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1995 Review

1995 Program Proposal

**USAID MALI  
RESULTS REVIEW**

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Submitted March 1996


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
## INTRODUCTION

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In 1995, USAID Mali restructured, based on an intensive reengineering process and the development of a new strategic plan. Most of the baseline indicators for the new strategic plan have not yet been measured, so it would not be useful to limit reporting to this plan. This report will document USAID's development impact from the perspective of both the old and the new strategic plans. It will use the progress indicators of the previous strategic plan, but summarize them in the context of the new strategic plan.

These indicators do not tell the full story of USAID's accomplishments in Mali during 1995. They do not reflect the tremendous commitment of Mission personnel to goals and objectives of the new strategic plan. They do not show how USAID has served as a model for other donor organizations, NGOs and the Malian Government to reengineer or restructure. Through reengineering, USAID has increased its capacity significantly to identify and accomplish program results. These will be demonstrated in the years ahead, as the Mission implements the activities of its seven-year plan.





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**USAID Mali Program Logical Framework,  
Fiscal Years 1990 - 1996**

<u>MISSION PROGRAM GOAL</u>	<u>COUNTRY TREND INDICATORS</u>
To Promote Economic Growth.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Real GDP grows at least 4% per year, surpassing \$3.7 billion by 1996.</li> <li>2. Per capita GDP increases from \$260 in 1989 to \$355 in 1996.</li> <li>3. Exports of goods and non-factor services increases from \$343 million in 1989 to \$500 million in 1996.</li> </ol>
<u>SUBGOAL</u> To Improve the Quality of Life.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Life expectancy increases from 47 in 1987 to 51 by 1996.</li> <li>2. Literacy rate increases from 14% in 1989 to 18% in 1996.</li> </ol>

*Note:* Words marked in bold reflect 1995 revisions. These revisions update the logical framework to 1996, taking into account the post-devaluation environment. Indicators have been quantified and clarified, where possible.

<p><b><u>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1:</u></b>  <b>Increase Private Sector Participation in the Economy.</b></p>	<p><b><u>PROGRAM PERFORMANCE INDICATORS</u></b></p> <p><b>A.</b> Formal private sector investment in the economy increases from FCFA 75 billion in 1989 to FCFA 191 billion in 1996.</p> <p><b>B.</b> (eliminated)</p> <p><b>C.</b> Number of traders receiving credit for grain storage and marketing through the Cereals Market Restructuring Program increases from 19 in 1988 to 70 in 1996.</p>
<p><b><u>PROGRAM OUTCOME</u></b></p> <p><b>1.1:</b> Improve Regulatory Policies and Practices</p> <p><b>1.2:</b> Decrease Fiscal Burden on the Private Sector</p> <p><b>1.3:</b> Improve Public Sector Performance</p> <p><b>1.4:</b> (eliminated)</p> <p><b>1.5:</b> (eliminated)</p>	<p><b><u>PERFORMANCE TARGET</u></b></p> <p><b>a.</b> (eliminated)</p> <p><b>b.</b> Transport: Price controls on internal transport are abolished by 1993, allowing private sector to provide agricultural transport services.</p> <p><b>c.</b> Privatization: The Pharmacie Populaire du Mali (PPM) stops importing nonessential drugs by 1991, permitting private pharmacies to do so directly.</p> <p><b>d.</b> Judicial system: Commercial and administrative courts in Bamako, Kayes, Mopti and regions become fully operational, hearing 1,200 cases annually by 1996.</p> <p><b>a.</b> Export promotion: GRM eliminates all export taxes by 1992 and establishes a one-stop window for export formalities by 1996.</p> <p><b>b.</b> (eliminated)</p> <p><b>c.</b> (eliminated)</p> <p><b>a.</b> Support to private sector: Ministry of Finance's DNAE is reoriented to a private sector support role.</p> <p><b>b.</b> Fiscal performance: Government fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP is reduced from 10% in 1989 to 8% in 1997.</p> <p><b>c.</b> Revenue promotion and equity: Tax revenues increase from FCFA 85.6 billion in 1988 to FCFA 184.5 billion in 1996, through increases in the tax base and equitable income tax rates.</p> <p><b>a.</b> (eliminated)</p> <p><b>b.</b> (eliminated)</p>

<p><b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2:</b>  <b>Increase Incomes in Areas of High Productive Potential.</b></p>	<p><b>PROGRAM PERFORMANCE INDICATORS</b></p> <p>A. The value of agricultural production increases an average of 4% per year during the 1989-1996 period.</p> <p>B. The value of agricultural exports increases from FCFA 60 billion in 1988 to 120 billion in 1996.</p>
<p><b>PROGRAM OUTCOME</b></p> <p>2.1: Increase Agricultural Production</p> <p>2.2: Increase Staple Grain Sector Productivity</p> <p>2.3: Increase Livestock Exports</p>	<p><b>PERFORMANCE TARGET</b></p> <p>a. Staple grains: grain production outpaces population growth (3.0% per year) during the 1989-1996 period.</p> <p>b. Food security: intra-annual grain price variation is reduced from an average of 11.2% for millet and 8.6% for rice in 1989 to 3% for millet and 1.5% for rice in 1996.</p> <p>c. Credit: Credit extended from USAID projects to cooperatives increases, from \$4.3 million in 1989 to \$5.5 million in 1995.</p> <p>a. Twenty-nine new technologies are developed by research organizations and adopted by farmers.</p> <p>b. Research: The national agricultural research system is reorganized, and a national agricultural research strategy is developed and adopted by 1995.</p> <p>c. Farmers adopt 22 improved farming practices by 1996.</p> <p>d. Land use and tenure: Land use and forest policies favoring private agroforestry investment are implemented by 1994, resulting in increased investment by 1996.</p> <p>a. Fiscal and regulatory measures: The GRM abolishes export taxes by 1991, minimizes nuisance taxes by 1993, simplifies procedures for livestock exports by 1994, and reduces regional transport obstacles by 1996.</p> <p>b. (eliminated)</p> <p>c. Private practice: The number of private veterinary practitioners increases from 0 in 1989 to 160 in 1996.</p>

<p><b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3:</b>  <b>Improve Delivery of Health and Educational Services</b></p>	<p><b>PROGRAM PERFORMANCE INDICATORS</b></p> <p>A. Infant mortality declines from 108/1000 live births in 1987 to 94/1000 in 1996.</p> <p>B. The number of pupils from a cohort of 1,000 completing the first cycle increases from 257 in 1989 to 450 in 1996.</p>
<p><b>PROGRAM OUTCOME</b>  <b>3.1: Improve Health Care</b></p>	<p><b>PERFORMANCE TARGET</b></p> <p>a. Village health centers: 120 new health centers are established, staffed with trained personnel, and financed entirely from local community funds during the 1991-1996 period.</p> <p>b. Infant vaccinations: The percentage of children under age 1 vaccinated against major childhood diseases increases from 5% in 1987 to 70% in 1996.</p> <p>c. Mothers at risk: The percentage of urban and rural women of reproductive age vaccinated with two doses of tetanus toxoid increases from 30% urban and 7% rural (1990) to 70% urban and 40% rural (1996).</p> <p>d. (eliminated)</p> <p>e. Contraceptives: The national prevalence rate increases from 1.3% in 1987 to 7.5% in 1996.</p> <p>f. Pharmaceuticals: The number of village pharmacies fully stocked with essential drugs and contraceptives increases from 0 to 500 by 1996.</p> <p>g. Private practice: The number of private health practitioners increases to 225 in 1996.</p> <p>h. Disease coverage: The percentage of mothers seeking prenatal consultations in project areas increases to 50% from 1991 to 1996.</p> <p>i. (eliminated)</p>

