

FINAL DRAFT  
**PROGRAM EVALUATION STUDY PLAN  
FOR  
THE USAID PROGRAM AND ITS IMPACT ON EGYPT POLICY  
REFORM PROGRAMS**

Submitted  
to

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**Executive Summary**

This plan is in pursuit of the objective specified in TAPR Scope of Work No. 1 of determining “how best to examine the USAID program at all levels in Egypt, to assess its impact, over the long term, on the progress of economic policy reform, and to identify ways to determine what aspects of the program are most likely to be effective in furthering the objectives of the Gore-Mubarak Partnership, developing through these endeavors a firm basis for undertaking future Mission activities that are in keeping with Partnership objectives.”

The plan reviews alternative approaches to aid program evaluations and concludes that it is feasible to use progress in policy reform as a gauge for program effectiveness. It is proposed that the Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index be backdated starting from the existing years of 1999–1995 to the beginning of the program in 1975 in order to discern the evolution of policy reform in Egypt. The USAID program could then be evaluated in relation to changes in components of the Heritage Index, although effects in the earlier years and through the large number of project activities may be difficult to trace. In any case, backdating of the Index should give a coherent picture of the course of economic policy reform in Egypt, and tie in directly with the use of the Index in relation to current sector policy programs.

This recommendation is chosen as feasible, manageable, supported by a review of contemporary development theory, and appropriate to current USAID program focus.

## **1. Scope of the Study**

In approaching the task of determining how best to examine the USAID program, we

- assembled an extensive bibliography and survey of past evaluations of the U.S. economic assistance program in Egypt and published literature on the Egyptian economy;
- reviewed the material to gain an overall impression of its extent and relevance for more comprehensive and focused evaluation;
- perceived the need for a systematic conceptual framework to use in analyzing the course of economic policy reform;
- concluded that the Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index offers the best model framework;
- propose that the Index (or some suitable modification of it) be backdated to 1975 to serve as a scale for tracking and evaluating policy changes;
- offer suggestions as to how the backdating could be carried out, and how the results might be used for program evaluation and policy planning purposes.

## **2. Review of the Literature**

Our brief review of the literature suggests there is a substantial consensus on the basic outlines of Egypt's conversion from its socialist period through the structural adjustment and stabilization phases and into what might be termed its current liberalization phase.

The U.S. programs provided a large portion of the international resources that supplemented Egypt's consumption and investment needs since 1972. Along the way, they advanced the economy in a number of ways, including substantial expansion of

power, roads, water and sewerage works, and schools. The physical infrastructure projects were accompanied by extensive assistance in institutional development in agriculture, the financial system, family planning, environmental controls, and formal education, plus technical training in a wide variety of fields. All of these efforts must have had innumerable effects and influences of all sorts of types. Tracing all of them is manifestly impossible, since many, including changes in the mind-set of Egyptians regarding their prospects and alternatives for development, are imponderable. Also difficult or impossible to identify, trace, or measure are the manifold ways in which the program impacts must have interacted with each other, as well as through individuals and institutions not directly involved in the aid programs.

Despite the complexity, the main lines of significance are quite clear. The capital construction, organizational, and human resources programs to which USAID contributed, building on Egypt's prior development level which was already substantial, have helped to equip the economy with an infrastructure and skill level which, combined with its advantageous geographic location, has prepared it to pursue more rapid growth. The successful completion of the structural adjustment and stabilization efforts supported by the IMF and World Bank has also been a major milestone in the progress of Egyptian economic development.

With the achievement of stabilization from 1992 onwards, financial support for policy reform has come mainly in the form of sector policy reform programs financed by USAID. These operate in a variety of fields and involve quid-pro-quo financial transfers

ted to progress in carrying out specific agreed-upon policy changes accompanied by technical assistance in policy design and implementation of legal, administrative, and organizational changes, and including related education and training.

So much for the general picture. The basic question to be answered is: of all that happened in the past, what needs to be investigated in the present as a guide to USAID program policy in the future? The vast scope, size, and diverse content of the program means that investigating all the manifold aspects of the program would require a very large, extensive, and intensive effort that could fill several volumes. The question is how to focus the study so as to observe the “law of manageable proportions” and arrive at a scope of work that: a) targets major points of interest and relevance for future program policies and approaches and as a basis for policy consensus; b) is do-able in a period of time that would not unduly delay the availability of results; and c) costs an amount appropriate to the value of the results. This requires a consideration of evaluation methodology, to which we next turn our attention.

### **3. Assessing Aid Impact Methodology**

Any attempt to trace or measure the impact of foreign aid faces difficult methodological choices. Any definition of “impact” implies detection of cause and effect. The problem has traditionally been approached by statistical analysis in various ways, such as:

The “proportions” approach: comparing the relative size of aid and economic aggregates such as the ratio of aid amounts to GNP, GDP, imports, investment (gross, sectoral, public, private). Such measures give some idea of the relative *importance* of aid flows in

the overall scheme of things, but give little evidence of the *effects* or *impact* on the economy. Such comparisons are useful, however to provide a general picture or setting for more detailed evaluation efforts, and are desirable as a common base of understanding and as a point of departure. Such comparisons have been presented in the USAID Public Affairs brochure **USAID: 20 Years in Egypt, The Story.**

The “correlation” approach: aid and related indicators of growth and development.

This method attempts to get at the cause-and-effect issue by comparing aid with the *changes* in the economic measures such as increases in GNP, investment, exports, agricultural production, etc. In its simplest statistical form, this approach relies on a *post-hoc-ergo propter-hoc* assumption, which may or may not be valid. However, calculating these relationships may provide the base for more detailed investigation that may reveal more solid evidence of causation by showing, e.g., that an increase in aid in fact did go directly into additional investment that would not otherwise have taken place.

As in the case of the “proportions approach” such basic calculations are worth including in a general evaluation study as a starting point. A recent World Bank study (1998) uses this approach to calculate the relative effectiveness of aid in various countries, especially in relation to poverty alleviation, suggesting that this kind of measure should be used as a basis for aid allocation among recipient countries. By focusing on poverty alleviation and aid, however, it leaves aside the much stronger connections between *growth* and poverty alleviation. In any case there does not appear to be any dependable way to show how much of the growth achieved by Egypt resulted from U.S. aid.

The multiplier model approach is another classic method that seeks to evaluate the effect of exogenous infusions of public resources on a closed economy through some type of expenditure multiplier model using input/output or the more current version of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models of the country. This approach will not adequately assess the impact of American economic assistance to Egypt for a variety of reasons, including the relatively small size of aid in relation to the formal and informal Egyptian economy, variety of programs, and available data quality. One attempt to do this for Egypt is Moustafa (1995), with little clarity in assessing program impact. We would not recommend pursuit of that approach.

What to do? All the major means of tracing aid program impact through economic statistics have serious flaws. All of them suffer from serious deficiencies owing to superficiality in analytical content and a unifying structure of analysis. After reviewing all the major methods, we are forced to conclude that the basic difficulty, in the end, is that there are too many interrelations to trace by any dependable statistical measures. We now turn to past studies on USAID in Egypt and the evaluation experience for relevant guidance.

#### **4. Past USAID Impact Studies (Citations in Appendices 1 and 2)**

A recent attempt at evaluating the impact of USAID on Egypt concentrates on program impact on economic policy reform, concluding that not much reform has taken place (Sullivan 1996). Although interesting reading (the paper culminates about 7 years of the author's related work), most of the claims made in the paper rely on anecdotal evidence and the paper is mainly a discussion of the institutional problems hampering reform

programs. This author does enumerate several successful USAID programs but comes back to the theme that to date no substantial change in policy reform has been made. Prosterman et al. (1992) attempt an evaluation of USAID taking the perspective of the program's direct impact on alleviating poverty and rural development. This approach is too narrow and out of step with evidence linking economic policy reform, growth, and poverty reduction (see paper delivered at Feb, 3-4, 1999 ECES conference by Dirck Stryker and Selina Pandolfi and works cited therein).

Handoussa (1983, 1990, and 1996) provides examples of the mainstream Egyptian view that USAID has failed because it did not support state-led development and subsidizing of public sector companies. In fact an entire conference at AUC in 1983 was devoted mostly to USAID's failure to go along with subsidizing state-led development and giant public monopolies (Sullivan, E. 1984). Most of this work can be dismissed as illustrative of local preferences for statist economic policies seeking to counter the building evidence that state-led growth policies have been a failure and can not lead to sustainable long-term economic growth.

Westley (1998) provides a broad-sweeping discussion of the impact of USAID on Egypt describing specific successful programs and the evolution of the program's direction from crisis alleviation to reducing dependence on assistance through economic policy reform. Like much of the recent commentary, Westley concludes that Egyptian policy makers can use the last 5 years of macro-economic stability and limited structural policy

reform as a platform for launching the urgent further sweeping reform of institutions and policy needed to produce long-term economic growth and raise living standards.

Many of the early studies that attempt to appraise USAID programs are outdated by the current program orientation. USAID has contracted for detailed evaluations of its sector policy reform program since 1992 and these documents are much more valuable for the study of program impact. (Berg, et al. 1994, TSG April, 1996, and TAPR June, 1998, Summary and detailed volumes). Another important source, but specific to agricultural policy reform is Fletcher (1996). These works serve as models for the kind of extended study suggested below to look further back in time with the same criteria, to measure progress in policy reform from the more distant past as a basis for comparisons with more recent results, current efforts, and targeted reforms for the future.

In addition to the foregoing broad-brush evaluations of the USAID program, there have been numerous evaluations of USAID-funded projects and activities. Appendix 3 contains a compilation of more than 200 of them supplied by USAID/W's CDIE. Additional information on project accomplishments is included in USAID/Egypt's Annual Status Reports. A reading of them leads to the conclusion that the evaluated projects had varying degrees of success in achieving their purposes, but very few of the evaluations deal with economic policy changes. Clearly this large amount of material does not provide the basis for broad judgments about even the overall effectiveness of USAID efforts in the various sectors, much less any way to trace economic policy impacts. Only for agriculture did we come across the kind of general appraisal that would

make such tracing feasible in any comprehensive way. Similar broad studies of the other sectors would be necessary as a pre-condition for finding policy influences and other development effects. Even with such in-depth study, policy impacts may be hard to find, given, e.g., the variety of institutional shortcomings in Egypt.

So much for the meager information base for judging impacts of assistance on the economy. Before proceeding to select a specific study plan, we should take a brief look at the relationship of these issues to what is going on outside the U.S. aid program.

## **5. Emerging Consensus on Economic Policy Reform and Sustainable Economic Growth**

Although it was not as clear as late as ten years ago, and certainly not at the start of USAID's program in 1975, there is now mounting consensus that the key to long-term sustainable economic growth is for a country to have policies and institutions in place that promote open markets and free trade, both domestically and internationally. From the extant applied policy and academic literature it can be inferred that the goals of poverty reduction, rural development, and in fact most elements of total human development can largely be obtained with adherence to policies that create the environment for long-term economic growth. This is not to give short shrift to investment in human capital or basic infrastructure. However, the evidence is less compelling that assistance in these areas has its intended impact, particularly if the country has not already adopted free trade and market-oriented economic policies (see paper given at Feb 3-4, 1999 ECES Conference by Nancy Birdsall and Lesley O'Connell p.12 and all works cited therein).

Sachs (1996) makes a strong case for economic policy reform from state control to open private markets as the single viable development option available for sustainable long-term growth of the Egyptian economy. Although this paper is non-academic, based on a lecture given during that time for the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES), it is based on the careful theoretical and empirical work published in top academic refereed journals by a number of economists. The list of references at the end of the paper is a good place to start for support of Sachs' position.

The February 3-4, 1999 ECES sponsored conference on ***Growth Beyond Stabilization: Prospects for Egypt*** was an all-out assault on the proposition that easy answers exist to Egypt's growth and development needs without the quick pervasive deregulation and decontrol by the state of the overall economy. Sachs and most other internationally recognized experts left little doubt that economic policy reform, dramatic retrenchment of the state regulatory apparatus, and selling off public sector enterprises must be accomplished soon if Egypt is not to fall further behind the remainder of the world in terms of its people's living standards.

With a few minor differences the other two major players in financing the turnaround of the Egyptian economy and, consequently, the reduction of dependence on foreign aid, clearly show in recent policy studies their agreement that Egypt must radically overhaul its domestic and international economic policies (see World Bank, 1998 and IMF, 1998). Although much of both studies is taken up with requirements for continued macroeconomic policy stability (monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, aggregate saving and

investment, and capital markets), a full chapter appears in each report identifying major restrictions in the international trade sector and a call for sweeping policy reform.

Both studies recommend aggressive changes in trade, taxation, government size, intervention and regulation, and banking if Egypt is to have the dynamic growth required for accommodating a younger and twice larger population. Informal, off-the-record discussions on the progress of economic policy reform in Egypt with World Bank and IMF officials leads us to the conclusion that, in fact, very little progress has been made.

The overall consensus view is summarized by Sachs (1996, p. 37), as “First of all growth does not come from aid.” He goes on at the same place to say that economic aid can bring an economy to stability but in several instances has only prolonged bad policy regimes, making their survival possible without taking the necessary steps to reform the economy, echoing Bauer (1993).

We conclude that for Egypt this is a half-full/half empty case, and that survival can best be seen as a significant value that allowed for the stabilization that in turn was the prerequisite for successful liberalization and deregulation. Rather than seeking to quantify all the economic impact of past aid programs, we suggest that this issue be left to rest and that the more productive and therefore preferable alternative is to concentrate evaluation on *policy reform* in greater depth and over a longer timeframe. The primary reasons are:

--this area has come to the forefront in importance in development thinking, with a growing consensus on the vital importance of deregulation;

--it is the current and appropriate focus of concentration of program objectives operating through the sector policy reform programs;

--the concentration of evaluation on economic policy issues provides a feasible and manageable focus on definable and traceable needs, objectives and accomplishments appropriately connected to the policy priorities on which there is so much current consensus. These points lead us to the choice set out next.

## **6. A Framework for Evaluation: The Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index**

It seems clear that the choice of method must be one that encompasses both what American economic assistance has done, as well as progress in economic policy reform. This then brings up additional questions. First, what is the economic model toward which reform is directed? And, can we make the extent of progress in economic policy reform somewhat measurable in order to gauge the impact of economic assistance, if possible, or at least to show that the aid was accompanied by a policy reform process or trend?

In 1997, USAID/Egypt adopted the Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom Index as an indicator of progress for the investment climate and economic policy reform (see USAID/Egypt Results and Resource Request March 1998, p. 13). The index stakes out the position that the model for economic policy reform is formed by the economic policies followed by countries like Hong Kong and Singapore. The index answers the question of what good economic policies look like and gives clear examples of successful

countries with these policies in place. Careful econometric studies using cross-country analysis and other evidence (see, e.g., bibliographies of Heritage Foundation and Sachs, 1996) suggest that the structural policy reforms needed to improve the ranking of Egypt in the Economic Freedom Index are the same policies necessary to promote long-term sustainable economic growth. Moreover, substantial and pervasive economic policy reform is a necessary and largely sufficient condition for continued social and political stability, as well as future total human development and evolution to more democratic political processes.

Given the uniquely appropriate scope of this framework for analysis, we suggest that USAID backdate the Index to 1975 using the readily available sources described on-line via Heritage's web site. Index ratings for 1995 through 1999 as well as supporting documentation are already available, making the completion of the task practical. This study would depict the evolution of economic policy reform in Egypt in Economic Freedom Index terms, to the present "mostly unfree" classification with a ranking of 97 out of 160 countries and a score of 3.35, from the largely boxed-up, economically repressed state-dominated economy of the early 1970s -- presumably close to 5 on the 5-point scale in 1975. The next step would be to look for connections between the economic assistance and the policy changes, recognizing that direct and specific impacts may be very difficult to trace. In any case, it is evident whatever progress in policy reform was made, tracking it in detail should help put the whole U.S. aid effort in clearer long-term perspective.

## 7. Implementing the Proposal

To follow the Index format, the retrospective evaluation would contain 11 sections. The first 10 would be identical to the major policy classifications used in the Heritage Index, i.e., Trade, Taxation, Government Intervention, Monetary Policy, Foreign Investment, Banking, Wage/Prices, Property Rights, Regulation, and Black Market. An additional “miscellany” category would explore USAID programs not directly related to economic policy reform. Some of these programs could be evaluated in terms of bringing Egypt to a stable point *structurally* in consonance with the IMF and World Bank macro-economic reform programs during the 1980s and early 1990s. Alternatively, e.g., in the case of agriculture, institutional development likely supported the feasibility of liberalizing policy reforms.

The format of the study would thus look something like this:

### Suggested Outline for Evaluation Study

#### I. Tracing the Evolution of Economic Policy Reform in Egypt back to the 1970s

Beginning with the 1999-95 Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index, trace back each of the ten categories comprising the index, as well as the overall index rating, to establish a baseline for evaluating the USAID program. The methods and data sources used to evaluate Egypt are transparent and readily available. Fifty variables are evaluated to arrive at the index rating. To keep the index manageable, the variables are grouped into ten categories/factors discussed below. The overall index score is the equally weighted average of the rating given in each category. The scale is from 1 to 5, the latter indicating the most restrictive economic policies. The major sources of basic information for the ratings are in Johnson, B.T. et al. (1999, p. 51-68), which describes in detail the methods and data sources to be followed to compute the index year-by-year from 1994 back to 1975.

For each category below we describe the variables to be studied in order to backdate the index to the beginning of the USAID Program in Egypt.

1. Trade Policy: average tariff rate, non-tariff barriers, corruption in the customs service.
2. Taxation: top income tax rate, tax rate that applies to the average income level, top corporate tax rate, other taxes.
3. Government Intervention in the Economy: government consumption as a percentage of the economy, government ownership of businesses and industries, economic output produced by the government.
4. Monetary Policy: average inflation rate for ten- year period (1986-1996 used in the 1999 assessment), average inflation rate for 1997.
5. Capital Flows and Foreign Investment: foreign investment code, restrictions on foreign ownership of business, restrictions on the industries and companies open to foreign investors, restrictions and performance requirements on foreign companies, foreign ownership of land, equal treatment under the law for both foreign and domestic companies, restrictions on the repatriation of earnings, availability of local financing for foreign companies
6. Banking: government ownership of banks, restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to open branches and subsidiaries, government influence over the allocation of credit, government regulations, such as deposit insurance, freedom to offer all types of financial services, such as buying and selling real estate, securities, and insurance policies.
7. Wages and Price Controls: minimum wage laws, freedom to set prices privately without government influence, government price controls, the extent to which government price controls are used, government subsidies to businesses that affect prices.
8. Property Rights: freedom from government influence over the judicial system, commercial code defining contracts, sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes, government expropriation of property, corruption within the judiciary, delays in receiving judicial decisions, legally granted and protected private property.
9. Regulation: licensing requirements to operate a business, ease of obtaining a business license, corruption within the bureaucracy, labor regulations, such as established work weeks, paid vacations, and maternity leave as well as selected labor regulations.
10. Black Market: smuggling, piracy of intellectual property in the black market, agricultural production supplied on the black market, manufacturing supplied on the black market, services supplied on the black market, transportation supplied on the black market, labor supplied on the black market.

Each category and each variable within it are to be studied and graded and the overall index computed for each year. To begin with, it is expected that the 1995 through 1999 published index and components for Egypt would be replicated exactly to gain familiarity with data sources and policy assessment methods and to conform the backdating process to the existing Index as closely as possible.

Additionally, the 49-page bibliography (Appendix 1) that is categorized according to the 10 factors listed above will be reviewed to check conformity of the sources listed in Johnson et al. (1999) with contemporary Egyptian economic policy.

## II. Assessment of USAID Impact on Economic Policy Reform in Egypt

The backdated Index will provide the basis for examining the content, objectives, and results of past USAID projects and programs for impact on or association with the evolution of each of the policy factors listed above. The basic idea is to categorize all aid programs in the same categories as those making up the indexes and assess what effect the programs had in changing the rating of Egypt in its path toward a market-oriented economy. The primary databases for identifying program/project results include: the series of Annual USAID Status Reports; the Summaries in Appendix 3 of some 200 USAID Program evaluations (and their 6500 pages of original sources). These sources would be screened for relevance to any of the 10 economic policy factors in the Index and used to assess impact on changes in economic policy. Given the difficulty of finding quantifiable relationships, the process of matching programs to changes in economic policy reform will necessarily be judgemental, not mechanical.

## III. Other Aspects of Program Impact

Much of USAID program assistance was aimed at stabilizing the Egyptian economy and mitigating some severe problems in health and infrastructure. In many ways the program was a remarkable success when viewed in conjunction with the IMF and World Bank programs stabilizing the macro economy and promoting fiscal and monetary stability. Egypt did undergo some structural and economic policy reform during the early years and it would be interesting to trace these reforms in relation to the Heritage Index 10 categories. From the early 1980s onward the agricultural sector, particularly, with USAID support and assistance, carried out many of the kinds of market-freeing reforms now emphasized by most development experts.

It would, however, be inappropriate to attempt to pigeonhole all USAID programs into one or more of the 10 categories, and wind up with square pegs in round holes. There is little use in making tenuous cases for a project's relationship to economic policy reform. It would be better to evaluate the programs in meeting their objectives, then try to cull any meaningful lessons to be learned that could be applied to future economic policy reform design. The evaluation should not assess broad impact on GDP or other major economic aggregates or attempt to push other quantitative or qualitative relationships that just are not there. It is only important to look for lessons *transferable* to economic policy reform.

#### IV. Defining the End Product: Policy Changes for Egypt to Reach Level One in All Ten Index Categories

In conformity to the objectives of this report it should be possible from the work accomplished above to identify the programs/projects that have been successful in assisting the transformation of Egyptian economic policy toward a market-oriented, export-growth-led economy. The construction of the index and the accompanying program/project evaluation will be interesting from an historian's view. However, its greater utility lies in giving direction for future USAID programs for accomplishing substantial economic policy reform that will result in Egypt attaining a sustainable future economic growth path. The basic issue to be confronted is what measures Egypt must take and how USAID can help in each of the 10 index factors to go from the present ratings to a scale rating of 1 for each factor.

From the perspective gained from constructing the index it should be possible to identify specific weak spots in current economic policy that are both readily apparent and verifiable. The use of the index to gauge policy changes allows a more objective outside check on policy reform progress. It should help lead to a more constructive dialogue to replace the current conflicting views that policy reform is either progressing nicely or is stalled at a low level.

The result from this section could be a two-year fast-track recommendation on a series of policy changes needed to move Egypt to a ranking comparable to the top 20 nations in economic policy and growth. USAID could then turn its substantial resources to solving transition problems impeding necessary policy changes. This set of policy targets would provide a more objective basis for negotiations on the use of USAID's substantial resources in support of those targets, including methods for easing the problems of transition—including related “social costs” that impede policy choices and their implementation.

#### VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

This section would summarize the principal findings and their significance—and provide a convenient source for the Executive Summary. It would also recommend any additional research suggested by the findings, such as:

- greater depth of analysis of the policy issues
- priorities for policy reform—in importance, in ease of implementation, or with strongest public support.

## **8. More Comments on the Heritage Index**

The Heritage Index relies on a variety of sources of information both quantitative and non-quantitative. The salient feature of the index is its concentration on the inputs to good trade policies rather than measuring their outputs, for instance, trends in the volume of exports. The volume of external trade may give a misleading signal of the long-term growth and sustainability of the sector if it is public sector led. A large subsidized public sector led export volume is essentially dumping, which is not sustainable and impoverishes the nation. The Heritage index concentrates on the level of tariffs, time for custom clearance and some admittedly less-quantifiable judgements to assess the health of a country's trade policy. De facto, practically free trade for imports and exports is the model for good trade policy. Examples comparing the Heritage Index with other related indexes are described in Johnson, et al. (1998, Chapter 5, 35-51).

Another advantage of the Heritage Index is that it is multidimensional, not concerned solely with the international trade sector. The formerly used Stanford Research Institute's Commercial Policy index focused too narrowly on the trade sector. A broader and more complete picture of Egypt's economic policy seems desirable. Additionally, reform of a country's international trade sector will not in itself move the economy to high sustainable growth. A wide variety of other facilitating factors, including internal deregulation of wages, prices, and investment, plus taxation, the legal system, infrastructure, and management and labor skills, have to be favorable. The point is that economic policy reform cannot be effective sector-by-sector, as the lessons learned from agricultural reform in Egypt have made clear. Economic sectors are tied together so that

the gains in efficiency due to reform of a single sector can be muted due to restrictions in closely related sectors. Additionally, government ministries with overlapping jurisdiction can make piecemeal sector reform difficult.

Some other features of the Heritage Index not to be underrated are that it is transparent and reproducible. A considerable amount of its supporting data, description of methods, and findings is available on-line through its web site as well as in published materials. As in neural network methods, investigators can “train” on the 1995 through 1999 already published indexes and from that point begin tracing the evolution of economic policy reform back to 1975.

It may be that the Heritage Foundation’s (and other sources’) classification of Egypt as economically repressed is distorted and could be improved through the evaluation suggested here (Sachs and Warner 1995). The long-term study may be able to identify programs that have had direct impact on economic policy reform. From programs that failed important lessons can also be learned. Successful programs with less-direct impact on economic policy reform may suggest more direct program initiatives. All of this material can help guide both USAID and Egyptian policy officials in improving the selection of future programs. Given the size, breadth, and longevity of the Egypt program, the results of the suggested systematic study may also be useful as a guide to USAID in re-directing resources in other countries to activities with greater long-term benefit.

Some may criticize the Index approach as too facile. This is essentially the criticism levied against test-based or any other criteria-based measurement of educational achievement. Yet the growing world consensus supports the view that if Egypt, even just mechanically, without much fanatical fervor for the free market, took policy actions to position itself among the top 20 countries of the world on the Heritage Index (with Bahrain, Czech Republic, and USA and others) Egypt could in time be among the fastest growing developing countries.

### **9. Work Schedule and Resources Needed**

Because of the experimental nature of the proposed study plan, we suggest that it be carried out in separate segments, so that successive parts can be designed in detail in the light of the experience gained in the preceding ones.

The first phase would consist of backdating the Heritage Index to 1975.

#### Resources needed:

1 senior economist	2 person-months
2 research assistants	<u>4 person-months</u>
Sub-total	6 person-months in 3-4 calendar months

The second phase would examine USAID programs and program policies during the period for relationships to or impact on policy reform. The study would aim to:

- (1) Review previous USAID program evaluations to appraise the effect on or relationship to the policy index criteria. Explore relationships of USAID programs to policy reforms and policy reform processes.
- (2) Consider other aspects of program impact and their relationship to the index criteria, including, e.g., whether various USAID programs made policy changes more feasible or acceptable.

The scale of the effort in this phase would depend on the prospects for fruitful analysis turned up in the process of assembling the Index material in the first phase. A great deal of professional judgement will be involved in this phase. If the prospects are promising, and it is decided to pursue the evaluation objectives in depth, then two more senior economists would join the Team Leader to analyze and evaluate the material. It may also prove desirable to specify additional related information gathering by research assistants or by senior specialist consultants in such substantive areas as agriculture, private enterprise, etc.

Resources needed:

-3 senior economists	3 person-months
-research assistance	2 person-months
-2-3 senior specialist analysts	<u>3 person-months</u>
	8 person-months in 4-6 calendar months

In the third phase the three senior economists would

(1) Consider the Index findings as a measurement standard for evaluating the progress of Egyptian economic policy reform over the period since 1975 and for defining the policy changes that Egypt would have to make to reach Level One in each of the ten Index categories.

(2) Formulate and present any further conclusions and recommendations that appear to be useful for future program policy planning.

Resources needed:

3 senior economists, 2 x 3 = 6 person-months in 2 calendar months

Grand total of person-months: 20 in 9-12 calendar months

Qualifications

The senior economists should have at least 10 years of experience working on economic reform pertaining to developing countries, and considerable USAID experience, including the ability to appraise national policy and aid program issues from the viewpoint of senior management. Excellent writing skills are a prerequisite. Prior Egypt-specific and program evaluation experience is highly desirable. The senior specialist analysts should be familiar with past and current developments in their fields in Egypt, and with related USAID projects and programs. The research assistants could be Egyptian scholars and/or, if available, persons who have worked on the Heritage Foundation Index or the Sachs-Warner Index.

## Appendices:

### 1. Bibliography of Selected Works Compiled in Heritage Foundation Freedom Index Categories

The listed works come from an exhaustive search of all materials related to the impact of USAID programs on Egypt. Library resources at USAID, American University in Cairo, and local offices of IMF and World Bank, and internet search engines were used. The material includes both USAID generated reports and outside public and academic research. Additionally, any reports covering economic policy reform in Egypt, whether discussing USAID or not, are included. The studies are categorized into the 10 Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index factors, already described in this report.

### 2. Summaries and Abstracts of Selected Works Dealing with U.S. and Other Foreign Assistance and/or Egyptian Economic Policy.

From the many works that are referenced above, we selected this group of studies as a list of “must read” reports for anyone following the progress of economic policy reform in Egypt and its relation to USAID. It is thought that any follow-up work to this study should include time invested in thorough knowledge of the original sources of the abstracts.

### 3. A “Time-Line” Perspective of USAID Program Content and Emphasis over the Period 1972 to present.

The appendix includes a listing of expenditures over the 25-year period broken into major components. Requests were made to various USAID Cairo offices for a finer breakdown to produce a time-line perspective but it appears the data are unavailable in Cairo at this time.

### 4. Summaries of 210 USAID-Sponsored Evaluations of Projects and Programs (from USAID’s Center for Development Information and Evaluation)

The material included in the appendix is abstracts of specific USAID evaluations of projects and sector programs. The material here, and additions to it as they become available, will be part of the database used to examine the impact of USAID in general on Egypt and, more specifically, economic policy reform. The project evaluation summaries listed here represent over 6500 pages (not including attachments) of original evaluation studies.

FINAL DRAFT  
**PROGRAM EVALUATION STUDY PLAN  
FOR  
THE USAID PROGRAM AND ITS IMPACT ON EGYPT POLICY  
REFORM PROGRAMS**

**Appendix 1: Bibliography of Selected Works Compiled in Heritage Foundation  
Freedom Index Categories.**

The listed works come from an exhaustive search of all materials related to the impact of USAID programs on Egypt. Library resources at USAID, American University in Cairo, and local offices of IMF and World Bank, and internet search engines were used. The material includes both USAID generated reports and outside public and academic research. Additionally, any reports covering economic policy reform in Egypt, whether discussing USAID or not, are included. The studies are categorized into the 10 Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index factors, already described in this report.

# **THE USAID PROGRAM AND ITS IMPACT ON EGYPT POLICY REFORM PROGRAMS**

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FINAL DRAFT  
**PROGRAM EVALUATION STUDY PLAN  
FOR  
THE USAID PROGRAM AND ITS IMPACT ON EGYPT POLICY  
REFORM PROGRAMS**

**Appendix 2: Annotated Bibliography.**

**Summaries and Abstracts of Selected Works Dealing with U.S. and other Foreign Assistance and/or Egyptian economic policy.**

From the many works that are referenced above, we selected this group of studies as a list of “must read” reports for anyone following the progress of economic policy reform in Egypt and its relation to USAID. It is thought that any follow-up work to this study should include some time invested in thorough knowledge of the original sources of the abstracts.

## **Annotated Bibliography**

### **The USAID Program and Its Impact on Egypt Policy Reform Programs**

Bangura, Abdul Karim, *The Effects of American Foreign Aid to Egypt, 1957-1987*, Mellen University Press, Lewiston, New York, 1994.

Realizing the sharp disagreement and inconsistency among previous researchers, the author analyzed data on micro and macro levels and found no direct relationship between levels of American development assistance and growth in Egypt's economy. He put the blame on inappropriate priorities. Among these are preoccupation with cold war challenges, overemphasis on consumer goods (domestic subsidies) rather than capital goods, the overriding interest of American firms, and imposed developmental conditions by USA. The aid was used to support the government-subsidized program in order to maintain the rather fragile political stability in Egypt. Competition between USA and other aid donors increased duplication and waste at the expense of building prospects for successful development. Sustainability is lacking in some AID projects, partly due the inability of GOE to continue after financial support for them stopped and partly because these projects did not address certain needs that were felt to be important by Egyptian officials. The author recommends restructuring the American aid program from project oriented to security assistance focus. This will give Egypt the flexibility to use funds in its best interests according to its developmental priorities.

Berg, Elliot; Sines, Richard; Walker, James. Interim evaluation: sector policy reform program and technical support for sector policy reform project – Egypt. Development Alternatives, Inc. USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor) Jul 1994, ii, 67 p. + 3 annexes

The Sector Policy Reform Program (SPR) has proved itself an effective substitute for the unconditioned cash transfers of the past two decades. It has succeeded in pushing forward the Government of Egypt's (GOE's) Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP), while accommodating the constraints imposed on policy lending by the special political circumstances of U.S. aid to Egypt. Despite the earmark and its implications for the credibility of conditionality, the GOE/World Bank/IMF program for reforms has been strengthened by USAID backup, and USAID itself has become a more significant and effective partner in policy dialogue.

In the past decade, and especially the past 3 years, the GOE has stabilized the economy and has made extraordinary progress toward economic liberalization and the reduction of distortionary economic policies. Following the wide-ranging reforms in agricultural policy that began in the mid-1980s, macroeconomic and broad sectoral reforms were introduced in 1991 with Bank-Fund support, under the ERSAP. Since 1991, exchange rates have been unified and exchange controls dismantled, real interest rates have become positive, the trade regime has become more open, and financial markets have been made more open and competitive. A beginning has been made in privatization.

USAID has contributed to this movement toward freer markets and increased efficiency of resource use. USAID was the chief sponsor, along with GOE, of the agriculture sector reforms. Through the SPR, it has provided support for ERSAP by reinforcing its conditionalities and complementing them by sponsoring new or related policy measures.

The SPR policy measures were generally well-designed to meet the targets of the program. Compliance has been good though uneven. The most consistent compliance has been in the financial and fiscal areas. The biggest gap between commitments and performance has been in privatization. Compliance was cosmetic in some cases; most notably, the GOE invented a way to comply formally with ERSAP conditionality by shifting state-owned enterprise (SOE) shares to so-called Employee Shareholder Associations while leaving unaffected SOE control and introducing no management changes.

The SPR will have special priority in the post-debt relief years (after 1994). The promise of substantial Paris Club debt and debt service relief has been the main incentive for GOE adherence to the reform program. But this will be gone once the Bank and Fund certify compliance with ERSAP policy conditionalities, probably in a few months. An additional peril for policy reform is the comfortable budget and balance of payments posture of GOE. The temptation to pursue more expansionist, less prudent, macroeconomic and sectoral policies will surely increase. The relative importance of USAID's SPR program will thus increase substantially, because it will be the only cash-backed multi-sectoral policy reform program.

Implementation of SPR has been extremely demanding. Conditionality could not be pushed so hard that it became "burdensome," given the large reform agenda that was already on the table. Nor could it be based entirely on the Bank-Fund policy matrix without risking the charge that the same reforms were being "paid for twice." Decision-making is centralized, policy analysts few, the flow of information sluggish, and habits of open debate and policy dialogue embryonic. Some ministries are uninterested, even hostile, to policy discussion with donors. Despite all this, and by dint of persistence and ingenuity, the Economic Analysis and Policy Directorate has succeeded in tracking compliance with the policy measures of SPR. In the process, they have learned a great deal about the Egyptian economy and about obstacles to reform, and have nudged the policy reform process forward. (Author abstract)

Fletcher, Lehman B. (Editor). *Egypt's Agriculture in a Reform Era*. Iowa State University Press. 1996.

The book covers most phases of the remarkable policy reform of the 1980s and 90s in the agriculture sector. It is a good example of how a crisis in a single sector can bring about substantial economic reform toward a market-orientation with clear lessons to be learned. It shows the importance of the will on the GOE side to reform as crucial and why reform in most other sectors has been slow. Also, shows the difficulty with sector-by-sector reform.

Handoussa, Heba. "The Role of the State: The Case of Egypt. Economic Research Forum. Working Paper 9404 Cairo Egypt. pp.30, 1996.

Authored by one of the most influential economists and opinion makers in Egypt, the report shows somewhat of a change in direction by the author toward a more moderate stance on the prospects of state-led growth and a public sector dominated economy. Many Egyptian opinion makers still hold fast to the notion that the only problem with public owned enterprises is poor management. The author contends that the evidence that private sector companies are more efficient than public sector ones is not conclusive. The author still believes, at this late date, that the government has a legitimate role in directing investment outside of market determination in order to choose winners. This document and many others like it circulating in local circles demonstrate the basic insularity in scholarship of local opinion makers.

Harik, Iliya. Economic Policy Reform in Egypt. University Press of Florida. 1997. (Biblio., references, index.)

Probably the best reference on economic policy reform in Egypt. It describes the various reform programs giving both the insider (Egyptian) view as well as the outsider views. The book discusses in depth the reasons for the lack of substantial progress in economic reform and growth. Book is balanced and a must read for persons concerned with economic policy and the continuing resistance to reform in Egypt. The references and index should be useful in further research on the topic.

Johnson, Bryan T., Kim R. Holmes, and Melanie Kirkpatrick. 1999 Index of Economic Freedom. Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal. <http://www.heritage.org>.

Available on line and in hard copy at the above web site address. The report ranks 160 countries as to economic policy that promotes market freedom and good government. Numerous articles documenting the relationship of the index several policy variables are listed at the above address. The index is taken seriously by international investors. The index goes back annually to 1995.

Lord, Montague, et al. USAID's Sector Reform Programs in Egypt." Cairo USAID, April 1996. (see summary by TAPR June, 1998).

The original report is detailed description and evaluation of the sector policy program covering several volumes. It is useful for specific project evaluation and progress in objective area. The TAPR is a useful easily readable summary.

Prosterman, Roy I. and Timothy Hanstad. Egyptian Development and U.S. Aid: A 25-Year Perspective. Rural Development Institute Monograph #9. March 1992.

The authors take the view that all aid assistance should be viewed from the perspective of poverty reduction and rural development. They break the USAID

program into sectors with direct impact on reducing rural poverty. They provide descriptions of several specific projects and lessons learned. Their overall assessment is that the USAID program has largely failed in having an impact on poverty in Egypt.

Sachs, Jeffrey. *Achieving Rapid Growth: The Road Ahead for Egypt*. Distinguished Lecture Series 3 Egyptian Center for Economic Studies. 1996. 45 pages including references and program comments.

This represents a policy paper given by one of the leading economists in the world on trade and development. It sets out in broad outline form a strong case for Egypt to fast-track economic policy reform, steering the economy radically away from state led to private market. The report has several of the cross-country empirical studies backing the proposition that good economic policy is most important element in achieving sustainable economic growth.

Sachs, Jeffrey and Andrew Warner. *Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration*. *Brooking Papers on Economic Activity*, 1:1995.

The definitive study on the importance of economic policies in explaining economic growth across countries. The empirical work serves as the foundation for testing other potentially important variables, e.g., human or physical capital investment, as to importance in promoting economic growth.

Sullivan, Denis J. *American Aid to Egypt, 1975-96: Peace without Development*, *Middle East Policy*, October 1996, pp. 36-49.

This paper goes in line with the author's other writings, particularly his (*American Economic Aid to Egypt, 1975-86: Political and Bureaucratic Struggles over Aid Disbursement and Development Choices*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1987), and ("Bureaucracy and Foreign Aid in Egypt: The Primacy of Politics, in: Ibrahim M. Oweiss, (editor), *The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt*, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 1990, Chapter 6, pp. 125-159".)

In the current paper author emphasizes that one of the reasons of failure of the American economic aid to contribute to economic development is the interministry and intraministry competition among the bureaucrats' conflicting interests. An equally important and maybe more serious reason comes from the American side. Seeing a huge amount of aid funds spent with no significant progress on the economic development front frustrates the USAID-Cairo officials. They are frustrated too when they had to confront the American Embassy opposing views about the aid funds. USAID recommends required actions and reforms (as well as the pace of such actions and reforms) on economic grounds, and the Embassy refuses to press in the same direction, putting the political stability and the continuity of the system as the first priority. Paper's recommendations include: USAID to be given independent agency status (instead of being under the Department of State) in order to operate on

economic grounds in principle. AID officials to focus their efforts on a few key development areas such as basic education, health care, private sector development, ... etc. AID officials to use resources in hand to train Egyptians to take over development projects. AID officials in Washington to reduce the American presence in Egypt by relying more on Egyptian staff. U.S. assistance to Egypt to be divided into "political" and "economic" assistance. Rationale is to have a sound way of judging the performance of each type.

Sullivan, Earl L. (Editor). *The Impact of Development Assistance on Egypt*. Cairo Papers in Social Science vol. 7 American University in Cairo, September 1984.

A series of informal papers/remarks given at a conference sponsored at AUC on the impact of foreign aid in Egypt. Interesting in that with a few exceptions the view is that USAID should not be in the role of helping to change Egyptian economic policy away from state domination. Much of the discussion is about the cultural uniqueness/special circumstances of Egypt as reason why market-oriented policies will not work.

Weinbaum, Marvin G. *Adjustments to a Global Economy: Th Role of U.S. Economic Assistance*. Illinois: University of Illinois, 1983.

As much as the U.S. became associated with the economic trends after 1974, it has remarkable little success in steering economic reform and in trying to impart its development values to Egyptians. While the massive American aid has to date made little success in building a productive economic system, the absence of self-sustaining growth has not been an effort to maintain Egypt as economically weak and exploitable so much as a result of AID's own institutional constraints, the size of the task, and the failure of the Egyptians to manage successfully the new resources and technologies.

FINAL DRAFT  
**PROGRAM EVALUATION STUDY PLAN  
FOR  
THE USAID PROGRAM AND ITS IMPACT ON EGYPT POLICY  
REFORM PROGRAMS**

**Appendix 3: A “Time-Line” Perspective of USAID program content and emphasis over the Period 1972 to present. ( Tabular and graphic presentation of annual data by category )**

The appendix includes only a listing of expenditures over the 25-year period broken into major components. Repeated requests were made to various USAID-Cairo offices for a finer breakdown to produce a time-line perspective but it appears the data are unavailable in Cairo at this time.

FINAL DRAFT  
**PROGRAM EVALUATION STUDY PLAN  
FOR  
THE USAID PROGRAM AND ITS IMPACT ON EGYPT POLICY  
REFORM PROGRAMS**

**Appendix 4: Summaries of 210 USAID-sponsored evaluations of projects  
and programs ( From AID's Center for Development  
Information and Evaluation )**

The material included in the appendix is abstracts of specific USAID evaluations of projects and sector programs. The material here and additions to it as they become available will be part of the database used to examine the impact of USAID in general on Egypt and, more specifically, economic policy reform in Egypt. The project evaluation summaries listed here represent over 6500 pages (not including attachments) of original evaluation studies.



the equipment or parts were replaced. Additionally, since removal of rock and concrete in order to place the temporary sealing bulkhead was not permitted by the Ministry of Irrigation, which is responsible for the dam structure, the contractor was required to initiate a design change which allowed the work to continue.

Specific lessons are as follows. (1) Replacement of the first 6 units occurred during a drought that had resulted in inordinately low water levels in Lake Nasser, which in turn threatened safe operation of the new runners. At the request of the EEA, additional tests and studies were conducted which have provided the EEA with operating procedures that will extend the range of operation under the most adverse head conditions. (2) The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BUREC) has revised many of its testing and inspection procedures based on what was learned in this project, which required exhaustive and rigorous testing of the welding. The comprehensive testing program has been the subject of several technical papers presented at technical association meetings. (3) To ensure that the concrete used to rehabilitate the draft tubes has a compressive strength of 9,800 pounds per square inch, the project: used modern additive materials in mixing the concrete and high-quality assurance procedures throughout the entire batching, placement, and curing of the concrete; imported the cement from the United States (the local cement did not reach the compressive strength requirements), and developed techniques to use liquid nitrogen to cool the aggregate rock in the batching operation. (4) A sophisticated and technically advanced bulkhead device (a sealing barrier) was designed by BUREC for this project which allowed a dry working environment. The use of this large bulkhead (approximately 11 meters by 28 meters) developed for the High Dam will reshape industry practices for similar projects in the future.

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\*PD-ABN-167 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=91283  
Final assessment of the Egypt child survival project (263-0203)  
Cobb, Laurel K.; Baer, Franklin C.; et al.  
Basic Health Management International  
Futures Group International  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Aug 1996, xiv, 57 p. + 12 appendices, POPTECH report no. 96-073-41

2630203  
9363024  
CCP-3024-Q-00-3012-00

\*Availability: Fulltext electronic copy available -- electronic version does not include Annexes A, B, C, G, H, J, K, or L

Final evaluation of a project (1985-8/96) to support four child survival (CS) programs in Egypt: Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI-- expanded in 1991 to include hepatitis B), acute respiratory infections (ARIs), child spacing/maternal child health (CS/MCH), and nutrition (eliminated as a separate component in 1992).

The project has been very successful and has contributed to reduced infant, child, and maternal mortality in Egypt. The 1995 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) showed an average 35% decline in infant mortality and 59% decline in child mortality over a 10-year period, concomitant with several CS successes -- increased immunization rates, use of oral rehydration therapy, and appropriate treatment of ARIs.

The EPI component has been the most successful. Currently, 79% of health districts are polio-free, and only 71 reported confirmed cases were found in 1995 (down from 550 in 1988). If current strategies, including National Immunization Days and Polio Mop-up campaigns are sustained and a sensitive surveillance system capable of detecting all acute flaccid paralysis cases continues to improve, Egypt should attain its zero confirmed cases of polio objective by 1997. Vaccination coverage has been maintained at more than 80% since 1988; at least 83% of 231 health districts have achieved 80% coverage. The 1995 DHS Survey noted 79% fully immunized coverage (excluding hepatitis B3). In addition, incidence of neonatal tetanus has declined by 89% since 1986; and 76% of districts have reported less than 1 case per 1,000 live births. A highlight is the Government of Egypt's (GOE) assumption of total financial support for EPI (by contrast, in 1992 the GOE had zero funding for the imported EPI vaccines, which were provided mainly by UNICEF).

A national ARI detection and treatment program based on standard case management has been established in all 27 governorates -- one of the first such programs in the world. The project estimates access to standard case management to be 87%; to achieve this high level, the project skillfully handled all the complexities involved in planning, personnel development, equipment, supply line, information system, research, and information, education, and communication (IEC).

The CS/MCH component conducted varied and often innovative activities and programs in association with different Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP) departments, with varying levels of success. These included an important Maternal Mortality Study in 1992, the development of 100 neonatal care centers, daya (traditional birth attendant) training and linkage with MOHP health centers, and upgrading of

delivery rooms and laboratories. There was, however, relatively little of the desired collaboration between this component and the USAID-funded MOHP family planning program.

The project is ending before the crosscutting programs can show final results. The project has laid the framework for a national decentralized computerized health information system (HIS); supplied hardware, developed software, and provided some training; as yet, however, only a few governorates are using the new system (called DecHIS). A training curriculum has been developed for decentralized health planning and management; 4 of 27 governorates have received such training so far. A clinic improvement program (model clinics) has begun and the service standards developed for these 15 clinics are in use there, but not beyond. Very recently, the mass media program developed a series of 12 TV spots on priority MCH topics that have aired in the last several months. A revision of the curriculum for nurses has been completed, and that for physicians has been delayed by agreement between MOHP and USAID. The Field Epidemiology Training program has begun supplying trained MOHP epidemiologists, conducted numerous studies related to public health problems in Egypt, and made significant progress in the institutionalization of the program. In the final 2 years, efforts focused on two areas in particular need of strengthening: training and mass media/health education. Materials produced in these areas are well done and will be very useful in the years to come. Project efforts to achieve sustainability through decentralization and integration are too recent to show results.

