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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The electoral process in Peru has faced three sets of concerns which influence the quality of citizen participation

- A need to assure the **transparency and integrity** of the voting process
- A need to develop the **institutional capacity** to organize and report the results of elections effectively, efficiently and at a reasonable cost
- A need to ensure the **widest possible participation** of citizens in the electoral process

Main Findings

The assistance provided through IFES has sought to address these concerns through a series of activities that included four basic elements

- Support for the process of carrying out the 1995 national presidential and congressional elections
- Support for the institutional development of the agencies of the electoral system.
- Support for civil society organizations engaged in efforts of promoting electoral participation and the integrity and transparency of the electoral process
- Support of a policy dialogue aimed at influencing the type of electoral reform legislation and forms of national representation enacted by the government

Results Achieved

- **Regarding support for the 1995 general election** The support provided by IFES assisted in improving operations of the National Electoral Tribunal (Jurado) in carrying out the election. However, problems remained to be addressed in areas such as training poll workers
- **Regarding support for the institutional development of the electoral system** After the 1995 national elections, an important focus of IFES activities was to work initially with the Jurado, the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) and the National Registry of Electoral and Civil Identity (IDENTIDAD) in building up the institutional capacity of the newly defined electoral system. *The municipal elections of 1995/96* were carried out with a reasonable degree of organization, despite a variety of jurisdictional disputes. Lessons learned from the 1995 presidential elections were taken into account in such areas as the development of training materials. However, a crisis mentality still prevailed and the kinds

of testing of messages that makes for good educational material were still not incorporated into design efforts

Uniformly, all three new organizations faced issues of developing an appropriate organizational culture to meet their responsibilities. IFES addressed this concern with a combination of staff training and technical assistance.

Success in developing this new institutional culture has been mixed. The Jurado has not instituted the necessary organizational transformations that will make it successful in its new roles. ONPE has begun to talk in terms of the need for strategic planning. It has simplified its organizational structure, reducing levels of hierarchy and reducing, as well, the number of permanent staff. It has also begun to incorporate the concept, if not the effective practice, of testing its training materials. IDENTIDAD is facing a concern regarding its capacity to deal with the public, with public acceptance and understanding of the transformations proposed, with the political dimensions of the role it has to play (as witness the recent controversy over enrolling parties) as well as with its internal capacity to meet its management requirements.

A further critical concern is the question of who is responsible for paying for the costs of maintaining the electoral system. Each of the three components receives far less from the Government of Peru's budget than what is considered by them to be the sums they require to carry out their tasks. The proposed solutions suggest the development of what may amount to a defacto poll tax--impeding voting by those who already have limited access, the poor, above all the rural poor, who constitute a significant portion of the country's population.

● **Regarding support for civil society organizations engaged in efforts of ensuring the integrity and transparency of the electoral process.** The IFES CA sought to support a variety of NGOs, undertaking various forms of activities which ran from efforts at promoting transparency in actual polling processes, dialogues regarding the issues involved in the elections, citizen participation in general and in rural areas and the role of the press in the electoral process. The bulk of the total of more than \$500,000 spent for civil society went to a single organization (Transparencia) which engaged in various of these forms of activities as well as becoming the national repository for electoral data.

Substantively, the results have been impressive. Transparencia carried out important functions as a poll watching agency for the national and municipal elections, establishing a reputation for objectivity across the political spectrum. Its multimedia center is an important data source regarding elections. Another NGO group, SER/CEAPAZ, undertook an important effort to increase voter awareness in rural areas.

However, it is clear that the efforts undertaken are not likely to be sustained given present circumstances. Transparencia is in an extremely precarious financial situation. SER, which conducted an effort at dealing with rural voter participation, is engaged in other forms of

activities to support its existence. Other NGOs are either too weak to continue or directed elsewhere.

While support under this CA for the NGOs was not intended to promote sustainability, it would certainly have been an advantage, and may be a necessity, for future democratic development if civil society organizations with reputations for honesty, objectivity and the capacity to perform were present within the electoral process.

- **Regarding support, largely through civil society organizations and public events, of a policy dialogue aimed at influencing the type of electoral reform legislation.** Aside from developing a book and other materials and calling attention to the issues through some well-publicized fora, this effort cannot be said to have achieved a concrete result. Future reform efforts may benefit from the groundwork laid by this set of discussions, but that remains to be seen. In the short run, the issue can be considered to be closed.

Recommendations

Several issues remain to be addressed to enhance citizen participation.

- The need to promote greater access of economically disadvantaged citizens, above all in rural areas, to the electoral process,
- The need to enhance the civic culture of citizens as voters,
- The need to enhance the capacity of citizens, as administrators of the electoral process, to be able to limit the loss of votes by nullification, and
- The need to further a policy dialogue which enhances the likelihood of a more comprehensible process for selecting members of Congress by bringing the individual voter closer to his or her representative.

Specific recommendations

To meet these broad general considerations, as well as to continue the process of developing the electoral system that has already been undertaken by USAID/ODIT through the IFES CA, we would make the following recommendations. These recommendations are, of course, subject to that most significant caveat of the availability of resources and subject, as well, to being prioritized within an overall strategy that takes into account the other IRs that are part of ODIT's overall strategic approach.

To enhance the institutional development of the public sector agencies of the electoral system

- ***Provide additional technical support to ONPE, IDENTIDAD and the Jurado directed at enhancing their implementation of an appropriate organizational culture to continue to modernize their functions*** Provide such assistance on a short term, highly focused basis, through such mechanisms as IQCs

- **Facilitate continued communication between ONPE and other technical arms of electoral agencies in Latin America seeking to enhance the necessary technical skills to undertake their tasks, skills such as better reporting of results** Again, this could be implemented through an IQC work order

To overcome issues of structural absenteeism by enhancing citizen participation

- ***Support an organization such as SER to expand its efforts to promote rural participation in the political process through the use of media, through community based civic education and through citizen action to secure the necessary identification documents*** This can be implemented through a grant and supervision provided directly through USAID/ODIT or through an IQC

- **Support efforts through NGOs and other mechanisms to promote a policy dialogue with the government to eliminate barriers, including financial ones, to access to identity cards** This can be implemented through a grant, best directed at a single NGO, and supervision provided directly through USAID/ODIT or through an IQC (In this regard, it may be possible to obtain allies within the government for reasons related to security issues)

To enhance civic awareness and civic education.

- **Develop a program of civic education that can be tied to Jurado efforts, requirements of the Constitution and concerns of the Ministry of Education as it revamps its curricula** To implement this recommendation, it may be more effective to turn to a civil society organization that has the capacity to design a supplementary text and to implement related audio-visual and radio/television programming This can be implemented through a grant and supervision provided directly through USAID/ODIT or through an IQC

To ensure the presence of civil society as a watchdog over issues of electoral transparency, integrity and reform

- ***Strengthen an existing civil society organization to carry out this function*** By virtue of its reputation, Transparencia is the likely candidate, but that signifies a need for a significant institutional re-orientation to meet the challenge of sustainability

The issue of sustainability of civil society watchdog organizations that are non-partisan and are often perceived by governments in power as posing a challenge is one that has been and is being faced by USAID democracy programs throughout the world It may be worthwhile,

in terms of approaching this issue, to look at the various alternatives that have been explored elsewhere, for instance, the development of general endowment funds, of trusts for specific institutions or specific types of activities

Programmatic Priorities

The most important area of concern for the long term maintenance and enhancement of the democratic process in Peru is ensuring that the structural barriers to electoral participation are reduced to the maximum degree possible. The least important recommendations are those related to strengthening the components of the electoral system. Structural barriers impede the full and effective functioning of the electoral process and contribute to limiting the democratic nature of participation in the Peruvian political system. While the agencies would benefit from continued technical enhancements, above all in the areas of social marketing and strategic planning, they (ONPE and IDENTIDAD above all) are sufficiently plugged in to be able to reach out for such technical support. The major concern that these agencies face is tied to the issue of structural barriers—the need for the state to provide sufficient resources to ensure that the electoral system functions. This also means providing the necessary resources to ensure that financing elections does not result in the generation of additional structural barriers.

The other two sets of specific recommendations, building greater citizen awareness and developing an independent watchdog to ensure electoral transparency, are important issues that rank just below that of enhancing participation by eliminating structural barriers. Greater citizen awareness can be facilitated by reasonably small investments to promote better availability of teaching materials and curricula for public education as well as through experiments using educational television, an available resource in Peru. Ensuring transparency may become a critical issue if there is a tight race for control of the national government in the next national election. Relatively small investments in strengthening NGOs concerned with these two issues may foster important impacts on future elections and future capacity for participation.

I. INTRODUCTION

Overall Objective

USAID/Peru's Office of Democratic Initiatives and Training (USAID/ODIT) has supported the electoral process in Peru since 1994 in large measure through a cooperative agreement (CA) with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), a US private non-profit foundation. The Cooperative Agreement, executed on September 29, 1994, provided a total of \$ 4,081,493¹ and with amendments runs through to December 31, 1997. The main objectives of the CA have been to implement a multi-faceted program of electoral assistance with both immediate and long term impact on the transparency, effectiveness and efficiency of the Peruvian electoral system. Support was provided to both the public sector agencies involved in managing the electoral process, the National Electoral Tribunal (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones [Jurado]), the National Office of Electoral Processes (Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales [ONPE]) and the National Registry of Identification and Civil Status (Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil [IDENTIDAD]²) and to civil society organizations whose activities related to the overall objectives of electoral assistance.

Using the CLIN 001 Indefinite Quantity Contract of the USAID Global Bureau's Center for Democracy and Governance, USAID/ODIT contracted through Development Associates Inc for the services of a team to undertake a final evaluation of the activities carried out through the IFES Cooperative Agreement. The evaluation was carried out by a two person team consisting of Joel M Jutkowitz Ph D, a US political scientist and Senior Associate of Development Associates, Inc with experience in Latin American politics and USAID democracy programming, and a Peruvian political scientist and lawyer and consultant to the State University of New York, Office of International Programs, Jose Luis Sardon, who specializes in Peruvian electoral systems.

The overall objective of the evaluation is to review, analyze and assess the effectiveness and impact of the electoral assistance component as implemented. As a part of this analysis of impact, the evaluation team examined the process of implementation, drawing lessons learned that are applicable to future USAID/ODIT efforts in support of electoral activities and other related democracy initiatives. The evaluation seeks to respond to the following general questions:

- Whether or not the approaches taken by IFES and its sub-grantees were implemented successfully—i.e. achieved the intended results?

¹ The total provided to IFES was \$3,681,943 with the balance of \$400,000 used by USAID for management purposes.

² IDENTIDAD is officially designated as RENIEC, the term used to describe it in the media. IDENTIDAD is the 'brand' identity that the organization is seeking to use in transforming its public image.

- Whether those approaches were implemented in a cost-effective manner?
- Whether the activities and intended benefits of the activities are sustainable?
- Whether the annual work plans served their intended purpose?
- Whether the electoral assistance indicators were appropriate and related to the indicators for each individual set of activities?
- Whether gender and ethnic considerations were taken into account?

