

**USAID/Rwanda**

**FY 2000 Results Review and Resources Request**

**March 1998**

**Note:**

Non-text files (e.g., spreadsheets, charts, maps, etc.)  
have been appended at the end of the document

## PART I. OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

### Introduction - ISP Approval Plus One Year

Twelve months ago, USAID/Rwanda submitted an Integrated Strategic Plan for the period Fiscal Years 1997-1999. Many of the elements of the situation in Rwanda remain as we introduced them in that document:

*The situation in Rwanda today is thus characterized by demographic shifts affecting as much as one-half of the population, resettlement and rehabilitation needs in all parts of the country, and a huge loss of human resources whether through flight, participation in genocide, or death. Fundamentally, it remains an open question whether Rwandans can recover from the polarizing effects of years of ethnocentric rule culminating in the genocide. The country faces an enormous struggle in overcoming the historical tendency to see power as indivisible. An increase in the influence of an extremist ideology could undermine the Government of Rwanda's (GOR) pledge to share power and create an equitable society for all Rwandans. In short, the instability of the transition period during which USAID will implement its programs cannot be over-emphasized.*

Rwanda's transition is a truly unprecedented. As noted recently by the U.S. Committee for Refugees: "rarely in human history has a society asked - insisted - that all its people live together again, side by side, in the aftermath of genocide. That is, however, the task at hand in Rwanda. The people of Rwanda are attempting to do what few societies in recorded history have ever done...Post-genocide Rwanda, however, is charting a dramatically different course. The country and its people are seeking to endure as one. A society torn apart by an attempt to obliterate an entire group is attempting to reestablish the trust needed to carry on."<sup>1</sup>

The key two part question about the overall context of this Results Report and Resource Request is: **is Rwanda in a transition and if so, what makes up this transition?** A recent review by the Mission and key USAID partners of that question focused on the political, social, and economic dimensions of the question.

Rwanda can currently be characterized by **apparent political stability** built around a strongly centralized government which is neither broadly representative nor exceptionally repressive. The political climate is constituted by **weak political institutions** which lack the maturity and diversity to engage the wider society in decision-making and a social/political culture of self-censorship through obedience to hierarchy. However, **central government power is tempered by the National Transition Assembly** which, though not elected, is appointed from various political parties based on provisions in the Arusha Accords. Those Accords project a five year transitional period for the present governmental structure, after which elections would be held. The period ostensibly began with the military victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the installation of the present government in July, 1994.

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<sup>1</sup> *Suspicion and Reintegration in Post-Genocide Rwanda*. February, 1998. U.S. Committee for Refugees.

However, very recently, the GOR's Foreign Minister stated that the appropriate starting date of the transition should be 1997 as it was the first year since 1959 that all Rwandans who chose to were able to come home. Although in the present government ministerial positions are shared among parties, real **power sharing has yet to be tried**. The need to bring 130,000 detainees accused of genocide crimes to justice continues to be a major constraint to a more open and participatory political process. An even deeper constraint is the **lack of trust that permeates all parts of the society**.

With the massive return of the refugees and their political leaders in late 1996 and early 1997, **political violence worsened in 1997**, principally in the northwest prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri where extremists seek to continue the genocidal fury. The outbreak of violence was facilitated by the GOR's open border policy for the return of the refugees, as armed insurgents reentered along with innocent refugees. **The GOR's Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), has generally been able to mount an effective response**, beating back and pursuing opposing forces perpetrating attacks on refugee camps and other locations. The GOR's decision to open its borders was a bold and regionally focused move. Rather than continue to tolerate the increasing threat of hostile refugee camps serving as training grounds for insurgency outside of its borders in what is now eastern DRC, the RPA aggressively repatriated the refugees and is confronting and trying to eliminate the security threat within Rwanda's borders. Tanzanian-based refugees also were repatriated.

High civilian casualties persist, as in the brazen assault in December, 1997 on Mudende camp where over 300 people, mostly elderly and children, were slaughtered on the eve of Secretary Albright's visit to Rwanda. To address RPA violations of human rights which have occurred in violent and sometimes poorly targeted counter-attacks, **RPA military courts have publicly detained, convicted and punished RPA soldiers and officers** found guilty of such actions even using public executions. Throughout the country there is **a pervasive need to rebuild confidence and trust among neighbors and in local and national institutions**. A strong undercurrent of suspicion and uncertainty undermines attempts at reconciliation. However, there is a remarkable resilience in Rwanda and a new infusion of ideas that are both promising and threatening. The specific implications of insecurity and violence for implementation of our program strategy should not be underestimated.

Socially, Rwanda's population is characterized by **high illiteracy rates, a high and growing infant mortality rate, the highest population growth rate in Africa, and a growing threat of HIV/AIDS infection**. Rwanda's social indicators remain alarming with population figures reaching an all time high of approximately 7.65 million in a country the size of the state of Maryland. It is the most densely populated African country at between 200 and 300 people per square kilometer. Rwanda has the continent's highest population growth rate, considerably in excess of 3% per year. Even for sub-Saharan Africa, Rwanda's low level of urbanization is remarkable as over 90% of the population is considered rural. More than 50% of Rwandans over six years are non-literate. Infant mortality has almost doubled since the late 1980's and now stands at 130 per 1000 live births, and child mortality rates add another 70 deaths per 1000 children between the ages of one and five. To effectively and sustainably solve these problems, the Ministry of Health (MOH) is decentralizing its resources in order to rapidly improve service delivery in an integrated primary health care system which

incorporates maternal child health, reproductive health and HIV/AIDS interventions.

Rwanda's economy is dominated by an agricultural sector which has attempted to reabsorb over two million people during the period 1995-1997 putting severe pressure on the land and the environment. These movements increased deforestation and encroachment on protected park lands and forests by people. Large scale livestock destruction in much of the country during the genocide and war has led to depletion of one of the Rwandan household's most important capital resources and marked decrease in the availability of animal manure which deprives the soil of needed nutrients. Settlement encroachment, violence, and poaching are threatening the fragile ecological zone in the northwest, affecting the mountain gorilla habitat there, and the once rich source of biodiversity in Rwanda's largest national park, Akagera, in the northeast.

**Nearly 100% of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture for household consumption;** however, it is estimated that over 50% of these households do not produce enough for their families to eat and must purchase some of their food in the market. Rwandan per capita food production has declined steadily since the early 1980's and, coupled with the 1994 genocide and continuing insecurity and the massive return of refugees, the FAO and WFP estimate that as many as 20-25% of all households lack sufficient food. Since 1994, many communities have been affected by repeated in and out migration which has disturbed agricultural production through uncertain land tenure, labor scarcity and other problems. Women and child-headed households are disproportionately represented among the food deficit groups as they lack much of the labor necessary for production activities according to a 1998 World Bank profile of Rwandan poverty.

Weak marketing mechanisms, poor internal transportation and the loss of food storage facilities, all contribute to high consumer prices and low farm gate prices. These high pricing margins reflect the high levels of commercial risk. Per capita agricultural productivity continues to decline due to increased population, input shortages, declining soil fertility, erosion and deforestation. In addition, insecurity has resulted in low production levels in the fertile northwest. Despite reported labor shortages in the agricultural sector due to death and imprisonment, limited off-farm employment is caused in part by a shortage of available capital.

On the positive side, the capacity to increase production exists in farmer associations, a structure that has survived the war and genocide. Production levels have increased slowly but steadily over the past six harvests and per capita agriculture sector output is at about 80 percent of the pre-war level. Increasing population pressures will result in a growing food gap, however, well into the next century and ways must be found to meet this gap through enabling net purchases on the market. There are new prospects for increased regional trade and better regional market linkages based on evolving political alliances and a stable exchange rate. **Although the formal private sector is small and stagnant, the informal sector is active.**

Much of the human and physical resources which constituted the GOR's Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) were destroyed in 1994. However, during 1997, the MOA reestablished the Food Security Technical Unit (FSTU) to improve data management and planning capacities, continued to support seed multiplication efforts using contract farmers and renewed its commitment to distributing agricultural inputs using private sector vendors. There is an **urgent need to expand production, increase productivity, diversify and add value to processing of agricultural products through small and micro-scale industry and enterprise which would add off-farm employment opportunities, and regional trade** so that families can afford to purchase a portion of their food requirements through market channels. USAID's ground-breaking Title II Monetization Program supports critical actions to improve food security, create sustainable livelihoods and build GOR capacity to direct food security policy. An active informal sector can benefit from these conditions even though the formal sector is small and dormant.

Finally, the transition is apparent in Rwanda's macro-economic performance. There is clear evidence of a willingness to rebuild the economic base even though political and social uncertainties continue. While significant increase and diversification of foreign and domestic investment seems only a distant hope, the GOR is actively pursuing solid policies for fiscal reform, financial restraint, and the creation of a level playing field for investment. However, **high military spending** (estimated at 30-40% of recurrent budget) and a **high foreign debt service burden** (end of 1996 debt equaled 83.3% of GDP and the same period's debt service amounted to 41% of exports and 26% of revenues) have resulted in severe budget deficits. It must also be pointed out, though, that the **foreign exchange rate has been quite stable since 1994 and access to foreign currency is completely liberalized**, although complete and open access remains problematic due to bureaucratic rigidities in the central bank. **The GOR's tax regime is well-advanced** in a process of rationalization to create a much friendlier environment for investment and private sector growth. Taxes have been shifted to a generally indirect regime and set at a much lower average rate of 20-30%. Customs duties have been simplified and lowered now only covering three bands or rates of 10%, 20%, and 40%. The GOR expects to institute a Value Added Tax in the next two years. However, revenue collection alone cannot come near satisfying the GOR's budget needs, and Rwanda remains highly donor dependent for its investment budget with 95% of those resources derived from official development assistance. There are increasing prospects of foreign investment entry in a few sectors, notably airlines, breweries, and energy.

### **Transitions Compared - Rwanda and the Region**

Transition indicators in Rwanda demonstrate the high degree of fluidity in the current situation and much contradictory evidence. Although not an elected body, **the National Transition Assembly has a notable degree of representation as the RPF moved quickly after 1994 to honor the Arusha Accords**. The **detainee caseload remains high**, but there is now a better system in place and functioning to determine arrest procedures and caseload management. The **ability to plan and manage development activities has improved**, with GOR and other local groups more focused on medium term plans rather than meeting

immediate basic needs; however such capacity is still quite shallow. **Rwanda is emerging as a regional leader** due to visionary leadership well connected with other regional leaders. As in the case of the new leadership of Eritrea and Ethiopia, the GOR is increasingly intent on directing and managing development and less amenable to continued activities of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While a **healthy trend in a transition from relief to development, it is posing increasing challenges to on-going and planned activities** of such NGO's.

Although common factors can be observed across countries in the region, there are significant areas where Rwanda's transition is distinct. Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea experienced long drawn out struggles in which grass roots political/social structures formed during the struggle are now the basis for political development. In Rwanda, the historic roots of the problems have festered beneath the surface for generations and a low-grade conflict seethed from 1990 to 1994 and culminated in the cataclysm of 1994 which was over in a few months. The goal of the RPF was to gain a share of power, and "shadow" **governmental systems were not developed in the bush**. Both Rwanda and Ethiopia have minority governments which make them **vulnerable to instability**. Both countries are **donor dependent**. Eritrea, on the other hand, has an unusual degree of social cohesiveness and a strong commitment to self reliance. Rwanda continues to be NGO/donor dependent but is seeking to manage NGO resources along the lines taken by Ethiopia and Eritrea and take a stronger lead in donor coordination. The important point is that these regional variations can offer Rwanda **important models particularly in the areas of local governance, military demobilization, refugee repatriation, food security and agricultural/economic development, and the way Rwandan leadership can shape donor coordination and dialogue**.

### **Other Donor Programs and Approaches - Consistent with USAID/Rwanda ISP**

The World Bank is in the final stages of approval (expected March, 1998) of its Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) which is very consistent with USAID's ISP. Fundamental to the Bank's strategic approach to Rwanda is the premise that development will itself be a part of the transition to peace and social stability for the country or, in other words, that **we cannot take as an assumption that social stability precedes the development effort**. The main objective of the proposed CAS is to assist the Government, in the context of coordinated international assistance, in making the **transition from emergency to sustainable growth**. This transition has three related principal themes: **social and economic reintegration** of refugees and vulnerable groups in a process of national reconciliation; **consolidation of the economic recovery** and reconstruction; and laying the basis for **sustainable growth**. Regarding economic liberalization, the Bank states that establishment of durable peace and political stability, good governance, and macro-economic and policy stability, are key to attracting private investments and keeping donors engaged in the development process. The strategic objectives of the Bank's CAS are: 1) rapid broad-based growth and income generation; 2) increase and restore human capital; 3) interventions targeted to the vulnerable; and 4) strengthen and rebuild capacity in both the public and private sector to design and deliver pro-poor, pro-growth policies.

