

USAID/Angola

Results Review and Resource
Request

FY 2000

USAID/Angola
March 23, 1998

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Released on or after July 1, 1998

USAID/Angola

Results Review

FY 1997

Part I. Overview and Factors Affecting Program Performance

1. US Concerns

U.S. national interests in Angola lie in the consolidation of peace, democratization, development of an open-market economy and a meaningful integration of Angola into the international community. It is a political imperative that the United States remain engaged in Angola. The United States has been involved in the quest for peace in Southern Africa since the mid-1970s, and has played a leadership role since the early 1980s. Currently seven percent of U.S. petroleum imports come from Angola. This is projected to increase to 15% by the year 2010. Angola is the United States' second-largest investment site (over \$4 billion) and third-largest trade partner in sub-Saharan Africa. The country is a growing market for U.S. capital equipment and manufactured goods, especially those related to the petroleum industry and infrastructure development. With increased stability the country will play a more significant role in the Southern Africa economy.

If the economic and social benefits of peace do not materialize, large quantities of food assistance and/or expensive peace-keeping interventions may again be required as a humanitarian response to a continuing man-made disaster, and/or to prevent instability from spreading to Angola's neighbors.

Angola is a country in transition. For the outside world to deal meaningfully with change in Angola, the engagement must be proactive. The USAID program is an integral part of what is currently a proactive interagency engagement with the Angolans. The USG is exercising leadership within the international community to assist the current transition and mitigate future crises, and USAID is a central player in this process. USAID's sustainable development interests elsewhere in Africa are jeopardized by Angolan conflict, crisis and instability. Political crisis mitigation and prevention are central components of USAID/Angola's strategy in recognition of these imperatives.

The USAID assistance program in Angola is a transition program designed to further the USG's political engagement in Angola. A successful assistance program must be keyed to and promote the most important transition processes. This is the internal architecture of USAID's engagement in Angola.

The war in Angola stopped in late 1994 with the implementation of the cease-fire subsequent to the signature of the Lusaka Protocol. Since that time, the "Government of Unity and National Reconciliation" has been put in place with UNITA occupying 11 Ministerial and Vice-Ministerial posts. UNITA has also taken its 70 seats in the National Assembly and participates fully in the national armed forces. However both the government and the Parliament are institutionally weak, and civil society can only be described as nascent. At the beginning of our post-Lusaka Protocol assistance engagement here, we were working to help people pick up their shattered lives through our feeding, demining, demobilization and resettlement activities. These efforts continue, as there still are isolated problem areas where we need to engage with emergency assistance. However, in most areas, the situation is gradually returning to normal. Upon this base of growing stability, we are helping to build

the institutional base that will support democracy and long-term growth. Our early efforts to engage the government on economic policy issues met with disappointment: whereas the donors and the IFIs continue to press the GRA on economic reform, no substantial government commitment is yet apparent. In response to the 1997 R4 review directives, our assistance program is taking a new direction this year, with a focus as well on child survival. The exploitation of the new oil discoveries in Angola will reduce and ultimately eliminate the need for concessional assistance, and USAID's program will close in the year 2005.

2. Major Achievements

The Government of National Unity: The Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) was formed in April 1997 when the four UNITA-appointed Ministers and seven Vice Ministers took up their cabinet portfolios and the 70 UNITA parliamentarians took their seats in the 220-seat National Assembly. UNITA's joining the Government and the Parliament was the most important political achievement of the period. The March 1998 legalization of UNITA as a political party and the promulgation of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's special status as leader of the largest opposition party cleared the way for legal UNITA activity throughout the country. The Parliament has been invigorated by UNITA's taking its seats, and has shaken off some of its reputation as a rubber stamp body. (The February debates on the national budget were the most contentious in recent years, although the voting was on strict party lines.) In keeping with the terms of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, three UNITA Governors and seven Vice-Governors were officially designated in March 1998. Formation of the GURN gave IRI the opportunity to work with the Parliament and the political parties as planned, and this work has been extremely successful: IRI has trained 12 of the 15 parties represented in the National Assembly in constituent relations and in governance.

Advances in the Peace Process Timetable. On March 6, the GRA and UNITA agreed to an ambitious timetable to complete all remaining actions under the Lusaka Protocol by April 1, 1998:

- Special in-situ demobilization of residual UNITA forces (completed as of 3/23/98);
- Demobilization of UNITA general officers (idem);
- Extension of state administration to Sautar, Luquembo and Quirima (idem);
- UNITA's declaration of complete demilitarization (idem);
- Government legalization of UNITA as a political party (idem);
- Agreement on the structure of Savimbi's bodyguard (idem);
- Demobilization and integration into the ANP of Savimbi's 400-person bodyguard contingent (idem);
- Government promulgation of the special status of UNITA leader's special status (idem);
- Nomination of UNITA governors, vice-governors and ambassadors (governors and vice-governors nominated as of 3/23/98);
- Cessation of Radio Vorgan broadcasting (pending);

- Transfer of UNITA leadership to Luanda (pending);
- Extension of state administration to Andulo, Bailundo, Mussende, Nharea, and Mungo (pending).

Since early 1998, progress on the peace process has been very encouraging, particularly due to the proactive interventions of the US and the UN Security Council. Nine of the 12 critical outstanding actions to implement the Lusaka Protocol have been achieved over the past two months.

New Petroleum Discoveries. Oil production has been steadily increasing, and all observers expect this trend to continue. Large new discoveries have been made in several deep-water offshore blocks. Average daily production in 1996 was 620,000 rising to 720,000 bbl/day in 1997. Industry analysts are predicting 780,000-800,000 bbl/day for 1998, and 1 million bbl/day by the turn of the century. Currently, the production increases are being offset by declining oil prices. However, this trend cannot be extrapolated meaningfully into the future. Assuming that oil prices recover, revenues accruing to the Government should increase by 50% over the 1996-2000 period. This trend validates the central tenet of our strategy - Angola's mineral wealth is expected to be sufficient to finance the country's development in the future, and Angola is not expected to be a long-term concessional aid recipient.

Revisions to the Constitution and the Timetable for Elections. In accordance with the Lusaka Protocol, the GURN is preparing to revise the Constitution in 1998, and has formed a Parliamentary committee to spearhead this process. A successful constitutional revision is central to Angola's future development. The existing constitution, enacted when Angola was a one-party state, vests tremendous power in the executive presidency to the detriment of Parliament. In addition, the centralized top-down administration contributes to the political disenfranchisement and marginalization of the electorate, and in a very direct sense to the climate of non-accountability of the Government towards the Angolan citizenry. Elections at the local or provincial level will not occur unless the appropriate constitutional revision is made. The move to revise the Constitution is a key and very positive political event in Angola, as it is expected to result in a reduction of centralized executive power, and equally importantly, in the possibility of meaningful participation of alternative political parties in the future governance of Angola.

Demobilization. In 1997, more than 70,000 former UNITA soldiers (ex-FMU) were demobilized. As of March 23, 1998, an additional 5,000 ex-FMU have been demobilized without being quartered and 1,000 ex-FMU in special categories (police, deminers and Joint Commission delegates) are in the demobilization process. The GURN provided the "Special Subsidy for Reintegration", WFP provided the food rations, and USAID and others financed IOM's transportation operation and provided resettlement kits. Demobilization is the key to peace in Angola, and this process, although lengthy, has been extremely successful. All of the quartered ex-UNITA forces have been demobilized, and have been transported to the chosen destinations in Angola. USAID has participated actively in the demobilization process, as a Troika observer at the Joint Commission and as a funding agency.

Mine Action Programs. More than three decades of almost constant internal conflict have left Angola with one of the world's most serious landmine problems: estimates vary but all agree that there are millions of landmines in Angola. There are to date more than 70,000 amputees, the majority of whom are women and children. Although USAID began supporting demining programs in FY95, in 1997 alone, USAID-funded mine action programs increased farmer's access to more than 6,100 hectares of arable land and rehabilitated 900 landmine survivors through prosthetic and orthopedic programs. USAID-funded mine awareness programs have saved hundreds of lives and prevented needless mutilation. _

Reduction of Free Food Distribution. USAID was able to reduce the number of free-food beneficiaries from 540,000 to 200,000, (a reduction of 340,000) as well as phase-out direct support to many vulnerable groups. Malnutrition decreased countrywide and many of USAID's nutritional feeding centers were either closed or absorbed into provincial hospital pediatric wards.

Seeds of Freedom. This USAID activity has demonstrated significant results that will improve farmers' ability to become self-sufficient, and contribute to food security in coming years. Two improved varieties of cassava were tested, and are in the process of being multiplied to provide 50,000 farmers with enough planting material to cover 50 square meters each. As these varieties are mosaic-virus resistant, a 50% yield increase is anticipated. 17 MT of maize, 400 kilograms of beans and 900 kilograms of groundnuts were produced through seed multiplication. The average production increase across these crops is anticipated to be 30%, based on test results to date.

Human Rights. World Learning's training program brought relief to about 150 prisoners whose human and civil rights were violated when they were incarcerated over the statutory limit. A human rights lawyer who participated in World Learning's training initiated an appeals process in the province of Huambo which resulted in the release of 80 prisoners who had spent years in jail without any charges being filed against them. This success has been having multiplier effects in the provinces of Bie, Huila and Luanda.

With USG support, the Association of Women Jurists brought the issue of women's and children's rights to public and GURN attention through a conference and pamphlet dealing with formerly neglected subjects such as spouse abuse, underage labor, and child prostitution. The Human Rights Division of the Ministry of Justice began slowly to assert its role in monitoring the serious human rights situation in the country. Using the Democracy and Human Rights Fund, we intend to contribute to the revision of Angola's code of criminal procedures, which dates back to 1910. Support to the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute promotes greater participation and respect for civil rights. USG-supported NGO's invited elements of the Angolan National Police to participate in human and civil rights-related seminars, marking the first time the ANP -- one of the primary human rights abusers in Angola -- underwent such training.

Women in Development: In 1997, USAID completed its analysis of the constraints to increased women's participation in the USAID program. This study has been widely praised as the best available analysis on the subject in Angola. USAID has institutionalized a working relationship with the Ministry of Women and with the civil-society Women's Network. USAID and the Swedish Embassy co-financed the watershed national conference on "Violence against Women" which marked the first time in recent Angolan history that this sensitive and very serious problem was discussed publicly. The issues of women's rights and women's participation in Angola's reconstruction and development are ones that USAID and the Embassy continue to stress in public fora, and USAID is integrating these imperatives into its strategic planning and activity design.

Increased cooperation with the GRA. One of the major achievements of the USAID engagement in Angola in FY 1997 was a significantly increase in the Mission's cooperation with the GRA. The development of the Child Survival strategy afforded USAID and the GRA an opportunity to work together to assess needs and plan interventions. This was the first such collaborative planning exercise undertaken by the Mission. Additionally, the increased number of democracy programs outside of Luanda has multiplied opportunities for better cooperation with local and provincial leaders, and USAID and NGO staff are now working much more closely than in the past.

Cooperation with US Oil Companies. USAID has strengthened its coordination and cooperation with the major US oil companies operating in Angola. USAID staff have provided guidance to those companies on investment opportunities in the social sectors, and joint financing possibilities are under active discussion. Cooperation agreements are under discussion with Chevron and Amoco, and are expected to be signed in the near future. An example of the extent of the cooperation is the recent Pact/Chevron proposal for micro-credit in Cabinda. Other initiatives with a number of different companies are in preparation.

Establishment of the USAID Office. The USAID office is now significantly better staffed than at the beginning of 1997. Program staff levels have increased from two to eight as of April 1. This quadrupling of staff on board has allowed the Mission to better engage on the sector and micro-issues involved with managing this transition program, and will improve accountability for US resources.

3. Factors Affecting Program/Country Performance and Remaining Challenges

Demobilization. Although over 70,000 former UNITA soldiers (ex-FMU) were demobilized, the process was somewhat imperfect. There were a number of desertions from the Quatering Areas, some evidence of UNITA regrouping of the demobilized, and a pattern of UNITA coercion with regards to the demobilizees' destinations. This process was imperfect in ways that made achievement of certain of our anticipated results problematic. UNITA coercive tactics in the Quatering Areas resulted in numerous last minute destination changes, with the result that many demobilized soldiers were transported to areas that they would not otherwise

have chosen (and presumably with which they have no or lesser attachment.) This phenomenon (particularly prevalent among underage soldiers) had a number of unfortunate negative impacts on USAID/Angola's anticipated results: [a] Only 900 of the planned 3,000 underage soldiers are in active follow-up by CCF-trained sponsors; [b] the former combatants have not returned in an organized way to their places of origin, which has made it in many cases impossible for them to participate in the reintegration support activities planned to help anchor them in their communities. The impact of our reintegration activities was lessened, as a good number of one of the important target groups were and are not present in the areas anticipated.

Resettlement: Displaced Angolan's failed to resettle in the numbers anticipated, citing fears of existing or future insecurity in their home areas. Per the 1998 UN Consolidated Appeal, only 60,000 IDPs resettled in 1997. There are still over 30,000 unresettled IDPs in Luena city (Moxico province), 25,000 new IDPs in Cubal (fleeing a perennially conflicted area of southern Benguela province) and an estimated 15,000 new IDPs in northeastern Lunda Norte (who fled the fighting in that area in May-June, 1997.) This failure to resettle likewise affected USAID's ability to work with an important target group with reintegration support as planned.

