliation) prior to litigation. Conciliators and conciliation centers must be authorized by and registered with the Ministry of Justice. The law applies to all civil matters in which justiciable claims are made concerning the rights of parties, but not to criminal cases (except insofar as they may constitute the basis for a derivative civil claim). Specifically included within the purview of the new law are family

matters pertaining to support, visitation, and domestic violence.<sup>2</sup> For the first two years subsequent to enactment, submission to conciliation was voluntary. Thereafter, as of January 2000, conciliation was supposed to have become a mandatory first step before the initiation of all civil judicial processes.

Mandatory conciliation under the new law did not take effect as originally planned and, as of the date of this writing, is not legally required anywhere in Peru. Several months before the scheduled requirement was to go into effect, the Ministry of Justice submitted a recommendation, proposing that application of the law be gradual, rather than universal. The basis for the recommendation was that the system was not prepared for such an extensive procedural change, and would predictably fail. The Ministry of Justice recommended that application of the Conciliation Law first take place in those regions best prepared to handle the change (Lima, Arequipa, and Trujillo), and further that certain subject areas of litigation be excluded until a later stage (family and labor disputes). Mandatory application of the Conciliation Law was then deferred in its entirety until January 2001, and at this point it is unclear whether, when, and to what extent it will ultimately be applied.

Although USAID's sponsorship of legal services and conciliation programs was not motivated by the new Conciliation Law, its prospective application clearly spurred on and encouraged SOI's involvement in and commitment to each of the programs below, although to varying degrees. For example, Phase I of the Ministry of Justice program started prior to the new law, but at that time emphasized provision of legal assistance to the poor; its focus changed dramatically after the new law. USAID had been involved with APENAC prior to the new Conciliation Law in a separate activity, but the IPRECON and Lima Chamber of Commerce projects began only after the new law. Circumstances are much different now, and the future application of this law is uncertain. In light of these developments, we found that SOI would be well advised to review this subject area with an eye toward determining whether and how conciliation will predictably fit into its overall future strategy and the current legal reality.

Another issue that became apparent, especially through the field visits, was the existence of significant duplication of services and activities within this area. Not only does this increase costs, but it also appears to have nourished an unhealthy rivalry between competing programs. For example, a minimum of two projects were involved in each of the following activities: training of conciliators, establishment of conciliation centers (sometimes within the same communities), preparation of manuals and training materials, public education, and school training programs. The evaluation revealed both competition and overlap in the provision of services not only between program grantees, but also with multiple other private and public conciliation services. Moreover, many of the grantees were unaware of these other programs, even when operating within the same communities. It appears that the advent of the new Conciliation Law has engendered substantial opportunism without genuine consideration or analysis of community needs and acceptance, or potential impact.

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<sup>2</sup> Without exception, everyone interviewed agreed that domestic violence is an inappropriate subject matter for conciliation, and that conciliating such cases is rarely successful. Unfortunately, a high percentage of domestic violence cases contribute to the caseload of disputes presented for conciliation, and differing and sometimes inconsistent approaches are used. The Ministry of Justice indicated that efforts are underway to amend the law to exclude domestic violence cases.

## 1. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE [IR1 and IR2]:

USAID entered into a two-part Limited Scope Grant Agreement with the Peruvian Ministry of Justice that began on July 31, 1997. Phase I (July 31, 1997-December 31, 1998) awarded \$250,000 to the Ministry for *Strengthening of Public Legal Clinics for Lima and Callao*. Phase II awarded an additional \$350,000 to extend the grant through April 30, 2000. It also amplified the scope of the activity, which became *Strengthening of Public Legal Clinics in Lima and Callao, and Implementation of Conciliation and Legal Assistance Centers in the Provinces.* USAID's total funding has thus been \$600,00, with an average annual commitment over the course of the grant of approximately \$220,000. The Ministry contributed a total of \$928,000 - \$285,000 in Phase I and \$643,000 in Phase II.

Some history behind this sub-activity will help to set the stage for USAID's current involvement and the evolution of the program and its goals. The Peruvian constitution guarantees free legal assistance for the poor, but Peruvian law does not permit *pro se* representation and therefore all litigants must be represented by attorneys. Access to justice is consequently difficult for the great number of Peruvians who are unable to afford private legal counsel. The Ministry of Justice carries the constitutional burden of providing free legal assistance to the indigent and, toward that end, in 1986 created a small system of Public Legal Clinics (*Consultorios Jurídicos Populares*), operating independently and mainly in Lima/Callao, although also in five interior provinces. Those clinics began operations staffed by lawyers and law-school interns, and provided legal consultations and representation in both civil and criminal litigation, as well as conciliation.

As a complement to the Ministry's efforts to provide legal assistance to the poor, SO1 funded an 18-month activity in 1996-97 to strengthen and support a similar set of free legal clinics being operated by the Lima Bar Association in Lima/Callao. When that project ended, the Lima Bar Association could not afford to finance the clinics, but the Ministry of Justice was interested in assuming responsibility for most of their operations and incorporating them into their system of Public Legal Clinics. Phase I of this activity funded that transfer of responsibility, and strengthened the existing PLCs and the formation of a Legal Clinics Network and telephone hotline, *inter alia*. The clinics were organized into separate divisions: 1) a Conciliation Center to attempt to resolve conflicts outside the formal process, and 2) a Legal Clinic to provide representation in formal proceedings for cases that could not be resolved through conciliation, or were inappropriate for conciliation. The project sought to systematize and increase the quality and quantity of free legal representation and conciliation services offered by the Ministry's clinics.

When Phase II began in 1998, the new Conciliation Law had already been enacted, and the project was redirected largely to the implementation of that law. The Ministry of Justice has a primary role in its implementation, both as a service provider and as the governmental entity responsible for authorization, operation, registry, and supervision of all Conciliation Centers. In addition to augmenting the provision of free legal services to the poor, the goal of the project expanded to include the promotion and development of conciliation nationally as an alternative conflict resolution mechanism. Expected results included the full establishment of the Legal

Clinics Network to include additional Clinics/Conciliation Centers, the creation of a specialized Technical Office on Conciliation within the Ministry, an informational database and registry to control and evaluate the impact of extrajudicial conciliation, and a significant increase in the quantity and quality of free legal and conciliation services provided through the Network.

Reporting appears to have been completed consistently and in a timely manner, and the reports appear to contain full and reliable information concerning progress and numerical outputs. Nonetheless, this does not provide a complete picture or reliable method of evaluating impact, as opposed to output. Of particular concern is the lack of any follow-up to determine or ensure compliance with successfully-negotiated agreements.

Any determination of cost-effectiveness is problematic, and would require a much lengthier and more detailed investigation than contemplated by the terms of this evaluation. We can report that records for February–December 1999<sup>3</sup> indicate that 6,143 conciliation inquiries were initiated in the 22 Ministry Conciliation Centers throughout the country. Of that total, 1,973 resulted in conciliation meetings, of which 1,582 resulted in partial or complete settlement agreements. Approximately 80% of the matters conciliated involved domestic disputes over child custody, visitation, support, and domestic violence. In the 24 Public Legal Clinics throughout the country, the documents reviewed indicate that 44,881 consultation inquiries were made in 1999, out of which 11,469 resulted in some type of judicial or administrative action being either initiated or concluded during the year.<sup>4</sup> Although it is unclear from the figures provided, the Chief Attorney of the Public Legal Clinic in Trujillo confirmed that approximately 70% of his caseload involved child support and other domestic matters. In addition to widespread distribution of informational literature and flyers, it was reported that 650 people attended conciliation training sessions or discussions.

The Director of the project in Lima was familiar with the SO1 Results Framework and Strategic Objective, and mentioned that she had attended USAID events relating to citizen participation, but quite candidly admitted that she did not see how her program furthered the goal of citizen participation. The representatives in the Trujillo office were unfamiliar with the SO1 framework.

As noted, a significant problem with the Ministry's conciliation process is the lack of any follow-up to verify compliance with agreements. While this is not contemplated in the grant agreement, such follow-up was seen by all grantees interviewed as being of great importance – a point about which they expressed considerable frustration. The Trujillo representatives interviewed expressed great concern over this failure, and had even undertaken to act as an escrow for child support payments to monitor and ensure compliance, but were told by the Ministry that they could not legally perform this function. Absent a client returning to the office voluntarily to follow up, they have no way of knowing whether the conciliated agreements are honored. Ultimate individual impact therefore cannot be determined.

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<sup>3</sup> It is unclear why January is omitted from this report.

<sup>4</sup> It is unclear whether there is duplication in the statistical recording of these cases. For example, there were 935 administrative actions initiated in 1999, and 902 administrative actions concluded in 1999. If any or all of the cases were both initiated and concluded within the same year, then they may be listed twice under this system of record-keeping, and the total figures above would not reflect actual caseload.

## Observations

This sub-activity is a remnant of IR1 (national institution strengthening), and has a dual identity under IR2 (greater access to justice). This is the only program that focuses on poverty as a criterion for the provision of legal services, and the only one that provides legal services other than conciliation. Obviously, indigent legal services are a critical need in Peru, but two questions arise: 1) USAID is funding a national activity that the GOP is constitutionally obligated to provide as a service to its indigent population; is this an appropriate role for the Agency? 2) How does the program contribute to achievement of broader citizen participation? It is clearly geared toward the resolution of specific individual needs and appears to have developed primarily into a child custody and support determination mechanism for single mothers. It seems unlikely that these women will gain meaningful access to justice or that they will participate more actively in democratic processes as a result of conciliating domestic disputes. If USAID's goal is to benefit that population, this seems to be a costly way to do so, especially absent any provision for follow-up. The activity was re-tooled in 1998 based upon the prospective application of the new Conciliation Law in January 2000. However, as discussed, the future of that law is now uncertain. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps advisable to review and revisit programs that were geared toward the new law.

## **2. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS [IR2]:**

### **A. Lima Chamber of Commerce**

USAID awarded two grants totaling \$287,263 to the Lima Chamber of Commerce to fund a two-year program titled *Access to Justice through Alternative Conflict Resolution Methods*. The total program amount was \$382,963, including a 33% cost-sharing provision. The initial grant was made on September 23, 1998, and the activity is scheduled to conclude on December 31, 2000. It appears that the SO1 grant constituted approximately 50% of the Chamber's 1999 institutional operating budget (although it is unclear whether that amount reflects operations other than the *Centro de Conciliación y Arbitraje Nacional e Internacional*).

The stated goal of this activity is to improve access to justice, citizen equality, and peaceful co-existence by providing alternative dispute resolution methods. Specific objectives include citizen education with respect to their rights/obligations *vis a vis* the state and one another, effective exercise of those rights, and improved access to justice through a networked system of 17 Chamber of Commerce Conciliation/Arbitration Centers. The first stage of the project was to be devoted to citizen education on legal rights, responsibilities, and conciliation/arbitration as alternative dispute resolution; training of potential conciliators; and formation of the *Unidad Central del Proyecto*, which consists of a network including the Lima Chamber of Commerce and four regional chambers (*Unidades Coordinadoras Regionales*). The next stage involved expanding the network membership to other local chambers of commerce, conducting further community outreach, education, and coordination programs, increasing training, and physically equipping the centers to become operational. Additionally, two sub-projects were included: 1) to provide training to Justices of the Peace in Lima (although this has since been abandoned because they were already obtaining training elsewhere); and 2) to provide two groups of 40

schoolchildren, ages 6 to 10, along with their parents and teachers, with training in “*habilidades sociales*” over a nine-month period, thus giving them social skills to enable them to avoid confrontation and violence, and resolve conflicts peaceably and appropriately. This second activity - a pilot program for school children - began near the end of 1999 and is currently in progress. Results of that initiative are therefore not yet available.

Reporting appears to have been completed consistently and in a timely manner, and the reports appear to contain complete and reliable information concerning progress and numerical outputs. Again, however, this does not provide a complete picture or reliable method of evaluating impact, as opposed to output. With regard to identification of project beneficiaries, a February 2000 report to USAID states the following: in 1999, 1120 people attended conferences and 281 people attended conciliator training workshops (total 1,401); in 2000, 480 people are expected to attend conferences and 320 are expected to attend training workshops (total 800). The budget allocated \$58,450 to conferences and workshops for both years. Divided by the sum total of 2,201 (1401 + 800), that results in a cost of \$26.56 per person attending each workshop or conference. Other than this single item, however, cost effectiveness of the following budget line items cannot be evaluated because of insufficient information: \$89,953 for dissemination, \$126,860 for establishment of the network (17 total members at a *per capita* cost of \$7,462.35), and \$12,000 for evaluation.

As of this writing, the only operational conciliation center in this nascent network is the Lima Center, which has just recently initiated official authorization procedures with the Ministry of Justice. (Although it has provided arbitration and conciliation services at a fee to its members since December 1993, the Center has primarily conducted arbitrations of commercial contract disputes.) Official authorization from the Ministry has already been obtained for four other Chamber-affiliated centers in the interior, but they are not yet operational. The Lima director hopes to have some centers both operational and authorized by mid-2000. The Lima Center appears to be firmly ensconced and well set-up; it has operated and assuredly will continue operations for the foreseeable future.

### **Observations**

The main goal of the Chamber is to strengthen the business community, and thus promote commercial and community development. Although the broadly stated goals of this sub-activity are to increase the general public’s access to justice through alternative dispute resolution methods, evaluators observed that the Chamber of Commerce is clearly geared toward the business sector and the resolution of commercial disputes. The Lima Chamber representatives interviewed agreed with this characterization, but added their hope that the various Chambers throughout the country could move away from their traditional elitism, develop more of a “social conscience,” and ultimately address the needs of some lay people unrelated to the business community.<sup>5</sup> Casting this broader net was also seen as a means of attracting wider donor

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<sup>5</sup> Note that the director of the Lima Center (understandably) expressed discomfort with the prospect of having the Chamber-affiliated centers perform conciliations in the area of domestic relations, in particular domestic violence. Domestic disputes, however, appear to constitute the main topic for conciliations sought by the public in the other programs under review. Moreover, Chamber-affiliated centers charge for their services, albeit on a sliding

support, specifically from USAID. Chamber representatives were unfamiliar with the overall SO1 Results Framework and democracy Strategic Objective, and could not articulate how this activity would ultimately promote the goal of broader citizen participation in a democracy context. It was unclear to the interviewer how this activity would serve the marginalized populations targeted by the Mission, particularly since no data were available about who had attended Chamber conferences or what they had done with the information thereafter.

## **B. IPRECON**

USAID awarded a grant of \$132,000 to IPRECON in September 1998 to fund a one-year *Training Program for the Creation of Conciliation Centers* (\$173,000 total project cost with cost-sharing of 31%). The completion date was later extended an extra two months (without additional funding), and the project concluded on November 30, 1999. IPRECON estimates that the USAID grant comprised approximately 60% of its institutional operating budget for 1999.

The stated goal of the project was to facilitate access to justice by means of extrajudicial conciliation. Toward that end, IPRECON identified the following specific objectives: 1) citizen education and promotion of conciliation as a means of dispute resolution through literature distribution, radio ads, and other informational events; 2) improved conciliation services offered through the training of university students, local leaders, and the Office of the Ombudsman in Lima, Arequipa, and Piura in accordance with the proposed Conciliation Law, and a training manual (to be drafted); and 3) establishment and follow-up of conciliation centers in Lima, Arequipa, and Piura to resolve disputes referred by the Ombudsman's Office and the local community. Expected results and indicators were identified with respect to these objectives, and monitoring was to be done by IPRECON, with reports to be submitted every trimester. Apparently, however, only two reports were actually submitted: one covering January-June 1999, and the other a "Final Report" covering October 1998-November 1999. Each of these reports is simply a checklist of activities, and each is approximately two pages in length. Neither of the reports contains information on indicators that would demonstrate ultimate results or impact of the overall activity.

With respect to training, the information provided by IPRECON appears to be somewhat inconsistent or, at best, incomplete. In one report, IPRECON states that 221 people were trained in conciliation courses, 148 of whom are staff of the Ombudsman's Office (it is unclear why emphasis was placed on training members of that Office when the project proposal indicates that its primary anticipated role would be to refer cases to IPRECON's private conciliation centers). The information provided indicates that only 33 people out of those trained have been accredited as conciliators; the SO1 activity manager explained that it takes several months for the Ministry of Justice to register new conciliators. Based on the total number of 221 people who participated in training sessions, divided into the budget line item of \$58,100 for training, the result is a cost

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scale depending on the type of dispute and locale. Clearly, these centers are not intended to nor are they likely to serve marginalized populations.

of \$262.90 per person; if the 33 people ultimately accredited are used to calculate costs, that would equal \$1,760.60 per person accredited.

With respect to citizen education and the distribution of materials, IPRECON estimates the audience reached as coinciding precisely with the entire populations of Lima, Arequipa, and Trujillo. This bare estimate, without foundation, is not found to be credible or reliable for purposes of this report. Therefore, the dissemination budget line item of \$31,100 cannot be evaluated for cost-effectiveness based on the information provided.

In charts given to the interviewer, IPRECON provided data with respect to conciliations in the Lima and Arequipa centers. The Lima conciliation center is located in the IPRECON office, and has been operating officially since January 4, 1999. During 1999, that center responded to 183 inquiries, out of which 63 conciliation attempts were initiated, of which 9 cases ultimately proceeded to conciliation (6 of those cases settled; 5 of those complied with the settlement terms). The Arequipa conciliation center is affiliated with the legal clinic at the law school of the *Universidad Católica Santa María* and has been operating since July 1999. From July–November 1999, the Arequipa center responded to 329 inquiries, out of which 20 conciliation attempts were initiated, of which 12 cases ultimately proceeded to conciliation (11 of which settled).

IPRECON encountered problems with the proposed center in Piura, and instead affiliated with the *Universidad Privada Antenor Orrego* in Trujillo to set up a conciliation center in conjunction with the law school's extant legal clinic facility. The Trujillo center was inaugurated on November 19, 1999, but was found to be essentially non-operational at the time of our site visit in February. This was due to a variety of problems, claimed mainly to relate to lack of marketing and money to staff the center. Only one case has been conciliated at that center in approximately three months; it entailed setting child support for two minor children, was concluded within one hour, and the settlement agreement contained an express disclaimer stating that the conciliator was not competent to handle domestic matters. There is no coordination between this center and other conciliation centers offering the same or similar services in Trujillo, which underscores the lack of community involvement/awareness.

