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**EVALUATION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
TO 1991/92 SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT**

Country Report: MOZAMBIQUE

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ACRONYMS

ASDI	Swedish International Development Agency
AGRICOM	State Enterprise for Agricultural Marketing
BOM	Bank of Mozambique
CAMOC	State Trucking Company
CENE	The National Executive Emergency Commission
CFM	National Railway of Mozambique
CIF	Cost, Insurance and Freight
CIP	Commodity Import Program
CREE	Committee for Enterprise Restructuring
CCPCCN	The Coordination Committee for the Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities
COA	Committee of Emergency Operations
CPSP	Country Program Strategic Plan
DFA	Development Fund for Africa
DNEP	National Directorate of Roads and Bridges
DNTR	National Directorate of Road Transport
DPCCN	Department for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Calamities
EMOSE	Insurance Company of Mozambique
ERP	Economic Rehabilitation Program
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FY	Fiscal Year
GCPI	Gabinete de Coordinacao dos Programas das Importacao
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRM	Government of the Republic of Mozambique
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICM	Cereals Institute of Mozambique
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INIA	Instituto Nacional de Investigaglo Agraria (National Agricultural Research Institute)
LOP	Life of Program/Project
LTC	Land Tenure Center
MA	Ministry of Agriculture
MTC	Ministry of Transport and Communication
NAR	The National Center for Support to Refugees and Free Movement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PSR	Private Sector Rehabilitation
PSSP	Private Sector Support Program
TA	Technical Assistance
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Program

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SUMMARY

Compared to other southern African countries affected by the 1991/93 drought, Mozambique was a unique case as a state of emergency was an on-going phenomenon. Although the drought exacerbated existing difficulties, the country had been confronted by emergency conditions for decades.

History and distorted macroeconomic policy conspired to increase Mozambique's vulnerability to the severe drought that struck the region during the 1991/93. What made Mozambique's vulnerability especially acute was the degree of damage brought about by decades of war and poor economic management. Public and private institutions, the infrastructure and the private sector economy were ill prepared to handle the demands of the new emergency. In this context, the Government of the Republic of Mozambique (GRM) and the international community assessed and responded to the drought of 1991/93.

In light of the weak institutions and limited material resources of the GRM to deal with the emergency, the international community assumed a dominant role in the drought response. In October of 1992, a Logistics Unit (UNILOG) was created within the World Food Program (WFP) to promote adequate transport, and to organize and monitor the delivery of food and other relief aid.

The participation of the US was a key component in the response. The US, through the USAID Mozambique Mission, provided the major portion of resources in a timely manner and played a pivotal role in the coordination of the overall response.

Distribution of relief goods was a combined effort of the World Food Program, NGOs and DPCCN. The WFP has estimated that of the 40% of the population served, half were served by the government DPCCN and half were served by the WFP and NGOs. Reliance on private transport was significant and unusual for Mozambique emergencies in recent years. Most road transport operations under its responsibility were made by contracting local private or public operators.

One of the most significant lessons of the Mozambique drought emergency was the contribution made by international NGOs. The demands of the emergency in the context of extremely debilitated public institutions obliged the donors to find alternative ways to fill the gap. In this vacuum, the international NGOs, as well as multilateral agencies such as the World Food Program, became key players. About a third of all food distribution during the course of the emergency in Mozambique was handled through NGOs.

Direct involvement of NGOs accounted for approximately 30 percent of food distribution in the most severely drought-affected provinces, with at least 23 national and international NGOs participating in free food aid distribution, nutritional rehabilitation, health programs, water drought-related projects, local purchases of food and logistical support.

There is general consensus that the severity of the 1992/93 drought in Mozambique created conditions that made it very difficult to continue the military conflict. As early as July, 1992,

there were signs of reconciliation. An agreement was signed in Rome between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO, permitting an expansion of the humanitarian relief program to all parts of the country.

With the Peace Accord signed, it became possible to reach populations by land that had previously been accessible only by airlift. With the exception of mined areas, all of Mozambique was suddenly opened up to the relief effort. Adequate food supplies were made available. The primary constraint to the provision of relief commodities became transport capacity on the ground.

The high levels of relief food openly sold in markets throughout the country is an indication of substantial leakage of food aid. Emergency food and commercial aid in Mozambique are closely interrelated as much of the emergency aid finds its way into the food market. This problem in an emergency is not as grave as the proportions of diverted food indicate. Much of the food finds its way to the population through commercial channels, albeit at a price not intended to be paid by the poor.

Various types of interventions on the part of the donor community, and USAID in particular, in the past decade in areas such as policy reform, deregulation and infrastructure development, greatly facilitated the effective response to the drought of 1991/93.

The drought occurred at the height of the civil conflict and unlike other countries in the region, the emergency food situation was the result of both war and drought. It is impossible to separate the effects of these factors. The situation that this report presents is therefore a consequence of these two inter-related impacts.

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

A. Overview of Political and Economic Life

History, politics and distorted macroeconomic incentives conspired to increase Mozambique's vulnerability to the severe drought that struck the region during the 1991/93 agricultural year.¹ The ability to cope at the individual and government level was particularly weak. What made Mozambique's vulnerability especially acute was the degree of damage brought about by decades of war and poor economic management. Public and private institutions, infrastructure and the private sector economy were ill prepared to handle the demands of a serious emergency. The body politic, even if active, was unable to marshal the consolidated national support necessary to deal with the emergency, over and above the on-going strains caused by domestic conflict. In this context, the Government of the Republic of Mozambique (GRM) and the international community assessed and responded to the drought of 1991/93.

After five centuries of Portuguese presence, Mozambique attained independence in 1975. Portuguese colonial control was in coastal areas until the turn of this century.² The struggle for independence succeeded only with the collapse of the Salazar regime. At independence, and in reaction to the colonial hardships, the GRM opted for the socialist economic model in a Soviet-style one party system. However, civil war erupted after independence with the government controlled by FRELIMO and armed opposition by RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance).

The civil war brought about rural insecurity, widespread population displacement, degraded internal infrastructure and economic disruption. It forced 1.5 million Mozambicans to become refugees.³ Armed conflict for thirty years and has had a devastating effect on life, government institutions, the economy, infrastructure and especially on agriculture. The war's affects were exasperated by the centralized economic system. Investment plummeted and economic growth declined.

¹ The Statement of Work for the SADE evaluation refers to the drought of 1992. It is useful to keep in mind the agricultural year for most of Mozambique begins in May and ends in April of the following year. The emergency response was for the latter months of 1991 and extended to the early months of 1993. For purposes of this report we will refer to the drought emergency of 91/93.

² For a more in depth analysis of the struggle for Portuguese domination and African resistance see, José Capela, **A Republica Militar da Maganja da Costa 1862 - 1898**, Edições Afrontamento, Maputo, 1988

³ Over 1.5 million Mozambicans relocated to neighboring countries during the violent, decade long conflict and banditry. Of these, 1.1 million are in Malawi refugee camps, 150,000 in Zimbabwe, 20,000 in Tanzania, 25,000 in Zambia, 24,000 in Swaziland and an estimated 250,000 in South Africa [source: UNOHAC, **Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Program for 1993-94**]

In 1991, GNP per capita was about US\$ 80. The estimated 15.3 million people of Mozambique are some of the poorest and most food insecure in the world. Commodity export values were down to 32.5 % from the 1980 value. The animal herd fell to 15%-20% of 1980 levels. Despite recent gains following policy reform and price liberalization, introduced in 1987, the volume of agricultural production in 1992 was 48% of the 1980 level.

Inappropriate centralized economic policies, especially rigid administrative pricing policies and control, are to blame for Mozambique's poor economic performance. The neglect of the family and private sector, where approximately 80% of the people earn their living, has led to increased food insecurity. Agricultural policies promoted capital intensive investment in centrally planned state farms and state controlled marketing.

Budgetary constraints and rising military spending diverted attention and resources from basic social services and infrastructure. The state sector was collapsing, inflation was growing and the informal economy was growing. By 1986, rigid official prices, divorced from market forces, generated severe shortages of basic goods. The prolonged civil insecurity, combined with economic policies that provided no incentive to private agricultural production, brought about an increased dependence on food imports. Over 50% of the population became "food insecure" with an estimated 50 - 60% of the population living in absolute poverty.⁴

B. Food Insecurity

The government of Mozambique has been notably successful in mobilizing food aid.⁵ The decline in domestic agricultural production, especially a marketable surplus, led to major shortfalls in supplies. To make up the deficit, the government appealed to the international donor community for food aid. The USG has consistently been the largest contributor. On average, annual food aid of cereal imports has equalled more than half a million tons since 1988 -- representing almost 90% of the total supply of cereals marketed commercially in urban and surrounding areas, or distributed free throughout the countryside. Despite the continuing low levels of domestic agricultural production and marketing, the availability of food in the country as a whole has been satisfactory as a result of these substantial food aid flows.

⁴ The World Bank.

⁵ An indication of the importance of external food aid to Mozambique's food security is that several of the Government of Mozambique's institutions to design and execute drought related activities, (CENE and CPE, see below) are located within the Ministry of (international) Cooperation.

Since 1987, both food aid and commercial imports have continued to increase, despite improvements in domestic production (see Table 1. below⁶). Imports increased from 312,453 MT (metric tons) in 1987 to 402,681 MT in 1990 to 649,858 MT before the drought of 91/93.

Table 1. Mozambique: Cereal Food Imports, 1987-1993

	Maize			Rice	Wheat	Total
	Commercial	Emergency	Subtotal			
1987	71,888	62,393	134,281	74,408	103,764	312,453
1988	201,444	180,939	382,383	61,724	127,730	571,837
1989	140,973	120,314	261,287	71,907	109,160	442,354
1990	79,323	162,368	241,691	46,990	114,000	402,681
1991	171,690	207,325	379,015	32,700	45,560	457,275
1992	244,892	280,479	525,371	56,800	67,687	649,858
1993	96,852	390,786	487,638	22,515	66,400	576,553

In 1987, in response to the deteriorating food and economic situation, and in part due to the drought of 1984, the GRM, with support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, initiated a program of policy reform known as the Economic and Social Recovery Program (ESRP). The USAID complemented this program with the Private Sector Support Program (PSSP), which went into effect in August of 1989.⁷ The central objective of the PSSP was to help Mozambique's economy move toward decentralization and market reliance, and away from the command system that had prevailed since independence in 1975. The Commodity Import Program (CIP) made possible the importation of vehicles and promoted private sales of goods and services. For the agricultural economy, restrictions on trade were reduced and competition was promoted in the private sector, especially in transport.

Reforms focused on macroeconomic policy issues, including exchange rates, trade policies, pricing policies, the government budget (including the composition of public expenditure),

⁶ Accurate data is difficult to obtain in Mozambique. Different sources give different numbers. Differences in fiscal years between donors and recipients complicate definitions and precise comparisons. For purposes of this report, data relies on USAID and the World Bank, unless otherwise stated.

⁷ Abt Associates, **Private Sector Support Program Evaluation**, March 1992.

and credit. In agriculture, the main focus has been on pricing and marketing policy in an attempt to restore incentives for agricultural production, especially for the family sector. Since the reform process began, prices of all agricultural commodities have increased dramatically. Domestic agricultural production responded favorably to the new policies.

Between 1986 and 1991, officially reported marketable food output by the family sector (which underestimates the production of the traditional family sector) tripled. The 1991 level of output was almost twice that of 1981. Domestically produced food's market share rose to over 55%.⁸ These startling figures indicate the resiliency, responsiveness and strong growth in rural areas. While the formal sector has fallen into shambles, the informal economy is reacting favorably to market forces. The marketed agricultural surplus is estimated to still be 90% of its 1981 level. Production in agriculture, led by the family sector, was improving even before the October 1992 peace.

These improvements, however, must be seen in terms of the near total collapse of earlier years. Rural production and standards of living remain significantly below 1980 levels. Even with a steady annual growth rate of 4%, the country will attain 1980 per capita income levels in 2015 (assuming a population growth rate of 2.6% per annum). The extent of damage and the degree of distortion that characterizes the country are extreme. Production, infrastructure, price relations, and human resources are dramatically distant from what might be considered as "necessary and normal." The history of conflict, colonial abuse and subsequent adventure with soviet-type socialism and central planning, compounded with drought emergencies and calamities, have left public institutions as empty boxes on otherwise impressive organization charts.

The drought of 1992/93 occurred at the height of the civil conflict in Mozambique, and as a result, unlike other countries in the region, the emergency situation was the result of both war and drought. It is impossible to separate the effects of these factors. The situation that this report presents is therefore a consequence of these two inter-related impacts. The October 1992 peace accord between the Government and RENAMO was a milestone in the recent history of the country. Furthermore, the accord was a major factor in the aversion of widespread famine resulting from the drought. Both contending parties and the international community were determined to avoid a replay of the situation in Angola and Somalia.

The peace has held so far. Demobilization and political reconciliation are currently proceeding well, with the UN presence visible and active throughout the country. Refugees and people displaced by the war are beginning to return to their original communities. Resettlement is taking place throughout the country. An air of optimism and bustling activity was observed by the evaluation team. Reported from throughout Mozambique. These are hopeful times for the people of Mozambique.

⁸ The World Bank, Mozambique: Issues for the Transition, From Emergency to Sustainable Growth, Draft, August 24, 1993.

Ken Wilson (see Annex 3), speaking from direct field experience, has eloquently and perceptively identified the challenge now facing Mozambique as the "new dispensation". In a recent note on *The Peace Process as Viewed from Morrumbala*, he observed:

" In many ways the revolt against FRELIMO reflected the struggle of rural populations to be independent peasants. Likewise I argue that RENAMO was severely weakened from within when it again failed to provide that option. This is the challenge for the new state, the new dispensation."⁹

The drought emergency of 91/93, its historical timing, and the response it evolved, unveiled some critical lessons for this "new dispensation" and for the emerging order. This mission hopes to have identified, if not all these timely lessons, at least some of the most important ones.

⁹ Ken Wilson, *The Peace Process as viewed from Morrumbala*, February 1993 (unpublished)

II. ASSESSMENT DESIGN AND RESPONSE

A. Needs Assessment

This section describes how the response to the Southern Africa Drought Emergency (SADE) evolved and how Mozambique's frail institutional capacity in place at the outset of the emergency came to be supplemented by new mechanisms of coordination and delivery. In a later section the contribution and future role of NGOs is highlighted. In addition, the complexity and urgency of the emergency's relief activities, political and technical decisions, coordination of multiple agencies and logistical concerns required in order to deal with the emergency are summarized in the ensuing discussion. The evaluation team appreciates the complexity of the relief effort.

In January 1992, the Early Warning System of The Southern African Development Community (SADC) signaled an impending drought in the region. Subsequent reports indicated that the scale and severity of the drought was substantial. A joint FAO/WFP mission to the region in March and April confirmed these findings.

Numerous factors contributed to the challenge of assessing needs in Mozambique. As compared to some of the other drought affected countries, Mozambique had a poorly developed early warning system. Prior to the signing of the Peace Accord in November of 1992 and for some time afterwards, the vast majority of the country was entirely inaccessible. While satellite images identified areas affected by the drought, there was no way of assessing the situation on the ground. Because of the war, population figures were not reliable, making estimations of needy populations by region difficult and imprecise. Reports from NGOs working in a small number of district capitals, together with USAID and UN needs assessment missions, complemented scant government reporting for the initial relief requirements.

By May 1992, there were 1.3 million people affected by the drought. The total number of beneficiaries of the emergency program, including those from the on-going war relief program, was placed at 3.1 million. The drought was most severe in the central and southern parts of the country, mainly the provinces of Gaza, Manica and Sofala.

B. Government Organization

Compared to other southern African countries affected by the 1991/93 drought, Mozambique is a unique case, as a state of emergency is not new phenomenon. Although the drought exacerbated existing difficulties, the country has been confronted by emergency conditions for decades. The drought emergency only served to further weaken government institutions.

Input from the Government of Mozambique, in terms of the initial assessment of the drought's effect, was largely from the Ministry of Agriculture. This information consisted of data relating to crop failure. Technicians associated with the National Early Warning System

reviewed the production of five basic food products in the Mozambican diet, and reported significant production declines from 1989/90 to 1991/2. The decline was approximately 3.6 million MT in 1991/92. Findings about changes in agricultural production are presented below.

Basic Agricultural Production
in thousands of MT

	1989/90	1991/92
Tete	98.4	15.7
Manica	91.9	5.4
Sofala	79.7	21.2

These provinces, between 1990/91 and 1991/92, suffered the most severe losses. Production of the five basic products decreased 84% in Tete, 86% in Manica and 62% in Sofala.¹⁰

Distribution of imported food in Mozambique is officially carried out through two government agencies, the Departamento de Prevenção e Combate das Calamidades Naturais (DPCCN), and the Ministry of Commerce (MOC). DPCCN is a relief agency attached to the Ministry of International Cooperation that assesses food requirements and is responsible for free distribution of food to rural households displaced or otherwise seriously affected by war-related insecurity, droughts or floods. The Ministry of Commerce estimates food supplies needed for commercial sale, oversees the food rationing systems in Maputo and Beira, and supplies food to wholesalers and retailers in other cities and towns.