Methodology

To respond to these questions, the team conducted in-depth interviews, reviewed documentation of USAID/ODIT, IFES and its sub-grantees under the cooperative agreement, reviewed materials including audio-visual materials produced by the various sub-grantees as well as re-analyzing surveys and other studies relevant to the themes of the evaluation. More specifically, the team met with representatives of virtually all the organizations that had received funding from IFES. The team also met with politicians from all of the major political groups within Peru, journalists, academicians and others concerned with issues of electoral reform. Finally, the team met with or interviewed by telephone key personnel of both USAID and IFES involved in the implementation of the cooperative agreement (A list of those contacted is contained in Appendix 2.)

In the in-depth interviews with politicians, academicians and journalists, the team sought not only to review the specific activities carried out by IFES, but also to examine the broader issues that these activities were intended to address: issues of the integrity, transparency and effectiveness of electoral institutions, access of citizens to the voting process, and concerns regarding the future course of electoral reform.

It should be noted that given the resources available to undertake the evaluation and its time frame (four weeks in the field to conduct the evaluation), it was not possible to carry out surveys or other similar studies of attitudes and behavior of target populations such as regional electoral personnel or voters who have served as polling place officials. However, it was possible, as shall be noted in the course of the discussion, to rely on several studies using either quantitative or qualitative approaches that were commissioned by IFES in the course of providing electoral assistance.

Balance of the Report

In the next chapter of this report, the team reviews the development of the electoral process in Peru, examining the principal concerns that face that process. These include concerns regarding the integrity and transparency of the process, regarding the structural limitations on voter participation and regarding the problems that have arisen in the conduct and management of the electoral process. From this diagnosis, the following chapter examines the specific activities undertaken under the cooperative agreement to meet these challenges and to support the institutional development of the institutions responsible for the electoral process. Chapter Four deals with the approach taken by IFES in managing these activities as well as the relationship between IFES and USAID/ODIT. Finally, Chapter V draws a set of conclusions from the evaluation which includes an examination of lessons

learned This chapter also includes a set of recommendations regarding possible lines of future development of the concerns associated with the electoral process

II. ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR AND PROCESSES IN PERU

The electoral process in Peru has faced three sets of concerns which influence the quality of citizen participation. Specifically, the Peruvian electoral process faces

- A need to assure the **transparency and integrity** of the voting process, to ensure that voters can express their preferences freely and those preferences are counted properly, i.e. that the voting process is not marred by fraud
- A need to develop the institutional capacity to organize and report the results of elections effectively (with a low level of errors), efficiently (within a reasonable space of time after an election) and at a reasonable cost
- A need to ensure the widest possible participation of citizens in the electoral process which, in practice, means eliminating structural barriers to participation such as the lack of the necessary voting credential (*libreta electoral*)

Transparency and Integrity

The essence of a democratic system of voting is that all citizens get to vote in a manner which ensures their freedom to choose and the certainty that their choice is counted. In practical terms, this has come to mean that votes are cast in secret to protect the right to freely choose. And, once cast, votes are counted and recorded in a manner that eliminates any possibility of fraud or manipulation.

Peru has developed processes that seek to respect both elements. The ballot is cast in secret. There are elaborate procedures in place to eliminate the forms of fraud that have historically been the case in Peru. Thus, there are checks on the identity of the individuals based in a national system of electoral registration. There are requirements regarding the act of voting, such as the need for the voter to seal his or her ballot and for the president of the polling place committee to sign the ballot which seeks to protect against ballot stuffing. There are requirements that the ballots be counted in a public manner at the level of each polling place. There are requirements that the count be recorded in a public manner, and the results distributed to a variety of authorities and interested parties (including the representatives of the armed forces and the different political parties) to ensure that eliminate the possibility of fraudulent reporting of results.

But for all of these requirements to be effective, citizens acting as polling place committee members have to understand their responsibilities. The various interested (party poll watchers) and disinterested parties (election administrators, armed forces etc.) have to fulfil their roles. There are important civic education and training functions that need to be fulfilled.

In times of high political tension, there is also an advantage if the integrity and transparency of the electoral process has an additional guarantee--a set of impartial poll watchers who understand and can evaluate the safeguards in place.

Institutional Capacity

An election also requires a significant organizational effort. That effort needs to be dedicated at the general organizational task of arranging the logistics and staffing of a national event involving a significant portion of the population (70% of all Peruvians over the age of 18). It needs to consider such specialized areas as the accurate registration of voters, the design of an appropriate ballot, the development of procedures for the rapid and accurate counting and reporting of votes and the adjudication of electoral disputes.

Widespread Participation

Finally, a truly democratic election requires the existence of the opportunity for participation of all citizens regardless of their location, ethnicity and economic condition. This means that there has to be a registration process that allows all to participate without respect to structural barriers, such as fees that are out of reach of any segment of the population. It means providing access to places of registration. It means providing the necessary information and education to motivate voters to participate--get out the vote campaigns. Such motivation may include, as it does in many Latin American countries including Peru, the legal obligation to vote, but even the consequences of that obligation needs to be communicated. It also means providing the voter with the required information to vote--information regarding the form of the ballot, the place to vote and the manner in which to vote. And, it also means, if the vote is to be an informed one, providing the voter with the necessary information regarding the candidates to make a choice.

Most of these civic education functions fall under the responsibility of the electoral authorities. Obviously communicating information regarding candidates and parties is, in fact, primarily a function of political campaigns.

Peru, after the interruption to its democratic process that was the result of the 1992 coup, had to face significant concerns in the 1995 election regarding the democratic character of that election. Hence, there was a need to provide support to ensure the fairness, transparency and integrity of the election. There was also a need, given constitutional changes in the electoral administrative apparatus, to assist in building a new organizational capacity to manage the electoral process in the future. And, finally, there was a need to assist in enhancing other participation of all Peruvian citizens in their government in general and specifically through the electoral process.

The efforts of IFES under the CA were directed at responding, at least in part, to these needs.

III. SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES OF THE ELECTORAL COMPONENT

Overview

The Cooperative Agreement between USAID/ODIT and IFES resulted in a series of activities that included four basic elements

- Support, beginning at the outset of the Cooperative Agreement, for a period of six months for the process of carrying out the 1995 national presidential and congressional elections. These elections, which took place on April 9, 1995, were the last elections wholly administered by the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones
- Support for the institutional development of the Jurado, ONPE and IDENTIDAD after the 1995 presidential elections and as these organizations were either established (the cases of ONPE and IDENTIDAD) or re-organized (the case of the Jurado). Initially, that support was provided in connection with the immediate need to conduct the 1995 municipal elections.
- Support for civil society organizations engaged in efforts of ensuring the integrity and transparency of the electoral process, in educating voters regarding key issues or in incorporating and stimulating the participation of citizens who had traditionally remained outside the political process, above all those in rural areas
- Support, largely through civil society organizations and public events, of a policy dialogue aimed at influencing the type of electoral reform legislation and the forms of national representation which would be enacted by the government

The process of support for the national elections of 1995 ended when the election process was concluded in April, 1995 after the overwhelming victory of President Fujimori eliminated the need for a second round. The process of support for the shift in institutional arrangements and the strengthening of the newly established institutional framework began shortly thereafter, with an initial focus on the municipal elections of November, 1995 and continued throughout the period of the CA. Support for civil society organizations began almost at the outset of the CA and also continued throughout the period of the CA. The efforts at electoral reform began after the municipal elections and were effectively ended when the new electoral law was passed in June, 1997.

These sets of activities received differential support with the largest portion of the funding going to institutional strengthening of Jurado, ONPE and IDENTIDAD (roughly 52% of the program budget). The 1995 presidential elections received around 20% of the program budget, civil society around 24% and the reform effort around 4%.

Support for the 1995 National Elections

Conducting an election involves a variety of processes including registering voters, informing voters regarding the time and place of the election, organizing the various regional and local boards required to implement the election, selecting election day polling staff (miembros de mesa), providing the necessary materials, arranging the collection and tabulation of results, providing the necessary training of temporary staff and assuring the reliability and accuracy of the entire process. Historically in Peru, these operations had been carried out by the Jurado within a structure whose principal focus was the legality of the process. The organization had virtually no technical skills in such areas as motivating voters using modern social marketing techniques³, in providing modern adult education tools to train staff, in processes of strategic planning to meet a specific objective. Elections were in reality almost a process of crisis management, but without the necessary organizational capacity in place to easily respond to the crisis.

IFES, along with other US NGOs such as the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and other international agencies such as IIDH/CAPEL and the OAS were brought in to provide support to Jurado in the conduct of the 1995 presidential/congressional elections. The elections were seen as a critical element of the transition to a democratic process after the 1992 coup and the 1993 constitutional convention which promulgated a new constitution.

IFES provided assistance in designing and implementing a very limited effort at registering voters. The limit was a practical one--IFES activities began in October and the deadline for registration for the April 9, 1995 election was in mid December. The support provided consisted of production of a television spot in Spanish, a radio spot in both Spanish and Quechua (the most widely spoken indigenous language in Peru) and a poster, all focusing on the need to register.

IFES also supported the production of a get out the vote poster, related television and radio spots. The radio spots were also translated into both Quechua and the other principal indigenous language of Peru, Aymara. The Telecommunications Center of the Catholic University of Peru (CETUC) produced the spots. The spots, it should be noted, were carefully designed and displayed high production values. The television and radio spots were put on the air using the free time allocated by law to the Jurado. Jurado efforts to get out the vote were complimented by support provided by IFES to civil society organizations, support that will be discussed later on in this chapter.

³ Social marketing refers to the use of a set of communications skills to inform regarding social concerns. Those skills involve defining a message to be communicated, a target audience and appropriate media for that communication which ensures that the message is received and understood. Peru has over a decade of history of the development of effective marketing techniques tied to both commercial interests and social interests, the latter most notable in areas such related health. USAID/Peru has supported significant work in social marketing.

More significantly, IFES contributed to the election efforts of the Jurado by providing support to the training process

The Need for Training

The electoral process in Peru, as is generally the case throughout the world, while managed through agencies that have permanent staffs, is dependent on the capacity of individuals recruited for each election, either as short term staffers working in regional electoral offices or as members of polling place committees (miembros de mesas electorales). Thus, a critical element of an election is the capacity of the organizing agency to recruit, train and support these short term personnel--both remunerated and un-remunerated. Prior to the 1995 election, little had been done by the Jurado to incorporate modern adult learning methods into its training efforts. There were no skilled trainers on staff, no design of a training plan and no appropriate training materials⁴ for either Jurado staff or polling place committees.

IFES provided the resources for the Jurado to hire seven trainers to help design and implement the required training efforts. This addition to the Jurado payroll was undertaken with the understanding that the Jurado would add these trainers to their regular payroll when IFES support ended, a promise that was not fulfilled in large measure because of both the budgetary restrictions of the Jurado and the shift in responsibility for the management of the electoral process from the Jurado to ONPE. IFES also supported the development of training materials, the principal elements of which were a manual for polling place committees and a related twelve minute training video. Both the manual and the video were designed and produced with the technical assistance of CETUC. CETUC, which is highly regarded as a telecommunications and adult learning center, produced the manual and video, in consultation with the Jurado, using standard procedures for developing materials such as storyboards which laid out the content of the spots in advance of their production. The important exception was the failure to field test the materials with appropriate audiences due to time constraints. Approximately 600,000 manuals were produced and distributed for training purposes.