The budget line item allocated to setting up the conciliation centers was \$42,800. Divided equally by the three centers (although only two appear to be operational), the cost of each center would be \$14,266.67.

### **Observations**

Evaluators found that the IPRECON sub-activity seemed to lack a solid plan or real strategy from its inception, and appears to have been heavily reliant on the proposed application of the Conciliation Law to ensure a supply of business. Absent the captive audience thereby anticipated, the centers seem relatively inactive and unproductive (e.g., only 5 successful mediations in all of 1999 in a city the size of Lima is difficult to justify in light of the investment). The training similarly seems to have reached a minimal audience, only a small percentage of whom became accredited. Reporting was inconsistent in terms of the original project proposal and indicators, and internally inconsistent. The nature of the activity and the

reporting makes it difficult to estimate with any predictable accuracy its impact and influence, but it is likely quite low. The Ombudsman's Office in Trujillo, which received IPRECON training, agreed with the concept of conciliation training to change life attitudes and the climate of confrontation in Peru, but commented that the IPRECON training was very focused on setting up conciliation centers and obtaining authorization to operate. Their center in Trujillo was described by the Ombudsman's Office as having "nothing to do with the community." Finally, none of the IPRECON representatives interviewed were familiar with the SO1 Results Framework in any meaningful way, and could not explain how conciliation serves to promote the democracy Strategic Objective.

### C. APENAC

USAID awarded this NGO two grants totaling \$370,000 to fund a two-year program from July 1998 to July 2000. The total budget amounts to \$446,600, including 21% cost-sharing. This sub-activity is entitled *Promotion of Alternative Mechanisms for Conflict Resolution in the Area of the Apurimac-Ene Valley, Huamanga and Tarapoto*. Funding was provided by both SO1 (\$150,000) and the SO5 Alternative Development program (\$220,000). USAID financing constitutes approximately 80% of APENAC's total operational budget for these years.

The goal of the APENAC program has been to promote greater access to justice for disadvantaged communities in coca-producing zones by providing those communities with practical techniques and adequate strategies in alternative dispute resolution methods so as to manage and resolve their disputes peaceably. The specific objectives included the following: 1) creation and establishment of three conciliation centers; 2) strengthening of two existing conciliation centers; 3) development of a pilot school mediation project; and 4) promotion of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms through education and training at different levels, including native communities, grassroots and neighborhood organizations, public institutions, governmental entities and authorities, etc. Additionally, APENAC is in the process of developing software to record and collect information concerning the initiation, processing, conclusion, and follow-up of conciliation cases, and will be providing the software to the Ministry of Justice to aid in the collection of uniform, consistent, and useful data at the national level.

APENAC's original proposal identified indicators purporting to quantify not solely numerical output, but also success in actual conciliation efforts, as well as completion and follow-up strategies. Subsequent reporting has been timely, thorough, consistent with the original proposal, and has tracked progress against the original indicators. Of all the conciliation programs reviewed for purposes of this evaluation, APENAC's data collection, analysis, and reporting were all clearly and definitively a substantial cut above the rest, and conveyed the most useful information. Nevertheless, the inherent difficulties of gauging ultimate impact and influence of the sub-activity as a whole remain a challenge not yet overcome.

Determination of cost-effectiveness is problematic. The award budget allocated \$68,760 to training, dissemination, and publications; APENAC calculates that 7,732 people have been reached from August 1998-January 2000 within the relevant communities (\$8.89 per person). The award budget for the school component was \$19,200. APENAC estimates 1,798 student,

parent, and professor beneficiaries within that same time period (\$10.68 per person). Finally, the line item for creation and strengthening of conciliation centers was \$111,600; APENAC's figures show that 1,488 consultations were made at all affiliated centers, out of which 758 conciliation attempts were initiated, of which 550 cases have to date been settled (43 are still in process). This line item is not broken down by amounts required to create new centers, as opposed to the strengthening and operation of already-established centers. Moreover, there is insufficient information upon which to determine the cost-effectiveness of the amount (\$170,440) allocated to "Executive and Training Unit" in the award budget.

### **Observations**

Of all the conciliation programs reviewed, evaluators found that APENAC was the only organization that exhibited understanding not only of the USAID Democracy Results Framework and Strategic Objective, but further could explain how and where its program fits within that framework to promote or effect a more democratic culture. APENAC identifies two distinct approaches to conflict resolution: 1) formal (*centros de conciliación*); and 2) non-formal - i.e., the creation of capacities, education, and empowerment to resolve individual and community problems, with emphasis on the process itself. APENAC's theory is that increased capacity to deal with individual and local problems will teach people how to solve problems in organizations and communities by participating in the process of democratic development.

According to APENAC, the imposition of conciliation as a legal requirement will invariably be treated as a business proposition by providers, and will never truly be accepted by the people subjected to this imposition. Social dispute resolution through conciliatory mechanisms – rather than confrontation or violence – can be successful, but only if it arises from training, education, and changes made at the community level and based upon community norms, not business interests or opportunities. Making conciliation mandatory will not change reality. For these reasons, APENAC believes that the focus – especially in rural areas – is best placed on community training in communication and conflict resolution methods and skills, rather than emphasizing a physical location (conciliation center) and third-party conciliator. In this way, such programs would have more promise of changing underlying attitudes and mentality. Additionally, APENAC has made efforts to adapt ADR techniques so as to preserve local cultural values, to train local leaders who can act as community mediators, and to use Quechua-speaking conciliators in rural areas.

Insofar as the coca-producing regions are concerned, neighborhood conciliation (*conciliación vecinal*) is seen as critical to peaceful reconstruction of the social framework. In these areas of particularly high conflict, disputes (e.g., over property and debt such as family support or small commercial matters) are frequently resolved either by violence or apathy, because the underlying social structure has failed. There, the goal is to restore the public's ability to envision peaceful resolution to disputes, and start working to coalesce the communities to determine and work to meet their common needs. APENAC has also worked with police and other authorities in these areas to convince them to integrate themselves into the community and work with the people.

A significant level of conflict and controversy permeates the country outside the coca regions, as well. Recession has particularly affected the interior of the country, and the economic crisis has led to increased social turmoil, which has revealed a similar breakdown of the social structure.

### *Observations from the Field*

Site visits were made to the APENAC conciliation centers in Tarapoto, Lamas and Ayacucho. These visits raised various issues and concerns.

The Tarapoto center is affiliated with a women's NGO, PRODEMU, which has been in existence since 1984 and has offered conciliation to women since 1988 (financed by different donors) to resolve family matters. The vast majority of conciliations conducted there (between 20-27 a month out of approximately 50 consultations) relate to child custody, support, and visitation disputes, and they appear to be effective in handling such matters. Despite efforts made to broaden the nature and scope of disputes handled since their affiliation with APENAC, PRODEMU as an organization is firmly linked to women's interests and it appears unlikely that this will change, or that the nature of the conciliation caseload will enlarge or diversify substantially.

When asked what will happen to the Lamas conciliation center once the USAID/APENAC money ends, the interviewer was assured that it will continue somehow as it has in the past, perhaps with other donor funding; they have little choice because PRODEMU serves as an escrow to collect and disburse cash and food agreed upon as child support in successful conciliations. This escrow-type service not only facilitates compliance with successfully-conciliated support agreements, but it also represents the only follow-up or enforcement mechanism seen in any of the conciliation programs reviewed. If compliance with support agreements is not made as scheduled, PRODEMU facilitators contact the non-compliant party and make various attempts to elicit compliance. Evaluators were told that compliance rates are consequently high.

The Lamas conciliation center is located on the first floor of a private residence, and has been operating since 1997 (pre-USAID funds) as a community-based representative (*Defensoría*) of PRODEMU. APENAC's role has been to strengthen this center. Unfortunately, the Lamas center is doing quite poorly, as acknowledged by everyone present for our visit. They have only handled 44 cases in almost two years, and only three in the last four months. Several factors are likely contributors to this lack of success: 1) there are three other entities in the same community providing similar conciliation services; 2) the conciliators are a mother and her 19-year old son (this is a voluntary position, and therefore difficult to fill) with little training or experience; 3) 95% of the population speaks Quechua, but only the mother (who works only part-time) is a Quechua-speaker; 4) people from this community have gone to the Tarapoto PRODEMU center instead, perhaps due to privacy concerns; and 5) there are underlying community attitudes and male antagonisms that are not conducive to dispute resolution other than through violence. The Tarapoto PRODEMU conciliator expressed substantial concern over this poor performance and the lack of community acceptance of this *Defensoría* as a conciliation center.

In Ayacucho, the APENAC conciliation activity employs two full-time lawyers and three support staff, who work in the main office. The Huamanga (Ayacucho) Conciliation Center is located within the Court building, by way of an agreement with the Court that expires later this year. This Center was launched in 1996, and has received the support of the Judicial Branch (which refers cases to the Center) and the Bar Association (*Colegio de Abogados*). Activities fall within three main components: attention to cases, dissemination, and training. Two types of conciliation cases are handled – those referred by the Court, and those presented by the individuals involved. Every year, some 8,000 cases enter the Court seeking administration of justice; 20% are civil and commercial, while 80% are criminal cases. From 1996 to date, out of a total of 646 cases referred to the Center by the Court, 546 proceeded to conciliation. Of the 89 conciliations that had not been referred by the Court, 61 reached agreement. No follow-up is done to verify compliance with the agreements reached; it is only when the parties return for some reason that the Center learns what happened.

In addition to the Huamanga Center, this office also carries out activities in San Francisco in the Apurimac Valley in cooperation with the SO5 Alternative Development program. This program is somewhat unique in that it is directed outward and more broadly toward community conciliation and relationships with local authorities, rather than focusing simply on the provision of services at a central conciliation facility. For example, APENAC provided a one-day workshop to all NGOs working in the Valley to explain the conciliation process and invite submission of disputes for resolution. APENAC also conducted outreach programs with area police to promote and encourage their integration into the community, rather than representing mere authoritarian imposition of power. As such, this program seeks to achieve a more fundamental change in community relationships, attitudes, and interactions. The Center director noted that this neighborhood conciliation program is based on the good faith and receptivity of beneficiaries, to whom the service is free until USAID funds are exhausted. He stated that, thereafter, it is unlikely that people would be both willing and able to pay for continued services. Unfortunately, program operations in the Apurimac Valley were not observed because of distance and logistical considerations.

In terms of training, the Huamanga office is involved in 32 “micro-projects” related to school-based conflict and teacher training. These are one-day basic workshops, with hands-on training in communication and conflict management, and are given in both Spanish and Quechua. The director explained that they are now developing advanced workshops to train selected individuals as trainers. The information provided indicates that 46 teachers have been trained for this work. APENAC materials on alternative dispute resolution in schools are also used by both CIDE and TAREA in Ayacucho.

The Huamanga Center director explained that the Judicial Branch has been highly discredited in the eyes of the general population, particularly in this part of the country. He stated that if the Conciliation Law goes into effect next year, it will likely exacerbate the situation by imposing one more bureaucratic requirement on an already unwieldy system. Several other interviewees also shared their concern that mandatory conciliation as presently proposed will impede, rather than facilitate, access to justice by adding yet another layer of expense and bureaucratic “red tape.”

Several suggestions for future SO1 strategy were offered by the various APENAC representatives interviewed. First, they believe that community work at the local level, and with local governments, should be emphasized. Second, APENAC urges USAID to facilitate (even require) the exchange of information among sub-activities, and to put together grantees that may have potential synergies, even if such connections are not obvious. Third, APENAC suggests that USAID needs longer-term activities; 1-2 years is not sufficient to see real results.

As a final point, the future sustainability of conciliation programs was discussed. In general. As noted earlier, conciliation services through these centers are currently being offered without charge, which will continue until USAID funding ends. Thereafter, people in these communities are unlikely to pay for continued services, and the centers they have come to rely upon will vanish. If USAID is providing a free service to people who have no money, that service is unlikely to ever become self-sustaining and will disappear once donor support ceases. The question then becomes: Is it wise or fair to create and then encourage community reliance on a service provider whose days are clearly numbered?

It is worth noting that the Chamber of Commerce program has the greatest potential for sustainability (based on income from other arbitration or a sliding scale of fees depending on nature of matter, income of parties, or amount at stake). However, the Chamber operates primarily in Lima, and the most pressing need for free conciliation services is in the interior. The Chamber's program seeks to develop a network of providers in the interior, but they will likely serve the small business community, not marginalized populations. It was found that, if these programs are to continue, this conundrum will somehow need to be addressed.

### **III. WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION [IR4]**

As noted in various studies and Mission documents, on any socio-economic scale women (who represent over half of the population) have traditionally been a "disadvantaged" group in Peru. Thus, their increased awareness and ability to represent their own interests is considered critical for the achievement of democratic governance. The participation of women as voters and in the political arena is viewed as particularly important if broad citizen participation in democratic processes is to become a reality. This appears to have been reflected in the legislation passed before the 1998 municipal elections which requires that at least 25% of all candidates be women. That law, which had been actively promoted by the leading women's organizations, was seized upon as a window of opportunity for preparing women to run for office at the local level. This would mean not only identifying potential candidates, but also persuading them to run, training them to negotiate with male political leaders for slots high enough on the ballot to actually be elected (rather than at the bottom of the list), and preparing them to campaign. For those women who won, it would also mean training them to fulfill their new obligations and to respond to the needs of their constituents.

Thus it was that, in response to the late 1997 call for proposals conducted by the SO1 team, a large number of NGOs proposed projects aimed at using the quota legislation to increase women's political participation. Four of those were judged to be viable and, in an effort to reduce the number of grants to be managed, the SO1 team called them together and suggested that, given their common interest, they collaborate under a single "umbrella" grant. The four

agreed, and the sub-activity known as **PROMUJER** (included in this evaluation) was born. Following an assessment of the administrative capacity of each organization, it was determined that the grant be given to the *Movimiento Manuela Ramos* (MMR), which would in turn award sub-grants to the other three NGOs and take responsibility for overall grant administration. Phase one of the grant was for \$595,428 and covered the period from June 1998 to June 1999, during which municipal elections were held. In the second phase, which runs from June 1999 to June 2000 and covers the April 2000 national elections, an additional \$550,000 was provided, making a grand total of \$1,145,428. The grant carries a 35% cost-sharing provision. The PROMUJER Coordinator noted that for phase one the result expected was a 25% increase in the number of women elected to municipal government – a target that had been reached. USAID records show an increase of 8.5% in Lima and 16% in the provinces. As shown in the PARTICIPE framework, for phase two the expected result is an increase in the percentage of women in the 120-member Congress – up to 17% in 2001 from a baseline of 10.8% in 1998.

In addition to MMR, the PROMUJER consortium includes: the *Asociación de Comunicadores Sociales Calandria*, the *Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación (CEDEP)*, and the *Centro de Estudios Sociales y Publicaciones (CESIP)*. The purpose of the grant is “to empower women politically and prepare them to carry out ‘good governance’ at the local and national level, as well as to promote the development of a democratic culture among women within the framework of consolidating the process of their increased access to formal power.” This is to be accomplished by advocating for the effective implementation of the quota legislation; the identification, promotion and training of women candidates; efforts to increase the number of women voters; and preparation of a “gender” agenda for candidates and officeholders. The grant includes a matrix showing six sets of activities – each subdivided into national and local efforts – with indicators and targets for each. The six activities are: lobbying; dissemination; training; promotion; research; evaluation and processing of results. It was explained by the PROMUJER Coordinator that, while indicator data were aggregated and reported at the end of phase one, in phase two data are not collected on a regular basis, but will be put together by the four organizations only at the end of the activity. For that reason, it was not possible for the evaluation team to verify progress to date; the remainder of this section relies on information derived from interviews and relevant documents.

The PROMUJER Coordinator regretted that, because the grant had been awarded only for one-year periods, it had not been possible to establish a baseline against which to measure results, nor is there a longer-term monitoring and evaluation plan built into the grant. Thus, targets are quantitative measures of outputs. The promotion and training of women as candidates is targeted for strategic provinces around the country, as related to the number of potential voters and level of disenfranchisement. These have included areas in and around Lima as well as in locations such as Trujillo, Ayacucho and Tarapoto (all visited by the evaluation team during field trips), Carhuaz, Ilo, Arequipa, Cajamarca, Huancayo, Cusco and Iquitos.

The roles of the four organizations are complementary but different. MMR and Calandria concentrate their efforts at the national level, while CESIP and CEDEP work at the provincial/local level. In support of this activity, alliances were developed with a variety of other organizations, which has enhanced overall outreach and dissemination potential. These include, for example, agreements with such groups as MMR’s *Reprosalud* offices around the

country, which help to identify potential candidates, disseminate PROMUJER information and provide on-site TA; IPEDEHP, which also helps to identify candidates and disseminates information through its network of human rights promoters; Transparencia, which sponsors local gatherings and monitors the electoral process; ESAN, which has provided materials for municipal management training; a myriad of local women's organizations around the country; local governments; and others.

Under PROMUJER, MMR and Calandria have collaborated on leadership training courses held in Lima, identifying suitable participants from the areas targeted and making necessary logistical arrangements. Around the 1998 municipal elections, two such courses were held with up to 80 participants and 3-5 facilitators each. While pre- and post-workshop questionnaires were administered to estimate short-term change, it has not been possible to provide longer-term follow-up, except with women later elected as mayors or council members (*regidoras*), as their visibility within the community makes it easier to keep in touch.

In examining the evolution of this sub-activity, it is important to know something of the four NGOs and their respective roles and views of PROMUJER.

**A. MMR** was founded by four women in 1979 to work on two issues: health and women's rights, which continue to be major priorities. Other areas of concentration now include: human rights; women's political participation and leadership (the PROMUJER component); and income generation. The organization's annual budget totals \$8 million, of which about \$6.5 million comes from USAID. *Reprosalud* is MMR's largest activity, with nine offices in the interior, which provide administrative support for this reproductive/health services program and serve as links to the community. The *Reprosalud* database includes 18,000 women. USAID (SO3) was the first donor to provide funding for this activity; UNFPA, and other donors now provide support. MMR's work on women's rights has been funded by the Ford Foundation.