<u>PROGRAM OUTCOME</u>	<u>PERFORMANCE TARGET</u>
3.2: Improve Basic Education	<p>a. Access: The number of children newly enrolled in the first grade increases from 57,340 in 1989 to 115,683 in 1996. For girls, the number increases from 21,534 to 51,870.</p> <p>b. Access: The number of children enrolled in grades 1 to 6 increases from 311,873 in 1989 to 601,554 in 1996. For girls the number increases from 115,300 to 236,543.</p> <p>c. Equity and access: The net enrollment increases from 25% in 1993 to 33% in 1996.</p> <p>d. Equity and access: The number of first cycle classes increases from 7,413 in 1989 to 8,950 in 1996.</p> <p>e. Efficiency: The promotion rate increases from 59% in 1989 to 75% in 1996.</p> <p>f. Efficiency: The percentage of students repeating primary school grades decreases from 31% in 1989 to 23% in 1996.</p> <p>g. Efficiency: The percentage of students dropping out from primary school decreases from 10% in 1989 to 2% in 1996.</p> <p>h. Quality: The number of second grade pupils able to rewrite in the testing increases from 75% in 1992 to 97% in 1996</p> <p>i. Quality: The number of second grade pupils able to read and understand in the testing increases from 13% in 1992 to 60% in 1996.</p> <p>j. Quality: The number of second grade pupils able to calculate in the testing increases from 14% in 1992 to 50% in 1996.</p> <p>k. Quality and Efficiency: The number of student years to complete the first cycle decreases from 21 in 1989 to 10 in 1996.</p>

USAID Mali Goal, Sub-Goal and Strategic Objective Indicators (March 1999)												
#	Description	INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Goal	Promote Economic Growth	Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	billion \$	base	base		actual	actual	actual	actual	p/act	plan
				19	210			2.9%	3.0%	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%
		Per capita GDP	\$		200			250	300	302	na/1,220	1,800
		Exports of goods & non-factor services	million \$		348			315	344	487	303,041	800
Sub-Goal	Improve the Quality of Life	Life expectancy in years		base			act	act	act	act	p/act	plan
				47			45	45	na	40	50/na	51
		Literacy Rate		14%			10%	10%	na	10%	17%/na	30%
SO 1	Increase Private Sector Participation in the Economy	Formal private investment in the economy	billion FCFA		base		actual	actual	actual	actual	p/act	plan
			% of GDP		75.0		80.0	85.1	135.5	175.4/180	191	
		# of traders receiving credit for grain storage & marketing from the PRMC		base			actual	actual	actual	actual	p/act	plan
				19			13	42	35	45	103/100	70
1.1	Improve Regulatory Policies and Procedures	Transport		base	actual	actual				actual		
		- abolish price controls on internal transport		fixed controls	urban enforced	controls established				transport reg. awareness		
		- private sector provides agricultural transport services	OHVN Zone	17% of cotton	100% of cotton	same				same		
		Privatization:		base			actual					
		- Pharmacie Populaire du Mali stops importing non-essential drugs		monopoly on all drugs			private importers have 100% non-essential					
		- private pharmacies directly import non-essential drugs										
		Judicial System:		base			actual	actual	actual	actual	p/act	plan
		Fully operational commercial and administrative courts in Bamako, Kayes, Mopti and Segou successfully handling business & industrial litigations	Bamako	0	0	0	301	401	1,180	1,018		
		- case litigated	Kayes	0	0	0	80	251	48	79		
			Mopti	0	0	0	25	16	17	21		
			TOTAL	0	0	0	406	770	1,190	1,207,119	1,200	
1.2	Decrease Fiscal Burden on the Private Sector	Export promotion		base			actual	actual	actual	actual	p/act	plan
		- elimination of export taxes		tax exists			tax removed					
		- one-stop window for export formalities					completed	functional	functional	functional	functional	functional
		- market information system for selected export goods									functional	functional
		Eliminated										
		Eliminated										
1.3	Improve Public Sector Performance	Support to the Private Sector		base			actual	actual	actual	actual	p/act	plan
		- reorient National Directorate for Economic Affairs to support the private sector		exclusive regulatory role			mandated support to priv. sector	no change	institutional study #1 completed	institutional study #2 completed	CCIM	CCIM
		Fiscal Performance		base			actual	actual	actual	actual	p/act	plan
		- GRM fiscal deficit	% of GDP	10.0%			11.2%	9.0%	9.0%	13.7%	12.4/10.0%	10.0%
		Revenue Promotion and Equity		base			actual	actual	actual	actual	p/act	plan
		- revenues increase through expanded tax base and equitable rates	billion FCFA		85.5		100.0	100.7	104.7	135.0	129/177.3	184.5
			% of GDP				15.3%	15.5%	15.5%	15.5%	na/14.4%	15.5%
1.4	Eliminated											
1.5	Eliminated											

**USAID Mali Agriculture (SO 2) Indicators (March 1996)**

#	Description	INDICATOR	1988	1989	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
SO 2	Increase	A. value of agricultural production Index	base		actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
	Income in	(grains and cotton) 1988-100	100		83	117	135	195	130/170	137
	Area of High Potential	B. value of agricultural exports (cotton, cereals, livestock)	base		actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
		FCFA	60		79	62	66	78	90/162	120
2.1	Increase	2.1.a. Staple Grains	base	base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
	Agricultural Production	(a) annual grain production	1981-89	1.5	2.23	2.16	2.23	2.46	2.61/2.16	2.60
		(b) annual population growth	% change		27%	-4%	4%	10%	-11%	19%
		(b) annual population growth	% growth	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%
		2.1.b. Food Security	base	base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
		Intra-annual price variation								
		(a) millet	1982-89	11.2%	6.1%	6.4%	6.6%	6.2%	4.0/5.4%	3.0%
		(b) rice	1982-91	6.6%	2.2%	1.9%	1.5%	6.4%	1.5/11.1%	1.5%
		2.1.c. Rural Credit		base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
		(a) DHV	\$ million	1.10	1.48	1.56	2.11	2.40	3.0/3.8	4.5
		(b) PRMC	\$ million	3.10	2.40	2.60	3.16	1.10	2.5/0.97	0.5
		Total	\$ million	4.20	3.88	4.16	5.29	3.50	5.5/4.77	5.00
2.2	Increase	2.2.a. New Technologies	1980-89	base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
	Staple Grain Sector	developed by research institutions & adopted	varieties	6	6		6	0	1	extension
	Productivity	by farmers	practices	1		1	2	0	2	extension
		2.2.b. National Agricultural Research System		base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
		(a) reorganized		old	re-org.			budget	fin. system	impact
		(b) strategy developed & adopted		none	GRM	donors	finance	downsize	monitor	studies
		2.2.c. Farmers adopt improved farming practices		base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
				3	12	17	17	17	na/10	22
		2.2.d. Land use & forest policies favor private agroforestry investment		base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
				state	review	legislation	de-control	new Code	vll. comm.	invest.
2.3	Increase	2.3.a. Livestock export fiscal and regulatory measures		base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
	Livestock Exports	export tax	exist	exist	eliminated					reduce
		other tax	exist	exist			eliminated			transport
		procedures	complex	complex	simplified			simplified		obstacles
		decentral. marketing	centralized	centralized			regional		task force	in the region
		2.3.b. Eliminated								
		2.3.c. # of private veterinary practitioners	vets	base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
			assistants	0	60	90	110	162	150/na	160
				0	30	70				