Results

As noted above, prior to the 1995 election, the Jurado had not approached the training of field staff and polling place committee members in an effective fashion. Materials were scant and inappropriate. There was no skilled staff to develop or implement a training strategy. IFES, according to the terms of the CA, was to support enhanced institutional capacity of the Jurado through contraction of a training coordinator and trainers, development of training materials for polling place workers in both printed and video formats and provision of additional voter information materials. The intended impact was to enhance the capacity of poll workers and Jurado staff in the conduct of the 1995 national and subsequent elections.

⁴ The training materials for polling place committee members consisted of a few barely legible sheets of the relevant laws and regulations without explanations or appropriate examples.

The support provided by IFES assisted in improving operations of the Jurado in carrying out the election. A training staff, supported by IFES, was set up to manage this function. For the first time, through the operations of this training staff, the Jurado was able to provide polling place committee members (miembros de mesa) with a manual designed by professional adult educators that described their functions and that was supported by audio-visual didactic materials (the training video).

While these results represent an advance in electoral procedures, as IFES was able to determine in a follow-up study, much remained to be done. Using a set of focus groups which permits an in-depth examination of the themes covered, but is limited in its ability to measure impact on a national level⁵, IFES examined both the impact of its efforts on middle management of the election effort (members of provincial Jurados and Registrars) and members of the polling place committees. The study covered five areas of the country: Chiclayo in the north, Huanuco located at the entrance to the coca producing area, Arequipa and Cuzco, two principal urban centers in the Altiplano and greater Lima/Callao.

It is clear from this study that the IFES effort had a limited impact. For example, only a small portion of those included in the focus groups of polling place committee members (20%) ever saw the training video. Universally Jurado staff and polling committee members complained about a need for adequate training. They also were concerned, in many cases, about the appropriateness of the training material received from Lima for the specific social context of their locality. The argument presented in the focus groups about the inadequacy of training also was related to two other elements: the lack of the necessary time to carry out training, and the excessive centralism of the entire process--the control exercised by Lima.

Members of polling place committees felt that there was a need for a more simplified approach to training which could include the use of mass media. They felt that the materials provided did not offer the necessary explanations regarding counting votes, especially preferential votes for Members of Congress⁶ (Preferential votes are votes cast to select the specific candidate on a party list that a voter prefers⁷). The polling committee members also voiced concerns about the cultural cues provided.

⁵ Focus groups while allowing a representation of important variables (in this case differences in function and differences in regions) do not provide a scientific basis for representing a given population or universe. Thus, the results are suggestive but provide only a limited power to generalize. This limitation needs to be balanced against the fact that this is the only systematic data available to make inferences regarding results achieved at the level of individual trainees.

⁶ The Jurado did not provide the necessary instructions to CETUC regarding counting procedures to be included in the manual. The video did provide some guidance, but as noted, it is likely that the video was not widely disseminated.

⁷ In the Peruvian electoral congressional process, a voter is supposed to first select the party list he or she prefers and then write-in the numbers assigned to up to two congressional candidates from that party that the voter would like to see elected.

by the audio-visual materials supported by IFES, suggesting that such materials be directed at a wider, less-sophisticated audience, one more clearly representative of Peruvians in general.

One element of the problem clearly was the lack of time to adequately pre-test and adapt material to the differences in social situation and language throughout the country. The process of the 1995 election, as had traditionally been the case, clearly was managed without a sense of long term strategic planning--the need to draw a reasonable time line for the preparatory activities required to carry out an election. The form of planning was also faulted--the excessive centralism that resulted from the assumption that all decisions had to be made in Lima without taking into account the cultural differences that influence such tasks as training, communicating with and motivating a multi-ethnic society.

Thus, while the IFES supported effort had represented an advance in terms of providing better training materials and a clearer commitment to training, much remained to be done. The problems that needed to be addressed included the process of institutionalizing strategic planning, the organization of training as a regular function of electoral implementing agencies and the need to address the cultural and educational diversity of those engaged in the temporary, but highly significant tasks of managing the voting and vote counting processes.

Electoral System Restructuring

The Constitution of 1993 established an electoral system to be made up of the Jurado, ONPE and RENIEC which together would manage the electoral process. Each of these agencies had, in theory, a distinct role to play, derived from the general requirements of managing an election as well as the particular historical circumstances of Peruvian electoral practice. The Jurado is defined as the entity that

- administers electoral judicial matters,
- supervises the legality of the electoral processes,
- acts as custodian of the list of registered political organizations,
- supervises the fulfillment of norms regarding political organizations and electoral regulations,
- certifies the election of candidates, and
- presents, in a collaborative fashion, the budget of the electoral system (Jurado, ONPE and IDENTIDAD) to the executive branch.

The ONPE is the organization responsible for

- planning and conducting elections,

- designing the ballot and other required materials to carry out elections,
- publicizing the purposes of an election including efforts to ensure that voters understand the date, purpose and processes to be followed during a given election

IDENTIDAD took over the responsibility of the Jurado to maintain a registry of voters and to issue a voter's identity card (libreta electoral) which in Peru has served as the equivalent of the national identity card used throughout Latin America⁸ IDENTIDAD took over as well the role played by the Civil Registry offices to record births, deaths, marriages and other civil actions IDENTIDAD is charged with developing a single national identity card and related database that will ensure the integrity of the system of citizen identification in Peru

The process has resulted in removing the most technical functions such as maintaining databases and counting votes from the Jurado and their transfer to either ONPE or IDENTIDAD As is to be expected in the creation of a new system, there have been various jurisdictional disputes among the three entities as they have defined the manner in which to implement their functions These jurisdictional disputes, as a report of an IFES consultant to the Jurado suggested, in part arise from a failure of the governing laws and regulations to fully define the relationships between the three entities Some of these disputes, as is the recent case of verification of signatures on party registration petitions, have had political implications The party petition case, in fact, led to the removal of a function of signature verification from IDENTIDAD and its transfer to ONPE, a decision made by the Jurado in its role as the entity responsible for certifying party registration

Issues that each of the organizations and the system as a whole face in organizing and implementing elections include, in addition to defining the boundaries of the activities of each agency

- definition of appropriate internal organization to meet the requirements of the tasks faced,
- development of appropriate procedures for conducting elections including a capacity to meet the challenges required regarding strategic planning, management of short term paid and unpaid personnel and conduct of specialized technical tasks such as ballot design, vote counting, maintenance of an accurate voter registration list, verification of voter signatures etc ,
- development of an appropriate organizational culture to support the new organization and activities, and
- financing of the necessary activities to conduct mandated electoral activities

⁸ Most countries in Latin America consider this function as a means of control. Hence, the agency most often responsible for administering the identity card is the Ministry of Interior or its equivalent, the ministry responsible for internal control. Peru, historically, had developed this function in a different manner

IFES Assistance to Municipal Elections

After the 1995 national elections, an important focus of IFES activities was to work initially with the Jurado and ONPE and later on with IDENTIDAD in building up the institutional capacity of the newly defined electoral system. The problem to be faced was both an immediate one of assisting the Jurado and above all, ONPE, to carry out the municipal elections of 1995/96⁹ and a longer term one of assisting all three institutions in their development under the terms of the new legal arrangements for carrying out the electoral process. IFES' work plan called for developing a broad-based civic education campaign to diminish null votes. The work plan also called for developing the necessary manual to ensure that the poll workers had an understanding of electoral procedures.

Support provided by IFES for the municipal elections were once again complicated by the limited time frame between the initiation of operations of ONPE (effectively at the beginning of August of 1996 when the new director was named) and the date of the municipal elections (November 12, 1996). In connection with the municipal elections, IFES provided limited support to the Jurado to train the members of its Special Electoral Tribunals, the short-term election boards set up at the provincial level to oversee a specific election. That support came through maintenance of the salaries of the staff of five trainers with the Jurado's training unit beyond the period required for the national elections. IFES also provided technical assistance to this process through one of its consultants.

The bulk of IFES support for the municipal elections went to ONPE which had the major burden for administering that electoral process. IFES focused its support in large measure on the area of Information and Electoral Training. IFES, through its electoral information center in Washington, provided ONPE with examples of posters, training manuals, videos and other electoral materials used in other parts of Latin America. IFES also paid for the development of a manual for polling committee members and a related training video which was used in training workshops by ONPE¹⁰.

The design of the manual and video took into account some of the concerns resulting from the focus groups conducted by IFES after the national elections. More attention was paid to processes of counting votes, and the manual took what was considered to be a more user friendly approach--the use of a cartoon character as narrator of both the manual and video. However, it should be noted again, based on the limited time available between the establishment of ONPE and the municipal elections, this manual did not use standard techniques for testing and verifying the accuracy and comprehensibility of the message to be transmitted. The materials were defined in terms that ONPE staff considered user friendly, but no actual test was carried out to verify those beliefs.

⁹ The municipal elections involved both a general election held throughout most of the country and complementary elections as they were designated held somewhat later in areas that had been foci of terrorist activities. ONPE developed a revised manual for the complementary elections that incorporated additional clarifications of voting and counting procedures.

¹⁰ ONPE provided 18% of the financing for the manual and video and the balance was paid for by IFES.

IFES also provided technical assistance to ONPE in support of the organization and development of its first electoral process. That assistance was provided both by the IFES Chief of Party in Peru and by outside consultants.

In summary, the municipal elections were carried out with a reasonable degree of organization despite a variety of jurisdictional disputes. As the IFES work plan indicated, support was provided to enhance the know-how of the polling place committee members as well as to conduct limited civic education activities. While part of the intent of the work plan was to reduce null votes, it is difficult to measure such impact, nor was the work plan set up with a view toward such measurement except indirectly through the focus groups mentioned below. Lessons learned from the 1995 presidential elections were taken into account in such areas as the development of training materials. However, a crisis mentality still prevailed and the kinds of testing of messages that makes for good educational material was still not incorporated into design efforts 'por falta de tiempo' (lack of time).

As with the national elections, IFES conducted focus groups after the municipal elections with polling place committee members and middle management (local temporary employees of ONPE, of the Jurado¹¹ and electoral Registrars [these last are civil servants]). The focus groups which took place in Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Iquitos, Cuzco and Lima/Callao were held in late November and early December of 1995. Many of the same themes that had appeared after the national elections appeared again: centralism versus local initiative, lack of time to complete the necessary tasks, lack of training for polling place committee members, and a lack of civic responsibility on the part of voters (Civic responsibility according to the focus group members referred to a lack of voter understanding of their rights and responsibilities as voters). Additional themes arose such as the problem of conflict among the representatives of the various electoral agencies regarding issues such as appropriate rules of procedure and questions regarding the design of the ballot and other electoral documents.

The issues of training and that of electoral material design dealt directly with the areas supported by IFES. Regarding materials, focus group members pointed out that there had been significant advances in the design and in the procedures for using the materials that inspired greater confidence and security in the voting process. But they also indicated areas that required further attention including a need to pay attention to the way people in the provinces understood the ballot and its instructions. With respect to training, the focus groups pointed to the need to improve the quality of the trainers who used the newly developed training materials as well as the need to develop a better methodology for training.