MMR has a history of lobbying actively for women's rights, particularly with female members of Congress and key congressional committees – something for which the organization is criticized by other women's groups as being “*gubernistas*” (pro-government). Some 600 women politicians receive the MMR newsletter. As part of PROMUJER, after the municipal elections, it was MMR (using their own special German software) that processed and analyzed data on women's participation for the GOP voter registration office (which did not have the capacity to do so efficiently). A report titled “Women in Power” was then produced and widely disseminated, including publication in *El Comercio*, a leading newspaper. As part of its advocacy and dissemination strategy, the organization sponsors a television program called *Palabra de la Mujer* (Women's Turn), which airs over the weekend on a cable station in Lima.

Under the PROMUJER award, this NGO has received \$482,728 for the two-year period. With regard to the administration of the grant, MMR interviewees reported that, while there had been difficulties at first, these have been largely overcome and that working relations among the four organizations (who already knew one another) have evolved over time. It was noted, for example, that consensus had been reached on the PROMUJER slogan, indicators, timeline and other programmatic details. For the most part, however, each organization continues to “do its own thing.” These interviewees felt that, were this experience to be repeated, more emphasis

should be placed on leadership training, noting that only MMR had been providing this type of training for women, having begun as a small program funded by the IDB using the IPEDEHP methodology. In retrospect, MMR interviewees also felt that PROMUJER had focused too much on the 25% quota law, having neglected the electoral law and the political parties, both of which they saw as crucial to improving women's chances at the national/congressional level. As a result, they predicted that the upcoming elections will not be as successful as were the municipal elections in terms of the percentage of women who win. They felt that the most successful strategy has been communication with civil society through the media, noting that much demand has been created within both the written and electronic press.

### **Observations**

If USAID support should end, MMR believes that the four NGOs would not continue to work together on a project basis, but would continue to stay in touch, as they enjoy cordial relations and share the same interests. MMR felt that it could obtain a small amount of funding to continue the leadership training initiative, noting that others would undoubtedly keep doing "massive awareness campaigns" through television sets placed in town squares, and so on.

In terms of the Mission's future strategy, MMR recommended that USAID convene more coordination meetings with all counterparts in order to maximize results through greater synergy. It was also recommended that "pilot municipalities" be chosen (e.g., Puno, Huancavilica, Ayacucho and one or two from the coast) for teaching women from the community and from local government how to identify problems, design solutions, seek funding, and so forth. It was further suggested that this be done around a core issue or concrete problem in order to teach participatory practices, and that health might be a good place to start, as local health committees already exist. Evaluators find that these suggestions merit attention as the USAID planning process goes forward.

**B. Calandria**, founded in 1983, has received a total of \$319,500 under the PROMUJER sub-activity. The organization's annual budget totals approximately \$1 million, part of which comes from the sale of consulting services. This NGO specializes in the area of social communication. Programs include: gender and communications; local government; youth; and communications and citizenship. Together with MMR and *Flora Tristán*, it is part of the Feminist Radio Collective, which transmits regularly. Calandria is also active in the facilitation of *Mesas de Concertación*, which work at the local level on policy issues with citizen participation, using techniques related to communication, mediation and negotiation. This organization also provides training for journalists in various locations, conducts opinion surveys and produces informational videos which are widely disseminated in the areas where it works. To promote women's rights and participation, Calandria coordinates a campaign called "*De Igual a Igual...*," carried out with local counterparts in various parts of the country. It also runs a Women's Leadership Training School, funded by Diaconía.

### **Observations**

Reflecting on the administration and evolution of PROMUJER, Calandria interviewees felt that difficulties had arisen due to a lack of clarity, and that there had been a need to clarify functions

at the outset. They explained that this had not been done due to “inertia” (i.e., the question had simply never been dealt with, despite the fact that there had always been underlying tension). Specifically, while it was clear that MMR was to assume administrative responsibility, the issue of who was to assume responsibility for “political” coordination was never discussed. They now feel that there could have been rotating coordinators, adding that there was a need to respect the specialty of each organization. It was also noted that in the last year the SO1 program manager has played a more active role as moderator of the group (they meet with the USAID manager every 45 days), which they view as highly positive. They then stated that it would be good to have more opportunities for exchanges, asserting that PROMUJER needs more political discussion and clear leadership. Finally, interviewees noted that, should no additional USAID support be available, they have “some funds” to continue and that the women who are now in office help to cover costs.

Calandria interviewees see a need to test models for joint management (*cogestión*) at the local level, which could be a basis for the formulation of public policy. They are also concerned about making the media more of an interlocutor between the state and society. For future USAID strategy, they recommend efforts to strengthen civil society and to create mechanisms for citizen participation to democratize planning at the local level - promotion of municipal programs, women’s watchdog systems, and so forth. Evaluators support these suggestions.

**C. CEDEP** is basically a think-tank founded 23 years ago by a group of male professionals interested in macroeconomic development studies, particularly agriculture and rural development. It now also works on citizen safety, democratic constitutionality and decentralization. At its headquarters, CEDEP holds issue-based forums on priority issues. Interviewees explained that the organization is sponsoring six forums to which presidential candidates are invited to present their respective platforms, and that all except Fujimori’s Perú 2000 had accepted. The issues include education, health, citizen safety, decentralization, and economic policy. CEDEP has a staff of 50 (21 in Lima) and also works in rural areas in places like the Callejón de Huaylas and Ayacucho. Lima headquarters has three divisions: a) Research, Studies and Proposals; b) Projects; and c) Administration. There is also a Planning Office. The gender specialist, responsible for PROMUJER activities, reports directly to the Executive Director, who described this as an important cross-cutting issue. The organization’s annual budget runs between \$500,000 and \$1.5 million. The PROMUJER award for the two-year period totals \$168,250.

CEDEP participates in a number of issue-based networks and donor groups, including the *Consortio Propuesta Ciudadana* (six of the largest NGOs in Lima, Piura and Cuzco), NOVIB’s *Plataforma* with 27 NGOs, a gender group and German-sponsored *AgroAcción*. Microprojects in the provinces, which address issues such as environment, rural credit, etc., are funded by Canada and Germany.

Before PROMUJER, CEDEP had never received USAID funding. The Executive Director spoke positively of meeting the U.S. Ambassador, and USAID Mission officials at the PROMUJER grant-signing ceremony. He also reported that CEDEP is pleased with this activity, including the way it is administered by MMR. PROMUJER represents CEDEP’s first entry into the world of “women’s” projects and, judging by the Executive Director’s comments, it appears

that this experience has had a positive impact on the organization. He indicated that if it is not possible for USAID to provide further support for this activity, they intend to seek other funds to continue the work. He noted that Holland provides core funding for the Callejón de Huaylas, where their main PROMUJER activity is located, and that in 2002 they expect additional support for local government development – which they see as a high priority.

Under phase one of PROMUJER, CEDEP carried out a survey of rural women and trained 20 promoters in the province of Carhuaz to get women registered to vote. In phase two, they are teaching women about the 25% quota law, the election law and how to vote. This activity covers four provinces, including Huaraz and Carhuaz, and will be extended to Yunguay. It was explained that the first objective is to reduce abstentionism among women and to register them to vote, for which it has used materials from SER and Transparencia. Also, women candidates are recruited and taught to negotiate in order to avoid being placed last on the party list. In the 1998 local elections, in Carhuaz the percentage of women elected to municipal office rose from 5% to 30%. Now, CEDEP works with these *regidoras*, and has agreements with local governments. Under those agreements, five courses are conducted with all members (male and female) of local councils on the basics of municipal government. Then, CEDEP works individually with female members to bring them up to the level of their male colleagues (who generally have the advantage of speaking Spanish, being literate, etc.). It was pointed out that these are very poor municipalities with no staff, and that the council must do everything. To handle money (which is illegal for council members), they obtain letters of authorization from the mayors. In five district-level municipalities, CEDEP also helped with strategic planning. It was explained that the process employed is not participatory at first – that the first step is “let’s do a plan.” But once there’s a basic draft, the idea is to hold a consultation or open meeting (*cabildo abierto*) to get citizen involvement and input. To date, one such consultation had been held.

Following the 1998 elections, the *regidoras* formed a network covering five provinces. The network Board has had four meetings and, because of the logistical difficulties related to travel in that part of the country, the president has said she will visit district by district to spread the word about the network. CEDEP explained that its role is as an outside facilitator.

### **Observations**

CEDEP interviewees believe that if Fujimori wins and does not hold a majority in Congress, it may be possible to bring greater attention to the issue of decentralization. They believe it is crucial to strengthen local institutions through real participation and by providing much-needed training for local officials and organizations, stating that it is urgent to “*tecnificar iniciativas locales*” (technify local initiatives). For USAID’s future strategy, CEDEP recommended that local initiatives be supported, and that there be better articulation among grantees – *a la* NOVIB Platform approach, as mentioned above. Evaluators find these suggestions to be a positive contribution to USAID’s future planning. They reported having attended three monthly meetings with some eight other NGO counterparts and USAID representatives – the last of which had been held at CEDEP – to discuss the election process, and that the next meeting was to be held later in the month, after our visit. They felt these meetings should continue after the April vote.

**D. CESIP**, founded in 1976, was originally active in Lima, doing research and publications about children. It now works in four parts of the country, and promotes capacity building among women and children through three programs: a) women, citizenship and politics (PROMUJER); b) health and reproductive rights; and c) adolescent children's concerns. CESIP's first support from USAID came indirectly for a study for PROMUDEH. It then received funding under GRADE. CESIP's PROMUJER budget is approximately \$175,000. Its total annual budget runs from about \$700,000 to \$1 million.

This NGO seeks to collaborate with other women's groups; it serves as coordinator of the *Grupo Impulsor Nacional Mujeres por la Igualdad Real* (the ongoing group organized for the UN Conference in Beijing), with expenses covered by the Ford Foundation, but no paid staff. This includes 20 women's groups in each region – a total of 140 in all. The purpose is to monitor government compliance with the Beijing agreements. Prior to PROMUJER, CESIP worked with *regidoras* in Lima, Cajamarca and Chiclayo, through whom they were able to have Women's Commissions established within the municipalities to reach out to women citizens. They then created a network called the *Asociación de Mujeres Municipales* (Association of Municipal Women), which is now promoting (with Calandria and others) working groups bringing together *regidoras* and female municipal employees.

As part of phase one PROMUJER training, CESIP worked with participants to develop a women's municipal agenda. This was to be taken back to all political parties represented and become part of their campaigns and the subsequent municipal activities by those elected. No specific information was available regarding the results to date of this effort. The only indicator mentioned specifically by interviewees was that they had made 179 media presentations. In phase two, CESIP took responsibility for developing a Women's Agenda before the 2000 elections. This had just been completed prior to this interview, and was to be presented at a press conference on February 18. The Agenda is meant to be considered by candidates and become a tool for post-electoral use by women officeholders. It was also expected to be incorporated into the work of women's networks in the zones where CESIP is active. The Agenda includes five issue areas: literacy, health, political participation, violence, and job equity. CEDEP's survey of rural women was used as input for formulation of the Agenda. However, though the Agenda was to be published as a product of PROMUJER, it was developed without the participation of the other organizations. It is worth noting that interviewees from those NGOs had not seen the Agenda with which their names were to be associated. (Meanwhile, MMR had developed its own Women's Platform with funds from UNFPA, USAID and others - a non-PROMUJER document which adds the issue of reproductive health.)

### **Observations**

CESIP interviewees termed PROMUJER an interesting space for dialogue and political debate, noting that the experience could be improved. They stressed the fact that PROMUJER has established name recognition within the media and among other NGOs, explaining that the press and electronic media frequently call upon PROMUJER spokespersons for interviews and comments about breaking news or current events. It was noted that only recently have NGOs participated at the political level, and that problems have arisen due to different "institutional

dynamics” – i.e., some organizations are larger than others and have different agendas. They felt that a weakness of PROMUJER is that the periodic processing of experience has not taken place.

These interviewees recommended that USAID’s future strategy give priority to activities at the local level, working with municipal government and promoting citizen participation through the creation of spaces for dialogue and other such approaches, which evaluators find to have merit. They also recommended continued support for women’s political participation, as well as for the strengthening of civil society, broadly defined (i.e., NGOs, universities, unions, grassroots groups, etc.)

**The view from the provinces:** Thanks to the cooperation of the *Reprosalud* offices, the evaluation team was able to meet with small groups of mayors and *regidoras* in Trujillo, Ayacucho and Tarapoto. All were elected for the first time in the 1998 local elections. All had participated in PROMUJER training workshops (both as candidates and as elected officials), and expressed appreciation for the support and guidance provided, noting that without that encouragement and assistance they would not have thought of running for office or been elected. Interviewees were eager to continue strengthening relations with their peers and hone their own skills. They confirmed what PROMUJER interviewees had reported in Lima – i.e., that while there had been some slight degree of party tension at the beginning, all trainees soon united to work for women’s common goals, and that party affiliation had become virtually irrelevant.

In all three sites visited, interviewees called for more direct contact with PROMUJER (not just printed materials), as well as additional, more tailored training to increase their performance as officeholders. There was a strongly-held view that the lack of adequate follow-up and more individualized assistance, while not contemplated in the grant, was a weakness of the program. They explained that during PROMUJER workshops they had learned to draft projects, carry out campaigns, negotiate with party officials, and deal with municipal authorities and difficult mayors. However, many emphasized that this training had been generic, and that in the future PROMUJER needs to monitor the performance of those elected to make its investment more cost-effective. They recommended that workshop planners design much more specific training, taking into account the different levels of responsibility they now face. They also recommended better coordination among NGOs working on gender issues, as they had felt overwhelmed by the number of invitations received, which tended to “disorient the process.”

The question of networks was also raised at each site. In Lima, MMR had reported that, at the last meeting with women mayors, participants had decided to form an Association of Women Mayors, and had named an organizing committee and obtained legal recognition for this new NGO. In response to their request, MMR has agreed to facilitate this process, but will not pursue this until after the April elections in order to avoid its politicization. In Tarapoto, it was reported that MMR, Calandria and another NGO are looking at plans to form an *Asociación de Regidoras de San Martín*. In Ayacucho, interviewees felt that it was a mistake to separate mayors and *regidoras* into two different groups. These interviewees noted that there are over 1,000 women mayors and *regidoras* in Peru, and that together they should form a network similar to the *Red de Mujeres Políticas del Ecuador* (Ecuadoran Network of Women Politicians). In Trujillo, interviewees recommended the formation of networks at the provincial level, asserting that larger groups become intimidating. They felt it would be helpful for PROMUJER to support creation

of follow-up networks and meetings at the local level within a six-nine month period after the elections, thus allowing time for officeholders to get their bearings and accumulate experience to share with others. They felt that there is a real need for this type of re-connection. These interviewees were also eager to learn how their colleagues have done since the elections (i.e., what kind of projects have been undertaken, how they did it, and so forth), which would keep them motivated.

#### **IV. SCHOOL-RELATED CIVIC EDUCATION [IR4]**

USAID documents show that ODI has supported school-based civic education since at least 1995 when, under the PARDEM/GRADE activity, eight such projects were approved. In 1998, under IR4, SO1 continued support for two of those initiatives aimed at democracy education and student participation in public schools at both the primary and secondary level. This appears to respond to the underlying contention that it is only by working with citizens from the earliest age that the development of a strong democratic culture will be possible in Peru. As pointed out by a number of interviewees, the country's public education system suffers not only from a lack of economic resources (especially in the marginal urban and rural zones), but also from the hierarchical and authoritarian practices which have traditionally characterized that system. The GRADE Mid-Term Evaluation Report (September 1997) states that all school-based civic education projects addressed the issue of "how the educational system and environment frequently reproduce an authoritarian culture, which invariably affects both teachers and students." It is further noted that: "The promotion of a culture of democracy, then, must start at the early stage of socialization, with the hope of eventually reversing this situation." Informed interviewees also stressed that the school environment is not only undemocratic, but in many cases it is downright unsafe, involving administrators and teachers who use violence and intimidation as a way to deal with students.

Thus, attention has been given to the need to develop new approaches to civic education, based on participatory practices that provide students with opportunities to experience and practice democratic values on a daily basis. It was noted that, to be successful, this effort must not be limited to the school environment alone. It also means identifying and reaching out to the other actors involved in the process of laying the foundation for a more democratic culture, as well as monitoring and maintaining it - parents and other family members, along with community-based private and public institutions.

The need for new approaches to public education was reported to have been tacitly endorsed by the Ministry of Education in 1998, when it created a new unit that is charged with developing new curricula and teacher training and translating innovative practices into official policy. It now appears important for Peruvian NGOs to advocate actively for measures for institutionalizing citizen/democracy education at the policy level, despite any future personnel changes that may occur. One way to address that challenge would be to demonstrate the effectiveness of comprehensive strategies which not only set new behavioral standards among all actors within the school (principals, teachers and students), but also bring to the table other key actors from outside of the education system (parents, business leaders, public and community organizations). It was reported by the USAID activity manager in Lima and the CARE project director in Ayacucho that such a comprehensive approach has been a guiding principle of the

girls' education initiative, "*Nuevos Horizontes para la Educación de las Niñas*" under SpO6, which has collaborated with SO1 by providing \$100,000 to support the integration of girls within the current school-based citizen education sub-activity.

While recognizing that the political context has led to instability within government institutions (for example, the November 1999 change of key Ministry of Education officials), it was found that the school-based democracy education sub-activities currently supported by SO1, which began in April 1998, are still being developed, and appear to be somewhat scattered and disjointed. The approach outlined in grant documents focuses on students, teachers and principals, while the participation of parents and other family members is not contemplated in the original design. As this need has become increasingly apparent, efforts to reach out to parents are being added. Clearly, the activities implemented to date have been of good quality and carried out with a high degree of commitment. However, they do not yet add up to a proactive and comprehensive strategy. Rather, as indicated, it was found that some program components have tended to evolve on a piecemeal basis in response to the challenges or opportunities that arise, while de-emphasizing work at the policy level. In the second year of this initiative, it would be helpful if the organizations involved jointly carried out a process to define specific strategies in two areas: first, education policy advocacy to capture the opportunities and confront the challenges that may arise as a result of the current electoral process and, secondly, to incorporate parents and community organizations more effectively in this experience.