The various other governmental agencies formally involved with the Mozambican Emergency Program are described in greater detail below:

CCPCCN - The Coordinating Committee for the Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities, headed by the Prime Minister, is the highest level institution for the administration of the Emergency Program. The CCPCCN is responsible for the coordination and formulation of policy, strategy and management of the Emergency Program.

CENE - The National Executive Emergency Commission was created in 1987 by the Council of Ministers and is coordinated by the Vice Minister of Cooperation. CENE monitors the day to day management and operation of the Emergency Program and maintains contact with the donor agencies contributing to the relevant programs. CENE also coordinates the free distribution of humanitarian aid, and assists in the preparation of GRM appeals for food aid. Included in the CENE is the Technical Committee for the Emergency (CTE) which conducted analysis on the emergency

¹⁰ Mozambique: The Response to the 1992 Drought in the context of Long-term Development Objectives. Paulo Fumane, Austral Consultaria E Projectos, Ltd., September, 1992.

situation. CENE is linked to the Ministry of Trade, and is assisted by various UN agencies.

DPCCN - The Department of Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities was created in 1980 as part of the Ministry of Cooperation. It was one of the key government agencies to participate in the drought relief effort. DPCCN is credited with the distribution of about 40% of all relief commodities. Although DPCCN is supposed to have a strong prevention role, the severity of the emergency situation over the past decade has required a greater focus on relief than on prevention. To this end, in 1984 DPCCN created a specialized unit, "Unidade de Apoio Logistico" (UAL), responsible for the planning, receiving, storage, transport and distribution of provisions, as well as the preparation of necessary paperwork and the rendering of accounts related to all donated goods. DPCCN/UAL is assisted by CARE International, UNICEF, WFP and the Swedish Government. DPCCN has delegations at the provincial and district level. In some locations, DPCCN provided the sole representative of the emergency effort.

CTE - The Technical Committee for the Emergency coordinates both the relief operations carried out by DPCCN and the Emergency Program for the rehabilitation of infrastructure, carried out by the various individual Ministries.

NAR - The National Center for Support to Refugees and Free Movement coordinates with the Ministry of Cooperation, and is linked to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

COE - The Committee of Emergency Operations includes various representatives of the international community, such as the UN agencies, the bilateral and multilateral donors, the NGOs, and the Food Committee for Logistics, which coordinates services related to the principal food donors.

Ministerial Emergency Units are also located in each of the technical ministries and are responsible for the implementation of the Emergency Program in their respective ministries. Included are the Ministries of Agriculture (Development), Health, Trade (Food Security), Construction and Water, Transport and Cooperation.

At the provincial level, there are primarily two groups: the Provincial Commission of the Emergency (CPE), which represents the CENE, and the provincial and district level DPCCN officials.

Despite the formal panoply of agencies to deal with emergencies, when initial estimates of the drought in Southern Africa were assessed, Mozambique was poorly prepared to effectively manage the magnitude of the anticipated need. The government system was extremely centralized and lacked the managerial and professional capacity to deal with the emergency, especially at the province and district levels where food distribution was to take place.

The general perception that the government was absent from the emergency response, however, is not true. DPCCN, with all its deficiencies, had officials at every district level in areas where international NGOs and other agencies were neither able nor willing to operate. District level DPCCN officials were there, on the ground, with first hand knowledge of the local arena. DPCCN officials assumed sole guardianship of large amounts of valuable commodities, often in the context of relative anarchy and several were killed as a result of armed robberies. Overall, however, provincial and district DPCCN representatives were poorly staffed and poorly equipped to adequately coordinate and manage the tasks entrusted to them. The WFP has estimated that of the 40% of the population served, half were served by DPCCN and half were served by a combination of WFP and NGOs.

By late 1992, it was apparent that DPCCN was overwhelmed by the task. The management, logistical support and especially the poorly maintained truck fleet were far from adequate for an emergency operation the size and extent of the one at hand. In the period from January to May 1992, DPCCN was only able to distribute 10,000 MT of maize per month (maximum monthly distribution was 15,300).¹¹ Given the drought appeal's monthly requirement of 42,000, it was crucial that another means of delivery be created.

C. United States Government, USAID and Multilaterals

A UN/SADC committee, referred to as DESA (Drought Emergency in Southern Africa), was created in early 1992 to coordinate and monitor the drought response on a regional level.

In March/April 1992 the FAO and WFP conducted field assessments of the drought throughout the region and assessed its impact. They, along with other UN agencies, identified projects to improve health and nutrition, assisted livestock owners, and provided emergency water supplies. The UNDP Humanitarian program also organized a Disaster Management Training Program (DMTP) workshop for members of the Government, NGO and the donor community from drought affected southern African countries in Harare in early September 1992.

In response to the prospect of severe famine in the Southern Africa region, USAID created a Southern Africa Drought Emergency (SADE) Task Force, staffed by representatives from the Africa Bureau and the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance and including representatives from USDA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Peace Corps and the Department of State. The SADE Task Force, formalized in April 1992 was charged with coordinating the overall drought response.

The USAID mission to Mozambique tracked the development of the 1992 drought, relying mostly on their own situation reports and NGO field reports. NGOs made important contributions to initial needs assessments by documenting and circulating district level

¹¹ **Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA), Situation Report, (No. 1), August, 1993**

information. This location-specific information was of key importance. It was often the only source of accurate information on local conditions.

In March/April an OFDA assessment team visited Mozambique in order to obtain information on the potential impact of the drought. It conducted a thorough assessment of the afflicted southern African countries, providing critical information on both food and non-food needs which helped form the basis of USG assistance to the region. This assessment, combined with a UN/SADC appeal issued in May 1992, provided donors with a framework for decisions on resource targeting.

The international community's drought response was timely, sufficient and reasonably well coordinated. The FAO, WFP, national government and NGOs provided warnings of impending drought in late 1991 and early 1992. In January and February of 1992, the FAO, WFP and USAID played a crucial role in determining the extent of the failure of the rains throughout the region and in supporting governments' appeals for assistance.

D. NGOS and The World Food Program

A number of international and national NGOs had been distributing food as part of their humanitarian and development work for years, expanded their operations at the provincial and district levels. It has been a long-standing policy of USAID to support NGOs and to encourage partnership links with WFP and other UN organizations in Africa and elsewhere.

As the impact of the drought loomed in late 1992, it became increasingly clear to the donor community and to the GRM that the national structures in place were going to require a great deal of assistance. For food deliveries on the ground, DPCCN had by that time proven itself to be an inadequate mechanism of delivery, and the structuring of an alternative mechanism was essential. The August 1992 DESA report stated that "Although drought-related assistance needs within the entire region are escalating, the situation within Mozambique deserves particular attention. Mozambique is the most seriously affected country in the sub-region as a result of drought and severe civil strife. Widespread deaths from starvation are already reported and the situation will inevitably deteriorate rapidly in the months ahead in the absence of a massive international relief effort."¹² In June 1991 representatives from the United States Government and USAID met with representatives of the WFP in order to hammer out a system whereby USG commodities, by far the largest contribution to the WFP, could be channeled to beneficiary populations in an efficient, timely and accountable manner. The result of these discussions was the creation of a system of tripartite agreements between the WFP, the DPCCN and individual NGOs. A total of seven NGOs entered into tripartite agreements in response to the drought. World Vision, which has been working in Mozambique for a number of years, moved the largest volume of food under this system.

¹² **Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA) Situation Report**, August, 1992, p. 6.

The system of dividing responsibilities between the WFP, the DPCCN and NGOs appears to have worked well, even if the initial implementation of certain tripartite agreements was slow. International NGOs were of critical importance in providing local information and hands-on implementation capabilities in the provinces, and accountability in the distribution and monitoring of food aid. The opinion of the evaluation team is that the contribution of NGOs in the emergency and their role in the subsequent development was perhaps the most significant "lesson learned" from this crisis. This topic and the implications of NGO role in emergency and development in Mozambique is explored more fully later in this report.

E. Regional Coordination

The 1991/93 southern Africa drought demonstrated the value of regional and national early warning systems by providing governments and donors with sufficient lead time to plan and implement relief programs, thus avoiding mass starvation. The Southern African Development Community, FAO, USAID and local governments all provided timely notice of the failure of the rains and the potential for serious crop loss.

In mid June 1992, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs had designated the WFP Area Director in Harare as the UN Regional Coordinator for Logistics and Food Transport. In this capacity, the Regional Coordinator became responsible for coordinating all food aid movements and related logistics in the region. This office was, in addition, responsible for the management of the Regional Logistic Advisory Centre (RLAC), jointly established by WFP and SADC in Harare, to advise both donors and local agents on food flows within the region, and alert interested parties to anticipated congestion and/or alternative routes through ports and overland transport corridors.

In October of 1992, a Logistics Unit (UNILOG) was created within the WFP in order to supplement existing capacities by promoting or providing adequate transport. Specifically, UNILOG was to organize and monitor the delivery of food and other relief aid commodities to RENAMO controlled areas. The United States Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) gave \$2.6 million to WFP to help support the creation of UNILOG.

Donor coordination was entrusted to the UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs Committee, or UNAHOC. Although the UN had been working directly with the GRM since 1987, the creation of UNAHOC provided for the inclusion of RENAMO areas in the relief effort. UNAHOC assumed the responsibility for coordinating the UN and other donor humanitarian assistance, not only for the drought but for the entire post-war reconciliation and rehabilitation process. Its work, for example, includes the demobilization of soldiers and the demining of roads. There are UNAHOC field offices in six provinces which encompass RENAMO areas.

F. United States Food Contribution

The USG participation was key to the international drought response in southern Africa and provided the major portion of resources for the relief effort. The contribution was a key

element of the international response to the drought in southern Africa, Mozambique in particular. The US, through the USAID Mission in Mozambique, provided in a timely manner the major portion of resources, and played a pivotal role in the coordination of the overall response. As the gravity of the situation became apparent, the USG reviewed other relevant 1992 programs in order to mobilize food and non-food assistance to the region. Food and dollar resources were reprogrammed from less critical programs, while protecting allocations to other emergencies throughout the world, including Africa. A unified US response was designed.

In April 1992, some 45,000 MT of food were shipped to the region and prepositioned for later allocation to specific countries. With the arrival of 600,000 MT of food aid in the region by the end of August 1992, the shortfall was, with few exceptions, averted. By the end of December 1992, a total of 1,781,032 MT of US food aid had arrived in the region. This foresight and agility in prepositioning essential commodities was of great strategic advantage and should be replicated in future situations.

G. Host Government Contribution

The GRM was aware of its limited resources to deal with the emergency and turned to the international community for assistance. The primary material contribution from the government of Mozambique consisted of logistical support by DPCCN's Logistics Support Unit (LSU). LSU transported relief cargo throughout the country, particularly to remote and war-torn areas. In September 1992, the DPCCN fleet consisted of 510 trucks ranging in size from 4 to 25 MT capacity, with an average capacity of 11 MT. However, only 371 of those vehicles, or 73%, were operational. In addition, 20% of the fleet at that time was 6 years or older. Major donors to DPCCN include the government of Italy, ASDI and CARE. Together, these entities account for 46% of DPCCN's total truck transport capacity.

H. Multilaterals

According to the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination, the contribution of multinationals to the drought effort from 1992 to 1993 in Mozambique totaled \$143.5 million. Of this \$48,002,384 was supplied by the US.

Of the various United Nations agencies responding to the emergency, the most significant program was from the World Food Program (WFP). The WFP focused on facilitating logistics and transport planning and coordinating food distribution activities for all donors. Approximately 41% of total USG emergency food contribution to the region passed through the WFP distribution system.¹³ The multilateral and EC contributions to the Mozambique drought relief are given in the table below.

¹³ U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, May, 1992, p. 8.

TABLE 2. Mozambique: Multilateral and EC Food Contribution (metric tons)

DONOR	TOTAL	AGAINST APPEAL	OTHER RELATED
EC	21,105,622	20,427,844	677,778
FAO	350,000	350,000	0
UNICEF	524,713	232,710	292,003
WFP	122,391,421	100,783,449	21,607,972
WHO	62,000	62,000	0

Source: UNAHOC, **Closing Report**, April 30, 1993

The United Nations and the ten SADC members co-sponsored a Donor Pledging Conference in Geneva, June 1-2, 1992. They jointly prepared a report on the drought and an appeal for assistance totalling \$854 million, including emergency food aid of 1.6 million MT. This did not reflect the total cost of the drought, but rather what the UN and SADC considered to be the minimum response to meet emergency requirements in 1992/3. Governments pledged almost \$600 million in emergency food and non-food assistance, including 840,845 MT of emergency food aid, plus an additional 929,889 MT of non-emergency food aid.

I. US Government Response

Of the USG allocations, Mozambique received a total of \$249.1 million in USG assistance. United States food aid totaled 829,924 Metric Tons (almost 60% of the total estimated need) valued at \$219.8 million.¹⁴ The US contribution came primarily from the USDA under PL 480 Title I and section 416 (b) and from USAID under Titles I and III. For a more detailed presentation of United States food assistance, see Table 3. The breakdown of United States Government assistance to Mozambique in relation to regional assistance is give in the table below.

¹⁴ United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, May, 1992.

**Table 3. Mozambique: USA Emergency Assistance
to Mozambique and Southern Africa (FY 93)**

	Mozambique	Regional
Total Food Aid:	892,924 MT	2,328,183 MT
Value of Food Aid:	219,788,200	649,844,400
Value of Non-Food Aid:	29,362,014	86,382,297
Total USG Assistance:	\$250,043,138	\$738,554,880

Sources of Non-Food Aid to Mozambique

DFA:	7,000,000	Mozambique Primary Health
DFA:	11,900,000	PVO Support Project
OFDA:	8,452,014	Various Emergency Activities
DOS:	2,000,000	Refugee Support
TOTAL:	29,352,014	

Source: USAID, **Report to Congress on the Southern Africa Drought**, May 1993

Additionally, on a regional level, the State Department for Refugees allocated \$10,000 to WFP for food purchases, \$2,000,000 to UNHCR for non-food aid activities, and \$300,000 to UNV for Volunteers. OFDA allocated an additional \$32,070,685 to support various regional activities.

The USAID/Maputo's response to the drought addressed four drought-related problems: scarcity of food; scarcity of water; weak logistics; and health deterioration. Logistics have always been the limiting factor in Mozambique. The Mission has therefore concentrated its efforts in infrastructure development. Mechanisms employed by the Mission to address this issue include airlift support, management and logistics advisors to the DPCCN, operational assistance to PVOs, and communications hardware and software. As explained in this report, earlier USAID assistance to Mozambique, especially in the area of infrastructure development, facilitated greatly the relief effort of 1992/93.

J. Drought and the Peace Accord

There is a general consensus that the severity of the 1992/93 drought in Mozambique created conditions inhibitive for continuation of military conflict. As early as July 1992, there were signs of reconciliation. An agreement was signed in Rome between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO, permitting an expansion of the humanitarian relief program to all parts of the country.

This Declaration of Principles called for the establishment of a committee, under the auspices of the UN, to coordinate and distribute food along routes both within the country and from neighboring countries. The first meeting to discuss strategies on how to implement the agreement was convened in the UN Resident Coordinator's Office in Maputo on July 23, 1992.

The UN appeal for contributions requested that the "donors should strenuously pursue every avenue to engage RENAMO in discussions on corridors of tranquility to enable relief food to pass into their areas." Most observers, as well as RENAMO leaders, agree that the severe impact of the drought was a major factor in bringing the conflicting sides to sign the Rome Peace Accord on October 4, 1992, the height of the drought's impact.

III. IMPLEMENTATION AND COORDINATION OF THE RESPONSE

A. Coordination and Distribution

Prior to the adoption of the Guiding Principles for the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in July 1992, DPCCN and Government Emergency Program officials had primary operational responsibility for the implementation of the relief effort. After July, however, this framework changed. Recognizing that adequate and timely humanitarian aid and food supplies were essential to save lives, and to the peace process itself, a total of 12 "Peace Corridors" were identified. A UN led Humanitarian Assistance Committee then began operation. With some delay in negotiations with the government on the role of UNHCR in relation to the DPCCN, it was agreed that WFP would create a food aid logistics agency and assume primary coordination of the food aid distribution. Improved access was only possible after the general Peace Agreement was signed in Rome, in October 1992.

As noted earlier, the creation of tripartite agreements between the government, the UN and NGOs was an innovative and practical instrument for the coordination and effective implementation of food aid distribution. Tripartite agreements made provisions for the non-governmental organizations to assume ultimate responsibility for the distribution of WFP commodities, and provided a mechanism which ensured accountability and timely distribution. In such arrangements the roles and responsibilities called for the WFP to supply the commodities, as well as associated internal transport, storage and handling costs. The DPCCN was to provide provincial and district level information on affected populations. In addition, DPCCN was initially to receive, clear, and store the commodities. This function, however, was later contracted out to Manica Freight Services by the WFP. The NGOs assumed final accountability in the districts through the implementation and monitoring of relief distribution. Seven tripartite agreements were signed between the WFP and DPCCN by the following non-governmental organizations: The Adventists Relief and Development Agency; CARITAS; Red Cross/Crescent of Mozambique; Food for the Hungry International; International Committee of Red Cross; Medicins Sans Frontier/Spain; World Vision; and World Relief.