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<b>USAID Mali Health (SO 3.1) Indicators (March 1996)</b>													
#	Description		INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
SO 3	Delivery of Health Services	A.	Infant mortality rate					est.	est.	est.	est.	pl./act.	plan
			per 1000	108				na	na	na	na	95/na	94
3.1	Improve Health Care	3.1.a.	New village health centers established, staffed with trained personnel & financed from local community funds	Total		base	0	actual	actual	actual	est.	pl./act.	plan
								0	0	5	17	120/134	120
		3.1.b.	% of children under 1 year old immunized against major childhood diseases	Total	base			actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
				BOG	5%			41%	34%	45%	58%	65%/na	70%
				DPT3						78%		na/77%	
				measles						45%		na/42%	
										51%		na/51%	
		3.1.c.	% of women of reproductive age vaccinated with 2 doses of tetanus toxoid	Total		base		actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
				Rural				19%	8%	10%		na/19%	
				Urban			7%				17%	30%/na	40%
							30%				44%	60%/na	70%
		3.1.d.	<i>Eliminated</i>										
		3.1.e.	National contraceptive prevalence rate		base			actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
					1%			na	na	3.5%	5.4%	6.8/7.0%	7.5%
		3.1.f.	# of village pharmacies fully stocked with essential drugs and contraceptives				base	actual	actual	actual	est.	pl./act.	plan
							0	na	257	300	347	437/650	500
		3.1.g.	# of private health practitioners	Total			base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
				Bamako				na	41	116	231	200/na	225
		3.1.h.	% of prenatal consultations in project areas	Total				base	est.	plan	est.	pl./act.	plan
				SCF							44%	na/na	50%
				CARE				66%		68%		58%	
				WV				31%		68%			
									49%	73%			
		3.1.i.	<i>Eliminated</i>										

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USAID Mal Education (SO 3.2) Indicators (March 1996)												
#	Description	INDICATOR		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	
SO 3	QUALITY & EFFICIENCY	E. # of pupils from a 1000 cohort completing the 1st cycle	Weighted Average	actual	actual	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan	
			Girls	257	284	300	316	411	388	438/388	480	
			Boys		230	287	279	388	350	408/350	423	
3.2	ACCESS	3.2.a. # of children newly enrolled in 1st grade (% is the gross access rates)	Total	base	actual	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan	
				57,540	55,837	62,211	64,153	64,487	83,300	104,050/83,300	118,883	
			Girls	21,634	20,406	23,231	25,072	38,744	30,000	48,323/40,610	61,670	
			%	16%	16%	18%	20%	29%	28%	28/28 %	33%	
			Boys	35,906	35,431	38,980	40,481	55,743	53,300	58,734/53,300	63,613	
			%	28%	27%	30%	31%	41%	36%	41/36 %	43%	
			7 year old population	Total	282,817	282,025	290,577	282,000	289,550	280,267	282,359	304,073
			Girls	132,894	131,831	130,136	130,722	134,519	130,821	147,208	184,876	
			Boys	129,923	130,194	130,441	131,284	135,037	140,340	145,151	150,098	
			ACCESS	3.2.b. # of children enrolled in grades 1 to 6 (% is the gross enrollment rates)	Total	base	actual	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.
	311,873	323,354			340,573	374,041	438,302	497,888	647,347/542,861	601,564		
Girls	118,300	118,284			124,407	130,430	165,693	192,207	213,220/212,833	230,543		
%	16%	16%			17%	19%	22%	25%	28/27 %	30%		
Boys	193,573	205,070			216,166	234,611	272,609	305,682	334,141/330,088	368,011		
%	28%	29%			29%	31%	35%	40%	44/42 %	48%		
7 to 12 year old population	Total	1,407,083			1,454,042	1,482,874	1,499,287	1,509,784	1,531,313	1,555,967	1,594,140	
Girls	718,134	736,955			748,898	743,883	753,460	768,008	780,618	783,807		
Boys	688,951	717,087			734,076	752,394	756,324	763,305	785,349	788,633		
EQUITY & ACCESS	3.2.c. Net enrollment rate	Total								base	actual	pl./act.
		Girls						25%	24%	31/26 %	33%	
		Boys						20%	20%	22/21 %	25%	
EFFICIENCY	3.2.d. # of 1st cycle classrooms	Total	base	actual	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan		
			7,413	7,461	7,591	7,798	7,884	8,606	8,606/8,978	8,950		
		Girls										
QUALITY	3.2.e. Promotion rate	Total	base	actual	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan		
			59%	na	na	63%	67%	64%	74%/na	78%		
		Girls	31%	na	na	31%	30%	30%	24%/na	23%		
QUALITY	3.2.g. Drop-out rate	Total	10%	na	na	6%	3%	6%	2%/na	2%		
		Girls										
		Boys										
QUALITY	3.2.h. % of tested 2nd grade pupils able to write	Total				base	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan		
						75%	85%	na	na	97%		
		Girls				13%	39%	na	na	60%		
QUALITY	3.2.i. to read & understand	Total				14%	17%	na	na	80%		
		Girls										
		Boys										
QUALITY & EFFICIENCY	3.2.k. # of student years to complete the 1st cycle	Total	base					actual	pl./act.	plan		
		Girls	21					21.5	7/na	na		
		Boys						23.5	7/na	na		

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## SECTION I: SPECIAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE USAID MALI PROGRAM

### A. Progress towards USAID Mali Goal and Subgoals

USAID's goal, adopted in September 1995, is to help Mali achieve a level of sustainable economic, political and social development that eliminates the need for concessional foreign assistance. The two key variables in achieving this goal are increasing the economic growth rate and decreasing the population growth rate. Mali's 6% real economic growth rate in 1996 is evidence that the economy can grow at a rate sufficient to improve social conditions for its population, provided that population growth falls. Domestic savings, one measure of the sustainability of economic growth, increased from 6.6% of GDP in 1994 to 8.8% of GDP in 1995. Population growth statistics will be released in 1996, following a USAID-sponsored demographic and health survey, but the increase in use of modern contraceptive methods from 5% to 7% (calculated by couple-years of protection) and dramatic improvements in contraceptive sales between 1994 and 1995 are good indicators that progress is being made.