Two of the organizations funded in 1995 under PARDEM through GRADE sub-grants were the *Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Educación (CIDE)* and the *Asociación de Publicaciones Educativas (TAREA)*. It was not until 1998 that they started working directly with the Mission as primary recipients of SO1 funds. Similar to the case of the NGOs involved in PROMUJER, both CIDE and TAREA submitted proposals to USAID in response to the late 1997 grant competition – one to work at the primary school level, and the other in secondary schools. USAID then suggested that, given the complementarity of their proposals, they work together through a single grant for administrative purposes, carrying out an activity called: "Democracy Education and Student Participation in Public Schools." It was then agreed that CIDE would receive the grant and, in turn, award a sub-grant to TAREA. USAID made an award of \$353,224 for the period from September 1998 to September 2000. As prime recipient, CIDE is responsible for all administrative and financial reporting to USAID. However, on the technical side, the two organizations operate separately, each maintaining a direct relationship with the SO1 team. The CIDE/TAREA grant was included in this evaluation.

The purpose of the grant was to develop a special program in selected public schools to promote and reinforce the development of democratic skills and attitudes among primary and secondary students. Under this "umbrella" grant, CIDE was responsible for activities at the primary education level, and TAREA took the lead at the secondary level. Together, they were to implement a pilot experience in 30 primary schools and 40 secondary schools located in marginal urban areas of Lima and in Ayacucho to promote democratic attitudes and values among students through a series of pedagogical techniques and new course content.

These activities were to include cooperative agreements with the Ministry of Education at both central and local levels, and the participation of school principals, teachers and students. CIDE

and TAREA were to develop a series of educational materials; carry out training workshops for teachers and school authorities; organize 40 “mock municipalities” (*municipios escolares*) in secondary schools; coordinate with municipalities and local institutions to sustain the program; and finally, towards the end of the project, develop two pedagogical proposals - for both primary and secondary schools - which are to be endorsed by the Ministry of Education for dissemination throughout the system and incorporated into the official curriculum. The PARTICIPE Results Framework includes the submission of such a proposal to the Ministry for national dissemination as a performance indicator to be achieved by 2001. It also includes an indicator related to the number of students who are “aware of their rights and responsibilities and practice them.” This is defined as “primary and secondary school students who attend at least one USAID NGO-sponsored activity focused on civic education and practices of democratic processes in their school communities.” The target is 41,000 students by 2001 from a baseline of zero in 1997.

Unlike PROMUJER, the CIDE/TAREA grant document itself contains no overall set of results, indicators and targets. Each organization has been reporting programmatic activities separately and directly to the SO1 team on a quarterly basis. The SO1 activity manager meets once a month with each organization separately, and once a month with both together. Thus, from a technical perspective, in reality this “umbrella” sub-activity is managed as if it were two separate grants.

Because this is a pilot project still under development, it is not yet possible to predict results in terms of the level of awareness achieved among the student population. Clearly, its true impact in terms of behavioral change, the level of participation and the degree to which new practices are internalized by individual primary and secondary school students will only be known in the longer term. Moreover, it is important to remember that the success of this activity is also a function of the degree to which this new type of democracy education is incorporated into the school curriculum and official education policy. In short, while it is not yet possible to assess accurately overall impact and cost-effectiveness, it is possible to affirm that the quantitative outputs defined in the PARTICIPE Results Framework appear to have been met.

The experience was reported by both counterparts to have been productive in terms of working under this “umbrella” grant. Nevertheless, both CIDE and TAREA stated that there has been a lack of coordination between them, something they see as both a challenge and a situation that needs to be remedied.

To continue this examination of civic education in the public school system, let us now look at the activities carried out by each counterpart.

**A. CIDE:** In 1984, this NGO founded the *Colegio José Antonio Encinas* as a pilot project for developing alternative educational patterns for elementary and high school students through a school-based democracy approach. Formal certification as an NGO was received in 1996. CIDE reports an annual institutional budget of approximately \$750,000, of which the USAID grant represents about \$120,000. Other support is received from the European Union for an environmental education program, and the organization also raises money through consultancies for the Ministry of Education in the area of teacher training. CIDE focuses on four major areas of intervention: the *Colegio José Antonio Encinas*; a Teacher Training Program; an

Environmental Education Project; and this USAID-funded Democracy Education Program. All activities are geared to addressing the public education system.

With regard to this sub-activity, the general objective, as stated in the CIDE proposal, is: girls and boys have developed democratic skills and attitudes with the support of their teachers, and participating schools have a valid proposal for Democracy Education that responds to the challenges of a new democratic culture in the country. The four specific objectives listed target students, teachers, principals and school involvement at the community level. During the first stage, CIDE has worked in 20 primary schools in Lima (10 in the southern cone within the *Unidad de Servicios Escolares* 1; and 10 in the north within USE 2) and in 17 schools in Ayacucho (9 in Huamanga and 8 in Huanta), thus surpassing the original target of 30 schools. In each school, a group of teachers (about 20% of the faculty) are trained and, once trained, CIDE chooses two per school to act as “promoters.” These promoters serve as liaison agents, providing follow-up for participating teachers and keeping CIDE informed of progress. Reports indicate that some 14,000 elementary school students have been involved in the different activities carried out by participating teachers and supervised by promoters. These activities may involve, for example, choosing a “student of the week,” exercises to increase self-esteem, learning to claim individual rights, and so forth. Data also show that 497 teachers have received training, and that 67 have been trained as promoters. Work with parents has begun, but is at a very early stage. Teacher training focuses on the following areas: Self-Esteem, Gender Equity, Citizen Participation, and ADR in the classroom (with which APENAC has cooperated). Towards the end of this sub-activity, CIDE plans to approach the Ministry of Education, advocating that its curriculum be incorporated into official policy and disseminated as a cross-cutting primary school subject called “*Conciencia Democrática y Ciudadana*” (Democratic and Citizen Awareness).

In terms of the potential institutionalization of this sub-activity, CIDE interviewees spoke of the organization’s dedication to the development and application of innovative practices within the classroom, and underscored their intention to do all possible to continue with efforts now underway. However, unless new resources are obtained, the organization would almost certainly be unable to continue the same level of implementation. It was explained that this would likely result in a staff reduction and a decrease in the number of activities undertaken. Whatever the circumstances, it was explained that the methodologies developed, which have proven to be a valuable tool for the promotion of democracy education, will continue to be used.

### **Observations from the field**

Unfortunately, because this evaluation coincided with the summer vacation period, it was not possible to observe activities in progress at participating schools. However, with the help of CIDE staff members, while in Ayacucho the evaluation team was able to meet with a group of six teachers (from six different public schools) from Huanta, Huamanga and Huamanguilla for a focus group discussion. All had been selected to participate in CIDE’s initial pilot training in early 1999, and expressed appreciation for the support and guidance provided through this new opportunity. Interviewees stated that other teachers were eager to get involved, and they emphasized that, while the “CIDE project” was found to be very promising, it should be expanded to all the teachers and not limited to only a few. These interviewees felt strongly that

for the project to succeed it must involve the whole school. It was also noted that, in this way, the challenge of institutionalizing this alternative approach within the school could be easily overcome, as it would no longer be considered an isolated program. It was also suggested that the approach to teacher training should focus not only on students' self-esteem, but also on that of the teachers themselves because, as a body, there is no sense of unity.

These teachers also recommended that in order to promote mutual learning there should be opportunities for exchanges, such as meetings to share experiences, internships and on-site visits, not only among the promoters (which is now the case), but also at the level of participating schools where best practices could be identified and eventually applied by others. Most of these teachers reported some degree of collaboration with the *Defensoría de la Mujer, el Niño y los Adolescentes* (DEMUNA) and the Office of the Ombudsman. Moreover, they explained that CIDE had developed agreements with the *Dirección Regional de Educación de Ayacucho* (DREA, the Ayacucho Regional Education Authority) and the *Unidades de Servicios Escolares* (USEs).

All teachers interviewed agreed on the need to find effective ways of approaching parents and inviting them to join in this initiative. They felt that this is particularly important in view of the pressing need to obtain parents' collaboration and their understanding of why it is essential to change the authoritarian treatment of their children and raise their awareness about the benefits of this innovative effort within the school. We agree. Interviewees also recommended that special attention be given to school principals and to the need to advocate for the type of education policies that favor this sort of initiative. Finally, these teachers stressed that, when there is support from all concerned, it will be much easier to achieve a more democratic and safe environment within the schools. Indeed, this coincides with major studies on this subject.

**B. TAREA** was founded in 1974 in an effort to provide education to the marginalized adult sectors of Peruvian society. Over the years, it has broadened its target population to include community leaders, teachers, teenagers, and so forth, and began to address the need to improve public education policy. While TAREA's total annual budget is approximately \$800,000, the budget for this activity is approximately \$344,000, of which \$160,000 comes through the USAID/CIDE grant, \$90,000 from Save the Children, and \$85,000 from TAREA counterpart funds.

Under this sub-activity, TAREA is pursuing five objectives: 1) 500 student leaders trained in Lima/Ayacucho; 2) 40 mock municipalities organized and functioning; 3) 40 mock municipality student projects implemented; 4) 40 schools have teams of teachers trained, promoting student participation and the democratization of the school environment; 5) *concertación*/collaboration with school and local officials to promote student participation. At the end of the last school year, TAREA completed the first round of the *Municipios Escolares* (Mock Municipalities) initiative, through which students participate in the election of a mayor and council which is committed to undertaking a school project, as announced in the candidates' platform. Forty-five schools located in Lima, Huamanga and Huanta are participating in this initiative, thus surpassing the original target of 40 schools. In September 1998, TAREA signed collaborative agreements in Ayacucho with both DREA and USE to officially support this activity.

To begin the process, TAREA contacted groups of principals and teachers in the target high schools, introducing them to this initiative and providing training to carry it out. Similar to the approach employed by CIDE, following the teacher training component, TAREA chose from two to four teachers at each school to form an Advisory Team. Those Teams then facilitated the electoral process among students and the creation of the mock municipalities. Students elected to office participated in a leadership and political awareness training workshop. They were then expected to undertake implementation of a school project, and were also singled out for public recognition, including a meeting with the Mayor of Huamanga.

The project focuses on four major components: training and follow-up; documentation and the production of educational materials; community outreach; and evaluation. TAREA reports indicate that a total of 59,397 high school students had voted on “election day” in participating schools; no data on the level of post-electoral participation were available. It was also reported that in Lima 95 persons participated on Advisory Teams, while in Ayacucho 105 individuals were involved. Like CIDE, TAREA has also developed a collaborative agreement with the Ministry of Education. In that regard, the organization is currently working on development of a cross-cutting citizen education curriculum to be incorporated into official math and science courses. This falls under the project component called “curriculum enrichment” (“*diversificación curricular*”), for which 60 teachers have been trained.

The probability that TAREA will institutionalize this sub-activity is heightened by the fact that it relates directly to the organization’s basic mission. Both Board and staff members stated that, if USAID support should end, it may be difficult to continue with teacher training and to provide follow-up for promoter and student activities with the same degree of dedication. However, they affirmed that they will definitively continue with this citizen education activity and try to persuade additional donors to support the effort. In short, they were optimistic about their ability to institutionalize both the activities and the methodologies, especially given the fact that they had managed to obtain funds from Save the Children, in addition to providing counterpart resources. They are already working on new proposals to seek additional funding from USAID and other current donors, and to approach new sources.

### **Observations by students in Ayacucho:**

TAREA shares a local office with SER in Huamanga. Thanks to the cooperation of two TAREA project coordinators, the evaluation team conducted a focus group interview at a local high school (*Colegio José Agustín Sánchez Carrió*) with three elected student mayors (*alcaldesas*) and one council member (*regidor*) from three different high schools in Huamanga and Huanta.

During this focus group session, evaluators noted references by participants to various issues that appear to represent tensions within the Mock Municipality program, and that may merit attention if this activity is to reach its full potential within the framework of IR4. One was the fact that the elections described appear to have revolved around the personality of the candidates rather than on their “platforms,” and in most cases the projects chosen for attention related to school maintenance and infrastructure (including building a pool), rather than focusing on more civic-minded or community-based initiatives. While there is no doubt that such improvements are needed, a two-fold question arises: To what degree do such in-house activities contribute to

students' understanding of and ability to participate in the affairs of the communities in which they live, and is it fair for students to absorb burdens that are the responsibility of school authorities, when they could instead learn to advocate for the public education system to do its job?

The second concern was that, according to these students, school principals tend not to support this activity and, in many cases, erect barriers to its implementation and institutionalization. They felt that it was important to include training for principals as an integral part of the program.

Third, while it is true that students engage in an "electoral process" in which they have a chance to exercise their right to vote, the approach employed appears to mirror the behavior of adult politicians and the personality-driven, highly competitive nature of the current electoral process. On the other hand, we found little evidence of methodologies geared to expose students to alternative processes, such as promoting participatory dialogue as a means of creating new democratic practices, or for developing skills in areas such as team-building, participatory needs assessment, group decision-making, conflict management, consensus-building, and so forth.

All four of the students interviewed reported that their school mates are already getting ready to compete in the upcoming elections, as they do not want simply to participate in the process by voting, but also by being elected to the Mock Municipality.

Finally, evaluators wish to express a concern that was heightened by our discussions with CIDE/TAREA participants in the field. Based on accounts by interviewees and a review of relevant documents, we find that the methodologies employed in schools, which are based largely on competitive rather than collaborative behaviors and practices, may be inappropriate for achieving the results expected within the framework of SO1/IR4. In this regard, it was found that greater emphasis on building skills for consensus-building and collaborative participation could strengthen future activities.

**C. Foro/Youth** is another SO1 sub-activity within the general framework of school-related civic education. It is sponsored by an NGO called *Foro Nacional/Internacional*, and, though separate, is linked to that organization's major SO1 sub-activity - building a national agenda for the future ("*Agenda: Perú*"), which is treated in section VI of this Chapter. A one-year grant of \$62,700 was awarded to Foro in September 1996 to support a program titled, *University Youth and the Future of Peru*. The completion date was later extended to March 31, 2000 and the total grant was increased to \$139,500.

In its strategic focus document for the 18-months leading up to the 2000 elections, SO1 expressed its support for the civic participation of university youth in selected provinces by providing them with information on relevant issues and encouraging their involvement in discussions and debates. The PARTICIPE framework includes a result calling for primary, secondary and university students and other youth leaders to learn and practice democratic values. The indicator selected is: "Number of youth leaders trained in Democratic Education," with a target of 5,000 by 2001 from a baseline of 2,000 in 1998. This is defined as "university students and other leaders aged 18-24 who attend at least one training activity and participate in

discussions on key issues related to democratic governance in Peru.” Based on that definition, it appears likely that the target will be met.

In the initial phase of this sub-activity, Foro conducted an assessment of attitudes and participation by Peruvian youth, and published a book titled, *La Juventud Universitaria y su Participación en la Vida Nacional: Actitudes y Motivaciones*. USAID documents indicate that results for 1998 included this ground-breaking study, plus the participation of 2,000 students in Foro events on youth and politics, and a Foro university youth website, which had received 3,700 hits. SO1 personnel report that, in 1999, a total of 2,400 youth participated in some Foro event related to democracy. It was also reported that, between August 1999 and February 2000, 400 youth leaders in six cities had received special training to reinforce their participation in the upcoming elections; it was expected that by March more than 600 would have been reached. In addition, SO1 personnel report that, for that same period, 713 youth had participated in democracy fairs in six cities; projections included five more fairs in March, reaching an additional 500 youth.

Among its other accomplishments, Foro reports note the following: a number of events co-sponsored with other organizations, such as the Ebert Foundation and the *Asociación Cristiana de Jóvenes*; support for student publications of which over 10,000 copies were distributed in universities in Lima and the provinces; and operation and improvement of the web page which, by November 1999, had received over 22,000 hits.

### **Observations**

It is not clear how many of the Foro Youth events were also related to the *Agenda: Perú* sub-activity, leading to some possible double-counting of attendees. Indeed, the two initiatives are closely linked and focus largely on the formulation of the Agenda for the future. Because Foro Youth’s reporting has tended to be incomplete and inconsistent (and not submitted in a timely manner), it is not possible to verify the particulars of progress to date. Moreover, since results are measured in terms of quantitative outputs, and given that regular follow-up is not included in the program, it is not possible to assess (except anecdotally) the level of impact on the civic/democratic awareness and participation practices of participants, nor the degree to which specific sub-populations are involved (while all participants are “youth,” available data are not disaggregated by gender, language group, etc.).

During interviews with Foro/Youth participants in Ayacucho and Trujillo (two in each site), a lack of effective follow-up emerged as a key issue. All had been invited to travel to Foro events in other parts of the country (some on several occasions), and found them to be exciting and stimulating, but reported no significant post-event activity. In every case, interviewees called for more communication and action by Foro; they exhibited no true civic awareness or altered participation practices. In Ayacucho, two of the four students trained by Foro had formed an NGO called *Agenda Ayacucho*, patterned after the *Agenda: Perú* initiative, but had not been able to mobilize human or financial resources to plan or carry out any activity. In Trujillo, no networks had been formed as a result of the working groups created by Foro over a year earlier to mount the *Agenda: Perú* event there; interviewees reported that there were no plans for the future.

Foro documents indicate that the creation of NGOs or other groups, such as *Pacto Perú*, *Alameda* and others, was stimulated by Foro events. However, there is only sketchy information as to the purpose, membership and activities of these new groups. It appears that Foro has not yet been able to provide the organization-development assistance needed to help build these budding local entities – with or without USAID support. A November 1999 communication from the Foro Youth Coordinator notes that: “Many of these young groups have gone from simple protest or diagnosis, and are now looking for strategic approaches on which to base their projects.” He stated that, “Foro’s AGENDA work on strategies interests them greatly and shapes local visions and proposals based on Francisco’s [president of Foro] work.” Finally, he expressed the hope that, in the future, training and dissemination programs will be able to rise to the challenge.

It is also unclear as to Foro’s capacity to institutionalize this activity, or its ability to take advantage of progress to date to fashion a solid strategic plan of its own which would lead to meaningful longer-term results. We find the absence of OD assistance to newly-formed groups to be a weakness of program design which diminishes the potential for achieving maximum impact. Given the time horizon implicit in reaping results when dealing with youth, the relatively small number of beneficiaries reached, and the very limited SO1 budget, we find the cost-effectiveness of this sub-activity to be regrettably low.

## V. DEMOCRACY & VOTER EDUCATION [IR4]

It should be noted that approximately two-thirds of the current SO1 budget is dedicated to preparations for the 2000 elections. In addition to the sub-activities discussed in this section, others such as PROMUJER, Foro and APOYO, which are covered elsewhere in this report, also support aspects of this effort.

