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GUATEMALA DEMOBILIZATION AND INCORPORATION PROGRAM

**An Evaluation Prepared for The Office of Transition Initiatives
Bureau for Humanitarian Response
U S Agency for International Development**

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A NOTE ON ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

The report is organized into six chapters as follows

- I Executive Summary
- II Methodology
- III Background
- IV Program history and Implementation
- V Performance and Impact of the Program
- VI Success Factors and Lessons Learned

For those interested in a quick overview of findings and conclusions, please see the executive summary which covers principal points in the first ten pages of the report

For those interested in more detail on findings and their rationale, the last two chapters, V and VI, provide added perspective and explanation. Chapter V covers program management and coordination performance in some detail along with a comprehensive rundown on component accomplishment. Chapter VI provides more detail and the rationale for success factors, constraints and lessons learned.

Finally, for those interested in program history and implementation, Chapter IV provides a detailed blow by blow account of what actually transpired in the conduct of the program along with observations on all aspects. This chapter will also be useful for those going to this evaluation as a reference work for purposes of research, reporting and for use in future program formulation. Chapter IV is longer and more detailed than necessary for an evaluation of this nature. On the other hand, it provides the detail and analytical basis for all findings and judgements made in other sections. Thus, those questioning the foundation of assertions made throughout the document should review this chapter for reasoning behind the thinking expressed.

For information on interviews, sources, and a summary of field and project site visits, please consult Appendices A through C.

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John Heard, OTI
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**GLOSSARY OF PRINCIPAL TERMS, ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
USED IN THIS REPORT
Guatemala Demobilization Project**

“Albergue”	Refuge Refers to the halfway hostels where ex-combatants without a destination or home to return to following departure from the demobilization camps
ACNUR	Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (see UNHCR)
“Beca”	Scholarship Refers to the subsidies paid to URNG ex-combatants for training and upon departing demobilization camps and halfway hostels
CACIF	Comite Coordinador de Asociaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras, Apex Private Sector Representational Organization
“Campesino”	Rural poor peasant farmer or agricultural worker A large portion of the URNG combatant ranks came from campesino backgrounds
CEI	Comision Especial de Incorporacion – Members URNG, Gobierno, International Community
CEAR	Comision Nacional de Atencion a Repatriados, Refugiados y Desplazados
CONALFA	Comite Nacional de Alfabetizacion
CONAD	Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas
COPAZ	Comision Presidencial para la Paz
CPR	“Comunidades de Poblacion en Resistencia” – Communities of Populations in Resistance Groups that fled the conflict into hiding in the Mountains in the early 1980s
CRE	Cruz Roja Espanola
“Disperso”	Dispersed person Refers to those demobilized ex-combatants who returned home to various parts of the country following the cantonment period in the demobilization camps as opposed to those that went to halfway hostels
ECHO	Departamento para la Ayuda Humanitaria de la Comunidad Europea
ECO (or EC)	Bilateral GOG/URNG “Coordination Team” Equipo Coordinador Refers

to the group established under CEI to define and implement follow-up coordination mechanism for the period after Nov 3, 1998 Meets weekly

EU	European Union (see UE)
FGT	Fundacion Guillermo Toriello
“finca”	Farm Used sometimes to refer to the cooperative farms formed under the program for URNG ex-combatants leaving the halfway houses
“Finquero”	Farmer owner Refers to the wealthy, conservative, large land owning, class of Guatemala that traditionally has exerted strong influence over both the private and public sectors and the political course of events
FIS	Fondo de Inversion Social
FONAPAZ	Fondo Nacional para la Paz National Peace Fund – Principal GOG organization responsible for implementing the Incorporation Program
FORELAP	Fondo Para la Reinsercion Laboral y Productiva
FOGUAVI	Fondo Guatemalteco para la Vivienda
FUNDES	Fundacion para el Desarrollo Sostenible en America Latina
GOG	Government of Guatemala
INDUPAZ	Industrias para la Paz, A Project Proposal – USAID (See Bibliography)
INTECAP	Instituto Tecnico de Capacitacion y Productividad
MINUGUA	Mision de Verificacion de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala
MSPAS	Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social
NGO	Non-Government Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OEA	Organizacion de Estados Americanos
OIM	Organizacion Internacional para las Migraciones
OMS/OPS	Organizacion Mundial de la Salud/Organizacion Panamericana de la Salud
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives

ONG	Organización No Gubernamental (See NGO)
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization (see OMS/OPS above)
PAREC	Programa de Apoyo a la Reinserción de Ex-Combatientes – financed by EU
PIP	Programa de Incorporación Productiva
PMA	Programa Mundial de Alimentos
PMA/E y O	Policía Militar Ambulante – Extraordinaria y Ordinaria
PNUD	Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (see UNDP)
PRODESA	Proyecto de Desarrollo Santiago (Managed educational testing at the secondary level for the basic education program managed by the OAS)
“Sin Destino”	Without destination Refers to the group of ex-combatants in the demobilization camps which had no place to go following demobilization and ended up in the halfway hostels
UE	Union Europea
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission on Refugees
URNG	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteco
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Program
ZONAPAZ	Peace Zone Region of Guatemala most severely affected by the conflict Includes departments of Peten, Quiche, Huehuetenango, Totonicapan, Solola, Chimaltenango, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz and San Marcos

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I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A Program Context

On December 29, 1996, the final "Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace" was signed in Guatemala City marking the end of over 35 years of low intensity civil war. The conflict had slowly bled the country of its social and economic vitality and afflicted two generations of Guatemalans with death, displacement and suffering, especially among the poor and indigenous elements of society. It also marked the conclusion of a long and tortured peace process which had actually begun almost ten years before with the signing of the Esquipulas II Accord in 1987 setting forth a series of steps to achieve peace across the Central American region.

In November of 1996, a little over a month before the final Accord was signed, and in close cooperation with the USAID Mission in Guatemala, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) began planning a program to assist with the demobilization and incorporation of guerilla forces of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteco (URNG), the insurgent movement. It was further agreed that OTI would assist with demobilization of military units.

Over the course of the following two years, USAID/OTI, with strong backing from the USAID Mission, and in a co-financing partnership arrangement with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), funded a broad array of activities associated with the two major phases of the demobilization effort to date, namely a) cantonment and initial demobilization of URNG guerilla forces, also known as the "Emergency Phase", and b) Initial Incorporation, which ran from the date of departure of ex-combatants from the original cantonment camps on May 3, 1997, until the end of the Initial Incorporation period in November 1998. The executing agency utilized by USAID/OTI and UNDP for program implementation was the International Office of Migration (IOM) with which OTI had previously worked in Haiti in that country's demobilization program. OTI officially ended its involvement in the Guatemala program by the end of December 1998.

B General Conclusions

The evaluation's general conclusions are as follows:

- (1) The program overall was a clear success in terms of its demobilization and incorporation objectives.
- (2) USAID/OTI successfully honored its policy mandate in that entered at the beginning of the program and exited at the end, having successfully completed its

mission to facilitate a true transition from ongoing conflict to a condition of stability and peace

- (3) USAID/OTI's experience in Guatemala has a wealth of valuable lessons to offer and should serve as a model for such efforts in the future

In support of the above conclusions, by the end of the Initial Incorporation period combatants had been effectively demobilized and resettled in viable or potentially viable settings. They had been accepted by surrounding communities. Stability had been established throughout the countryside, and the emergency was over. Conditions are now in place for true sustainable development to occur, given adequate follow-through by the Government of Guatemala (GOG) and the donor community on the broader reform plan established by the Peace Accords. USAID/OTI and its funding partner, UNDP, were truly critical to realization of effective transition from conflict to a stable peace and can feel a justifiable pride in this accomplishment. They were, without question, the two most important players on the donor side, and are recognized as such by all of the major stakeholders in the process, including the URNG, the Government of Guatemala, the United Nations and the donor community in general.

Further, USAID/OTI, together with UNDP and IOM, exhibited outstanding leadership, commitment and good sense throughout the period evaluated. These organizations were faced with exceedingly severe political, logistical and other constraints to effective program planning and execution. They overcame these barriers to a remarkable degree, however, through an extraordinary capacity to work together as an effective team, built on trust, and to devise intelligent, practical solutions to near impossible situations. This is not to say that there weren't problems and some errors in judgment here and there. There were, but by and large mistakes were corrected, implementers learned from the experience, and they moved forward with significantly enhanced effectiveness. They are also now in a position offer advice of exceptional value to future post-conflict situations.

Finally, the fact that USAID/OTI entered at the beginning and left at the end of the transitional effort, having successfully completed its mission, is an exceedingly rare and important accomplishment, much in keeping with OTI precepts, and should also serve as a model for future programs.

C Specific Accomplishments

In terms of implementation, the program can point to the following specific achievements

1 Emergency Phase (January 1 through May 3, 1997)

- Successful planning, design and construction of 26,000 square meters of living and working space in eight demobilization camps capable of housing over 3,000 combatants. The work was carried out in less than two months, under budget, and a quality product was delivered.

- Successful demobilization of 2,940 Guerillas in the camps over a two month period in which they were documented, surveyed and trained in a highly efficient team effort by the international community

2 Initial Incorporation Phase (May 3, 1997 through November 1998)

- Effective management of departure from the camps of former combatants to final destinations throughout the country including 323 “without destination” who were placed in halfway hostels prepared for this purpose
- Provision technical vocational training to 1,148 ex-combatants
- Placement and initial assistance to 277 ex-combatants on cooperative farms purchased for them by the GOG
- Productive enterprise assistance to 419 ex-combatants through 220 individual projects
- Effective provision of literacy and basic education training to 3,338 beneficiaries (including a community civilian participation of close to 40%)
- Execution of a successful social communication campaign in 16 workshops throughout the country with 1,375 participants from a cross section of demobilized and community based sectors which explained the Peace Accords the rights of returning ex-combatants and facilitated reconciliation
- Essential assistance in the return and incorporation of 151 families (493 persons) of URNG supporters from Mexico and various other countries
- Effective provision to 953 demobilized Military Police of technical vocational training, tool kits and an apprenticeship experience with local companies, directly resulting in employment of 126 military ex-combatants (724 were working in some capacity) before the end of the program
- Effective assistance in the relocation and resettlement of one “Community of Populations in Resistance” in the mountains of Quiche to a cooperative farm, involving 250 families with 890 individuals, and provision of critically needed infrastructure and medical supplies to two other communities

3 Effective Incorporation

For purposes of answering the question on whether effective incorporation has actually taken place, the evaluators took the position that effective incorporation for a demobilized ex-combatant should be defined as 1) acceptance as a member in good standing by the community in which he or she has settled or resettled, and 2) achievement

of economic parity by the ex-combatant with the majority of the members of his or her community¹

In these terms, the program has succeeded. Ex-combatants are now living in equal or better social and economic circumstances than their neighbors and with equal or better prospects for growth in the future. This is true for both the former guerilla and military groups. Even in cases where economic assistance benefits have not yet flowed from the program, the vast majority of ex-combatants have inserted themselves in a positive light in local communities where they currently enjoy good acceptance and support. Now, the challenge of “Definitive Incorporation”² is to deal with the extreme level of generalized urban and rural poverty of the country in a development or “transforming” sense, if the cycle is not to begin all over again down the road. Plans for this are underway by the GOG with strong donor support, including USAID.

D Success Factors, Constraints, and Lessons Learned

In terms of principal success factors, constraints, and lessons learned, the real point of this evaluation, the following summarizes the team’s findings

1 Success Factors

- a) **The Right People** The team found this to be the single most important factor contributing to overall success of the program. The Guatemalan Program was blessed with a unique confluence of exceptional leadership present in key action entities, both in the donor community (including USAID Mission management and the two OTI resident representatives) and on the Guatemalan side, including the GOG and the URNG (especially during the emergency phase). This group was truly dedicated to program goals above other institutional and territorial considerations. Problems of “ego” and “turf” were swept aside by a cast of characters willing to do what ever it took to achieve the objective.
- b) **Donor Flexibility** This was the second most important factor. The readiness of principal donor agencies to compromise on policy and practice and streamline procedures where necessary, in the interest of effective teamwork, was critical throughout the effort. The best examples of this were USAID/OTI and the UNDP, which jointly funded the bulk of the program, and worked together with an openness and collaborative spirit rarely seen in such situations.
- c) **Host Government Capability and Flexibility** The evaluation team was deeply impressed with the extraordinary dedication and capability of most of the GOG senior management personnel interviewed, past and present. They reflected a remarkable degree of stature, wisdom and willingness to go the extra mile, in terms of policy and

¹ This is in line with the Incorporation Peace Accord, OTI entry documents and evaluation team interviews with key GOG officials in charge at the time.

² “Definitive Incorporation” is the third phase of the Demobilization Program (following “Initial Incorporation”) It commenced in December 1998 and has no defined termination point.

procedural considerations, to make sure the program accomplished its objectives. Part of this relates to the caliber of people involved. Another part relates to the nature of the institutions, which were created outside of the mainstream ministerial framework in line with current “modernization of the state” precepts.

- d) **The Coordinating Mechanism** The Special Incorporation Commission (CEI) played the dominant role as the main implementation coordination vehicle for all programs in support of Initial Incorporation following the emergency phase. All important implementation decisions relating to the incorporation effort were vetted and coordinated through the CEI with the URNG and the international donor community. The CEI imposed structure and order on the program and was eminently critical to its success. Without it there might well have been chaos, as there was in Nicaragua following demobilization, for example, and to a lesser extent in El Salvador, where solid authorities for donor coordination were not established.
- e) **Nature of the Relationship with the URNG** There were serious disagreements between the URNG and the GOG and donor communities and frequent delays over policy and strategy issues. But, it was always possible to meet with the URNG during the emergency phase, and subsequently with its Fundacion Guillermo Toriello (FGT), and have a serious discussion without counter-productive acrimony, not the case in other Central America programs. Also, the guerillas left the camps with a good attitude, reflecting the positive environment that had been created by the vision and comprehensive nature of the Peace Accords. This was enhanced by the guerilla experience in the camps, which was likewise highly positive, thanks to their well organized and managed program of activities. This was vital to effective problem solving and implementation in general.
- f) **The Size, Nature and Attitude of the Force to be Demobilized** To state the obvious, had the URNG combatant force been 30,000 instead of 3,000 program planning and implementation would have been many times more difficult. Donors and implementing organizations could come to grips with the magnitude of the job.

2 Negative and Limiting Factors

- a) **Lack of Planning** There were good reasons for the lack of medium and longer term planning and negotiations out front on program direction and strategy. There was no time for this in the flurry of preparations for the cantonment phase. Nevertheless, the program suffered because of this lack. Each new element had to be negotiated and planned, or replanned, at the time of initiation due to a repeated pattern of “delay and crisis” that was practiced by the FGT in the course of implementation. The rules of the game kept changing, and it was frequently impossible to make adequate arrangements for the proper design, sequencing and mutual reinforcement between components that could have considerably enhanced program impact.
- b) **Political Nature of the FGT, Technical Capability and the Co-Direction Factor** The FGT was dedicated from the beginning to maximizing benefits for its

membership, regardless of the cost in terms of viability of program components. It was also subject to sometimes conflicting political pressures of governing fronts and constrained by the need to give priority treatment to those who had sacrificed the most in the mountains. Further, it was a new foundation and had no operational experience. The Foundation has now learned from experience and is more amenable than in the past to the adoption of sound strategies, recognizing the need to compromise on ideological principles for the sake of program viability. It also suffered throughout the period from a serious shortage of qualified people, at all levels of management and execution, as well as a totally inadequate budget related to essential field operations, logistics, and mobility.

- c) **The Missing Private Sector** Outside of the apprenticeship component of the Military demobilization activity, the private sector essentially had no role in the program. There were understandable reasons for this associated with its historical role in society and the bitterness of its relationship with the URNG. But it was a serious lack, and meant that there was little or no effort throughout the program to address the employment problem on the URNG side or to take advantage of private sector expertise and institutional capabilities in a variety of needed areas. This is now changing as the FGT reaches out to various professional chambers.
- d) **Information Management** There was a severe lack of information regarding beneficiaries as well as most other aspects of the Foundation's thinking, policies, planning and programming activity throughout much of the implementation period. This problem stands out above others for those attempting to plan and manage program components, and was a serious obstacle to effective deliberations in the CEI. This is also now improving. For future programs, a common database should be negotiated and agreed upon with respect to beneficiaries and program activities as a minimum.

3 Lessons Learned

Some of these represent the flip side of the above factors and are of generalized importance. Others are not, and are more specific and linked to particular program components. They are included, because in all likelihood, many of these same components will be incorporated in future post-conflict programs.

- a) **Get the Right People** This is the single most important lesson of the Guatemalan experience. How to do it is another matter. But the need for effective teamwork among all of the major players in a demobilization effort is so extreme that every effort should be made to assure that institutional representatives on the ground at the time of both negotiations and implementation are of the highest caliber and can be counted on to put the mission ahead of institutional priorities. The same effort should be made by host governments, with donor assistance where necessary.
- b) **Get involved early** The advance work accomplished in Guatemala by the OTI consultant in November and December of 1996 was critical to the extraordinary

success of the cantonment phase of the demobilization program. It would have been even better, however, to have carried out an assessment of the situation considerably earlier, such as in the summer before, to get a better handle on the institutional, social, economic, and political factors and constraints needing to be addressed. It is also possible, although not certain, that key aspects of program structure (such as the nature and mandate of the foundation to represent the insurgents in program management and content) could have been negotiated in advance, at least partially, which might have made a substantial difference in program feasibility and impact.

- c) **Donor Flexibility and Coordination** As already mentioned, the unique arrangement and relationships established in Guatemala were crucial to effective execution of the cantonment phase especially as well as most of the rest of the Initial Incorporation Phase. This is a must for future programs.
- d) **Program Structure, Institutional Capacity and Transparency of the Implementing Organization Representing the Insurgents** A major lesson from the Guatemala experience is that management of the program to be implemented should be under the direction of an entity which is dedicated to program goals, the best interests of the peace process and effective reintegration of beneficiaries above all other priorities. There are various different ways such a structure could be devised. But for future programs, donors and host governments should attempt to identify the organization early and provide it with

Safeguards to assure transparency, including separation from, although oversight by, the political cadre of insurgent leadership

Technical assistance to develop technical and managerial capability in the context of an assistance program for re-incorporation

Budget for staff, infrastructure and mobility

- e) **Planning and Implementation Capability of the Government** In the future, OTI should seek to relate to those government agencies that have the degree of independence, flexibility and capabilities required by a demobilization scenario. If such agencies are not in place, it would be important to try to create the necessary capability through the strengthening or restructuring of appropriate units, or, as a last resort, to create the entity, more than likely as an attachment to the Presidency of the country in order to provide for the needed priority, budget, flexibility and capability. A strong government counterpart apparatus with access to decision making at the highest level is vital. It is also important to have a government entity capable of relating to the insurgent side in the form of an open institutional mindset and attitude.
- f) **Coordination Vehicle** The CEI is a vehicle worth repeating for reasons explained in the report. The only additional recommendation would be to give it added teeth in the negotiation process so that it would be in a better position to enforce compliance.

with program commitments over the course of implementation in terms of both the insurgent organizations and participating donors

- g) **Information Flow** Accurate and fluid information flow must be assured for effective program administration. This should be negotiated at the time of program formulation along with incentives for sharing. The development of a common data base, given today's technology, should now be relatively easy to set up between donor and implementing agencies
- h) **Secure Productive Private Sector Involvement from the Beginning** It should be in the best interest of the private sector to facilitate peaceful integration of former insurgents. The Private Sector also has the eventual solution for the commercial and industrial development of the interior of the country (the real and lasting answer to the problem of urban and rural poverty in Guatemala and in most countries) and should be involved early in planning of options for this as well
- i) **Timing of Cantonment Phase** The two month period (less for many) in the camps did not allow time for proper orientation for re-entry into society, an adequate detailing of employment options and project possibilities, or sound planning for interventions to follow. This is not to criticize what was actually done, which was a marvel of highly coordinated activity among a host of players. It was still too short, however. In hindsight, three to four months would have been about right in this case. This would obviously vary in other settings, but proper timing is important. It is a question of how much is enough and how much is too much
- j) **Land** This was a basic right under the Peace Accords. It should have been addressed earlier in the program. Land for the cooperative farms was provided, but only after a substantial delay. Land for the dispersed group has still not been worked out, and may never be, given the convoluted tenure situation in Guatemala. The lesson for the future is that land should only be promised where it can be delivered in a timely fashion to those groups to which are to receive it
- k) **Housing** This was another right under the Peace Accords. It also should have been addressed earlier. The Guatemalan Housing Fund (FOGUAVI) scheme, now being implemented, is a good one and is working, at least on the cooperative farms. What is lacking is housing for the dispersed group. The program is in place. It is more a problem of access and information. Housing is a huge problem in Guatemala and undoubtedly in most other post conflict settings. As was explained to the evaluators, vulnerable people are motivated by housing above all other priorities and will go to where the housing is before worrying about employment
- l) **Expectations** In the Guatemala Program, false expectations were constantly raised by the FGT and, unwittingly, by the donors, not knowing in advance what it would take to implement programs on the drawing board. Further, expectations were raised in the ex-combatant group by the FGT with regard to entitlements that were unrealistic and tended to reinforce a paternalistic mindset. The Military

demobilization program (PMA) likewise suffered from unrealistic expectations regarding wage levels in private industry which resulted in a shortfall on the employment side and the return of many to the security business. Promises should be kept to a minimum while emphasizing the reality of the market place and the importance of self-reliance, creativity and hard work in the development of personal opportunity. Promises made, but not delivered, are a disservice to the beneficiary group in that they automatically curtail needed effort and creativity in search of individual solutions.

- m) **Credit** The grant nature of the Productive Investment Program design facilitated rapid implementation and the ability to move on quickly after execution to other areas and components, not having to worry about collections. Nevertheless, it established an unfortunate precedent and an "entitlement" attitude among some beneficiaries. It also denied to the group the experience of working with credit and having to budget costs in order to deal with a repayment schedule. The majority of those interviewed expressed extreme reluctance to enter into market credit relationships for fear of mortgaging and losing what they had to offer as collateral. If these people are to prosper and grow, however, they will need to be able to tap credit markets in the future for badly needed investment and working capital. Experienced NGO micro-enterprise programs should also be tapped in support of such programs in the future. They were notably excluded from the Guatemala Program.
- n) **Training** The technical training component of the program was generally adequate in quality, but not in duration. Nor was it linked, with the exception of the PMA program, with employment or productive enterprise projects. The lessons here are 1) technical training should be based on true market opportunities, 2) training should have been integrated with the productive project program and supplemented with a follow-up program of job search and placement, 3) selection should have been based on an adequate assessment of aptitude and preferences as well as market opportunity, 4) training should have been tied to an apprenticeship program for those intending to enter the job market (as was done in the PMA program), 5) the private sector should have been involved in planning and execution from the start, and 6) for a number of fields, such as auto-mechanics, electricity, carpentry etc., the training was not enough to satisfy entry requirements of many companies and should have been longer.
- o) **Safeguards on Equity** Inequities and the appearance of inequities should be avoided if possible. In the Guatemala case, some beneficiaries were clearly favored over others, especially those in the halfway houses. Others received favored treatment when it came to training, productive investment projects and jobs with the Foundation. For a given beneficiary to receive an additional set of benefits is not necessarily wrong in the context of a particular situation. What is important is to have a policy and adhere to it, so that all know the rules of the game. It is also important to have a data base that can adequately track who receives what and assure that multiple benefits in a given case are justified by circumstances and a valid rationale (now in place in Guatemala).

p) Transition to Development Despite the fact that this was an “incorporation” and not, supposedly, a development program, concepts of sustainable development should have been introduced from the beginning. Obviously much of any demobilization effort will be of a transitional nature. On the other hand, principles should be introduced early in order to develop the appropriate mindset on the part of beneficiaries and implementers alike.

For a full detailing of the above factors and lessons learned, please see Chapter VI.

In conclusion, there is rich experience in the Guatemala program which has much to offer to future efforts of this nature. This experience should be tapped, both in the form of this report, but, even more importantly, through the participation of key actors involved in the program in the planning and execution of new endeavors where these lessons could be productively applied.

II METHODOLOGY

The evaluation was carried out as an in-house exercise by a personal services contract employee of OTI. He was assisted by a Guatemalan consultant, formerly employed by IOM for work on the Productive Incorporation Program (PIP) component of the Demobilization and Incorporation Program.

The evaluator visited Guatemala for a week in late September and early October 1998 for initial planning and arrangements for the full evaluation. The evaluator then returned on October 18 for five weeks of field work concluding on November 24, 1998.

The heart of the evaluation was a series of structured interviews carried out in the field with beneficiary groups and individuals representative of the major components of the project, mainly URNG and PMA ex-combatants. The interviews gathered feedback on program implementation and impact, levels of social and economic viability and beneficiary satisfaction, and capacity development as a consequence of training, productive enterprise assistance, institutional outreach efforts and follow-up problem solving on the part of implementing agencies. The evaluation also carried out interviews of institutional actors, headquarters and field staff, to capture feedback on operational success factors including political, policy, technical and resource constraints, tactics, coordination, and problem solving efforts. The exercise further carried out an exhaustive review of project documentation including reports, correspondence, evaluations and data in general from OTI, the USAID Mission, the International Office of Migration (IOM), other donors, the Special Incorporation Commission (CEI), the Government of Guatemala (GOG), the Fundacion Guillermo Toriello (FGT) and other sources.

The exercise commenced with field interviews on October 19 (See Appendix D, Visits to Field and Project Sites), which lasted off and on for the following four weeks. This was not the original plan, which would have wrapped up this portion more quickly, but the schedule was disrupted by the passage of Hurricane Mitch over Central America on the weekend of Oct 31, precisely in the middle of the field portion of the effort, which caused several days of down time for both field travel and institutional visits. A number of main roads were rendered impassible, and for two days following the storm the Government declared a national emergency, shut itself down except for relief efforts, and told everyone to stay home.

Throughout the effort the team kept in close touch with OTI's Resident Representative in Guatemala, Mr. David Gould, as well as the program funding partner, the United Nations Development Program, with which the team met three times over the period. The team also met and compared notes with a second evaluation team contracted by the UNDP to carry out a review of the performance of the project in the context of the operation of the

Special Incorporation Commission and was able to verify that the two evaluations were basically on the same wave length and coming up with similar conclusions, albeit from different angles. This evaluation also covered somewhat more territory than the other in that it also dealt with the Military demobilization assistance effort and other supporting activities not specifically touched by the by the UNDP exercise which was more narrowly focused on the CEI and policy questions associated with program management and implementation.

The evaluation did not carry out a sample survey of beneficiaries, which the UNDP was planning on contracting in the case of the PIP program. It opted rather to gather a comprehensive array of impressions from basically all sources, both on the beneficiary and implementation sides of the program, in an attempt to develop a comprehensive picture of what had happened and why for the purpose of drawing lessons from the experience and determining the degree to which the program had effectively met its objectives. The exercise also attempted to determine the degree to which effective incorporation had actually occurred.

The level of effort for the exercise was two people for five weeks in Guatemala followed by another three weeks of drafting and editing in the U.S. In terms of numbers, the team met with a total of approximately 60 beneficiaries from the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteco (URNG) ex-combatant membership in varying degrees of depth including the dispersed, halfway house and cooperative farm sub-groups along with another 13 ex-military police members and 10 more from Communities of Populations in Resistance (CPR). The team also had contact with a considerably larger group through attendance at various PIP workshops in different locations. In Institutional Interviews in both the field and the capital, the team met with another 60 officials and staff from institutions involved in the program at various levels including the GOG, international organizations, the US Government, the FGT, and the Private Sector.

The team believes it captured a comprehensive picture and sampled a sufficiently wide circle of opinion to be able to draw valid conclusions on the planning and conduct of the program as well as success factors and lessons learned for purposes of improving OTI and donor responses in the future to similar post-conflict situations.

III BACKGROUND

A The Road to Peace¹

Some background on the Guatemalan conflict, the evolution of the Peace Accords and the atmosphere at the time is important to an understanding of the contextual framework within which the demobilization program was carried out. The principal stakeholders in the program at all levels are products of their own history and are conditioned by attitudes formed through decades of interaction with powerful social, economic and political forces as well as the military conflict of the preceding 35 years.

1 The Peace Accord Scenario

The road to peace in Guatemala was long and tortured. It began in the mid 1980s following a period of brutal State sponsored military repression in the late 1970s and early 1980s resulting in the flight of thousands of non-combatants into the mountains and to Mexico and the creation of isolated "communities of populations in resistance" (CPRs)². This had been preceded by continuing low intensity struggle by guerilla forces since 1960 and was destined to last for more than another decade, until 1996, over 35 years of armed conflict in the countryside³.

Transition to peace began in the mid-1980s with a new constitution, the election of the first democratically elected civilian President in over thirty years (Venicio Cerezo), and new measures to assure political pluralism and personal liberties. The peace process itself commenced with the Accord signed in May 1987 at the Esquipulas II meeting of Central American Presidents which set forth a series of steps to achieve peace across the region. The Accord called for national reconciliation, an end to armed hostilities, the

¹ This section is drawn from the following sources: a) United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, "Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca", Dec 12, 1996, b) Holiday, David, pp 68-74, "Guatemala's long road to Peace," Current History, February 1997, c) World Bank and the Carter Center, "From Civil War to Civil Society - The Transition from War to Peace in Guatemala and Liberia", July 1997, d) Comision Especial de Incorporacion, "Demobilization of the Guerilla in Guatemala," Oct 1997, e) Rhodes William Stacy, "Peace in Central America, Peace in Guatemala, How Long can it Last?", presentation to the Tucson Council on Foreign Relations, June 1998, and interviews with Hector Morales, Secretary, SEPAZ, and Eduardo Aguirre, SEPAZ representative to the CEI and responsible for management of reincorporation programs for the Government of Guatemala, November 1998.

² The CPRs exist to this date and were assisted by this program. See Chapter IV, Section A 2 e.

³ Although the conflict in question commenced in 1960, it had been preceded during most of this century by repeated periods of repression, social fragmentation and polarization, including widespread physical and human destruction, under more than thirty different governments (15 of which were Military Juntas) World Bank and Carter Center, pp 1-2

democratization of government structures, free and open elections, and an end to external support to irregular forces

As a consequence of the Esquipulas Agreement, a Committee of National Reconciliation was formed and private talks began with URNG commanders living in Mexico city. Neither President Cerezo nor his successor, President Jorge Serrano, however, were able to make much headway due to skepticism by the URNG and civil society in general. Both were perceived as corrupt and reflecting elite interests. The process moved forward in fits and starts over the next few years in a period characterized by political instability and economic stagnation, including an unsuccessful Fujimori style "self coup" attempt by President Serrano which provoked a powerful pro-democracy opposition movement among leaders from public, private and academic sectors. President Serrano did manage to create a Peace Commission (COPAZ), in 1991, which agreed with the URNG in April of that year to begin setting negotiating parameters.

It wasn't until 1994 that a serious negotiation process began, however, under the leadership of President Ramiro de Leon Carpio, who had been elected in June 1993 to finish out Serrano's term (driven into exile following the "self-coup" attempt). Leon Carpio, known for honesty and support for human rights, had more credibility than his predecessors and pursued the peace process relentlessly. By January 1994, he had secured a "Framework Accord" with the URNG which established a process and defined subjects to be negotiated prior to an end to the conflict. By the end of March 1994 a calendar and items to be discussed were agreed upon between the URNG and COPAZ, and the first actual accord, on Human Rights, was signed by both parties. At this point the United Nations was requested to send a Verification Mission, MINUGUA, to Guatemala which is still in the country today monitoring compliance with Peace Accords.

Three additional accords followed under the Leon Carpio government in June 1994 and March 1995 including resettlement of refugees and displaced peoples, the creation of a Historical Clarification "truth" Commission, and the Accord on the Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples. It was left to the current President of Guatemala, Alvaro Arzu, elected in late 1995, to conclude the process with the Socioeconomic and Agrarian Accord signed in Mexico in May 1996, followed by the Accord on Civil Authority and the Role of the Army in a Democratic Society in September, a particularly important reform agenda for the military, legislative and judicial branches of government. A de facto cease fire which had been in effect during most of this period was subsequently formalized in Oslo on December 4, followed in rapid succession by a constitutional and electoral reform accord in Stockholm, a reinsertion agreement in Spain, and the Final Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace signed on December 29 in Guatemala City, ending the longest civil war in Latin American history, with the possible exception of Colombia.