### B. Progress towards Strategic Objectives

#### 1. Economic Growth

USAID's sustainable economic growth strategic objective addresses the obstacles to increasing value-added growth on a sustainable basis in the major economic subsectors. Growth in GDP jumped from 2.5% in 1994 to 6% in 1995. The major sectors contributing to this growth were gold, cotton, cereals, textiles and construction, all of which expanded in response to the 1994 devaluation. While the private sector needs no assistance in exploiting Mali's gold resources, the cereals and livestock sector needed and benefitted from USAID assistance, contributing to an 8.6% increase in the value of agricultural production in 1995. Formal private sector investment increased by 16%. Rural credit catalyzed by USAID in the Upper Niger River Valley zone increased by 58%. USAID and World Education financed the creation of ten urban savings and loans clubs in 1995. A total of 800 women are members of the clubs, each of which has amassed savings between \$400 and \$2,000. Loan activity began in 1996.

#### 2. Youth

USAID's youth strategic objective focuses on changing the social and economic behaviors of youth. In terms of availability and access to services, USAID has made progress in both health and education. In 1995, it helped stock another 90 village pharmacies with

contraceptives, increase gross enrollment in primary school from 33% to 35%, and increase the number of classrooms by 5%. Child and maternal vaccination rates appear not to have improved, however, perhaps because NGO activities are not reflected in official national vaccination coverage data. In terms of improved quality of services, in 1995 USAID helped train personnel in 131 new village health centers and increase the percentage of primary school students promoted to the next grade level from 71% to 74%. In terms of increased demand, USAID helped increase the national modern contraceptive prevalence rate from 5% to 7%. In Bamako, these rates have increased even higher. In 1995, 21% of unmarried men and 11% of unmarried women used modern contraceptives. The Mission also helped increase the percentage of children newly enrolled in first grade from 33% to 34%. The percentage of prenatal consultations in one USAID project areas fell, however, perhaps because of expansion of the project's geographic coverage to areas where services were not provided previously.

#### 3. Democratic Governance

USAID's new democratic governance strategic objective focuses on making community organizations effective partners with

Government in decentralized development decision-making and planning. In 1995, USAID helped promote decentralization and develop the enabling environment for community organizations. The Mission funded civic education training, which helped the Decentralization Mission catalyze the geographic definition of almost 400 rural communes. USAID sponsored seminars to improve financial management of municipalities, which helped one city to increase its revenues by 400%. Mayors gained new ideas for increasing the confidence of citizens in local institutions, following a USAID-funded seminar. The Mission helped President Alpha Oumar Konare communicate better to the population his vision of a decentralized democratic system, and improved the ability of the Presidency to manage its work and communicate with the rest of Government. A similar effort is being initiated for the Prime Minister's Office. In 1995, USAID helped make the first three administrative courts operational, allowing citizens to challenge the actions of Government officials. It also began a media campaign to help Malians use the new courts effectively. With USAID assistance, women parliamentarians were trained in political science to increase their effectiveness in parliamentary debates. The Mission funded 17 grants to international non-governmental organizations, almost all of which work closely with dozens of Malian NGOs and community associations. Through the Human Rights Fund, NGOs and associations undertook activities in judicial reform, legal assistance, civic

education, media professionalization, and the fight against female genital mutilation and discrimination against women.

#### 4. Information and Communications

The information and communications special objective focuses on making information more readily available to Malians and enhancing its use through improved communications. In 1995, USAID established a "real time" market information system for business opportunities (import and export) by linking with the UNCTAD Trade Point bulletin board. Because of this service, Malian entrepreneurs have identified new markets for their commodities, and are discovering new sources of goods and services they are seeking to purchase. USAID is also continuing its support for Malian market information systems, which have given producers and consumers quick access to accurate price information and trends, allowing them to make more informed decisions. Finally, through several PVO grants, USAID continues to support the improved dissemination and use of information, decentralization and enhancement of democracy by providing technical and financial assistance for the publication of community-based newsletters, newspapers and technical publications in local languages.

#### C. Significant Economic, Political and Social Developments affecting Progress

##### 1. Political Issues

The most important political event of 1995 was the establishment of peace in northern Mali. The decentralization campaign focussed the attention of Malians inside and outside of Government on the changed role and relationships of the Malian State and civil society. The 1994-1995 school year was successfully completed, for the first time in three years. The Government's position basing scholarships on need and merit is not accepted by elements of the Association of Malian Students, which marshalled enough power to organize three three-day student strikes in late 1995. Civil society leaders have encouraged reconciliation between the Government and the students. Despite the imminent 1997 elections, political and popular support for the student movement has diminished to the point that the student association is not likely to disrupt school activities in 1996. Late in 1995, the Government survived a vote of no-confidence, demonstrating its strength within a vibrant democratic system.

##### 2. Peace in the North

The Government of Mali resolved the ethnic conflicts that had made northern Mali insecure since the late 1980's. Plans were developed to gather combatants into camps and expropriate their arms, to integrate some of them into the Malian military and government services, and to help the remainder make a transition into civilian life.

Realizing the great risk it was taking in

promising accelerated development for northern Mali, the Government called upon the donors to help it meet commitments to reestablish security, reinstall the Administration in the North, provide emergency assistance, rehabilitate infrastructure, and implement water, education and health activities. The Government invited all donor representatives to Timbuktu in July to present a program to coordinate this assistance. Donors indicated their commitment to supporting the Government's urgent-action plan and development strategy for the North. A joint committee was reactivated to ensure continued coordination.

To ensure the success of demobilization efforts, the UNDP established a trust fund, to which USAID contributed \$1 million under the Africa Conflict Resolution Act. Canada, the Netherlands and Norway also contributed. A donor committee coordinates the programming of the trust fund. The ex-combatants are expected to be integrated into the military, Government and society by the beginning of March 1996.

Administrative officials have regained their posts in the cities and some of the larger towns and rural districts of northern Mali. However, the Government is having a difficult time recruiting 200 health and 300 education personnel to serve in the North. Its ability to do so will ease the burden on the NGOs working in the area and serve as a symbol of the Government's commitment to the long-term

development of northern Mali.

Peace has allowed NGOs to increase the efficiency of their existing activities and to expand into previously insecure areas. Resource-poor Government officials are relying on NGOs to provide essential services, of which the most urgent are drinking water, health facilities, cereals banks, and gardens.

Donors have released funds for infrastructure, water development and rural development projects in the North that had been on hold. These projects are injecting needed resources into the local economy. Donor-supported public works activities are creating significant employment opportunities. USAID is redirecting a portion of its nationwide health, family planning and education assistance to the North.

Peace encouraged 37,000 refugees to return from surrounding countries in 1995. Almost all of them returned without the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR helped 1,900 refugees repatriate, well short of its 7,200 target. The Commission expects to play a major role in repatriating the remaining 60,000 to 70,000 Malian refugees. Some returnees have been integrated into existing NGO activities. Many of them have returned with few if any resources, with little access to water and no prospect of harvesting food until the fall of 1996.

The traditional economy of the northern

regions, linked to neighboring countries, is thriving once again, with increased trade, bustling markets and a large amount of construction. Artisans are producing handicrafts for sale and export. Tourists have started to visit the area once again.

### 3. Decentralization

In 1995, the Government showed that it was prepared to risk its survival on the success of the decentralization process. Significant progress was made in laying the legal framework for decentralization, educating citizens, and carrying out the process of redistricting. The Decentralization Mission has coordinated closely with the donor community during this process. The President and Government leaders have made such a strong commitment to decentralization that it will be impossible for the few opponents among the political parties and in the Administration to stop the process.