The experience of the municipal elections, the first test of ONPE and of the new electoral system, demonstrated that the new organization was capable of carrying out an election. It also pointed to a continuing need to improve training capacity and to undertake the longer term strategic planning that would form the basis for successful management of future elections.

¹¹ Members of the Oficinas Decentralizadas de Procesos Electorales (decentralized electoral processes offices) and the Jurados electorales especiales (special electoral tribunals).

Developing a New Organizational Framework

Jurado

All three organizations, the Jurado, ONPE and IDENTIDAD have faced the need to develop appropriate organizational frameworks for the tasks that they have been assigned within the new electoral system. The Jurado may be said to have had both the simplest organizational challenge and the most difficult. It has moved from being the entire institutional framework to being a part of that framework. It has lost its elections administration function to ONPE, its control of the electoral registry to IDENTIDAD. It has retained several important functions, but little in the way of the necessary resources to carry them out. It is the official arbiter of the electoral process certifying candidates and parties, declaring winners, adjudicating disputes, and etc. It is also responsible for civic education of the electorate in the broad sense of the term, developing a sense of understanding of the role of the citizen as a member of the electorate in the periods between elections. However, while its collective leadership, the five members of the Jurado itself, are certainly qualified lawyers and judges, the organization has not developed the necessary capacity to operate in a results oriented manner. As importantly, the budget of the Jurado is a limited one, burdened with unfunded or underfunded mandates. For example, the Jurado is the responsible entity to pay the pensions due to its staff or to its former staff assigned to ONPE and IDENTIDAD. However, it has received no additional budget from the Government of Peru to cover the full extent of that requirement.

The Jurado's civic education task has been burdened by the lack of adequate funding. Any proposed approach it wishes to take to the task requires funding outside its normal budget, funding it has not been able to obtain. It need be noted that it also has not taken significant initiatives to promote this function. (The Ministry of Education which also has a constitutional responsibility for a broad process of civic education has not made much headway in this area as well according to members of Congress concerned with the matter.) As the historical memory of the electoral system, the Jurado also has demonstrated considerable weakness. It has not had the resources or the inclination to develop a modern database which would facilitate access to the information it has had on record. This lack of an inclination was one factor which prompted IFES to locate a multi-media electoral information center in the private sector.

IFES, it should be noted, did provide support to the Jurado in the form of the development of materials for an experiment in civic education in schools--the formation of school municipalities. These school municipalities are in reality school governments set up along the lines that are followed in Peru for choosing local level leaders (mayors and municipal councilpersons) and conducting local government. In a recent national meeting of student leaders (October 16, 1997), participants expressed an interest in developing such opportunities for students to develop an understanding of the processes of democracy. To date, the Jurado, however, has not taken significant steps to implement this or other civic education initiatives.

ONPE

ONPE has gone much further in organizing its functions as a modern enterprise. While ONPE started out with a fairly large hierarchical staff (approximately 245 staff members of whom 183 were full time regular staff, 54 were under short term contracts and 8 were on loan from other agencies) in which there were four management layers, it engaged in a process of re-organization and re-definition of functions after only a short space of operations. The re-organization was driven by financial realities--the operating budget provided by the Government of Peru could not support the existing level of personnel. However, the change to a permanent staff of around 80 and a reduction in managerial layers was facilitated by outside technical assistance which included the technical assistance provided by IFES as well as the lessons absorbed regarding management and strategic planning through the course provided by IFES that will be discussed below.

IFES also provided ONPE with support for an experiment in testing an alternative of automatic voting (use of voting machines tied directly to computation systems that permitted instant reporting of results). That support included both observation visits to Brazil to observe municipal elections which use such systems and a test during the complementary municipal elections in Peru of a system provided with support from IFES. The experiment permitted insights into the problems that arise in implementing such a change in systems and the approaches that need to be taken to overcome those problems. However, given existing legislation, which is unlikely to change in the near future, it is not currently possible to introduce a system of automatic voting.¹²

IFES has provided additional support in the form of computer software as well as access to new technologies and approaches (for example, methods of encrypting of databases and use of geographical information systems). In commenting on the support provided by IFES, ONPE's head stated that the single most lasting contribution made by IFES was linking ONPE to agencies throughout the region and elsewhere in the world engaged in similar activities.

At the end of the three years of the IFES CA and after two rounds of municipal elections and the organization and implementation of a special recall election process in November, 1997, ONPE has demonstrated a capacity to fulfill its intended role. In fact, it has begun to build on some of the lessons drawn from the technical assistance and training provided by IFES in such areas as developing a manual and training guide for respectively poll committee members (*miembros de mesa*) and for the temporary staff of the Decentralized Offices of Electoral Processes (ODPE) which are the field centers for managing the elections. The new manual for poll committee members draws on lessons learned from previous manuals. It was subject to a very limited amount of field testing (using service employees in Lima), which is certainly a beginning, but just that in implementing appropriate techniques for testing communications instruments. The new training guide for heads of ODPEs is a comprehensive one that includes basic principles as well as specific techniques. The guide serves

¹² A new municipal elections law was passed and promulgated in October, 1997. The law does not authorize automatic voting. The current general election law (September 29, 1997) also does not specifically contemplate the use of automatic systems of vote-counting.

as a comprehensive reference document as well as a basis for training ONPE has used the guide in its training of heads of ODPEs. In short, there has been considerable movement in meeting the need for better training, a need met over time with support that ONPE readily acknowledges has come from IFES but at the same time has clearly been internalized in the language and actions of ONPE's leadership.

IDENTIDAD

IDENTIDAD, as a new organization with a broad function to perform, has clearly needed to develop an institutional framework and approach to its task--to provide all Peruvians with a national identity card that accurately represented their status and was united in a database with appropriate vital statistics. The task involved integrating the existing functions of the electoral registry and the civil registry into a single comprehensive, secure national database. According to the principal Congressional sponsor of the Electoral Law, Congressperson Martha Chavez, the system was as much intended to identify all Peruvians as to ensure their access to vote. Thus, while IDENTIDAD is clearly a part of the formal electoral system, its function extends beyond that system.

The approach that has been taken involved integrating two separate and distinct data systems, the electoral registry which had been managed by the Jurado and the civil registry system that functioned throughout the country at the municipal level. The task was undertaken emphasizing privatization of functions such as management of databases. IDENTIDAD has organized itself to be a manager of a contracting process which at the same time was set up to be self-sustaining. Revenues generated from the system of registration of citizens and their vital statistics are intended to be sufficient to cover all of the costs of IDENTIDAD and in addition, according to the recently enacted electoral law to contribute to support the other elements of the electoral system.

The process of integrating functions has begun to take place, but not without considerable friction as the majority of former Jurado employees, the electoral registers, have lost their jobs as the size of IDENTIDAD's staff has been reduced. As part of a process of transforming the institution, IDENTIDAD, as noted earlier, has altered its name to provide the public with an easier means of identifying its function from the official title that it received as the Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil (National Registry of Identification and Civil Status). That task has been a difficult one as witness continuing references in all of the principal media to the organization by its previous abbreviation (RENIEC). In that regard, using the term IDENTIDAD, in the USAID/APOYO survey, 27% of those asked did not recognize the name of the organization as compared with only 11% who failed to recognize the Jurado and 19% who failed to recognize ONPE¹³. Even though IDENTIDAD has to eventually reach out to all Peruvians, it has as yet to establish its brand name.

¹³ If we include those who say they do not have an opinion regarding the organization, IDENTIDAD does slightly worse. 32% either do not know it or have no opinion about it versus, 17% for the Jurado and 22% for ONPE. In a similar vein, a recent (September, 1997) survey by another survey firm, DATUM, showed that a similar number of individuals did not know RENIEC and that those that recognized the name gave it on average a grade of 11.9, just barely a gentleman's C.

What IDENTIDAD faces can be considered more an organizational identification problem than a problem of overcoming resistance to the task it performs. For example, IFES in support of IDENTIDAD conducted a survey in August of 1997 in the greater Lima metropolitan area (province of Lima). That survey showed that an overwhelming majority of those interviewed (99%) thought an identification card was necessary. However, while 95% of those interviewed had a *libreta electoral* (voter registration book), only 14% had received their *libreta mecanizada*, the temporary substitute card that IDENTIDAD has been issuing as part of the process of cleaning up its database and developing its systems to issue a new national identity card beginning next year.

The survey also pointed to an issue that has arisen regarding the card--the cost of making a change. While the majority had not exchanged their *libreta electoral* for the *libreta mecanizada* because they did not have the time (54%) or felt it unnecessary (23%), 19% felt the new card (which costs around \$10-12) was too expensive. That 19% overwhelming comes from the two lowest socio-economic groups (C & D) which represent 76% of the population. Thus, a concern to be faced by IDENTIDAD is the issue of the cost of its card, given the requirement for universal coverage. In that regard, the IFES supported survey provides additional insights. When asked why they did not have a *libreta electoral*, around two-thirds of those who did not have one indicated that they had never had one (this group represented about 3% of those in this sample of Lima). A significant portion (45%, again largely drawn from the lowest economic groups [C & D]) had no idea about the fact that in 1998 there would be a single identification document. Finally, 60% were not in agreement that they should have to pay for the card--an attitude held by a majority of all socio-economic groups except the members of the uppermost class (A).

Stated in other terms, although the vast majority support a system of identification, the survey suggests that the particular system to be instituted has not been effectively publicized in Lima, and that there is likely to be considerable resistance over time to the desire for self-sustainability of IDENTIDAD. The implications of this requirement for self-sustainability also has to be examined from the viewpoint of its potential impact on the operations of the electoral system, an issue that will be discussed later in this chapter.

IFES technical assistance to IDENTIDAD has focused on assisting in developing IDENTIDAD's institutional image, its organizational structure and the financial requirements of the process of shifting to a new identity card. That support has included direct technical assistance, support for a public information campaign and the support of travel by IDENTIDAD staff to Chile, Colombia, Mexico and the United States to observe technical aspects of registration systems. Support has been provided for such activities as internal performance audits directed at improving systems for service delivery and training to strengthen the capacity of staff in service delivery.

Need for an Appropriate Organizational Culture

Uniformly, all three new organizations faced issues of developing an appropriate organizational culture to meet their responsibilities. Such an organizational culture requires the ability to undertake strategic planning, to develop skills in the management of large temporary staffs directed at a highly

technical task, the conduct of a national election. Each of the three organizations had questions it needed to face: the Jurado in terms of its hierarchical and legalistic frame of mind, ONPE in terms of its highly structured bureaucracy and its need to project an image, an inheritance from the Jurado, and IDENTIDAD in terms of its need to be able to project a new image, to communicate regarding a new product (the National Identity Card) and to open up what was also in effect a hierarchical organization. IFES addressed these concerns with a combination of staff training (directed at the Jurado and ONPE) and technical assistance (directed at all three organizations).

The principal effort at staff training supported by IFES was a series of courses and workshops managed by the Universidad Peruana de Ciencias Aplicadas (UPC) (Peruvian University of Applied Sciences). Participants in the UPC series were drawn from both the permanent staffs of the Jurado and ONPE, including senior staff. IDENTIDAD chose not to participate in the course. The training course was substituted by IFES for the international observation/study tours that had originally been proposed in its workplan, because it was felt by IFES, the Jurado and ONPE that this was a better mechanism for providing the necessary staff development.

