STOCKTAKING OF REFORMS
IN AGENCY OPERATIONS

SURVEY ANALYSIS

May 1998

(edited version February 1999)

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**(for the Stocktaking Team, through USAID/PPC/CDIE/PME's
Performance Measurement and Evaluation IQC, Delivery Order 1)**

Note: This report could not have been written without the collaboration and painstaking design, administration, and analysis of the entire Stocktaking Study Team, including

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Preface

The stocktaking survey was designed December 1997-January 1998, administered February 1998, and analyzed April-May 1998. The survey was conducted by a six-member study team, which included three USAID staff in PPC—Liz Baltimore (Results Oriented Reengineering—ROR), John Haecker (Center for Development Information and Evaluation—CDIE), and Peggy Schultz (ROR)—and three contractors—Larry Beyna, Chanya Charles, and Jerry Harrison-Burns. The team received valuable guidance from the larger Stocktaking/Diagnostic Team (whose members came from all over USAID/Washington) and that team's sponsors, Terry Brown (AA/M) and Tom Fox (AA/PPC). Stocktaking/Diagnostic Team members were Bill Bacchus, Gerry Britan (convenor), Richard Byess, Hariett Destler, Diane La Voy (convenor), Hiram Larew, David McCloud, Susan Merrill, Tony Pryor, Larry Tanner, Jim Vermillion, Ralph Williams, and Frank Young. In addition, Nancy Hutchins (M/Information Resources Management—IRM) provided invaluable and timely technical support; Jim Vermillion (PPC/Democracy—DEM), crash analytical support; the Agency's e-mail system administrators in the field and in Washington, critical logistical support; and Stacy Stacks, Vicky Michener, and Judy Light of the Performance Measurement Team of Management Systems International (MSI), expert editorial assistance. The response to the survey from USAID staff in Washington and the field was incredible. The team is grateful to all who contributed.

I. INTRODUCTION

"USAID is going through a cultural upheaval."

The USAID staff survey analyzed in this report was part of a larger effort to take stock of program operations "reengineering" in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Agency-wide reengineering officially began in October 1995, but various reforms had been implemented in some parts of the Agency on an experimental basis dating back to 1993. In response partly to Vice President Al Gore's National Performance Review and partly to a strongly felt need for change from within USAID, reengineering has engendered an array of reforms in how the Agency does business, including the adoption of key core values (customer focus, managing for results, staff empowerment and accountability, teamwork and participation, and valuing diversity), major changes in development program operations (strategic planning, achieving results, and monitoring and evaluating performance), and new operational tools and systems (performance-based budgeting, management information systems, and reporting through the Results Review and Resource Request (R4) system).

"We are a long way from being able to judge the relative merits of reengineering, as we have not successfully implemented the principles. It is time to fully implement the principles and utilize the tools at hand to begin achieving RESULTS."

In November 1998, the Agency Administrator asked the Assistant Administrators (AAs) in the Management (M) and Program and Policy Coordination (PPC) Bureaus to commission a review of the status of program operations reengineering. They were asked to take stock of the reforms to date and recommend actions for aligning Agency practice with reengineering principles. Accordingly, the AAs established a Stocktaking Team of about 15 senior and mid-level managers from USAID/Washington and charged it with reviewing progress to date, diagnosing problems, and recommending practical measures for improvement.

Assisted by a study team of six staff and contractors, the Stocktaking Team first established a conceptual framework of reengineering, referred to as a "reengineering results framework" (see Figure 1) and a set of indicators for assessing the status of reengineering reforms and measuring progress over time (see tables in Section V). Using the results framework as a guide, the team mounted a three-pronged stocktaking effort: (1) an extensive review of documents on the Agency's experience with reengineering, (2) a series of focus group discussions and interviews of Agency staff and partners, and (3) a survey of Agency staff to obtain their perceptions, opinions, and recommendations regarding reengineering in USAID/Washington and the field.

Figure 1: USAID Reengineering: A Conceptual Results Framework



This report presents the results of the survey. Section II, which follows this introduction, describes how the survey was developed and administered. Section III summarizes what is known about the 580 Agency staff who responded to the survey. Finally, Section IV presents a "snapshot" of reengineering as seen through the eyes of survey respondents, and Section V, a detailed analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data collected. Sections IV and V are organized according to the four Intermediate Results (IRs) presented above. Quotations from the survey are *presented in boxes* throughout the report.

> *"Very good tool. Remember, in attitude surveying, one must always see to it that the respondents get the final results as quickly as possible."*

The final survey question asked for comments on the stocktaking survey. More than 60 staff responded. A small number (14) felt that the survey was biased, too long, too confusing, or not expansive enough. However, more than half (36) expressed very positive reactions. Some appreciated the opportunity to express their views; others suggested that more such staff surveys be conducted, and others felt the exercise was good for staff morale. Several respondents (13) believed that the survey, and the stocktaking effort as a whole, should not end with data collection and analysis: the results should be shared with staff, and, most important, they should lead to significant *action* on the part of the Agency's leadership.

> *"It is great to ask for opinions; it is even*

A Mosaic of Staff Perceptions and Opinions—Excerpts from the Stocktaking Survey

"USAID is a wonderful Agency with the best of purposes. Through it all, I firmly believe that. I feel sad (trite but true) to see us still in such a limbo trying to reestablish our identity and integrity when, post Cold War, we have so much we could accomplish."

"I have worked for 18 years in this Agency and have loved my job; but I and many others feel beaten down by Washington bureaucracy and overkill on layers of process, duplication in the office structure, SO [strategic objective] teams, and program objective teams; much as we talk about managing for results, we don't yet."

"The problems...stem from perceived lack of commitment to reengineering at the top."

"It is interesting that we have to relearn what we knew as children—that two heads are better than one. For years, we have worked and been rewarded as individuals, so it will take time to change our thinking."

"There is too much rhetoric in USAID about GPRA [the Government Performance and Results Act], proving results to Congress, etc. We should be encouraging our staff and partners to improve their programs overall, not just for Congress (which gives very mixed messages as to whether it's even interested in performance in foreign aid)."

"Do away with all the buzz words and acronyms."

"Never forget that organizations are either bureaucratic or virtual reality oriented, and the combinations between these two basic structures do not work well."

"Sometimes I think that people hide behind reengineering in order to cover up for their lack of a clear direction....We have become so process-oriented and bureaucratic that we have lost the meaning of what USAID was created to do."

"Fully implement reengineering, especially in Washington."

"Reengineering and our new results orientation have improved the Agency's operations, but at a cost—everyone is tired and fearful of more change. The Agency must work to foster stability and continuity."

"We have reengineered ourselves into a ditch: RIFed [laid off through reductions in force] too many FSOs [foreign service officers] to pay for a non-functional computer system; forced reduced staff to feed redundant systems; disempowered and blamed the employees for the failures; and then claimed success in front of Congress. Perfect."

"The Agency has barely survived the Congress's attempt to abolish it. Nevertheless, the operational changes undertaken are positive vis-a-vis core beliefs and may improve our chances of survival. Stay the course! Feedback must continue and enthusiasm must be sustained."

"I think that reengineering has been a disappointment. The Agency (the emperor without clothes) has never really asked those most involved whether they feel we are better off. Rather than positive, reengineering is most often black holes of time and energy."

"Continue the reengineering process. Get our main stakeholder, Congress, on board...."

II. APPROACH

Survey Design

The survey design was based primarily on the four Intermediate Results (IRs) of the results framework (see Section I). Several performance indicators were identified for each IR to create a "snapshot" of the status of the reforms, and the study team was charged with collecting data on those indicators. The indicators and accompanying data are provided in tables in Section V.

> *"The survey seems to be programmatically biased. I would have asked more basic questions such as: Has reengineering resulted in any real changes or improvements in the way your mission operates?"*

The survey was intended to yield a *snapshot* of the status of reengineering, not a *picture* of change and progress. As the first of its kind, the survey provides the Agency only with *baseline* data against which change and progress can be measured in future surveys. Since no survey was conducted prior to the implementation of reengineering, it is not possible to assess *progress*. Indeed, a small minority of survey respondents expressed the opinion that some things have gotten worse since reengineering. Also the survey did not ask respondents to say whether things had changed since the beginning of reengineering but focused only on the substance of reengineering in the here and now and advice for making improvements in the future.

The study team developed a 67-question survey, a copy of which is in Appendix 1. Forty-five of the questions were multiple-choice, 22 were open-ended, asking for details, examples, comments, and recommendations. The 67 questions can be categorized as follows:

Questions 1-6. Information about the respondents: sample to which the respondent belonged (sampling will be discussed later), employment status (U.S. direct hire–USDH, foreign service national–FSN, U.S. third country national–USTCN, resource support services agreement–RASA, participating agency services agreement–PASA, fellow, or technical advisor for AIDS and Child Survival–TAACS, institutional contractor, or other), locale (field or USAID/Washington), geographical region (for people responding from the field), time employed by USAID (under two years, two to five years, or over five years), and managerial status (non-manager, managing up to 10 people, 11-50, and over 50). These were multiple-choice questions to be answered by all respondents.

Questions 7-17. IR 1 – Empowered staff and teams accountable for results: perceptions of the extent to which individuals and teams are empowered, held accountable, and given incentives to manage for results as well as the extent to which they have made significant decisions relating to their work. Eight questions were multiple-choice, and three were open-ended. As in all questions that asked respondents for a rating, the choices were "don't know or does not apply to me," "not at all," "hardly at all," "to some extent," or "to a great extent." The open-ended questions asked for hindering and facilitating factors and recommendations for improvement. All respondents were asked to answer all 8 questions.

Questions 18-33. IR 4 – Responsive and flexible approaches for implementation: perceptions of the accessibility of approaches and information and the utility of Agency tools, tactics, processes, and systems to help staff and teams achieve results (e.g., strategic planning, the new management system (NMS), procurement, and Agency culture). Thirteen of these questions were multiple-choice, and three were open-ended, asking for hindering and facilitating factors and recommendations. All respondents were asked to answer all of these questions.

Question 34. Operating unit (OU) and strategic objective (SO) team identifiers: respondents were asked to identify themselves as OU heads, OU deputy directors, heads of OU program offices/functions, SO team leaders, SO team activity managers, SO team members, or none of the above. On the basis of their answers, respondents were divided into three groups for most of the remaining questions: the three OU sub-groups answered questions on IR 2 and IR 3 from an OU perspective, and the three SO sub-groups, from an SO team perspective.

These identifiers were used so that only respondents with direct experience in program operations would answer questions about customer and partner involvement, development program decision-making on the basis of performance information, and the results framework (Questions 35-65). The intent was to identify differences in perceptions between staff who generally are not serving on SO teams (but ought to know about SO team operations, namely, the OU respondent group) and those who are (namely, the SO respondent group).

Respondents who did not belong to OU or SO sub-groups skipped Questions 35-65.

Questions 35-43, 47-57, and 63-65. IR 2 – Addressing development needs through customers and partners: perceptions of the use of customer and partner input into strategic planning, assessments of partners' financial contributions to USAID strategic objectives, a few additional questions about program activities for SO respondents only, and perceptions of the effectiveness of the results framework as a tool for program operations. Fourteen questions were multiple-choice, and nine were open-ended, asking for examples and recommendations.

Questions 44-46 and 58-62. IR 3 – Results-oriented decision-making: perceptions of the extent to which program decisions (at the strategic level for both OU and SO sub-groups and at the activity level for SO team members) are based on performance information. Three questions were multiple-choice, and four were open-ended.

All respondents answered the two final questions.

Question 66. Advice to the Agency Administrator: how to move Agency practice closer to principle in the areas covered by the survey.

Question 67. Additional comments on the stocktaking effort and the survey.

Raosoft™, an e-mail survey software, was used in the survey to promote wide participation and ease of analysis. Respondents received and responded to the survey via the local area network (LAN), and the study team was able to analyze the data directly from the LAN responses, thus avoiding the laborious task of transferring responses to a data base. With ease of analysis, however, came some limitations, as follows.

(1) Some sub-groups of respondents were inadvertently allowed to answer questions not intended for them. Several "skips" were written into the survey. These automatically skipped some survey questions for certain respondents on the basis of their answers to prior questions. The skips worked as they were supposed to, but respondents were allowed to move *back* through the survey, and some who did answered questions not intended for them. This did not happen very often, but it distorted the results slightly.

(2) Respondents were allowed a limited amount of space to answer the open-ended questions. Some respondents wanted to write longer answers and were obviously frustrated in not being allowed to do so.

A draft survey was pilot-tested in USAID/Washington, first with paper and pencil and then with the e-mail format. On the basis of the tests, several questions were eliminated to decrease the amount of time needed to complete the survey (and increase the rate of participation). In some cases, questions were clarified.

Survey Samples

The survey was administered to three samples: random, targeted, and open invitation. For the random sample, which was initially intended to serve as the source of baseline data, every tenth name on the Agency's January 1998 e-mail list of 8,317 names was selected. Lists or generic e-mail boxes were eliminated, reducing the sample to 783. When the list was converted to an e-mail list specifically for the survey, about 35 names with unusable e-mail addresses were dropped. Later, when the first notice of the survey was sent, another 40 names were dropped because the e-mails were undeliverable. Finally, about 10 were found to be the names of institutional contractors, not USAID staff. Eventually, the random sample consisted of 700 Agency staff.

The targeted sample consisted of 50 individuals in USAID/Washington and the field who were considered particularly knowledgeable on the basis of their prior experience with reengineering reforms. The sample included individuals who worked on the program operations business area analysis during the inception of reengineering or on in-country experimental labs when reengineering was being tested or on developing the new Agency guidance, and so on. The sample included ten mission directors, one deputy director, three deputy assistance administrators, ten foreign service nationals (FSNs), and five U.S. Personal Service Sub-Contractors (USPSCs). Fifteen of these staff were located in USAID/Washington and 35 in the field.

The open-invitation sample included any other persons who wanted to take the survey. All Agency staff were informed through e-mail that the survey was available and invited to take it.

Survey Administration and Response Rates

On February 11, 1998, the random and the targeted samples were notified that they had been selected and were asked to participate. They were subsequently sent the survey via their own offices' LAN systems and follow-up reminders to participate. The actual dates on which potential respondents first received the survey varied. All potential respondents were given at least three weeks to respond. The survey was closed on March 4, 1998.

The data on response rates are not precise, partly because some respondents did not indicate their sample type (Question 1) and partly because some apparently erred in identifying their type. Though only 50 were included in the targeted sample, 66 responses identified themselves as belonging to the targeted group.

This much is known:

! **A total of 580 responses were received.** The few duplicate responses received were eliminated, but there was a lack of time and resources to investigate why duplicates were received, and the study team's lack of facility with the software (or perhaps the software itself) would have made it difficult to do so.

! **Approximately 50% of the 580 responses were from the random sample, 12% from the targeted sample, and 38% from the open-invitation sample**. These estimates are based on the 546 responses to Question 1 for which sample types could be determined. (Thirty-four could not be identified as to sample type.)