Two sub-activities related directly to democracy and voter education were included in this evaluation – *Servicios Educativos Rurales* (SER) and the *Instituto de Democracia y Propuestas* (IDS). In addition, the sub-activity carried out by *Transparencia* was reviewed.

A. **SER** was founded in 1980 to work with churches in rural areas. Nearly ninety percent of its activities are carried out in the provinces through an office in Ayacucho and one in Moro. SER’s main programmatic themes include: citizen education (electoral and civic education), local government strengthening, rural women’s training, inter-institutional dialogue (*Mesas de Concertación Interinstitucional*), teacher training and administration in rural schools, and rural infrastructure. This NGO’s annual budget is approximately \$800,000, and it receives support from a variety of international donors. Under SO1/IR4, USAID provided a grant of \$118,819 for an electoral education sub-activity during the period from July 1998 through July 1999. In August 1999, the grant was modified, extending it to July 2000, and increasing the total amount to \$253,335 (plus 25% counterpart funds from SER).

The first phase of this electoral education activity was designed to encourage the participation of citizens in the 1998 municipal election process, especially in areas with a high incidence of abstentionism and null or blank votes. Thereafter, this sub-activity focused on a series of

initiatives geared to stimulate the exercise of civic rights and responsibilities as contemplated in the Peruvian Constitution. In the second phase, SER seeks to: promote citizen participation in the April 2000 elections, with a special target of reducing abstentions and decreasing the number of null votes; provide a space for public debate between citizens and candidates regarding policy issues; and stimulate the participation of youth, women and rural populations.

SER interviewees in Lima and Ayacucho reported that the organization has developed participatory training methodologies and resource materials which have been disseminated with highly positive results. Indeed, it was found that SER voter-education materials are being used by several other SO1 counterparts. Two-day training workshops, which were reported to be one of the primary activities, are held in collaboration with local organizations. Participants are then expected to return home and serve as promoters, repeating the experience by conducting one-day "transfer workshops." Evaluators found that in Ayacucho the local SER office is working closely with and providing technical assistance and capacity-building to the *Federación de Clubes de Madres* (FEDECMA), a 100,000-member, department-wide, grassroots organization. Others targeted as potential promoters of transfer workshops are school teachers, city council members and community leaders. SER has recruited university students to conduct training workshops for promoters. The Ayacucho office has an agreement with the Office of the Ombudsman, which attends SER training sessions.

During phase one, SER carried out a series of these two-day training workshops for promoters in 11 provinces of Ayacucho (which has a 30% rate of abstentions and a high level of blank and voided votes). These were titled, "*Mandatario Significa Mandado*," and involved the participation of some 50 community leaders in each event. Other activities included: holding candidate forums involving representatives of different political parties and then engaging them in a facilitated political debate around specific issues on the local public agenda; democracy fairs, at which videos of candidates' messages were played in public squares and community centers, followed by cultural events; and training for local candidates on issues related to municipal management and democracy. The same types of activities are planned for phase two in connection with the April 2000 congressional/presidential elections. During our visit to Ayacucho, SER representatives reported they were planning to hold a presidential candidate debate in the second half of March, using the format developed by CADE. Three topics had been chosen for debate: the state of emergency and strengthening of civil society; economic development for Ayacucho; and decentralization. This was seen as an event targeted to elite and educated members of the local community, and attendance is to be by invitation only. Before the debate, SER planned to send candidates a report written by an anthropologist on the demands of the citizens of Ayacucho. Preparations were also underway for a democracy fair. For that event, SER planned to invite candidates to tape ten-minute campaign messages to be shown in the main square.

Over the course of this sub-activity, SER has failed to submit to USAID the quarterly progress reports called for in the grant agreement. Instead, a two-year report was filed for all of 1998 and 1999. That report estimates that 18,504 people attended the one-day transfer workshops carried out by promoters, and that a reduction of up to a 50% of null votes was found in ten of the participating provinces (Chumbivilcas, La Mar, Victor Fajardo, Huanta, Churcampa, Chupaca, Chucuito, Huancane, Azangaro and El Collado) as compared with the 1995 election results,

according to data provided by the *Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales* (ONPE). However, it was also found that a smaller reduction of electoral abstentions and blank votes had been recorded.

For the second phase of this initiative, various activities leading up to the April 2000 vote had taken place or were in the planning stage. Forty (19 men, 21 women) phase-one promoters from 22 provinces gathered in Lima to evaluate the experience gained during the 1998 municipal election process and to explore different future political scenarios. In addition, 24 workshops to train promoters were held between November 1999 and January 2000 (data on the number and types of participants had not yet been compiled). Two “Validation Workshops” with promoters to refine the training methodology based on experience to date, and three transfer workshops at the community level had been conducted by promoters. At the time of this evaluation, SER representatives reported that one of the questions they were asking themselves was what to do with these trained promoters after the elections. One possibility under consideration was to form a National Network of Citizen Promoters (*Red Nacional de Promotores Ciudadanos*).

### **Observations**

Since phase two results relate directly to the outcome of the April elections, it is not yet possible to assess the degree to which expected results will be achieved. The performance indicator in the PARTICIPE Results Framework that most closely relates to this sub-activity is the “number of expert/citizen/congressional debates held on key issues (prior to 2000 elections).” The target is five debates by 2001 from a baseline of zero in 1998. Once again, it is too early to assess performance. Meanwhile, interviewees explained that SER analyzes impact by measuring quantitative outputs - voter turnout, the number of valid ballots cast, the number of responses to pre- and post-workshop surveys, and so on. For voter-related results, SER’s assessment will be based on the post-election report issued by ONPE. Overall, SER does not appear to have a clear understanding of impact vs. outputs or an institutional strategy for achieving and measuring impact. As described to us, planning appears to be a reaction to events as they unfold, rather than a more strategic approach to shaping those events.

With regard to the institutionalization of this sub-activity, SER not only shows a strong desire to do so, but also a deep commitment to continue promoting civic and voter education practices. Interviewees stated that the institution has been working quite successfully in the area of electoral and civic education since 1994, in partnership with different civil society and public institutions and the support of other donors. In the event that USAID funding ends, SER reported that it is ready to seek alternative resources, as they have done in the past.

When invited to share perceptions of the future, SER representatives pointed out that there is an urgent need, within the overall political context of Peru, to generate political debate addressing institutional democratization, and to intensify citizen education efforts at the local level. In this regard, interviewees felt that the media holds great potential to accomplish this, and that this should be used to maximum advantage. In Ayacucho, it was explained that, for obvious reasons (i.e., cradle of the Shining Path), donors have made this part of the country a preferred area, and that often activities within the same rural communities overlap. This was said to confuse community members, who grow weary of so many disparate offers. In addition, it was reported

that there is a lack of information and coordination among the many USAID counterparts based in Ayacucho. Interviewees urged that USAID representatives understand that more orchestrated interventions generate synergy (not only between the Agency and its partners, but also among counterparts themselves), and that efforts should not be stove-piped “*en compartimentos estancos.*” Evaluators agree with this view.

## **B. IDS**

This NGO was founded at the height of the terrorist war in 1986 to address issues related to pacification, political education, democracy, and citizenship. It has a staff of six full-time and three part-time employees, and an annual budget of roughly \$350,000. In July 1999, IDS was awarded a grant of \$105,990 by USAID to support a one-year program titled “*Democracia Ayer y Hoy*” (Democracy Yesterday and Today), which is designed to provide democracy education through provincial television stations, and is implemented in collaboration with *TV Cultura*, an NGO founded in 1985 by social communications specialists.

The general objective of this sub-activity is to stimulate public discussion of topics related to democracy and citizenship in 20 of the country’s largest cities during the period prior to the April 2000 elections. Specific objectives are to: promote the use of TV time for local and regional discussion; train local and regional media representatives to handle modern techniques for dealing with public interest issues; and produce materials and videotapes for local, regional (and, if feasible, commercial national) television channels on democracy/citizenship themes to support discussions by local leaders and citizens, also using closed-circuit cable. Impact indicators included in the grant include: the number of agreements signed with local and regional TV stations; the number of communicators who attend the training workshop; power of transmitters and geographic area covered by participating stations; participation by local/regional leaders in the programs; and the effect of debates within other communication media.

To date, IDS has made agreements with 47 local TV stations – far surpassing the 20-channel target figure. It was explained that there are 120 television channels in Peru, most of which air local news. The 47 stations recruited for this sub-activity are both commercial cable and local public channels. IDS did not have information, for example, on how many of them handle paid commercials to support programming or the total audience reached. At the outset, IDS brought representatives from the 47 stations together for a workshop in Lima to explain details of this activity. According to IDS and other interviewees, this was a highly motivational event, as it brought together individuals with the same interests who had been working in isolation. Interviewees in the field confirmed their strong desire to turn this into an ongoing network, so as to solidify the group and work toward common goals. Meanwhile, IDS representatives stated that without this type of follow-up, this initiative will fall apart. For that reason, they were hoping to bring participants together again at the end of the program for a joint evaluation and future planning. No concrete plans for this or other follow-up had yet been formulated.

IDS/*TV Cultura* selected 10 topics for the *Democracia Ayer y Hoy* series (i.e., expanding the electorate, women’s political participation, history of political parties, history of municipal government, etc.). Each topic is examined in an eight-minute videotape produced by IDS/*TV Cultura*, which covers both the past and present status of the issue (five had been completed at

the time of this evaluation). These tapes are then sent to the 47 participating TV stations, which are to use them as tools for producing a one-hour, talk-show type program on each subject. These are to be aired once a week over a 10-week period. Along with the tapes, local stations are to receive accompanying manuals which provide hints and detailed ideas about how to plan for and produce the hour-long program – inviting local leaders to form a panel, interviewing a recognized expert, “man on the street” interviews, etc. After all programs have been produced and copies have been sent back to IDS, the plan calls for production of a five-minute taped overview of total programming, to be run as publicity for additional broadcasts.

To help ensure that this initiative would not be taken advantage of to benefit favored candidates or political parties, IDS made agreements with *Transparencia* and SER to provide “monitors” from among their volunteers to help facilitate and observe local program arrangements and taping. Indeed, during our visit to Ayacucho, evaluators met, not only with local station owners and the anchorperson who was to conduct the first show (about to be taped), but also with the *Transparencia* representative who was serving as monitor. Clearly, this activity had produced great enthusiasm and had awakened the interest of the station (a new public channel with nightly programming from 6-10pm) in the subject of citizen education for democracy. All participants in that discussion were eager to see that this activity continues and that the network of local stations is consolidated.

### **Observations**

As this evaluation was taking place, participating TV stations were in the process of producing the first of the 10 programs. Therefore, it is far too early to assess results. However, assuming all goes as planned, this sub-activity will have produced a total of 470 hours of local television programming, plus a national network of local/regional stations (supposedly interested in other civic issues), for a cost of about \$106,000. We find that this holds great promise as a highly cost-effective approach to reaching a significant number of citizens and to better prepare them to exercise their rights and responsibilities; it therefore warrants close monitoring by the SO1 team.

In terms of institutionalizing this initiative, IDS interviewees stated that they are already thinking of how to continue working with participating stations, using this format to produce citizen education/political culture programming on other topics and possibly for school children or other sub-populations. They were also contemplating the possibility of approaching channel N in Lima, offering the material already produced for broadcast. If they were to repeat the experience, these interviewees stated they would start by first listening to local producers in the process of choosing the topics to be covered, and would ensure greater interaction between local stations and IDS at the national level.

### **C. Transparencia**

This NGO spearheads voter education and election monitoring efforts in Peru. It was created in 1994, in preparation for the 1995 presidential election, and has been a leading force in voter awareness and education ever since. At that time, USAID supported *Transparencia*'s work indirectly through NDI, IRI and IFES; it also was a GRADE sub-grantee. It was not until 1998 that a direct relationship began with USAID. In FY 99/00, total SO1 funding is approximately

\$842,000; its current grant runs to August of this year. *Transparencia* interviewees considered that receiving funds channeled through U.S. organizations is a waste, and that being funded through GRADE was “disastrous.” They were clear that the current arrangement is far superior to the two previous experiences. They also felt that the requirement for grantees to contribute counterpart funds is a positive measure that should be maintained.

The PARTICIPE framework includes a result related to, “The presence on election day and prior of an effective force of electoral observers that can pronounce on the quality and transparency of the electoral process.” The performance indicator is the “Percent of polling places covered by domestic and international observers, prior to and on election day (2000 elections).” The target is 70%, up from a baseline of 32% in 1998. To help achieve desired results, the SO1 team facilitates coordination among grantees. Meetings of the Elections Group are held every two weeks. These generally include representatives of *Transparencia*, SO1, IDS, PROMUJER and SER.

Representatives of this organization reported that it has a national network of 20,000 volunteers around the country who help to educate citizens about how to vote, get out the vote and serve as poll watchers. Thanks to these volunteers, on election day, *Transparencia* produces three reports on results: one in the morning, one in the afternoon, and a quick-count. The organization has 16 paid regional promoters and 32 “*tías*” (godparents) who are people from the provinces who serve as volunteer liaison agents. The latter were brought together for a workshop in Lima. Regional promoters, in turn, train provincial coordinators who, it was reported, had carried out 194 workshops for volunteers in their areas in connection with the upcoming elections. As part of its overall effort, *Transparencia* holds national and international conferences, conducts seminars and holds other special events related to the electoral process.

## VI. DEVELOPMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE [IR4]

This section includes information on two sub-activities: *Agenda: Perú* by *Foro Nacional/Internacional*, which was one of the grantees selected for evaluation, and the *Instituto APOYO*, which was only reviewed. At the outset, it should be noted that, while both were dedicated to developing agendas for the future, Foro’s aim is to lay out strategies for what Peru might look like 20 years from now, while APOYO concentrates on the next decade. At the time of this evaluation, both efforts were still underway. We found that the most potentially cost-effective results could be achieved if the two efforts were compatible and mutually-reinforcing, particularly as concerns the dissemination of their reports. Foro interviewees indicated that the two grantees exchange information, and that their efforts are complementary, a view shared by APOYO. However, no concrete steps to coordinate their activities were mentioned by either. APOYO explained that there is much similarity between the two efforts, but that they prefer to be more practical and present a shorter-term, less ambitious scheme. Finally, APOYO interviewees perceived that *Agenda: Peru* was closely identified with a single institution, whereas they had tried to bring others on board.

**A. Foro Nacional/Internacional**<sup>6</sup>: The December 1998 document describing SO1's strategic focus for the 18-month period from October 1998 to April 2000 includes "Development of a democratic agenda for the 2000 elections and beyond" as an area of emphasis under IR4. Among the programmatic actions to be taken was support for the efforts of the *Agenda: Peru* project of the think-tank Foro Nacional/Internacional. The statement of hoped-for results indicates that, to the extent possible, a consensus democracy agenda for the country would be forged. Beginning in September 1997, four grants have been awarded to Foro for a total of \$136,000. The first three supported development of the Agenda, while the fourth (for the period from January to May 2000) was for its dissemination. No specific results, indicators or targets for this sub-activity are included in the PARTICIPE Results Framework. However, the above-mentioned USAID document indicates that this effort was to be aimed at collecting and reflecting back to Peruvians their visions of a future Peru, and that among the key groups to whom Foro would present its preliminary findings would be political parties and movements, with the idea that they may incorporate portions of this "consensus vision" into their political platforms. It was also to be presented to the military, through the School of Advanced Military Studies (CAEM).

Foro, which has four members, three of whom comprise the Board, was founded by the president and a colleague following the departure of the former from the World Bank in 1992. Its annual budget totals approximately \$300,000, of which 20% is generated through private consultancies. The organization is decentralized; the president and two other professionals work from their homes, while the office is only used for administrative functions. Other services are contracted out – for example, *Transparencia* manages the Foro web page. The president regretted that, to keep up with USAID contract requirements, Foro is forced to employ an administrative staff of three. He reported that relations with the SO1 team, which has demonstrated "sensitivity and patience," are very good. Further, he indicated that he knew SO1 well, as he had worked on the PARDEM project paper. He felt that USAID's decision to leave "lost causes" (i.e., work with the GOP) was a good one.

In its first phase from 1993 to 1995, Foro conducted a national assessment of democratic governability using a participatory methodology called, *El Experto y El Ciudadano* (the Expert and the Citizen) to identify major problems. This resulted in publication of a book with analyses of 15 issues by specialists in those fields. The president then chose the issues he considered most important for further investigation, and Foro published a number of books on those subjects (i.e., Reform of the Executive Branch, Youth, Poverty, Sustainable Development, Environment, Judicial Reform, Vision of Peru, and so forth – see the Documents Annex for more details). While an interdisciplinary group was formed for the first book mentioned, for the most part others have been written by individuals chosen as experts in their fields, with topics selected by Foro.

At the time of this evaluation, the final Agenda report was being edited by the president, who is also co-coordinator of the Agenda project. He stated that the full report will contain 320 pages, and will also be published in comic book format and as newspaper supplements; it was not yet clear when this might happen. Meanwhile, in January a summary of the activity and one chapter

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<sup>6</sup> A second Foro sub-activity dedicated to university youth is treated separately under the section on Civic Education.

was published in a document titled, *Perú: Agenda y Estrategia para el Siglo 21, Informe Final del Proyecto Agenda: Perú*.

### **Observations**

Based on a review of relevant documents and interviews with key informants, our major findings concerning this sub-activity include the following.

There was no clear evidence that a “consensus democracy agenda for the country” has been forged or that elements of the strategies elaborated by Foro have been incorporated into the platforms of political parties. The delayed publication schedule and dissemination effort makes it increasingly less likely that significant impact will be achieved during the current election cycle.

Most SO1 counterparts were familiar with the individuals involved in Foro, and felt they were highly-committed scholars and experienced professionals. However, an overwhelming majority were unfamiliar with the Agenda. Those who did know about it felt it was a largely academic exercise by a few individuals, rather than the result of a participatory process. Some termed the effort “*machista*,” holding that it has failed to incorporate important gender considerations.

Because the strategies included in the Agenda are designed for 20 years hence, and given the urgent sense of need for “*institucionalidad democrática*” (democratic institutionality – an need expressed frequently during this evaluation), it seems unlikely that this sub-activity will produce any meaningful impact on the body politic.

Based on criteria related to the expectations articulated in USAID documents and the limited number of persons reached through this effort, its cost-effectiveness is found to be highly questionable, particularly as compared with other sub-activities and in light of SO1’s extremely small budget.