The UPC series which was held intermittently between August and December, 1996. It covered a broad range of topics including strategic planning, the development of an institutional image, the political function of elections, the process of democratic elections, organizational administration including management of human resources, logistics, and budget control. The course combined lectures with various forms of participatory training that included a workshop directly related to the tasks of the participants. The participants, in general, rated the courses highly.

More importantly, in terms of the application of lessons learned to the job at hand, while ONPE because of its re-organization after the course was completed (reduction of core personnel by around half) lost the services of many personnel who participated in the course, the course clearly had an impact. Senior ONPE staff in discussions with the evaluation team clearly demonstrated that they understood such concepts as strategic planning, management by result and team coordination of efforts. ONPE's re-organization also reflected an attempt to reduce hierarchy as well as reduce personnel. A similar sense of shift in organizational culture was not felt in interviews with Jurado personnel.

Success in developing this new institutional culture has clearly been a mixed one. The Jurado still functions as a hierarchical bureaucracy and still has not instituted the necessary organizational transformations (establishment of an effective educational department for example) that will allow it to carry out its new roles. ONPE has begun to 'talk the talk' in terms of the need for strategic planning. It has simplified its organizational structure, reducing levels of hierarchy and reducing, as well, the number of permanent staff. It has also begun to incorporate the concept, if not the effective practice, of testing its training materials, a vital tool in an organization dependent on temporary staffing. IDENTIDAD is facing a concern regarding its capacity to deal with the public, with the political dimensions of the role it has to play (as witness the recent controversy over enrolling parties) as well as with its internal capacity to meet its management requirements.

Who Pays

A further critical concern, related to the broad issue of structural limitations on voting, is the question of who is responsible for paying for the costs of maintaining the electoral system. The electoral law appears to be clear that the three institutions are supposed to have budgets that pay for any elections contemplated in the electoral code¹⁴ But, in practice the situation is far different Each of the three components receives far less from the Government of Peru's budget than what is considered by them to be the sums they require to carry out their tasks The Jurado, for example, received a budget of NS8,000,000 (US\$3,000,000 approximately) when its requirements were for an additional NS25,000,000 (US\$9,260,000 approx)¹⁵ ONPE also operates a deficit between its requirements for up-coming elections and the funds available to it from the government (ONPE's government supported budget is approximately \$2.4 million for 1998, while its director indicated that it hoped to secure an additional \$6.5 million in fines to meet the requirements of the 1998 municipal elections) Only IDENTIDAD has a potential for generating sufficient resources from fees for service so that its budget of around NS 74 million appears to meet its needs

The current solution, apart from an appeal to a government that considers that it cannot afford more, is to rely on what might be called a combination of fees for service and fees for the foibles of human nature ONPE has bet its solvency on the ability to collect fines from those who do not vote IDENTIDAD balances its budget on the fees it receives from renewals of identity cards and those that have to be replaced because they are lost or stolen (The Jurado is betting on a combination of charity from the government and the surplus generated by IDENTIDAD's efficiency) Above all, the proposed solutions, especially that proposed by IDENTIDAD, suggest the development of what may amount to a defacto poll tax--impeding voting by those who already have limited access, the poor, above all the rural poor

IDENTIDAD's leadership is aware of the problem and has suggested a solution It has established a fund that will finance identity cards for those who are in extreme poverty according to government calculations and cannot afford them. That fund will be financed by a loan from the Office of the Presidency to IDENTIDAD which IDENTIDAD will pay back over a number of years from its surplus At issue is the manner in which the fund will be implemented what percentage of the population will qualify (this hinges on the definition of extreme poverty--does it cover 10% of the population, does it cover 18% or more¹⁶?), and will the funds available be sufficient? How will

¹⁴ Special elections are supposed to be covered by additional appropriations Title XV of the Organic Electoral Law No 26859 covers budgetary issues

¹⁵ This covers requirements for the next municipal elections (NS 14 million) as well as to cover pensions, mandated salary adjustments and the acquisition of space for the Jurado

¹⁶ The head of IDENTIDAD in a interview with the evaluation team thought that the total to be covered amounted to 10% of the population The Peruvian government based on current studies indicates that over 18% of the population is in extreme poverty and an additional 28% is classified

individuals demonstrate their need and what additional administrative burden is implied in this process? Where will additional resources be drawn from (raising fees of other segments of the population?), and how will that process limit the surpluses assigned to ONPE and the Jurado to meet their needs?

The issue remains a difficult one, a concern that influences the future characteristics of a vital democratic function. If the government of Peru is not committed to ensuring that there are sufficient resources available to pay for the elections required by its constitution, will the result be, over time, that the responsible agencies are forced to limit access to participation by imposing fees that restrict the ability of those who have a right to participate to exercise that right--above all those of limited economic resources. The solution currently on the table, that of a loan to IDENTIDAD, may not suffice to avoid what amounts to a poll tax that restricts access to the electoral process. This issue remains to be dealt with in the future.

NGO Support

The IFES CA sought to support a variety of NGOs, undertaking various forms of activities which ran from efforts at promoting transparency in polling processes, dialogues regarding the issues involved in the elections, citizen participation in general and specifically in rural areas and the role of the press in the electoral process. The earlier IFES work plans did not specifically address the intended impact of the grants except to refer to "activities that are related to elections and civic education"¹⁷. Later work plans called for "promotion of a more effective labor by Peruvian NGOs in promoting electoral processes, above all among dis-advantaged sectors", and "strengthening the technical, administrative and managerial capacities of NGOs so that they could be sustainable beyond the limits of the program"¹⁸. The bulk (around half) of the total of around \$500,000 spent for civil society went to a single organization (Transparencia) which engaged in various of these forms of activities as well as becoming the national repository for electoral data through the establishment of its Multimedia Center.

The approach taken to providing sub-grants to civil society organizations involved a process of identification of the sub-grantees by IFES in coordination with USAID/ODIT. There was no open competition. Potential grantees were identified, asked to provide proposals and the proposals evaluated. The assumption was that there was a finite number of civil society organizations qualified in this specialized field. These were the organizations to which it was assumed that the resources would be best directed. Despite the statement in the 1996 work plan, there was also no assumption that support was to be directed to a process of institution building--grants were made for specific

as poor (Ministerio de la Presidencia, *Elementos de la Estrategia Focalizada de Lucha Contra la Pobreza Extrema*, Lima, 1996, p. 20)

¹⁷ From a document labeled 'Annual Activities-Peru Election Assistance Project'

¹⁸ IFES, *Programa de Asistencia Electoral, January, 1996*, Anexo I, p. 3

activities not to strengthen or develop an institution. As it turned out, Transparencia was considered the organization best qualified to carry out various of the activities proposed by IFES as part of its work plan. Thus, Transparencia received the bulk of the funding.

Other organizations that received support, each for a specific activity or set of activities included

- Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales (Peruvian Center for International Studies) (CEPEI) to conduct a series of regional dialogues in early 1995 on the national electoral process and, at a later date that same year, on the municipal elections. The dialogues reached a relatively small audience (1250), but the impact was extended by CEPEI's publication of the proceedings. CEPEI continues to exist, but on a very limited basis. It is currently searching for funding to continue its efforts as a think-tank focusing largely on international relations.
- Consejo por la Paz (Council for Peace) to undertake a get out the vote campaign for the 1995 national elections. The Council used a series of seminars as well as television and radio spots to get its message across. The television and radio spots were widely disseminated although no surveys or other tests were made to measure their actual impact. No further support was provided to the Council.
- Instituto de Prensa y Sociedad (Institute for Press and Society) (IPYS) to undertake a seminar on Press as a Factor in an Election which was held in March, 1995. This seminar had, as its principal audience, the press both from Lima and from the provinces. As would be expected given the target audience, the event was extensively covered in the press. However, as the coordinator of the event indicated, the event was just a seed and needed to have follow-up. No such follow-up was provided within the context of the IFES CA. IPYS is seeking support to develop its activities on an international basis, focusing on the Andean region.
- Universidad Peruano de Ciencias Aplicadas (Peruvian University of Applied Sciences) (UPC) to support a public forum in Lima in September, 1995 labeled "municipal creativity" which was promoted in advance through cooperating media and was further disseminated through television reaching over 600,000 viewers. The forum focused on the views of the principal candidates for mayor on the major issues that Lima as a metropolis is facing including urban planning and citizen participation, sanitation, street vending, transportation, the shanty towns (pueblos jóvenes), energy, and transportation. The results of the forum were later published. This event can also be considered a success, but again there was no long term follow-up because UPC is not a civil society organization whose focus is on fostering these sorts of civic dialogues.
- SER/CEAPAZ are two organizations engaged in rural development. They were funded to promote citizen initiatives in rural areas through training of local journalists and opinion leaders. This sub-grant which lasted between July, 1996 and April, 1997 reached 228 radio journalists in rural areas who were motivated to promote themes of civic education.

SER/CEAPAZ tracked the impact of the specific campaigns generated in various rural areas. Some specific results reported included increased electoral participation in several districts (differences in voting participation from one election to another), conduct of an anti-alcoholism campaign through citizen initiative and pavement of a road again as a result of citizen initiatives. The efforts, as the final report indicated, "resulted in radio serving its proposed role to motivate citizen participation and a dialogue with local authorities" SER as an organization continues to work actively in these rural areas with an agenda that emphasizes community development and citizen participation. It is currently seeking support for such activities.¹⁹

All of these activities, taken one by one, can be deemed successful. All addressed issues related to citizen participation in elections. But, virtually all of the support was focused on a single event or set of events that was not linked to a longer term action by the organization in question. Only in the case of SER/CEAPAZ was the program an extended one, designed to have a longer range result.

Support for Transparencia

Transparencia is a civil association which was established in July, 1994. Its principal activities are promoting the participation of civil society in the electoral process which includes efforts at ensuring the fairness and integrity of the electoral process, civic education, organization of systems of electoral observation and analysis of electoral information. It has developed a series of publications on its activities. It houses a multi-media resource center regarding elections which publishes an electronic newsletter on issues related to elections throughout the region. It manages a website on electoral issues and maintains relevant databases.

Support for Transparencia by IFES was not confined to a single event or program, but rather to a series of events and to the establishment of at least one long term activity, the Multimedia Center. Support was initially provided in connection with the 1995 national elections to secure volunteers to build a network of national electoral observers. This first sub-grant was considered a success because around 10,000 volunteer observers participated under Transparencia's aegis in election day observation. A similar number of observers was fielded by Transparencia for the municipal elections, also, as noted below, supported in part through the IFES CA. As importantly, Transparencia developed a reputation through its actions in the 1995 national elections for impartiality and objectivity in its role as election monitor and post-election analyst. It has maintained that reputation to date with politicians, journalists and academicians of all political positions interviewed by the evaluation team, all coinciding in their favorable appraisal of Transparencia.