Distribution relied heavily on the private sector, especially the transport sector. The contracting of such services was a crucial component of the integrated drought effort in Mozambique. Manica Freight Services was contracted by WFP to provide commodity receipt and storage facilities. UNHCR contracted the parastatal trucking fleet, Transcarga, to assist in the transport of relief commodities. Many NGOs relied heavily on private transporters to move relief goods. In fact, a large measure of the success of the relief effort derived from the ability of the NGOs to efficiently tap into private sector options.

An unforeseen obstacle during the course of the drought relief effort was that of custom duties levied on emergency aid. Effective July 1, 1992, right in the middle of the relief effort, port authorities introduced entry fees for vehicles. Provincial authorities in Tete began to charge entry/exit fees and convoy fees for vehicles crossing the border into Malawi.

These taxes amounted to about \$12.50/MT. Cargo tax was an additional problem, with local governments charging \$50/MT. A Redd Barna airlift of 500 MT to Manica was suspended for several weeks because the organization was unwilling to pay \$25,000 in cargo taxes charges by local airport authorities. Most of such problems were overcome at the insistence of NGOs and donors, but the cost in terms of loss of staff time was high.

B. Example of Effective Action: Sofala Province

Sofala was one of the most drought-affected provinces in the country. The experience in this province is a good indication of synergy between various agencies, especially NGOs, to receive and distribute relief aid. As of November 1992, NGOs in Sofala were handling about 37% of distribution in the province. A year later, in November 1993, that portion had increased to an impressive 65%.¹⁵

From the port to the district distribution centers within Sofala, the responsibility for transport was formally divided between the various agencies. DPCCN, using the DPCCN fleet, was responsible for four districts, representing 18% of the beneficiary population. RENAMO zones, representing 17% of the population, were accessed by UNILOG, using private contractors. The combined efforts of Food for the Hungry International, CARE, the International Committee of Red Cross, World Vision, and Red Cross Mozambique, distributed 65% of the relief.

The expanding role of the international NGOs in response to the emergency is well illustrated by the evolution of one of the more active NGOs in Sofala, Food for the Hungry International (FHI). FHI has had an operational presence in the Province since 1988. Prior to 1992, the largest FHI project was an Agricultural Rehabilitation project funded by USAID. The objective of the project is to provide seeds, tools and agricultural extension services to 10,000 families in two districts along the Beira Corridor, the 360 km road from the Indian Ocean to the border with Zimbabwe. In mid 1992, FHI was encouraged by USAID/Maputo to expand their area of operation. FHI responded by including the districts of Buzi and Marromeu, both inaccessible by road at that time. This raised the number of FHI beneficiaries to 30,000. To ensure some measure of physical strength among the beneficiary population and to prevent the seeds from being consumed by the population, food provided by the EC was to be distributed prior to and following seed and tool distributions.

In preparation for this expanded role, FHI opened field offices in Buzi and Marromeu, hired staff and positioned supplies and equipment - by boat and by air, respectively. In addition to the Rural Rehabilitation project, an integrated Health Project, funded by the OFDA, was in the initial stages of development in Marromeu. At the same time, negotiations were under way between FHI, the WFP and DPCCN to enter into a tripartite agreement to provide food assistance to affected populations in the four FHI districts of Sofala.

¹⁵ CARE, **Monthly Report**, September, 1993.

By June 1992, conditions in Marromeu were worsening, reports of starvation in rural districts were coming in. FHI prepared for the delivery of WFP commodities by exploring ocean and river transport options, and contracting independent private transporters. In the first week of July 1992, FHI was forced to evacuate all its staff from Marromeu because of rebel attacks. FHI did not return until late September. In October, while negotiations with the DPCCN and WFP continued in Maputo, FHI began an OFDA funded airlift to Marromeu, transporting maize provided by the EC. When the tripartite agreement was formalized and the peace accord improved security in the region, FHI was able to begin transporting commodities to the four districts by a combination of road, river and ocean routes. The total amount distributed, approximately 6,500 MT of mixed commodities, was largely limited by available transport.

According to the Mediciens Sans Frontier, nation-wide distribution under the tripartite agreements reached 813,302 beneficiaries, or 21% of the estimated population in need from November 1992 to April 1993.¹⁶ As this proportion only represents distribution within the parameters of the tripartite agreements, NGOs were responsible for delivery of more than the 21% share of activities.

According to the WFP, direct involvement of NGOs accounted for approximately 30% of food distribution in the most severely drought-affected provinces, with at least 23 national and international NGOs participating in free food aid distribution, nutritional rehabilitation, health programs, water-related projects, local purchases of food and logistical support.

C. Commodity Acquisition, Storage and Distribution

i. Commodity Acquisition

The major share of the maize brought into Mozambique in response to the drought was supplied by the United States Government. In 1991, of the total 379,015 MT imported into Mozambique for both commercial and emergency purposes, 217,000 MT (57%) was supplied by the US. The following year, in response to the greater need, total imports of corn reached 525,371 MT of which 489,000 MT (93%) was from the US. These commodities are sourced in the US in consultation with the USAID Mission. The various provisions of U.S. Public Law 480, availability and world-wide demand determine the allocation and acquisitions for a given country.¹⁷

¹⁶ Mediciens Sans Frontier, **Monthly Bulletin**, August, 1993.

¹⁷ Title II of the Food for Peace Program (PL 480) provides grant food aid for the emergency and private assistance and it is tonnage driven, the amount allocated is the amount that is sent. Title III of the Food for Peace Program is a bilateral grant program intended for development projects involving policy and institutional reforms and is market driven in its value. Title III was widely used throughout the Southern Africa region during the drought. **CONFIRM**

In 1992, fully half of the US food aid to Mozambique was allocated through Title III (51% of FY 1992) while the balance was primarily authorized under Section 416(b) (41% of FY 1992), and channeled through the WFP. Under the USDA, the Section 416(b) program authorizes the Commodity Credit Corporation to make donations of surplus commodities. In 1993, the USG response called for an even greater proportion of Section 416(b) food aid (142,099 MT of maize or 48% of FY 1993 food aid) allocated to the World Food Program. The balance was split almost equally between Titles II and III. Title I of P.L. 480, a concessional sales and market development program administered by the USDA, was not used in Mozambique during the period under consideration.

ii. Storage

In responding to the drought, WFP contracted the services and facilities of Manica Freight Services. Because of its size and capacity relative to other freight forwarders working in Mozambique, Manica Freight Services was a logical choice. In general, sufficient storage capacities were available at port facilities, though shortage existed in the interior. The quality of storage facilities, however, was often sub-standard. The storage of large amounts of food reduced ventilation and apparently contributed to spoilage.

Manica Freight Services warehousing capacities at the various ports are as follows:

Maputo:	50-55,000 MT
Beira:	65,000 MT
Quelimane:	2,000 MT
Nacala:	12,500 MT

At the time of this Evaluation Mission, November 1993, food stocks were adequate. Shortages in Niassa during July were covered by local purchases. When these operations are complete, stocks will be sufficient until December 1993. Nampula stocks were augmented by WFP stocks from Nacala, originally destined for mobilization, but sat deteriorating in the port. Cabo Delgado, given the small monthly requirements, is being covered by local production. For the population-dense and drought-prone Central and Southern zones, stocks are in place or in the pipeline, guaranteeing distributions through the end of the current year. The situation is one of too much food in stock rather than too little.

Storage of relief commodities became more difficult at a later stage in the drought relief effort when the supply of food aid surpassed the need. Although storage capacity was initially sufficient, large quantities of relief food had to be maintained for several months in late 1993, incurring storage costs and spoilage. The problem of spoiled stocks is examined more closely later in this report.

iii. Distribution

Distribution of relief goods was a combined effort of the World Food Program, NGOs and DPCCN. The WFP has estimated that of the 40% of the population served, half were served by DPCCN and half were served by the WFP and NGOs. Reliance on private transport was significant and unusual for Mozambique's emergencies in recent years. After its creation in October 1992, all road transport operations under UNIOLOG's responsibility were contracted to private or public local operators. DPCCN also contracted private transporters to complement its own capacity. Deliveries to the districts in early 1993 increased to about 40,000 MT per month, roughly doubling the volume from a year before.

For the first six months of the drought response, from May to October of 1992, distribution was hampered by problems of access to a number of areas - primarily areas under the control of RENAMO. There is a high probability that mortality as a result of hunger and related diseases was high in some isolated districts. Conditions of people emerging from RENAMO held zones was often poor. One must assume that others were unable to secure assistance in time for nutritional rehabilitation.

The USAID deserves special note for providing funds to various NGOs to implement airlift operations to inaccessible populations at risk during these crucial early periods. USAID funded airlifts to Marromeu and to seven emergency distribution centers along the Zambezi river, implemented by Food for the Hungry and World Vision respectively.

After the Peace Accord was signed in October of 1992, overland distribution to populations was possible, whereas they were previously accessible only by airlift. With the exception of mined areas, all of Mozambique suddenly opened up to the relief effort. Adequate food supplies were made available. The primary constraint to the provision of relief commodities became ground transport. The contracting of private transport was therefore key in the relief effort.

Accessibility throughout the country, particularly in RENAMO held areas, is a major change for relief operations in the post peace accord period. Food can now be distributed over a much wider area and has led to both significant improvements in overall food availability and greater food security. In general, however, pockets of need will continue in the rural areas as repatriation and resettlement movements continue in the coming months. As the demographic patterns within Mozambique continue to change, getting assistance to these groups will present an altogether different type of challenge. Rather than concentrating large quantities on a limited number of sites, relatively small quantities will need to be provided on the basis of careful targeting and monitoring.

iv. Mozambique's Port and Rail Performance

When the magnitude and extent of the southern Africa drought became apparent, a great deal of concern was expressed by the donor community that a large portion of food aid would

have to enter other drought-affected landlocked countries by way of Mozambique. The port of Beira, in Sofala Province, is particularly important because of its link to Zimbabwe via the Beira Corridor. A main rail line of 317 kilometers of single track connects Beira to Machipanda on the border with Zimbabwe. The Beira Corridor operated under the protection of the armed forces of Zimbabwe and Mozambique until the United Nations assumed responsibility for its protection, following the signing of the Peace Accord.

Commodity reception at the port of Beira was also critical for the relief effort within Mozambique. Much of the imported food destined for the provinces of Tete and Manica and all goods destined for the province of Sofala was received at Beira. Though the port of Beira had recently undergone extensive rehabilitation, it was not clear in the initial stages of the drought mobilization that the ports, rails and roads of Mozambique would be able to handle the anticipated volume of food aid. CFM in general, and the port of Beira specifically, has been receiving substantial funding for rehabilitation in recent years. Therefore, a deliberate decision was made on the part of the donor community to take the risk and utilize the ports of Mozambique heavily. The DESA (UN/SADCC) Situation Report of August 1992 reported that over 150,000 MT had already moved through the port of Beira and the Corridor by the end of June 1992. Final figures indicate that fully 20% of all food aid for the southern African region was received by the Beira port, followed only by Durban at 17%.

From April 1992 to April 1993, Mozambique's ports handled a total of 143 vessels and discharged 2,260,647 MT of grain through two transport corridors. From April 1992 to February 1993, the average monthly tonnages discharged in the ports were as follows:

Maputo	82,000	tons/month
Beira	111,000	tons/month
Nacala	4,900	tons/month

The ports of Mozambique, therefore, played an important role in the international relief effort for the region. Rail transport also worked well; from Beira to Zimbabwe, CFM was accomplishing an average of four loads a day. Despite around the clock operations, at times berthed ships had to wait up to three weeks in Beira to unload commodities. During a one week period in May, over 28,000 MT moved through the Beira Corridor by rail and road, an average of 4,000 MT/day. The railway from Maputo to Zimbabwe also proved effective, transporting an average of 1,000 MT per day, with no significant losses.

Considering the performance of the main Mozambique ports, the overall port capacity proved to be sufficient. The main problems preventing greater efficiency of the ports were: (i) the lack of equipment and spare parts; (ii) weak management; and (iii) institutional deficiencies. There were also serious problems with pilferage at the port of Quelimane, generating losses of about 20% per shipment. In general terms, however, the movement of relief commodities in the ports of Mozambique was adequate, validating the investment in these facilities by the donor community over the course of the past decade.

v. Road Transport

Mozambique's overall truck fleet decreased substantially since Independence in 1975. The participation of private transport declined even more. The overall truck fleet was estimated at 8,000 to 10,000 units in September 1992. The vast majority are thought to be smaller trucks in the 2-5 MT range, many out of service due to the war or awaiting repairs. During the drought period, the composition of the truck fleet is estimated to have been as follows:

- Private vehicles operated by small businessmen and traders.
- Proprietary fleets of large corporations, which in theory do not provide for-hire services.
- Common carrier road haulers offering transport services for hire.
- Government-owned and parastatal fleets (CAMOC, AGRICOM, DPCCN, Transcarga)

As mentioned earlier, one of the successes of the drought relief effort was the heavy utilization of private transporters by the implementing parties, including UNILOG, DPCCN and NGOs. UNILOG, in particular, relied heavily on the participation of the private sector for commodity storage and transport.

The earlier policies and investments, supported by USAID, in favor of privatization, especially in the transport sector, helped Mozambique prepare to deal with the drought. The drought demonstrated the validity of privatization efforts in the transport sector by expanding contracted allocations to the private sector for emergency relief logistics. Privatization has the potential to shift the balance of truck capacity from the public to private sector.

The decision to privatize the main parastatal fleets in Mozambique has largely been made, as a loan condition of the recently approved Roads and Coastal Shipping project funded by the World Bank. There is general consent in the GRM and donor community that the main parastatal fleets should be privatized.

D. Demining

A critical factor in the transition from emergency assistance to a long term development program in Mozambique will be the removal of thousands of mines scattered throughout the country after the three decades of war. Rehabilitation activities will require the rapid clearance of priority routes and the development of the GRM's capacity to deal with this long term problem. Given the scale and complexity of the demining program, efforts have started slowly. Activities such as resettlement and repatriation, particularly in heavily mined areas like southern Manica, have been hampered. The institutional framework and financial backing for demining seem to be in place, now, and more rapid progress can be expected.

E. Monitoring

A major problem in reviewing the distribution of relief goods in Mozambique is that only certain NGOs provide reliable information on food distribution. Information is compiled by the WFP only on deliveries to the Provinces and, in most cases, to the district centers, but not at the beneficiary level. Verbal reports from various donor and NGO representatives involved in the operation suggest that the extent of diversions and mistargeting of beneficiaries was high, especially towards the end of the operation. There appears to be significant variation in the patterns of onward delivery to outlying villages and distribution centers. The high levels of relief food openly sold in markets throughout the country is an indication of substantial leakage. This problem in an emergency is not as grave as the proportions of diverted food indicate. Almost all of the food finds its way to the population through commercial channels, albeit at a price not intended to be paid by the poor.

IV. IMPACT AND RESULTS

A. Economic and Social

All evidence reviewed by this evaluation mission indicates that, because of the competent and coordinated international relief effort, lives were saved and the 1992/93 drought did not turn into massive famine. No major dislocations of people took place, no feeding centers were created and Mozambique did not become another Somalia or Ethiopia. The prolonged emergency in Mozambique and the absence of reliable information makes it impossible to identify the impact of the 1992/93 drought in a precise manner. Information provided by NGOs, government agencies and diplomatic and USAID trip reports, offer only a general assessment of the impact of the drought and the other prevailing conditions in Mozambique. It is particularly difficult to separate the impact of the peace accord from the impact of the on-going crisis. There is no question that the ability of the international community to respond to the drought emergency would have been severely curtailed without the peace. In all, the drought response experience of Mozambique is an example of the positive role of international cooperation, demonstrating that a successful famine response can be mounted even in one of Africa's poorest and most devastated countries.

The drought drastically reduced the harvests in 1992 and agricultural production losses were large in most provinces. The traditional lean period begins in October and continues to March. By October 1992, populations had begun to shift significantly. Planting was problematic when, as a USAID official pointed out "three million people weren't home." Although no statistical data is available, production losses were severe.

There is no reliable information on the impact of the drought on forestry. As in most of the semi-arid regions, the need for firewood in Mozambique leads to the destruction of the forest and impairs the productivity of forest lands. Drought accentuates this depletion.

The drought aggravated the productivity of livestock and forced a reduction of foundation stock. The depletion of livestock was well underway prior to the drought because of the war.

Losses from fishery production and damage to fish habitat also occurred. During the drought, a number of rivers dried out, including the Zambezi, the Limpopo and the Pungue, with corresponding loss of young fish.

The social impact of the drought is difficult to identify as distinct from the on-going and inter-related crises of chronic malnutrition, dislocation, and civil instability. Food shortages and decreased nutritional intake were already in evidence in most remote areas prior to 1992 and were undoubtedly aggravated by the drought conditions.