! **The response rate for the random sample was approximately 41%**. This was calculated as follows: 272 respondents who identified themselves as random sample members plus 17 additional respondents (50% of the 34 unidentified respondents) divided by 700 (the approximate number in the random sample). A response rate in the range of 35-45% is, by most accounts, considered very respectable.

! **The response rate for the targeted sample must be estimated but it was probably high.** At least 16 of the 66 people who said that they were in the targeted group were incorrect, but others may have incorrectly identified their sample type. Some of the 50 in the targeted group were contacted informally to see if they had participated in the survey. From their reports it may be concluded that the response rate for this select group was good.

Data Analysis

Table 1: Comparison of the Random Sample with the Total Sample on Selected Characteristics

	Random	Total
Employment Status		
Number	270	559
USDH	44%	48%
FSN	39%	35%
USPSC/TCN	9%	11%
RASA, PASA, Fellow, TAACS	4%	3%
Other	3%	3%
Locale		
Number	272	572
Field	67%	66%
Washington	33%	34%
Region		
Number	187	388
AFR	25%	28%
ANE	30%	26%
ENI	12%	17%
LAC	29%	27%
Other	3%	3%

The initial intent of the survey was to use the random sample of respondents as baseline data. (The other samples were expected to yield additional data.) However, data from the random sample turned out to be quite similar to the entire sample in terms of respective percentages of staff sub-groups, as shown in Table 1. For example, in the random sample, 44% of the respondents were USDHs, 39% were FSNs, 9% were USPSCs and TCNs, and so on; whereas, in the total sample, 44% were USDHs, 35% were FSNs, 11% were USPSCs and TCNs, and so on. Therefore, the study team decided to use the data from the *entire* sample, rather than just the random sample, for the purposes of this report.

Regardless of the sample type, those who wanted to respond to the survey did, and those who were reluctant were not pressed to respond. Therefore, there is no good reason to believe that the total sample is any less representative of USAID staff than the random sample. Nor, on the basis of some spot analyses, is there any good reason to believe that responses from the total sample are more or less positive than responses from a strictly administered random sample would have been.

Staff responded to 60 specific questions about reengineering, of which 39 involved multiple-choice responses that lent themselves to quantitative analysis. In analyzing the responses to those questions, the study team first looked at data from the entire sample and then looked for differences among groups disaggregated by:

- *locale*,
- *employment status*,
- *time in the Agency*, and
- *managerial status*.

The summary data from these analyses are presented in Appendix 2 and discussed in Sections IV and V.

The open-ended questions were analyzed according to content. The results of this analysis are reported in Sections IV and V.

III. SURVEY RESPONDENTS

A total of 580 e-mail responses to the survey were received. Responses to Questions 2-6 and 34 give a fairly good picture of the respondents. The picture is not complete, however, because some respondents chose not to answer certain survey questions that asked for information about them. Much of what is known about the survey respondents is laid out in Table 2.

Table 2: Characteristics of Survey Respondents

Question	Category	Proportion	Number
Q.2. Employment Status (n=559)	USDH	48%	270
	FSN	35%	195
	USPSC/TCN	11%	61
	RASA/PASA/Fellow/TAACs	3%	19
	Other[1]	3%	14
Q.3. Locale (n=572)	Field	66%	380
	Washington	34%	192
Q.4. Region (field staff only) (n=388)[2]	AFR	28%	109
	ANE	26%	99
	ENI	17%	67
	LAC	27%	103
	Other[3]	3%	10
Q.5. Time in USAID (n=564)	Two years or less	15%	83
	Two to five years	18%	100
	More than five years	68%	381
Q.6. Managerial Status (n=557)	Non-manager	68%	379
	Manage up to 10 staff	16%	91
	Manage between 11 and 50 staff	11%	62
	Manage more than 50 staff	4%	25
Q.34. OU/SO Team Level (n=540)	OU Head	9%	48
	OU Deputy Director	3%	15
	OU Program Office Head	6%	31
	SO Team Leader	9%	51
	SO Team Activity Manager	12%	67
	SO Team Member	21%	112
	None of the above	6%	31

[1] Respondents were not asked to specify their choice of “other,” but at least some probably were institutional contractors.
[2] This number is higher than the 380 field staff in Q. 3. Some non-staff individuals may have taken the survey and answered Q. 4 but not Q. 3.
[3] Respondents were not asked to specify their choice of “other.”

IV. A SNAPSHOT OF ALL SURVEY FINDINGS

Snapshot of All Survey Findings

This section presents a general picture of the status of reengineering based on USAID staff responses to the stocktaking survey. As such, it contains only the highlights of the findings. A more detailed analysis is given in Section V.

The "snapshot," which is organized according to the four IRs of the reengineering results framework, concludes with a summary of staff recommendations for USAID's Administrator.

IR 1: Empowered Staff and Teams Accountable for Results

For reengineering reforms to succeed, individuals and teams in the Agency must be empowered to make decisions to achieve agreed-upon objectives. The survey posed questions about *empowerment* to make decisions, *accountability* for managing for results, *incentives* to manage for results, and *decision-making* about how to achieve results. "Empowerment" is defined as giving people sufficient authority, resources, etc. to do their jobs effectively. "Accountability" refers to judging people's use of authority and resources to plan for achieving results, implement their activities, and monitor and evaluate their progress in a responsible manner. "Incentives" are positive consequences people can expect if they demonstrate that they are managing for results. Finally, "decision-making" includes making and implementing decisions affecting the choice of approaches or use of resources.

> *"In my experience, there has been too much micro-management for empowerment...to work well. Empowerment can't work without a letting go of power by someone. It can't be all kept in the hands of the Mission Director or team leaders."*

> *"In AID/W, we have a serious problem with actually delegating authority. There are too many levels, too many decision makers, and little accountability."*

The Big Picture: More Accountability than Empowerment. In general Agency staff feel that they are empowered as individuals and teams "to some extent" and they and their teams, "to some extent" make significant decisions about how to achieve the results for which they are accountable. However, the data also suggest that staff, as both individuals and members of teams, feel that their levels of empowerment and decision-making are not commensurate with the higher levels of accountability to which they are being held. Furthermore, staff believe that their units and offices do not do much in the way of providing incentives to them, as individuals or as teams.

> *"The weakest principle is incentives, due to the (lack of) latitude in practical terms of offering any. The real incentive is being empowered to do good development work which has measurable results."*

Differences among Groups. The picture shows some fairly consistent differences among sub-groups. On all but one of the questions for this IR, staff in the field give higher average ratings than those in USAID/Washington. Compared with Washington staff, field staff generally see both themselves and their teams as more empowered, more accountable, and as having more incentives for managing for results. On the issue of decision-making, field staff see themselves as less involved than USAID/Washington staff, but see their teams as more involved.

> *"We have a common vision articulated and a clear set of values, and a well-defined strategy. With this framework there is considerable latitude to determine how one achieves*

For the survey analysis, respondents were divided into three groups on the basis of employment status: USDHs, FSNs, and all others (USPSC, RASA, PASA, Fellow, and TAACS, refered to as "USPSC et al."). As a group, FSNs see themselves as considerably less empowered, held accountable to a slightly lesser extent, and having made significant decisions to a considerably lesser extent than their USDH colleagues. However, they have a greater sense of receiving incentives for managing for results as individuals. With teams, the story is somewhat different. FSNs rate not only team incentives but also team empowerment, accountability, and, to a very slight degree, decision-making higher than USDHs. There is no consistent pattern for USPSCs et al., but as a group they do not give any of the indicators for IR 1 the highest rating.

The picture for field staff by region is not particularly clear. The staff from either the ANE or the LAC region give the highest rating to all but one of the eight multiple-choice questions. (However, some of the differences are very slight). The one exception is the ENI staff which gives the highest rating for individual incentives.

Presence/Absence of Management Commitment and Support from Two Survey Respondents:

"I had a supervisor who treated his staff as valuable resources. He also did not make us feel we were inferior to him. He was very open to suggestions, quick to explore other possibilities. He encouraged creativity. He was also a good teacher. He believed in sharing information with everyone."

"The DAA took personal charge of a team, managing all the details and making even the minor decisions herself. Even the counsel of the

The Presence and Absence of Effective Teamwork from Two Survey Respondents:

"We had established a team with a very specific, clearly identified goal. We had different people on the team with the right balance of experience, knowledge and enthusiasm. Mission management had confidence in the judgment of team members, working as a group."

"(1) Lack of delegation to teams and team members; (2) lack of integration of team members into the team; (3) lack of properly defined roles in teams; (4) dual structures in missions and confusion as to where the

How long an individual has been in the Agency does not make much difference in his or her views on team empowerment, team accountability, and individual and team decision-making. However, staff with relatively less time in the Agency report feeling less individually empowered and accountable, yet with more access to incentives, than those with more time.

"I have noted no changes in incentives since reengineering was instituted. Incentives remain the same—either a strong EEP [employee evaluation plan] or a less strong EEP. What other incentives

Finally, in general, non-managers feel less empowered as individuals and teams, less individually accountable, less provided with individual and team incentives, and report having made significant decisions as individuals and teams to a lesser extent than most of the sub-groups of managers. The only exception, and the difference is slight, is in the area of team accountability. Where managers score higher than non-managers, high scores do not appear to be concentrated in any one of the managerial groups (i.e., managing 1-10 persons, 11-50, and over 50).

The Presence and Absence of Effective Empowerment from Two Survey Respondents

"I empowered myself, was totally ready to be held accountable for the outcome and made a quick decision. Doing my job well is the incentive I have for taking such a risk."

"No authority to be creative was granted. I was told to do it one way or

Factors Supporting and Constraining IR 1. The survey sends a number of strong messages about what helps or hinders application of the key managing-for-results principles of empowerment, accountability, incentives, and decision-making and what should be done to improve the situation. The strongest message is that Agency management must demonstrate commitment and support—and action, not just talk—for these principles, starting with the very top, down through senior and middle managers to the level of supervisors and team leaders. Another clear message is that the Agency needs to work on building skills in and understanding of teamwork, encouraging managers to empower their staffs and to refrain from micro-managing them, and training in managing for results at *all* levels, but especially at the program management level.

IR 2: Addressing Development Needs through Customers and Partners

Under IR 2, and for purposes of the survey, "customers" are defined as individuals or organizations who receive USAID services or products, benefit from USAID programs, or are affected by USAID actions. The focus is on the ultimate recipients of USAID's programs. "Partners" are organizations or their representatives with whom USAID works cooperatively to achieve mutually agreed-upon objectives and intermediate results. To address development needs most effectively, both partners and customers must be involved.

"Customer orientation is an organizational culture thing, and has to grow in

The Big Picture: Moderate Use of Information from Customers and Partners in Strategic Planning and Development Activities. Overall Agency staff and teams have, to some extent, been using information from both their customers and partners to *develop and modify their strategic plans*. This is true of both staff at the OU level—i.e., directors, deputy directors, and chief program officers—and staff at the SO level—i.e., team leaders and members and activity managers. However, SO team staff report that they have been *planning and modifying their development activities* on the basis of customer feedback to a lesser extent (but closer to "some extent" than to "hardly at all").

It is unclear why there is a difference between customer input in strategic plans and development activities. One explanation may lie in the survey questions themselves. The question about strategic planning asked for a rating for "the past year;" whereas the question about planning activities asked for a rating for "the past six months." It was considered reasonable to base the question on one year of experience for strategic plans and six months for development activities, since, as a general rule, strategic plans are reviewed and revised less often than program activities.

"Reengineering has changed attitudes toward customers and partners. This is a

The snapshot shows that only half of the respondents directly involved in program operations are able, with a high degree of confidence, to estimate the level of their strategic partners' financial contributions to USAID's programs. This is equally true of SO-level staff *and* OU-level staff, who might be thought to be in a better position to know more about partners' financial contributions. This troubling finding raises questions about how well program staff know what their partners are doing in relation to USAID's development programs.

Readers should be careful not to read too much into these findings about customers and partners. Many of the comments received suggest that many staff do not make as strict a distinction between "customers" and "partners" as the survey did. These terms are also confused in other contexts (e.g., in training sessions and strategy development workshops), and sometimes an individual or organization can be seen as both a customer and a partner.

"Involving customers and partners takes

Differences among Groups. Notable differences exist among sub-groups of Agency staff. As with the other IRs, one of the most prominent differences is between staff in the field and staff in Washington, with staff in the field reporting considerably more use of customer and partner input. Arguably staff in the field are generally more involved in programs that rely on customer and partner information and have more access to their customers and partners than staff in Washington. However, it should be remembered that these findings are based on responses solely from OU and SO team staff, who are all working in programs that involve customers and partners. While it may be more difficult for USAID/Washington staff to obtain information directly from customers and partners, that does not lessen the importance of getting and using such information.

"(When it comes to customers and partners), transparency, honesty, and

At the SO level, compared with their USDH colleagues, FSNs and USPSCs et al. consistently report higher use of customer and partner information. This is not true at the OU level, but the finding is based on a very small sample of FSNs or USPSCs et al. who are OU directors, deputy directors, or chief program officers.

Only slight differences may be found among staffs in the four geographical regions, except that LAC staff consistently report the highest use of customer and partner information, at both the OU strategy level and SO-team level. LAC OU-level staff give use of partners' input to adjust their OUs' strategic plans one of the highest ratings in the entire survey; and LAC SO-team-level staff report relatively high use of customer input into adjusting SO strategies.

"Missions and operating unit managers need to be freed up somewhat from constant...reporting requests from USAID/W...to afford them time to think...(and to) visit

Among staff with different tenures in the Agency, the most notable differences are that at the SO-team level, use of customer and partner information appears to be inversely related to years of experience in USAID. In other words, staff with the least time in the Agency report more use by their teams, and those with more time report less.

Finally, at the OU level, managers of more than 50 persons report greater use of both customer and partner information than other staff. Middle managers (of 1-10 persons and 11-50 persons) report less use, and non-managers even less. This part of the picture seems reasonable. One might expect that the more senior the manager, the greater his or her sense that the OU is acting on customers' and partners' input. At the SO-team level, no senior managers report use (which stands to reason, as there are few, if any, senior managers on SO teams). The picture is mixed with respect to the other sub-groups.

"Involve customers and partners throughout the process of development assistance, from strategy...to

Information Sources. The most common source of information from both customers and partners is regular meetings and site visits. Other fairly common sources of information are focus groups and planning workshops for customers and telephone conversations, e-mail messages, and planning workshops for partners. Partners are almost twice as likely to belong to an SO team as customers; surveys are used twice as often with customers as with partners. Staff cite a variety of unusual sources of customer and partner input, including, for example, the media, proposals from partners, town meetings, and unsystematic informal discussions in person and on the phone. This suggests that staff are hearing more from their customers and partners (and presumably listening to them more) than might be reported in R4s and other reports.