Extension of State Administration: Extension of state administration began in April 1997; by March 1998, 275 of the 354 localities controlled by UNITA had reverted to government control. This included one provincial capitol as well as Negage, the largest city in Angola under UNITA control. The process also took place in the sensitive diamond-producing areas of the Cuango and Lucapa river valleys. The amount of Angolan territory still under UNITA control has been reduced by approximately 75 percent since the beginning of the process.

The conduct of the Government and UNITA towards the extension of administration has been mixed. Government police and army units frequently operated in a heavy-handed manner and used the process as cover for the disruption of UNITA's grass roots political structures. UNITA did not always cooperate with the process, frequently restricting the movements, access and activities of newly-arrived Government officials. Local populations who had never before lived under post-independence Government authority often reacted badly to the arrival of GRA security forces, a reaction that was used for political purposes by UNITA's leadership.

The GRA has been slow to put in place civilian administrative personnel. Thus, many areas have been "normalized" on paper, but remain without effective Government control and without any Government services. In addition to UNITA non-cooperation in some areas, the Government's poor logistical capabilities were often unable to support personnel deployed to the remote areas of a country twice the size of Texas. The failure to pay and provision security forces had a negative impact on human rights as well as law and order in these areas, as security forces personnel resorted to looting. The difficult and lengthy process of normalization [a] created a certain number of new IDPs and [b] delayed resettlement and subsequent reintegration activities. In addition, the slow pace of normalization and

appointment of provincial and local leaders delayed NDI's planned work with those administrators.

Ceasefire Violations, Banditry and Remining: MONUA tracked cease-fire violations throughout the year, ranging from small isolated incidents of banditry to the larger-scale clashes that took place during the extension of state administration in Lunda Note Province in May 1997. Newly laid mines killed a number of civilians. Ten UNITA supporters died in prison in Malange while under police detention and numerous village headmen supporting UNITA were assassinated. These events, more importantly the pattern of events, led to a generalized feeling of insecurity in the provinces, which, based on anecdotal evidence, further reduced incentives to resettle. NGOs and UN agencies adopted stricter security policies, effectively reducing the number of work-hours, and increasing the marginal cost of providing assistance outside of Luanda.

Economic Reform and Government Expenditures. Both the IMF and the World Bank have been unsuccessful in their efforts to engage the GRA on macro-economic reform issues, and the GRA has shown few signs of commitment to change. The Managing Director of the IMF visited Angola in late 1996, but subsequent technical missions failed to produce an agreement or a framework for moving toward such an agreement. Transparency International ranked Angola as the second-most untransparent country in Africa in 1997.

The 1998 budget amounts to \$3.8 billion, to be financed with \$2.2 billion in oil revenues, \$500 million in non-oil revenues, \$400 million in grants under the community rehabilitation program, and \$700 million in external financing. The government has overestimated oil revenues, which contributes to the financing gap of approximately \$1.4 billion. Government non/late-payment of salaries and inability to finance recurrent expenditures at adequate levels is perhaps the most significant factor inhibiting our ability to work with the GRA on the reconstruction of Angola. No Government budgetary commitment to contribute to a massive reconstruction effort in the interior is evident in the 1998 budget.

The oil-fueled over-valued national currency favors imports and serves as a disincentive to investment and job-creation. Government policies repelling investment and the generalized neglect of the interior of the country continues to impact negatively on the coastal-interior terms of trade, to the detriment of the majority of the people in the interior. This continued economic marginalization of areas once largely controlled by UNITA is a second-generation (i.e., post Lusaka) problem that will need to be addressed by the GRA if there is to be a real peace dividend and stability in former UNITA areas.

New Petroleum Discoveries. Oil production has been steadily increasing, and all observers expect this trend to continue. The causal relationship between significant and increasing oil revenues and the willingness or unwillingness of the GRA to undertake economic reform cannot be determined. However, our recent experience is that countries undertake structural adjustment/stabilization programs only when they have no other viable options. It is thus

anticipated that the existence of these newly discovered reserves will serve to entrench rent-seeking behavior and continue to effectively undercut reformers and reform.

4. Program Evolution

At the beginning of 1997, USAID was providing free food assistance to 540,000 people in Angola. By the end of 1997, free-food recipients had declined to 200,000. Again, in the beginning of the year, USAID was engaged in large-scale distribution of agricultural input packs, emergency health interventions, therapeutic feeding and other "emergency" or "humanitarian" activities. By the end of 1997, our focus had shifted radically to reconstruction, agricultural extension, and community rehabilitation.

1997 was the first full year of implementation of the "full" USAID program in Angola, and consolidation of program direction has largely been achieved. The April 1997 R4 program review directed the Mission to integrate child survival activities into the program. As a result, the Mission placed Angola on the country list for the Child Survival Grants program, and two proposals were submitted by NGOs operating in Angola. The Mission received \$3.5 million in child survival/other health money in the 1998 DA budget, and will be making grants to one or two NGOs for child survival activities. At a late-1997 program review attended by all relevant Washington Department and Agencies, the decision to extend the USAID program in Angola until 2005 was taken. The Mission has decided to update its strategy to cover the 2000-2002 period. The lack of progress on SPO # 1 (Economic Reform) led the Mission and USAID/Washington to eliminate the Special Objective, with the understanding that efforts in this area could be re-initiated if/when a commitment of the GRA to carry out a real economic reform program materializes.

In 1998, USAID intends to take a number of important but modest steps to improve stability at the community level, and consolidate the significant gains that have been made to date. In so doing, USAID is faced with the following strategic issues for 1998.

- The pace at which normalization and rural stability is achieved will dictate where and when communities can be accessed and reconstructed.
- The extent to which USAID will be able to work with more grass-roots community organizations on democracy issues will depend on funding available, and the political requirement to remain engaged at the central political level.

5. Events affecting implementation

Visas. The GRA continues to withhold long-term work visas for (inter alia) NGO staff, with an apparent bias against workers from African and Middle Eastern countries. This has had significant negative impact on NGO ability to manage their operations, and made achievement

of the results anticipated difficult. USAID/Angola has likewise had difficulty obtaining visas for non-American PSCs. Business men and women likewise have difficulty in this area, and the Embassy is engaging the GRA at the highest level on this issue.

Security. The operating environment continues to place NGO staff and equipment at risk, necessitating increased investments in security equipment, guards, and policies to protect lives and equipment (e.g., night-time travel bans, convoys, mine-surveys.) The security situation in the interior is such that travel to project sites is expensive, time-consuming and often not possible. NGOs, over the course of 1997, pulled out of areas in Kuanza Norte, Malange and Kuito in which they had been operating, citing security concerns. The resulting NGO inability to work systematically and continuously with the beneficiaries has reduced the quality of the assistance provided, and has reduced the quantity of outputs/results obtained.

Operating Expense Funds. FY 1998 was to have been the year of consolidation of USAID/Angola's management of the numerous Mission-funded and centrally-funded activities the Mission has ongoing. The Mission received a new personnel ceiling of 22 positions, but received insufficient Operating Expense funds to bring these people on board. In addition to inhibiting the ability of this Mission to staff up to levels congruent with the dictates of sound management, OE limitations are such that direct hire staff have had to curtail travel both in country and in the region this year. Contracting support continues to be unequal to our needs, and the OE limitations preclude us from making alternative arrangements.

AID/Washington Support. USAID/Angola needs the continued assistance and cooperation of the Central and Africa Bureaus to fund and assist with managing the Angola program. OTI, FFP and OFDA have done superlative work in Angola, and their continued engagement is needed. The USAID/Angola Mission simply does not have the resources to fund the variety of transition activities that are required to make a difference in Angola from the declining DA/ESF budgets. In addition, OE and staffing constraints argue for continued expert activity management from Washington. This is a requirement stemming not only from overall staff/OE levels, but from the perspective of specialized expertise in (e.g.,) child survival and psycho-social rehabilitation. This Mission will need continued support from AFR/SA to assist us with program documents (Congressional and Technical Notifications, Country Checklists, Congressional Presentations.) This Mission simply does not have sufficient staff to manage submission of these documents, if the required and desired attention to strategy formulation and program results is to be retained.

Part II. Progress Toward Objectives

Summary Results Table

Objective Name	Rating	Evaluation findings
SO 1: Increased resettlement, rehabilitation and food-crop self-reliance of war-affected Angolan communities	Met	<p>USAID-funded NGOs CARE, CRS, WVI, and SCF/US were able to reduce the number of free food beneficiaries by 340,000.</p> <p>The agricultural and community revitalization programs of USAID-funded PVOs rehabilitated 668 village facilities, 163 kms. of irrigation canals, 1,646 kms. of roads and 74 bridges.</p>
SO 2: Increased national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions	Met	<p>IRI's work with Parliament and the political parties has received extensive media coverage and unqualified praise from the Luanda political landscape.</p> <p>World Learning's work on human rights led to the release of over 100 prisoners.</p>
SPO 1: Facilitate Angola's preparation and implementation of economic structural adjustment and macro economic program	Failed to meet	<p>IMF assessments during 1997 were that the GRA has failed to put in place fiscal measures sufficiently transparent for an ESAF.</p> <p>World Bank assessment of the 1998 budget and economic program revealed unrealistic planning and a likely \$1.4 billion budgetary deficit in 1998.</p> <p>This special objective is being eliminated in the 1998 strategy update.</p>
Percent funding through NGOs and PVOs: FY98 90%; FY99 85%; FY00 85%		

2. Strategic Objective # 1 - Increased resettlement, rehabilitation and food-crop self-reliance of war-affected Angolan communities - Performance Analysis.

SO#1 supports USG objectives in Angola and supports the Mission Performance Plan in its goal to "phase out of emergency assistance and help Angola through its transition to rehabilitation and sustainable development." The achievement of SO#1 is rated as fully successful. The majority of USAID-supported programs surpassed their planned results: USAID supported mother-child health [MCH] programs resulted in a decrease in infant and maternal mortality rates to 41/1,000 and 262/100,000 respectively; 870,000 children and women of childbearing age received vaccinations; 2,300 adults from the civil society were trained to provide clinical and occupational therapy to 71,000 traumatized children; the demobilization of the quartered former UNITA troops [ex-FMU] was completed; food crop self-reliance was improved in many areas as more than 340,000 people were able to be phased-off USAID-funded general distributions; and 668 village and agricultural infrastructure rehabilitation projects were completed.

However, in general terms, progress in the political landscape in 1997 did not meet expectations which limited USAID's ability to achieve all of the planned results. UNHCR reports that although approximately 60,000 IDPs resettled in 1997, 1.2 million Angolans remain displaced, and increasing insecurity in certain areas of the country, such as Huila, Benguela and Lunda Norte provinces, caused the displacement of new groups of people who previously had not required assistance. Recognizing the uneven pace of normalization in Angola, a realistic evaluation of the results of SO#1 in 1997 indicate that resettlement, rehabilitation and food-crop self-reliance has been most successful in those war affected Angolan communities that have achieved stability.

IR # 1 Increased levels of food security in communities where there are significant populations of resettled.

IR # 1.1 Increased household food production. Household food production was severely disrupted during the war, compounded by the displacement of more than three million people. Many of the 800,000 who have since resettled have temporarily settled in interim areas [where they have greater access to arable land] while they wait for security to improve in their home villages. In order to maximize the potential of the 1997 planting season, the first planting season for many IDPs since the war, 73 ag extensionists were trained to work with rural farming communities to improve local farming methods, and 60 farmer groups were formed to educate other farmers about improved techniques on demonstration plots. To complement this work, USAID supported the rehabilitation of 163 kilometers of irrigation canals and six reservoirs to serve an estimated 68,000 people, primarily through food-for-work [FFW] programs. USAID-funded mine action programs further increased farmers' access to more than 6,100 hectares of arable land.

By late 1997, USAID was able to reduce the number of free-food beneficiaries from 540,000 to 200,000, as well as phase-out direct support to most vulnerable group feeding programs.

However, the results of the 1997 planting season will not bear fruit until 1998 and are dependent not only on a favorable agricultural season, but also on continued security in rural areas.

IR # 1.2 Improved food crop variety availability. USAID has made significant progress in facilitating the nutritional improvement of rural populations by supporting the introduction of a variety of food crops to offset the extremely low levels of seed stock left after more than 30 years of war. Due to the disruption of agricultural production during the war and the inability of the GRA to provide improved seeds, the quality of seed stocks dropped considerably and seeds brought in from other countries in the region were not always appropriate or adapted for use in Angola. To respond to this, USAID supported the Seed of Freedom [SOF] project to increase the potential for food security through the testing, multiplication and distribution of improved and adapted varieties of staple food crops.