2 The Accords and Objectives of the Incorporation Process

The accords, 10 in all, including some 442 commitments, marked a political and policy breakthrough and provided a national reform agenda on which the international donor community could base a serious response. In effect they constituted " an action plan

for the political, economic, social and cultural development of Guatemala ”⁴ Together they called for a “profound restructuring of the state” including reform of the military, the national police and the system of justice, tax and financial management, a major expansion of social services (especially health and education) to vulnerable groups, and political and social inclusion and respect for the rights and traditions of all Guatemalans ⁵

Within three weeks following the signing of the final accords a Consultative Group Meeting on Guatemala was held in Brussels The Arzu administration made an impressive presentation of a “full fledged peace program”, and there was an outpouring of pledges of financial support totaling almost \$2 0 billion for the four year period 1997-2000, including the United States through USAID with \$250 million ⁶ The elements were in place for an accelerated reform and development program desperately needed by a country beaten down for decades by civil strife, economic stagnation, and severe to extreme poverty on the part of the vast majority of its citizens

Of most relevance to the Demobilization Program was the Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), signed in Madrid on December 12 It set forth the phases of the process, initial incorporation (including “emergency” demobilization and insertion stages), and final or “definitive” incorporation The timetable was specified – demobilization date or “D” to D+60 days for the demobilization or cantonment stage, D+60 plus one year for “Initial Incorporation”, and “Definitive Incorporation” thereafter The Accord further lists objectives and principles which seek to “create the best possible conditions for the integration of URNG members into the legal, political, social, economic and cultural life of the country, in security and dignity and to provide URNG members, particularly former combatants, with the necessary support to consolidate their integration ”⁷

The Agreement required the establishment of a Special Incorporation Commission (CEI) which would be responsible for coordinating the incorporation program and for taking decisions on the allocation of funding to its contingent programs and for raising technical and financial resources The commission was legalized by Government accord on January 28 and was established and operating at the time of commencement of the Initial Incorporation Phase on May 3, 1997 Finally, in order to assure full participation by beneficiaries in the design, execution and evaluation of projects and programs concerning them, the Agreement called for the establishment of a “Foundation” for incorporation which was to be directly involved in the various stages of the integration process This resulted in the creation of the Fundacion Guillermo Toriello (FGT) which has represented the URNG and its members throughout the program in the CEI and with the donor community in general The Foundation was legally established on April 4, 1997

⁴ USAID Mission to Guatemala, p 1, USAID/G-CAP Special Objective – The Peace Program, 1998

⁵ *Ibid.*, p 1

⁶ Rhodes, p 9

⁷ United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), “Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, Dec 12, 1996

B The Atmosphere at the Time of the Accords and Initiation of the Demobilization Program⁸

For an understanding of the dynamics of planning and execution of the demobilization program it is important to have a feel for the situation and atmosphere surrounding final negotiations and program initiation. These also relate to what might or might not have been possible to resolve prior to setting in place the policies and practices of the principal institutional mechanisms and actors in the process.

First, on the URNG side, there was an urgent concern for security arrangements and extreme suspicion. The focus of the URNG did not include such things as technical integrity, or equity concerns in benefit distribution, or effective information sharing or transparency. Rather it was concerned with protection of forces during the highly vulnerable cantonment process - both into and out of the camps. In dealing with this concern, President Arzu gave his personal guarantee of protection for exposed guerilla forces and their families in the mountains during the precarious period following the Cease Fire until D day, which ended up being March 3, 1997, at which point the guerillas were to commence deployment to the demobilization camps. The Guatemalan military also played a key role during this period, which it executed with sensitivity and intelligence, in terms of developing and honoring a relationship of trust with URNG commanders. Nevertheless, starting in early December 1996, negotiations and events leading to the cantonment phase were tense in the extreme and had to deal with a host of difficult logistical and security issues.

On the Government side, there was frenetic activity during this period, as a capable team of GOG negotiators and managers dealt with horrendous political, economic, logistical and time constraints in order to finalize demobilization terms and details with the URNG and prepare arrangements deployment to the camps. The situation had been made considerably more difficult thanks to a political kidnapping in October by an urban guerilla cell of an 86-year-old woman belonging to one of Guatemala's wealthiest families, one that had been supportive of President Arzu. This was eventually resolved through an exchange for one of the ranking URNG commanders. But it served to temporarily set back the peace process and made for an increase in tension on both sides at precisely the wrong moment. Further, any hope of involving the private sector in the program at the time was probably dashed by this ill-advised move. Finally, the job of finding land and negotiating space for eight separate camps was equally difficult. Government officials charged with the job had to deal with over 35 different landowners, many in remote locations, before final arrangements for the sites could be concluded. This involved a frenetic process of non-stop travel in the interior from farm to farm to engage in the most difficult of negotiations. A typical response from a farm owner at the time was, "These people have been killing my cattle and kidnapping my family and now

⁸ This section is drawn mainly from interviews with principal GOG officials involved during this period including Presidential advisor Ricardo Stein, and Hector Morales, Eduardo Aguirre, and Alvaro Colom, all of FONAPAZ at the time, in addition to the Holiday article.

you want to put them in my back yard?”⁹ The price that was paid was reportedly heavy, in time energy and money

C The Donor Response¹⁰

The major donor response to the Peace Accords in terms of substantive pledges came at the Brussels meeting of the Consultative Group in January 1997. By early December, however, a working group of four donors (the “Group of Four”) had come together to prepare for the cantonment and demobilization phase of the program including USAID, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the European Union (EU) and the Organization of American States (OAS). There was intense cooperation within the group and with the Government in the planning and countdown to D day. A key planning meeting of the URNG, donors and GOG agencies was held in Mexico in the second week of December. This successful gathering which dealt, among other things, with institutional roles, commitments and assignments, helped to set the tone for an emergency effort which can only be described as amazing in terms of the quality of performance and coordination by participating entities, including the URNG, GOG and donor agencies. USAID (Mission and OTI) played an important leadership role in this meeting, which the main GOG protagonists remember with sincere appreciation. (See following section.)

In Mexico and subsequent weekly sessions it was agreed that UNDP and USAID/OTI would handle camp preparation and construction together with FONAPAZ. EU was to contribute and manage food distribution, and the OAS would provide basic education/literacy and civic orientation training in the camps. Also at this early stage IOM was brought in as the executing agency for the jointly financed USAID/OTI-UNDP side of the effort. IOM was asked to play this role based on prior outstanding experience with the USAID/OTI funded demobilization program in Haiti, and key personnel from that program joined the Guatemala staff.

Several other donors also played key roles at this stage, most notably the Spanish, especially the Spanish Red Cross, which worked tirelessly in the camps to maintain needed services. Norway also made a substantive contribution through UNDP toward camp construction.

It should be noted at this point that the level of trust and cooperation among the main players, donors, implementers and GOG was of a level this evaluator has not observed in other settings. More on this later, but a major finding can be stated at the outset, that the agencies involved and the program were blessed with a unique set of special people at the helm, who were committed more to the importance of their mission and the need get a quality job done fast than to their own institutional or personal interests. On this point there is universal agreement in Guatemala.

⁹ Interview with Alvaro Colom, Former Director, FONAPAZ

¹⁰ This section is drawn from interviews with former FONAPAZ officials involved at the time along with donor representatives from UNDP and USAID including OTI Senior Advisor and program manager, Johanna Mendelson, and field consultant, Charles C. “Chuck” Brady, charged with planning and managing the logistical and construction effort for the cantonment phase.

IV THE PROGRAM – HISTORY AND IMPLEMENTATION

A The Emergency Phase – Demobilization and the Camps¹

The USAID/OTI effort commenced in November 1996 with discussions with the GOG and other international organizations on the scene regarding the immediate needs of Peace Accord implementation in the areas of demobilization and reincorporation of the URNG and a downsized Guatemalan military. Early interest and commitment was expressed by Mr. Ricardo Stein, Chief of Cabinet at the time to President Arzu, with the objective of having a quick-impact program available immediately after the Accords were to be signed on December 29, 1996.

Shortly thereafter an assessment scope of work and field team was pulled together by the OTI consultant contracted for the assessment and planning effort. Late November assumptions for the emergency program included 8 orientation centers, populated by approximately 2,700 former URNG combatants, geographically spread out in difficult terrain, a complete absence of infrastructure on the sites, and the need for an intensive program to prepare the ex-combatants for viable reinsertion into Guatemalan society. The time allowed for the required assessment, team building, planning, design, and construction effort to be carried out (approximately three months) was impossibly short by any reasonable standard.

In early December the Group of Four came together (USAID, UNDP, OAS and the EU) in an ongoing working group. They met daily most of time in dealing with the multitude of needs that had to be addressed prior to “D day” (guerilla deployment to the camps) which was to occur within 90 days following the signing of the Accords. USAID and UNDP, in tight collaboration, provided effective leadership for this group.² Also, early in the month a collaborative relationship was established with the Guatemala office of the International Office of Migration (IOM). OTI had earlier requested assistance of IOM officers experienced in the Haiti demobilization program. It soon became clear that IOM was far and away the best alternative as an organizational vehicle for program implementation given its uniquely appropriate mix of experience, skilled personnel, institutional flexibility and commitment to the cause of effective demobilization. An

¹ Much of this material is drawn from interviews and working papers supplied by Chuck Brady, OTI consultant responsible for camp planning and construction. Other sources include the CEI publication, “Demobilization of the Guerilla in Guatemala”, Oct. 1998, and a number of other interviews with key individuals involved at the time such as Dr. Johanna Mendelson, Mauricio Valdes, Diego Beltrand, Ricardo Stein, Hector Morales, Eduardo Aguirre, Alvaro Colom, Fernando Calado and (See Appendix A, Interviews).

² The key actors in this leadership effort were USAID Deputy Mission Director, Leticia Butler, Chuck Brady, and Mauricio Valdes, Program Director for the UNDP in Guatemala at the time.

understanding was also quickly developed between UNDP and USAID/OTI to co-finance the program on a 50/50 basis through IOM

During December needs were defined and budgeted, and a unified plan was formulated under which cooperating agencies could bring their respective technical and financial resources to bear in a way that accommodated each participant's interest, restrictions, expertise and resources³ At the same time an extensive coordination effort was carried by USAID/OTI and the UNDP with the GOG, mainly with FONAPAZ, (National Peace Fund), which had been set up in the early days of the Peace Process to deal with needs of refugees and repatriated groups FONAPAZ took the lead at the time for the Government on all matters related to planning and implementation for the cantonment phase and worked tirelessly with the donor group on infrastructure needs of the camps, site negotiation and other related requirements

An informal working group soon evolved consisting of USAID/OTI, UNDP, IOM and FONAPAZ, along with the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala, (MINUGUA - responsible for oversight of the Peace Process including demobilization) On the Government side, a Logistical Support Commission was established on December 18, under the terms of the Peace Accords, to coordinate the countdown to D day in terms of camp preparation The Commission included the URNG, FONAPAZ, the Presidential Peace Commission (COPAZ), and the National Commission for Attention to Repatriated, Refugee and Displaced Persons (CEAR) along with representatives from the Group of Four It was lead by MINUGUA A logistical assessment was also carried out early in the month by the UN Peace Keeping Department (UNDPKO) which included the OTI consultant Finally, on December 20, a Government Commission was formed to resolve land use issues and address off-site infrastructure needs

As can be seen, the complexity and rapid-fire nature of the institutional networking and communications that had to occur for successful planning and execution of the camp phase of the program would have been a huge challenge at best for any implementing group Fortunately, the level of dedication, agility and flexibility of key persons from each institution was such that it all worked in terms of highly articulated and complementary organizational roles along with truly extraordinary performance by all institutions involved This required a level of excellence in communication and coordination almost unheard-of in such situations⁴

On the first of January, 1997, preparation of detailed plans, specifications, and site adaptation plans began on an emergency basis The following partial schedule is illustrative of the fire drill nature the effort in January and February which required the best that all participants had to offer⁵

- Jan 1 – begin preparation of detailed plans, costs, specs for on-site infrastructure

³ Brady, Memo of December 23, 1996

⁴ Interviews with most of the key personnel at the time including Chuck Brady, Mauricio Valdez, Leticia Butler, Alvaro Colom, Hector Morales, Eduardo Aguirre, Diego Beltrand (See Appendix A, Interviews)

⁵ Brady memorandum of February 27, 1997

- Jan 6 – open bidding for off-site infrastructure (Tuluche, Los Blancos, Sacol)
- Jan 14 – complete plans, costs, specs for on-site infrastructure
- Jan 4-14 – establish bidding procedures for on-site infrastructure
- Jan 14 – receive offers for off-site infrastructure
- Jan 15 – open bidding for on-site infrastructure
- Jan 17 – award contracts (off-site infrastructure – complete construction in 3 weeks)
- Jan 20 – receive bids for on site infrastructure
- Jan 20-23 – evaluate bids, award contracts, commence construction supervision
- Feb 7 – complete off-site infrastructure
- Feb 9 – complete on-site infrastructure at Las Abejas and Mayalan
- Feb 23-28 – complete on-site infrastructure at Sacol, Tzalbal, Tuluche, Los Blancos

There were eight camps in all at the following sites

Sacol in the Peten
 Mayalan in Ixcán, El Quiche
 Tzalbal in Nebaj, El Quiche
 Tuluche I and II in Quiche, El Quiche
 Las Abejas in Quetzaltenango
 Claudia in Ecuintla
 and Los Blanco in Taxisco

Together the camps were designed to hold 3,000 plus ex-combatants. Each camp had 55 to 60 structures including command posts, warehouses, sleeping areas (combatants plus families and camp staff), recreation facilities, libraries, day care shelters, latrines, sanitary facilities, kitchens, dining areas, and multipurpose rooms. Separate contracts also had to be let for electrical services and camp maintenance. The exercise was made yet more difficult by heavy rains in the northern Departments, especially in the Peten, through most of the January-March period. Further, each camp had to be constructed in a manner consistent with the climate and conditions of the region in which it was located. In the highlands, for example, walls were made of wood with zinc sheets for roofing, while in coastal regions walls were replaced by curtains to allow cross ventilation. The buildings were designed to be minimal and functional, and in keeping with the Peace Accords, “austere and dignified.”⁶ In all, 26,000 square meters were constructed, which doesn’t begin to do justice to the complexity of the job, including off-site infrastructure.

Anyone experienced in construction contracting would look at the above schedule in disbelief. But this was only half the story. Sites had to be selected and negotiated on the same frenetic basis, as referenced earlier, and the camps had to be furnished⁷, staffed, and plans prepared for management of food, health care, utilities, and other services. The construction supervision job alone required round after round of site visits which kept

⁶ Brady memorandum of March 8, 1997

⁷ Illustrative of the nature of the situation, a few days before the camps were to open, after exhausting the all sources of supply in Guatemala for chairs, an IOM logistics specialist had to fly to El Salvador on an emergency procurement mission. He accompanied the chairs back to the camps in the nick of time. Interview with Oscar Sandoval, IOM

OTI, IOM and key members of the Logistical Support Commission constantly in helicopters and scrambling through an endless string of 15 hour days

Total costs of camp construction came to approximately Q26 4 million, or about \$4 5 million at the exchange rate of the time, of which USAID/OTI covered \$1 1 million ⁸

In another example of extraordinary coordination and trust, funding for construction had to be advanced by FONAPAZ, because funding from USAID did not become available in the form of the grant to IOM until March 7. FONAPAZ was subsequently made whole through an informal arrangement, meticulously managed, under which UNDP advanced funds supplied by Norway (in an early unconditioned grant) to IOM which were eventually replaced by corresponding USAID funds on IOM's books in order to achieve the 50/50 balance agreed upon between the two donors. It was a relationship among partner agencies on both the donor and Government side which required the highest level of trust, skilled management and transparency.

Other members of the Group of Four performed exemplary roles as well along with other donors and Government Agencies. An effective working group was set up, for example, among USAID, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), CEAR, the European Union (EU), UNDP and IOM to develop the Camp Administration and Management Plan. Initially there was strong debate as the GOG and the URNG staked out positions that were far apart and unworkable. In subsequent meetings these issues were effectively resolved through persistent negotiation, drawing heavily on the diplomatic skills and intelligence of the principal institutional actors.

With respect to Camp Management and Organization, responsibilities for each site were assigned as follows. The UN Peace Keeping Force (UNDPKO), or the Blue Berets (a 155 person unit which started arriving on February 15), was tasked with liaison with both URNG and Armed Forces commands in the area, monitoring observance of the cease fire, patrolling the demilitarized zone surrounding the camp, receiving arms, verification of personnel, issuance of initial identification cards, visitor control and patrol of the area. The URNG was charged with camp command and operations, camp security, maintenance of order, and upkeep of grounds and facilities. Finally, the international community had the responsibility for provision of program services related to health (Pan American Health Organization (OPS)), education (OAS), documentation (UNHCR), food (EU), and evaluations and orientation sessions (OAS/IOM) leading to the development of profiles required for planning post demobilization incorporation activities. A contingent of the Spanish Red Cross which arrived in late February was deployed as well to the camps where they joined the UNDPKO and URNG commanders as a team to assist in verification, camp management, demobilization and pre-incorporation activities.

On February 23, 1997, the day when the camps were to open ("D day"), was established as March 3. All other matters thereafter were defined in terms of D day plus days or months depending on the timing of the event. D plus 60, or May 3, 1997, was established

⁸ p 14, Comision Especial de Incorporacion, "Demobilization of the Guerilla in Guatemala", Oct 1997, and p 1, USAID/OTI, "Summary of USAID/OTI Investment in Guatemala," Sept 28, 1998

as the end of the emergency phase of the program and the commencement of “Initial Incorporation”, by which point the camps had to be vacated and the ex-combatants sent to either final or provisional destinations

On March 3 guerillas started flowing into the camps with the bulk arriving by the middle of the month. The exit schedule from the camps to final or temporary destinations was established in a phased scenario running from late April (D+43) to May 3 (D+60). Thus, the main activities of the camps took place over slightly more than a one month period from mid-March to mid-April. The shortness of this period, although considered desirable at the time, was to surface later as a constraint in terms of the time needed for adequate assessment, orientation and training of the URNG cadre affected.

During their time in the camps, URNG ex-combatants passed through a whirlwind of activity which kept them totally busy, out of trouble, relatively happy and in good health. A number interviewed look back on this period with a certain nostalgia. They had little to worry about at the moment. Their immediate needs for rest, food, shelter, health services, and recreation were effectively addressed. They were organized, surveyed, documented, and trained in a highly efficient team effort by the international community.

Prior to the opening of the camps, commencing on February 22 and ending on March 11, the OAS (with USAID and UNDP funding through IOM) carried out an excellent 35 hour training program in participatory style with 127 “promotores educativos” selected from the more experienced and educated URNG demobilized cadre. The training prepared the students to provide initial training in civic formation, literacy and vocational orientation. IOM prepared and supervised the vocational part of the course. Education materials and detailed guides were provided by the OAS trainers for the sessions to come in the camps.

By all accounts this training was outstanding in quality, although too short. Most of the trainees were between the ages of 16 and 20, 85% were men, 72% had an indigenous language as their mother tongue, and 11% had attended no school at all, but had learned to read during the conflict.⁹ Another 20% had a third grade education, and 29% had completed the sixth grade. A great deal of attention was directed to inter-active teaching methodology and the need to focus on vocational options and livelihood possibilities for the ex-combatants as a whole. They were also constantly evaluated and counseled. It was recognized that they would need considerable assistance during the cantonment phase in order to adequately impart the material for which they had been trained.

The training activity in the camps commenced on March 20. Initially trainees were grouped in two sections by level of literacy and schooling. Training included basic education and “homologación” or validation by the Ministry of Education as to studies realized which were verified through national tests for the third grade, sixth grade and high school. The second phase of the training was devoted to vocational orientation. In all cases, supervision and assistance for the training was coordinated effectively among

⁹ Lack of formal education is not necessarily a valid indicator of literacy or ability to master and teach academic material in the context of the Guatemalan guerrilla. See Footnote #14

OAS and IOM technicians, URNG education coordinators in each camp, the Spanish Red Cross, and MINUGUA personnel

Training sessions were dynamic and characterized by “learn by doing” concepts and active teaching methodologies with heavy student participation. Methodology and timetables were modified as needed based on experience and emerging constraints. The most serious problem was the lack of time to more fully develop the subjects at hand. It was further determined that the real payoff to the effort would come with follow-up training in places of destination of the ex-combatants, with more time to fully address the needs in each area. A general profile of job preferences was captured through this process which indicated that the vast majority of beneficiaries wanted to work in service industries (most wanting self-employment) with agriculture, livestock and commerce following in that order.¹⁰

Also during the cantonment phase, beneficiaries were documented and provided with permanent ID cards by UNHCR and surveyed by the URNG which established an initial profile of the demobilized population. Some of basic figures coming from this exercise include the following

URNG personnel in the camps	2,940
Women	14.8%
Age 16 to 20	63.8%
Indigenous	81.2%
Illiterate	18.5%
Functional illiteracy	2.1%
Literate, but no schooling ¹¹	20%
Some level of schooling	59.2%
Professionals	2.8%
Unmarried or separated	46%

Upon conclusion of the cantonment phase and the departure of demobilized soldiers, the camps were broken down and distributed to some 124 neighboring communities, benefiting over 90,000 inhabitants. This was done on the basis of community petitions and agreements that matching contributions of labor would be made for needed works projects. This was a highly positive move from a public relations standpoint and allowed a number of URNG members to offer material benefits to their communities. USAID/OTI and the UNDP covered freight charges and the purchase of needed additional construction materials using savings from the cantonment period. Medical, dental and kitchen equipment was donated to the new Fundacion Guillermo Toriello for use in halfway houses where demobilized guerillas having no immediate place to go were

¹⁰ International Organization for Migration, “Componente Orientacion Vocacional”, May 15, 1997. Interviews with Raul Rosende, OAS, and Francisco Ureta, Training Coordinator, IOM.

¹¹ The evaluation team interviewed one of these at the Peten Cooperative Farm. He was totally self-taught, having grown up in the mountains with guerilla forces, but had achieved an extraordinarily high state of academic understanding, was an officer among the ranks, and a key member of the board of directors of the cooperative.

sheltered on a temporary basis. IOM supervised the restoration work in campsites to return properties to owners in original condition.¹²

All in all, the camp phase was a smashing success, and is so considered by the universe of interviewed personnel.¹³ The evaluators agree with the assessment, especially with regard to planning and execution of camp construction and the remarkable degree of high quality coordination and leadership provided by participating institutions. On the other hand, additional time in the camps could have been productively utilized to address some of the serious planning gaps that followed as described in following sections.

B Initial Incorporation – URNG

1 Implementation Structure – the Institutions¹⁴

First, it is important to note that the Incorporation Program has been managed by a Co-Directorship arrangement consisting of the GOG and the URNG (each acting through its representative institutions as mandated by the Peace Accords) and advised by the International Donor Community with MINUGUA acting as the official verifier. The issues associated with co-direction are manifold and discussed in later sections.

Second, before getting into the detail of program implementation, it is necessary to have a feel for the unique set of institutions established to manage the incorporation process. The nature and functioning of these institutions has impacted heavily on the course of events and performance of program components. The principal entities in the Guatemala case are the Special Incorporation Commission (CEI) and the Fundacion Guillermo Toriello (FGT), both mandated by the Peace Accords and both crucial to their implementation. On the Government side, the two most important institutions are SEPAPZ and FONAPAZ. Finally, IOM will be covered below in its role as the executing agency for USAID/OTI and UNDP.

a The Special Incorporation Commission (CEI)

The Special Incorporation Commission (CEI) has played the dominant role as the main implementation coordination vehicle for all programs in support of Initial Incorporation.¹⁵ Its structure and how it operated is relevant to an appreciation of the political and structural constraints that confronted the program from its inception.

¹² p. 24, "Demobilization of the Guerilla in Guatemala", Comision Especial de Incorporacion, Nov. 1997. This was not a simple or cheap task. The properties had to be returned in the precise condition in which they were received, including grading to restore terrain to original configuration in some cases.

¹³ Some of those interviewed by the team now admit that the time in the camps should have been considerably longer including the FGT and European Union/PAREC staff. There were pressures at the time, however, which precluded this option. (See Chapter VI)

¹⁴ This Section is drawn from a) Comision Especial de Incorporacion, "Incorporacion", November 1998, b) Comision Especial de Incorporacion, "Reglamento Interno" February 11, 1997, c) interviews with GOG and donor members, and d) interviews with FGT officers and staff.

¹⁵ The period in question is from May 3, 1997, until Nov. 3, 1998. Prior to this period, coordination was carried through the working groups described in the preceding section.

Virtually all important implementation decisions relating to the URNG incorporation effort were vetted and coordinated through the CEI with the URNG Foundation (FGT) and the international donor community. A major portion of the time and effort of the USAID/OTI field representative, especially during the first year of the period, was dedicated to working with the CEI mechanism in pursuit of needed implementation actions and decisions on the part of partner and counterpart institutions. Lessons can be drawn from the experience of working with this critical body relative to the potential effectiveness of post-conflict implementation and coordination structures.

The CEI was adjourned permanently in late November 1998 at the end of its extended mandate. The original incorporation period, which was to last one year, was extended for six months at the conclusion of the first year of the program in May 1998 in order to effectively conclude a number of important activities still in process at that time. It has now been succeeded by a bilateral working group (GOG/URNG) known as ECO for "Equipo Coordinador," with a mandate to define and implement a follow-up, CEI-like, coordination mechanism for the multi-year, definitive incorporation period, now initiated.

In its own words the Special Incorporation Commission (CEI) was formed to accompany Initial Incorporation for the purpose of creating favorable conditions and assuring that projects contributed effectively to incorporation with "security and dignity" as basic conditions for the reconciliation of Guatemalan society.¹⁶ It began operating under its mandate, the Government Accord of January 28, 1997, on D+60 or May 3, 1997.

By regulation the Commission was composed of three representatives designated by the Government, three from the URNG and four advisory representatives from cooperating international donor agencies. MINUGUA was also asked to participate as observer and verifier. The Commission itself was to be represented jointly by the GOG and the URNG. Its primary objective was to guarantee fulfillment of the Initial Incorporation stage. Its principal functions included the following¹⁷

- Coordination of the initial incorporation program and decision-making concerning financial assignments for subprograms and projects under its mandate
- Mobilization of technical and financial resources
- Definition of adequate financial mechanisms, including the possibility of trust funds, in consultation with donors, to facilitate agile and effective compliance with program requirements
- Nomination and coordination of working groups with specific purposes and agendas
- Coordination with the Foundation for the Incorporation of the URNG, established in the Basis for Legal Incorporation Accord
- Follow-up and monitoring to assure activities respond to the principles and objectives of the Incorporation Accord

¹⁶ p 1, Comision Especial de Incorporacion, "Incorporacion", November 1998

¹⁷ p 2, Comision Especial de Incorporacion, "Reglamento Interno" February 11, 1997

CEI was the only organization with the authority to make decisions relative to the Initial Incorporation Program. It had a secretariat managed by a professional able to count on technical and financial support from SEPAZ. The Secretariat prepared the agenda and produced the required memoranda for the record on resolutions taken by the body.

For the first year of the Incorporation Program the CEI met once a week for an average of four to six hours each and somewhat less frequently during the last six months. The chairmanship of the body alternated between the GOG and the URNG. The principal international players attending included USAID/OTI, UNDP, the EU and MINUGUA.

The CEI imposed structure and order on the program, although it was often not able to resolve basic disputes on program implementation issues. On the Government side, a strong team headed by Ricardo Stein, Secretary, SEPAZ (The Peace Secretariat), assured solid leadership and expeditious decision making relative to necessary GOG actions in support of the program. For the Foundation, the team headed by President Enrique Corral was aggressive in pursuit of URNG interests, but often not forthcoming for reasons that can be understood, if not condoned.¹⁸ It succeeded in blocking or severely delaying a variety of program actions which required expeditious treatment in order to maintain program momentum, integrity and succeed operationally. (See following section on the FGT.)

With respect to the donor community, the CEI was an effective coordination vehicle, but was not in a position to force compliance with program timetables or terms on the part of donors required to operate within restrictive policies of their respective governments. In the case of USAID/OTI and the UNDP, this was not a serious problem. Both organizations exhibited extraordinary flexibility and agility in responding to the twists and turns of program direction required by evolving events and positions taken by the Foundation. The European Union, on the other hand, was not so fortunate, being forced by its own taxing procedural requirements to endlessly delay needed commitments and actions. In an ideal world, it would have been preferable for the CEI to have had more leverage to require compliance with program mandates and timetables, once basic commitments were made by contributing governments.

In summary, the CEI was eminently necessary and critical to the success of initial incorporation programs. Without it there might well have been chaos, as there was in the Nicaragua case, for example, and to a lesser extent in El Salvador, where solid authorities and mechanisms for donor coordination were not established.

b The Fundacion Guillermo Toriello (FGT)

The Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the URNG called for the establishment of an "Integration Foundation" to assure "full participation by beneficiaries

¹⁸ There are understandable reasons for the Foundation's position and behavior on many issues faced in the CEI which are explained more fully in following sections. Basically the FGT had to respond to competing political forces within its own leadership which often did not allow it to act in an operationally rational manner.

in the execution and evaluation of projects and programs concerning them”¹⁹ This resulted in the founding of the Funcacion Guillermo Toriello (FGT) which was legalized in February and commenced operations in May of 1997

Throughout the Initial Incorporation period, the Foundation represented the URNG in the capacity of “co-director” of the program and acted as such in dealings with the CEI and other implementing entities including the donor community. It was a new and evolving organization, still defining its strategy and building capacity. It claimed to be both a policy setting and executing organization for the benefit of URNG membership, but was of divided opinion as to the political nature of its role and mandate.²⁰

The FGT from the beginning struggled to maximize benefits to its membership, including ex-combatants, political supporters, and returned “external structures”. The ex-combatants, for the most part, comprised what is known as List A. These were members who were still in active combatant status in the mountains at the time of the Peace Accords. Political supporters, or List B, were those who supported the cause in their communities and elsewhere, but who were not actual combatants. List C included URNG supporters (including some ex-combatants) who were out of the country at the time of the Accords. The Initial Incorporation Program, by and large, officially addressed List A, with some limited exceptions. This (the FGT position on the inclusion of Lists B and C) has been a continuing bone of contention between the Foundation, the CEI and its membership, especially within the USAID/OTI/UNDP program, which was designed from the beginning to deal only with ex-combatants.²¹

The other main concern with the FGT had to do with its institutional capacity for program execution. In terms of people, it appeared to have relatively strong leadership, and its area chiefs, for the most part, were qualified and committed. It was weak at the lower supervisory levels, however, and stretched extremely thin for the geographic and sectoral areas it had to cover. On the resource side, by its own admission, its budget was tight and unable to cover minimum requirements in terms of people, operating expenses and basic administration such as transportation, communications, data management, etc.²²

¹⁹ United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, “Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, Dec 12, 1996

²⁰ In interviews with management of the Foundation the evaluation team heard two somewhat differing positions on this point. One view held that the FGT was not political, but that it did have to respond on a priority basis to the needs of those who had sacrificed the most in the struggle in the mountains as well as balance the competing interests of different URNG fronts. On the other hand, it was pointed out that by the nature of the situation it was a fact of life that the Foundation had to be political and should be accepted as such by those who would deal with it, including the donor community.

²¹ Interview with Ricardo Stein

²² The evaluation team tried repeatedly and in writing to obtain written materials from the Foundation with needed data and information. But received nothing, indicating either an inability or unwillingness to respond. Further, both USAID and IOM indicated that needed reporting from the Foundation had been almost nil and that performance in terms of accountability, adherence to program operating commitments, and execution in general had been sadly lacking. The team was likewise able to observe this in various settings in the course of field investigation. Information flow has been a major problem.

c Government Institutions²³

The two main participating agencies of the GOG for the Incorporation Program were the Peace Secretariat (SEPAZ) and the Peace Fund (FONAPAZ). These organizations served as principal counterparts to both USAID/OTI/UNDP and the EU and together constituted the other “Co-Director” for the program together with the FGT.