Numerous recommendations for the successor Healthy Mother/Healthy Child Project are included. (Author abstract, modified)

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PD-ABN-076      Final Evaluation Report(24)                      Rec\_no=90913  
Agricultural production and credit project (APCP) : a final  
assessment  
Fletcher, Lehman; Jensen, Karl  
Datex, Inc.  
Egypt. Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (Sponsor)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Jun 1996, iii, 43 p.  
Task order no. 12

2630225  
263-0225-C-00-5045-00

Final evaluation of a program/project (1986-96) to encourage agricultural policy reform in Egypt and strengthen the Principal Bank

for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC).

The project succeeded in moving the agricultural sector to the forefront of Egyptian economic reforms, and has achieved a remarkable transformation of Egypt's agricultural policies, introducing sweeping reforms that have substantially liberalized agricultural production, pricing, and trade and led to significant increases in both production of major food crops and real farm income. At the same time, however, the liberalization of output and input markets has exposed farmers, processors, and consumers to price instability in the international markets. Little has been done to develop a system for collecting and disseminating the price and market outlook information that is needed to help Egyptian producers and consumers adjust to external market shocks.

Despite this good record, some policy reversals and setbacks occurred during 1995-96 and have damaged public confidence in the continuity of the Government of Egypt's (GOE's) policies and created uncertainty about the security of private investment and agribusiness operations. The GOE should give high priority to reestablishing its credibility; perceived market failures should be addressed only through limited interventions that disrupt private sector activity as little as possible.

Also, with the broadening of the new reform program, continuing to treat studies and policy formulation as benchmarks and giving equal weight to all benchmarks runs the risk of dissipating resources and diminishing the incentive effects of policy conditionality. Conditionality should be assigned in proportion to the expected impacts and strategic importance of the policy actions required.

Largely as a result of additions to its equity capital under the project, PBDAC's equity has risen from LE 100 million to LE 900 million, enabling expansion of its loan portfolio. PBDAC has and will continue to have a crucial role in supplying rural credit; it is evolving from its previous role as a supplier of in-kind credit and provider of distribution and marketing services into a bank that provides credit and financial services to Egypt's small farmers, agricultural businesses, and, increasingly, the entire rural community.

The Bank Improvement Program initiated in the last 2 years of the project is moving in very promising directions as far as the village and branch banks and the subsidiary BDACs are concerned. The program has successfully tested credit-worthy lending methods, promoted deposit mobilization, and extended lending to women and non-farm businesses,



component of the Cairo Water III Project. The component, which is being implemented by Black and Veatch International (BVI), aims to strengthen the General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply (GOGCWS). Mid-term evaluation covers the period 12/92-6/96.

Overall performance of MTSS to date is fair, but has improved in recent months as the project has gained respect and momentum within GOGCWS. Much of this can be credited to a new and supportive Chairman. Recent successful events include start-up of very effective pilot projects, establishment of an excellent training program, and establishment of a Performance Management Unit. Of course, the MTSS contractor team shares in this success.

Though recent accomplishments have been impressive, much remains to be done. The lofty vision of the project paper and the sustainable systems and programs specified in the BVI contract will not be reachable during the remaining year of the performance period, nor will they likely be attained within the 2 years remaining in the project. For most efforts, at least 3 more years is believed a minimum support requirement to build sustainability. Personnel and financial systems will take longer.

The tariff issue has been a contentious problem for all parties, with USAID rightfully claiming that the Egyptian government has again failed to meet a legal agreement, while GOGCWS and MTSS team members feel they have been asked to deliver on a condition that is not under their control. GOGCWS and MTSS believe that the recent plan accepted by the Governor will be fully implemented within the next month or two. The plan provides for a 28% annual increase for 5 years for water and an increase to 50% for the wastewater surcharge. These have to be ratified by local councils that have the authority to make changes. This sequence of steps poses a risk and requires close USAID monitoring. If the rate increase is accepted, all sides should claim victory and move to the next steps of continuing to improve the major water and wastewater utilities in Cairo. Without further development by each, especially regarding operations and maintenance practices, infrastructure improvements from the \$1.2 billion USAID investment will be subject to damage and a shorter lifespan.

The project's performance improvement methodology is beginning to gain sufficient momentum to create sustainable change if supported and continued at least throughout the planned PACD of 12/97 and perhaps beyond. This methodology is supported by the commodities program and also frames all pilot activities and training initiatives. It serves to integrate the project and provide a framework for measuring results.

(Author abstract)

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PD-ABN-221 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=91504  
Population/family planning III project  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
23 Jun 1996, 20 p.  
Companion evaluation: PD-ABM-525

2630227

Summarizes interim evaluation (PD-ABM-525) of a project to support Egypt's family planning (FP) efforts. The evaluation covered the period 1992-3/96.

The project, through its eight subprojects, is making good progress toward increasing FP service volume, improving quality of services, improved implementing agency management capacity, increasing information for policy makers, and expanding information, education, and communication (IEC). Together, these outputs have contributed to increased couple-years of contraceptive protection.

Management capacity of the subprojects has been strengthened through the development of management systems, training, and emphasis on supportive supervision. Improved information for policymakers has had slower success because there exists no body which has policy dialogue, formulation, and dissemination as a high priority.

The umbrella approach of using one prime contractor and several subcontractors is advantageous for coordination of project activities.

Continued emphasis in Upper Egypt on the mobile teams and nursing schools is likely to improve and expand services, though with activities just recently started, it is too early to tell. (Author abstract, modified)

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PD-ABM-525 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=89595  
Midterm evaluation of the Egypt population/family planning III  
project (263-0227)  
Stephens, Betsy; Cobb, Laurel; et al.  
Basic Health Management International  
Futures Group International  
USAID. Bur. for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research. Center  
for Population, Health and Nutrition. Ofc. of Population (Sponsor)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Mar 1996, xvi, 95 p. + 6 annexes : statistical tables, POPTECH report no.

95-055-035

Companion Evaluation Summary: PD-ABN-221

2630227

9363024

CCP-3024-C-00-3011-00

Evaluates umbrella project to support Egypt's national family planning (FP) efforts. The project comprises 8 subprojects, implemented by the Ministry of Health, the National Population Council, the Ministry of Information, and the private sector. Mid-term evaluation covers the period 1992-3/96.

The project is making good progress toward its targets for service volume, quality, and IEC. The MOH infrastructure alone includes a vast network of 3,706 units; no one is further than 5 km from a health care source. Focus has been on improving service quality and institutionalizing high-quality care and support systems. Training of the system development SP staff and similar support provided to the clinical service improvement subproject and the teaching hospital organization SP have strengthened their capacity to offer quality services. The project has supported an effective program of mass communication, local IEC activities, and interpersonal communication.

Full and informed choice is an important dimension of quality and in the long term is indispensable to sustainability. One concern is the heavy reliance on the IUD, although a recent dramatic increase in the use of the injectable is encouraging.

A great deal of progress has been made in developing the mission, strategy, structure, staff, and systems in the subprojects. However, the developments are scattered throughout the subprojects, and most of them need additional TA -- some short-term, some long-term -- for complete institutionalization.

Although Egypt faces some difficult policy issues, there is no entity for which policy dialogue and formulation is a priority. Without such ground setting, there is a risk that Egypt's FP program will be unprepared for the inevitable financial and sectoral changes to come (i.e., eventual removal of free contraceptives given by foreign donors and changes in national price control strategies in all sectors).

It is crucial that the new Ministry of Population and FP (MOPFP) and/or the NPC retain a strong orientation toward policy, planning, and research issues. The new Ministry is uniquely positioned to support

the service and IEC activities of other ministries and agencies, to preclude duplication of efforts, and to help implementing agencies emphasize quality of service. Support for new service delivery activities is not recommended, since coverage is adequate. The pressing issues are service quality, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness.

The project represents a radical change in management, with management placed under a single contract with 8 subprojects, unlike its predecessor, which had 24 subprojects supported through a series of cooperative agreements. This umbrella mechanism has distinct advantages; it facilitates coordinated planning and implementation and helps to ensure complementarity and avoid overlap. It also decreases USAID's management burden.

USAID should retain the umbrella mechanism in the follow-on project, but consider a more flexible contracting mode. The rigidity of a contract forces a focus on deliverables rather than qualitative outputs and puts a heavy burden on all for detailed documentation. Either a cooperative agreement or performance-based contract would provide much more flexibility and permit all concerned to spend more time and resources on the program instead of the process.

An important lesson learned is that the time frame is too short. The project, initially conceived as a 5-year effort, has been compressed into less than 4 years. This short period has forced an orientation toward detail (deliverables) and diverted attention from the big picture. Five years is the absolute minimum for a program with long-term goals and vision; 10 years would be better. This project should be extended and the follow-on designed with a 10-year time-frame. (Author abstract, modified)

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PD-ABN-710 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=93000  
Child survival project -- Egypt, 1985-96  
Egypt. Ministry of Health and Population  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
1996, v.p. [ca. 600 p.]

2630203

Final report by the Government of Egypt's Ministry of Health and Population (MOPH) on the USAID-funded Child Survival Project (CSP) (1985-8/96). The report, which documents the project's accomplishments, activities, and lessons learned, is based, in part, on the final project evaluation (PD-ABN-167).

The CSP has been a very successful project and has achieved most of its objectives. The Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI) component is the most successful of the three components; it has attained almost all of its objectives, as follows. (1) A total of 79% of health districts are polio free, with only 71 cases found in 1995 (down from 550 in 1988). If current strategies, including National Immunization Days and Polio Mop-up campaigns are sustained and a sensitive surveillance system, capable of detecting all acute flaccid paralysis cases continues to improve, Egypt should attain its "zero confirmed cases of polio" objective by 1997. (2) Vaccination coverage has been maintained at more than 80% since 1988. At least 83% of 231 health districts have achieved 80% coverage. The 1995 Egypt Demographic and Health Survey noted 79% fully immunized coverage (excluding Hepatitis B3). (3) An 89% reduction has been achieved in neonatal tetanus since 1986. A total of 76% of districts have <1 reported case per 1000 live births.

A highlight of the EPI program, and of the development of Egypt's support for it, is the Government of Egypt's (GOE) assumption of financial support for the program. In 1992, the GOE had zero funding for the imported EPI vaccines (polio, DPT, measles and part of BCG). However, as the CSP ends, the GOE is picking up total support: vaccine costs alone in 1996/1997 are \$28 million, to be borne by the GOE.

A national Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI) control program based on standard case management (SCM) has been impressively established in all the 27 governorates: it is one of the first such programs in the world. CSP estimates access to SCM for ARI to be 87%. CSP achieved this success through skillfully handling all the complexities of creating the required support components -- planning, manpower development, equipment, supply line, information system, research and information, education and communication (IEC).

The child survival/maternal child health (CS/MCH) component conducted varied and often innovative activities, in association with different MOHP departments and with varying levels of success. These included an important Maternal Mortality Study in 1992, the development of 100 neonatal care centers, daya (traditional birth attendant) training and linkage with MOHP health centers, and upgrading of delivery rooms and laboratories.

This report also concludes that the CSP has: (1) laid the framework for a national decentralized computerized health information system (HIS), and supplied hardware, developed software, and provided some training in its use; (2) developed training curriculum for

decentralized health planning and management; (3) developed a clinic improvement program, known as Model Clinics, which was pilot tested in 15 clinics to provide service, operational, and supervisory standards; (4) developed a mass media program, including more than 24 T.V. spots on priority MCH topics; (5) initiated the revision of sections of the physicians and nurses curricula that deal with child and maternal health; (6) established a Field Epidemiology Training Program and Unit to supply trained epidemiologists to the MOHP (trainees have already conducted a number of studies, and significant progress has been made in institutionalizing the program); (7) focused efforts during the final 2 years of the project on strengthening training and mass media/health education, with good results; and (8) institutionalized the three project components (EPI, ARI, and CS/MCH) and initiated efforts to achieve sustainability of other aspects of the project through decentralization and integration. (Author abstract, modified)

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PD-ABL-944 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=87928

Canal cities water and wastewater : phase II institutional support

project (CCII) -- interim evaluation final report

Hallett, Dan S.

Datex, Inc.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)

Sep 1995, ix, [41] p.

Delivery order no. 13

2630174

9300085

AEP-0085-I-00-2060-00

Evaluates efforts under Phase II of the Canal Cities Water and Sewerage Project to strengthen the capacities of the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) and governorate wastewater departments (WWDs) to provide operation and maintenance (O&M) of the physical facilities installed under the project. The evaluation covers the period 6/91-9/95.

Due to the length of time needed to change reactive management systems to pro-active ones, few tasks have been completed. Nonetheless, all tasks have made significant progress and have been enthusiastically endorsed by project clients. These include the establishment of a Steering Committee, which has fostered cooperation between the WWDs/governorates and facilitated the negotiation of city contracts for O&M of the wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) by the SCA. The project has also ensured governorate/city ownership of the WWTPs and prepared a "tariff model" which uses the cost-of-service approach and can be used



Evaluates Commodity Import Program (CIP) assistance to Egypt. Evaluation covers the period 1975-91 for the program's public sector component (PUCIP), and 1986-12/94 for its private sector component (PRCIP).

Together, PUCIP and PRCIP have accounted for \$5.3 billion in aid since 1975, or about one-fourth of the total amount of Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance provided to Egypt. PUCIP expenditures have totaled \$4 billion, with capital goods accounting for one-third of total expenditures, and bulk goods for one-quarter. PUCIP was terminated in 1991, although an existing pipeline is still being drawn down. PRCIP expenditures have totaled nearly \$1.3 billion, with capital goods and bulk grains each accounting for about one-fifth of total expenditures.

USAID paperwork and procedural requirements are a major headache for private importers, but they utilize the PRCIP due to its long grace period, coverage of the foreign exchange risk, and the quality of U.S. goods. Financial incentives to induce banks to participate in the program, on the other hand, are inadequate under current economic conditions. There has also been little effective publicity for the PRCIP, with some importers unaware of the grace period allowed and some thinking the program had been discontinued. The Project Finance Facility (PFF), which provides medium-term import credits related to plant modernization and/or expansion, is underused.

Egypt's stabilization and structural adjustment programs have had considerable impact on the CIP. Unification of the exchange rate in 1991 and the related build up of foreign exchange reserves eliminated the foreign exchange support justification for the CIP. The country's restructuring process is continuing and could have further unforeseen impacts on the program. There is also growing competition to the PRCIP, due to a wider selection of import finance sources in Europe that offer goods comparable to the U.S. goods, at lower prices, with faster delivery. Congressional earmarking is also inhibiting effective use of PRCIP resources. The annual earmarking has led in recent years to imports of grain commodities, which are basically used as commercial rather than developmental goods.

Despite its problems, the PRCIP remains politically and, due to the interest-free grace period, economically relevant, although it has had a limited impact on the economy due to its relatively modest scale. Still, PRCIP funding accounts for about 10% of total imports by Egypt's private sector, and funds are mainly destined towards the growth

sectors of the economy. The program is not adequately addressing the need to accelerate development of the private sector to spur increased economic growth. The PRCIP could be appreciably enhanced if it were aggressively marketed.

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PD-ABK-163 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=83751  
Interim evaluation : sector policy reform program and technical  
support for sector policy reform project -- Egypt  
Berg, Elliot; Sines, Richard; Walker, James  
Development Alternatives, Inc.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Jul 1994, ii, 67 p. + 3 annexes

2630233  
9300095  
PDC-0095-Z-00-9053-00

The Sector Policy Reform Program (SPR) has proved itself an effective substitute for the unconditioned cash transfers of the past two decades. It has succeeded in pushing forward the Government of Egypt's (GOE's) Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP), while accommodating the constraints imposed on policy lending by the special political circumstances of U.S. aid to Egypt. Despite the earmark and its implications for the credibility of conditionality, the GOE/World Bank/IMF program for reforms has been strengthened by USAID backup, and USAID itself has become a more significant and effective partner in policy dialogue.

In the past decade, and especially the past 3 years, the GOE has stabilized the economy and has made extraordinary progress toward economic liberalization and the reduction of distortionary economic policies. Following the wide-ranging reforms in agricultural policy that began in the mid-1980s, macroeconomic and broad sectoral reforms were introduced in 1991 with Bank-Fund support, under the ERSAP. Since 1991, exchange rates have been unified and exchange controls dismantled, real interest rates have become positive, the trade regime has become more open, and financial markets have been made more open and competitive. A beginning has been made in privatization.

USAID has contributed to this movement toward freer markets and increased efficiency of resource use. USAID was the chief sponsor, along with GOE, of the agriculture sector reforms. Through the SPR, it has provided support for ERSAP by reinforcing its conditionalities and complementing them by sponsoring new or related policy measures.

The SPR policy measures were generally well-designed to meet the targets of the program. Compliance has been good though uneven. The most consistent compliance has been in the financial and fiscal areas. The biggest gap between commitments and performance has been in privatization. Compliance was cosmetic in some cases; most notably, the GOE invented a way to comply formally with ERSAP conditionality by shifting state-owned enterprise (SOE) shares to so-called Employee Shareholder Associations while leaving unaffected SOE control and introducing no management changes.

The SPR will have special priority in the post-debt relief years (after 1994). The promise of substantial Paris Club debt and debt service relief has been the main incentive for GOE adherence to the reform program. But this will be gone once the Bank and Fund certify compliance with ERSAP policy conditionalities, probably in a few months. An additional peril for policy reform is the comfortable budget and balance of payments posture of GOE. The temptation to pursue more expansionist, less prudent, macroeconomic and sectoral policies will surely increase. The relative importance of USAID's SPR program will thus increase substantially, because it will be the only cash-backed multi-sectoral policy reform program.

Implementation of SPR has been extremely demanding. Conditionality could not be pushed so hard that it became "burdensome," given the large reform agenda that was already on the table. Nor could it be based entirely on the Bank-Fund policy matrix without risking the charge that the same reforms were being "paid for twice." Decision-making is centralized, policy analysts few, the flow of information sluggish, and habits of open debate and policy dialogue embryonic. Some ministries are uninterested, even hostile, to policy discussion with donors. Despite all this, and by dint of persistence and ingenuity, the Economic Analysis and Policy Directorate has succeeded in tracking compliance with the policy measures of SPR. In the process, they have learned a great deal about the Egyptian economy and about obstacles to reform, and have nudged the policy reform process forward. (Author abstract)

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PD-ABK-363 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=84206  
International Executive Service Corps (IESC)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
2 Jun 1994, 11 p.  
Companion evaluation: PD-ABK-161

2630225

Summarizes interim evaluation (PD-ABK-161) of a project to support assistance to Egypt's private sector by Volunteer Executives (VEs) of the International Executive Services Corps (IESC). Evaluation covered the period 11/89-6/94 and focused on cost-effectiveness.

Results of the evaluation were extremely positive, showing that program effectiveness went beyond expectations. In one particular project, the amount of improved profitability could have paid for the entire IESC Cooperative Agreement. VEs' personable, direct, and practical approach to sharing information enabled clients to benefit almost immediately from the technology transfer.

For example, in the DIAB Agricultural Reclamation projects, IESC TA resulted in an increase in reclaimed desert acreage from 160 to 450 feddans, the addition of 200 employees, and an increase from 15% to 36% in grape exports. Services to the American University in Cairo helped the University to develop two new degree programs. TA to MIRACO expanded its air conditioning factory by 50%, increased U.S. imports to over \$12 million, and increased sales and exports to Middle Eastern markets. Another client, the Red Sea Hotel, had a short and efficient start-up with major cost savings, and reached break-even in its first year; the hotel generates LE 200,000 a month in profits and employs 300 people. In summary, considering the short time that the VEs spend with clients, their impact has been very significant in the great majority of cases.

Costs for IESC's director and regional director (\$35,000 and \$27,000, respectively, per annum) are far less than the usual cost of a chief of party (\$193,000).

Finally, the evaluation found no reason to change either the client contribution formula or spousal travel, the former because the current formula is adequate to the market, the latter because the cost of IESC projects is already low.

Major recommendations are to expand the program, which currently operates in Cairo and Alexandria, to other major governorate capitals such as Mansoura and Damietta, and into Upper Egypt, and to find alternative transportation for VEs, who spend as much as 3 hours a day driving and parking.

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PD-ABJ-054 PES/ES(21)  
Local development II [LD II], 263-0182  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
14 Jun 1994, [16] p.

Rec\_no=80818

Companion evaluation: PD-ABG-869

2630182

Summarizes final evaluation (PD-ABG-869) of a project (9/85-9/93) to improve the capacities of local governments in Egypt to plan and implement basic service projects, and to sustain service provision through local resource mobilization (LRM).

The first purpose of the project was achieved through 16,011 subprojects (SP's), financed by block grants, which improved the quality of life for 52 million Egyptians. SPs in provincial governorates improved water systems in 1,473 villages, constructed 3,250 km of roads, added 2,793 classrooms to existing schools, supplied 25 villages with wastewater treatment plants, and implement 1,059 small environmental projects, most for solid waste and sewage collection. SPs in urban governorates paved 2,354 streets; installed 634 km of street lighting; installed 58,496 meters of water distribution lines and 44,422 meters of sewers (mostly in unserved neighborhoods in Giza, Shoubra El Kheima, and rural Suez); provided garbage collection carts and trucks and manual tools; constructed and renovated public toilets, markets, bakeries, abattoirs, and classrooms; installed toilets in schools; and procured school equipment, primarily desks and tables.

Local governments were provided with TA in planning, management, budgeting, and training; with equipment and facilities; with more than 92,000 person-days of technical and managerial training; and with block grants for governorate-initiated training of PVO and governorate staff. The result was an impressive increase in planning and implementation abilities at all levels in the governorates. Management information systems were established in all 26 governorates. In addition, operations and maintenance capabilities were upgraded, with numerous maintenance centers, garages, and workshops established.

The LRM component did not achieve its objective, however. There were two main reasons for this. First, project designers had falsely assumed that the Government of Egypt (GOE) would support fiscal decentralization; they had failed to understand the history of centralization in Egypt and overlooked a legal environment which ensured that the central government retain control of all revenues collected locally. As a result, efforts to promote local revenue and fee collection and retention and to help the GOE develop a block-grant financing system of its own failed. Second, the project suffered from its unwieldy size and multipurpose approach for solving constraints in all of the governorates.



2630152  
9364200  
LAG-4200-I-00-3056-00

Evaluates project to strengthen Egypt's capacity for agricultural research and extension. Evaluation covers the period 1985-6/94.

Significant advances have been made in Egyptian agriculture during the project's existence. However, the project cannot take exclusive credit for these, which must also be attributed to: (1) major policy reforms implemented during the past 12 years, many of which removed significant disincentives to agricultural development; and (2) improvements in agricultural research programs made by A.I.D.-sponsored projects in the late 1970s and mid-1980s. Rather, the project has built itself on the foundations laid by the above efforts, and pursued new activities, resulting in significant improvements in the production, nominal value, and commodity prices for a broad spectrum of crops, as well as for wheat, the production of which has increased more since 1987 than at any other time in Egypt's history.

Specific project accomplishments have included the development of management information systems at 9 agricultural extension facilities, and the formation of research and extension councils for each of Egypt's 4 major regions; an extensive training program, which has significantly improved the seed industry; and a new initiatives component, through which unanticipated problems may be solved or opportunities pursued.

Unfortunately, the project has been constrained by significant problems with implementation, management (which may have resulted, in part, from the 2-year delay in establishing a project administration unit), and funding. (1) Leadership changes plagued both USAID/E (which has had 3 Mission directors) and the GOE. (2) A critical audit resulted in reductions in project funding, and the cancellation of several important components in 1992, and further reductions have been proposed. However, the audit's major complaints have been addressed, the GOE's failure to provide its share of project funding has been positively resolved, and management problems have ended with the appointment of a new project manager in 1990.

Despite these problems, the project has been a vital part of the USAID effort to improve Egypt's agricultural productivity. It is recommended that most of the original funding level be restored, and that it should continue, intact, until a successor project has been developed and set in place. Future activities should be more sharply

focused, take advantage of Egypt's excellent production capacities, and seek to improve and expand domestic and export markets for agricultural commodities.

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PD-ABK-364 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=84207  
Project activity completion report : local government II  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
17 May 1994, 11 p.5 appendices : statistical tables

2630182

PACR of a project (1987-9/93) to improve the capacity of local governments (LGs) in Egypt to provide basic services for low-income residents and to mobilize local resources.

Basic services provided in provincial governorates included: provision of clean, piped water to 22 million people in 1,473 villages; construction of 3,250 km of roads; addition of 2,793 classrooms to schools, providing space for 107,000 students; construction of wastewater treatment plants in 25 villages; and 1,059 small environmental projects, largely for solid waste and sewage disposal, benefiting more than 7.5 million citizens.

In the urban governorates the project helped to: pave 2,354 km of streets and install 634 km of street lighting; install 58,946 linear meters of water distribution lines and 44,422 linear meters of sewer installations; provide 1,047 garbage collection carts, trucks, and tools; construct 100 public toilets and renovate 1,500 others. In addition, markets, bakeries, and abattoirs were constructed and/or renovated, and 2,106 classrooms were constructed and 40,470 pieces of school equipment were procured.

All told, more than 16,000 small projects were funded under the project, vs. a target of only 3,600. Training goals were also far surpassed, with over 98,000 LG and PVO personnel receiving training in technical and non-technical subjects vs. a target of 63,550 in technical subjects.

However, fiscal decentralization did not occur, due to the lack of supportive national policies and coordinating mechanisms (wrongly assumed to exist in the project design). The project shows how difficult local fiscal autonomy is to achieve in terms of organizational assignments, staffing, and defined functions. Future efforts to assist local governance should not adopt comprehensive institutional development objectives without confirming that supportive

policy foundations are in place on the part of both the recipient country and the donor agency. Unless in a position to exert maximum and sustained leverage, a donor should avoid seeking to alter Egypt's policies on local resource mobilization.

Basing sustainability of local services on a major policy change at the central level was an unrealistic assumption. Local projects are most likely to be sustained with local initiatives. The project clearly demonstrated that Egyptian LGs are capable of planning, implementing, and monitoring block grants, and the project system for financing infrastructure proved an efficient and effective means of funding basic services on a massive scale. Paradoxically, the system of operating outside the normal Egyptian administrative structure was the project's greatest strength. Through provision of block grants, governorates and localities were given the flexibility to move funds between sectors as well as between projects. At the same time, however, future achievements are at risk precisely because its system has not been adopted by the government.

The project also showed the value of infrastructural development, which has an immediate impact on large numbers of people, as an incentive for innovations in administration and governance projects.

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\*PN-AAX-282 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=78412  
Capital projects : economic and financial analyses of nine capital projects in Egypt  
Hanrahan, Michael; Walker, James; et al.  
USAID. Bur. for Policy and Program Coordination. Center for Development Information and Evaluation  
AID evaluation technical report, no. 19, Mar 1994, xviii, 56 p. + 2 appendices : statistical tables  
Related document: PN-AAX-281

\*Availability: Fulltext electronic copy available

Over the period 1977-92, A.I.D. funded nine capital projects in Egypt, which collectively increased electric power generation, introduced a modern telephone system in Cairo and Alexandria, and rehabilitated a water and sewer system that served 23 million people. This study presents detailed ex post facto analyses of the projects' economic and financial internal rates of return. The methodology, assumptions, and data are examined and described. Results indicate a mixed performance, with generally low to medium financial and economic rates of return. These low rates are not due to technical problems -- the projects were well designed, used appropriate technology, and were

operated in a sound manner. In large measure, the poor performance was due to the Egyptian Government's poor economic policies, such as government price controls, regulations, subsidies, and employment and management structures that resulted in inefficient production and inefficient use of project outputs. A clear lesson is that in a bad policy environment, even technically sound projects cannot generate a good rate of return. In the last few years, Egypt has initiated several policy reforms that have corrected a number of inappropriate prices and subsidies. These actions, it is hoped, will improve the economic rates of return on future capital projects. (Author abstract, modified)

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\*PN-AAX-281 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=78411  
Capital projects : Egypt case study  
Liebersson, Joseph; Stallard, Janice; et al.  
USAID. Bur. for Policy and Program Coordination. Center for Development  
Information and Evaluation  
AID evaluation technical report, no. 20, Mar 1994, vi, 47 p. + 7 appendices  
Related documents: PN-AAX-265 and PN-AAX-282

\*Availability: Fulltext electronic copy available -- electronic version does not contain tables, figures, charts, or graphics

Based on evaluation of nine capital projects carried out between 1977 and 1992, this report assesses A.I.D.'s capital assistance program in Egypt in terms of both its commercial benefits for the United States and its developmental benefits for Egypt. In regard to the first aspect, the study found that few A.I.D.-funded projects or studies generated either participation by other donors or follow-on sales for U.S. companies; none generated participation by a private investor. The report places much of the blame for this on U.S. firms' failure to take advantage of a clear opportunity to develop the Egyptian commercial market; in short, U.S. firms were "out-marketed" by their European and Japanese competitors. Findings regarding the developmental benefits of the projects are mixed. (1) The projects helped support strong private sector growth in Egypt through the 1980's. They increased electric power, introduced a modern telephone system in Cairo and Alexandria, and rehabilitated water and sewage systems, significantly improving the quality of life of many poor Egyptians. Nonetheless, their economic and financial rates of return were generally disappointing. (2) The projects were built to a high technical standard, but their sustainability is in doubt due to insufficient financial resources, uneven operations and maintenance practices, and inadequate employee training and compensation. (3) The pursuit of commercial advantage for U.S. firms did not distort the



1990 to March 1994  
Basch, Paul F.; Hammamy, Diaa; et al.  
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services. Public Health Service. Ofc. of  
International Health  
John Snow, Inc.  
Egypt. Ministry of Health (Sponsor)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Mar 1994, 78 p. + 2 appendices

2630102  
9365929  
PDC-5929-I-00-0109-00  
Contract evaluated: 263-0102-P-HI-1013-00

Final evaluation of the Cooperative Health Program (12/90-3/94), which provides TA, through a PASA with the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS), to Egyptian researchers.

In general, collaboration among USAID, the USPHS, and the Egyptian Ministry of Health (MOH) was quite successful, and the collaborative work of U.S. and Egyptian investigators generated significant research results that could improve health in Egypt. TA was of very high quality.

There were many individual achievements. Laboratories and offices in the MOH and universities have been upgraded through equipment purchases; several can now serve as reference laboratories in Egypt and for the region. The capacities of research groups have been greatly enhanced; most received computers and data management training, and several groups gained the capacity to evaluate potential health problems through community prevalence surveys. In service and production-oriented projects, protocols and Standard Operating Procedures were standardized among collaborating institutions and brought up to international norms.

Despite these individual achievements, the sustainability of the program and its impact on public health is questionable. At the most basic level, the program simply wasn't long enough to establish a widespread increase in capacity, nor to ensure the sustainability of many of the projects; several investigators expressed apprehension that the equipment and expertise gained may not be usefully employed in the near future. The program also suffered considerable management and logistical deficiencies, especially in the earlier stages, although USAID, by requiring the establishment of an in-country Management Support Unit, was able to resolve many of the logistical issues.

On a broader level, the program seemed to lack purpose and cohesiveness. For example, the 17 projects in the program portfolio lacked a common theme, and the translation of research findings into policy was limited. Most this has to be blamed on USAID, which failed to provide adequate direction and oversight, and on the design of the program, which did not establish clear goals or lines of responsibility between the U.S. Office of International Health (OIH), which was responsible for managing the project, and USAID; in fact, there was significant disagreement between USAID and OIH about the nature of the program. The MOH seemed to be left "out of loop" in many cases, and as a result did not feel a sense of ownership of research findings, nor seem very motivated to translate findings into policy recommendations.

Future collaborations of this type should include a formal project paper, link program components more closely to current MOH and USAID strategies and goals, focus TA more clearly on sustainability goals, and specify terms of reference and expectations for both USAID and OIH.

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PD-ABH-881 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=78041  
Partnership in development project activity (263-0102.01)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
5 Jan 1994, [8] p.

263010201  
2630216

Summarizes interim evaluation of a project component to provide TA in support of the Government of Egypt's (GOE) privatization efforts. The evaluation covered the period 12/90-12/92.

The GOE's privatization program, which since 1991 has been headed by a newly created Public Enterprise Office (PEO), represents a milestone in the ongoing liberalization process begun in the mid-1970s under President Sadat, and has received a boost from agreements concluded in 1990 and 1991 with the World Bank and the IMF. However, initiation of the program, which aims at the divestiture of 150 public enterprises, has been hampered by a host of obstacles and delays, including an apparent lack of commitment on the part of the GOE, the lack of an organized and consistent approach, and the poor performance of the original contractor (since changed).

To date, the project has had only limited direct impact on divestiture. Its major successes have been in helping to organize the PEO, developing a strategy and standard procedures for privatization, working with the Holding Companies to identify candidates for

privatization, and promoting awareness of privatization. Legal and financial procedures and techniques for divestiture are in place, significant progress has been made in increasing proponents of privatization within the GOE, a number of enterprises have been readied for privatization, six companies have been brought to the point of sale, and the groundwork has been laid for launching a series of transactions to test the procedures for privatization and to establish precedents. The Mission has played a critical role in these accomplishments by supporting GOE movements towards a more liberalized economy.

The GOE's issuance of a set of guidelines establishing the parameters, criteria, and timetable for privatization has reduced uncertainty about the program's time-frame and has also provided the affirmation needed by the GOE's multilateral and bilateral creditors of its commitment to the program. Nonetheless, the GOE has not yet proved that its commitment is firm, and it has yet to adopt parallel measures to prevent later resistance to the program or to build support among the various stakeholders. Confusion regarding the authority and respective roles of the Egyptian institutional parties to the privatization process still persists and can be expected to pose obstacles in the future.

The evaluation's recommendations for follow-on TA focused on public awareness and program promotion, sales transactions, mobilization of financial resources, strengthening institutional capability and decisionmaking, and the provision of training. The Mission notes that these concerns have been extensively addressed in the Project Paper for the new Privatization Project (2630238), which also includes a series of evaluations by a contracted outside firm.

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PD-ABH-892      Final Evaluation Report(24)                      Rec\_no=78089  
Project assistance completion report (PACR) : production credit  
project (263-0147)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
27 Jan 1994, 12 p.

2630147

PACR of a project (8/82-5/92) to expand the provision of production credit to the Egyptian private sector.

Results were mixed. The short-term credit component used almost all of its funds, approving over 350 transactions with an average value of \$100,000; the number of participating banks increased from 5 to 9.



delayed until 1989 because key personnel had to be replaced during the first year. Since 1991, the project has gradually gained momentum and is now accelerating, although not all planned outputs will be in place in each command area by the PACD.

To date, the project has created 7 Directorates and 2 Inspectorates, which are equipped with computers and office equipment, laboratories, transportation facilities, and trained personnel. Equipment for construction activities is in place and 36 mesqa improvement contracts covering 52,000 feddans and 26 main delivery system improvement contracts are in progress. While these efforts have not yet had a quantifiable impact on crop yields, they have given farmers the water resource security they need to select more high-yielding crops.

Although institution building is still incomplete, the project has made significant progress in establishing a capacity within MPWWR to carry on project work after the PACD. Specifically, the project has trained engineers at the command levels; developed the Irrigation Advisory Service (IAS), which has conducted 17 feasibility studies; facilitated the evolution of a network of construction firms; and developed a technique for training and promoting Water User Associations (WUAs). The commodity procurement plan, which had overstated needs, has been revised and substantial savings have occurred as a result.

The project has suffered from the following deficiencies. While irrigation system designs are generally appropriate, mesqas have been improved using mobile pumps, a strategy which is not always up to good design standards. Construction activities need to be more closely supervised and coordinated. Because implementation of downstream control structures to introduce continuous flow was delayed, many completed mesqas are now getting by on rotational delivery. What most hinders the project's sustainability and MPWWR's institutional capacity is that the WUAs are still awaiting legislative approval and the cost recovery issue has not yet been resolved despite several attempts to do so.

The following lessons were learned. (1) It is important to consider the ensemble of a project's outputs -- not just physical outputs -- when deciding whether or not the project has met its goals. In the present case, while the number of mesqas installed and feddans improved has been low, the project has improved water control and delivery systems and created the potential for environmental amelioration. (2) The project's attempt to develop procedures to rehabilitate irrigation systems and increase crop yields requires an organization capable of

managing the effort. The creation of an authority might be an improvement, but its political and financial implications need further study. (3) The project was well-planned; its major constraints have been lack of shared understanding among MPWWR, A.I.D., and the TA contractor. Disputes related to implementation and financing should be settled during the negotiation phase. (4) Interministerial coordination and cooperation are difficult to achieve; grant awards should be conditioned on positive policy decisions within projects that require a multidisciplinary approach.

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PD-ABH-200 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=76878  
Evaluation report of the peace fellowship program -- AID project :  
development training peace fellowship component  
Ramsey, Gordon B.; Fink, Rodney J.  
Development Associates, Inc.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Nov 1993, vii, 25 p. + 8 annexes

263012501  
OTR-0000-I-14-0035-00

Evaluation of the Peace Fellowship Program to provide U.S. graduate training to public and private sector personnel in Egypt. Evaluation covers the period from 9/88-9/93.

Nine hundred and twenty-nine Fellows have completed training and 172 are still participating in U.S. training versus a goal of 1,250 Fellows. The latter target will certainly be met and could be exceeded by the PACD, 10/95. The Peace Fellows have completed degrees, thesis research, and published many academic papers in collaboration with U.S. counterparts and they have gained a wide exposure to the U.S. educational system and culture, one of the original motivations for the program following the Camp David Accords.

Throughout the program various targets have been established and amended for specific groupings of Peace Fellows. The latest amendment (1992) aims to draw 24% of total fellows from the private sector, 23% from the public sector, and for 18% of Fellows to be women. In this aspect, the project's management performance has been good.

The overall management of this project by the host government is one of the best illustrations of how an assistance project should work. The Egyptian government, in the task of providing graduate studies for Egyptians, has had long experience through its own programs funded by the Egyptian Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE); the MOHE has managed

the Peace Fellowship Program with confidence. If USAID/Cairo continues support for Egyptian participants in graduate level studies in the U.S., the MOHE would be the most appropriate counterpart agency to manage a new project of that type. A.I.D. has implemented the program in a professional manner. The USAID project officer has established effective working relations with the MOHE at all levels.

The one serious weakness in the program's administration has been a lack of structured participant follow-up activities after the Peace Fellows complete their training and return to Egypt. A Comprehensive Orientation, Follow-up and Evaluation (OFE) Program has been proposed, and A.I.D. is urged to adopt it in the near future.

Recommendations are as follows. For the near term, some adjustments should be made in the procedures of the MOHE, USAID, and the Egyptian Cultural and Educational Bureau, Washington, D.C. (ECEB). For the longer term, USAID, in collaboration with the MOHE, should design and implement a new program that would maintain the momentum of the current program and provide academic degree training in business, including general management, operations management, accounting, finance, management information systems, marketing, international business and trade, economics, environmental studies, tourism, education, nursing, and city planning. (Author abstract, modified)

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PD-ABG-869 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=76211  
Egypt local development II program (263-0182) : evaluation report  
Fitzcharles, Ann; Dalton, James J.; et al.  
Associates in Rural Development, Inc.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Sep 1993, xi, 46 p. + 6 annexes  
Companion evaluation summary: PD-ABJ-054

2630182  
263-0182-C-00-3067-00

Final evaluation of a project (9/85-9/93) to enhance the capacity of Egypt's local governments to (1) plan, implement, and maintain basic service delivery systems (BSDSs), and (2) sustain such services through local resource mobilization (LRM).

Results were mixed. On the positive side, systems for planning and implementing BSDSs have been established in each governorate. Local popular and executive council members, along with governorate, markaz, and village/district officials, have planned and implemented 17,000 BSDS subprojects which have provided basic services in water,

electricity, roads, wastewater, and school renovation. In addition, many facilities were put in place under the operations and maintenance (O&M) component, including, inter alia, 875 village workshops, 175 markaz maintenance centers, and 31 zonal/district workshops and central garages/workshops. All told, BSDS services have benefitted nearly 90% of Egypt's rural and urban population. Finally, improvement in local government capacity to implement BSDSs was demonstrated at all levels. Notable achievements included training of over 94,000 governorate staff through Governorate Training Centers, and establishment in each governorate of a maintenance coordinator and of management information systems (MIS) which use quarterly data to allocate funds for local subprojects.

Prospects for sustaining these achievements are mixed, however. The MIS exhibits the greatest potential, as long as the Office of Cabinet Affairs requires automated retrieval of governorate information; the Land Management Units and the Offices of Analysis and Financial Development also show promise. Sustainability of other elements is unlikely. Prospects for O&M are dim due to the Government of Egypt's (GOE) failure to address recurrent cost funding, and only a handful of established training institutions have incorporated project-designed training programs into their curriculum. As for institution-building, the project's use of block grant funding, which provided the greatest stimulus in this area, has not been institutionalized by the GOE, and there exist no central coordinating agencies linked to the Ministry of Local Administration (MLA) to assist in developing guidelines for local efforts. Overall, the project erred in linking local institutional development to GOE policy and organizational changes. Well-entrenched and powerful elements in the GOE will dominate local bodies for years to come.

The LRM component was limited by existing law, which does not allow local authorities to collect, manage, and retain significant amounts of money. Nevertheless, numerous local attempts are made by rural and urban governorates to generate revenue for basic services, including fees-for-service, income generation, cost recovery, assessments, leasing of public facilities to private operators, privatizing public enterprises, and voluntary contributions. There has been no evidence of cooperation among the Ministry of Finance, the MLA, and local administrative units to promote and support LRM. In sum, the purpose of the LRM component was not met and is not likely to be met for years to come.

The following lessons were learned. (1) Infrastructure development, which immediately affects much of the population, is an effective

incentive for innovations in administrative and government systems in which improved performance is not immediately felt or credited to the proper source. (2) Basing sustainability of basic services on a major policy change at the GOE level was unrealistic. In practice, local projects are most likely to be sustained with local initiatives not sanctioned in any way by the GOE. (3) Had project activities been set within the GOE rather than within a parallel structure which the GOE administrative organization is not equipped to direct, the chances of sustainability would have increased.

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PD-ABG-675 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=75868  
Final evaluation of the information, education, and communication subproject of the Egypt population/family planning II project (no. 263-0144)  
Bennour, Elizabeth J.; Werner, Louis G.; Yassin, Zeinab  
DUAL Inc.  
International Science and Technology Institute, Inc.  
USAID. Bur. for Research and Development. Ofc. of Population (Sponsor)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
3 Sep 1993, xiii, 107 p. : statistical tables, Report no. 92-187-153  
Companion evaluation summary: PD-ABH-390

2630144  
9363024  
DPE-3024-Z-00-8078-00

Final evaluation of the IEC subproject of the Family Planning II Project in Egypt. The subproject has been implemented by the State Information Service (SIS) under the Ministry of Information, through its IEC Center and 58 local information centers.

SIS has made major efforts to implement the recommendations of A.I.D. evaluations and assessments and to achieve the subproject purpose of increasing family planning knowledge and contraceptive awareness and practice through the mass media and interpersonal communication. It has demonstrated that it has a comparative advantage as an IEC family planning implementing agency in three areas: reaching rural women through television; reaching rural men through interpersonal communication activities; and using its extensive network of local influential and religious leaders. One of SIS' major strengths is its sound base of professional and committed staff at both the central and local levels as well as its willingness to respond to recommendations and to innovate. It has demonstrated that it is able to both implement and use surveys and research. In order to increase its efficiency in reducing the family planning acceptance-practice gap, SIS needs to

place greater emphasis on rural Upper Egypt where contraceptive rates remain low; base its television productions on formative field research in order to effectively reach the target audiences; develop a field-based planning process for its local activities; and improve the methods and materials used in its interpersonal communication activities. SIS is also in a prime position for developing inter-agency coordination at both national and local levels.

The following lessons were learned. (1) It is more cost-effective to pass family planning messages through short, well-targeted spots than through multi-episode series. Focus group surveys indicate that rural women will remember short, specific messages. (2) Television spots that are placed in a rural setting and that show everyday rural situations are the most effective in reaching rural women. (3) Media messages targeting rural and poor urban men and women need to be linked to the daily reality of these groups, who find it difficult to relate to national issues. (4) Television spots cannot effectively achieve their objectives unless pre-production research is undertaken with the target to identify the most appropriate themes for passing on messages and to test alternative scenarios/images before going into production. (5) In order for interpersonal communication activities to effectively address local problems, local workplans need to be developed in the field by the local offices themselves through a "diagnostic" process involving all of the local actors and agencies. (6) Central office staff can only address local office program needs if they are in regular contact with the field through visits and field-based technical assistance. (7) In order for workshops for local influentials to achieve maximum efficiency they must be designed to meet the needs of participants who work with specific target groups, e.g., religious leaders/rural men; female social workers/rural women; teachers/high school students; and male youth leaders/male youth. (8) When several local office staff are actively involved in IEC family planning activities, it is important that they be trained side by side in major skill areas in order to use the same approaches and pass on the same messages. (9) Local activities are much more effective and the coverage much broader when implemented in close conjunction with other implementing agencies. (Author abstract)

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PD-ABG-740 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=75959

Child survival [: Egypt]

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

12 Aug 1993, 7 p.

Companion evaluation: PD-ABF-500

2630203

Evaluates project to improve the health of mothers and children through four vertical interventions: Expanded Program of Immunization; Acute Respiratory Infection; Child Nutrition; and Child Spacing. Evaluation covers the period from 1985-11/92. Lessons learned are discussed below.

Every public health program must be designed to fit within the existing institutional context. This project is managed as a semi-autonomous program which means that special efforts need to be made to integrate its activities into the existing Ministry of Health (MOH) administrative structure and the existing service delivery system.

The MOH leadership should plan early for the level of MOH support necessary to maintain post-project activities. A study to determine the funding requirements to sustain post-project activities has been initiated. Early attention to this most important issue is critical to the future of the program in Egypt.

It is more important to emphasize the quality of services being developed than it is to attempt premature evaluation of the impact of these service. The project is working to improve service delivery across a wide spectrum of maternal and child health care areas. Particular attention needs to be focused on quality assistance in these programs.

Effective, skills-oriented training is a key to sustainability. The CSP has trained large numbers of health providers and equipped 26 training centers in 19 governorates.

The project's management information systems (MIS) call for the collection of much more data than it is possible to analyze. The MIS is being redesigned to foster a greater degree of analysis and utilization of information at the periphery of the Health Care Systems.

Involving the university community in strategy formulation, planning, research, and training is an excellent way to find talent and advocacy for the project. The project plans to strengthen the link between the MOH and universities.

Establishing adequate services on a decentralized basis is essential to the success of the program. Delegation of responsibility for child spacing activities to the local level will establish improved commitment from local officials. The project is now applying this approach.

Mass Media and Social Marketing are critical in mobilizing the public and in creating a better demand for child survival services or changing behavior. Private commercial expertise needs to be harnessed in order to produce high quality media materials and to ensure adequate air time in order to reach the largest numbers of people rapidly during the next two year period. (Author abstract)

See also abstract of companion evaluation, PD-ABF-500.

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PD-ABG-420 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=75076  
Final evaluation of the clinical services improvement subproject of  
the Egyptian Family Planning Association under the  
population/family planning II project  
Cobb, Laurel; Beasley, Rogers; et al.  
Dual & Associates, Inc.  
International Science and Technology Institute, Inc.  
USAID. Bur. for Research and Development. Ofc. of Population (Sponsor)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
28 Jul 1993, xiv, 108 p. + attachment : charts, statistical tables, Report  
no. 92-184-149 (b)

2630144  
9363024  
DPE-3024-Z-00-8078-00

Final evaluation of a subproject (under the Population/Family Planning II project 263-0144) to upgrade the quality and quantity of family planning (FP) services in the Egyptian FP Association (EFPA), the country's foremost FP private voluntary organization (PVO). The evaluation covers the period 6/87-3/93.