Additional support was provided to Transparencia by IFES in 1995 to carry out programs of civic education regarding the municipal elections. The sub-grant supported training and fielding of

¹⁹ SER was the managing entity for the two organizations. IFES had no contact with anyone from CEAPAZ. The evaluation team could not locate a contact.

observers to cover 80% of the electorate. Transparencia was also supported to conduct a national meeting of its regional coordinators to evaluate the electoral process at the end of 1995.

As will be discussed further below, Transparencia received support for a series of meetings designed to further the policy dialogue regarding electoral reform. Finally, Transparencia has received support for the establishment of its Multimedia Center, a computer based information center which, as noted above, has set up databases related to analyzing elections in Peru and elsewhere in the region. The Center has a website that is available through the Internet.²⁰ The Center is effectively the only functioning information center in Peru that can provide analyses of the electoral process. Its director is a skilled professional who has been used by IFES to provide technical assistance to ONPE and the Jurado in the recent publication of the results of the municipal elections of 1995/96.

Transparencia, with support from IFES and other donors has established itself as a significant contributor to the electoral process in Peru. Transparencia also has established an international reputation for its abilities to organize national observer networks. But, Transparencia faces a critical problem--its ability to sustain its activities. The support that Transparencia has received to date from IFES has focused, as already noted, on events or programs. The support has tended to reinforce the capacity that Transparencia has displayed, but has not permitted a program of institutional strengthening.

There is a notable exception--the Multimedia Center. The Center is a potential source of revenue generation. However, as yet it is not sufficiently developed as a revenue producer. There is an evident need for a specific marketing effort directed at making the Multimedia Center into a revenue source. That effort would include a careful analysis of the available market for its services and of appropriate mechanisms for charging for those services. But, the Multimedia Center as presently constituted is not likely to survive if Transparencia cannot sustain itself. The Center at present does not generate sufficient revenues to cover a minimum budget for staff, for its space requirements and support services.

While it was not USAID's intent through the IFES CA to undertake a program of institutional strengthening²¹, the programmatic success of Transparencia raises an issue to be considered:

- Given the importance of a civil society presence in providing oversight of the electoral process and in maintaining the historical memory of that electoral process as well as providing access to the experience of other countries (the dual roles of the Multimedia Center), should USAID examine the possibility of sustaining the benefits already generated by its efforts--the

²⁰ The Center's website is located at <http://www.transparencia.org.pe>

²¹ As noted earlier, language indicating a concern with sustainability was in the IFES 1996 work plan approved by USAID. However, the type of grants awarded and the overall size of those grants indicated that their focus was programmatic and not designed to foster institutional support.

existence of an institution with both a national and international reputation for electoral observation and electoral analysis?

We will return to this issue in the conclusions and recommendations in Chapter V

Supporting a Policy Dialogue for Electoral Reform

The 1993 Constitution had established the concept of an electoral system with responsibilities divided among three agencies, the Jurado, the ONPE and RENIEC. The Constitution did not define the exact roles and relationships of the three agencies. That remained to be done through legislation. Moreover, the character of representation in the Constitution was also not clearly defined. The 1995 Congress was to be elected through a single national district using proportional representation, but the issue still could be redefined by legislation. Thus, there were a series of political and technical questions regarding the electoral process in general and the election of Congresspersons that remained to be decided. In this context, IFES sought, through technical assistance to the three electoral agencies and through various seminars and publications, to assist in influencing the course of electoral reform legislation being debated in the national Congress. Specifically, the IFES 1996 work plan called for the conduct of a symposium to analyze alternative proposals for electoral reform which would contribute to improving the electoral system. There was no specific reference in the work plan to the impact expected from action in support of the agencies of the electoral system in their efforts to promote reform.

With regard to the electoral agencies, IFES provided technical assistance in support of the Jurado's attempts to define and present its position regarding proposed electoral reform legislation to the Congress.²² Similarly, IFES provided technical assistance to IDENTIDAD to help define its positions regarding changes in electoral law. According to the members of the Jurado, the efforts of the Jurado, despite the support received by IFES, did not have a great influence on the character of the legislation.

IFES supported two waves of public dialogues regarding electoral reforms. The first wave in 1996 resulted in a symposium and publication (Fernando Tuestas, editor, **Simposio Sobre Reforma Electoral** [Symposium regarding Electoral Reform]) which brought together Peruvian and international experts on electoral reform. Participants in the symposium included Peruvian academicians, journalists and members of Congress. Themes covered included norms for regulating political parties and campaigns, the impact of the electoral system on the political process and the relationship between governability and the electoral system. The second wave was carried out by Transparencia and included another series of symposia in Lima, Piura and Arequipa. These symposia also brought together academicians, journalists and politicians and were widely covered in the press.

²² The technical assistance was provided by a former head of the Costa Rican counterpart electoral agency and employed lessons learned from that experience. The technical assistance provider was considered by the Jurado to have provided crucial support in this area and other areas as well.

Both waves raised important issues, including such concerns as the impact of the single national district on issues of representation and accountability. However, based on discussions held by the evaluation team with relevant politicians, and, above all, those directly responsible for drafting and managing the legislation actually passed, it is clear that the two waves had little impact on the shape of the legislation.

The failure to influence the legislation in any significant way either through a dialogue between the official legal experts (the Jurado) and Congress or in a more public fashion is quite understandable. The majority party in Congress had presented a bill that it considered a good bill. It was a difficult task under any condition to influence legislation that was defined by the majority party in Congress, given the fact that this was neither a burning public issue, nor one where there was a great deal of strong support for change from other political parties. However, future reform efforts may benefit from the groundwork laid by this set of discussions. In the short run, the issue can be considered to be closed. The congressional majority considers its task of electoral reform a closed issue.

Saliency of Electoral Reform

While there have been no specific studies on citizen attitudes toward the broad issue of reforming the electoral process, it is possible to speculate about some of the elements that contribute to the low level of saliency of the issue outside a very limited circle of specialists in the field. These factors begin with the fact that, in general, the last elections have been considered to be reasonably fair and honest. There have been no widespread incidents of fraud. There certainly have been problems such as the high percentage of votes for Congress nullified in 1995, but, as analysts indicated, these problems have not greatly influenced electoral outcomes.²³ Thus, there was little public clamor for change and little basis for generating that clamor. Moreover, while representatives of various opposition parties offered alternative forms of redrawing the districting system for Congress, they did not press the issue beyond the confines of the Congress with great vigor. Thus, it can be argued, there was not much of a constituency for change, and no effort by the most interested parties to generate that constituency.

Electoral reform is a highly technical issue. The issue has to be brought home through a concerted political education effort or through the recognition of a significant crisis in the electoral system before the voters are likely to focus on that issue. Given the lack of either element, the issue is likely not to resurface until after the next national elections, provided those elections demonstrate that the system is not functioning.

²³ Transparencia's analyses, for example, point to a possible difference of one or two seats in Congress which would not have resulted in a shift in the relationship between the majority and the minority.

IV. PROJECT ADMINISTRATION and COORDINATION WITH USAID

Project Administration

Issues of Internal Management

Looking retrospectively at the arrangements that were put in place to operate a given activity, it is easy to have a perfect vision of the best approach that should have been taken. But, the realities of actually implementing an activity, place limitations on the ability to see clearly into the future and anticipating all that will take place. Those realities in the case of IFES were the need to immediately engage in supporting an electoral process that was fixed in time, using whatever institutional instruments were available at the time. It also meant a need to shift the direction of activities as the institutional framework for implementing elections shifted (the establishment of ONPE and IDENTIDAD, the redistribution of functions between the Jurado, ONPE and IDENTIDAD). It also meant taking into account the conflicts that arose between the three component agencies of the electoral system regarding the definition of their functions and prerogatives. Overall IFES was able to manage the task well.

This was the case despite the CA's very rocky start. IFES' initial Chief of Party left after only a brief period (less than a couple of months) in Lima, leaving the project's direction in the hands of the home office coordinator. IFES initial work plans for 1994/95 and even through 1996 were not well drawn. Finally, its early quarterly reports also were not designed to effectively communicate CA activities. These problems were remedied by providing a new COP (after almost a year of CA activities) as well as by improvements in the work plans and reports provided.

There are some areas where lessons can be drawn regarding improvements in the management of this sort of complex, multi-faceted and highly politicized activity. These lessons are

- ***Provide broad authority to your field team*** IFES chose to maintain a significant amount of authority over such matters as budget and finances in the home office. While generally the home office followed the lead provided by the field, the reports and comments from Peruvian counterparts suggest that the decision making process was cumbersome. It is more efficient in managing a multi-faceted project if the field office has broader authority to determine the field budget, subject, for example, to the same periodic review through a workplan that USAID exercises.
- ***The quality of a Chief of Party is critical to a successful operation*** IFES' current Chief of Party received high marks from counterparts for her work, both as a manager and as a professional knowledgeable in the subject matter. It was clear that she was able to maintain a delicate balance between the three public agencies despite inter-institutional rivalries among the three. Her presence clearly facilitated the operations of the CA.

- *A local advisory board can facilitate management of a complex political situation* The CA indicated the possibility of the establishment of a Peruvian advisory board to review and offer suggestions regarding NGO grants. No such board was set up. However, there were clearly areas where such a board, set up formally or informally, could have provided valuable insights into a complex situation. Certain specific activities could have benefitted from such insights, most notably the policy dialogue on electoral reform²⁴

Responsiveness to Changing Conditions

The activities that IFES engaged in under the aegis of the CA represented a textbook case of the need to respond to shifting conditions. The player that IFES had as a counterpart at the start of the process, the Jurado, was not the set of players (the Jurado, ONPE and IDENTIDAD) that ended up responsible for the electoral process. This shift from a single agency to a multiple set of agencies meant a re-ordering of efforts to build institutional capacity over a very short period of time. In addition, the tasks that were undertaken at the beginning were clearly more of a distinct character than those that followed. IFES moved from being part of the donor team that had to meet the election deadline in April, 1995 to a manager of an institution building process, a policy reform process and a process of enhancing the role of civil society. IFES appears to have made the adjustments well, using such tools as focus groups to measure impact and to develop plans for further efforts at institutional strengthening of the public sector agencies (above all ONPE).

A weakness in the response, as seen in the workplans, was the sort of indicators proposed for certain activities. It took several workplans before IFES moved from what were essentially process indicators to what were more results oriented indicators. In its last workplan, the one for October 1996-September, 1997, it did offer some indicators that, in fact, were impossible to measure within the timeframe of its activities, taking into account as well the resources required. For example, as an indicator of the impact of its civil society component, it proposed both an increase in system confidence and a change of participation levels in the democratic process in relation to specific civil society organization activities. Looking at the SER/CEAPAZ activity, for example, no attitudinal baseline had been established, therefore, no measurement of changes in attitudes toward system support was possible. Similarly, no baseline levels of participation had been established. As the activity's final report presents the situation, the best available indicator was the suggestion of increased activity as represented by specific citizen activities regarding specific local projects. (The attribution here was possible, but only suggestive because there was no established baseline.)

The lesson to be drawn is that it is best to use indicators which are measurable within the scope and resources assigned to an activity.

²⁴ In that connection, several of the pro-government politicians interviewed suggested that at least the first wave of the policy dialogue seemed to be tilted toward the opposition.