Both organizations were of an “extraordinary budget” nature and reported to the office of the President. Both were in line with “Modernization of the State” policies designed to create more responsive structures in response to reform, efficiency and accountability requirements. Both were legally able and pursued a policy of contracting outside personnel when and where necessary, often on a consulting basis and at salary levels outside of official pay scales, in order to deal effectively with rapidly evolving demands.

To utilize a USAID analogy, SEPAZ was like the Program Office of a Mission. It mobilized resources, managed the budget, negotiated and approved programs and monitored performance against targets. It did not act as an executing agency. FONAPAZ on the other hand, acted like a combination of Mission technical and project offices. It had operational financial and technical resources at its disposal and executed programs. It also drew on other GOG agencies to complete the necessary resource package for complex undertakings such as construction of the camps described earlier.

One characteristic stood out in the evaluation team’s research related to these organizations. This is that they were blessed with uniquely qualified and motivated managers both at the top and in the middle ranges. They were also mobile, hard working, and, by and large, optimistic. The team found them to be open and forthcoming with information and pleased to put in the extra hours needed whether for program management or dealing with the evaluation team.²⁴ The team also found them to be committed to making government work. In general they were understanding and even handed when dealing with implementation issues posed by the Foundation and the URNG and expressed considerable sympathy for the growing pains of the FGT. These people and their organizations appeared to be concerned most of all with mission accomplishment, whatever the cost in time and effort.

d The International Organization for Migration (IOM)

IOM was the principal executing agency utilized by USAID/OTI and the UNDP in the Demobilization/Incorporation Program in Guatemala. As noted earlier, USAID requested IOM assistance in November 1996, based on prior experience with the Haiti demobilization effort, to assist with planning and preparations for the emergency phase in Guatemala. USAID then agreed with UNDP, which also had a history of working with

²³ Much of the material for this section was drawn from an interview with Luis Eduardo Escobar, currently with SEPAZ and formerly with FONAPAZ. These observations are born out as well through a variety of other interviews and observation of performance of these institutions in the field.

²⁴ For example, due to emergency commitments related to Hurricane Mitch, the current SEPAZ secretary was not able to meet with us during the day. He happily met with us in our hotel for two hours in the evening after a horrendous day, however, in order to assure we had what we needed.

IOM in Guatemala and elsewhere, to utilize the organization as the operational vehicle for program management. There were good reasons for this. IOM was highly experienced in the business of assisting with the resettlement of displaced peoples, not only in Guatemala, but in many other countries around the world including several in Latin America with experience directly relevant to the Guatemala situation. It also had an excellent previously established relationship with the principal executing agencies in the Government of Guatemala such as FONAPAZ and CEAR.

The program was implemented on the basis of a grant agreement with USAID/OTI, notwithstanding the fact that the relationship was by nature more akin to a cooperative agreement or even a contract in some respects. IOM played the same role for the UNDP with which it had a long and mutually supportive relationship (IOM is affiliated with the United Nations family as “independent associated” agency). The extraordinarily collaborative nature of the relationship among these three entities, UNDP, IOM and USAID/OTI, was one of the principal keys to the success which the program has had to date.

IOM was staffed by expatriate and Guatemalan officers and technicians contracted for specific programs and project components. It was agile and flexible, able to hire and downsize as needed on short timelines. In the case of the demobilization/incorporation program, it had separate units for logistics, training, productive projects, the PMA/E program, and for information management, which produced timely, good quality reports on all program activities (See Bibliography). It also had a sophisticated accounting system capable of dealing effectively with split funding arrangements such as the one utilized for this program.

IOM did a remarkable job with program implementation, demonstrating the ability to move with extraordinary speed and depth, based on meticulous planning, as illustrated time and again when faced with the complex logistical, technical and managerial challenges of the effort. Its biggest problem was in the area of “co-direction,” with the FGT. As will be seen, the structure of the program in several areas was such that it caused a state of counterproductive antagonism to exist in the field between the two organizations, notwithstanding the maintenance of cordial relationships at management levels. This is something to be avoided in the future through structural modifications in design for program management and coordination.

2 The Beginning – Departure from the Camps²⁵

a The Move

Commencing on April 16 (D+43) with the first wave of demobilizing URNG members, all ex-combatant occupants of the camps either returned on their own or were taken to final or temporary destinations. This was accomplished on the basis of detailed planning by IOM which had previously interviewed all camp occupants and built a data base with

²⁵ This description is drawn from mainly from interviews with IOM managers of the departure exercise and the IOM report “Componente Transporte”, May 1997

required information for purposes of logistics and payments of training scholarships, mobilization subsidies and transportation costs

For those without a final destination (“sin destino”), mainly hard core, long term combatants who did not have families or homes to return to, four half way hostels (“albergues”) were set up to receive them on what was thought at the time to be a short term, temporary basis²⁶ By May 12, all transport had been completed It would have been accomplished even faster had it not been for some early difficulties that surfaced in the case of the Cooperativa Ixcán Grande in Mayalan where a group of returning URNG members had been expelled prior to their return²⁷ There was one other group that remained in one of the Tulucho camps, due to the absence of a suitable halfway hostel at the time The camp at Tulucho was thus utilized as a halfway hostel on a short term basis until the new facility could be prepared at an orientation center, COCADI, in Chimaltenango Tulucho also served as a temporary catchment area for URNG members who had returned home to find an untenable situation for whatever reason and decided to return to join the “sin destino” group in the Albergues

Transportation arrangements for the movement of so many people to so many destinations were complex and had to be carefully planned and supervised The actual number that left the camps during this large scale move was 2,928 persons of which 2,468 were taken to final destinations (“dispersos”)²⁸ and 323, or 12% went to halfway houses²⁹ Another 80 walked home on their own Members were transported by buses, launches, airplanes, helicopters, and beasts of burden The group included 24 pregnant women and 293 handicapped people Destinations were scattered over a wide area of the country, with the largest number going to Quiche Department, followed by the Peten and Huehuetenango with other large numbers going to Alta Verapaz, Guatemala, Solola, Quetzaltenango and Suchitepequez Other significant numbers returned to other areas in highly dispersed form including, Chimaltenango, Izabal, Escuintla, San Marcos, Totonicapan, and Santa Rosa The geographic dispersion factor has continued to present serious challenges to program managers throughout the incorporation period because of the complexity of travel, communications and monitoring of such a group

b Scholarships – Money for Survival

Upon departure from the camps, each demobilized guerilla heading for a final destination received a scholarship payment (“beca”), ostensibly to cover the cost of attending vocational training courses, along with a subsidy for mobilization, and, if necessary, an additional payment for travel The “beca” consisted four checks, three in the amount of

²⁶ Most of these members, known as the Alberque Group, eventually remained in the half way houses for up to eight months, a problem discussed later in this Chapter

²⁷ Eventually resolved through a team effort between USAID/OTI/PNUD (\$24,000 contribution for cardamom dryers), the FGT and FONAPAZ with assistance from the GOG cooperative oversight organization

²⁸ Demobilized ex-combatants who went home to destinations throughout the country were known as “dispersos” for “dispersed persons”

²⁹ The halfway hostel group soon increased to something over 350 due to those dispersos who decided to return after exploring the situation with their homes and communities

Q1,080 each, and one for Q540. These payments were given to 2,466 members. With agreement from the CEI, payments were authorized to those older than 12 years. The checks were dated over the four month period, April through July so that they had to be cashed monthly, one after the other. As of September 1997, of the Q9.5 million in checks issued, Q9.4 had been cashed. The training on which this money was to be spent did not actually commence in the case of the “dispersos” until November for the earliest courses, meaning that funds received by the end of July were long gone, for almost all, prior to the commencement of training. These people had to eat, and without jobs, projects, or training, it was impossible not to utilize the money they had received for survival.

In the case of the Alberque group, no “beca” was paid as they were headed to no cost lodging for a temporary period.³⁰ What they were paid was a monthly subsidy of Q150 in cash to cover minor expenses and visits home to their families.

3 Program Content and Implementation

a The “Albergue” (Halfway House) Group

i) General

The final population of the albergue group of hard core ex-combatants ended up being about 355, slightly larger than the original number transported from the camps at their close. Some of the original dispersos had attempted to go home and had then given up and returned. The distribution, by albergue, was as follows:

- COCADE Center, Chimaltenango – 72
- Papalha, Alta Verapaz – 135
- Finca Los Brillantes, Retalhuleu – 46
- Centro de Capacitacion La Esperanza, Quetzaltenango - 102

The location and rehabilitation of the albergues was carried out by FONAPAZ with SEPAPZ supervision with the help of the Ministry of Agriculture, CEAR and the Spanish Red Cross, which handled food and sanitation for the installations. The FGT monitored the management and maintenance of the Albergues closely and represented the inhabitants in the CEI. In August, USAID/OTI/UNDP together with FONAPAZ financed further rehabilitation, especially for Cocadi which received the residents of the initial provisional Albergue at Tuluche in that same month.

From the beginning, the residents of the “albergues” were treated as the top priority by the FGT and in general received all program benefits in advance of the “disperso”

³⁰ They did receive their “becas” upon departure from the Albergues some eight months later.

group³¹ There is an equity issue here, found in various forms throughout the program, which is discussed later in the report³²

ii) The Cooperative Farms

From the beginning there was strong interest in two of the alberques, Brillantes and Papalha, in the possibility of cooperative farming ventures. With EU support, the CEI put together a working group in June to look into proposals from the alberques with support from IOM³³. Subsequently in early July, the GOG delegation "agreed in principal" to buy land and housing on behalf of homeless URNG ex-combatants stressing that it would take time and that members would have to be flexible on location. In the Sept 30 session of the CEI a GOG/URNG working group presented a schedule for two cooperative purchases to be facilitated by the GOG Land Fund, "Fondo de Tierra"³⁴

Finally, in late November, after several false starts, the FGT announced that three farms had been approved by the Land Fund for purchase to permanently settle 235 of the ex-combatants living in hostels. The FGT team had done most of the work, but gave credit to the Land Fund, with which it had been in constant contact. This was major news in the CEI and was greeted by applause after months of frustration and not knowing how and when a solution would be found for this difficult but high priority group on which had been lavished so much time and attention³⁵. At length the purchase of two of the three farms was finalized on December 23, thanks to strong support from the Land Fund.

In early January, preparations regarding housing, water, food etc for the farms went into high gear under CEI supervision and, on January 21, final documents were signed on the farm in the Peten. Relocation in the case of one of the farms on the Coast started in January on a small scale and picked up speed rapidly by the end of the month when the property was actually turned over, Santa Anita located in Colomba, Quetzaltenango. From here on events move ahead rapidly, and by the end of March all three farms were fully settled, housing construction had begun on two, wells were being dug, and food was being supplied through a World Food Program under food for work schemes organized by FONAPAZ. Subsequently electrical connections for all three farms were financed by USAID/OTI/UNDP³⁶. As before, IOM assisted in the transfer to the final destination, although in this case it was a much easier process.

³¹ The sole exception was the exit "becas" the dispersos received upon leaving the camps, although this would be more than compensated for later when the alberque residents moved to their own final destinations on cooperative farms.

³² The heavy focus on the Alberque group to the virtual exclusion of dispersos until much later in the program also had an impact on viability of both training and productive project components for the disperso group, although the fact that the dispersos had to fend for themselves for a considerable period of time was not all bad.

³³ USAID cable reporting on the CEI meeting of June 10, 1997.

³⁴ This was to be the first purchase by the newly created Land Fund.

³⁵ USAID cable reporting on the CEI meeting of Nov 25, 1997.

³⁶ USAID reporting cable on the CEI meeting of March 31, 1998.

It should be noted here that after the transfer from the hostels a modest number of additional ex-combatants in the disperso category relocated to the farms (mainly to Las Tecas in Suchitepequez and a smaller number in the Peten), joining the ranks of the albergue group. The cooperative farms offered a substantially stronger benefit package than what could be received in the dispersed category. The land and existing infrastructure alone, owned by the cooperatives, provided an asset base and security that could not be approached through other routes. At some point, the dispersos may be able to receive land promised by the accords on an individual basis, but until that time the cooperative farms offer tremendous advantages to the ex-combatant population.

With respect to personal financing, each of the albergue ex-combatants on the farms was paid a "departure scholarship" ("beca de salida") financed by USAID/OTI/PNUD through IOM in the form of four checks, three for Q1080 and one for Q540, the same formula used for the training becas issued earlier to the dispersos, thus balancing the scale, although for the preceding eight months the albergue group had been living with free room and board.

Following transfer, the farming groups worked mainly with the European Union financed PAREC I program which supplied them with food, some modest agricultural assistance and pre-feasibility study and soil analysis assistance for the development of future productive endeavors. USAID/OTI also provided modest funding for small productive projects including cattle to fatten on two (one on the coast and one in the Peten) and renovation of coffee plants for the third.

The cooperative groups had received some technical training while in the hostels, covered in the following section. The masonry training for some was particularly valuable for housing construction to come on the farms under the FOGUAVI program.³⁷ Other training received was not so useful. In team visits to the farms, all claimed a strong need for more specific and substantial training relevant to their productive endeavors.

In the course of the evaluation the team visited all three farms as described below:

- Finca Santa Anita – Cooperative Farm, Colomba, Quetzaltenango. 63 Ha. For 37 families, or about 200 people from the Albergue DIGESA in Quetzaltenango. The farm, a coffee production operation, was lacking in working capital, but claimed to have good prospects for financing from PAREC II³⁸ for increased production and a possible drying plant ("beneficio"). USAID had provided assistance to re-seed 14 manzanas. Members were in the process of building their own homes under the FGT/FOGUAVI program with World Food Program support. The group was well organized with a Board of Directors and three sub-commissions on women, infrastructure, and field operations. Priorities were clear. The coop also had been

³⁷ Under the FOGUAVI (Guatemala Housing Fund) program (open to all Guatemalans), ex-combatants receive Q12,000 toward construction cost. They are expected to put up Q4,000 of their own money. The EU, however, financed the other Q4,000 in the case of the farms.

³⁸ European Union financed reincorporation program, a follow-on to PAREC I, in cooperation with the FGT, expected to be approved by the end of 1998. (To be covered in more detail in Chapter VI.)

receiving strong support from the local FGT coordinator. Expert technical assistance on coffee processing and marketing was needed, but prospects appeared positive due to the excellent location of the farm, quality of land, existing infrastructure, and some technical capacity. It appeared to be a well disciplined group with high moral, despite the present shortage of investment and working capital. The cooperative board was developing ideas for working in the local community by taking advantage of training in masonry and other skills to earn outside income once housing had been completed.

- Finca Las Texas (El Progreso) – Cooperative Farm, Cuyutenango, Suchitepequez
315 Ha for 76 families totaling about 375 persons from Albergue Los Brillantes. Thirty-six of the members came from the original Albergue group and the others from the ranks of the dispersed including members of three different URNG fronts.³⁹ The land had been selected by the group for its potential for high productivity in agricultural and livestock. The coop, which appeared to have strong possibilities in a number of areas (rice, sugar, grain, vegetables, cattle, rubber, fish culture), seemed to momentarily stagnating in terms of income producing activity and planning. Most of the work of members had been going into completion of housing for the community under the World Food Program food for work program. There will be some income when fattened cattle are sold in early 1999 (28 head donated by USAID/OTI). The group was waiting for the results of soil studies financed by PAREC which seem to be long in coming. In the meantime, members were engaged in subsistence production. They had little information on the studies, project possibilities, or financing.⁴⁰ The Coop had a Q7 0 million debt to pay off for the land to the Fondo de Tierra, and had little idea how it was going to cover the Q1 4 million annual debt service requirement (two year grace period). The cooperative was not yet legalized, due to lack of financing for the cost of processing. The group had received little training, most of which it considered irrelevant to its current situation. In general they were looking to the Foundation and PAREC to solve problems and were waiting for news. The Foundation representative was not aware of the current status of the studies or other project possibilities.
- Finca Nuevo Horizonte, Santa Ana, Peten, Cooperative Farm. Approximately 840 Ha, the largest of the three cooperative farms by a wide margin (although with the lowest quality soil), and for the cheapest price, Q3 0 million, for 114 families and 145 official beneficiary members in the group, including some from List B and C. The main productive potential of the farm is in forestry, cattle and vegetables along with basic food crops. There was also a long term tourism potential. The cooperative was engaged in the legalization process. The group appeared to be well organized and making good progress, with no internal or external relationship problems. Housing for members was in construction under the FOGUAVI program and looked solid with

³⁹ The inclusion of members from the other fronts made for less cohesion and solidarity in the group than on the other farms and may have contributed to a degree to the somewhat lower level of moral and energy found by the evaluation.

⁴⁰ The evaluation team was subsequently advised by the FGT that financing for needed investments on Las Texas and other farms would most likely be provided by PAREC II. On the other hand, PAREC II resources will be limited and stretched thin. (See Chapter VI). This also reflects a more generalized problem of communication between the Foundation and its membership.

innovative design features. Construction workers had been well trained in masonry by the Quetzaltenango institute and were being paid through the WFP.

The coop exhibited dynamic leadership, which has been able to stimulate sustained enthusiasm for work needed to bring the farm into production and deal with other needs. There was good cooperation with the local community, and an auxiliary mayor was authorized by the municipality. The coop had applied for a school from the Social Investment Fund (FIS) with good prospects.⁴¹ Two teachers were being supplied by the Municipality, and the Ministry of Education was expected to accredit the school in the new year and supply two alternative teachers. A sub-group of 90 members of the cooperative had purchased 32 head of male cattle on their own account with money taken from becas, Q1,000 each, and had high hopes for profit from weight gain. On the production side, the cooperative was waiting for results of a pre-feasibility study on forestry potential being carried out by a local NGO with Ministry of Agriculture support. The FGT also planned on doing a diagnostic evaluation of production possibilities. Future technical assistance may be possible to secure from FECOAR, the Federation of Regional Agricultural Cooperatives. The one main concern, as with the other farms, was for needed investment and working capital, some of which will hopefully come from the PAREC II program. The outlook is optimistic provided that resources can be secured in time.⁴²

In assessing the viability of the cooperative component of the program, it was quite obvious that these beneficiaries had the best of all possible deals. It could, however, have been better. These groups have tremendous assets at their disposal, but could fail from lack of badly needed investment and working capital, essential technical and management training, adequate technical assistance, and simple things like communications and mobility. Given the advantages of the land, location and other assets, it is hard to understand why the Government, FGT and the EU had not come together and made a greater effort, sooner. (USAID/OTI and the UNDP were asked to invest in other programs as opposed to the farms which remained the responsibility of the EU within the donor community.) One or two of these cooperatives, especially those with stronger leadership, and with the right mix of timely assistance, could turn into models of what can be done in such situations and utilized as guides other resettlement cases to come.⁴³ They could also be used to showcase the program. This is not to say that they will not be successful in the long run, but at some point critical momentum may be lost, jeopardizing potential viability, as may possibly be happening in the case of Las Tecas. The land debts on the farms are large, but should be paid, if the viability and credibility of both the farms and the program is to be maintained. The first year of the two year grace period on the debts (10-year term) has almost run its course.

⁴¹ Social Investment Fund which finances self-help community level infrastructure and other needs.

⁴² This group made a point of telling the team that it is not sitting back and waiting for help. If the external resources are not forthcoming from PAREC II, the coop will seek needed investment capital from other sources, including their own production. They also made it clear, however, that sooner or later, lacking the necessary capital, they would have to look for answers off the farm. Certain minimal investments should be made soon in order to achieve the returns necessary to pay the debt, survive and grow.

⁴³ Such as the CPR farms and upcoming programs for displaced and repatriated groups (known as "poblacion desarraigada" or "uprooted" groups, the next major priority for the FGT.)

On the other hand, to invest too much in the cooperatives could well pose a political dilemma for the FGT and the Government, again on the equity issue. The farms have so much already that they actually are in an elite position relative to the mass of dispersos and rural poor in general. To allow one or more of the cooperatives to flounder, however, from lack of attention to critical elements, or poor timing, could also exact a heavy price in terms of the credibility of the FGT and the program in general.

This argument may be unfair if indeed the PAREC II program will provide the framework of assistance which these cooperatives need. From conversations with the EU and PAREC management, however, and from the track record of the EU to date, it seems doubtful to the evaluator that the program will arrive in time, with the crop season set to commence in March and April of 1999, or that it will have sufficient resources to cover its targets, of which the cooperatives are only one element. PAREC II is also to cover the majority of the dispersos in the country with community linked productive projects.⁴⁴

One factor stood out above others as a problem in the case of the cooperatives and the program in general, and it should not be that difficult to solve. It was the pure lack of information available to beneficiaries in the face of high expectations. The governing boards and rank and file of these groups had little idea what was happening with respect to planning going on in the home office of the Foundation or analytical exercises in progress or planned under the PAREC program. Nor did the field representatives of the Foundation. The person responsible in the Foundation did, but his delivery system for the information was lacking. Also, information coming out of the PAREC program itself was painfully slow and uncertain, being delayed constantly by heavily procedural requirements for study, development, review and approval.

iii Technical Training in the Albergues⁴⁵

In keeping with the priority accorded to the albergue group, technical training began first in the hostels, about two months following departure from the camps. The first round of training during July and August 1997 focused in employment induction, general business administration, cooperativism and gender. The program included 351 participants.

The training began with a workshop dedicated to employment which included data on training demand (drawn from the camp phase), possible productive activities, and a menu of training options provided by the Instituto Tecnico de Capacitacion y Productividad (INTECAP) and other training organizations. In one hostel, Papalja, it was necessary to carry out another separate diagnostic of training demand in response to a project defined by that group which was collective in nature.⁴⁶ The overall population in the four hostels

⁴⁴ The team was told that the amount of the PAREC II project is five million ECUs for five years.

⁴⁵ This section is drawn mainly from interviews with the two chiefs of training in IOM and the FGT and the document, "Programa de Educacion, Homologacion, Capacitacion y Reinsercion Laboral y Productiva, periodo Mayo-Agosto 1977, IOM, Sept 1997.

⁴⁶ Two of the hostels at the time, Los Brilliantes and Papalja, were interested in collective projects while the other two tended toward individual projects and employment pursuits.

demonstrated wide variety in training preferences which ran from agriculture, to computers, to mechanics, to health, to carpentry and others

The initial round continued with components dedicated to general business management, cooperativism and gender carried out by IOM contracted NGOs selected for technical capacity and cost. The business management element, completed by 307 ex-combatants, covered general administration and accounting. The component for cooperativism, completed by 300, covered cooperative organization, principles, legislation, the peace process. In the gender area, themes included gender identity, socialization and self-esteem and gender equity in incorporation. About 250 completed this component. In discussing this training later with ex-combatants in the fincas, they referred to it as useful, but not terribly helpful in terms of running a business or managing a cooperative. It really did need to be followed by training dedicated to specific technical disciplines.

Actual technical training for the albergue groups was carried out during the September – December period of 1997. The process commenced with voluntary selection by the trainees of different subjects of interest from the menu of options provided on the basis of the earlier employment induction component. Men, 67% of the group, leaned toward agricultural subjects, auto-mechanics, carpentry and small commerce. The women also preferred agriculture in addition to sewing and marketing. The relatively young group (most between 12 and 29 in age) elected mainly agriculture, carpentry, electro-mechanics, auto-mechanics, and tailoring. Altogether 30 different courses were carried out including 12 in Papalja, 8 in La Esperanza, 7 in COCADI and 3 in Los Brillantes.

The courses varied widely in duration with a range of 30 to 600 hours, the shortest being for driving and management of small stores with others like auto-mechanics, carpentry, masonry and electricity requiring 500 to 600 hours, all of which involved substantial periods of practice beyond theory. There was one particularly gratifying case where residents of the Los Brillantes albergue, taking the agriculture course, carried out their practice work on several hectares on loan from the administrator of the farm in which the hostel was located and produced much of the food consumed by the Alberque itself.

The courses were of varying quality, depending on the institution, but were generally satisfactory with one egregious exception⁴⁷. The training was supervised with weekly visits by the IOM training team, normally accompanied by FGT counterparts. Where necessary IOM took corrective action and supplied needed materials and equipment. The area of training, which appears to have paid off the most in the short term was masonry, which has served the housing program well on the cooperative farms.

There were three principal problems with the training, all of which are shared with the subsequent training program for the disperso community. First, selection for the courses

⁴⁷ This was the case of the Instituto Bartolo Perlo in Coban where both the training and the food was terrible. Sewing practice was done on paper cutouts, for example, and the food was all beans. Professors were absent from many classes. This was discovered early by IOM and most of the trainees were transferred to the high quality program at the Quetzaltenango Instituto Privado de Occidente. Interview Francisco Ureta, Director of Training for IOM.

was totally based on what the trainees themselves elected, with no attempt to determine the aptitude of the candidates, many of which did not have the ability to effectively take advantage of what was offered. Secondly, even the longest of the courses offered was too short to allow for a level of proficiency adequate for competent entry level performance in many areas, especially in the more technical disciplines such as auto-mechanics. Most training courses for such fields require at least six months (the longest course ran about three months). Third, there was no attempt to link the training to forthcoming employment or projects involving the beneficiaries. This last problem was compounded by a lack of concern with employment in general (as opposed to “productive” projects offering self-employment) along with a lack of research relative to market demand for graduates of the training. The total absence of Private Sector involvement in the incorporation program further contributed to this shortcoming.

iv Productive Incorporation Projects (PIP Program)⁴⁸

The productive project concept was born of the need to assist those demobilized without land who needed a means of generating income. It was also born of the concept that the demobilized should be independent and not vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the labor market and the private sector in general which traditionally was not to be trusted (Historically the rural poor had been severely abused by the old line “finquero” class of large land owners)⁴⁹. It was further pointed out to team that the system of social security in the country offered little security in fact, and that people were scared of employment because there was no security in the Guatemalan workplace. With a productive project, like a store, there are assets and one has the ability to defend oneself. Thus, from the beginning, the FGT proposed productive project schemes of one kind or another.⁵⁰

The first productive project request tabled in the CEI by the FGT was in June 1997. It included income generating projects with a number of List B members which was not acceptable to the Government. In July FGT submitted another request, this time for \$7.1 million which included \$1.7 million for the half way hostel population, \$1.2 million for List B, and \$4.2 million for other supporters, to which the GOG warned that resources were limited but agreed further study. (It is worth noting that at the same time the GOG had presented to the CEI a list of more than 1,200 government positions that URNG ex-combatants could fill)⁵¹. Subsequently a comprehensive response was prepared by IOM, under USAID/OTI and UNDP direction, offering support for literacy/civic and vocational

⁴⁸ This section and the subsequent one dealing with the PIP program in the disperso community is drawn from a variety of sources including USAID cable reports on CEI meetings, IOM, USAID/OTI, and FGT reports on program implementation plus numerous interviews with PIP project beneficiaries, institutional staff involved in the program, FGT monitors and Government officials.

⁴⁹ From interviews with FGT and IOM field representatives. For many ex-combatants of rural poor “campesino” backgrounds, employment meant working as a “jornalero” or agricultural worker on large farm estates, a feudal like setup where laborers were often abused, paid a pittance, and then fired the moment they were no longer needed.

⁵⁰ Interview with Rosana Gomez, Director, Programa Economico-Productivo, FGT.

⁵¹ USAID cable reporting on CEI meeting of July 8, 1997. Reasons for the lack of response to the Government’s offer of jobs are several - first, distrust in general, second and perhaps most important, above all campesinos want land and a house (you can’t be thrown out of your house. From a job, one can be fired any time), third, low wages and lack of security. Interviews: Ricardo Stein and program field staff.

training tied to productive projects through December 1997 for just over \$2.0 million. The FGT had serious reservations, however, and a working group was created under the CEI to develop an improved framework for productive enterprise assistance.⁵²

In late September the URNG presented a modified version of the IOM proposal which requested project funds along with budget for technical assistance to beneficiaries. USAID/OTI expressed reservations over the Foundation's ability to implement such an effort. Finally, a further modified concept was approved by the end of the month which placed UNDP/USAID co-financed funds under the control of IOM under a "co-direction" arrangement with the FGT, which was to select beneficiaries and identify and develop projects for funding. The program was further delayed, however, due to URNG reluctance to proceed with the component until the question of cooperative farms had been resolved for albergue residents (see preceding section 11). At length, on November 20, co-directors from IOM and the FGT were approved together with a schedule to provide projects to those leaving the Albergues by early February, 1998.⁵³

The structure for the final approved program required formation of a Board of Directors including the GOG (represented by SEPAZ), the URNG (represented by the FGT), and the Donors (UNDP and USAID/OTI). The Board, in turn, named national Co-directors, one each from IOM and the FGT. The concept was to provide both a means of livelihood to the beneficiary and family and benefits to the population in the area of incorporation. The methodology required five steps: identification, formulation, implementation, supervision and follow-up. The concept also involved participation by the beneficiary in each of the stages with program staff assisting with design aspects and follow-up.

The program commenced in January, 1998. It was to run for six months until June 1998, during which time all projects were to be developed, approved and implemented, a timetable which was ambitious in the extreme and made for serious errors early in the program. A subsequent six month period, from July to December, was to be for follow-up monitoring and assistance to assure long term sustainability.

It was decided to implement the projects in the form of small grants, rather than credit, to beneficiaries. Each grant was to be for the same amount, Q15,000 (about \$2,500) in the case of the albergue group and Q10,000 (about \$1,600) for the dispersos. Collective projects for groups of beneficiaries were encouraged on principle and in order to mobilize larger amounts of investment capital. Staff assigned to the effort by the Foundation, funded by USAID/OTI and PNUD, consisted of four field technicians (two each in Quetzaltenango and Chimaltenango) plus one supervisor. The size and capability of this team was not up to the challenge, however, as will be seen below.

⁵² USAID cable reporting on CEI meeting of August 12, 1997.

⁵³ USAID cables reporting on CEI meetings of Sept 23, Nov 11 and 25, 1997. It is worth noting that one of the major stumbling blocks in negotiations on the PIP program was the perceived URNG desire to control the activity and mold it to support political objectives. Feasibility was the main concern. At one point the FGT proposed a scheme which would have folded all PIP projects into a single integrated cooperative structure with resources and revenues flowing through a single URNG financial apparatus.

The campaign for project development began in earnest in January in response to severe pressure to have projects ready for the non-farm albergue group due to leave the hostels in mid February. The first 11 projects developed by the FGT team were approved in early February, having passed through a process involving clearance by representatives of each of member of the Board of Directors. A total of 35 had been approved by the end of the month, breaking all records for speed (at the expense of quality and feasibility) and allowing plans for closure of the hostels to proceed at that time. In all, 59 projects were developed and approved for the Albergue group benefiting a total of some 130 recipients.

The Albergue projects, by all accounts, were put together at a fire drill pace with little effort investigate viability, the market, and, more importantly, aptitude and preparation of the beneficiary. Project proposals were developed "at a run and on the back of an envelope" which included basic numbers that more often than not were made up. One project drew on the next, in a cut and paste assembly line exercise. Frequently, neither the beneficiary nor the technician had been to the site or done any real leg work, as required under the terms of the grant agreement.

The result could have been predicted. In September 1998, IOM field consultants conducted a partial evaluation of the PIP program to date. In the case of the albergue group, 38 (67%) of the 57 projects that had been implemented (two projects had not yet started) were visited and assessed in terms of performance and sustainability. Of the group, ten (26%) were classified as either good or excellent (Only one was in the excellent category). Another 14 (37%) were rated "regular" or "OK" meaning that they were similar to other businesses of similar type in the area and would possibly survive, but that there was risk of failure. Another 14 (37%) were rated bad or terrible ("pesimo"). The bad rating indicated that the business would not survive without "immediate" financial and technical assistance. The pesimo rating indicated complete failure, of which there were two out of the 14. In summary, 67% of the projects reviewed were at risk, with 37% in very precarious position.⁵⁴

In another evaluation, also carried out in September by the OTI Resident Representative, a group of 12 albergue PIP projects were visited. A full two thirds were either weak (6), failed (1) or not implemented (1). One was considered passable and three characterized as good.⁵⁵ These results are corroborated by the experience of IOM field staff and this evaluation. (Note that the disperso PIPs, developed in a slightly later time frame by IOM rather than FGT staff, are in far better shape as a group. See Section b 111 below.)