During 1995, the National Assembly passed the Collectivities Code, spelling out the respective powers of the communal and national governments. Elections to establish the communal governments are scheduled for early 1997. USAID, through central funds, is helping the Government revise its electoral code to ensure the transparency of communal, legislative, and presidential elections.

The Decentralization Mission has initiated an intensive information and communications

campaign. It has issued publications, given interviews to the written and oral press, established regular television programs, and developed theatrical sketches for both radio and television. USAID and other donors have helped the Mission carry out training sessions on decentralization and redistricting throughout Mali. These sessions are also designed to address the needs of Malians for civic education. As a result of these efforts, Malians in the rural areas understand better that locally-elected officials will be answerable to them first, and to the Central Government second.

Redistricting is being completed in the five regions of southern and central Mali. Citizens in these areas have proposed the creation of 588 communes, of which 357 have been accepted and the remainder need to be arbitrated. In many cases, the existing arrondissements will be replaced by communes, and many new communes will be created from regroupings of villages. Reestablishment of the Administration in the North has delayed redistricting efforts in that area.

Despite the progress made in redistricting, some Malians contend that the speed in which it was carried out prevented decision-making from being adequately transparent. However, demonstrating transparency and creating a sense of ownership is more important for the next steps in decentralization than it was during the redistricting process. If it is found that Malians at the local level do not have the means or the willingness to support communal governments,

it is likely that overall confidence in governance will drop. The Malian Government's ability to assist communes financially will be restricted by its commitment to the IMF and World Bank to reduce the budget deficit.

Some Government policymakers believe that decentralization will weaken the State. The Decentralization Mission is overseeing an institutional development project supported by the World Bank to ensure a proper balance between the Central Government, communal governments and civil society. This project also will help donors coordinate their assistance to democratic governance.

#### 4. Civil Society

Civil society in Mali is coalescing, especially in the rural areas, where associations are forming coalitions. The Chamber of Agriculture is no longer the sole voice of rural Mali. In urban areas, coalition-building is not as widespread. Many urban NGOs are weak, unspecialized, and in some cases just mechanisms for merchants to avoid paying customs duties.

NGOs are highly regarded at the Ministerial level. The right of association is strong. However, Malian Government officials at the local or regional level are not necessarily as supportive as their leadership. For example, Customs inspectors are delaying Customs clearance for dozens of legitimate NGOs in their efforts to limit the number of duty exonerations,

NGOs are uniting to fight this practice. They also are lobbying the Government to modify legal limits on interest rates, which if implemented would have the effect of ending microenterprise lending.

#### 5. Consensus Building

The Social, Economic and Cultural Council, made up of 58 representatives of civil society, became fully functional in 1995. This consultative body advised the Government on health issues, resolution of problems in the North, and the details of the Government's four year plan. It traveled throughout the country, soliciting citizen concerns on such issues as schools, devaluation and insecurity.

For the second year, the Government organized an open meeting to discuss the status of human rights and democracy in Mali. The seminar was broadcast live on television and radio. A large number of Malian civil society institutions used this opportunity to criticize the Government publicly on issues related to insecurity, the justice system, schools, decentralization, peace in the North, illegal imports and the electoral code. The event demonstrated the Government's transparent and open approach to addressing its problems. It was evident from the seminar that the Government of Mali has a good human rights record, but also is interested in addressing its deficiencies.

The Prime Minister, in his efforts to build support for Mali's democratization and

development process, visited the US to address a World Bank meeting on the environment. He met with the Vice President, the USAID Administrator, members of Congress and the Presidents of the World Bank and IMF. He also met with American NGOs and representatives of the private sector and gave an address at Harvard University.

## 6. Structural Adjustment

The Malian Government has made great progress in managing its finances and in liberalizing its economy. It has earned accolades from the World Bank and the IMF, both of whose Presidents visited Mali in 1995. Mali was the first country James Wolfensohn visited as the new President of the World Bank.

This year was the third and last year of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) Program. Having satisfied successfully the requirements of the program, the Malian Government has negotiated a second three year ESAF program. The Malian economy made spectacular progress with a growth rate of 6% and an average inflation rate dropping to 12.5% from 24.8% in 1994, the year of the 50% devaluation. The current account balance deficit was reduced from 18.2% to 15.2%. Revenues increased by 12% while expenditures only rose by 6%, reducing the budget deficit to 10.5 percent of GDP from 13.7% in 1994. Customs revenues have increased by 30%, following the restructuring of the Customs Service and the transfer of 400 agents to border stations.

Government wages have been brought down to 36% of the operating budget from 47% in 1993. All internal arrears have been paid and no additional arrears have been incurred. This has injected a large amount of resources into the private sector, increasing its motivation to provide competitive services to the Government. The State's debt to the banking system has decreased well above expectations. The debt service ratio fell to 16% from 23.6%.

As a result of these accomplishments, the Malian Government is no longer operating in a crisis mode. It has the flexibility for the first time in years to make long-term investments.

Structural adjustment, particularly the 1994 devaluation, has encouraged private sector investment and increased the profitability of many firms. Many international companies are investing in gold mining. Several firms were privatized in 1995. Other parastatal organizations, such as *Office du Niger* and *Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Textiles* (CMDT) have negotiated performance plans with the State. In the wake of devaluation, artisans and microenterprises are finding greater demand for their products. In 1995, a European handicrafts store bought \$100,000 of Malian handicraft products through the efforts of the USAID-funded Microenterprise Pivot Group,

The next three year structural adjustment program with the World Bank and IMF is

expected to solidify progress and establish the goal of eliminating the need for such exceptional assistance. At the same time, it will increase Government support to health, education, women, and the private sector.

## 7. Financial Sector

The financial sector had many new initiatives in 1995, following the 1994 agreement by West African Monetary Union countries to encourage the development of non-bank financial institutions. USAID continued to work on two innovative proposals -- venture capital and debt for development (debt swaps) -- to introduce new ideas into the financial sector. The venture capital study began in 1995 to explore ways of overcoming the credit constraints imposed by an overly conservative commercial banking industry. A potential Malian partner has been identified and a final decision to begin a test of a venture capital fund in Mali will take place in the first quarter of 1996. The debt swap study identified potential Malian sovereign debt that could be purchased on the secondary market and exchanged for local currency to support development programs. The amount of debt available for swaps, the countries involved and potential purchasers have been identified and final decision awaits the terms of the Paris Club negotiations on Malian debt, because these terms may be more favorable than a debt swap.

The informal financial sector also made significant progress in 1995 with two conferences on microfinance institutions held in

the regional capital of Sikasso. USAID funded one of these conferences, which allowed PVOs, NGOs and other groups involved in the sector to share and discuss their different approaches. These conferences are the start of a process to identify the common and best practices for microfinance institutions and to combine efforts to making these programs sustainable.