Through the end of 1992, the subproject (SP) had established 17 primary centers and 95 subcenters in 17 governorates; served 298,091 new FP clients; and provided another 311,731 related services. The SP's principal contribution has been the establishment of high-quality centers which have spearheaded a national emphasis on the quality of FP services. Although the quality of the SP services has been excellent, the cost of such quality has been high, relative to MOH costs. The SP's establishing, equipping, and furnishing of clinics and offices has been extravagant and has included equipment not essential to FP or other related services. The SP centers are also very underutilized for FP. It is unclear why the offered high-quality services are so underutilized. Institutional and management turmoil is one possible explanation; market demand is another. No professional research was



Final evaluation of a subproject (SP) to reduce fertility rates in Egypt. Evaluation covers the period 1987-1993.

As the SP entered its second year, approximately 2.9 million couples were practicing family planning (FP), representing a contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) of 37.6%; by 1992, CPR had risen to 47.1%. Although the MOH was only one contributor to this progress, its successful achievement of SP outputs made it a principal contributor. With USAID's support, the MOH has established FP clinics in 21 governorates; provided contraceptive technology training to 6,000 doctors and 7,000 nurses; developed and implemented FP management systems for planning, monitoring, supervision, management information, and commodities management at the central, governorate, district, and service provider levels; trained MOH staff at each of those levels in those new systems; developed a motivated, skilled cadre of full-time FP service providers; and improved the quality of FP services. Most importantly, it provided FP services to over 500,000 clients each year from 1988-91; in 1992 over 600,000 clients were served. Government leadership, from the President, to the Minister of Health, and to Undersecretaries of Health, has supported the national population effort and FP.

Challenges remain, however. Fertility in rural Upper Egypt remains much higher than the national rate, and women there are less likely to have prenatal care or be assisted at delivery by a doctor, trained midwife, or nurse. In 1991, the infant mortality rate in rural Upper Egypt was almost double that of rural Lower Egypt and significantly higher than that in urban Upper Egypt. In addition, the MOH FP program at present is essentially a one method (IUD) program. The number and variety of long-lasting methods should be expanded to include progestin-only contraceptives in their oral, injectable, and implant forms.

Also, gender roles in Egypt constrain service delivery in rural areas. First, female physicians are led to seek work in urban areas; and, second, due to cultural norms governing privacy, clients (especially in Upper Egypt) seek female providers and/or refuse FP (particularly IUDs) when provided by a male physician.

The following lessons were learned. (1) Although provision of quality FP services requires a great deal of effort, attention, and commitment, it need not be not capital intensive; a clean, one-room clinic equipped with very minimal equipment and staffed with trained and caring professionals who listen to and communicate with their

clients, can offer high-quality FP services. (2) Public sector management can learn from the private sector how to stay competitive in the total FP market. In Egypt, the MOH learned from the quality focus of the Clinical Services Improvement SP (also under the Egypt Population/FP II Project) of the Egyptian FP Association, and has steadily upgraded the quality of MOH services even though quality per se has not been a focus of this SP. (3) Service statistics based on couple years of protection measure distribution of contraceptives rather than clients served or reduced fertility. A more precise assessment of contribution to reduced fertility can be achieved with client-based service statistics. (Author abstract)

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PD-ABG-446 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=75183  
Project to promote the development of the High Institutes of Nursing in Egypt and supplemental program to extend the development of the High Institute of Nursing, Assiut University  
Fullerton, Judith T.; Sukkary-Stolba, Soheir  
International Health and Development Associates  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Jun 1993, x, 78 p.

2630102

Contract evaluated: 263-0102-G-00-0022-00

Final evaluation of project (1/90-6/93) to promote the development of university nursing education in Egypt by establishing a consortium of High Institutes of Nursing (HINs). The project was implemented by Project HOPE.

Despite the problems noted below, the project made remarkable progress in improving the status and image of nurses in Egypt. A strong HIN Executive Board has been established, facilitating communication among the Institutes. The project has also succeeded in establishing Demonstration Clinical Units (DCUs), each linked to either a hospital or primary health care facility; many of the DCUs will be sustained through local efforts beyond the life of the project. The development of written nursing standards is another significant contribution, and one which required a great deal of effort.

Sharing of educational resources and technical expertise help newly established HINs develop their junior faculty; consultants from well-established HINS were hired to assist the faculty of new HINs. In addition, project workshops helped raise consciousness about nursing issues in Egypt; junior faculty stated that they use workshop information in conducting in-service training for other health care

providers. U.S. training of HIN Directors, DCU Coordinators, and physicians encouraged professional growth, facilitated collegiality between HIN Directors and physicians, and enabled some HIN Directors to network with U.S. nurses.

Problem areas included: (1) lack of clarity regarding the roles of HIN Directors, status of the Executive Board (advisory vs. policymaking), management practices, and rules and regulations; (2) lack of clarity about project inputs among HIN Directors, who expected more up-to-date books, equipment, etc; (3) overly ambitious and unrealistic objectives, which should have been refocused at the time of mid-term evaluation; and (4) problems in overall communication between Project HOPE staff and some HIN directors. A team-building workshop would have helped clear the air and created a better working environment.

The following lessons were learned. (1) In projects where major institutional changes are desired, a great deal of attention should be given to the formation of Advisory/Executive Boards consisting of representatives from all relevant policymaking organizations. (2) Project policies, rules, and regulations governing the status and the relationship between cooperating organizations have to be clearly identified, formally articulated, and disseminated among members of participating organizations. (3) The success of a curriculum development initiative depends to a large extent on the amount of human resources, TA, time, and money allocated to the effort. (4) The development of a set of nursing standards is crucial for the success of a project which aims at improving the image of nursing. If these standards are significantly to determine the quality of nursing, they should be enforced and updated as needed.

Follow-on projects to sustain the project's achievements and extend HIN influence into secondary/technical nursing education are recommended.

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PD-ABG-242 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=74824  
Training subprojects of the Egypt population/family planning II  
project  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
13 Jun 1993, [14] p.  
Companion evaluation: PD-ABF-652

2630144

Summarizes final evaluation (PD-ABF-652) of three training

subprojects (SPs) of the Population/Family Planning (PFP) II Project in Egypt: the Regional Center for Training in Family Planning (RCT), the Teaching Hospital Organization (THO), and the Private Practitioners FP Project (PPFPP). No time frame is noted.

The three SPs are addressing, each in its own way, the need for well-qualified FP trainers and service providers. (1) RCT has made remarkable progress, and all the essential components of a training organization are now in place. Along with its affiliated satellite training centers, the RCT has trained some 4,400 FP trainers and service providers; the training is well received and contains a first class contraceptive technology component. It appears that RCT trainees have contributed to the country-wide reduction in the birth rate (from 38 per 1,000 in 1986 to 31 per 1,000 in 1993). However, with the diminishing number of FP trainers needing training, RCT must reconsider its mandate and identify and meet the next generation of FP training needs.

The ambitious THO SP has had a difficult first 3 years. Training has been the most successful component; to date, THO has developed an excellent obstetrics/gynecology curriculum and trained 46 ob/gyn specialists in 8 public hospitals, modeling a level of care superior to that offered previously. THO has also, inter alia, developed excellent clinical guidelines for THO service providers, established a professional training center at El-Galaa, and opened 7 new FP clinics. However, service delivery outputs are behind schedule and not likely to be achieved, mainly due to the overly ambitious SP design and an unrealistic implementation plan. To increase clinic utilization, THO will have to openly compete for clients in the urban FP market; otherwise, its services will be in insufficient demand and incapable of becoming self-supporting. THO should also implement the new organizational structure proposed by the THO technical director to resolve conflicts over structure and staffing that hamper goal achievement.

(3) The PPFPP has accomplished a great deal in 3 years. It has recruited over 1,300 physicians in a network of private FP service providers and trained over 600 clinic assistants. Its physicians have provided contraceptive services to an estimated 204,000 new FP acceptors and, through acceptance of the IUD, has contributed to over 196,000 couple years of protection. This has been accomplished by expanding the FP practice of ob/gyns and by upgrading the FP skills of general practitioners and pediatricians. PPFPP also supports its physicians with marketing assistance, continuing medical education, and monitoring of the services provided. So great is the demand for its

services that PPFPP regional offices report waiting lists of physicians eager to participate.

The evaluators also discussed several cross-cutting training issues. These include: delineating and strengthening institutional mandates for training; assessing training needs and developing training plans; selecting trainees; assessing training impact; institutionalizing training system capacities; and strengthening inter-institutional coordination.

The following lessons were learned. (1) Assessment of the impact of FP training is impossible without pre-training baseline data. (2) Sustainability must be planned for from project outset, and adequate time and resources must be allocated to this effort. (3) Training institutions must serve the needs of the organizations whose people they are training. (4) Where several training institutions are involved, clear delineation of mandates is necessary to avoid overlap and competition for clients. (5) In training programs, it is sometimes necessary to focus on achieving training outputs at the expense of creating sustainable institutional capacity.

USAID/E accepts 11 of the 12 evaluation recommendations, the most critical being continued funding of the RCT and THO subprojects in PFP III with specific modifications and more focused mandates, especially for THO. PPFPP, on the other hand, should seek other sources of support. Further USAID/E support to the private FP sector will be provided via competitively awarded contracts under PFP III.

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PD-ABG-015 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=74371  
Farmer to farmer -- agricultural cooperative development  
international  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
12 May 1993, 12 p.  
Companion evaluation: PD-ABE-330

2630102

Summarizes interim evaluation (PD-ABE-330) of the Farmer-to-Farmer (FtF) program in Egypt. Evaluation covers the period 6/90-12/92.

The program, which is managed by Agriculture Cooperative Development International (ACDI), has proven to be an effective agent in providing new and appropriate technologies to Egyptian farmers. Working to cultivate a core group of leader farmers through intensive educational and TA activities, the program has constructed the basis and potential

for an extensive outreach program.

The FtF program is having a positive impact on farmers in the ten governorates where it is active. The greatest impact is felt directly by the approximately 600 farmers who have been recruited and are active in the program (i.e., the leader farmers). Over 90% of these farmers have adopted at least one technology which was shown to them by U.S. volunteer farmers; the average leader farmer has adopted two technologies. At least 80% of the farmers in this core group have found the new adopted technologies to have increased their operating efficiency. The minimum financial impact, as measured in cost savings or increased yields attributed by the farmer to the new technology, has ranged from a low of 800 LE/farm/year to 529,000 LE/farm/year.

The significance of the technology transfer success is not only in the number of new specific technologies that have been adopted by farmers, but in the rate of technology transfer. This program has achieved a remarkably high rate of technology transfer and adoption. The FtF program is complementing the services being provided through the Ministry of Agriculture/Agricultural Research Center (ARC) extension program. At the local, village level, the two programs are synergistically linked.

However, despite its successes, the program has focused more resources on the education of the leader farmer and fewer on facilitating the outreach process from the leader farmer to the larger community of Egyptian farmers. It has not yet been demonstrated that the core group of farmers, simply because they have gone to the United States or have had a U.S. volunteer visit their farm, will actively engage in transferring their newly learned technology and experience (and associated benefit) to other farmers. Much greater emphasis must now be put on the outreach component of the program. Expansion of the FtF program should move in concert with new ARC initiatives in developing six regional research and extension centers. (Author abstract, modified)

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PD-ABM-554      Special Evaluation(22)      Rec\_no=89721  
Assessment of the Governors' Council of Women (GCOW) development and  
family planning project -- 1990-1993  
Wawer, Maria J.  
Futures Group  
USAID. Bur. for Research and Development. Ofc. of Population (Sponsor)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Apr 1993, vii, 34 p.

9363035

DPE-3035-C-00-0053-00

Evaluates subproject of the Population Policy Initiatives project to strengthen the Governors' Council of Women (GCOW) in Egypt in the areas of population and family planning (FP) and policy development. Interim evaluation covers the period 6/90-4/93.

The project has met planned outputs by establishing 11 active GCOW committees, providing training, and implementing 11 demonstration projects. The committees are meeting numerical targets with respect to clinics established, community meetings and seminars, training of district and local women leaders, and implementation of literacy classes and women's income-generation projects. The project has been very successful in motivating women leaders to become involved in population and FP. Proposal preparation and planning abilities of GCOW members have been substantially strengthened, as has their capacity to lobby for and coordinate the efforts of ministries and agencies.

However, the emphasis placed by GCOW committees on establishing new clinics and classes has a number of drawbacks. Some of the services duplicate those of other agencies, often within close geographic proximity. The cost-effectiveness and sustainability of the services developed have not been appraised, and their long-term continuation presents problems. Setting up services also takes resources away from the GCOW's broader policy, planning, and advocacy roles. The project should be reoriented away from direct services toward coordination of other agencies.

Overall, the GCOW project has been a success: for the first time, women leaders have been systematically organized to address problems of FP and women's services. The project has great potential to influence policies and planning related to women-in-development and population; the access of women leaders to governors has been excellent, as has their capacity to identify problems women face in acquiring services.

Innovative activities to be considered include exploring ways to improve the quality of existing services, reducing FP drop-out rates, and coordinating more mobile FP outreach and services, e.g., by conducting client satisfaction surveys and reporting results to governorate decision makers and service providers. As has been pointed out many times, the number of Egyptian women residing in underserved areas is far smaller than the number residing close to poor quality services. GCOW training, orientation, and study tours should be designed to expose committee members to broader policy, advocacy, and

quality control issues and give them the skills to deal with them. Also, project TA, monitoring, and administrative roles need to be reorganized in order to provide GCOW committees with appropriate, non-duplicative technical and administrative support. Mechanisms to ensure timely transfer of funds are also urgently needed. (Author abstract, modified)

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PD-ABH-391 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=77167

Project assistance completion report : renewable energy field testing, project no. 263-0123.2  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Mar 1993, 15 p.

263012302

PACR of a subproject (1982-8/92) to field test renewable energy technologies in Egypt.

The project was essentially a failure. Only 4 of 11 targeted field tests were conducted, and 3 of these suffered serious delays, resulting in three PACD extensions. More importantly, no significant progress was made towards addressing the real constraints to the effective development and utilization of renewable energy in Egypt, namely, economic, bureaucratic, and administrative constraints. Rather, the project focused on lack of appropriate technology, which is not the main constraint.

The project was not without accomplishment, however. Training was provided for 152 policymakers and 500 engineers, versus a target of 40-100 for each group. Also, a Renewable Energy Information System (REIS) was established and is functioning at the Government of Egypt's (GOE's) New and Renewable Energy Authority (NREA); numerous economic and environmental analyses were also completed. Finally, 56 new initiatives for field tests were proposed and 1 of these was implemented, versus respective targets of 6 and 1-2.

Lessons learned included the following. (1) Successful technology transfer requires attention not only to technological issues, but also to the financial viability of the technologies; the existence of local infrastructure for their manufacture, sale, and marketing; and a strategy for the organizational, financial, technological, and policy elements required. (2) The design of field test systems suffered from insufficient interaction among the U.S. contractors, NREA staff, and the GOE. In a related vein, the process of obtaining approval from NREA and USAID/Cairo for field testing and system design documentation was

too time-consuming and expensive. Excessive detail is to be avoided in drafting Requests for Proposals for smaller-scale field tests. (3) Training should focus on (a) experience in engineering-experimental data acquisition and analysis (including microcomputer use), and (b) practical exposure to hands-on renewable system operation and trouble shooting. (4) Ensuring that a system can pay its own way, through some form of a monetary collection model, can greatly contribute to sustainability. (5) When possible, portable data loggers should be used instead of PC units, which can complicate data collection processes and are more susceptible to hardware and software failure under adverse environmental conditions. (6) Overly centralized project management and evaluation can create unnecessary delays. Localized evaluation in particular is more productive, since evaluators are more familiar with projects and their implementors.

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PD-ABF-570 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=73348

Science and technology for development

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

8 Feb 1993, 11 p., ES no. 263-93

Related documents: PD-ABF-572 through PD-ABF-576

2630140

263014001

263014002

263014003

263014004

Summarizes individual interim evaluations (PD-ABF-572/576) of the umbrella Science and Technology for Development Project in Egypt and its four component projects. The evaluations covered the period 1986-1991/92.

The first component project, Science and Technology Cooperation (STC), seems well-launched toward its major objective, which is selling the R&D approach to Egypt's industrial and local government sectors, and thus helping to strengthen linkages between the R&D community and these two sectors. The STC Secretariat (the Government of Egypt's implementing agency) is a lean operation with well-qualified staff and high morale. Procedures are well thought out and, following some initial difficulties, appear to be working well. The Secretariat has awarded 33 research contracts, conducted a variety of workshops and seminars, and published newsletters and other documents. The project also prepared 49 feasibility studies for small, labor-intensive agricultural/industrial subprojects (SP's) and distributed them to about 2,000 young entrepreneurs; 3 of the SP's are being demonstrated

in the 6th of October City. The STC project also supports the Egyptian National Scientific and Technical Information Network and its extension to regional universities.

The schistosomiasis research project is a promising effort that is for the most part on schedule; its major focus is finding a vaccine against schistosomiasis. The project has awarded 46 research grants, including 29 full grants for about \$9 million and 17 Young Scientist grants for about \$340,000.

The energy conservation and efficiency project is being effectively implemented and progressing well toward its objectives. Sixteen cost-sharing energy conservation SP's have been funded, nine in the private sector and seven in the public sector; total energy savings from these SP's are expected to be \$3.4 million per year. Some 800 plant and other personnel have been trained in energy conservation.

The energy manpower development project is meeting a serious need by developing personnel for Egypt's petroleum and electricity sectors. Only the technical and management training component can be considered successful at this time, however. The training facilities upgrading and personnel development components started late and are experiencing implementation difficulties.

One lesson was learned: the umbrella mechanism provided only minimal value, since each component project stood on its own. The mechanism did facilitate start-up, but other mechanisms could have done the same.

The projects will be re-directed toward a more environmental focus, in keeping with USAID/E's new priorities.

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PD-ABF-153      Final Evaluation Report(24)                      Rec\_no=72328  
Final evaluation of three family planning subprojects under the  
Egypt population/family planning II project (263-0144)  
Montague, Joel; Wright, Mary; Younis, Nabil  
Dual & Associates, Inc.  
International Science and Technology Institute, Inc.  
USAID. Bur. for Research and Development. Ofc. of Population (Sponsor)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
18 Dec 1992, x, 49 p. + 8 appendices, Report no. 92-172-138  
Subproject titles: Comprehensive family care subproject of the Coptic  
Association for Social Care (CASC) -- The Upper Egypt family planning  
and community development subproject of the Bishopric for Public,  
Ecumenical, and Social Services (BPSS) -- The rural community-based  
family planning subproject of the Coptic Evangelical Organization for

Social Services (CEOSS)  
Companion evaluation summary: PD-ABF-667

2630144  
DPE-3024-Z-00-8078-00

Evaluates three family planning (FP) subprojects (SP's) in Egypt: the Comprehensive Family Care SP of the Coptic Association for Social Care (CASC); the Upper Egypt FP and Community Development SP of the Bishopric for Public, Ecumenical, and Social Services (BPSS); and the Rural Community-based FP SP of the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS). The CASC approach features family life education; the BPSS approach links women's development, literacy, and income generation with FP; and the CEOSS SP provides FP within a comprehensive community development framework.

Although all three SP's have been hampered by bureaucratic and financial delays, they are now underway and have met some of their objectives. CASC has met 52% of its target for new contraceptive acceptors, BPSS 58%, and CEOSS 66%. Systems have improved in CASC, and CEOSS has done excellent work in training, informational meetings, and outreach and follow-up. BPSS's work in literacy training appears to be statistically associated with the number of new FP acceptors. On the other hand, little progress can be reported with respect to revenue generation and sustainability.

Because funding and constraints were so great it is difficult to make generalizations about what has worked and why. Nevertheless, the following lessons can be drawn. (1) Local social, cultural, and religious environments create special parameters. Projects in Egypt need more time, more flexibility, and a far more secure commitment of financial resources. Project designs should include quantification of local inputs whether in cash or kind. (2) Projects in remote or isolated areas require a certain degree of autonomy over their own resources. At the same time, they require adequate financial, technical, and logistic support. (3) From the very start, donors should instill a sense of project ownership into PVO's. They should not intervene too directly in ongoing operations or impose excessive and/or changing bureaucratic requirements on the agencies. (4) Both CASC and BPSS have relatively simple informal management systems at the service delivery level, which may in some cases be more appropriate and effective than more formal systems. (5) Additional emphasis needs to be given to sustainability. Although this was a major USAID focus in the BPSS and the CEOSS SP's, it is obvious that this was not fully understood by the two agencies. (Author abstract, modified)

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PD-ABF-049 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=72109

Evaluation of non-project training for USAID/Cairo  
Sanders-Smith, Melanie; Theisen, Gary  
Academy for Educational Development, Inc.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Nov 1992, x, 51 p. + 8 annexes : charts, statistical tables

263012502

9300085

PDC-0085-I-00-9061-00

Evaluates non-project training (NPT) activity to train middle and senior level employees of Egypt's government and public and private sector firms in priority economic sectors.

Overall, NPT is very successful, both in terms of its management and achievements. Trainees voice unanimous praise, giving countless examples of improvements in their professional performance and citing technical, managerial, cross-cultural, language, and attitudinal changes. Managers agree that participants work and think differently after their U.S. training, resulting in improved relationships among colleagues and with clients, higher standards, greater efficiency, and increased productivity.

The project has trained 650 persons, and all have been highly qualified employees with potential to contribute to their organizations and to their country's development. NPT has been relatively successful in recruiting private sector employees and women, and placing participants in historically black colleges and universities. About 17% of trainees have come from the private sector -- not an minor accomplishment, given Egypt's history of public sector ownership of industries and service organizations. Approximately 18% of participants have been women, again a significant accomplishment. The distribution of trainees among subsectors closely mirrors Egypt's Five Year Plan, especially the trend toward privatization. NPT has been successful in recruiting individuals to study management, marketing, and other business-related topics.

Recommendations are made to further facilitate the recruitment of women and private sector employees, to improve trainee placement, and upgrade orientation, monitoring, and follow-up activities. (Author abstract, modified)

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PD-ABF-571 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=73349

Joint management review and evaluation report : US assistance to the Egyptian labor movement

Sullivan, John H.; Barrett, Jerome T.; Iskander, Kate D.

Development Associates, Inc.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)

Nov 1992, vii, 32 p. + 4 annexes

Work order no. 14

Companion evaluation summary: PD-ABG-739

263012509

OTR-0000-I-00-0035-00

Evaluates cooperative agreement (1989-92) with the African American Labor Center (AALC) to strengthen the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF). AALC's work with ETUF began in 1979.

Major conclusions are as follows. The labor movement in Egypt continues to be an important, democratically inclined sector which will feel the stress from structural adjustment and privatization and is worthy of A.I.D. funding. AALC is both acceptable to the labor movement and capable of carrying forward programs and projects on labor's behalf. It has met with a challenging set of external constraints and has overcome them well. A major shortcoming, however, has been AALC's inability to make any strides toward sensitizing ETUF to the need for programs aimed at women workers. Relationships between AALC's representative, and ETUF, constituent unions, other donors, and the State Department appear to be excellent. By contrast, the relations between AALC and USAID/E have, at times, been in need of improvement.

USAID appears to have given inadequate attention to the labor sector in its current country strategy. An opportunity to provide for labor may exist in the new Democratic Initiatives Strategy now in preparation.

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PD-ABF-500 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=73192

USAID/Egypt child survival project (grant no. 263-0203) : midterm evaluation

Bermawy, Helmy M.; Foltz, Anne-Marie; et al.

Datex, Inc.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)

25 Nov 1992, vi, 31 p. + 7 annexes : charts, statistical tables

Summary in English and Arabic

Contract # incorrectly listed on cover page as 263-0203-C-00-220-00

Companion summary evaluation: PD-ABG-740

2630203

263-0203-C-00-2220-00

Interim external evaluation of the Egyptian Child Survival (CS) project covers the period 1985-11/92. The project aims to improve the health of mothers and children through four vertical interventions: an Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI), acute respiratory infection (ARI), child spacing, and nutrition (later merged into child spacing). Because of administrative delays, most major activity has taken place since 1990. Project agreements have been amended several times. Currently, the project is funded for \$67 million with an ending date of 8/95. A team of nine independent consultants (four from Datex, Inc., one from the World Health Organization (WHO), and four from Egypt) carried out the evaluation in Cairo and five governorates.

Findings are as follows. After a slow start, the project is organizationally stable and is progressing at working speed. Using a difficult national approach, it has succeeded in exceeding its target of 80% coverage of children for six immunizations and in maintaining a functioning cold chain. As a result, the number of reported target diseases has declined. Progress is being made toward polio eradication. Training in all the components has been extensive. More than 17,000 health workers have been trained in EPI; nearly half of all primary health care/Ministry of Health (MOH) physicians have been trained in ARI; and over 6,000 physicians and nurses have been trained in perinatal services. Additionally, almost 4,000 dayas (traditional birth attendants) have received training. Research and knowledge, attitude, and practice (KAP) studies have been carried out.

Sustainability is a major concern. The full institutional and financial resources for sustainability are not yet in place and need to be planned. Constituencies for child survival are underdeveloped. Project activities are not yet well integrated into the MOH. Although the GOE's in-kind contributions are extensive, it is not meeting its full share of promised cash contributions. Meanwhile, the project has engendered new recurrent costs for vaccines, drugs, and consumables, which the GOE will have to finance if these vital CS activities are to be maintained without project support. The eradication of polio alone will require an annual investment of several million dollars for several years.

Management capacity at Governorate/district level needs to be strengthened. The project's national approach is not succeeding at the lower levels of the health care system because of the project's centralized management. Planning, research, and TA appear to be

directed mainly at meeting central needs. The project needs to move more of its resources to provide greater support and flexibility in management, supervision, and planning at the governorate/district levels to assure smooth service implementation and to assure quality services.

Management information systems and indicators for monitoring project achievement need improvement. The MOH has numerous information systems, such as birth and death registration, which can be used more effectively to manage and plan CS services. Project and MOH information systems are not fully coordinated. The project, through its need for data, has added to the burden of reporting at the point of data collection. Many of the indicators for project monitoring in the project paper amendment are not suitable for measurement.

Project management needs improvement in other areas also. Steps should be taken to better coordinate training activities, establish a project-wide research review committee, improve MOH capacity in mass media, and utilize private media resources as well.

Training can be further improved by still more emphasis on practical skills and on-site training, team-building, and more involvement of the universities. (Author abstract, modified)

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PD-ABF-504 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=73196  
Project assistance completion report (PACR) : national control of  
diarrheal diseases project (NCDDP), grant no. 263-0137  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
3 Sep 1992, 16 p.

2630137

PACR of a project (9/81-9/91) to reduce mortality due to diarrheal diseases among Egyptian children aged 0-5 years, mainly through the extension of oral rehydration therapy (ORT).

Exceeding all targets, the project dramatically reduced child mortality due to diarrhea (from 33/1,000 in 1982 to 11.8/1,000 in 1991, a 64.5% decline) and has earned a worldwide reputation for its success. Specifically, the project: (1) increased mothers' awareness of ORT to 99% since 1985 vs. a targeted 90%; (2) raised mothers' knowledge of proper mixing of oral rehydration salts (ORS) to 90% vs. a targeted 75%; and (3) raised mother's use of ORS to treat diarrhea to at least 66% vs. a targeted 50%.

The training program was highly successful. A total of 47 appropriately equipped governorate training centers offered hands-on ORT training to over 10,000 physicians and 15,000 nurses, while workshops for medical organizations -- the Pediatric Society, the Pharmacists Syndicate, and the Friends of Breast milk Society -- provided information on ORT to administrators, pharmacists, statisticians, social workers, and community leaders. The project also helped add ORT to medical and nursing school curricula.

Mass media -- primarily TV, accessible to 90% of the Egyptian population -- were used to introduce ORT to the public, resulting in increased awareness of and demand for ORT. In response, USAID, in collaboration with UNICEF, worked with the MOH to ensure uninterrupted production of ORS (initially, UNICEF provided equipment and raw materials and USAID financed production). The government pharmaceutical firm responsible for ORS production originally did so under a MOH administrative order, not because the activity was profitable. Toward the end of the project, ORS prices were increased to ensure continued production.

Project sustainability has been encouraged through the government's creation of a budgetary line item for ORT and through establishment of a directorate-level MOH administrative unit. Nonetheless, sustainability is doubtful (some efforts have been relaxed already since the 9/91 PACD) unless creative financing measures can be utilized. Also needed is policy dialogue on the turf battle within the MOH concerning the use of funds from the Child Survival project (2630203) to monitor diarrhea incidence (which has changed little over the life of the project).

Research by UNICEF demonstrates that diarrhea can be prevented at the village level through the use of low-cost technology in sanitation, water supply, and community health education. In this context, USAID needs to examine why its water and sanitation projects, costing millions of dollars, seem to have made no impact at all on diarrhea incidence.

Project research also discovered that rice-based ORS has definite advantages over the regular glucose-based formula and that there are a small percentage of diarrhea cases that are not responsive to ORT. More work is needed in these areas, and also in (1) discouraging inappropriate use of drugs (especially antibiotics) in treating diarrhea, and (2) overcoming continuing problems in mothers' incorrect ORS mixing/dosing.

Several lessons were learned. (1) The project was successful due to a unique set of physical and economic conditions within Egypt -- good leadership, plentiful resources, a culturally homogenous society, a settlement pattern which enhanced the use of media and project management, and an elaborate MOH infrastructure. These conditions may not be easily replicable elsewhere. (2) Vertically structured, semiautonomous interventions can be highly effective but are difficult to integrate into the health service system when external funding ceases. (3) Pilot testing is important for programs intended for nationwide implementation. (4) Mass media are a successful, cost-effective means of increasing demand for child health services. (5) The use of one contractor throughout a project contributes to smooth implementation and results in the trust of local experts and authorities.

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PD-ABE-473 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=70097  
Evaluation of the institutional development project of the National  
Population Council, Egypt  
Wawer, Maria; Levine, Ruth E.  
Futures Group International  
Urban Institute  
Columbia University  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
8 Jul 1992, xv, [47] p. + 7 appendices : statistical tables  
Companion evaluation summary: PD-ABP-108

2630144  
9363035  
DPE-3035-C-00-5047-00

Evaluates a subproject (SP) to strengthen the capacity of Egypt's National Population Council (NPC) to coordinate population and family planning policies at both the Governorate and Technical Secretariat levels (NPC/G and NPC/TS). Interim evaluation covers the period 1987-5/92.

The SP has been redesigned three times in an effort to respond to problems in implementing the NPC/TS component, the need to improve coordination with the U.N. Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), and emerging institutional priorities. Implementation, which was very slow during the first 2 years, intensified greatly in 1990 with the arrival of a resident management advisor and the appointment of an active Project Director.

Achievements in the NPC/G and NPC/TS components have varied



Evaluates project, implemented by CARE, to strengthen the capacities of community-based, Egyptian NGOs (ENGOS) to initiate self-help development projects in the four rural governorates of Fayoum, Sohag, Qena, and Aswan. Midterm evaluation covers the period 7/90-6/92.

The project is a sound, well-managed program of impressive achievements that will exceed its target of 250,000 beneficiaries, most of them economically disadvantaged. Progress in the two major components -- Community Sponsored Development Activities (CSDA) and Small Economic Activities Development (SEAD) -- has been as follows.

CSDA, aimed at building ENGO capacity to establish and manage local infrastructure and community service projects, has made excellent progress. The program has undertaken 561 of a targeted 600 projects, mobilized LE 1.61 million of a targeted LE 2.16 million in local cash and in-kind contributions, and benefitted 236,910 individuals against a target of 200,000. While women's participation is short of target, this is attributable to in-country conditions, not the project. ENGO leaders widely commend the project's approach, saying that the training has significantly enhanced their competencies in executing and promoting CSDA-type projects; objective evidence corroborates these claims. Community conferences organized by ENGOS and project staff as a public forum for needs assessment have been a seminal event in ENGO-community relations and in ENGO capacity building. The project should now expand ENGO management training and development education extension.

The SEAD component, aimed at building ENGO capacity to establish and manage credit programs in support of small/microenterprises, has also made impressive progress; all major targets should be met or exceeded by the 6/93 PACD. Priority indicators -- e.g., loan repayment rates, percentage of loan funds active, interest rates, volume of delinquent loans -- meet or closely approach SEAD's ambitious targets, while secondary indicators -- e.g., number of loans disbursed, women as a percentage of potential borrowers -- should be at least 80% of target. Demand for loans is high and most ENGO credit funds are effectively managed; financial controls are in place and well-utilized. More broadly, SEAD has promoted participatory decisionmaking, increased ENGO membership, improved ENGO program management and community relations, and expanded ENGO outreach to the poor. The major issue now is to ensure sustainability by remedying deficient ENGO support for community volunteers and their role in credit outreach to women.

A negative note in the project has been CARE's inability to develop the capacity of Regional Federations (RFs) to sustain training and





The following lessons learned from the overall program will be addressed if a follow-on project is undertaken: (1) Full academic degree programs (M.A., M.S., or Ph.D.) are more desirable and satisfactory to Peace Fellows. This is the only A.I.D.-funded program that focuses on graduate-level training. (2) Private sector candidates should have opportunities for Master's degrees in business fields. (3) As for practical or on-the-job training, PFP is not the appropriate vehicle since it is primarily an academic graduate study program. (4) Split-funding of Ph.D.s should be discontinued -- problems encountered with visa extensions and financing of medical coverage are unjustified administrative burdens. Also, GOE regulations allow for extensions of sometimes more than 7 years for Ph.D.s. Some of the requested extensions may go beyond PACD. (5) Postdoctoral research should be for periods of at least 18-24 months. (6) Data/research programs (18-24 months) were found to be appropriate for completion of Egyptian Ph.D.s. There must be good coordination between Egyptian and U.S. universities. (Author abstract)

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PD-ABF-497      Final Evaluation Report(24)                      Rec\_no=73189  
Project assistance completion report : private investment  
encouragement fund  
Kirschstein, Fred K.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Jun 1992, 16 p.

2630097

PACR of a project (9/79-9/91) to establish a Private Investment Encouragement Fund (PIEF) to provide medium and long-term credit and equity capital to private companies in Egypt.

Eight loans, totaling \$17.8 million, were made under the PIEF; recipients included GM Egypt, Fayrouz Hospital, Pioneer Seed, Berzi Confectionary and Food Co., Arab Aluminum Co., Arab Medical Food Co., MISR Poultry Grandparents, and South Egypt Drug Company. Six banks participated in the PIEF, and 50 million Egyptian Pounds (LE 50 million) were leveraged (if some lending which might have taken place anyway is included). Average loan length was 5 years, which, while not long-term by U.S. standards, is long-term in the Egyptian context.

Nevertheless, the project cannot be considered to have achieved its overall goal of encouraging financial institutions to make longer-term investments in the private sector. The failure is primarily due to the restrictive climate created by both Egyptian regulatory practices and USAID lending requirements which were applied early in the project,

including administratively set financial variables (i.e., credit allocations, interest rates, and exchange rates), and excessive regulations governing loan approvals which precluded banks from engaging in normal, market based financial intermediation. Further, there is no indication that the project fostered greater collaboration among financial institutions, another of its stated objectives.

About \$15.2 million of the funds were disbursed through the PSCIP mechanism (adopted to circumvent delays in loan approvals), reflows from which were to accrue to a Local Currency Special Account; as of June 30, 1992, the account was still \$3.74 million short of the required \$15.2 million.

A number of lessons were learned concerning credit projects. USAID should, as a rule, avoid directed credit projects, except in cases of serious market failure or to redress past discrimination in lending. Recommended is analysis of a host country's policy, legal, and regulatory framework as it affects the financial sector, coupled with policy-based non-project assistance to encourage liberalization of the economy and financial system; projectized assistance should be used mainly as a catalyst in a favorable policy environment. USAID's regulations and administrative requirements compounded the burden of host country regulations; given the unpleasant experiences in adhering to and negotiating the complex web of rules and regulations which attended this project, USAID should stick to the maxim "keep it simple."

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PD-ABF-505      Final Evaluation Report(24)                      Rec\_no=73197  
Activity assistance completion report : decentralization support fund  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Apr 1992, 7 p. + 5 annexes : statistical tables

263K60504  
263016104  
2630143

PACR of the Decentralization Support Fund (DSF), designed to accelerate administrative decentralization in Egypt by providing 21 rural governorates with money to procure U.S. capital and other equipment. The DSF was initiated in 1980 as project 2630143, subsequently subsumed as subproject 04 under 263K605, and was completed under 2630161.04; a follow-on, Local Development II (LD II - 2630182) has been active since 1985. Report covers the period 9/80-9/91.

Capital equipment supplied under DSF greatly increased the capacity of the 21 participating governorates to provide basic services to their

rural populations, and especially to improve environmental conditions. USAID disbursements for DSF of almost \$100 million enabled purchases of 1,776 major pieces of equipment, service vehicles, and associated spare parts, as well as smaller items such as pumps and laboratory equipment.

DSF equipment is now providing enhanced fire protection, improved sanitation through wastewater pump trucks and garbage trucks, expanded supplies of potable water, and other new/improved services in rural cities, markaz, and villages.

The experience gained by local and central government entities through planning and procurement activities (e.g., preparing technical specifications, contracting for offshore procurement) also enhanced institutional capacity to deliver basic services and strengthened the decentralization process. Inventory and control systems for spare parts, as well as operation and maintenance procedures, have been established and institutionalized under DSF and LD II at governorate and markaz levels.

While equipment utilization and availability rates are generally satisfactory, there were some exceptions. South Sinai, Red Sea, and New Valley have average utilization rates of 40%, 58%, and 51%, respectively, and availability rates of 76%, 74%, and 79%; however, these relatively low numbers can be explained in part by the isolation of these governorates from service/repair facilities, as well as the fact that most equipment is used for seasonal purposes. Utilization rates in Fayoum and Qalubia, at 54% and 45%, are unsatisfactory, as is Fayoum's availability rate of 68%. Low rates are indicative of poor maintenance management, leading to excessive work days spent on repair. LD II is addressing maintenance management in problem governorates.

The following lessons were learned. (1) Equipment assistance programs must be critically evaluated and corrected early in the implementation stage. (2) There was a general lack of awareness at all levels of the importance and benefits of adequate operation and maintenance of equipment, as well as a lack of maintenance resources (tools, facilities, and especially trained staff); LD II is emphasizing these aspects. (3) Monitoring under LD II has revealed that some items provided under DSF were severely underutilized, primarily refrigerator trucks, small asphaltic batch plants, and solid waste incinerators; the need for such unusual items should have been more thoroughly assessed.

22 Apr 1992, 7 p.

263016106

Presents final Mission report on a project (1982-91) to support, in conjunction with four other projects, the Government of Egypt's policy of economic and administrative decentralization. The five projects were originally known collectively as Decentralization Sector Support (DSS). When DSS ended, the present project continued under the Local Development II (LD II) program.

While the project provided useful support to decentralization efforts and its training efforts increased local capacity and management, the overall objective of facilitating fiscal and administrative decentralization was not realized. DSS's basic assumption -- that the decentralization trend that started in the 1960's would continue and be significant -- did not hold true during the life of the project, but suffered a setback in the late 1980's due to a mounting need for the central government to control the budget deficit and due to continued security concerns. However, by the project's last year (1991), decentralization and change in local administration law were again being debated.

More than 40% of the original project budget was to be used to provide start-up TA to an important local government training center that the GOE was building at Sakkara. Construction was considerably delayed, however, and when the center was finally ready to begin operations, its management was put in the hands of a central GOE ministry, which refused project TA and which also failed to acquire appointed staff or a regular budget for the center. Given this lack of GOE commitment, funds programmed for the center were shifted to other training activities, where they were effectively applied.

The project's major training effort took place under the Training Block Grant (TBG) activity, which is now operational under the LD II program. More than 32,000 persons, including governorate officials, local leaders, and PVO members, have received management training under TBG; 16% were women. A recent assessment of TBG was very positive and urged its continued support. The project also funded a number of research activities, most notably the successful rural small-scale enterprise pilot credit activity, which, beginning with \$750,000, disbursed 9,519 loans totaling \$2.53 million at market rates, and has now been expanded into a full-blown project.

The project teaches these lessons. (1) Given the problems with the

Sakkara Center, future funds should not be allocated to support operations of GOE projects under construction without a firm national commitment. (2) USAID policies that forbade paying honoraria to GOE officials who taught TBG classes proved counterproductive because GOE policies allow officials to receive honoraria for special duties (even if performed during normal working hours). Henceforth, training programs using GOE officials either should be funded by the GOE or USAID honoraria regulations should be waived at the design stage.

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PD-ABE-204 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=69309  
Phase I evaluation report : customs component of the public finance  
administration project no. 263-0209, Egypt  
Cairns, Leonard  
Development Alternatives, Inc.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Mar 1992, v, 19 p.  
Companion evaluation summary: PD-ABF-495

2630209  
PDC-0095-I-32-9097-00

Interim evaluation of a project component to upgrade the Egyptian Customs Authority (ECA). The component has been implemented through a PASA with the U.S. Customs Service (USCS). The evaluation covers the period 3/90-3/92.

The component had a slow start which undermined relations with ECA. Delays were due to difficulties in securing accommodations for the two-person USCS team, as well as to problems in meeting A.I.D. procurement requirements. To make matters worse, USCS undertook two minor initiatives meant to be confidence-building activities but which proved to be failures. The Alexandria Filing Project was handicapped by procurement problems that reduced the value of the product, and the Export Documentation Project had a lack of response. The ECA became increasingly impatient and requested a new implementing agency, while the Ministry of Finance subsequently requested project termination.

USCS, on the other hand, was frustrated by the ECA's failure to respond positively to recommendations. If implemented, these recommendations could benefit both Egypt and the international trading community. They would probably form the basis of the approach of any TA team, and would enable ECA to move toward a risk-based system of customs control. However, ECA has not shown full commitment to implementing the recommendations. The ECA has also tended to give inaccurate or partial information. Difficulty in obtaining passes to



Enterprise Development Foundation (ESED), was delayed, a new Executive Director hired in 4/91 has accelerated progress. After only 1 year of lending, ESED has achieved nearly 50% operational self-sufficiency. The portfolio has suffered from some delinquency problems, partly because of poor legal follow-up to loans made during the initial months. Legal follow-up has improved recently, as has the effectiveness of extension officers at preventing delinquency. The portfolio quality appears to be improving, and a planned staff incentive system should increase the productivity and efficiency of the lending process.

The foundations' success is partly due to several features of the project design. (1) The collateral fund is held in dollars, which protects against devaluation. (2) Portfolio funds are obtained from local banks to whom the foundations pay commercial interest rates. This has instilled financial discipline and given the foundations an incentive for charging realistic interest rates. (3) As USAID/E covers the operating costs of the foundations, their interest revenues are deposited in their accounts with the local banks, thereby reducing interest payments and contributing to self-capitalization.

Although a two-to-one leverage of the collateral fund by the end of the project was anticipated in the design, this appears unlikely; uncertainty within the financial sector makes the possibility of future leverage impossible to predict.

Lessons learned include the following. (1) While manufacturing may have the greatest potential for direct employment generation, the foundations should also consider lending to commerce and services as a means of increasing borrower concentration and decreasing portfolio risk through diversification. (2) As new foundations are initiated, the possibility of coordinating ongoing TA through an association or network should be investigated, as should the feasibility of working through private foundations instead of banks. (3) The percentage of women borrowers could be increased through lending for services, trade activities, and nonformal enterprises.

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PD-ABF-503    Final Evaluation Report(24)                      Rec\_no=73195  
Project assistance completion report : energy policy planning,  
project no. 263-0123.1  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
18 Feb 1992, 13 p.  
Cover date: July 1991

263012301

PACR of a subproject (SP) to develop the Government of Egypt's (GOE's) capabilities to collect and analyze data needed for energy policy planning, focusing on institutional development of the Organization for Energy Planning (OEP). Final report covers the period 8/82-5/91.

The SP succeeded in strengthening the GOE's institutional capacity to process and analyze energy data by precipitating the creation of OEP, and met nearly all its numerical targets. However, OEP's impact on the root problem of ineffective development and utilization of energy resources has been limited; while OEP has proved itself to be a competent analytical body, it lacks formal and informal mechanisms for feeding its analytical outputs into the GOE's energy policy planning and decision-making process. OEP is taking steps to become a more active participant.

All training under the professional development component was successfully completed, and in some cases, outputs exceeded expectations. An energy data collection system is in place and OEP has trained over 3,000 energy managers, primarily from the industrial sector. Fifty full-time specialists have been trained, compared to an expected 10 or 15. International experts conducted nine week-long training seminars on topics ranging from energy cogeneration policy to energy conservation in the transportation sector.

Outputs of the special studies component included: (1) analyses of energy conservation in industry, agriculture, transportation, and cogeneration; (2) a high efficiency lighting demonstration for Nasr City hospital; (3) sectoral policy studies of energy consumption in industry and transportation; and (4) 16 in-depth energy audits of Egyptian industrial facilities, 11 in conjunction with U.S. contractors and 5 with the Government of Sweden -- the audits are being put to use under the Energy Conservation and Efficiency Project (2620140.3)

Lessons learned, taken from the 4/89 evaluation, include the following. (1) Institution building of the sort attempted in this project is a long, complex process, requiring a commitment by A.I.D. well beyond the "incubation" stage. (2) Personal factors and dynamics, though difficult to capture in project plans, are extremely important in determining the success of institution building, suggesting a need for attention to process variables in project planning. (3) When choosing to use host country contractors, Missions should be ready to accept some loss of control. (4) Intermediate evaluations are powerful instruments for keeping a project in line with objectives. (5) For

relatively long-term institutional development projects, plans should be written so as to allow considerable flexibility in responding to changing conditions; detailed plans can create problems for a project being implemented in the midst of uncertainty, because some of the partners are likely to take them seriously.

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PD-ABE-200 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=69304  
Cairo sewerage II West Bank (USAID no. 263-0173) : Cairo wastewater  
program -- 1991 interim evaluation summary report  
Cooper, Fred C.  
ASCG Inc.  
Harza Engineering Co.  
Ahmed Abdel-Warith Consulting Engineers  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Jan 1992, xii, 100 p. + 4 appendices : charts, statistical tables  
Delivery order no. 12  
Companion evaluation summary: PD-ABF-506

2630173  
ANE-0249-I-00-9022-00

Evaluates a project to improve wastewater collection and treatment systems on the West Bank of Cairo, Egypt. The interim evaluation, which covers the period 9/84-9/91, was delayed nearly a year due to the Gulf War.

The project is moving ahead in an appropriate manner. Design and construction was found to be of high quality, and while delays have been encountered, implementation has been good overall, especially given the magnitude and complexity of the program. While significant problems and constraints were identified, these issues were in large measure already being addressed by the responsible agencies.

As of 9/91, construction of West Bank facilities was approximately 70% complete, and construction of all major facilities except the Western Desert Sludge Disposal Facility should be completed by the 9/94 PACD. The Zenein Treatment Plant was completed in 1990 and is now operating at its full capacity of 330,000 cubic meters daily (cmd), with excess flows (estimated at 400,000 cmd) being bypassed after receiving only preliminary treatment. The Zenein plant and completed screw pump stations are currently under maintenance contracts with U.S. firms. Construction of major collectors for the West Bank system, as well as of many minor collectors and relief sewers, has also been completed.

Due to the unavailability of treatment and effluent disposal facilities on the East Bank, the East Bank relief system has not been put into operation and raw sewage is being diverted to the Zenein Treatment Plant, at an estimated rate of 292,000 cmd. This situation is expected to continue until early 1993.

Although the completion of the new Abu Rawash facility will greatly increase sewage treatment capacity, the expansion of the collection systems and urbanization and population growth in the areas it will serve will necessitate full utilization of capacity by 1995, within 2 years of the date of full operation. This issue, and others, are addressed in recommendations.

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PD-ABF-498 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=73190  
United States Investment Promotion Office (USIPO), 263-0102 :  
project assistance completion report (PACR)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
[1992], [9] p.