B. Estimate of Vulnerability and Impact

The most systematic attempt to estimate impact of the drought on people was done by the Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) in cooperation with local authorities and NGOs. The MSF method of assessing the conditions of the drought facilitated an objective evaluation of conditions throughout the country and gave a macro level understanding of impact. Key vulnerability variables were tracked and weighted in representative districts and an overall perspective of the situation was prepared and published monthly. The variables for this index include population movement, markets, harvests, food stocks, food aid, nutritional status, water and sanitary conditions.

The following Table (also Table 6 of the Statistical Annex) and corresponding graph is based on MSF findings and traces the impact of the drought in various districts. This information indicates that the response to the crisis was indeed successful, although the situation in a number of districts continues to be of concern. The districts classified as grave reached ten in January 1993 with thirteen districts classified as alarming. By the middle of 1993, the districts reporting grave were down to none, while districts of concern remained high.

Table 4. Mozambique: Indicators of Vulnerability to the Emergency

Month	Condition		Number of Districts Reporting
	Grave	Alarming	
October 1992	2	7	41
November 1992	5	11	57
December 1992	4	13	55
January 1993	10	10	52
February 1993	4	13	52
March 1993	2	7	41
April 1993	2	4	46
May 1993	1	6	50
June 1993	1	7	54
July 1993	0	0	54
August 1993	0	9	49

Source: Medecins Sans Frontieres, Various **Bulletins** and Mission estimates

C. Future Food Production

Agricultural production is improving with the return of people to their places of origin and is expected to reach near normal levels, given adequate rainfall. As noted earlier, the production response to the improved policy environment was astonishing, even before the peace. Between 1986 and 1991, officially reported marketable food output by the family

sector (often under-estimated) increased to a level almost twice that of the 1981. Its marketed share rose to over 55%. Increased production is currently observed throughout the country.¹⁸

The most recent WFP food need estimates for the 1993/94 season are indicative of the improving conditions. The WFP estimates that food import needs will drop to 800-900 thousand MT in 1993/94, compared to over a million during the emergency. If true, then the projected import level suggests a significant turn around. As the earlier estimates of food aid indicate, such an improvement was not expected. This improvement is a demonstration of the resilience of the Mozambican peasant to cope with adversity.

D. Impact in RENAMO Areas

The impact of the drought and the Peace Accord enabled access to isolated RENAMO areas where the traditional coping mechanisms of communities must have been more developed. Many communities in Mozambique have had either no contact with outside assistance, or only limited contact with the International Red Cross, for the past 15 years.

What little opportunity there has been so far to work in these areas indicates that their response to outside assistance, including emergency food, has been conditioned by their prolonged isolation. There are reports of farmers in RENAMO areas who, possessing farming tools, have declined NGO offers to supply them with agricultural utensils, preferring reliance on their traditional (and likely less risky and dependent) practices. Such a response would have been highly unusual in Nhamatanda, for example, a government controlled area with long exposure to external aid and free food distribution. There are reports of villages collectively funding school teachers from within the community. Relief workers who have had the opportunity to compare the two communities, in the past, have remarked on the discipline and self-reliance within RENAMO villages in the absence of external aid.

Because of their isolation, RENAMO zones in the interior of the country have a longer tradition as communal units than the demographically shifting Accommodation Centers. Accommodation Centers are targeted by the international community because of easy access. Nevertheless, despite their ability to cope, it appears that conditions in many of the former RENAMO areas are even worse than the government controlled areas, because of their extreme and long standing isolation. There is a general consensus among relief workers that people in RENAMO zones are more debilitated than those who had moved to the more accessible government controlled areas.

E. Returnees

¹⁸ The World Bank, Mozambique: Issues for the Transition, From Emergency to Sustainable Growth, Draft, August 24, 1993.

Although cross-border movement into Mozambique has been significant, there is no agreement on how many of these populations are scouting expeditions and how many are permanent returnees. All parties, including Malawi camp administrators, Mozambican District Administrators, UNHCR and NGOs, believe that refugee returns will be self-initiated household decisions. Speculations on when large numbers will move, and what will draw them back across the border, are based on such factors as: (i) perceptions of personal security; (ii) expectations of the current harvest; (iii) availability of food under distribution programs to ensure survival until next harvest; (iv) availability of land; (v) ease of access, including demining, opening of roads and availability of transport; (vi) the end of the rainy season which will ease travel and permit shelter construction; (vii) access to health and school facilities; and (viii) progress on demobilization and elections. Putting all these factors together, it appears that the number of returning refugees will continue to increase.

F. Timeliness

An understanding of the chronology of the events prior to the drought is critical to understanding the means by which the emergency was dealt with and its impact. The sequence of events and the various responses are summarized below.

i. Pre-Drought Donor Contributions

Various types of interventions on the part of the donor community, especially USAID, over the past decade, in areas such as policy reform, deregulation and infrastructure development, greatly facilitated the effective response to the drought of 1991/93.

ii. Deliveries of Food Aid

The rapid response on the part of the US meant food was available in sufficient quantity to cover the drought months, from January of 1992 to June of 1993. Because relief supplies were already committed, and could not be easily "turned off," commodities, maize in particular, amassed in local storage facilities. In November of 1992, with stocks in country and a good harvest in some parts of the country, relief food was still arriving in the ports of Mozambique. Such oversupply serves to delay the recuperation of commercial agriculture and the reemergence of functioning markets. The impact of late arrivals of commodities is explored in more detail in the section of this report on prices and the local markets.

G. Food Quality

Of perhaps greater concern than the over-supply of commodities is the issue of quality control, which appears to have been a problem in the later stages of the drought relief effort in Mozambique. The demands to move large amounts of food, combined with poor storage conditions in-country, have contributed to the food spoilage, mainly US yellow maize.

Commodities arriving in Mozambique in recent months, at least 50,000 MT, were declared unfit for human consumption upon arrival. The commodities appear to be US surplus grain sourced under section 416 shipped to Mozambique through the WFP for 1992 and 1993. Appropriate disposal is currently under discussion in Maputo; options include dumping the spoiled grain at sea, for \$55/MT, or shipment to South Africa for livestock use.

If grain left the US in poor quality, the reasons should be examined closely. This oversight could deflect from the overall success of the relief effort. Of even greater concern is the possibility that the spoiled food could find its way into the commercial market.

H. Transport

The importance of an extensive transportation and communication infrastructure was one of the major lessons of the 1992/93 drought in southern Africa. South Africa's regional transportation base, the best in Sub-Saharan Africa, facilitated the delivery of food to the land-locked countries of Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. A network of ports, railways and roads existed through which governments and organizations were able to transport relief food. The drought led to the first significant regional cooperation between SADC members and South African officials, who coordinated six transportation corridors to ensure adequate delivery of food shipments.

The transport of large quantities of food aid placed unprecedented demands on the region's infrastructure. Food imports during the emergency increased by as much as 400% from normal. Bottlenecks did occur, with congestion plaguing main transport routes.

One important by-product of the 1992/93 drought in southern Africa was a significant increase in the capacity utilization of Mozambique's port and railway system. The Caminões de Fero da Mozambique (CFM) is a parastatal organization that manages Mozambique's railroads and ports. CFM is organized into several divisions, called Directorates, along geographical corridors, namely: CFM/North, CFM/Center, CFM/South and the smaller CFM/Zambezi. All these Directorates include both railroad and port operations.

The CFM has historically been a mainstay of Mozambique's economy, generating significant foreign exchange earnings. The CFM system was built mainly to handle traffic to and from Mozambique's inland neighbors, chiefly Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi as well as eastern sections of South Africa.

In 1973, the last year in which operation of the railways was not inhibited by political or security problems, the three main corridors carried 20 million MT of freight, of which nearly 80% was international traffic. In that year, CFM carried over 90% of Zimbabwe's external freight traffic, 80% of Malawi's copper and nearly 100% of Malawi's trade. In the same year, CFM's foreign exchange revenues, \$110 million, financed most of the structural deficit in Mozambique's balance of trade. By contrast, in 1991, the total CFM system carried less

than 1.4 million MT and generated net losses of about \$800,000 on operating revenues of \$35 million.

Concern over Mozambique's capacity to transship the necessarily large quantities of food aid to landlocked countries proved primarily unfounded. Fortunately, CFM in general, and the port of Beira specifically, had been receiving substantial funding for rehabilitation in recent years and performed better than expected.

USAID began to assist CFM in 1986 with a program providing \$5.5 million for various activities. The Regional Rail Systems Support (RRSS) project, provided an initial amount of \$34.5 million in 1988, an amendment of \$21 million was added in 1990. This project was intended to contribute significantly to development, not only in Mozambique, but in the southern Africa region as a whole. USAID's strategic objective for the transport sector in southern Africa is to "increase capacity and efficiency in the transport systems that serve regional cooperation and provide access to regional and external markets." In addition, improved rail efficiency may, in the medium to long term, contribute to food security by providing a reliable transport link between rural producers, urban consumers, and export outlets.

Final figures now indicate that fully 20% of all food aid for the southern African region was received by the Beira port, followed by Durban at 17%. From April 1992 to April 1993, Mozambique's ports handled 143 vessels and discharged in total approximately 2,260,647 MT of grain for final delivery in Malawi, Mozambique, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The ports of Mozambique played a key role in the international relief effort for the region.

V. DROUGHT THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT

A. Political Impact

Most observers and RENAMO leadership agree that the severe impact of the drought was a major factor contributing to the signing of the Peace Accord in Rome on November 4 1992. The severity of the drought became apparent in June and July of 1992 as RENAMO began to release people from RENAMO controlled areas. People began migrating by foot to Accommodation Centers in provincial and district capitals for food and clothing provided by international relief agencies. During the appeal for contributions, the international community and multilateral donors requested that "donors should strenuously pursue every avenue to engage RENAMO in discussions on corridors of tranquility to enable relief food to pass into their areas".

On July 16, 1992, RENAMO and the Government of Mozambique signed a Declaration of Principles, whereby the UN, in cooperation with ICRC, assumed responsibility for the movement of relief goods throughout the country into both FRELIMO and RENAMO zones. Efforts by the ICRC to deliver food to starving villagers in RENAMO-held territory afforded UN officials the opportunity to establish transportation and communication links with the rebel-held territory. The international community continued to press for the successful conclusion of the peace negotiations that had been plodding along in Rome for months. The signing of the Peace Accord soon followed.

B. Emergency and Development

The term emergency acquires special meaning in Mozambique. "Emergency" has been a way of life for almost three decades. The degree of distortion and damage from prolonged conflict has blurred the border between emergency and non-emergency assistance. Production, infrastructure, price relations, institutional capacity and human resources are dramatically deficient, and will remain so for a long time. In such circumstances, where large segments of the population are vulnerable, food and non-food aid are hard to separate.

Interrelationships between emergency and development in conditions of extreme need brought about a series of interventions and innovations that are expected to influence the way that foreign assistance is provided in post war development. In this respect, the drought emergency served as a catalyst to intensify and expose the deterioration of Mozambique's governmental institutions. The national agencies officially responsible for activities were unprepared to manage a national program of drought management. Such activities include planning and coordination, information gathering and analysis, relief distribution and monitoring. The international donor and NGO community, at the invitation of the government, assumed many of the responsibilities of public governance, especially at the local and provincial levels.

C. The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

The need for alternative channels for food distribution led the international donors and the government to turn to international and national NGOs for assistance. NGOs had been conducting humanitarian and development work in Mozambique for a number of years. After August 1992, they assumed a much greater role in food distribution. As mentioned earlier, NGOs responded surprisingly well, distributing about a third of all food aid. The performance of NGOs is one of the significant success stories of the emergency and offers insight on ways to deal with future drought related emergencies.

D. Food Aid and the Food Markets

The arrival of large quantities of food relief, mainly US yellow maize, depressed the price of domestic maize for some markets and may have generated a disincentive for marketing locally produced grain. The lead time in the process of obliging, procuring and preparing food for shipment constrained rapid response to changing situations and obligated relief commodities in excess of required need.

Several events contributed to overestimating the need and supply of commodities in Mozambique. In the absence of any reliable data and to avoid a major famine at all costs, the GRM, USAID and the donors deliberately overstocked relief supplies as a hedge against the possibility of yet another failed harvest. The 1993 crop, however, was significantly larger than expected. A significant supply of food aid was on its way at the same time the harvest reached the market. In addition to the expectedly good harvest, initial estimates of returning refugees were overestimated. Approximately one million refugees were expected return by the middle of 1993, however, the actual number remained closer to 400,000. There are now indications that the numbers are picking up and an undetermined number of refugees bypass the registration centers.

As of October 1993, in response to a better than expected food situation, the initial Title III request was reduced from 185,000 MT to 75,000 MT. The expected arrival of surplus food aid, especially of Title II grain (emergency relief), contributed to a sizable drop in the price of yellow corn and domestically produced white maize in some markets, with potentially adverse effects on domestic food production.

The changing situation is illustrated by the current WFP appeal to donors and distributors to refrain from distributing local production in order to dispose of accumulated stocks. As of November 1993, the WFP had estimated in-country maize stocks at approximately 120,000 MT. A comparison of the volume of commercial maize shipped by the US in 1992/93 with the planned amounts for 1993/94 is a further indication of the sharply changing situation. In 1992/93, a total of 241,000 MT were shipped. For 1993/94 the planned shipments were down to 70,000 MT, with 35,000 MT on hold. The changing situation has difficult budgetary implications for the GRM. A decreasing need in commercial food aid, combined with

increased local production, means that a source of Government budgetary support - the sale of donated commercial food aid - must be reduced.

Food aid's negative correlation with the domestic price of both yellow and white corn is shown in the Graph below. The price of a kilo of yellow maize reached 150 meticals in recent months (about six US cents at the going exchange rate), a price well below the commercial border price. Although studies on the effect of food aid on food prices are for the urban markets of Maputo and Beira, there is increasing evidence that the effect is felt increasingly over a wider range. Indicative is the following from the June 1993 MSF Bulletin: "The wide range of local produce continues to allow local markets to function, offering many basic foodstuffs at reasonable prices. In most of the rural areas, yellow maize has disappeared from the market although other cheap alternatives exist. Along the Beira corridor in Sofala and Manica, the price for maize is extremely low, and farmers in Manica only receive 130 Mts/kg for their white maize. It was reported that farmers must travel all the way to Maputo to sell their produce in order to realize a satisfactory profit."¹⁹ According to some reports, the low price of domestically produced corn is discouraging the sale of marketable surplus. Such sales would have bolstered demand for inputs. If this is indeed the case, food aid is adversely affecting development.

¹⁹ Medecins Sans Frontieres, *Boletim Mensal*, No. 12, Junho 1993. p. 10




Figure 1. Commercial and Emergency Food Aid Arrivals and Prices of White and Yellow Maize in Maputo March 90 - Sept. 93

Prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture/Michigan State University/University of Arizona Food Security Research Project.

The proportions of imported food during the emergency period shifted significantly towards emergency commodities. The average ratio of emergency to commercial food imports for the period 1987-1991 was 718,305 MT/665,318 MT = 1:08. During the 1991-93 drought, that ratio shifted sharply to 671,265 MT/ 386,744 MT, a 74% greater share of emergency allocations as compared to commercial.²⁰ The drastic increase of emergency aid had an inevitable effect on the food market.

Emergency food and commercial aid in Mozambique are closely interrelated. Much of the emergency aid finds its way into the food market. The findings of a recent study of the Maputo food market is indicative of the inherent difficulties of targeting food and separating it from market forces. This same study also shows how, in the context of food dependency on the part of large segments of the population, emergency targeted food and commercial supplies are interrelated at the household level. The problem is not that the leakage takes food away from the hungry. A recent study by Cornell University concludes that " ... it is clear that the food aid, although not reaching the intended beneficiaries through the Novo Sistema de Abastecimento (the card ration system), is nonetheless feeding them through the parallel market channels."²¹ The difficulty derives from the timing and size of the food arrivals, and the ensuing effect on domestic production.

The consignee system for distribution of commercial food aid was identified as a main source of "leakage." By 1990, many of the commercial food consignees owed millions of meticals to the Treasury for food already received. In 1991, a more rigorous system of screening consignees was introduced. Leverages continue, however. The various problems inherent in food distribution will remain as long as the ability of government to administer competition remains weak.

The prices of yellow corn in Manica and other markets indicate that emergency yellow corn continues to enter the markets in large quantities through theft and from households. Retail prices at these markets declined below the price paid by consignees at port. In eight markets of the Agricultural Market and Information System (SIMA), the average May retail price was below 329 meticais/kg, the consignee price at port.²²

The most recent Ministry of Agriculture/Michigan State University studies of food distribution, as well as the findings of this mission, indicate that the handling of commercial food aid remains a source of market distortion, at least in some markets. This effect will

²⁰ Figures for the second semester of 1993 are for projected arrivals.

²¹ David E. Sahn and Jaikishan Desai, The Emergence of Parallel Markets in a Transition Economy: The Case of Mozambique, Cornell University Food and Nutrition Policy Program, July 1993.