The francophone West African Central Bank continued its policies of liberalizing and decentralizing the financial sector to promote growth. The Central Bank continued its policy of establishing a range for interest rates with floor and ceilings established rather than the previous administratively-determined interest rates. This policy has allowed financial institutions to remunerate savers with a more market-determined rate. The Central Bank no longer absorbs all excess liquidity found in the commercial banking system. This measure has forced commercial banks to re-examine local investment opportunities to place their excess liquidity. The Central Bank has demonstrated its commitment to liberalization and decentralization by organizing a coordination group that brings together commercial banks, NGOs, donors, savings and loans and credit unions to develop a common policy and approach to the emerging microfinance sector in the region.

#### 8. Economic Subsectors

The livestock sector continues to benefit from USAID-facilitated foreign direct investment and

the 1994 FCFA devaluation's impacts on exports and import substitution. The livestock export "boom" of 1994 leveled off in 1995. The value of exports decreased by 10.2%, as producers invested in building their herds.

Other export commodities continue to perform well, including green beans, mangoes and potatoes. New records were set in 1995 in the level of finance mobilized, the number of exporters and number of producers involved (350,000 producers in 9,000 villages), leading to the export of 10,000 metric tons of green beans to Europe worth \$7 million to Malian producers. USAID-funded export promotion activities are directly responsible for half of these totals. A total of 2,500 metric tons of mangoes were similarly exported, while purchasers of Malian potatoes came from as far afield as Cotonou, Lome and Abidjan.

The cotton subsector set new records with a reported 400,000 metric tons of grain cotton resulting in a \$60 million net profit. Under the performance plan for the CMDT, this profit will be split between producers (35%), the Government (35%) and the CMDT (30%). This places Mali as the largest producer of cotton in Sub-Saharan Africa. Two new cotton gins were opened in 1995. The cotton subsector through the CMDT contributes \$4 million monthly in taxes to the Government.

Cereal exports also have benefitted from liberalization, privatization and the restructuring of relative prices through the January 1994

FCFA devaluation. Exports of maize, millet and sorghum were reported to neighboring countries, especially Senegal. Although the rainy season in 1995 was not as abundant as in the previous two years, river levels and fish production rose. Total production was not as high as in previous years but the deficit areas are dispersed geographically, and immediate food aid needs can be met by production from other areas and in-country stocks. Structural food aid imports have decreased significantly with both France and USAID no longer continuing structural food aid wheat imports to Mali. USAID Mali's last PL 480 Title III food aid shipment was in 1993. The only remaining donor providing structural food aid wheat to Mali in 1995 was Canada, which intends to stop its structural food aid to Mali.

The rice subsector was notable in 1995 for the drastic reduction in the import tariff on imported rice. USAID technical assistance played the leading role in influencing the decision of the Minister of Finance to reduce the imported rice tariff in early June from approximately 50% to 20%. Using data from the USAID-supported Market Information System, made immediately available through the structured data sets of the USAID-supported FEWS Project, the Mission produced graphical representations of historical trends. This data convinced decision makers that domestic rice prices were rising over time due to declining marketing margins and not due to trader hoarding to capture large margins, as other donors claimed. USAID also provided the

Minister with scenarios of price movements given different reductions in the rice tariff structure and levels. As a result, he announced the lowering of the rice tariff through late August. Having seen that USAID also was correct in countering the predictions by other donors of a "flooded" market, the Minister has kept the tariff at its lower level throughout 1995 and into 1996.

The rice sector also made progress in 1995 in its restructuring with direct support from USAID technical assistance. The former rice parastatal, the *Office du Niger* restructured, with support from USAID and other donors. In 1995, it signed a performance plan with the Government and its producers similar to the one that has been highly successful with the cotton parastatal, CMDT. Furthermore, USAID's two-year effort to get both the Government and other donors to privatize the four rice mills of the *Office du Niger* bore fruit. The rice mills have been closed down, their staff have been released and paid severance, and the other donors and the Government agree that privatization is the next logical step. Full privatization of these mills awaits an amendment to the law that created a rice milling holding company from the restructured *Office du Niger* by the Malian legislature. Ironically, it is not clear that private investors will be interested in the rice mills. This year, small-scale rice mills were able to process all of Mali's domestically-produced rice.

## 9. Education Sector

The education sector again experienced student unrest in 1995 tied to student demands for stipends. The Malian Government has not given in to student demands to increase spending on stipends. The amplitude of student unrest is clearly on the decline. Having reached its zenith in 1991 with the overthrow of the previous 23-year military regime, disruption and damage caused by student unrest has declined in each successive year. The present Malian Government has arrested student leaders who promote disruption and damage of public property. These arrests have convinced many Malians that civic action tactics within a democracy do not include disrupting public life or destroying public property.

USAID Mali's support for liberalization of the education sector has acted as a catalyst for many education initiatives. The non-project assistance conditionality of the Basic Education Expansion project, which provided the legal framework for the creation of private and community-managed schools, is increasing the access of students to basic education. The project has helped regional education officials, who are the main liaison between local schools and regional authorities, play a more supportive role. After receiving USAID-financed training, these Government agents no longer block local initiatives, but instead support them. USAID's insistence on participatory processes, local budgeting and a focus on customers has been internalized by local education officials, who

hold regular forums with parent and teacher associations, PVOs and NGOs.

This project contributed to the nation-wide decentralization effort through expanding to the entire country its initiative to deconcentrate Ministry of Basic Education activities. In each region, the project has transferred bank accounts, budgets and accountants to education authorities so they can provide better support for the local school system. Over 75% of USAID's support to the education sector is now at the regional level and implemented by NGOs.

USAID has had a significant impact on both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of standard operations within the Ministry of Basic Education. The National Pedagogy Institute is testing students annually and has produced tests in national languages without external assistance. The Office of Statistics and Policy has made great strides in transforming data into information that decision-makers can use. The most striking example of this growing expertise is the "School Distribution Map," which is a computer-generated map of all localities in Mali that have a primary school. The map was greatly appreciated as a planning and decision-making tool by the Minister, who brought it to the attention of the Council of Ministers and eventually the President. The Ministry also produced fliers on education sector information, annual indicators and evolution of indicators. These fliers and maps were presented to the National Assembly in 1995 to sensitize

legislators to the educational needs in Mali. They also have been distributed widely to teachers as well as to participants at national and international conferences to improve understanding of Mali's educational sector and to inform and guide debate.

The USAID grant to Save the Children in Kolondieba to implement their approach to community-based schooling has had wide repercussions in Mali's basic education sector. The Minister of Basic Education, visiting Kolondieba at USAID's insistence, was greatly impressed at what communities were willing to contribute to create schools. He returned to Bamako and began a New Basic School program that incorporates and expands upon the Save the Children model for local school development. The New Basic School program also provides an example and lesson on the workings of the nascent Malian democracy. After the Minister's visit to Kolondieba, he requested consultants scale up this idea to a national level. These consultants presented an ambitious program with curriculum review and modular components, local language instruction, curriculum reform and a thorough restructuring of the Ministry of Basic Education. But when teacher unions and opposition parties criticized the ambitiousness of these reforms and the lack of a participatory process in developing them, the Minister was called before the National Assembly to explain the program. The reforms are now being redesigned based on input from these groups. An information campaign has been initiated to

inform Malians of the reforms and gain their commitment to them.