In reflecting on the future, the president of Foro mentioned a number of issues he sees as high priorities, including reform of the state and of the judiciary, local government/decentralization, citizen education/media dissemination, human rights training for teachers, advocacy training, and the formation of rapid response teams within political parties. In terms of USAID strategy, he felt SO1 should invest in preparing the next generation to govern. He suggested this could be done by supporting a one-year, half-time masters program of technical courses on mid-level management, conducted perhaps by a consortium with Catholic University and two other universities, so that each would bear only one-third of the cost. Evaluators find these suggestions to be impractical in light of SO1’s goals, the need to focus on the shorter-term, and the limited resources available.

**B. APOYO Institute (AI):** This is the nonprofit arm of the Grupo APOYO, a for-profit firm, which was founded 23 years ago to conduct economic surveys and consultancies for the public and private sector. The Institute was created in 1989, and works only on social and constitutional policy issues. It has 15 members, who are its employees, and its Board is made up of representatives of the for-profit firm, plus the Executive Director of the Institute. AI was

awarded an SO1 grant for \$333,782 for the period from September 1996 to June 1998 to implement an activity aimed at improving the functioning of the Peruvian Congress. Under PARTICIPE, a second grant was awarded for the period from September 1999 to May 2000. This provided \$100,000 for a program titled, "Agenda for the First Decade" (AI is to provide \$42,800 in counterpart funds). No specific results, performance indicators or targets for this sub-activity appear in the PARTICIPE Results Framework. In discussing indicators, AI interviewees explained only the type of activities carried out and the number of individuals involved.

Phase one of the AI Agenda activity was funded by the National Endowment for Democracy. It involved the formation of eight Task Forces to deal with key issues selected by the Institute: Reform of the State/Decentralization; Local Government; Political and Legislative Reform; Judicial Reform; Public Safety; Education; Health; and Poverty. Each Task Force (TF) included a head researcher, a journalist, a representative of the business community, a politician, and a top public official, among others. A total of 60 individuals were recruited as members of the various TFs. A basic document for each TF was drafted by the head researcher, and three meetings of the TFs were held between June and October 1999. Following those meetings and approval of the resultant documents by the TFs, a conference was held in Lima to disseminate findings. Each document contains a compilation of the various options identified by the TF for dealing with the topic at hand, rather than a single consensus strategy.

The SO1 grant supports phase two of the TF activity. Specifically, it aims to: a) do further research on specific topics; b) decentralize TF dialogue to the provinces in order to share results and incorporate new perspectives; and c) broadly disseminate overall results (with the assistance of the journalists on the various TFs). At the time of this evaluation, the first two components had been completed. For the second component, two workshops had been held – one on November 26, 1999 in Tarapoto with 50 participants and co-sponsored by AMRESAM (Association of Municipalities of the San Martin Region), and the second on December 17 in Piura with 40 participants and the cooperation of CIPCA (Center for the Investigation and Promotion of Rural People). In each case, a USAID representative (from SO5 and SO1) was present. At both events, selected topics among the eight were presented and discussed. The conclusions reached by participants are included in the final TF reports as addenda to the basic documents, thus adding to the number of options discussed, rather than being incorporated into those already identified.

To initiate the third sub-activity component, on January 18 a Journalists Round Table with some 30 editors, reporters and anchors was held in Lima to disseminate results. At that session (attended by the USAID/ODI Chief), two of the eight topics were presented, while a complete set of TF documents was distributed to all attendees. This was followed on January 20 by presentation of the eight TF documents at a meeting sponsored by CADE, an influential business association. That event was attended by representatives of all presidential candidates, with the exception of Fujimori. Both events generated considerable press coverage. The remainder of the dissemination campaign was still in the planning stage at the time of this evaluation.

### **Observations**

If they were to repeat this experience, AI representatives said they would include a longer period of time for planning and implementation. They would also include a greater dissemination effort, but said they were unsure how to do this, noting that this could be taken advantage of for political purposes (though it is unclear why this could not be used to advantage). These interviewees also felt that simpler versions of the eight TF documents could be produced in order to reach a broader audience. They are eager to capitalize on efforts to date, and reported they are already seeking funding for annual meetings of the TFs – something that members responded positively to in a brief AI questionnaire. The idea is that the documents already produced could serve as a baseline against which TF members could monitor progress over time. Also, AI would keep in touch with TF members and further strengthen this multi-sectoral network by making greater use of the internet/e-mail.

With regard to the national context, AI interviewees were convinced that Fujimori will not have a majority in the new Congress, and that this is both an opportunity and a threat. They felt that the challenge will be to convert this into something positive. One way to do that, they opined, would be to seize the period between April 9 and July 28 (when Congress takes office) as an opportunity to provide training for new members and their staff. AI feels this is when newly-elected and inexperienced members of Congress will be most receptive and appreciative of any help they can get. To do this, AI reported it is developing a plan and seeking funding to conduct a seminar for Congress and staff to be held during the interim period.

In terms of SO1 strategy, AI believes that a continuation of current support for civil society organizations could impact the quality of the political parties by 2005, asserting that it is only then that there will be an opportunity to improve the parties. Therefore, these interviewees recommend that the priority now be to strengthen civil society. They wondered: “How well do NGOs really function internally?” – a question they felt merits investigation, noting further that “each piece now works separately.” AI representatives recommended that SO1 strategy be divided into four time periods: now to the April 9 elections; April-July to see if Fujimori retains a majority in Congress; July 2000-July 2002 when municipal elections will again be held; and 2002-onward. They strongly recommended that USAID should better orchestrate the efforts of its counterparts by convening meetings to explain “*a dónde vamos todos*” (where we are all going together).

## ***PART TWO – OVERALL FINDINGS***

This section discusses overall findings as they emerged from our examination of the various sub-activities. This responds to the charge contained in the SOW to look at sub-activity impact against the PARTICIPE objectives, and against the Mission’s strategic framework for democracy (i.e., against the IRs and the SO itself).

To set the stage for that discussion, it is important first to share findings of a more contextual nature, given that the general political situation significantly affects all SO1 sub-activities. Therefore, the first four findings in this section should be viewed as an environmental framework within which to consider further the information presented in Part One of this Chapter.

## **The Current Context**

1. The lack of political will on the part of the government of Peru to institute reforms in the electoral, judicial and other key systems has continued to weaken the democratic process and to mitigate against meaningful citizen participation in the country's governance. Indeed, the GOP's resistance to strengthening the capacity of governmental institutions to respond to citizens' demands was reported to have increased in this pre-electoral period. A number of key informants predicted that the gravity of this situation will worsen significantly in the president's next term.
2. The weakening of key private sector institutions in recent years, particularly political parties and civil society organizations, has caused a further loss of faith among citizens in the democratic process. This has been exacerbated by the worsening economic situation and the sense that democracy won't put food on the table. The civil society sector - which could provide a counterbalance to government and help build citizen confidence - was found to be fragmented, weakened and not well prepared to stimulate proactive citizen participation in the governance process or to advocate effectively on behalf of citizens' interests. No clear evidence was found of proactive initiatives to strengthen this sector as a whole.
3. While the re-election of president Fujimori was seen as a foregone conclusion by all those contacted, the high level of anxiety surrounding the post-electoral period appears to have caused a correspondingly high level of uncertainty among civil society organizations as to just what to do after the April vote. Questions such as whether it will take one or two rounds to win, whether the government will retain a majority in Congress, what will happen between April 9 and July 28, whether pending legislative initiatives will be taken up in the new term, and so forth appear to be keeping many NGOs off balance. As a result of these uncertainties, it was found that, for the most part, SO1 counterparts have not yet developed concrete plans for dealing with the various scenarios that may emerge during the post-electoral period.
4. Political debate is highly segmented and limited, with that space occupied largely by political elites and academic analysts. At the grassroots level, there is an underlying sense of fear and intimidation which blocks meaningful engagement in the political process. This has resulted in a serious disconnect between the population at large and those engaged in the political/electoral process.

## **Overarching Findings Emerging from the Analysis of SO1 Sub-Activities**

5. Relations between SO1 team members and counterparts were reported by one and all to be excellent. It was found that there is universal high regard and respect for the team, which means that USAID has significant influence or *poder de convocatoria* among SO1 counterparts. This sense of good will and confidence will be important for shaping and implementing future DG strategies. USAID's image among donors participating in the Governance Group and other key informants was also highly positive; the current demand-based DG strategy was even referred to as a "model" for others.

6. While recommendations from past evaluations appear to have been addressed by the SO1 team in as far as possible given the deteriorating political climate, some still pertain. For example, the September 1997 GRADE evaluation spoke of the need for the “design [of] a better system for measuring program impact and sustainability,” the necessity of “strengthening sub-grant evaluation and impact measurement,” and the establishment of “greater communication among the diverse... initiatives in order to share strategies and compare modes of delivery.” The latter view was again expressed in 1999 during the USAID Partners Retreat, when the Development of Synergies group recommended that the Mission should promote synergy in a participatory manner, focusing on joint activities within and between SOs. While the SO1 team communicates with the other SOs, concrete collaboration and joint funding at the activity level were found with SO3, SO5 and SpO6. Also, the November 1997 IFES evaluation highlighted the need to strengthen an existing civil society organization (*Transparencia* was mentioned as the likely candidate) as a “watchdog over issues of electoral transparency, integrity and reform.” The evaluation suggested that this be done through the development of a general endowment or trust fund to help ensure sustainability. While SO1 support has clearly strengthened this counterpart, its future appears to remain precarious. The SO1 team reported that this has been the subject of on-going discussions this year, as well as a USAID-financed evaluation.
7. The successful mechanisms and methodologies outlined in the February 1998 evaluation report on the Local Government Development Project (SO5) provide valuable clues for developing approaches related to decentralization and the strengthening of municipal democratic governance and community participation in other (non-coca) areas. The emergence and operation of the Association of Municipalities of the San Martin Region (AMRESAM) was found to provide particularly relevant lessons for possible application in other parts of the country under SO1/IR3.
8. Nearly all counterparts were unfamiliar with SO1’s overall strategy and the array of organizations receiving support. Nor were they aware that the three key themes identified in the PARTICIPE activity description were to be integrated into all SO1 programs: 1) need for and importance of independent institutions; 2) need for and importance of decentralization; and 3) need for greater participation by all Peruvians in public debate and decision-making processes. It was suggested by a number of interviewees that information be sent to counterparts about all SO1 activities underway and appropriate USAID contacts, and it was universally recommended that the SO1 team convene meetings of all counterparts to discuss priority issues and ways to achieve greater synergy.
9. With few exceptions, there was a marked lack of coordination and collaboration among SO1 counterparts, who tend to work within their own spheres of interest, while unaware of what others are doing within or outside of those areas. This was found to be the case not only in Lima, but also in the smaller communities visited during field trips. The major exception to this was found among counterparts active in the current electoral process. The SO1 team has facilitated a highly-effective process of coordination among those organizations, whose representatives meet together regularly to share information and discuss tactics. Nevertheless, communication between that sector and others is virtually non-existent and,

among individuals associated with other counterparts, communication was reported to be largely at a personal level. Of the examples found of institutional coordination between and among other sub-activities, some appeared to be almost accidental, rather than as a result of joint planning processes.

10. Networks of varying size and purpose have been created or facilitated by nearly all counterparts. However, these tend to work in isolation from one another, even when co-located in smaller communities outside of Lima. Thus, potential synergies that could maximize results for all concerned tend to be lost.
11. The activities undertaken by many of the NGOs contacted do not reflect an institutional capacity for solid strategic planning; they tend to concentrate on the achievement of long-term, generalized goals, with no clear indication of intermediate results. Exceptions to this long-term focus were found among those counterparts engaged in the electoral process and, to a lesser extent, those that concentrate on use of the media to inform members of the public about their civic rights and responsibilities.
12. It was found that a number of sub-activities employ the use of press releases, videotapes, the internet, and radio and television programs as part of their citizen and voter education efforts. Because of the wide variety of these dissemination efforts, it was not possible for evaluators to arrive at an overall finding with regard to their effectiveness. Though radio was reported to be the most important medium for reaching the majority of the population, the sub-activities underway within this arena concentrate largely on TV and the written press rather than radio, and are designed mainly to support election-related efforts.
13. With regard to sub-activity performance indicators and the timely collection of data, there appears to be a disconnect between the SO1 team and individual counterparts, some of whom tend to measure progress by their own separate sets of indicators, while failing to gather and transmit data in accordance with the results frameworks included in their grants or to submit reports in a timely manner. Most counterparts seemed unclear about how to measure the impact of their activities vs. the quantitative outputs, or how to develop appropriate indicators for that purpose.
14. “Umbrella” grants involving two or more NGOs appear to be promising mechanisms for administering sub-activities while reducing the SO1 team’s management burden. However, as currently employed, their potential has not been maximized. The two umbrella grants examined (PROMUJER and CIDE/TAREA), were created at the behest of USAID, which suggested to applicants working on the same issue that their individual proposals be combined in a single contract. The contracts office reported that it had encouraged such arrangements as a way to save time. However, the time saved appears to accrue mostly to that office. This is because, while financial reporting is combined, thus reducing the volume of work for contract personnel, each NGO continues to carry out its own separate project under the umbrella and files separate reports. In discussing future SO1 strategies, several NGOs suggested the desirability of forming consortia, in which a number of organizations - including groups from key regions of the country outside of Lima - undertake a single project.

15. There was broad consensus among interviewees that USAID DG strategies should give priority to two areas: strengthening the civil society sector as a valid interlocutor and facilitator of relations between citizens and selected government authorities, and work at the level of local government to strengthen both municipal management and the ability of citizens to represent their interests in the decision-making process. Such initiatives were felt to be particularly important in view of the central government's disinterest in democratic reforms and greater citizen participation, and the consequent need to build an appreciation of democratic governance by targeting institutions to which citizens can have direct access. It was pointed out that work at the local level would also help to prepare municipalities for decentralization, if and when that process should occur.

## ***CHAPTER FOUR – CONCLUSIONS***

Based on an analysis of the foregoing findings, this Chapter presents the overall conclusions drawn by evaluators in response to the questions posed in the Scope of Work, particularly at the level of the PARTICIPE program and SO1. These conclusions then become the basis for the recommendations offered in the next and final Chapter of this report.

- A. Clearly, USAID/Peru’s decision to emphasize a demand-based strategy for its Democracy Program during the period leading up to the year 2000 elections was a sound one. That determination greatly enhanced the Mission’s potential for achieving SO1: “broader citizen participation in democratic processes.”
- B. Of the current sub-activities examined, it is clear that those working in the area of human rights (Office of the Ombudsman, CNDDHH, IPEDEHP) have achieved significant impact on citizen awareness and participation, including male/female and Quechua-speaking sub-groups. Not only have these organizations achieved impressive results of their own, but they have actively coordinated their efforts, making for a whole greater than the sum of its parts.
- C. While many of the other sub-activities studied appear to be well on the way to meeting their respective goals, objectives and expected results, it is not possible at this time to gauge their impact on the civic/democratic awareness and participation practices of the intended beneficiary populations. This is due to several factors:
  - ◆ The impact of various sub-activities is directly related to the results of the April elections (PROMUJER, SER, Transparencia) and can only be measured once that process is completed;
  - ◆ In two cases (FORO Nacional/Internacional and the APOYO Institute), impact will be a function of the degree to which the agendas they have produced are considered by candidates and are discussed and espoused by newly-elected political leaders;
  - ◆ In other cases, the true impact on the awareness and participation practices of the beneficiary populations will not be known except in the mid- or long-term (CIDE/TAREA, Foro Juventud, IDS).
- D. The lowest degree of impact on citizen education and participation corresponds to those sub-activities that were designed to serve individual beneficiaries through conciliation services and free legal assistance, and do not undertake policy-related advocacy or dissemination efforts (Chamber of Commerce, IPRECON, APENAC, Ministry of Justice).
- E. With regard to the institutionalization of sub-activities within grantee organizations, there is no doubt that the desire to do so is strong. However, the ability of grantees to achieve this is mixed. Most participating NGOs have small amounts of funding available for this purpose, and many have already prepared proposals to obtain additional resources – either from USAID or other donors. Organizations that are well established and whose primary mission coincides with the sub-activities underway (Ombudsman’s Office, CNDDHH, IPEDEHP,

Manuela Ramos, Calandria, CESIP, SER, CIDE, TAREA, APENAC, MinJus) are most likely to institutionalize results.

- F. Increased communication and coordination among all SO1 counterparts could produce more effective results at the SO level by capitalizing on potential synergies. Meanwhile, there are clear multiplier effects among those organizations using methodologies and practices pioneered by other grantees including, for example, IPEDEHP's training methodology and the election-related materials produced by *Transparencia* and SER.
- G. The cost-effectiveness of the various sub-activities is clearly a function of the size of the SO1 budget, the number of citizens reached, the efficacy of the program in terms of impact, and the size of the SO1 budget. On that basis, we must conclude that, to date, the most cost-effective interventions have been those related to human rights. Activities designed by IDS to use the electronic media for democracy education are promising in terms of their potential for reaching large numbers of citizens in a cost-effective manner. However, they are too new to have produced measurable results. Using fore-mentioned criteria, we conclude that the least cost-effective sub-activities are those that reach very small numbers of beneficiaries while not proactively advocating for policy change (Chamber of Commerce, IPRECON, APENAC, Ministry of Justice, APOYO Institute) and those that propose long-term solutions and involve a relatively limited number of beneficiaries (FORO Nacional/Internacional, CIDE/TAREA, Foro Juventud).
- H. Because of the diverse nature of, and results expected from, the various sub-activities supported under the four Intermediate Results (IRs), it is not feasible to assess overall impact at that level. This is further complicated by the fact that indicators lack consistency across similar programs; different variables are being tracked, which makes comparison especially difficult and creates an "apples and oranges" effect. Moreover, it is not clear that successful completion of the goals, objectives and expected results of the sub-activities reviewed under IR2 and IR4 will, in fact, produce the results expected at the IR level. Meanwhile, activities under IR1 and IR3 are too few to achieve any significant progress toward meeting those results as currently stated. A careful review and revision of IRs is needed to better match sub-activities with desired results.
- I. With regard to results at the level of the PARTICIPE program and the SO1 framework, because over two-thirds of available funding is dedicated to election-related indicators (with targets set for 2001), impact cannot yet be accurately assessed.
- J. The five-year post-electoral period will be a crucial time of transition in Peru – marked by both opportunities and challenges - during which to lay the groundwork for sustainable democratic institutions and strengthen civil society as a sector. There is an urgent need for carefully-planned strategies to maximize those opportunities and effectively deal with the challenges that will surely arise during this critical period if increased citizen awareness and participation are to be achieved.
- K. Because democratic governance affects all substantive initiatives, a more proactive effort within USAID/Peru to ensure that DG approaches are integrated into all areas of the

Mission's portfolio, while not depending solely on the disproportionately small budget allocated to SO1, would help to ensure the success of all concerned and broaden citizen participation in democratic processes.