²² Ministerio da Agricultura/Michigan State University, The Pricing and Distribution of Yellow Maize Food Aid in Mozambique: An Analysis of Alternatives, September 1993.

increase throughout the country as access improves and markets become more integrated. Price volatility is a characteristic of most food products in recent years. Yellow corn, white maize and rice have shown great instability, with monthly average prices doubling at times or falling by half in as little as two to three months. Weekly prices show even greater instability.²³

USAID/Maputo, through its own assessments, is well aware of the potential adverse impact of imported food on local food production. Food aid must aim to encourage local production, market development and self-reliance, not dependency. As important consideration for the future development of Mozambique, where dependency on external aid, and food aid in particular, is so large and has continued for so long, it is deeply ingrained in the political and economic life of the country. At least 70% of the Gross Domestic Product is generated by external aid.

E. Southern African Development Community Coordination

The drought and the associated relief effort sanctioned and confirmed the importance of regional cooperation. It also underscored the positive contribution that South Africa can make in the region. The Front Line States worked successfully with South Africa during the emergency, an unprecedented and vital collaboration. The success of the drought response, combined with political changes underway in South Africa, bode well for lasting regional coordination in southern Africa. A series of regional cooperation structures: the coordination of six transport corridors; an operations control center in Johannesburg; a logistics center in Harare; and a computerized communication system, have proven their importance in confronting the emergency and have served to strengthen regional integration.

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference, the forerunner of SADC, was founded in 1980 to promote economic independence from apartheid in South Africa. The constructive evolution of regional cooperation during the relief effort is inducing the inclusion of South Africa in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The Grain Control Center in Johannesburg, for example, established with the express purpose of contributing to the Southern Africa Drought Emergency, was cited by relief workers as a good illustration of the type of regional coordination ensuing from the drought. The Center was set up in April of 1992 to coordinate cross-border port, rail and road activities and allow for regular interaction of representatives from the governments, the UN and donors. The GOCC was so successful that there were calls for it to remain in operation once the crisis had passed.

Another significant contribution to the national and regional response to the 1991-93 drought came from the Beira port and CFM. USAID and other donors have been assisting CFM since

²³ Ministry of Agriculture/Michigan State University, **The Organization, Behavior, and Performance of the Informal Food Marketing System in Maputo**, May 1993.

1986 with various programs to increase capacity and efficiency. These projects were designed to contribute to development, not only in Mozambique, but in the region as a whole. The overall strategic objectives for the transport sector were to serve regional cooperation and provide access to African and external markets. Close to a fifth of the grain imported into the region for the emergency came through Beira and the Beira corridor.

F. Consistency of USAID Policies

The USAID and USG interaction with Mozambique to bring about policy reform goes back to 1984. As early as 1983, the Government of Mozambique realized that the command system was failing and in need of adjustment and reform. This provided the US Embassy and USAID with an opportunity to initiate a dialogue with the authorities on issues of economic policy.

In 1987, the Government of Mozambique initiated a comprehensive Economic and Social Recovery Program (ESRP). The USAID has worked in unison with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Mozambique for policy reform support through the Private Sector Support Program (PSSP), which went into effect in August 1989.²⁴ The primary objective was to help move the economy toward decentralization and market reliance. The Commodity Import Program (CIP) made possible the importation of vehicles and promoted private sales of goods and services. For the agricultural economy, restrictions on trade were reduced and competition was promoted in the private sector, especially transport.

Reforms focused on several key macro-economic policy issues: (i) the exchange rate; (ii) the foreign exchange allocation system; (iii) trade policies; (iv) pricing policy; (v) the size and composition of public expenditure; and (vi) credit. In addition, the reforms addressed institutional and market infrastructure issues in the key sectors. In agriculture, the main focus of reforms under the ESRP and USAID programs has been on pricing and marketing policy, with a view to restoring the incentives for agricultural production, transport and marketing.

Policy and private sector development promoted by the Private Sector Support Program (PSSP), especially in the area of rural transport, was essential in making the emergency response to the drought of 1991-93 a success. PSSP encouraged the use and development of private sector importers and distributors. Private sector participation increased from 34% of the total value of commodities distributed in 1984 to 78% in 1988 under the first program, and to 100% in the latter years of PSSP.

The contribution to the national and regional response to the 1991-93 drought by the Beira port, and CFM was, to a great extent, possible because of USAID support. USAID has assisted CFM since 1986 to increase capacity and efficiency. As noted earlier, 20% of all food aid for the entire southern Africa Region in response to the 1991-93 emergency was

²⁴ Abt Associates, **Private Sector Support Program Evaluation**, March 1992.

received and cleared through the port of Beira, 3% more than what came through Durban, South Africa. The USAID and GRM strategy and investment in infrastructure development, was essential to the success of the drought relief effort in Mozambique and the region.

The consistency and the strategic importance of USAID's work in Mozambique extends to other key areas of food security, such as a project in support of market information and research for food security at the Ministry of Agriculture through Michigan State University. The information and research from the Michigan State work is the most comprehensive and reliable source of quantitative agricultural information and analysis available in the country.

The response and mobilization of resources through Washington-based coordination, the efforts of the USAID/Maputo in the context of an on-going crisis, and the efforts of American NGOs and church related organizations to expand beyond their normal capabilities and resources, were pivotal components of an integrated endeavor. All these forces combined to make the experience of the Mozambique 1991-93 drought a case in which the finest traditions of American values and humanitarian solidarity found expression.

VI. ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: How Civil Society Made Up for Weak Public Institutions

A. Role of the NGOs in Drought Relief

NGOs played a critical and effective role in the Mozambique drought emergency of 1991-93. The demands of the emergency, in the context of extremely debilitated public institutions, obligated donors to use non-governmental organizations to manage large parts of the relief effort, particularly the delivery of food to rural populations. International NGOs and multilateral agencies, such as the World Food Program, provided the required relief assistance. About a third of all food distribution during the course of the emergency in Mozambique was handled through NGOs.

At least 23 national and international NGOs participated in food aid programs, either food distribution, Food For Work or related technical and logistical assistance (Table 4, of Statistical Annex, and Annexes 1 and 2). The primary organizations active in relief commodity distribution include: Africare; ADRA; the International Committee of Red Cross; World Vision; Medicins Sans Frontiers; Oxfam; Food for the Hungry International; CARE; and CARITAS. National NGOs and formal and informal community organizations played a relatively small role in food distribution, with the exception of the Mozambican Red Cross and CARITAS.

As the country moves from drought assistance to more sustained types of development, NGOs can continue to play an important role. For many international NGOs working in Mozambique, the recent drought related food aid was a diversion from their longer term, primary goal of development. Even at the height of the drought effort, numerous NGOs involved in the relief effort were able to integrate emergency assistance with other types of developmental assistance. These NGOs were active in planning and implementing programs in health, agricultural extension, water supply and income generation.

Annex A provides a brief on international NGOs involved in various types of development assistance in Mozambique and Annex D contains a description of several NGO relief programs undertaken during the drought.

B. Analysis of Rural Conditions

At least eight international NGOs are implementing health projects in the Provinces of Sofala, Tete, Gaza, Zambezi and Manica Provinces. Activities consist of nutritional monitoring and rehabilitation, therapeutic feeding, the establishment of Mother/Child clinics and the provision of emergency health care. The evaluation team found that NGOs were the best source of information on rural economic and drought conditions.

Medicins Sans Frontier (MSF) was particularly helpful in gathering and analyzing health related information at the provincial and district level. MSF began operations in September

of 1992. Within a few months, MSF was producing and distributing a highly professional and informative monthly bulletin.

MSF introduced a method of assessing localized conditions in different regions, thereby permitting the extent of the drought's impacts to be understood. Specific areas of vulnerability were assessed in representative districts and a global map of the situation was prepared and published monthly (Table 5).

MSF staff gathered information by training and enlisting the participation of other international NGOs working in various parts of the country. By tapping into the vast network of international NGOs working at the district level, MSF provided a centralized mechanism to solicit, track, and collate a wealth of primary information. Beginning as a modest mimeograph document of a few pages, the **MSF Bulletin** became one of the premier sources of information in the country on the emergency and its impact, tracking information from nutrition to cholera incidence to district level market prices.

C. Development of Agricultural Extension Services

As part of the drought relief effort, at least six international NGOs were active in the procurement and distribution of cereal and vegetable seed packs to farmers in six different provinces. Now that the drought has abated, international NGOs in Mozambique are continuing to assist rural communities with projects in improved seed production and distribution, and agricultural extension. These efforts will continue into the 1993/94 agricultural year. One such example with significant lessons for future development is the rural extension work of World Vision in Zambézia.

Under the technical direction of a highly trained and experienced specialist in seed breeding, World Vision is complementing its emergency food aid with an innovative program of agricultural extension. Farm trials are underway for adaptation and multiplication of staple food seed varieties. Trials are conducted for a variety of crops and agricultural practices including: maize; sorghum; millet; sweet potatoes; cassava; beans; peppers; squash; lettuce; tomatoes; onions; and other vegetables. These trials are conducted through technical exchange and cooperation with the National Institute of Agricultural Research (INIA). By experimenting with agricultural extension, farm-based research, and information dissemination, such projects are innovative approaches to rural development.

Agricultural extension in most of Sub-Saharan Africa does not have a good record. Research results from the International Research Centers often do not reach the farmers because of the inadequacies of national research and extension institutions. The efforts to develop such national institutions, especially extension, often result in ineffective and expensive bureaucracies. Mozambique has the chance to avoid the mistakes of others and learn from the NGOs' experience to restructure services for agricultural and rural development. Mozambique's incipient rural extension experience with World Vision is a promising new

approach for an extension system which is farmer-driven and based on local needs. The government's existing agricultural extension is not able to cope with the need. World Vision's experience could provide the basis for building a national extension service that could avoid some of the pitfalls of centralized government planning and management.

D. Food for Work

The emergency demonstrated the ability of a number of NGOs to effectively expand and manage large-scale food distribution programs. As the emergency status dissipates, NGOs are returning to their traditional roles in local development and community participation. The local focus of NGOs makes them especially sensitive to community conditions and needs. They are, therefore, a viable agent for change. The community based approach often enables NGOs to respond with more agility than centralized public organizations, which tend to be more removed from the communities and the local environment.

The performance of international NGOs in Mozambique during the 1991-93 drought demonstrates that they are capable of extending beyond their normal operational role and parameters. Even if their coverage remained small relative to the need, Mozambique's NGO experiences demonstrate how to manage drought relief at the local level and are concrete examples of the type of projects that food aid can promote in the future for strengthening local and national civil society organizations, capacity building and reconstruction.

[Where is the discussion about targeting vulnerable populations, when was an area declared desperate and food freely distributed to all, how well did these programs work?]

E. Directions for Sustainable Development

As the drought recedes in Mozambique and peace returns, the role of both the international NGO and international assistance in general is being examined and redefined. The urgency of rethinking the role of government and the potential contribution of NGOs is intrinsically interwoven with the way in which international assistance is provided to Mozambique. At present, hundreds of expatriates and other types of technical assistance consume \$300 million, or 43% of all external aid to Mozambique. It is estimated that more expatriates work in Mozambique than the number of national professionals in the public sector. The viability of this model will come under great scrutiny with the advent of peace. As the lessons from the emergency are reviewed, now is an opportune moment to revisit external aid and technical assistance strategies. Given the limited capability of public institutions to function in rural areas, and the credibility and presence of NGOs, an effort should be made to strengthen the capacity of local organizations to undertake rural development.

The changing context and the role of the NGOs from emergency to rehabilitation and development is appreciated by the USAID Mission as reflected in its program for NGOs support:

PVOs (NGOs) have assumed a lead position in dealing with the movement of people across the country, and in assisting farm families to reach home safely and start up the long process of restoring a rural economy and a way of life that is increasingly self-reliant and free from dependency on outside sources of assistance. U.S. PVOs with whom the Mission has a grantor-grantee relationship are situated in each of the provinces which are undergoing the greatest movement of people. Many of these PVOs have been assigned specific and often weighty responsibilities for the physical and socioeconomic well-being of an increasingly large percentage of the affected population.²⁵

Another example of appropriate response in this context is a recent grant to Catholic Relief Services/Caritas.²⁶ The original objective of the grant, signed in the summer of 1992, was to "distribute approximately 5,220 metric ton of relief food to 50,000 vulnerable people in ten districts of the three provinces of Manica, Gaza and Inhambane and to strengthen the capacity Caritas Mozambique to target food distribution during a nine-month period." By the end of August 1993, the grant was amended to reflect food for development objectives. The amendment modified the statement of work so as "to provide seeds and tools to 4,409 families in Mozambique to stimulate local food production."

The number of Mozambican NGOs is growing and their role in the country's development is expected to increase. The 1992 lifting of a ban on Free Association has already had an impact on the development of local NGOs. Although currently limited in number, they are growing rapidly. Representatives of over 60 local NGOs attended a conference of Mozambique's NGOs in June 1992. A list put out by the organizers of the event noted 87 local NGOs, including professional organizations, humanitarian aid groups, special interest groups of various kinds, and community and provincial development groups.

Most local nongovernmental organizations in Mozambique are new, and not ready to assume responsibility for major projects. Mozambique's NGOs have voiced a need for seminars and training courses and technical assistance in identification, management and evaluation of development programs. Training in financial management and accounting are also in demand among emerging nongovernmental organizations. International NGOs working in Mozambique would be in an ideal position to provide this kind of institutional training to local NGOs.

International NGOs can be effective partners in the process of strengthening local and national NGOs by assisting them in meeting donors' juridical and accounting requirements. The emergency demonstrated ways to bypass such constraints (e.g. the introduction of tripartite agreements). An international NGO or other entity with a proven track record assumed responsibility for project implementation in partnership with a local NGO. Tripartite

²⁵ USAID Mozambique, **PVO Support Project**, Internal Memorandum, August, 1993.

²⁶ USAID Grant No AOT-1067- G-00-3031-00

agreements can be a practical instrument, satisfying the donors who prefer to deal with known NGOs while providing for the participation and development of national entities. These innovative arrangements should require increasing participation and responsibility by the national counterpart and include more training and capacity building. Focus should be placed on NGOs with a national scope of operation, such as Red Cross/Red Crescent and CARITAS, as potential recipients of such assistance.

An example of international assistance for local NGO development is the International League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' (LRCS) support to the Mozambican Red Cross. LRCS provides leadership in various support projects in Mozambique for vulnerable sections of the population. LRCS actively supports the development of the local Red Cross Societies. LRCS began work in Mozambique in 1981, and operated in the provinces of Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala, Manica, Tete, Niassa and Zambezi. Its activities focus on community based health and nutrition, training of nurses, and education.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

All evidence reviewed by this evaluation mission indicates that, because of the effective international relief effort and GRM support, lives were saved and the 1992/93 drought did not turn into massive famine. No major dislocations of people took place because of famine, no feeding centers were created and Mozambique did not become another Somalia or Ethiopia. Overall, the drought response experience of Mozambique is an example of successful international cooperation demonstrating that an effective famine response can be mounted even in one of Africa's poorest and most devastated countries.

The drought of 1992/93 aggravated the consequences of the on-going civil conflict. In its appeal for food aid for the agricultural year of May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993, the Government of Mozambique estimated that as a result of the drought, an additional one million people would need relief food assistance. The total number of persons requiring food relief assistance, displaced or severely affected by the drought conditions, including those from the ongoing war, was put at 2,827,200 persons, a 54 percent increase from the ongoing war emergency levels.

Mozambique was poorly prepared to effectively manage the consequences and magnitude of the anticipated need. The government system lacked the managerial, professional and material capacity to deal with the emergency, especially at the province and district levels where food distribution was to take place. The general perception that the government was absent from the emergency response is not true, however. The WFP has estimated that of the 40 percent of the population served, half were served by DPCCN and half were served by a combination of WFP and NGOs.

The international community's drought response was timely, sufficient and under the circumstances well coordinated. Dividing responsibilities between the WFP, the DPCCN and NGOs appears to have worked well.

The USG participation was key to the drought response. Through the USAID Mission in Mozambique, the US provided the major portion of resources, and played a pivotal role in the coordination of the overall response. The accomplishments of the relief effort were, to a large extent, possible because of past USAID assistance. The consistent strategy of USAID policy support and infrastructure development in Mozambique, since 1984, played an important role in the successful response to the drought.

The emergency confirmed the weak state of government institutions while, at the same time, it demonstrated that NGOs and the private sector could assume much of the functions that government traditionally sought to carry out itself. The international NGOs assumed a large share of the effort and successfully so. Unless, however, national NGOs will need to substantially strengthen management and other institutional skills in order to effectively promote development.

Food distribution relied heavily on the private sector, especially the transport sector. Reliance on private transport was significant and unusual for Mozambique's emergencies in recent years.

The prolonged war emergency in Mozambique and the absence of reliable information of any type makes it impossible to precisely identify the impact of the drought. It is particularly difficult to separate the impact of the peace accord from the impact of the on-going crisis. The ability, for instance, of the international community to respond to the drought emergency would have been severely curtailed without the peace.

The linkage between food and non-food aid is starkly apparent in Mozambique, where large segments of the population already live at the margin of subsistence. Per capita income is the lowest in the world. Health statistics, from child mortality to life expectancy, are the worst of any country for which such data is available. Under such conditions, the border between emergency and non-emergency assistance is blurred as the conditions of life of most people are normally not much better than when a drought emergency befalls.