The 59 PIP projects approved for the Albergue project included 51 in the area of commerce, basically small stores and services. Another three were classified as industrial, such as block making, and four were in agriculture with one in the "other" category. The major portion of these were in the two departments of Chalatenango and Guatemala. In the course of the evaluation, the team visited a number of the Albergue

⁵⁴ IOM, "Programa de Insercion Productiva – Evaluacion Parcial de los Proyectos del Programa", Sept 17, 1998. The Guatemalan member of the Evaluation Team was also on the team for the IOM evaluation.

⁵⁵ USAID/OTI memo of October 5, 1998, by Resident Representative, David Gould.

PIP project sites and talked to a larger sampling in workshops in Chimaltenango and Guatemala City ⁵⁶ The following summarizes the teams observations and conclusions

First, the projects had obviously been put together at breakneck speed with little thought to feasibility Most, about 85%, were small stores, often inserted into neighborhoods where there was intense competition from similar stores already in business Several cases were observed where two or three such stores resided on the same block The team visited one such site in Chimaltenango, a group project of four albergue residents (total investment Q60,000) that was being run by one handicapped member of the group The store had an average cash flow of Q75 per day with a 15% mark up Thus there was Q11 25, or about \$1 75, a day to cover all other expenses including a Q500/month rent on the store The person behind the counter admitted that they were not going to make it in the current location, with two other stores within a hundred feet or so, but didn't know what to do

In other cases, store owners complained about everything from high rents to lack of demand, high prices of merchandise, lack of capital, lack of support, lack of training or understanding on how to run a store Most claimed the answer was more money or cheap credit For others, the problem was that they had had to use their PIP money on health, or housing, or survival A significant percentage appeared to have a paternalistic mindset and felt that the Foundation had to do something Many had little idea what they were doing and had no concept of accounting or keeping track of cash flow and inventory The accounting training that they had received in the albergues had not been absorbed It had been far too complicated for ready absorption in that setting, plus the fact that it had occurred months before they had a chance to apply what they had learned Many indicated that they had kept no record at all of income and outgo, even in rudimentary form, or that they were a month or more behind ⁵⁷ Out of a group of 40 beneficiaries in one "store" oriented workshop attended by the team, about 10 said they were doing OK, and many of these had been in the business at an earlier point in their lives

In a different category, the team visited a carpentry shop in Chimaltenango where a group of seven beneficiaries had invested their combined resources, over Q100,000 (\$15,000) The shop had impressive equipment and was in a good location The group had also received training from a "master" carpenter over a two month period and was able to make products of acceptable quality for the local market, but very slowly Costs, lumber and their own labor, were high In terms of earnings, the shop was failing The only answer from the owners was that they needed more money and training There was little initiative exhibited either from the group or the FGT "consultor" in the area The evaluation team tried to make constructive suggestions,

⁵⁶ The geographic spread of these projects was mainly due to the fact that most of them came from the COCADI Albergue in Chalatenango (72 beneficiaries) who by and large selected PIP projects as opposed the cooperative farm option

⁵⁷ Cash flows for these stores varied between \$35 and \$125 per day with a ten to 15% markup In seminars attended by the evaluation team, IOM consultants tried to impart simple record keeping tools for tracking daily sales, income, inventory and costs This was much more practical and suitable for this group than the actual "accounting" forms and concepts utilized in FGT's administration training

such as contracting the former “master” for a cut in the earnings of the shop in return for getting the operation up to speed, but left feeling that little would be done and that sooner or later equipment would be sold to finance living expenses

The OTI Resident Representative’s evaluation highlights another case of a block factory with eight albergue beneficiaries, now failing, with losses of Q10,000 per month. The group knew how to make blocks and had good equipment, but little management or marketing skill. Sales never picked up, and soon production dropped to zero. The group, however, continued to pay itself salaries of Q1,080 per month per member. As the OTI representative observed, the worst projects seem to be the large complicated ones paying salaries unconnected with income, especially those designed to with a “humanitarian” ideal in mind (serving needs of the handicapped - the case for both the carpenters and the block makers). The same report sites the “appalling ignorance of business” of many of the PIP beneficiaries.⁵⁸

In other cases known to the Guatemalan member of the team, recipients had spent all or a major portion of their project money on something else, like a TV and VCR, or had decided to do some other project. He and other field workers also site the problem of inadequate follow-up. If the FGT monitor did come by, he or she tended to fill out a checklist with made up numbers and departed without adding value.

In summary, PIP activity associated with the albergue group was not of acceptable quality. In fact, it was so problem prone that IOM concluded that for the following effort with dispersos the method of design, approval and follow-up would have to change radically, with IOM taking over. This in fact happened, also at USAID/OTI’s urging, and resulted in substantially better performance (see Section b v below).⁵⁹

Many of these projects will fail, or provide only a trickle of income insufficient to sustain a family. Many will go out of business. Some already have. Part of the answer for these people will be a return to the labor market. Many are already working in other areas or farming. In some cases the spouse is running the store and it results in a modest supplement. For others, the situation can be turned around with qualified technical assistance or additional training, which is now happening through IOM in some cases.

In terms of lessons observed from the evaluation experience, first of all many of these people are not mini-entrepreneurs. They do not have it in their experience or in their blood.⁶⁰ Secondly, aptitude is important and attitude is even more important. One has to

⁵⁸USAID/OTI memo of October 5, 1998, David Gould

⁵⁹ In fairness, the activity served as an “incorporation” vehicle and bought time which could be utilized to seek other solutions for the albergue group. As such it served the purpose of the “incorporation” objective.

⁶⁰ The Chief of the Productive Economic area for the FGT argued that campesinos by nature are mini-entrepreneurs in that they buy and sell in the market all the time. This, the team feels, is questionable. From experience around the world, peasant farmers are often victimized by market players with greater leverage. They have had little information or opportunity with which to develop entrepreneurial skills while trying to survive in a highly competitive environment from a disadvantaged position. This is why many former campesinos in the ranks of the demobilized are now looking to other alternatives rather than going back to the land, although the pull of the land is still powerful for those without viable alternatives.

have energy and commitment to succeed in business, even micro-business, and recipients of such projects should be selected with in mind. Many of the albergue members were selected for reasons that had nothing to do with either ability or outlook. Thirdly, training is vital. It must be relevant and adequate to the job. The training that the albergue group received in the administrative management area did not stick. It was too early, too short, and too complicated, by all accounts, at least in the accounting area.⁶¹ The same was apparently true for the "marketing" component. Thirdly, project design and development must be taken seriously. In this case it was ultimately slipshod. The feasibility analysis part of the presentation was essentially made up and had little relation to reality. Site selection was often inappropriate. Finally, adequate, meaningful follow-up assistance is essential. In the case of this component, it was not happening, or when it did, it was carried out in a cursory manner that would not solve the problem.

Notwithstanding the above arguments, the PIP program can be carried out correctly, as was demonstrated in the case of the dispersos, to be covered in the following section.

b The Disperso Group

1) General

For a long time, something like six months, the disperso group appeared to be the forgotten component as the albergues took precedence over other major program elements. The donors became more and more worried about it in the CEI, as did the GOG, raising the issue again and again.⁶² One argument goes that it may, in fact, have been a good thing in a perverse sense, in that these people had to fend for themselves for a long time and in so doing picked up survival skills on the economy (as opposed to in the mountains) and were forced to become more self-sufficient before tangible project benefits became available to them. This has been born out by PIP program experience with this group, especially in rural areas, as will be seen below. By and large the non-farm dispersos that the evaluation team interviewed in communities of the interior appeared to be more self-reliant, more optimistic, and with more prospects for success, than their albergue counterparts, with the exception of the cooperative farm group.

The principal problem that faced the disperso group within the context of the program was the fact that they were "dispersed" although there were areas of concentration. This made it a more complex proposition to reach them and provide them with program assistance. Nevertheless, many had been helped substantially by both the training and PIP components. On the other hand, for much of this group, what the program had provided to date had been not been much of anything. The majority of List A beneficiaries had still not been reached with either training or a project, something over

⁶¹ The team received this same reading from a large number of Albergue graduates, both in project sites as well as on the cooperative farms where most of them ended up.

⁶² USAID cable reports on CEI meetings report repeated attempts to bring the issue to the fore with little progress until the end of 1997.

1,500 ex-combatants This is the group to be assisted primarily by the European Union PAREC program, once it gets off the ground ⁶³

ii) Training

Technical training activity for the disperso community actually began in August 1997 with a round of "Induccion Laboral" (employment induction) workshops carried out by FGT and IOM technical teams in 10 departments around the country The induccion was actually attended by 607 ex-combatants of the 794 to receive training under plans developed from the cantonment orientation exercise The trainees were given presentations on training demand, possible productive activities and a menu of training options This activity confirmed and documented technical training selections and requests from the dispersos, thus allowing planning to go forward for the subsequent specific training program

The problem was that the earliest courses did not commence until late November, and most dispersos had to wait until the new year, 1998 Some courses did not begin until over a year later, and some were still waiting at the time of the evaluation, wondering how and why their number had not yet been called ⁶⁴ By the time training actually commenced, much of what had been imparted in the "induccion" had been lost, and many had been forced to seek work in other areas and other parts of the country For a significant number, the training actually received would have little to do with real employment or project possibilities This delay, enormously frustrating to USAID/OTI, UNDP, and IOM, because of the loss of momentum and continuity it caused, was reflective of the larger problem of non-transparent, politically motivated selection practices of the FGT The organization refused to provide the trainee list until it was satisfied that the "right" people were going to be trained

Actual training began in late November 1997 with courses in masonry, carpentry, commerce, computer usage, sewing, electricity, electronics, auto mechanics, driver education, and tailoring It was a complex undertaking FGT selected the students, but IOM, had the responsibility of planning and contracting 35 different training events in nine different departments and mobilizing the students along with food and lodging arrangements (As explained earlier, the training "becas" had long since been "eaten") By the end of the year, some 424 trainees were in courses or had completed training There were some short courses, such as driver education, baking and weaving that could be completed in a matter of weeks Most required two to three months depending on the institute and the intensity of the training Included in the group were 42 women The courses solicited most by the men were auto-mechanics, driving, commerce and tailoring while the women preferred sewing, tailoring and commerce

⁶³ This, in the view of the evaluation team, is a serious problem, and will be discussed in the concluding chapters The PAREC program, dedicated to "reinsersion" was to commence together with the other major incorporation components of the USAID/UNDP program, and at the time of the evaluation was a year behind schedule, throwing the overall program out of sync

⁶⁴ Interviews with dispersos in both the field and the capital

Subsequently, in the January through June 1998 period, following more or less the same scenario, another 442 dispersos were trained or had commenced training, this time with 43 women. The preferences were as before except there was stronger interest in agriculture on the part of the men. The women added computer usage and cooking as priorities. In all, 39 training events were realized during the period in the Departments of Quetzaltenango, Suchitepequez, Guatemala, Solola and Quiche.

Courses ran from 20 hours (for driving and commerce) up to 315 for auto-mechanics, electricity, masonry or carpentry. Agriculture required 240 and tailoring 280. On the average, training was divided into 70% practice and 30% theory. By the end of June 1998, of the 848 participants, 665 had successfully graduated and 62 had dropped out. The rest, 121, were still in training at the time of the evaluation.

Again, quality was variable, but in general acceptable. Most of the training institutes were small and could be characterized as fair to excellent. The strongest training programs by far were provided by the Instituto Tecnológico Privado de Occidente in Quetzaltenango, which ended up training well over half of all trainees, about 495, including a number that had left the program put on by Bartolo Perlo at Coban, which had been a disaster, and only ended up training 35 from the originally contracted 100.⁶⁵ By all accounts, the training received in Quetzaltenango was first rate.⁶⁶

The training did not stop as planned at D+14 (June 1998) but continued throughout 1998. The last half of 1998 was to be the "follow-up" period according to the training plan, but more time was needed for the training itself, and the job of getting the PIP program going and other priorities took precedence over the needed follow-up effort.

In the course of the evaluation, the team talked with some 50 former participants in the training program including a group trainee session in the Foundation dedicated exclusively to training issues. The following summarizes what the team observed together with its main conclusions.

As observed above, most of the training was of acceptable quality, although some courses less so than others, with Quetzaltenango as the standout performer. The principal problem was that the training was carried out in a vacuum, isolated from needed linkage with either projects to come or employment. There were some exceptions, especially in the case of masonry for those who went on to work on housing projects, and, obviously, agriculture. Many of those trained in commerce went on to run small stores under the PIP program. There was, however, a serious gap. It was only during the conduct of this evaluation, that the Foundation's training program started attempting to get a reading on which PIP beneficiaries had received

⁶⁵ IOM took appropriate action in such cases, counseling or sanctioning programs not performing to standard or canceling contracts altogether, as was the case with Bartolo Perlo. The training staff at IOM was constantly on the move in a supervision effort which was extremely heavy. Whenever possible, FGT training team members were included. But often they were not available for travel. Interview with Francisco Ureta, Training Director at IOM.

⁶⁶ Reports from a significant number of the Quetzaltenango trainees including those in the more complex courses such as auto-mechanics, as well as field staff from IOM and the FGT.

training in what subjects, although the evaluators were told that the FGT had a data base showing which trainees had received what benefit overall ⁶⁷

In the team's conversations with trainees, many cases were found where computer trainees had no access to computers, drivers with no access to a vehicle, auto-mechanics with no access to a shop, tailors and sewers working in agriculture or commerce, and a number of store owners without a clue as to how to run a business

Another problem area was that there had been no real attempt to determine aptitude, for given disciplines, and people were selected willy-nilly for this and that course on the basis of self-selection and approval from the Foundation. There was little counseling of trainees regarding their suitability for the training or its relevance to their future ⁶⁸. Students complained that the orientation sessions had not given them a sound basis for selecting training options. It had been too quick and superficial, and there was not a serious attempt to help them understand the job market

The training, although adequate while it lasted, was too short to prepare students sufficiently for meaningful entry level in many jobs. Three months can not prepare an auto-mechanic or an electrician to do more than act as the lowest level helper in a repair shop ⁶⁹. This, of course, also depends on the degree of follow-up support, and ideally a period of apprenticeship training, which did not happen in this program ⁷⁰. Agricultural graduates stressed that methodology was inadequate. There was also a problem of communication, in that many of the students spoke mostly their indigenous language, and translation was either not available or inadequate. A number of graduates spoke to the team regarding the lack of utility of the computer training courses, which mainly taught the "office" program for Windows 95. Several of these courses were for one or two weeks only, although some ran longer. What they did not appear to do was to give them sufficient understanding of concepts to be able to continue working and learning independently ⁷¹.

In the area of planning, supervision, and follow-up, there was a serious lack of attention. People were trained, and that was that, with a few exceptions. They either moved on to a PIP project or they didn't, but there was no attempt to ascertain what they were doing with the training or to assist them to find a job where the training

⁶⁷ As mentioned, the evaluation team repeatedly requested (verbally and in writing), unsuccessfully, data and documentation from the Foundation on various subjects, but especially on the relation between training and the PIP program. The team also requested to see a demonstration of the database, also to no avail. It is suspected that the right hand didn't know what the left hand was doing. This now appears to be changing, but it has been a long time in coming.

⁶⁸ Interviews with trainees in the Foundation

⁶⁹ Irvin Jones, member of the evaluation team, a highly trained auto-mechanic and experienced in auto-repair employment possibilities in Guatemala, on the basis of working with various beneficiaries trained by the program

⁷⁰ In the case of the PMA program, covered later in this report, trainees received five months of training in most cases plus a month of paid apprenticeship training in a company engaged in production using the discipline in question

⁷¹ This may be an academic point in that so many of the "computo" graduates had no access to a computer, nor would they for the foreseeable future

could be applied. This was not done before or after the training, a complete absence of connection with the employment objective. Others complained that graduating students were given no tool packages, such as those handed out in the PMA/E program. An entry level trained carpenter, without a PIP project but without tools, had a serious problem finding a way to make a living from his craft – the same for a barber or a tailor. For those without a project or a job, it was “a hard drop in the curb.” The fact was, people simply did what they had to do, based on traditional patterns and personal connections.

On the bright side, the principal stakeholders learned a lot from the experience. As the head of training for the Foundation observed, “knowing what we know now, we could develop a perfect program.” At the time of the evaluation, the FGT was getting serious about employment, and had made connections with the major GOG linked but private sector supported training institute, INTECAP, which had previously been unwilling to work with the URNG (INTECAP is known for its ability to prepare students for employment in the Guatemalan industrial sector, a major advantage.) The Foundation was also talking to the Chamber of Commerce and exploring possible employment options through that body. Further, there is now an attempt to link training with productive projects, and this is expected with the PIP II program, commencing as this report is finalized. The Foundation was also interested in modular type training where students could go at their own pace and benefit from a more individually tailored program. Finally, in keeping with its strategy for the “definitive incorporation” phase, the FGT planned on orienting new training initiatives toward constructive integration of the beneficiary and his or her activity within community (also a PAREC concept). The major concern, of course, was money. New plans and institutional wherewithal to implement them were still basically unfunded, with the exception of the PAREC program, which was rigorously restricted to project specific interventions.⁷²

In conclusion, the training program was adequate within itself, but inadequate in relation to the rest of the incorporation effort. The needed linkages were not planned or executed. Given the position of the FGT during most of the period, and its exclusive dominion over the selection of trainees and projects, there was probably not much that IOM or the donors could have done to correct the situation, except to take a stand and paralyze the program. This, given serious delays already experienced, was not an attractive option.

In terms of lessons for the future, they are fairly self-evident. First, the rationale for the training should be clear. If it is employment, that requires one course of action. If it is for micro-enterprise, that is another. More than likely it should be a combination of both, depending on the setting and needs of the beneficiary group. Secondly, assuming that meaningful employment is an objective, the market should be carefully assessed in advance. Where and what are the jobs, and what are the skill levels required? Thirdly, aptitude and attitude of trainees should be assessed relative to preferences and suitability for different disciplines. In a word, training should be integrated and rationalized within the framework of the objectives of the program.

⁷² Interview with Fernando Ascoli, Co-Director, PAREC Program

In fairness, the Foundation and IOM were aware of these needs and had been for a long time. Part of the problem, in the case of the PIP program for the albergues, was the “delay – crunch” syndrome that the program kept passing through. Months would go by, and then there would be a crisis level push to get the component, whatever it was, on the road in time. This happened with all of the major components of the incorporation effort in which USAID and UNDP were involved. As such, when the time came to implement, it was difficult to focus on anything external to the immediate task at hand.

iii) **Productive Incorporation Projects (PIP Program) for Dispersos**

Once the albergue PIP projects were launched, the Foundation started working on its campaign for dispersos. Projects were developed and approved in the April– June 1998 time period. By the end of June, 161 projects had been initiated with 289 beneficiaries. The projects were spread over 15 Departments with most of them clustered in Guatemala, Chimaltenango, Escuintla and Quetzaltenango, areas known as “low concentration”⁷³

This time, the design and development effort varied significantly from the preceding one for the albergue group. First there was more time. Second, IOM got involved technically to a much higher degree in the identification, review and approval exercise, facilitating genuine feasibility analysis in each case. It was still a rapid-fire drill, but there was a larger, better staffed, more technical effort directed to it. In consultation with the FGT, and with donor backing,⁷⁴ IOM hired additional consulting staff in the PIP area,⁷⁵ following the albergue exercise, out of concern for badly needed additional follow-up for albergue projects and to deal with strong pressure to move ahead quickly with a large number of new disperso projects. Although this generated some friction between the two organizations, because the status and leverage of the FGT side of the equation was diminished, the product was worth it in the form of significantly enhanced, quality and performance. The results have borne out the wisdom of the IOM decision.

This time around, beneficiaries were seriously involved in the identification and design of their projects and in doing much of the leg work on feasibility and market research. They were also more heavily involved in site selection. The projects for this group in general made more sense, and beneficiaries appeared to be more self-reliant. As alluded to earlier, one hypothesis was that the dispersos, having had to survive on their own account for a period approaching a year after leaving the camps, had developed survival skills, become more self-reliant, and had a less dependent and more constructive attitude in general. The obverse may be the case for albergue residents, who had had all needs met in the hostels for the better part of the preceding year. In its field investigation, the evaluation team found this to be true. It was also found that the further away from the

⁷³ Other areas of “high concentration” are to be covered by the EU through the PAREC program

⁷⁴ The USAID/OTI resident representative pushed the IOM project manager into taking this decision

⁷⁵ One of the consultants hired, Irvin Jones, was the second member of the team for this evaluation

Guatemala metropolitan area, the more enterprising and positive many of the recipients became ⁷⁶

For whatever combination of reasons, the figures speak for themselves. The Sept 1998, IOM PIP evaluation, referenced earlier, found the following

Out of 44 disperso projects under implementation visited, 21 (47%) were assessed as either good or excellent (Four were in the excellent category). Another 12 (27%) were considered "regular" or "OK", and the last 11 (25%) were considered bad or a total failure. Thus, almost half of the disperso projects reviewed were good or better as opposed to only 26% in the case of the albergues. In the other evaluation, carried out by the OTI Resident Representative, out of a group of 15 disperso projects visited, 6 or 40% were judged good as opposed to 25% for the albergue group. One was "OK" and four (25%) were weak as opposed 50% on the albergue side ⁷⁷

By way of comparison, the Foundation did its own breakdown of quality in August 1998 classifying some 170 implemented projects into the following categories: stable (meaning relatively good), regular (just OK), and projects in crisis. In its review the FGT found that 81 or 48% were stable, another 72 or 42% were OK, and 17 or 10% were in crisis. The criteria may differ a bit, but the relative proportions of these different reviews are in basic agreement. Unfortunately the Federation breakdown did not breakout the numbers for the albergue and disperso groups. It does indicate, however, that the Foundation is being honest with itself on the quality issue ⁷⁸

The evaluation visited a number of the disperso projects and talked to the recipients in various workshops along with institutional staff in the field and headquarters offices of involved agencies. General conclusions follow

Although the disperso projects exhibit many of the same problems and gaps that the albergue projects did, they did so in a much lower order. In general, they were successful, although sustainability in the long term was questionable due to limited business experience of the beneficiaries, highly competitive local markets and the nature of the enterprises themselves – low margin and low productivity

The projects were providing a valuable income supplement to the disperso group, although few were sufficient for the complete support of a family. More often than

⁷⁶ There was one particularly telling contrast noted between PIP workshops, both for stores, attended by the Evaluation Team, one in Guatemala City with mainly urban recipients, and the other in Quetzaltenango, with a stronger rural and semi rural representation. The Quetzaltenango group, notwithstanding viability problems of its own, was significantly more positive in outlook, creative in developing solutions, and focused on innovation and mutual supporting measures than the Guatemala group which, with few exceptions, preferred more money or hand holding from the FGT as the answer to all problems. The Guatemala group was almost the mirror image of the Quetzaltenango group in terms of its rather depressing reading on itself individually and collectively. There was also a much more lively and able FGT coordinator in Quetzaltenango, which, undoubtedly contributed to the positive mindset of these people

⁷⁷ IOM, "Programa de Insercion Productiva" and USAID/OTI memo of Oct 5, 1998, David Gould

⁷⁸ Fundacion Guillermo Toriello, Equipo Economico Productivo, Informe Sobre la Implementacion, Segumiento, Control y Monitoreo de los Proyectos Productivos " August 1998

not one or more members of the family or group worked on the outside to supply needed backup income. Many of the projects were also providing valuable business experience to some of the more enterprising dispersos who may be able to use this as a springboard to expanded ventures down the road.

Just as with the albergue group, these projects need continued quality follow-up assistance and in a number of cases, those currently on a solid earnings growth path, would benefit from market credit for expansion. They also need more training in bookkeeping, management and marketing. There are a number of cases where if stores would band together, they could realize considerable savings from economies of scale in transportation and bulk purchasing. The will is there and good ideas. What is needed is more information and access to existing sources of credit and technical assistance. Often only a few hundred dollars of credit could make a major difference for expansion of a store, or a larger stove, or a new line of merchandise.

Many of these projects are in fact contributing to their communities through improved service and competition in retailing, supplying a needed product or service (corn grinding, cheaper meals, a community nursery, an auto repair shop, etc – See Annex on visits to project sites.) Generally these ventures have been well received in their communities. There was one particularly exciting case in Xecoxol, Chimaltenango, visited by the team, where an ex-combatant with an agricultural supply store, agreed to convert his stock to all organic inputs (fertilizer, herbicide, pesticide) in line with the latest recommendations on organic farming, which is cheaper, produces better returns, and doesn't damage the environment or health of the community. This followed an excellent, persuasive pitch by an IOM agronomist on the benefits of organic farming to the community, which became so enthusiastic that it persuaded him to come back the following week for a longer session with more farmers in the area. In this case, it may be possible for this store to bring real and lasting benefit to a community which previously had been tied (in the old "company store" context) through debt, to input suppliers of chemical products which have taken advantage of farmers in the highlands for decades to the detriment of their income generation ability, their soil, their health and the environment.

In conclusion, the PIP concept is a good one and should be considered for future efforts. But, it should be carried out in a sound professional manner in terms of feasibility and the market and site selection, selection of participants, and adequate training and technical assistance. To do it right the first time, saves an enormous amount of time and aggravation down the road. At the time of the evaluation there was an enormous amount of mopping up to do with marginal projects in the field on both sides of the albergue/disperso split. The PIP II project should benefit from many of these lessons.

Although the grant idea is a good one and innovative, and it certainly saved a lot of time in getting the project off the ground, a credit program should be considered for those projects that need it and deserve it from their record of performance. This would not have to be financed by the project itself, just the dedication of enough technical time and effort to facilitate linkages with other sound banking or NGO sources of market based

credit. It would also be good for these beneficiaries to have some experience with credit for times down the road when opportunities for growth present themselves.

Training, obviously, should be strongly linked to the PIP program, preferably after the subject of the project is identified so the relevant courses can be taken. It would also be invaluable for many of the beneficiaries to have an identified source of technical assistance or just the ability to ask key questions once in a while.

To state the obvious, not all projects are the same size and cost. Some thought should be given to differing sizes of projects in terms of funding, based on the ability of the beneficiary and the cost structure of the venture, although it is recognized that there are political and psychological reasons why this might not be feasible in the short term.

On follow-up, the FGT, even if it had had adequate technical expertise, was hamstrung by staff and budget considerations. Consultants and monitors had to travel by bus, foot, or hitching a ride to many destinations. This kind of far flung program, however, demands high mobility. Most of this problem was probably of the FGT's own making as it had opportunities to take advantage of donor willingness to assist early in the program. It should still be solved for the future and for other programs. There was certainly an urgent need at the time of the evaluation in relation to this component and many others.

Finally, as with so many other aspects of this project, better information flow and sharing is essential. Neither beneficiaries nor field staff were aware of opportunities for further training, technical assistance, credit and other important inputs that could be made available from time to time, nor did they have current market intelligence.

This concludes the section on Program Content under Initial Incorporation. The remainder of this chapter covers other contributing and related activities financed by USAID/OTI and UNDP.

4 Basic Education and Literacy⁷⁹

The basic education and literacy campaign carried out in a partnership effort by the OAS and the FGT was one of the most successful elements of the overall incorporation program. It not only contributed significantly to a strengthening of basic educational and literacy levels amongst the URNG rank and file and a substantial number of their "civilian" neighbors, but also in a very meaningful way to the reconciliation process between ex-combatants and their communities. Participants and communities alike remember it today with great respect. Its only real shortcoming may have been that it ended too soon, in May of 1998, after only one year of highly productive activity.

⁷⁹ Material for this section comes from a) OAS, "De Combatientes a Educadores", June 1998, b) OAS, "Escuela sin Paredes", June 1997, c) IOM, "Componente Orientacion Vocacional", May 1997, and interviews with OAS Program Director, Raul Rosende, IOM Training Director, Francisco Ureta, and FGT Education Director, Francisco Rimola, along with a number of former URNG "promoters".

The genesis of the program came from a June 1996 meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Panama in which members agreed to assist Guatemala within the framework of a resolution supporting democratization and the peace process. It also responded to the basic "Incorporation" Peace Accord which called for specific sub-programs for literacy and technical training.

The OAS already had considerable experience in such programs from its work in other post conflict situations in Nicaragua, Suriname, and Haiti. Drawing from those efforts, the basic rationale for the Guatemala program was to a) address the need for the formation and promotion of civic values among post conflict populations and b) contribute to the incorporation process through development of basic skills essential for social and economic integration. USAID/OTI and UNDP jointly funded the program through IOM at a level of \$987,000, of which the USAID share was \$357,000.

In January 1997 the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy and the URNG Education Team began developing program strategy. The immediate priority was to establish the educational level of ex-combatants in the camps and to provide them with orientation on civic values and vocational options. This was to be followed by a more comprehensive program in communities where they were to be reincorporated. The program was designed in four phases including 1) formation of education promoters, 2) education in the camps, 3) education in resettlement and re-incorporation communities, and 4) educational testing and validation of new levels achieved by participants.

The first and second phases of the program were described in the earlier section on the Emergency Phase, Demobilization and the Camps, (See IV A). As mentioned, 128 educational promoters, drawn from the better educated ranks of the URNG, were put through an intensive 35-hour program in Totonicapan in preparation for the camp phase (Subsequently, another 49 promoters were trained and added to the group in response to the magnitude of the work in the community phase of the program). The promoters were trained by ten "education technicians", drawn from the URNG and the OAS, who stayed on in the capacity of supervisors and monitors for the rest of the program, thus providing consistency and continuity in the community phase. The decision to use URNG ex-combatants themselves as trainers and field cadre for the program was based on the conviction that their previously established levels of trust with the group would facilitate a more productive teaching relationship. From experience this proved to be a correct call, as verified by ex-combatants interviewed, teachers and students. An added benefit was that the program kept the ex-combatant promoters busy, trained them and gave them work which was good for motivation and group unity, not only for them, but for those with whom they came into contact, involving everyone in a can-do mentality which was probably as important for the learning process as what was being taught in the courses.

The camp phase of the program was highly successful in terms of its objectives of providing basic literacy and civic formation training and establishing educational levels of some 2,765 participants. As reported earlier, the same cadre of promoters also provided basic vocational orientation in the camps based on IOM training and supervision. The educational level ("homologacion") activity (including the conduct of a

series of examinations) was advised and assisted ably by the Ministry of Education, the National Committee on Literacy (CONALFA), which handled the primary level, and the Santiago Development Program (PRODESSA), which dealt with secondary testing. The trainers succeeded in achieving a passing rating for 98% of the trainees in primary education and 66% at the secondary level. This was especially significant given the ex-combatant and campesino background most of the participants who had little or no experience in formal study (40% with no formal schooling at all), complicated by the fact that training and testing had to be given in as many as nine different indigenous languages in addition to Spanish. It was a well planned and orchestrated exercise carried out with precision in a very limited time period, less than a month and with only three to four hours a day to work with.⁸⁰ As reported earlier, its only real shortcoming was that it was too short to accomplish much in terms of actual educational progression and retention of material imparted, especially in the area of vocational orientation.⁸¹

Immediately following the departure of ex-combatants from the camps, the program commenced in earnest at the community level, starting with a second training seminar for promoters, this time with 177 participants and including some community organization techniques along with education and literacy. The stated purpose was to “ambientar” or orient and condition the implementation of the project to the social conditions of the beneficiaries, and to avoid the contextual separation of the beneficiaries from their local environment.⁸² High levels of interactive learning, creativity development and community involvement were incorporated within the methodology employed.