"Our customers now are largely field Missions. We've amended projects to accommodate a Mission request. In the present environment, with the intense concern over management units, any extra procurement action is frowned on. But it's the right thing to do."

Respondents' examples of how they use customer and partner input provide texture to the survey snapshot. Input is used in deciding to direct program attention to a new area; to change whole strategies or intermediate results; to drop, add, or change activities; to design results packages; and so on.

How to Increase Customer and Partner Involvement—A Few Views

"Insist on participatory approaches to monitoring and evaluation."

"Mission leadership must require it."

"Clarify conflict of interest for partner collaboration."

"More time and funds for travel outside the office."

"Program office must build it into design."

How to Increase the Achievement of IR 2. According to survey respondents, a number of actions should be taken to align principles and practice in putting customer and partner information to use in program operations. The Agency should provide more clarity, guidance, and flexibility regarding working relationships with customers and partners, most notably in the area of procurement restrictions, to avoid conflict of interest with partners. More attention should be given to creative as well as tried-and-true ways for increasing dialogue. The Agency's leaders and mid-level managers should stress the importance of working with customers and partners through support and example. And management should provide more resources, especially time and travel money, to staff who want to interact more with customers and partners.

IR 3: Results-oriented Decision Making

USAID is striving to focus more on results in planning, implementing, and monitoring and evaluating development programs. Especially important is the increased use of results data by SO teams in making decisions about program strategy and activities. This was the focus of the eight survey questions on this IR: three questions for individuals who identified themselves as OU directors, deputy directors, or chief program officers; and five for those who identified themselves as SO team leaders, members, or activity managers. The results framework itself was the subject of three questions asked of both groups.

The Big Picture: Making Decisions on the Basis of Performance Information. According to the survey data, SO teams are making decisions on program strategies and the allocation of resources on the basis of performance information. But OU-level program managers are making considerably greater use of such information. Almost two-thirds of the OU group say that SO teams used performance information to make results framework or resource decisions at least two times during the year preceding the survey, but slightly less than half of the SO-team group could say the same.

"(Underlying) this (question) is an assumption that SO teams make decisions that are not based on performance, which I believe is false. Performance is now 50% of the SO's ranking. It is very important and constantly considered."

The difference between the groups is apparently in perception rather than actual behavior. Both groups were asked about SO team use of performance information, and, presumably, most of the respondents in both groups were thinking of the same SO teams. From the specific examples provided, it appears that some of the OU group were thinking of their own decisions as well as team decisions. If so, it stands to reason that their responses would be stronger than those of their SO team colleagues.

"We noticed that our indicator on national institutions was not doing well and decided, for the present, to dedicate fewer resources to this area (while recognizing other major donor support in this area) so as not to jeopardize the development

Another interesting fact is that 23% of the OU group and 28% of the SO team group respond that they "don't know"—interpreted as not being able to estimate—the number of instances in which SO teams made decisions based on performance information. This inability to estimate may be understandable in light of the many factors that go into decision-making, such as the availability of resources, political considerations, earmarks, etc. However, it also suggests that results-oriented decision-making may not be in the forefront of people's minds.

"There is pressure not to make changes in the results frameworks or indicators, given the efforts to which the mission teams went to get USAID/W approval during the R4 process—even when results/facts suggest a change."

If the standard is lowered from two instances to one instance of the use of performance information by SO teams in the last year in making strategic decisions, the percentage of OU-level program managers reporting use of performance information increases from 66 to 71% and that of the SO-team-level managers, from 50 to 70%. These results show consistency between the two groups.

"Bean counting (i.e., we counted the number of organizations that networked around shared problems) was turned into impact tracking (i.e., we now count the number of viable partnerships around shared

Similarly, the snapshot reveals that half of SO-team managers report that their teams used performance information to confirm or adjust their program activities two or more times during the past six months. (OU-level program managers were not asked about this. Also, the timeframe was *six months*, as explained earlier.) If the standard is lowered to one or more times, the percentage rises to slightly more than two-thirds of the SO-team-level respondents.

Differences among Groups. As with most other aspects of the survey, perception of decision making differs dramatically depending on staff locale. More than twice as many program management staff in the field (at both the OU and SO levels) as staff in Washington report two or more instances of the use of performance information in strategic decisions, and one and a half times as many field staff as Washington staff report the same in activity-level decision making.

No notable differences are found among types of employees or among staff with differing Agency tenures. Differences among regions are minimal, except that considerably fewer staff in the LAC region report using performance information to make either strategic or activity-level decisions than their colleagues in the other regions. Finally, the percentage of staff reporting information-based decision making generally increases with the level of management responsibility.

Three Examples of Activity-Level Decision Making

"Based on our field findings, we decided to include some men in microenterprise programs, as most programs currently involve women, and an imbalance seems to be appearing."

"Quality data from a nutritional surveillance project was used to reduce the number of sentinel points surveyed. By reducing the number of sentinel points, the activity is much more likely to be sustainable when our development support funds are no longer available."

"We decided that we are willing to cut off a grant to the ___ if we do not see specified progress in the next six months."

Examples of Decision Making. Specific settings for decision making include meetings with partners, R4 review sessions, team meetings, and annual field program reviews. Performance information is obtained from survey data, monitoring data from partners, informal assessments, data on key performance indicators, performance audits, consultations with customers, project data, pilot project findings, and so on. Examples of decisions include terminating non-performing activities, revising the focus or intermediate results in results frameworks, canceling grants, shifting resources from less productive activities and strategies to more promising ones, redesigning or dropping results packages, redefining targets, putting more performance pressure on USAID-funded partners, and many more.

> *"Spend less time figuring out what to report to*

How to Increase the Achievement of IR 3. Two of the most prominent suggestions for increasing SO teams' use of performance information in decision making are to develop better monitoring and evaluation systems and practices and to increase the flexibility of Agency systems connected with results-oriented decision making. Additional recommendations focus on increasing partner and customer involvement in obtaining and using performance information, developing better and more flexible indicators, and providing more training, incentives, resources, and leadership for results-oriented decision making.

> *"We CONTINUALLY adjust activities on the basis of performance information. The sources of this information most likely are the often subjective judgments of colleagues and counterparts in the field or else second-hand data sources. We don't have resources for*

> *"The reward for perfor-mance has to be real. The perception remains that there is little that ties rewards or punishments to*

The Results Framework as an Effective Tool. The people closely involved in program management (both OU-level and SO-team-level staff) generally agree that the results framework is an effective tool for helping SO teams accomplish development results. Also, the analysis shows that the level of agreement is consistent between the two groups.

As for sub-group differences, field staff are much more positive about the results framework than USAID/Washington staff; FSNs are considerably more positive than their USDH and USPSC et al. counterparts; ENI staff are much less positive than their colleagues in all the other regions; staff with less than two years of experience in the Agency are much more positive than those with more experience; and senior managers are considerably more positive than other managers or than non-managers.

> *"Teams need to be given the time to implement things before being held accountable for the results. Forcing a look every year when the results are proposed for a 5-8-year period creates additional bureaucratic work and suggests that teams are not really empowered."*

> Three Views of the Results Framework
>
> *"The results framework forces us to articulate our assumptions and try to understand the relationship between our goals and what we do to reach those goals. It helps us avoid overlapping and counter-productive activities and predict where our biggest obstacles occur."*
>
> *"There is no evidence to suggest that the results framework corresponds to the actual needs of the developing country. Rather, the rigidity of the framework probably causes the writers to eliminate, underestimate, or overestimate their goals simply to fit them into the framework."*
>
> *"Results frameworks are so new they haven't stood the test of time. Time will prove the level of their effectiveness."*

Respondents who believe that the results framework is an effective tool cite a variety of reasons for their opinion. The results framework is seen as useful (compared several times to the project-level logical framework) in mapping out where a program and an SO team are going, communicating program strategy and expectations with partners and customers, guiding the design and implementation of program activities, and serving as a guide for assessing program performance. Although the data show more agreement than disagreement about its effectiveness, the results framework has many critics. Some see it as being too complex for staff and partners to understand; others feel it is too simple to capture the dynamics and complexity of development strategies; and still others think it is too time-consuming, for the value that it adds to development planning, or too measurement-oriented, at the expense of sound strategy and implementation.

How to Improve the Results Framework. Many survey respondents say that the results framework should be made simpler and more flexible by stripping it of jargon and letting people improvise how they define and organize the results they are trying to achieve. Others think that staff and partners need more training in how to use the results framework and more examples of well-conceived frameworks. Finally, many argue for more participation—by staff, partners, and customers—in the development and use of the results framework.

IR 4: Responsive and Flexible Approaches for Achieving Results

For reengineering reforms to succeed, program operations approaches must be responsive and flexible, and Agency approaches must enable timely and effective achievement of results. "Approaches" are the tools, tactics, processes, and systems used in program operations (planning, achieving results, and monitoring/evaluating performance). Each manager and work team must have access to all the information needed for achieving results.

"Involving customers and partners takes time."

The Big Picture: Some Agency Approaches Are Working Better than Others. Agency staff are generally not very satisfied with the Agency's approaches, but they feel that certain approaches are helpful. Staff rate the contribution of automation-communication (i.e., e-mail, internet, web) halfway between contributing "to some extent" and "to a great extent" for improving their ability to achieve results. This is the highest rating on the entire survey. Far below automation-communication, but still relatively positively regarded, are organizational arrangements (i.e., offices, operating units, teams), strategic planning (including customer planning, results frameworks, etc.), agency human resources (number of staff, skills, etc.), and performance measurement (monitoring, evaluation, reporting). These approaches have ratings just under "to some extent."

Three Views of Responsible/
Flexible Approaches

"There are no responsive and flexible tools. We have taken away from agency personnel the tools they were familiar with and knowledgeable about, and exchanged them for something similar yet different, so you spend too much time trying to learn new tricks."

"We've always had tools that could be made to work well. Restructuring around results has made them less unwieldy and available, perhaps, to more USAID staff."

"We have been able to cut the amount of time for developing and beginning a new activity to six months—a significant improvement over the past, when it would take 18 months."

Agency approaches most heavily criticized are automation-MIS (the New Management System—NMS), agency culture, and procurement (acquisition and assistance—A&A, performance-based contracts, contracts, grants, etc.). The contribution of automation-MIS was given the lowest rating on the entire survey, just under "hardly at all"; procurement and agency culture fall close to the halfway mark between contributing "hardly at all" and "to some extent."

Three other Agency approaches are rated as contributing "to some extent" in the achievement of results: program implementation organizing approach (results packages, projects, activities), resource allocation, and agency directives and guidance.

"I think you should completely junk the 'automated' systems and start all over again, this time listening to

Access to Information. Staff give relatively positive ratings to access to information. This received the second most positive average response of the 13 questions on Agency approaches. Although respondents' comments suggest that much could be done to make information more accessible (i.e., handier, more readable, and more usable)—especially policies, directives, and guidance—it appears that needed information can be obtained.

Differences among Groups. There are fairly consistent differences among sub-groups. Field staff rate all but one of the 13 quantitative survey items for this IR higher than USAID/Washington staff. The only exception is automation-MIS, which field staff rate slightly lower than Washington staff. Reasons for the higher field ratings are a matter of speculation, but one possibility is that field staff may have more hands-on experience with the approaches. In addition, some of the respondents' comments and examples indicate that certain types of staff and offices—e.g., procurement staffs—are responding more flexibly and in a more customer-oriented way to those in charge of implementing programs and activities than to those in Washington.

"A member proposed a way to reduce the time to process a grant from seven months to three. His idea was discussed by the team, and accepted. The 'front office,' through delegation of authority, allowed the team to carry out the task. A new implementation

"In designing a new activity, a team of FS-01 officers—including contracts, legal, technical, program, and PDO--worked together using old process and new principles. The result was lauded for being fast, innovative, and reengineered. It took historical knowledge and open minds."

FSNs, as a group, seem considerably more positive about the Agency approaches and information than their USDH and USPSC et al. colleagues. FSNs rate *every one* of the 13 scorable items for IR 4 higher than USDHs and all but one higher than USPSCs et al. Given the field-Washington differences, it stands to reason that FSNs (all of whom are field staff) would be generally more positive about Agency approaches for achieving results than all USDHs (many of whom are in USAID/Washington). However, it is worth noting that USDHs seem generally more positive than their USPSC et al. colleagues, most of whom are in the field. The sharpest contrasts between FSNs and their USDH and USPSC et al. colleagues are in their responses on automation-MIS (NMS), strategic planning, Agency directives and guidance, and Agency culture.

"Our operating unit is under-staffed, under-equipped, under-funded, and not fully empowered to implement

As to region-specific differences, the general picture is that ENI staff are relatively less positive than those in the other regions, and ANE staff are positive about more approaches than their counterparts. ENI staff give very low marks to procurement, program implementation organizing approach, performance measurement, and Agency human resources compared with their colleagues in the other regions. ANE staff give higher marks to automation-MIS (NMS), Agency directives and guidance, resource allocation, Agency culture, and Agency human resources than staff in the other regions. LAC and AFR staff see strategic planning as more helpful than ENI and ANE staff.

"AID/W needs to move to a collective responsibility for requirements placed on the field and has to think of missions as clients. There has always been a large disconnect between FM, OP, HR, G and regional bureaus on any number of issues. Keeping guidance simple and in one place would help."

There is one quite consistent difference based on length of time with the Agency. On all but one of the 13 survey items for IR 4, staff who have been in the Agency for less than two years give higher average ratings than their colleagues who have been around longer. Staff with under two years' experience in USAID are more likely to feel that the Agency generally provides useful approaches and access to information than their colleagues. They give the top rating ("to a great extent") to all approaches except strategic planning and are markedly more positive about automation-MIS (NMS) and somewhat more positive about organizational arrangements, Agency culture, resource allocation, program implementation organizing approach, and Agency directives and guidance. In one area, strategic planning, staff with two to five years' experience in USAID are the most positive.

"This is a cultural thing; if the managers of resources and senior managers believe in flexibility it will happen. I've been blessed to be in an environment for my whole time in

Noteworthy differences exist between non-managers and managers. Compared with all their colleagues, senior managers (those managing more than 50 persons) are considerably more positive about the utility of Agency culture in achieving results, somewhat more positive about Agency human resources, and considerably less positive about the program implementation organizing approach and automation-communication (e-mail, etc.). Compared with all managers, non-managers are considerably more positive about automation-MIS (NMS), somewhat more positive about Agency directives and guidance, and a bit less positive about access to information. Managers of 11-50 persons are considerably more positive about strategic planning and resource allocation, less positive about Agency approaches in general, and somewhat more positive about procurement than all managers.