The state of permanent emergency from extremely low levels of food and nutrition and necessity to satisfy basic needs, breaks down the distinction between commercial and emergency food when large amounts of food aid were imported. Food destined for free distribution found itself in the market. Up to 50 percent of emergency food aid is sold in some form at the consumer level.

Oversupply of donated food depressed food prices and is likely to have an adverse effect on production in some markets. Obligated amounts surpassed the need, primarily in the form of shipments to WFP which arrived in the middle of 1993. The lead time in obligating, procuring and shipping food constrained the ability to respond rapidly to a changing situation. The large amounts of imported food aid in response to the emergency resulted in sizable amounts of spoiled food, mainly maize.

The experience in Mozambique confirms the preference of food for cash (FFC) programs as compared to food for work (FFW), when the FFC option is possible. People prefer FFC and thus have a greater incentive for work. The preference for cash is due to the consumer choice that cash payment makes possible and is consistent with local market development. The preference for cash for work as compared to FFW is also supported by both economic theory and experiences in such diverse countries as India and Northeast Brazil.

A significant finding from the Mozambique drought emergency is the critical contribution made by NGOs. About a third of all food distributed for the 91/93 emergency was handled by NGOs. In some provinces such as Sofala, the NGO share reached 60 percent.

NGOS demonstrated that at the local level of food distribution, the critical end of the line, they can carry out emergency food distribution while continuing their developmental activities. In a number of cases, NGOs built from the emergency innovative and much needed programs of longer term development such as agricultural experimentation and extension.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Role of NGOs

As the impact of the drought subsides, NGOs should be supported for an expanded role in the reconstruction and development of Mozambique as well as to be better prepared for future emergencies. With the receding of the emergency, NGOs can do more than in the past in the development of needed services such as agricultural extension, community health and local infrastructure. Their community base predisposes them to respond to local circumstances with more agility and accountability than central public organizations which are generally more distant from the communities, both geographically and culturally.

The three main recommendations coming out of Mozambique's drought response are: strengthen local national NGOs; broaden USAID support to NGOs and the civil society; and support a regional program to benefit from comparative experiences and insights.

Specific recommendations are:

- Local entities like the National Red Cross/Red Crescent and CARITAS have the national scope and track record to merit additional support and responsibility. The explicit aim must be to contribute with technical and financial assistance to the creation and development of provincial, district and local community capabilities, community participation and institutions for emergency assistance and especially development work with NGO support.
- *Expand USAID's support to the NGOs in Mozambique under the PVO Support Project.*²⁷ This USAID-supported project, in consultation with the GRM and other donors, should become an integral part of the national program for reconstruction and development. The aim would be to prepare a *national program*. That is not only a localized project by project support, but a comprehensive nation-wide program in coordination with all major donors and NGOs. It would be most desirable to make such a program a part of structural adjustment programs supported by the World Bank. Care needs to be taken in such nation-wide program to avoid centralization and to maintain flexibility of approaches. Such a national program should be based on the experience of the emergency and the contribution of NGOs and other expressions of the civil society and be designed from the "bottom up", not by central bureaucracies.

²⁷*This project aims to "direct AID assistance through private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in support of their efforts to assist Mozambicans to develop their capacity to manage and provide basis humanitarian assistance to destitute and needy persons and to facilitate the transition from dependence on food aid to self-provisioning." From Internal USAID, Mozambique Memorandum for Project Paper Amendment No. 3 (Project 656-0217).*

- Develop a *capacity building program for NGOs for the SADC region with corresponding national programs*. Capacity building of national and international NGOs should be expanded to improve the preparedness of NGOs and other organizations for drought and other development related emergencies. Such training should include visits to observe and learn from other drought experiences. In this respect the linguistic and cultural affinity of Mozambique with Brazil and the long experience of Northeast Brazil with drought recommend that region, especially the State of Ceará, as an observation and study site. The World Bank, which has been active in the development of Semi-arid Northeast Brazil for many years, should be approached for support.²⁸

The recommendations above may be summed up as follows: The emergency in Mozambique, as well as in the other SADC countries, has demonstrated that NGOs can be resourceful contributors to emergency and development assistance. Programs need to be designed and on-going ones expanded, to help further develop the organizational and human resource capacity of NGOs, giving special emphasis to local NGOs.

B. Food Aid Policy

It is an opportune moment for a review of the use and programming of food aid in Mozambique. Such a review must make provisions for continued effective responses to possible future disasters. The review should consider the following:

- a. Diminish the Government's role in food distribution. Redirect the Government toward developing policy and monitoring of food security and emergencies. Government, donors and international agencies should assist in policy formulation and private sector market development (information, infrastructure, competitiveness).
- b. Continue to use food aid as the basis for policy dialogue and policy reforms with the GRM, the donors and the UN agencies. The predominance of the USG food and non-food assistance to Mozambique, together with the acknowledged contribution of USAID in the economic reform of Mozambique since 1987, provides USAID the opportunity for a continued leading role in this respect.
- c. The emergency program should rely more on cash for work (CFW) when such options are available and as the reconstruction effort gets under way. Both economic theory and experience recommend the monetization of payment as a preferred method of incentive by the worker and for local market development.

²⁸The World Bank has recently arranged observation visits for Mozambicans to Brazil to witness the Brazilian methodology in areas such as rural development, cashew cultivation and processing. These observation visits have met with favorable results.

- d. Import price parity of yellow corn and other commodities should be an explicit objective of food aid. Food prices should reflect real costs to avoid depressing local prices and local food production.
- e. A basic food grain stock be maintained in Maputo and Beira to prevent wide price fluctuations and to help move prices at import parity. The maintenance and management of such stock entails costs and, therefore, the stock should be of a minimum amount.
- f. Food distribution should assure competition by consignees and transparency and accountability from public officials. USAID should lead in this effort and provide assistance to train local personnel for improved management of the program.
- g. Below market price leakage must be reduced and hopefully halted. The move toward import parity price, and the conditions toward a competitive food market, will need to be complemented with more effective fiscal management and storage control at the ports.
- h. The arrival of substandard food should be better controlled at its origin as it is difficult to monitor and regulate once it reaches Mozambique.

IV. LESSONS LEARNED

The overriding strategic lessons from the Mozambique experience with the drought emergency are the ability to deal with a potentially grave disaster in the face of weak governmental structures by:

- a. mobilizing civil society organizations such as NGOs, and
- b. making otherwise politically unpopular decisions by using the emergency as the justification for needed changes. This was the case even with the peace process where the impact of the drought was a major factor in bringing the conflicting sides to sign the Rome Peace Accord.

Main specific lessons that emerged from the Mozambique drought emergency with possible wider applicability are:

- Reliance on diverse organizations and approaches for food distribution and emergency response is an appropriate option that needs to be looked at in similar crises. Though central plans and coordination are important, such emergencies should be seen as opportunities for experimentation and innovation. The Mozambique case demonstrated that there is no need for grand centralized implementation strategy and institutional monopolies.
- The macroeconomic policy framework and the economic and political context, including physical infrastructure, are determining factors in the efficiency of an emergency response. This, the context, appears critical for the contribution that emergency can make beyond saving lives to sustainable future development.
- The evaluation of food shortages tends to overestimate need. It is recommended that need assessments be done by independent firms, NGOs and universities, not the public agencies that deal with emergency assistance.
- Emergency assistance must be cognizant of its close interrelationship to developmental assistance. Emergency assistance in view of the need to improve food security, should aim to contribute to longer term development and not be a one shot isolated action of food distribution.
- Programming of emergency food aid must consider that regardless of formal bureaucratic compartmentalizations and conditions, short term emergency objectives and emergency distribution mechanisms, the impact of emergency and development food assistance are closely interrelated. Ultimately market forces are significant determinants of the benefits and beneficiaries of food aid. Food aid inevitably impacts development.

ANNEX A
INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN MOZAMBIQUE, 1993

ACTIONAID

Contact: Mr. Anthony Nedley, Country Director
Province(s): Zambezi

Actionaid is working in two major areas, first by providing basic materials, food and equipment in the field of relief and rehabilitation at the district level and secondly through various activities in community based rehabilitation and integrated rural development, in the areas of agriculture extension, education, health, cottage industry, communications, fisheries and women's activities.

ADVENTISTS DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF AGENCY

Contact: Mr. Dwight Taylor, Director
Province(s) of Operation: Maputo, Inhambane, Sofala, Zambezi

ADRA has established a relief program based in Inhambane province to import, package and distribute relief food and non-food items via road transport to displaced persons in Inhambane Province. The Agricultural Development Program, which began in 1990, continues with the training of farmers in methods of tropical agriculture. Other local structures involved are CENE, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church and local community groups.

AFRICARE

Contact: Mr. Ralph Coleman, Resident Representative
Province(s) of Operation: Sofala

AFRICARE supports several agricultural projects, focused on small-scale irrigation and animal traction, as well as construction in areas chronically prone to drought. AFRICARE also provides clothing and medical equipment.

AIR-SERVE

Contact: Mr. Andrei Maliarov, Program Manager
Province(s) of Operation: All provinces

Air-serve has several small aircraft available for rental to other non-governmental organizations to transport not only relief commodities but also passengers and high value items, such as medicines, spare parts, etc.

CARE

Contact: Mr. Joseph Kessler, Country Director

Province(s) of Operation: Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala, Manica, Zambezi, Tete, Nampula, Niassa, Cabo Delgado

Care is providing technical assistance to the Logistical Support Unit (LSU) of DPCCN, which includes operating as the logistical Support Unit to DPCCN, managing operations as the Logistical Support Unit to donations from port of entry to end user and training in all areas relevant to logistics. The Logistical Support Unit is intended to benefit mainly government employees and recipients of relief aid. CENE and DPCCN are the local structures involved with the LSU project. CARE also has health education and Water Supply Project in Inhambane, and a road rehabilitation Project in Nampula.

CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

Contact: Mr. Palmari de Lucena, Regional Director (Harare)

Province(s) of Operation:

CRS is collaborating with and supporting CARITAS projects in Mozambique.

COMMUNITY AID ABROAD

Contact: Ms. Helena Zefanias Lowe, Field Representative

Province(s) of Operation: Inhambane

CAA is a small Australian organization which has been involved in Mozambique since 1985.

CONCERN

Contact: Ms. Patricia MacLoughlin, Representative

Province(s) of Operation: Nampula

CONCERN is engaged in the operation of a cloth factory and assists private tailors in making clothes for the displaced population in and around Nampula. Support is also provided to agricultural projects in Maputo and Nampula with technical assistance and irrigation pumps, and the distribution of seeds and handtools.

COCOCAMO (COOPERATION CANADA-MOZAMBIQUE)

Contact: Mr. David Smith, Coordinator, Nampula
Province(s) of Operation: Nampula

COCOCAMO is running 6 projects in the fields of agriculture, health, education, emergency relief, and small industries in and around Nampula city and district.

COSV (Coordinamento delle Organizzazioni per il Servizio Volontario)
Coordination of Organizations for the Voluntary Service

Contact: Mr. Antonio Mazzonna, Project Coordinator
Province(s) of Operation: Maputo, Cabo Delgado

COSV is carrying out the rehabilitation of the Training Center in Pemba and is providing training to medical personnel at basic levels.

CRIAA (Centre de Recherche/Information/Action pour le Developpment en Africa)

Contact: Mr. Jacques Marchand
Province(s) of Operation: Cabo Delgadois

CRIAA is running an Integrated Activities project in Cabo Delgado, in support of agricultural marketing enterprises and rural development, as well as providing assistance to light industries in fisheries and handicraft. It also provides support in the health sector.

CUAMM

International College for Health Cooperation in Developing Countries
Contact: Dr. Valerio Mecenero, Delegate
Province(s) of Operation: Gaza, Sofala

The Health Cooperative projects provide support in the health field.

CUSO/SUCO (CANADA)

Contact: Ms. Jaqueline Lambert-Madore, Director
Province(s) of Operation: Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Maputo, Sofala

CUSO/SUCO is responsible for various activities in the country, primarily support to agricultural co-operatives, peasant associations and workers unions in the provinces of Gaza, Manica and Maputo. Other involvement focuses on health and sanitation, construction and environment.

EDUARDO MONDLANE FOUNDATION (EMF)

Contact: Ms. Gabrielle Athmer, Coordinator
Province(s) of Operation: All

EMF is a recruiting agency for the Dutch Cooperants; it has some 30 expatriates working in various sectors in the provinces of Maputo, Gaza, Zambezi, Nampula, and Cabo Delgado. EMF serves as an intermediary agency in the financing of development projects, it has several projects in the areas of water systems, agriculture, health, education and small scale industry.

FOOD FOR THE HUNGRY INTERNATIONAL

Contact: Mr. Shaun Walsh, Country Director
Province(s) of Operation: Sofala

Food for the Hungry International established an office in Mozambique in 1987 and is currently working in 5 districts in the province of Sofala. FHI is involved in a variety of development activities which include agricultural extension, school construction, returnee rehabilitation and settlement programs. Emergency assistance is also provided through the distribution of relief items, in particular food, clothing and medicines.

GERMAN AGRO ACTION

Contact: Mr. Heinz Seidler, Coordinator
Province(s) of Operation: Sofala/Manica, Nampula, Cabo Delgado

German Agro Action is carrying out two major projects in Sofala/Manica, Nampula and Cabo Delgado which consist of general emergency assistance and emergency aid for secondary schools.

INTERNATIONAL ACTION AGAINST HUNGER

Contact: Mr. Hugues Burrows
Province(s) of Operation: Sofala

IACF works primarily in the context of emergencies, in the areas of nutrition, sanitation, and the distribution of seeds and agricultural implements. IACF has been working in Mozambique since September of 1992. Their work is concentrated in the province of Sofala, working with the displaced populations. They have opened nutritional rehabilitation centers in Buzi, Dondo, and Nhamatanda.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

Contact: Ms. Felice Dindo, Head of Operation

Province(s) of Operation: All provinces

ICRC has five main objectives: To provide protection to persons detained as a result of the conflict, to reestablish family links among families disrupted as a result of the conflict, to provide protection and emergency assistance to civilians affected by the conflict, to operate orthopedic centers, and to disseminate information on international humanitarian laws. Operations are coordinated through a working relationship between the ICRC and the Mozambican Government (Ministries of Defense, Security, Health and Cooperation) as well as between ICRC and RENAMO. In Mozambique, they were originally the only group allowed to work in RENAMO held areas and were instrumental in delivering life-saving relief supplies to populations in those areas.

LEAGUE OF THE RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES (LRCS)

Contact: Mr. Arne Jacobson, Representative

Province(s) of Operation: All provinces

LRCS is supporting the Mozambican Red Cross in emergency relief assistance and disaster preparedness, as well as in projects for the rehabilitation of social institutions. LRCS' activities are carried out under five main projects areas: Disaster Preparedness, Training in Financial Management, Rehabilitation work, Primary Health, and First Aid and Community Based Projects. LRCS is training Mozambican Red Cross volunteers in Management, communications, maintenance of vehicles, stockpiling of emergency relief commodities, assessments of early warning signs for poor health and/or malnutrition. Beneficiaries are the most vulnerable groups of the population, in particular the aged, the mentally retarded, the displaced people, children and pregnant woman.

LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION

Contact: Mr. Keny Nyati, Representative

Province(s) of Operation: Maputo, Gaza, Sofala, Tete, Inhambane

Lutheran World Federation is running integrated Rural Development projects in the above mentioned regions, encompassing the sectors of agriculture, Health, Education, and income generation projects. Lutheran World Federation also offers emergency assistance through DPCCN in the form of donated commodities.

MEDICINS SANS FRONTIER

MSF/France

Contact: Mr. Philippe Huet, Coordinator

MSF/Spain

Contact: Dr. Jose Maria Echevarria, Coordinator

MSF/Belgica

Contact: Dr. Vincent Jansens, Medical Coordinator

MSF/Holland

Contact: Dr. Sheri Lecker, Coordinator

MSF/Suisse

Contact: Mr. Paul Dalechamps

MSF/Intercellular

Contact: Ms. Tine Dusachoit

MSF is an international humanitarian organization which works in the area of health in the context of an emergency. In addition to the Inter-Cellular Unit, there are 5 sections of MSF in Mozambique: MSF/Belgium working in Inhambane, Niassa, Nampula and Tete; MSF/France working in Zambezia, Sofala, Manica; MSF/HOLLAND working in Nampula and Niassa, and MSF/SWISS and MSF/SPAIN working in Maputo.

NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID (NPA)

Contact: Mr. Skagestad, Project Coordinator

Province(s) of Operation: Tete, Manica, Cabo Delgado

Norwegian People's Aid is running projects in the following main areas: 1) Agricultural rehabilitation; 2) Resettlement; 3) Vocational Training; 4) Irrigation.

OXFAM/UK

Contact: Ms. Tabby Mgandi, Country Representative

Province(s) of Operation: Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Zambezia, Maputo

OXFAM/UK is working mainly in the fields of health training, adult education and literacy, rural extension and emergency relief.