On commencement, the program was immediately faced with a complex logistical constraint associated with the high level of territorial dispersion of the group and its relocation in difficult-to-access geographic zones distant from the capital. These areas also suffered from a severe lack of basic infrastructure and high levels of poverty and illiteracy. The situation required an agile and flexible organizational scheme that could contend with major problems of transport, communications, and support imposed by isolation and local conditions. A pyramidal structure was devised for the program which matched each promoter with one or more local ex-combatant groups, or “nucleos educativos” which in turn could incorporate one or more small villages or neighborhoods. Each promoter then had to conduct sessions at several different educational levels, which required a corresponding organizational effort on the part of local ex-combatant groups along with a substantial number of “civilian” participants. The overall structure covered 2,668 ex-combatant beneficiaries in 224 “nucleos” (each nucleo had ten or more students) in 251 communities spread over 76 municipalities and 16 departments throughout the country. This in turn required a dynamic monitoring and supervisory effort on the part of technical staff from the OAS and the FGT with strong support from the Ministry of Education, CONALFA and PRODESSA. Promoters, for example,

⁸⁰ The education program had to be sandwiched in among a plethora of other activities in the camps including daily political orientation by the URNG, health and documentation services, cooking and cleanup duties assigned, recreation and camp policing and maintenance.

⁸¹ The vocational orientation component of the training used the same education promoters, but was supervised by IOM.

⁸² P 11, OAS, “De Combatientes a Educadores”

received continuing updating and refresher training through monthly group meetings with the technical staff⁸³

With respect to materials, 25 texts were developed in such diverse fields as mathematics, Spanish, literacy, natural sciences, health education, accounting, civic formation and others. These were elaborated in accordance with standards required by the Ministry of Education and also had to be appropriate for adult education in a campesino context. The texts further promoted community organization and self-help concepts woven through examples given to illustrate academic or technical points being taught⁸⁴

The final numbers speak for themselves. A total of 3,338 beneficiaries attended classes including a community civilian participation of close to 40%. A total of 2,108 students were evaluated by technical personal at two primary levels and one secondary. Of these 1,817 were successfully promoted to higher grade levels. Basic literacy training was given to 262 beneficiaries. Another 943 were educated at the primary level. Another 1,200 were educated at the sixth grade level and 973 at the junior high ("tercero basico") level ready attend high school or "bachillerato" programs.

In summary, the program was carried out with energy, creativity and intelligence at all levels. One important measure of the success of the program was the high level of participation by non-demobilized members of surrounding communities, which arrived at 38% of the total group of beneficiaries. This facilitated a major community level impact in the form of reconciliation and improved relationships between ex-combatants and their neighbors. It also spurred the development of local initiatives resulting in community action projects such as schools and other small public works⁸⁵

The program came to an end in May 1998, much to the disappointment of students and promoters alike. The most serious criticism of the effort would have to do with this fact. First, there was real momentum in the activity and real progress being made in education and in reintegration of ex-combatant populations within their communities as well as increasing local initiative. Secondly, the cadre of trained promoters represented a sizeable, capable and motivated force of agents which could have been productively utilized either to carry on the program and attack other needs in the area of community action and self help targeted on conditions of poverty and deprivation in these areas. At the time of the evaluation, most of the promoters had returned to other jobs or enterprises of their own choosing and were lost to the program, although they still represent a

⁸³ According to the OAS, there was a mechanical problem that resulted in substantially delayed payment to a large number of the promoters in the field due to logistical and communications constraints. It was a real credit to the program, however, and its mystique, that the promoters continued uninterrupted service in their communities for periods of two to three months before finally receiving back pay and other costs.

⁸⁴ There was a struggle initially between the OAS and the URNG regarding the ideological content of the material. The OAS was eventually able to prevail, however, and assure that the teaching material was basically free of political bias.

⁸⁵ Originally non-URNG members were opposed to the program, viewing it like "secret cells" plotting together. As a product of a series of meetings with the FGT, the GOG and the Donors, however, it was decided that the only way to placate these people was to include them in the classes, from where they went on to participate actively and become friends with other students – an unanticipated, but rather inspiring benefit.

resource that could be identified and tapped in future efforts (Some have continued in the teaching profession, capitalizing on their experience and training)⁸⁶

To be fair, there are other activities available for both ex-combatants and the general population which can and do substitute for the now terminated education program. One of these is the School Without Walls activity now being implemented by the FGT with NGO support from Manos Unidas. Another is the radio "distance" education program being managed by the Tikal Foundation for the primary grades. Finally, the program in general advanced the educational process greatly in the communities in which it operated, generating strong, continuing interest in education and putting additional pressure on the Ministry of Education to respond within the broad context of the Modernization of the State mandate under the Peace Accords.⁸⁷

5 Social Communication Campaign⁸⁸

"No me mires como extraño pues soy de tu propia sangre, que si me fui a la montaña para luchar contra el hambre ahora que vuelvo a mi tierra vuelvo dispuesto a abrazarte, a cultivar a tu lado la historia de nuestros padres y sembrarla en nuestros hijos sin odios ni enemistades."⁸⁹

In compliance with the Incorporation Peace Accord, the purpose of the campaign was to educate the Guatemalan public on the incorporation process and the content of the Peace Accords. The idea was to create an atmosphere of harmony and dialogue to facilitate the peaceful integration of ex-combatants and their communities. The campaign was focused on communities of higher risk for conflict in order to "sensitize" them to the importance of compliance with the accords and the benefits of peaceful incorporation.

Planning for the Campaign for "Sensibilización Social" began in May of 1997. Implementation did not commence, however, until January of 1998, having been delayed repeatedly in CEI meetings by debate over need, in relation to other public information efforts by the Government, as well as concern over quality and suitability relative to the sensitive and evolving situation in the countryside.

The campaign was approved in principle in the October 14 session of the CEI and a special tripartite "technical secretariat" (IOM, FGT and GOG) was set up to plan and oversee the program.⁹⁰ The secretariat came under the direction of a sub-commission of

⁸⁶ The USAID Mission is now looking into the possibility of including some of them in a teacher training/certification program which will enable them to teach in the official GOG system.

⁸⁷ The GOG is committed to substantial increases in national budgets and outreach for Education and Health services for all Guatemalans under the Modernization of the State mandate.

⁸⁸ Material for this section is drawn mainly from IOM, "Informe Final - Campaña de Sensibilización Sobre El Proceso de Incorporación de la URNG a la Legalidad" and interviews with Beatriz Azurdia and Catalina Miz, Coordinator and Field Monitor for the campaign respectively.

⁸⁹ Principal message of the campaign which was also broadcast in the principal languages of the zone of coverage, loosely translated: "Don't look at me as a stranger, I am of your own blood, and if I went to the mountains to struggle against hunger, now that I return to my land I am ready to embrace you, to cultivate at your side the history of our fathers and to seed it in our sons without hatred or animosity."

⁹⁰ USAID cable reporting on October 14 session of the CEI.

the CEI for communication including the URNG, the GOG and the International Community. The campaign was financed by USAID/OTI (\$80,000) and UNDP (\$30,000) through IOM (which put up \$30,000 of its own money from Geneva). Management of the campaign was assigned to a working group consisting of a Coordinator from IOM and technical advisors, one each from IOM, FGT and the GOG.

The approach and plan adopted for implementation consisted of a series of workshops in areas of greatest potential for renewed conflict along with a reinforcing radio campaign. The workshops were directed to community leaders and representatives of the demobilized population with the purpose of achieving a multiplier effect through continuing communication by participants with their neighbors.

The workshops were meticulously planned and carried out in 16 municipalities and 9 departments of the country selected from areas where there had been detected some type of rejection or conflict within the incorporation process and where there were large concentrations of ex-combatants. The order of execution was determined by the degree of conflict found in the target areas. The first four communities included Colotenango, Huehuetenango (where ten ex-PAC members had been condemned for human rights violations)⁹¹, Quiche (where a strong political difference existed and where 393 ex-combatants were concentrated), La Libertad in the Peten (one of the most conflictive zones during the war), and the fourth in Ixcán, Quiche, where a higher level of rejection had been observed (problem of the Ixcán Grande Cooperative – see Section IV, B 2).

Fifteen days before a workshop, the working group would call a meeting of local leaders in the selected community along with municipal authorities and other organizations in the area. FGT and ex-combatant representatives also attended. In this gathering, the workshop would be explained in detail and concerns would be put to rest. Three days before the workshop, one of the promoters would travel to the community to verify all details, and again one day before to finalize arrangements including audio visual aids, speaker system, seating, etc. Standard conference fare was utilized including flip charts, overheads, note binders etc., and relevant material was handed out. Most of the workshops were held in municipal halls and had a duration of one day. In six of the workshops, a translator had to be used to deal with indigenous language requirements.

Attendance was better than had been hoped, coming to 1,375 participants in all, from all targeted sectors including local authorities and municipal officials, the demobilized, local improvement committees and other community organizations, teachers, neighbors and women's groups. Also attending as observers and lending additional credibility to the gatherings were representatives from MINUGUA, FONAPAZ, the OAS, FGT, and IOM.

⁹¹ The PACs were armed civil defense patrols, drawn from rural communities and set up by the Guatemalan Military during the worst years of the conflict, to identify and destroy elements sympathetic to the insurgency. They generated extreme hatred. This decision was controversial and generated strong feelings on both sides in that PAC members themselves were also victims, having little choice in the decision to participate (the alternative being to be killed as "sympathizers").

The methodology utilized was highly participatory and involved group identification, analysis and resolution of potential problem areas. The workshops commenced with an exposition and on the purpose of the exercise to make sure all participants were comfortable, and then continued with a detailed explanation on the Global Peace Accord on Human Rights focusing on rights, duties and responsibilities shared by all in order to comply with the Accords. They further emphasized the rights of ex-combatants to return and be treated like other citizens with a special focus on the responsibilities of all citizens to build a better, more tolerant and inclusive Guatemala. Techniques utilized to assure adequate participation included questions and answers, working groups and games related to themes under discussion. Forgiveness was requested for persons that had caused pain and damage. At the close of each workshop, all participants held hands to demonstrate solidarity and understanding, followed by a fiesta and dancing.

From all reports the workshops were well planned and executed and had the desired result. Evaluations collected following each session were almost universally positive. Each workshop was planned and carried out with the character and needs of the local group in mind based on extensive checking and preparation prior to the event.

The program also involved a radio campaign broadcast nationally and with greater intensity in areas of past and potential conflict. The messages were produced in Spanish and relevant indigenous languages. The campaign was carefully monitored by the working group to assure quality and consistency. The quotation at the beginning of this section was one of the messages. Others involved similar themes. The campaign was carried out in two parts over a five month period, April to September 1998.

In general, the evaluation team found that the social communication campaign was a great success and carried out with genuine sensitivity and intelligence. Again, in hindsight, the only real shortcoming was that it should have started earlier and been carried out over a longer period. At a point in the not too distant future, when continuing implementation of the accords inevitably develops new ragged edges in the countryside, a repeat performance of this effort could be key to heading off renewed conflict in high risk areas. There is still great ignorance throughout both urban and rural Guatemala on what the Peace Accords really mean and imply for the future in terms of behavior and social and economic interaction at the community level. Also, valuable experience and lessons have been gained which should be retained for the future.

A repeat of the campaign, updated appropriately for the Definitive Incorporation stage, could be especially useful in those areas to be covered by the EU financed PAREC II program which to date has not commenced and may not for several more months. The group to be assisted by this program, some 1,500 or more ex-combatants and supporters, have still received virtually nothing substantive in the way of incorporation assistance.

One final recommendation for future programs of this nature would be to integrate the education and social communication campaigns. The education effort did much to further the reconciliation process, and the cadre of trained promoters could be especially effective in carrying the message of the Accords to areas of greatest need. They could

also perform a valuable follow-up service in making sure that the message was fully absorbed and appreciated through classes and community organization efforts

6 Return of External Structures⁹²

From the beginning, the URNG was concerned with the return of its "External Structures" from Mexico and other countries. A CEI working group was set up in May 1997 to plan the return, the cost of which was ultimately shared among USAID/OTI, UNDP, EU and the Government of Sweden. Total cost came to just over \$87,000.

The objective of this component was to return 151 families (493 persons) from Mexico and other countries including Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua and the United States. It was a complex undertaking requiring formal arrangements in the countries of origin, transport of persons and belongings by land or air to Guatemala, temporary room and board after arrival and transport to final destinations.

The exercise was executed under the direction of a special sub-commission with participation from the FGT, SEPAZ, FONAPAZ, CEAR, UNHCR (High Commission on Refugees), MINUGUA, IOM and the Spanish Red Cross. The GOG Ministries of Foreign Relations (and overseas consular services), Finance (customs service), Gobernacion (national police) and Health (hospital services) were also involved as was Medicos sin Fronteras in the area of health services. The plan, coordinated by SEPAZ and implemented primarily by IOM, involved a series of steps in a highly articulated process including return documentation, purchase and delivery of air tickets, transport by land from Mexico, separate transport of belongings, transfer and temporary housing of returnees in hostels, warehousing of belongings, documentation of beneficiaries in Guatemala and "becas" for training. In the case of the Mexico group, all returning beneficiaries were accompanied in Mexico by UNHCR representatives and met at the border by CEAR for transfer to either the Capital or Quetzaltenango. Most of the returnees were brought back between July and September of 1997. Each returnee (153 in all) received a training beca similar to those received by the disperso group, except these were somewhat larger, a total of Q5,250, or around \$860.

In conclusion, the component dedicated to return of external structures was successful and exhibited an extraordinary degree of coordination among the wide array of agencies involved. What to do with these people, however, and how to help them remained a subject of continuing debate between the FGT, the GOG and donor community. They were explicitly excluded from the mainstream PIP and training programs financed by USAID and UNDP, despite repeated requests and protests from the FGT, although they were incorporated to a limited extent in some of the vocational training, especially late in

⁹² "External structure" is a URNG euphemism for either combatants or active supporters who left the Guatemala during the conflict and continued to support the cause in various ways from outside the country including logistics, publicity, international relations etc. Material for this section is drawn primarily from IOM, "Programa de Retorno de Las Estructuras Externas de la URNG" December 1997.

the period. They will also be covered by the PIP II project commencing in December 1998, however, and will be eligible under the PAREC II program⁹³

7 Outreach Centers and Institutional Strengthening of the FGT⁹⁴

The evaluation was able to collect only minimal documentation on implementation of the "institutional strengthening" area of the program. Some \$89,000 was committed for outreach centers by USAID/OTI with another \$144,600 coming from UNDP. The purpose was to strengthen institutional capacity to implement the program in the field. Funding went to cover costs associated with opening "outreach" ("modulos de apoyo") centers (rent, staff, computers, printers etc.) together with the Foundation's six regional offices in Quetzaltenango, Solola, Mazatenango, Santa Cruz del Quiche, Coban and Santa Elena in the Peten. In addition, another \$172,000 was committed by USAID/OTI and UNDP (OTI share \$67,349) to strengthen headquarters capacity to implement programs in the field covering two vehicles plus some operating and staff costs.

The six centers were opened in April and May of 1998. The team physically visited only one of these, the Mazatenango office. The team did, however, question regional representatives from offices in the Peten, Quetzaltenango and Masatenango along with a number of other Foundation and IOM consultants and officials concerning the subject. The following are observations drawn from the information available:

First, notwithstanding the USAID/UNDP contributions, the institutional capacity of the Foundation in the field was severely lacking in the following areas:

- **Transportation and Mobility** Field office personnel were basically without vehicles. They depend on other organizations such as IOM, MINUGUA, donors and the GOG to supply transport for visits to project sites. When on their own, they had to take a bus or walk. This obviously limited capacity to implement timely follow-up activity.
- **Information** Although regional offices now share a data base with FGT headquarters showing beneficiaries and key information, they appeared to be almost totally lacking in information regarding program planning, implementation arrangements, resources available, potentially forthcoming assistance and outside opportunities. Thus their ability to assist beneficiary groups in planning related to current and future assistance programming was almost nil. Nor were they in a position to assist with linkages to external sources of assistance including NGOs and Government agencies.

⁹³ There was an equity concern with the external structures, in that some of them were rumored to be on at two and perhaps three lists (A, B & C) entitling them to multiple benefits. Hard evidence of this was not available, however, due to the refusal of the FGT to share information on who had received what benefit. IOM did keep such records and found no evidence in this case, and MINUGUA eventually made the FGT lists public allowing further checking which likewise turned up no evidence, although in other cases the Foundation had tried to pass off both list B and C people as List A types. In future programs, a common database, available to all agencies, with key detail on all beneficiaries, including benefits received and entitled, will be critical to assuring transparency and equity in program implementation.

⁹⁴ In the absence of much documentation, this section was drawn mainly from interviews with FGT personnel at all levels in addition to others in the GOG, IOM, UNDP and USAID.

- **Technical Capacity** There were some excellent field personnel in place with strong leadership skills, energy and good will. They were spread extremely thin, however, over major geographic areas of responsibility and had no real capacity to deal with technical and financial problems encountered in their territories. Essentially, all problems worth solving had to be referred back to headquarters. These people, by and large, had good survival skills and could offer moral support, but their ability to advise on a technical level regarding management of projects, marketing, production operations, etc., was seriously lacking. They also appeared to have little knowledge regarding other available resources for technical assistance and credit from traditional sources such as NGOs, the Government, and the banking sector. In a word, they were not “plugged in” and appeared to be working in isolation, much like most of their beneficiaries. For the most part, they waited for the benefits to flow from whatever donor or Government financed program was on tap at the moment.⁹⁵

There was one outstanding exception to this, the regional coordinator in the Quetzaltenango office, who appeared to be very knowledgeable, on top of the program, and able to exercise considerable influence over events by sheer force of will. She was constantly charging around bringing people and resources together and coordinating helpful activities between the FGT, the GOG, and donor programs including USAID/UNDP and the EU. She also clearly had the confidence of the people she was trying to help. This exception to the rule demonstrates, as always, that the most important factor of all is people and motivation, although it would have been a great help to her to have a vehicle and more resources at her disposal.

Second, as reported in Section IV B 1, the institution in general suffers from the same general shortcomings. It is severely lacking in mobility and logistics capability, information (at least information it is willing to share) and technical capacity. This is recognized by all parties involved in the incorporation program including the Foundation itself and the GOG. In a September 1998 report, commenting on the need for institutional strengthening of the FGT, the CEI recommended that a series of measures be established, among other things, to assist the organization through institutional agreements with Government entities for program execution (which presumably would provide some overhead), support for access to financial resources, and advice and training to elevate its technical capacity.⁹⁶

In interviews with the President of the Foundation and program directors, this same message was echoed. The FGT would prefer a trust fund arrangement and unfettered access and control of resources for program implementation, but also admits to an urgent need for technical strengthening in various areas where gaps (“lagunas”) exist including strategy formulation, program planning and management, housing, credit, information management, technical training and others. The Foundation also clearly needs strengthening in a host of other important areas having to do with governance (both of the

⁹⁵ This was partially a resource problem and partially, the evaluators believe, one of ideology and a felt need to be free of dependence on traditional government and private sources, which normally came with strings attached. Thus imagination and initiative relative to such sources was severely constrained.

⁹⁶ P 12 CEI, “Balance del Programa de Incorporacion de la URNG a la Legalidad”, September 1998

institution itself and the demobilized population) and administrative management including personnel, resource mobilization and the like. Although the extent of the need does not appear to be adequately recognized, there is a growing appreciation that will undoubtedly increase over time.

Perhaps the greatest need of all is simply for a stronger organizational team which will require higher salaries and the ability to offer stable employment.⁹⁷ The question is, where can the Foundation turn at this point for the required assistance? The original set of donors, with the advent of the end of “initial incorporation” and with increasingly scarce resources, is now moving back to regular mainstream and other emergency (such as reconstruction from Hurricane Mitch) program priorities in Guatemala and elsewhere.⁹⁸ (The one exception, of course, is the EU with its PAREC II program. This will be a relatively modest effort, however, at a little over \$5.0 million, and is not targeted on institutional strengthening.)

To be fair, the Foundation has received assistance from other sources to date including the Government of Spain (the principal institutional donor), the European Union and the Nordic countries through UNDP. Most of the existing commitments, it is understood, are now near exhaustion. The PAREC II program may possibly provide some additional limited assistance, once it comes on line, but it will be directed only to those elements which directly support implementation of the PAREC program, as designed, in the field.

There is now a truly urgent requirement for the Foundation to seek additional funding for appropriate types of assistance including a strong dose of capacity building through training and technical assistance. The team understands that the GOG desires to assist in this effort.⁹⁹

In conclusion, the team has two observations. First, if the final incorporation phase of the program is to be implemented effectively, considerable strengthening of the FGT is essential now and over the coming months. Hopefully the Government will work with the Foundation to identify and effectively tap sources of such help, both financial and technical. Part of this effort will also have to deal with the need to develop greater transparency and accountability on the part of the Foundation in order to develop the donor confidence required for needed investments. This is not in place now.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ The team did not get a salary schedule, but from interviews it appears that Foundation staff at the operational level receive low salaries relative to similar personnel in other organizations such as IOM and Government Agencies. It is also rumored that they are obliged to contribute a substantial sum (10-15%) on a continuing basis to the URNG.

⁹⁸ This, of course, is happening in the case of USAID with the departure of OTI. It is also happening with the UNDP to a lesser extent. UNDP assistance will continue for a while at a lower level with a follow-on productive project program, PIP II. That is it, however, for the “incorporation” program dedicated specifically to the demobilized population. Interview with Maria Noel Vaeza-Ogilvie, General Manager of Recovery, Reconciliation and Reform Programs at UNDP.

⁹⁹ Interview with Eduardo Aguirre, Director of Incorporation Programs, SEPAZ.

¹⁰⁰ Interviews with UNDP and IOM staff indicate past problems obtaining an adequate rendering of accounts from funds contributed for specific purposes.

Secondly, there is an obvious lesson here for the future. This is that the strengthening component for the implementing organization on the insurgency side should be negotiated and started early, preferably before program commencement. In order to secure the needed commitment to accept technical assistance early on from sources outside of the ideological orbit of the organization, it would probably help to have such organizations as the FGT and its sister foundation in El Salvador argue the case on the basis of experience and tough lessons learned.

C Assistance to GOG Military Ex-Combatants¹⁰¹

The program component dedicated to the socio-economic reintegration of the Extraordinary Mobile Military Police (Policía Militar Ambulante Extraordinaria—PMA/E) is one of the success stories of the demobilization effort. From the beginning it was well planned and executed by IOM with strong support and collaboration on the part of the GOG and the Armed Forces. There are lessons to be learned, to be sure, as will be seen below, but the activity stands in contrast to the URNG side of the program in terms of its comprehensive nature, cohesive design, internal consistency and relatively problem free implementation. The principal reason for this is that the program was basically managed by a single competent entity, IOM, although with technical co-direction by FONAPAZ. It did not have to contend with the tug-of-war type “co-direction” factor that plagued the URNG program. The highly positive roles of the Government throughout (SEPAZ and FONAPAZ) and the Military initially, were also key factors.

By way of background, the genesis of the program came from the Accord on Civil Authority and the Role of the Army in a Democratic Society signed in Mexico in September 1996 which in Article 62 stated that the PMA would be dissolved within one year from the signing of the final Peace Agreement. The same article went on to state that the Government committed itself to design and execute programs that would permit the productive reintegration of demobilized members of the Army. To be more specific, the bodies mentioned in the Accords to be demobilized were both the PMA “Ordinaria” y “Extraordinaria” (PMA/O and PMA/E - ordinary and extraordinary). The PMA/O had duties directly linked with the regular army while the PMA/E mainly provided security services for State and private institutions. In order to enter into service with the PMA/E a soldier had to have first been a member of the PMA/O for something like three to five years. Both bodies were considered elite corps in relation to security and participation in the armed conflict.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ The principal sources of information for this section include 1) IOM, Cuarto Informe de Avance, Programa de Apoyo a la Reinserción Socioeconómica de la PMAE, Sept 30, 1998, 2) IOM, El Caso de Guatemala con la Policía Militar Amulante, Un Esfuerzo Común, presentation by Diego Beltrand, July 1998, 3) IOM, Informe de Pasantías, April 1998, and 4) various interviews with IOM program management and field staff, SEPAZ officials responsible for monitoring the program, the GOG National Employment Office, ex-PMA beneficiaries in the field, and INTECAP, the Technical Institute for Training and Productivity, responsible for much of the training provided by the program.

¹⁰² The PMA/E, especially, was rumored to have participated in some of the worst abuses of the Military and certain connected private sector interests during the war and were feared and hated accordingly.

The program was officially set up under the coordination of SEPAZ and executed jointly by IOM and FONAPAZ. The design consisted of three phases: 1) motivation and vocational orientation, 2) technical training and apprenticeships, and 3) reference and referral services in relation to job opportunities. It was drawn in part from IOM experience with military demobilization in Haiti as adjusted for the Guatemalan setting.

The activity commenced with a pilot effort with the PMA/O which had demobilized together with the URNG in March of 1997. Most of this group of 699 entered into service with private security companies or state security organs such as the new National Civil Police or the guard force for prisons. A small group of 33 elected to participate in the pilot program reintegration program which was carried out between March and November 1997 and which validated the methodology to be employed and allowed implementers to better understand the profile of the beneficiaries.

The PMA/E, a force of 1,722 people, was demobilized on a staggered timetable between September and December of 1997. The full reintegration program began in October with day long information sessions open to the entire corps, attended by 1,370 or 80% of the original group. This was followed by week long Motivation and Vocational Orientation Workshops attended by 1,039 members, or 60% of the total deactivated.

The workshops were carried out in six different sites in Guatemala City, Jutiapa, Salama in Baja Verapaz and Quetzaltenango. In addition to the identification of vocational interests and selection of training options, the workshops were designed to motivate and educate beneficiaries regarding the importance of their transition to civilian life as well as to build self-esteem. Various training institutes participated by providing information on different programs of study and associated employment possibilities. Chief among these was the Technical Institute for Training and Productivity (INTECAP), the largest and best-known training organization in Guatemala, an autonomous Government entity with a mixed public/private board of directors and strong private sector backing. Also participating were the Imrich Fischmann Technical Vocational institute and the National Institute for Technical Formation. These three organizations provided 90% of the training in the program, with the bulk coming from INTECAP.

Some 981 persons, or 94% of those attending the workshops, elected to participate in the training and apprenticeship program. Of these, 28 eventually left in mid-stream for diverse personal reasons leaving 953 to complete the program or 55% of the total demobilized.¹⁰³

For implementation of the training component, IOM signed agreements with various training institutes in order to provide the necessary coverage in both the Capital and areas of concentration of beneficiaries in the interior of the country, including nine different training sites in all in Guatemala City, Alta and Baja Verapaz, Coatepeque, Chiquimula,

¹⁰³ These percentages are cited due to a concern over the rather large percentage of those demobilized who are presumed to have returned to security work of one kind or another. This will be explored further below.

Jalapa, Jutiapa, Quetzaltenango and Suchitepequez The idea was to allow beneficiaries to be with their families as much as possible as well as to reduce costs and facilitate linkage with local labor markets In most cases, IOM provided necessary equipment and some infrastructure, thus also strengthening the training institutes themselves

The design of the training program was drawn in part from standards developed by the International Labor Organization which call for a six month training period as being necessary for rapid entrance as a technically qualified “helper” in most types of jobs appropriate for such a group (Similar to the URNG program, three months had been proposed initially) In this case, five months of training (600 hours) plus a month long apprenticeship (200 hours) with private local companies, was selected for the program In each discipline, the training was designed to instruct both traditional and modern practices in order to provide the trainee with a range of possibilities upon graduation

The methodology was based on a learn-by-doing approach which downplayed theory and focused on practice ¹⁰⁴ In many cases, this resulted in a side benefit of the program in that trainees produced goods and services of real benefit to their families and the local community, thereby reflecting credit on both themselves and the program Examples included free haircuts for local school children in all locations, tables, chairs and other items donated to local schools and churches, construction of walls and floors for schools, electricity connections installed in local residences, sheets and curtains for the National Hospital in Jutiapa, minor vehicle repairs without cost in various sites, donation of free bread to the old people’s home in Jutiapa, and construction of minimal housing for destitute families at all sites ¹⁰⁵

As in the case of the URNG, the most popular course for the men was auto-mechanics, followed by tailoring Other popular courses included electricity, cooking and bread making, carpentry, barbering, and masonry, which together accounted for the vast majority of all training The most popular course for the women (there were only 14 out of the group of 953 completing training) was cooking

In addition to the purely technical elements, and depending on the course of study, students also received training in micro-enterprise administration, public relations, industrial hygiene and basic math Courses in mechanics, masonry and carpentry were also complemented with a module on technical design, and auto-mechanics trainees were all given driver education and received their licenses Each graduating student further received either a certification from the training institute or the Ministry of Education with regard to compliance with standard technical skill level requirements

¹⁰⁴ In an interview with the principal training institute, INTECAP, trainers and administrators alike complained over the need to orient the program so much toward practice at the expense of theory The nature and educational level of the group, however, was such that there really was no other choice A greater emphasis on theory would have discouraged and probably lost a sizeable percentage of the trainees

¹⁰⁵ The team visited one site in Animas Lomas, near Jutiapa, where masonry trainees had installed a large and truly impressive tile floor, in place of what had been only dirt before, in the community church along a new, well-constructed wooden lectern The community was truly grateful and made this known to the evaluators

Upon completion of the training portion of the program, students all moved on to supervised apprenticeships (“pasantias”) in local businesses. The apprenticeships, for the most part, were highly structured experiences with benchmarks, periodic evaluation and heavy supervision. They were also carefully monitored by IOM and the GOG. The experience gave the trainees the opportunity to get to know the business in a practical setting including norms and standards of work, management practices, and supply and marketing channels. It was an activity of mutual benefit to both trainees and companies, who received free labor in the process and had the opportunity to evaluate the performance of potential employees without cost.

All trainees were also provided with tool kits of a minimum value of Q2,500, based on lists provided by instructors in each discipline. The lists were discussed with each student and adjusted prior to actual purchase. The process was carefully controlled and purchases were made on the basis of competitive quotes. Each trainee signed a guarantee committing him or her to sound use of the tools in line with program objectives. This also facilitated internal control and transparency of the process. Various ceremonies, attended by donor and program representatives, mostly in June and July 1998, were held where the tool kits were officially turned over to the trainees. There were 949 packages in total.

The final component of the program, known as Reference and Opportunity Service, began following completion of the apprenticeship stage for most trainees and was still running at the time of the evaluation. The service offered the trainee employment advice and reference services, resume assistance, reproduction of required documents, psychological testing required for most jobs, referral to public and private employers, and provision of flyers and information in general regarding opportunities as they were identified.

Most of this service was actually provided by IOM which maintained a complete data base on all trainees with key information on location, training, skills, background etc. IOM also hired four field monitors from areas of concentration of PMA graduates to assist with trainee follow-up work and facilitate information flow. An agreement was also signed with the Ministry of Labor to reinforce the National Employment Office through the opening of regional offices in Jutiapa and Salama and the strengthening of the offices in Quetzaltenango and at headquarters in Guatemala. The team visited the National Employment Office and received a demonstration on an impressive data base just being established in both the headquarters and field offices to be utilized for job search and placement purposes.

Finally, IOM is actively pursuing connections with various chambers and associations to facilitate job placement for the trainees including those for industry, agriculture and livestock, export of non-traditional products, clothes and textiles, construction, commerce, coffee, auto-mechanics, and sugar producers. The same is true for a long list of companies, in the capital and in the interior in high employment potential businesses such as cut and sew (“maquila”), restaurants, bakeries, supermarkets and retail operations, and others including from the public and NGO sectors. IOM had also signed

a memorandum of understanding with the National Registry and Methods Office of the Ministry of Health for the accrediting of ex-PMA auxiliary nurses to be authorized to work in public and private health centers around the country

In terms of results, which are still preliminary as the program was continuing at the time of the evaluation, the following was reported as of September 30, 1998

Category	Total Numbers	% of Group on which data was available
Total Trained	945	
Total Visited and on which data is available	724	100
Total employed by means of the apprenticeship experience	45	6.2
Total employed in the same field as their technical training	22	3.0
Total employed in other fields	63	8.7
Total employed through use of the tool kits provided	59	8.1
Self-employed in other areas	48	6.6
Total employed in whatever capacity not including agriculture	237	32.7
Working in Agriculture	246	34.0
Total Working, including Ag	480	66.3
Looking for work	241	33.2

Of those 45 holding jobs as a result of their apprenticeship experience, 22 (49%) were working in auto-mechanics shops with the next largest category being Bakeries at 6 (13%). In the case of the 22 working in their chosen field of study, the largest category at 6 (27%) was in masonry with the next most important categories at 4 each being electricity, auto-mechanics, and industrial sewing. Of the 63 "employed in other fields" category, 35 (55%), are working in the security business. Of those 59 self-employed through use of their tool kits, the largest category at 18 (30%) was in hair cutting followed by tailoring and cooking at 22% and 20% respectively. Finally, of those 48 self-employed in other areas, the largest category was in running small stores at 10 (20%), followed by other small commerce and grain mills at 10% and 6% respectively.