2630102

PACR of a project (1981-92) to establish the U.S. Investment Promotion Office (USIPO) under the auspices of the Egypt - U.S. Joint Business Council as a private nonprofit organization to promote U.S. business investment in Egypt.

From 1981 to 1988 USIPO was primarily used by the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI), a Government of Egypt (GOE) agency, as a private sector support organization for activities related to the GOE-managed Private Sector Feasibility Studies Project (PSFSP -- 2630112). As a result, USIPO reacted to the needs of the GOE and was not a proactive organization with its own strategic plans, goals, and objectives. From 1981 to 1988 USIPO's accomplishments were modest at best, providing very limited information on Egypt's investment environment to American investors who visited Egypt.

From 1988 to 1989 USIPO was granted increased financial resources and independence. USAID transferred the PSFSP to USIPO in 1988, a few months before a new A.I.D./USIPO follow-on cooperative agreement was signed in 1989. USIPO managed to increase the rate of PSFS project activity and facilitated the activities of several U.S. investors to Egypt.

With the new cooperative agreement in 1989, export promotion started as a small part of USIPO's mandate. As it turned out, export promotion

became very successful from 1990 to 1991. In fact, an evaluation of USIPO conducted by SRI International in 1990 noted the tremendous effort and resources necessary to facilitate U.S. investments to Egypt and suggested USIPO expand its activity and resources in export promotion.

In 2/92 A.I.D. designed the Export Enterprise Development Project, a \$10 million follow-on project strictly devoted to export promotion, in effect postponing investment promotion until economic conditions were more favorable.

The following lessons were learned: (1) the GOE's economic policies, implementing procedures for foreign investment, and the projected returns on investments are the most important factors in determining foreign investment decisions; (2) a well-organized, focused, and independent private sector organization, not a GOE entity, that can provide accurate, reliable, up-to-date market information to U.S. investors, is the preferred vehicle to promote and facilitate U.S. investments in Egypt; (3) financial incentives -- such as feasibility study cost sharing or reconnaissance cost sharing trips to Egypt -- are useful to U.S. business executives but not critical to a decision to invest; and (4) any investment promotion activity requires highly skilled TA to support the implementing agency and patience on the part of the donor. (Author abstract)

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PD-ABF-495 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=73187  
USAID public finance administration project (263-0209)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
1992, 6 p., ES no. 263-92  
Companion evaluations: PD-ABE-184, PD-ABE-204

2630209

Summarizes two evaluations (PD-ABE-184 and PD-ABE-204) of Phase I of a project to improve the efficiency and equity of tax administration in Egypt. The evaluations covered the period 11/87-6/92 and focused on project components concerning (1) national tax, (2) local finance, and (3) customs.

The national tax component has proceeded extremely well, although not according to the original schedule. Phase I was largely devoted to redrafting legislation, preparing forms, training employees, and generally gearing the Ministry of Finance (MOF) up to implement a sales tax to which the Government of Egypt (GOE) had committed itself under an IMF agreement. The key product of these efforts was a document



PDC-5832-I-00-0095-00

Final external evaluation of a 1981-91 project to improve basic education (comprising primary and preparatory education -- grades 1 through 9) in Egypt.

The project has made major contributions to improving basic education in Egypt. It has had marked impact on school access and enrollment, particularly in rural areas, and has been a driving force for implementing basic education reforms and improving curriculum design. Effective project management by USAID and the Egyptian Ministry of Education (MOE), excellent contractor work, and good cooperation among USAID, Egyptian officials, and contract personnel have yielded significant professional results.

The goal of increasing enrollment of females and rural youth through the school construction program was attained. More than 1,850 rural schools were constructed, surpassing the target of 1,300 by 50%, and 100 more are under construction, representing an increased capacity for basic education of 875,000 pupils a year; nevertheless, classroom overcrowding and facility maintenance remain areas of concern. All primary enrollments have increased over the last decade, but the increase was particularly dramatic in rural areas, and especially among girls; female participation in rural primary schools increased from 36% to 42% of total enrollment, and in rural preparatory schools from 180,000 to over 700,000. In urban areas, female enrollment doubled.

The two educational reform units established by the MOE in 1989, the Educational Planning and Information Division (EPID) and the Center for Curriculum and Instructional Materials Development (CCIMD), are fulfilling their intended roles with the help of project TA. EPID's Educational Management Information System reaches all 27 governorates, exceeding the target of 15. However, it is not yet the management tool envisioned; this will require continued TA. The project has also helped develop the MOE's research capacity through its assistance to the EPID's Research Directorate, which completed two national surveys; however, institutionalization of the capacity to effectively use research and analysis in policy and planning decisions will also require a continuation of TA.

The MOE has designated the CCIMD as the authoritative body for curriculum reform as envisioned by the Egyptian Educational Reform Act of 1988. CCIMD's first product is an excellent curriculum for grades 1 to 3 in Environmental Studies, which integrates Science, Social Studies, Health, and Home Economics; the course materials and teachers'

guides have been distributed to all schools. Curriculum work in other key subject areas is ongoing, and will require at least 2 more years before all 5 grades of primary school are covered. CCIMD lacks a system for evaluating curriculum impact; linkages with the newly created National Center for Educational Evaluation and Examinations, to which the project has provided limited support, should be strengthened. Retention of quality staff at CCIMD will require resolving organizational status issues. The project also added a small TA component to address problems concerning special education, an area of growing concern to the Government of Egypt.

It is strongly recommended that assistance be continued in all project areas to allow the impressive accomplishments of the project to come to full fruition.

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PD-ABE-194 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=69297  
Interim evaluation of Alexandria wastewater system expansion  
project, USAID contract no. 263-0100  
Sloane, J. R.; Porter, David W.; et al.  
Briley, Wild and Associates, Inc.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Dec 1991, 2 v. : ill., charts, maps, statistical tables  
Contents: v. 1. Summary of findings -- v. 2. Appendices  
Companion evaluation summary: PD-ABF-494

2630100

Evaluates a project to expand and improve wastewater collection, treatment, and disposal systems in Alexandria, Egypt. Interim evaluation covers the period 8/79-4/91.

Construction is far behind schedule. Two main factors caused the delays: unforeseen and challenging soil and groundwater conditions, which necessitated major design adjustments, and the failure of the Alexandria Organization for Sanitary Drainage (AGOSD) to take timely action regarding effluent discharge, sludge disposal, and contracting management. Nevertheless, given revised targets, construction activities have progressed well and the quality of work is high. USAID has funded 6 subprojects, 3 of which are complete, and 3 of which are expected to be completed by the project's 1993 end. AGOSD has funded 30 construction tasks, but the status of these is unclear due to AGOSD's failure to respond to requests for information.

In terms of its social, and particularly health, impacts, the project has been successful. Laterals and collectors have been installed in

over 90% of previously unsewered portions of the project area, nearly eliminating sewage flooding/ponding in the streets, which in turn has reduced the incidence of waterborne diseases. Impacts on water quality along the coastal Mediterranean and in Lake Maryout were difficult to quantify, for the following reasons: domestic sewage flows are not yet being processed by the two primary treatment plants, which are still under construction; the project does not provide for treatment of industrial wastes, which continue to be discharged without pretreatment; and the impacts of discharging effluent have not been monitored.

Project sustainability is a major issue. The operations and maintenance (O&M) program is less than a third complete, and faces considerable obstacles. To transform AGOSD into a viable, sustainable organization, it will be necessary to train and motivate its O&M staff, promote changes in financial and management structure, reduce staff levels, and expand its authority to levy and collect wastewater tariffs. USAID should continue with O&M assistance for a year after the planned 1993 completion date for construction contracts. It is also recommended that a preventive maintenance program be continued and expanded to protect completed project equipment until full operation begins.

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PD-ABF-496 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=73188  
Agricultural production and credit project (263-0202)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
1991, 8 p., Es no. 263-91  
Companion evaluation: PD-ABE-654

2630202

Summarizes interim evaluation (PD-ABE-654) of a program/project to provide Egyptian farmers with expanded access to credit and technology within a deregulated agricultural sector. The evaluation covered the period 9/86-6/91.

The program has made generally good progress. The policy reform component has made strides in freeing farmers from area controls and output quotas, liberalizing prices, and reducing input and credit subsidies. The policy reforms have been fully supported by the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation. However, while recent increases in wheat and rice areas and yields are being attributed to the policy reforms, there is only limited hard evidence of significant program impact. This is to be expected given the complexities of in



The first phase of a three-phase Master Plan, the project was originally designed to expand and develop the wastewater collection, treatment, and disposal facilities for major portions of the city, designated as the East and West zones. In addition to the construction defined in the Master Plan, the project finances management, design, and engineering services, and training for the system's operation and maintenance. When completed in 1994, the project will have constructed 211 kilometers of sewers, 11 pump stations, two treatment plants, one sludge facility, and numerous undercrossings as well as providing operation and maintenance training for the system's sustainability.

The mid-term evaluation focused on the project's overall social/environmental impact, its physical progress, its sustainability, and corrective actions necessary to accomplish overall project objectives. The evaluation team, experienced in wastewater systems design, construction management, operations training and maintenance, and environmental analysis, spent one month in Alexandria reviewing documents, interviewing personnel, and visiting sites. In addition, an Egyptian consultant assisted with the social/environmental portion of the evaluation. The consultant surveyed representative samples of the served communities and gathered relevant public health statistics.

The collection system has been expanded to all targeted areas, and facilities completed have virtually eliminated sewage flooding of served residential streets. The evaluation team concluded that USAID is providing the direction necessary to successfully complete the project. USAID's project management, combined with the professional efforts of the consultant, Wastewater Consultants Group (WWCG), have resulted in project facilities which are well-designed, functional, and well-constructed. Delays in project implementation have been beyond the control of USAID or WWCG. They have resulted from a protracted national controversy surrounding effluent discharge location (sea outfall or land), complex soils and groundwater conditions, and inefficient project management procedures of the host country implementing agency, Alexandria General Organization for Sanitary Drainage (AGOSD).

Preliminary analysis of project impact is positive. While it is difficult to attribute these improvements solely to the project, the substantial elimination of sewage flooding/ponding in the streets of the served areas have improved the quality of life and decreased the incidence of water-borne diseases. (Author abstract)

Irrigation management systems  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
[1991], 14 p. + attachment, ES no. 263-90-05  
Attachment: XD-ABD-547-A

2630132

Summarizes attached evaluation (XD-ABD-547-A) of a project to help the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources (PWWR) upgrade water distribution and irrigation systems in Egypt. Interim evaluation covers the period 1981-6/90.

Progress has been poor for a number of reasons, most of which can be traced to management and communication problems at and between USAID/E and the Government of Egypt (GOE): burdensome bureaucratic procedures, poor cooperation in decisionmaking and priority setting, inadequate counterpart funding, and inadequate attention to staff motivation and development. In addition, lack of appropriate PWWR non-engineering staff and the absence of a dynamic training program raise questions about the project's sustainability.

The project has 9 distinct, project-like components, progress in which has been as follows. (1) The Irrigation Improvement component has experienced serious delays and suffers from unrealistic planning; with current funding, only 25% of the target area can be reached. Cost recovery is a difficult and politically sensitive issue, feasibility studies have been unacceptable, the training program is largely moribund, and water user associations are not yet operable. Cooperation between project advisors and Egyptian counterparts has been notably poor. (2) Structural Replacement has gone fairly well, with 14,000 structures rehabilitated or replaced (largely eliminating the backlog), but quality control has deteriorated. (3) Preventive/Channel Maintenance has been paralyzed due to staffing problems and poor participation by Public Excavation Companies. (4) After early delays, Main Systems Management progressed rapidly and basic objectives are being met. (5) Planning Studies and Models activities, as currently designed, will not meet urgent water management needs at the directorate level. (6) Most Professional Development activities (e.g., the management information system, training needs assessment, and curriculum development) are experiencing serious delays resulting from lack of qualified staff and poor planning. (7) At the Water Research Center, research programs are promising, but underfunded, and TA has had little impact. Academic training, while promising, may take longer than planned. (8) The Project Preparation Department has carried out acceptable studies which are leading to actual

construction. (9) Surveying and Mapping activities are just getting underway.

The evaluation served as a catalyst for decisive corrective action by PWWR and USAID/E.

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PD-ABD-536 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=66999  
National agricultural research project (263-0152)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
1991, [12] p.+ attachment, ES no. 263-91  
Attachment: XD-ABD-536-A

2630152

Summarizes evaluation (XD-ABD-536-A) of a project to strengthen Egypt's national agricultural research system and to facilitate related policy reforms. The evaluation covered the period 1988-12/90 and was undertaken in response to concerns expressed by the U.S. Senate's Appropriation Committee and USAID's Inspector General in hearings of 6/6/90.

Findings in regard to concerns expressed in the congressional hearings are as follows. (1) Project goals are very worthwhile and are understood similarly by the Government of Egypt (GOE) and USAID/E. After a slow start, the project is now proceeding favorably and has contributed to significant increases in the production of rice and wheat. (2) A well-articulated system for financial and administrative management is in place. Its deficiencies are remediable. (3) The role of the private sector in the project should continue to expand as USAID/E and the Ministry of Agriculture encourage its involvement. (4) Institution-building of existing Egyptian institutions is an effective path to achieving program success. (5) The major constraints to project success lie within the ponderous Egyptian bureaucracy, which emphasizes centralized planning and micro- management. (6) Changes made to the project design in 1988 are still relevant and only marginal further adjustments are needed. (7) Areas of concern included the delegation of authority, the establishment of research priorities, privatization of new seed plants, and organizational reform in the policy analysis component.

The major recommendations of the evaluation focused on the above-noted concerns, making release of \$42 million in FY 1991 funds contingent on GOE efforts in these areas. After the evaluation, the Regional Inspector General conducted a special investigation into possible abuse and mismanagement in the project; this was followed by a

special audit inquiry by the Mission. Project responses to these inquiries have helped alleviate many previous concerns. To date, 5 of the 6 conditions set by the ENE Bureau on 5/29/91 for authorization of the FY 1991 obligation of \$42 million have been met.

Three major lessons were learned. (1) Umbrella projects with multiple components should be designed and implemented with precise delegation of authority, clear administrative guidelines, and definite financial procedures. (2) Individual project components should have individual support offices and local staff exclusively assigned to help implement each component. (3) Research projects with heavy emphasis on training and institutional strengthening are susceptible to delays in implementation, and take longer to show visible positive results.

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PD-ABF-502 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=73194  
Private sector feasibility study project (PSFSP) 263-0112 : project  
assistance completion report (PACR)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
[1991], [7] p.

2630112

Presents final Mission report on a project (1979-91) to fund feasibility studies, sector studies, reconnaissance visits, and investment promotion activities to speed the development of Egypt's private sector.

Performance of the original implementing agency, the Government of Egypt's General Authority for the Investment and Free Zone (GAFI), was inconsistent, hampered by a cumbersome application review and approval process and general bureaucratic inertia. As a result, in 12/88 project implementation was assumed by the Egypt/U.S. Joint Business Council, which established the United States Investment Promotion Office (USIPO). Despite Egypt's difficult investment environment, USIPO increased the usage and effectiveness of the project until its PACD in 9/91. USIPO's small but private sector oriented staff, more experienced in serving U.S. businesses, were a critical factor in enabling USIPO to improve the range and quality of support services to serious U.S. investors. USIPO's general marketing of the project was only marginally better than GAFI's, but its follow-up with interested American companies made a significant difference. Even though GOE rules and regulations were still a disincentive for U.S. businesses, USIPO was able to complete 12 feasibility studies, 19 reconnaissance visits, and 6 investment promotion activities during its 18-month tenure, vs. GAFI's 10 sector profiles, 25 feasibility studies, 20 reconnaissance

visits, and 5 approved projects in 9 1/2 years.

The project teaches four lessons. (1) The GOE's economic policies, procedures for foreign investment, and expected return on investment are the most important factors affecting foreign investors' decisions. (2) Financial incentives such as cost sharing for feasibility studies and reconnaissance visits were useful to U.S. executives, but not critical to a decision to invest. They were appreciated more by smaller and medium size firms than by large ones. (3) A GOE entity is not the preferred vehicle for promoting U.S. investment in Egypt. (4) Project management took too much GOE, USIPO, and USAID staff time. Future projects should be bureaucratically leaner.

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PD-ABC-362 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=62575  
US Investment Promotion Office (USIPO) evaluation report  
Mathieson, John A.; Vickland, Kathleen H.  
SRI International. International Policy Center  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
USAID. Bur. for Asia and Private Enterprise (Sponsor)  
Nov 1990, i, 20 p. + 3 appendices  
Companion evaluation summary: PD-ABD-537

2630102

Interim evaluation of a project to promote and facilitate U.S. investment in Egypt. The evaluation covers the period 1981- 11/90.

The project was unable to achieve its original goal of stimulating U.S. investment and therefore was drastically revised in 1989. Although some increases in U.S. investment occurred, the overall U.S. corporate presence remains small -- particularly for a country as large as Egypt. The total number of U.S. investments amounts to about 50 ventures.

The project's shortcomings in investment promotion are primarily due to the lack of improvement in Egypt's business environment. However, numerous internal weaknesses in the project were also present. Until 1986, the project remained merely responsive to investor inquiries, rather than actively carrying out formal marketing campaigns. Until 1989, the project was hindered by a series of institutional shortcomings, including a lack of clearly defined methods and performance targets; an absence of specific strategic annual work plans; inappropriately experienced or motivated personnel; staff rivalries and personality clashes; and a lack of promotional tools.

Beginning in late-1988, serious steps were taken to change the project's focus, goals, and implementation strategy. Promoting exports, rather than investments, became the major focus, new personnel were recruited, and the existing staff restructured. The project was also made responsible for conducting private sector feasibility studies. Since this time, project management and oversight have improved markedly. While achievements have been limited, they are improved over the previous period. The project has assisted about 25 companies in gaining export contracts.

PN-ABG-829 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=61989

Technical assessment : rural small-scale enterprise pilot credit activity in Egypt

Gardner, John W.; Proctor, Jack E.

Development Alternatives, Inc.

USAID. Bur. for Science and Technology. Ofc. of Rural and Institutional Development (Sponsor)

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)

GEMINI technical report, no. 5, Oct 1990, ii, 22 p. + 4 annexes

263016106

9365448

DHR-5448-Q-10-9081-00

263-0161-A-00-7254-00

Interim evaluation of a subproject (SP) to test a methodology for extending credit to small rural enterprises in the Egyptian regions of Damietta and Sharkia through the National Bank for Development (NBD). The evaluation covers the period 1987-10/90.

The SP has exceeded expectations. Since lending began in 10/89, the SP has made 4,816 loans -- against a target of 2,000 -- in the amount of L.E. 3.96 million. High demand has resulted in full utilization of the loan fund and has brought the SP to the break-even point in operational income and expenses. SP success is attributable to both the strong leadership within the NBD and the responsiveness and hard work of small entrepreneurs.

More specifically, the loans have been made at market-based rates to small entrepreneurs in 93 villages in 38 village council units on an unsecured basis. Women comprise about 9.3% of borrowers, receiving about 10% of the amount loaned. There have been no loan losses and the loan delinquency ratio is 0.3%. More than 100 different types of activities have been funded. Although working capital loans are common, most loans have been made for the purchase of small machines,

equipment, and tools. Borrowers reported increased income as a result of the loans and many have hired additional employees.

Because of these outstanding results, this pilot activity can be replicated in Cairo in its current form with minor modifications to reduce operational costs. However, an independent financial audit should be carried out before the SP is extended to other areas, since NBD operational expenditure data have been unreliable.

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PD-ABC-046 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=61483  
Final evaluation of the mineral, petroleum and groundwater  
assessment program (MPGAP)  
Lootens, Douglas J.; Pavloff, George; et al.  
Dames and Moore  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
13 Sep 1990, 52 p. + 6 appendices  
Delivery order no. 16  
Companion evaluation: PD-ABC-046

2630105  
PDC-5517-I-00-7136-00

Final evaluation of a project to assess mineral, petroleum, and groundwater resources in Egypt. External evaluation covers the period 9/80-9/90.

The project was effectively executed, with very positive results. The three primary objectives of data collection, data handling and management, and private sector investment were substantially achieved, though the impact of private sector investment may not be apparent for several years due to the nature of the natural resource development business. Primary achievements included: (1) effective in-country and overseas training of the four participating Government of Egypt (GOE) agencies, all of which received substantial institutional strengthening through the project; (2) provision of equipment and related training to enhance technical information management by said agencies; (3) creation of a remote sensing data processing center of world class standards; (4) location and evaluation of groundwater aquifers in the Eastern and Western Deserts; (5) negotiation of three mineral concession agreements; and (6) completion of aeromagnetic, basin, and seismic surveys of interest to international oil companies.

Despite these achievements, the project failed to meet expectations in several areas. There was a disappointing lack of cooperation among GOE agencies, partly because of the failure of the GOE coordinating

committee, but also as the result of long-standing competitiveness between agencies. Due to conflicts in management, the Egyptian Geological Survey and Mining Authority was separated from the project in 4/87, fully 3.5 years prior to project completion. This probably could have been avoided through efforts on all sides. Finally, the completion of the Landsat Atlas was delayed by at least 3 years, primarily as the result of contracting problems which led to significant delays in the delivery of key equipment.

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PD-ABA-548 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=57904  
Helwan housing and community upgrading project for low-income Egyptians : the lessons learned  
Planning and Development Collaborative International, Inc.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
USAID. Bur. for Private Enterprise. Ofc. of Housing and Urban Programs (Sponsor)  
1 Feb 1990, iv, 39 p. + 7 annexes : statistical tables

2630066  
9401002  
OTR-1002-C-00-5189-00

A.I.D.'s housing and community upgrading project in Helwan, Egypt, has drawn strong criticism. An October 1988 audit showed that, after 10 years and an expenditure of \$134 million, not a single low-income family was living in the new community and many promised improvements in other communities were years behind schedule. In response to an audit recommendation, this report documents the major lessons learned from the project. The project context is described, including issues related to Egypt's economy, the USAID/Egypt Mission, trends in international housing assistance, and the level of professional skills required for the project. Events leading to project authorization are traced, followed by an assessment of the project objectives, the status of the Helwan new community and the community upgrading program, project management and construction, and institutional development. The report concludes that, in spite of myriad problems, the project should not be viewed as a total failure. Since the 1988 audit, progress has been rapid, with some 7,200 plots fully serviced and most community facilities completed. Housing construction is well underway and initial sales have taken place. Ultimately, more than 20,000 new housing units will be available to moderate-income Egyptian households. Moreover, while the project did not follow its planned schedule, a decade is not an unusually long time in the developing world for implementing massive housing projects.

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Child survival programs in Egypt

Tumavick, Nancy; Binnendijk, Annette; et al.

USAID. Bur. for Program and Policy Coordination. Center for Development Information and Evaluation

AID impact evaluation report, no. 73, [1990], vii, 26 p. : ill., charts, statistical tables

\*Availability: Fulltext electronic copy available -- table 3 is not included in electronic version

In the early 1980's, A.I.D., together with the Government of Egypt, UNICEF, and WHO, developed a strategy for child survival focused on two key interventions: oral rehydration therapy (ORT) to control diarrheal diseases and an expanded program of immunizations (EPI) against the six major communicable childhood diseases. This report evaluates the performance and health impacts of the two programs.

Both programs have had high levels of success. ORT awareness and use has spread throughout Egypt and child nutrition during diarrheal episodes has improved. Statistics suggest that an accelerated decline in infant and child mortality in the mid-1980's is essentially the result of the program, especially of its popularization of home and private rehydration. However, the actual incidence of diarrheal episodes has probably not changed, indicating that the program's preventive aspects, ranging from promotion of hygiene among mothers to massive investments in potable water and sewage systems, have yet to prove effective.

The EPI program has resulted in rapidly increasing and high coverage rates among children for all antigens. Although reliable data are not available, EPI has most likely reduced both mortality and morbidity, since unvaccinated Egyptian children are at significant risk from the targeted diseases. On the negative side, coverage rates for tetanus toxoid injections of pregnant women have lagged considerably in comparison with the rest of the program.

The rapid success of the two programs is largely due to Egypt's unique positive circumstances: the population's cultural and linguistic homogeneity and concentration along the Nile; extensive health infrastructure and large pool of trained health personnel; availability of low-cost ORT and immunization technologies; and wide access to television. While these factors limit the programs' replicability elsewhere, the programs' flexibility, limited focus, and use of mass media are broadly applicable. Partly because of the

success of the two programs, the patterns of infant and child mortality are shifting in Egypt, with acute respiratory infection now emerging as the leading cause of death and hence the main concern of future child survival efforts.

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PD-CBK-776 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=67729

Local development II

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

[1990], [9] p. + attachment, ES no. 263-90

Attachment: XD-CBK-776-A

2630182

Summarizes midterm evaluation of a project (XD-CBK-776-A) to provide technical and financial resources to local governments in Egypt in support of administrative and fiscal decentralization. The evaluation covered the period 1985-89.

While the project has fulfilled the purpose of building local capacity to implement local projects, its long-term sustainability is questionable. The project has not been successful in promoting policy changes to increase the power of local governments to raise and retain local revenues. The Government of Egypt (GOE) lacks the commitment needed to make the required legislative and administrative changes.

At the national level, the project has faced considerable institutional problems, largely because it vested implementation authority in temporary bodies rather than in permanent GOE entities. The Interministerial Local Development Committee (ILDC), the overall steering committee for the program, has not developed into the high-level program and policy deliberation body originally foreseen. The ILDC's Technical Secretariat was not assigned the expected number of staff members and has faced jurisdictional conflicts with the Minister of Local Administration. In addition, the overall project management structure, even if it were functioning properly, is overly complex.

It is too early to assess impact on the local level, especially since the two main training activities were seriously delayed. It is evident that local councils have gained considerable experience in assessing community needs, planning and designing appropriate projects, and providing for operation and maintenance. However, several problems have also been encountered. Construction inspection for wastewater treatment plant subprojects has been inadequate, mainly due to a shortage of experienced personnel and lack of transportation to project

sites. The project's management information system has not been used in local decisionmaking and implementation. Local government operation and maintenance activities are inefficient, with poor spare parts management and a shortage of trained mechanics and tools. Also, the practice of apportioning block grants to governorates primarily on the basis of population is questionable.

The Mission generally agreed with the evaluation team's recommendations for improving implementation of specific activities, but was less enthusiastic about its proposals for solving overall policy and management issues. Nonetheless, the Mission will use emphasize to the GOE the importance of resolving organizational problems. The Mission will also redesign its local development sector assistance to condition disbursement of block grants on policy progress in key areas.

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PD-ABA-077 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=56565

Peace fellowship

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

23 Oct 1989, [6] p., ES no. 263-89

Companion evaluation: PD-AAZ-073

2630110

2630125

Summarizes evaluation (PD-AAZ-073) of the Peace Fellowship Program, established under Project 2630110 to provide opportunities for U.S. graduate study and training to Egyptian personnel, and continuing under Project 2630125. The project has been implemented by the Egyptian Ministry of Higher Education's (MOHE's) Missions Department through a contract with AMIDEAST.

The major findings and conclusions are: (1) USAID/E has had minimal influence at the policy-level on the Missions Department's implementation of the project. (2) Overall training targets have been exceeded, making this one of the largest bilateral training programs in history. (3) Training has served a cross-section of the English-speaking public, but circumstances, rather than planning, have determined fields of study. (4) Clinical medicine has been overrepresented, accounting for more than 30% of nominations to date under Project 0125. (5) Private sector targets have been met, but clearer development objectives in Project 0125 and in Egypt's own planning point to greater private sector and development oriented training needs. (6) The Egyptian Cultural and Educational Bureau (ECEB) has functioned well in placing and monitoring participants, but



inadequate equipment, supplies, testing, and recordkeeping at family health care centers; (2) insufficient number and training of staff members; and (3) inappropriate educational materials. (Author abstract, modified)

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PD-ABE-096 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=69049  
Project assistance completion report : data collection and analysis  
project (263-0142)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
24 Sep 1989, 11 p.

2630142

PACR of a project (1980-5/88) to assist Egypt's Ministry of Agriculture in improving its capacity to collect and analyze economic data.

All training activities for staff of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (AERI) and the Undersecretary for Agricultural Economics and Statistics (U/AES) were accomplished. The project funded four Ph.D. candidates, all of whom are expected to return to Egypt by 10/89, as well as U.S. short-term training or observational tours for some 140 persons, all of whom have returned, with the majority making use of skills and knowledge gained. Trainees acquired technical skills in such areas as objective yield forecasting, cost of production estimation, farm income estimation, farm labor data estimation, poultry production data estimation, dairy production data estimation, channel data marketing for horticultural crops, list frame construction, and data processing. Additionally, the project sponsored over 35 seminars, workshops, and conferences, the most impressive of which was an agricultural economic policy reform seminar attended by senior government officials and representatives of 9 Arab countries and several international organizations. In addition, considerable TA was provided, and substantial progress made in tailoring methodologies to the Egyptian context. The project also issued more than 20 commodity and input reports, along with 5 policy studies and other papers, and established a computer center at U/AES.

Despite these achievements, only limited progress was made in developing institutional systems for generating data on a nationwide basis, due mainly to lack of cooperation and coordination between AERI and U/AES. This failure is in turn related to the traditional bureaucratic context in Egypt, which is not conducive to the sharing of authority. Progress was also hindered by the apparent lack of demand for improved statistics, and by USAID/E's lack of attention to the

project.

Lessons learned include the following. (1) The acquisition of new technical skills and sophisticated equipment is not sufficient to increase the output of a recipient organization. In addition, there must be an organizational capability and the desire to use those skills. (2) Policy studies must be an integral part of project activities and they must also be desired by senior host government officials. (3) More attention must be given to the selection of candidates and their English language skills. Ph.D. training in this project had to be extended due to poorly prepared candidates.

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PD-AAZ-988 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=56079

University linkages

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

27 Sep 1989, 7 p. + attachment, ES no. 263-88-11

Attachment XD-AAZ-988-A

2630211

2630118

Summarizes evaluation (XD-AAZ-988-A) of a project to provide grants for applied research to be carried out collaboratively by U.S. and Egyptian university faculty and potential end-users (e.g., industrial or agricultural enterprises). External evaluation covered the period 1980-4/89.

The project created enough useful linkages - not between Egyptian and U.S. universities, but between principal Egyptian researchers and their U.S. counterparts - to justify USAID/e's \$20.5 million expenditure. The 18 research activities evaluated yield a rate of return to the Egyptian economy in excess of what could be expected from infrastructure projects. (The Mission cautions, however, that rates of return can differ radically depending on the assumptions made about the time streams for costs and returns.) The project also created new respect for and confidence in the ability of Egyptian scholars to help solve real problems. However, Egyptian universities remain biased in favor of theoretical rather than applied research, and budgetary allocation for the latter must be increased in order to change this attitude.

Early and intensive involvement of the expected end-users of the research proved crucial. In the most successful cases, top managers of the public enterprise involved not only approved the project, but assigned the firm's engineering staff to work collaboratively with the

academic investigators. Research tended to be less successful when government Ministries rather than public enterprises served as intermediaries. In agriculture, for example, where the ultimate users are necessarily represented by Ministry, technical success and widespread application do not necessarily go hand in hand. Unless successful results are disseminated to farmers by extension agents, the successes may not extend past the experiment station. One of the most pervasive sources of weakness is the lack of interdisciplinary thinking in design and execution; there is a tendency to focus on technical and physical outputs alone without any concern for economic, social, or institutional issues.

A follow-on project is planned.

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PN-ABC-710 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=55583  
AID microenterprise stock-taking : Egypt  
Grant, William; Bigelow, Ross E.; et al.  
Development Alternatives, Inc.  
Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.  
USAID. Bur. for Program and Policy Coordination. Center for Development  
Information and Evaluation (Sponsor)  
AID evaluation occasional paper, no. 29, Jul 1989, xiii, 21 p. + 4  
appendices : statistical tables  
Cover title: AID microenterprise stock-taking : Egypt field assessments

9311096  
PDC-1096-I-09-8043-00

In the last 10 years, USAID/Egypt has supported a number of projects with modest microenterprise components. In contrast, the current trend is to segregate microenterprise development from other initiatives. This report evaluates two projects which utilize these different approaches. The former approach is represented by the small enterprise loan program (SELP), a tiny component of the very large Helwan urban development project, while the current strategy is represented by a microenterprise loan fund operated by the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS). CEOSS has been more successful in some respects. By the end of the grant in 1986, CEOSS had made 421 loans totalling \$140,000, and the fund has continued to grow. Only 14% of the outstanding balance is in arrears, and only 5 loans are in default, each because of the borrower's death. The future of the SELP loan fund, however, is in doubt. As of 6/87, about 19% of the outstanding balance of loan payments was in arrears by an average of 10 months, and there is little prospect for on-lending the repaid funds now that the SELP component of the project is over. CEOSS's

success can be attributed largely to local participation in project design and the effective integration of credit with technical assistance and training activities. Both projects were inhibited by Egypt's macroeconomic policy environment and the high rate of inflation (22%-25% per annum), however, and despite the fact that some of CEOSS's loans were making returns of up to 200%, the small value of the loans has limited both activities effectiveness in generating new jobs.

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PD-AAZ-424 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=54671

Evaluation of the structural replacement and project preparation unit components of the irrigation management systems project  
Wickham, T.; Auslam, D.; Jubboori, S.  
Camp Dresser and McKee, Inc.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
ISPAN report, no. 18, Apr 1989, xi, 80 p.  
ISPAN activity no. 640B

2630132  
3980289  
ANE-0289-C-00-7044-00

Evaluates two components of the Irrigation Management Systems project in Egypt. One component aims to replace small- and mid-size irrigation structures and the other is to establish a project preparation unit (PPU) within the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resource (MPWWR) to carry out feasibility and prefeasibility studies of prospective investment in irrigation. External evaluation covers the period 1981-4/89.

Both components have benefited from project TA and produced useful, high-quality products. Structural replacement has resulted in more than 7,000 new small- and mid-size masonry and concrete structures to take the place of old or no longer functional structures controlling water in the Nile Basin irrigation system. About 2,000 additional structures are currently under construction and/or scheduled to be completed by mid-1989. The structures are functional and of satisfactory quality. This component has also increased the capability of Egyptian contractors to contribute to construction projects in rural parts of the country, and it has strengthened the supervision capacity of the MPWWR.

The PPU has produced 11 high-quality reports in English and a number of reports in Arabic assessing the economic feasibility of a wide range of potential investment projects in the irrigation sector. Some of these studies have led directly to construction and completed projects,

while one helped the MPWWR avoid an uneconomic investment. In addition, this component has resulted in substantial numbers of people better trained in feasibility analysis, a skill which needs strengthening in the MPWWR.

Despite these achievements, neither component will meet all objectives by their respective completion dates. Approximately 2,000 more irrigation structures need replacement, and the PPU is not yet considered capable of producing high-quality reports in English on its own. These shortfalls are attributed to overly ambitious project targets, particularly regarding the time needed to institutionalize a new agency such as the PPU. It is recommended that the structural replacement component be extended for 2 years, and that the PPU receive scaled-down TA comprised of one multidisciplinary advisor and a generous supply of short-term consultants for 3 more years. However, before these extensions are improved the MPWWR must take steps to resolve certain key administrative constraints in such areas as staffing, salary incentives, and per diems.

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PD-AAZ-014 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=53275  
Cairo sewer I O&M training  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
2 Mar 1989, [6] p. + attachment, ES no. 263-88-09  
Attachment in Arabic with English appendices

2630091

Summarizes external impact evaluation of the training component of the Cairo Sewerage I project. Evaluation covers the period through 11/88.

Major findings are as follows. (1) Operations and maintenance (O&M) training contributed to improved performance of pump stations and sewer cleaning which, along with several other factors, contributed to a 66% reduction in sewerage flooding. (2) Though inadequate numbers of staff (6-7%) were trained, the training was effective because it accounted for the educational backgrounds of attendees and was presented in Arabic by esteemed Egyptian staff. (3) A key element in improved station performance was the recognition by the Cairo General Organization for Sanitary Drainage's (GOSD) O&M staff that their work was regularly observed and evaluated via performance monitoring checklists. (4) In the 18-month hiatus between the conclusion of the activity and implementation of Work Order 4A (which facilitated training activities under the follow-on project), performance monitoring and good O&M practices lapsed in all but one case due to

lack of institutional support. (5) Institutionalization of O&M training is hampered by GOSD's lack of management and budgetary autonomy, by uncertain supply of foreign exchange for purchase of spare parts, by GOSD's inadequate but underspent O&M budget, by excess numbers of poorly paid workers, and by lack of incentives for good performance. (6) If applied on a consistent basis with adequate budgetary and other institutional support, this O&M training program could serve as a model for other Government of Egypt and USAID/E activities.

Several lessons were learned. (1) In order for training to be effective, trainees must be motivated to use the newly acquired knowledge, the training must be regularly reinforced, and follow-up checks must be made. (2) A training scheme can be successful only if it is supported by management and fully integrated into the management systems of the organization. (Author abstract)

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PD-ABD-550 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=67021

Population sector assessment

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

21 Mar 1989, [9] p. + attachment, ES no. 263-90-05

Attachment: XD-ABD-550-A

2630144

Summarizes evaluation (XD-ABD-550-A) of Egypt's population problems and USAID/E's Office of Population. The evaluation covered the period through 3/89.

The Egyptian government aims to reduce the population growth rate from 2.8% to 2.1% by the year 2001. To achieve this goal, the contraceptive prevalence rate will have to increase from 37.6% to at least 51%. Although this will require tremendous effort, there have been some recent progress. Examples include the following. (1) Contraceptive prevalence has increased from 30% in 1984 to 38% in 1988. (2) There has been a dramatic, positive change in the political commitment to address population issues, with forceful calls to action at the highest level. (3) A National Population Council (NPC), which was established in 1985, has served as a focal point for population-related activities. The NPC has set specific, measurable goals for expanding contraceptive delivery and has begun to develop governorate action plans on population. (4) Family planning has gathered support from both Muslim and Coptic leaders. (5) Egyptian organizations, with A.I.D. assistance, have increased their support for family planning service delivery. (6) An effective partnership between

the public and private sectors has evolved. (7) Service quality has greatly improved. (8) The State Information Program for family planning has greatly improved. (9) Egyptian medical researchers and institutions are carrying out some of the world's best contraceptive research.

USAID/E's Office of Population is well positioned for an expanded Egyptian family planning program. Highlights of the Office's past few years include: meeting objectives to increase access to family planning; improving relationships with key Egyptian institutions; assessing contraceptive prevalence and method mix; assisting in the improvement of family planning messages; and supporting biomedical research on contraceptive technology.

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PD-AAZ-564 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=55014  
AID/PVO collaboration  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
25 Feb 1989, [5] p. + attachment, ES no. 263-89  
Attachment: XD-AAZ-564-A

2630102

Summarizes a study (XD-AAZ-564-A) to assess the performance of U.S. and Egyptian PVO's and their relationships with the Government of Egypt (GOE) and USAID/E in order to determine the feasibility of using an umbrella mechanism to simplify the funding and implementation of PVO projects in Egypt. The study was based on surveys and extensive interviews.

Although relatively few in number, U.S. PVO's have developed successful working relationships with Egyptian institutions by concentrating largely on promoting local skills and systems for development-oriented work by Egyptian counterparts. However, U.S. PVO's require greater GOE appreciation of their role in promoting and assisting community-based institutional growth. Many U.S. PVO's expressed a desire for a higher level of USAID/E support in PVO dealings with the GOE, increased USAID/GOE funding of PVO work with local development institutions, and less stringent USAID/E grant approval and monitoring requirements.

The term "PVO" has a different sense in Egypt than it has in the United States. In Egypt, the term describes a wide variety of national, regional, and local nonprofit social, welfare, relief, cultural, and development organizations supported and regulated by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA). As of 10/88, there were almost

14,000 such PVO's registered with the MSA for work at the local level, and 160 at the national level. There is a strong need to upgrade the management and leadership of Egyptian PVO's and to strengthen GOE confidence in their capacity to function without micro-regulation. Additional improvements could be made by developing intermediate-level PVO's to support community-based ones and by encouraging the relatively more affluent and powerful segments of Egyptian society to share more fully in the support of PVO activities.

Although further funding of the PVO sector in Egypt is needed, there is no clear basis for concluding that additional funding or its availability from a new source (such as an umbrella project) would enhance long-term PVO self-sufficiency and sustainability. A limited umbrella project to address immediate bureaucratic constraints is nonetheless desirable. Such an effort should be consistent, however, with a longer-term evolution towards a more comprehensive approach to fostering a development-oriented PVO community in Egypt.

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PD-AAZ-073 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=53538  
Evaluation of the peace fellowship program, AID project no. 263-0110  
Ball, Thomas H.; Schieren, Carl  
Checchi and Co. Consulting, Inc.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Jan 1989, v, 43 p. + 17 appendices : statistical tables  
Companion evaluation summary: PD-ABA-077

2630110

Evaluates project to establish a Peace Fellowship Program to provide U.S. graduate-level training in key development sectors to Egyptian students. The program is implemented by the Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) and by the Egyptian Cultural and Educational Bureau (ECEB) in Washington, D.C. External final evaluation covers the period 1980-1/89.

The program is one of the largest bilateral training programs in history and a signal achievement in U.S.-Egyptian relations. Some 2,024 students have participated in graduate studies programs, exceeding the target of 1,900; in terms of person-months of training, targets have been exceeded by 15%.

The program has been available to a cross-section of English-speaking Egyptians in the academic, public, and private sectors. About half of participants have come from the universities, 38% from outside greater Cairo and Alexandria, and 19% have been women. However, in the

program's second phase, to be implemented under Project 2630125 (Development Training), some changes need to be made in participant selection. Use of discipline-specific selection committees comprised only of university professors has biased the process toward applicants with good research plans. Clinical medicine has been overrepresented, accounting for 17% of total training, even though few Egyptian doctors are qualified for hands-on clinical work in the United States. It is recommended that this field be eliminated from eligibility. Although the private sector target of 12% has been met, this level needs to be raised in response to both host government and USAID/E development plans, which place increased reliance on the private sector. It is recommended that a portion of the budget be set aside for the private sector and that a new selection procedure for this group be adopted.

The ECEB has functioned well in placing and monitoring participants. However, low salaries and poor working conditions have caused high staff turnover and low morale within the Peace Fellows unit. Moreover, while the unit appears capable of handling the current number of participants, the expanded follow-on project may prove overwhelming. It is recommended that special assistance be given to the ECEB in addressing these problems, as well as in providing improved orientation, field trips, and conferences for Peace Fellows.

A major criticism on the Egyptian side has been that implementation has been delayed repeatedly by slow reimbursements and by low levels of obligations for new participants. Phase II of the program has an estimated life of 3 to 8 years, and an estimated funding level of \$5 million to \$13 million. Orderly planning cannot take place until A.I.D.'s intentions are made more clear. It is recommended that USAID/E work closely with the MOHE to ensure that the expectations of both sides are clearly stated, fully understood, and sufficiently agreed to so that implementation can take place at a reasonable pace.

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PD-AAAY-706    PES/ES(21)    Rec\_no=52241  
Afro-American Labor Center : grant no. 263-0125-G-00-8036-00  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
13 Dec 1988, [6] p. + attachment, ES no. 263-88-08  
Attachment: XD-AAAY-706-A

2630125  
Contract evaluated: 263-0125-G-00-8036-00

Summarizes attached evaluation (XD-AAAY-706-A) of a grant to the African American Labor Center (AALC) project to promote trade unions in Egypt. Special evaluation covered the period 1983-87, and was



USAID. Bur. for Science and Technology. Ofc. of Health (Sponsor)  
WASH field report, no. 250, Nov 1988, ix, 67 p. + attachment : statistical  
tables  
WASH activity no. 452

9365942  
2630091  
DPE-5942-C-00-4085-00

Evaluates project to improve Cairo's wastewater system through rehabilitation of the primary collection system, training of operation and maintenance staff, and development of expansion plans. Ex post external evaluation covers the period through 11/88.

The project improved Cairo's wastewater system's operation and maintenance; since 1981, flooded areas have been reduced by nearly two-thirds. Pump stations and sewer cleaning still have deficiencies but are more effective due to a combination of new equipment, training, preventive maintenance, and management advice. The training component was effective but needs to be expanded (in regard to both technical and management training), since only 6%-7% of the work force has received training thus far. Effective operation of the General Organization for Sanitary Drainage (GOSD) is constrained by a lack of management autonomy and limited ability to raise revenues. The GOSD's budget is also inadequate and the provision of foreign currency for spare parts is uncertain.

After the project was terminated, a 15-month hiatus in initiating follow-on Work Order IVA caused some of the gains made by the project to be lost. To reinstate the program to the level needed by 1991 (when clean water flowing into Cairo will exceed the new system's capacity) will require: (1) restoring preventive maintenance checklists and regular evaluations and training personnel from GOSD's Technical Evaluation Department to undertake these responsibilities; (2) initiating an annual competition, with prizes, for best station, crew, performance; (3) building an urgently needed pump repair shop; (4) improving the supply of and procedures for obtaining spare parts; (5) developing safety policy and providing safety equipment and training (an urgent need); (6) educating the public to avoid misuse of sewers; (7) amending building regulations in order to prevent building without sewers as well as the construction of buildings over manholes; (8) mapping the sewer system; and (9) establishing new maintenance depots.

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PD-AA Y-269 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=51121

Population/family planning project (263-0144) : state information

service/information, education and communication component  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
[Sep 1988], [7] p. + attachment, ES no. 263-88-07  
Attachment: XD-AAY-269-A

2630144

Summarizes evaluation of an activity supported by two projects (263-0029 and 263-0144) to establish an Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) Center within the Government of Egypt's State Information Service (SIS) to promote family planning (FP). External evaluation covered the period 1982-5/88 and is based on a comparison of 1982 data with data from a new survey of sample households and of opinion leaders, or "influentials."

No one can say what the specific impact of IEC activities has been, but general awareness of population issues is high and has been maintained since 1982. More women now know about and use contraceptives, the percentage of respondents not expecting to rely on children in old age has tripled, and approval rates for spacing and limiting family size are very high (95% and 90%, respectively).

SIS media campaigns have been very effective in reaching the general public (except for rural females). Access is high to television and radio (95% and 90%), and 87% of respondents had seen FP spots on television while 58% heard information on the radio. This sort of mass media campaign is less effective in reaching national-level and urban influentials, however, who responded more to press coverage and to FP workshops and public meetings.

Several alarming trends were uncovered, however. Some 74% of political influentials and 84% of religious influentials are not convinced that a population problem exists and are apt to stress solutions that accommodate population growth rather than reduce fertility. Furthermore, despite gains in FP knowledge and acceptance, the number of women discontinuing use of modern methods is still very high, and more of the public now feels that religious leaders are against FP.

Recommendations are made to develop an integrated media campaign focused on family spacing, contraceptive methods, health benefits for the mother and child, and one's religious responsibility to produce healthy, strong children. Media use should be tailored to specific audiences: television for the rural masses, radio for urban males, and press for national influentials. The press should also be used to

present more detailed analyses of FP problems. Special print materials for illiterates and influentials should be produced, and public FP meetings should be staged to involve rural influentials.

The Mission comments that several problems noted by the evaluation are already being addressed by the new SIS director; it also notes that FP support is growing among high-level religious and political influentials. (Author abstract, modified)

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PD-AAX-853    PES/ES(21)    Rec\_no=49659  
Population/family planning project (263-0144) : state information  
service/information, education and communication component  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
7 Jun 1988, [6] p. + attachment, ES no. 263-88-03  
Attachment: XD-AAX-853-A

2630144

Summarizes attached evaluation of Egypt's State Information Service's Information, Education, and Communication Center (SIS/IEC), created to promote family planning (FP) under the Population Projects (263-0029 and -0144). Special evaluation focuses on institutional development, is based on interviews with contractor and SIS/IEC personnel, document review, and site visits, and covers the period 1985-88.