SAVE THE CHILDREN FEDERATION/US

Contact: Ms. Shasi Chanda, Country Director

Province(s) of Operation: Maputo, Gaza, Sofala, Tete, Nampula, Niassa and Cabo Delgado.

SAVE THE CHILDREN/UK

Contact: Mr. Justin Opoku, Country Representative

Province(s) of Operation: Maputo, Gaza, Sofala, Tete, Nampula, Niassa and Cabo Delgado.

SAVE works in seven provinces to assist the Ministry of health, Social Action and other in tracing, documenting, and reunifying children separated from families. This includes the placement of children with biological or substitute families, material support and consultation to families and communities, training and consultation with other agencies working with unaccompanied and war affected children. In addition, SAVE has projects in integrated rural development: health, agriculture, education, training, water and small credit. SAVE also addresses emergency needs of refugees/dislocated people with the distribution of materials, clothing, with nutritional rehabilitation for malnourished children, with work in irrigation and water sources, and with the supply of agricultural supplies to aid self-reliance. The focus is to reduce the burden on displaced families by meeting basic domestic/farming needs and thereby reduce dependency on external programs and structures.

REDD BARNA (Norwegian Save the Children)

Contact: Mr. Carlos Santos, Resident Representative

Province(s) of Operation: Manica, Sofala

Redd Barna is engaged in relief and rehabilitation activities to benefit needy children and their families and has provided assistance to the Social Welfare Department, especially in the training of social workers. Redd Barna is also involved in the rehabilitation of a health post, schools, grinding mills, water and sanitation, agricultural seeds and tools. Many small projects were also started in such diverse sectors as beekeeping, re-forestation, fisheries and brick-making.

SKILLSHARE AFRICA (SSA)

Contact: Mr. Alvaro Casimiro, Field Director

Province(s) of Operation: Manica, Maputo, Sofala, Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Tete.

Skillshare Africa is running one project focusing on 1) Emergency support in health and education and 2) "Cooperantes" for State enterprises and Industries. The first project focuses on activities financed by the GRM, while the second one assists in filling posts in State run industries where requested by the government of Mozambique. Local structures involved are the Ministry of Construction and Water, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Health, the Secretary of State for fisheries, as well as the City Council Planning Departments.

WORLD RELIEF

Contact: Ms. Alexandra Marcus, Program Director

Province(s) of Operation: Zambezia, Gaza, Maputo, Nampula

World Relief is the international relief and development agency for the National Association of Evangelicals. Its main thrust is to teach and provide development skills, as a facilitator, while simultaneously assisting in specific development projects in the areas of agriculture, sanitation, health, water, and income-generating in the rural areas. Additionally, World Relief responds to emergency needs in displaced people camps and in village situations by providing food, blankets, clothes, cooking utensils, seeds and personal farming implements. World Relief implements through the National Evangelical Churches.

WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL

Contact: Mr. John Yale, Program Director

Province(s) of Operation: Manica, Tete, Zambezia, Sofala, Nampula, Maputo.

World Vision has been working in Mozambique since 1984 and is active in four provinces. World Vision works primarily in the areas of emergency food importation and distribution as well as non-relief items such as clothing and medicines. World Vision also works in agricultural rehabilitation and development, including procurement and distribution of emergency seeds and tools, extension work, irrigation systems and research on new seed varieties. Where there is a food crisis, World Vision distributes food to selected districts, hospitals, street children, Food for Work programs and school feeding. The emergency program in the area of health in the provinces of Tete, Sofala and Zambezia has 11 nutritional rehabilitation centers. In addition, they do vaccination campaigns, nutritional surveillance and activities in water and sanitation. Preventative medicine programs in the districts of Nicoadala and Changara include activities in vaccination, birth control, sanitary education.

ANNEX B.
MOZAMBICAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

MASS ORGANIZATIONS

- OCM Organização Continuadores de Moçambique
 Organization of Continuers (of the Revolution)
 Contact: Sr. Ivone Mahumane
- OJM Organização da Juventude Mozambicana
 Organization of Mozambican Youth
 Contact: Sr. Leonardo Candeeiro
- OMM Organização da Mulher Mozambicana
 Organization of Mozambican Women
 Contact: Sra. Modesta Daniel
- OTM Organização dos Trabalhadores de Moçambique
 Organization of Mozambican Workers
 Contact: Sr. Augusto Macamo

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

- AAC Associação Amigos da Criança (Gabinete da Primeira Dama)
 Association of Friends of Children (Department of the First Lady)
- AAD Associação de Apoio ao Desamparado (Chimoio)
 Association of Assistance to the Underprivileged
 Contact: Sr. Nunes Gimo
- ADEFAM Associação dos Deficientes das Forças Armadas de Moçambique
 Veterans Association
 Contact: Sr. Virgilio Wanela
- ADEMO Associação dos Deficientes Mozambicanos
 Association of handicapped Mozambicans
- AMA Associação Mozambicana dos Asmáticos
 Mozambican Association of Asthmatics
- ADM Associação Mozambicana dos Diabéticos
 Mozambican Association of Diabetics
- Associação de Apoio a Criança da Rua

Association of Street Children

CVM Cruz Vermelha de Moçambique
Red Cross of Moçambique
Contact: Sr. C. Digongo

OMAH Organização Mozambicana de Assistência Humanitária
Mozambican Organization of Humanitarian Assistance

NDYOKO Recreação Infantil
Recreation for Children

WOMEN ORGANIZATIONS

OMM Organização da Mulher Mozambicana
Organization of Mozambican Women
Contact: Sra. Modesta Daniel

AMRU Associação Mozambicana da Mulher Rural
Mozambican Association of Rural Women
Contact: Sra. Amélia Zambeze

MBEU Associação para a Promoção do Desenvolvimento Económico e
Sociocultural da Mulher
Association for the Promotion of Economic and Sociocultural
Development for Women

MULEIDE Associação Mulher, Lei, e Desenvolvimento
Association Woman, the Law and Development
Contact: Sra. Alcinda Abreu

GENERAL DEVELOPMENT - RELIGIOUS

ACRIS Acção Cristão Interdenominal de Saúde
Interdenominational Christian Action for Health
Contact: Sr. Adventino Mapilele

CCM Conselho Cristão de Moçambique
Christian Council of Moçambique

Contact: Sr. Isaias Funzamo

SOSAMO Associação Sociedade Salesiana de Moçambique
Association of Mozambican Salesians
Contact: Pe. Jose Rodolfo

CARITAS CARITAS de Moçambique
Contact: Sr. E. Martinho

CI Congresso Islámico de Moçambique
Islamic Congress of Moçambique
Contact: Sr. Hassan Makda

CISLAMO Conselho Islamico de Moçambique
Islamic Council of Moçambique
Contact: Sr. Abdullatif Cassamo

Solidariedade Islamica de Moçambique
Islamic Solidarity of Moçambique
Contact: Sr. Anuar Junior

GENERAL DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS; NON RELIGIOUS

AAIM Associação dos Amigos da Ilha de Moçambique

ACCV Associação Cultural da Casa Velha

ADC Associação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade

ADCR Associação para o Desenvolvimento das Comunidades de Xai-Xai

ADEFAMO Associação dos Desmobilizados das Forças Armadas De Mozambique
Association of Demobilized Soldiers
Contact: Sr. Julio Nimuire

ADESSO Associação para o Desenvolvimento da Provincial de Sofala

AMDU Associação Mozambicana para o desenvolvimento Urbano
Mozambican Association for Urban Development

- AMODEFA Associação Mozambicana para o desenvolvimento da Família
Mozambican Association for Development of the Family
Contact: Sra. Lucia
- ASSANA Organização par ao desenvolvimento da Provincial de Nampula
Organization for the Development of the Nampula Province
- Associação para o Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Rurais de Gaza
Association for the Development of Rural Communities of Gaza
- Associação Cívica da Mozambique
Associação Cultural e Cívica - Pemba
Associação Kanimambo
- KARIBU Associação de Educação de Adultos e Desenvolvimento Comunitário
(Nampula)
- ONJ Organização Nacional dos Jornalistas
National Organization of Journalists
Contact: Sr. Hilário Matusse
- KULIMA Organização para o Desenvolvimento Socio-Econômico Integrado
Organization for Integrated Socio-Economic Development
Contact: Sr. Domenico Liuzzi
- Liga Internacional das Concepções Globais do Consenso
Contact: Mahomed Essak
- MOCIZA Movimento Cívico de Solidariedade e Apoio ao Desenvolvimento da Zambézia
- NOPI Nucleo das ONG da Provincia de Inhambane
- PROTETE Associação formed for development of Tete Province
- SOTEMAZA Development of Manica, Sofala, Zambézia and Tete
- Rotary Club - Maputo

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS/ORGANIZATIONS

- ACTIVA Associação Mozambicana das Mulheres Empresariais e Executivas
Association of Mozambican Women Professionals and Executives

**ANNEX C
PEOPLE INTERVIEWED**

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

WASHINGTON, DC

Food for Peace

Mr. Tim Lavelle - Director of FFP Emergency Programs

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

Ms. Tamra Halmrast-Sanchez - Disaster Operations Officer

Ms. Alexis Robles - Information Specialist

Africa Bureau

Ms. Linda Howey - AFR/AA/DRCO (Disaster Response Coordination Office)

MAPUTO

USAID Mission to Mozambique

Mr. Roger Carlson - Director

Mr. John Miller - Deputy Director

Ms. Cheryl McCarthy - Program Officer

Mr. James Jackson - Food for Peace Officer

Mr. Sidney Bliss - Project Development Officer

Mr. Amimo Oliveira - Food Officer

Ms. Juliet Born - Assistant Program Officer

Mr. Fernando Santos - Food Aid Monitor

Mr. Julius Schlotthauer - USAID Mission Director in Maputo up to August, 1992. Contacted in Washington, DC.

AFRICARE

Mr. Ralph Coleman - Country Representative

CARE INTERNATIONAL/LOGISTICS SUPPORT UNIT

Mr. David Helmey - Co-Director

Mr. John Hoare - Logistics Officer

UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COORDINATION

Ms. Sam Barnes - Chief of Assessment and Planning Unit

WORLD FOOD PROGRAM

Mr. Philip Clarke - Director of Operations

Ms. Alzira de Ferreira - Monitor, Food Aid

FOOD FOR THE HUNGRY INTERNATIONAL

Mr. Shaun Walsh - Country Representative

Ms. Carimat Juma - Project Coordinator

Mr. Paz Humbane - Project Coordinator

WORLD BANK

Ms. Jacomina de Rengt, Economist

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

Mr. Jorge Varela, Project Director, MSU/MA

Mr. Higino Francisco de Murrule., Research Associate, MSU/MA

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE

Mr. Jose Rodolfo - Chief of Food Security Department

AIRSERVE

Mr. Alan Graham - Program Director

Mr. Andrei Maliarov - Program Manager/Mozambique

ADVENTIST DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF AGENCY

Mr. Dwight Taylor - Director

INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVES

Mr. Anthony Davies - Director

SOFALA

LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION

Ms. Augusta Cardoso - Accountant

Mr. Rolan Titto - Coordinator

FOOD FOR THE HUNGRY

Mr. Nial Watson - Program Manager

Mr. William Messiter - Program Coordinator

Mr. John Robinson - Logistics Manager

Mr. Buck Deines - Agronomist

Mr. Thomas Tanguis - Marromeu Representative

AFRICARE

Mr. Rick Duanaz - Program Coordinator

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF RED CROSS

Mr. Ulrich Mueller - Chief of Beira Delegation

Mr. Lars Hanson - Field Coordinator, Nampula

MARINERS

N. Scott Stewart - Operations Manager

DPCCN

Mr. Chicumbe - Director

MEDICINS SANS FRONTIERS/FRANCE

Mr. Thomas Bonnet - Administrator

Mr. Jean-Philippe Debus - Caia Logistician

QUELIMANE, ZAMBÉZIA

WORLD VISION

Mr. Rik Williams - Senior Project Officer

Mr. Rick Fitzpatrick - Commodities Project Officer

Mr. Walter Middleton - Commodities Manager

Ms. Lesley Stitch - Agricultural Officer

Ms. Satya Sheela - Commodities Officer

IBIS RURAL EXTENSION

Mr. Bente Topsoe Jenson - Coordinator

COMISSÃO PROVINCIAL DA EMERGENCIA/ZAMBEZIA

Mr. Jean Pierre Medaets - UN Advisor

QUILIMANE SECONDARY SCHOOL

Ms. Covindo - Principal

COMMUNITY LEADERS AT NICUADALA DISTRICT, ZAMBEZIA

XAI-XAI, GAZA

RED CROSS MOZAMBIQUE

Mr. Ignacio Novela - Provincial Secretary

Ms. Patricia Baumann - Nutrition Specialist, International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent

CARITAS

Mr. Albino Machacale - Secretary

Mr. Jose Modlane - Logistics Officer

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ANNEX D. EXAMPLES OF NATIONAL NGOs AND THEIR WORK

A. Local Mozambican Red Cross

The Mozambican Red Cross (Cruz Vermelha Moçambicana, CVM) has operated in Xai-Xai, located in the Province of Gaza, since 1983. In addition to CARITAS, CVM is one of the largest country-wide local NGOs. A strong Red Cross presence is found in Manica, Sofala and Zambezi. Plans for expansion and strengthening are underway in other provinces. Red Cross societies are already in place throughout the country, and therefore able to reach large numbers of people if given the means to develop the necessary organizational and material capacity. Because of their neutral status in the FRELIMO/RENAMO conflict, Red Cross/Crescent Societies can serve as agents of reintegration. As part of the Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, they are non-sectarian.

The Province of Gaza in southern Mozambique has a total population of about 1.4 million, divided into 11 districts. The provincial capital of Xai-Xai has a population of about 150,000, of which roughly a third are dislocated from mostly nearby zones. According to local sources, a sizable number have returned to their zones of origin. More are expected to return after the local school cycle. The proximity to Maputo, now only a three hour drive, is having a visible impact on the local economy. Promising prospects exist for recuperation of livestock herds, a traditional and well suited activity in Gaza Province.

The International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) had been providing technical assistance to the Xai-Xai Red Cross/Red Crescent chapter throughout the drought emergency. In response to the cessation of hostilities, the ICRC closed its office in Xai-Xai in November of 1993. ICRC will now continue to support the local Red Cross through technical assistance in the administration, accounting, outreach and fund raising. An expatriate nutritionist from the LRCS is providing two years of technical support. ICRC will also continue to finance special projects, such as the family reunion (tracing) project.

ICRC expects to be out of Mozambique entirely by 1995 because of its mandate to work in areas of violent conflict. All relief distributions were ended as of October 1993. Two more programmed distributions, in Vadosi and Gorongosa, will be implemented by the local Red Cross. In addition, the ICRC will continue to facilitate the introduction of the local Red Cross chapters into RENAMO zones.

The local Red Cross in Xai-Xai has been implementing food distributions within the context of a four-part agreement with WFP, DPCCN and the UNHCR. UNHCR provides coordination and information on refugee populations along the Zimbabwe border. A total of 24,000 people were assisted with relief food in the month of October in the two districts of Chicualacuala and Mandlakaze. The number of beneficiaries is down substantially from the number assisted in January and February of 1993, when the need was greater.

The assistance of the Red Cross Chapter in Xai-Xai is now shifting to developmental support through the distribution of seeds and tools donated by the Portuguese Red Cross. This work

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began last year but its efforts were foiled by the drought. This year, seeds and tools donated by the LRCS have been distributed with good results; farm families have prepared the ground for planting, mainly white maize and beans, and are awaiting the rains. The rains, though plentiful, especially in January, have been irregular this year.

Social and development work consists of a health project funded by UNICEF, with a Medical Technician and 5 nurses. The nurses have been receiving training in preventative health and community participation since 1991. As part of the current transitional program, 12 Social Workers were funded by UNICEF to work, in conjunction with the Ministry of Acção Social, with children traumatized by the war, a widespread problem in Mozambique aggravated by the kidnapping of children and their forceful removal from their families.

One of the most encouraging aspects for future local level institution building and sustainability in Xai-Xai are the innovative income generating activities of the Mozambican Red Cross Chapter, small projects which the Chapter Director (Delegado) referred to as "our own". They rent out idle trucks, resell wood and other types of local building materials. A pottery project and a grinding mill are not only self-sufficient, but the source of small amounts of income for local residents. In addition, the Red Cross in Xai-Xai appealed to the government and received a prime three acre plot of land - strategically located between two main roads - on which they intend to build their local offices and units to rent for income generation. There are also plans to produce and market bricks.

An innovative move by the international federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Society has been to foster cooperation between the Malawi and Mozambique national chapters. A memo of Understanding, dated September 21, 1993, makes provisions for an exchange of experiences, know-how and training between the two societies in the areas of logistics mechanisms, distribution of food and non-food items, health activities, and tracing activities.

B. CARITAS

CARITAS is the relief and development organization associated with the Catholic Church. There are CARITAS organizations all over the world, in most cases supported by Catholic Relief Services. CARITAS/Mozambique receives most of its funding from sister CARITAS organizations in Europe, particularly CARITAS/Germany, CARITAS/Holland and CARITAS/Switzerland. The local strategy in Xai-Xai follows the national CARITAS strategy of repatriation, reconciliation, and resettlement. CARITAS has already had two national campaigns to raise awareness about the war and the coming process of reconciliation.