The SOF project was extremely successful in improving farmers' access to and increased production of food crops. In 1997 alone, more than 800 farmers participated in testing the imported seeds, and of the 12 new varieties of crops tested, nine were selected over local varieties on the basis of yield, cooking time, and palatability. Not only have new varieties of crops been adapted, but many of these have shorter growing cycles which will enable farmers to have multiple harvests of staple crops, rather than relying on a single harvest. Furthermore, the multiplication of these adapted crops seeds for additional trials for the 1997/98 planting season is underway. Complementing this activity was the distribution of seeds to more than 144,300 farming families in rural communities, and the creation of more than 140 seed banks.

IR # 1.3 Restored roads and bridges in certain areas. Throughout the war in Angola, and particularly during the heaviest period of fighting between 1992 and 1994, the roads and bridges that linked people in one village to those in another were destroyed by landmines, ground explosions and aerial bombardments. This was especially true of roads and bridges between areas controlled by the GRA and those controlled by UNITA. To re-establish the links between people and communities to increase the movement of goods, services and information, USAID-funded NGOs constructed, rehabilitated and maintained 1,646 kilometers of roads and 74 bridges. Nonetheless, many areas are still cut off and some roads and bridges that were repaired have been remined.

IR # 1.4 Rehabilitated community facilities. In most provincial towns and villages, the majority of community facilities were either destroyed during more than 30 years of fighting or became dysfunctional due to a prolonged state of disrepair and a lack of government resources directed to improve social infrastructure. Therefore, USAID funding revitalized communities through the construction and repair of 127 schools, 50 health posts, 163 kilometers of irrigation canals, 122 water systems/wells, 91 latrines, 22 kindergarten/feeding centers, nine markets, eight village nurseries, six reservoirs, four water-powered grinding mills, one pediatric clinic and one maternity delivery room. The rehabilitation of these facilities had direct benefits vis a vis access to health, education and agriculture and brought

communities together, working for their common good. However, the GRA's lack of commitment to providing resources to the social service sectors makes progress difficult.

IR # 2 Improved health status in areas covered by NGO partner programs. In general terms, in 1997 overall health status remained poor. According to UNICEF, Angola's average infant and maternal mortality rates of 195/1,000 and 1,500/100,000 respectively, rank among the highest in the world. The Ministry of Health continues to experience severe service delivery problems, due to low salaries, late- or non-payment of salaries, and lack of essential drugs, operating budgets and trained personnel. Although some increase in government spending on health is anticipated, the increase is not expected to be dramatic, nor is it expected to have much short term impact. Despite this environment, USAID-supported health interventions saved numerous lives, through the rigorous rehabilitation of more than 19,000 malnourished children, by vaccinating more than 870,000 children and women of childbearing age against tetanus and the major preventable childhood diseases, and by providing preventative and curative health care services to 244,000 people in remote areas lacking government support.

As originally conceived, the USAID/Angola Results Framework did not envisage many USAID-funded health activities, as the intermediate result was to have been achieved through the activities of other donors. Given the outcome of the 1997 R4 Review, it was determined that the Mission would add child survival activities to the portfolio in FY 98, building upon the success of ongoing programs, in order to continue to address the overwhelming need for basic health care services, particularly in support of women and children.

IR # 2.1 Decreased rates of malnutrition. During the height of the war in 1993/4, nearly 1,000 people were dying a day from malnutrition and other causes related to the war. Populations were cut off from any means of providing for themselves and relief organizations, the majority of which were funded by USAID, responded by flying in food aid and establishing emergency feeding programs for malnourished children and other vulnerable groups. Over the past few years, however, such emergency needs have diminished and the number of malnourished children requiring therapeutic and supplemental feeding decreased in 1997 to the extent that five of the 11 USAID-supported therapeutic and supplemental feeding centers were either closed or absorbed into provincial hospital pediatric wards.

Notwithstanding progress in many parts of the country, there continued to be a need for emergency feeding centers to address cases of severe and moderate malnutrition of children, mostly due to medical complications and poor feeding practices. In addition, in some areas the nutritional status of the local population decreased due to the arrival of new IDPs, many of whom fled their agricultural fields when their villages were attacked and arrived in areas where food stocks were not sufficient to support them. Over the coming year, it is expected that the remaining pockets of malnutrition will decrease, unless a rise in insecurity causes the displacement of additional people and the agricultural season is not as productive as anticipated. In general, as USAID continues to support the training of MOH staff to increase their capacity to train others in nutrition, and immunization coverage improves as a result of programs funded by USAID and other donors, the prevalence of malnutrition exacerbated by

vaccine-preventable diseases, such as measles should decrease.

IR # 2.2 Increased access to primary health care. Social services in Angola have taken the longest to recuperate from over 30 years of war and neglect by the government. Even the most basic health services are absent in most areas of the country, taking a heavy toll on women and children, many of whom die daily from vaccine-preventable diseases and complications in childbirth. In response, USAID supported MCH programs which have resulted in a decrease in infant and maternal mortality rates to 41/1,000 and 262/100,000 respectively where they serve compared to the national averages of 195/1,000 and 1,500/100,000. More than 325 traditional birth attendants [TBAs] were trained in 1997 who subsequently assisted 11,530 deliveries. Close to 20,000 women received prenatal consultations either by trained TBAs or at USAID-supported health posts. More than 48,000 women received training through 160 seminars conducted by NGOs on health and nutrition. USAID also funded the provision of basic curative and preventative services at seven health posts, five of which had mobile medical teams to reach outlying areas, providing consultations to over 244,000 people.

In order to increase immunization coverage against tetanus and the major preventable childhood diseases, USAID vaccinated more than 870,000 children and women of childbearing age. In addition, 200 cold chain technicians, vaccinators or community activities were trained and seven new fixed vaccination posts were established. USAID also provided funding to UNICEF for vaccines and vaccination materials for the work of the NGOs in EPI, and supported both UNICEF and the World Health Organization for the national polio campaigns. It is impossible to determine how many lives were saved and how much human suffering was relieved as a result of these emergency interventions. However, many more women and children continue to be at risk and in need of support. USAID plans to continue to support programs to target the needs of women and children in FY 98, and will continue to press the GRA to channel more appropriate levels of resources into the social services.

IR # 2.3 Increased access to potable water. The availability of potable water remains a major problem for rural communities in Angola, with the attendant disease-related ramifications. Most wells in Angola either were destroyed or have fallen into a state of disrepair, forcing people, especially women, to travel great distances in order to provide for their families. To increase access to potable water for rural communities, the construction and/or rehabilitation of as many as 122 water systems (including wells) was funded in 1997. However, the need for improved access to potable water is still outstanding for the majority of rural communities throughout the country.

IR # 3 Rehabilitation of war victims and other vulnerable groups.

IR # 3.1 Institutional support provided for the treatment and rehabilitation of vulnerable groups. The war in Angola left both visible and invisible scars on the Angolan people through its legacy of landmine victims, war-traumatized children, former child-soldiers, and widows. To address the special needs of these vulnerable groups, USAID supported the

rehabilitation of more than 900 landmine survivors, many of whom were women and children, through prosthetic and orthopedic programs. Over 300 crutches and 7,000 prosthetic components were produced and distributed.

In addition, with crucial funding from USAID, grass-roots community capacity to assist the rehabilitation of vulnerable groups improved significantly during 1997. More than 2,300 adults from civil society [representatives of NGOs, churches, and schools] were trained to provide clinical and occupational therapy to 71,000 traumatized children. In addition, 44 community groups for children [soccer teams, theater groups, et cetera] were established and eight primary schools, three pre-school centers, and four traditional structures for community meetings were constructed/rehabilitated to improve the institutional reintegration of traumatized children in a supportive community-based environment. Recognizing that community care is preferable to children's homes or orphanages, USAID also supported the placement of children in foster care and in extended family care. Notwithstanding the continued successful implementation of these programs, the need for institutional support for the treatment and rehabilitation of vulnerable groups in Angola will continue for generations.

IR # 3.2 Communities and individuals trained to facilitate return of vulnerable groups to their homes. The war in Angola shattered communities and the ties that bind families. Children were forcibly recruited by both sides to fight in the war, wives were separated from husbands, and the number of widows and orphans skyrocketed. Now that peace is holding, displaced people and fractured communities are trying to piece themselves together again. In order to facilitate the return of vulnerable groups to their communities, USAID supported the training of 450 people to trace families, and by the end of 1997 more than 1,470 families were traced and 1,020 children [525 ex-UNITA underage soldiers and 495 other separated children] were reunited with their families. In addition, more than 175 adults and 300 catechists [lay church workers] were trained in techniques to facilitate psychosocial and economic reintegration of former child soldiers into their home communities.

IR # 3.3. Demobilization process supported. The completion of the USAID-supported demobilization of quartered ex-FMU was one of the most significant events of 1997, with far-reaching implications for sustained peace in Angola. Although the demobilization process was difficult and had numerous setbacks, nearly 42,000 of the 61,000 ex-FMU registered at the quartering areas [QAs] were demobilized. The remainder either deserted or were incorporated into the Angolan Army [FAA], police, or became deminers under the National Demining Program. USAID provided crucial support to the UNHCR which coordinated the demobilization process, and to three NGOs who provided essential humanitarian services at four of the 15 QAs for the former soldiers and their dependent family members. In addition, USAID provided essential funding for resettlement kits for the demobilized soldiers and transportation for the former soldiers and their families to their selected destinations. USAID played a leading role as one of the three Troika observers at the Joint Peace Commission's demobilization policy group. Since the original 61,000 ex-FMU troops were quartered, close to an additional 8,000 "residual" UNITA troops have been registered and disarmed, and are in the process of being demobilized. Thus, only 1,000 ex-FMU in special categories [Joint

Commission members, deminers, etc] remain to be de-mobilized (not counting deserters or FAA troops).

Assessment of Progress:

The activities under this Strategic Objective are rated as fully successful, and USAID/Angola remains optimistic that the prospects for completing the transition from emergency activities to rehabilitation interventions in FY 98 is good. An increase in resettlement of IDPs and refugees is anticipated and the successful implementation of community revitalization programs is expected to expand, based on the achievements in 1997. However, the pace of extension of state administration and demilitarization of the countryside has been much slower than expected which has prevented the level of achievement of certain of our planned resettlement and reintegration results. This calls into question the implicit assumptions upon which the SO hinges - that peace and stability will be re-established in the rural areas. Most observers now expect that this will take significantly longer than was originally envisaged. The strategy update will discuss possible changes in key assumptions, and refine the indicators where necessary.

The "customers" of the USAID assistance/transition efforts under this strategic objective are the victims of the war. Uniformly these people want peace above all, as they recognize that peace is the main determinant of their ability to put their lives back together. Downstream customer expectations include agricultural assistance programs, functioning health services, and schools for their children, which are in line with the goals of the SO. Progress is being made by the PVOs implementing USAID-funded program in hiring practices and targeting interventions to avoid [unintended] discrimination against women, but more efforts need to be made. USAID's upcoming strategy revision will incorporate all pertinent gender-based recommendations made by the WIDTECH team's 1997 evaluation.

The World Bank recently completed negotiations with MINARS on its resettlement and recovery program. MINARS now has the capacity to make grants to NGOs to assist with reintegration efforts which will facilitate disbursement of the combined \$2.25 million joint USAID-MINARS project for reintegration support. OFDA, OTI and FFP resources are fully integrated into this Strategic Objective, and the Mission intends to make continued use of these resources in its achievement.

OBJECTIVE: APPROVED: 18/06/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: ANGOLA/USAID			
RESULT NAME: Increased resettlement, rehabilitation and food self-reliance of war-affected Angolan communities			
INDICATOR: 811,000 IDPs resettled.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of people resettled. SOURCE: UCAH, WVI, SCF/US, CARE, CRS INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: 811,000 IDPs resettled. COMMENTS: Although there were a number of advances in the resettlement of IDPs and refugees, there were also a number of cases of new IDPs. Overall, the level of resettlement expected to be accomplished in 1997 did not occur, mainly due to the slow progress of the extension of state administration, lack of full freedom of movement, and insecurity in many areas.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	100,000	60,000
	1998	250,000	N/A
	1999	300,000	N/A
	2000	350,000	N/A

OBJECTIVE:			
APPROVED: 18/06/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: ANGOLA/USAID			
RESULT NAME: Increased household food production			
INDICATOR: Decrease in free food distribution in partner programs			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of beneficiaries decreased SOURCE: WVI, SCF/US, CARE, CRS INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Partner programs decrease the number of beneficiaries receiving free food distributions. COMMENTS: Over the course of 1997, 340,000 of the 540,000 USAID-supported free food beneficiaries were able to be phased-off general distributions. With few exceptions, the reduction in free food distributions did not result in increased levels of malnutrition among the beneficiary populations. USAID plans to phase-out free food distributions through WVI, SCF/US, CARE and CRS to the remaining 200,000 beneficiaries in FY98. If any residual populations still have unmet needs in FY99 and beyond, USAID will provide assistance through WFP.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	300,000	340,000
	1998	200,000	N/A
	1999	Zero	N/A
	2000	Zero	N/A