Regarding other donor organizations, USAID continues to work hard to improve coordination on implementation of all three strategic objective programs. On SO1, we work closely with the Swiss, Dutch, German, Canadian, and Belgian governments as well as the European Union and U.N. Office on Human Rights, on human rights, justice, and rule of law activities and with the World Bank and the UNDP on governance and demobilization. Related to SO2, we work in concert with the Swiss, Germans, Belgians, UNFPA, and the World Bank on health services and HIV/AIDS/STI programs. Central to our activities on household food security in SO3 is coordination with WFP, UNICEF, FAO, and the UNDP and the EU, Dutch, Italian, German governments.

### **U.S. Foreign Policy Interests in Rwanda - Close Match with the USAID ISP**

In her December, 1997 address to the Organization of African Unity, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright articulated U.S. Government policy objectives in the Great Lakes region: to support peace and the rule of law, promote good governance and democracy, and encourage economic development and integration. Her rationale underscored the fact that the region's natural and human resources as well as its strategic location make it either a catalyst or a stumbling block to African unity. Secretary Albright also called attention to the need for a process of healing from the region's terrible tragedies, and she specifically dealt forthrightly with the events in Rwanda in 1994 by "acknowledging that we -- the international community -- should have been more active in Rwanda in 1994, and called them what they were -- genocide."

These policy objectives form the basis of the U.S. Government's development assistance program in Rwanda as USAID continues to implement an Integrated Strategic Plan that combines humanitarian and development assistance. This assistance is based on the premise that achieving a lasting peace in Rwanda is crucial to regional stability and in the clear interest of the United States. This premise was reaffirmed in high level bilateral consultations between the Rwandan President and Vice President and the Secretary of State during her recent visit and is consistent with the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative principles: African ownership, strategic coordination, linking relief to development, regional perspective and promoting stability. Further, USAID goals shape the Rwanda program: promoting broad-based economic growth and agricultural development; strengthening democracy and good governance; building human capacity through education and training; stabilizing population growth and protecting human health; and providing humanitarian assistance.

While the Mission Performance Plan is still being drafted, preliminary country team discussions led by the Ambassador clearly indicate that conflict prevention and laying the foundations for sustainable development will rank very highly making the USAID ISP Strategic Objectives very relevant to the USG priorities most likely to be identified in the MPP.

### **Greater Horn of Africa Initiative - Full Partnership with USAID/Rwanda ISP**

The USAID/Rwanda ISP aggressively applies GHAI principles and strategic objectives. With the final approval of the GHAI Strategic Plan and the heightened attention given by REDSO/ESA and USAID/Washington, we are engaged in increasing the level of direct collaboration. The ISP is oriented to ensure Rwandan ownership, both in the government and outside of it. Being an integrated plan, maximum effort was made to coordinate all USG resources, such as the State Department, Department of Defense, as well as those of the Bureau for Humanitarian Response and other USAID bureaus, for achievement of the strategy - the degree of success is discussed below under lessons learned. As has already been proven and will be elaborated in this R4, linking relief to development is integral to the implementation of all of the SO's. One major example is SO3 where the P.L. 480 Title II Emergency Monetization Program will directly support activities to increase food production, agricultural productivity, and market integration to enable Rwanda to diminish and eventually shed its dependence on food aid - bridging relief to development. The Rwanda program is also firmly grounded in the regional reality of this small country and we are already implementing activities to strengthen regional linkages as in the travel, funded by SO1, of Rwandan officials to Eritrea and Uganda to learn from those countries' experience in decentralization and strengthening local government. The GHAI will be conducting market transport studies to establish a much more solid understanding of regional trade dynamics for future planning and implementation. Finally, promoting stability or, inversely, anticipating instability and preventing conflict are essential to the Rwanda ISP. The original ISP included a discussion of crisis modifiers and Part III of this R4 will review those factors in looking toward the remainder of this strategic program period. Adjustments in implementation of the Women in Transition activity due to the increased fighting and insecurity in the northwestern prefectures is one example of how the crisis modifiers have been utilized in ISP implementation.

A high degree of congruence exists between the Rwanda ISP and the GHAI Strategic Plan. The GHAI's Strategic Objective One, Strengthened African Capacity to Enhance Regional Food Security is closely related to the Rwanda ISP Strategic Objective Three and includes some attention to the Rwanda ISP Strategic Objective Two related to child survival interventions. GHAI Strategic Objective Two, Strengthened African Capacity to Prevent, Mitigate, and Respond to Conflict in the GHA Region is integrally linked to the Rwanda ISP Strategic Objective One. The GHAI Special Objective Three, Improved Access to Analytical Information is very much in support of much of the work of the Rwanda ISP. One example of improved information access is the SO1 activity which is supporting Rwandan journalists' trial coverage from Arusha, Tanzania on the International Tribunal genocide trials to increase Rwandan awareness and knowledge of those trials.

### **Lessons Learned from ISP Implementation to Date - The Transitional Mosaic**

Rwanda's transition from a complex emergency characterized by genocide, civil war, economic collapse, and social disintegration to sustainable development characterized by social cohesion, political stability and participation, and economic growth has begun with a high degree of variability. Indeed, geographic and sectoral variation form **a mosaic of**

**progress and failure - advance and retreat.** This mosaic affects programming such as the fact that the Mission's SO2 is largely focused on institutional development whereas SO3 retains a large emphasis on meeting emergency needs. And the situation of Rwanda exhibits major advances and retreats which require programmatic responses, as in the case of the Mission's return to an overwhelmingly disaster response mode virtually overnight when the massive influx of returning refugees began in late 1996. This section will briefly identify salient observations and lessons learned to date in implementation of the recently approved ISP.

The first lesson is that **progress is extremely difficult in rebuilding the social fabric** in light of still simmering genocide perpetrated by armed extremists. In early February, the senior GOR press spokesman declared their actions to be "terrorism, pure and simple". There is no indication of any political agenda of the insurgents other than to retake power by force, rekindle the genocide and finish what was started in 1994. Of Rwanda's eleven prefectures, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi in the northwest are considered insecure with repeated acts of violence and on-going RPA campaigns in response. These actions and reactions create a basically untenable situation for relief and longer-term development activities. Two other prefectures, Kibuye and Cyangugu in the west and southwest, are less problematic, but any governmental or non-governmental development actions are limited due to recurring violence. The rest of Rwanda is mostly secure. Development and relief programs are implemented without the high level of threat of the other areas. However, disappearances, insurgent sponsored jail breaks of genocide detainees and other prisoners, and apparently random murders and terrorist acts occur throughout the country. The violence, terrible in and of itself, creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity that inhibits, and, in some areas, prevents rebuilding of the social fabric and achievement of sustainable development objectives.

Related to the on-going violence is the **general sense of impunity** for the 1994 genocide by many Rwandans which also impedes reintegration in Rwandan society. With almost 130,000 people detained in prisons and jails, it is clear that the GOR considers applying the National Genocide Law as a top priority for rebuilding the nation. However, it is common to hear that the sentiments of much of the public, especially the Hutu majority including the recent refugee returnees, range from **disinterest to disbelief in the genocide accusations**, and consternation and even opposition to having so many fellow Rwandans under arrest and thereby kept from carrying on their lives and contributions to economic activity. An active minority of genocide survivors and "old caseload" returnees (those people who mostly returned immediately after the GOR victory in 1994 who had, by and large, spent much of their lives outside of Rwanda) wants **swift justice, even retribution, for genocide crimes**. Obviously, the GOR is caught between these pressures for more and less strict application the genocide law.

Another aspect of continued insecurity and violence is occasional blatant **disregard for human rights** by the GOR's security forces. Innocent civilians have been caught in the crossfire in fighting between the RPA and the insurgents. Others have been detained and

badly treated, even killed, without regard for the due process called for in Rwandan law. To its credit, **the GOR has tried, convicted, and punished military personnel in several cases of this nature.**

Development will not take hold without stability embedded in security which, in turn, requires justice and the rule of law. The area of USAID's program most closely related to the negative elements of Rwanda's current situation is Strategic Objective One, Increased Rule of Law and Transparency in Governance. Much of the results to be achieved directly attack root causes of insecurity and violence in the effort to prevent future conflict, but face great difficulties in implementation. **Daunting as it may be, SO1 has to be the strategic starting point and programmatic heart of the transition country effort.** However, with the clear commitment by the U.S. Government, evident in the on-going ISP, support to the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda in Arusha, and the newly announced Great Lakes Justice Initiative, and of other donor and international organizations, SO1 activities will continue to confront the challenges of counteracting Rwanda's insecurity and violence.

The **decimation of the ranks of human resources** by war and genocide of Rwanda's public and private sector institutions is another basic reality affecting the implementation of the USAID ISP. In all sectors of Rwandan economy and society, a huge proportion of the skilled labor force, as high as 90% of some institutions, were eliminated by genocide and related flight. The generally high quality of the top levels of GOR senior management compensates in part for this fact, but there are simply too few qualified staff at all lower levels to effectively implement development activities. Much of the USAID ISP and the programs of other donors focuses on rebuilding human resources and the institutions. The GOR is increasingly asserting its authority to direct and manage development. It generally desires to limit the activities of the many NGO's which filled the institutional voids caused by genocide and population displacements. However, there is still a general consensus among and recognition by key GOR decision-makers that, across most sectors, NGO's are still required to manage some of the implementation of relief and development programs, even if seen as a necessary evil. **The will for African ownership is very evident in the Rwandan transition context, but, as yet, the efficacy is often not.**

A positive lesson related to the problem of the dearth of Rwandan capacity evident from USAID ISP implementation is the **growing number of collaborative efforts by U.S. PVO's and Rwandan grassroots organizations (farmers' associations and health posts).** They are working together, with the former strengthening the capacities of the latter with the intention of building more sustainable partnerships. Another positive outcome seen in ISP implementation is that U.S. PVO's are working to strengthen the GOR's capacity to deliver such key services as agricultural extension and health care.

Related to that kind of partnership that has important consequences for Mission programming is the **ability of emergency partners, primarily international non-governmental organizations, to make a transition from relief to development assistance.** Although the Mission has continued to program transition assistance through NGOs, it is increasingly clear

that **many do not offer the type of solid and consistent technical expertise that the Government of Rwanda now needs to rebuild its development institutions in a sustainable way.** With notable exceptions in Rwanda, international NGOs have little institutional experience working with and for national governments and cannot provide the technical skills that enable the Rwandan government to structure effective information, financial, and administrative management systems on a national scale. Capacity-building assistance can be better provided by other organizations with strong institutional expertise, international lending and monetary organizations, universities or through the secondment of technical experts to appropriate line ministries. **Customer and partner participation have been increasingly important in the implementation of the ISP.** Focused particularly on capacity building, the Mission is working to see that GOR capacities in partner ministries and other institutions are increased in order to transfer more implementation authority and responsibility to them. As the GOR establishes itself and develops long term development strategies for the country, it demands **quality assistance from the partners with whom they choose to work, exit strategies from international aid organizations and the understanding that Rwandans will decide on the terms of assistance.** Another general lesson from ISP implementation to date is that **gender considerations related to the effects of genocide can loom even larger than in sustainable development countries** and the design and implementation of relief and development activities following the genocide must take that into consideration. While many women were killed in the genocide, the fact that women constitute around 54% of the Rwandan population and are the heads of more than 15-20% of the households indicates that more men than women may have been killed or fled and not returned. Child-headed households are also part of the current family structure as a result of the war, genocide and population movements. The overwhelming majority of the 130,000 genocide detainees are men. Life for Rwandan women has been radically altered. Left in charge of families, often decimated and including one of more orphans to look after in addition to their own children, women have been particularly vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity. **Women, who bore the brunt of much of the labor demands of rural households before the war, have seen their situations generally become more difficult.** On top of the previous demands in performing agricultural tasks, water and fuelwood hauling, child care, and cooking and cleaning, many women now must carry food to men in prisons and try to market household production as well. Repeated population movements only exacerbate the women's difficulties and those of their households.

The Women In Transition activity, funded by OTI as part of the ISP's SO3, has focused on providing a range of support mechanisms for reestablishing food production and building income generation opportunities. The USG relief food distributions and food for work activities have also devoted large amounts of resources to improving the difficult situations of women and their vulnerable households. Programs for unaccompanied or orphaned children have been instrumental in applying emergency assistance to childrens' centers, initiating reunification and foster care activities and community care systems to minimize institutionalization. The G/HPN Displaced Children and War Orphan Fund has provided very important assistance for these activities.

Another general lesson is from **the process of developing and managing an ISP**. With many of the Mission's partners, **synergies and collaboration have been clearly successful** including: 1) all of the Bureau of Humanitarian Resources offices: Food for Peace, Foreign Disaster Assistance, and Transition Initiatives; 2) the GHAI, both its Washington and Nairobi branches; 3) the Global Bureau; 4) the U.S. Embassy in Kigali; and 5) the Defense Attache Office (DOD). Experience with other departments has been far less encouraging. Nevertheless, the ISP process is building more effective links between relief and development with a particular focus on conflict and crisis prevention. For example, the Mission organized a seminar on Rwanda's transition, in part to assist in R4 preparation, with very useful participation from BHR and GHAI. As the Mission develops its Performance Monitoring Plan in the next month, we will continue to work closely with all partners. The Mission stands ready to share its experience as other missions take on the challenge of integrated planning.