Relation of Indicators to IR Indicators

It is worth noting that the indicator proposed for civil society fits in with the indicator for the IR that corresponds to the activity--percent of people that have high confidence in national institutions. However, as noted above, at the level of the specific activity, the indicator does not correspond. The specific activities may contribute to the overall IR, but it is important to take into consideration that the activity level indicator needs to be related to the activity and not necessarily directly to the overall indicator to which the specific activity contributes. It is worthwhile to remember as well in judging the choice of specific activities that the activity needs to contribute to the overall IR under which it fits, if the entire set of activities is to contribute to the desired result.

Ability to Relate to Counterparts

As has already been mentioned in connection with the Chief of Party, IFES established good working relations with its principal counterparts, the three public agencies that form the electoral system. In general, the relationship with civil society organizations was also a good one, although here there were concerns expressed by a few counterparts regarding relations with IFES. Some of those concerns centered on administrative issues such as the speed with which IFES responded to proposals (a function in part of the division of responsibility between IFES/Peru and IFES/Washington).

Another concern which needs to be addressed in the future is the form of financing sub-grants. The sub-grants to the various organizations were divided into partial payments which consisted of an advance of 60%, a partial payment of 20% after a portion of the grant period had passed and a final payment of 20% after receipt of a final report. For established institutions which have core budgets such as the UPC, this certainly posed no great problem. However, for the relatively financially weak NGOs such as SER/CEAPAZ and Transparencia, the need to, in effect, finance the cash flow of the activity added to their financial burden. In other parts of the world, other forms of financing (use of monthly or quarterly advances, liquidated on a monthly basis, for example) have been adopted which take into account the grantor's cash flow concerns and the need to ensure that final reports are received. Some, such as the use of monthly cash advances, do put a burden on the grantor, but the advantage is to facilitate the focus of sub-grantee energies on their activities and not their short term finances. There are also other alternatives for financially weak organizations--tutelage arrangements where, in effect, the grantor becomes the financial administrator, for example.

These concerns notwithstanding, it is clear that IFES was able to maintain relations with a wide variety of organizations and to balance the requirements of a complex set of relations among the counterparts. The concerns expressed point to areas where USAID and its grantees can learn from experience.

Cost Effectiveness

If one examines the overall distribution of costs of the CA by programmatic area, it is clear that the activities were conducted in a cost effective manner. A large sum was expended up front to support

the 1995 national elections in part because the resources needed to be used for what was the most significant electoral event of the CA period and in part because of the need to assist in the short term in a process that was being carried out by an agency with major organizational and budgetary weaknesses--lack of capacity to conduct training and develop adequate training materials. The major investment of the balance of the CA was in the strengthening of the three electoral agencies. A significant proportion of those institutional development funds have been directed at the ONPE, the agency that can be considered to have advanced furthest.

Contributions to civil society have been cost effective in terms of the quality of the events that have been supported, and the immediate results achieved. A question remains regarding future planning whether there would have been greater cost effectiveness in the long run in an approach that would have concentrated funding in one or two civil society organizations, enhancing those organizations more and reducing the administrative burden to IFES.

Even the policy dialogue can be considered a cost effective activity, given the relatively small amount of programmatic support it entailed, and the fact that specific products such as a publication were produced.

Coordination with USAID

The CA between IFES and USAID/Peru called for substantial involvement of USAID/Peru in the activities carried out under the agreement. That substantial involvement included review of annual workplans, foreign travel of Peruvians, sub-agreements with local NGOs in excess of \$10,000 and hiring of key personnel. Substantial involvement did take place. The most critical element of that involvement, review of annual workplans, was a task taken with considerable seriousness as witness the careful scrutiny to which the 1996 workplan was subjected. That plan was initially rejected and reworked at the request of USAID/ODIT to ensure that it met concerns expressed by USAID, including concerns regarding issues of budget and indicators.

It would appear that beyond these formal conditions of substantial involvement, there was a continuing process of interaction between USAID/ODIT and IFES staff as well as an involvement of USAID/ODIT in the major events that were implemented through the CA. Thus, there were ample opportunities for informal coordination.

In one area, however, there might have been a better linking of IFES and USAID/ODIT, in the area mentioned earlier in this chapter of linking activity level indicators with overall IR indicators. This is, as noted above, not an easy task to accomplish.

Overall, it would appear that the IFES CA effectively fulfilled the requirements of substantial involvement, permitting the necessary coordination and flexibility intended in the design of this set of activities.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Issues Facing the Electoral Process

The electoral process in Peru has faced three sets of concerns which influence the quality of citizen participation²⁵ Specifically, the Peruvian electoral process faces

- A need to assure the **transparency and integrity** of the voting process, to ensure that voters can express their preferences freely and that those preferences are counted properly, i.e. that the voting process is not marred by fraud
- A need to develop the **institutional capacity** to organize and report the results of elections effectively (with a low level of errors), efficiently (within a reasonable space of time from the moment of the election) and at a reasonable cost
- A need to ensure the **widest possible participation** of citizens in the electoral process which in practice means eliminating structural barriers to participation such as the lack of the necessary voting credential (*libreta electoral*)

Main Findings

The assistance provided through IFES has sought to address these concerns through a series of activities that included four basic elements

- Support, from the outset of the Cooperative Agreement, for a period of six months for the process of carrying out the 1995 national presidential and congressional elections
- Support for the institutional development of the Jurado, ONPE and IDENTIDAD after the 1995 presidential elections and as these organizations were either established (the cases of ONPE and IDENTIDAD) or re-organized (the case of the Jurado)
- Support for civil society organizations engaged in efforts of ensuring the integrity and transparency of the electoral process, in educating voters regarding key issues or in incorporating and stimulating the participation of citizens who had traditionally remained outside the political process, above all those in rural areas

²⁵ Juan Rial's recently completed study of Political Participation provides empirical support for much of the analysis contained in this section. He also points to the need for a process of civic education--emphasizing the importance of civic education writ large, encompassing broad issues of defining the role of the citizen in a broader Peruvian democratic order. Rial is one of the principal consultants used by IFES/Peru in its activities. Rial's study was a work product of the IFES CA

- Support, largely through civil society organizations and public events, of a policy dialogue aimed at influencing the type of electoral reform legislation and forms of national representation enacted by the government

Results Achieved

Examining each of these areas, we reach the following general conclusions

- **Regarding support for the 1995 general election:** This support was provided at the onset of the CA. Support focused on ensuring that the elections were fair, free of fraud and that there was a high degree of citizen participation. Tasks undertaken included provision of program support (posters, audio-visual materials and manuals), technical assistance and payment of training personnel for the Jurado which lacked the necessary funding to fulfill its function of training local temporary election staff. Support was also provided to several NGOs to assist in efforts to ensure the fairness of the vote and the participation of the public.

Results It is clear that the support provided by IFES assisted in improving operations of the Jurado in carrying out the election. For example, for the first time the Jurado was able to provide polling place committee members (miembros de mesa) with a manual designed by professional adult educators that described their functions and that was supported by audio-visual didactic materials (above all a training video). However, it is also clear from a follow-up study that such material had a limited impact. For example, only a small portion of the intended audience ever saw the training video. Universally Jurado staff and polling committee members complained about a need for adequate training. One element of the problem clearly was the lack of time to adequately pre-test and adapt material to the differences in social situation and language throughout the country.

- **Regarding support for the institutional development of the Jurado, ONPE and IDENTIDAD** After the 1995 national elections, an important focus of IFES activities was to work initially with the Jurado and ONPE and later on with IDENTIDAD in building up the institutional capacity of the newly defined electoral system. The problem to be faced was both an immediate one of assisting the Jurado and ONPE above all to carry out the municipal elections of 1995/96 and a longer term one of assisting all three institutions in their development under the terms of the new legal arrangements for carrying out the electoral process.

Results *The municipal elections* were carried out with a reasonable degree of organization despite a variety of jurisdictional disputes. Lessons learned from the 1995 presidential elections were taken into account in such areas as the development of training materials. The new polling committee manual, for example, took into account IFES supported focus group suggestions that materials needed to be more user friendly. Hence, the manuals and related video introduced cartoon figures that were clearly directed at a broader audience as well as addressing critical issues such as how to count votes which had not appeared in previous

manuals. However, a crisis mentality still prevailed and the kinds of testing of messages that makes for good educational material was still not incorporated into design efforts 'por falta de tiempo'

Need for an Appropriate Organizational Culture

Uniformly, all three new organizations faced issues of developing an appropriate organizational culture to meet their responsibilities. Such an organizational culture requires the ability to undertake strategic planning, to develop skills in the management of large temporary staffs directed at a highly technical task, the conduct of a national election, as well as developing special skills appropriate to each organization. IFES addressed these concerns with a combination of staff training and technical assistance.

Success in developing this new institutional culture has clearly been a mixed one. The Jurado still functions as a hierarchical bureaucracy and still has not instituted the necessary organizational transformations (establishment of an effective educational department, for example) that will make it successful in its new roles. ONPE has begun to 'talk the talk' in terms of the need for strategic planning. It has simplified its organizational structure, reducing levels of hierarchy and reducing as well the number of permanent staff. It has also begun to incorporate the concept if not the effective practice of testing its training materials, a vital tool in an organization dependent on temporary staffing. IDENTIDAD is facing a concern regarding its capacity to deal with the public, with public acceptance and understanding of the transformations proposed, with the political dimensions of the role it has to play (as witness the recent controversy over enrolling parties) as well as with its internal capacity to meet its management requirements.

Who Pays

A further critical concern, related to the broad issue of structural limitations on voting, is the question of who is responsible for paying for the costs of maintaining the electoral system. Each of the three components receives far less from the Government of Peru's budget than what is considered by them to be the sums they require to carry out their tasks. The solution, apart from an appeal to a government that considers that it cannot afford more, is to rely on what might be called a combination of fees for service and fees for the foibles of human nature. ONPE has bet its solvency on the ability to collect fines from those who do not vote. IDENTIDAD hopes to balance its budget on the fees it receives from renewals of identity cards and those that have to be replaced because they are lost or stolen. (The Jurado is betting on a combination of charity from the government and the surplus generated by IDENTIDAD's efficiency.) Above all, the proposed solutions suggest the development of what may amount to a defacto poll tax--impeding voting by those who already have limited access, the poor, above all the rural poor, who constitute a significant portion of the country's population.

The alternatives are fairly simple. The government needs to make a commitment to funding these essential functions of a democratic order. If the commitment involves use of fees for service, then there has to be a mechanism in place such as an **adequate** fund to finance the participation of the poor in the electoral process which eliminates the discriminatory elements of the fee for service. It is worth noting in that regard that it is in the Government of Peru's interest, as it has defined that interest in terms of security concerns, to guarantee that all citizens are properly identified.

- **Regarding support for civil society organizations engaged in efforts of ensuring the integrity and transparency of the electoral process**, the IFES CA sought to support a variety of NGOs, undertaking various forms of activities which ran from efforts at promoting transparency in actual polling processes, dialogues regarding the issues involved in the elections, citizen participation in general and in rural areas and the role of the press in the electoral process. The bulk of the total of more than \$500,000 spent for civil society went to a single organization (Transparencia) which engaged in various of these forms of activities as well as becoming the national repository for electoral data.