OBJECTIVE: APPROVED: 18/06/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: ANGOLA/USAID			
RESULT NAME: Improved food-crop variety availability			
INDICATOR: Increase in improved food crops adopted by farmers in targeted areas.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Adoption rate % SOURCE: CREA/Angola, WVI, CRS, CARE, SCF/US, Africare INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Improved food crops adopted by farmers in targeted areas increase. COMMENTS: In 1997 alone, more than 800 farmers participated in testing new varieties of imported seeds. Of the 12 new varieties tested, nine were selected over local varieties on the basis of yield, cooking time, and palatability. These adapted seeds are now in the process of being multiplied for use by farmers in the 1998/99 planting season to increase the availability of a wider variety of improved food crops.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	Zero	Zero
	1998	12.5 % of population	N/A
	1999	25 % of population	N/A
	2000	35 % of population	N/A

OBJECTIVE: APPROVED: 18/06/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: ANGOLA/USAID			
RESULT NAME: Restored roads and bridges in certain areas			
INDICATOR: Secondary and tertiary roads and bridges repaired and maintained.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: kilometers of roads and numbers of bridges SOURCE: WVI, CREA/Angola, CARE, SCF/US, CRS INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Secondary and tertiary roads and bridges are repaired and maintained. COMMENTS: USAID-funded PVOs exceeded the results planned over three years in only one year. The roads and bridges destroyed during the war that were reconstructed and rehabilitated with support from USAID re-established the links between people and communities and increased the movement of goods, services and information.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	500 kms. 30 bridges	1,646 kms. 74 bridges
	1998	500 kms. 30 bridges	N/A
	1999	500 kms. 30 bridges	N/A
	2000	500 kms. 30 bridges	N/A

OBJECTIVE: APPROVED: 18/06/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: ANGOLA/USAID			
RESULT NAME: Rehabilitated community facilities			
INDICATOR: Rehabilitation of schools, health posts and other community facilities.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: number of facilities rehabilitated per year. SOURCE: CREA/Angola, CARE, CRS, SCF/US, WVI, CCF INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Schools, health posts and other community facilities are constructed/rehabilitated. COMMENTS: USAID-funded PVOs exceeded the results planned over three years in only one year. USAID support for the rehabilitation of essential facilities such as schools, health posts, latrines, irrigation canals and wells which were destroyed during the war greatly improved the potential of the population for increase access to health, education as well as agricultural production, and brought communities back together, working for their common good.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	100	311
	1998	100	N/A
	1999	100	N/A
	2000	100	N/A

OBJECTIVE: APPROVED: 18/06/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: ANGOLA/USAID			
RESULT NAME: Decreased rates of malnutrition			
INDICATOR: Decrease in number of children with severe or acute malnutrition			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Numbers of individuals outreached. SOURCE: ACF, WVI, MSF/France, MSF/Belgium INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The number of children with severe or acute malnutrition treated at USAID-funded feeding centers is decreased. COMMENTS: During the height of the war in 1993/94, nearly 1,000 people were dying a day from malnutrition and other causes related to the war. However, over the past few years such emergency needs have diminished and the number of malnourished children requiring therapeutic and supplementary feeding decreased in 1997 such that five of the 11 USAID-supported feeding centers closed or were absorbed into the provincial hospital pediatric wards. Over the coming years, it is expected that the remaining pockets of malnutrition will no longer require funding from USAID.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	15,000	19,000
	1998	8,000	N/A
	1999	N/A	N/A
	2000	N/A	N/A

OBJECTIVE: APPROVED: 18/06/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: ANGOLA/USAID			
RESULT NAME: Increased access to primary health care			
INDICATOR: Increase in access to primary health care.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Numbers of individuals outreached. SOURCE: IMC, Africare, WVI, MSF/France, CRS INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Access to primary health care (EPI, MCH and basic community-based health care) is increased. COMMENTS: In order to increase immunization coverage against tetanus and the major preventable childhood diseases, USAID supported the vaccination of more than 870,000 children and women of childbearing age, the training of more than 48,000 women on health and nutrition, and the provision of basic health care to over 244,000 people at health posts. The majority of the USAID-funded programs in the health sector are emergency programs including both preventative and curative activities. Therefore, this indicator is in the process of being revised so that it conforms to USAID's child survival strategy.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	1 million	1.27 million
	1998	800,000	N/A
	1999	N/A	N/A
	2000	N/A	N/A

OBJECTIVE: APPROVED: 18/06/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: ANGOLA/USAID			
RESULT NAME: Increased access to potable water			
INDICATOR: Increased water points			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of points rehabilitated SOURCE: CREA/Angola, CARE, WVI, CRS, CCF INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Water points are constructed/rehabilitated. COMMENTS: Most wells in Angola either were destroyed during the war or have fallen into a state of disrepair, forcing people, especially women, to travel great distances in order to provide for their families. To increase access to potable water for rural communities, in 1997 USAID supported the construction and/or rehabilitation of as many as 122 water systems (including wells), exceeding the results planned for 1997 by 57 percent.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	70	122
	1998	70	N/A
	1999	70	N/A
	2000	70	N/A

OBJECTIVE:			
APPROVED: 18/06/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: ANGOLA/USAID			
RESULT NAME: Institutional support provided for the treatment and rehabilitation of vulnerable groups			
INDICATOR: Number of organizations with socialization treatment capacity expanded.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Numbers of beneficiary organizations SOURCE: CCF, SCF/UK INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of organizations with socialization treatment capacity are expanded. COMMENTS: In 1997, with crucial funding from USAID, grass-roots community capacity to assist the rehabilitation of vulnerable groups improved significantly. More than 2,300 representatives from 64 NGOs, churches, and schools were trained to provide clinical and occupational therapy to 71,000 traumatized children. Also 44 community groups for children were established as well as 11 kindergarten/primary schools to improved the institutional reintegration of traumatized children in a supportive community-based environment. In addition, USAID supported the rehabilitation of more than 900 landmine survivors, many of whom were women and children.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	100	119
	1998	50	N/A
	1999	50	N/A
	2000	50	N/A

OBJECTIVE: APPROVED: 18/06/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: ANGOLA/USAID			
RESULT NAME: Communities and individuals trained to facilitate return of vulnerable groups to their homes			
INDICATOR: TOTs given to adults in socialization treatment increased.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Numbers trained. SOURCE: CCF, SCF/UK INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: The number of TOTs sessions provided to adults in the area of socialization treatment increased. COMMENTS: The war in Angola shattered communities and the ties that bind families. Now that peace is holding, IDPs and fractured communities are trying to piece themselves together again. To facilitate the return of vulnerable groups to their communities, USAID supported the training of 450 people to trace families with lost children, and by the end of 1997 1,020 children were reunited with their families. In addition, more than 475 adults were trained in techniques to facilitate psycho-social and economic reintegration of former child soldiers into their home communities.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	800	925
	1998	800	N/A
	1999	800	N/A
	2000	800	N/A

OBJECTIVE: APPROVED: 18/06/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: ANGOLA/USAID			
RESULT NAME: Demobilization process supported			
INDICATOR: Number of former soldiers disarmed and returned to their communities increased.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Numbers of demobilized SOURCE: UCAH, IOM, CRS, WVI, Africare INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of former soldiers disarmed and returned to their communities increased. COMMENTS: The completion of the USAID-supported demobilization of quartered ex-FMU was one of the most significant events of 1997, with far-reaching implications for sustained peace in Angola. Although 61,000 ex-UNITA soldiers were registered at the quartering areas, only approximately 42,000 were demobilized. The rest either deserted or were incorporated into the Angolan Army, police, or became deminers under the National Demining Program. In addition, 8,000 "residual" UNITA troops have since been registered and are in the process of being demobilized. All of these excess troops, and the more than 40,000 FAA troops originally scheduled to be demobilized should complete the process in 1998.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	100,000	41,796
	1998	50,000	N/A
	1999	N/A	N/A
	2000	N/A	N/A

3. Strategic Objective # 2 - Increased National Reconciliation through Strengthened Civil Society and Political Institutions - Performance Analysis

Strategic Objective # 2 furthers the achievement of USG goals in Angola and supports the Mission Performance Plan in its goals of "Promoting consolidation of the peace process to enhance internal and regional stability" and "Promoting democratic principles and institutions, respect for human rights, including women's rights, and the development of civil society."

Overall, there were significant improvements in the area of national reconciliation in 1997. UNITA members elected to the National Assembly during the 1992 elections were incorporated into the legislature. The Government of National Unity [GURN] is well-along in the process of extension of state administration: almost 85% of the country is now controlled by the state. There were indications of cooperation between erstwhile political opponents - the Government and UNITA administrators.

USAID, the first donor to put in place a broad-gauge DG program, continues to play a pivotal role in Angola's democratic development. The focus on lower-level democratic institution building also makes USAID a major player in Angola's move to achieving sustainable peace and the development of a culture of tolerance and respect for human rights. The activities under SO # 2 are geared towards achievement of reconciliation of the governing and the governed by working on both the supply and demand sides of governance in Angola. National Democratic Institute's [NDI's] project on local administration and the International Republican Institute's [IRI's] project in the National Assembly both focus on the "governing" (supply) while PACT's local NGO strengthening and World Learning's human rights and journalists' training projects are directed toward the "governed" (demand).

IR # 1: Reconciliation Opportunities Among Diverse Groups of Angolans Emerge.

IR # 1.1: Increased Capacity of (select) national, provincial and local political and administrative leadership to respect human rights and promote national reconciliation.

This IR was deemed important because Angola's three decades of war have created a climate in which violations of human rights are common and there is a deep distrust of political leadership. It was expected that activities that targeted political and administrative leadership would make those leaders committed to the spirit of reconciliation running through the Lusaka Protocol. Angola's political ideology between 1975 and 1989 made it impossible to have open discussions on human rights and divergent political views. Thus, the seminars and training activities under this IR clearly assist in overcoming this problem.

To address the issue of women's rights, USAID and the Swedish Embassy organized a national seminar on "Violence Against Women" which brought together about 150 participants from different parts of the political spectrum. This was the first time that the issue of violence against women was debated publicly with such a diverse mix of the Angolan society in a climate of trust, respect and tolerance.

With the same objective of promoting national reconciliation and improving Angola's human rights conditions, NDI put on the seminar entitled "Making Democracy Work" which brought together 150 people representing different viewpoints from government ministries, political parties and civil society. The seminar focused on reinforcing the capacity of the judicial system to promote and protect basic human rights.

With focus on political leadership, in 1997, IRI's nine programs resulted in several political parties undertaking significant restructuring and the formation of a coalition to increase effectiveness in the National Assembly. In each of the programs Angolans (regardless of their political affiliation, gender, age and geographic location) participated in activities that enhanced reconciliation and dialogue.

The Association of Women's Jurists brought the issue of women's and children's rights to public and GURN attention through a conference and pamphlet dealing with formerly neglected subjects such as spouse abuse, underage labor, and child prostitution. The Human Rights Division of the Ministry of Justice began slowly to assert its role in monitoring the serious human rights situation in the country. USG-supported NGO's invited elements of the Angolan National Police to participate in human and civil rights-related seminars, marking the first time the ANP -- one of the primary human rights abusers in Angola -- underwent such training.

IR # 1.2: Increased Capacity of Citizens and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to Resolve Disputes Peacefully and Effectively.

Peaceful and effective dispute resolution, at the macro level, was another problem created by Angola's many years of war. Through improved capacities of CSOs, it was expected that the demand for peace would increase and oblige the political leadership to work together in the national interest.

NDI's "Voices of Reconciliation" is designed to teach citizens about the democratic values of freedom of expression and tolerance. The program marked the first time that journalists of Radio Nacional (GRA) and Vorgan (UNITA) worked together; it was also the first time that a program was aired on the two stations contemporaneously. In collaboration with a local theater group, NDI has produced three radio sketches, which focus on tolerance of diverse viewpoints and citizens' rights. Also, World Learning's seminar on "Violence Against Women" contributed to increased technical capacity of the participants by providing practical instruments to enable them deal with dispute management.

IR # 2: Citizens Exercise Their Democratic Rights and Responsibilities.

IR # 2.1: Increased Public Understanding of their Rights and Responsibilities of Citizens in a Democracy and Appropriate Channels (both Government and non-government) for the Representation of Citizen Interests.

Angola's erstwhile vertical and central political orientation did not provide citizens the opportunity or channels to exercise their rights. Since democratic rights presumes that citizens have responsibilities in a democracy, there was a perceived need for Angolans to increase their understanding of the nexus between rights and responsibilities.

In 1997, a USAID-funded NGO conducted four civic education workshops that focused on the design of civic education programs for various sectors of society. Each workshop included representatives of most political parties, CSOs, religious organizations, members of parliament, and representatives of key government ministries.

A total of 268 trainers [60% of them women] have undergone Human Rights Advocacy training under USAID's human rights activity. Many of these trained activists are now sensitizing their communities on the rights and freedoms entrenched in the constitution, the legal codes and the international human rights conventions to which Angola is a signatory.

USAID's program with the political parties involved 1,500 participants who increased their understanding of democratic systems, rights and responsibilities of citizens, and the role of government. The success of this programming has resulted in requests for similar programs from labor unions, church groups, professional and student associations.

An important characteristic of the "Voices of Reconciliation" activity is to provide citizens an opportunity to challenge public officials, who are in turn given the chance to respond to concerns that citizens voice on issues as diverse as freedom of movement, demining, etc.