Another key lesson from ISP implementation in the Rwandan context to date is **how essential it is to build a high degree of flexibility into programming**. USAID was just beginning, in late 1996, to identify its longer-term strategic framework when over 1.2 million Rwandans returned to their country. We had to mount a herculean effort to respond to that need, with a great deal of assistance from the BHR Bureau. Once disaster assistance activities were under way, though, the Mission moved quickly to develop the ISP. **Rapid ISP completion, in about six weeks, favored responsiveness enabling the Mission to return quickly to the business of implementation and reengineering our partnership with the GOR**. Following ISP approval, Strategic Objective Agreements were elaborated and signed, with a great deal of effective coordination and help from USAID/Washington and REDSO/ESA partners, which have provided significant and necessary latitude in program implementation. While there has been, in reality, very little time since their approval and signing, **the SOAGs' flexible nature, in both programmatic and funding senses, have permitted the Mission to use its best judgment in sequencing the launching of the ISP's activities for all three SO's**.

## **PART TWO: PROGRESS TOWARD OBJECTIVES**

### **SO1: Increased Rule of Law and Transparency in Governance**

SUMMARY: SO1 is designed as the programmatic heart of the Mission's work towards Rwanda's reconstruction and rehabilitation. Unless the rule of law is re-established in Rwanda and the cycle of impunity broken, efforts to rebuild social and economic structures will ultimately be futile. This SO takes into account the work of the GOR, other bilateral donors, Rwandan and international NGOs and other international organization. It links closely with GHAI SO2, strengthened African capacity to prevent, mitigate and respond to conflict in the GHA region, and it incorporates two GHAI principles, African ownership and linking relief to longer-term development activities.

The mission judges that SO1 is meeting its expectations, with some areas of difficulty, and is confident that it will achieve important results under this SO. The Mission also finds this SO

to be highly relevant to the U.S. national interests under discussion related to drafting the U.S. Mission Performance Plan. The discussion below will show the progress made to date in program development and implementation. The current program, approved in the Rwanda ISP, combines development assistance with resources from BHR/OTI and ESF to address needs in an evolving situation.

SITUATION ANALYSIS: Rwanda is a post crisis country in transition to eventual sustainable development. But there can be no stability or sustainability in Rwanda without justice. Therefore, SO1 was developed to support the rule of law and promote good governance. This SO is built upon results achieved in 1995 and 1996 through the Democracy in Governance Project (DIG). The focus of much of our support to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) is the genocide law, approved in September, 1996 and a direct outcome of the GOR Genocide Conference funded by USAID in 1995. This law introduced the concept of confession with penalty reduction (plea bargaining) for the first time in Rwanda. The law also defined four categories of genocide perpetrators with varying levels of guilt and punishment. The mechanisms of the genocide law are designed to accelerate confessions and the recognition of guilt. However, a genocide law awareness campaign initiated by the MOJ in 1997 did not produce the desired results. USAID responded to this disappointing beginning by providing social marketing expertise to the MOJ to help them develop the skills to mount effective information and awareness campaigns.

The number of people accused and detained for genocide crimes continues to grow and poses acute problems for the justice system and, indeed, for the Rwandan economy and society. The return of 1.2 million refugees from DRC and Tanzania has resulted in many additional arrests. However, today there are procedures for arrest and techniques for developing case files for prisoners. These advances, along with the genocide law, provide a framework for addressing this problem.

While confronting justice issues, the GOR is also attempting measures to improve governance and prevent a recurrence of genocide. The issuance of new identity cards without any ethnic designation was an important initial step to allow freedom of movement and reduce the importance of ethnic identity. The distribution of these cards was organized by the Ministry of the Interior with USAID and Dutch collaboration.

The GOR is also vigorously implementing decentralization with coordinated support from USAID, the World Bank, and UNDP. If successful, these efforts will devolve real authority and significant development investment budget control to the community level for the first time in Rwanda's history, thus lessening concentration of power in the central government. A corollary outcome will be broader-based participatory development processes.

But the efforts of international contributors may have underestimated the extent of the tragedy and the depth of the trauma affecting this society. With the return of almost 2 million people since 1994, divisions within this society have deepened, contributing to the insurgency in the northwest. Although military action is attempting to stem the tide of violence, progress

toward resolution of this problem cannot wait for a military victory. GOR efforts must continue to meet the needs of citizens in the northwest and assure people that it is the intention of this government to deal justly with all its citizens. Unless the GOR can deal with the insurgency in the northwest in a decisive yet fair manner, objectives under this SO will be difficult to achieve on a consolidated and enduring national scale.

Long held beliefs and attitudes are deeply ingrained and must be changed if people are to live together in harmony. Measuring results in the areas of rule of law and transparency in government will, of necessity, have both qualitative and quantitative aspects. The SO team believes that with the use of focus groups and selected polling strategies we can establish a baseline against which results can be measured. Baseline and targets will be established by the end of CY 1998.

PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS: Activities under SO1 are clustered under three Intermediate Results: **IR1.1 Strengthened capacity for the administration of justice; IR1.2 Increased security of property and persons; and IR1.3 Improved governance, accountability and transparency.** These results packages are closely linked and are supported by our counterparts in the GOR. In each IR, we can report progress in both programming and implementation.

#### **IR1.1 Strengthened capacity for the administration of justice.**

RESULTS: One hundred and twenty anglophone students are beginning their last year of studies at the University of Rwanda Law School. By 1999, these students, mostly returnees from Uganda and Tanzania, will join 180 francophone students to provide 300 additional lawyers for Rwanda, a six fold increase from the 54 lawyers currently practicing in Rwanda.

Under a cooperative agreement with USAID, the University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) is providing legal instruction, and has written and published the first introductory text on Rwandan law in English. The initial printing of 500 copies has been distributed to law students, government officials and other interested persons and an additional 500 copies will be available in April, 1998. The project is also assisting five Rwandan law students to prepare for and attend the prestigious Jessup International Court in Washington D.C. in April, 1998. The topic of this year's moot court is crimes against humanity, and students will need to present both the prosecution and the defense sides. At a time when it is almost impossible to find Rwandan lawyers willing to defend people accused of genocide crimes, this competition will set a small but important example of sound justice principles. It is noteworthy that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has designated one of their lawyers as a coach/mentor to prepare the students for the competition.

The National Judicial Council, based on provisions in the Arusha Accords and created in 1996, elected its first board in what was considered by international donors to be an impeccable election. However, the institution has been slow to develop. The Council, which is headed by the president of the Supreme Court and with representatives from all Rwandan

courts, is charged with appointing, promoting and monitoring all judges and with establishing and maintaining an independent judiciary. Six council representatives recently visited the U.S. to observe our legal system in operation. It is hoped that this trip will help move the Council towards a point when further USAID assistance can be productive.

Within the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), USAID has supported the Permanent Office of Awareness (POA), charged with increasing awareness of a range of justice issues. The POA was responsible for mounting the first unsuccessful awareness campaign regarding the genocide law. As a result of the lack of response to this campaign, the MOJ requested assistance in social marketing techniques. A technical advisor worked with the POA for four weeks to develop an action plan for a follow on campaign and the overall development of the POA. Second phase assistance will help the POA implement this plan and develop a more successful public awareness campaign regarding the genocide law.

In addition to these planned activities, the SO team is enabling twelve Rwandan journalists to travel to Arusha to cover the trials of the ICTR over the coming year. USAID/Tanzania has been very helpful with its collaboration in making this activity successful. The USG is the only donor behind this type of activity in a systematic way. USAID and the MOJ strongly support this way of "making justice visible" to the Rwandan people. Radio and TV journalists travel in pairs to Arusha and send reports back to Radio Rwanda. These reports are now being broadcast in all three national languages. Preliminary indications show great satisfaction with the daily transmissions. Radio Rwanda plans to conduct public opinion polls to measure impact of the broadcasts. Thus far, the journalists, one third of whom will be women, have been well received in Arusha and have earned the support and respect of the ICTR.

PROSPECTS: The Law School will graduate 300 anglophone and francophone lawyers in 1999. It is expected that many of these graduates will enter public service, thus partially alleviating the MOJ's needs for trained professionals. Beginning in 1998, UQAM will begin translating and publishing all the legal codes into English. This will make all codes available in both languages and accessible to the law school and to all judges, prosecutors and lawyers. Discussions with the nascent National Bar Association, just underway, aim to identify points for USAID assistance.

Capacity building with the National Judicial Council should begin in 1998 upon receipt of a proposed action plan. Continued technical assistance will be provided to the POA to improve social marketing skills. The POA action plan calls for training in diagnostic research, design, and re-testing tools for conducting knowledge, attitude and practices (KAP) studies to establish a basis and a baseline for project activities. Results will include a campaign aimed at all prefectures using primarily radio, live theater and print materials. This campaign will enhance awareness of the genocide law and increase understanding of general justice issues. While preparing these campaigns, the POA will develop skills in designing and implementing additional campaigns. Increased social marketing around justice and conflict resolution have also been proposed by the mission and the Great Lakes Justice Initiative team which came to

Rwanda in February, 1998. If funds are available, POA activities can be expanded.

The MOJ will also receive support for the Rwandan mobile groups which are charged with completing the case files of all individuals detained for alleged genocide crimes. These files are the first step in the judicial investigation of a crime. The lack of case files has been a significant bottleneck in moving genocide cases towards prosecution. To date, the mobile groups have completed 50% of the case files of all detainees. During their recent assessment, the same Great Lakes Justice Initiative team recommended additional support for these groups. In response, the Mission will provide motorcycle transport for the teams so that they can access rural communes and complete this important task more quickly.

### **IR1.2 Increased security of property and persons**

RESULTS: Improvement in the quality and operational capacity of the police has been achieved through a variety of training activities and equipment procurement. Over 300 Rwandans have attended the Uganda Police Academy for entry level and specialized training. A complete training curriculum for entry level police has been written and published in English and tested in training courses. 100 mountain bicycles, with appropriate training modules, have been made available to the communal police and have helped to increase the visibility of the police and improve their ability to respond to community needs.

The National Demining Office (NDO) has identified 600 km<sup>2</sup> of land which has been compromised by mines and unexploded ordnance. By the end of the ISP period, their target is to cover 50% of that territory with demining activity. To date, 25% of that land has been covered. While building national capacity for a sustainable office skilled in training and handling 24 specialized dogs that can detect mines and training 110 deminers, USAID contractor, RONCO, and the NDO have cleared over 7,400 mines and 200,000 unexploded ordnance since September 1995. In addition, they have launched a successful mine awareness campaign that has helped to save lives. USAID is collaborating closely with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in supplying assistance to the NDO.

Demobilization activities have been slowed by the insurgency in the northwest. However, the Mission is active with the GOR, the World Bank and the United National Development Program (UNDP) and other donors regarding a systematic approach to demobilization and reintegration for both RPA and former government (ex-FAR) soldiers.

PROSPECTS: In mid-1997, the Mission acted to rectify difficulties in police training implementation management in order to enhance the GOR's role in decision-making. This positive change delayed implementation which is now recommencing in earnest. Continued training for public safety officials will include refresher courses in police techniques and management training for mid-level officers. A selected number of officers will also go to the U.S. for training. The GOR has requested assistance in developing forensic capabilities and this will be added to the scope of activities during the current phase. We will also provide additional equipment to facilitate communication between communes and with the central

office of the communal police. Finally, TA will be provided (preferably from the region) to assist in drafting essential enabling legislation for the communal police. All activities are closely coordinated with the two other major donors, the U.K. and Rhineland Palatinate. All three donors support training which emphasizes respect for human rights, training which is reinforced by communal police authorities. However, given the current insurgency and level of apprehension throughout the country, the police and the GOR will need to be vigilant to ensure that public safety officers act in a professional manner while maintaining public security.

The NDO expects to have 50% of all compromised land identified by their survey cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance by the end of 1999 when the project is now due to conclude. The Mission anticipates the need for limited follow on support to the NDO in 2000 to continue the task of mine awareness and clearance so that all identified mines and unexploded ordnance can be safely disposed of. We look to the findings and recommendations of a scheduled DOD team to identify what remains to be done to ensure sustained Rwandan demining capacity.

The insurgency may delay further demobilization. USAID is sending the Director of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) and four staff to Eritrea to learn about demobilization/reintegration practices. Initial reintegration efforts will focus on 5,000 soldiers mustered out in September, 1997. Contingent on the security situation, an additional 12,000 soldiers should be mustered out later in 1998, once systems are in place to provide assistance during their transition to civilian life. SO1 activities will provide support through micro-enterprise development and vocational skills training. Organizing to launch these activities with the World Bank and GOR is proving to be slow.

### **IR1.3 Improved governance, accountability and transparency.**

Support for decentralization, increased capacity for local governance, improved capabilities at the National Transition Assembly and strengthened civil society organizations form the basis for work under this IR.

RESULTS: The GOR has committed itself to decentralization and important legal and organizational work is underway to revamp administration, devolve authorities, and make local government more participatory and locally responsive. The degree of centralization within Rwandan society was highlighted by a recent World Bank Poverty Study which showed that only 1% of GOR resources are managed at the commune level and of this amount 75% is derived from local revenue collection.