SIS/IEC has made good progress, particularly in selection of media themes, production of high-quality TV spots utilizing private contractors, and financial management. Specific findings are: SIS/IEC organization, management, and staff are competent, although staff too often are dependent on the Director for routine administrative decisions; management would benefit, however, from additional professional staff and improved utilization of national consultants and training. Financial management has also been improved.

Program development (especially TV advertising) has improved markedly with the use of private agencies for designing, producing, and testing the materials. The pretesting and professional design used for TV spots should now be systematically extended to SIS/IEC's other products and activities. Local educational activities (e.g., governorate-level seminars, village-level public meetings, and meetings for specific audiences) have been surprisingly successful in attracting large, mixed audiences of men, women, and children and in providing detailed explanations of contraceptive methods as well as serious presentations of Islamic views on FP. According to the evaluation team, the presence of television video crews and the provision of small incentives during



conventionally trained physicians.

Nevertheless, certain areas need improvement. For example, 24 Ministry of Health (MOH) clinics were renovated and equipped in order to provide SCU students with the opportunity to work with MOH personnel in providing patient care, but a number of factors, including too few patients and the low technical performance of MOH physicians, have made the value of this experience questionable. In addition, the failure of the MOH to develop even model PHC units has meant that SCU students have no opportunity to use their training after graduation.

Management development has also proved problematic: while SCU's participatory management style went a long way to ensuring its early growth into a strong institution, now that the school is established more structured management systems are needed. Financial sustainability is also an issue; Government of Egypt (GOE) salary levels may not be enough to retain faculty, although the GOE budget may be supplemented by a variety of income generating activities, such as group practices, faculty housing, and, possibly, use of the microbiology and pathology laboratories.

A project extension through 1/90 has been approved in order to (1) strengthen the Department of General Practice and other specialty departments; (2) develop a career structure for General and Family Practice physicians; (3) develop specific scientific disciplines and scholarly research capabilities of importance to Community Health/General Practice; (4) improve management by hiring a senior business manager, restructuring SCU organization, and providing in-service training for supervisory staff; (5) increase revenue generation by expanding group practices and developing more potential laboratory services; and (6) help the MOH develop model PHC clinics.

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PD-AAX-624 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=48770  
Cairo sewerage I  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Mar 1988, 3 p. + attachment, ES no. 263-88-02  
Attachment: XD-AAX-624-A

2630091

Summarizes attached evaluation of a project to rehabilitate Cairo's sewerage system. Evaluation covered the period 1981-87 and was based on document review, inspections of sewers and pump stations, and interviews with sewer cleaners and repairmen, community leaders and residents, and project staff.

The evaluation found that there had been an 84% reduction in chronic sewerage flooding since the project was initiated in 1981. Of the 67 areas with chronic flooding problems identified in 1981, only 11 remain, with 12 other areas experiencing occasional, localized flooding. Similarly, residential complaints about flooding have dropped markedly; Cairo sanitation officials credit the project with this drop.

Surveys of residents show that 76% are aware of the project and could cite problems which the project had reduced (e.g., foul odors, mosquitoes and flies, increase in diseases, difficulty in walking or driving through the streets, etc.).

Continuing flooding problems can be traced in some areas to increased population density and illegal housing; in other areas, lack of waste disposal systems lead residents to dump garbage directly into the sewers. Industries and public institutions are also known to abuse the sewerage system by dumping chemical and solid wastes.

The Mission comments that continued flooding is largely caused by industrial abuse. Solid wastes (from tanneries in particular) damage and clog secondary pipelines, which the Cairo General Organization for Sanitary Damage cannot afford to correct or replace. Sewer maintenance operations are being upgraded, however, and the Mission will work with the Governorate of Cairo (GC) to end industrial system abuse. The GC has also begun a pilot garbage collection service in two affluent areas; if successful, the service will be expanded.

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PD-AAX-892 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=49709  
Recurrent cost study : progress and potential in key project areas  
(education, health and agriculture)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
24 Mar 1988, 3 p. + attachments, ES no. 263-88-04  
Attachments: XD-AAX-892-A, XD-AAX-892-B

Summarizes attached study (XD-AAX-892-B) of the potential for recovering the recurrent costs of the Government of Egypt's (GOE) public services in the education, health, and agriculture sectors. The study was based on review of A.I.D. documentation.

The project has shown that cost recovery has great potential. If beneficiaries can influence or control the use of funds to obtain quality services, then even the poor will pay service fees for curative health care, textbooks, school building maintenance, and irrigation

system upkeep.

Some cost recovery activities which have been initiated or are under consideration in education are (1) community/parent contributions for maintenance of primary schools; (2) sale of advertising space on notebooks and textbooks; (3) sale of textbooks and/or a reuse program; (4) a school tutoring program with a portion of the teacher's fees retained; (5) performance awards for teachers; and (6) development of private schools without limitations on fees or salaries. Another new approach is the granting of autonomy to district and village level schools, including the authority to set and retain fees and donations.

In health, the GOE has made a commitment to upgrade selected facilities and charge fees in a significant departure from the social contract of free health care for all. Initiatives in this area include (1) the Curative Care Organization, which recovers 100% of recurrent costs; (2) the Health Insurance Organization; and (3) group practices developed by the Suez Community Health Personnel Training Project which recover most clinic and medical school recurrent costs.

Initiatives in the agriculture sector have been slow to develop because of a restrictive policy environment, the undisputed public benefit of agricultural research and extension, and constitutional and religious opposition to charging water fees (e.g., for irrigation). Potential cost recovery activities in this sector include (1) legalization of water users' associations; (2) fees for irrigation drainage systems; and (3) local contributions of labor for the maintenance of tertiary irrigation canals.

Key recommendations are to: support efforts to lift restrictions on private schools and community/parent contributions; build on the success of the Suez Community Health project by identifying Egyptian initiatives that could benefit from continued USAID/E support; and study areas in the agriculture sector where fees could be instituted, particularly rice and land taxes. The Mission comments that the study has proven very useful in focusing attention on cost recovery issues; a similar study of cost recovery in infrastructure and local development projects would be worthwhile.

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PD-AAX-786 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=49434

Renewable energy

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

25 Jan 1988, [6] p., ES no. 263-87-01

Companion evaluation: PD-WAC-590

263012302

Summarizes external, interim evaluation (PD-WAC-590) of a project to field test renewable energy technologies in Egypt. Evaluation covered the period 1982-1/88 and was based on document review and interviews.

Project technologies appear viable, even in today's economic environment, for particular end uses; wind may have significant potential for the energy grid. Further, the Government of Egypt (GOE) is committed to the use of renewable energy in desert and remote areas and for conventional energy conservation and has increased budgetary support in its annual and five-year plans. The GOE now has a staffed and functioning institution - the New and Renewable Energy Authority (NREA) - capable of implementing project-supported activities.

However, the project is far behind schedule. Only the construction of two field tests can be completed before the current (8/88) PACD. Available information has not been fully utilized or disseminated. Project delays are primarily due to the management shortcomings of GOE/NREA, USAID/E, and the TA contractor. The project implementation plan was not realistic and was not revised to serve as a meaningful management control mechanism. The prime contractor's work was technically weak, delivered late, and completed without full GOE participation. During the last year, however, resident contractor performance has improved and procedures have been streamlined.

Before any project activities other than field tests currently under procurement are approved, redesign is required to improve procurement/management procedures, expand the technologies to be considered, and develop links with private sector contractors, manufacturers, and end-users. Accordingly, the evaluation strongly recommended that the project be redesigned and the PACD be extended.

USAID/E prefers, however, to (1) limit the project scope during the present PACD to the four field tests under procurement and the establishment of a renewable energy information system, thus allowing NREA time to gain management experience; and (2) extend the PACD for 2 years and proceed with project redesign when NREA has appointed a full-time coordinator, adopted a management structure, agreed on a realistic project implementation schedule and management process, and assumed responsibility for key implementation functions. In addition, the present TA contract will be phased out.

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\*PD-AAV-910 PES/ES(21)  
USAID/Egypt : electricity sector assessment

Rec\_no=44689

Hamman, Timothy; Richter, Charles  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
8 Jul 1987, [12] p. + 2 attachments : statistical tables, ES no. 263-87-03  
Attachments: XD-AAV-910-A, XD-AAX-910-B

2630160  
2630033  
2630196

\*Availability: Best available copy -- pages 8 - 18 missing

Summarizes an attached evaluation of A.I.D.'s assistance to Egypt's electricity sector through 1986 (XD-AAV-910-A) and an attached assessment of energy pricing issues (XD-AAV-910-B). Both attachments were prepared in-house by USAID/E.

Since 1975, USAID/E has provided over \$1 billion through eight projects to expand and upgrade electrical power systems in Egypt. The projects have helped to construct a number of new generation facilities (the one exception being the Ismailia plant, which has a history of operating problems) and have significantly upgraded the capacity of the Egyptian Electrical Authority (EEA). The AID-funded plants today provide about 24% of Egypt's electrical generation capacity, with more power coming on-line by 1990; the plants are more efficient than older EEA plants and their revenues are adequate to cover operating expenses.

However, owing to institutional constraints, A.I.D. projects to improve overall power system efficiency have not fully achieved their objectives; in the future, these should be tailored to the particular needs of the individual distribution companies.

The projects teach that choice of a contracting method is a key initial decision. The turnkey approach has been very effective when a standardized package of services is utilized, but greater client control is needed when "customized" services are procured and when large multi-donor plants are constructed. When procuring sophisticated state-of-the-art technology, solicitation of proposals is preferable to developing equipment specifications and invitations for bids. The introduction of new technology requires intensive educational efforts, and sufficient spare parts should always be provided for the life of the equipment.

Energy in Egypt has traditionally been heavily subsidized, and as of 11/86, electricity was receiving a subsidy of about 80%, amounting to LE 2.8 billion annually. Energy tariffs have actually declined in relative terms in recent years. As a result, USAID/E has made future

energy assistance contingent upon major price increases. In fact, substantial increases (including a 29% hike in electricity tariffs) were announced in 5/87 as part of an agreement with the IMF. USAID/E then reversed a previous decision not to finance additional rehabilitation for the Aswan High Dam power plant. As further increases are expected, USAID/E is also prepared to finance planning and feasibility work, and will provide additional assistance if prices are significantly increased again during 1987. If prices do rise substantially, however, USAID/E expects the World Bank to become the major power sector donor.

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PD-WAC-590 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=47250  
Midterm evaluation : USAID/GOE renewable energy field testing project  
deLucia, Russell J.; Braithwaite, Douglas C.; El Shafei, Mona  
deLucia and Associates, Inc.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Jun 1987, [68] p.  
Companion project evaluation summary: PD-AAX-786

9365730  
2630123  
PDC-5730-I-00-6110-00

Evaluates project to field test renewable energy (RE) technologies (e.g., wind energy technology, etc.) in Egypt. Midterm evaluation is based on document review, site visits and interviews with Government of Egypt (GOE) and USAID/E officials; no time frame is indicated.

Management shortcomings by USAID/E, the TA contractor, and the GOE, along with design flaws, have put the project far behind schedule. Had the project been evaluated a year earlier, the implementing schedule and strategy could have been modified to eliminate many of the delays. As things now stand, the project should be substantially redesigned before any new activities are approved. The provision of TA has been most notably inefficient: the objectives of joint work and technology transfer components have not been achieved, and there have been numerous reported incidents of problems with personnel and document quality.

On the other hand, RE is receiving increased political support from the GOE, which expects it to play a key role in its development strategy. Also, largely due to project efforts, a GOE institution capable of implementing project-type activities is in place (the New and Renewable Energy Authority - NREA), and many of the technologies appear to be viable for particular end uses given current economic

conditions in Egypt.

Among possible options for the future, the evaluation team strongly recommends that the PACD be extended and that the project undergo an extensive redesign that would continue some activities (the information system and already approved field tests and initiatives) and add new ones (tests not yet defined, specialized training, programs to involve the private sector). The redesign should consider the following aspects: (1) project management and implementation; (2) technical (technology/system) focus; (3) institutional and other support activities; (4) private sector activities; and (5) procurement procedures for both TA and hardware/software. More specifically, the project management structure should be revised to include: an NREA project manager devoting nearly full-time attention to the project; a new project management committee; better management controls; and replacement of the Resident Project Manager with a Technical Assistance Project Coordinator to coordinate firms participating in field test procurements.

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PD-AAV-663 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=44041

Basic education

El Din, M. Gamal; Conly, S.; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

1 May 1987, 8 p. + attachment, ES no. 263-87-02

Attachment: XD-AAV-663-A

2630139

Summarizes third annual impact evaluation (XD-AAV-663-A) of a project to fund school construction and provide educational equipment and TA to Egypt's Ministry of Education (MOE). The evaluation covered the first 2 years of operation for newly constructed schools and was based on statistical data from new and control schools and household interviews.

Newly constructed schools have had a significant impact on enrollment rates for girls and other disadvantaged groups (e.g., children in remote villages). In new schools (NS's), female enrollment increased 15% in the first year, compared to 8% in control schools (CS's); for boys the increases were 15% in NS's and 3% in CS's. Both of these figures exceed the 9% forecast by the project. Second year impacts were smaller, but still significant. Distance, overcrowding, and household economic status (especially for girls) continue to influence enrollment figures, however.

Dropout and repetition figures have been lower at NS's than at CS's

as well. In the first year, 12% fewer girls dropped out of the NS's than dropped out of the CS's; for boys, the figure was 6%. Overall levels of continuation are relatively high; virtually all children enrolled in the NS's complete grade 5, the presumed level of functional literacy. Major factors influencing the dropout rate are academic failure (for boys), gender-related issues (for girls), distance from the school, and economic status.

The impact of school construction on academic achievement, however, has been negligible; there is no significant difference in achievement of literacy and numeracy in NS's and CS's. Also, AID-financed equipment for practical subjects is not well-utilized. Failure rates are relatively high in the practical electricity and carpentry classes in both CS's and NS's because of lack of funds, poor instruction, and equipment distribution and maintenance problems. Another factor may be that practical course performance is not taken into account in student rankings. Finally, project TA has had little or no impact on the policies and programs of the MOE, its governorate offices, or schools.

The Mission comments that the evaluation's focus was limited to too few sites and cannot support analysis of the project's national and regional impacts. Future "life-of-project" evaluation series should include feedback systems and greater flexibility.

Action decisions are to urge the MOE to reassess the practical instruction program, to scale down the equipment supply program and require the MOE to demonstrate that it has improved equipment use, and to explore the feasibility of teacher training and textbook production projects.

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PD-AAV-516 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=43530  
Production credit project  
Cowles, D.; Conly, S.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
5 Apr 1987, [7] p. + attachment, ES no. 263-87-01  
Attachment: XD-AAV-516-A

2630147

Summarizes attached external evaluation (XD-AAV-516-A) of project to provide credit to enable Egyptian private sector firms to import U.S. equipment and commodities. Evaluation covered the period through 12/86 and was based on a statistical profile of a sample of participating firms (PF's) and on structured interviews with firm representatives.

PF's are generally new (76% created since 1974), growing (62% doubled output and 71% doubled sales and revenue in last 5 years), and import-dependent (buying equipment and/or raw materials from abroad). However, they differ greatly in size, type of product or service, and type of commodity procured - facts not fully captured in earlier studies. Specifically: (1) 43% depend on banks for their foreign exchange (FX) needs and 57% report that the project is more important for FX than for credit; (2) 56% are in industry, followed by agriculture (25%) and health and other sectors (19%); (3) 55% produce consumer goods and services, while 45% produce intermediate goods; and (4) 24% export part of their output.

Major conclusions are as follows. (1) The project partially achieved its purpose of expanding investment; without the project, 46% of PF's would have had to delay or drop production plans. (2) Most (74%) industrial PF's used project funds to import raw materials, (preferring to purchase equipment from non-U.S. sources) whereas 61% of agricultural and 100% of all other PF's used project funds to procure equipment. (3) Since attempts by some PF's to increase their profits by using cheap FX was often offset by the higher price of U.S. goods and because banks are unlikely to lend for non-viable activities, it is unlikely that the project, which only increased the stock of available funds, supported fundamentally unprofitable firms. (4) The project's role in expanding PF output, sales, and investment (an expansion not reflected in increased employment) was relatively small. The project did not, as originally intended, significantly strengthen the credit system, although it did help expand productive capacity: 95% of the PF's importing equipment and 30% of those importing raw materials reported that the project helped them initiate new activities. However, 64% of the PF's importing raw materials used these primarily to maintain, not increase, output. The project was thus clearly important as a vehicle for both short- and medium-term credit. (5) Although project funds were preponderantly used for FX, the project is not merely a cheap FX window; credit was important to a large minority of PF's, although less frequently to industrial PF's.

USAID/E, stressing the project's evolving nature, notes the evaluation's importance in providing data on the Egyptian private sector and its utility for refining program criteria toward output-expanding equipment purchases and away from raw materials importing.

support the Undersecretary of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, MOA, continuing and new responsibilities including the Official Agricultural Sector Information Service (OASIS)

Ralston, R. A.

Egypt. Ministry of Agriculture (Sponsor)

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)

20 Feb 1987, 43 p.

2630142

Evaluates project to strengthen the data collection and analysis capacities of Egypt's Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) - primarily those of the Undersecretariat of Agricultural Economics and Statistics (UAES) - and to establish a national agricultural data base. External evaluation covers the period 8/80-2/87 and is based in part on document review.

The project, which is due to end in 8/87, has not lived up to expectations. There has been no real progress toward a national data base, and the data analysis component has been a disappointment as well. Although the MOA's understanding of microcomputer technology has increased, the actual use of computers on real problems has been limited. Nonetheless, because of recent institutional, organizational, personnel, and management changes (especially by the MOA, but also by USAID/E), there is good potential for UAES to develop into a dynamic, cohesive data collection and analysis unit - provided that strong USAID/E support to the unit is continued under a related project, the National Agricultural Support Project (NASP), and that the existing PASA with the U.S.D.A. is extended.

Several factors have combined to encourage this optimism, including inter alia, the recent establishment of UAES's Official Agricultural Statistics Information Service (OASIS), the relocation of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute to the same building as UAES, and the procurement for OASIS of a sophisticated mini-computer mainframe with several remote terminals.

Recommendations for follow-on support under the NASP include, inter alia: focusing of data collection and analysis on activities that will contribute to establishment of a national agricultural data base; provision of top-level TA in policy analysis, commodity analysis monitoring, and assessment of ongoing agricultural reforms; and intensive training of agricultural economists. Several detailed recommendations are provided as well.

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Control of diarrheal diseases

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

10 Feb 1987, [8 p.] p. + attachment, ES no. 86-11

Attachment: XD-AAV-340-A

2630137

Summarizes attached midterm evaluation (XD-AAV-340-A) of the Control of Diarrheal Diseases project in Egypt. Evaluation, the second joint donor review by USAID/E, WHO, UNICEF, and the Ministry of Health (MOH) covered the period 1981-86 and was based on document review, site visits, and interviews with project personnel and beneficiaries.

The project has successfully created a large, multisectoral oral rehydration therapy (ORT) program and has established 2,700 rehydration centers in 77% of MOH facilities. In addition, the project has mounted a successful and cost-effective media campaign publicizing the dangers of dehydration and the use of ORT. About 96% of mothers interviewed recognized the ORT packet, about 82% said they used it, and 97% of users were able to mix it correctly. About 9,000 government physicians, 3,500 nurses, and over 300 pharmacists and pharmacy inspectors have been trained by the project, and production of oral rehydration salts (ORS) has been adequate and distribution - for which the pilot "depot-holder" scheme has proven effective - has been good.

There are several problems, however. (1) Project administration is overly centralized; governorates are not adequately involved in the planning process, and local level personnel lack understanding of and control over centrally administered incentive programs. (2) Mothers need more information on diarrhea case management, e.g., how to feed during diarrhea. (3) Priority training activities - production of training materials and new, task-based curricula - are behind schedule, and many health professionals still lack appropriate ORT knowledge and case management skills. (4) Current dependence on a single public sector firm for ORS production threaten long-term program sustainability. (5) The project's routine reporting system lacks clear objectives and collects excessive information. (6) Recent studies linking declining infant mortality rates to the ORT program are inconclusive and based on flawed statistics and/or methodologies.

USAID/E comments that the evaluation lacks a comprehensive overview of project activities, is negative in tone, gives only cursory treatment to project sustainability (a key issue in the Statement of Work), and fails to offer USAID/E specific guidance for implementing

the next phase of the project. Nonetheless, USAID/E action decisions extend the project 2 years and propose steps to address the problems noted in the evaluation.

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PD-AAZ-623 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=55124  
Neighbourhood urban services  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
5 Feb 1987, [8] p. + attachment, ES no. 263-86-10  
Attachment: XD-AAZ-623-A

263016105  
2630153

Summarizes final evaluation (XD-AAZ-623-A) of a project to assist district governments and PVO's in planning and implementing small infrastructure and services subprojects (SP's) in Greater Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt. The evaluation covered the period FY81-6/87.

The project demonstrated that small infrastructure projects can be handled at the district level, and its strategy of learning through repeated implementation of SP's proved effective in developing local institutional capacity. The 2,800 SP's implemented under the project are generally of high quality, appropriate, and well-utilized, serving an estimated 4 million people annually. Those implemented by the district governments (1,200) included rehabilitation and expansion of schools and health clinics as well as street lighting, paving, water, and sewerage services, while PVO SP's (1,600) improved existing health clinics, day care centers, and vocational training centers. The project has also increased public sector responsiveness to local needs by giving popular councils a greater voice in local decisionmaking. Previously, the councils had few opportunities to exercise their legal right to approve local SP's.

On the negative side, the district governments' ability to effectively manage SP's was constrained by a lack of technical skills, particularly in engineering. Although training was provided to over 70% of district-level managers and engineers, delays in training activities deflated their impact on SP implementation, and institutionalization was impeded by a shortage of qualified trainers. Maintenance training was also conducted late in the project, with the result that urgent maintenance requirements were not met, even though efforts were made by the project to provide maintenance funds and assess needs.

Despite significant achievements, the project's future is uncertain

due to financial factors. The project design did not reorient municipal government towards self-financing and cost-recovery or adequately exploit PVO potential to mobilize local financing. As a result, district governments and PVO's remain dependent on outside grants and the financial means of sustaining the provision of basic services is not yet in place.

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PD-CAV-003 Final Evaluation Report(24) Rec\_no=45775  
Project assistance completion report : agricultural development  
systems project (263-0041)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
4 Feb 1987, 5 p.

2630041

Final Mission report on a project (9/77-9/86) to upgrade horticultural research and economic analysis in Egypt's agricultural sector.

Project targets, as modified by amendment, were largely fulfilled. Outputs include: a horticultural laboratory with tissue culture and greenhouse facilities, located at the University of Cairo; project-generated technologies and extension reports; various improved horticultural crops and increased production; baseline studies for economic policy formulation; extensive training (six Ph.D. degrees, 12 postdoctoral assignments, and short-term training for 260 persons); 10 economic policy workshops; and support funding for 450 Egyptian researchers. Relationships were facilitated between the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and academic researchers, both Egyptian and American, where before there had been little contact. The horticultural laboratory, the result of extensive collaboration between Egyptian institutions and the University of California, produced a high-yielding tomato variety which has been extensively adopted and, it is estimated, has increased Egyptian farm incomes by an amount as great as the total U.S. contribution to the project.

The sustainability of these achievements is, however, seriously in doubt, for they were generated in an environment that basically stood outside of Government of Egypt (GOE) institutions such as the MOA, the local university system, and the Agricultural Research Center. Although sustainability was identified as a problem as early as 1983, a strategy for institutionalizing project activities was never developed. In fact, since the PACD the horticultural laboratory has been underfunded by the GOE, while the agricultural economics component, which generated no facilities, has dissolved. Although it is not known

exactly why sustainability issues were neglected, it may be that the project was intentionally designed to circumvent GOE institutions so that it would have the financial flexibility to more quickly generate research. And this is the project's major lesson - while circumvention of host government institutions may produce useful results, it cannot produce institution building. Additionally, project objectives, expectations, and management roles should be clearly understood by all parties from the outset.

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PD-AAV-113 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=42843  
Technology transfer and manpower development  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
10 Feb 1987, [8] p. + attachment, ES no. 263-86-09  
Attachment: XD-AAV-113-A

2630026

Summarizes attached external evaluation (XD-AAV-113-A) of a project component to train Egyptian teachers of English at preservice and in-service levels. Evaluation covered the period 11/83-2/87 and was based on document review and interviews with key personnel involved in English Language Teaching (ELT) in Egypt and with project beneficiaries.

The project is now a valued part of Egyptian ELT despite manifold early problems. USAID/E did not award the initial project grant (in 1983) until after the academic year had begun, making staff recruitment and placement for that year impossible, and the Fulbright Commission (FC) - the grantee - did not appoint a project officer until nearly 2 more years had passed, by which time most of the key personnel who were to be associated with the project had been transferred. In addition, staff turnover at the end of the second year was 75% due to confusion over status and entitlements, poor housing and logistical arrangements, and management and cultural adjustment problems. However, later (1985-86) recruitment efforts resulted in tremendous staff improvements. In all, the project has now placed 21 U.S. ELT experts at regional Egyptian universities, provided support to inservice teacher training, assisted the Center for Developing English Language Teaching (CDELT) with curriculum development, and enabled junior faculty to participate in an annual ELT conference, held in the United States.

Despite these gains, the project is not yet on solid ground. (1) Neither the project's traditional academic exchange nature nor its need for annual A.I.D. and Egyptian funding approval are appropriate for this institutional development activity; the latter in particular has



USAID/E support for private sector activities has increased over time and these activities have generally been highly successful. However, assistance has emphasized the nonprofit sector, which has limited, primarily urban, coverage. FP services are still not fully available in rural areas.

A major lesson learned is that a "target of opportunity" approach, adopted in the absence of strong host country political commitment and institutional framework, is likely to result in diffusion of effort and program impact. Moreover, in the overall political and institutional context, assistance to the private sector has proven relatively more effective than efforts to energize the GOE's FP program.

The evaluation recommended that USAID/E: (1) adopt a more focused project approach, emphasizing service delivery and institutional development activities; (2) expand the role of the private sector, both its traditional nonprofit and market-oriented elements; (3) incorporate support for an augmented, Egyptian-designed and -implemented policy development program carefully targeted to broaden support in policymaking circles.

USAID/E takes exception to some degree with the evaluation, stating that in particular the realities of the situation vis-a-vis institutional development and TA have not been adequately assessed. The lack of one, effective GOE agency responsible for implementation is a major constraint and TA can only have a limited impact in this context. Future assistance will focus on improving service delivery (to which institution building is but a means). Institutional assistance will be provided in response to demonstrated GOE commitment.

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PD-AAU-657 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=41961  
Strengthening rural health delivery  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Nov 1986, [9] p. + attachment, ES no. 263-86-08  
Attachment: XD-AAU-657-A

2630015

Summarizes attached final evaluation (XD-AAU-657-A) of a project to upgrade the capacity of Egypt's Ministry of Health (MOH) to identify replicable methods for improving rural health delivery. The evaluation, based on document review, site visits, and interviews, covered the period through 11/86 and was conducted by a MOH/consultant/World Bank team.

A strong and technically sound R&D unit was created within the MOH; this unit successfully developed and tested new interventions and in doing so created a positive climate for such strategies. In general, the interventions improved health delivery and seem, although this is difficult to quantify, to have raised rural health status. Outreach (home visits) and in-facility maternal child health activities were especially effective, although outreach activities should include the traditional midwife. Upgrading of service quality was found to depend on supplementing staff income with performance-based incentives and providing systematic and supportive supervision. Logistic support, especially the provision of vehicles, was also a crucial factor.

Information collection and dissemination was less satisfactory and of limited use at higher levels of the delivery system; the multiple recording requirements of diverse MOH departments and programs constrained productivity. However, the project's development of a replicable family health record demonstrates the impact of good information coordination. The project also developed proposals - accepted by the host government - for a national rural health strategy covering 5 areas: personnel development, financing, alternative health care, logistics, and primary health care.

Replication will depend on strengthening supervision and management from the health facility level through the national level. Consideration should be given in particular to the high costs of vehicles and the problems experienced in procuring them. Still, it should be noted that despite the high costs of project interventions, overall costs were lower due to expanded coverage.

The project has shown, inter alia, that: effective health education depends more on staff commitment than on educational methods; inservice training is a valuable motivator, but cannot compensate for inadequate preservice education; and planning among and with decentralized government units requires superb coordination of resources.

USAID/E criticizes the evaluation for neglecting some genuine achievements and for not assessing the effects of project assumptions on replicability; the evaluation's major conclusion - the feasibility of nationwide replication - was inconsistent with some findings. USAID/E also feels that the impact of "human infrastructure" projects cannot be adequately assessed until 5-10 years after completion.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
11 Sep 1986, [9] p. + attachment, ES no. 263-86-07  
Attachment: XD-AAU-090-A

2630105

ES of a project to help 4 Government of Egypt (GOE) agencies - the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC), the Remote Sensing Center (RSC), the Desert Research Institute (DRI), and the Egyptian Geological Survey and Mining Authority (EGSMA) - gather geotechnical information and better disseminate it to potential investors. Mid-term evaluation covered the period 7/82-7/86 and was based on document review and interviews.

The overall project concept is valid. However, the planned GOE coordinating framework has not functioned effectively, and USAID/E has partly filled this vacuum at the expense of progress in institution building. Management and staff competence at the agency level are rated good to excellent, and interagency cooperation has increased, but information sharing could be further improved. Delays in equipment procurement have set the project back significantly, although original schedules were unrealistic.

TA for mineral, groundwater, and remote sensing has been competent, but weaknesses in the management/marketing background of the Bendix team have limited assistance to EGSMA in developing mineral information packages; poor cultural orientation has also resulted in misunderstandings between consultants and trainees. More positively, turnkey operations by Aeroservice in the petroleum sector have encountered few difficulties; interagency cooperation on the aeromagnetic/radiometric survey has been very good.

The agencies have faced common problems in establishing data bases, and greater specialized TA and training in managing computer facilities will be needed, as will more time to generate information from the data.

The adequacy and dissemination of information produced so far has been mixed. The Aeroservice report is excellent and parts have been sold to 3 oil companies, but EGPC must more aggressively market the report. Mineral packages need to cater more to investors, no DRI reports are completed, and the quality of RSC Landsat imagery has been less than expected; EGSMA marketing, while expansive and ambitious, would still benefit from better information distribution and from mineral market analysis.

USAID/E takes significant exception to the evaluation report. In particular, USAID/E finds that the evaluation overstates the negative impact of lack of GOE coordination and reflects a poor understanding of the Project Paper, and therefore does not accept recommendations to (1) energize the original management structure or design a new mechanism and (2) recruit a new U.S. coordinator with management and information expertise. USAID/E feels that Bendix should not provide TA in mineral market analysis and package development.

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PD-AAU-031 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=40542  
Agricultural management development  
Hopkins, Nicholas; Feteha, Mohammed; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
7 Aug 1986, [8] p. + attachment, ES no. 263-86-06  
Attachment: XD-AAU-031-A

2630116

Summarizes attached final evaluation (XD-AAU-031-A) of a project to establish a Center for Agricultural Management Development (CAMD) within Egypt's Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) to train mid-level managers and to resolve management problems in public sector agricultural institutions. The evaluation covered the period 1980-6/86 and was based on document review, observation of training sessions, and a non-random survey of 143 former trainees.

The CAMD, all the facilities of which will be completed by 6/86, has conducted 72 sessions in the basic course, 21 in the advanced course, and a number of special courses. Overall, it has trained about 1,400 (or about 10%) of MOA managers to date. The vast majority of the trainees interviewed were very satisfied with their training, the key deficiency of which was the inadequacy of the case materials drawn from the Egyptian context. The majority of trainees also felt that training improved their job performance, although they consistently reported that lack of understanding by supervisors and the rigidity of existing bureaucratic procedures make it difficult to apply their learning. USAID/E was particularly disappointed with the scanty feedback provided by supervisors.

CAMD's Research and Evaluation Unit has been only marginally involved in analyzing the management problems of public sector agricultural institutions. Needs assessment and follow-up are overly routine. Shortcomings in these areas identified in the 1983 evaluation (see abstract of XD-HAA-536-A) have still not been addressed, for reasons that are not entirely clear, although the lack of progress does

indicate USAID/E's need to strengthen evaluation follow-up. In other areas, CAMD could benefit from clearer job descriptions and lines of authority, and it needs a strategy to integrate itself in the mainstream of MOA activities.

Overall, CAMD has strong support from high-level MOA officials and its immediate survival seems assured. It should now build on its area of proven success; specifically, while CAMD should provide services to the National Agricultural Research Project (NARP), it should not let the training of NARP research managers or other special activities detract it from its main task of training mid-level line managers. As to the long term, only the future will reveal whether the CAMD can maintain sufficient critical distance from the MOA (if it is in fact integrated administratively within it) to make a real contribution to increasing agricultural production. It should be remembered, however, that managers play only an indirect and supporting role in agricultural development. Ultimately, improved production depends on farmers.

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PD-AAU-150 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=40772  
Nutrition education in health centers (grant to Catholic Relief  
Services)  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
26 May 1986, 7 p. + attachment, ES no. 263-86-04  
Attachment: XD-AAU-150-A

2630042

Summarizes final external evaluation of project subactivity to improve child health and survival in Egypt by educating mothers in basic health, nutrition, and child care through Ministry of Health (MOH) centers. Evaluation covered the period 1979-4/86 and was based on document review, site visits, and interviews.

The project failed to achieve its objectives. The nutrition education program reached only 534, or 30%, of the intended 1,400 MOH centers, and was only partially implemented at these. Nutrition education classes for mothers - the single most important element - were regularly held at about 342 centers. Further, only 39% of participating centers had both scales and growth charts, and only 47% regularly maintained charts. The project evaluation plan itself was only partially realized, since both time and funds with which to implement the growth monitoring system were lacking; as a result, no information on program impact is available.

The single most important institution building output - establishing



on an attached mid-term evaluation (XD-AAS-313-A).

The project's success has been mixed. The construction of community facilities is behind schedule due to problems in retaining mid-level staff members and an overambitious implementation plan, which has not allowed an effective management system to be established. Only 4 of the planned 17 facilities have been completed. The construction of other facilities, which should begin soon, will require close monitoring to assure their completion. In a related problem, GOE agencies have been slow to accept innovative design standards to lower housing and infrastructure costs. Cost savings have come mostly from the construction of narrow, unpaved roads.

Despite this, the project has made some important inroads. GOE agencies have come to recognize that upgrading informal settlements is a legitimate approach to urban development. However, legalization of land title, a critical factor in the project's success, remains an unresolved policy issue. A major achievement has been the expansion and improvement of housing stock in informal settlements through the provision of credit. The Housing Improvement Loan Program (HILP) has made 1,369 loans, with a household contribution of 50%, for room additions, new apartment construction, and other improvements. HILP's performance in targeting low-income groups, mostly salaried workers, and in ensuring timely repayment has been excellent. Tangentially, the project has also successfully stimulated community participation, and a training program in building trades has been established.

Although much of the program cost cannot be recovered, more costs will be recovered than in traditional GOE housing programs. The HILP has helped to meet cost recovery targets even though the 7% interest rate charged is low. These cost recovery targets, it has been learned, are unrealistic and should be lowered. Another lesson learned is that sites should be selected based on their accessibility to off-site sewage facilities.

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PD-AAS-759 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=37962  
Basic education : study of USAID contributions to the Egyptian basic  
education program, second annual report, September 1985  
Geldin, M.; Grant, S.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
26 Oct 1985, 4 p. + 2 attachments : charts, statistical tables, ES no.  
263-86-02  
Attachments: XD-AAS-759-A, XD-AAS-759-B

2630139

Evaluates project to help the Government of Egypt (GOE) increase the enrollment in and efficacy of basic education (grades 1-9) by constructing schools and providing educational materials. ES covers the period 1982-1985 and summarizes a second annual evaluation based on document review, household surveys, and interviews with headmasters, teachers, and Ministry of Education (MOE) officials (XD-AAS-759-B).

The project strategy of targeting underserved rural areas has successfully increased net school enrollment, particularly among females. Net grade 1 enrollment has increased by 12.9% (vs. a life of project goal of 9%), and net enrollment for grades 2-6 by 6.4%. In four sample villages, new school construction has increased the enrollment of 6-year-olds from 89% to 100% for boys and from 49% to 95% for girls.

Instructional equipment provided under the project is generally appropriate in type and quality (except for agricultural equipment), though insufficient in quantity; the equipment has evidently helped make learning more practically oriented. There is, however, urgent need for continued teacher training and other approaches to improve instructional techniques.

TA has been hampered by delays and is seriously behind schedule. To compound the problem, the MOE has not attempted to implement the recommendations of completed TA reports.

Recommendations of the attached evaluation include to: (1) give priority to increasing grade 1 enrollments, since high percentages of grade 1 students remain enrolled through grades 3 and 6, presumed levels of functional literacy (USAID/E does not agree that children, once enrolled, remain in school until they reach a level of functional literacy nor that literacy is attained by grades 3-6); (2) retain the generally sound project distance threshold of 2 km between schools, but apply it flexibility when benefits to waiving it appear significant; (3) continue focus on rural rather than urban areas.

A FY86 amendment will propose including workshop space in new schools and possibly expanding the equipment program to new subjects such as physical education. Other action decisions are to: resolve TA problems; revise the agricultural equipment list; continue inservice training and explore new approaches to upgrading teaching techniques; and review problems with equipment distribution, management, and maintenance.

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\*PD-AAS-315 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=37031

Small farmer production project

Ware, T.; Molldrem, V.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

31 Oct 1985, 3 p. + attachment, PES no. 263-85-19

Attachment: XD-AAS-315-A

Evaluation period: Mar 1983-Jun 1985

2630079

\*Availability: Best available copy -- pages 48 and 127 missing from evaluation attachment

Evaluates pilot project to develop an improved, replicable small farm credit and input delivery system in three Egyptian governorates. PES covers the period 3/83-6/85 and summarizes an attached evaluation (XD-AAS-315-A).

The pilot project has successfully made credit more readily available to small farmers at near-market interest rates (14%) and has freed provision of credit and inputs from prevailing price and quota controls. An active, expanding credit operation in 38 village banks, including total coverage of three districts, has made 41,563 loans totaling LE 34 million and involving 28,000 farmers; of these, 22% were to tenant farmers, 2% to landless farmers, and 13% to women. Repayment rates are 99%. Bank management, originally very skeptical about lending without heavy collateral, now has a strong commitment to the loans; project credit, input delivery, and extension activities have all contributed to overall performance.

The proposed expansion of the project approach to eight new governorates is justified by high expected rates of return (ROR's): the internal economic ROR on current activities is estimated at 31% excluding the construction component, and 20% overall. Certain activities have much higher ROR's (e.g., 800% for selected extension activities). Returns are highest for high-value, limited-demand crops (plans for national replication should consider this). Livestock and poultry enterprises increase net income by an estimated one-third over traditional crops alone.

Wider replication, while administratively feasible, requires careful planning, commitment of counterpart institutions, and training. Certain key tasks, e.g., development of a procedures manual and an improved accounting system, are unfinished; too rapid an expansion may strain the system. Overlap with the current project and its TA team is



and support capabilities - e.g., in marketing DRTPC services, establishing computer and library facilities and attracting research teams in new areas.

While the DRTPC has made significant progress towards diversifying funding sources, full institutional and financial viability is not achievable within the current phase. Also - although greater marketing efforts are still needed - recent overemphasis on commercializing DRTPC services has led to a shift away from long-term research of primary economic importance and toward short-term revenue generating studies. Much of USAID/E is unaware of DRTPC services and should use them more extensively.

The selection of first-rate local and U.S. academic institutions has been a critical factor in project success.

Action decisions are to: (1) extend the project 1 year at no additional cost to USAID/E (a recommended 5-year extension was rejected by USAID/E), obtaining LE 2 million from outside sources to meet DRTPC local costs during this year; (2) present to USAID a plan for marketing DRTPC research services; (3) obtain MIT or other assistance for marketing; and (4) increase USAID/E awareness of DRTPC resources.

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PD-AAS-561 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=37522  
Irrigation management systems  
Stains, E.; Janssen, W.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Sep 1985, 8 p. + attachment, ES no. 263-81-1  
Attachment: XD-AAS-561-A

2630132

Evaluates project to strengthen Egypt's Ministry of Irrigation (MOI). ES covers the period 1981-11/85 and summarizes an attached mid-term external evaluation based on document review, site visits, and interviews with USAID/E and MOI personnel (XD-AAS-561-A).

The project is contributing to a more functional MOI structure, but progress has been slower than planned, due mostly to an unrealistic implementation plan and other design errors. While U.S. and in-country training activities are on schedule and seem to be making a major contribution to upgrading MOI staff, two key institution building components - the development of a Project Preparation Unit (PPU) and a telemetry project - have been hindered by the MOI's difficulty in recruiting and retaining qualified engineering staff. Despite this,



the transfer of technology, few formalized internal management systems have been created, and there has been little coordination with other programs. Both the GIT and the counterpart agency, the Engineering and Industrial Design and Development (EIDDC) Center, have been oriented toward factory-floor engineering rather than product development and marketing. In fact, the strengths of the ITAP unit (a part of EIDDC) are greatest in areas of least concern to industry and lowest in priority areas.

Diagnostic services, designed to assess the strengths and weaknesses of an industrial firm, have lacked a clear methodology, techniques for demonstrating the costs and benefits of proposed interventions, and a system for monitoring and following up on clients' needs; as a result, there has been a very low rate of implementation of diagnostic service recommendations. Also, the use of short-term consultants (particularly Egyptian) has been insufficient and, at times, inappropriate; responses to information requests have often been delayed; training is behind schedule; and the advisory committee has provided little guidance or support.

It is recommended that there be an organizational overhaul of the ITAP unit. Strategic objectives need to be identified; targets and performance indicators set; and a management information system put into place. Management responsibilities and reporting relationships must be formalized and the advisory committee should be activated. TA and diagnostic services should be reoriented to meet client needs. In order to respond to these recommendations, resources will have to be allocated according to explicit policies, ITAP will have to develop a competitive edge, and the unit's human and financial sustainability will have to be addressed.

It is noted that the Egyptian response to these recommendations has been immediate and positive. (NE Bureau abstract, modified)

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PD-AAR-409 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=35080  
Management development for productivity  
Mitchell, R.; Rousseau, R.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
12 Aug 1985, 2 p., PES no. 263-85-16  
Attachment: XD-AAR-409-A  
Evaluation period: Aug 1980 - Aug 1985

263009001

Evaluates subproject (SP) to increase the productivity of private,





nonresponsive, nondirective management systems; lack of trained management and technical staff; insufficient operational and financial autonomy; ineffective coordination between national and local organizations; and poor construction management and operations/maintenance (O&M) practices. Existing training systems/capabilities in the sector are fragmented; training activities have been constrained by management deficiencies, poor compensation practices, and low employee motivation.

AID-financed construction is reasonably on schedule, but the completion of critical system components is often not synchronized. Local construction contractors, whose work was poor, have been replaced by expatriate firms. Cost projections have been incorrect, construction of major parts of the system remain unfunded, reliable information by which to estimate costs is not available. There are also indications that the new water supply/wastewater systems are least benefiting those whose need it the greatest.

It is recommended, inter alia, that: (1) the National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage (NOPWASD) coordinate operations and sector data bases, develop curricula, set standards, and design and construct infrastructure; (2) local organizations be given autonomy and O&M responsibilities; (3) expatriate contractors provide construction and O&M assistance and training; (4) an information system to include cost monitoring and budgeting be set up; (5) the GOE review wastewater secondary treatment technologies; and (6) data collection be undertaken to estimate impact on beneficiaries and beneficiaries' ability to pay. (NE Bureau abstract)

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PD-AAR-354 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=34758

Aquaculture development

Gheith, M.; Swanson, J.; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

14 Jul 1985, 2 p. + attachment, PES. no. 263-85-13

Attachment: XD-AAR-354-A

Evaluation period: Aug 1978-Feb 1985

2630064

Evaluates project to promote fish farming in Egypt. PES covers the period 8/78-2/85 and summarizes an attached special evaluation (XD-AAR-354-A) which was based on document review, interviews with Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), USAID/C, and contractor personnel, and site visits.

The project has had a history of implementation problems and has been at a standstill since 8/84. None of its major outputs have been completed, largely due to poor planning and poor management of inputs. Construction of the National Aquaculture Center (NAC) has been delayed by changes in design and a lack of technical expertise for monitoring; the TA team was not used effectively because of poor timing and was excluded from construction supervision. Inadequate English-language skills have severely constrained training - only 7 participants are in the United States, while 2 others have returned with Master's degrees.

Nonetheless, project assumptions remain valid; the MOA remains highly committed to aquaculture and the private sector has demonstrated its willingness to invest in fisheries. Revised project objectives - which focus on NAC construction and some training, while deleting support functions (hatcheries, collecting stations, revolving credit, and marketing) - can be achieved if the PACD is extended to 12/87. Even with diminished functions, the NAC will be able to fulfill important roles in aquaculture research and extension.

In addition to extending the PACD, evaluation team recommendations include: continuance of long- and short-term training; revisions to NAC construction design; cost-benefit analysis of the homestead plan; funding for mullet broodstock development; and additional technical consultants for aquatic resource management, administrative planning, and engineering.

Lessons learned: (1) the time, money, and expertise needed to implement the project were underestimated; (2) the management by committee approach was ineffective and culturally inappropriate; (3) separation of TA from architecture/engineering activities caused construction design problems; (4) project management was not assured of access to technical expertise or encouraged to use it in project monitoring; (5) host country contracting may have contributed to implementation problems. (Near East Abstract, modified)

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PD-AAR-408 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=35078

Industrial management program (subactivity)

Sobh, A.; Mitchell, R.; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

30 Jul 1985, 2 p., PES no. 263-85-16

Attachment: XD-AAR-408-A

Evaluation period: Sep 1982-Jun 1985

2630101

Evaluates the Industrial Management Program, a project component to provide in-country training to public sector employees of Egyptian companies under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. PES, consisting of a facesheet only, covers the period 9/82-6/85 and is based on an attached special evaluation report (XD-AAR-408-A).

USAID/E has decided not to approve the Government of Egypt's request for a project extension for an additional 150 trainees.

Lessons learned are: (1) for management training to have a significant impact, it is important to develop a critical mass in the management cadre; (2) training impact is enhanced by focusing on specific sectors and issues; (3) public sector managers respond favorably to training opportunities; and (4) coordination of related projects would be of mutual benefit.

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PD-AAR-120 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=34054

Agricultural development system

Lee, J.; Beausoleil, J.; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

5 Jun 1985, 3 p., PES no. 263-83-11

Attachment: XD-AAR-120-A

Evaluation period: Jan 1981-Jun 1983

2630041

Evaluates project to strengthen the Government of Egypt's (GOE's) horticultural and agricultural economics research and extension capabilities. PES covers the period 1/81-6/83 and is based on an attached evaluation (XD-AAR-120-A).

Although not a success overall, the project increased productivity, enhanced Egyptian research skills (e.g., in empirical analyses of economic issues), and demonstrated that collaborative GOE/academic research teams could produce useful results. Improved high-yield horticultural varieties were quickly adopted by farmers; the economic benefits of increased tomato production alone may justify the project's costs.

Nevertheless, institution building purposes were not achieved in full, due in part to an overcomplex and expensive policy and administrative structure, and in part to the failure of the TA contractor, the University of California/Davis, to develop viable management, administrative, and fiscal procedures, and to attract qualified personnel. Severe implementation problems resulted and



longer than, project implementation; the 2 to 6 year range for project development may be shortened through use of the critical path method (CPM) which provides a schedule that readily identifies the causes for delay in project implementation. In general, projects should delegate as much responsibility as possible to the smallest number of individuals or institutions; fewer contracts mean fewer approval delays. Project 2630165 (Safaga Silos Complex) is a possible model.