IR # 2.2: Strengthened Capacity of CSOs (Service Delivery, Advocacy and Watchdog) and Political Parties to Respond to Members Needs and Represent their Interests to Relevant Authorities.

Five political parties developed a low-cost method to create a data base (card file system) to accurately assess the number of party members. IRI also worked with several of the political parties as they reorganized to be more effective at the local level and better prepare for the constitutional debates.

In a selection process that included 150 NGOs, USAID, its partners and stakeholders selected 18 for an organizational development program. The selected NGOs are currently receiving technical assistance to increase their competence, accountability, and empower them to serve as watchdogs. PACT has also trained 14 mentors and 32 NGO leaders to serve as national resources for developing the capacities of their members. The NGOs participating in the program have taken the initiative to strengthen the coalition of NGOs in Angola [FONGA] at the provincial levels and build linkages across regions.

The input of participants at the seminar, on "Violence Against Women", is now currently under review for implementation by the Ministries of Justice and Promotion of Women. World Learning's community human rights' training has thus far resulted in the release of 80

prisoners in Huambo and 50 in Lubango. The initiative has been having a multiplier effect as evidenced by other activists succeeding in securing the release of 40 prisoners [mostly women and children] from Luanda's prison. Nine people from civil society organizations and political parties have been supported to participate in international study missions which focus on human rights and constitutional issues.

IR # 2.3: Greater Free Flow of Information from Independent News Sources.

For several years, Angolans' sources of information were limited to the state-controlled media and UNITA-controlled radio and newspapers, both of which were used to further the political agendas of the two political factions. It was determined that the best way to counter this situation was to encourage the development of independent media, and increase access to unbiased information.

185 journalists [approximately 40% women] from all provinces have so far been trained with USAID funding. These journalists come from both state and independent media and received basic professional skills training to enable them to play their expected catalytic role in a free and democratic society. USAID grantees produced 17 radio programs that are broadcast nationally on FM (Radio Nacional), short wave (Vorgan) and four provincial radio stations (LAC, Radio Morena, Radio 2000, and RNA/Huambo). A recent listener poll revealed that 50% of those surveyed were regular listeners, 77% had heard the program more than once, and 95% heard it at least once.

IRI's programs afforded the leadership of the political parties an opportunity to appear in both broadcast and print media and some opined that these opportunities were ones they would not otherwise have had. IRI has been asked to host a twice-weekly call-in show where Parliamentarians would be invited to discuss the activities of the National Assembly. VOA's *Linha Aberta*, *Linha Directa* broadcasts diverse perspectives on issues critical to Angolan development such as democratic reforms, conflict resolution, and demilitarization. By pulling VOA's leads and stories, national radio stations and newspapers use VOA broadcasts as a wire service. VOA was the first broadcasting outlet to provide detailed reports on Congo-Brazzaville and the former Zaire. A recent government survey, conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics, gives VOA 40% of total radio listenership in Angola.

IR # 3: Facilitate Accountable Governance within Parliament and 3 Provincial Administrations.

IR # 3.1: Improved Capacity of Parliamentarians and Political Parties to Assume Legislative Responsibilities and Represent Citizen Interests.

The imbalance created by the legacy of one-party state and super-concentration of power in the Executive branch of government needs to be redressed. With improved capacity in the parliament and within political parties, it was envisaged that an active and participatory debate would emanate from alternative sources that would foster greater representation of the

interests of the citizens.

IRI worked with 9 of the 12 political parties represented in the National Assembly. These programs were attended by more than 1,500 activists and included 129 of the 220 members of the National Assembly and Ministers and Vice Ministers. The topics covered included: elements of a democratic system; rights and responsibilities of citizens; role of political parties; constituent relations and responsiveness to the people. The quality of the dialogue in the National Assembly considerably improved and it was observed that 1997 was the first time some members of the majority party were openly critical of the government while some members of opposition parties abstained from voting along party lines. Another result of IRI's work at the National Assembly was the movement, by the seven smallest political parties, toward the formation of a coalition/caucus to increase their effectiveness. One political party [the FNLA –National Liberation Front of Angola] adopted new operating and organizational policies.

IR # 3.2: In Key Provinces, Improved Capacity of Provincial and Local Administrations to Perform their Roles Consistent with the Lusaka Protocol and Respond to Citizens.

Consistent with the objective of ensuring greater representation of citizens' interests, another major governance problem in Angola is that the executive presidency not only has an overarching control over the Ministries and the National Assembly, but also over provincial and local governments, whose officials are appointed representatives of the chief of state. Consequently, to foster decentralization and deconcentration of power and responsibilities, it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of the local administrators so that they can better fulfil their roles and be responsive to their respective citizens.

NDI's program is to strengthen the capacity of provincial and local administrators to respond to the needs of their communities. In light of the fits and starts of implementing the Lusaka Protocol and incomplete implementation of extension of state administration, this activity did not take place in 1997. NDI is, however, engaged in consultations for implementation of these efforts in 1998.

IR # 4: Strengthen the Foundation for Citizens & Political Parties to Participate in Free, Fair and Peaceful Elections.

This IR has its roots in the electoral disaster of 1992, when UNITA refused to accept the results of the elections that were judged to be free and fair by international observers. One of the key lessons learned after 1992 was that the foundation for organizing elections must be strengthened and there should be demobilization before elections can be held. Demobilization and demilitarization are cornerstones of the Lusaka Protocol. In view of the slow pace of implementing demilitarization, there has been some reluctance to advance elections. Consequently, there has been a slow-down of the proposed activities that were to lead to achievement of this IR, particularly IR # 4.2 [a better informed electorate with increasing experience in democratic rights and responsibilities] and IR # 4.3 [facilitate an impartial and

effective electoral administration]. It is expected that assistance to the electoral process will be a major effort if municipal elections are held in 1999.

IR # 4.1: Enhanced Political Party Capacity to Understand Democratic Processes and Work Across Party Lines.

IRI has trained 129 members of the National Assembly and 1,500 political party activists in areas such as party organization, strategic planning, communication, public opinion surveying, finance and constituent relations. This program was aimed at not only enhancing communication between political operatives and their constituents, but also to get politicians to work across party lines as well as improve the political parties structures so that they can participate in free, fair and peaceful elections.

The performance of this Strategic Objective met expectations. Although some programs [NDI] were late to start up and in some cases progress toward achieving objectives was inhibited by the slow pace of the peace process and extension of state administration [NDI and Constitutional Development], results under the political institutions, human rights and journalism training rubrics were outstanding.

In accordance with the Lusaka Protocol, elections [local, legislative and presidential] were to be held between 1998-2000. However, the Constitution which was to create the framework for the administration and implementation of elections is yet to be completed. A Constitution Development Commission [44 Parliamentarians] was set-up in November 1997. In light of the importance of the constitution to the peace process and to creating the framework of democracy development, USAID/Angola is assisting this process by channeling support to the Commission, National Assembly and Political Parties represented in the National Assembly. This support is consistent with U.S. government's interest in enhancing the prospects for longer term democratization and assisting Angola to make its political processes more responsive to its citizens. It is expected that the adoption of the new constitution will take place sometime in 1999, thus pushing back the timetable for elections.

As Angola's peace process becomes more solid, USAID's assistance to further the democratization processes will become more development-oriented. While the strategy will be consistent with the circumstances of Angola, and priorities identified by Angolans, it is conceivable that USAID's approach will be to increasingly support the "governed" with the expectation that a reinforcement of demand from society will have far-reaching impacts on the democratic process. Considering that there will be a need to respond to the demands of the society, USAID's approach will likely be complemented with assistance to Angolan institutions which can check and balance the dominant role of the Executive branch of government.

USAID/Angola has decided to re-examine the assumptions, the approach, the opportunities and the challenges surrounding this strategic objective in the updated strategy for Angola [to be reviewed concurrently with this document]. It is likely that there will be significant

changes in the approach chosen and in the results framework. As such, comments on the intermediate results, targets and indicators will be found in that document.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #2: Increased national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions			
APPROVED: 01/MAY/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Angola			
RESULT NAME: Reconciliation opportunities among diverse groups of Angolans emerge.			
INDICATOR: Increased capacity of leadership to respect human rights and promote national reconciliation.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of participants in fora for open dialogue. SOURCE: IRI, NDI, PACT, World Learning. INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Increase in number of participants in fora for open dialogue held at the local, provincial, or national level which bring together diverse participants. COMMENTS: Indicators and targets will be revised when strategy is updated.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	500	429
	1998	750	N/A
	1999	800	N/A
	2000	1000	N/A

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #2: Increase national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions			
APPROVED: 01/MAY/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Angola			
RESULT NAME: Reconciliation opportunities among diverse groups of Angolans emerge.			
INDICATOR: Increased capacity of citizens and civil society organizations to resolve disputes peacefully and effectively.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of reported citizen initiatives on dispute resolution. SOURCE: NDI, PACT, World Learning. INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: COMMENTS: Indicators and targets will be revised when strategy is updated.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	10	5
	1998	20	N/A
	1999	25	N/A
	2000	40	N/A

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #2: Increase national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions			
APPROVED: 01/MAY/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Angola			
RESULT NAME: Citizens exercise their democratic rights and responsibilities.			
INDICATOR: Increased public understanding of rights and responsibilities of citizens			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of times CSOs participates in policy formulation at all levels of governments. SOURCE: IRI, NDI, World Learning. INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: A CSO or CSO network actively participates in the formulation of policies, laws, or regulations established by national, provincial, and/or local government. COMMENTS: Indicators and targets will be revised when strategy is updated.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	5	3
	1998	10	N/A
	1999	15	N/A
	2000	20	N/A

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #2: Increase national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions			
APPROVED: 01/MAY/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Angola			
RESULT NAME: Citizens exercise their democratic rights and responsibilities			
INDICATOR: Strengthened capacity of civil society organizations and political parties to respond to members needs and represent their interests			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of citizen initiatives on what is learned through civic education. SOURCE: IRI, PACT, World Learning. INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Citizens reporting increased understanding of their rights and responsibilities in a democracy. COMMENTS: Indicators and targets will be revised when strategy is updated.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	5	3
	1998	10	N/A
	1999	15	N/A
	2000	20	N/A

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #2: Increase national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions			
APPROVED: 01/MAY/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Angola			
RESULT NAME: Citizens exercise their democratic rights and responsibilities.			
INDICATOR: Greater free flow of information from independent news sources			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of listenership. SOURCE: IRI, NDI, VOA, World Learning. INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: COMMENTS: Indicators and targets will be revised when strategy is updated.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	3,000,000	4,000,000
	1998	4,500,000	N/A
	1999	5,000,000	N/A
	2000	6,000,000	N/A

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #2: Increase national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions			
APPROVED: 01/MAY/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Angola			
RESULT NAME: Facilitate accountable governance with parliament and 3 key provincial administrations.			
INDICATOR: Improved capacity of parliamentarians and political parties to assume legislative responsibilities and represent citizens' interests			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of trained parliamentarians and members of political parties. SOURCE: IRI INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Understanding by Parliament and political parties of basic democratic values. COMMENTS: Indicators and targets will be revised when strategy is updated.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	2,000	1,500
	1998	2,500	N/A
	1999	3,000	N/A
	2000	4,000	N/A

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #2: Increase national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions			
APPROVED: 01/MAY/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Angola			
RESULT NAME: Facilitate accountable governance with parliament and 3 key provincial administrations.			
INDICATOR: In key provinces, improved capacity of provincial and local administrators to perform their roles consistent with the Lusaka Protocol and respond to citizens.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of administrators responding to citizens needs. SOURCE: NDI INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Working groups or other structures within a given provincial department to facilitate integration. COMMENTS: Indicators and targets will be revised when strategy is updated.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	25	0
	1998	40	N/A
	1999	50	N/A
	2000	100	N/A

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #2: Increase national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions			
APPROVED: 01/MAY/1997 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Angola			
RESULT NAME: Strengthen the foundation for participation in free, fair and peaceful elections.			
INDICATOR: Enhanced political party capability to understand democratic processes and work across party lines.			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of political parties capacitated to understand democratic processes and work across party lines. SOURCE: IRI INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Improved organization of political parties. COMMENTS: Indicators and targets will be revised when strategy is updated.	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
	1997	12	9
	1998	20	N/A
	1999	30	N/A
	2000	40	N/A

4. Special Objective # 1: Facilitate Angola's preparation and implementation of economic structural adjustment and macro economic program - Performance Analysis

The Mission Performance Plan is currently under revision at the US Embassy with the full participation of all Agencies. The MPP Goal # 3 is currently stated as: "Promote US trade and investment, economic reform and favorable business climate." The USAID Strategic Objective [promote economic reform] is clearly related to this goal. Parallel efforts by EXIM and TDA are designed to improve the climate for US businesses operating in Angola.

Angola has made little progress in forging a commitment to pursue a macro-economic reform program. This opinion is shared by the World Bank and the IMF which has recently stationed a representative here. USAID became involved in this effort for two reasons: [1] An economic reform program is vital if Angola is to exploit its economic opportunities and pursue a course of sustainable development, and allow the benefits of peace to accrue to the majority of the population, and [2] a US commitment by President Clinton to President dos Santos in 1995 to provide assistance in this area.