"In other departments, it was clear (1) what the priorities and strategies were from senior management, (2) they were set by those who knew enough so that they were not inconsistent with the situation on the ground I had to manage, and (3) when

Factors Supporting and Constraining IR 4. Staff had a lot to say about the factors facilitating and hindering the responsiveness and flexibility of Agency approaches. According to survey respondents, things work well when (1) there is effective communication and information-sharing (particularly through communications technology and on teams), (2) staff are given the license to be innovative and creative and to stretch the rules a bit, (3) people are really collaborating on teams, (4) staff receive support from management (both their supervisors and top managers), and (5) guidance is available, clear, and

"There remain in the Agency some individuals who follow orders well, do not think for themselves, and are paralyzed by choices and responsibility. When they are part of the decision or action stream, they can

consistent. Agency approaches do *not* work particularly well when (1) there are problems with Agency processes and tools (especially the procurement process and the NMS), (2) guidance and rules are confusing, and (3) people avoid accepting responsibility or taking risks, lack trust and courage, and so on. Also mentioned, but by fewer respondents, are lack of management support for new approaches and tools (especially by authoritarian managers at various levels) and lack of communication and information-sharing, both of which are the inverse of positive factors.

According to survey respondents, to increase the utility of its approaches, first and foremost, the Agency should concentrate on getting management on board. Respondents appear convinced that managers, from senior officials on down the line to those in team leadership positions, must start "walking the talk" of reengineering. The Agency should also focus on clarifying its guidance and the many terms that have entered the reengineering lexicon, making more training available to all staff (management training for the managers, technical and administrative training for staff, and joint training of managers and staff in appropriate areas), increasing opportunities for information-sharing (particularly on what works well and what does not), and correcting problems with certain processes and making them more reengineering-friendly (especially the procurement system in the field and in Washington and the budget system).

"So much was left open to individual missions to figure out for themselves...that we have spent an inordinate amount of time creating the wheel. Standard Operating Procedures have been replaced

"We need a culture of results management that starts from Washington, goes to the Front Office, down to teams, and is reflected in employees' work objectives. Reengineering has let 1000 flowers bloom. Some are roses, some are weeds. It's time to cut away the weeds and replicate roses."

Advice to the Administrator

This snapshot ends with observations and thoughtful suggestions drawn from the responses of approximately 400 Agency staff. Not all comments and recommendations can be captured here, but several messages stand out.

"Walk the talk. Don't let Washington or Mission

First, and above all else, USAID staff are asking the Administrator to take charge of making Agency practice consonant with the principles of reengineering, first, by "walking the talk" himself—in everything he does and says—and, second, by demanding that his senior managers—the Assistant Administrators, Deputy Assistant Administrators, Mission Directors, and Office Directors—do the same. He should hold them accountable for practicing the principles themselves and for holding their managers responsible, and so on down the line.

"Reengineering in many offices is only lip service, with centralization of authority more the rule at all levels than decentralization. [can't type more than 6 lines here - much

Second, the Administrator should ensure that more authority is delegated from Washington to the field, from senior managers to mid-managers, from office directors to teams, from USDHs to FSNs and PSCs, and, in many cases, from authoritarian team leaders to team members.

Third, the Administrator should talk with staff even more than he does already. He should observe reengineering first hand—in the offices of USAID/Washington and out in the field. He should walk the halls as well as "walk the talk."

"The Administrator needs more feedback from the working level, so that he can encourage senior and mid-level management to recognize and allow more initiative in seeking new approaches to longstanding tasks and problems."

"Training, training, training."

Fourth, the Administrator should ensure that staff get the training they need to put reengineering principles into practice. This means training not only for the new entry staff and line staff working in teams, but also for their supervisors, and their supervisors' supervisors, all the way up the line. Training in management, the technical program operations skills—planning, achieving results, and monitoring and evaluation—teamwork, and participatory processes are just a few of the areas training should concentrate on.

"Take an honest look at the incentive structure and how it ACTUALLY works—who is getting rewarded and for what?...Reward GOOD management and professional practices and FIELD

Fifth, the Administrator should revise the Agency's incentives systems, to ensure that they agree with the principles of reengineering. Continuing to reward old behavior or ignoring a staff member's failure or refusal to apply reengineering principles is demoralizing. A key place to start here is with the processes and procedures of the Agency's personnel system.

Agency staff make many more recommendations—some of them very specific—for reform of various agency systems and processes (e.g., procurement, budget, NMS, R4, strategic planning, and so on), for dealing with the world outside USAID (e.g., reductions in earmarks, the authority to budget by strategic objective, and so on), and for changing people's attitudes and behavior (more trust, more accountability, more teamwork, and so on).

"[Do] nothing more. Just leave us be."

"Encourage and reward people for implementing the principles."

V. DATA HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of data are presented in this chapter organized by IR. Quantitative data are summarized in tables; qualitative data, in a brief discussion of the content analysis of responses to open-ended questions. Data are given indicator by indicator—the indicators correspond to survey questions. (Raw quantitative data are summarized in Appendix 2.)

IR 1: Empowered Staff and Teams Accountable for Results

Four major indicators (empowerment, accountability, incentives, and decision-making), with two sub-indicators for each (one for individuals and one for teams), are used to measure progress on this IR (Questions 7-14). While the data are based on the responses of all respondents, the number of respondents varies with each question. In general, fewer people responded to the questions about teams, primarily because quite a few people lacked experience on teams.

Table 3: IR 1 INDICATORS AND DATA FOR ALL RESPONDENTS (Scale: Not at all=0; Hardly at all=1; To some extent=2; To a great extent=3)	
Indicator 1: Perceptions of INDIVIDUAL EMPOWERMENT to make decisions to achieve agreed-upon objectives (Q. 7).	**1.90 (n = 510)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=1.96 Washington=1.81 o USDHs=2.04 FSNs=1.69 USPSCs et al.=1.86 o No notable differences by region o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=1.72 2-5 yrs=1.80 >5 yrs=1.97 o Non-managers=1.70 Manage 1-10=2.19 Manage 11-50=2.38 Manage > 50=2.42	
Indicator 2: Perceptions of TEAM EMPOWERMENT to make decisions to achieve agreed-upon objectives (Q. 8).	**2.06 (n = 432)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=2.18 Washington=1.78 o FSNs=2.11 Others=2.00-2.09 o ENI=2.08 Others=2.18-2.20 o No notable difference by years with USAID o Managers of 11-50=2.35 Others=2.01-2.06	

Indicator 3: Perceptions of INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY for managing for results (Q. 9).	**2.25 (n = 512)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=2.28 Washington=2.22 o USDHs=2.34 FSNs=2.20 USPSCs et al.=2.12 o LAC & ANE=2.33-2.36 AFR & ENI=2.18-2.26 o Years with USAID: 2-5 yrs & >5 yrs=2.29 <2 yrs=2.08 o Managers=2.36-2.51 Non-managers=2.13	
Indicator 4: Perceptions of TEAM ACCOUNTABILITY for managing for results (Q. 10).	**2.19 (n = 428)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=2.28 Washington=1.97 o FSNs=2.34 Others=2.07-2.17 o LAC=2.51 ENI=1.94 Others=2.24-2.29 o No notable difference by years with USAID o Non-managers=2.21 Managers=2.07-2.14	
Indicator 5: Degree to which the offices in which respondents work provided INCENTIVES TO INDIVIDUALS for managing for results in the last six months (Q. 11).	**1.20 (n = 504)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=1.33 Washington=0.94 o FSNs=1.42 Others=1.10-1.16 o ENI=1.47 AFR=1.19 Others=1.30-1.41 o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=1.55 Others=1.05-1.16 o Managers of >50=1.52 Managers of 11-50=1.32 Others=1.13-1.16	
Indicator 6: Degree to which the offices in which respondents work provided INCENTIVES TO TEAMS for managing for results in the last six months (Q. 12).	**1.28 (n = 424)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=1.41 Washington=1.28 o FSNs=1.52 Others=1.09-1.21 o LAC=1.52 ANE=1.41 Others=1.27-1.28 o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=1.59 Others=1.15-1.20 o Managers of 11-50 & >50=1.39-1.40 Others=1.16-1.23	

Indicator 7: Self-reported extent to which INDIVIDUALS MADE AND IMPLEMENTED DECISIONS within the last six months to influence approaches or resources used (Q. 13).	1.97 (n = 493)
Sub-group differences: o Staff in Washington=1.89 Field=1.70 o FSNs=1.79 Others=2.03-2.11 o No notable differences by region o Years with USAID: >5 yrs=1.96 <2 yrs=1.89 2-5 yrs=1.75 o Managers=2.27-2.31 Non-managers=1.84	
Indicator 8: Self-reported extent to which TEAMS MADE AND IMPLEMENTED DECISIONS within the last six months to influence approaches or resources used (Q. 14).	**1.92 (n = 420)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=2.02 Washington=1.68 o No notable difference by employment status o LAC=2.19 ENI=1.80 Others=2.00 o No notable differences by years with USAID o Non-managers=1.86 Managers=1.97-2.19	

Factors That Facilitate and Hinder the Achievement of IR 1. Respondents were asked to identify factors that that made the principles of empowerment, accountability, incentives, and decision-making work well (Q. 15) and those that kept them from working (Q. 16). There were 409 responses to Q. 15 and 397 to Q. 16.

Content analysis revealed three key factors that facilitate or hinder application of the principles.

! ***Management commitment and support* —** 93 respondents offer this as a positive factor, and 101 offer its absence as a negative factor. Examples of positive comments: "a supportive and trusting manager," "leadership," and "when senior managers held the team accountable for results without trying to micromanage the process." Examples of negative comments: "when people who talk the talk do not walk the walk," "lack of leadership/guidance at the mission director level," and "management not really interested."

! ***Effective teamwork* —** 50 respondents offer this as a positive factor; and 57 offer its absence as a negative factor. Examples of positive comments: "team members working toward the same goal" or "the right balance of knowledge, skill and experience." Examples of negative comments: "controlling team leaders," "the good of the individual was placed above the good of the team," and "when there is not a sharing of information and communication among SO team members."

! ***Staff and teams empowered and held accountable* —** 45 respondents mention this as a positive factor, and 38 cite its absence as a negative factor. Positive comments include "allowing team members full responsibility to make decisions and move forward" and "having sufficient training to do my job, resources to research the best approach, and minimum bureaucracy to implement." Among the negative comments are: "teams have been formed but the same management level makes all the major decisions" and "there are no clear guidelines on the extent of empowerment."

A substantial number of respondents cite other factors: *trust* (35), *a good decision-making process* (31), *clear goals and direction* (30), and *delegation of authority* (29) on the positive side and *centralized decision-making and poor decision making process* (25), *lack of delegation of authority* (20), and *lack of resources* (19) on the negative side.

How to Increase Achievement of IR 1. Respondents were asked who needs to do what so that their working experience better reflects the principles of empowerment, accountability, incentives, and decision making (Q. 17). Recommendatins were received from 410 respondents. The most common fell into five categories, except for training and education they mirror major factors identified in Q. 15 and Q. 16. The five categories are listed below with a few illustrative comments.

! ***Management support and commitment*** (128 responses) **—** "Directors and deputy directors need to emphasize these principles to their supervisory staff and follow up to make sure their staff are applying them." "Management needs to stop protecting managers...who only understand how to use disincentives and threats..., do not trust their staff, and who [say] 'damn the process...hit the target—MY target.'"

! ***Teamwork*** (51 responses) **—** "The Agency needs to understand how teams function." "Team leaders need to be more coach-oriented, delegating, sharing information...." "Team leaders must accept that implementation responsibility is still with project and activity managers. Not every decision is a collective decision of the team. Teams are for strategy development, planning, monitoring, not day-to-day implementation."

! ***Training and education*** (39 responses) **—** "More sensitization of senior managers." "Training in program management with the new principles should be offered to all technical staff." "We have totally inadequate management training...[but] even with training there is hardly anyone to DO THE WORK."

! ***Empower people*** (34 responses) **—** "Empower FSNs, especially at the middle level." "Match authority with accountability." "The DAA needs to empower the professional staff to achieve the goals and then step back and let them do it—giving high ranking to high achievers and low ranking to low achievers."

! ***Delegation of Authority*** (19 responses) **—** "The delegation from Washington to the field has to be real; the Mission Director has to delegate authority and responsibility to the teams." "We need to be trusted to make important decisions ourselves."

Additional recommendations include *rewarding and recognizing people* (19); *increasing incentives* (14); *insisting that EVERYONE apply the principles* (12); *clearly defining direction, objectives, and results* (10); *trusting people* (8); and *increasing communication* (8).

IR 2: Addressing Development Needs through Customers and Partners

Seven major indicators, divided into two subsets on the basis of the type of survey respondent, are used to measure this IR.

The first three tap the perceptions of *OU directors, deputy directors, and chief program officers* ("OU-level program managers") with respect to developing strategic plans on the basis of needs expressed by customers (Q. 35) and on the basis of input from partners (Q. 38). Respondents were also asked how their operating units obtained information from their customers and partners (Q. 36 and Q. 39). Q. 41 asked for an estimate, with a certain degree of confidence (Q. 42), of the percent of their partners' financial contribution to implementing their strategic plans. This indicator is a proxy measure of the extent to which informed partnership is really occurring.

The remaining four indicators tapped the perceptions of *SO team leaders, members, and activity managers* ("SO-team-level program managers") with respect to team involvement with customers and partners. The questions are similar to those for the OU-level program manager, except that they involve strategic plan development and modification at the SO level (Qs. 47, 50, 52, and 53). Q. 48, which was for the SO respondents only, asked the extent to which program *activities* have been planned or changed on the basis of customer feedback. This set of respondents was also asked to estimate partner financial contributions (Q. 55) and to rate their degree of confidence in the estimates (Q. 56).

In the analysis of responses to the questions asking both OU and SO respondents for estimates of partner contributions, only those respondents who expressed a high degree of confidence were counted.

The number of respondents varies with each question, since the questions were directed at two different groups.