Of those 241 in the "looking for work" category, 93 (39%) want jobs in auto-mechanics with the next largest category being in the sewing industry at 45 (19%) followed by hair cutting, carpentry, baking and masonry in that order. The vast majority of those 246 in agriculture were in Baja Verapaz and Jutiapa. What is not known is how many of these may eventually leave the farm if better opportunities can be identified.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ The team interviewed several in farming whose intention was to look for work after the end of year holidays. They were temporarily engaged in the harvest season, as are many in other professions, because

At the time of the last official report on the program, the following was reported in terms of characteristics and status at the moment (September 30, 1998)¹⁰⁷

- Only partial coverage of the employment situation - tracked down and interviewed 79% of the demobilized group Thirty trainees were due to complete their training programs on 30 Sept¹⁰⁸
- High participation in agriculture of those beneficiaries needing to obtain food for their families for the year to come Once the harvest season and the holidays are over, many of these will convert to being potential job seekers
- Many of the beneficiaries rejected offers of employment due to low salaries offered by companies relative to what had been received while in the employ of the PMA, at Q1,200 per month, which also included food and lodging (Explored more fully on the next page)
- Difficulties in job seeking due to low levels of schooling (most had not completed the sixth grade), lack of prior work experience in the field of study, concentration of the majority of beneficiaries in the interior of the country (85%)¹⁰⁹, and the stigma carried by virtue of being former PMA members

In the course of the evaluation, the team interviewed 13 ex-PMA members in several field and job sites in addition to involved personnel from IOM, GOG (SEPAZ/ FONAPAZ and the National Employment Office) training officials (INTECAP) and two companies offering apprenticeships under the program The following are the team's observations

- The program was well planned and managed from the start There was excellent collaboration among the principal action agents, namely IOM and FONAPAZ, along with INTECAP and the Ministry of Labor's National Employment Office Communication and Information sharing was excellent The program was implemented with efficiency and great attention to detail Every effort was being made to follow-up and facilitate the achievement of maximum employment benefits from the program
- The training, by and large, was also well done While INTECAP, which provided the majority of the training was quite good, the real standout was the Technical Vocational Institute Imrich Fischmann, which provided truly outstanding instruction, the results of which were verified by successful trainees interviewed by the evaluators

of the nature of the agricultural cycle in Guatemala and the need to provide food for families over the coming year

¹⁰⁷ p 32, IOM, Cuarto Informe de Avance, Programa de Apoyo a la Reinsercion Socioeconomica de la PAME, Sept 30, 1998

¹⁰⁸ One of whom, just completing his apprenticeship, was interviewed on Oct 29 on the factory floor

¹⁰⁹ As will be covered in Chapter VI, employment opportunity in the interior is severely constrained by lack of industry of all types and a tremendous concentration in the Guatemala City metropolitan area

as well as IOM personnel ¹¹⁰ The team observed that certain fields require much more intensive and longer training than others, and better results could have probably been obtained by programming longer periods for such fields as auto-mechanics, carpentry, and electricity Also, as in the case of URNG programs, greater attention should have been directed to aptitude and attitude verification Selection was basically done by the trainees themselves, with insufficient individual guidance

- Generally speaking, the apprenticeship program had good reviews, with not so impressive cases reported in some instances What was heard from the two companies interviewed was that more of the training should actually occur in the factory (these were both cut and sew operations) It is likely that somewhat better results could have been obtained in certain fields by actually contracting the companies themselves to provide more of the training for their specific production lines Both companies reported good behavior and work habits on the part of the trainees
- Lacking in the program in hindsight was adequate preparation of the trainees for the reality of the job market they were entering in terms of compensation Guatemala has a high unemployment rate and wages are low, especially at the entry level In a large number of cases, trainees were disappointed and in some cases shocked to be presented with compensation levels far below what they had been earning in the Military In the future, a better job of explaining the wage situation and prospects for growth should be carried out which would set more realistic expectations prior to graduation This, of course, would not necessarily solve the problem, but presumably, with a better understanding of the labor market, graduating students would approach their job search in a more practical vein and be more prone to look at long term benefits of skill development rather than focussing on immediate results, which in this case undoubtedly limited initial workforce absorption of trainees to a degree ¹¹¹
- Concerning employment assistance, while the focus on this issue alone by the program was in itself a major advance over the URNG program, more attention earlier on should have been invested in assessing the market and negotiating participation of associations of various types of businesses in planning of training, apprenticeship, and placement activities It would have been good to have illustrative company representatives make presentations at the time of orientation with respect to opportunities, compensation levels, prospects for growth etc At the National Employment Office, although the referenced data base was impressive, management of the service appeared disconnected from the mainstream of Private Sector activity in Guatemala Much of its information on job opportunities came from want ads It seemed a rather bureaucratic organ within the structure of the Ministry of Labor and

¹¹⁰ The evaluators interviewed two Fischmann graduates who had started small businesses on their own and were successfully applying a truly impressive range of skills developed with initiative and great creativity (See Appendix C, Visits to Field and Project Sites for Oct 28)

¹¹¹ The evaluators interviewed several graduates who expected to return to security work for this reason, rather than pursuing fields in which they had been trained

lacking in the initiative necessary to pursue private sector opportunities with the necessary vigor and imagination

- One last concern remains over the number of ex-PMA who are either still engaged in security work and carrying arms or who have returned to such work or who are likely to do so in the near future. This may or may not be a serious concern as long as they are gainfully employed. On the other hand, if the an objective, albeit unstated officially, is to reduce the number of weapons carrying former combatants, then this program may have partially missed the boat. Of the original 1722 demobilized from the PMAE, only some 448, or 26%, are verified to be working in some activity other than security with another 241 or 14% looking for work. It is also a safe bet, given wage levels and experience, that a number of those currently looking for work and others employed temporarily in agriculture will eventually return to security¹¹²
- Total cost of the PMA program came to approximately \$3,286,000 with the USAID/OTI share being about \$729,000. This breaks out to about \$3,488 per trainee which compares favorably to the some \$4,233 spent per beneficiary on the URNG side¹¹³. In the case of USAID/OTI alone, only some \$728,621 was actually spent, coming to about \$765 per beneficiary, a bargain by any estimation.

In conclusion, the program can be safely viewed as successful and a model effort in terms of its comprehensive nature and solid management. The verdict is still out on medium and longer term results, because it ended so recently and some data remains to be collected by IOM. There are also useful lessons in this experience that could be applied to both insurgent and military sides of the equation for the future. (See Chapter VI)

D Communities of Populations in Resistance – CPRs

As mentioned in the Background section of this report, during the scorched earth period in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as well as before and after, thousands of non-combatants and their families fled the conflict into the mountains and jungles of Guatemala and to Mexico. The internal displacement phenomenon was massive in the Departments of El Quiche, Huehuetenango and Alta Verapaz. By some estimates as many as 80% of all persons abandoned, at least temporarily, their places of origin. A portion of these internal refugees, sharing ethnic, religious and territorial characteristics

¹¹² From interviews with graduates currently in security work it was reported that they could earn between Q1,200 and Q1,500 per month while essentially only putting in a little over half time, like one week on and one week off, although while on duty hours were very long. Thus, often in such cases, the employee can engage in other income generation activity as well. In the long run, probably the only real answer to this problem is through economic development and the reduction of the crime rate in general, thus reducing demand for security guards and improving wages in other fields. The situation should improve over time.

¹¹³ For PMA $\$3,285,869/953 = \$3,448$. For URNG $12,444,696/2940 = \$4,233$. The programs were, of course, entirely different, and some beneficiaries, especially PIPs recipients and those on cooperative farms, received much more than others. Nor does this take into account separation payments made by the Military to demobilizing PMA. PMA beneficiaries also received a Q5,000 cash payment from the program at the time of separation.

in common as well as the common experience of being uprooted, eventually came together and formed “Comunidades de Poblacion en Resistencia ” These groups settled in forests and in the jungle with the intention of continuing to live their lives autonomously ¹¹⁴ The three groups assisted by this program settled and survived the past 15 years in the foothills of the Sierra de Chama, North of the Municipality of Chajul, Department of El Quiche, now known as las CPR Sierra ¹¹⁵ The problem was that these groups had settled on land previously owned and occupied by another group of campesinos that had had to abandon the same land even earlier Consequently, at the time the Peace process was unfolding, both groups were living in precarious, unstable situations, that required logical solution, one that would guarantee the all important access to land on which these peoples depended for their livelihood

Consequently, during the prolonged run-up to the Peace Accords in the summer of 1996, a Framework Agreement was signed between the land committees of the CPR Sierra groups (known as Comites Pro-Tierra de Chajul) and the Government, represented by FONAPAZ¹¹⁶ The fundamental objective of the agreement was the resettlement of these groups while at the same time promoting their social and economic reintegration, especially in relation to access to land Part of the Agreement also dealt with the need to return the Chajul land to its former owners

The GOG then acquired new farm lands as resettlement sites for the CPR communities, both from Chajul and the Peten The Chajul communities were to be relocated to four new cooperative farms known as El Tesoro in Quiche, and Maryland, El Mar and El Triunfo (last two together) in Retalhuleu The activities supporting this resettlement scheme, financed in part by USAID/OTI, were to 1) assist in the resettlement of 250 CPR Sierra families (890 individuals) to Maryland, 2) provide for the installation of critical infrastructure in the form of platform pit latrines at Triunfo and a suspension foot bridge at El Tesoro, and 3) provide critically needed medicine for the health clinic at Maryland

A full report is available regarding the relocation of the CPR Sierra group to Maryland Similar to other major logistic undertakings by IOM in support of the demobilization program, this was a complex and demanding exercise and carried off with efficiency and energy on the basis of careful planning and organization It required two full time IOM technicians for a period of two months to organize and manage the move in addition to 10 field coordinators during the move itself, which utilized 18 busses, six trucks, and four helicopters over a five day period Food, water, lodging while in transit, and documentation all presented serious challenges, but the move was completed successfully and within the time allowed As usual, there was close and effective cooperation with

¹¹⁴ In visits to two of the new CPR resettlement sites the team heard stories of how these people lived for years off the land, migrating from place to place in search of food and water while evading the army and the conflict in general as best they could

¹¹⁵ p 2, IOM, “Operacion de Traslado de las CPR – Sierra a La Finca Maryland, Informe Final, August 1998 Another group visited by the Evaluation Team settled in the Peten jungle in a National Park although USAID/OTI funding was not provided in that case

¹¹⁶ “Acuerdo Marco de Negociacion entre el Gobierno de Guatemala, Las CPR de la Sierra y Comites Pro-Tierra de Chajul”, June 18, 1996

other participating agencies including FONAPAZ, CEAR, UNHCR, MINUGUA, the National Police, the World Food Program and the Red Cross

At the time of the field work for this evaluation (Nov 1998), all of the relocations had been accomplished with the exception of the Peten group which had been held up by Hurricane Mitch. The team did visit Triunfo, but was unable to get to Maryland due to conditions created by the hurricane. The team also visited the proposed site, then under preparation, for the Peten group. The following are the team's observations:

- The CPR assistance effort, while not being part of the mainstream demobilization program, does comprise an important related element in that a fairly significant number of URNG ex-combatants are incorporated within these groups, approximately 350 from List A. (A number of ex-combatants had either come from the CPRs originally or joined them during the later years of the war and were taken in as members of the communities in good standing.) Also, CPRs represent an important component of what is known as the "uprooted" population ("poblacion desarraigada") of Guatemala, consisting of internally displaced and repatriated refugees in severe need and who are targeted for assistance in the future under the Peace Program as a whole. The uprooted population is now a priority group for the FGT as well.¹¹⁷
- The CPRs are now relocated on farms of their own, with no debt to repay except to themselves (rotating funds). In this sense, they have an enormous advantage. While the land may be fair to good, conditions are primitive. They are living in what is known as "techo minimo" (minimum housing), provided by the EU, essentially four stakes in the ground with laminated tin on top and plastic on the sides. They are in severe need of training and productive projects, none of which had yet materialized at the time of the evaluation. They were surviving on World Food Program donations and, in the case of Triunfo, visited by the team, had a small health unit health staffed by the Ministry of Health. At El Triunfo a small irrigation project was in the planning stage, with Italian support through the Ministry of Agriculture, but the group had no knowledge of when it was to be implemented or what was to be produced. There was a serious drainage problem on the land, exacerbated by the recent passage of Hurricane Mitch, and the group was running short of food. The URNG ex-combatants in the group were desperate for training and productive projects, but likewise had no knowledge of what was going to happen.¹¹⁸
- The USAID contribution of latrines at Triunfo, especially configured to take into account the drainage problem, were obviously a godsend to the community and critical to its health and wellbeing. There was no way of gauging the impact of the bridge at El Tesoro or the Medicine at Maryland, but it is a safe bet that these contributions were also critical to successful start up of these new settlements.

¹¹⁷ The CPR component was an initiative of the OTI Resident Representative

¹¹⁸ The team visited Triunfo accompanied by the FGT representative from Mazatenango. He likewise had no knowledge of the substantial URNG membership of the group, but took notes and was going to investigate possibilities.

- Clearly, more technical and financial assistance is needed for these long suffering communities in order to achieve social and economic stability in their new settings. The team understands that the uprooted population in general is now a major priority for the GOG under the Peace Program. It is hoped that there will indeed be adequate follow-through assistance. These groups are living in precarious settings at the moment, with essentially no resources other than the land they are sitting on and minimal personal belongings. A sound leadership and organizational structure appears to be in place, and these people are obviously survivors. But they do need a boost to get going again, mainly of a productive project nature with some relevant (practical agricultural technology for the area) technical assistance and training. At the risk of stating the obvious, this would be in the best interest of peace and stability in the countryside over the medium and long term. Undoubtedly there are plans for this, but as has been observed repeatedly above, information was in short supply.

This concludes Chapter IV – Program History and Implementation

V PERFORMANCE AND IMPACT OF THE PROGRAM

This chapter is designed to accomplish two objectives

- 1 Synthesize findings of the evaluation in terms of program implementation performance, drawing on program history as detailed in the preceding chapter and observations from interviews with major participating agency managers at all levels
- 2 Assess the extent to which effective “incorporation” has occurred as a product of the program This is based on a comparison of the socioeconomic condition of the ex-combatant with that of the community in which he or she is “incorporated”

A Synthesis of Findings – Implementation Performance

In the interest of brevity, and to avoid repetition of narrative presented earlier, this section will state findings, with explanations where necessary, and document sources where needed from earlier sections or elsewhere This section presents two assessments, one on management, along with planning and coordination functions, and the other on execution of program elements and accomplishment of program objectives and targets

1 Management - Planning, Negotiation and Coordination

The planning, management and coordination effort can be broken down into two separate periods, as can the program overall, a) the Emergency Phase, from commencement of detailed planning before the signing of the final Peace Accords in December 1996 until exit from the Demobilization Camps on D+60, and b) Initial Incorporation, running from May 3, 1997 until November 1998

a Emergency Phase

Pre-Program Planning and Negotiations Assessment and Planning for the program, which began in mid-November 1996, was outstanding relative to the cantonment phase The senior OTI consultant assigned for the purpose assembled an exceptional team and pursued the assessment with a hard headed pragmatic approach born of years of experience in such exercises The effort also enjoyed extraordinary support from both the GOG and the initial group of donors involved (See, Chapters III, C, “The Donor Response” and IV A “The Emergency Phase – Demobilization and the Camps”)

Negotiations with the GOG and the URNG on requirements for demobilization and the camps were carried out by the donors with uncommon dispatch and flexibility The Mexico meeting in mid-December 1996 was critical to the process and highly successful

thanks, in part, to exceptional leadership and agility demonstrated by both USAID and the UNDP. “They really listened, and responded with what was needed, regardless of the rules,” was a common comment heard in interviews with both URNG and Government sources. A catalytic role was also played by USAID/OTI Washington which spearheaded a drive to get OTI involved early in the planning and assessment process.

Notwithstanding the success of this phase, in hindsight, it can be observed that it would have been better for USAID and other key donors to have involved themselves earlier in the process. As it was, initial assessment and planning was dedicated almost exclusively to the cantonment phase. Due to the urgency factor, little thought could be given to what would come after the camps in terms of strategy for incorporation, program elements, implementation arrangements, institutional capability and other feasibility issues.

The role and capacity of the “Foundation” to assure participation of the URNG ex-combatants, for example, could have been developed and negotiated to a degree that might have ameliorated later problems with politically motivated recalcitrance on the part of the FGT. Although this might not have been possible in the two to three months prior to program commencement because of the urgency of camp preparation and the high level of sensitivity associated with the signing of the final accord on December 29, it is likely that some progress could have been made by starting during the summer before. The same could be said of the need to secure meaningful private sector involvement for the Initial Incorporation phase, which never was achieved.¹

Management and Coordination During the Emergency Phase, management and coordination on all sides was virtually flawless. As reported in Chapter IV, there was a confluence of exceptional leadership present in key action entities, both in the donor community and on the Guatemalan side, which was dedicated totally to the goal of successful demobilization above all other institutional considerations. Problems of “ego” and “turf” were swept aside by a cast of characters willing to do whatever it took to achieve the objective. They pursued their roles with a level of commitment and pragmatic attention to priorities and detail not seen by this evaluator in three decades of foreign development assistance. This remarkable performance was also spurred by the extreme urgency of the situation brought about by the timetable for D day (combatant deployment to the camps) and D+60 (demobilization and exit from the camps). (See Chapter III, C “The Donor Response”, and Chapter IV A “The Emergency Phase”)

This is not to say there were not problems or disagreements. There were. But they were solved with dispatch, for the most part, on the basis of tough, but reasonable negotiations. Every donor, international organization, and GOG agency had its role and, with few exceptions, carried it out effectively and on time. It was a masterpiece of coordination among individuals and agencies which communicated constantly through official and

¹ A luncheon was held prior to demobilization with CACIF, the apex private sector organization, in which USAID tried to interest the organization in needed program support. There was some interest manifested on the CACIF side, although reluctance to deal with the URNG as opposed to the PMA. It was not possible to follow-up on this opening subsequently, however, due to the extreme urgency associated with planning for camp construction. Interview with OTI Senior Advisor Johanna Mendelson.

unofficial channels alike to overcome bureaucratic, political, financial and physical obstacles. Further, the cast of characters and institutions was wide and varied, involving some 16 different international entities, making the job even tougher.² The standout performers of this cast were in the Group of Four - USAID/OTI, UNDP, EU and OAS plus IOM which acted as both as the principal implementing organization and, on occasion, a minor donor. This group carried the leadership ball together with key GOG institutions and the URNG for planning and execution of the cantonment phase.

Perhaps most important, at the helm of these agencies was a group of unique individuals who deserve special credit for rising above institutional interests and taking the necessary risks to overcome constraints and assure accomplishment of the mission on the prescribed timetable. They also established an uncommon bond of trust among each other which made possible type of rapid and genuine communication required for success of the fire drill exercise they had to execute to get the job done. These individuals occupied key positions in USAID, UNDP and IOM along with equally extraordinary individuals on the Government side, both civilian and military. They also had excellent cooperation and support at the time from MINUGUA and the URNG commanders.³

Finally, one individual stands out above others as a prime mover in the race against time to prepare the camps for D Day on March 3. This was USAID/OTI consultant at the time who planned and managed construction and preparation of the camps for guerilla deployment. He is universally recognized today in Guatemala for the quality and efficiency of his role and his dynamic leadership of the process, without which the established timetable could never have been achieved. (Chapter IV A)⁴

b Initial Incorporation

The effective management and coordination practices established during the emergency phase were continued among key donors and the GOG during the entire Initial Incorporation period with one exception which will be highlighted below. On the other hand, planning and negotiation suffered to a degree, as the extreme pressure to meet operational deadlines was lifted, and space was opened for politics and vested interests to enter into the mix of deliberation and decision making required by the program.

Between USAID/OTI, UNDP, IOM, and GOG agencies, FONAPAZ and SEPAZ, the effective partnership established earlier continued unabated. The cast of characters in these entities remained basically the same, with the exception of the USAID/OTI resident representative, who was changed in April 1998. Fortunately, the new representative had the sensitivity and the good sense to accurately assess the value of the previously existing set of highly productive relationships at play and take immediate advantage of them to for

² USAID/OTI, UNDP, EU, ECHO/EU, OAS, IOM (both implementer and donor) MINUGUA, UNDPKO, UNHCR, PAHO, ICRC, Spanish Red Cross, Governments of Spain and Norway, Doctors without Borders of France, Doctors of the World of Spain

³ Credit here needs to be given to the GOG military commanders in charge at the time. They were able to establish a bond of trust with their counterparts on the URNG side without which the demobilization would have floundered. Interviews with Ricardo Stein, Eduardo Aguirre, Hector Morales, and Alvaro Colom

⁴ There is universal agreement on this point including donors, GOG, MINUGUA, and URNG

the benefit of the program. He also had strong backing from the Front Office of the USAID Mission in Guatemala at the time, and throughout the program, which eased the transition considerably. This can be considered a model for effective internal USAID cooperation between the Washington based OTI operation and the mainstream USAID program, something USAID should strive to preserve and repeat in other settings.

Further on the plus side, as described in Chapter IV, the Accords called for the establishment of an especially effective coordination vehicle for management and oversight of the Initial Incorporation Program, the CEI, which imposed enormously valuable structure and order on the program. Without the CEI there might well have been chaos, as there was in Nicaragua and to a lesser extent in El Salvador. The CEI provided a forum where issues and decisions could be debated in a civil setting and where donors and implementers could engage in candid discussion of complex problems without generation of counterproductive antagonism. It also provided a valuable facility for record keeping, decision making and inter-institutional arrangements at various levels.⁵

On the other hand, the CEI was continually hamstrung by the biggest single constraint of the program, which, for lack of a better term, the team is calling the "co-direction" factor. Time and again, critical decisions were delayed, program momentum was stalled, and transparency was compromised due to inability of the CEI to force compliance with program timetables, terms or policies, on the part either the FGT or the donors. It would have been valuable had the CEI had more leverage, preferably by negotiated mandate, to require performance in line with commitments and rules of the game.

The problem was not only with the FGT, but also with the European Union, which consistently demonstrated an inability to live up to timetables and commitments due to bureaucratic constraints of its own. Following the emergency phase (which had been characterized by outstanding collaboration between the European Community's Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) and the other institutional actors), upon commencement of Initial Incorporation, the EU increasingly pursued its own direction distinct from the other principal donors and the GOG, with little effort to communicate or coordinate, and became increasingly out of step with the mainstream effort.

This was not a trivial problem. As the Initial Incorporation period closed in November 1998, the EU had still not secured approval for its main productive program for ex-combatants which, as promised in 1977, was to have commenced at the latest in the fall of 1998. It is now facing a target group of over half of the URNG ex-combatants with a set of unrealistic expectations long generated, which have yet to receive critically needed assistance for incorporation in their communities and which will be lucky to see any program activity until sometime in the Spring of 1999. Activity will hopefully

⁵ USAID/OTI and the UNDP with IOM as a silent partner, learned early on to take maximum advantage of the CEI as a forum for decision making by getting their positions synchronized in advance in order to present united fronts on key issues. They would also discuss important points in advance with concerned GOG actors. One would queue off the other in an orchestrated pattern that would often prevail over divided opposition, another illustration of the extraordinary partnership and understanding formed among these institutions.

commence in time to catch the beginning of the agricultural cycle in March and April, but this is doubtful given its track record to date ⁶

Finally, it should be noted that time and again effective management of the program was frustrated by a phenomenon that could be labeled the “delay/crisis” syndrome. Repeatedly there would be an interminable delay on the part of the FGT for agreement with a program activity or in selection of beneficiaries, while beneficiaries, donors, and the GOG had to wait, frustrated, while momentum and opportunities for mutually reinforcing interventions would be lost. Then, suddenly elements would come together and it would be time to move forward, but in a crisis mode to make up for lost time and respond to political pressure. In turn, this would necessitate a “crash” task force effort that would leave no time to carry out planning, design, selection and follow-up functions with required diligence. In these situations, performance took a back seat to political expediency unless, as happened in some cases, such as with the PIP and Training programs for dispersos, IOM with donor backing would step in and make the extra commitment needed to pull off the job with the required attention to detail.

There was, in fact, continuing internal discussion within USAID, UNDP, and IOM with respect to when and where to draw the line in regard to politically motivated delays and counterproductive decisions taken by the FGT on beneficiary selection, project design, activity orientation, and other issues. More often than not, there was no choice but to move forward and make the best of a less than adequate situation. There would have been cold comfort in paralyzing the program in order to stand on principle in such cases, none of which in isolation was worth derailing the mainstream effort.

Looking back now, in hindsight, there probably was not that much that either IOM, or the donors, or the GOG could have done under existing circumstances and pressures of the moment. When the problem should have been addressed was before commencement at the time rules were being established. But, of course, at that time, what was to come was not foreseen. There is a lesson here to be detailed in the concluding chapter.

What can be said is that IOM with strong backing from USAID/OTI and UNDP consistently worked miracles in turning impossible tasks on impossible deadlines into decent performances notwithstanding severe coordination, communication and logistical constraints it was up against. This ability was also thanks to the extraordinary leadership and support provided by both USAID/OTI and UNDP.

Finally, with respect to the FGT, it must be said that planning, management and coordination were all sadly lacking. The organization did have strong negotiating skills. What it did not have was either the managerial or technical capacity to develop viable positions and designs for dealing with the principal implementation requirements of the program. Given its position as Co-Director, with veto power over all program activities, it was in a position to effectively stall until it got what it wanted, one way or another.

⁶ Interviews with EU, GOG, FGT and other donor officials. There was universal frustration with EU performance and its lack of communication and coordination.

As explained in Chapter IV, B 1 there were good reasons for the apparent political position the Foundation took time and again on various implementation issues. Foundation management was under strong continuing pressure to respond to competing interest groups, especially those who had sacrificed the most in the struggle in the mountains, as well as to the various different URNG "fronts". Also, the position of the FGT in general has evolved over time to a much more constructive posture relative to the need for a cohesive and internally consistent program. The organization is learning and becoming more skillful with experience, as would any new foundation, although it still severely lacking in human and financial resources relative to the challenges it faces.

The trick now will be to build on this experience in other settings. Hopefully, when the time comes, the FGT may be available to assist in the conceptualization and negotiation of an institutional entity for representing the insurgent side in a post-conflict program which would have the needed level of managerial capacity and vision to work effectively as a team with the other major players.

2 Program Execution – Accomplishments and Targets

This will be a brief summary of program accomplishments with commentary on performance, drawing primarily on the preceding chapter. With respect to program targets, it should be remembered that with outside of the emergency phase, the program was designed as it moved forward, based on evolving needs as they were identified. There were no specific targets set forth at the beginning of the program for specific components. They were set in the process of formulating the activities for the most part.

a Emergency Phase

The emergency phase achieved accomplished the following

- Planning, design, construction and equipping of eight camps for demobilization capable of housing over 3,000 guerilla combatants. Some 26,000 square meters was constructed in widely varying sites, each involving some 55 to 60 structures. All construction was competitively bid in a rapid, but transparent process. The work was carried out on time and under budget. A quality product was delivered. The entire process took place in the two month period, January and February, 1997. Total cost came to approximately \$4.5 million of which the USAID/OTI share was \$1.1 million.
- 2,940 Guerillas were successfully demobilized in the camps over the course of a two month period in which they were documented, surveyed, and trained (basic education, literacy and vocational orientation) in a highly efficient team effort by the international community. Health and recreation needs were also addressed efficiently. Management of the camps was also an effective team effort between URNG commanders, the UN Peace Keeping Force and the Spanish Red Cross.
- Upon conclusion of the cantonment phase and departure of demobilized ex-combatants, the camps were broken down and materials were distributed to some 124

neighboring communities benefiting over 90,000 inhabitants. Materials were valued at an estimated Q1.9 million. This was a highly positive exercise in public relations for the program and URNG members involved with benefiting communities.

In summary, the Emergency Phase is considered an unqualified success. In hindsight, the one area for improvement would have been a somewhat longer cantonment period. Three to four months would have allowed for a more substantive training and orientation program for the guerrillas and more effective negotiation, planning and design for initial resettlement and incorporation assistance activities to follow.

b Initial Incorporation

- **Departure from the Camps** 2,928 ex-combatants left the camps between April 16 and May 12, 1997 of whom 2,468 were taken to final destinations in communities of the interior and the capital and 323 were taken to halfway hostels. Another 80 walked home. Training scholarships of Q3,780 each were paid to 2,466 ex-combatants leaving for final destinations (“dispersos”). It was a complex undertaking, expertly planned and managed by IOM.

i) Concerning the Halfway Hostel (“Albergue”) group

- **The Cooperative Farms** By the end of February 1998, after a delay of nine months, some 277 ex-combatants and families from the hostels had been resettled on three cooperative farms purchased for the program by FONAPAZ with financing from the GOG’s Land Fund (funded by the USAID Mission’s Peace Program). Beneficiaries have been receiving needed food and housing assistance from the World Food Program and the Government’s FOGUAVI program along with modest productive assistance from USAID/OTI in the form of cattle for fattening and coffee plants. Although beneficiaries on these farms have a substantial advantage over former dispersed colleagues, they are presently in a precarious economic position waiting for technical and financial assistance from the European Union’s PAREC program. There is an extreme shortage of working and investment capital. Land debts are substantial, some \$2.6 million, on which payments will start coming due early in the year 2,000. Fortunately, the groups appear to be well organized with relatively strong leadership, at least in two of the three cases, Santa Anita and El Horizonte.

These farms have potential for long term viability. They also have the potential to fail if needed information and financing is not provided on a timely basis especially for the coming crop season, March 1999. This depends in large measure on the PAREC program and the Foundation’s ability to mobilize needed follow-up technical assistance and information. The future is unclear at this point. (See Chapt IV, B 3.)

- **Training at the halfway hostels**
 - 351 ex-combatants received preliminary training in the hostels in employment induction, business administration and gender issues. This training was

superficial, and most benefits were lost due to the long delay between the training (July/August 1997) and exit from the hostels (Feb /March 1998)

- 285 ex-combatants received technical training, while in the hostels, between September and the end of 1997, in a variety of technical fields including agriculture, auto-mechanics, computer usage, carpentry, tailoring etc. Most of the training took place over a three month period or less. The training, while technically adequate, was flawed by inadequate selection in terms of aptitude and the labor market, a training period that was too short, and the lack of attempt to link training with productive projects or employment counseling and assistance. Most of the recipients were either on the cooperative farms or received productive projects. In most cases, and with the exception of agriculture and masonry, the training had relatively little relevance to what the graduates are doing at present.
- **Productive Projects (PIPs) for the Halfway Hostel Group** Between January and May 1998, 59 productive projects were approved for 130 recipients. This activity was seriously flawed, however, from slipshod design, poor selection, and lack of follow-up. Probably half will fail or never get beyond minimal survival status. (See Chapter IV, B 3 a iv) This was one of the cases of delay/crisis management by the Foundation which was also responsible for design, selection and follow-up. Subsequently, at the urging of USAID/OTI, IOM moved in and took over follow-up for these activities along with the design of projects for the dispersed group with much better results (see below)

ii) Concerning the Dispersed Group (“Dispersos”)

- **Training for Dispersos**
 - 607 ex-combatants received employment induction training in August 1977 out of 794 selected during cantonment which was used for selection of subsequent technical courses for the trainees. It suffered from a superficial attempt to match beneficiaries with appropriate fields and a long delay following orientation prior to commencement of actual technical training in November or later.
 - As of the end of September 1998, a total of 688 ex-combatants had completed courses, 62 had dropped out and another 175 were still being trained. Assuming these have now completed their courses, the total comes to 863 which exceeds the original target of 794 set for the dispersed group. The Instituto Tecnológico Privado de Occidente in Quetzaltenango provided over half the training and was considered by far the best source of training within the URNG program.