To support decentralization, OTI resources have funded an expatriate and a Rwandan consultant to the Ministry of the Interior. In addition, two trips to Uganda and Eritrea have been funded to study decentralization practices in those countries. These trips resulted in excellent radio coverage discussing the findings of the study trips and a national conference on decentralization attended by all eleven Prefects and Ministry Secretary Generals held in

February 1998 while this document was being prepared. Representatives from Uganda and Eritrea were brought to Rwanda to participate in this conference.

In addition to these activities at the policy level, the Africare Local Governance Initiative Project funded with Mission DA resources is working in 12 pilot communes (roughly equivalent to U.S. counties) to encourage localities to develop a process for local-based participation in deciding resource allocation to benefit their communities. Development committees have been established in 24 sub-communal sectors and 120 people have been trained in Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Techniques. These people will form twelve PRA teams, one for each commune, to assist sector development committees in determining and implementing priority development activities. After reviewing the initial work of the project, the Ministry of the Interior has asked Africare to help all sectors in the 12 pilot communes to form development committees so that they can participate in the project. This would result in development committees in approximately 120 sectors. Once a community mechanism is in place, modest grants are available through the project to fund proposed community projects. The capacity to select representatives, debate and decide on appropriate activities and implement those activities are seen as equally important and serve as criteria for ranking funding proposals for community activities. Building this capacity at the local level will improve community solidarity and also lessen the power of the central government to manipulate the local population--another practice that produced the genocide. Complementing and building directly on this USAID activity, the World Bank is set to approve one of its first-in-the-world Learning and Innovation Loans for almost \$5 million which will expand on the USAID-tested model of participatory local development in Rwanda, to be implemented through 2002.

Opportunities for assisting the National Transition Assembly and civil society organization are still in the programming stage. Selection of staff for the seven technical committees at the National Assembly should be completed in 1998 thus enabling assistance to begin.

PROSPECTS: Under the Local Governance Initiative, we will continue to support decentralization with the expectation that this GOR policy will be successfully tested and implemented during the life of the ISP. Africare will expand activity into 120 sectors. Success in both endeavors will require considerable political will. The World Bank's project will amplify the results of the USAID effort.

Anticipated results through the National Transition Assembly support project include improved skills to analyze and write reports, legal documents and budgets. Results under the civil society support project will include increased capacity for civil organizations to represent their constituents and influence public policy.

## **B. SO2: Increased Use of Health and Social Services and Changed Behaviors related to STI/HIV, Maternal and Child Health by Building Service Capacity in Target Areas**

### **1. SUMMARY**

Expected results achieved under SO2, approved in May 1997, have met expectations over the reporting period and very promising partnerships between USAID, the Ministry of Health and the World Bank Health and Population Project have been established. The articulation of SO2 has been improved to better reflect a focused goal of increased service utilization, particularly in the health sector. The modification in language and intent was necessary to better allow monitoring of impact measures of service utilization. As discussed at the ISP review, this SO is sufficiently flexible to include possible support which the USG may want to make for improvement of the delivery of other social services such as education, although no specific plans exist at this time. The Mission also finds this SO to be highly relevant to the U.S. national interests under discussion related to drafting the U.S. Mission Performance Plan.

## **2. SITUATION ANALYSIS**

In the post-crisis period, the Ministry of Health (MOH) has renewed its commitment to decentralization through the establishment of health districts within each region and the shifting of management, resource allocation and planning responsibilities from Ministry of Health headquarters to the 11 health regions. The MOH has established national guidelines and action plans and defined and operationalized health districts. Improved planning and supervision which should in turn improve services delivered is the expected outcome of the district system.

In 1997, the Ministry of Health (MOH) restructured the National AIDS Prevention Program (PNLS) to act solely as a coordination and research body. Planning, resources management and service delivery is the responsibility of health districts. Decentralization of these functions is making sexually transmitted infection/ human immunodeficiency virus (STI/HIV) services available to rural populations for the first time. Rural STI/AIDS clinical services are very limited and, if available, of poor quality. Likewise, information and education programs aimed at HIV/AIDS prevention are organized in an ad hoc fashion and tend to concentrate in urban and peri-urban areas. Post-1994 serosurveillance data indicates that HIV prevalence rates remain high in urban areas (32.6% in Kigali) and may be rising in rural areas (3.6% in Ruli, rural Kigali, as opposed to 1-2% prior to 1994). In 1997, the MOH estimates the prevalence rate among the sexually active population under 20 years of age is about 9.7%. Any potential rise in rates in rural areas would be devastating as 95% of the Rwandan population is considered rural. HIV/ AIDS programming through the transition period will take advantage of decentralization and focus on a long-term management approach to this chronic health issue.

Constraints to program progress include on-going insecurity. STI/AIDS decentralization activity design was revised and redirected when, four months into the planning stage, the eastern prefecture of Kibungo replaced Ruhengeri, due to increasing insecurity in that northwest prefecture. Plans for a rapid population survey of the Nyagatare health district (Umutara prefecture) which was to provide important baseline data were halted because of

violence in December 1997. Progress indicators for this activity were established at morbidity/mortality levels but without key baseline data and a population denominator it will be impossible to determine change over a 12 month period. In addition, the Ministry of Health unexpectedly instituted limited cost recovery schemes throughout the country, significantly decreasing the number of patients presenting themselves at treatment facilities and thereby patient records. Progress indicators must be reconsidered and revised immediately as the activity is funded only through September 1998.

Other factors that have important consequences for SO2 programming and results are: 1) the ability of emergency-oriented health partners, primarily international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to provide the type and quality of technical skills the national health system demands in the transition-to-development stage; and 2) cumbersome internal contracting and procurement systems which have stifled innovative ideas, program flexibility and time-sensitive responses crucial to supporting a country in transition. With the exception of one or two NGO partners, none has demonstrated an ability to provide solid technical assistance to the MOH in the priority areas of decentralized, integrated health care delivery; health care financing and cost recovery; health manpower development skills; or health communications. Well into the transition period, remarkable variation in the amount and quality of information collected by NGOs make data analysis on process and impact indicators problematic.

### **3. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS**

#### **a. IR2.1: INCREASE AVAILABILITY OF DECENTRALIZED, QUALITY PRIMARY HEALTH CARE (PHC) AND STI/HIV SERVICES IN TARGET AREAS.**

ACTIVITY IR2.I.1 aims to decentralize and integrate STI/HIV/AIDS prevention and control services in four pilot regions and will emphasize the establishment of human resources and systems necessary to improve the quality of STI and primary health care service delivery. Emergency relief assistance was crucial in the physical rehabilitating and re-equipping of the national health system; however inadequate manpower and management systems hinder the delivery of quality care. STI/AIDS assistance, implemented through the Global Bureau's AIDS activity, IMPACT, since the closure of the AIDSCAP project in December 1997, is designed to strengthen the MOH's capacity to improve the quality of STI clinical and education services at the health district level, particularly services for adolescents and women. The IMPACT activity builds on a successful model of STI programming developed under the post-1994 AIDSCAP project in which decentralization of training, supervision and decision-making resulted in 75% of STI cases being correctly assessed versus a comparative figure for the centrally-managed MOH project of 47% correctly assessed. In addition, AIDSCAP support in re-building the Rwandan National AIDS Prevention Program (PNLS) in the post-crisis period has made the integration of decentralized STI services possible so soon after the crisis. Adhering to recommendations of the AIDSCAP close-out evaluation, AIDS prevention programming will concentrate on strengthening the decentralization of services based upon the successful Gitarama pilot, and reinforce technical assistance in the development and

implementation of national IEC strategies --a noted weakness under AIDSCAP implementation.

IMPACT-supported regional action plans are being developed by health district teams and expected progress indicators include: the establishment of quality clinical services (based on the syndromic approach) in four pilot regions; clear and widely disseminated national STI guidelines and protocols; improved management practices such as 60% of individuals presenting with an STI being assessed and treated according to national guidelines and the MOH supervision checklist being revised to address syndromic management issues and used consistently at the district level; and stronger linkages between the national health systems and community-based communication and education networks such as the incorporation of STI and information, education & communication (IEC) program elements into the formal MOH supervision and monitoring system.

ACTIVITY IR2.1.2 aims to increase and improve long term primary health care delivery at the health district level and builds on USAID/BHR/OFDA relief interventions which provided health, water and sanitation and shelter rehabilitation support. The activity, implemented by the American Refugee Committee (ARC), is testing the effectiveness of decentralized health care by strengthening PHC services and public sector capacity in the Nyagatare health district of Umutara which was devastated by years of war and neglect. The Umutara region was, until recently, part of the Akagera National Park and settlement construction began in late 1996 to accommodate the return of some 170,000 recent returnees from refugee camps of eastern DRC and Tanzania and an estimated 300,000 "old caseload" returnees from Uganda.

Nine of eleven health facilities in the Nyagatare district have been rehabilitated and equipped with both USAID emergency and development funds. Construction of the Karangazi and Rwampasha health centers was started in late February 1997 with UNHCR funding and are 95% complete. Since activity start up in September 1997, all health facilities have elected Community Health Committees and accounting and administrative training for the committee members was completed in February 1998. A total of 14,260 individuals were vaccinated against meningitis in addition to coverage by the district's on-going EPI program and mobile vaccination program.

Based on recommendations from an assessment of district antenatal care services, supervision and monitoring systems have been strengthened and regular data collection was instituted to improve program performance. ARC organized a family planning workshop in which 35 of the participants increased pre-test scores by 16%. All health facilities now offer family planning services and ARC has launched community education programs on the importance of pre- and antenatal care, child spacing, and proper nutrition. An accelerated training of 45 Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) was organized and district supervisors are now receiving antenatal statistics from 70% of the TBAs, up from zero in early 1997. The nutritional status of all children under five in the district has been evaluated and two health centers are implementing a joint "model garden/supplemental feeding" program. Laboratory technician training began in November 1997 and the 21-day lab training sessions will continue through April 1998 until all district health centers have a trained technician and a functional laboratory.

**EXPECTATIONS:** During the transition period, the Mission is testing decentralized assistance approaches through the integration of STI/AIDS services in four regions and by piloting a comprehensive Primary Health Care (PHC) activity in one target health district with the ultimate goal of slowing STI transmissions rates and decreasing high rates of infant (130/1000) and maternal mortality (810/100,000 births). Activities under this IR are expected to lay the foundation for expanded STI/AIDS, reproductive health and maternal/child health assistance in a long-term, post-ISP program. The GOR has requested USAID assistance to implement a Demographic Health Survey (DHS) by the end of 1999. Given the lack of post-1994 population-based data, survey results would provide the MOH with crucial planning data and would serve as baseline data for USAID's longer-term health and population activities in Rwanda. Until now USAID assistance has steered clear of involvement in precipitous family planning programs due to the extreme sensitivity --political and social --on the part of almost all Rwandans who lost family members to genocide or displacement and on the part of social groups who perceive family planning as a tool to control population. However, because Rwanda has the highest birthrate in Africa, longer-term health assistance will begin to focus on family planning and reproductive health. It is critical that Rwandans come to terms with and define their own long-term population policies and develop acceptable national strategies and the MOH has taken a leadership role in this domain.

**b. IR2.2: IMPROVE KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTIONS RELATED TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, EMPHASIZING STI/HIV, IN TARGET AREAS.**

ACTIVITY IR2.2.1 aims to create a replicable and sustainable community-based peer education model. The activity, implemented by CARE International, builds on a successful peer education intervention developed under the post-1994 AIDSCAP/Rwanda project. Through regular training and supervision, 200 community-based peer educators have mobilized their communities through education sessions, the provision of condoms, individual referral to health facilities and by serving as information resources. By the second year of implementation, the activity has reached 93% (approximately 200,000) of the target population of women, women-headed households, widows and adolescents with information concerning STI/AIDS prevention and the portion of the target population who can identify signs/symptoms of most common STIs has risen since 1995 from 30% to 80%. "Prudence" (socially marketed condoms) sales have risen from approximately 740 per month in early 1997 to 4,000/month by the end of the year.

During 1997, the informal peer educator outreach network was linked to the MOH's health education system through 136 training sessions which integrated informal peer educators and formal health center animators under the supervision of MOH nurse supervisors. By the end of 1997, 531 local associations had received education in STI/AIDS prevention and 4,483 local authorities, secondary school teachers, and religious leaders have received training in STI/AIDS prevention.

ACTIVITY IR2.2.2 aims to develop a national capacity to produce and disseminate quality health messages through the creation of a Rwandan Health Communications Center. This

activity is breaking new ground for the Mission in terms of African led performance-based partnerships and strategic coordination. USAID, the World Bank and the Ministry of Health (MOH) have designed an activity in which each partner has equal responsibility and equal accountability for results. 15 months of intensive and sometimes difficult activity design included: a Business Operations Review, establishment of a legal framework for the Center, an agreed upon equipment list, building rehabilitation and negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding among the three partners. Consensus was reached in late 1997 and implementation will begin in March, 1998.

The success of the Rwanda Health Communications Center will depend on the participation and support of all three partners and the GOR's commitment to permitting the Center to assume a private-sector, market-based approach to communication services. In turn, USAID and its implementing partner, Population Services International (PSI), must demonstrate commitment to African (GOR) determination, control and ownership.