Table 4: IR 2 INDICATORS AND DATA FOR ALL RESPONDENTS (Scale: Not at all=0; Hardly at all=1; To some extent=2; To a great extent=3)	
Indicator 1: OU-level program managers' perceptions of the extent to which their STRATEGIC PLAN HAS BEEN DEVELOPED OR MODIFIED BASED ON NEEDS EXPRESSED BY CUSTOMERS (Q. 35).	**2.16 (n = 118)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=2.27 Washington=1.93 o USDHs & FSNs=2.17-2.18 USPSCs et al.=1.67 o LAC=2.35 Others=2.20-2.27 o Years in USAID: 2-5 yrs=2.30 >5 yrs=2.15 <2 yrs=2.00 o Manage 11-50 & >50=2.25-2.32 Manage 1-10 & non-managers=2.00	
Indicator 2: OU-level program managers' perceptions of the extent to which their STRATEGIC PLAN HAS BEEN DEVELOPED OR MODIFIED BASED ON INPUT FROM PARTNERS (Q. 38).	**2.31 (n = 85)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=2.42 Washington=2.07 o USDHs=2.36 FSNs=2.00 USPCs et al.=1.50 o LAC=2.81 ENI=2.50 ANE=2.29 AFR=2.07 o Years in USAID: >5 yrs=2.34 2-5 yrs=2.00 (Only one respondent was in the <2 yrs category) o Manage >50=2.58 Other managers=2.26-2.29 Non-managers=2.00	
Indicator 3: The percentage of OU-level program managers able to estimate, at a self-reported level of confidence of "very" or "extremely" confident, the PERCENTAGE OF THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES to their strategic plans being CONTRIBUTED BY THEIR PARTNERS (Q. 41).	**47% (n = 73)**
The e-mail survey software used did not allow computation of sub-group differences for this indicator.	
Indicator 4: SO team-level perceptions of the extent to which their teams' STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE STRATEGIES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED OR MODIFIED BASED ON NEEDS EXPRESSED BY CUSTOMERS (Q. 47).	**2.11 (n=195)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=2.18 Washington=1.84 o FSNs=2.29 Other staff=1.93-1.97 o LAC=2.36 AFR=2.26 ENI & ANE=2.00-2.06 o Years in USAID: <2 yrs=2.41 2-5 yrs=2.15 >5 yrs=2.03 o Manage 11-50=2.27 Non-managers=2.09 (No responses from managers of >50)	

Indicator 5: SO team-level perceptions of the extent to which their teams' development program ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN PLANNED OR CHANGED BASED ON CURSTOMER FEEDBACK during the past six months (Q. 48).	**1.70 (n=187)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=1.79 Washington=1.31 o USDHs=1.51 Other staff=1.74-1.81 o No notable differences by region o Years in USAID: <2 yrs=2.13 2-5 yrs=1.83 >5 yrs=1.56 o Non-managers=1.65 Manage 1-10=1.79 Manage 11-50=2.08 (No responses from managers of >50)	
Indicator 6: SO team-level perceptions of the extent to which their teams' STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE STRATEGIES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED OR MODIFIED BASED ON INPUT FROM PARTNERS (Q. 52).	**2.17 (n=187)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=2.21 Washington=1.97 o USDHs=1.97 Other staff=2.26-2.28 o No notable differences by region o Years in USAID: <2 yrs=2.02 2-5 yrs=2.37 >5 yrs=2.46 o Manage 1-10=2.33 Non-managers=2.13 Manage 11-50=2.00 (No responses from managers of >50)	
Indicator 7: The percentage of SO team-level respondents able to estimate, at a self-reported level of confidence of "very" or "extremely" confident, the PERCENTAGE OF THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES directed toward achieving their teams' strategic plans (either budgeted or actually expended) that was being CONTRIBUTED BY THEIR TEAMS' PARTNERS (Q. 55).	**47% (n=139)**
The e-mail survey software used did not allow computation of sub-group differences for this indicator.	

Table 5 summarizes data on how OU and SO managers obtained information from customers and partners. They were asked to check off as many items as applied from a list of possible sources of information and to cite other sources not on the list.

As shown, two of the most common sources of information from both customers and partners are regular meetings and site visits.

Other sources of information from *customers* cited are *local NGOs that serve or represent customers, informal meetings with selected customers, informal communications, field mission sources* (for USAID/Washington program managers), *reports from contractors, proposals received, monitoring and evaluations, FSN input, the media, fellow donors who track customers, special studies, sector assessments that include consultations, formal requests via letters, interviews, conferences,* and *literature reviews.*

Table 5: SOURCES OF INFORMATION FROM CUSTOMERS AND PARTNERS								
	Sources of CUSTOMER Information				Sources of PARTNER Information			
	OU-Level Program Managers		SO-Team-Level Program Managers		OU-Level Program Managers		SO-Team-Level Program Managers	
Types of Sources	No. of Times Cited by a Respondent	Top 3 Cited	No. of Times Cited by a Respondent	Top 3 Cited	No. of Times Cited by a Respondent	Top 3 Cited	No. of Times Cited by a Respondent	Top 3 Cited
Customer/partner is an SO Team member	19		33		34		62	
Survey	46		61		30		29	
Focus Group	47	*	43		37		44	
Rapid Appraisal	21		34		12		21	
Regular Meetings	50	*	108	*	71	*	138	*
Telephone/e-mail	34		68		49		86	*
Planning Workshops	45		69	*	57	*	82	
Site Visits	60	*	110	*	52	*	97	*
Other	14		21		9		16	

Other sources of information from *partners* include *proposals, periodic meetings, town meetings, reports, correspondence, roundtable discussions, informal communication, joint partner meetings, steering committees, retreats with partners, extended team meetings, sector assessments, discussions with government officials, semi-annual reports, interviews,* and *special studies.*

Examples of Activity Planning or Modification on the Basis of Customer Feedback. Q. 48 asked SO-team-level respondents to indicate the extent to which their development program *activities* were changed on the basis of customer feedback in the past six months, and Q. 49 asked for examples. Nearly 100 examples were received. A small number appeared to refer more to partners, although only customer examples were requested. “Customers” and “partners” cannot be sharply distinguished; both terms can apply to the same entity depending on the process or transaction in question, but in this case respondents were clearly not using the terms as defined under reengineering.

Many of the examples cited refer to the *means* of obtaining feedback or the situations in which feedback is used, rather than true examples of planning or changing program activities on the basis of feedback.

The following are representative of the true examples offered:

- "In the last three months, at the request of the local business community, USAID has engaged in a review of labor law and an analysis of the value-added tax. These were not even blips on our screen six months ago."

- "We finalized the design process for one of the results packages—this resulted from a lot of dialoguing with our customers."

- "Activities have been focused on two towns, referred to as high potential zones, following customer recommendations."

- "We developed a new results package for adolescent reproductive health based on direct input from customers and stakeholders. This is a new activity for us."

- "We are abandoning some services/products and procedures not desired or appreciated by our customers, sometimes to the chagrin of our partners, who were using our resources to accomplish activities they deemed important."

- "We reviewed the results framework with 65 of our potential customers and changed aspects of the RF in response to input."

- "The design of a RP [results package] for one IR [intermediate result] involved monthly meetings with customer representatives. Activities under another IR are being changed as a result of a customer survey."

How to Increase Achievement of IR 2. OU-level and SO-team-level program managers were asked for suggestions of actions that would enable the Agency to live up to its principles regarding customers and partners (Q. 43 and Q. 57). The top five types of advice among the 331 suggestions received were as follows:

- ***Provide more clarity in guidance and definitions and more flexibility in application, especially with respect to procurement and partners*** (44 responses) — Respondents cite such needs as "more flexible procurement rules" and "more clarity on conflict of interest" to allow partner collaboration, "fewer procedural requirements forced on the field," and redefinition of the term "customer" (for example, to include grassroots organizations, or to refer to U.S. taxpayers).

- ***Increase the dialogue with customers and partners, especially through creative ways of communicating*** (34 responses) — The comments here are very general, such as "take the time to continuously consult and involve," or "meet with partners and customers more often."

! ***Increase management's and leaders' support of the core values*** (27 responses) — A few comments: "Top managers need to be sure that there is adequate travel money so that managers can get out there and work with people;" "management must demonstrate how it is addressing the needs of *its* partners and customers;" "strong senior management leadership."

! ***Provide adequate resources, especially OE (operating expenses) resources for travel*** (25 responses) — Respondents' comments center around two themes: "increased staff in the field" and "more OE for travel."

! ***Allow more time for staff to consult with customers and partners*** (23 responses) — Respondents want "more time outside the office for field trips," "greater time in the planning process," and so on.

Other advice centered around *more regular consultation with customers and partners* (12), *more promotion of transparency and trust* (11), *more active listening to customers and partners* (10), *involvement of customers and partners in every phase of the program operations cycle* (10), *more requests for feedback* (9) and *more empowerment of teams and operating units to respond to customers and partners* (9).

IR 3: Results-oriented Decision Making

Three major indicators measure progress on this IR: two deal with the use of performance information by SO teams to confirm or make adjustments in their results frameworks, allocations of resources, or program activities, as reported by OU and SO managers (Qs. 44, 58, and 60). The third major indicator is the extent to which both OU and SO respondents agreed (or disagreed) that the results framework is an effective tool for helping SO teams accomplish results (Q. 63).

The number of respondents varies with each question since some questions were asked of OU or SO respondents only.

Table 6: IR 3 INDICATORS AND DATA FOR ALL RESPONDENTS	
Indicator 1.a: Percentage of OU-TEAM PROGRAM MANAGERS reporting two or more instances in the past year of an SO team CONFIRMING OR ADJUSTING ITS RESULTS FRAMEWORK OR ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES on the basis of performance information (Q. 44).	**64% (n = 69)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=77% Washington=33% o USPSCs et al.=100% USDHs=66% (No FSNs & only 3 USPSCs in respondent group) o AFR & ANE=83% ENI=73% LAC=69% o Years with USAID: >5 yrs=65% 2-5 yrs=50% (No staff with <2 years in respondent group) o Non-managers & manage >50=71-78% Non-managers=71% Others=53-56% (Non-managers are presumably all program officers)	
Indicator 1.b: Percentage of SO-TEAM PROGRAM MANAGERS reporting two or more instances in the past year of their teams' CONFIRMING OR ADJUSTING THEIR RESULTS FRAMEWORKS OR ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES on the basis of performance information (Q. 58).	**47% (n = 147)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=53% Washington=21% o FSNs=53% Others=44-46% o AFR, ENI, & ANE=56-58% LAC=42% o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=56% Others=45-47% o Non-managers=44% Manage 1-10=50% Manage 11-50=60% (No managers of >50 in respondent group)	
Indicator 2: Percentage of SO-TEAM PROGRAM MANAGERS reporting two or more instances in the past six months of their teams CONFIRMING OR ADJUSTING THEIR PROGRAM ACTIVITIES on the basis of performance infomation (Q. 60).	**50% (n = 145)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=54% Washington=35% o All categories=50-51% o ANE=64% AFR & ENI=56-59% LAC=34% o Years with USAID: <2 & 2-5 yrs=56-57% >5 yrs=46% o Manage 11-10=78% Non-managers & manage 1-10=47-50% (No managers of >50 in respondent group)	
Indicator 3: Rating, on a scale of -3 to +3 (scale: strongly disagree=-3; disagree=-1; agree=+1; strongly agree=+3), of extent to which OU and SO managers agree that the RESULTS FRAMEWORK is an effective tool for helping SO teams acheive development results (Q. 63).	**1.17 (n = 271)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=1.31 (a little over "agree") Washington=0.67 (a little under "agree") o FSNs=1.44 Others=0.96-1.07 o AFR, LAC, & ANE=1.37-1.46 ENI=0.76 o Years in USAID: <2 yrs=1.67 Others=1.10-1.12 o Manage >50=1.56 Others=1.11-1.21	

Examples of the Use of Performance Information. Respondents were asked to cite examples of decisions made on the basis of performance information (Qs. 45, 59, and 61). The questions were used as both a check to see if people reporting decisions could actually cite examples—and they could cite many—and as a supplement to the quantitative data.

Forty-two OU respondents and 84 SO team respondents provided examples (Qs. 45 and 59). Not all examples are limited to use of performance information by an SO to confirm or adjust its results framework or allocation of resources. Some reflect decisions on the part of the "front office," but most often they appear to have been taken with the concurrence or recommendation of SO teams. Many involve decisions about activities and projects or about indicators. A few of the examples cited follow:

- "SO 4 was changed to give it a more specific focus on water, as opposed to the broader area of natural resources."

- "Lack of progress on electoral administration led to a change in the framework and change in contractors. The mission recognized that, while electoral administration is not perfect, further improvements could only be realized through greater civil society involvement."

- "We were getting more hard results in EG [economic growth], so when the budget crunch came, we opted for more EG rather than try to 'save' DG [democracy and governance], which was extremely important but much harder to produce hard results."

- "In HIV/AIDS, our SO team was getting poor results in a 'peer education activity.' Analysis showed that greater promise could be attained through another, more intense, behavior change methodology—voluntary counseling and testing. The former program is being shut down and we are moving in the new direction."

- "Several activities/projects were terminated because of inability to clearly influence performance indicators or achieve stated objectives."

- "Our IR team got more resources based on performance factors."

- "A sector assessment and performance monitoring information helped us shift two intermediate results to lower levels of the results framework because we learned they were more means than results."

Sixty-two SO team respondents cite examples in which their team confirmed or adjusted program activities on the basis of performance information (Q. 61). Just about all of these are activity-level examples, but many of them are similar to examples given for Q. 59. Several respondents (not counted in the 62) simply note that their example for this question is the same as for Q. 59. This suggests that some USAID staff do not make a clear distinction between results frameworks and activities when thinking about decisions based on performance information.

Examples cited include “changed the end date of a condition precedent,” “did not renew an agreement,” “terminated an activity,” “deferred certain activities,” “scaled back assistance due to partner’s lack of clear objectives,” and “used lessons learned from pilot projects to refocus activities.”

The Results Framework. As indicated in Table 6, OU and SO team respondents, on average, agree that the results framework is an effective tool for helping SO teams accomplish development results. (The average is 1.17 (on a scale of -3 to +3, with 1.00 reflecting “agreement” and 3.00 reflecting “strong agreement.”) Of those who express an opinion, 87% agree or strongly agree, while 13% disagree or strongly disagree.

Respondents were also asked to give their reasons for agreeing or disagreeing that the results framework is effective (Q. 64). The 251 comments received reflect the common view that the results framework is not only a strategic planning and management tool, but also a tool for measuring results and monitoring activities.

The following comments illustrate the range and depth of positive and negative feelings about the results framework:

- “The results framework keeps us all fiercely on track.”
- “It shows the relationship among the results and the way for evaluating them through specific indicators.”
- “It might be a tool, but it is not as effective as it is supposed to be. The language used confuses everyone—partners, counterparts, customers.”
- “It is very good at helping teams/mission focus and articulate what the common objective(s) is. However, there is no one right way to write the objectives. We spend countless hours reworking the frameworks and indicators to make them near perfect...which isn’t possible.”
- “One can see or understand at a glance what a strategic objective is supposed to do and who are the members [of an SO team]. If well designed, it is self-explanatory.”
- “The time and effort (and general disinterest) in working on such a framework mean that no one wants to change it again—it isn’t a tool, but a corset.”
- “The results framework is all but ignored in this Bureau.”
- “It guides implementation. It facilitates result monitoring. It guides selection of activities. It guides processes.”
- “The world is not as simple as direct cause and effect—the model is too narrow.”

! “Results frameworks seem to force activities into areas that are measurable—with the emphasis on the measurement, not the activity.”

Respondents were asked for suggestions about how to make the results framework more effective. The 212 responses cover many topics, but the three most common pieces of advice are on training, the need for simplicity and flexibility, and more participation in developing results frameworks.

! ***Make it more simple and flexible* —** 32 respondents want the tool to be easier to use. Most of these suggestions are very general, such as “keep it simple.” Examples: “allow greater flexibility to adjust the results framework annually as experience dictates” and “allow flexibility in format and content of frameworks, adapted to specific needs of teams.”