Although much of the training was of good quality, it suffered from most of the same problems of the halfway hostel group in that there was inadequate selection (often for non-transparent reasons), and it was carried out in a vacuum, isolated from either productive projects to come or employment, notwithstanding repeated USAID and IOM attempts to stimulate the linkage. It was also too short and

lacked follow-up, although there is now an attempt by the Foundation to create necessary linkages with associations of industry and commerce

- **Productive Projects for Dispersos**

- By the end of June 1998, 161 projects had been initiated for 289 beneficiaries spread over 15 different departments of the country. These were of much higher quality than those of the halfway hostel group. By and large they were well designed, beneficiaries were involved in selection, and there was adequate follow-up. In this case, a good 60% should be successful and continue to grow while another 15% should survive. (See Chapter IV, B, 3, b v) These projects were developed by IOM as opposed to FGT in the case of the halfway house group, again thanks to USAID/OTI's timely initiative.

This group of projects should be considered successful, although adequate follow-up is needed which should be possible to accomplish, for at least the coming six months, through the recently approved PIP II project jointly financed by UNDP and USAID/OTI which was due to commence by the end of 1998.

b Other Related Programs

i) Basic Education and Literacy

The basic education and literacy campaign carried out in a partnership effort by the OAS and the FGT was one of the most successful elements of the overall program. The final numbers speak for themselves. A total of 3,338 beneficiaries attended classes, including a community civilian participation of close to 40%. A total of 2,108 students were evaluated by technical personnel at two primary levels and one secondary. Of these 1,817 were successfully promoted to higher grade levels. Basic literacy training was given to 262 beneficiaries. Another 943 were educated at the primary level. Another 1,200 were educated at the sixth grade level and 973 at the junior high ("tercero basico") level ready to attend high school or "bachillerato" programs.

The program was carried out with creativity and intelligence at all levels. One important additional measure of success was the high level of participation by non-demobilized members of surrounding communities. This facilitated a major community level impact in the form of reconciliation and improved relationships between ex-combatants and their neighbors. The only real criticism of the effort would be that it ended sooner than it needed to and could have made a greater impact with another few months of time.

ii) Social Communication Campaign

Sixteen successful workshops were carried out by IOM under a tripartite technical secretariat (IOM, FGT and the GOG) in as many municipalities selected from areas where there had been detected rejection or conflict within the incorporation process or

where there were large concentrations of ex-combatants. A radio campaign was also effectively implemented. Attendance was better than had been hoped, coming to 1,375 participants from all targeted sectors including local authorities, demobilized ex-combatants, community improvement committees and other assorted groups. The workshops were well planned and executed and had the desired result. The program should be considered a true success. The only criticism would be that it was delayed until January 1998, while it could have had important earlier benefits had it been executed sooner following departure of ex-combatants from the camps.

iii) Return of External Structures

Under this component, 151 families (493 persons) of URNG supporters were brought back from Mexico and various other countries. It was a complex logistical undertaking handled successfully by IOM under the direction of a special sub-commission with participation from the FGT, SEPAZ, FONAPAZ, CEAR, UNHCR, MINUGUA and the Spanish Red Cross. The component was clearly successful and exhibited an extraordinary degree of coordination among the wide array of agencies involved.

iv) Institutional Strengthening - FGT

In early 1998, USAID/OTI and UNDP funded costs (some \$233,600) associated with setting up and opening "outreach" ("modulos de apoyo") centers together with the Foundation's six regional offices in Quetzaltenango, Solola, Masatenango, Santa Cruz del Quiche, Coban and Santa Elena in the Peten. Another \$172,000 was committed to strengthen headquarters capacity to implement programs in the field. This assistance was good as far as it went. It didn't go far enough, however, and today the Foundation is severely lacking in technical and logistical capability in the field and headquarters. This is now recognized by the Foundation and the GOG which is officially supporting the need for additional funding and technical assistance.⁷

d Assistance to GOG Military Ex-Combatants

Between October of 1997 and November 1998, out of a total of 1,722 demobilized members of the Extraordinary Mobile Military Police, the program trained 953, or 55%, in five month vocational courses together with a month long apprenticeship and provided follow-up job-search and placement assistance in cooperation with the GOG's National employment office. Each graduate also received a tool kit in the chosen field of training. Based on incomplete data, by the end of Sept 1998, 45 had been employed by the company providing the apprenticeship experience, another 22 had been employed in the same field as the technical training, 63 were employed in other fields, another 59 had been employed through use of tool kits provided, 48 more were self-employed in other areas and 246 were engaged in agricultural production. Thus 66% of the group on which data had been collected (724) were working in some capacity.

⁷ Last page, CEI, "Balance del Programa de Incorporacion de la URNG a la Legalidad", Sept 1998

In summary, the program was well planned and managed from the start with excellent collaboration among the principal action agents including IOM and FONAPAZ, along with INTECAP and the Ministry of Labor's National Employment Office. Every effort was also made to follow-up and facilitate achievement of maximum employment benefits. The training, by and large, was also well done and of adequate duration and quality as was the apprenticeship program in contrast to the URNG training program.

Lacking in the program, in hindsight, was adequate preparation of the trainees for the reality of the job market they were entering in terms of compensation given the low wages of Guatemala in general. One final concern remains over the number of ex-PMA who are either still engaged in security work and carrying arms or who have returned to such work or who are likely to do so in the near future. This may not be a serious concern as long as they are gainfully employed. On the other hand, if an objective is to reduce the number of weapons carrying former combatants, then this program may have partially missed the mark. Of the original 1722 demobilized from the PMAE, only some 448, or 26%, are verified to be working in some activity other than security with another 241 or 14% looking for work. It is also a safe bet, given wage levels and experience, that a number of those currently looking for work and others employed temporarily in agriculture will eventually return to security.

e Communities of Populations in Resistance

USAID/OTI successfully participated in a resettlement scheme for CPR communities from Chajul, Department Quiche, to three new cooperative farms in Quiche and Retalhuleu. The activities supporting this resettlement scheme, financed in part by USAID/OTI, were to 1) assist in the resettlement of 250 CPR Sierra families (890 individuals) to Finca Maryland, 2) provide for the installation of critical infrastructure in the form of platform pit latrines at Triunfo and a suspension foot bridge at El Tesoro, and 3) provide critically needed medicine for the health clinic at Maryland. These were all carried out successfully in the summer and fall of 1998. What is now lacking, given the precarious state of these farms, is adequate follow-through financing and assistance in the productive economic area. Such assistance is expected together with other programs for the larger group of uprooted populations under the overall Peace Program. (This activity was a target of opportunity for USAID/OTI, in that it was sorely needed at the moment. It was not originally a part of the planned demobilization program.)

3 Conclusion on Performance by USAID/OTI and its Principal Partners – UNDP and IOM

First of all, the program has been a major success thus far, although it is not over yet, notwithstanding USAID/OTI's departure. Combatants are demobilized and incorporated in viable or potentially viable settings. They have been generally accepted by surrounding communities. The emergency is over.

Secondly, USAID/OTI, together with UNDP and IOM, exhibited outstanding leadership, commitment and good sense throughout the period evaluated. These organizations were

faced with exceedingly severe political constraints to effective program planning and execution, but overcame most obstacles through a remarkable ability to work together to devise intelligent, workable solutions. Where necessary, due to political, financial or other realities, decisions were made to proceed with less than adequate planning or resources with a given activity because of the need to move forward somehow rather than paralyze the program which would have had yet more serious consequences relative to the overall incorporation purpose of the program. Certainly, in those cases where the USAID/OTI, UNDP, IOM and the GOG had a free hand, they proceeded with a high level of professional excellence. This is typified by the emergency phase as a whole, the basic education and literacy campaign, the social communication campaign, the PMA program and the logistical components of a number of different activities. Outstanding performances were also realized time and again throughout the program in the case of individual training and project initiatives, many of which were truly excellent. That the overall quality of the economic assistance side of the effort in particular suffered from some serious gaps was a function of what in effect, at the time, was an immovable object over which neither the donors nor the GOG had control.

Knowing what is known now, the evaluators believe that improvements could have been made through earlier engagement in design and negotiation of the program to deal with the most important constraint of the effort, the political position of the FGT. In the future, it will be vital to negotiate the creation of a structure and a representative body for demobilizing insurgent forces that can be counted on to operate on the basis of commitments in the best interest of the program and its beneficiaries. Whether this is accomplished directly through the creation of a technically governed representative body or by means of a coordinating structure with the necessary leverage is less important than assuring that one way or another a structure is devised which will allow for a true partnership effort in the interest of program goals.

Other basic improvements that could have benefited performance would have been

- A longer cantonment phase allowing for more complete training and orientation of the ex-combatants in the camps and more complete planning for activities to follow,
- Early engagement of the private sector relative to employment objectives of the program, and
- Insistence on integrated management of training and productive project activities allowing for the needed mutual reinforcement to be structured into the effort.

There are a host of other lessons and recommendations to be drawn from the experience which will be documented in the sections to follow. These are only the most significant ones relative to operational performance.

B Incorporation – Has it Happened?

For purposes of answering the question on whether effective incorporation has happened, the evaluators are operating on the following premise. Effective incorporation for a demobilized ex-combatant should be defined as 1) acceptance as a member in good standing by the community in which he or she has settled, and 2) achievement of economic parity with the majority of the members of his or her community. This is also in line with the Incorporation Accord, OTI entry documents and interviews with key officials in charge at the time (especially Ricardo Stein, former President of the CEI).

The evaluators are viewing this program as a demobilization and incorporation effort, and not in sustainable development or social and economic transformation terms. If the latter were to be taken as the goal of the past two years, the effort would have to be judged incomplete at best and a failure at worst. Before true development can happen, however, conditions must be created which will allow for the needed investment in productive capacity in its various manifestations. One of those obvious conditions is peace, security, and relative stability in urban centers and the countryside such that vital human and financial capital needed for real growth will be risked. This, the evaluators believe, is what should be used as a definition for effective incorporation in the case of this program.

Finally, at the risk of stating the obvious, it should be remembered that the period evaluated is "initial" incorporation only, now followed by "definitive" incorporation. Initial incorporation is just that, initial. More time will be needed for initial incorporation to be judged permanent on the basis of its demonstrated durability. This will also depend on a series of factors external to the program related to social and economic trends in the country, the current reform program of the GOG, productive engagement of the private sector in development of non-traditional industries in the interior and other factors related to the evolution of the political situation and the development of democratic institutions.

With the above thinking in mind, the evaluators believe that effective incorporation through the demobilization program has indeed occurred for the following reasons:

1. Social and economic conditions of communities where ex-combatants have relocated following demobilization demonstrate the following characteristics:

General 79% of Guatemalans live in poverty and 59.3% live in extreme poverty. The country's social indicators are among the worst in the hemisphere. National averages mask even sharper inequalities. Mortality rates of women, infants and children are the highest in Central America. Adult literacy is estimated at 48% for the country as a whole, but is significantly higher in rural areas and especially among indigenous groups, which comprise half the population of the country. Mean years of education and access to schools are among the lowest in Latin America. Less than half of rural Guatemalans have access to running water, a quarter have access to electricity and less than one in ten have access to sanitary facilities.⁸

In terms of productive and income generation capacity, over half of the population depends on agriculture for its livelihood, but only 16% of the land is cultivated by 88% of

⁸ Description and data is drawn from the USAID FY 1998 Congressional Presentation on Guatemala.

the smallest farms (average size 1.5 Ha). Over the past two decades, agricultural production has actually declined in per capita terms and relative to its share of GDP, now about one quarter, due to the lack of investment and sound management as a consequence of the conflict. During this period the number of micro and small farms doubled from 38,000 to 74,000 leading to a further decline in size and productivity. Very substantial percentages of the population have no land at all and seek work as agricultural laborers.⁹

Areas of Settlement Areas of the country where the greatest concentrations of demobilized ex-combatants have settled include the Peten in the North, Masatenango and Retalhuleu in the South, Jutiapa in the East, Quiche in the Northwest, Quetzaltenango, Solola and Huehuetenango in the West and the Department Guatemala in the central zone of the country. The general nature of the areas of resettlement can be characterized as urban (Guatemala City) and “marginal” urban (low income areas surrounding the city), rural, rural/urban (Dept and municipal capitals in the interior) and farms.

The majority of the beneficiaries of the program are either on the cooperative farms or in rural or village settings, rural/urban secondary towns, or marginal areas surrounding the Capital. In rural areas, basic services such as electricity, telephone and potable water are few, of poor quality or non-existent. Many of these areas are isolated due to deteriorated roads and a general absence of infrastructure. Health problems are serious and average education levels come to less than three years of schooling with high levels of functional illiteracy. Food comes from subsistence production, and what income there is comes from agricultural wage labor at extremely low levels. There is almost no industry with the exception of a few factories owned by local elites related to processing of agricultural commodities. Opportunities for employment outside of agriculture are almost nil.¹⁰

In marginal urban areas conditions are a little better but still fluctuate between poverty and extreme poverty. Much of the housing is informal with improvised design using tin, cardboard and wood and in areas of poor drainage, contributing to already poor health conditions.¹¹ Basic services (electricity and potable water) are still limited. Wage levels are low and unstable outside the industrial sector, and unemployment in general is high.

2. The condition of demobilized ex-combatants living in the above areas can be characterized as follows.¹²

Economic Over 80% of ex-combatants are not employed in a wage earning job although it is believed that many more do piece work on nearby farms and elsewhere. Approximately 19% were owners of their own business, mainly small stores, and another 13% indicated that a family member owned a business that could be amplified. 80% had received a package of basic inputs on leaving the camps which in some cases could be

⁹ World Bank Economic Memorandum on Guatemala, August 22, 1996

¹⁰ Drawn from Wingerts Consulting, “Industrias para la Paz”, Nov. 1998, and Irvin Jones, “Situación Socio-económica de las Comunidades en donde hay Concentración de Desmovilizados” Nov. 1998

¹¹ There is a housing deficit on the order of one million in Guatemala. Interview with Angel Berna, Housing Program Director, FGT

¹² Most of this material is drawn from a survey carried out in August and September 1998 by MINUGUA of more than 800 demobilized ex-combatants throughout the country

utilized to start a small business. Only 21% owned their own land, although 55% had access one way or another (rented, nearby family etc.) to land for farming purposes.

Social Indicators 26% possess their own housing, 34% live with a member of their family, and another 13% rent living space leaving 22.5% with no place to live. In terms of education, 77.5% indicated that they could read and write, a surprisingly high figure, which jibes with observations of the evaluators in the field. 80% indicated that they had participated in the OAS sponsored "School without Walls" program of education described in Chapter IV. 83% said they would like to continue their studies. 26% indicated a limiting physical impairment of some kind.

Community Acceptance Of those surveyed, 77.6% indicated good or average ("buena o regular") acceptance by their communities against only 5.5% that claimed a negative reception, although in response to other questions, 13% indicated that they suffered from some threat or crime, and 31% reported negative security implications from their participation in the URNG political party.

3 Observations of the Evaluators

The evaluators visited and interviewed ex-combatants in all of the different types of settings listed above including urban, marginal urban, rural, semi-rural, and farm. In general, ex-combatants were found to be living in equal or better social and economic conditions than their neighbors and with equal or better prospects for growth in the future. This was certainly the case for residents of the cooperative farms, which, given the realization of needed and expected investments in the near future, could rise to a considerably higher standard of living than surrounding communities.

In the case of PIP project recipients, especially among the disperso population, the majority are viable micro-business owners at present with fair prospects for improvement down the road. Many ex-combatants and their families are benefiting from dual incomes, partially from the store run by a family member and their own wage labor plus subsistence farming. Others who received training, but no project, are simply back in the rural and urban work forces doing whatever they can, often a combination of agricultural labor and subsistence farming. In the case of the PMA, the indicators are stronger still, especially given the ability to return to security work for many.

In the interview process, the evaluators consistently inquired over social acceptance by the communities in which the ex-combatants had relocated. The answer was just as consistently positive, often highly so. The social communication campaign also came in for high marks in this context as did the basic education and literacy program. In virtually no place was a serious problem noted. Many indicated that they had made a conscious effort to reach out to the community and establish good relationships. This was especially the case with the cooperative farms. It was also the case of a number of the PMA graduates who had contributed to their communities while in training and were now providing valuable additional services in their communities. In a small number of instances ex-combatants indicated pockets of resentment here and there, but in no case

was it presented as a serious problem or something they could not live with or eventually overcome

In conclusion, the evaluators take the position that effective incorporation has occurred. Even in those cases where no benefits have yet flowed from the program, the ex-combatants have had to survive, and, regardless of levels of education, they are not stupid. They have by and large inserted themselves effectively and in a positive light in the local economy and are enjoying community acceptance and support. There are situations where the absence of program inputs may have actually been a positive factor, in that the communities themselves are in such difficult economic straights that local resentment could be caused from observation of a flow of excessive benefits to the demobilized group.¹³

Now the challenge of Definitive Incorporation and what follows is to deal with the overall level of poverty in a "development" or transforming sense, which is built into plans for reforms and programs to come.¹⁴

¹³ One other factor gleaned from interviews with both ex-combatants and a number of program managers and staff from both the GOG and implementing organizations, is that former guerillas are by and large pleased to be out of the mountains, have a roof over their heads and enough to eat, and enjoy some minimal prospects for improvement of their economic condition in the future. It was a long tough road that they had pursued, and there was a lot of suffering.

¹⁴ Interviews with Hector Morales and Eduardo Aguirre of SEPAZ in describing broader development plans of the GOG.

VI SUCCESS FACTORS AND LESSONS LEARNED

This chapter draws on the two preceding chapters in an attempt to pull findings and lessons together in one place for purposes of future post-conflict planning and negotiation. There is rich experience in the Guatemala program which has much to offer to future efforts of this nature. The evaluators hope that that this experience will be tapped, both in the form of this report, and, more importantly, through the participation of key individuals involved in program execution on all sides.

A Factors for Success and Constraints

1 Success

this program had tremendous advantages over others that came before. These advantages and others experienced during program implementation are described below.

- a **The Right People** It is generally agreed that this is the single most important factor contributing to the overall success of the program. As highlighted repeatedly in the report, the Guatemalan Program was blessed with a unique confluence of exceptional leadership present in key action entities, both in the donor community and on the Guatemalan side including the GOG and the URNG (during the emergency phase) which was dedicated totally to the goal of successful demobilization above other institutional considerations. Problems of "ego" and "turf" were swept aside by managers willing to do whatever it took to achieve the objective.

This was also true at middle and lower management levels in the case of key donors and the principal executing organization, IOM. The evaluators, time and again, interviewed spectacular performers in charge of executing program components in IOM and the GOG. Some were identified in the FGT as well, although they were constrained by policy and political considerations during much of the period.

With respect to USAID/OTI in particular, this was also true in the case of both of the resident representatives and the front office of the USAID Mission. In scores of interviews throughout the evaluation, this was ratified again and again by other donors, GOG staff, the FGT, and beneficiaries.¹

- b **Donor Flexibility** This may have been the second most important factor. The readiness of principal donor agencies to set aside rules and make compromises in the interest of teamwork to achieve important and urgent objectives was absolutely critical, especially during the emergency phase, but also throughout the effort. The

¹ This was also strongly ratified by U.S. Amb. Donald Planty, who arrived in Guatemala prior to the Peace Accords and was present throughout the program.

star examples of this are USAID/OTI and the UNDP, who jointly funded the bulk of the program described with an openness and collaborative spirit not seen before by the writer. It is also true of IOM which acted on occasion as a donor and had many of the same attributes. This is a tremendous credit also to the individuals involved including the Director and Deputy Director of USAID, the OTI resident representatives, management and senior staff of the UNDP program in Guatemala, the Director and senior staff of IOM and the UN Resident Representative. This also reflects credit on the home offices of these organizations for allowing their Guatemalan operations the autonomy to implement as conditions warranted.

- c **Host Government Capability and Flexibility** The evaluation team was impressed with the extraordinary dedication and capability of most of the GOG senior management personnel interviewed, past and present. They reflected a truly remarkable degree of stature, wisdom and willingness to go the extra mile to make sure the program accomplished its objectives. They also worked exceedingly long hours and were not constrained by the normal tendency bureaucrats to opt for the safe route to survival in game of government. Part of this relates to the caliber of people involved at all levels in the agencies concerned. Another part relates to the nature of the institutions, which were created outside of the mainstream ministerial framework in line with current “modernization of the state” precepts. SEPАЗ and FONAPAZ were the principal entities involved on the GOG side, and they both depended on the office of the Presidency and operated with “extraordinary” budgets and the ability to hire and fire and pay higher salaries as conditions warranted.
- d **The Coordinating Mechanism** The Special Incorporation Commission (CEI) played the dominant role as the main coordination vehicle for all programs in support of Initial Incorporation following the emergency phase. All important implementation decisions relating to the incorporation were vetted and coordinated through the CEI with the URNG and the international donor community. The CEI imposed structure and order on the program and was eminently critical to its success. Without it there might well have been chaos, as there was in Nicaragua, for example, and to a lesser extent in El Salvador, where solid authorities for donor coordination were not established. It could have been a yet more effective body had it had more authority to insist on compliance with commitments and demand information.
- e **Nature of the Relationship with the URNG** This factor cut both ways, positive and negative. On balance, it was positive. There were serious disagreements and endless debate and delays over policy and implementation strategy issues. But it was always possible to meet with the URNG during the emergency phase (outstanding collaboration during actual demobilization) and subsequently with the FGT and have a serious discussion of the problem of the moment, not always with resolution, but at a minimum, sides could be presented and debated in a professional atmosphere.
- f **The Size, Nature and Attitude of the Force to be Demobilized** To state the obvious, had the URNG combatant force been 30,000 instead of 3,000 program

planning and implementation would have been much more difficult. The fact is, the program was “bite sized” relative to many that had gone before. Donors and implementing organizations could come to grips with the magnitude of the job as opposed to earlier experiences involving several times the number of ex-combatants. Also, for a combination of reasons, the guerillas came and left the camps with a positive attitude, reflecting the position of their leadership, but also reflecting the positive atmosphere created by the vision and comprehensive nature of the Peace Accords which were far reaching and addressed the true nature of the problems which had been plaguing Guatemala for decades. The URNG had good reason to be proud. The productive atmosphere was also strengthened by the guerilla experience in the camps which was highly positive, thanks to excellent management of the emergency phase in general and the well organized program of activities in the camps in particular, notwithstanding false expectations raised by overly ambitious promises.

2 Negative and Limiting Factors

- a Lack of Planning** There were good reasons for the lack of medium and longer term planning and negotiations out front with respect to program direction and strategy. There was no time for this in the flurry of negotiations and detailed preparations for the cantonment phase, as described in Chapter IV. Nevertheless, the program suffered because of this lack. Every new element and component had to be negotiated and planned at the time of initiation due to the pattern of “delay and crisis” that was established by the FGT in the course of implementation. The rules of the game kept changing, and it was often impossible to make arrangements for proper design, sequencing and mutual reinforcement between components that would have been desirable and would have enhanced impact across the board.
- b Political Nature of the FGT, Technical Capability and the Co-Direction Factor** As described throughout the report, the FGT was dedicated from the beginning to maximizing benefits for its membership regardless of the cost in viability of program components. It was also subject to sometimes conflicting political pressures of governing fronts, and it was constrained by the need to give priority treatment to those who had sacrificed the most in the mountains. Finally, it was a new foundation and had no experience with anything other than survival and ideology.

The Foundation has learned from experience, and is now much more amenable than in the past to adoption of sound strategies, recognizing the need to compromise on principles for the greater viability of program design and management. For most of the period, however, it represented more of a hindrance than a help to sound program execution. The veto power that it was accorded by the Accords, which was respected by the GOG and the Donors, also gave it the power, which it utilized liberally, to stall other institutional players until it had achieved whatever the political goal was of the moment, regardless of the cost to the program. It also suffered throughout the period from an extreme shortage of qualified people, at all levels of management and execution, and a totally inadequate budget.

- c **The Missing Private Sector** Prior to the apprenticeship component of the PMA activity, the private sector had no role in the program. There were understandable reasons for this associated with its historical role in society and the bitterness of its relationship with the URNG right down to the wire in the signing of the Peace Accords. It was still a serious lack, and meant that there was no little effort throughout the program to address the employment problem on the URNG side. This froze out an entire sector that could have been immensely helpful in terms of training, placement and needed expertise relative to Guatemalan economic opportunities, markets, technology etc. This is now changing as the FGT reaches out to various professional chambers. But it has been a long time in coming and could have been an invaluable asset in the search for viable options for ex-combatants throughout the country and especially in the metropolitan area.
- d **The Missing NGO Sector** The NGO community and civil society in general was largely missing from the program. This community could have made significant contributions to planning and implementation of most program elements. This is especially true in the case of micro-enterprise, credit and cooperative development.
- e **Information Management** One problem stands out above others for those attempting to plan and manage program components throughout the period. It was also a serious obstacle to effective deliberations in the CEI. This was a severe lack of information regarding beneficiaries and most other aspects of the Foundation's thinking, policies, planning and programming activity. Reasons for this are unclear. Perhaps it was simply that "information is power". It may have also resulted from a feeling of institutional vulnerability by the Foundation and a desire to protect itself from scrutiny. For whatever reasons, it was a major problem. Not only was information not shared between the Foundation and the other major players, but often it seemed that it was not shared between one department and another and between headquarters and field units. This is also now improving.

B Lessons Learned

Some of these represent the flip side of the above factors and are of generalized importance. Others are not, and are more specific or linked to particular program components. They are included, because in all likelihood, many of these same components will be included in future post-conflict programs.

- 1) **Get the Right People** This is the single most important lesson of the Guatemalan experience. How to do it is another matter. But the need for effective teamwork among all of the major players in a demobilization effort is so extreme that every effort should be made to assure that institutional representatives on the ground at the time of both negotiations and implementation are of the highest caliber and can be counted on to put the mission ahead of all other priorities. The same effort should be made by host governments, with donor assistance where necessary.

- 2) **Get involved early** The advance work accomplished in Guatemala by the OTI consultant in November and December of 1996 was critical to the extraordinary success of the cantonment phase of the demobilization program. It would have been even better, to have carried out an assessment considerably earlier, such as in the summer before, to get a better handle on the institutional, social, economic, and political factors needing to be addressed. It is also possible, although not certain, that key aspects of program structure (such as the nature and mandate of the foundation to represent the insurgents) could have been negotiated in advance, at least partially, which might have made a major difference in program feasibility and impact. In any case, to have a team on the ground at the time of negotiations that has already internalized the detail of program needs, constraints and the political dynamics of the situation, would be invaluable in terms of bringing added foresight to difficult issues.

- 3) **Donor Flexibility and Coordination** The unique arrangement and relationships established in Guatemala were crucial to effective execution of the cantonment phase especially and most of Initial Incorporation. The Guatemala model should definitely be replicated in future settings of this nature. The one problem was the case of the European Union which, for reasons explained earlier, was not able to deliver in a timely fashion on commitments and had a tendency to rigorously stick to bureaucratic norms inappropriate to the dynamic nature of the situation in such settings.

- 4) **OTI's Leveraging Capability** USAID/OTI was able to spend a relatively modest \$6.3 million while playing a lead role in a \$25 to \$30 million effort. This was a remarkable job of leveraging resources and should be repeated in other programs. To pull it off in the future will require the same intensive effort at donor cultivation that went in to the Guatemala program. It should be done in any case for the other benefits that accrue from such tight collaboration and the resulting trust.

- 5) **Timing of USAID/OTI Departure** There was divided opinion in Guatemala among the donor and implementation community regarding the scheduled departure of OTI at the end of 1998, roughly coincident with the completion of the "Initial Incorporation" phase. On balance, the weight of opinion was that the time was right. OTI was around long enough to assure successful implementation of a full program of assistance for incorporation and for other donors, including the mainstream USAID program, to pick up the ball in a "regular" programming context. OTI's flexibility at the beginning of the program and throughout many of the rough stages of early implementation assured the ability of the US Government respond agilely to twists and turns of the program as it evolved. The evaluators agree, however, that now is the time to move on and to free up OTI's resources for other start-up scenarios.

OTI's departure also comes at a time when program strategy is shifting in general from individual assistance to more of a community and area focus, which is appropriate. The only real concern of the evaluators is for adequate follow-up to components funded and managed by OTI which were still not complete in terms of full field execution at the time of the evaluation. This was the case of the PIP program (there will be a PIP II financed jointly by USAID and UNDP) as well as the

PMA program in terms of the employment component. In most respects, however, the time is right, and there never will be a time when all conditions are perfect.

- 6) **Program Structure, Institutional Capacity and Transparency of the Implementing Organization Representing the Insurgents** A major lesson from the Guatemala experience is that management of the program to be implemented should be under the direction of an entity which is dedicated to program goals, the best interests of the peace process and effective reintegration of beneficiaries above all other priorities. There are various different ways such a structure could be devised.

Certainly the insurgent side has to have a strong representational body. From the experience of working with the FGT, it would have been better to have had an institution capable of sound planning and execution as well as being able to truly assure the "participation" of ex-combatants in design and implementation. Also, the lack of transparency of many of the FGT's positions and actions was a serious constraint. The lesson from this is that for future programs, donors and host governments should attempt to identify the organization early and provide it with

- Safeguards to assure transparency including separation from, although oversight by, the political cadre of insurgent leadership
- Technical assistance to develop technical and managerial capability in the context of an assistance program for re-incorporation
- Budget for staff, infrastructure and mobility

It should be possible to negotiate the recommended structure through the provision of incentives, safeguards and an oversight arrangement to assure that political considerations are taken into account, but that the first priority would be effective pursuit of program goals. This organization, in turn, could either implement directly, as the FGT has attempted to do, or contract with other organizations such as IOM, NGOs, or private firms for execution of particular elements.

- 7) **Planning and Implementation Capability of the Government** As explained earlier, this was a major plus factor for the program. In the future, OTI should seek to relate to those government agencies that have the degree of independence, flexibility and capabilities required by a demobilization scenario. If such agencies are not in place, it would be important to try to create the necessary capability through the strengthening of appropriate units, or, as a last resort, to create the entity, more than likely as an attachment to the Presidency of the country in order to provide for the needed priority, budget, flexibility and capability. A strong government counterpart apparatus with access to decision making at the highest level is vital. It is also important to have a government entity capable of relating to the insurgent side in the form of an open institutional mindset and attitude. In Guatemala the Government went out of its way to contract people who were somewhat left-of-center in orientation to lead the peace effort, people who were perceived by the guerilla as at

least neutral in the struggle. In El Salvador, for example, the National Reconstruction Secretariat and the FMLN Foundation were constantly at swords points to the real detriment of the program. The FMLN at times was successful at playing the Government off against USAID, something that did not occur in Guatemala.²

- 8) **Coordination Vehicle** The CEI is a vehicle worth repeating for reasons stated in earlier sections. The only additional recommendation would be to give it additional teeth in the negotiation process so that it would be in a better position to enforce compliance with program commitments over the course of implementation in terms of both the insurgent or beneficiary organizations as well as donors.
- 9) **Information Flow** Effective and fluid information flow must be assured for effective program administration. This should be negotiated at the time of program formulation along with incentives for sharing. The development of a common data base, given today's technology, should now be relatively easy to set up between donor and implementing agencies.
- 10) **Secure Productive Private Sector Involvement from the Beginning** The Guatemala Program missed a great deal from the absence of the Private Sector in the planning and development of not only employment possibilities but a host of other elements which could have been helpful such as market research and technical assistance on commercial enterprises projects and supply and distribution activities. It should be in the interest of the private sector to facilitate peaceful integration. The Private Sector also has the eventual solution for the commercial and industrial development of the interior of Guatemala (the real and lasting answer to the problem of urban and rural poverty) and of most countries, and should be involved early in planning of options for this as well. (The INDUPAZ proposal now being considered by USAID and UNDP may represent a viable scheme for this type of involvement.)
- 11) **Secure Productive NGO Involvement from the Beginning** The NGO community could have contributed substantially (micro-enterprise, credit, coops etc.) It could also have facilitated dialogue and the development of productive relationships within communities. The energy and creativity of this sector should be tapped.
- 12) **Timing of Cantonment Phase** The two month period (less for many) in the camps did not allow adequate time for proper orientation for re-entry into society, an adequate detailing of employment options and project possibilities, or planning in general of interventions to follow. This is not to criticize what was actually done, which was a marvel of highly coordinated and articulated activity among a host of players. It was still too short, however, as was recognized by most of the major institutional players (GOG, UNDP, OAS, IOM). What the precise amount of time should have been is difficult to say, probably three to four months would have been about right. A longer period could have brought a series of other problems such as those experienced in El Salvador (up to nine months) and other settings.