Results: If one examines the substantive results achieved, they are impressive. Transparencia carried out important functions as a poll watching agency for the national and municipal elections, establishing a reputation for objectivity across the political spectrum. Its Multimedia Center is an important data source regarding elections. Another NGO group, SER/CEAPAZ, undertook an important effort to increase voter awareness in rural areas. That effort can also be considered to have achieved its purpose. Many of the individual events that were funded can be deemed successful within the scope of their immediate purpose.

However, it is clear that the efforts undertaken are not likely to be sustained given present circumstances. Transparencia is in an extremely precarious financial situation. SER, which conducted an effort at dealing with rural voter participation, is engaged in other forms of activities to support its existence. Other NGOs are either too weak to continue or directed elsewhere.

While support under this CA for the NGOs was not intended to promote sustainability, it would certainly have been an advantage, and may be a necessity, for future democratic development if civil society organizations with reputations for honesty, objectivity and the capacity to perform were present within the electoral process.

- **Regarding support, largely through civil society organizations and public events, of a policy dialogue aimed at influencing the type of electoral reform legislation**, IFES sought through various seminars and publications to assist in influencing the course of electoral reform legislation being debated in the national Congress. It also assisted the three government electoral agencies in their efforts to propose approaches to electoral reform.

Results. Aside from developing a book and other materials and calling attention to the issues through some well-publicized fora, this effort cannot be said to have achieved a concrete result. It is highly likely that it was a difficult task under any conditions to influence legislation that was defined by the majority party in Congress, given the fact that this was neither a burning public issue, nor one where there was a great deal of strong support from many political parties. Future reform efforts may benefit from the groundwork laid by this set of discussions, but that remains to be seen. In the short run, the issue can be considered to be closed.

In summary, the IFES CA has produced substantial results, both short term in facilitating the two sets of elections in 1995/96, the nationals and the municipals, and in establishing a more substantial institutional base for future elections, above all through ONPE. Given that ONPE and IDENTIDAD have begun the process of shaping their internal organizations to meet the requirements of the tasks they face and the budgets that support those tasks, there is a clear likelihood of sustainability of the benefits of the institutional strengthening provided under the CA. The Jurado's situation is more precarious--there is far less of an institutional transformation to sustain. Another issue remains to be dealt with for all of three institutions--the issue of the commitment of the Peruvian government to provide sufficient financial resources to remove the structural barriers to effective electoral participation of those in extreme poverty and to guarantee the necessary support to perform this vital democratic function.

The issue of sustainability is different for the civil society organizations that the CA has supported. Transparencia which received the greatest amount of resources and which has demonstrated its capacity to perform is not financially sustainable in its present form. There are currently no other NGOs which perform a similar function of providing supervision of the integrity and transparency of the electoral process. Nor is the investment in the Multimedia Center, the only such center in Peru, assured under present arrangements. Thus, at present, the possibilities of sustainability of the civil society effort looks bleak.

Referring to the question of gender and ethnic considerations, the CA's activities did not take directly take gender issues into account. Nor did it directly target specific ethnic groups. However, the CA's activities tried to ensure coverage of the principal indigenous populations in its electoral activities, incorporating Quechua messages in the national get out the vote campaign for the April, 1995 elections and incorporating Quechua and Aymara in the 1995/96 municipal election efforts. Grants provided to Transparencia and to SER/CEAPAZ reached out to rural areas and to indigenous groups as well.

Recommendations

General Considerations

Despite the existence of a legal obligation to vote, around 26% of the electorate did not vote in the 1995 presidential election. Some of that absenteeism is due to errors in the voter registration lists, for

instance, unrecorded deaths may mean that real absenteeism is lower than the apparent absenteeism reflected in the figure of 26%. But, at least five percent and as much as half of the total may be part of a structural absenteeism--citizens lacking the necessary access to the body politic to vote, because they are poor and cannot afford a *libreta electoral* (voter card), or poor and located in rural areas and facing logistical barriers to obtaining voter cards and voting or because they lack the necessary understanding of what is required. A significant additional portion of eligible voters waste their franchise above all at the level of the choice of their legislators because of an inability to properly use their ballots, or to have their ballots properly counted (around 40% of those who voted in the 1995 congressional elections). These two concerns point to several issues that remain to be addressed to enhance citizen participation.

- The need to promote greater access of economically disadvantaged citizens, above all in rural areas, to the electoral process,
- The need to enhance the civic culture of citizens as voters,
- The need to enhance the capacity of citizens as administrators of the electoral process (miembros de mesa) to be able to limit the loss of votes by nullification, and
- The need to further a policy dialogue which enhances the likelihood of a more comprehensible process for selecting members of Congress by bringing the individual voter closer to his or her representative.

Specific recommendations

To meet these broad general considerations, as well as to continue the process of developing the electoral system that has already been undertaken by USAID/ODIT through the IFES CA, we would make the following recommendations. These recommendations are, of course, subject to that most significant caveat of the availability of resources and subject, as well, to being prioritized within an overall strategy that takes into account the other IRs that are part of ODIT's overall strategic approach.

To enhance the institutional development of the public sector agencies of the electoral system

- ***Provide additional technical support to ONPE, IDENTIDAD and the Jurado directed at enhancing their implementation of an appropriate organizational culture to continue to modernize their functions.*** Provide such assistance on a short term, highly focused basis, through such mechanisms as IQCs only insofar as the organizations demonstrate the necessary continuing commitment to change. Changes in institutional culture should include adaptation of social marketing techniques such as those used in USAID supported health programs.

- ***Facilitate continued communication between ONPE and other technical arms of electoral agencies in Latin America seeking to enhance the necessary technical skills to undertake their tasks, skills such as better reporting of results.*** Again, this could be implemented through an IQC work order

To overcome issues of structural absenteeism by enhancing citizen participation

- ***Support an organization such as SER to expand its efforts to promote rural participation in the political process through the use of media, through community based civic education and through citizen action to secure the necessary identification documents***
This can be implemented through a grant and supervision provided directly through USAID/ODIT or through an IQC
- ***Support efforts through NGOs and other mechanisms to promote a policy dialogue with the government to eliminate barriers, including financial ones, to access to identity cards***
The basic problem here is one of political will--the government has chosen not to pay for the full cost of a vital democratic function. While it might be possible to provide marginal technical assistance to enhance the ability of IDENTIDAD, above all, to streamline its costs, the fact remains that the state needs to provide an adequate budget. Thus, given a lack of political will, pressure will have to be applied. This activity can be implemented through a grant, best directed at a single NGO, and supervision provided directly through USAID/ODIT or through an IQC. (In this regard, it may be possible to obtain allies within the government for reasons related to security issues.)

To enhance civic awareness and civic education

- ***Develop a program of civic education that can be tied to Jurado efforts, requirements of the Constitution and concerns of the Ministry of Education as it revamps its curricula.*** To implement this recommendation, it may be more effective to turn to a civil society organization that has the capacity to design a supplementary text and to implement related audio-visual and radio/television programming. (Such an approach was successfully employed by PARTICIPA in Chile.) SER and CETUC (the educational television center of the Catholic University) have demonstrated such capacity. SER has the advantage of being involved directly in rural areas. This can be implemented through a grant and supervision provided directly through USAID/ODIT or through an IQC. It would be best here, as well, to look to a single NGO for all civil society activities to ensure that the NGO in question can build the necessary institutional base.

To ensure the presence of civil society as a watchdog over issues of electoral transparency, integrity and reform

- ***Strengthen an existing civil society organization to carry out this function*** By virtue of its reputation, Transparencia is the likely candidate, but that signifies a need for a significant institutional re-orientation to meet the challenge of sustainability

The issue of sustainability of civil society watchdog organizations that are non-partisan and are often perceived by governments in power as posing a challenge is one that has been and is being faced by USAID democracy programs throughout the world. It may be worthwhile in terms of approaching this issue to look at the various alternatives that have been explored elsewhere, for instance, the development of general endowment funds, of trusts for specific institutions or specific types of activities.

Programmatic Priorities

The major constraints on defining priorities among the recommendations contained above are the degree to which these recommendations fit in with the overall strategy of the SO team, and the degree to which resources are available to implement the recommendations. These are concerns which need to be addressed by the SO team as part of its strategic development process. Bearing that in mind, we can examine the specific recommendations drawn from the evaluation.

Taken in isolation, the most important area of concern for the long term maintenance and enhancement of the democratic process in Peru is ensuring that the structural barriers to electoral participation are reduced to the maximum degree possible. The least important recommendations are those related to strengthening the components of the electoral system. Structural barriers impede the full and effective functioning of the electoral process and contribute to limiting the democratic nature of participation in the Peruvian political system. They need to be addressed as an issue within the context of an overall strategy of democratic development. The technical concerns of the electoral system agencies have received considerable attention from the IFES/CA. While the agencies would benefit from continued technical enhancements, above all in the areas of social marketing and strategic planning, they (ONPE and IDENTIDAD above all) are sufficiently plugged in to be able to reach out for such technical support. The major concern that these agencies face is tied to the issue of structural barriers—the need for the state to provide sufficient resources to ensure that the electoral system functions. This also means providing the necessary resources to ensure that financing elections does not result in the generation of additional structural barriers.

The other two sets of specific recommendations, building greater citizen awareness and developing an independent watchdog to ensure electoral transparency, are important issues that rank just below that of enhancing participation by eliminating structural barriers. Greater citizen awareness, in addition to being a commitment of the Government of Peru through its constitution, can be facilitated by reasonably small investments to promote better availability of teaching materials and curricula for public education as well as through experiments using educational television, an available resource in Peru. Ensuring transparency, while not currently a critical issue, may become one if there is a tight race for control of the national government in the next national election. Relatively small investments in strengthening NGOs concerned with these two issues may foster important impacts on future

elections and future capacity for participation. As suggested in the specific recommendations, the best possibility is to consider small investments that contribute to several of these concerns by working with one or at the most two NGOs whose agendas fit with that of USAID's Democracy SO team. This would also provide the basis for a local point of dialogue with the agencies of the electoral system and the Government of Peru to promote concerns of financing and maintaining the electoral system.

There is clearly a set of needs to be met, but they must be placed within the strategic framework of the Democracy SO and its available resources.

APPENDIX 1. PERSONS CONTACTED

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APPENDIX 2. MATERIALS REVIEWED

The team examined several different types of literature and documentation for the purposes of this evaluation. These included all of the relevant activity documentation in both the files of USAID/ODIT and IFES/Peru such as the project paper, the cooperative agreement with IFES, the SO team's strategy, IFES work plans, quarterly reports and annual reports, IFES consultant reports and reports of sub-grantees to IFES. Documents reviewed also included the financial records of the IFES CA contained in their quarterly reports and annual reports as well as available through the IFES accounting system.

The team also reviewed specific work products of the CA including the various manuals and training instruments produced by the Jurado and ONPE for the national and municipal elections, the proceedings of the policy fora on elections (including the volume edited by Fernando Tuesta), the results produced by various sub-grants including the manuals developed by SER/CEAPAZ, the volume published by UPC regarding municipal elections and the reports put together by Transparencia.

Finally, the team examined the training videos and spots produced under the auspices of the CA. The team also contacted and tested the site of the Transparencia Multimedia Center.