! ***More training and education* —** 22 respondents suggest that training is the key to a more effective results framework. Examples: “we used to have mandatory training on the old log-frame—we need the same on the new RF,” “give examples and patient explanation, walk people through live cases...to support staff’s understanding,” and “TRAINING!—disseminate examples of good ones (I haven’t seen any that I like yet).”

! ***More participation* —** 16 respondents think that there should be more involvement of partners and customers in the development and use of results frameworks. One respondent put it quite aptly: “We need to educate everyone from the janitor to the Mission Director to all NGOs, PVOs, host government, ‘this is why we’re here, and this is how we prove/disprove that the strategic framework is on target.’”

Other types of advice include *developing more understanding of the results framework and related concepts* (13), *making the framework more precise* (11), *providing more resources to develop and use it effectively* (9), *introducing more realism into developing results and objectives* (9), and *disseminating more guidance and best practices about the results framework* (7).

How to Increase Achievement of IR 3. Among the 240 comments received on how to increase the use of performance information, the largest numbers of responses express the need for better monitoring and evaluation systems and practices and more flexibility in USAID’s systems (e.g., budget, program, and activity management).

! ***Better monitoring and evaluation systems and practices* —** 34 respondents suggest that the Agency and its staff need such things as “simpler monitoring tools,” “better, more objective systems for collecting performance information,” “a good system of measuring progress,” and “strict monitoring based on a well-conceptualized plan.”

! ***More flexibility in Agency systems* —** 27 respondents suggest such improvements as “more flexible resource allocation,” “[more of a connection between] budgetary allocations and performance," "flexible assistance vehicles, like umbrella contracts under SOAGs [strategic objectives agreement]," and "multi-year budgets [that could] permit greater flexibility."

Other recommendations include more communication and customer/partner input (14), better and more flexible indicators (13), more reviews and analyses of performance information (12), more resources (especially to collect data and get staff out into the field) (11), better data (11), training and technical assistance in managing for results (10), incentives (10), and leadership and guidance (10). Fifteen respondents feel that they already do a good job of using performance information or that they are on the right track and just need a little more time.

IR 4: Responsive and Flexible Approaches for Achieving Results

Three major indicators relate to this IR: (1) the Agency's approaches for achieving results, (2) the responsiveness and flexibility of the approaches, and (3) access to information needed for achieving results. The second indicator rates 11 specific approaches provided by the Agency.

These data come from Qs. 18-30 of the survey. While the data are based on the responses of all respondents, the number of respondents varies with each question because not everyone had actual experience with approaches for achieving results.

Table 7: IR 4 INDICATORS AND DATA FOR ALL RESPONDENTS
(Scale: Not at all=0; Hardly at all=1; To some extent=2; To a great extent=3)

Indicator 1: Extent to which the Agency has provided APPROACHES respondents need to effectively achieve results (Q. 18).	**1.76 (n = 484)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=1.85 Washington=1.57 o FSNs=1.90 Others=1.65-1.75 o No notable differences by region o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=1.86 Others=1.72-1.74 o Manage >50=1.83 Manage 11-50 & non-managers=1.76-1.78 Manage 1-10=1.67	
Indicator 2.a: Extent to which STRATEGIC PLANNING (including customer planning, results frameworks, etc.) contributes to respondents' ability to achieve results (Q. 19).	**1.90 (n = 441)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=2.07 Washington=1.56 o FSNs=2.08 USPSCs et al.=1.98 USDHs=1.77 o AFR & LAC=2.18-2.22 ENI & ANE=1.72-1.97 o Years with USAID: 2-5 yrs=2.01 Others=1.86-1.94 o Manage >50=1.77 Other managers=1.93-2.05 Non-managers=1.86	
Indicator 2.b: Extent to which PROCUREMENT (acquisition and assistance (A&A) performance-based contracts, contracts, grants, etc.) contributes to respondents' ability to achieve results (Q. 20).	**1.63 (n = 416)**

Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=1.68 Washington=1.53 o FSNs=1.78 USDHs=1.58 USPSCs et al.=1.48 o LAC=1.84 ENI=1.40 Others=1.63-1.77 o Years with USAID: 2-5 yrs & <2 yrs=1.71-1.72 >5 yrs=1.60 o Non-managers & manage 1-10=1.66-1.68 Other managers=1.50-1.53	
Indicator 2.c: Extent to which ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (offices, operating units, teams) contribute to respondents' ability to achieve results (Q. 21).	**1.96 (n = 493)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=2.06 Washington=1.75 o USPSCs et al. & FSNs=2.06-2.08 USDHs=1.85 o ENI & AFR=2.10-2.19 ANE & LAC=1.94-1.99 o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=2.13 Others=1.92-1.95 o No notable difference by management status	
Indicator 2.d: Extent to which AUTOMATION-COMMUNICATION (internet, e-mail, web) contributes to respondents' ability to achieve results (Q. 22).	**2.45 (n = 512)**
Sub-group differences: o No notable differences by locale, employment status, or region o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=2.55 >5 yrs=2.48 2-5 yrs=2.33 o Manage >50=2.18 Others=2.45-2.55	
Indicator 2.e: Extent to which AUTOMATION-MIS (NMS) contributes to respondents' ability to achieve results (Q. 23).	**0.93 (n = 425)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in Washington=1.00 Field=0.90 o FSNs=1.16 Others=0.76-0.82 o ANE=1.07 Others=0.77-0.85 o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=1.49 Others=0.86-0.90 o Non-managers=1.03 Manage >50=0.64 Others=0.74-0.84	
Indicator 2.f: Extent to which PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ORGANIZING APPROACH (results packages, projects, activities) contributes to respondents' ability to achieve results (Q. 24).	**1.80 (n = 414)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=1.93 Washington=1.53 o FSNs & USPSCs et al.=1.92-1.93 USDHs=1.68 o LAC & ANE=2.01-2.03 AFR=1.91 ENI=1.71 o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=2.06 2-5 yrs=1.86 >5 yrs=1.74 o Manage >50=1.64 Others=1.81-1.84	

Indicator 2.g: Extent to which AGENCY DIRECTIVES AND GUIDANCE contribute to respondents' ability to achieve results (Q. 25).	**1.75 (n = 487)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=1.82 Washington=1.61 o FSNs=1.95 Others=1.62-1.64 o ANE=1.96 ENI=1.62 Others=1.78-1.79 o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=1.89 Others=1.71-1.72 o Non-managers=1.79 Manage >50=1.50 Others=1.65-1.70	
Indicator 2.h: Extent to which PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT (monitoring, evaluation, reporting) contributes to respondents' ability to achieve results (Q. 26).	**1.89 (n = 454)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=1.99 Washington=1.68 o USPSCs et al. & FSNs=1.90-1.98 USDHs=1.79 o LAC & ANE=2.05-2.09 AFR=1.95 ENI=1.65 o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=2.02 Others=1.83-1.90 o Manage >50=1.76 Others=1.86-1.91	
Indicator 2.i: Extent to which RESOURCE ALLOCATION contributes to respondents' ability to achieve results (Q. 27).	**1.79 (n = 433)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=1.85 Washington=1.66 o FSNs=1.91 USPSCs et al.=1.78 USDHs=1.69 o ANE=1.97 Others=1.74-1.80 o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=2.08 Others=1.71-1.85 o Manage 11-50=1.91 Manage >50=1.50 Others=1.76-1.79	
Indicator 2.j: Extent to which AGENCY CULTURE contributes to respondents' ability to achieve results (Q. 28).	**1.63 (n = 457)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=1.69 Washington=1.51 o FSNs=1.83 Others=1.49-1.53 o ANE=1.77 LAC & ENI=1.64-1.69 AFR=1.57 o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=1.77 Others=1.59 o Manage >50=1.73 Manage 11-50=1.52 Others=1.59-1.65	
Indicator 2.k: Extent to which HUMAN RESOURCES (number of staff, skills, etc.) contribute to respondents' ability to achieve results (Q. 29).	**1.91 (n = 479)**
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=1.98 Washington=1.77 o FSNs=2.05 USPSCs et al.=1.94 USDHs=1.82 o ANE=2.05 ENI=1.81 Others=1.95-1.99 o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=2.05 2-5 yrs=1.96 >5 yrs=1.86 o Manage >50=2.05 Others=1.88-1.95	

Indicator 3: Extent to which respondents have ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION they need for achieving results (Q. 30).	2.12 (n = 496)
Sub-group differences: o Staff in field=2.21 Washington=1.96 o FSNs=2.21 Others=2.05-2.09 o No notable difference by region. o Years with USAID: <2 yrs=2.23 >5 yrs=2.13 2-5 yrs=2.05 o Managers=2.15-2.19 Non-managers=2.10	

Factors That Facilitate and Hinder the Achievement of IR 4. Qs. 31 and 32 of the survey asked respondents to identify factors that make it possible (or difficult) to apply the principles of responsive and flexible approaches. There were 294 responses to Q. 31 and 270 to Q. 32. Five factors facilitating the application of the principles are commonly cited.

! ***Effective communication and information sharing* —** 58 respondents refer to "being informed...on time," having "the required information...via the use of phones and personal contacts," "internet access to development information," and "e-mail and other modern communication services," and the like. Excellent communication skills on the part of team leaders, good inter-office and inter-bureau communication (which is generally not the case), and good communication among team members, including virtual team members, are also mentioned.

! ***Permission to be flexible, innovative, and creative* —** 55 respondents cite such factors as "staff willing[ness] to interpret rules flexibly to get the job done," "management attitudes support[ive] of innovation," "waivers of competition in procurement," "a creative and great GC [General Counsel]," "flexible contracting mechanisms," and being "able to use a variety of approaches."

! ***Teamwork and collaboration* —** 38 respondents mention the following or similar factors: "when the work team and the supervisor are in sync with the goals of the office," teamwork in which "those who 'controlled' the process would understand the purpose of the work and could modify accordingly," "when the mission and USAID/W office team leaders are on the same wave length," "when there were great teams in formation and great team players."

! ***Support from management and leadership* —** 38 respondents cite leadership as a factor: "local management has developed a culture of innovation," "when we are empowered by our supervisors," "support from the director and team leader," and "supportive management [and] support groups (GC, OP [Operations], FM [Financial Management]) providing solutions not barriers."

! ***Guidance* —** 35 respondents mention "the availability of easy-to-understand instructions/guidance and resources," "Agency rules [that are] well understood and easily accessible—the ADS [Automated Directives System] is neither," "management parameters for operating effectively," and other similar factors.

Smaller numbers of respondents mention *training and knowledgeable staff* (19), *sufficient (or insufficient) time* (19), and *personal accountability and trust* (15), *empowerment* (9), and *good office equipment* (8). Two incompatible views of the time factor are expressed. In one sense, when there are "realistic time lines and resources to allow for consultation and participation," approaches can be flexible and responsive. A contrasting view is that the principles work when "the pressure to achieve results quickly [is] very strong and traditional systems [can] be shortened and pragmatic approaches thought through and partially applied."

Three factors hindering the application of the principles are commonly cited.

- ***Specific bureaucratic processes*** **—** 44 respondents cite unreengineered Agency processes and systems, especially the procurement process and the NMS. A few typical comments: "procurement processes remain opaque, complicated, time-consuming and unresponsive," "the premature introduction of NMS caused a chaotic situation in which critical and time-sensitive decisions were hampered by uncertainties about the process," and "Washington's R4 review and consultation are not as flexible as advertised and a lot of trouble."

- ***Confusion over guidance, rules, etc.*** **—** 43 respondents mention this factor. Some of the general examples: "unclear and conflicting guidance," "lengthy guidance arriving late," and "lack of guidance;" specific examples: "we could have benefited from better guidance and models of best practices in development of Results Packages," and "R4 and non-presence guidance does not reflect BHR [Bureau for Humanitarian Relief] needs."

- ***Human factors*** **—** 38 respondents cite human failings, including avoidance of responsibility, risk-avoidance, lack of trust, lack of courage, and so on.

Sizable numbers of respondents also identify *inflexible processes and people* (31), *authoritarian management and lack of management support* (20), and *lack of communication and information sharing* (19). Other impediments cited by small numbers of respondents include *lack of access to tools*, *lack of knowledge and training, poor teamwork, lack of financial and staff resources*, and *the NMS*.

How to Increase Achievement of IR 4. Q. 33 asked respondents who needs to do what to improve the situation so that their working experience reflects the principles of flexible and responsive Agency approaches. Comments from 303 respondents fall into five categories. Two of the most common recommended changes, i.e., more management support and commitment and more training, are also among the top recommendations under IR 1 (empowerment and accountability).

- ***Management support and commitment* —** 84 respondents suggest that a primary key to flexible and responsive tools, systems, processes, etc. is the behavior of USAID's managers. Examples: "Management should empower team members," "management must make the team approach work or stop trying and go back to the old system," "top-level management needs to give more than lip service—managers need to be trained in managing work and people."

- ***Clarity on guidance and definition of terms* —** 34 respondents believe that what is needed are such improvements as "a good, cogent definition of teamwork and empowerment, emphasizing that management still has decision-making power," "clear, simpler guidance and procedures," "simple, clear guidance on contracting rules and regulations," "simplified procedures and processes," "accelerated updating of the ADS," "consistent policy from IRM/W [Information Resources Management/Washington] on information systems management," and "clear...operational norms."

- ***Training* —** 33 respondents mention the need for training and education of staff, from top management down. One respondent writes, "integrated training, where senior management is not separated out and kept in a cocoon, but is rather trained with middle management and staff." Another argues that "both USAID/W and the field missions should arrange for training for actual actors (program implementers), and it should not be limited to only a few office chiefs." Another suggests that "reengineering training received poor reception because it was handled differently across the Agency, by staff who were not necessarily strong in necessary skills."

- ***Better communication and information sharing* —** 22 respondents cite such needs as "periodic meetings/sessions between teams...to share programmatic information, successes, constraints, etc.," "more open forums at which respective individuals exchange necessary information to achieve success," "broader knowledge of technical and administrative functions," "training in the new approaches," and "better training for FSN staff in procurement processes."

- ***Fix the processes, especially procurement and budget* —** 22 respondents call for process improvements. Examples: "procurement processes need to be made less cumbersome and enable development assistance to be delivered rather than hamstrung," the Agency should "start all over in streamlining procurement and personnel assignments," "greater flexibility in the timing of decisions regarding the reallocation of OYBs [operatin gyear budget funds or "buy-ins"] depending upon performance, greater flexibility in the whole budget process, and more monies up front at the beginning of the fiscal year."

Other recommendations center around c*hanges in the way USAID/Washington does business and in how it relates with the field* (17), *the "human factor,"* e.g., the need to have personal responsibility (13), *more flexibility and risk-taking* (12), *incentives and rewards that reflect the* *core values* (12), *holding people accountable* (11), *honesty about the political aspects of USAID's work* (9), *more resources* (9), and *several others*.