² p 16, USAID/El Salvador, The First Three Years of the Peace and National Recovery Project (519-0394) – Lessons Learned, Oct 1994

- 13) Land** This was a basic right under the Peace Accords. It should have been addressed earlier in the program, or not included. Land for the cooperative farms could have been identified earlier and arrangements could have been made for the halfway house group to resettle earlier than they were, which was only after a nine month wait in the albergues. Land for the dispersed group still has not been worked out, and may never be, given the convoluted tenure situation in Guatemala. It probably should not have been promised in the first place except for large group situations. The lesson for the future is that land should only be promised where it can be delivered in a timely fashion to those groups to which are to receive it.
- 14) Housing** This was another right under the Peace Accords. It also should have been addressed earlier. The FOGUAVI scheme now being implemented is a good one and is working, at least on the cooperative farms to date. What is lacking is housing for the dispersed group. The program is in place. It is more a problem of access and information. An NGO could have been contracted to act as the field arm of the program, the type of role that the Cooperative Housing Foundation has played in other settings. Housing is a huge problem in Guatemala and undoubtedly in most other post conflict settings. As was explained to the evaluators, vulnerable people are motivated by housing above all other priorities and will go to where the housing is before worrying about employment. Home ownership is a major factor in establishing the security and stability of a family. Ideally, the housing element of a program should be tightly coordinated with components dedicated to economic sustainability – training, employment, small enterprise.
- 15) Expectations** In the Guatemala Program, false expectations were constantly raised by the FGT as well as, unwittingly, by the donors, not knowing in advance what it would take or how long it would take to implement programs on the drawing boards. Further, expectations were raised in the ex-combatant group in general with regard to entitlements and benefits that were unrealistic and tended to reinforce a paternalistic mindset which did some damage in the case of the albergue PIP activity in particular.

Every effort should be made to explain and hammer home, where necessary, the real world nature of the market in terms of both small enterprise and employment. The PMA program suffered from unrealistic expectations regarding wage levels in private industry which resulted in a shortfall on the employment side and the return of many to the security business. In the case of the EU program, expectations were raised on the cooperative farms and in other geographic areas of PAREC coverage may not be met. Promises should be kept to a minimum while emphasizing the reality of the market place and the importance of self-reliance, creativity and hard work in the identification and development of personal opportunity. Promises made, but not delivered, are a disservice to the beneficiary group in that they automatically curtail needed effort and creativity by beneficiaries to seek their own solutions.

- 16) Credit** The grant nature of PIP program design facilitated rapid program execution and the ability to move on after execution to other areas and components, not having

to worry about collections. It made sense for this reason given the extreme pressure felt by implementers to get the show on the road. Nevertheless, it established an unfortunate precedent with some ex-combatants, especially those from the halfway house group, who in interviews expressed the view that the program owed them much more and who were unwilling to seek other sources of needed capital in the market. It also denied the group the experience of working with credit and having to budget and watch costs in order to deal with a repayment schedule. The majority of those interviewed expressed great fear of entering into market credit relationships for fear of mortgaging and losing what little they had to offer as collateral. If these people are to prosper, however, they will need to be able to tap credit markets in the future for badly needed investment and working capital.

17) **Training** The technical training component of the program has mixed reviews. It was generally adequate in quality, but not in duration. Nor was it linked, with the exception of the PMA program, with employment or productive enterprise projects. There are obvious lessons here:

- First, technical training should be based on true market opportunities, identified and verified in advance.
- Second, it should have been integrated specifically with the PIP program and with a follow-up program of job search and placement.
- Third, selection was a problem and should have been based on a rapid but thorough assessment of aptitude and preferences as well as market opportunity.
- Fourth, the training should have been tied to an apprenticeship program for those intending to enter the job market (as was done in the PMA program).
- Fifth, the private sector should have been involved in planning and execution from the start.
- Sixth, for a number of fields, such as auto-mechanics, electricity, carpentry etc., the training was not long enough to satisfy entry requirements of many companies and should have been longer.³
- Finally, notwithstanding the excellent effort made by IOM in designing, contracting and monitoring the training program, experienced vocational training experts should have been brought in earlier.

18) **Agriculture and the Chemical Company Store** Highland farmers throughout Guatemala suffer from the Company Store syndrome with chemical fertilizer, pesticide and herbicide suppliers. They have been exploited for generations by this

³ Many of these same recommendations, including the one on duration, were made in the evaluation of the El Salvador Program pp III 7-9 Development Associates, Inc., Evaluation of the Peace and National Recovery Project, Jan 1994

system, as have their counterparts in other countries of Latin America. This has resulted in a type of debt servitude which keeps prices low at the farm gate, results in low productivity and soil depletion, damages the environment and affects the health of farmers, families and animals alike, especially children. There is a huge need to convert to organic farming which is cheaper, more effective, higher yielding, produces better financial returns and is good for the environment and health of the family. In programs such as this which involve a heavy focus on agriculture, the opportunity should not be lost to assist farmers to break out of the vicious cycle of production based on chemical inputs.

19) Follow-up The “follow-up” element is critical to the success of any program of assistance to small business or agriculture or those seeking employment. In the Guatemala case, staff and resources were not there to carry out a viable program of follow-up, allowing a number of individual and group projects to flounder and creating an unfortunate image for the organization responsible. Not only is adequate staff and budget required to provide the necessary coverage, but the technical capacity has to be injected to assure that the follow-up, when it does happen, actually makes a difference.

20) Safeguards on Equity Inequities and the appearance of inequities should be avoided if possible. In the Guatemala case, some beneficiaries were clearly favored over others, especially those in the halfway houses. Others received favored treatment when it came to training, PIP projects and jobs with the Foundation. In still other cases, employees of the foundation were also project recipients or had a share of a cooperative farm. For a given beneficiary to receive an additional set of benefits is not necessarily wrong in a given situation. What is important is to have a policy and adhere to it, so that all know the rules of the game. It is also important to have a data base that can adequately track who receives what and assure that multiple benefits in a given case are justified by circumstances and a valid rationale.

21) Transition to Development Despite the fact that this was an “incorporation” and not, supposedly, a development program, concepts of sustainable development should have been introduced from the beginning. Obviously much of any demobilization effort will be of a transitional nature. On the other hand, principles should be introduced early in order to develop the appropriate mindset on the part of beneficiaries and implementers alike. This is especially important in economic assistance components such as training, productive projects, and the cooperative farms. In future programs, this concept should be more evident. Also, long term development of the surrounding area or community should ideally proceed apace with the demobilization activity. Hopefully this will happen now in Guatemala. It is not healthy for the program to focus too long on just the ex-combatants without more of an effort to resolve the poverty problem in general of the area.

INTERVIEWS

GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA

Secretaria para la Paz (SEPAZ)

- Ricardo Stein Heinemann, Soros Foundation, Former President of the Comisión Especial de Incorporación (CEI) and Technical Secretary, SEPAZ
- Hector Morales, Secretary, SEPAZ
- Enrique Eduardo Aguirre Cantero, Representative to CEI and responsible for all Reincorporation Programs
- Luis Eduardo Escobar Hernandez, Consultor, Reincorporation Programs, URNG and PMAE
- Maria Ramirez, Coordinadora, Programa de Resarcimiento

Fondo Nacional para La Paz (FONAPAZ)

- Alvaro Colom Caballeros, former Director FONAPAZ, currently President, Grupo Mega
- Fernando Calado, now with IOM, former consultant to FONAPAZ in Unidad de Asistencia al proceso de la Paz

Ministerio de Trabajo y prevision Social, Oficina Nacional de Empleo

- Marco Antonio Castellanos, Director

Instituto Tecnico de Capacitacion y Productividad (INTECAP)

- Ramon Castellanos, Director, Guatemala City Center
- Chief of Training Program for PMAE
- Professors for Carpentry and Tailoring

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

European Union

- Maria Fernandez Carcedo, Economista, Delegacion de la Comisión Europea
- Fernando Ascoli, Co-Director, PAREC

International Organization for Migration, Guatemala

- Diego Beltrand, Coordinador Nacional, Programa Desmovilización e Incorporación
- Antonio Fraile, Coordinador de Operaciones
- Cesar Guillen, Coordinador del Programa de Inserción Productiva (PIP)
- Irvin Jones, Consultor, Programa de Inserción Productiva (PIP)
- Monique Van Hoof, Seguimiento, Programa de Inserción Productiva (PIP)
- Victor Martinez, Consultor, Programa PIP
- Daniel Gomez, Consultor, Programa PIP
- Beatriz Azurdia, Coordinadora, Campana de Sensibilización
- Catalina Miz, Monitora, Campana de Sensibilización

- Oscar Sandoval, Coordinador, Traslado de las CPR Sierra
- Hjalmar Calderon, Coordinador del Programa PMAE
- Herbert Aitken, Capacitacion, Programa PMAE

Organization of American States (OAS)

- Raul Rosende, Director, Unidad para La Promocion de la Democracia, Programa de Reinsercion de Desmovilizados en Guatemala

United Nations Representative

- Lars Franklin, Resident Representative
- Clemencia Munoz Tamayo, Deputy Resident Representative

United Nations Development Program

- Fernando Masaya Marotta, Program Officer
- Maria Noel Vaeza-Ogilvie, General Manager, Recovery, Reconciliation and Reform Programs
- Mauricio Valdes, former Director of UNDP program in Guatemala, now in UNDP headquarters in New York (by telephone)

United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)

- Henry Morris, Jefe, Chief, Resettlement and Incorporation Area

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

US Embassy

- Ambassador Donald J Planty

US Agency for International Development (USAID)

USAID Mission to Guatemala

- George Carner, Mission Director
- Leticia Butler, Deputy Mission Director
- Jack H McCarthy, Coordinator, Peace Program
-

USAID Office of Transition Initiatives

- David Gould, Resident Representative, OTI
- Charles C Brady, field consultant, OTI (by telephone)
- Catherine Haberland, Program Manager, OTI/USAID/Washington
- Johanna Mendelson, former Senior Advisor, OTI (currently with World Bank Post Conflict Unit)

GUATEMALAN ORGANIZATIONS

Fundacion Guillermo Toriello (FGT)

- Enrique Corral Alonso, President
- Judith Erazo Caravantes, Senior Management Group of Foundation

- Rosana Gomez, Director, Programa Economico-Productivo
- Angel Berna, Director, Programa Vivienda y las Fincas Cooperativas
- Gustavo Pernilla, Director, Programa de Atencion a Desmovilizados
- Francisco Rimola, Director, Programa de Capacitacion
- Maria Luz Martinez, Sub-Directora, Programa de Capacitacion
- Ruben Lopez, Programa de Educacion
- Fernando Vasquez, Consultor, Programa PIP, Region Guatemala
- Marco Antonio Ruis, Consultor, Programa PIP, Region Quetzaltenango
- Marco Tulio Sanchez, Consultor, Programa PIP, Region Chimaltenango
- Jose Maria Cuculista, Field Representative, Oficina Regional, Masatenango
- Lidia Amparo Santos, Field Representative, Oficina Regional Quetzaltenango
- Marco Antonio Ramos, Field Representative, Oficina Regional Chimaltenango
- Bernabe Salazar, Field Representative, Oficina Regional Peten
- Felipe Coroy, Monitor, Programa PIP
- Victoria Bamamco, Monitora, Programa PIP

PRIVATE SECTOR

Grupo Mega, Guatemalan Consulting Firm, contracted by UNDP to Evaluate URNG Incorporation Program financed by UNDP and USAID

- Alvaro Colom Caballeros, President, former Director FONAPAZ
- Lorena Mejicanos, Manager, Program Evaluation of URNG Incorporation

Private Companies

- Carlos Arias Bouscayrol, General Manager, Cardiz, S A , Apparel
- Modesto Par Gutierrez, Plant Manager, Suez, S A , Apparel

PROGRAM BENEFICIARIES

URNG

The team met with approximately 60 beneficiaries in varying degrees of depth including ex-combatants from both the dispersed group and the three cooperative farms. The team also had contact with a considerably larger group through the vehicle of attendance at various PIP workshops at different locations. In the course of field visits the team also met with several “external structure” returnees and others from List B, supporting members.

PMA/E

The team met with 13 ex-PMA/E beneficiaries in field sites and employment locations.

CPR

The team visited two CPR sites and met substantively with a total of about 10 members, about half of which were URNG members incorporated with the CPR groups.

APPENDIX B

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APPENDIX C

VISITS TO FIELD AND PROJECT SITES

Oct 19, 1998

- Vivero de la Paz, outskirts of Guatemala City PIP project nursery, community gardens and possible new project for hydroponics production PIP recipient, dispersed ex-combatant working with group of seven women from the community Interviewed beneficiary and another dispersed excombatent along with supporting personnel from FGT and IOM Troubled project now in process of redesign Prospects are good
- Carpentry Project, Chimaltenango PIP project for group of seven from Cocadi Albergue in Chimaltenango Interviewed project recipients along with FGT regional monitor and consultant Project is in serious trouble Problems of management and motivation
- Tienda Project, Chimaltenango PIP project to group of four from COCADI Albergue Interviewed one beneficiary, a war-wounded ex-combatant Project is in serious trouble Problems of management and location Almost no cash flow
- Tienda Project in San Andres Ixtapa outside of Chimaltenango Interviewed beneficiary, a dispersed excombatent Project is successful Good location Good management by spouse of beneficiary
- Restaurant Project in Chimaltenango Interviewed excombatent woman beneficiary from the Cocade Albergue Project is barely successful but should improve Good management, initiative and motivation

Oct 21

- PIP Project Recipient Workshop, Conavigua, Guatemala City Observed workshop on problem solving for PIP projects and interviewed major portion of group of 40 beneficiaries Most were from the greater Guatemala City area A little over half had tienda projects The success rate was discouraging Most complained of lack of adequate financing and training, low margins, stiff competition There were some successes, especially among those with experience before or during the conflict

Oct 22

- IOM Agricultural Workshop, Xecoxol, Chimaltenango Department Observed workshop on agricultural problem solving with a strong pitch on organic farming technology Interviewed excombatants and supporters, List A and B, and members of the community along with agricultural consultant under contract to IOM, FGT field monitor and consultant, and other IOM field personal One PIP project for a store for

agricultural supplies is barely making it with chemical fertilizers and pesticides. An agreement was reached to convert to organic supplies based on strong community response to the workshop resulting in arrangements for a follow-up visit and presentation to larger group of farmers. Arrangements were made to assist the store owner with transport and sale of his chemical supplies in order to use proceeds for new organic products in greater demand by the community. The revised project has good prospects but will require strong technical support and follow-up.

Oct 23

- IOM Sewing Workshop, Casa de Lisados, Guatemala City. Interviewed women and one man participants, including two PIP beneficiaries along with FGT project monitor. First rate hands on presentation was made by IOM contracted expert. One benefit of workshop was to put women in contact with a source of sound technical advice for problems down the road.

Oct 24

- IOM PIP project recipient workshop, Quetzaltenango. Group of seven PIP recipients, all store owners. Interviewed excombatants, most despersos, along with regional FGT monitor and consultant and IOM field personnel and local MINUGUA monitor. Group was highly motivated and creative in coming up with innovative solutions to problems encountered. They also agreed to combine resources on procurement and transportation for purchasing power and economies. Thin margins and high rent were the principal problems, but most have good prospects for success if they can maintain the current level of commitment and spirit.

Oct 24

- Cooperative Farm, Santa Anita, Colomba, Quetzaltenango. Interviewed President and leadership group from the Cooperative together with the FGT Regional Coordinator. 37 families, or about 200 people, mainly from the Albergue DIGESA in Quetzaltenango. The farm, a coffee production operation, is lacking in working capital, but had good prospects for financing from PAREC II for increased production and a possible drying plant. USAID had provided assistance to re-seed 14 manzanas. They are building their own homes, the FGT/FOGUAVI program with PMA support. The group was well organized with a Board of Directors and three work commissions, women, infrastructure, and field. Priorities were clear. Coop has been receiving strong support from the local FGT coordinator. Expert technical assistance on coffee processing and marketing is needed. Prospects are good due to location, land, infrastructure, some technical capacity in coffee production, and seemingly strong leadership and management.

Oct 25

1377

- Taller de Mecánica Automotriz, Guatemala City PIP project recipients, group of 15, with large investment in auto repair shop Interviewed several officers and members of the group They exhibited good leadership but were lacking in adequate training for more than a couple of the leaders This will be a difficult management proposition for the leaders given size of the group and the fact that a number will not actually be working in the shop Also interviewed FGT PIPs coordinator for the Guatemala City area and two former promotores in the group from the OAS program in basic education and literacy

Oct 28

- Bakery run by ex-PMA/E in Animas Lomas, Jutiapa Beneficiary, a 12 year veteran with PMA/E, with a campesino background, had received excellent training in the Imrich Fischmann Institute with a good apprenticeship experience The bakery, a traditional artisan type operation, should do well Beneficiary exhibited strong initiative, innovation and good management and financial practices with plans for expansion Would be a good candidate for micro-enterprise credit Business is clearing about Q2,500/month The whole family was involved and also engaged in subsistence farming
- Carpentry service enterprise in Animas Lomas, Jutiapa Beneficiary, an 11 year veteran with PMA/E, was running a highly innovative operation with no electricity Trained by the Imrich Fischmann Institute Beneficiary, with a campesino background, had invented a remarkable hand powered lathe and sanding machine Prospects are good Beneficiary is industrious with a good feel for business and the market, and produces high quality work The whole family was involved and also engaged in subsistence farming
- Tailor, Animas Lomas, Jutiapa Beneficiary, who also ran a small store, was trained in INTECAP with an apprenticeship in a tailor shop in Jutiapa, was not doing well Demand was almost nil except for small repair jobs He was considering leaving town to look for work either in security or a maquila (cut and sew) operation in the city
- Animas Lomas, Jutiapa Met with six ex-PMA/E beneficiaries Two had been trained in cooking and two in tailoring, one in auto mechanics and the last in nursing Most were interested in returning to security work where pay was better than anything available in the community or in entry level jobs in their training fields They were also engaged in the current harvest All had campesino backgrounds
- Animas Lomas, Jutiapa, auto repair shop Interviewed ex-PMA beneficiary trained in auto mechanics at the Fischmann Institute Beneficiary appeared motivated, pleased with training experience and, according to the shop, had solid skills The shop itself was poorly organized and in poor condition, but owners claimed that business was increasing

10/28

- Animas Lomas, Jutiapa, met with town leaders who had strong praise for the PMA/E program and showed evaluator excellent work on the town church that had been contributed by the trainees

Oct 29

- Guatemala City, Fabrica Cardiz, S A Apparel (Maquila) operation, interviewed Plant Manager Also interviewed two ex-PMA beneficiaries, one working in security and one on the factory production line Three ex-PMA beneficiaries had passed through a one-month apprenticeship in the factory One was hired by the company Plant had 700 workers Wages were relatively low, at Q225/week up to Q400 Experience with trainees was positive, good discipline, but not all had aptitude for the work Education was not a factor except for basic literacy High demand for trained workers, but factory had its own training operation that could train employees faster for its line than an outside program We discussed the merit of setting up a program which would take more advantage of Factory training facilities The beneficiary on the line appeared to be doing well and was happy with his work and growth prospects The other employee in security was satisfied but not happy with pay
- Guatemala City, Fabrica Suez, S A Apparel (Maquila) operation Interviewed Plant Manager and one PMA beneficiary just finishing his one month apprenticeship The trainee did not appear motivated and was interested in getting home for the holidays He wanted a higher salary than the company was prepared to pay He may drift back into security work The factory wasn't prepared to hire anybody at the moment, but in another month, some jobs were going to open up Pay for workers ran between 18 to 26 Quetzales per day The highest level could make Q1,200 per month Conditions appeared good and benefits included food and transportation Company was remotely considering establishing a branch operation in Huehuetenango
- Guatemala City, headquarters of INTECAP (Instituto Tecnico de Capacitacion y Productividad, Guatemala's national training institute supported by both the Government and the Private Sector Interviewed Director and head of training along with two professors in tailoring and carpentry The institute had to overcome resistance of the beneficiaries to technical training, especially theory components and had to focus overly on practice on the shop floor Behavior of PMA students was excellent in the program A significant portion of the PMAE students were very strong in their courses, although not a majority They had good work practices and discipline But, heavy supervision was needed INTECAP claimed good linkages claimed with private sector along with some financing Regarding the job market the Institute observed they it responded to persons in the program, not the market It also stressed a strong need for training in micro-enterprise Although INTECAP does aptitude testing, this was not part of this program INTECAP trains some 100,000 people per year and claims to have good credibility with private sector sources of employment Demand is still strong for trained labor

- Guatemala City, National Employment Office, Ministry of Labor The Office, which has an agreement with IOM financed by USAID through IOM and FONAPAZ to provide employment assistance to ex-PMA beneficiaries, is being upgraded as part of the current Modernization of the State program with program financing Also, the Peace Accords mandate the Ministry of Labor to be responsible for provision of needed services to the beneficiary population The idea is to respond to need throughout country through development of a rapid response capability The office is very proud of its new data base program for classifying job applicants and making matches against identified opportunities A demonstration was provided The Office held regular meetings with the PMA program group in IOM Five regional offices are to open soon Each will have a computer system linked to the national program Currently 149 job applicants are in the active file The Office is trying to establish contacts with companies, but it is slow going Much information is obtained from want ads and announcements The Office stressed that the Private Sector is leery of hiring URNG members because of fear of problems and start up of unions

Nov 4

- Finca Las Texas (El Progreso) – Cooperative Farm, Cuyutenango, Suchitepequez Dept (from Albergue Los Brillantes) Interviewed Cooperative Officers (President, Secretary and others) The coop includes some 76 families totaling 375 persons 36 of the members came from Albergue Los Brillantes and the others had dispersed earlier from the camps and came from three different fronts of the URNG The land, 7.5 caballerias, or 315 Ha, was selected by the group for its potential for high productivity in coastal agricultural and livestock production The coop, which seems to have good potential in a number of areas (rice, sugar, grain, vegetables, cattle, rubber, fish culture), appeared to be more or less stagnating for the moment in terms of income producing activity Most of the work of the members is now going into completing housing for the community under the PMA food for work program There will be some income when fattened cattle are sold early next year (28 head donated by USAID/OTI) The group is now waiting for the results of soil studies financed by EU/PAREC which seem to be long in coming In the meantime, the coop is engaged only in subsistence production and housing construction They had almost no information regarding the studies, project possibilities, financing from whatever source The Coop has a Q7.0 million debt to pay off for the land to the Fondo de Tierra, and has little idea how its going to cover the Q1.4 million year debt service requirement (two year grace period) Coop is not yet legalized, although papers have been prepared, due to lack of financing for the cost of processing The group had received little training, most of which it considered irrelevant to its current situation The disperso population had had some training They are looking to the Foundation to solve their problems and waiting for news from PAREC, but have little to go on (There is no known commitment from PAREC beyond the soils studies) The foundation representative was not aware of the current status of the studies or other project possibilities, although he was supportive in general

- CPR Triunfo – El Quiche Total size of the group is some 350 families They had only arrived in Sept '98, and been there about six weeks The Triunfo group is now living in 'Techo Minimo" housing provided by the EU Although there were some 100 to 150 URNG demobilized "dispersos" in the group which had originally come from the CPR Sierra in Chajul, the Foundation Rep accompanying the team had no information about them Interviewed some of the dispersos of the group They had received no training and had had no contact with the Foundation to date They were emphatic on the urgent need for training The group appeared stymied until it received additional support from the Foundation The CPR was to receive a "mini riego" project financed by the Italian government to be implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture, but it had no idea what was to be cultivated and when The techo minimo housing consists of aluminum sheeting held up by poles with no walls Land was wet with much standing water after the passage of "Mitch" indicating a drainage problem USAID/OTI had donated latrines configured to deal with the lack of drainage The Group was short of food which it has been receiving from CEAR The URNG members, by their own choice, were to receive the same benefits, no more no less, than the rest of the CPR (Apparently some 350 URNG demobilized in List A are part of the CPR Sierra group from where the three new CPR farms had come (El Tesoro, Maryland, El Triunfo), excluding the Peten, Santa Rita It looked like a long road ahead, but the spirit was there to stay the course

Nov 11

- Finca El Horizonte, Santa Ana, Peten, Cooperative Farm Interviewed Consejo de Administracion officers and spoke with a number of the other demobilized ex-combatants The farm encompasses 20 caballerias or approximately 840 Ha , the largest of the three cooperative farms There are 114 families and 145 members in the group including some from List B and C In November and December of 1997 a small advance group arrived with the main body coming at the end of February 1998 The price of the land was Q3 0 million, the cheapest of the farms The main productive potential of the farm is in forestry, cattle and vegetables along with basic food crops There is also a long term tourism potential The cooperative is currently in the legalization process through INTECOOP

The group appeared to be well organized and doing well in general, with no internal or external relationship problems Housing construction for members is now in construction under the FOGUAVI program and looks solid with innovative design features Construction workers were well trained in masonry by the Quetzaltenango institute and are being paid through the PMA program The coop appears to have dynamic leadership which has been able to stimulate sustained enthusiasm by membership for work needed to bring the farm into production There is good cooperation with the local community, and an auxiliary mayor has been authorized by the municipality The coop has applied for a school from the FIS Currently two teachers are being supplied by the Municipality, and the Ministry of Education is expected to accredit the school next year and supply two teachers A sub-group of 90 members of the cooperative purchased 32 head of male cattle on their own account

with money taken from Becas, Q1,000 each, and hopes are high for profit from weight gain. On the production side, the cooperative is waiting for the results of a pre-feasibility study on forestry potential being carried out by a local NGO. The FGT will also do a diagnostic evaluation of production possibilities. Future technical assistance is also expected from FECOAR, the Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives. The one main concern, as with the other farms, is for needed investment and working capital, some of which will hopefully come from the PAREC program. The outlook is optimistic.

- CPR Santa Rita, Peten. 134 families including 400 plus people. There was a small number of ex-combatants in the group. The team interviewed an advance group at a new farm for resettlement provided by the Government. Most of the families had not yet been relocated to the new location. The farm covers about 2,900 Ha, by far the largest seen to date. The originally group started out in small units in the mountains having fled army attacks in the early 1980s, eventually coming together. In 1991 they settled down in their current location (Zona Maya National Park). They had received some help from NGOs, mainly Spanish, from 1991 to '94. They had lived like guerrillas for long periods, only more difficult from lack of arms, no money, and no leverage for seeking food and assistance from communities in the area.

The group had been preparing for the move (delayed due to Hurricane Mitch) to the new farm for more than a month. They were running low on food, currently being supplied through the World Food Program. Medicines and health care assistance are currently supplied by NGOs along with some education. They had been receiving some help from CONAD on reforestation activity and were to benefit from a financial incentive scheme for protecting areas reforested. This is may be the best bet for the future of the CPR for sustainability. The soil is most apt for forestry development in the long term. No projects had yet been planned except for some community forestry activity. The group was waiting for a study of possibilities. The general aspect was positive, but development will be a long time in coming. In the meantime, the group has good survival skills.

Nov 12

- Guatemala City. Visited series of PIP projects on outskirts of the city mainly in the Mixco area. Most were very small operators, without much training or education, but appeared to be doing well and growing in most cases. These were almost all indigenous beneficiaries. Most of the projects had only started up three to four months before the visit. Projects included the following:
 - Store. Q20,000 investment, 2 beneficiaries, with cash flow of Q800/day with 15% margin of profit. It had began very modestly, but was growing rapidly. Good location, good management.

- Store Q10,000 investment with cash flow of Q300/day Husband works in another job The business had doubled in three months Positive prognosis, but slow growth
- Store Q30,000 investment, 3 beneficiaries, with cash flow of up to Q1,000/day Store was in a good location with strong management and could sell more with expansion Good candidate for micro-enterprise credit
- Mill Q10,000 investment with Q50 to 60 per day of gross income Beneficiary had been trained in mill maintenance Providing valuable service to community Positive outlook for growth
- Store and tortilla making operation Clearing Q30/day over expenses Owner trained as a driver, but had flunked the license exam Management a bit shaky, but good prospects for growth with added equipment (large stove)
- Store Q10,000 investment with cash flow of Q400/day Beneficiary was a former education promoter from the OAS program who spoke highly of the experience in terms of community impact and support
- Store Q10,000 investment with 250/300 cash flow Good prospects Very industrious owner

**Revised Scope of Work
Evaluation of Guatemala Demobilization Program
USAID/BHR/OTI**

Rationale

Beyond the traditional question regarding accomplishment of project purpose and objectives, the greater need from a program planning and management perspective is to learn from the experience in order to improve our response to future post-conflict situations, which promise to abound over the coming years. The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) is particularly anxious to draw from its work in Guatemala in terms of such key success factors as strategy, levels and types of resources contributed, implementation tactics, process design and control, management structure, coordination among donors and implementing agents, interaction with beneficiary groups, required skills for critical components and the like. Thus, although the evaluation will describe what actually happened against implementation targets, more importantly it will attempt to document why elements succeeded or failed, in varying degrees, in terms of the above success factors and perhaps others not identified at the moment. One final high priority question relates to the bottom line goal of the overall effort, or effective incorporation of former fighting units into society. This, of course, is a long-term effort, and by no means complete at this time. Nevertheless, the evaluation will look at near term impact and attempt to make a valid prognosis for the future on the basis of progress to date.

It is worth noting that at the commencement of the effort, purpose and objectives were not entirely clear or even known, beyond the need to demobilize and incorporate ex-combatants. Approximate numbers were known and the types of interventions were spelled out, especially for the initial phase, but many previously unidentified needs emerged only during implementation, and responses had to be designed and set in motion en route. This also will be highlighted in the evaluation in order to improve ability to predict planning, resource, and management requirements for future operations of this nature.

With these thoughts in mind, purpose and objectives of the evaluation are as follows:

Purpose

Document experience from the project and draw lessons learned for future program design and management in post-conflict situations.

Objectives

- 1 Determine the degree to which the project accomplished implementation targets. This will include the three broad areas of a) assistance to URNG ex-combatants, b) assistance to GOG military ex-combatants, and c) other activities designed to enhance

program management and deal with the gap represented by Communities of Population in Resistance OTI Guatemala has documented some thirty plus components within these categories, of widely varying levels of importance and cost Some will be treated in much more depth than others, especially those relating directly to the larger incorporation or “reinsertion” goal

- 2 Analyze success factors in the Guatemala case related to the effectiveness of OTI financed interventions to draw lessons learned for future programming This will include elements such as those mentioned above under rationale with a particular focus on approach, management, process, and coordination The interaction between OTI and key actors such as UNDP, IOM, the URNG, the CEI, the GOG, and the USAID Mission will be highlighted along with involvement of beneficiaries in field management of project activities
- 3 Determine, to the extent possible, the degree to which project beneficiaries have been effectively incorporated into society Effective incorporation will include viable employment and income, security, and the stability and nature of the relationship of ex-combatants with their communities including the three cooperative farms

Methodology

The heart of the evaluation will be a series of structured interviews carried out in the field with beneficiary groups and individuals representative of the major components of the project, mainly URNG and PMA ex-combatants The interviews will gather feedback on levels of social and economic viability, satisfaction, motivation, and capacity development as a consequence of training, enterprise assistance, outreach efforts and follow-up problem solving on the part of implementing agencies This will not be a statistically valid survey Rather the exercise will cover as many representative groups within the major categories as possible within approximately two weeks of field work

The evaluation will also interview actors at various levels from implementing institutions to capture feedback on operational success factors including political, policy, technical and resource constraints, tactics, coordination, problem solving efforts etc Finally, the evaluation will review project documentation including reports, reviews, evaluations and data in general from OTI, the USAID Mission, IOM, the CEI and others As much as possible, this review will take place in advance of the interview portions of the exercise