The USAID-initiated Education Pivot Group, which unites NGOs active in the education sector, received its first funding from other donors in 1995. Contributions by France to the Education Pivot Group in 1995 validated this grouping of NGOs as a viable partner in the education subsector, as did the inclusion of the Education Pivot Group in policy dialogues with the Ministry of Basic Education.

The strategy for improving girls' education changed in 1995. Previously, USAID had helped the Ministry improve the access and availability of education in order to increase girls enrollment and retention rates and decrease their drop-out rates. This "supply-side" approach was supplemented in 1995 by activities to stimulate demand for schooling young girls. These activities included information, education and communication efforts and were implemented in collaboration with Peace Corps, NGOs and PVOs. Individuals at the national, regional and local school levels were identified to promote girls' education. These individuals, as well as other teachers, have been trained in the importance of educating young girls. The national level policy is to institutionalize this emphasis on promoting girls' education.

#### 10. Health Sector

USAID funded participants to the 1995

worldwide conference on population (Cairo). The conference provided positive feedback and confirmation to Malian participants of their progress in addressing this delicate social issue. For example, the Government now organizes its thinking around the broader idea of reproductive health when addressing population questions in Mali. In 1995, the Malian Ministry of Health produced norms, standards and policy on reproductive health, which are some of the most progressive in West Africa. They provide guidelines on who is responsible for what services, address gender issues directly, focus on the role of young women, and remove barriers to contraceptive access. Contraceptive products and services available on the Malian market include Depo-Provera, IUDs, condoms, Norplant and sterilization, with only female barrier methods unavailable.

The second Malian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) began data collection in 1995 with USAID funding. Following the first DHS in 1987, these data will provide the opportunity for comparative study of long-term trends through cross-section and time series analysis. A preliminary report will be available by May 1996. The 1995 Mali DHS employs one of the largest sample sizes in Sub-Saharan Africa with over 9,000 households. Ground-breaking modules in the Mali DHS include maternal mortality, AIDS, excision, community service availability and a specific men's survey. Information from the DHS is greatly appreciated and used by other donors, the Government, PVOs and many others, including

the Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development (RAPID) study.

RAPID presentations in 1995 to Government officials in Mali have had a galvanizing impact on their planning process. USAID helped the Planning and Statistics Unit of the Ministry of Health to understand, manipulate and interpret the RAPID model. The result was a sobering, Malian-led demonstration of the effect of different fertility rates on development prospects over a 30-year time frame. When presented to an interministerial committee, it stimulated consensus to increase the percentage of the budget allocated to health and education as a response to the scenarios described through the presentation. This committee, composed of the Ministers of Health, Basic Education, Rural Development, Finance, Interior, Communication and Youth and Sports, meets twice a year to promote understanding on the development implications of the health sector, demographics and AIDS.

Significant progress has been made on specific diseases during 1995. The Guinea worm eradication program, which USAID supports, has reduced by 67% the incidence of reported cases in southern Mali. The goal of complete eradication of Guinea worm in Mali by December 1997 is within sight. USAID support to-date has resulted in sufficiently positive results to allow 1995 to be marked as the beginning of the three-year process for certification of eradication by the United Nations.

A meningitis outbreak in the Dioro area during the dry season of 1995 was brought to the attention of local authorities through community-based, grassroots pressure. This popular pressure mobilized additional resources from communities, NGOs and the Government. Local communities demonstrated their ability to manage their own affairs through heightened community activism. The USAID-funded PVO, Africare, responded with an unprecedented 14,000 meningitis vaccinations over the course of ten days. The Malian Government, when informed of the problem, did not try to hide or suppress information, and the problem was widely reported in the media.

The meningitis outbreak was followed by a cholera epidemic in the Mopti region, which was reported in the international news in 1995. The health system responded by developing an information, education and communication campaign to change behavior and increase demand for health-related products and services. Malian authorities chose not to combat the outbreak with vaccinations because of the high cost and low effectiveness of a cholera vaccine. The Government's commitment to free flow of information had a positive impact on the type of response and its timing. This commitment to transparency and the need for information, education and communication was further evidenced by the Malian President's visit to Mopti during the outbreak.

The return of peace in the North in 1995

allowed USAID to restart child survival activities funded through the US PVO World Vision. The Community Health and Population Services project also began USAID-funded health sector support in the North for the first time since 1985. Guinea worm eradication activities have also begun in the North.

The growing success of decentralization was evident in the health sector. Demand for community health centers has exceeded originally planned targets because of the larger-than-expected response of local communities to decentralization. Local communities' willingness to pay for health services is greater than originally expected. Decentralization is beginning to take hold, with communities able to mobilize themselves for the provision of health services.

The USAID-funded Infection Prevention Conference in 1995 brought international and Sahelian representatives to Bamako to discuss and disseminate best health practices. These practices included utilizing single-use needles only once, sterilizing with appropriate equipment and not just flame-heating, the importance of basic handwashing, washing dried blood off of mattresses before changing patients, and a general informational campaign. As a result of this conference, the rate of post-procedure infection at five health sites in Bamako declined by almost 50%.

Mali continues to benefit and capitalize on 20 years of USAID investments in the Center for

Research and Study on Population and Development (CERPOD) located in Bamako. Regionally funded investments have assisted USAID's bilateral program through the provision of data and research studies. Specific studies from 1995 include the situational analysis that assessed the quality of care at service delivery points in Mali, the nine country migration and urbanization study, the migrant entry to urban areas study, and the bilaterally funded evaluation of knowledge of the family planning logo in Mali. This last study highlights the bilateral program's confidence in CERPOD capacity, through its direct investment, to conduct targeted studies to inform decision making.

#### 11. Improvement in the Status of Women

Political support for women's concerns in Mali remains strong. Women's associations and NGOs, despite their weak institutional capacity, are better integrating gender into development activities and civic actions.

As part of USAID's reengineering process, a working group was created to develop a strategy for addressing the gender aspects of the Mission's program and internal organization. Many male and female staff contributed voluntarily to this effort. They collaborated with programmatic and reengineering working groups to draw their attention to the importance of addressing gender issues. The group explored important issues such as gender equity in the Mission. After

fruitful, constructive and thorough discussions and analysis of the possibility of establishing a gender strategic objective, the group recommended that gender issues be considered cross-cutting and addressed in all strategic objectives.

The coordinator of French-speaking NGOs at the Beijing Conference on Women was a Malian woman who upon return has organized forums on women's judicial rights, encouraging women to pursue higher education and fight against female excision. Access to information in Mali on female excision, concerning for example, the progress in neighboring Burkina Faso, has also increased public attention on reducing this danger to reproductive health. Progress in reducing this problem for women is reflected in Mali being the first country in the world to include a female excision data collection module in the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). Inclusion of this data collection module is an indication of the increased political will in Mali to address these social issues.

#### D. Major Factors Affecting Program Performance

While the Malian political, economic and social environment offered new opportunities and obstacles to achieving development impact, the main factor affecting Mission performance in 1995 was USAID's status as an experimental laboratory for the Agency's reengineering. Virtually 100% of USAID Mali staff

participated in retreats, town meetings, steering committees, working groups and training sessions throughout the year. Commitments to the reengineering process meant that some staff almost doubled their number of work hours.