ACTIVITY IR2.2.3 aims to decentralize STI/AIDS service delivery and complement improved clinical practices with national information and education strategies. The information, education and communications (IEC) component of the decentralized STI/HIV activity (see Activity IR2.1.1 for more detail) will initially focus on the mobilization and engagement of political, religious and opinion leaders in the fight against AIDS and the completion of the first national AIDS IEC strategy in Rwanda.

EXPECTATIONS: Given the promising results established in phases one and two of the peer education pilot, USAID intends to fund the third and final phase in which peer education methodologies will be refined and community and MOH sustainability achieved. Due to USAID's comparative advantage in the IEC domain and strong results to date, activities established under IR2 over the life of the ISP will lay the foundation for long term IEC assistance in any post-ISP program design.

**c. IR2.3: ENHANCED SUSTAINABILITY OF PHC SERVICES THROUGH IMPROVED FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY & IMPROVED HEALTH CARE FINANCING.**

ACTIVITY IR2.3.1 supported an independent evaluation of Ministry of Health (MOH) Financial Management and Contracting capabilities in early 1997. Overall confidence in the MOH system is low as no uniform accounting procedures applied across Ministry institutions for funds utilized directly by the MOH. As a consequence, many effective accounting, procurement and internal control procedures are absent from one or more of the MOH institutions reviewed.

Based on review findings and recommendations, the MOH has introduced a more uniform accounting system across central and regional levels, inaugurated a system of cash books to record all cash transactions, separated donor bank accounts and are in the process of introducing expenditure monitoring systems. The key MOH staff position, the Director of the

Division of Finance and Administration, was filled in January 1998. A Scope of Work detailing further actions to be undertaken in collaboration with the Finance and Administration Director has been developed and technical assistance will be provided over the course of 1998 to bring MOH systems up to USG standards.

ACTIVITY IR2.3.2 aims to assist the MOH to develop and pilot sound health care cost recovery systems that will ensure the Ministry meets recurrent costs within the national health care system. In the immediate post-crisis period, the national health care system has been highly and unrealistically subsidized by international relief organizations, and Rwandans have become accustomed to free health services and pharmaceuticals. Throughout 1997, emergency assistance funds dwindled to almost nothing, and the MOH is addressing the acute shortage of funds by introducing a fee-for-service system and the privatization of the national pharmaceutical warehouse. Several studies to determine health care costs at the district, prefecture and central levels were initiated late last year. In early 1998, USAID will sponsor a team of health care financing experts from the Global Bureau's Partnerships for Health Reform (PHR) project to assess MOH needs in the short-term and begin developing a sustainable system of cost recovery.

EXPECTATIONS: The provision of specific technical assistance to strengthen internal financial and administrative systems and MOH accountability are expected to be completed by 1999. USAID assistance in piloting national health care financing and cost recovery schemes will be initiated and perhaps tested under the ISP; however, long-term assistance in health care financing is expected to bridge into a post-ISP health program.

#### **d. IR2.4: INCREASED CAPACITY TO PROVIDE BASIC SOCIAL SECTOR SUPPORT**

ACTIVITY IR2.4.1 aims to provide specific one-time transition support to refurbish and provide management training for Ministry of Health's Kicukiro Training Center and provide equipment for three nurse specialty training courses (laboratory, radiology and dental) at the Kigali Health Institute. USAID assistance, implemented through Samaritan's Purse, will be completed by March 1999 and will enable the MOH to better address the critical health manpower shortages.

ACTIVITY IR2.4.2 was completed in 1997 and successfully moved emergency psycho-social assistance for unaccompanied and orphaned children in centers to stable and longer-term transition support within the community. During 1994 and 1995 this activity, implemented by Save the Children/US, provided trauma support for 2,876 children in unaccompanied children centers. Psycho-social sports, education and cultural activities were organized for institutionalized children, trauma cases were identified and referred for treatment, and unaccompanied children center personnel and resident adolescents were trained in child-care. As Rwanda moved away from the crisis, assistance focus shifted to communities following the establishment of GOR policies of community-based care and directives to close unaccompanied children centers. Responding to the fluid situation, SCF/US shifted psycho-

social interventions into target communities in which some 6,000 reunified or fostered children have participated in on-going cultural, educational or sports activities. SCF staff have visited over 7,000 fostered children for follow up visits to ensure adequate standards of child care and over 5,000 family and community meetings or social activities have been organized to familiarize reunified or foster children with their new communities. Trade apprenticeships and literacy programs were developed for 160 children. Income generation support was provided to some 1,500 foster children, foster families, and child-headed households.

ACTIVITY IR2.4.3 aims to strengthen a national social service network which supports the long term needs of vulnerable children. Progress under this activity has been extremely weak given the March 1997 restructuring of GOR ministries which halted implementation. The ministerial reshuffle resulted in the establishment of the Ministry of Gender, Family and Social Affairs (MIGEFASO) as the principal social issues organization within the GOR. The process of articulating a social sector view, both within MIGEFASO and within the GOR, has been difficult and time consuming. By January 1998, MIGEFASO had succeeded in articulating a social sector policy and establishing a national action plan which the GOR, donor community and NGOs support. USAID's implementing partner, Save the Children/UK, argues that building internal GOR consensus has been critical as progress in social welfare policy development necessitates a long-term view and commitment. In January 1998, SCF/UK submitted a proposal to amend the original plan to better conform to changes in the GOR. The proposal is currently under review.

EXPECTATIONS: Consistent with the ISP crisis modifier approach, activities under IR2.4 were designed as short to medium-term transition supports which would phase out with increased stability or could be quickly re-oriented should the situation inside Rwanda deteriorate. Given Rwanda's progress towards stability, this IR serves as a bridging instrument moving USAID assistance from emergency relief to longer term development programming. Activity IR2.4.1 will be completed in a 12 month timeframe and although health manpower needs remain a national priority, USAID health assistance will begin to focus on PHC, STI/AIDS and health care financing in the longer term. Assistance in the unaccompanied children sector will continue through the transition period and discussions are currently underway with the Displaced Children and War Orphan's Office in Global and NGO partners in Rwanda concerning expanded support to communities and AIDS orphans. The Mission views support to the unaccompanied children's sector as necessary but limited in the medium term unless the situation worsens.

### **C. SO3: Increased ability of rural families in targeted communities to improve household food security.**

#### **1. SUMMARY**

Household food security is essential if Rwanda is to have peace and stability. Without it, people will continue to struggle over a fragile resource base and conflict will continue. The

events of 1994, with the resulting massive loss of life and physical displacement, disrupted the agricultural cycle, resulting in loss of adapted seeds, cuttings, agricultural inputs and research facilities, and aggravated disputes over land. The loss of human resources to death, detention or flight and their effect on motivation to plan and plant for the future have had an even greater impact on Rwanda's economic and social life. Given the pivotal role of household food security in Rwanda, the ISP review meeting in April 1997 recommended a separate SO to address inter-related food security transitional activities. While not a perfect record, results under this SO demonstrate the USG's ability to respond to emergency situations such as a population increase of nearly 25% due to repatriation of refugees from Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Tanzania in 1996/97 and the resulting unrest, and simultaneously to build capacity and lay the foundations for development assistance. Although targets will not be set until DA and monetization activities are fully developed, the discussion below will show outstanding progress in overall program implementation and furnish our assessment of prospects for further achievement through the end of the current ISP. This SO is meeting most of its expectations and is highly relevant to the U.S. national interests being set forth in the U.S. Mission Performance Plan.

## **2. SITUATION ANALYSIS**

Vigorous Rwandan leadership has been a decisive factor in improving household food security. The GOR has taken primary responsibility for national transition as demonstrated by their leadership in emergency food distribution. USAID has also been aided by the ability to integrate USG resources - DA with BHR/OFDA, OTI and FFP resources - and to coordinate with international NGO and IOs, particularly the World Food Program (WFP), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Food and Agriculture Organization. These factors have allowed the mission to provide relief developmentally while serving the immediate Rwandan household food security needs through targeted assistance. Served during the past year were 479,000 vulnerable households (primarily returnees) who received food aid distributions and 86,000 households which benefited from food for work. Simultaneously, the Mission and the GOR have moved ahead on medium and longer term transition and development objectives.

The focus of SO3 on household food security directly links to GHAI SO1 -- strengthened African Capacity to Enhance Regional Food security and also converges with GHAI SO2 -- Strengthened Africa Capacity to Prevent, Mitigate and Respond to Conflict in the GHA Region since scarce agricultural resources are central to the crisis in Rwanda. As detailed in the discussion of specific IRs below, SO3 also incorporates the GHAI principles of African leadership, strategic coordination and linking relief and development. In 1998, we are incorporating a regional perspective on trade into action to improve food security and create economic opportunities and off-farm enterprises.

Many BHR projects have contributed to stability over the past year. USG food aid smoothed the transition of 1.2 million returnees. Food aid (50% contributed by the USG) assisted over 500,000 beneficiaries through free food distributions, food for work and nutritional feeding.

Three thousand eight hundred new houses have been built with OFDA, OTI and DA resources and another 5,900 rehabilitated in an effort to diffuse conflict over property rights. Hoes and seed have been distributed to 40% of the vulnerable population, adapted germ plasm was returned to Rwanda and parent stock multiplied to facilitate improved seeds distribution.

NGO partnerships are essential to SO3 implementation. OFDA resources are primarily channeled through international NGOs and NGOs will play an important role in implementing transition activities funded with monetization resources. But the nature of the partnership is changing as we move into development activities. NGO activities will be more closely linked to specific IRs, more international and national NGO partnerships will be encouraged, and greater collaboration with the GOR will be required.

Many more immediate impediments to household food security have been addressed using a coordinated package of USG resources including food aid. Though progress has been made, recovery in Rwanda has not been steady as demonstrated by the varying need for OFDA assistance from \$25 million in FY94/95 to \$1.3 million in FY96, \$24 million in FY97 and an anticipated \$3 million in FY98. At the same time, the structural food deficit has dropped from 287,000 MT in 1995 to an estimated 110,000 MT in 1998 and per capita agricultural production in the 1997B season was 80% of the 1990 level, exemplifying the amazing resilience of the Rwandan people.

However, many problems remain and these constraints form the basis for our work in SO3. Although the structural food deficit has dropped over the past three years as the emergency diminished, it remains 40% higher than it was in 1990. The need for economic diversification away from traditional agriculture remains critical. Armed conflict makes agricultural production problematic in the fertile production zone in the northwest. The government and private sector organizations available to respond to these problems are weak. As a result, USAID will remain vigilant and ready to respond to emergency needs, such as El Nino, if necessary while addressing longer term solutions which will enable all households gain access to the means to achieving food security.

National food security is a GOR priority with three objectives: 1) to increase local food production of the smallholder family; 2) to increase rural incomes through farm and off-farm employment; and 3) to expand regional trade, especially in food and non-food necessities.

In support of this commitment, the GOR recently realigned key ministries moving agricultural cooperative development to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and placing a determined new minister in charge. Draft legislation giving women the right to inherit property has been reviewed by the cabinet and should be sent to the National Assembly for debate and approval later this year. Such legislation will have a positive impact on increased household food security by enabling women to control their own resources.

SO3 activities supported through PL480 Title II monetization proceeds and DA in FY98/99

will increase the GOR capacity, particularly the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Cooperatives and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), to develop and implement national food security policies and strategies to attain Rwanda's three food security objectives.

### **3. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS**

Success to date provides the best evidence that USAID can make a difference in the lives of people in a difficult transition context. Results can be found in both of the SO3 intermediate results (IRs): **IR3.1: Increased GOR capacity to plan and implement sound food security practices; and IR3.2: Increased household food security in target communities.** Progress under IR3.2, which has been achieved primarily by working with rural communities to meet immediate needs and promote increased self sufficiency, provides the best data to demonstrate that SO implementation is on track and likely to achieve the desired results. IR3.1 seeks to build national capacity and is moving forward at a satisfactory pace. The SO team is continuing to review its indicators and will set targets with our customers and partners over the next six months as we apply lessons we have learned in responding to emergency, transition and development needs.

#### **a. SUB-IR 3.2.1. INCREASED RURAL ACCESS TO AGRICULTURAL INPUTS AND EFFICIENT MARKETS**

PROGRESS: In the last growing season ( September-December 1997), over 140,000 vulnerable households, including returning refugees, received OFDA and OTI funded tools and seeds packs. OFDA assistance was provided to 100% of the vulnerable families identified by MOA representatives in the 32 communes where World Vision and FHI work. Seed multiplication projects, supported by OFDA, provided over 2,600,000 sweet potato cuttings, distributed to vulnerable families by World Vision. Over the past three years World Vision alone has provided 1,620 MT of bean seed, 527 MT of corn and 209 MT of sorghum in addition to 15 million sweet potato cuttings and 700,000 mosaic resistant cassava cuttings. USG Food for Work resources have contributed to the rehabilitation of 831 km of market access roads. The Women in Transition (WIT) Project enabled over 4,000 women marketers to increase their trading volume in order to realize transport economies and increase their competitiveness. WIT also provided small ruminants to 166 women's associations which agreed to pass on the first offspring to other vulnerable women in need of livestock. Ruminants were also provided to women's groups through OFDA grants. The small ruminant population was decimated in 1994, and its replenishment matters as much for restoration of supplies of organic manure to bolster soil fertility as for meeting demands for meat and milk.