In 1996, USAID financed two activities in this area:

[1] A contract with Coopers and Lybrand to provide technical assistance to the Luanda Water Company [EPAL]. The World Bank \$70 million proposed loan to EPAL to modernize the water transmission and distribution system for the city contains as one of the conditions precedent the stipulation that EPAL will allow some form of private sector participation in management and operation of the company. Coopers and Lybrand received the contract to research options for private sector participation [management contract], to structure a tender, and to assist EPAL in awarding a contract for private sector operatorship. In mid-1997, Coopers presented its report on the options available to EPAL. From July 1997 to March of this year, EPAL, the Department of Water and the Ministry of Planning were unable to reach an agreement on which option will be pursued, despite strong demarches from USAID and the World Bank. However, in March, all parties agreed to fundamental changes in the water regime - in all parts of Angola. Responsibility for setting water prices, and determining whether there would be [and what form it will take] private sector participation in the management of the provincial water utilities has been formally delegated to the Governors. As such, we will be proceeding with preparation of bidding documents for the Governor of Luanda, with a view to attracting private sector utility managers or investors to Luanda to manage the Water Utility.

[2] A contract with Harvard Institute for International Development to work with the GRA on a macro-economic reform program. HIID has made several visits to Angola, and has done excellent work on the foreign investment code, which it is helping to revise. Originally the work on the investment code was chosen as it was something specifically requested by the Prime Minister, and would have favorable impact, irrespective of whether a reform program was initiated. However, it was also intended to be the foot in the door for HIID, to lead to more comprehensive reform promotion activities. Although the GRA has shown interest in

revising the investment code, it has shown little interest in working with HIID [or any other organization] on economic reform.

The Post made a number of very strong and high level demarches to the GRA on this issue throughout 1997. These took the form of high-level visitors [including the Secretary of State] and the Ambassador reiterating to the GRA the need to implement a comprehensive reform program, and reiterating our ability and willingness to assist in this area.

The Mission decided not to invest further resources in this strategic objective in 1997, consistent with the results of the 1997 R4 review in Washington. No resources are requested/planned for this special objective during the 1998-2000 period. However, this determination may be reconsidered if the GRA demonstrates a commitment to pursuing a reform program.

In close cooperation with the IBRD, USAID will continue to press the GRA to take action on the issue of private sector operation of EPAL, but will not authorize the contractor to perform additional work on this effort until a GRA decision to allow private sector participation is made. HIID will continue work revising the foreign investment code, and will mount an effort entitled "Alternative Futures" to model for the GRA the future shape and size of the Angolan economy under various policy scenarios. It is intended that this latter exercise will demonstrate to the GRA the future impact on the economy and the society of the willingness or failure to undertake fundamental economic policy reform. The Embassy and USAID will continue to press the GRA at all levels to undertake a meaningful reform program.

The performance of this Special Objective is rated as poor. The underlying reasons for this are described in detail in Part I of this document.

Based on all observers' assessment of the prospects, the Mission has decided to make full use 'of already committed resources [where feasible] but not to allocate additional resources to this objective. In conformity with that decision, the strategy revision [and Results Framework revision] will eliminate this Special Objective.

It is requested that Washington understand the possibility that USAID will re-engage in this area if/when the GRA makes a meaningful commitment to such a process. The importance of this issue to our national interests [US trade and investment, and consolidation of a lasting peace] dictates that the decision should be revisited if the GRA position changes.

6. Environmental Compliance

USAID/Angola continues to comply fully with the environmental regulations specified in 22 CFR Part 216. Both in 1996 and 1997 the Mission prepared a number of Initial Environmental Examinations, and we continue to receive excellent support from the Africa Bureau Environmental Officer, in the drafting and review of program documentation dealing with environmental concerns. No significant issues or problems are anticipated with 22 CFR Part 216 compliance. USAID will continue to rely on the Africa Bureau Environmental Officer to ensure compliance with 22 CFR Part 216.

Part III. Status of the Management Contract

The management contract for USAID/Angola is the letter of February 4, 1998 from Carol Peasley, A/AA/AFR to James Anderson, AID Representative, USAID/Angola. This letter is based on the following documents:

- USAID Strategy for Angola [7/17/95]
- 1999 R4 [April 1997]
- 1997 Results Framework [April 1997]
- Africa Bureau Review of R4 and Results Framework [6/18/97]
- Angola Mid-course Strategy Review Meeting [1/2/98]

The provisions and agreements contained in these documents sufficiently describe and define the contract. The Mission is concerned that pressure on AFR's 1998 OE budget has made it impossible for USAID/W to honor the terms of the contract. The Mission simply cannot complete the installation of basic operating systems, physical infrastructure and staff itself to the agreed levels without a higher level of OE in FY 1998 or the \$3.145 million it has requested for FY 1999. Furthermore, the Mission cannot be held responsible for accomplishing the programmatic objectives of the contract if given only the current \$1.5 million in FY 1998 and the target level of \$2.205 million in FY 1999. As the FMFIA reported in October 1997, the Mission is operating at an unacceptable level of vulnerability with three material weaknesses and 55 separate management deficiencies.

One key provision of the management contract is the "efficient management of Mission resources, including the physical security and welfare of [Mission] staff." The Mission is currently in a temporary office, which lacks all but the most basic security, and continues to depend on rented vehicles without radios for much OE-transportation. USAID/Angola intends to move to a permanent office building, most likely through a lease-purchase arrangement, and although most of the security upgrades will be funded by IG/SEC, the renovation, moving and make-ready costs for a new facility will be substantial, and will have to be met primarily from the OE budget.

The limited OE resources impact directly on management time available for donor coordination, coordination with the Embassy, and coordination with the host government. With only one other direct hire at post, the Mission is obliged to rely on PSCs for most program management. Although these professionals are technically sound, they are generally less-well-versed in USAID systems and procedures. As such, Mission management has been forced [consistent with creating systems to prevent waste] to limit functional redelegations of authority to team leaders, with the attendant additional burden on Mission management time.

This Mission has been only partly successful in gathering under the USAID/Angola management "umbrella" [paragraph 2 of the management contract] the many activities funded by:

- BHR [OFDA, OTI, FFP, PVC]
- the Global Bureau [Displaced Children's and Orphan's Fund and War Victims' Fund]
- the State Department [IO and ESF funding], and
- the Department of Defence [demining assistance.]

Although some economies can be achieved with central management of certain activities, in order to integrate these activities fully into our program results framework, and manage for results, we need additional staff to keep abreast of activities in these diverse sectors, which imperative carries with it certain direct and indirect costs impacting on the OE budget which are not currently budgeted for when comparing OE and required staff levels.

USAID/Angola

Resource Request

FY 2000

Part IV. Resource Request

A. Financial Plan

The program budgets for FY 1998-2000 follow this narrative. As we expect the program to be joint-funded from both the DA and ESF accounts in FYs 1998 and 1999, we have prepared program funding schedules for both accounts. We have followed Bureau Guidance for the 1998 and 1999 Development Assistance funding levels, and have projected FY 2000 DA resources required, taking into consideration:

- **Congruence with the management contract.** The management contract between USAID/Angola and AFR directs this Mission to obligate funds and achieve intended results in two strategic objective areas, as approved by AID/W.
- **ESF funding levels.** ESF is scheduled to be made available to this Mission in both FYs 1998 and 1999. No ESF funding after FY 1999 is planned. As such, the level of DA funding requested increases in FY 2000 to maintain funding levels at approximately current [DA and ESF combined] levels.
- **Transition issues.** The budget requested for Democracy and Governance increases relative to the budget for Resettlement and Rehabilitation, reflecting reduced needs in the latter area and increased needs in the former as the country prepares for and perhaps implements elections.

Providing the level of resources requested and required for this program is an ongoing issue, both on the OE and on the program sides. For FYs 1998 and 1999, most concerns center around the availability of ESF. In FY 2000, the concerns are adequate DA levels of funding.

If ESF funding is not made available at the requested levels in FY 1998 and 1999, the program will be seriously distorted by both the significant reduction in funding and the sectoral distribution of the DA funding available to this Mission.

Scenario # 1: No ESF in either year is made available.

The existing democracy program largely closes down, as the mortgage on our ongoing activities is larger than and thus cannot be covered by DA/DG funding in 1998. No new activities are implemented and funded until 1999. Our plans to build democracy with lower-level CSOs and other elements of civil society remain on the shelf, and IRI will prematurely terminate its very successful work in Angola. No election preparation activities are funded by the USG in Angola in 1999.

Child survival activities begin in 1998, but receive only a very low level of funding in 1999. As child survival activities are [in industry terms] capable of generating operational leverage [when fixed costs are high compared with variable costs] the impact would be: [a] a dramatic decrease in the number of children receiving assistance and surviving, and [c] a dramatic increase in the per child cost of providing child survival interventions. The Mission remains engaged in the child survival area, but impact of the interventions in lives saved is modest.

Scenario # 2: \$5 million in ESF [1998] and \$2 million in ESF [1999] is made available.

All SO # 1 activities are focussed on child survival in 1998. No economic/employment generating activities are undertaken. In 1999 the child survival portfolio is reduced, and the Mission reverts to an agriculture focus. The program will by that time have lost direction, and the strategy and intervention plan deformed by the dual phenomena of:

- "normal" levels of CS funding in 1998, followed by low levels of CS funding in 1999;
- "normal" levels of economic growth funding in 1998 - permitting the income and employment generation activities planned - followed by a return to agriculture activities in 1999, a reversal of the desired trend.

It is clear from the above analysis that ESF funding is essential to this program. ESF funding for this politically important program will allow us to remain engaged with the critical resettlement and rehabilitation activities envisaged under the Lusaka protocol. ESF funding for our democracy building program is absolutely essential. It is clearly in the USG's interest to engage with a significant level of resources in both of these critical areas.

The Mission is requesting \$20.4 million in FY 2000; \$10 million in DA/DG funds, and \$10.4 million in child survival, other economic growth and environment funds. This mix of funding, as above, reflects the need for election preparation and monitoring [most indications are that there will be elections in 2000] and is adequate to continue sustainable child-survival activities that will have been begun in 1998 and 1999.

Following are the program resource request tables, one set for each DA and ESF funds for FYs 1998 - 2000. The Mission is planning a certain level of field support in FYs 1999 and 2000, and the field support table follows the program funding tables.

B. Prioritization of Objectives

USAID/Angola's Strategic Objectives, in FY 2000, will have different priority rankings than if ranked today. By FY 2000 all observers predict that stability will have returned to at least 85% of Angola, and the important processes to be supported will be democratic [and macro-economic] in nature. As such, the ranking of the Strategic Objectives for FY 2000 purposes is:

SO # 2 - Democracy

SO # 1 - Resettlement and Rehabilitation

C. Linkage with Centrally Funded Mechanisms

Our ability to achieve the results planned in Angola is not only dependent on DA/ESF funding. We are seeing now, in FY 1998, outstanding cooperation from OFDA to extend grants and

provide bridge funding to emergency health sector NGOs, which we anticipate will implement the child survival program in Angola. Likewise, we are seeing good cooperation from OTI [e.g., extending the VOA grant] to assist in consolidating activities in the democracy sector. BHR/FFP continues to provide critical resources for activities under SO # 1, and we foresee a continuing but markedly declining need for food assistance over the planning period. It is clear that DCOF and War Victims' funding needs to continue in Angola, as without such funding, achievement of the results planned under IR # 3 of SO # 1 will be impossible, given the specialized expertise and funding from G. This Mission needs the continued engagement of BHR and G Bureaus, i.e., the human and financial resources that these specialized organizations can bring to our program in Angola.

D. Workforce

The workforce planning figures are sufficient to implement the program described in this Results Review and Resource Request. It should be noted, however, that due to an insufficiency in the FY 1998 OE budget, the Mission has been unable to staff up to its approved levels. The reader is referred to Part III [Status of the Management Contract] above for further details.

E. Operating Expenses

USAID/Angola was formally constituted in June 1996 with the arrival in country of the Program Officer. While a skeletal staff of USPSCs and a few FSNs began planning the build up of the office right away, the staffing increases did not start in earnest until the beginning of FY 1998. FY 1998 was targeted as the year to increase staff size to 21 from the FY 1997 approved level of 13. Unfortunately, the FY 1998 OE budget was limited to \$1.5 million, which was \$1.4 million short of the amount needed to lease housing, purchase supplies and NXP, lease a new office building and bring two new USDH to post. This is of considerable concern to the Mission because the FY 1997 FMFIA report noted three material weaknesses and they were all related to staffing and lack of secure office space.

The FY 1999 target level of \$2 million is grossly inadequate to meet the Mission's requirement. By underfunding the FY 1998 OE budget, those unfunded requirements essentially have been pushed off until FY 1999. Therefore, the "bulge" in the FY 1998 budget represents a one-time correction for start-up costs. Note that the FY 2000 request level settles back to \$2 million, exclusive of ICASS costs.