Advice to the Administrator

Q. 66 of the survey asked respondents to give one piece of advice to USAID's Administrator to bring Agency practice closer to Agency principles discussed in the survey.

The 397 responses received fall into five categories, as follows.

- ***Provide leadership and ensure senior management commitment to principles and reforms*** — 46 respondents want the Agency Administrator and senior managers (AAs, DAAs, et al.) to "walk the talk" and to "set the example and live the experiment." They also want the Administrator to "hold senior Agency managers responsible for ensuring that the core values [are] exercised routinely," "get those who can't lead out of the way so [that] those who can, can," "cause his immediate circle to adopt the principles and values of reengineering and then reward and punish behavior in light of the guiding principles," and "tell his staff [to] listen to their staffs, even when they do not agree with the advice—they could be articulating what many others think, but lack the courage to say."

- ***Delegate more authority and empower staff and teams more*** — 37 respondents would like to see more devolution of decision making and less micro-management. Examples: "direct bureaus to direct office directors to get out of the way and let teams be empowered," "to the extent possible, truly devolve decision-making authority to the lowest level—including FSNs," and delegate "greater procurement and grant-making authority to the field."

- ***Communicate and dialogue more with Agency staff at all levels*** — 33 respondents advise the Administrator to "take the time to listen to employees," "have 'lunch-bunch' sessions with randomly picked staff," "ask questions of the field," "travel more often to the field," "use frequent questionnaires from all staff of all levels," "participate periodically in bureau staff meetings with employees," and "get more feedback from people actually working in teams."

- ***Provide more training and education*** — 28 respondents call for training at all levels, including the senior staff level. Recommended training topics include teamwork, participatory approaches, program operations and systems, and management skills. A few suggestions: "Instruct PPC and M to figure out what's worked, implement a major initiative to disseminate these lessons and train us on best practices," and "spend more resources to train USAID staff around the world on the aspects of reengineering." One person writes, "Train, train, and train...this means stop spending money on computers and remember that people are what makes up this or any organization—not machines and their languages."

- ***Revise the incentives system* —** 24 respondents advise the Administrator to "encourage and reward people for implementing the principles" and "reward creativity and taking risks." Two suggested approaches: "have nominations be submitted by units that feel that they are successfully achieving the principles," and "tie budget allocation to performance [and] reward the performers—through increasing budgets...and promotions."

Several recommendations from relatively fewer respondents fall into a group that might be described as USAID/Washington-related. They include *making the human resources system congruent with reengineering* (13), *reengineering USAID/Washington* (13), *fixing the NMS* (12) *and procurement* (11), *limiting the Agency's program priorities and focus* (11), *making the budget more flexible—primarily by reducing earmarks* (9), and *providing clearer guidance* (9). General recommendations from small numbers of staff include more teamwork and teams, more trust of staff, more focus on results, more accountability, better planning, more use of information technology, better participatory processes, more recognition of the constraints to reengineering, more public relations for Agency programs, and less reporting.

It is impossible in this brief report to do justice to the many thoughtful observations and interesting suggestions in the answers to Q. 66. This report therefore recommends that the entire set of unedited, unidentifiable comments be transmitted to the Agency Administrator.

Appendix 1

USAID STOCKTAKING SURVEY

The Administrator has asked the Bureau of Policy and Program Coordination and the Bureau for Management to do an assessment or "stocktaking" of reengineering efforts in the Agency's program operations system. This survey will provide decision-makers with an important understanding of progress under reengineering and the state of the program operations system in the Agency. In addition to this survey, an AID/W working group is also pursing specific actions to resolve problems and to further implement reforms. This effort will be coordinated with and complement other recent efforts by the Acquisitions & Assistance and Workforce Planning Task Forces and the REFORM Initiative.

Responses to this survey will be kept strictly confidential. Although some background information is asked, individuals cannot be identified by their responses and the software does not record your e-mail address. Only the aggregated results of the survey will be shared around the Agency.

The survey will take approximately 15-30 minutes to complete. We are particularly interested in your responses to the open-ended questions in the survey and your suggestions for actions that could be taken in the short and longer term to address issues of concern. Your responses will be submitted electronically when you save the survey at the end. We very much appreciate the time you are taking out of your schedule to complete this survey. Analysis of survey results will be made available via e-mail and the Web by late March. To provide feedback or for further information, contact the "Stocktaking Team": John Haecker, Chanya Charles, Peggy Schultz and Liz Baltimore at stocktaking@usaid.gov (within USAID system: "stocktaking@irt@aidw").

For purposes of analyzing the data from this survey, we need to know a few things about you. For each of the following questions, please choose the response that applies to you:

Q1 - I am responding to this survey because:
[] I received an email stating that I am part of a random sample group.
[] I received an email stating that I am part of a targeted group.
[] I did not receive a special email, but read a general notice.

Q2 - I currently work with USAID as a (choose one):
[] U.S. Direct Hire
[] Foreign Service National (either Direct Hire or PSC))
[] U.S. Personal Services Contractor (PSC) or Third Country National (TCN)
[] RASA, PASA, Fellow or Technical Advisor for AIDS & Child Survival (TAACS)
[] Institutional Contractor
[] Other

Q3 - I currently work in (choose one):
[] a USAID field office (bi-lateral mission, regional mission, etc.)
[] USAID/Washington

Q4 - I currently work in (choose one):
[] Africa region (AFR)
[] Asia and Near East region (ANE)
[] Europe and Newly Independent States region (ENI)
[] Latin America and Caribbean region (LAC) [] Other

Q5 - I have worked for USAID (choose one):
[] less than two years
[] two to five years
[] more than five years

Q6 - Do you currently serve in an official managerial position in USAID (i.e., as a division director, office director, etc.)? Please choose one:
[] I do not hold a managerial position in USAID.
[] I manage/direct a USAID office or unit that has up to 10 staff
[] I manage/direct a USAID office or unit that has between 11 and 50 staff
[] I manage/direct a USAID office or unit that has more than 51 staff

Below we describe some of the principles that guide how the entire Agency operates. Please answer the questions based on your experience with respect to each.

Empowered staff and teams accountable for results

Principle: INDIVIDUALS AND TEAMS ARE EMPOWERED (I.E., HAVE SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY, RESOURCES, ETC.) TO MAKE DECISIONS TO ACHIEVE AGREED UPON OBJECTIVES.

Q7 - To what extent are you, as an INDIVIDUAL, empowered to make decisions to achieve agreed upon objectives? (Please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q8 - **I**f you are a team member, to what extent is your TEAM empowered to make decisions to achieve agreed upon objectives? (Please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Principle: INDIVIDUALS AND TEAMS ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR MANAGING FOR RESULTS (i.e., their performance is judged on the basis of how well they use their authority and resources to plan for achieving results, implement their activities, and monitor and evaluate their progress in a responsible, results-oriented manner).

Q9- To what extent are you, as an INDIVIDUAL, held accountable for managing for results in the work that you do? (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q10- If you are a team member, to what extent is your TEAM held accountable for managing for results in the work that it does? (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q11 - During the past six months, to what extent has the unit or office in which you work provided specific incentives for you, as an INDIVIDUAL, to manage for results in the work that you do? We define incentives here to mean any positive consequences that you could expect to experience if you were to demonstrate that you were managing for results. (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q12 - If you are a team member, during the past six months, to what extent has the unit or office in which you work provided specific incentives for your TEAM to manage for results in the work that it does? (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q13 - During the past six months, to what extent have you actually made and implemented significant decisions about how you, as an INDIVIDUAL, are to achieve results for which you are accountable? By significant decisions, we mean decisions that had a real influence on the approaches or resources you used. (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q14 - If you are a team member, during the past six months, to what extent has your TEAM actually made and implemented significant decisions about how your team is to achieve results for which it is accountable? (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q15 - Please think of a time in your experience when the principles relating to empowerment, accountability, incentives, and decision-making worked well. What were the factors that made this possible?

Q16 - Please think of a time in your experience when the principles relating to empowerment, accountability, incentives, and decision-making did not work well. What factors were responsible for this?

Q17 - Who needs to do what to improve the situation so that your working experience reflects these principles?

Responsive and flexible approaches for achieving

Principle: PROGRAM OPERATIONS APPROACHES ARE RESPONSIVE AND FLEXIBLE. AGENCY APPROACHES ENABLE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF RESULTS. As the term is used here, "approaches" refer generally to the tools, tactics, processes, and systems used in program operations.

Q18 - To what extent has the Agency provided you with the approaches you need to effectively achieve results? (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

For areas listed below, to what extent do each, in their present state, contribute to your ability to achieve results? (please choose one for each area)

Q19 - Strategic Planning (including customer planning, results frameworks, etc.)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q20 - Procurement (A&A, performance-based contracts, contracts, grants, etc.)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q21 - Organizational arrangements (offices, operating units, teams)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q22 -Automation-communication (internet, e-mail, web)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q23 - Automation-MIS (NMS)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q24 - Program implementation organizing approach (Results Packages, Projects, Activities)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q25 - Agency directives and guidance
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q26 - Performance measurement (monitoring, evaluation, reporting)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q27 - Resource allocation
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q28 - Agency culture
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q29 - Agency human resources (#of staff, skills, etc.)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Principle: EACH MANAGER AND WORK TEAM IS CONCERNED WITH, AND HAS ACCESS TO, ALL THE INFORMATION THEY NEED FOR ACHIEVING RESULTS.

Q30 - To what extent do you have access to the information you need for achieving results? (please choose one)
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q31 - Please think of a time in your experience when the principles of responsive and flexible approaches (tools, tactics, processes, systems, and information) worked well. What were the factors that made this possible?

Q32 - Please think of a time in your experience when the principles of responsive and flexible approaches (tools, tactics, processes, systems, and information) did NOT work well. What factors were responsible for this?

Q33 - Who needs to do what to improve the situation so that your working experience reflects these principles?

For the purpose of the following question, an "operating unit" is defined as a USAID field mission or USAID/W office or higher-level organizational unit that expends program funds to achieve a strategic objective, strategic support objective, or special objective, and that has a clearly defined set of responsibilities focused on the development and execution of a strategic plan.

Q34 - Please read down the following list in order, and choose the FIRST item that applies to you:
[] HEAD of an OPERATING UNIT that expends program funds
[] DEPUTY DIRECTOR of an Oper. Unit that expends prog. funds
[] Head of an Operating Unit's PROGRAM office/function
[] TEAM LEADER of a STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TEAM responsible for achieving development program results
[] ACTIVITY MANAGER of a STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TEAM responsible for achieving development program results
[] MEMBER of a STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TEAM responsible for achieving development program results
[] None of the above

Addressing development needs through customers and partners

Principle: INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF CUSTOMERS IN PLANNING, ACHIEVING, AND MONITORING AND EVALUATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. (Customers are defined as individuals or organizations who receive USAID services or products, benefit from USAID programs, or are affected by USAID actions. We mean USAID's ultimate customers here, not partners with whom USAID collaborates to serve the ultimate customers. We will also ask specific questions about partners.)

Consider for a moment your operating unit's current strategic plan. (A strategic plan includes the operating unit's strategic objectives and a description of how it plans to use resources to accomplish them. Typically, a strategic plan includes results frameworks and narrative discussions for each of the strategic objectives it contains.)

Q35 - To the best of your knowledge, to what extent has your operating unit's strategic plan been developed or modified based on needs expressed by customers?
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q36 - How did your operating unit obtain the information from customers? Please check all that apply.
[] customer is SO Team member [] survey [] focus group
[] rapid appraisal [] regular meetings [] telephone/email
[] planning workshops [] site visits [] other

Q37 - If other, please specify.

Principle: INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF PARTNERS IN PLANNING, ACHIEVING, AND MONITORING AND EVALUATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. (Partners are defined as organizations, or their representatives, with whom USAID works cooperatively to achieve mutually agreed-upon objectives and intermediate results.)

Q38 - To the best of your knowledge, to what extent has your operating unit's strategic plan been developed or modified based on input from partners?
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q39 - How did your operating unit obtain the information from partners? Please check all that apply.
[] partner is SO Team member [] survey [] focus group
[] rapid appraisal [] regular meetings [] telephone/email
[] planning workshops [] site visits [] other

Q40 - If other, please specify

Q 41 - USAID partners often include some who contribute financial resources toward the achievement of the USAID strategic plan (e.g., other donors, host country governments, and non-governmental organizations). To the best of your knowledge, approximately what percentage of the financial resources directed toward achieving your operating unit's strategic plan (either budgeted or actually expended) is being contributed by your operating unit's partners?
[] Don't know [] 0-25 percent [] 26-50 percent [] 51-75 percent
[] 76-100 percent

Q42 - How confident are you that your estimate is an accurate one? Please choose one:
[] Not at all confident [] Just a little confident
[] Somewhat confident [] Very confident [] Extremely confident

Q43 - What are the most important things that need to be done to improve the situation so that Agency practice meets up to the principles regarding customers and partners?

Results-Oriented Decision-Making

Principle: INCREASED FOCUS ON RESULTS IN PLANNING, ACHIEVING AND MONITORING AND EVALUATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. INCREASED USE OF RESULTS DATA IN MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT PROGRAM STRATEGY AND ACTIVITIES.

Q44 - To the best of your knowledge, how many instances have there been during the past year in which a strategic objective team in your operating unit made a decision to confirm or adjust its results framework or allocation of resources on the basis of performance information?
[] Don't Know [] None [] One [] Two [] More than two

Q45 - Please cite an example of this.

Q46 - What needs to be done to increase the extent to which strategic objective teams base their decisions on performance information?

Addressing development needs through customers and partners

Principle: INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF CUSTOMERS IN PLANNING, ACHIEVING, AND MONITORING AND EVALUATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. (Customers are defined as individuals or organizations who receive USAID services or products, benefit from USAID programs, or are affected by USAID actions. We mean USAID's ultimate customers here, not partners with whom USAID collaborates to serve the ultimate customers. We will also ask specific questions about partners.)

Q47 - Consider for a moment your team's current SO strategy (An SO strategy includes the team's strategic objective(s), results framework, and a description of how it plans to use resources to achieve results.)

To the best of your knowledge, to what extent has your team's SO strategy been developed or modified based on needs expressed by customers.
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q48 - To the best of your knowledge, how many instances have there been during the past six months in which your team planned or changed its development program ACTIVITIES based on customer feedback?
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q49 - Please cite an example of this.

Q50 - If your strategy or activities have changed based on customer input, how did your team obtain the information from customers? Please check all that apply.
[] customer is SO Team member [] survey [] focus group [] rapid appraisal
[] regular meetings [] telephone/email [] planning workshops [] site visits [] other

Q51 - If other, please specify

Principle: INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF PARTNERS IN PLANNING, ACHIEVING, AND MONITORING AND EVALUATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. (Partners are defined as organizations, or their representatives, with whom USAID works cooperatively to achieve mutually agreed-upon objectives and intermediate results.)