PROSPECTS: Future activities supported through the Monetization Program will provide agricultural inputs and improve farming practices. Sample activities include procurement of inputs and equipment and provision of agronomic advice for farmers and improved food handling. These activities will be complemented by others focused on more effective on-farm storage, rural roads rehabilitation, and increased access to credit. All activities will emphasize

support to women farmers and beneficiaries will be disaggregated by gender to monitor results. Activity will focus on six of Rwanda's 11 prefectures with an emphasis on areas of high resettlement and high productive capacity. The WIT project will continue to support vulnerable women in agricultural projects, crop trading and marketing activities impacting an estimated 164,000 women and their family members by 2000. This represents an estimated 14% of the vulnerable women and their dependents in the five target prefectures. Overall, this is an ambitious picture. The activities above should be viewed as an illustrative menu where prospects of relative impact and management considerations drive selection.

### **SUB-IR 3.2.2. INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF STAPLE FOODS FOR VULNERABLE FAMILIES**

PROGRESS: Food aid was distributed to 565,000 vulnerable families through WFP (half of all food aid resources were provided by the USG) during 1997. Women received 58% of all free food distributions and nutritional supplements and 39% of all FFW distributions. In addition, WFP set criteria to ensure that women were actively involved in food distribution committees helping to make decision and organizing distribution days. WFP estimates that USG food sustained 2.8 million vulnerable people during 1997 through both targeted food distributions and FFW opportunities.

PROSPECTS: It is anticipated that the 98B season (February-April) will be the final distribution of emergency seeds and tools. However, to further reduce vulnerability, seed multiplication efforts and improved delivery systems through private sector channels will be promoted through continued OFDA grants, monetization proceeds and EG funds. The current reduction in the structural food deficit, from 287,000 MT in 1995 to 110,000 MT in 1998, demonstrates that this transition is well underway.

### **SUB-IR 3.2.3. INCREASED OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVED LIVELIHOODS FOR VULNERABLE FAMILIES IN TARGETED COMMUNITIES**

PROGRESS: Land scarcity, decreasing soil fertility and high population density result in an acute need for Rwanda to move rapidly away from dependence on subsistence agriculture. Increased opportunities for off-farm enterprises and employment is essential so that food requirements can be met on the market. Rural enterprise development is an important component of the ISP. Examples to date include OFDA funded activity which established seven agro-forestry tree nurseries with a total of 80,000 seedlings ready for transplanting (50% of the workforce for this activity were women). World Vision assisted farmers associations to develop seed multiplication plots and realize a profit from the sale of improved seeds. In addition, community projects integrated within three OFDA funded activities supported animal husbandry and provided agricultural credit to vulnerable individuals identified by commune leaders. Under the WIT project, 280 women's associations received advice on business basics and start up grants for micro-enterprises (e.g. ceramic and brick-making) which benefited over 25,000 vulnerable women and their children.

**PROSPECTS:** Rural enterprises will be developed through the support of resource centers that provide technical and business skills training, agricultural extension and demonstration, small scale food processing and technical support for crop storage and trading using monetization proceeds and EG funds. Baseline data will be collected in 1998 to measure the expansion of rural enterprises and off farm employment and ensure that women benefit from at least 50% of all resources. The USAID/GOR partnership in this endeavor is strong, though both Ministries - Commerce as well as Agriculture - are weak at mid-level capacity.

However, sustained household food security will not be realized in Rwanda without an enabling environment built on sound policies, legal structures and implementation practices that promote and support GOR capacity and private sector development. These issues are addressed in IR3.1. Progress to date under IR3.1 has been modest but even so bodes well for attaining results. With the addition in FY98/99 of economic growth funds, this activity may be expanded into a third IR.

### **SUB-IR 3.1.1 INTEGRATED FOOD SECURITY INFORMATION AND ANALYSES GENERATED BY THE MOA**

**PROGRESS:** The MOA has re-established the Food Security Technical Unit (FSTU) and provided initial staff. This unit will integrate all food security data from USAID, EU, FAO, and WPF into a single format that will provide both quantitative and qualitative information and analysis. The FEWS representative and the SCF/UK Household Food Economy Study have offices in the Ministry. FEWS personnel are serving as a focal point for the development of this unit, and SCF/UK is training MOA staff in surveying techniques and data analysis. Baseline data has been obtained from selected areas in five prefectures. Although no official government document has been issued by the unit, donors and NGOs have used data it generates to target food aid assistance and seeds and tools distributions. SCF/UK Household Food Economy Study identified areas where poor families had traditionally relied on money earned through farm labor to purchase food in the market. The loss of men and the fact that large farms and tea plantations were not at full production revealed a double vulnerability and an urgent need for assistance.

**PROSPECTS:** USAID will support the reinstallation of the agricultural statistics data base lost in 1994. With additional technical assistance provided with EG funds, the mission anticipates that the first FSTU integrated food security analysis and projection will be distributed in 1999. By 2000, the FSTU plans to issue regular quarterly reports and periodic special reports to aid in planning and policy development. TA will also support the ability of the MOA to do their own data collection and analysis, making some donor and NGO data collection unnecessary.

### **SUB-IR 3.1.2: GOR AND FOOD SECURITY DONORS USE MOA FOOD SECURITY**

## **DATA AND ANALYSIS TO EVALUATE VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND FOOD INSECURITY AT THE NATIONAL, PREFECTURAL AND COMMUNAL LEVELS**

**PROSPECTS:** This second level indicator will measure the utility of the information and analysis provided by the FSTU. Since food security is central to GOR development plans, other ministries, including the Ministry of Finance and Planning, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Cooperatives, and the Ministry of Family, Gender and Social Affairs, have already expressed interest in using the reports as a planning and monitoring tool. Mission anticipates wide utilization in 2000 once recipients realize that the reports are accurate and dependable. To ensure success, the FSTU will need to work with their customers throughout the first year to refine the report so that it meets the needs of their users. In addition, in order to ensure sustainability, the activity will contribute to capacity building so that the MOA has the possibility of having all necessary staff to provide food security information.

### **SUB-IR 3.1.3. INCREASED NUMBER OF MEN AND WOMEN TRAINED IN AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES.**

**PROGRESS:** Household food security must be based on a foundation of improved agricultural practices that increase production, reduce loss and improve marketing. On-site training has already begun under OFDA grants which include training for 6,500 farmers in conjunction with seeds and tools distributions carried out by Food for the Hungry International, and World Vision training of associations to undertake commercial seed multiplication.

**PROSPECTS:** Training in improved farm practices will continue to be a part of OFDA funded agricultural projects and transition projects funded with monetization proceeds. On-site training will be closely coordinated with MOA field officers. More formal short term training will also be supported with DA resources through an improved training program at the National Agricultural Training Centers. The first students will benefit from USAID assistance at the Centers in 1999, however, curriculum development will continue throughout 2000 with an increasing emphasis on private sector farmers associations and cooperatives, and outreach to women farmers.

**Results Management/Lessons Learned:** SO3's transition focus and commitment to African ownership and integrated planning give unusual strength to this SO as well as its most difficult management problems. For example, because the GOR is our partner in the WIT program, new regulations limiting funding advances to 30 days have resulted in increased lag time in providing small grants to vulnerable women. Similarly, our desire to involve the GOR as a partner in the Monetization Project has complicated resolving USAID legal, regulatory, and procurement matters. On the positive side, the GOR partnership strengthens the impact of both projects, particularly during a time when the government's ability to respond to the needs of the people is essential for stability and peace.

As the mix of DA/BHR resources changes, this SO will be adapted to new realities in

Rwanda and our programming mandates. A new IR is likely that includes several activities to increase off farm enterprises and employment generation.

#### **d. ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE**

All activities under each SO have received a categorical exclusion with the following exceptions:

##### **SO1 Increased rule of law and transparency in governance**

Activity 1.2.2. GOR demining capacity established (696-0155)

IEE determination: Deferral-no additional funding will be provided without IEE determination. Regional Environmental Officer will review 4/98.

Activity 1.2.3. Reduction in the size of the military and an increase in the capacity of selected groups to engage in discussions about the role of the military through the transition period.

IEE determination: Deferral-insufficient information available on implementation modalities. IEE determination prior to sub-obligation.

Activity 1.3.1. Establishment of mechanisms in pilot sites for citizen input on local resource decisions.

IEE determination: Negative determination with conditions. Conditions for environmental screening, review, mitigation, monitoring and reporting have been specified and mission will report to Regional Environmental Office. Regional Environmental Officer will review 4/98.

##### **SO2 Increased Rwandan Capacity to Provide Primary Health Care and Basic Social Services in Target Regions.**

Activity 2.1.1 Decentralized and integrated STI/HIV/AIDS prevention and control program in four pilot regions.

IEE determination: Categorical Exclusion with the exception of the gonococcal resistance studies. Regional Environmental Officer will review 4/98.

Activity 2.1.2 Increase Ministry of Health capacity to expand and implement quality primary health services in the Nygatara Health District. (696-0159)

IEE determination: Categorical Exclusion with the exception of the laboratories at the six health centers and the rehabilitation of health centers. Regional Environmental Officer will

review 4/98.

### **SO3 Increased Ability of Rural Families in Targeted Communities to Improve Household Food Security.**

IR 3.2 Increased household food security in target communities

IEE determination: Activities under this IR are funded by BHR and fall under blanket environmental documentation and requirements of Regulation 216 as applied to the Bureau of Humanitarian Response.

#### **Additional planned actions:**

In FY98, the SO3 SOAG will have a major amendment outlining the uses of EG funds available in FY98/99. IEE determination will be required before obligation.

### **PART III. STATUS OF THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT**

USAID/Rwanda's ISP was approved for the period 1997-1999 in April, 1997. We are completing the first year of its implementation. In this section, we will review the few minor changes made in ISP implementation, the status of the crisis modifiers provided in the ISP as of February, 1998, and projections for likely scenarios for the remainder of the ISP period and options for USAID planning and programming for the subsequent years.

SO1 implementation has produced important results related to most of its IR's. However, specific actions on supporting the GOR demobilization program and strengthening the National Demobilization Commission's technical capacities have not progressed to this point and are likely to be delayed. The GOR's demobilization program is being implemented very slowly due to the on-going conflict in 4 of the 11 prefectures. It is completely understandable that the GOR will have to limit the pursuit of its objectives in demobilization in order to give higher priority to maintaining sufficient force levels to engage with the insurgents' terrorist campaign to rekindle and complete the genocide.

Implementation of SO2 is on track and the Mission sees a clear path to greater MOH engagement in a sustainable development partnership. As noted in the Part II discussion of SO2, the Mission could consider expansion into increasing utilization of other services, particularly education, if additional funding and management support were to be forthcoming. SO3 will shift focus away from emergency interventions toward increased transition activities to provide greater opportunities for rural household self sufficiency. At the same time, a new dimension will be added that is more developmental in nature and will aim to increase rural enterprises and off-farm employment. This focus will likely result in a third IR, a

determination to be made once recruitment of a USPSC SO3 Team Leader (agricultural specialist), presently under way, is completed.

The ISP identified four crisis modifiers as issues or phenomena to watch which could effect ISP implementation. First, we discussed the likely effect of on-going or increased instability in some regions which would constrain action in those regions across the entire program. Indeed, there has been such instability in the form of continuing clashes and intermittent slaughter as radical insurgents perpetrate terrorist acts and the RPA responds. For that reason, the program has been able to accomplish little in the prefectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, and been limited in its activities in Kibuye and Cyangugu across all the SO's. Incidents of sporadic violence occurred in other regions such as the attack on a public bus in the northeastern Rwanda's Umutara prefecture where ARC is implementing activities under SO2. That incident led to postponement of gathering important baseline data to enable monitoring of progress on IR 2.1.2. Attacks on World Food Program and other programs' vehicles and drivers have complicated delivery of FFP resources throughout the ISP period.

Another crisis modifier concerned possible adverse changes in GOR policies or performance. The specific areas raised for attention were human rights abuses and the openness or inclusiveness of political process. GOR performance related to these areas does not indicate any need to change the Mission's results framework. That is not to say vigilance in monitoring of the government's performance is not still necessary particularly on respect for human rights in the zones of insecurity and related to the massive number of detainees for genocide crimes. The GOR has continued to build a representative government. USAID's participatory local governance initiative under the LGI activity is at the vanguard of implementation of the GOR's decentralization policies. A concern has been raised that corruption may be appearing, leading to mismanagement of resources. However, in at least one very prominent case, when official attention was given to the problem, a key official was removed and replaced by another official whose performance has been above reproach. When USAID surfaced complaints from vulnerable groups of petty corruption in the local distribution of relief supplies (seeds and tools), the Prime Minister cracked down swiftly and effectively. Compared to other governments in the region, the GOR seems relatively free of corruption.

A third crisis modifier was the case of additional massive influx of refugees, but this has not occurred since ISP implementation began. This modifier has been overtaken by events and is no longer relevant. As noted in Section I, most of the refugees have been settled with remarkably few incidents of violence. This is not to say that problems of land tenure and settlement have not occurred or do not persist. The key point is that the population increased by more than 25% and yet the overall situation remained quite stable, having no effect on USAID ISP implementation, except in the four prefectures addressed by the first crisis modifier.