The evaluation confirms the findings of the 4/84 study of the host country payment process conducted by Arthur Young. Greater involvement by the Legal and Contracts Offices in developing the initial contract will decrease the number of problems in procurement and contract execution. Also needed is the establishment of a unified management structure at the project development and implementation stages. The project management team should meet regularly to review progress and agree on necessary changes.

Technical training programs, particularly at the lower operating levels, continue to be inadequate; the programs should be hands-on, in Arabic, long-term, and onsite. The most direct solution is to require the prime construction contractor to provide technical information and training expertise through the entire warranty period. Participation in such training will allow contractors to protect their financial interest during the warranty period, invoice regularly for TA, and possibly receive a percentage payment on production output of locally trained employees.

Other problems include contractor reports that are not used as a management tool; insufficient material and site control; shortages of government controlled materials; the unavailability of skilled labor; and poor quality of construction. (Near East Bureau abstract, modified)

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XD-AAR-408-A Special Evaluation(22)  
Industrial management program  
Coopers and Lybrand Associates, Ltd.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Jun 1985, 18 p. : statistical tables  
Attached to PD-AAR-408

Rec\_no=35079

2630101

Evaluates the Industrial Management Program, a project component to provide in-country training to public sector employees of Egyptian companies under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry. Special evaluation covers the period 9/82-6/85 and is based on document review

and interviews with project, Government of Egypt, and USAID/E personnel.

The program was generally successful in providing training opportunities to public company and public institution employees. Tailored training courses in economics and business management, industrial project operation and implementation, and environmental protection were provided to 458 persons; approximately 75 percent of the eligible companies from almost all industrial sectors enrolled employees in the tailored program. Trainees' course evaluations and self-assessments indicated a high degree of satisfaction with the program.

In addition to the tailored program, the American University of Cairo (AUC) identified 18 standard courses in its curriculum which responded to training needs which had been revealed in a survey of industrial firms. Approximately 450 trainees have enrolled in the AUC courses.

Although the program has successfully increased the skills of individual trainees, it has not yet been possible to assess the on-the-job impacts of the training or the willingness of senior management to allow trainees to use their new skills. Also, to ensure impacts at the company level, a critical mass would have to be developed within the firm. The latter has been partially constrained by the General Organization for Industry's desire to maximize the number of firms participating in the program.

It is recommended that the project be extended, but modified to: include training for private sector employees; institute closer coordination with related projects; employ a sector focus when selecting participant companies; familiarize senior managers with the range of available assistance to industry; and expand existing reporting systems to include follow-up assessments. The Near East abstract (on which this abstract is based) notes that USAID/E has decided not to extend the program, but rather to focus on assistance to private industry.

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PD-AAQ-996 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=33743

Control of diarrheal diseases

Collins, C.; Oldham, W.; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

14 May 1985, 2p, PES no. 263-85-03

Attachment: XD-AAQ-996-A (indexed only)

2630137

Evaluates phase one of a two-phase project to reduce child mortality in Egypt by making rehydration services and materials nationally available. PES covers the period 4/82-5/84 and summarizes an attached special joint evaluation (XD-AAQ-996-A) based on document review and site visits.

Phase one has been remarkably successful. An organizational structure has been developed at the central and governorate level which coordinates effectively with other programs and agencies. Thousands of medical professionals (including over 500 physicians and 400 nurses) have received training in oral rehydration therapy (ORT), an oral rehydration salts (ORS) production facility has become operational and has produced 2 million large and 6.5 million small ORS packets, and rehydration center supply kits and a marketing plan have been developed. Surveillance and baseline data on diarrhea morbidity and mortality are being compiled in phase-one project areas and action-oriented research is being conducted on diarrhea's clinical patterns and etiology and the operational and sociocultural aspects of ORT. Most importantly, a successful television campaign has significantly increased public awareness of ORT.

Subsequent to the attached evaluation, efforts have been made to improve project staffing, personnel policies, and financial management. Also, a standard ORS formula and distribution packet have been agreed upon by the Ministry of Health and UNICEF, and a production contract to meet projected demand has been signed. The television campaign implemented in 1984 will continue in 1985. Further attention must be paid to disbursement procedures, cost-benefit analysis, and governorate-level coordination and supervision and additional training in ORT clinical management should be provided.

The lessons learned are: (1) the project's semiautonomous nature facilitates implementation and permits recruitment of expertise from a variety of sources; (2) problems of salary scales and incentive payments complicate implementation; and (3) outreach and dissemination programs must be coordinated closely with the provision of supplies and services. (NE Bureau abstract, modified)

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PD-AAR-011    PES/ES(21)    Rec\_no=33767  
High Institute of Nursing (HIN), Assiut University (subactivity)  
Tadros, F.; Collins, C.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
22 May 1985, 2 p. + attachment, PES no. 263-85-12  
Attachment: XD-AAR-011-A

2630042

Evaluates subactivity to help Assiut University in Cairo to establish, develop, and institutionalize the High Institute of Nursing (HIN) through TA from Project HOPE. PES covers the period 2/83-1/85 and summarizes an attached special evaluation (XD-AAR-011-A).

Action decisions are: (1) USAID should consider a 2-year extension of the HOPE Grant to provide technical assistance and support to complete the final 2 years of the 5-year curriculum and to continue faculty development, including participant training; and (2) funding for such an extension should be contingent on demonstrated commitment by Assiut University to develop a feasible plan for faculty recruitment and to establish both short- and long-term strategies for securing HIN staff. This plan should incorporate the evaluation recommendations concerning: a staffing plan for the HIN with job descriptions and responsibilities; strategies for faculty recruitment; incentives (monetary and professional) to be provided by Assiut University to improve faculty retention; terms of work for the HOPE technical assistance team; and community orientation of curriculum and support for student fieldwork.

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PD-AAR-048 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=33751

Vocational training for productivity

Nassar, A.; Shigetomi, S.; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

19 May 1985, 2 p. + attachment, PES no. 263-85-09

Attachment: XD-AAR-048-A

263009002

Evaluates subproject to strengthen the capacity of the Egyptian Ministry of Industry's Productivity and Vocational Training Department (PVTD) to plan and implement vocational training (VT) programs. PES covers the period 9/81-12/84 and summarizes an attached special evaluation (XD-AAR-048-A) based on interviews with PVTD and contractor staff.

Much has been accomplished. The project has sponsored seminars and inservice teacher training, developed Arabic instructional modules, established a materials production center, initiated training services to industry, implemented participant training, and begun development of a self-paced competency-based VT curriculum. A training facility has been set up at the Sammanud garment factory and a second is being constructed at Egyptian Copper Works. The women's training program has

successfully placed women in many traditionally male industries. Also, the contractor has submitted a plan to reorganize and strengthen the PVTD.

Several activities are behind schedule, however, and funds are rapidly being depleted. Workforce needs were underestimated, recruitment and retention of project staff has been difficult, and the decision to develop a new curriculum rather than adapt existing materials has been costly in both time and money, as has the use of extensive audiovisuals; the instructional materials library will probably not be completed. Some of the institutions to which participant trainees were sent are of dubious quality.

The evaluation recommends that TA for PVTD reorganization, women's VT, and a nationwide testing system be considered complete, and that preference in equipment procurement be given to the two company training centers, but USAID/E wishes TA extended for implementation and follow-up and would prefer to let PVTD set its own equipment priorities. Other recommendations are to limit video cassettes to instructor training, use in industry, and other selected applications; and to use teaching modules for groups as well as individuals.

It was learned that host countries should participate in contracting decisions. USAID should help the Egyptian government develop criteria for evaluating contractor performance, establishing reporting requirements, etc. Contractors should advise concerning expected cost overruns well in advance.

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PD-AAR-066    PES/ES(21)    Rec\_no=33955  
Applied science and technology (scientific and technical information  
(STI) component)  
Arif, Sherif; Ervin, Lawrence; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Mar 1985, 3 p., PES no. 263-85-14  
Attachment: XD-AAR-066-A  
Evaluation period: Dec 1983-Mar 1985

2630016

Evaluates information component of an applied scientific and technology research project in Egypt. PES covers the period 12/83-3/85 and is based on an attached special evaluation (XD-AAR-066-A).

The project has been very successful in responding to the information needs of the Egyptian scientific and engineering community in the form

of 3,000 bibliographic searches of international data bases for almost 2,000 users. Five information "nodes" have been established, of which three are particularly strong and interested in the creation of an Egyptian bibliographic data base. The number of repeat users, willingness of users to pay a fee, and the types of subjects being searched indicate that the information is useful. Training for over 500 Egyptians in major elements of modern information systems has been conducted for both node staff and various interested organizations, firms, and universities.

A major constraint is the absence of the "governance" directorate called for in the original design. Establishment of a unit to handle management and coordination functions is necessary to ensure that participating nodes will continue to share some standard methodologies, cooperate in developing an Egyptian data base, and provide service to all users in their respective markets. Cost recovery, especially of foreign exchange, is another important dimension of the institutionalization issue. While the training program has been adequate up to now, the remaining period will require greater focus on marketing, trainee selection, and follow-up. In general, the project design assumed an unrealistically fast pace of implementation, not recognizing the realities of the decisionmaking process and underestimating the requirements for Arabization of the automated information system.

Lessons learned are: (1) the establishment of an information network requires an effective coordination mechanism; (2) training should be tailored to support specific objectives; (3) implementation schedules are often overambitious; project managers should consider altering implementation tactics as circumstances change.

Recommendations include extension of the project for 1 year, contingent on establishment of a management and technical coordination unit, and a more formal basis for the operations of the executive committee. (NE Bureau abstract)

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PD-AAQ-925 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=33548

Data collection and analysis

Sleeper, Jonathan; Radi, Arnold; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

3 Mar 1985, 2 p., PES no. 263-85-02

Attachment: XD-AAQ-925-A

Evaluation period: Aug 1980 - Nov 1984

2630142

Evaluates project to strengthen the capacity of the Government of Egypt's (GOE's) Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) to collect and analyze economic data for use in agricultural policy planning. PES covers the period 8/80-11/84 and summarizes an attached special evaluation (XD-AAQ-925-A) based on document review, a field visit, and interviews with project personnel.

Despite delays and problems, the project is responding to the GOE's need for agricultural statistics and has already had an impact on policy development. Fourteen major studies are underway and 41 research papers have been written; short-term technical training has been given to 40 people, and 4 students are receiving academic training in advanced computer programming, area frame use, census sampling, labor statistics, crop forecasting, and estimation of objective yields. The Senior Advisory Group, which identifies data collection priorities and contributes to agricultural policy development, has provided a successful forum for discussing agricultural strategy.

Implementation delays resulted from faulty assumptions (e.g., availability of qualified participants), faulty administrative arrangements, and inadequate provision of vehicles and automatic data processing (ADP) equipment, as well as from erratic provision of TA and the lack of a full-time resident consultant. Communication among USAID/E, the MOA, and TA contractors needs improvement.

The project teaches that: a project can achieve its purpose despite long delays in input provision; timing is crucial (this project coincides with and responds to a growing GOE need for agricultural data); short-term TA needs careful management; and English-language requirements continue to constrain training efforts.

Recommendations resulting in action decisions include extending the project for 2 years; employing a resident technical advisor; procuring ADP equipment and providing training in its use; and developing a training plan for FY85.

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PD-AAR-065 PES/ES(21)  
Egypt water use and management  
Carmack, W.; Stains, E.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Mar 1985, 3 p., PES no. 263-85-15  
Attachment: XD-AAR-065  
Evaluation period: Jun 1976-Mar 1985

Rec\_no=33952

2630017

Evaluates project to demonstrate improved irrigation water management (IWM) and associated practices in 3 Egyptian governorates. Final PES covers the period 6/76-3/85 and summarizes an attached special final evaluation (XD-AAR-065-A).

Project outputs have significant potential for improved IWM, but are somewhat different from those planned due to (1) conflict between the project's design, which called for IWM research, and its objective of increasing crop production; (2) several design assumptions not apropos to Egyptian conditions. Thus, instead of producing a replicable package of IWM technologies, the project developed a replicable methodology for developing such technologies.

Although project training was sometimes overly academic or insufficiently comprehensive, the formal and on-the-job upgrading of Egyptian technical personnel has been the project's major benefit, followed closely by the substantial data which were produced on Egyptian irrigation, agronomic, and social conditions. Also, a limited number of farmers received land leveling and mesqa improvement services. Significant production increases occurred, but cannot be attributed solely to project activities because the latter were combined with other interventions in a technical package.

The project has shown that effective water user associations can have a huge impact on the maintenance and management of water resources in Egypt, especially at the local level. The presence of sociologists greatly facilitated the organization of such groups, although the project did not create a fully replicable process for the organization of water user associations and their interface with the Ministry of Irrigation. The project also demonstrated that gravity irrigation in Egypt is technically feasible, socially acceptable, and offers important benefits to farmers without wasting water.

Lessons from XD-AAR-065-A are the need for: a contract administrator; close USAID monitoring; multidisciplinary team evaluations; detailed scopes of work for evaluators; and, in the design stage, economic analysis of a project's relevance to national goals. The attached evaluation also includes detailed recommendations in re: research processes, irrigation parameters, farmer involvement, systems management, agronomic and structural changes, and training.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Feb 1985, 3 p., PES no. 263-85-11  
Attachment: XD-AAQ-865-A  
Evaluation period: Jan 1975-Dec 1984

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263K607

Evaluates Commodity Import Program (CIP) intended to ease the Government of Egypt's lack of foreign exchange needs to import equipment and raw materials. PES covers the period 1/75-12/84 and consists of a facesheet attached to a special evaluation (XD-AAQ-865-A)

Action decisions are to: (1) compare the appropriateness of the CIP imports with other USAID/E assistance objectives at the time of program negotiation; (2) continue progress on implementing efficiency measures in the 1984 and 1985 Project Approval Assistance Document (pp. 7-8) and others identified in the course of implementation; (3) verify training, planning, and other preparatory steps for imports of large capital equipment; (4) limit USAID/E's involvement in programming local currency generations to identifying recipient projects and amounts; (5) standardize reporting of the end-use audit system; (6) upgrade the CIP Arrival Accounting System by obtaining and installing an updated operating system release, revising the system in the context of ongoing maintenance, and providing users with step-by-step instructions for the access and use of the system; (7) examine the feasibility of allowing importers to require money-back warranties; and (8) apply lessons learned from this evaluation to future CIP allocations.

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Production credit

Cowles, David; Suma, James; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

13 Feb 1985, 2 p., PES no. 263-85-08

Related document: PD-AAQ-344

Evaluation period: Aug 1982 - Dec 1985

2630147

Evaluates project to finance the foreign exchange (FX) costs of raw materials and intermediate and capital goods imported by the Egyptian private sector. PES covers the period 8/82-12/85 and is based on an unattached special evaluation.

The project has been very successful in financing FX costs: its 288 transactions, valued at \$54 million, have covered an extensive list of raw materials and capital equipment for the plastics, poultry, construction, and textiles industries; 68% of these transactions have been for end-users, and the vast majority have been appropriate to Egypt's development needs. Effective project interest rates, estimated at 22-28 percent, are positive given Egypt's 20 percent inflation rate.

The project's credit market objectives, however, have not been achieved. Project interest rates are tied to the Central Bank of Egypt's interest rate structure, which sets minimum rates for short-term trade lending above maximum rates for longer-term industrial credit; as a result, banks have focused on short-term lending. Moreover, the project's Maintenance of Value (MOV) provision (originally intended to ensure that importers would pay a realistic price for FX), along with an increasingly subsidized FX rate, have encouraged private enterprises to use the project more as a foreign exchange window than as a source of term credit. (Some FX subsidization is justified, however, to offset U.S. source and origin requirements, which add 20-30% to import costs.)

In addition, planned training has not been implemented, due to institutional problems and delays in developing a training plan, and the Private Sector Steering Committee, which was to provide guidance on macroeconomic issues, has not met.

Action decisions are to: (1) remove the MOV provision; (2) implement training; (3) convene the Steering Committee; and (4) in follow-on credit projects: initiate policy dialogue to encourage an interest rate structure favorable to longer-term production lending; develop a



entities involved in activities that have a nationwide impact; and prepare cost calculations for services to facilitate institutionalization. Also shown have been management complications resulting from the use of incentive payments.

Action decisions are for USAID/E to issue 2 project implementation letters: the first to obtain MOH approval of recommendations to the SRHD unit and to have that unit produce a written plan for gradual transfer of project activities to the GOE, and the second upon receipt of that approval to authorize further action on recommendations and necessary document revisions. (Near East abstract, modified)

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PD-AAQ-521 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=32647  
Telecommunications I, II, III  
El Abd, A.; Hammann, T.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
18 Feb 1985, 4 p. + attachment, PES no. 263-84-12  
Attachment: XD-AAQ-521-A  
Evaluation period: Jun 1978-Jun 1984

2630054  
2630075  
2630117

Evaluates three projects (now being implemented as one) to upgrade Egypt's telecommunications system by strengthening the Arab Republic of Egypt Telecommunications Organization (ARENTO) and by rehabilitating or replacing system components in Cairo and Alexandria. Mid-term PES covers the period 6/78-6/84 and is based on an attached special evaluation (XD-AAQ-521-A).

The project is well managed and is producing its intended results at a reasonable cost. While there are continuing problems due to the complexity of the construction program, these problems are being addressed and solutions are forthcoming. Achievement of the project's purpose will depend on ARENTO's institutional capacity; to this end, an ARENTO planning management unit is functioning, new training programs are in place, and improved accounting, financial, and personnel systems are being developed. Although ARENTO's financial position is poor, this is expected to improve as services are strengthened.

The project's major impact will be an upgraded public telephone service. The telephone switching equipment procured is of high quality, requires little maintenance, and is reasonable in cost. Other inputs have also generally been sufficient in quantity and quality.

Contracts have been signed for all eight switching systems; five are operating and the rest should be operating by 6/85. Significant progress is being made on construction of the outside plant network.

It was learned that: a capable, aggressive project manager and team continuity are important to a project's success; equipment needs to have proven in-service reliability; as few organizations as possible should be involved in providing communications services; institutional changes must be continually re-introduced to overcome bureaucratic inertia; and the project's relatively short and low-cost implementation schedules for switching and outside plant relief could be used as a standard for similar projects.

Several detailed recommendations for improving project implementation and for follow-on activities are made. A key action decision is to identify activities which ARENTO can undertake with its own resources or as part of a follow-on project to continue its institutional development. (Near East Evaluation Abstract, modified)

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XD-AAR-011-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=33768  
External evaluation team report to Project HOPE/USAID  
El Gueneidy, Mervat M.; Ohlson, Virginia M.; Holzemer, William L.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
23 Jan 1985, 15 p.  
Attached to PD-AAR-011

2630042

Evaluates subactivity to help Assiut University (AU) to establish the High Institute of Nursing (HIN) through TA from Project HOPE. Special evaluation covers the period 2/83-1/85; no methodology is given.

Project HOPE has contributed significantly to successful establishment of the HIN, which is now fully operational. Three classes containing a total of 145 students have been admitted, and curricula and teaching materials are being developed, implemented, and revised for the first 3 years of the 5-year program. HIN faculty have received 36 weeks of U.S. and inservice training in such areas as pedagogy, curriculum design, and community health services delivery. The project's Technical Advisory Committee has served as a liaison with related organizations and as a forum for discussing critical HIN development issues.

It is recommended that the project be extended for at least 2 years as needed to complete the full 5-year curriculum and to allow time to

promote HIN institutionalization and program upgrading; during this period HOPE can address faculty recruitment problems through development of a Master's degree program, further training, and ongoing TA.

Also, the HIN should develop opportunities for faculty to receive doctoral education within AU, develop closer ties with the AU Hospital, provide students greater opportunities for English-language training, and ensure that the faculty's heavy workload and isolated lifestyle does not inhibit their enthusiasm or professional development; nursing faculty should see that student training is oriented toward community health care. The highly successful short-term U.S. training program should be continued and Project HOPE should continue to employ two long-term consultants to provide academic support; in particular, HOPE should help to develop long- and short-term faculty recruitment strategies. (Near East Bureau abstract, modified)

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PD-AAQ-533 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=32584  
Irrigation management systems structural replacement component  
Carmack, W.; Stains, E.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Jan 1985, 2 p. + attachment, PES no. 263-85-10  
Attachment: XD-AAQ-533-A  
Evaluation period: Jun 1983-Dec 1984

2630132

Evaluates structural replacement component of a project to improve irrigation management in Egypt. PES covers the period 6/83-12/84 and is based on an attached special evaluation.

Work in the five Phase I project directorates is essentially complete. A total of 3,078 structures, including intakes, head regulators, steel gates bridges, tailescapes, siphons, aqueducts, and weirs, have been or are now under construction. Training sessions have been held for Ministry of Irrigation (MOI) personnel in structure design and in construction and water management. Construction exceeded targeted levels in areas where training was conducted, and the quality of the training manuals has been high.

Overall irrigation operating efficiency is increasing and water savings since 1981 is estimated at 7-11%. Also, implementation of recommendations from a 1983 evaluation pertaining to training and the use of portable test hammers, mechanical mixers, and vibrators has contributed to improved quality of irrigation structures; structure





Government of Egypt (GOE), and the TA contractor, Wilbur Smith and Associates.

The project has been tremendously successful in implementing district and governorate SP's. Some 80% of the funds allocated to districts have been disbursed and almost 800 SP's have been completed; many others are in progress and there is no doubt that the target of 950 SP's will be surpassed. Special projects - chosen by governorates, but largely administered by districts - account for 42% of district funding (up from 22% at the time of the previous evaluation in 12/83). These special projects are for road paving, sidewalks, solid waste management, office equipment, and equipment maintenance.

About 1,000 PVO SP's have been initiated or completed and it is expected that ultimately 75% of the 1,600 eligible PVO's will receive grants averaging \$8,000 - project plans had called for 2,500 PVO's to receive \$4,000 each. More importantly and in a marked change from the 12/83 evaluation, a wide variety of PVO's in terms of size and type have received support. Also, an important funding change has occurred in the PVO category: \$1 million (or 10% of PVO funding) has been reserved for four large community centers, one in each of the project governorates. This, along with the increased emphasis on special district SP's, shows a definite trend toward providing support at the governorate level rather than at the lower levels as originally planned.

Training is behind schedule, with implementation only now getting underway. The nine courses which have begun (five for GOE and four for PVO personnel) seem relevant; cases are drawn directly from project experience. Attendance is a problem, however, (running at about 50%) and it is difficult to ensure that the courses will reach those engineers directly involved in SP implementation. Nor is it clear that the GOE will continue the training when the project is finished.

In other areas, problems of GOE incentive and maintenance funds remain, but there has been progress in these areas. Local officials' attitudes toward the project have become more positive, while both USAID/E and TA personnel are now more realistic and better informed about the problems of urban Egypt. Finally, the project still lacks specific targets for local capacity building and decentralization. Targets should be negotiated with the GOE during planning for the next round of SP's and incorporated into the phaseover to a successor project or projects.

El Din, Mahmoud Gamal; Grant, Stephen H.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
27 Dec 1984, 168 p. + attachments : charts, statistical tables, PES no.  
263-85-05  
Attachments: XD-AAQ-651-A, XD-AAQ-651-B  
Evaluation period: Jan 1983-May 1984

2630139

Evaluates project to upgrade and expand Egypt's basic education system (grades 1-9). PES covers the period 1/83-5/84 and summarizes a first-year evaluation (XD-AAQ-651-B), submitted by a life-of-project evaluation contractor and based on site visits, interviews with village leaders and school officials, a survey of sample households, and analysis of school and governorate-level data.

Through the construction of accessible schools and the provision of instructional materials, equipment, and TA, the project has increased the enrollment rate and helped improve public education. On average, new schools opened in Fall 1983 added 7 boys and 14 girls to grade 1, and 5 boys and 23 girls to grades 2-6. Construction is generally ahead of schedule, with 1,141 classrooms completed and 3,430 started. The project has provided \$40 million worth of commodities, but due to staff shortages, overexpectations, and contractor/Government of Egypt (GOE) differences, was unable to provide TA on schedule.

The project has shown that: (1) careful planning and collaboration can keep construction activities on schedule; (2) a community's school-sending readiness is apparently affected by overcrowding in existing schools, enrollment trends for boys and girls, the community's economic level, pre-existing formal and informal facilities, and community leaders' attitudes (knowledge of these factors can improve site selection); (3) the project focus on grades 1-9, rather than 1-6, is valid, as a shortage of preparatory and secondary schools is likely in the near future; and (4) community-based schools seem to have the greatest impact on female enrollment. Instructional practices can be improved through: greater emphasis on measurement of student performance; practical instructor training; encouragement of innovative practices; certification of technical teaching assistants; better equipment inventory and maintenance; and recruitment of local women teachers.

The attached evaluation report shows that a life of project evaluation contract can be effective in the short run to point out and correct weaknesses and in the long run to develop reliable impact data.

Full compliance is expected from Egypt's National Investment Bank on measures to correct inadequate expenditure reporting. (Near East Abstract, modified)

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XD-AAQ-865-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=33381  
Commodity import program in Egypt, 1975-1984 : a review and assessment  
Development Associates, Inc.  
Price Waterhouse  
U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Bur. of the Census  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Dec 1984, v.p. : charts, statistical tables  
Attached to PD-AAQ-865

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PDC-I-13-3077-00

Evaluates Commodity Import Program (CIP) intended to ease the Government of Egypt's (GOE) lack of foreign exchange needed to import equipment and raw materials. Special evaluation covers the period 1/75-12/84 and is based on document review and interviews with project personnel.

Through some 4,400 transactions, the CIP has financed food commodities, industrial machinery, raw materials, semi-finished products, and spare parts. The program seems efficiently managed and, given the profusion and complexity of CIP objectives and time and





Agricultural Mechanization Institute (AMI) management and facilitating AMI institutionalization by streamlining organizational structure, coordinating project components, improving reporting channels, and using internal evaluations; (2) consider extending project activities to allow for additional extension; (3) focus more on soil analysis in the land improvement subproject; and (4) simplify the loan procedure and continue mechanization credit activities, particularly water lifting.

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XD-AAR-435-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=35061  
Evaluation of private sector feasibility studies program : USAID  
project no. 263-0112  
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Nov 1984, 26 p. + 10 appendices : charts, statistical tables  
Attached to PD-AAR-435

2630112

Evaluates project to stimulate U.S. private investment in Egypt. Special evaluation covers the period 9/79-11/84 and is based on document review and interviews with project staff and Egyptian and U.S. businesspersons.

Although targets have not been reached, the project approach has been generally successful. The majority of potential U.S. investors interviewed indicated that the incentives offered by the project were an important factor in their decision to explore investment opportunities in Egypt. Of 84 applications received, 44 have been disapproved and 4 are under consideration. Ten reconnaissance visits and seven feasibility studies have been completed; seven staff members have been trained; and ten sectoral studies have been prepared. Three of the firms that have used the project are currently processing Law 43 applications. It remains unclear how many actual investments will be made.

Achievement of targets was hindered by several factors. The initial promotion effort was a "shotgun" approach. The project was highly publicized before application procedures were finalized, and the original procedures were cumbersome. A one-year contractual delay impeded timely completion of half of the sectoral studies. Later delays resulted from bureaucratic problems in both Cairo and in the commercial section of the Egyptian Embassy in Washington. However, the introduction of modified procedures in 6/84 and the increased experience of General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI)

personnel have partially offset the negative impact of these problems.

It is recommended that the project be extended with the following changes: (1) initial screening, routing of applications, and communication with applicants be streamlined and (2) greater emphasis be given to promotion of the project as a package of services provided by USAID/E.

Lessons learned: (1) the timing of project inputs is critical. In this case, application procedures should have been finalized and sector studies completed before the project was promoted; (2) targeted investment promotion efforts are most cost-effective; and (3) the time frame for securing investments was unrealistic in the project design. (Near East Abstract, modified)

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PD-AAQ-646 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=32740  
Rice research and training  
Bowers, S.; Radi, A.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
14 Nov 1984, 2 p., PES no. 263-85-01  
Attachment: XD-AAQ-646-A  
Evaluation period: Sep 1979 - Oct 1984

2630027

Evaluates project to increase Egypt's research, extension, and training capabilities in rice production, seed processing, and storage. PES covers the period 9/79-10/84 and consists of a facesheet attached to a special evaluation (XD-AAQ-646-A).

Action decisions are to: (1) promote the institutionalization of the National Rice Institute to ensure that rice research and training receives continued Government of Egypt support; (2) decide whether to narrow the scope of or eliminate the mechanization component; (3) consider extending the TA contract to ensure that laboratory and seed processing equipment are properly installed; (4) improve coordination with related projects; (5) continue and expand research activities in areas identified in the evaluation, particularly blast control; and (6) continue policy dialogue on rice pricing and agricultural inputs supply.

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PN-AAR-514 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=32148  
Small-scale enterprise sectors in Egypt : a critical analysis of  
seven selected studies  
Howe, Gary N.  
USAID. Bur. for Near East. Ofc. of Technical Support

Oct 1984, 52 p.

NEB-150-0-4103-00

A synthesis and a critique of seven studies examining various aspects of Egypt's small-scale enterprise sector are presented. Major findings of the studies are that: Egypt's Law 43 has spurred development of large-scale private and mixed enterprises, but not of small and very small enterprises; the latter-type enterprises are characterized by relatively localized marketing, low levels of fixed and working capital, and heavy reliance upon skilled labor; and expansion of these enterprises would be facilitated by relaxed regulation, the provision of credit available through mechanisms geared specifically to their needs, the development of labor training schemes, and more stable supplies of raw materials at more equitable prices. Negatively, the studies fail to specify: the prospects of the small-scale sector and of its subsectors in relation to the large-scale sector; the difference between production in the formal and the very large informal small-scale sector; and the important social role played by the informal small-scale sector in providing subsistence labor on a wide scale. Areas of additional study to remedy these lacunae are suggested.

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XD-AAQ-646-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=32742  
Evaluation team report : rice research and training project  
IRI Research Institute, Inc.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Sep 1984, 116 p. : statistical tables  
Attached to PD-AAQ-646

2630027

Evaluates project to increase Egypt's research, extension, and training capabilities in rice production, seed processing, and storage. Special evaluation covers the period 9/79-10/84 and is based on document review, site visits, and discussions with project staff.

Progress has been exceptional in most activities. Extension has directly helped over 90,000 farmers cultivating 46,500 feddans to produce yields 59% above the national average. Financially, extension has been most helpful to farmers cultivating less than 1 feddan (1.03 acres). Registered seed, free from red rice, has been produced for 3 years, and enough of the new certified Giza 173 seed was produced to plant 50% of rice acreage in 1984. In addition, the project has trained 63 extensionists, 25 national rice advisors, 2 Ph.D. candidates, and 5 persons in postdoctoral and 5 in nondegree studies.

However, the entire effort is in danger of unraveling because the National Rice Institute has not been endowed with permanent status (without which there can be no means to assure ongoing research and training capabilities). The project has also been affected by low rice prices and a lack of timely inputs, as well as, initially, by such typical implementation problems as finding trainees with adequate English skills, providing transportation for extension, clearing commodities through imports, and securing full-time counterparts.

In addition to the crucial issue of institutionalization, several other problems must be addressed: rice mechanization has not progressed well and should focus on one machine (i.e., a thresher) or be eliminated; and additional TA is needed in blast screening and in the installation of laboratory and processing equipment. Also recommended are greater coordination with other projects and acceleration or expansion of selected project activities.

Lessons learned: (1) provision of permanent status to a new institution (along with its own staff and budget) is essential; (2) typical implementation problems should be realistically addressed in project design; (3) quantifiable targets can help maintain momentum; and (4) high returns are possible from production-oriented research and active extension, especially in a favorable environment. (Near East Abstract, modified)

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PD-AAQ-095 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=31850  
Vehicle maintenance training  
Shigetomi, S.; Wilburn, A.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Sep 1984, 7 p. + annexes, PES no. 263-84-16  
Evaluation period: Jul 1980 - Jul 1984

2630114

Evaluates project to establish a vehicle maintenance training center (VMTC) under Egypt's General Syndicate for Land Transport (GSLT) to serve 10 public sector bus and truck transport companies. Final PES covers the period 7/80-7/84 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with the contractor and Egyptian participants.

The VMTC has made significant progress since the mid-term evaluation - administrators and instructors have been trained, a curriculum has been established, equipment was cleared through customs, shops and classrooms have been equipped, and administrative and instructional

procedures have been developed. Eighty-five workers have been trained in twelve different trades. The bus companies report that the training quality is good, although they sought more training and at different levels.

However, the VMTC is operating significantly under capacity. Much of the equipment was underutilized and the number of trainees remains well below the center's capacity of approximately 200 trainees at any one time. Ultimately, achievement of the original project purpose will depend on whether the GSLT makes effective use of the VMTC's potential to provide training - a potential which surpasses the original training targets. GSLT commitment to the VMTC is suspect, however, perhaps because the project addressed not a development but a political issue (resulting from problems associated with Commodity Import Program-financed buses). Because increased funding cannot create such a commitment in the GSLT, it is recommended that the project not be extended.

Lessons learned are that: (1) the commitment of direct and indirect Government of Egypt implementing agencies is critical to project success; (2) the time-consuming nature of creating a new institution should be considered when establishing project targets; (3) given the importance of good host country management to project success, USAID should do everything possible to attract and retain good managers; (4) politically motivated projects often experience problems during implementation; and (5) a mid-term evaluation can help improve project implementation. (Near East Evaluation Abstract, modified)

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PD-AAP-707 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=30808

Construction management

Robieson, R.; Pearson, T.; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

14 Aug 1984, 2 p. + attachment

Attachment: XD-AAP-707-A

Evaluation period: Mar 1982-Mar 1984

2630040

2630042

Evaluates pilot project to provide TA in construction management to selected Egyptian firms. PES covers the period 3/82-3/84 and consists of a facesheet based on an attached special evaluation (XD-AAP-707-A).

There are no pending project-specific action decisions, but the evaluation team recommends that USAID/C consider: (1) an expanded TA

program based on this pilot effort; and (2) including construction management and value engineering/analysis under AID-financed construction projects where appropriate.

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PD-AAP-959 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=31419  
Small scale agricultural activities  
Radi, Arnold; Dod, David; Handly, Arthur  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
10 Aug 1984, 2 p. + attachment, PES no. 263-84-13  
Attachment: XD-AAP-959-A  
Evaluation period: Jun 1979-Jul 1984

2630096

Evaluates project to improve small-scale agriculture in Egypt by introducing appropriate technology (AT) subprojects (SP's). PES covers the period 6/79-7/84 and summarizes an attached end-of-project evaluation (XD-AAP-959-A) based on document review, site visits, and interviews with participants, project personnel, and personnel from related organizations.

A mid-term evaluation (1981) reoriented the project, leading to the creation of over 50 new AT SP's in the areas of food processing, rural development, pest control, animal and plant production, and irrigation/soil preparation. Most SP's have been favorably evaluated for appropriateness, replicability, cost-effectiveness, adoption, and applicability, although 4 have been deemed appropriate only for wealthy and better-educated farmers.

Despite severe time constraints, outputs of 31 SP's have begun to reach end-users. However, the project design falsely assumed that small farmers and manufacturers, would, once acquainted with an AT innovation, readily extend it to others. This problem was compounded by the lack of adequate project linkage to the Ministry of Agriculture's (MOA) Central Extension Service and by the latter's organizational and staffing problems. As a result, the responsibility for extension activities was placed on technical personnel unversed in extension. In addition, most training activities were abandoned, although an in-country training symposium was successful in helping participants to identify and develop AT SP's. Still, the project has helped develop a nascent interest in AT; institutionalization will largely depend on the support given to AT by the Agricultural Mechanization Research Institute.

Lessons learned include: (1) reliance on the "demonstration effect"

for spreading new technology is not sufficient - an active extension effort is necessary; (2) establishing a "bottom-up" approach to institutionalization is a time consuming process; (3) a baseline socioeconomic study and sociocultural expertise throughout the project would have contributed to evaluating project impact; and (4) a mid-term evaluation can be a useful management tool for identifying implementation problems and proposing solutions. (Some information was drawn from XD-AAP-959-A).

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PD-AAP-616 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=30736  
Basic village services  
Carduner, Olivier; Kuhn, Ernest; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
5 Jul 1984, 2 p., PES no. 263-84-08  
Attachment: XD-AAP-616-A  
Evaluation period: Mar 1982-Mar 1984

263016102  
263K60502  
2630103

Evaluates project to improve and expand the capacity of Egyptian villages to plan, organize, finance, implement, and maintain locally chosen infrastructure projects. PES covers the period 3/82-3/84 and is based on attached mid-project evaluation (XD-AAP-616-A).

The following actions have been recommended and approved: (1) to establish a transitional plan to enable the Organization for Reconstruction and Development of the Egyptian Village (ORDEV) to assume management of information and monitoring activities after the TA contractor leaves; (2) to promote more efficient maintenance in future training programs; (3) to encourage more effective use of Government of Egypt (GOE) financed maintenance funds for subprojects; (4) to develop appropriate policy guidelines for approving projects related to wastewater and groundwater drainage; (5) to identify an appropriate strategy to address the special needs and problems of governorates that are behind on meeting project goals; and (6) to develop a non-cash incentives system to reward successful basic village services (BVS) performance where feasible.

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XD-AAQ-207-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=32058  
Evaluation : agricultural mechanization project, Egypt  
Pragma Corp.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
14 Jul 1984, vi, 108 p. + 13 appendices

Attached to PD-AAQ-207

2630031

Evaluates project to support agricultural mechanization in Egypt. Special evaluation covers the period 9/79-7/84 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with USAID/E, Government of Egypt Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), bank, and other project-related personnel and with farmers.

After a slow start due to an overly ambitious design and lack of basic research data on mechanization, project progress has accelerated. The planning and evaluation subproject (SP) has: conducted 5 surveys; prepared 22 technical reports; trained counterparts in data collection and analysis; and established a small computer hardware unit. The soil improvement SP should complete precision land leveling of 1,000 feddans in late 1984. The machinery management extension SP has: trained 12,868 farmers and MOA staff in 1,382 demonstrations and short courses, 51 mechanization extensionists, 4 MOA staff in M.Sc. programs, and 68 MOA staff and farmers in short-term overseas courses; produced 10,000 posters, 20,000 extension folders, 18 television programs, 15,000 slides, and 20 video tapes; and provided TA to equipment loan recipients. The service center development SP has provided credit to 6 private service centers and 23 workshops and assisted some 10,000 farmers in replacing the animal-drawn sakia with motor-driven pumps. The research and development SP has: funded 9 research grants; tested and modified machinery; developed a prototype thresher; and provided in-country training.

Although the project expects to raise farm production and income by reaching about 25,000 farmers directly through extension and training and over 24,000 indirectly through its loan funds, it has not become the nexus for Egypt's mechanization efforts as was expected due to funding limitations and the involvement of other institutions.

Lessons learned include to design more flexibility and start-up time into implementation plans and ensure that basic research data are available prior to implementation. Key recommendations are to: extend selected activities; improve organizational management capabilities; clarify institutional responsibilities; expedite customs clearance; emphasize soil analysis; and simplify loan procedures. (Near East Evaluation Abstract, modified)

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XD-AAP-707-A Special Evaluation(22)

Rec\_no=30809

Evaluation of construction management contract between DDR

International of Atlanta, Georgia and the Ministry of Development,  
State of Housing and Land Reclamation, A.R.E.  
Baron, William C. C.; Zedalis, John P.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
22 Jul 1984, 23 p. + 4 attachments  
Attached to PD-AAP-707

2630040  
2630042

Evaluates pilot project to provide TA in construction management to selected Egyptian firms (evaluation also covers similar assistance to A.I.D.'s Irrigation Pumping Project - 2630040). Special evaluation covers the period 3/82-3/84 and is based on document review and interviews with contractor, host government, USAID/C, and construction industry personnel.

DDR International, the contractor, has provided very valuable construction management assistance to four public sector Egyptian firms. Participant firms particularly praised DDR's capability and persistence, but felt that had DDR's contract time been longer, much more could have been accomplished. Many also felt that DDR's scope of work should have been broadened to include instruction in quality assurance, cost control, equipment control, quantity surveying, and information systems and to allow more time for training of trainers. The firms' rates of project completion increased where DDR participated and some projects were finished on time or ahead of schedule.

Less positively, the one private company participating in the project, the Urban Development Company for Investment and Contracting (UDICO), did not continue DDR's services after the 90-day trial period because it sought the more extensive services which DDR had provided to the public sector El Nasr General Contracting Company (which had hired DDR on its own before this project started). Nevertheless, UDICO expressed interest in participating in an expanded construction management program.

Lessons learned are: the likelihood of successfully introducing a new technology such as construction management is enhanced when the audience has already demonstrated its receptivity; and the quality of a TA team and its personnel are critical to project success.

It is recommended that USAID/C consider an expanded effort modeled after the DDR project, using the training office of the Ministry of Housing. Also, when appropriate, construction projects should include

a construction management requirement and project designs by architectural and engineering firms should be subject to value analysis (external evaluation of designs vis a vis a planned facility's function). (Near East Evaluation Abstract, modified)

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PD-AAP-563 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=30650  
Provincial cities development  
Stephenson, J.; Zobrist, Fred; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
15 Jul 1984, 3 p., PES no. 263-84-09  
Attachment: XD-AAP-563-A  
Evaluation period: Aug 1981 - May 1984

2630127  
263016103  
263K60503

Evaluates project to upgrade the institutional capacity of the governorates of Beni Suef, Fayoum, and Minia in Egypt to plan, implement, and maintain urban infrastructure at the municipal level. Mid-term PES covers the period 8/81-5/84 and consists of a facesheet attached to a special evaluation (XD-AAP-563-A).

Action decisions are, inter alia, to: (1) decide on the proper balance in implementation between capital investment and capacity-building; (2) consider using conventional engineering services instead of a design-construct approach and consider options to accelerate and expand subproject implementation; (3) delegate SP approval to municipalities; (4) assess recurrent costs and manpower requirements implicit in master plans and develop alternative proposals for staging investments; (5) conduct an environmental assessment of proposed modifications to wastewater treatment facilities and new construction; (6) expand TA and give greater weight to the project's management, training, and technical aspects; and (7) consider the desirability of additional funding.

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\*PD-AAR-091 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=33986  
Alliance for engineering cooperation  
Mounir, Riad; Pearson, Thomas; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
24 Jun 1984, 2 p. + attachment, PES no. 263-84-10  
Attachment: XD-AAR-091-A  
Evaluation period: Jun 1981-May 1984

2630042





through loans rather than grants; the LDF has been made into a viable profitmaking institution; and the 390 local units that have taken part in project activities have been rewarded with greater autonomy, greater responsibilities, and with new skills in identifying and addressing development needs. Altogether, 5,626 ORDEV, village council, markaz, and governorate personnel have received in-country training and 119 overseas training.

Although there is still considerable work to be done in strengthening local analytical and decisionmaking skills, the prognosis for achieving the project's purpose and its goal is good. The project teaches that "learning by doing" is a valid approach to decentralization and institution strengthening, and that a successful development idea will be replicated by private entrepreneurs wherever opportunities exist, as were the village activities in this instance. (Near East Evaluation Abstract, modified)

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XD-AAR-091-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=33988  
Evaluation of Alliance for Engineering Cooperation : American  
Association of Engineering Societies - Egyptian Society of  
Engineers  
Zedalis, John P.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
29 May 1984, 22 p.  
Attached to PD-AAR-091

2630042

Contract evaluated: 263-0042-6-00-1057-00

Evaluates project component to improve the capabilities of the engineering profession in Egypt. Special evaluation covers the period 6/81-5/84 and is based on literature review, visits with engineers in New York and Cairo, and interviews with A.I.D. personnel and others.

The Alliance for Engineering Cooperation, composed of the Egyptian Society of Engineers (ESE) and the American Association of Engineers (AAES), was created in June 1981, but has achieved only moderate success. Of three planned seminars, two - on land reclamation and town planning - were held in early 1983; the third was cancelled. The Cairo Center for Continuing Engineering Education (CEC), a major grant component, was established, but is operating on only a limited basis due to a lack of staff; positions for a director and a part-time assistant director are vacant. A modest number of technical books and publications have been acquired for the CEC library and audio/video equipment has been procured. AAES/ESE personnel exchange has been

limited; AAES officers made only three visits to Egypt (including seminars), and ESE officers did not visit the U.S. until March 1984, and then at their own expense. Outreach activities especially have fallen short of expectations.

The Alliance's poor performance is due primarily to a lack of institutional capacity and motivation/commitment: the ESE has no experience in outreach programs aimed at the practicing engineer, and AAES was not oriented toward managing and administering the grant efficiently. Furthermore, efforts of both parties have been literally part-time. In retrospect, it is apparent that the Alliance was formed without full recognition of the ESE's elite character (it represents only 1.5% of Egypt's practicing engineers).

It is recommended that TA be provided to ensure proper installment and use of the audio/video equipment and that CEC operating expenses be covered for one additional year. These actions would give CEC the opportunity to operate as originally intended and would mute any criticisms that might arise from the U.S. and Egyptian engineering communities.

The project has demonstrated the necessity of choosing appropriate institutions as implementing agencies and of making adequate staffing a precondition to the provision of assistance. (Near East abstract, modified).

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XD-AAP-923-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=31364  
Project evaluation report : family planning pre-service training for  
doctors subproject (PIL #28)  
Voulgaropoulos, E.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
May 1984, 20 p. + 8 annexes  
Attached to PD-AAP-923

2630029

Evaluates subproject (SP) to develop a family planning training and outreach program in Egypt for newly graduated physicians in ten Egyptian governorates. Special evaluation covers the period 8/81-5/84 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with USAID/E, University of Alexandria High Institute of Public Health (HIPH), and Government of Egypt (GOE) personnel and with trainees.

Although the SP has developed training plans and educational materials, only 63 preservice trainers from eight governorates (vs. a

planned 240 from 10 governorates) have received two weeks (vs. a planned three) of Stage 1 family planning training at the Abbis II Health Center; a projected 80 will have been trained by the end of the project, only 33% of the target. Stage 2 training has been provided to 160 physicians in eight governorates by 29 of the preservice trainers and 19 HIPH staff; Stage 2 output is expected to reach only 15-20% of the target. Training has been hampered by: (1) for the Stage 1 course, insufficient qualified trainees due to governorate-level staffing shortages, the GOE's failure to provide candidates, and the reluctance of physicians to leave private practices for the period required for Stage 1 training; and (2) for the Stage 2 course, the transfer of already-trained preservice trainers, and inadequate governorate training facilities (and limited GOE funding for renovation or construction), training supplies, and equipment (e.g., pelvic models, films, slides). Although trainees report satisfaction with the training, its effectiveness has been handicapped by the inability of trainees to observe or practice IUD insertions on live patients. Finally, although a community family planning outreach program has been established at Abbis II, its application has been inconsistent, supervision by health center medical staff inadequate, and medical supplies chronically lacking.

Lessons learned are the importance of direct and indirect host government support to project success and of basing design targets on a realistic assessment of available human resources and facilities.

Several recommendations are given.

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PD-AAP-243    PES/ES(21)    Rec\_no=29808  
Neighborhood urban services  
Amato, Peter W.; Roberts, John; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
2 Apr 1984, 1 p., PES no. 263-84-07  
Attachment: XD-AAP-243-A  
Evaluation period: Aug 1983-Mar 1984

2630153  
263K60505  
263016105  
263016105

Evaluates project to strengthen the decentralized provision of basic services in needy communities of Alexandria and Cairo, Egypt. PES, consisting of a facesheet, covers the period 8/83-3/84 and is based on an attached special evaluation (XD-AAP-243-A).

Actions decisions are to: (1) intensify the dialogue with the Government of Egypt (GOE) to seek more clearly defined and shared objectives of decentralization and the best means to achieve them (e.g., how to increase local management capacity and how to allocate service functions more rationally among different levels of government); (2) focus PVO subprojects on fewer large activities and on fewer, more specifically identified, development priorities; (3) link the training activities for District, Governorate, and PVO officials more directly to their current needs and capabilities and to the study of decentralization objectives in order to promote local understanding of and involvement in decentralization; and (4) try to hasten the GOE's very slow obligations of funds for maintenance and incentive pay.