The office building situation requires special mention. The Mission is currently occupying temporary office space until it can locate a secure location. The search has been actively underway since June 1996. This year, since funds to purchase an office complex have been identified by the Bureau for Management, the Mission has been actively pursuing that option. As of mid-February, the Mission is in the final stages of negotiating a lease/purchase contract for a property that would allow the move to take place on/a June 1998. The FY 1999 Request level contains \$400,000 to cover the renovations to the building to make it suitable for occupancy. It also includes a \$300,000 line item [C 23.2] for office rental which has been

added as a contingency. Obviously, this need will drop out if we successfully convert the lease/purchase contract to a purchase contract before the end of FY 1998.

Please note also that the budget does not contain any provision for the purchase of new ADP equipment to replace faulty, year 2000 victims. As of the drafting of this narrative, guidance had not yet been received from IRM as to whether our equipment must be replaced. If all ADP equipment had to be replaced, it would cost the Mission around \$50,000.

GLOBAL FIELD SUPPORT

Objective Name	Field Support: Activity Title & Number	Priority *	Duration	Estimated Funding (\$000)					
				FY 1998		FY 1999		FY 2000	
				Obligated by:		Obligated by:		Obligated by:	
				Operating Unit	Global Bureau	Operating Unit	Global Bureau	Operating Unit	Global Bureau
Increased National Reconciliation through Strengthened Civil Society and Political Institutions	World Learning Contract No AEP-5468-I-00-6013-00	high	1998-1999	400,000	0	1,000,000	0	0	0
Increased National Reconciliation through Strengthened Civil Society and Political Institutions	IFES Contract No AEP-5468-I-00-6003-00	high	1999-2000/01			3,000,000		3,500,000	
Increased National Reconciliation through Strengthened Civil Society and Political Institutions	Asia Foundation CA No AEP-5468-A-00-5037-00	high	1999-2000			500,000		500,000	
GRAND TOTAL.....				400,000	0	4,500,000	0	4,000,000	0

* For Priorities use high, medium-high, medium, medium-low, low

Workforce

FY 1998 On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire		1						1	1					1	2	3
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0		1					1	1
OE Locally Recruited Program	1	1						0							0	0
								2							0	2
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	3	1						0	2	1	7		1	0	11	11
								4							0	4
Total Staff Levels	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	3	1	8	0	0	2	14	21
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Workforce

Org. Angola FY 1999 Target On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire		1						1	1	1				1	3	4
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0			1				1	1
OE Locally Recruited Program	1	1						0							0	0
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	3	1						0	2	1	7		1	11	11	
								4						0	4	
Total Staff Levels	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	22
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Org. Angola FY 1999 Request On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire		1						1	1	1				1	3	4
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0			1				1	1
OE Locally Recruited Program	1	1						0							0	0
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	3	1						0	2	1	7		1	11	11	
								4						0	4	
Total Staff Levels	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	22
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Workforce

Org. Angola FY 2000 Target On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire		1						1	1	1				1	3	4
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0			1				1	1
OE Locally Recruited Program	1	1						0							0	0
								2							0	2
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	3	1						0	2	1	7		1	11	11	
								4						0	4	
Total Staff Levels	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	22
TAACS Fellows								0							0	0
								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Org. Angola FY 2000 Request On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire		1						1	1	1				1	3	4
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0			1				1	1
OE Locally Recruited Program	1	1						0							0	0
								2							0	2
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	3	1						0	2	1	7		1	11	11	
								4						0	4	
Total Staff Levels	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	22
TAACS Fellows								0							0	0
								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Workforce

Org. Angola FY 2001 On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire		1						1	1	1				1	3	4
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0			1				1	1
OE Locally Recruited Program	1	1						0							0	0
								2							0	2
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	3	1						0	2	1	7		1	11	11	
								4						0	4	
Total Staff Levels	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	22
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Workforce

Org. Angola Summary On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff						Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff	
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2		SpO 3	Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal			All Other
FY 1998:																
U.S. Direct Hire	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	7	0	0	1	11	11
Total OE Funded Staff	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	8	0	0	2	14	15
Program Funded	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Total FY 1998	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	3	1	8	0	0	2	14	21
FY 1999 Target:																
U.S. Direct Hire	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	3	4
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	7	0	0	1	11	11
Total OE Funded Staff	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	16
Program Funded	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Total FY 1999 Target	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	22
FY 1999 Request:																
U.S. Direct Hire	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	3	4
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	7	0	0	1	11	11
Total OE Funded Staff	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	16
Program Funded	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Total FY 1999 Request	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	22
FY 2000 Target:																
U.S. Direct Hire	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	3	4
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	7	0	0	1	11	11
Total OE Funded Staff	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	16
Program Funded	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Total FY 2000 Target	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	22
FY 2000 Request:																
U.S. Direct Hire	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	3	4
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	7	0	0	1	11	11
Total OE Funded Staff	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	16
Program Funded	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Total FY 2000 Request	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	22
FY 2001 Estimate:																
U.S. Direct Hire	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	3	4
OE Internationally Recr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	7	0	0	1	11	11
Total OE Funded Staff	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	8	0	0	2	15	16
Program Funded	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Total FY 2000 Target	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	8	6	4	16	0	0	4	30	38

Workforce

MISSION :

Angola

USDH STAFFING REQUIREMENTS BY SKILL CODE

BACKSTOP (BS)	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 98	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 99	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 2000	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 2001
01SMG	1	1	1	1
02 Program Off.	1	1	1	1
03 EXO				
04 Controller		1	1	1
05/06/07 Secretary				
10 Agriculture.				
11Economics				
12 GDO				
12 Democracy	1	1	1	1
14 Rural Dev.				
15 Food for Peace				
21 Private Ent.				
25 Engineering				
40 Environ				
50 Health/Pop.				
60 Education				
75 Physical Sci.				
85 Legal				
92 Commodity Mgt				
93 Contract Mgt				
94 PDO				
95 IDI				
Other*				
TOTAL	3	4	4	4

*please list occupations covered by other if there are any

TRUST FUNDS & FSN SEPARATION FUND

Orgno: 21654
 Org. Title: USAID/Angola

Foreign National Voluntary Separation Account

Action	FY 97			FY 98			FY 99		
	OE	Program	Total	OE	Program	Total	OE	Program	Total
Deposits			0.0	10.0		10.0	10.0		10.0
Withdrawals			0.0			0.0			0.0

Unfunded Liability (if any) at the end of each FY.

Local Currency Trust Funds - Regular (\$000s)

	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99
Balance Start of Year		0.0	0.0
Obligations			
Deposits			
Balance End of Year	0.0	0.0	0.0

Exchange Rate(s) Used

Trust Funds in Dollar Equivalents, not in Local Country Equivalents

Local Currency Trust Funds - Real Property (\$000s)

	FY 97	FY 98	FY 99
Balance Start of Year		0.0	0.0
Obligations			
Deposits			
Balance End of Year	0.0	0.0	0.0

Trust Funds in Dollar Equivalents, not in Local Country Equivalents

Cost of Controller Operations

Org. Title: USAID / ANGOLA		Cost of Controller Operations												c:\ch\results\co-21654.wk4		
Org. No: 21654		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total												
11.1	Personnel compensation, full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.1	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.3	Personnel comp. - other than full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.3	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.5	Other personnel compensation	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.5	USDH			0			0			0			0			0
11.5	FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.8	Special personal services payments	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.8	USPSC Salaries			0			0			0			0			0
11.8	FN PSC Salaries	30		30	30		30	30		30	31		31	31		31
11.8	IPA/Details-In/PASAs/RSSAs Salaries			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.8	30	0	30	30	0	30	30	0	30	31	0	31	31	0	31
12.1	Personnel benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	USDH benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Educational Allowances			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Cost of Living Allowances			0	6.7		6.7	6.7		6.7	6.7		6.7	6.7		6.7
12.1	Home Service Transfer Allowances			0	0.7		0.7	0.7		0.7			0			0
12.1	Quarters Allowances			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Other Misc. USDH Benefits			0	2		2	2		2			0			0
12.1	FNDH Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Payments to the FSN Separation Fund - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Other FNDH Benefits			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	US PSC Benefits			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	FN PSC Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Payments to the FSN Separation Fund - FN PSC			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Other FN PSC Benefits			0	10.9		10.9	10.9		10.9	10.9		10.9	10.9		10.9
12.1	IPA/Detail-In/PASA/RSSA Benefits			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 12.1	0	0	0	20.3	0	20.3	20.3	0	20.3	17.6	0	17.6	17.6	0	17.6
13	Benefits for former personnel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13	FNDH	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13	Severance Payments for FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
13	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
13	FN PSCs	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13	Severance Payments for FN PSCs			0			0			0			0			0
13	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FN PSCs			0			0			0			0			0

Cost of Controller Operations

Org. Title: USAID / ANGOLA		Cost of Controller Operations												c:\ch\results\co-21654.wk4		
Org. No: 21654		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total												
	Subtotal OC 13.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	Travel and transportation of persons	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21	Training Travel	5		5	5		5	5		5	5		5	5		5
21	Mandatory/Statutory Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21	Post Assignment Travel - to field			0			0			0			0			0
21	Assignment to Washington Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Home Leave Travel			0	4.8		4.8	4.8		4.8	5.5		5.5	5.5		5.5
21	R & R Travel			0	6		6	6		6	5		5	5		5
21	Education Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Evacuation Travel			0	1		1	1		1			0			0
21	Retirement Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Pre-Employment Invitational Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Other Mandatory/Statutory Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Operational Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21	Site Visits - Headquarters Personnel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Site Visits - Mission Personnel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Conferences/Seminars/Meetings/Retreats			0	6.5		6.5	6.5		6.5	6.5		6.5	6.5		6.5
21	Assessment Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Impact Evaluation Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Disaster Travel (to respond to specific disasters)			0			0			0			0			0
21	Recruitment Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Other Operational Travel			0	6		6	6		6	6		6	6		6
	Subtotal OC 21.0	5	0	5	29.3	0	29.3	29.3	0	29.3	28	0	28	28	0	28
22	Transportation of things	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
22	Post assignment freight			0	16		16	16		16			0			0
22	Home Leave Freight			0			0			0			0			0
22	Retirement Freight			0			0			0			0			0
22	Transportation/Freight for Office Furniture/Equip.			0			0			0			0			0
22	Transportation/Freight for Res. Furniture/Equip.			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 22.0	0	0	0	16	0	16	16	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0
23.2	Rental payments to others	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Office Space			0			0			0			0			0
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Warehouse Space			0			0			0			0			0
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Residences			0	84		84	84		84	84		84	84		84
	Subtotal OC 23.2	0	0	0	84	0	84	84	0	84	84	0	84	84	0	84
23.3	Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
23.3	Office Utilities			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	Residential Utilities			0	0.9		0.9	0.9		0.9	0.9		0.9	0.9		0.9
23.3	Telephone Costs			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	ADP Software Leases			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	ADP Hardware Lease			0			0			0			0			0

Cost of Controller Operations

Org. Title: USAID / ANGOLA		Cost of Controller Operations												c:\ch\results\co-21654.wk4		
Org. No: 21654		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
23.3	Commercial Time Sharing			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	Postal Fees (Other than APO Mail)			0			0			0			0			0

Cost of Controller Operations

Org. Title: USAID / ANGOLA		Cost of Controller Operations												c:\ch\results\co-21654.wk4		
Org. No: 21654		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total												
23.3	Other Mail Service Costs			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	Courier Services			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 23.3	0	0	0	0.9	0	0.9	0.9	0	0.9	0.9	0	0.9	0.9	0	0.9
24	Printing and Reproduction			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 24.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.1	Advisory and assistance services	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.1	Studies, Analyses, & Evaluations			0			0			0			0			0
25.1	Management & Professional Support Services			0			0			0			0			0
25.1	Engineering & Technical Services			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.2	Other services	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.2	Office Security Guards			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Residential Security Guard Services			0	26.4		26.4	26.4		26.4	26.4		26.4	26.4		26.4
25.2	Official Residential Expenses			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Representation Allowances			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Non-Federal Audits			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Grievances/Investigations			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Insurance and Vehicle Registration Fees			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Vehicle Rental			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Manpower Contracts			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Records Declassification & Other Records Services			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Recruiting activities			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Penalty Interest Payments			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Other Miscellaneous Services			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Staff training contracts			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	ADP related contracts			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.2	0	0	0	26.4	0	26.4	26.4	0	26.4	26.4	0	26.4	26.4	0	26.4
25.3	Purchase of goods and services from Government ac	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.3	ICASS			0	17.6		17.6	17.6		17.6	17.6		17.6	17.6		17.6
25.3	All Other Services from Other Gov't. accounts			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.3	0	0	0	17.6	0	17.6	17.6	0	17.6	17.6	0	17.6	17.6	0	17.6
25.4	Operation and maintenance of facilities	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.4	Office building Maintenance			0			0			0			0			0
25.4	Residential Building Maintenance			0	7.6		7.6	7.6		7.6	7.6		7.6	7.6		7.6
	Subtotal OC 25.4	0	0	0	7.6	0	7.6	7.6	0	7.6	7.6	0	7.6	7.6	0	7.6
25.7	Operation/maintenance of equipment & storage of g	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.7	ADP and telephone operation and maintenance costs			0			0			0			0			0