The final crisis modifier related to the dearth of capacity of human resources which could

negatively effect program development and implementation and inhibit GOR ownership. Capacities are being improved very slowly across all sectors and this problem continues to have an impact on our program and to pose challenges to putting Rwandan ownership into practice. Nevertheless, remarkable progress is evident in Rwanda's evolution from genocide and a military dictatorship to being firmly in a transition to sustainable development and a representative, responsive, and participatory government. At this point, while remaining fully cognizant of the tremendous limitations still existing in GOR institutional capacity, ISP implementation does not need to be modified due to a worsening of that factor.

The ISP was developed to identify objectives and activities in three fiscal years, 1997-1999. The Mission cannot project at this time what the preferred option will be for continued programming after FY 1999. However, the ineluctable fact is that Rwanda is progressing through a transition, albeit unevenly in different aspects of its society and economy. Almost one year into ISP implementation, guarded optimism is warranted. At least three scenario seem possible for the remainder of the current strategic planning period. First, the general context could improve greatly, particularly regarding security, justice and economic performance; progress in ISP results achievement could far exceed expectations; and USAID would then develop a longer-term sustainable development program for a period exceeding the transitional window of three years. Second, the general context could change very little; progress in ISP results achievement could stay within a reasonable range of expected performance; and USAID would then extend the existing strategic framework for some additional time period, perhaps up to three years. Third, the general context could worsen in significant ways which negatively affect results achievement; and USAID would then curtail some or all of its program except for meeting humanitarian response needs. The Mission expects to be able to determine the most useful programming approach on the basis of next year's R4 2001 document. In the meantime, SO Team progress will be assessed quarterly and USAID/Washington, REDSO, and other partners will be informed frequently on the status of both the general context and program performance.

**USAID/RWANDA**  
**FY2000 RESOURCE REQUEST**

**May 1998**

## PART IV. RESOURCE REQUEST

### A. NARRATIVE FOR OPERATING EXPENSE BUDGET AND WORKFORCE REQUEST

USAID/RWANDA's approved staffing level is 44 positions, of which six are U.S. Direct-Hire, eight USPSCs and thirty FSNs (one FNDH and 29 FN PSCs). Four USPSCs and two FSNs are program-funded. All U.S. Direct-hire positions are currently filled. USAID/Rwanda has finalized an Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) through 1999, which is serving as the Mission's primary programming document for administering assistance in Rwanda. The OE resources and workforce levels envisioned below will be sufficient to implement activities outlined in the ISP. The following chart shows the planned budgets and variances for USAID/RWANDA R4-2000.

	FY 98	+/-	FY 99	+/-	FY00
USDH	72.1	126.6	198.7	59.2	257.9
FSNDH	14.1	0.2	14.3	0.4	14.7
FN PSCs	218.8	27.4	246.2	6.9	253.1
US/INT'L PSCs	551.5	12.9	564.4	9.8	574.2
Travel	276.9	66.2	343.1	41.5	384.6
Transportation	169.0	121.0	290.0	(35.0)	255.0
Housing	134.0	16.0	150.0	1.0	151.0
Office/Other	498.6	7.8	506.4	(3.6)	502.8
Procurement	260.0	0.0	260.0	(80.0)	180.0
ICASS	195.6	12.0	207.6	1.0	208.6
TOTAL	2,390.6	390.1	2,780.7	1.2	2,781.9

#### USDH:

**FY 98:** USAID/Rwanda expects turnovers in Democracy Officer and Health and Population Officer positions. Incumbents are expected to continue with overseas assignments.

**FY 99:** The Mission has budgeted for 3 Home Leave Transfers (H/L) and replacements of the Mission Director, the Program Officer and the Executive Officer. These transfers will largely affect the educational allowance budget line items as Rwanda does not have international schools.

**FY 00:** The Mission has budgeted for turnover in Controller, Health and Population Officer and Democracy and Governance Officer positions.

**FN PSCs Personnel:** The Mission has currently four vacant positions which are being filled in FY98. Four year salary anticipated for FY99 and FY00. Additionally, a wage survey was completed by United Nations (UN) in July 1997 resulting in increase of 30% in UN local employees salary. This wage survey is under review by AID/W/PER/OE who advised that increase would be effective PP20/97. Consequently USAID/R has estimated and budgeted an anticipated increase of 30% for its FSNs salary in FY98. No significant salary increases are anticipated in FY99 and FY00.

**US PSCs Personnel:** The Mission will maintain the four operating expense funded USPSCs positions. Those are, one Program Assistant, one Deputy Executive Officer, one Systems Manager and one Executive Assistant (Local Hire). This later position will be filled in FY98.

**Travel/Transportation:** The Mission expects turnover in Democracy and Health and Population positions and 5 R&Rs in FY98. FY99 will see 6 R&Rs, 3 Home Leave Transfers and replacements in the Mission Director, the Program Officer and the Executive Officer positions. Mission's estimations are based on an average family with 2 children. Equally, the Mission anticipates turnover in the Democracy Officer, the Controller and Health and Population Officer positions in FY00.

**Housing:** One residence will be needed to house the HPN Officer in FY98.

**Procurement:** In addition to the procurement of 2 vehicles in FY98, 2 vehicles in FY99 and 1 vehicle in FY00, the Mission has budgeted for the purchase of more office and residential furniture/equipment, as well as ADP hardware and software to support the new Mission Accounting and Control System (MACS) to be installed/implemented in fiscal year 1998 (Negotiations with AID/W are underway to allow USAID/Rwanda to become a MACS site).

**ICASS:** The ICASS amount has been increased by 7% in FY99 and FY00 to pick up vehicles maintenance charges.

### **Year 2000 Problems:**

The Mission has reviewed Y2K hardware and software and is assured that we will have sufficient capacities or funding for any problems which might arise.

## **B. PRIORITIZATION OF OBJECTIVES**

Mission priorities among SO's are difficult to establish because: 1) the ISP is less than one year in implementation and, thus, aggregate performance at the SO level is extremely hard to judge; 2) the Rwandan transition from genocide and war to sufficient stability to pursue sustainable development is very complex and requires simultaneous attention to justice, governance and household food security; and 3) the health services SO is an earmark priority for AFR and the Mission, and HIIV/AIDS is yet one more frightful menace to the Rwandan people. However, given that not all of the IR's under these SO's are as urgent or can be sequenced, the Mission would place priority on all IR's under SO2; all except market access under SO3; and, under SO1, greater priority on the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior (decentralization), and law training activities and less on demobilization, civil-military dialogue and, reluctantly, National Transition Assembly and National Bar Association support.

USAID FY 2000 BUDGET REQUEST BY PROGRAM/COUNTRY

11-Aug-98  
11:55 AM

Country/Program: RWANDA  
Scenario: Base Level

S.O. # , Title	Approp. Acct	Bilateral/Field Support	Est. SO Pipeline End of FY 99	Estimated Total	FY 2000										Est. Expend. FY 00	Est. Total Cost life of SO	Future Cost (POST 2000)	Year of Final Oblig.	
					Basic Education	Agric.	Other Growth	Pop	Child Survival	Infectious Diseases	HIV/AIDS	Other Health	Environ	D/G					
SO01: Increased Rule of Law and Transparency in Governance																			
DA	Bilateral		4,999	2,500											2,500		34,516	0	0
	Field Spt		0	0															
	Total		4,999	2,500	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,500			0	
SO01: Increased Rule of Law and Transparency in Governance																			
ESF(GLI)	Bilateral			2,500						0	0				2,500		34,516	0	0
	Field Spt			0															
	Total			2,500	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,500			0	
SO 2: Increased Primary Health Care and Social Services Utilization in Target Regions																			
DA	Bilateral		3,874	3,000					1,000		1,500	500					19,488	0	0
	Field Spt		0	0														0	
	Total		3,874	3,000	0		0	1,000	1,500	500	0	0	0	0				0	
SO03: Increased Ability of Rural Families in Target Communities to Improve Household Food Security																			
Title III	Bilateral		6,556	5,000			5,000					0					15,375	0	0
	Field Spt			0															
	Total		6,556	5,000	0		5,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				0	
SO03: Increased Ability of Rural Families in Target Communities to Improve Household Food Security																			
DA	Bilateral			4,500		1,400	3,100											0	0
	Field Spt			0															
	Total			4,500	0	1,400	3,100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				0	
	Bilateral			0															
	Field Spt			0															
	Total		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				0	
	Bilateral			0															
	Field Spt			0															
	Total		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				0	
Total Bilateral			15,429	17,500	0	1,400	8,100	0	1,000		1,500	500	0	5,000					
Total Field Support			0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0					
<b>TOTAL PROGRAM</b>			<b>15,429</b>	<b>17,500</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,400</b>	<b>8,100</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,000</b>	<b>1,500</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5,000</b>					<b>0</b>	

FY 2000 Request Sector Totals -- DA		
Econ Growth		4,500
[Of which Microenterpris		0
HCD		0
PHN		3,000
Environment		0
[Of which Biodiversity]		0
Democracy		2,500
Humanitarian		0

FY 2000 Request Sector Totals -- ESF		
Econ Growth		0
[Of which Microenterprise		0
HCD		0
PHN		0
Environment		0
[Of which Biodiversity]		0
Democracy (GLJI)		2,500
Humanitarian		0

FY 2001 Target Program Level	0
FY 2002 Target Program Level	0
FY 2003 Target Program Level	0





TRUST FUNDS & FSN SEPARATION FUND

Orgno: USAID/RWANDA

Org. Title: 696

**THIS REPORT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE RWANDAN FSN PLAN**

**Foreign National Voluntary Separation Account**

Action	FY 97			FY 98			FY 99		
	OE	Program	Total	OE	Program	Total	OE	Program	Total
Deposits			0.0			0.0			0.0
Withdrawals			0.0			0.0			0.0

Unfunded Liability (if any)  
at the end of each FY.

**Local Currency Trust Funds - Regular (\$000s)**

	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99
Balance Start of Year		0.0	0.0
Obligations			
Deposits			
Balance End of Year	0.0	0.0	0.0

Exchange Rate(s) Used

**Trust Funds in Dollar Equivalents, not in Local Country Equivalents**

**Local Currency Trust Funds - Real Property (\$000s)**

	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99
Balance Start of Year		0.0	0.0
Obligations			
Deposits			
Balance End of Year	0.0	0.0	0.0

**Trust Funds in Dollar Equivalents, not in Local Country Equivalents**

Workforce

Org. USAID/RWANDA (696) FY 1998 On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1						2	2	1	1				4	6
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0	1		1				2	2
OE Locally Recruited Program	1		1					0	1						1	1
								2							0	2
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0		1					1	1
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0			1				1	1
OE Locally Recruited	1	3	0.5					4.5	2	7	16				25	29.5
Program	1		0.5					1.5							0	1.5
Total Staff Levels	4	4	2	0	0	0	0	10	6	9	19	0	0	0	34	44
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Note:

Number of staff reported above exclude:

-Buddy Shanks: OTI funded

-Tim Shortley: FFP funded and partially funded out of SO3

-Ann Lewis: OFDA funded

Workforce

Org. USAID/RWANDA (696) FY 1999 Target On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire								0							0	0
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program								0							0	0
Total Staff Levels	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Org. USAID/RWANDA (696) FY 1999 Request On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1						2	2	1	1				4	6
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0	1		1				2	2
OE Locally Recruited Program	1		1					2	1						1	1
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0		1					1	1
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0			1				1	1
OE Locally Recruited Program	1	3	1					5	2	7	16				25	30
	1							1							0	1
Total Staff Levels	4	4	2	0	0	0	0	10	6	9	19	0	0	0	34	44
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Workforce

Org. USAID/RWANDA (696) FY 2000 Target On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire								0							0	0
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited OE Locally Recruited Program								0 0 0							0 0 0	0 0 0
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited OE Locally Recruited								0 0							0 0	0 0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited OE Locally Recruited Program								0 0 0							0 0 0	0 0 0
Total Staff Levels	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TAACS Fellows								0 0							0 0	0 0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Org. USAID/RWANDA (696) FY 2000 Request On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1						2	2	1	1				4	6
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited OE Locally Recruited Program								0 0 2	1 1		1				2 1 0	2 1 2
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited OE Locally Recruited								0 0		1					0 1	0 1
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited OE Locally Recruited Program								0 5 1			1 16				1 25 0	1 30 1
Total Staff Levels	4	4	2	0	0	0	0	10	6	9	19	0	0	0	34	44
TAACS Fellows								0 0							0 0	0 0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows



Workforce

FY 2000 Request:																
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	4	6
OE Internationally Rec	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	3	3
OE Locally Recruited	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	5	3	8	16	0	0	0	27	32
Total OE Funded Staf	2	4	1	0	0	0	0	7	6	9	19	0	0	0	34	41
Program Funded	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
<b>Total FY 2000 Request</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>44</b>