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PD-HAA-536 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=32766  
Agricultural management development  
Swanson, John; Radi, Arnold; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
27 Mar 1984, 2 p., PES no. 263-84-06  
Attachment: XD-HAA-536-A  
Evaluation period: Aug 1980 - Oct 1983

2630116

Evaluates project to establish a Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) Center for Agricultural Management Development (CAMD) to train MOA middle managers in Egypt. PES covers the period 8/80-10/83 and is based on an attached special evaluation (XD-HAA-536-A).

Action decisions are to: 1) identify ways to expand CAMD'S capacity to meet the management needs of the agricultural sector; 2) improve the follow-up system for trainees who have completed the basic course; 3) improve the ability of the research and evaluation unit to support CAMD training efforts and contract out baseline surveys; 4) direct contractor efforts away from classroom instruction and participant processing and toward course and staff development; 5) outline objectives and activities of all five CAMD units; 6) provide CAMD with examples of management problems and issues from other projects for inclusion in courses; and 7) assess CAMD's video and video production needs.

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XD-AAP-616-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=30737  
Basic village services : fourth mid-project evaluation  
Chetwynd, Eric, Jr.; Samaan, Maurice N.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

Mar 1984, iii, 25 p. + appendices  
Attached to PD-AAP-616  
Summary report: PD-AAW-495

263016102  
263K60502  
2630103

Evaluates project to improve and expand the capacity of Egyptian villages to plan, organize, implement, and maintain locally chosen infrastructure projects. Mid-term evaluation covers the period 3/82-3/84 and is based on site visits and comparison of governorates' achievements via a custom designed scale matrix.

The basic village services (BVS) project is well on target in meeting its goals. It has activated Egypt's decentralization policy as a vital element of rural development, stimulating local private sector economic activity, including agriculture, and improving the quality of life. Development institutions are being strengthened from the village to the markaz and governorate levels. A major accomplishment is raising local awareness concerning rights of elected village councils to choose and administer village projects. Since performance varies considerably among governorates, incentives are recommended to assist governorates that lag in performance, and rewards for those that excel.

Lack of maintenance of project-built infrastructure is a serious problem across all governorates; there are also specific technical problems - some (e.g., insufficient village wastewater treatment/drainage capacity) are beyond the project's scope and require national-level attention.

Among the lessons learned from the project are that: (1) meaningful decentralization depends upon increased delegation of authority from the central government to the village, and increased village capacity to use this authority effectively; (2) the capacity of villages to exercise authority to manage development projects requires project-specific training and management experience; (3) rural development projects can stimulate private sector development directly through infrastructure construction contracts, and indirectly through the existence of adequate public infrastructure (e.g., water, roads).  
(Near East Evaluation Abstract)

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XD-AAP-697-A Special Evaluation(22)  
Evaluation of canal maintenance project  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

Rec\_no=30804

Mar 1984, 18 p. + appendices  
Attached to PD-AAP-697

2630035

Evaluates project to increase agricultural productivity in Egypt by restoring and maintaining irrigation canals. Special evaluation covers the period 9/78-12/83 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with Government of Egypt Ministry of Irrigation and other project personnel.

Despite an initial 18-month delay due to U.S. and GOE disagreements over the provision of TA, equipment testing requirements, and contractual commitments to U.S. suppliers, the project has exceeded all its 5-year targets. Four public companies have been provided with dredging, earthmoving, and support (e.g., trucks, spare parts, tools) equipment. For the two companies that first received equipment, canal/drain debris removal increased by 62% between 1979 and 1982; a total of 101 million cubic meters had been dredged/excavated by 1982, primarily for maintenance. With improved canal maintenance and water availability, some farmers have reported increased agricultural productivity.

An unexpected benefit has been the use of AID-financed equipment to construct the new El Salaam Canal (i.e., Peace Canal) in the Sinai; also, a U.S. dredge is being used to maintain water exchange between the Mediterranean Sea and Lake Bardawil to permit continued lake fishing.

The project has been hampered by: equipment problems (mostly resolved except for shop equipment); ineffective TA (e.g., a consultant approved the wrong order of trucks for shipment to the project); an inadequate project design which overestimated economic rates of return (e.g., from increased cotton production) and lacked a logframe to aid in evaluation; and poorly executed training plans which resulted in Egyptian company personnel receiving only limited field training by U.S. factory representatives and no U.S. training.

The project's implementation problems highlight the need for a clear understanding of the terms of delivery, warranty, onsite training, etc. among host country personnel, consultants, and suppliers. It is recommended that funding be obtained to provide lacking equipment parts.

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XD-AAP-563-A Special Evaluation(22)

Rec\_no=30651

Mid-Egypt provincial cities development project : mid-term evaluation

Johnson, Pamela R.; Kachinsky, Robert; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Mar 1984, 67 p. + appendices  
Attached to PD-AAP-563

2630127  
263016103  
263K60503

Evaluates project to upgrade the institutional capacity of the governorates of Beni Suef, Fayoum, and Minia in Egypt to plan, implement, and support urban infrastructure at the municipal level. Mid-term special evaluation covers the period 8/81-5/84 and is based on interviews with project, municipal, and contractor officials.

Mainly using a "learning by doing" approach, the project has: completed draft master plans for water and wastewater infrastructure in the three cities; completed 73 urgent subprojects (SP's) and funded 135; markedly improved municipal staffs' capabilities to plan and implement SP's; awarded almost all construction and consulting services contracts to private Egyptian firms; and trained 338 city employees through 18 courses.

However, the project's institutional goals, timeframe, and planned range of infrastructure were overly ambitious, and project scope has narrowed during implementation to a current focus on capital components. The financial viability of existing or planned infrastructure investments has not been addressed. "Learning by doing" is no longer adequate to achieve planned capacity-building and decentralization, and USAID/E has been too closely involved in SP review and approval to allow decentralized decisionmaking. Project training should meet the requirements for implementing SP's, operating current plants and networks, and preparing for the system expansion expected with the master plans; improved capacity is especially important as the cost of the proposed master plans far exceeds project funds and will require the cities to finance implementation.

Lessons learned are that: (1) capacity-building is lengthy and requires careful planning and monitoring - a phased shift of project responsibility to the Government of Egypt may have been useful; (2) financial viability must be considered in implementation; (3) USAID/E should be selective in monitoring decentralization activities; and (4) training should be oriented to practice. (Near East Bureau Abstract, modified)

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PD-AAQ-657 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=32787

Major cereals

Bowers, Sidney; Radi, Arnold; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

28 Feb 1984, 5 p., PES no. 263-83-10

Attachment: XD-AAQ-657

Evaluation period: Jul 1979 - May 1983

2630070

Evaluates project to develop and provide Egyptian farmers in 8 pilot governorates with the technology needed to increase cereal, forage, and grain legume production through strengthened research and extension skills and improved research-extension linkages. PES covers the period 7/79-5/83 and summarizes an attached external mid-term evaluation (XD-AAQ-657-A).

The project is making excellent technical progress, although much remains to be done. A number of implementation delays have occurred due to chronic management problems involving commodity procurement, construction, customs clearance, and a lack of participant trainees with adequate English language capability; these have been partially resolved. While progress in extension has been less significant than that in research, links between research and extension have been strengthened, which has created an enthusiastic and receptive atmosphere among participating staff and farmers. The yields of small farmer demonstration fields have increased significantly. The project is reaching 2,025 villages with over 12,000 farmers.

Action decisions are to: (1) review and reach agreement on a comprehensive project logical framework to be followed by all parties in implementing the remainder of the project; (2) strengthen and institutionalize the integration of research and extension work; (3) improve statistical analysis capabilities and establish a utilizable data base; (4) emphasize improved management skills in technical assistance; (5) complete construction as soon as possible; (6) establish an inventory and receiving system for commodities; (7) establish a financial status reporting system for the project budget; and (8) complete current seed processing and production activities and increase efforts to strengthen seed production and distribution systems within project purview. (Near East Abstract)

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PD-AAN-873 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=28737

Applied science and technology

Arif, Sherif; Mitchell, Robert E.; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
30 Jan 1984, 1 p. + attachment, PES no. 263-84-3  
Attachment: XD-AAN-873-A  
Evaluation period: Apr 1980-Dec 1983

2630016

Evaluates project to strengthen the capacity of Egypt's scientific and technological community to manage research to solve priority development problems. PES covers the period 4/80-12/83 and is based primarily on interviews with U.S. and Egyptian project participants.

The project has advanced the institutional development of Egypt's nascent Academy of Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT) and its 11 institutes, particularly the National Research Center (NRC), and enhanced their ability to plan and monitor an applied research program in science and technology. ASRT and NRC have articulated most of the management functions necessary for future growth and developed linkages with both public and private sector entities to support their activities. The project has also had good success in helping to launch a national technology policy process. Project components, to develop (1) an equipment maintenance and repair management system and facility and (2) a national standardization system, are well underway and should be completed as planned. R&D activities have also proceeded apace, with 7 specific activities either completed or underway in the areas of food, biogas, corrosion, wool wax, bentonites, phosphates, and pharmaceuticals. Unfortunately a user-focused orientation has not yet been fully established in the R&D projects, for staff have had to operate without planned support in research programming, techno-economic studies, and marketing.

However, some 75% of project Phase II funds remain unexpended. Serious delays have occurred in: the procurement of equipment and supplies (a major project component); activities carried out by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in R&D management improvement; and the establishment of user "nodes" for a science and technology information system. Special attention should be given to completion of the latter component.

Overall, the project's purpose remains valid and achievements to date are sufficiently strong to warrant a forward thrust to remedy implementation delays. Most important, much more attention should be given to strengthening ASRT and NRC research management, and to in-country training and training of trainers.



An action decision is made to amend the project paper with special emphasis on: strengthening the Suez Canal University Faculty of Medicine's (FOM's) administrative, management, and financial capabilities; developing the clinical curriculum and faculty; expanding the FOM's role in providing improved health services at the Ministry of Health's clinical teaching sites; and extending the project through graduation of the first class of medical students in 1987.

Further recommendations detail these and other issues, including, inter alia: program monitoring and review; development of the postgraduate general practice training programs; group practice development; and establishment of a faculty research fund.

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XD-AAP-243-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=29809  
Arab Republic of Egypt neighborhood urban services project  
evaluation : phase I report, revised final draft  
International Science and Technology Institute, Inc.  
American University in Cairo. Social Research Center  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Dec 1983, v.p.  
Attached to PD-AAP-243

2630153  
263016105  
263K60505

Evaluates project to strengthen the decentralized provision of basic services in needy communities of Alexandria and Cairo, Egypt. Special evaluation covers the period 8/83-3/84 and is based on document review and interviews with project staff and local participants.

Due largely to capable TA, project implementation has largely been effective. The district subproject (SP) component is well ahead of target with district officials and People's Council members actively participating; the overall quality of district SP's, both structurally and in terms of meeting needs, is adequate to good. PVO SP's are also proceeding well, although there is some uncertainty as to how many and what kind of PVO's are to be assisted. Training efforts have focused on orienting district and PVO officials to project procedures and on community training in waste removal, but this component has lacked the staff and funding levels needed to develop local organizational skills.

Overemphasis on the rapid initiation of SP's (in response to both U.S. and Egyptian pressures) has put a strain on the TA team; moreover, if this rate of implementation continues, SP funds will be exhausted



journals after the PF's return to Egypt. Nearly 27% of participants are women, vs. a targeted 35%.

Returned PF's are of good calibre and several have already made impressive, developmentally related contributions, utilizing knowledge gained in the U.S., and generating new knowledge; the majority returned to the same position held previously, but with more expectation of advancement. However, while PF's sponsored by universities, research institutes, private companies and public companies (in descending order) see their training as very helpful, those sponsored by government agencies (the Ministry of Health being a notable exception) report little improvement in work situation.

While the 21-month faculty upgrading part of the PFP is working smoothly, the 10-month variant has caused a number of management problems because of its uniqueness in concept, its time-consuming placement requirements, and because of the highly motivated Egyptian participants' determination to seek extensions so they can complete Master's degrees. Recommendations include, inter alia, shifting from the present mix of 10- and 21-month fellowships toward a basic 12-month program, with extensions of up to 3 months.

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XD-HAA-536-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=32767  
Interim evaluation : agricultural management development project  
Creedon, Daniel; Compton, Cheryl Wilson; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Nov 1983, 51 p. + 8 annexes : statistical tables  
Attached to PD-HAA-536

2630116

Evaluates project to establish a Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) Center for Agricultural Management Development (CAMD) to train MOA middle managers in Egypt. Special evaluation covers the period 8/80-10/83 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with USAID/E, MOA, and CAMD personnel and with current and former trainees.

While progress has been satisfactory and MOA/CAMD support enthusiastic, CAMD will have to significantly increase its training capacity if MOA middle management training targets are to be met. Since 1978 1,158 middle managers (vs. a target of 2,000) from 13 governorates (vs. a target of 8) and 2 public sector farming organizations have attended 46 basic, advanced, and workshop courses; 64 women have also been trained (all except 9 have attended courses at the governorates due to cultural prohibitions which prevent



remained passive despite problems severe enough to warrant intervention. The parties never fully agreed on targets and division of responsibilities.

Regarding logframe targets, the training curricula originally developed by RCA, which allowed students to work at their own pace, were criticized by the GSLT, causing RCA to revert to more traditional curricula; these in turn were deemed worthless by a member of the evaluation team because they assume literacy. USAID/E, however, believes the new curricula (all 15 should be ready by the end of 1983) have merit and has asked RCA and the GSLT to have them reviewed by the bus and truck companies. Long-term training at RCA's New Jersey headquarters has been given to 9 of 16 Center instructors (reduced from 22 with the consent of all parties), but its value has been challenged because of English language difficulties. Many problems could have been avoided if logframe assumptions such as the adequacy of salaries for Center instructors, provision of trainees by the GSLT, and timely completion of Center construction had been within the project's control.

USAID/E must still resolve the following with the new Center Director: the customs problem; instructors' salaries, assessment of their capabilities, and completion of their training; and assessment of the adequacy/utility of the curricula and of bus and truck company willingness to participate in the Center.

The major lesson learned - poor management yields poor results.

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XD-AAQ-603-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=32689  
Evaluation report : poultry improvement project  
Bishop, John P.; Shafik, Nemat T.; Osman, Adly E.  
5 Oct 1983, 30 p. + attachments  
Attached to PD-AAQ-603

2630060

Evaluates project to help the Government of Egypt (GOE) to increase poultry meat and egg production. Special evaluation covers the period 9/78-9/83 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with poultry producers and USAID/E and GOE personnel.

The project did not unfold as planned. During Phase I, 264 person-months of TA and short-term training for 70 Egyptian participants were provided. Yet, training was oriented only toward management-level personnel and consisted primarily of observation tours of U.S. universities and commercial poultry production facilities; no

technical training was offered. Planned improvements at 3 GOE breeding/hatching farm were not completed due to a host of implementation delays; the first delivery of imported chicks and equipment did not arrive until late 1981 and installation of new buildings remains incomplete.

Phase II accomplishments were also limited. Plans to expand 3 additional breeding/hatching farms were abandoned due to the delays at the 3 original sites. Disease control activities which had been programmed for GOE farms, intermediate growers, and village producers were implemented only at the GOE farms, and there only partially and after long delays; all that resulted was a study which recommended that a disease control program be initiated at the farms and necessary drugs supplied to carry it out. Only one Phase II output - a 1-month vaccine/pharmaceutical demand study to determine whether local demand was sufficient to support domestic drug production - was completed.

In short, although improvements at the 3 GOE farms will increase their capacity to provide breeding stock, the project's emphasis on imported breeds (which are more prone to disease) - while neglecting village-level disease control - suggest that it will do little to assist small producers. Consumers will likely benefit from the project, if the imported birds are successfully distributed to large producers, as will the large-scale producers themselves and the scientists at the GOE farms who will be able to experiment with improved breeds. Small-scale production, however, remains a promising area for future A.I.D. assistance.

Annexes include exceptions taken by A.I.D.'s Office of Agriculture to the evaluation conclusions.

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XD-AAN-920-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=28808  
Evaluation report of the Suez community health personnel training  
project  
Richmond, Julius; Dowidar, M. L.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
12 Oct 1983, vi, 45 p. + annexes  
Attached to PD-AAN-920

2630136

Evaluates project to establish an integrated medical education and health services program in 5 governorates bordering Egypt's Suez Canal. Special evaluation covers the period 6/81-10/83 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with USAID/E and

Government of Egypt Ministry of Health personnel, Suez Canal University (SCU) faculty/students, and others.

The SCU Faculty of Medicine (FOM) has made remarkable progress toward project objectives. The first 3 years of a unique curriculum emphasizing primary health care has been developed; the second, mainly clinical, 3 years have been designed. A highly motivated staff of 152 faculty (mostly junior members) and 26 physicians in residence have been recruited with offers of subsidized housing, a chance to take part in Egypt's first group practice, research opportunities, and short and long-term training (25 have thus far been trained, including 5 in long-term U.S. programs). Three undergraduate classes, 195 students, have begun medical training; 45 physicians have entered the Master's general practice (GP) program (the first 14 graduated in 3/83).

FOM building renovations were completed in 1981. Microbiology, pathology, and anatomy labs have been set up and a hematology lab will open soon. A medical library, maintenance department, and audiovisual center are being developed; however, the former has been unable to recruit a librarian and the latter two, although equipped and staffed, have inadequate management.

The project is already having a positive impact on community health services. FOM students work 2 days a week at 12 urban/rural MOH health centers (4 of which have been renovated with teaching annexes) in Ismailia, Port Said, and the Suez Governorates. Also, 2 GP Master's graduates have become health center directors and others are awaiting assignment.

However, the FOM has been hampered by inefficient internal management (e.g., overly centralized authority; lack of commitment by some faculty; and inadequate support staff).

Key recommendations are to strengthen FOM administrative and financial capabilities and the clinical program and to expand community health services delivery.

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XD-AAN-854-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=29127  
Evaluation report for vehicle maintenance center project  
Soliman, Reda M.; McGuerty, Richard  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
23 Aug 1983, v.p.  
Attached to PD-AAN-854

2630114

Evaluates project to develop a Vehicle Maintenance Training Center to upgrade the skills of Egyptian bus and truck repairmen. Special evaluation covers the period 8/81-8/83 and is based on document review, indepth interviews, and a site visit.

The project is seriously off target and all three parties - the General Syndicate of Land Transport (GSLT), RCA (the contractor), and USAID/E - are deeply disappointed. No workers have been trained (200 were targeted for this date); only 9 of 22 instructors for the Center have received U.S. training; only 6 of 15 courses have been completed; and customs problems have allowed only two of eight shops to be completely equipped.

The GSLT, which even now does not seem to understand the contract, has not provided a full-time Center director as counterpart to the RCA Chief of Party (COP) and has in effect abandoned responsibility for the project. The GSLT has seriously hurt implementation by rejecting RCA's original training curricula (prepared using a methodology agreed to in the contract) and by failing to: complete Center construction before RCA's arrival; provide incentives adequate to attract and maintain instructors; and involve bus and truck company management in course development.

In its turn, RCA's record regarding procurement (e.g., sending 110V instead of 220V equipment), fellowship training, and curriculum development has hardly been exemplary. Although RCA was forced to abandon the methodology contracted for, it is now using off-the-shelf U.S. materials which seem to be above the reading level of the potential trainees and require 30-40% revision. U.S. training of Center instructors by RCA has had meager results due to trainees's lack of comprehension of English. With some direction, RCA's performance could have been much better.

Although the USAID/E project officer was to spend 40% of his time on this project and despite early warning signals, little was done to pressure the GSLT into action; USAID/E's role seems to have been dominated by expediency and by sensitivity to the GSLT. The only strong push for action came from the first COP - who was dismissed by the GSLT. This teaches the need for USAID to fill management gaps left created host agencies.

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PD-AAN-302 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=27347

Tax administration

Meyer, Steffi; Suma, James C.; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
5 Aug 1983, 1 p. + attachment, PES no. 263-83-09  
Attachment: XD-AAN-302-A  
Evaluation period: Sep 1980 - May 1983

2630115

Evaluates project to promote greater efficiency in the Government of Egypt's tax administration and collection operations. PES covers the period 9/80-5/83 and consists of a facesheet attached to a special evaluation (XD-AAN-302-A).

Recommendations are to: direct technical assistance efforts (which should be short- rather than long-term) toward establishing a priority system of examination; coordinate nonproject tax-related training programs with project efforts; provide additional temporary duty assistance to develop an on-job training program; provide assistance to develop a long-term ADP implementation plan and training program; and conduct a study of the Tax Department's present and future data processing needs and capabilities.

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XD-AAR-120-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=34056  
Agricultural development systems : second interim evaluation  
Blue, Richard N.; Pollack, Bernard; Sleeper, Jack  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Jun 1983, 42 p.  
Attached to PD-AAR-120

2630041

Evaluates project to increase the institutional capacity of the Government of Egypt (GOE) to plan and manage an effective agricultural research system. Special evaluation covers the period 1/81-6/83 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with project, GOE, and USAID/E staff and with farmers.

The project's initial scope was narrowed to strengthening horticultural and agricultural economics research capabilities. A subsequent subactivity focused on research in postharvest food handling, strengthening agricultural information management, and establishing a new horticultural science laboratory.

Using a combination of TA, training, technology transfer, and adaptive research, the project made a substantial contribution to increasing agricultural productivity and to improving the research

skills of Egyptian scientists. It also alerted the GOE and A.I.D. to the potential of horticultural cash crops for domestic and export consumption. The GOE has begun to capitalize on this potential by liberalizing price controls and export regulations on many categories of crops.

Although the project's institution building objectives were not fulfilled, the training opportunities and access to research networks and materials which the project has opened to Egyptian scientists may perhaps lead to a more productive Egyptian agricultural research system.

Recommendations for immediate action are for USAID/E and GOE to: work out administrative and funding arrangements for continuing project activities through 1984; establish research priorities; reorganize research teams as needed; and, in general, encourage joint Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)/academic research teams. Recommendations for future planning include to: establish an MOA institutional support structure for project activities; convene a combined international/Egyptian research advisory committee; and consider all types of funding mechanisms for future A.I.D. assistance in the agricultural research sector. In the long term, USAID/E may wish to establish an international center for horticultural research to increase the visibility of U.S. assistance to Egypt.

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PD-AAN-951    PES/ES(21)    Rec\_no=28866  
Agricultural mechanization  
Lee, J.; Swanson, J.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
25 Jun 1983, 43 p. + annexes, PES no. 263-83-7  
Evaluation period: Sep 1979-Jan 1983

2630031

Evaluates project to build Egypt's capability to promote agricultural mechanization. Mid-term PES, prepared by an outside team, covers the period 9/79-1/83 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with contractor and Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) personnel, participating farmers, and businessmen.

The project, while behind schedule, is moving steadily forward and is expected to contribute substantially to agricultural mechanization in Egypt. Current focus is on the six subprojects (SP's), one of which was added during implementation. These are progressing at varying rates and levels of success and in isolation from each other. At present, the most basic SP's are considerably ahead of the others.

This is especially true of the machinery extension and training SP, which is making excellent progress in demonstrating basic mechanization technologies to small and medium farmers, and this in accordance with farmers' own expressly stated needs and priorities. This SP is expected to create a demand for the services for which the other SP's will develop capabilities - land-leveling, service facilities, local manufacture, etc. However, precisely because earlier SP's lay the basis for later SP's, the current lack of SP coordination, if continued, could create problems later on. The next 6 months will prove critical. Efforts to equalize progress among the SP's were recommended.

Project management (the MOA and the contractor) were disappointed with the superficiality and even factual inaccuracy of the evaluation team's efforts and its failure to provide specific recommendations. A particular disappointment was the evaluation's failure to analyse specific problems facing the soil improvement and research SP's in the light of current organizational constraints; a special concern anent the latter is that the project is not making full use of the highly experienced research technical director. USAID/E concurred with project management's views and requested that its addendum be officially included in the evaluation.

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XD-AAN-302-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=27358  
Mid-term evaluation of the tax administration project  
Fox, William F.; Quindry, Kenneth E.  
University of Tennessee  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Jun 1983, iv, 39. + appendix  
Attached to PD-AAN-302

2630115

Evaluates project to upgrade the Government of Egypt's (GOE) tax administration and collection operations. Special evaluation covers the period 1980-83 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with project, USAID/E, and U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) consultants.

Progress has been achieved in four areas. The GOE reorganized its Tax Department (TD) along functional lines, and although coordination problems remain, TD staff members, 42 of whom have received U.S. training, have adjusted rather well to their new responsibilities. A separate Tax Training Institute (TTI) was developed to provide necessary training. Course materials were prepared in tax collection

and examination and 26 courses in tax-related skills were offered to 533 students from 8/82 on. An ADP division was created, staffed, and equipped with 24 data entry machines; training (of 15 programmers) was initiated in 4/82 and operations in 8/82. A system to process business tax withholding returns was developed and at the time of evaluation 528,000 returns were in various stages of processing. Finally, a streamlined and more accurate collection system was implemented in 7/82 in the Cairo area and later extended to other areas of Egypt, reducing paper work and transcription errors and partially shifting the collection burden to the taxpayer.

Long delays were experienced in most phases of the project due to overly optimistic time schedules, development of project activities before the GOE was fully prepared, and delays in placing senior TD staff and procuring a site for the TTI. The TD's policy of examining 100% of returns was hampered by an insufficient, inadequately trained, and overworked staff (as a result, 1978 returns were still being examined in some districts in 1982) and by IRS's focus on a strict selection examination process in the face of TD resistance. Lastly, lack of coordination between the Tax Administration Project and the Tax Modernization Project, designed to be developed in tandem, resulted in a failure to achieve optimum results from the two activities.

Ten recommendations to redress the above-noted problems are set forth.

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PN-AAL-015 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=27335  
PL-480 Title I : the Egyptian case  
Blue, Richard N.; Dunlop, David W.; et al.  
USAID. Bur. for Program and Policy Coordination. Ofc. of Evaluation  
AID project impact evaluation report, no. 45, Jun 1983, xix, 48 p. + 9  
appendices

263PL01

The history and varied impacts of the P.L. 480 Title I program in Egypt (reinstated in 1974 following a break in 1967) are assessed in light of Government of Egypt (GOE) policies and food needs. Also assessed is the program's impact on U.S. objectives.

Major conclusions are: (1) To the extent that it reduces the cost of food imports essential to the GOE's policy of ensuring a plentiful supply of cheap bread, Title I supports policies that act as disincentives to farmers (despite evidence that improved technologies could increase production by 50%); 1967-74 data support the inference of a disincentive effect. Population growth and other pressures,

however, may force the GOE to improve domestic production; options for doing so are presented. (2) Wheat distribution by the Ministry of Supply tends to strengthen the Ministry's control over all elements of the food distribution chain, possibly making it difficult to reorient the system - which has eliminated or severely reduced regionally centered private marketing and processing of wheat and wheat flour - toward increased local production. (3) General data (it is almost impossible to disaggregate Title I wheat from the total supply) show that daily per capita caloric intake has reached nearly 2,800 and that infant mortality increases when the wheat supply is interrupted, but also that there may be increased obesity and diabetes due to high carbohydrate intake. (4) Self-help provisions have been poorly monitored by USAID/E, although policy dialogue, Egyptian coordination, and the specificity of the agreements have improved since 1979. (5) Title I, which the GOE considers critical to U.S.-Egyptian relations, has helped ensure the U.S. foreign policy objective - which has been overriding - of Egyptian stability, a key factor in the Mideast peace process. (6) Marketing and budgetary effects have been limited.

The United States should continue to encourage GOE efforts to adjust its agricultural pricing policy in order to ensure that this largest of all Title I programs fully complies with the letter and spirit of recent P.L. 480 legislation and U.S. development policy initiatives. Included are 25 tables, 13 figures, several complementary analyses, and a 40-item bibliography (1968-82).

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XD-AAN-921-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=28816  
Mid-term evaluation of the university linkages project (263-0118)  
Baldwin, Emily; Zartman, William I.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
May 1983, 27 p. + annexes  
Attached to PD-AAN-921

2630118

Evaluates project to promote development research by Egyptian universities. Mid-term special evaluation covers the period 9/80-3/83 and is based on site visits and interviews with project personnel and potential users of project research.

Although an unrealistic time-frame has put it 1.5 years behind schedule, the project is on track, and criticisms within USAID/E and the local press are largely unfounded. The Supreme Council of Universities (SCU) has established the Foreign Relations Coordination Unit (FRCU) as an agency to review and provide grant funding for

research proposals made by Egyptian universities, all 11 of which are participating in the project. The FRCU, which has a good potential for institutionalization, has determined priority research areas and to date its committees have very carefully reviewed 700 proposals and approved 87 for funding. Efforts are being made to avoid reduplication of research and to move from mini- to maxilinkage research proposals, i.e., from very specific to multidisciplinary research. Problems have included uneven information dissemination to the universities; undue stress on a few research areas (agriculture and engineering); and FRCU reluctance to reject proposals outright. Perhaps the project's most problematic aspect is the FRCU's interpretation of capacity building as rewarding universities merely for participating, e.g., by approving poor proposals, (contrary to FRCU's usual procedure). Another problem is that A.I.D.'s automatic inclusion of a TA contractor in the project seems patronizing and unnecessary given the extreme competence of FRCU management. Because the joint U.S.-Egyptian research envisioned in the project design has proven financially infeasible, U.S. university personnel have played consultant roles, to the satisfaction of their Egyptian counterparts.

The most important impact of the project - which has already taught that institutions are not built overnight and that A.I.D. should not seek outside help to implement its own regulations - has been to remove the marginality previously associated with development research in Egypt. For USAID/E action decisions, see abstract of PD-AAN-921.

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PD-AAN-947 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=29660  
Small farmer production  
Martella, E.; Radi, A.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
31 May 1983, 1 p. + attachment, PES no. 263-83-6  
Attachment: XD-AAN-947-A  
Evaluation period: Aug 1979-Mar 1983

2630079

Evaluates project to develop and apply an improved small farmer credit and inputs system in three Egyptian governorates. PES covers the period 8/79-3/83 and consists of a facesheet based on an attached special evaluation (XD-AAN-947-A).

Action decisions are to: (1) carry out a second survey and compare results with baseline data collected in 1979-80 in order to establish a clearer link between the project's processes and its impacts; and (2) redesign elements of the project along the lines recommended in the

special evaluation to enable improved verification of project processes and identification of the most effective combination of interventions.

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PD-AAM-738    PES/ES(21)    Rec\_no=25980  
Decentralization support fund  
Stone, Michael P.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
15 Apr 1983, 2 p.  
Attachment: XD-AAM-738-A  
Evaluation period: Sep 1980-Feb 1983

263K60504  
263016104  
2630143

Evaluates project to support decentralization in Egypt's 21 rural governorates by funding governorate purchase of capital equipment. PES covers the period 9/80-2/83 and consists of a facesheet attached to a special evaluation (XD-AAM-738-A).

Recommendations are to: incorporate the special evaluation's recommendations affecting new tender documents and technical specifications; develop a program to assess equipment maintenance constraints and monitor governorate maintenance performance; develop specific interventions for addressing governorate maintenance issues; decide on the special evaluation's recommendations involving personnel additions and procedures; and refine or modify procurement procedures to improve efficiency and responsiveness.

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PN-AAL-011    Special Evaluation(22)    Rec\_no=26209  
Egypt : the Egyptian American rural improvement service, a point four project, 1952-63  
Johnson, Pamela R.; El Dahry, Ahmed; et al.  
USAID. Bur. for Program and Policy Coordination. Ofc. of Evaluation (Sponsor)  
AID project impact evaluation report, no. 43, Apr 1983, xi, 26 p. + 10 appendices

The long-term impact of the model Egyptian American Rural Improvement Service (EARIS) project (1952-63), still Egypt's most successful land reclamation effort, is evaluated in this report.

Alignment with Egypt's top political and developmental goals enabled EARIS to successfully reclaim 37,000 acres of lake bottom and desert land at three sites, build 13 complete and 64 satellite villages, and

resettle 7,500 landless families. A semi-autonomous structure facilitated implementation but hindered transfer of responsibility to Egypt's line ministries, while infrastructure building was unrealistic and lacked long-term planning for upkeep and recurrent costs. The project's main accomplishment was to put needed inputs - land, water, credit - into the hands of small farmers. Political shifts and the move to large state farms on reclaimed land prevented its replication.

The 30,000 acre site at Abis was EARIS's most successful, thanks in part to the marketing, economic, and service opportunities offered by nearby Alexandria. Today, farm income in Abis has risen dramatically, average large animal holdings have increased from 1 to 4 per household, and land values have soared; prosperity is evident. Individual and cooperative investments have allowed farmers to intensify land use, control marketing, and process their milk and cheese. About 25% of cropland is devoted to high-value vegetable production, and cereal crop production equals or exceeds that of the Old Lands.

The two desert reclamation sites, Qoota and Kom Osheim, totaling 7,000 acres, have not fared as well. Only a fraction of the lands' productive potential is now being used due to the large-scale withdrawal - legal and illegal - of irrigation water by spontaneous land reclamation upstream. Some of the 1,600 settler families have abandoned their farms and many who remain depend on semi-skilled work in Cairo.

The project taught that small farms on reclaimed land are financially viable and highly productive if irrigation water is assured and well-managed and farmer choice permitted and that population increases result in land fragmentation, indicating the need for a diversified economic base. U.S. support for the project made a difference that is still felt.

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XD-AAN-947-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=29661  
External evaluation of the small farmer production project  
Penson, John; Morrow, Robert; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
20 Apr 1983, 61 p.  
Attached to PD-AAN-947

2630079

Evaluates project to develop and apply an improved small farmer credit and inputs system in three Egyptian governorates. Special evaluation covers the period 8/79-3/83 and is based on interviews with

farmers and project personnel, and on available statistical data.

From a strictly developmental point of view, the project is already, at only the halfway point of implementation, enormously successful. It has already exceeded the targeted number of farmers and it is clear that the expected income and production increases have been met as well. However, the project has not fulfilled its avowed experimental nature - its intent to develop and apply an optimal combination of agricultural extension and credit. Instead, implementation has gone directly to the application stage without fully testing all the options first. For this reason, the effects of credit with or without extension and the income and production changes in project vs. nonproject areas remain unknown. Nonetheless, the project has had a significant impact on the availability and productive use of short- and medium-term credit, which in turn has, in combination with an active extension program, resulted in increased farm production.

Of the outputs, the improved credit system is the most successful to date. Other outputs are progressing at varying rates of speed and success. The planned development of an improved storage and handling system, however, has been hampered by policies regarding the respective roles of the public and private sectors.

A key recommendation is to determine if the project is indeed experimental in nature, and if so, to commit the additional resources needed to fulfill this objective, i.e., to expand the project so that activities can be conducted in entire districts (rather than in single villages as at present) and testing and demonstration of project interventions can become a reality.

Lesson learned: The more convoluted the project design, the more likely that the project will achieve some, rather than all, of its objectives. (Near East Evaluation Abstract, modified)

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PD-AAM-724 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=25952  
Cairo university/MIT : development planning studies  
Stone, Michael P.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
28 Mar 1983, 5 p., PES no. 263-83-4  
See attachment XD-AAM-724-A for evaluation  
Evaluation period: Sep 1980-Feb 1983

2630061

Evaluates project to create, in cooperation with the Massachussetts



both components has been on or below original estimates, with no compromise in building standards or the use of innovative technologies.

However, the number of housing units constructed or rehabilitated is below target, due primarily to delays of over a year in host country contracting for technical services. Moreover, although contracting problems have now been settled and implementation is more or less on schedule, the project's most difficult phases have yet to begin and lack of agreement on and understanding of project objectives by USAID/E, GOE, and contractors clouds the near future.

Lessons learned are that: project designs must include a realistic time frame for implementation; objectives must be clear, mutually understood, and commonly agreed upon by all parties prior to project approval and implementation; and policy-oriented objectives should be approached directly, rather than as a part of day-to-day implementation.

Action decisions call for: (1) a review of existing project management, recommendations for streamlining joint management, and the initiation of management and organizational reforms; (2) review and analysis of housing buildout options and their implications for pricing and marketing strategies, with a recommendation on the appropriate option to be selected; and (3) further in-house study on the effectiveness of the upgrading component and on the possibility of expanding that activity to other areas of Cairo.

PES notes that the special evaluation was uneven and failed to analyze and report overall project progress (e.g., especially of the important upgrading component).

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PD-AAM-699    PES/ES(21)    Rec\_no=25898  
Urban health delivery systems  
Fouad, Nabahat; Stone, Michael P.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Egypt. Ministry of Health  
10 Mar 1983, [6] p. + attachment, PES no. 263-83-01  
Attachment: XD-AAM-699-A

2630065

Evaluates pilot project to upgrade the urban health delivery system of Egypt's Ministry of Health. PES covers the period 11/78-8/82 and consists of a facesheet attached to a special evaluation (XD-AAM-699-A).

Action decisions are to: extend in-country training to the staffs of the former North and East Zones; reorganize project construction

activities; obtain legal determinations on additions to five privately-owned maternal/child health clinics in Cairo; establish regular meetings between the Cairo and Alexandria staffs; officially assign counterparts to the Westinghouse contract Equipment Specialist; open the Tora general urban health center and begin testing service improvement interventions; complete a joint Project Implementation Letter on a plan of action to improve health services; and complete a revised implementation plan.

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XD-AAM-724-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=25953  
Evaluation of the Development Planning Studies Project  
Mitchell, Messrs R.; Charleson, William R.; Vrebalovich, T.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Feb 1983, 75 p.  
Attached to PD-AAM-724

2630061

Evaluates project to create, in cooperation with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), a Development Research and Technology Planning Center (DRTPC) at Egypt's Cairo University to provide development planning assistance to Government of Egypt (GOE) Ministries. Special evaluation covers the period 9/80-2/83 and is based on document review and interviews with project and USAID/E officials.

Focus is placed on the possibility of achieving DRTPC institutional viability - in terms of fiscal status, the market for DRTPC services, and the DRTPC training and consultancy development - between 1/83 and 7/86, the end date for a project extension recently proposed by CU and MIT. Fiscal support has come entirely from project funds, but future viability depends upon the DRTPC's ability to provide services that clients want. The DRTPC is expected to face formidable funding problems beginning in 1985-86, and little has been done to identify the problem or to plan for its solution. The DRTPC's marketing division has become increasingly successful in obtaining research contracts in the sectors of transportation, physical planning, and water resources, but has had only limited success in penetrating the key sectors of construction, industry, and agriculture. This suggests a possible misalignment between DRTPC services and the organizational structure of its potential clients. Good progress has been made in upgrading the technical skills of participating CU faculty, while DRTPC consultancy services have helped clients solve serious development problems and DRTPC seminars and workshops have helped GOE and industry professionals upgrade their skills. With the DRTPC working as a successful



farmer incomes and new farmer enterprises, and improved linkages between research, extension, the PBDAC, and farmers. FM data collection/analysis has been weak, however.

VB and extension personnel have received initial hands-on training (in part from Ministry of Agriculture and agricultural university personnel), but there will be an increasing need for formal project training and in-country training facilities are virtually non-existent. Short-term U.S. training was provided to a first group of 10 credit and FM personnel in 1982.

Existing facilities are in deplorable condition; an unrealistic schedule has made it almost impossible to complete Phase I construction of VB's and warehouses before mid-1984.

A total of 15 recommendations are made.

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XD-AAM-738-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=25983  
Mid-term evaluation of the decentralization support fund  
Gardner, George R.; Coulter, George S.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Feb 1983, 28 p. + 4 p.  
Attached to PD-AAM-738 (PES)

263K60504  
263016104  
2630143

Evaluates project to support decentralization in Egypt's 21 rural governorates by funding governorate purchase of capital equipment. Special evaluation covers the period 9/80-2/83 and is based on site visits, interviews with Government of Egypt (GOE) and project officials, and on a review of the entire procurement process.

The project's Technical Liaison Group has helped governorate planners select equipment appropriate to their needs, and the project, now entering its second phase with the arrival of hundreds of pieces of road construction equipment, is contributing significantly to decentralization at all levels as equipment is used to meet real needs in districts, villages, and towns. Initial procurement delays either have been or are being resolved, although the time taken by A.I.D.'s Office of Contract Management (SER/COM) to review bids has been increasing. Delays in delivering equipment from the Alexandria port have presented a problem, with close to 6-month delays in distributing dozers and graders and shorter delays in distributing fire trucks to





2630005

263-0005-C-00-1009-00

This study evaluates the training experiences of A.I.D. participants since 1975, analyzing the effects of socio-economic, demographic, and technical and non-technical factors on the following three stages of training: pre-departure; training/living experiences in the United States; and impact of training on returnees in home country. The study involved 650 respondents to written questionnaires which represents 50% of all participants returning between 1975-80. Recommendations are made on pre-departure preparation, implementation of training, and on follow-up. (Participant training abstract, modified)

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XD-AAM-699-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=25899

Report on the special evaluation of the Moh Urban Health Delivery  
Systems Project

Boostrom, Eugene R.; Wiles, John W.; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

Egypt. Ministry of Health

Oct 1982, v, 33 p. + 7 annexes

Attached to PD-AAM-699

Evaluation period: 18 Aug - 24 Sep 1982

2630065

Evaluates pilot project to upgrade the Egyptian Ministry of Health's (MOH) urban health delivery system. Special evaluation covers the period 11/78-8/82 and is based on document review, interviews with project officials and beneficiaries, and inspection of project construction.

Designed to improve health service delivery, the project has focused on constructing, renovating, and equipping facilities, these activities consuming 70% of project expenditures to date. Despite this emphasis, construction/renovation activities are behind schedule and the project's overall disbursement rate is low. If recommendations made in the evaluation are implemented, however, all planned construction should be completed by the project's end.

Service-oriented aspects of the project have lagged, making it unlikely that the project will substantially improve the population's health status or MOH health service delivery. Achievements have included the training of 2,000 MOH and other project personnel in-country and the training of one long- and 65 short-term participants



detracted from providing service and equipment directly to individual companies. Unclear design led to four major components not being effectively linked to each other, each component wound up as an end in itself. The training component, for example, was not linked to either the environmental or the capital assistance components, except by subject matter. Four IPP components were implemented by three separate contractors, but there was no avenue for coordination among them. Key decisionmakers' roles were inadequately defined and often contributed to role conflict. As a result of decisionmakers' conflicts, the needs of the public sector companies were neglected. None of the key decisionmakers was aware of what the other decisionmakers did for the IPP. By emphasizing dissimilarities, the groups' communications were inhibited; procedures rather than results not only became more important but also crowded out investment decisionmaking.

Project strengths include: a better awareness of the problems facing Egypt's industrial sector, experience in conducting feasibility studies, more discussion of structural reform, and greater experience in procedural issues.

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XD-AAR-026-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=33855  
Mid-term evaluation; Egypt : cooperative marketing project  
Miller, Gerald David; Waldstein, Alfred  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
May 1982, 84 p.  
Attached to PD-AAR-026

2630095

Evaluates project to establish the Egyptian United Cooperative Society (UCS) as an institution capable of providing production capital and assisting private agricultural marketing cooperatives (AMC's). Special evaluation covers the period 9/79-2/82 and is based on site visits, interviews, and document review.

Despite a delayed and somewhat misguided start, the project is not without promise. The original project proposal, based on an unsolicited proposal by the Cooperative League of the U.S.A. (CLUSA), overestimated the Egyptian cooperative system's structural coherence, experience in managing credit programs, and ability to influence the market. When CLUSA realized that marketing objectives could not be met, it deemphasized marketing, farm data collection and analysis, and training activities, and focused on institution building. Consequently, and despite serious staffing problems, the UCS's ability to develop and execute marketing plans, though still inadequate, has been strengthened.

Most UCS marketing activities have built on ongoing AMC programs, but UCS itself handled the exporting of approximately 10% of members' potato production in 1981-82, and was thus able to increase potato farmers' incomes; UCS plans to increase its role in exporting potatoes and other produce. Regarding credit, a revolving production fund is in place, but has been used at no more than 40% of capacity, partly because need for capital is no longer a major constraint to farmer production; there is no evidence of increased production due to the fund, however. The project has made some contribution to lowering farmers' production costs through UCS production of seed potatoes. Finally, planned World Bank funding of infrastructure for produce storage, handling, and processing has not been made available.

Since project objectives remain realistic, it is recommended that the project be extended one year. Immediate action should be taken to: explore infrastructure financing by local village councils; design and implement a study/training program for UCS staff, including extensive short-term technical assistance; collect reliable farm survey data needed for project evaluation; and increase provision of production credit.

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PD-AAL-811 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=25395

Development industrial bank I

Schneider, J. D.; Kabodan, H. A.; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

9 Feb 1982, 6 p., PES no. 263-81-8

Attachment: XD-AAL-811-A

Loan no. 263-K-035

Evaluation period: Jun 1976-Aug 1981

2630018

Evaluates project to upgrade the institutional capacity of Egypt's Development Industrial Bank (DIB) to increase industrial production, especially in the private sector. Evaluation covers the period 6/76-8/81 and consists of a PES facesheet attached to a special evaluation (XD-AAL-811-A).

Subsequent to the evaluation report, the DIB experienced renewed sub-borrower interest in A.I.D. loan funds, largely as a result of a gradually increasing awareness of U.S. products by Egyptian businessmen. To further spur this interest, the Terminal Disbursement Date was extended to 12/31/83 in order to accommodate a revised disbursement schedule; the DIB's free limit was raised to \$1 million;

and the DIB's flexibility under A.I.D. 50-50 shipping regulations was reconfirmed.

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PD-AAL-809 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=13764  
Housing and community upgrading for low-income Egyptians; final  
evaluation report  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.  
Feb 1982, xv, 181 p. + 4 appendices

2630066

Evaluates project to provide housing and community upgrading for low-income urban Egyptian families. Mid-term evaluation covers the period 1978-2/82 and is based mainly on document review and interviews with project personnel.

Due to lengthy negotiations with U.S. consulting firms, USAID/E had to extend the project 1 year to mid-1984 and less than 10% of project funds have been expended. In the Helwan New Community (HNC) sites and services/core unit subproject, major design work is complete and construction of a model housing estate of nearly 200 units is underway. The awarding of the first major infrastructure contract, however, still awaits USAID/E's approval. In the subproject to upgrade six communities (an instance of the project's occasionally unrealistic design), upgrading has begun in only three, and work is at best incomplete in developing evaluation and finance plans and replicable community action programs and in other areas. The planned Vocational Training Center has been replaced by community center training programs.

Although the Government of Egypt's (GOE) success in lowering the costs of its conventional low-income housing projects seems to make the cost savings projected for the HNC unattainable (a fact which may undermine USAID/E's credibility in future housing policy interventions), the project as designed has several advantages over current GOE housing; for example, the HNC provides ownership and better site planning and both subprojects offer a full range of community services.

Two issues demand speedy attention. USAID/E and the GOE's Joint Housing Program/Project Implementation Unit (JHP/PIU) must agree on the plan for the HNC. According to USAID/E, inclusion of a three-story vertical core would turn the HNC into a conventional GOE housing project. USAID/E and the JHP/PIU must also reach accord on the extent of USAID/E's technical oversight; JHP/PIU is pressing for greater

responsibility over technical issues.

Lessons learned are that: USAID/E should outline its key technical criteria in advance to expedite project implementation and not undermine the JHP/PIU's sense of accomplishment; GOE agencies do not readily participate in a project in which they are not directly involved; and the project will not in itself solve the long-term policy issue of placing the GOE's housing strategy on a more economical footing.

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XD-AAL-811-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=13766  
Special evaluation FY 81-8 : Development Industrial Bank  
Steckel, Bill  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
8 Feb 1982, 5 p.  
Loan no. 263-K-035  
Attached to PD-AAL-811.