In Xai-Xai, CARITAS distributed food aid under a USAID-CRS-CARITAS tripartite grant, which assisted it in improving management and accountability. The focus is now on seed and tool distribution. CARITAS/Xai-Xai felt it could have distributed considerably more than the 1,750 MT of seeds received this year from CRS. Work at the parish is organized through local commissions focusing on those in most need. Like the local Red Cross, the local

CARITAS leadership has plans for income generating projects, including a brick oven to help support its community work.

Other civil society organizations in Mozambique worthy of support during the transition from emergency to development, are the Mozambican Women's and Youth Movements (OMM and OJM). Until recently, OMM and OJM were FRELIMO party organizations with a centralized political orientation. The Association of Rural Women of Mozambique (Associação Mozambicana da Mulher Rural), with a strong commitment to rural development, though currently with modest geographic coverage, and the Community Development Foundation, lead by the widow of the late President of Mozambique, Samora Machel. Annex 2 provides a more complete list of local Mozambican civil organizations and NGOs.

C. Food for the Hungry: Food for Work Project

A Food For Work project undertaken by Food for the Hungry in Sofala illustrates the potential for international NGOs to facilitate development at the local level.

In late 1992, as the impact of the drought became increasingly critical in rural areas, negotiations were underway between FHI, the WFP and DPCCN for a tripartite agreement to provide food assistance to affected populations in the four FHI-assisted districts of Sofala. The town of Marromeu, on the Zambezi River, had been completely isolated from the rest of the country for more than a decade. With near complete crop failures, the residents of Marromeu were reportedly eating wild tubers and roots and reports of starvation were on the rise.

FHI attempted to supply Marromeu with relief commodities by a combination of ocean and river routes. Although there was some initial success, this route became increasingly difficult as the water level of the Zambezi fell. Within this context, FHI began to broker negotiations between local FRELIMO and RENAMO authorities to support of a Food For Work project to demine and clear the road from Marromeu to Inyaminga, linking Marromeu with the rest of the country.

The FHI project began in early May of 1993, with at least 400 people participating in clearing 55 kilometers of road that month alone. Meetings were also held with RENAMO officials in Inyaminga and Gorongoza to coordinate activities and maintain a dialogue. By September, the entire stretch, approximately 128 kilometers to the Inyaminga intersection, was opened by groups of local farmers organized by the resident authorities of that particular area. At Inyaminga, one can access the main road to the provincial capital of Beira.

The opening of the road in Marromeu has had an immediate impact. The local market is noisy and vibrant, whereas all it had to offer a year ago were some scraps of soap and a very small amount of dried fish. A small public bus, collectively rented by residents of Beira, pulled into town in early November. The South African owner of a defunct safari lodge outside of Marromeu arrived by plane in September, and has hired staff to begin renovations.

Representatives of Lomaco, a multinational agricultural company, arrived in 2 jeeps in November to undertake a feasibility study for production of local cotton. A local evangelical church, based in Beira, has sent representatives to meet with church counterparts in Marromeu. The importance of these commercial and social links with the outside world cannot be underestimated. For a community that has had virtually no contact with the rest of the country for almost 12 years, they are big changes indeed. Similar changes are taking place in villages and towns all over the country.

FHI's sensitivity to active local participation and close consultation with local officials and leaders, contributed to the success of the project. The drought emergency demonstrated that such NGO-lead projects represent innovative and valuable uses of USG food aid.

**ANNEX E.
MAP**

ANNEX F.
STATISTICAL ANNEX

TABLE 1

**MOZAMBIQUE: USA FOOD AID ALLOCATIONS TO MOZAMBIQUE AND SADC REGION:
FY 92 AND 93**

SOURCE	FY92	FY93
FFP TITLE II		
Regional	154,045.00	120,161.00
Mozambique	42,579.00	75,589.50
Mozambique to Regional (%)	27.6%	62.9%
FFP TITLE III		
Regional	446,881.00	206,350.00
Mozambique	246,354.60	79,000.00
Mozambique to Regional (%)	55.1%	38.3%
USDA TITLE I		
Regional	330,339.00	102,400.00
Mozambique	0.00	0.00
Mozambique to Regional (%)	0.0%	0.0%
USDA 416		
Regional	796,500.00	307,500.00
Mozambique	200,000.00	36,209.00
Mozambique to Regional (%)	25.1%	11.8%
TOTAL		
Regional	1,727,765.00	736,411.00
Mozambique	488,933.60	190,798.50
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE TO MOZAM	28%	26%
EXCLUDING TITLE I:	35%	30%

Source:
 1. Regional Figures: Congressional Report to Congress, April, 1993
 2. Mozambique Figures: AID/FHA/FFB, 9/93

NOTE: Title I of Public Law 480 is administered by USDA and is a concessional sales and market development
 Title II of the Food for Peace Program (P.L. 480) provides grant food aid for emergency and private assist
 Title III of the Food for Peace (P.L. 480) is a bilateral grant program intended for development projects i
 The Section 416(b) Program under USDA authorized Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) donations c

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Table 2

MOZAMBIQUE: CEREAL FOOD IMPORTS (MT)

COMMODITY	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	TOTALS
1. MAIZE								
Commercial	71,888	201,444	140,973	79,323	171,690	244,892	96,852	1,007,062
Emergency	62,393	180,939	120,314	162,368	207,325	280,479	390,786	1,404,604
TOTAL	134,281	382,383	261,287	241,691	379,015	525,371	487,638	2,411,666
2. RICE								
(commercial only)	74,408	61,724	71,907	46,990	32,700	56,800	22,515	367,044
3. WHEAT								
	103764	127730	109160	114000	45560	67687	66400	634301

Sources: 1) 1987 - 1989: Ministry of Commerce, Department of Food Security as cited in Louis Berger Report, op. cit., August 1991;

2) 1990-1993: Data from Ministry of Commerce "Food Aid Pledges and Shipments: Annual Reports; World Food Program INTERFAIS database and UNILOG dispatches database; USAID unpublished data and EEC unpublished data, as reported in MSU/MA

Note: 1993 Commercial Maize: 1. Actual Arrivals: 26,852
2. Planned Arrivals: 70,000

TABLE 3

MOZAMBIQUE: NON-FOOD
 US GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE BY SOURCE AND TYPE OF ACTIVITY
 FISCAL YEAR 1992

I. A.I.D BUREAU FOR AFRICA		US\$
DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AFRICA (DFA)		
a. REGIONAL		
	SARP Drought Emergency Relief Project	1360000
	SARP Regional Transport Project	550000
	SARP ICRISAT Sorghum & Millet Seed	1150000
	Extension of FEWS to Southern Africa	2900000
	Africare Regional Water Project	2600000
	Peace Corps Drought Emergency Project	802000
	Subtotal:	26552000
b. MOZAMBIQUE		
	Support to Mozambique Primary Health Care Project	\$7,000,000
	PVO Support Project	\$11,900,000
	Subtotal:	18900000
II. STATE/BUREAU FOR REFUGEE PROGRAMS		
a. REGIONAL		
	UNHCR for Water & othe non-food assistance programs	2000000
	UNV for 10 food aid monitors	300000
	Subtotal:	2300000
b. MOZAMBIQ		
	ICRC for Emergency Appeal	2000000
	Subtotal:	2000000
III. OFDA		
a. REGIONAL		
	WFP Logistical Assistance	2500000
	Food Monitoring Project	1000000
	A.I.D Assessment Team	105500
	Relief Coordinator SADE Task Force	35911
	Telecommunications Assessment Team Support	17085
	US IFRCCS	190230
	Africare Regional Water Project	1502959
	Peace Corps PASA Emergency Response	167000
	Subtotal:	5518685
b. MOZAMBIQUE		
	WV Airlift	1771000
	WV R&D Zambezia Emerg Relief Project	264251
	Amer Red Cross health & Water projects	321300
	WFP Logistics in moving US supplemental food	2600000
	FHI Emergency Airlift	797000
	ICRC Emergency Program for affected population	2000000
	World Relief Food Distribution	698463
	Subtotal:	8452014

**** Source: Report to Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, U.S. Senate, May, 1993

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TABLE 4

MOZAMBIQUE: MAIN DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS OF USA FOOD AID
FY: 1991-1993

FUNDING SOURCE/SPONSOR		METRIC TONS	\$ VALUE (\$000s)
FISCAL YEAR 1991			
TITLE II	ADRA	3,239.6	1,026.3
	WORLD VISION	3,425.9	1,163.1
	ADRA	689.4	182.0
	GTG/Sect206	75,000.0	16,593.5
	WFP - REG	12,520.0	2,874.6
Subtotal		94,874.9	21,839.5
TITLE III	GTG	72,408.0	18,939.9
SECTION 416	WFP/PRO	50,000.0	11,470.0
TOTAL FISCAL YEAR 1991:		217,282.9	52,249.4
FISCAL YEAR 1992			
TITLE II	ADRA	3,051.0	853.3
	WFP/IEFR	7,060.0	2,844.9
	WORLD VISION	20,430.0	5,426.4
	WORLD VISION	4,800.0	801.6
	WFP - REG	7,238.0	1,355.2
Subtotal		42,579.0	11,281.4
TITLE III	GTG	246,354.6	49,300.0
SECTION 416	WFP/PRO	200,000.0	72,200.0
TOTAL FISCAL YEAR 1992:		488,933.6	132,781.4
FISCAL YEAR 1993			
TITLE II	ADRA	6,429.5	1,859.9
	WFP/IEFR	7,500.0	3,727.5
	WORLD VISION	54,160.0	19,154.0
	WFP - REG	5,100.0	851.7
	WORLD VISION	2,400.0	1,372.5
Subtotal: Title II		75,589.5	26,965.6
TITLE III	GTG	79,000.0	15,000.0
SECTION 416	WFP/IEFR	44,890.0	14,409.6
	WFP/PRO	61,000.0	19,381.0
	WFP - REG	36,209.0	6,649.8
Subtotal Section 416		142,099.0	40,440.4
TOTAL FISCAL YEAR 1993:		296,688.5	81,754.3
GRAND TOTAL 1991-1993		1,002,905.0	*****

**** TITLE III request decreased to 70,216 MT.

NOTE: NGOs also received USA food for distribution via the WFP.
These include World Vision, Food for the Hungry, ADRA and World Relief

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Table 5. GLOBAL PLEDGES TO MOZAMBIQUE IN RESPONSE TO THE DROUGHT EMERGENCY

CANADA	CANADIAN RED CROSS	CASH	420168
	GTG/WVC/CFGB/CLWR	CASH & IN-KIND	19300000
	ICRC	CASH	781250
	RC/CANADA	CASH	308333
	Subtotal		20809751
DENMARK	-	CASH	2533784
	DANCHURCHAD,RC/DENMARK,		
	SCF,UNHCR,UNICEF,WFP	CASH FOR RELIEF WORK	6756757
	DANISH RED CROSS	CASH FOR IFRC PROJECTS	181818
	WFP/IEFR	CASH FOR 1250 MT + TRANSPORT	1130892
Subtotal		10663251	
FINLAND	RC/FINLAND	CASH	133333
	Subtotal		133333
GERMANY	GERMAN NGO	CASH FOR 2880 MT MAIZE	869799
	GERMAN NGO	CASH FOR 3397 MT MAIZE	932510
	GERMAN NGO	CASH FOR BEANS & OIL	823404
	GERMAN NGO	CASH FOR TRUCKS & EQUIP.	255319
	GERMAN NGO	IN-KIND - 5775 MT Y. MAIZE	2189216
	GERMAN NGO	IN-KIND - 650 MT MAIZE FLOUR	253020
	Subtotal		5323268
IRELAND	TROCAIRE	CASH FOR FEEDING PROGRAM	16129
	Subtotal		16129
JAPAN	-	CASH FOR EMERG. FOOD ASSIST.	5468750
	-	CASH FOR FERT. AG MACHINES	7031250
	-	CASH FOR NON-PROJ. GRANT AID	19531250
	UNHCR	CASH FOR MOZ RETURNEES	500000
	WFP	CASH FOR FOOD ASSIST.	1562500
	Subtotal		34093750
LUXEMBOURG	-	CASH FOR NON-FOOD ITEMS	1732960
	WFP	CASH FOR WATER SUP. FACILITIES	189873
	Subtotal		1922833
NETHERLANDS	CARE INTERNL	CASH FOR FOOD/40,000 FAMILIES	1976778
	ICRC	CASH FOR DROUGHT AFFECTED	5491329
	RC/NETHERLANDS	CASH	359281
	WFP	CASH FOR FOOD AID	2197802
	Subtotal		10025190
NORWAY	-	CASH FOR NON-FOOD ITEMS	11793027
	CARE/NORWAY	CASH FOR DIST. SEEDS & TOOLS	172414
	CARITAS NORWAY	CASH FOR REHAB HARBOR EQUIP.	170358
	CX RELIEF NETWORK	CASH FOR FEEDING CHILDREN	230769
	NORAD RES. REP.	CASH FOR AIRLIFT/LOGISTICS	170358
	N. CHURCH AID	CASH	171821
	N. CHURCH AID	CASH FOR REPATRIATION REFUND	114992
	N. PEOPLE'S AID	CASH	429553
	N. RED CROSS	CASH	343642
	N. RED CROSS	CASH FOR DISASTER RELIEF	307692
	N. RED CROSS	CASH FOR DISASTER RELIEF	307692
	N. REFUGEE COUNCIL	CASH FOR REPATRIATION REFUND	398724
	RC/NORWAY	CASH	500000
	SALVATION ARMY	CASH FOR FOOD DIST.	340716
	SCF/NORWAY	CASH	859107
	UNDP	CASH FOR IMPROV. ACCOUNTANCY	637959
	UNICEF	CASH FOR HEALTH	325000
	UNICEF	CASH FOR FEEDING PROGRAM	717703
	Subtotal		17991527
	SWEDEN	-	CASH FOR NON-FOOD ITEMS
Subtotal			19144168
SWITZERLAND	CARITAS/SWITZ	IN-KIND - 1800 MT MAIZE	526515
	COORDIN. OFFICE SDC, MAPUTO	CASH FOR WATER PROV./LOGISTICS	396825
	ICRC, SWISS DEV. CORP OFFICE, MAPUTO	IN-KIND - TECH. ASSIST.	72993
	ICRC GENEVA	CASH FOR 5 TRUCKS	555556

Table 5. GLOBAL PLEDGES TO MOZAMBIQUE IN RESPONSE TO THE DROUGHT EMERGENCY

	MSF/SWISS	CASH FOR DIST. 8221 MT	211111
	SWISS RED CROSS	IN-KIND - SOAP, SEEDS, ETC	186131
	TERRE DES HOMMES/SWISS	CASH FOR SEEDS/WATER PROV	214286
	Subtotal		2163417
UK	-	CASH FOR NON-FOOD ITEMS	17385969
	RC/UK	CASH	94518
	Subtotal		17480487
USA	BI-LATERAL	CASH FOR PRIMARY HEALTH PR	7000000
	BI-LATERAL AND WFP	FOOD AID - 829924 MT	219788200
	FHI	CASH FOR EMERG. AIRLIFT	797000
	ICRC	CASH FOR EMERG. RELIEF	2000000
	ICRC	CASH FOR EMERG. ACTION PLA	2000000
	RC/US	CASH FOR EMERG. RELIEF	321300
	WFP	CASH FOR FOOD AID/LOGISTICS	2600000
	WV	CASH FOR EMERG. AIRLIFT	264251
	WV	CASH FOR EMERG. AIRLIFT	1771000
	WPI	CASH FOR FOOD DIST.	698463
	Subtotal		237240214
EEC	-	CASH FOR DROUGHT	2739726
	-	CASH FOR NON-FOOD ITEMS	1839528
	RED CROSS	IN-KIND - CEREALS	919708
	Subtotal		5498962
		FROM US:	237240214
		FROM ALL OTHERS:	145206066
		GRAND TOTAL:	382446280

Source: Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA).
Regional Highlights and Resource Mobilization
Financial Summaries, February, 1993

NOTE: Refer to Table 1 for more information on US Government contribution.

NOTE: Due to difference in fiscal years and unit costs, totals may not be comparable wi

TABLE 6

MOZAMBIQUE: INDICATORS OF VULNERABILITY TO THE EMERGENCY

MONTH	CONDITION		NUMBER OF DISTRICT REPORTING
	Grave	Alarming	
October, 1992	2	7	41
November, 1992	5	11	57
December, 1992	4	13	55
January, 1993	10	10	55
February, 1993	4	13	52
March, 1993	2	7	41
April, 1993	2	4	46
May, 1993	1	6	50
June, 1993	1	7	54
July, 1993	0	7	54
August, 1993	0	9	49

Source: Medecins Sans Frontieres
Various Bulletins and Mission Estimates

Note: The factors considered in assessing the condition of vulnerability for each district were: nutritional status, population movement, markets, harvest and stocks, food water and sanitary conditions.

Mozambique

Indicators of Vulnerability