## ***CHAPTER FIVE – RECOMMENDATIONS***

As explained by Mission management, later this year USAID/Peru will have an opportunity to propose its new five-year strategy to Agency officials. Decisions concerning future programming always involve complex trade-offs between competing priorities, and are often constrained by budget allocations restricted to certain types of activities. Understanding the challenges inherent in the planning process, and in response to the objectives laid out in the Scope of Work, the evaluation team offers the following recommendations in the hope that they will help to facilitate that process.

1. The bulk of SO1 support should be targeted to the achievement of clear and specific results within the five-year period following the 2000 elections, rather than aiming for longer-term impact. IRs should be revised and re-aligned in accordance with this new focus. Citizen education through the media, particularly radio and television, along with the strengthening of civil society and participatory approaches to local governance should be given priority.
2. The SO1 team should take the initiative to achieve greater synergy among counterpart organizations, while strengthening the civil society sector, by creating incentives for increased cooperation among sub-activities. These might include support for a “*Centro de Encuentro de la Sociedad Civil Sobre Democracia*” to coordinate the sharing of materials and methodologies (to avoid duplication of effort), and organize capacity-building activities, such as discussion groups, retreats and site visits among counterparts, advocacy and other training, and so forth.
3. To reduce the management burden on SO1 team members, while providing more time for strategic thinking and planning, activities designed and implemented jointly by consortia of two or more organizations should be encouraged. A strong preference for such collaborative efforts or “umbrella projects,” especially those that pair Lima-based organizations with partners located in the provinces, with overall results frameworks and the regular collection of performance data, should be clearly stated in future calls for proposals. This does not mean to suggest that applicant organizations should be encouraged to merge; only that two or more independent entities join together in a single enterprise.
4. Because the need for democratic governance affects the potential for success of all activities and is a high priority for the U.S. Country Team, USAID Mission officials should ensure that democratic principles, such as transparency and citizen participation, are incorporated into all programmatic initiatives. They should also seek to develop increased cross-sectoral linkages between SO1 and other SOs, identifying and capitalizing on opportunities for joint activities in pursuit of complementary objectives.
5. Mission management should give special attention to the re-location and consolidation of efforts aimed at local government, moving those activities beyond SO5 in the pursuit of overall Mission goals while taking advantage of the successes achieved by the Local Government Development Project. This could be accomplished by placing all local government initiatives under SO1/IR3 (or whichever IR is most appropriate in the new DG

strategy), with subdivisions for activities within coca-growing areas and those undertaken outside of those areas, similar to SO2/PRA/MSP activities.

6. If it is determined that work in the area of basic education is to continue, and sufficient resources become available, the Mission should consider creation of a separate education SO, along with appropriate performance and impact indicators to measure results related to basic education and the longer-term development of the country's human resource base.
7. The DG Assessment Team should develop alternative political scenarios based on the results of the 2000 elections. These should include in-depth examinations of the three areas the evaluation team considers to be particularly important for USAID interventions within the next five years:
  - ◆ the structure and dynamics of Peruvian civil society, as well as its potential for serving as a counterbalance to government and contributing to the process of democratization;
  - ◆ the policy and legal framework for decentralization, along with the strengthening of local government and citizen involvement at that level; and
  - ◆ the role of the media (particularly radio and television) in democracy education and public debate concerning policy issues.

*ANNEX A:*  
**Scope of Work**  
**Evaluation Plan**

## Scope of Work

### Evaluation of USAID/Peru's Democracy Education Activities

USAID/Peru, through its Office of Democratic Initiatives (ODI), wishes to contract the services of an evaluation team to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of selected activities that form part of USAID/Peru's program in support of its Strategic Objective No. 1: "Broader Citizen Participation in Democratic Processes."

#### **Background**

The USAID Mission in Peru is implementing a series of activities under its current strategic plan that covers the period 1997-2001. The objective of this plan is to promote broad-based sustainable social and economic development in Peru. The plan includes six strategic objectives: broader citizen participation in democratic processes; increased incomes for the poor; improved health, including family planning, of high-risk populations; improved environmental management of targeted sectors; reduced illicit coca production in target areas; and expanded opportunities for girls' basic education in target areas.

USAID/Peru's activities in support of democracy and implemented by the SO1 team place emphasis on the areas of the country most affected by poverty and inequality of participation in decision-making processes. To achieve its democracy objective, the Mission proposed four intermediate results (IRs) in the 1997-2001 strategy:

- IR1-More Effective Selected National Institutions,
- IR2-Greater Access to Justice,
- IR3 Local Governments More Responsive to Their Constituents, and
- IR4-Citizens Better Prepared to Exercise Their Rights and Responsibilities.

The SO1 team implements activities in support of these IRs and the overall SO under two large umbrella projects. These projects are "Participatory Democracy," or PARDEM, which was authorized in 1994 and is thus somewhat outdated in design given the constantly evolving political environment in Peru<sup>7</sup>, and "Citizen Participation and Access to Justice," or PARTICIPE, which was authorized just recently in March 1999. The PARDEM project is nearing its termination date of September 30, 2000 and funding for its activities has been fully obligated. The purpose of PARDEM has been to strengthen democratic systems of government

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<sup>7</sup> The design assumed increasing political will on the part of the government to institute democratic reforms and thus proposed to work fairly intensively with government institutions. This assumption has unfortunately not withstood the test of time and the Mission has deviated somewhat from the original design as a result.

that empower both Peru's citizenry to express its needs and its government to respond effectively.

The complex development of democracy in Peru over the last few years has been characterized by the progressive weakening of the democratic system in the country. This new and significant challenge, combined with the upcoming general elections scheduled for April 9, 2000, led the SO1 team to revise somewhat its strategic approach to democratic strengthening in Peru. (See "Strategic Focus of the USAID/Peru Democracy Program for the 18-Month Period Leading Up to the year 2000 Elections," the document referenced in Section V). In response to this strategic shift, in March 1999 the PARTICIPE activity was designed and approved.

The purpose of PARTICIPE is to increase awareness among citizens of their rights and responsibilities and to enhance the responsiveness of government institutions that citizens interact with in exercising their rights. PARTICIPE supports the same four IRs described above but places special emphasis on IRs 2 and 4 and focuses on the most vulnerable groups in rural and marginalized urban areas of the country. The end of the PARTICIPE activity coincides with the end of the USAID/Peru's strategic plan in September 2001, and PARTICIPE will fund SO1 activities from now through the end of the current strategy period – September 2001.

Within the Mission portfolio, funding for democracy activities under SO1 has been limited in comparison with funding for other activities under other Mission SOs. For the past three years, the total fiscal year budget for SO1 has been approximately \$3.0 million, or 3-5% of USAID/Peru's annual budget. Taking into account some alternative development monies spent on local government strengthening and other democracy-related activities, over the last three years approximately 10% of the Mission's overall budget has been spent in support of democracy activities.

During FY 2000, the USAID Mission will be developing a new five to eight-year Strategic Plan to promote sustainable development in Peru. Part of this new Mission plan will be continued support for democratic development. The evaluation of selected democracy activities (i.e., sub-activities under PARDEM and PARTICIPE) will therefore provide important lessons learned for this strategy development exercise.

With the need to develop a new democracy strategy on the horizon and with pivotal elections slated for April 2000, the SO1 team is planning to contract as well for a Democracy and Governance Assessment to gain a deeper understanding of the key issues facing democratic development in Peru. The team expects this assessment to analyze the status of democratic development in Peru, incorporate lessons learned from USAID's democracy interventions, and make concrete recommendations on programmatic directions for the future. USAID/Peru sees the evaluation of selected sub-activities in democracy as an integral and preliminary component of the Democracy and Governance Assessment and development of the new democracy strategy for Peru. A separate Scope of Work, however, will address the work to be carried out for the Democracy and Governance Assessment.

The evaluation of selected sub-activities in democracy -- the subject of this current scope of work -- will assess the level of impact USAID/Peru has achieved through its democracy

education and awareness activities. The groups of sub-activities the evaluators will be asked to review involve democracy education and awareness interventions in the following areas: human rights education for community leaders, democratic education in public schools and with university and other youth groups, voter education, and education of the public on extra-judicial conciliation and other alternative means of access to justice for the poor, among other civic education and awareness activities. The evaluators are being asked to examine the Mission's hypothesis that by educating and promoting awareness of Peruvian citizens – and particularly disadvantaged citizens – about their rights and responsibilities, these citizens will participate more, defend their rights more actively and demand more vigorously from the State effective democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law. In preparing its new strategy, the Mission is keenly interested in knowing to what degree its “demand-based” strategy of stimulating democratic participation has been effective and whether similar interventions should be pursued in the future.

### **Objectives of the Evaluation**

The evaluation has the following fundamental objectives:

- 2.1 Determine the impact and degree of influence of selected democracy education and awareness activities in terms of advancing the Mission's democracy objective.
- 1.2 Identify best practices, methodologies, lessons learned and make recommendations that will facilitate an in-depth Democracy and Governance Assessment and subsequent design of a new USAID strategy for democratic development in Peru.

The evaluation should emphasize and respond to the following:

- Goals, objectives and expected results of the selected sub-activities, the PARTICIPE project and the SO1 results framework, in order to evaluate planned versus actual impacts of the education and awareness components of the selected sub-activities.
- Degree of sub-activity impact on the civic/democratic awareness and participation practices of the intended beneficiary populations.
- The relative institutionalization of the sub-activity impacts, including possible multiplier effects and generalized usage of methodologies and practices.
- The cost-effectiveness of sub-activities.
- Identification of the principle lessons learned, difficulties and perspectives. The team will assess the impact of each sub-activity or element thereof against the specific objectives established for that sub-activity, for PARTICIPE and against the Mission's strategic framework for democracy (i.e., against the IRs, SO and indicators related thereto). Less attention may be given to the goals and objectives for PARDEM as there has been substantial “water under the bridge” since it was designed in 1994 and the Mission's democracy program has necessarily operated on a “rolling” design basis since then.

### **Period of Time the Evaluation Will Cover**

The team will evaluate three fiscal years of support for democracy in Peru: FYs 1997, 1998 and 1999. In order to make the link between past activities and the current selected sub-activities that are to be evaluated, and to provide adequate context to the current interventions being carried out, the evaluation team will review previous evaluations and case studies conducted under the PARDEM and Alternative Development activities, including those of the:

- GRADE civic education project (PARDEM)
- CRS human rights project (PARDEM)
- IFES elections support project (PARDEM)
- IPEDEPH project (PARDEM/PARTICIPE)
- Transparencia project (PARTICIPE) (in process, preliminary sections available)
- Municipal Development Programs (Alternative Development Project)

The SO1 team will make these reports available to the evaluation team immediately upon commencing work.

### **Sub-Activities to Evaluate**

The evaluation will involve a review of the various approaches to democracy education and awareness that the Mission has utilized through the following activities (the evaluation plan will give relatively greater weight to those activities with asterisks as the SO1 team has less information on their possible impacts – either because they are newer activities or employ newer approaches, or because the connection between the activities and possible participation-related behavioral changes are less obvious or direct):

#### **4.1 IR1: More Effective National Institutions**

- Public awareness activities on human rights conducted by the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman
- Dissemination of rights, legal education, and benefits of conciliation as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, provided through free legal assistance and conciliation services (Ministry of Justice) \*

#### **4.2 IR2: Greater Access to Justice**

- Public awareness and training in conciliation and conflict resolution (Chamber of Commerce, IPRECON, APENAC) \*
- Human rights awareness through the National Coordinator for Human Rights \*

#### **4.3 IR3: Local Governments That Respond to the Needs of Their Constituents**

- Training on mechanisms for citizen participation through the Local Government Development Program (implemented through the Alternative Development Strategic Objective - the evaluation may be limited to a review of the latest project evaluation as this activity is funded through another SO)

#### 4.4 IR4: Citizens Better Prepared to Exercise Their Rights and Responsibilities

- Training of community leaders as human rights promoters (IPEDEHP)
- Promotion of women's political participation (PROMUJER) \*
- Voter education in rural areas (SER) \*
- Democratic education and student participation in public schools (CIDE/TAREA)\*
- Participation of youth in national life (FORO Nacional/Internacional) \*
- Voter education and public awareness on electoral issues (Transparencia)
- Democracy education through provincial television programs (IDS) \*
- Dissemination of results of citizens' consensus visions for a future Peru (FORO Nacional/Internacional) \*
- Dissemination of results of the Task Forces program which developed consensus-based policy recommendations in eight areas (Instituto APOYO)

#### **Methodology**

- This evaluation will be an external evaluation, but should be conducted in consultation with USAID/Peru to ensure the team has the fullest possible background and contact information. The key issues to be addressed by the evaluation should be developed in consultation with the SO1 team during the evaluation team's first visit to Peru. The methodological instruments to be used should focus on obtaining information and opinions from counterparts, beneficiaries and other donors. The team is free to conduct complementary techniques for evaluating the selected sub-activities as surveys and focus groups.
- The evaluation team may wish to consider starting its work with a paper review. This would include a review of: 1) the Mission's 1997-2001 democracy strategy; 2) the democracy analysis document prepared by the SO1 team; 3) previous activity evaluations; 4) the "Strategic Focus of the USAID/Peru Democracy Program for the 18-Month Period Leading up to the Year 2000 Elections" document; and 5) current activity designs, to understand the context for the review and determine where to place emphasis on field visits and interviews. The SO1 team will provide these and any other documents the evaluations team requests.
- Once the evaluation team determines which sub-activities and/or elements thereof to focus on, it shall develop an agenda of interviews with project implementors, field visits/interviews and focus groups with beneficiaries and events in process to attend, and will review didactic materials from the selected sub-activities. The SO1 team will facilitate these visits and interviews by providing:
  - a list of key contacts per sub-activity for interviews, including experts in various sub-sectors of democracy, activity coordinators, counterpart organizations, donor organizations and direct and indirect beneficiaries.
  - Suggested locations for field visits, i.e., areas where there is a high concentration of sub-activities to be evaluated.

In addition, for each sub-activity to be evaluated, the team should consider:

- a) evaluating a representative sample that facilitates generalized results
- b) assessing field activities in at least three locations in addition to Lima to facilitate identification of basic points of comparison and analysis. In the interests of cost and overall effort, the team will select areas where the selected sub-activities are concentrated.

## **Evaluation Type and Team Composition**

### **6.1 Type of Evaluation**

This evaluation is intended to be an external evaluation. Members of the SO1 team will serve as resources, facilitators and coordinators to the extent that the evaluation team requires or desires such assistance.

### **6.2. Profile and Composition of the Evaluation Team**

Given the nature of the sub-activities to be evaluated, the evaluation team should include the following skills/characteristics:

- The evaluation team should be comprised of four members (1 team leader, 2 mid-level professionals, and 1 Jr. professional). At least one team member will have intimate, in-depth and broad-based knowledge and experience with the political context and democratic development of Peru over the last 15 years, gained through living and/or working in Peru. It is also expected that one team member should have expertise in evaluating gender issues as a programmatic focus.
- The team will have expertise in democracy, preferably with experience in conducting evaluations in Peru, or at a minimum in other countries in Latin America.
- Team members will have the ability to interact with people from many different social and economic backgrounds.
- All team members will have fluency in Spanish (FSI 4/4 or higher). The Team Leader will be fluent in English.
- The team will have knowledge of USAID operations and methodology for achieving results (managing for results, development of strategic frameworks with strategic objectives, intermediate results and indicators).

## **Schedule for the Evaluation**

The evaluation will take place over a period of 8 weeks, from January 17, 2000 to March 10, 2000.

### **7.1 Preparatory Phase (one week): January 17-23 (in U.S. or other home of record)**

- Review and analysis of documents

- Development of draft evaluation plan
- 7.2 Investigation and Information Collection Phase (four weeks): January 24 – February 18 (in Peru)
- Review of draft evaluation plan with USAID/Peru, preparation of final plan
  - Approval of evaluation plan by USAID/Peru
  - Meeting with SO1 team to finalize list of key questions to be included in the evaluation
  - Interviews with counterparts
  - Field visits
  - Meetings with other donors
  - Meetings with key people in civil society and government
  - De-briefing with the SO1 team and other Mission personnel to present preliminary findings and conclusions
- 7.3 Synthesis Phase (10 days): February 19 – 29 (in U.S. or other home of record)
- Analysis of all information gathered in-country
  - Preparation of the first draft of the report, including recommendations
  - Submission of the first draft to USAID/Peru’s SO1 team (February 25)
  - Selection and preparation of complementary information (annexes)
- 7.4 Presentation Phase (3 days): March 1 – March 3 (in Peru)
- Presentation of results and principle findings to USAID
  - Roundtable discussion of the draft evaluation report with USAID and selected counterparts or experts (in Spanish and English)
- 7.5 Final Phase (one week): March 4 – March 10 (in U.S. or other home of record)
- Revision of the final report to incorporate suggestions and recommendations from USAID and its counterparts in Peru
  - Submission/presentation of the final report to USAID/Peru (in English and in Spanish)
- 7.6 Principle Products and Tasks
- The contractor shall abide by all the tasks and time frames established in these Terms of Reference, particularly in Section VIII “Schedule for Evaluation.” If for any reason the contractor cannot comply with this schedule, the contractor will contact USAID/Peru immediately to agree on a solution to resolve any issues or problems that may arise with respect to the schedule of work.
  - Content of the Final Report: In addition to the key findings related to the evaluation of the selected sub-activities, the final report shall include an analysis of the effectiveness of SO1’s efforts in democratic education and whether and how it has advanced the Mission’s democracy objective in Peru. The final report shall include an executive

summary, a brief description of the methodology used in the evaluation, the body of the report, and a listing of recommendations for the Mission's follow-on democracy strategy.