Q52 - To the best of your knowledge, to what extent has your team's SO strategy been developed or modified based on input from partners (including partners who may be on your team)?
[] Don't know, or this does not apply to me [] Not at all
[] Hardly at all [] To some extent [] To a great extent

Q53 - How did your team obtain the information from partners? Please check all that apply.
[] partner is SO Team member [] survey [] focus group [] rapid appraisal [] regular meetings
[] telephone/email [] planning workshops [] site visits [] other

Q54 - If other, please specify

Q55 - USAID partners often include some who contribute financial resources toward the achievement of the team's strategic objective (e.g., other donors, host country governments, and non-governmental organizations). To the best of your knowledge, approximately what percentage of the financial resources directed toward achieving your team's strategic objective (either budgeted or actually expended) is being contributed by your team's partners?
[] Don't know [] 0-25 percent [] 26-50 percent [] 51-75 percent [] 76-100 percent

Q56 - How confident are you that your estimate is an accurate one? Please choose one:
[] Not at all confident [] Just a little confident
[] Somewhat confident [] Very confident [] Extremely confident

Q57 - What are the most important things that need to be done to improve the situation so that Agency practice meets up to the principles regarding customers and partners?

Results-Oriented Decision-Making

Principle: INCREASED FOCUS ON RESULTS IN PLANNING, ACHIEVING AND MONITORING AND EVALUATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. INCREASED USE OF RESULTS DATA IN MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT PROGRAM STRATEGY AND ACTIVITIES.

Q58 - To the best of your knowledge, how many instances have there been during the past year in which your strategic objective team made a decision to confirm or adjust its results framework or allocation of resources on the basis of performance information?
[] Don't Know [] None [] One [] Two [] More than two

Q59 - Please cite an example of this.

Q60 - To the best of your knowledge, how many instances have there been during the past six months in which your strategic objective team or activity managers made a decision to confirm or adjust program ACTIVITIES on the basis of performance information?
[] Don't Know [] None [] One [] Two [] More than two

Q61 - Please cite an example of this.

Q62 - What needs to be done to increase the extent to which strategic objective teams base their decisions on performance information?

Think about results frameworks for a moment. We define a results framework as a description, often a graphic one, of a program strategy, which shows the strategic objective and the intermediate results needed to achieve it, and the cause-effect relationships (or hypotheses) that link results to one another.

Q63 - To what extent do you agree with the following statement: The results framework is an effective tool for helping strategic objective teams accomplish development results.
[] Don't know [] Strongly disagree [] Disagree [] Agree [] Strongly Agree

Q64 -Please state, as precisely and briefly as you can, the reasons for your response in the previous question.

Q65 -What needs to be done to make the results framework a more effective tool for helping strategic objective teams accomplish development results?

Comments

Q66 - What one thing would you advise the USAID Administrator to do so that Agency practice can move closer to achieving the principles discussed in this survey?

Q67 - If you have any other comments you would like to share with respect to the stocktaking effort or this survey, please write them here:

Thank you for helping us with this survey. Please press the Save button to submit your answers and you will automatically exit from the survey.

Appendix 2

Quantitative Data

COMPARATIVE "SCORES" BY 580 SURVEY RESPONDENTS[1]

Question	Score on a scale of 0-3 for most items (exceptions are noted in the Question column)																
	All	Locale		Employment Status[2]			Region				Time in USAID[3]			Managerial Status			
		Field	AID/W	USDH	FSN	USPSC RASA, PASA, Fellow, TAACS	AFR	ANE	ENI	LAC	< 2 yrs.	2-5 yrs.	> 5 yrs.	not a mgr.	mng. 1-10 pers.	mng. 11-50 pers.	mng. > 50 pers.
	n=580	n=380	n=192	n=270	n=195	n=80	n=109	n=99	n=67	n=103	n=83	n=100	n=381	n=379	n=91	n=62	n=25
IR 1: Empowered Staff and Teams Accountable for Results																	
7. Extent to which individuals are empowered	1.90	1.96	1.81	2.04	1.69	1.86	1.95	1.94	1.98	1.99	1.72	1.80	1.97	1.70	2.19	2.38	2.42
8. Extent to which teams are empowered	2.06	2.18	1.78	2.00	2.11	2.09	2.18	2.20	2.08	2.20	2.08	2.05	2.04	2.01	2.06	2.35	2.06
9. Extent to which individuals are held accountable	2.25	2.28	2.22	2.34	2.20	2.12	2.18	2.36	2.26	2.33	2.08	2.29	2.29	2.13	2.51	2.55	2.36
10. Extent to which teams are held accountable	2.19	2.28	1.97	2.07	2.34	2.17	2.29	2.24	1.94	2.51	2.25	2.19	2.15	2.21	2.14	2.12	2.07
11. Extent to which individuals were provided incentives	1.20	1.33	0.94	1.10	1.42	1.16	1.19	1.30	1.47	1.41	1.55	1.05	1.16	1.16	1.13	1.32	1.52
12. Extent to which teams were provided incentives	1.28	1.41	1.28	1.09	1.52	1.21	1.28	1.41	1.27	1.52	1.59	1.15	1.20	1.23	1.16	1.40	1.39
13. Extent to which individuals made & implemented decisions	1.97	1.70	1.89	2.11	1.79	2.03	2.02	2.11	1.95	2.06	1.89	1.75	1.96	1.84	2.31	2.27	2.30
14. Extent to which teams made & implemented decisions	1.92	2.02	1.68	1.92	1.94	1.87	2.00	2.00	1.80	2.19	1.90	1.85	1.94	1.86	1.97	2.04	2.19

1 Unless otherwise noted, the scores were calculated as follows:
[(# of "Not at all" responses x 0) + (# of "Hardly at all" responses x 1) + (# of "To Some extent" responses x 2) + (# of "To a great extent" responses x 3)] divided by [(# of total responses) - (# of "Don't know/Not applicable" responses)]

Among all the average scores calculated for all respondents on all 4-point scale questions (i.e., the average scores for Qs. 7-14, 18-30, 35, 47, 48, 38, 52, and 41, in the first column of the table), the mean average rating was 1.88. This figure allows a point for comparing the relative strength of average ratings for each of the 4-point scale items. For example, the average rating for the extent to which individuals feel empowered (Q. 7, 1.90) is very close to the how people responded, on average, to all the questions; the average rating for extent to which individuals received incentives (Q. 12, 1.20) is a relatively low average rating; and the average rating for automation-communi-cation (Q. 22, 2.45) is a relatively high average rating.

2 Fourteen respondents designated their employment status as "other." Because of the small number, and our inability to determine their precise status, we have dropped them from the analysis of questions by employment status.

3 Ten field respondents designated their region as "other." Because of the small number, and our inability to determine the precise nature of their location in the field, we have dropped them from the analysis of questions by region.

Question	All	Locale: Field	Locale: AID/W	Employment Status[2]: USDH	Employment Status[2]: FSN	Employment Status[2]: USPSC RASA, PASA, Fellow, TAACS	Region: AFR	Region: ANE	Region: ENI	Region: LAC	Time in USAID[3]: < 2 yrs.	Time in USAID[3]: 2-5 yrs.	Time in USAID[3]: > 5 yrs.	Managerial Status: not a mgr.	Managerial Status: mng. 1-10 pers.	Managerial Status: mng. 11-50 pers.	Managerial Status: mng. > 50 pers.
	Score on a scale of 0-3 for most items (exceptions are noted in the Question column)																
	n=580	n=380	n=192	n=270	n=195	n=80	n=109	n=99	n=67	n=103	n=83	n=100	n=381	n=379	n=91	n=62	n=25
IR 2: Addressing Development Needs Through Customers and Partners																	
35. Extent to which OU's Strategic Plan was developed or modified based on customers' input (according to OU respondents: Directors, Dep. Directors, and Chief Program Officers)	2.16	2.27	1.93	2.18	2.17	1.67	2.27	2.20	2.25	2.35	2.00	2.30	2.15	2.00	2.00	2.25	2.32
38. Extent to which OU's Strategic Plan was adjusted based on partners' input (according to OU respondents)	2.31	2.42	2.07	2.36	2.00	1.50	2.07	2.29	2.50	2.81	3.00[4]	2.00	2.34	2.00	2.29	2.26	2.58
41. Percentage of OU respondents who estimated the percentage of financial resources in their OU's strategic plan contributed by partners with a self-estimated level of confidence in their estimates at "very" or "extremely" confident	47%	The survey software did not allow computation of this indicator by sub-groups.															
47. Extent to which team's SO Strategy was adjusted based on customers' input (according to SO Team respondents: Team Leaders, Team Members, Team Activity Managers)	2.11	2.18	1.84	1.97	2.29	1.93	2.26	2.06	2.00	2.36	2.41	2.15	2.03	2.09	2.18	2.27	—[5]
48. Extent to which team's activities were planned/ changed based on customer feedback (according to SO Team respondents)	1.70	1.79	1.31	1.51	1.81	1.74	1.76	1.77	1.82	1.82	2.13	1.83	1.56	1.65	1.79	2.08	—
52. Extent to which team's SO Strategy was adjusted based on partners' input (according to SO Team respondents)	2.17	2.21	1.97	1.97	2.26	2.28	2.24	2.16	2.18	2.26	2.46	2.37	2.02	2.13	2.33	2.00	—
55. Percentage of SO Team respondents who estimated the percentage of financial resources in their team's strategic plan contributed by partners with a self estimated level of confidence in their estimates at "very" or "extremely" confident.	47%	The survey software did not allow computation of this indicator by sub-groups.															

Question | Score on a scale of 0-3 for most items (exceptions are noted in the Question column) | All | Locale | Employment Status[2] | Region | Time in USAID[3] | Managerial Status

4 Only one respondent answered this question.

5 Dash (-) means no survey respondents answered the question.

		Field	AID/W	USDH	FSN	USPSC RASA, PASA, Fellow, TAACS	AFR	ANE	ENI	LAC	< 2 yrs.	2-5 yrs.	> 5 yrs.	not a mgr.	mng. 1-10 pers.	mng. 11-50 pers.	mng. > 50 pers.
	n=580	n=380	n=192	n=270	n=195	n=80	n=109	n=99	n=67	n=103	n=83	n=100	n=381	n=379	n=91	n=62	n=25
IR 3: Results-Oriented Decision Making																	
44. Percentage of OU-level respondents reporting that an SO team made a decision to confirm or adjust its results framework or allocation of resources on the basis of performance information two or more times during the past year	64%	77%	33%	66%	—-	100%	83%	83%	73%	69%	—-	50%	65%	71%	53%	56%	78%
58. Percentage of SO Team respondents reporting that their team made a decision to confirm or adjust its results framework or allocation of resources on the basis of performance information *two or more times* during the past year	47%	53%	21%	44%	53%	46%	58%	56%	57%	42%	56%	47%	45%	44%	50%	60%	—-
60. Percentage of SO Team respondents reporting that their team or activity manager made a decision to confirm or adjust program activities on the basis of performance information *two or more times* during the past six months	50%	54%	35%	50%	51%	51%	56%	64%	59%	34%	56%	57%	46%	47%	50%	78%	—-
63. Extent to which OU-level and SO team respondents agree that the results framework is an effective tool for helping SO teams accomplish development results *(Note: This score is on a scale of -3, -1, +1, +3, ranging from strongly disagree, to disagree , to agree, to strongly agree.)*	1.17	1.31	0.67	1.07	1.44	0.96	1.37	1.46	0.76	1.38	1.67	1.12	1.10	1.14	1.21	1.11	1.56

Question	**Score on a scale of 0-3 for most items (exceptions are noted in the Question column)**																
	All	Locale		Employment Status[2]			Region				Time in USAID[3]			Managerial Status			
		Field	AID/W	USDH	FSN	USPSC RASA, PASA, Fellow, TAACS	AFR	ANE	ENI	LAC	< 2 yrs.	2-5 yrs.	> 5 yrs.	not a mgr.	mng. 1-10 pers.	mng. 11-50 pers.	mng. > 50 pers.

	n=580	n=380	n=192	n=270	n=195	n=80	n=109	n=99	n=67	n=103	n=83	n=100	n=381	n=379	n=91	n=62	n=25
IR 4: Responsive and Flexible Approaches for Achieving																	
18. Extent to which Agency provided approaches	1.76	1.85	1.57	1.65	1.90	1.75	1.85	1.89	1.81	1.78	1.86	1.72	1.74	1.76	1.67	1.78	1.83
Approaches:																	
19. Strategic Planning	1.90	2.07	1.56	1.77	2.08	1.98	2.18	1.97	1.72	2.22	1.94	2.01	1.86	1.86	1.93	2.05	1.77
20. Procurement	1.63	1.68	1.53	1.58	1.78	1.48	1.63	1.77	1.40	1.84	1.72	1.71	1.60	1.66	1.68	1.53	1.50
21. Organizational Arrangements	1.96	2.06	1.75	1.85	2.08	2.06	2.19	1.94	2.10	1.99	2.13	1.95	1.92	1.94	1.92	2.08	2.00
22. Automation-Communication	2.45	2.46	2.43	2.45	2.48	2.46	2.48	2.48	2.46	2.45	2.55	2.33	2.48	2.45	2.53	2.55	2.18
23. Automation-MIS	0.93	0.90	1.00	0.82	1.16	0.76	0.77	1.07	0.79	0.85	1.49	0.90	0.86	1.03	0.74	0.84	0.64
24. Program Implementation Organizing Approach	1.80	1.93	1.53	1.68	1.92	1.93	1.91	2.03	1.71	2.01	2.06	1.86	1.74	1.81	1.81	1.84	1.64
25. Agency Directives and Guidance	1.75	1.82	1.61	1.64	1.95	1.62	1.79	1.96	1.62	1.78	1.89	1.71	1.72	1.79	1.65	1.70	1.50
26. Performance Measurement	1.89	1.99	1.68	1.79	1.98	1.90	1.97	2.09	1.65	2.05	2.02	1.90	1.83	1.86	1.90	1.91	1.76
27. Resource Allocation	1.79	1.85	1.66	1.69	1.91	1.78	1.74	1.97	1.78	1.80	2.08	1.85	1.71	1.79	1.76	1.91	1.50
28. Agency Culture	1.63	1.69	1.51	1.53	1.83	1.49	1.57	1.77	1.69	1.64	1.77	1.59	1.59	1.65	1.59	1.52	1.73
29. Agency Human Resources	1.91	1.98	1.77	1.82	2.05	1.94	1.95	2.05	1.81	1.99	2.05	1.96	1.86	1.88	1.95	1.93	2.05
30. Extent to which staff has access to information	2.12	2.21	1.96	2.09	2.21	2.05	2.25	2.22	2.20	2.17	2.23	2.05	2.13	2.10	2.15	2.19	2.18