FY 2001 Estimate:																
U.S. Direct Hire	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	4	6
OE Internationally Rec	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	3	3
OE Locally Recruited	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	5	3	8	16	0	0	0	27	32
Total OE Funded Staf	2	4	1	0	0	0	0	7	6	9	19	0	0	0	34	41
Program Funded	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
<b>Total FY 2000 Target</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>44</b>

MISSION : USAID/RWANDA (696)

USDH STAFFING REQUIREMENTS BY SKILL CODE

BACKSTOP (BS)	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 98	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 99	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 2000	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 2001
01SMG	1	1	1	1
02 Program Off.	1	1	1	1
03 EXO	1	1	1	1
04 Controller	1	1	1	1
05/06/07 Secretary				
10 Agriculture.				
11Economics				
12 GDO				
12 Democracy	1	1	1	1
14 Rural Dev.				
15 Food for Peace				
21 Private Ent.				
25 Engineering				
40 Environ				
50 Health/Pop.	1	1	1	1
60 Education				
75 Physical Sci.				
85 Legal				
92 Commodity Mgt				
93 Contract Mgt				
94 PDO				
95 IDI				
Other*				
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>

\*please list occupations covered by other if there are any

Org. Title: Org. No: OC	Rwanda 696	Overseas Mission Budgets															
		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request			
		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	
11.1	Personnel compensation, full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			
11.1	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH	5.9		5.9		0		0	6.0		6.0		0		6.2		6.2
	Subtotal OC 11.1	5.9	0	5.9	0	0	0	6.0	0	6.0	0	0	0	6.2	0	6.2	
11.3	Personnel comp. - other than full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			
11.3	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH			0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
	Subtotal OC 11.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
11.5	Other personnel compensation	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			
11.5	USDH			0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
11.5	FNDH			0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
	Subtotal OC 11.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
11.8	Special personal services payments	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			
11.8	USPSC Salaries	308.9		308.9		0		0	326.6		326.6		0		336.4		336.4
11.8	FN PSC Salaries	82.6		82.6		0		0	91.5		91.5		0		94.3		94.3
11.8	IPA/Details-In/PASAs/RSSAs Salaries			0		0		0			0		0		0		0
	Subtotal OC 11.8	391.5	0	391.5	0	0	0	418.1	0	418.1	0	0	0	430.7	0	430.7	
12.1	Personnel benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			
12.1	USDH benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			
12.1	Educational Allowances	60.2		60.2		0		0	180.6		180.6		0		240.8		240.8
12.1	Cost of Living Allowances	6.5		6.5		0		0	7.0		7.0		0		7.0		7.0
12.1	Home Service Transfer Allowances	1.4		1.4		0		0	2.1		2.1		0		2.1		2.1
12.1	Quarters Allowances	2.5		2.5		0		0	3.0		3.0		0		2.0		2.0
12.1	Other Misc. USDH Benefits	1.5		1.5		0		0	6.0		6.0		0		6.0		6.0
12.1	FNDH Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			
12.1	Payments to the FSN Separation Fund - FNDH			0		0		0			0		0		0		0
12.1	Other FNDH Benefits	8.2		8.2		0		0	8.3		8.3		0		8.5		8.5
12.1	US PSC Benefits	242.6		242.6		0		0	237.8		237.8		0		237.8		237.8
12.1	FN PSC Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			
12.1	Payments to the FSN Separation Fund - FN PSC			0		0		0			0		0		0		0
12.1	Other FN PSC Benefits	136.3		136.3		0		0	154.7		154.7		0		158.8		158.8
12.1	IPA/Detail-In/PASA/RSSA Benefits			0		0		0			0		0		0		0
	Subtotal OC 12.1	459.2	0	459.2	0	0	0	599.5	0	599.5	0	0	0	663.0	0	663.0	
13	Benefits for former personnel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			
13	FNDH	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			
13	Severance Payments for FNDH			0		0		0			0		0		0		0
13	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FNDH			0		0		0			0		0		0		0
13	FN PSCs	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			
13	Severance Payments for FN PSCs			0		0		0			0		0		0		0
13	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FN PSCs			0		0		0			0		0		0		0
	Subtotal OC 13.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
21	Travel and transportation of persons	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			
21	Training Travel	38.6		38.6		0		0	40.9		40.9		0		43.4		43.4
21	Mandatory/Statutory Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			
21	Post Assignment Travel - to field	26.0		26.0		0		0	45.0		45.0		0		48.0		48.0

Org. Title:		Rwanda		Overseas Mission Budgets														
Org. No:		696		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total		
21	Assignment to Washington Travel			0.0			0			0.0			0			12.0	12.0	
21	Home Leave Travel	4.5		4.5			0	43.0		43.0			0			24.0	24.0	
21	R & R Travel	52.0		52.0			0	64.0		64.0			0			96.0	96.0	
21	Education Travel	15.0		15.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
21	Evacuation Travel	10.0		10.0			0	10.0		10.0			0			11.0	11.0	
21	Retirement Travel			0.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
21	Pre-Employment Invitational Travel			0.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
21	Other Mandatory/Statutory Travel			0.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
21	Operational Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line				
21	Site Visits - Headquarters Personnel	33.9		33.9			0	37.4		37.4			0			41.1	41.1	
21	Site Visits - Mission Personnel	3.9		3.9			0	4.3		4.3			0			4.7	4.7	
21	Conferences/Seminars/Meetings/Retreats	63.0		63.0			0	66.7		66.7			0			70.7	70.7	
21	Assessment Travel			0.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
21	Impact Evaluation Travel			0.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
21	Disaster Travel (to respond to specific disasters)			0.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
21	Recruitment Travel			0.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
21	Other Operational Travel	30.0		30.0			0	31.8		31.8			0			33.7	33.7	
	Subtotal OC 21.0	276.9	0	276.9	0	0	0	343.1	0	343.1	0	0	0	384.6	0	384.6		
22	Transportation of things	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line				
22	Post assignment freight	62.0		62.0			0	90.0		90.0			0			120.0	120.0	
22	Home Leave Freight	2.0		2.0			0	90.0		90.0			0			60.0	60.0	
22	Retirement Freight			0.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
22	Transportation/Freight for Office Furniture/Equip.	65.0		65.0			0	50.0		50.0			0			35.0	35.0	
22	Transportation/Freight for Res. Furniture/Equip.	40.0		40.0			0	60.0		60.0			0			40.0	40.0	
	Subtotal OC 22.0	169.0	0	169.0	0	0	0	290.0	0	290.0	0	0	0	255.0	0	255.0		
23.2	Rental payments to others	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line				
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Office Space			0			0			0			0				0	
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Warehouse Space			0			0			0			0				0	
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Residences	134.0		134.0			0	150.0		150.0			0			151.0	151.0	
	Subtotal OC 23.2	134.0	0	134.0	0	0	0	150.0	0	150.0	0	0	0	151.0	0	151.0		
23.3	Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line				
23.3	Office Utilities	15.0		15.0			0	15.9		15.9			0			17.5	17.5	
23.3	Residential Utilities	39.2		39.2			0	41.5		41.5			0			45.6	45.6	
23.3	Telephone Costs	56.5		56.5			0	59.9		59.9			0			63.5	63.5	
23.3	ADP Software Leases			0.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
23.3	ADP Hardware Lease			0.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
23.3	Commercial Time Sharing			0.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
23.3	Postal Fees (Other than APO Mail)			0.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
23.3	Other Mail Service Costs			0.0			0			0.0			0				0.0	
23.3	Courier Services	2.0		2.0			0	2.5		2.5			0			3.0	3.0	
	Subtotal OC 23.3	112.7	0	112.7	0	0	0	119.8	0	119.8	0	0	0	129.6	0	129.6		
24	Printing and Reproduction			0			0			0			0				0	
	Subtotal OC 24.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
25.1	Advisory and assistance services	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line				

Org. Title:		Overseas Mission Budgets														
Org. No:		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC	Rwanda 696	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
25.1	Studies, Analyses, & Evaluations			0			0			0			0			0
25.1	Management & Professional Support Services			0			0			0			0			0
25.1	Engineering & Technical Services			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.2	Other services	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.2	Office Security Guards	27.0		27.0			0	28.4		28.4			0	29.8		29.8
25.2	Residential Security Guard Services	90.0		90.0			0	94.5		94.5			0	94.7		94.7
25.2	Official Residential Expenses			0.0			0			0.0			0			0.0
25.2	Representation Allowances	1.7		1.7			0	1.7		1.7			0	1.7		1.7
25.2	Non-Federal Audits			0.0			0			0.0			0			0.0
25.2	Grievances/Investigations			0.0			0			0.0			0			0.0
25.2	Insurance and Vehicle Registration Fees	6.7		6.7			0	7.0		7.0			0	7.0		7.0
25.2	Vehicle Rental			0.0			0			0.0			0			0.0
25.2	Manpower Contracts			0.0			0			0.0			0			0.0
25.2	Records Declassification & Other Records Services			0.0			0			0.0			0			0.0
25.2	Recruiting activities			0.0			0			0.0			0			0.0
25.2	Penalty Interest Payments			0.0			0			0.0			0			0.0
25.2	Other Miscellaneous Services	51.7		51.7			0	40.0		40.0			0	40.0		40.0
25.2	Staff training contracts			0.0			0			0.0			0			0.0
25.2	ADP related contracts			0.0			0			0.0			0			0.0
	Subtotal OC 25.2	177.1	0	177.1	0	0	0	171.6	0	171.6	0	0	0	173.2	0	173.2
25.3	Purchase of goods and services from Government accounts	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.3	ICASS	195.6		195.6			0	207.6		207.6			0	208.6		208.6
25.3	All Other Services from Other Gov't. accounts			0.0			0			0.0			0			0.0
	Subtotal OC 25.3	195.6	0	195.6	0	0	0	207.6	0	207.6	0	0	0	208.6	0	208.6
25.4	Operation and maintenance of facilities	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.4	Office building Maintenance	46.0		46.0			0	60.0		60.0			0	50.0		50.0
25.4	Residential Building Maintenance	39.5		39.5			0	65.0		65.0			0	60.0		60.0
	Subtotal OC 25.4	85.5	0	85.5	0	0	0	125.0	0	125.0	0	0	0	110.0	0	110.0
25.6	Medical Care			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.7	Operation/maintenance of equipment & storage of goods	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.7	ADP and telephone operation and maintenance costs	2.5		2.5			0	3.0		3.0			0	3.0		3.0
25.7	Storage Services			0.0			0			0.0			0			0.0
25.7	Office Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance	14.7		14.7			0	15.0		15.0			0	15.0		15.0
25.7	Vehicle Repair and Maintenance	13.0		13.0			0	2.0		2.0			0	2.0		2.0
25.7	Residential Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance	13.0		13.0			0	20.0		20.0			0	20.0		20.0
	Subtotal OC 25.7	43.2	0.0	43.2	0	0	0	40.0	0.0	40.0	0	0	0	40.0	0.0	40.0
25.8	Subsistence and support of persons (by contract or Gov't.)			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26	Supplies and materials	80.0		80.0			0	50.0		50.0			0	50.0		50.0

Org. Title: Org. No: OC	Rwanda 696	Overseas Mission Budgets														
		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
Subtotal OC 26.0		80.0	0.0	80.0	0	0	0	50.0	0.0	50.0	0	0	0	50.0	0.0	50.0
31 Equipment		Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
31 Purchase of Residential Furniture/Equip.		60.0		60.0			0	85.0		85.0			0	65.0		65.0
31 Purchase of Office Furniture/Equip.		55.0		55.0			0	50.0		50.0			0	35.0		35.0
31 Purchase of Vehicles		65.0		65.0			0	65.0		65.0			0	35.0		35.0
31 Purchase of Printing/Graphics Equipment				0.0			0			0.0			0			0.0
31 ADP Hardware purchases		60.0		60.0			0	30.0		30.0			0	25.0		25.0
31 ADP Software purchases		20.0		20.0			0	30.0		30.0			0	20.0		20.0
Subtotal OC 31.0		260.0	0.0	260.0	0	0	0	260.0	0.0	260.0	0	0	0	180.0	0.0	180.0
32 Lands and structures		Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
32 Purchase of Land & Buildings (& construction of bldgs.)				0			0			0			0			0
32 Purchase of fixed equipment for buildings				0			0			0			0			0
32 Building Renovations/Alterations - Office				0			0			0			0			0
32 Building Renovations/Alterations - Residential				0			0			0			0			0
Subtotal OC 32.0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
42 Claims and indemnities				0			0			0			0			0
Subtotal OC 42.0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL BUDGET</b>		<b>2390.6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2390.6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2780.7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2780.7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2781.9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2781.9</b>
Dollars Used for Local Currency Purchases		<u>45%</u>		1075.8				<u>1251.3</u>						<u>1251.9</u>		
Exchange Rate Used in Computations		\$1.00 =	295 RF					\$1.00 =	295 RF					\$1.00 =	295 RF	
Workyears of Effort 1/																
FNDH		1		1			0	1		1			0	1		1
FN PSCs		27.5		27.5			0	30		30			0	30		30
IPAs/Details-In				0			0			0			0			0
Manpower Contracts				0			0			0			0			0
<b>Total Workyears</b>		<b>28.5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>28.5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>31</b>

1/ One workyear of effort is equal to 2080 hours worked.