- Presentation of the final report: The final written report will be presented in both English and Spanish. The contractor shall provide the SO1 team with three copies of the report in English and three copies in Spanish. The contractor shall also provide USAID/Peru with a copy of the final report on a 3.5" diskette in Microsoft Word for Windows, Version 97.

## Evaluation of USAID/Peru's Democracy Education Activities

### Evaluation Plan

I. **Preparatory Phase** (three days): January 19-26 (in U.S. & ')

- ◆ Review and analysis of key documents
- ◆ Begin developing draft evaluation plan

II. **Investigation and Information Collection Phase in Peru** (Jan. <sup>19</sup> *Jan 27 - Feb 19*)

- ◆ Review/approval of evaluation plan by USAID/Peru
- ◆ Meeting with SO1 team members to identify interviewees and field sites and finalize questions
- ◆ Interviews with counterparts and other key informants
- ◆ Field work in three sites
- ◆ De-briefing with the SO1 team and other Mission personnel to present preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations

The chronology of this phase is as follows:

| Date                          | Event & Person to Visit  | Responsible                                       |
|-------------------------------|--|---|
| Thur Jan 27                   | US & Argentine team members arrive in Lima   |   |
| Friday 28<br>9:00am<br>2:30pm | Team Planning Meeting (TPM) at Hotel Las Americas<br>Entry briefing at USAID/Peru  | Goodin, Vegas,<br>Guttmann, Mooney<br>(full team) |
| Sat 29<br>9:00am/<br>1:00pm   | TPM at Hotel:<br>Assign responsibilities by IR & counterparts<br>Distribute documents for paper review, including:<br>- Mission's 1997-2001 democracy strategy<br>- Democracy analysis doc. prepared by the SO1 team<br>- Previous activity evaluations<br>- Doc. On "Strategic Focus of USAID/P Dem. Prog. for 18-month Period Leading to 2000 Elections"<br>- Current activity designs & relevant contracts<br>Completion of evaluation plan and data collection instruments | Full team   |
| Afternoon                     | Work individually on respective components   |   |
| Mon 31<br>8:30am              | TPM at Hotel to verify status of preparations  | Full team   |

|             |  |                            |
|-------------|--|----------------------------|
| 10:00am     | Interview with María Antonieta Delgado at USAID  |                            |
| 11:00am     | Interview with Sobeida González at USAID   |                            |
| 12noon      | Interview with START team at USAID   |                            |
| 2:30pm      | Interview with Violeta Bermúdez at USAID   |                            |
| 3:30pm      | Meeting with Carrie Thompson for discussion/approval of proposed evaluation plan, field sites & report outline |                            |
| Tues. Feb 1 |  |                            |
| 9:00am      | Initiate scheduling of interviews & field trip logistics   | Vegas                      |
| 10:00am     | Interview with USAID Mission Director Tom Geiger   | Full team                  |
| 11:00am     | Other interview(s) at USAID  |                            |
| 2:00pm      | Initiate interviews with other key informants in Lima *  | “                          |
| Wed 2       | Interviews in Lima   | “                          |
| Thurs 3     | Interviews in Lima   | “                          |
| Friday 4    | Interviews in Lima   | “                          |
| Saturday 5  |  |                            |
| 9:00am      | TPM at Hotel   | “                          |
| Afternoon   | Interviews/data collection in Lima   |                            |
| Monday 7    | Interviews in Lima   | “                          |
| Tuesday 8   | Interviews in Lima   | “                          |
| Wed 9       | Travel to Ayacucho<br>Travel to Trujillo   | Goodin, Mooney<br>Guttman, |
|             | Field work in Ayacucho & Trujillo  | Goodin, Mooney,<br>Guttman |
| Thurs 10    | Continue field work  | “                          |
| Friday 11   | Return to Lima   | “                          |
| Saturday 12 | TPM to discuss findings and begin shaping conclusions  | Full team                  |
| Sunday 13   | Resume data collection in Lima<br>Travel to Tarapoto/Lamas   | Goodin, Mooney<br>Guttman  |
| 3:30pm      |  |                            |
| Monday 14   | Data collection in Lima & Tarapoto/Lamas   | Full team                  |

|                                |  |                   |
|--------------------------------|--|-------------------|
| Tuesday 15                     | Return from Tarapoto/Lamas   | Guttmann          |
| Wed 16                         | Drafting & TPM to agree on preliminary findings, conclusions & recommendations; prepare for de-briefing & report drafting                  | Full team         |
| Thurs 17                       | TPM to agree on preliminary results & de-briefing preparations   | “                 |
| Friday 18<br>9:00am            | Final preparations for de-briefing & departure   | “                 |
| 3:30pm                         | De-briefing with the SO1 team and other Mission personnel to present preliminary findings, conclusions & recommendations & elicit comments | “                 |
| Saturday 19                    | Departures from Peru   | Mooney & Guttmann |
|                                | Prepare Assessment Team TPM & work on draft report   | Goodin            |
| Monday 21<br>9:00am/<br>5:00pm | Facilitate Assessment Team TPM   | Goodin            |
| Tuesday 22                     | Morning departure from Peru  | Goodin            |

**Notes:**

1. During the course of this evaluation, it is our intention to maintain regular contact with the SO1 team, consulting on any outstanding issues or questions and keeping the COTR informed of progress.
2. While all team members will participate in initial meetings with the SO1 team and interviews with critically-important informants, in order to ensure the broadest possible coverage, individual team members will take lead responsible for the specific sub-activities/counterparts selected.
3. While members of the MSI team will meet frequently (even daily) on an informal basis, more formal TPMs are built into the evaluation plan to permit in-depth sharing of information and impressions related to the objectives of the evaluation. Thus, during the final debriefing with USAID on February 18, the team will be in a position to present a concise outline of preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations and seek initial reactions/comments from those in attendance. Those comments will then be taken into account when preparing the draft evaluation report.

4. Where possible, individual interviews will be supplemented by discussions/focus group interviews with sub-activity beneficiaries, as well as on-site observations of activities in progress.

\* Interviews are contemplated with representatives of the following sub-activities:

| Subject                                   | Organization                            | # of Inter.        | Respon. |
|---|---|--------------------|---------|
| IR1: More Effective National Institutions | 1. Ministry of Justice Rep.; Unit Chief | 2                  | MG      |
| IR2: Greater Access to Justice            | 1. Cámara de Comercio (Pres.& Area)     | 2                  | MG      |
|   | 2. IPRECON (Director & group)           | 1                  | "       |
|   | 3. APENAC " "                           | 1                  | "       |
|   | 4. CNDDHH (Director & Area)             | 2                  | JG/LM   |
|   | 5. Defensor del Pueblo                  | 1                  | "       |
| IR3: Local Govt.                          | (Review latest project evaluation)      | 0                  | JG      |
| IR4: Citizens Better Prepared             | 1. PROMUJER (each NGO)                  | 4                  | JG      |
|   | 2. SER                                  | 1                  | LM      |
|   | 3. CIDE                                 | 1                  | LM      |
|   | 4. TAREA                                | 1                  | LM      |
|   | 5. Foro Nacional/Internacional          | 1                  | JG/LM   |
|   | 6. IDS                                  | 1                  | JG/LM   |
| <b>TOTALS</b>                             | <b>12 Sub-Activity Organizations</b>    | <b>18 Intervs.</b> |         |

In addition to above counterparts and individuals recommended by the SO1 team, evaluators will collect information from other relevant organizations and donors, including:

1. USAID Assessment Team members present in Lima
2. Transparencia
3. APOYO
4. IPEDEHP
5. IDL
6. World Bank
7. IDB
8. GTZ
9. European Community

III. **Synthesis Phase:** February 23-March 10 (at home base)

- ◆ Analysis of all information gathered in-country
- ◆ Preparation of draft evaluation report
- ◆ Submission of draft report to USID/Peru's SO1 team (March 8)
- ◆ Selection and preparation of complementary information (annexes)

IV. **Presentation Phase:** 3 days between March 12-16 (in Peru)

- ◆ Presentation of draft report to USAID/Peru
- ◆ Roundtable discussion of the draft report with USAID and selected counterparts or experts (in Spanish and English)

V. **Final Phase:** 1 week between March 17-30 (in U.S.)

- ◆ Revision of the draft to incorporate suggestions and recommendations from USAID/Peru
- ◆ Submission of the final report to USAID/Peru (in English and Spanish)

*ANNEX B:*  
**Documents Reviewed**

## DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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*ANNEX C:*  
**Persons Interviewed**

## **PERSONS INTERVIEWED**

### **USAID/Peru**

Thomas L. Geiger, Director  
Carrie Thompson, Chief, Office of Democratic Initiatives (ODI)  
María Antonieta Delgado, Activity Manager, ODI  
Violeta Bermúdez, Activity Manager, ODI  
Sobeida Gonzales, Activity Manager, ODI  
Maruja Novoa, Program Assistant, ODI  
Cecilia Velasco, Program Assistant, ODI  
Teresa Pfeiffer, Program Assistant, ODI  
Tom Kellermann, Chief Program and Project Development Office  
Miriam Choy, Program Specialist, Strategic Analysis & Results Team (START)  
Rosa María Chávez, Program Specialist, START  
Esaú Hidalgo Murrieta, Office of Local Government & Alternative Development  
Peter Deinken, Coordinator, Alternative Development  
David L. Bayer, Deputy Executive Officer  
Kristin Langlykke, Coordinator, Girls' Education Project, Office of Health, Population  
and Nutrition  
Allen Eisenberg, Regional Contracts Officer  
Martin Fischer, Acquisition & Assistance Specialist

### **Peruvian Government**

#### **Defensoría del Pueblo:**

Jorge Santistevan, Defensor del Pueblo  
Rocío Villanueva Flores, Defensora Especializada en los Derechos de la Mujer  
Yolanda Falcón Lizaraso, Representante del Defensor del Pueblo en Trujillo  
Eliana Revollar Añaños, Representante del Defensor del Pueblo en Ayacucho

#### **Ministerio de Justicia:**

Natalia Ceballos Ríos, Directora Ejecutiva, Proyecto MINJUS-USAID  
Marco Antonio Moreno Gálvez, Jefe del Consultorio Jurídico Popular de Trujillo; Silvia  
Gutierrez Quesada, Conciliadora Extrajudicial del Consultorio Jurídico Popular de Trujillo

Municipalidad Distrital de Huanchaco; Trujillo: Fernando Bazán Pinillos, Alcalde; Jone  
Purizaga Chuyes, Regidora

Municipalidad Provincial de San Martín; Tarapoto: Marina Aguilar Zamora de Arévalo,  
Alcaldesa; Lily Tavera Pinto, Regidora; Belén Reátegui Valles, Jefa de la División del Programa  
del Vaso de Leche

Provincia de Julcán; Trujillo: Maribel Nery Mozo, Regidora de Educación, Cultura, Deportes, Espectaculares, y Turismo

Provincia de Julcán, Distrito de Carabamba; Trujillo: Rosa Brisenio Rodríguez, Regidora

### **Peruvian Organizations**

AMRESAM – Asociación de Municipalidades de la Región de San Martín, Tarapoto: Consuelo Rivero Ruíz de Tuesta, Secretaria Ejecutiva; Irma Hidalgo, Integrante del Comité de Capacitación

APENAC – Asociación Peruana de Negociación, Arbitraje y Conciliación: Eduardo Moane Drago, Presidente; Gabriela Goñi, Coordinadora de Proyectos; Angela María Elorrieta, Consultora; César Arce and Coordinator of the Ayacucho Conciliation Center

Asociación de Comunicadores Sociales Calandria: Rosa María Alfaro, Co-Directora del Departamento de Investigación; Mirtha Correa Alamo, Directora Programa de Género; Tatiana Acurio Cáceres, Responsable de Proyectos – Programa Género

Cámara de Comercio de Lima, Centro de Conciliación y Arbitraje Nacional e Internacional: Franz Kundmuller Caminiti, Secretario General; Carlos Ruska Maguiña, Coordinador General Proyecto USAID

CARE: Emilio Laynes Luján, Representante Proyecto Nuevos Horizontes para la Educación de las Niñas Regional Syscucho

CESIP – Centro de Estudios Sociales y Publicaciones: Ana Vásquez, Directora; Ana María Miranda, Coordinadora, PROMUJER

CEDEP - Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación: Félix Wong Carpio, Presidente del Consejo Directivo; Emma Zevallos Aguilar, Coordinadora, PROMUJER

CIDE – Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Educación: Sheila Mogrovejo, Directora; Elizabeth Moscoso, Capacitación/Coordinadora Actividades de Ayacucho; Elvira Atrognéo, Contadora; Pepe Rentegui, Desarrollo de Materiales; Amelia Valdez, Educadora; Carlos Moreyra, Colegio Estatal Gonzalez Gil-Huanta; Wilfredo Mesias, Escuela Castillo; Edgardo Pino; Escuela 19 de Ayacucho; Jaime Gimenez; Escuela 9 de Diciembre de Ayacucho; Rosa Perez, Colegio Los Licenciados de Ayacucho; y una profesora de Huamanguilla; Proyecto Educación Democrática en Escuelas: Focus Group en Huanta con: Director de la USE local, 6 maestros de 6 escuelas y 2 representantes de CIDE (Elizabeth Moscoso y Amelia Valdez)

CNDDHH – Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos: Miguel Herta Barrón, Adjunto de la Secretaría Ejecutiva; Esther Cárdenas, Area de Desarrollo Institucional

Compañía de Radiofusión Cordillerana, Ayacucho: Miguels Baez de la Cruz, Socio; Luís Ledesma, Conductor; William Sandoval, Monitor de Transparencia

FEDECMA - Federación de Clubes de Madres de Ayacucho: Vilma Ortega, Presidente; Margarita Soto, Vice Presidente

Foro Cívico/Foro Por Cable (Casa Grande Televisión), Casa Grande: María del Pilar Uzátegui Perea, Administradora; Luís García Heras, Conductor; Eduardo Francisco Guevara Córdova, Conductor; Osvaldo Moreno Cuzco, Publicista; Bárbara Méndez Cotrina, Publicista; Andrea Llanos Ríos, Asistente.

FORO Nacional/Internacional: Francisco Sagasti, President & Co-Coordinator Agenda: Perú; Jorge Chávez, Investigador Asociado; Agenda: Perú/Foro Juventud: Efraín Quicaña y Otoniel Sullca en Ayacucho y Luís Ezeta Uceda y Blanca Ganoza Grey en Trujillo

Instituto APOYO: Gabriel Ortíz de Zevallos, Executive Director; Alejandro Salas, Project Coordinator; Giuliana Scerpella, Project Manager

*IDL – Instituto de Defensa Legal: Ernesto de la Jara, Director; Carlos Basombrío Iglesias, Sub-Director*

IDS - Instituto de Diálogo y Propuestas: Percy Medina Masías, Executive Director; Carlos Cárdenas Tovar, Project Coordinator, TV Cultura; Katherine Sanabria, TV Cultura

IPAZ - Instituto de Investigación y Promoción del Desarrollo y Paz en Ayacucho: José Coronel Aguirre, Presidente; Noemí Cabana, Area Mujer y Niño; Roberto Códoba, Area Legal; José Inostroza, Coordinador, Red de Promotores de Derechos Humanos

IPEDEHP - Instituto Peruano de Educación en Derechos Humanos y la Paz: Rosa María Mujica Barreda,

IPRECON – Instituto Peruano de Resolución de Conflictos, Negociación y Mediación: Iván Ormachea Choque, Presidente del Consejo Directivo; Gustavo Moreno Hermoza, Consultor en Negociación y Conciliación, Psicólogo; Universidad Privada Antenor Orrego/Centro de Conciliación de IPRECON en Trujillo: Mario Torres Mendoza, Secretario del Consultorio Jurídico y Centro de Conciliación de la Facultad de Derecho

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PRODEMU – Asociación Promoción y Desarrollo de la Mujer/APENAC, Tarapoto: Dolly Arévalo Bartra, Conciliadora; Mercedes Toledo Soldevilla, Psicóloga/ Conciliadora; Lloy Mery Ríos Ríos, Obstetrica; Defensoría de la Mujer, el Niño y la Familia/APENAC, Lamas: Manuela Amasifuén Sangama, Conciliadora; Robinson Shupingahua Amasifuén, Conciliador; Domitila Piña Salas, Conciliadora

*SER – Servicios Educativos Rurales: Fernando Romero, President; Sandro Venturo, Coordinador de Programas; Iván Caro, Responsable del Proyecto de Educación Electoral y Ciudadana en Ayacucho*

*TAREA – Asociación de Publicaciones Educativas: Marita Palacios, Presidenta Consejo Directivo; Estela González, Coordinadora Area Educación Ciudadana; Pablo Flor, Promotor; Gonzalo Espino, Promotor/Publicación Perfiles; Magali Mora, Evaluación del Proyecto; Jacobo Alvarez, Promotor; Eduardo Leon, Propuesta Pedagógica de Diversificación Curricular/Ayacucho; Gerardo Soto, Concertación Municipios Escolares/ Autoridades Locales; Jose Luís Carbajo, Miembro Consejo Directivo/Coordinador Actividades Ayacucho; Dario Ugarte, Programa de Capacitación/Elaboración de Materiales; Focus Group en Huanta con: Alicia Cisneros, Coordinadora del proyecto en Huamanga; Coordinadora del proyecto de Huanta; 4 estudiantes: Rene Boitello, Alcaldesa Municipio Escolar Colegio Jose Sanchez Carrio, Huamanga; Iuliana Espinosa Muñoz, Alcaldesa Municipio Escolar San Juan de la Frontera, Huanta; Cesar Augusto Medina, Regidor Municipio Escolar San Juan de la Frontera, Huanta, y Alcaldesa del Colegio María Auxiliadora, Huanta*

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TV SAM (Televisión San Martín), Tarapoto: Hugo Azáldegui Gómez, Gerente de Promoción; Santiago Uzátegui Perea, Gerente Administrativo

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GTZ: Peter Luhmann, Director, Agencia de la GTZ en Lima

Inter-American Development Bank: Hugo Flórez Timoran, Especialista Sectorial Nacional

PACT: Judy Schroeder, Director

World Bank: Pierre Werbrouck, Representante Residente en el Perú; Elizabeth Dasso, Especialista en Sociedad Civil y Desarrollo Social

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