2630018

Evaluates project to help Egypt's Development Industrial Bank (DIB) increase industrial production, especially by the private sector. Special evaluation covers the period 6/76-3/81 and is based on a review of the DIB organization, the Egyptian banking sector, and other factors.

The DIB has used A.I.D. funds well to provide medium- and long-term industrial credit, albeit much more slowly than planned. Although disbursement was to be completed by the end of 1978, to date only 83% of funds have been authorized and only 50% disbursed. This slowness is due to: A.I.D. procurement regulations; the competitive disadvantage of U.S. products in the Egyptian market; the DIB's failure to promote its services actively and to extend to its clients the full benefit of A.I.D. loan funds (e.g., the DIB offered loans for under 10 years and with a grace period under 2 years when 15-year loans and 3-year grace periods were possible); the DIB's access to other sources of foreign exchange since late 1977; and the large number of cancellations of DIB-approved loans, sometimes by A.I.D., but mostly by borrowers due to changes in the exchange rate which increased the borrower's liability by 75%.

Although the DIB has channeled 72.4% of all A.I.D. funds to the private sector against a target of 65%, most of these loans have been made to medium and large enterprises, with small enterprises obtaining lower-rate loans from the DIB's OPEC fund. Further, the DIB's portfolio is highly concentrated in service enterprises, especially hotel and



special evaluators' request that senior personnel from the Egyptian Government's Ministry of Health and from the World Health Organization review the SCU curricula.

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PN-AAJ-989 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=12277  
Observations and recommendations related to the summer workshop on  
population and environmental education  
Murphy, Elaine M.; Cancellier, Patricia  
American Public Health Association  
USAID. Bur. for Development Support. Ofc. of Population (Sponsor)  
12 Nov 1981, [88] p.  
Evaluation period: 27 Jul - 31 Aug 1981

9365900  
AID/DSPE-C-0053

At its current 3% growth rate, Egypt's population will double to over 85 million by the year 2004. Given these alarming statistics, the Egyptian Ministry of Education (MOE) began yearly workshops in 1977 to provide an orientation in population and environmental education (P&EE) to enable Egyptian teachers to introduce modern methods and materials in these subjects in the school system. In October 1980 the MOE initiated a year-long correspondence course in population studies to prepare participants for the 1981 workshop, the subject of this report.

The workshop's agenda focused on using a large number of nontraditional teaching methods (e.g., brainstorming, problem-solving, role-playing, etc.) to treat the six subject areas (key population concepts, influences on population growth, Egyptian and world population problems and policies, physiology of reproduction, and population planning); and on evaluating participants' performance in the correspondence course and at the workshop, as well as their attitudes (through pre- and post-test surveys) towards P&EE issues and specific teaching methods.

Based on their observations, the U.S. consulting team prepared a list of recommendations. These included that: the MOE form subject area P&EE teams to identify and develop curricula and teacher guides with emphasis on teaching method rather than population theory; separate trainer-of-trainer workshops for each discipline be held to prepare a number of participants from each geographical district to lead local P&EE workshops funded by MOE; outside lectures on physiology of reproduction and other subjects not directly related to developing local workshops be reduced or omitted; the MOE consider reducing the number of topics into which P&EE is integrated in order to achieve



Residual end-of-project funds were used to purchase additional equipment. Since the commodities often arrive after project completion and the urgency to use them is greatly diminished, this practice should be carefully evaluated to determine if a true need exists or if equipment is being procured only to use remaining funds.

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PD-AAI-324 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=631  
Mid-project evaluation of development decentralization I  
Kerr, Graham B.; Kilmer, Gary D.; Miller, Gerald D.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
4 Oct 1981, vi, 43 p. + 13 annexes

2630021

Evaluates project to strengthen the capability of Egyptian villages to finance income-generating development projects. Special evaluation covers the period 1978-81 and is based on interviews with project personnel and visits to 21 villages.

The project is well on its way to achieving its purpose; all participants - the Organization for the Development of Egyptian Villages (ORDEV), Checchi and Company, and USAID/E - have done their part well. ORDEV has established a Local Development Fund (LDF), received 426 loan applications, and made over 200 loans totaling \$5.5 million; about 100 village projects are now being implemented. The geographic distribution of the loans - 83 to Upper Egypt and 124 to Lower Egypt - is consistent with population distribution but not with economic hardship; 81% of loans have gone to low-risk poultry, cattle fattening, and transportation projects. Most projects will be or are already profitable.

Many training programs have been carried out. Thirty-three ORDEV staff have attended courses in enterprise development, management, and finance at the Bluegrass Consortium in Kentucky, and 30 have returned to work with the LDF. The Consortium has developed 15 case studies of LDF projects for use in training. Also, 36 participants spent 1 month in the Philippines for training in rural development and small scale industries. Locally, 614 village council members and head executive officers have attended 21 seminars on local government and the LDF. The good quality of village recordkeeping can be traced to this training. Establishment of the ORDEV training academy has been delayed by Egyptian budgetary constraints.

It is recommended that: ORDEV give increased attention to building and maintaining the LDF and assisting maturing village enterprises

institutionally; Checchi strengthen and refocus its technical assistance on management and finance, based upon close examination of village projects; and USAID/E carefully assist and monitor progress. Fifteen more detailed recommendations are also included.

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PN-AAM-661 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=25498  
Management assessment : Egypt major cereals improvement project  
Mossler, John R.; Cregger, Floyd M.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Jul 1981, 61 p. + 2 attachments

2630070

Evaluates project to strengthen the Government of Egypt's (GOE's) research and extension capabilities in the production of cereal crops. Special evaluation, focusing on project management, covers the period 7/79-6/81 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with GOE, USAID/E, and contractor personnel.

The project, which originally focused on wheat, maize, sorghum, and barley, has been expanded to include grain legume and forage crops, farming systems research, and seed processing plants. A system of competitive university grants will also be established.

The project is behind schedule in all major inputs - provision of technicians, assignment of land, construction, procurement, and external training - and will almost certainly not achieve its goals by 9/30/84 as planned. Nonetheless, real progress has been made in cereals research (particularly large-scale wheat demonstrations), although not in supporting fields, such as entomology and pathology. Integration of research and extension activities, however, has been minimal and no village extension agents (160 targeted) have been appointed yet. There has been a good, but limited, start in the production and distribution of foundation seed and four scientists have been chosen for U.S. seed training. Forage and grain legume research is behind schedule. Lack of a comprehensive plan has hampered training activities.

Conflicting perceptions of the project's collaborative assistance methodology and failures in communication among the contractor (the Consortium for International Development), USAID/E, and the GOE are responsible for many of the project's problems. Moreover, lack of an active Executive Committee has deprived the project of essential guidance. Delays in procurement of equipment and supplies have been caused by complex purchasing and shipment procedures. Low incentive





A complicated "family folder" health facility record-keeping system was developed but has not yet been tested.

It is recommended that any follow-on project should establish an effective outreach system at the training center, focus HIPH training efforts on training trainers, emphasize family planning, test successful project developments (e.g., the family folder) on a wider scale, establish a mechanism for communicating successful service delivery, and should not need to provide HIPH with further long-term expatriate technical assistance.

A Contractor Performance Evaluation Report for One America, Inc. is attached.

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PD-AAI-169-A1 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=24855  
Strengthening rural health delivery project : special evaluation FY  
81-5  
Britanak, R. A.; Steckel, W.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
2 Jun 1981, 1 p. + annex, USAID/Egypt 81-5  
Evaluation period: 1 Sep 1976-28 Feb 1981

2630015

Evaluates project to strengthen rural health delivery in Egypt. Evaluation, which covers the period 9/76-2/81, consists of a PES facesheet, followed by a full evaluation report (PD-AAI- 169-B1). A cover memorandum provides a summary of the report.

Listed on the facesheet are actions to be undertaken by USAID/B concerning negotiations with the Ministry of Health (MOH) regarding the special evaluation team's recommendations: developing a new project implementation plan and submitting it to the MOH; approving a revised Project Paper; amending the Grant Agreement and the Westinghouse contract; and having additional technical assistance and MOH personnel assigned to the project.

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XD-AAJ-499-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=888  
Suez community personnel training project; evaluation report  
Gardner, George R.; Vuturo, Anthony F.  
USAID. Bur. for Near East. Ofc. of Technical Support  
University of Arizona  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Jun 1981, 45 p. + annexes  
Attached to PD-AAJ-499

2630136

Evaluates project to establish a health services training program at Suez Canal University (SCU) in Egypt. Special evaluation covers the period 5/80-6/81 and is based on site document review and interviews with contractor, Boston University (BU), and A.I.D. personnel.

The project's major commitment of resources to train a handful of physicians may be extravagant given the depth of health care needs in Egypt. Moreover, the project faces a host of problems. SCU's capacity to develop curriculum is growing, but only the first year curriculum is nearing completion. BU personnel have not yet inspected the six clinical training sites identified in Ismailia; construction is unlikely to be completed by 9/81. No sites have been found in Suez or Port Said. The proposed primary care group practice -- to supplement the incomes of the underpaid SCU medical faculty -- is of doubtful viability. Good progress has been made in refurbishing teaching, laboratory, and administrative facilities. Although staff development and continuing education are proceeding, short-term U.S. training has been of little value; non-faculty and junior faculty education has lagged; and initiation of long-term U.S. training appears unwise. BU has failed to strengthen SCU's management ability (e.g., developing lines of authority and budget and records systems), and SCU's need for centralization is antithetical to a decentralized project. Finally, the proposed Phase II is too vaguely conceived and will conclude 3 years before SCU's first medical class is graduated.

It is recommended that A.I.D and/or USAID/E: (1) condition continued support on enrollment of a class in 9/81; (2) complete Phase I, request from BU a proposal for Phase II, and consider a possible Phase III (lasting until 6/30/87); (3) continue funding curriculum design, continuing education, primary care, and health center development; (4) support training for non-physician health center personnel and in general health care; (5) not support group practices until the prototype has been tested; (6) strengthen BU's management advisory capability; (7) demonstrate the effectiveness of existing clinical teaching sites before funding new sites; and (8) require submission of curricula prior to Phase II.

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PD-AAJ-083 Special Evaluation(22)  
USAID/Cairo PL-480 Title II; program review  
Rhoda, Richard E.; Callier, Sandra S.  
USAID. Bur. for Near East  
Transcentury Corp.

Rec\_no=800

Jun 1981, xiii, 216 p.  
Evaluation period: Nov 1976-Jun 1981

263PL02  
2980150  
PDC-0262-I-00-1012-00

Evaluates four of five projects (excluding Sinai Feeding) in the P.L. 480, Title II food distribution program in Egypt. Evaluation covers the period 11/76-6/81 and is based on document review, site visits, and meetings with staffs of Catholic Relief Service (CRS), CARE, and Egyptian public and private agencies.

The CRS School Lunch project serves 1.2 million children in over 3,000 schools in Lower Egypt. Although evaluation data are lacking, the goals of increased enrollment and class attentiveness and reduced drop-out and absentee rates have been achieved. Major issues include the continued use of costly and poor-tasting wheat soy blend; commodity shifts proposed for FY 82 to cut costs; and the continued feeding of children in canal cities in this "rural" project. The CRS Maternal Child Health project provides food supplements and nutrition education to 500,000 children aged 3-36 months and to their mothers. Problems include the continued lack of a uniform children's growth chart and difficulties in instituting growth monitoring in clinics; doubt about the program's suitability given the high rates of diarrhea and infection; design deficiencies in the nutrition education component; and the need to select an optimal commodity mix within cost constraints. The CRS Other Child Feeding project serves 45,000 children under age 14 in 940 public and private institutions (orphanages, day care centers, hospitals). Outstanding issues are the possible need for other inputs and whether the program's size, commodity choice, and logistics enable it to reach needy children. The CARE Family Planning (FP) project, operated by the Egyptian FP Association (EFPA), uses food to increase acceptance of FP and provides soy oil and soy fortified flour to 40,000 FP acceptors. Key issues are how to limit the project to new, younger acceptors (women participants average 35 years of age and half to two-thirds of them accepted prior to the program); the capacity of local EFPA centers to operate the project; and whether to extend the project beyond its 1/82 expiration date.

Evaluators recommend postponing until 1983 the external evaluation proposed for fall 1982, because it is not well-timed for gathering information and because other types of assistance would be more beneficial.

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US assistance to Egyptian agriculture : slow progress after five years

U.S. General Accounting Ofc.

16 Mar 1981, iv, 103 p., ID-81-19

\*Availability: U.S. General Accounting Ofc.

Presents General Accounting Office (GAO) evaluation of A.I.D.'s agricultural assistance program to the Government of Egypt (GOE). Evaluation is based on document review and interviews with A.I.D., U.S., and GOE officials.

The overall impact of A.I.D. agricultural assistance has been negligible. A.I.D. has focused on technological development to the neglect of extension, a crucial underpinning of agricultural development. Extension has been limited by agent shortages and farmer mistrust of agents' regulatory functions, inadequate transportation, low salaries, poor training, and weak linkages between research and extension. Although A.I.D. has made serious efforts to face the extension dilemma in recent projects to increase production of rice and other major cereals, it is doubtful whether the underlying weaknesses in the GOE extension system can be adequately addressed in this piecemeal fashion.

The GOE's agricultural and food policies have limited productivity or caused product shifts and have effectively reduced farmer incomes while subsidizing the middle and upper classes. Increases in food imports have had similar effects. Due to the GOE's sensitivity to foreign interference in its policies, A.I.D. has tread softly in this area, encouraging "micro-reforms" (e.g., making fertilizer and credit more available to farmers) through specific problem-oriented projects or through formal and informal discussions with Egyptina policymakers. Existing mechanisms which can promote policy dialogue, e.g., the Commodity Import Program and P.L. 480 self-help agreements, have not been adequately used to this end.

More generally, progress in developing Egyptian agricultural projects has been slow due to A.I.D. and consultant contracting and staffing delays, project design deficiencies, unclear A.I.D. monitoring responsibilities, inadequate GOE support, and poor inter-donor cooperation.

Specific recommendations are made to correct these deficiencies. The Consortium for International Development, A.I.D., the University of

California/Davis, and other participating entities, defend themselves against the above criticisms with corrections or reinterpretations of the GAO data and conclusions.

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PD-AAI-169-B1 Special Evaluation(22)

Rec\_no=24856

SPECIAL EVALUATION OF STRENGTHENING RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY PROJECT  
BOOSTROM, EUGENE R.; TURNER, BARBARA; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

12 Feb 1981, 34 p. + annex

Duplicate fiche: PD-AAL-831

Evaluation period: 1 Sep 1976-28 Feb 1981

2630015

Evaluates project to strengthen rural health delivery in Egypt. This special evaluation attached to a PES facesheet (PD-AAC-020-A1) covers the period 9/76-2/81.

In the project's first 34 months, vehicles were deployed in the targetted 10 districts and commodities were supplied to four districts, one in each of four governorates. Project personnel worked with district, governorate, and rural health personnel to improve health record systems; revise job descriptions; provide pre-service and in-service training; institute regular home visits; and improve supervision. Also, the project demonstrated the effectiveness (40%) of oral rehydration in reducing mortality among infants and children with diarrhea. Nevertheless, the testing of interventions has not progressed as planned and data collected on these interventions are nowhere near analyzable form. Though funds were saved by reducing technical assistance and project staffing, these reductions will likely result in higher costs and lower quality when the government attempts to expand the program. Vehicles provided by the project have not been used to the extent expected, and they should no longer be provided. Testing of medical interventions should be reduced; those which have proven successful (oral rehydration and home visits) should be implemented nationwide. Project data should be processed in the United States on a priority basis. Project staffing at the central Ministry of Health (MOH) office should be increased, and three long-term advisors should be added to the Westinghouse contract. The project should be expanded to 10 districts as originally called for in the Project Paper and should be extended for 2 years to complete the testing of interventions, develop an applied research/demonstration capability within the MOH, and develop plans to expand the project nationally. Other recommendations include emphasizing in-country training, revising project manuals, and giving higher priority to water

supply and sanitation (with no financing for actual upgrading of physical facilities).

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PD-AAL-420 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=12718

Egypt : the agricultural development systems project; an interim evaluation

Blue, Richard N.; Fraenkel, Richard; et al.

USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt

Jan 1981, xi, 119 p.

2630041

Evaluates project to strengthen Egypt's public sector agricultural institutions. Evaluation covers the period 1977-1/81 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with USAID/E and project personnel.

Although the project has suffered from a seriously delayed and sometimes confused implementation, it now has the potential to make useful contributions to Egyptian agriculture, especially in the areas of horticulture and agricultural economics research. Early implementation problems resulted from delayed contract negotiation, and the choice of an inexperienced institution - the University of California at Davis (UC) - to undertake an unrealistically broad project, and strained relations between UC and USAID/E personnel. However, a major reorganization in mid-1980 has resulted in substantial progress. Collaborative research, involving Ministry of Agriculture personnel and Egyptian academic scientists, has been conducted in horticulture (12 studies), economics (15), and other areas (4); a study on Agricultural Statistics and Policy became the basis of a new A.I.D. project. Progress has been made toward establishing a central horticultural laboratory.

In contrast, due to an inadequate feasibility study and disagreement over personnel needs, the project never initiated any of its planned extension activities. Nor has it defined an institution building strategy. Training has been minimal; long-term U.S. training was provided to 2 scientists and short study trips to 12, and a few in-country workshops were held.

Project experience shows that broad programs with many purposes and activities are difficult to squeeze into a project format. Key recommendations are to: (1) revise the project paper to more realistically define objectives and strategies and then extend the project 2 years; (2) limit extension activities to a horticultural

information service; (3) improve communication between UC and USAID/E; (4) define a clear institutional development strategy; (5) appoint separate A.I.D. officers to monitor the horticultural and agricultural economics subprojects; and (6) enlist more scientists from other U.S. institutions and extend the length of both long- and short-term tours. Finally, A.I.D. should take more care in selecting contracting entities and invest more effort in the substantive implementation of projects.

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PD-AAN-311 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=27361

Integrated social work training centers  
Rusby, Paul G.; Sweet, Norman L.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Jan 1981, 1 p. + attachments, PES no. 263-81-03  
Attachment: XD-AAN-311-A  
Evaluation period: Sep 1977 - Nov 1980

2630020

Evaluates project to identify and test cost-effective ways of increasing the number, coverage, and effectiveness of Egyptian social services. PES, covering the period 9/77-11/80, consists of a facesheet attached to a special evaluation (XD-AAN-311-A).

The following actions have been taken: the project activity completion date was amended several times, permitting the continuation of technical services for two years after the special evaluation, and is currently scheduled for 11/30/82; and the project's financial plan was amended to add money for additional technical assistance and participant training.

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XD-AAN-311-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=27362

Partial interim evaluation of the integrated social work training project  
Langley, Grace  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt (Sponsor)  
Jan 1981, 19 p. + annex  
Attached to PD-AAN-331

2630020  
263-0263-S-00-1006-00

Evaluates project to identify and test cost-effective ways to expand and improve social services in Egypt. Special evaluation covers the period 9/77-11/80 and is based on document review, site visits, and interviews with GOE and other participants.

Progress has been uneven. After 3 years of confusion over implementing entities' responsibilities (a problem exacerbated by GOE participants' expectations of high salaries and lavish benefits), authority has been clearly defined and a process to improve social services begun. A demonstration training center for social workers has been established in Gharbeya Province, but lacks full-time residential trainers; 35 trainers are on call, however, with training of 75 trainers expected within a year. To date, training has been provided to 52 staff of experimental social units in Gharbeya and Assiut and to the staff and supervisors of day care centers. Case management training is in progress, and a plan for 1981 training (including community development training) is complete. Social service guidelines have been written and tested; social units in Gharbeya now have authority to decide on social security grants without referral to the Governorate.

Provision of social services, however, has been limited, due in part to funding delays. Furniture for day care centers has been designed but not built, teaching materials have not been obtained, sewing classes have been poorly organized and utilized, and family planning activities remain in the discussion stage. More positively, a manual for planning and designing social services was developed.

In other areas, community development associations were reactivated but are still in the organizational stage. A planned community needs assessment was not completed; a social unit area profile, developed in its place, has been completed for Gharbeya units. Little has been done towards developing a management information system.

Despite the project's mixed success, the project director has decided to replicate the project in four other governorates. It is recommended that the project be extended and flexibility in management ensured; activities be kept in line with resources; and expansion to Qena be considered.

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PN-AAJ-891 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=1979  
Approaches to appropriate agricultural technology in Egypt; a  
special case study evaluation  
Pearson, Robert W.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
1981, 37 p.

2630096  
NEB-0096-C-00-1063-00

Appropriate agricultural technologies (AAT) could greatly improve Egypt's agricultural production. This paper compares successful AAT projects in Turkey and Pakistan with ongoing efforts in Egypt, particularly the AID-funded Small Scale Agricultural Activities Project (SSAA), identifying points of commonality and developing a generalized approach to AAT.

Successful projects had six points in common: (1) an agricultural need was identified; (2) an AAT was developed to meet that need; (3) a prototype was developed/adapted to the technical capabilities of local manufacturers; (4) the product was field tested; (5) the prototype was modified after trials; and (6) the product was extended to manufacturers and end-users.

The main agricultural needs in Egypt were identified as: (1) mechanization with tractors, appropriate tractor attachments, and farm implements; (2) cottage and agro-industries (e.g., food processing); and (3) alternative energy technologies using solar, wind, and biogas power.

AAT can only be implemented if the Government of Egypt, Western donors, and recipient farmers have a positive attitude towards new technologies and are given adequate research and development (R&D) assistance, suitable manufacturing conditions, and extension links between the manufacturers and the final users. Egyptian R&D institutions and manufacturing workshops can, with additional funding, be developed through training programs, better equipment, and technical assistance. However, Egyptian extension links are almost non-existent and will require coordination between banks, the Ministry of Agriculture, donors, R&D institutes, and local areas.

The SSAA, designed to introduce AAT in Egypt, utilizes small shops and intensive on-site testing. To date, no SSAA technologies are in use in rural areas nor are training programs geared toward manufacturers and end-users. However, the SSAA, through the provision of grants and technical assistance, could be used for extension activities and to establish needed links between the development and implementation of AAT in Egypt.

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XD-AAI-560-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=14157  
Mid-project evaluation of the Egypt water use and management project  
Asmon, Itil E.; Corey, Gilbert L.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Nov 1980, 92 p. + annexes

Attached to PD-AAI-560

2630017

Evaluates project to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation (MOI) and to develop improved irrigation and water management practices. Special evaluation covers the period 9/76-11/80 and is based on document review; interviews with Government of Egypt (GOE), contractor, and USAID/E personnel; and site visits.

Although progress has been constrained by inappropriate or delayed provision of technical assistance and equipment, excellent success has been achieved in some areas. A multidisciplinary Egyptian water management study team, having received over 178 person-months of training, is conducting what is apparently the only on-farm research with good farmer cooperation in Egypt. Relationships between the contractor and the Egyptian team have been excellent, although the Egyptians have questioned the contractor's extensive use of short-term advisors.

In three pilot areas, Mansouriyah, Kafr-El-Sheikh, and Minya, the team has completed water budget studies which have provided valuable data on current constraints to on-farm water management. Field trials in precision land leveling and long furrows were delayed but have now begun. Initial crop management experiments, although important in building farmer confidence and producing remarkable yield increases, were irrelevant to project purposes per se; the focus of these experiments has now been modified.

The project's major shortfall has been its failure to demonstrate yield increases strictly from changes in water management. Due to the contractor's lack of a results-oriented attitude, planned canal trials have not begun, making it impossible for the project to fully achieve all outputs. In addition, project findings have not been disseminated to Egyptian agencies.

Pilot testing will now begin at three project sites to establish prototype irrigation delivery system technologies. A detailed action program is outlined. Recommendations are to continue the project and to expand its purposes to include labor savings, cost reductions, and water savings.

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PD-AAI-270 PES/ES(21)

Rec\_no=51123

Basic village services (263-0161.02) : assessment of village water

systems in Egypt  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
14 Aug 1980, 13 p. + attachment, ES no. 263-88-06  
Attachment: XD-AAAY-270-A

263016102

Summarizes attached external evaluation of a project to construct water pumping systems for villages in 22 Egyptian governorates in the Nile valley. Evaluation covers the period 1980-88 and was based on visits to 36 villages.

The project has significantly improved the quantity and quality of water in Egyptian villages. Functioning water systems exist in all villages visited by the evaluation team, and household connections to water systems have increased from 5% to 31%, reaching an additional 7 million people. Project funds made "significant" or "helpful" contributions to physical infrastructure in 86% of the villages surveyed.

Nevertheless, the water systems are plagued by a number of severe problems. Operation suffers from power outages, insufficient funds for fuel or electricity, and a lack of trained operators. Maintenance is often severely inadequate, contributing to service interruptions and equipment failure. While some operational problems result from poor design, most often problems go uncorrected because no clear institutional responsibility for O&M has been established.

Other problems center around water quality (even when water sources were unpolluted, half of the samples from the distribution systems were contaminated), lack of standpipes, and inadequate water tariffs (tariffs do not cover operating costs and collection has been late and less than assessed).

Unfortunately, by making water more available, the project also increased the amount of wastewater generated. Wastewater disposal is in almost every case grossly inadequate, and many potential solutions (e.g., piped sewer systems) are too expensive to be widely implemented.

Key recommendations are to (1) encourage regional systems and confirm governorate responsibility; (2) focus the follow-on project on fewer villages in order to develop more effective water/wastewater systems; (3) improve system design by requiring pre-feasibility studies and developing standard designs and training; (4) improve system capacity by adding water storage and standby diesel pumps to village systems and

by providing tools and O&M training to village operators; (5) initiate a leak detection program; (6) drop requirements for water meters and expand revenue by increasing connections and charging standpipe user fees; (7) increase TA significantly; and (8) develop a national health education program on water use and sanitation.

The Mission comments that the evaluation has been of great help in evaluating the rural water systems supported by project funds, rather than simply the use of those funds. The evaluation's recommendations on wastewater disposal have generated a pilot project to test six wastewater management systems in 20 villages, and other recommendations have been incorporated into planning for the follow-on activity.  
(Author abstract, modified)

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PD-AAG-322-C1 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=24483  
EVALUATION OF THE MIDDLE MANAGEMENT EDUCATION PROGRAM (MMEP)  
PILOT

ACTIVITY (FINAL REPORT)

Coopers and Lybrand Associates, Ltd.

Aug 1980, 32 p. + annex

Evaluation period: 1 Oct 1978-29 Feb 1980

2630042

2630090

AID/OTR-C-1773

Evaluates pilot project to educate key middle management business personnel in Egypt. This special contracted evaluation, which is attached to PES (PD-AAG-322-B1), covers the period 10/78-2/80 and is based on document review and interviews with project and Egyptian business personnel and with trainees.

Mainly because the terms of cooperation between the contractor, Southern Illinois University (SIU-C), and Egyptian counterpart institutions were not clearly defined at the project design stage, many key Egyptian institutions did not participate in the program. As a result of this failure, which should be avoided in future projects, SIU-C's contract was modified and the program was basically carried out in the United States through academic training at the SIU-C campus and practical internship at U.S. businesses. Key elements of the original program, in-country and country-specific education, never materialized.

Ninety-six representative businessmen participated in the program, which focused on improving individual skills in the areas of U.S. political, economic, and business environment, and generally approved

both it and SIU-C's performance. Suggestions for improvement include greater efforts to ensure that participating U.S. businesses parallel participants' home organizations; more emphasis on decisionmaking; reduction in classroom matter; and ensuring that all students are on the same level. While the project benefitted individual participants, it had little impact on Egyptian management training institutions because of their non-participation.

The project design, while correctly linking manager to environment, incorrectly assumed Egypt would soon possess a U.S.-type business environment; while in fact the public sector will likely remain dominant in Egyptian business for some time. Thus the project provides no basis for a USAID/E long-term management development program. It is recommended that such a program combine individual and organizational renewal within existing legal, sociopolitical, and institutional constraints and that host country institutions participate in project design and implementation.

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PD-AAI-711 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=41  
Evaluation of the Cairo University/Massachusetts Institute of  
Technology technological planning program  
Hubbell, Robert L.; Arnold, Henry A.; Walker, Eric  
Jul 1980, v, 40 p.  
Evaluation period: Dec 1976 - Jul 1980

2630061

Contract evaluated: AID/NE-C-1291

Evaluates project to institutionalize at Cairo University (CU) a capability to strengthen the ability of Government of Egypt (GOE) ministries to perform development research. Evaluation covers the period 12/76-7/80 and is based on a review of project documentation, site visits, and interviews with CU, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and GOE personnel.

The project's hypothesis -- that if tripartite MIT/CU/GOE teams research a developmental problem, a fruitful collaboration in development research between CU and GOE will be institutionalized -- generally proved true although the extent of institutional change varied among research teams. Despite administrative changes in the project participants, the four project targets were accomplished: (1) tripartite research team reports yielded practical results -- eight of the 13 projects have led to at least one action decision in GOE ministries; (2) an estimated 40-50 CU faculty, 230 students, and as many as 350 Ministry personnel received some research-related training;



A total of 96 managers (recruited ad hoc by SIU-C after the project planning council failed to establish a pool of potential trainees) eventually participated in the program. Most trainees felt that they had increased their knowledge of modern management techniques and of functional areas such as marketing, finance, accounting, and computer sciences; case studies and management simulation games were viewed as most beneficial.

It is recommended that the internship program be made more uniform and that participating U.S. companies be required to have a business paralleling that of the participant; the amount of classroom material be reduced or more time be allotted to cover it; learning materials be provided in advance; and that prerequisite courses be offered to ensure all trainees are similarly equipped. Other recommendations are to allow host-country officials to participate in contractor selection (to obviate implementation problems encountered by SIUC due to its not wholly credible image); have U.S. contractors establish counterpart relations prior to the project; and ensure that trainees are proficient in English.

Future programs (which should not be long-term) should combine efforts to improve individuals apart from their organizations and to help organizations become more effective within environmental constraints.

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PD-AAP-130 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=29355  
Evaluation report : applied science and technology research  
Stone, Clinton A.; Kehr, August; et al.  
6 May 1980, ii, 45 p.

2630016

Evaluates project to improve the institutional capability of the Egyptian science and technology community to develop and manage research programs. Special evaluation covers the period to 5/80.

Program progress is commendable. Increased Egyptian capability to develop and manage applied research programs is already observable and this program has the potential for continued and greater contributions to that goal. Ten projects have been identified and all but two are underway. The Academy for Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT) and the National Research Center (NRC) have organized, managed, and implemented applied research programs in the following areas: instrumentation, management training, phosphate ore utilization, wool scouring, corrosion in the petroleum industry, Red Sea fisheries,



extension the project has picked up momentum. About 200 midlevel and a few senior managers have been trained; the basic course is being taught by Egyptians in Arabic for the first time; and an enthusiastic, though small, Egyptian staff is gaining experience. However, the task of institutionalizing the ASIP method is far from complete. Preparation of an Egyptian reference book on agriculture management is also far behind schedule, but a small collection of "Successful Practices" is being assembled.

Several factors have contributed to the project's deficiencies. The project design was "Egyptianized" too late and at too low a level. Contractor capabilities did not meet the scope of the project, especially the research aspects (needs assessment, identification of successful practices, and development of the reference book); at least one team member should have had a clear grasp of ASIP methods and a good working knowledge of Arabic. Inadequate supervision by AID/W caused confusion in communications. Because the project has not been institutionalized in terms of the Ministry of Agriculture budget, it has been handicapped in both planning and staffing by uncertainty about available funds. There has been no systematic assessment of the project's impact on actual management practice. Activities complementing training, e.g., follow-up and consulting work, need strengthening. Most importantly, the project has made little effort to involve top-level and lower-level (e.g., cooperative managers) personnel.

Recommendations are made for a follow-on project which would incorporate a comprehensive results-oriented management development program.

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XD-AAI-795-A Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=48  
Poultry improvement project, section I, preliminary evaluation report  
Mathtech  
Compendium of reports, poultry improvement project, v. 1, 24 Apr 1980, 17  
p.  
Attached to PD-AAI-795  
Evaluation period: Aug 1978 - Dec 1979

2630060

Evaluates project to help Egypt expand poultry meat and egg production. Initial evaluation, conducted by USAID/E, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), and the contractor (MATHTECH), covers the period 8/78-12/79 and is based on a review of project documents and the first two interim reports.

Despite logistical, administrative, and especially communications and transportation problems, the failure to include all relevant government entities in the Project Paper, the lack of qualified MOA data specialists, and major difficulties in identifying central sources and finding accurate data, the project is on schedule and on budget and has achieved its goals on a much broader scale than planned. Project teams have: developed an econometric model; reviewed poultry production (in Upper, Middle, and Lower Egypt), the poultry disease problem, MOA breeding programs, and the General Poultry Company (GPC); completed the initial phase of the sector analysis; and developed major recommendations in each of these areas. Effective use of these instruments depends on improved participation by the MOA.

On the debit side, administrative and site selection problems have delayed expansion of the poultry breeding/hatching farms at Fayoum, Sakha, and Inshas, so that this component cannot be completed on schedule. Also, the need for remedial English-language training has delayed participant training, which was assumed by the University of Georgia after the University of Florida failed to adapt the unsuitable curriculum originally proposed.

Rapid sector changes have eroded many project assumptions and increased the need for a national poultry plan.

The project has taught that in implementing a project of this type, nothing should be taken for granted. All data should be double checked and information should be acquired from as many sources as possible. Also, the resident administrative team should arrive on site at least 1-2 months before the consulting team and administrative and logistics systems need to be developed before work can begin. When a project encompasses an entire sector as this one does, supportive industries and ministries also need to be included in the planning process.

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XD-HAD-340-E PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=36676  
Applied science and technology program in Egypt, evaluation of  
project 263-0016  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Feb 1980, 33 p., Ref. no. JCC 5-1  
Attached to PD-HAD-340

2630016

Evaluates project to upgrade the Government of Egypt's (GOE) institutional capacity to conduct scientific and technological research



Evaluates project to create a capability at Cairo University (CU) to conduct, in cooperation with Egyptian ministry personnel, applied research relevant to development goals. Special evaluation covers the period 12/76-2/80 and is based in part on interviews with personnel from Egyptian ministries, CU, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the contractor.

The project has achieved most of its objectives. Fourteen collaborative research projects have been developed by MIT faculty, their CU counterparts, and various ministries, focusing on: (1) energy: a project to provide personnel capable of long-term investment planning for the electric power system; (2) manufacturing: projects to strengthen engineering technology and to analyze the effect of government policy on small private industry; (3) public works: recommendations and guidelines for public agencies concerned with housing; identification of housing problems; studies of urban and intercity transportation and of groundwater reservoirs; development of water planning models and a model for operating the Aswan Dam; programs in crop irrigation and agriculture drainage planning; and (4) socioeconomic development: projects in rural communications, labor migration and manpower planning, health delivery systems, and improved sectoral and macroeconomic planning. The research projects have had an impact upon larger programs underway in Egypt and many recommendations have already been implemented.

Through these research efforts, and through workshops, conferences, seminars, and extensive publications, the project has increased awareness of the value of cooperation between ministry and academic personnel, upgraded the technical quality of CU faculty, established solid professional relationships between MIT and CU faculty, and developed a nucleus of people who can contribute to the resolution of development problems. Progress has also been made toward institutionalizing a framework for exposing decisionmakers to research in project/program evaluation. A Development Research and Technological Planning Center has been established at CU to solve developmental problems, support technological development, and provide a capability for rapid retrieval of essential data.

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PD-AAM-437 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=25144  
PL-480 Title III evaluation : basic village services, Egypt  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Feb 1980, 56 p.

2630103

263016102  
263K60502

Evaluates P.L. 480 Title III Basic Village Service (BVS) project to strengthen the capacity of local Egyptian governments to support rural development. Special evaluation covers the period 3/79-2/80 and is based on document review, site visits, and discussions with project and participating bank officials.

The project has progressed according to schedule (i.e., better than normal in projects of this type), although some objectives, particularly those regarding coordination among Egyptian agencies and popular participation in local projects, are so broadly defined that full achievement is not possible. Funds from sales of P.L. 480 grain have been distributed to governorates and villages in a timely manner. In 1/80 work began on 235 projects for 365 villages in 3 governorates. In Fayoum Governorate, canal lining is proceeding well and road improvement projects have begun. Water, sanitation, and biogas projects will start shortly in Fayoum, where all projects are expected to be completed on schedule. Sharkia and Sohag Governorates are limiting themselves to potable water and road projects.

The local projects are oriented toward social development as opposed to increased production, but water, sanitation, and road projects will have indirect but positive effects upon human productivity. For traditional projects, design, financial management, construction, and audit services have been adequate; there may be special design problems with more technical projects, e.g., those involving irrigation control or erosion. The Organization for Reconstruction and Development of the Egyptian Village (ORDEV) has implemented the project satisfactorily, but reporting has been slow.

Recommendations are to: (1) continue the project and expand activities to 8 more governorates as planned; (2) strengthen village and governorate-level implementation capabilities through an evaluation and training program; (3) require more rigorous analysis of projected benefits and distribution of benefits before approving local projects; (4) select a random subset of projects for intense cost-benefit analysis; (5) develop baseline data on the presence of potable water, roads, canal lining, etc.; (6) include more production-oriented projects; and (7) determine whether additional funds could be used next year, and if so, how.

Dimick, Niel A.; Wahby, Hussein; Quenemoen, Eugene  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
1980, [6] p. + attachments, PES no. 263-81-2  
Attachment: XD-AAI-560-A  
Evaluation period: Sep 1976 - Nov 1980

2630017

Evaluates project to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation (MOI) and to develop improved irrigation and water management methods. Special PES covers the period 9/76-11/80 and is based on an attached special evaluation (XD-AAI-560-A).

Excellent progress has been made in some areas. The chief achievements have been the creation of a well trained, field-oriented, interdisciplinary Egyptian water use research team and development of a methodology for conducting on-farm irrigation and research. The contractor has fielded a full complement of highly motivated advisors. The Egyptians, however, have questioned the contractor's extensive use of short-term advisors.

Despite these generally promising achievements, project objectives will not be met due to delays in initiating water budget studies and conducting water practices field trials, failure to demonstrate crop yield increases resulting from water management changes, and, most significantly, failure to test delivery canals. These shortfalls are due to the contractor's emphasis on research rather than application of results. Considerable agronomic research having little relevance to project purposes was conducted. In addition, project findings were not distributed to Egyptian agencies.

Because the project is well designed and has produced considerable institutional achievements, it is recommended that an optimal action program for the project's last phase be developed in order to provide the MOI with the information needed to determine future irrigation investments. Action decisions are to extend the project, add additional funding, and modify the logical framework.

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PD-AAC-020-A1 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=23529  
STRENGTHENING RURAL HEALTH DELIVERY PROJECT  
BRITANAK, R. A.; STECKEL, W.; et al.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
23 Jun 1979, 50 p., USAID/Egypt 79-1  
Evaluation period: 1 Sep 1977 - 31 May 1979

2630015

EVALUATES, FROM 9/77 TO 5/79, GRANT TO MIN OF HEALTH (MOH) OF GOVT OF EGYPT (GOE) FOR RURAL HEALTH PROJECT TO IDENTIFY AND VALIDATE BY FIELD TESTING REPLICABLE METHODS TO RELIEVE CONSTRAINTS ON MOH DELIVERY OF HEALTH SERVICES. EVALUATION, CONDUCTED BY USAID PROJECT COMMITTEE TOGETHER WITH GOE AND CONTRACTS PERSONNEL, WAS BASED ON PROJECT DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING PREVIOUS EVALUATIONS.

DUE TO THE EXISTENCE OF IBRD POPULATION PROJ IN MINIA GOVERNORATE, THE SIMILAR ASSIUT GOVERNORATE HAS REPLACED MINIA AS TEST SITE,

WHILE INPUTS HAVE GENERALLY BEEN SATISFACTORY, THERE HAVE BEEN DELAYS IN COMMODITY PROCUREMENT DUE TO LACK OF SPECIFICATIONS, AND ADDITIONAL CENTRAL STAFF, FIELD, AND EGYPTIAN CONTRACT PERSONNEL ARE NEEDED TO PERFORM LOGISTICAL DUTIES FORCED ON CORE STAFF. REMEDY IS BEING SOUGHT FOR INABILITY OF GOVERNORATES IN TEST AREAS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE VEHICLE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR. DECISION ON WHETHER TO MODIFY OR DISCONTINUE TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE (TAC) PROVIDED FOR IN PP WILL BE MADE AFTER SECOND TAC MEETING.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND PROJECT WILL BEGIN ON SCHEDULE 7/80. FIRST TRANCH OF VEHICLES HAS ARRIVED AND BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO ADDRESS TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM, AND SERVICES OF EGYPTIAN SPECIALISTS ARE BEING SOUGHT TO SURVEY THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. AN IN-COUNTRY TRAINING MANUAL FOR FIELD HEALTH PERSONNEL HAS BEEN PRODUCED AND 166 OF THE LATTER HAVE RECEIVED TRAINING, ESP IN BASIC SKILL. PARTICIPANT TRAINING IN US HAS ALREADY BEEN PROVIDED FOR 3 SHORT-TERM TRAINEES, WITH 3 MORE SHORT-TERM AND 6 LONG-TERM TRAINEES SCHEDULED SHORTLY. A MAJOR PROBLEM IN THIS AREA HAS BEEN THE ENGLISH DEFICIENCY OF POTENTIAL TRAINEES.

WHILE GENERALLY STILL VALID, ORIGINAL PROJECT GOAL, PURPOSE, OUTPUTS, AND BUDGET NEED TO BE REVISED TO INCLUDE BENEFICIARIES OF MOH SERVICES, WITH CONCENTRATION ON A FEW SPECIFIC HEALTH PROBLEMS. ANY PP CHANGE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE MADE ONLY AFTER TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF PROJECT SCHEDULED FOR 9/80.

LESSONS LEARNED INCLUDE NEED FOR MORE ORIENTATION AND PLANNING TIME FOR CONTRACTORS.

APPENDED TO PES (PD-AAC-020-A1) ARE TAC REPORT AND 3 OH QUARTERLY REPORTS. PES 79-1.

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PD-AAG-322-B1 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=24482  
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT EDUCATION PROGRAM (MMEP)  
RILEY, JAMES B.; MOUSTAFA, N.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
1979, 1 p., USAID/Egypt 80-10  
Evaluation period: 1 Oct 1978 - 31 Dec 1979

2630042  
2630090  
2630005

Evaluates pilot project to educate key middle management business personnel in Egypt. Evaluation, the final one for the project, covers the period 10/78-12/79 and consists of a PES facesheet attached to a special outside evaluation (PD-AAG-322-C1) on which it is based. It is noted that because the project as originally designed could not have served USAID/E's long-term management development goal, USAID/E decided to redesign the project in light of the recommendations made by the special evaluation team. It is also noted that, again in light of the special evaluation team's recommendations, USAID/E will prepare a project paper for a follow-on project (Management Development for Productivity -- 263-0090).

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PD-AAC-265-F1 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=23145  
EGYPT : PHASE 1 OF A PROJECT CONCERNED WITH POPULATION INFORMATION,  
EDUCATION, AND COMMUNICATION (11/6/78-12/17/78)  
PIET, DAVID L.  
American Public Health Association  
17 Dec 1978, 13 p.

Evaluation period: 30 Sep 1977 - 6 Nov 1978

2630029  
AID/PHA/C-1100

EVALUATES POPULATION INFORMATION, EDUCATION, AND COMMUNICATION PROJECT FROM 9/30/77 TO 11/6/78 IN EGYPT. PROJECT PURPOSE IS TO PROMOTE INCREASED AWARENESS AND MOTIVATION TOWARD FAMILY PLANNING (FP) AT ALL LEVELS OF SOCIETY, AND THEREBY INCREASE DEMAND FOR FP SERVICE OFFERED BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH. PROJECT BOOK WAS EXAMINED AND INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED.

ACTIVITIES TO: 1) SURVEY THE POPULATION & FP INFORMATION, EDUCATION, AND COMMUNICATIONS (IE&C) SITUATION, 2) BRIEF THE STATE INFORMATION SERVICE (SIS) ON VARIOUS IE&C PROGRAMS, 3) ASSIST SIS DEVELOP AN INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION MEDIA PLAN, AND 4) DEVELOP INITIAL PLANS FOR SHORT-TERM TRAINING REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THE PROJECT HAVE MET WITH LITTLE SUCCESS. NEITHER FORMAL SURVEYS OR EXTENSIVE CONCRETE PLANNING HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED. SIS IS NOT ASSUMING ENOUGH IE&C INFORMATION, EDUCATION, AND COMMUNICATION RESPONSIBILITY. NO FORMAL STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO FORM THE NECESSARY SIS FP COMMITTEE. A GREAT DEAL OF WORK TIME HAS BEEN LOST SINCE BOTH THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION & IE&C UNIT STAFF HAVE HAD LITTLE TIME TO DEVOTE TO THE IE&C PROJECT. THE FUNDS PROVIDED BY THE IDA POPULATION PROJECT FOR THE PRODUCTION OF FP EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS WERE NEVER USED. FURTHER, THERE IS AN ACUTE SHORTAGE OF EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, AND IE&C LEADERSHIP.

DESPITE DRAWBACKS SEVERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS HAVE BEEN RECENTLY FILLED, FP ACTIVITIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED BY SEVERAL ORGANIZATIONS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF EGYPT, THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION HAS RECEIVED THE ASSISTANCE TO PUBLISH A SERIES OF 6 TEACHER'S GUIDE BOOKS CONCERNING HUMAN POPULATION, AND SIS HAS REQUESTED THE IE&C UNIT TO ATTEND A 3-DAY WORKSHOP ON MASS MEDIA & FP.

EVALUATION RECOMMENDS THAT: 1)SIS FURNISH USAID THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTATION TO FINALIZE FUNDING, 2)COMPLETE RENOVATIONS FOR ADEQUATE OFFICE SPACE, 3)ENCOURAGE ALL IE&C MEMBERS TO ATTEND THE MASS MEDIA FP WORKSHOP,AND DEVELOP A COMPLETE,FLEXIBLE,COMMUNICATION PACKAGE ON FP; AND 4)THE IE&C UNIT RECEIVE A ONE WEEK ORIENTATION COURSE AND ACQUAINT THEMSELVES WITH THE FP SITUATION IN EGYPT.

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PN-AAS-361 Special Evaluation(22) Rec\_no=33809  
Returned participant evaluation  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
Nov 1977, 38 p. + attachments

This evaluation of A.I.D.'s participant training program in Egypt focuses was based on completed interviews with 142 of 177 returnees. The report contains a descriptive profile of the returnees and treats in detail the extent to which they are using and transmitting the knowledge gained through training. Recommendations are made in the areas of training design, trainee selection, pre-departure preparation, and follow-up services. (Author abstract, modified)

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PD-AAC-015 PES/ES(21) Rec\_no=22291  
Ismailia power plant  
Brown, Donald S.; Patalive, Charles J.  
USAID. USAID Mission to Egypt  
12 Jun 1977, 1 p.  
Evaluation period: 1 May 1976 - 31 May 1977

2630009

5/76 - 5/77

PROJECT WAS ON SCHEDULE. MAJOR CONTRACTOR, GILBERT ASSOCIATES, LEFT CAIRO,EGYPT IN APRIL 1977 AFTER AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED WITH THE EGYPTIAN ELECTRICAL AUTHORITY ON THE PROJECT'S BASIC DESIGN. GILBERT ASSOCIATES WAS PREPARING THE INVITATION FOR BID DOCUMENT TO BE ISSUED IN SEPTEMBER 1977. A TURNKEY CONTRACT WILL THEN BE AWARDED IN MARCH 1978. THE NEXT MISSION EVALUATION WILL BE IN MAY 1978.

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