Cost of Controller Operations

Org. Title: USAID / ANGOLA		Cost of Controller Operations												c:\ch\results\co-21654.wk4		
Org. No: 21654		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
25.7	Storage Services			0			0			0			0			0
25.7	Office Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance			0			0			0			0			0
25.7	Vehicle Repair and Maintenance			0			0			0			0			0

Cost of Controller Operations

Org. Title: USAID / ANGOLA		Cost of Controller Operations												c:\ch\results\co-21654.wk4		
Org. No: 21654		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
25.7	Residential Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25.8	Subsistence and support of persons (by contract or Gov't.)			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26	Supplies and materials			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 26.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
31	Equipment	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
31	Purchase of Residential Furniture/Equip.			0			0			0			0			0
31	Purchase of Office Furniture/Equip.			0			0			0			0			0
31	Purchase of Vehicles			0			0			0			0			0
31	Purchase of Printing/Graphics Equipment			0			0			0			0			0
31	ADP Hardware purchases			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 31.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
32	Lands and structures	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
32	Purchase of Land & Buildings (& construction of bldgs.)			0			0			0			0			0
32	Purchase of fixed equipment for buildings			0			0			0			0			0
32	Building Renovations/Alterations - Office			0			0			0			0			0
32	Building Renovations/Alterations - Residential			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 32.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
42	Claims and indemnities			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 42.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL BUDGET		35	0	35	232.1	0	232.1	232.1	0	232.1	213.1	0	213.1	213.1	0	213.1
Dollars Used for Local Currency Purchases		_____	_____		_____	_____		_____	_____		_____	_____		_____	_____	
Exchange Rate Used in Computations		_____	_____		_____	_____		_____	_____		_____	_____		_____	_____	

Operating Expenses

Org. Title: USAID / ANGOLA		Operating Expenses														
Org. No: 21654		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total												
Org. Title: USAID / ANGOLA		Operating Expenses														
Org. No: 21654		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total												
11.1	Personnel compensation, full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.1	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.3	Personnel comp. - other than full-time permanent	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.3	Base Pay & pymt. for annual leave balances - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.5	Other personnel compensation	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.5	USDH			0			0			0			0			0
11.5	FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11.8	Special personal services payments	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
11.8	USPSC Salaries	183		183	163		163	163		163	140		140	140		140
11.8	FN PSC Salaries	224.3		224.3	255.5		255.5	255.5		255.5	266.5		266.5	266.5		266.5
11.8	IPA/Details-In/PASAs/RSSAs Salaries			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 11.8	407.3	0	407.3	418.5	0	418.5	418.5	0	418.5	406.5	0	406.5	406.5	0	406.5
12.1	Personnel benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	USDH benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Educational Allowances			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Cost of Living Allowances	13.4		13.4	26.8		26.8	26.8		26.8	26.8		26.8	26.8		26.8
12.1	Foreign Transfer Allowances	0.7		0.7	2.8		2.8	2.8		2.8	0.7		0.7	0.7		0.7
12.1	Quarters Allowances			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Other Misc. USDH Benefits	4		4	8		8	8		8	8		8	8		8
12.1	FNDH Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Payments to the FSN Separation Fund - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	Other FNDH Benefits			0			0			0			0			0
12.1	US PSC Benefits	44.8		44.8	60.4		60.4	60.4		60.4	44.1		44.1	44.1		44.1
12.1	FN PSC Benefits	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
12.1	Payments to the FSN Separation Fund - FN PSC	10		10	10		10	10		10	10		10	10		10
12.1	Other FN PSC Benefits	50		50	130.8		130.8	130.8		130.8	130.8		130.8	130.8		130.8
12.1	IPA/Detail-In/PASA/RSSA Benefits			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 12.1	122.9	0	122.9	238.8	0	238.8	238.8	0	238.8	220.4	0	220.4	220.4	0	220.4

Operating Expenses

Org. Title: USAID / ANGOLA		Operating Expenses														
Org. No: 21654		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total												
13	Benefits for former personnel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13	FNDH	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13	Severance Payments for FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
13	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FNDH			0			0			0			0			0
13	FN PSCs	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
13	Severance Payments for FN PSCs			0			0			0			0			0
13	Other Benefits for Former Personnel - FN PSCs			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 13.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	Travel and transportation of persons	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21	Training Travel	25.3		25.3			0	25		25	25		25	25		25
21	Mandatory/Statutory Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21	Post Assignment Travel - to field	4.5		4.5	24		24	24		24			0			0
21	Assignment to Washington Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Home Leave Travel	4.8		4.8	9.6		9.6	9.6		9.6	11		11	15		15
21	R & R Travel	9.6		9.6	24		24	24		24	10		10	10		10
21	Education Travel	5.5		5.5	11		11	11		11			0			0
21	Evacuation Travel	3		3	5		5	5		5			0			0
21	Retirement Travel			0	5		5	5		5			0			0
21	Pre-Employment Invitational Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Other Mandatory/Statutory Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Operational Travel	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
21	Site Visits - Headquarters Personnel	16		16			0	64		64			0	64		64
21	Site Visits - Mission Personnel	5		5	36		36	36		36	36		36	36		36
21	Conferences/Seminars/Meetings/Retreats	13		13	13		13	13		13	13		13	13		13
21	Assessment Travel			0			0			0	6		6	6		6
21	Impact Evaluation Travel	3		3	3		3	3		3			0			0
21	Disaster Travel (to respond to specific disasters)			0			0			0			0			0
21	Recruitment Travel			0			0			0			0			0
21	Other Operational Travel	50.5		50.5	20		20	57		57	20		20	49		49
	Subtotal OC 21.0	140.2	0	140.2	150.6	0	150.6	276.6	0	276.6	121	0	121	218	0	218

Operating Expenses

Org. Title: USAID / ANGOLA Org. No: 21654 OC		Operating Expenses														
		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
		Dollars	TF	Total												
22	Transportation of things	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
22	Post assignment freight	16		16	32		32	32		32	16		16	16		16
22	Home Leave Freight	3		3	6		6	6		6	6		6	6		6
22	Retirement Freight			0	15		15	15		15	15		15	15		15
22	Transportation/Freight for Office Furniture/Equip.	43.1		43.1			0	36.4		36.4	3		3	3		3
22	Transportation/Freight for Res. Furniture/Equip.	10.6		10.6			0	17.4		17.4			0			0
	Subtotal OC 22.0	72.7	0	72.7	53	0	53	106.8	0	106.8	40	0	40	40	0	40
23.2	Rental payments to others	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Office Space	34.3		34.3			0	300		300			0			0
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Warehouse Space			0	45.6		45.6	45.6		45.6	45.6		45.6	45.6		45.6
23.2	Rental Payments to Others - Residences	216		216	264		264	264		264	408		408	408		408
	Subtotal OC 23.2	250.3	0	250.3	309.6	0	309.6	609.6	0	609.6	453.6	0	453.6	453.6	0	453.6
23.3	Communications, utilities, and miscellaneous charges	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
23.3	Office Utilities	0.7		0.7	0.7		0.7	0.7		0.7	1.2		1.2	1.2		1.2
23.3	Residential Utilities	4.8		4.8	4.8		4.8	4.8		4.8	5		5	4.8		4.8
23.3	Telephone Costs	112.3		112.3	84		84	84		84	84		84	84		84
23.3	ADP Software Leases			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	ADP Hardware Lease			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	Commercial Time Sharing			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	Postal Fees (Other than APO Mail)			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	Other Mail Service Costs			0			0			0			0			0
23.3	Courier Services	4.8		4.8	7.2		7.2	7.2		7.2	7.2		7.2	7.2		7.2
	Subtotal OC 23.3	122.6	0	122.6	96.7	0	96.7	96.7	0	96.7	97.4	0	97.4	97.2	0	97.2
24	Printing and Reproduction	3		3	3		3	3		3	3		3	3		3
	Subtotal OC 24.0	3	0	3	3	0	3	3	0	3	3	0	3	3	0	3
25.1	Advisory and assistance services	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.1	Studies, Analyses, & Evaluations	2.5		2.5			0	35		35	35		35	35		35
25.1	Management & Professional Support Services			0			0	35		35	35		35	35		35
25.1	Engineering & Technical Services	2.5		2.5			0	35		35			35	35		35
	Subtotal OC 25.1	5	0	5	0	0	0	105	0	105	70	0	70	105	0	105

Operating Expenses

Org. Title: USAID / ANGOLA		Operating Expenses														
Org. No: 21654		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
OC		Dollars	TF	Total												
25.2	Other services	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.2	Office Security Guards	39.6		39.6	52.8		52.8	52.8		52.8	52.8		52.8	52.8		52.8
25.2	Residential Security Guard Services	39.6		39.6	132		132	132		132	132		132	132		132
25.2	Official Residential Expenses			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Representation Allowances	0.9		0.9	0.9		0.9	0.9		0.9	1		1	1		1
25.2	Non-Federal Audits			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Grievances/Investigations			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Insurance and Vehicle Registration Fees	1.6		1.6	1.6		1.6	1.6		1.6	1.6		1.6	1.6		1.6
25.2	Vehicle Rental			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Manpower Contracts	35.2		35.2	25.2		25.2	25.2		25.2	25.2		25.2	25.2		25.2
25.2	Records Declassification & Other Records Services			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Recruiting activities			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Penalty Interest Payments			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	Other Miscellaneous Services	12		12	18		18	18		18	18		18	18		18
25.2	Staff training contracts			0			0			0			0			0
25.2	ADP related contracts			0	6		6	6		6	6		6	6		6
	Subtotal OC 25.2	128.9	0	128.9	236.5	0	236.5	236.5	0	236.5	236.6	0	236.6	236.6	0	236.6
25.3	Purchase of goods and services from Gov't. accounts	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.3	ICASS -3 OE Staff in FY 98 & 5 in FY99 & 2000	52.8		52.8	88		88	88		88	88		88	88		88
25.3	ICASS -4 PRG Staff in FY 98 & 5 FY99 & 2000	70.4		70.4	88		88	88		88	88		88	88		88
25.3	All Other Services from Other Gov't. accounts			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.3	123.2	0	123.2	176	0	176	176	0	176	176	0	176	176	0	176
25.4	Operation and maintenance of facilities	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.4	Office building Maintenance	28.1		28.1	6.3		6.3	6.3		6.3	10		10	10		10
25.4	Residential Building Maintenance	60.3		60.3	67.5		67.5	68		68	61		61	68		68
	Subtotal OC 25.4	88.4	0	88.4	73.8	0	73.8	74.3	0	74.3	71	0	71	78	0	78
25.7	Operation/maintenance of equipment & storage of goods	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
25.7	ADP and telephone operation and maintenance costs	6		6	9.6		9.6	9.6		9.6	9.6		9.6	9.6		9.6
25.7	Storage Services			0			0			0			0			0
25.7	Office Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance	12		12	18		18	18		18	18		18	18		18
25.7	Vehicle Repair and Maintenance	11		11	6		6	6		6	10		10	10		10
25.7	Residential Furniture/Equip. Repair and Maintenance	6		6	10		10	20		20	20		20	20		20
	Subtotal OC 25.7	35	0	35	43.6	0	43.6	53.6	0	53.6	57.6	0	57.6	57.6	0	57.6

Operating Expenses

Org. Title: USAID / ANGOLA Org. No: 21654 OC		Operating Expenses														
		FY 1998			FY 1999 Target			FY 1999 Request			FY 2000 Target			FY 2000 Request		
		Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total	Dollars	TF	Total
25.8	Substance and support of persons (by contract or Gov't.)			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 25.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26	Supplies and materials	8		8	17.5		17.5	17.5		17.5	17.5		17.5		17.5	17.5
	Subtotal OC 26.0	8	0	8	17.5	0	17.5	17.5	0	17.5	17.5	0	17.5	17.5	0	17.5
31	Equipment	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
31	Purchase of Residential Furniture/Equip.	55		55			0	174.4		174.4			0			0
31	Purchase of Office Furniture/Equip.	19.2		19.2			0	96.6		96.6			0			0
31	Purchase of Vehicles			0			0	26.4		26.4			0			0
31	Purchase of Printing/Graphics Equipment	18.6		18.6			0			0			0			0
31	ADP Hardware purchases	22.9		22.9			0	5		5			0	190.6		190.6
	Subtotal OC 31.0	115.7	0	115.7	0	0	0	302.4	0	302.4	0	0	0	190.6	0	190.6
32	Lands and structures	Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line			Do not enter data on this line		
32	Purchase of Land & Buildings (& construction of bldgs.)			0			0			0			0			0
32	Purchase of fixed equipment for buildings			0			0			0			0			0
32	Building Renovations/Alterations - Office			0	358.4		358.4	400		400	205.4		205.4			0
32	Building Renovations/Alterations - Residential			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 32.0	0	0	0	358.4	0	358.4	400	0	400	205.4	0	205.4	0	0	0
42	Claims and indemnities			0			0			0			0			0
	Subtotal OC 42.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL BUDGET		1623.2	0	1623.2	2176	0	2176	3115.3	0	3115.3	2176	0	2176	2300	0	2300
Dollars Used for Local Currency Purchases																
Exchange Rate Used in Computations																