Reengineering led to the development and approval of a new strategic plan, which is proving to be an excellent tool for making investment decisions and discussing policy with development partners. It also led to the reorganization of the Mission, carried out by an open bidding process. Forty persons changed jobs to become members of new strategic objective teams. The new reengineering management systems being put in place are helping USAID staff to communicate more clearly about Mission procedures and policies. The establishment of these systems should make USAID a more effective organization in 1996 and beyond.

## SECTION II: PROGRESS TOWARD STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

### PROGRAM GOAL: TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH

#	Description	INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Goal	Promote			<i>base</i>	<i>base</i>		<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>pl/est.</i>	<i>plan</i>
	Economic	Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)		10	2.10			2.63	3.02	2.06	2.08/2.46	3.7
	Growth											
		Per capita GDP			260			285	306	302	na/1,229	1,850
		Exports of goods & non-factor services			343			318	344	437	360/541	500

Source: 1994 World Development Report; IMF Documents.

Real GDP increased by 6% in 1995, compared to 2.5% in 1994. The above figures measure GDP in dollars, resulting in a sizable financial decrease in GDP between 1993 and 1994 that is explained by the 50% devaluation of the FCFA in January 1994. The FCFA figures demonstrate that, measured in domestic terms, national income continued to increase during this period. On average, the growth of real GDP from 1989 to 1995 has been greater than the population growth rate of approximately 3.0 percent. The 1995 GDP growth rate reflected the effects of good rainfall for cereals in 1994/95 and excellent rainfall for cotton in 1995/96 harvests, as well as the FCFA devaluation. More specifically, in constant prices, the value of food crops increased by 20% in 1994 and the value of cotton increased by 19.7% in 1995. Gold mining also increased in value by 20% and construction increased by 10% in 1995. Inflation dropped from 24.8% to 12.5%, as the economy adjusted to the devaluation. The value of cotton and gold exports increased by 59% and 64% respectively. On the other hand, the value of livestock exported fell by 10.2%, reflecting increased domestic consumption. GDP values and growth remain broad aggregate measures of national income and do not account for the informal sector growth in the economy (estimated as high as two-thirds of formal economic activity).

### PROGRAM SUBGOAL: TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE

#	Description	INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Sub-Goal	Improve the Quality of Life			<i>base</i>			<i>est.</i>	<i>est.</i>	<i>est.</i>	<i>est.</i>	<i>pl/est.</i>	<i>plan</i>
		Life expectancy in years		47			48	48	na	49	50/na	51

Source: Ministries; National Directorate of Statistics and Information; World Bank Development Report; UNDP Human Development Report; World Population

*Data Sheet; USAID estimates*

The base value for the life expectancy indicator (47 years) is derived from the 1987 census data and will not be updated until the 1997 census. The 1995 Demographic and Health Survey will provide information on this indicator. However, this indicator is not particularly useful for USAID decision-making, given the multiple variables influencing its value. This indicator will be reviewed for its relevance to USAID decision-making and reporting on impact, but it is not likely to be retained in the new strategic plan.

#	Description	INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Sub-Goal	Improve the Quality of Life	Literacy Rate	base				est.	est.	est.	est.	pl/est.	plan
			14%				15%	15%	na	10%	17%/na	20%

*Source: Ministries; National Directorate of Statistics and Information; World Bank Development Report; UNDP Human Development Report; World Population Data Sheet; UNESCO, USAID estimates*

The base value for the literacy rate indicator is derived from the 1987 census data and will not be updated until the 1997 census. There is no commonly accepted literacy figure for Mali, although all sources agree that Malians are among the least literate peoples in the world. Mali continues to make slow but steady progress in improving the national literacy rate. According to UNESCO, in 1994, the literacy rate for the entire population was 19%, but the rates for males and females were 26% and 11% respectively. Literacy varies widely between urban and rural areas. In 1994, 44% of the urban population were literate, while only 11% of the population were literate in the rural areas. In urban areas that year, 55% of men and 36% of women were literate. In rural areas in 1994, 18% of men and 5% of women were literate. USAID's focus on basic education will not result in an immediate impact on the literacy rate indicator, which measures the ability to read and write in any language of the population over 14 years of age. USAID's new strategic plan will continue this more long-term focus on educating young people rather than targeting resources on adult education and literacy training.

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1: INCREASE PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMY**

#	Description	INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
SO 1	Increase Private Sector Participation in the Economy	A. Formal private investment in the economy			base		actual	actual	actual	actual	pl/act	plan
		billion FCFA			75.0			69.9	95.1	136.8	176.4/168	181
		% of GDP			11.7%			12.2%	12.6%	13.5%	13.7/13.5%	15.4%

*Source: IMF Documents, February 1996.*

The January 1994 FCFA devaluation, along with the Malian Government's continued commitment to liberalization and privatization have created the necessary conditions for increased responsiveness of private investment, and Mali is taking advantage of the gain in competitiveness. As a result, formal private investment

increased by 20% in 1995, exceeding and actually leading growth in GDP. While the absolute value of Government investment increased, it decreased as a share of GDP, reflecting a growing economy and the continued withdrawal of the state from the economy. Increased investment is reflected in increased imports of machinery. Investors have purchased the privatized milk factory and poultry farm along with several other formerly State-owned or State-controlled firms. Recently reopened textile firms are now making large profits. *Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Textiles* (CMDT) is building several additional cotton gins to process increased cotton production. The demand for small-scale locally made machinery, as well as locally made construction materials, has increased. Gold production and exports have increased dramatically, and are expected to increase further, due to foreign direct investment by several international mining companies. One of these companies, BHT Utah, a joint venture with American investors, has been in Mali for several years while another new American entry, Pan African Resources Corporation, recently signed an agreement with the Government to invest \$2 million in the Kayes Region to prospect for gold and silver.

These increases in investment resulted from a significant withdrawal of the State from production activities as well as its multi-year efforts to promote the private sector. One way that USAID has promoted the private sector is by increasing savings and the availability of credit in limited geographic areas through the rural credit programs of the Development of the Upper Niger River Valley project and the Cereals Marketing Reform project as well as through NGO programs in both rural and urban areas. Many of these NGOs focus their credit activities on women. For example, World Education has established ten savings clubs with 800 women members. Up to \$2,000 in savings has been collected by each club since their initiation in 1995. Loan activities will begin in 1996. Management training has enabled 31% of women to record their management activities properly, while 71% of women members can compute their production costs. USAID-funded project and NGO activities have helped provide \$8 million in credit, creating over 9,000 new businesses and increasing agricultural output by an estimated \$2 million per year.

Through the Policy Reform for Economic Development project, USAID is assisting the Government to strengthen the courts system by creation and operationalizing commercial and administrative courts. These courts are improving the environment in which private sector businesses operate. In addition, the project's development of an export market information system is providing new opportunities to private sector export firms by making available to the public critical market information. By assisting the Government to undertake both budgetary and fiscal reform, USAID has contributed to the elimination of State domestic arrears, which thereby injected a significant amount of resources into the private sector. The decreased burden of the Government on the financial sector has resulted in reduced interest rates, spurring formal private sector activity.

#	Description		INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
SO1	increase	C.	# of traders receiving credit for grain storage & marketing from the PRMC		base			actual	actual	actual	actual	pl/act	plan
	Private Sector Participation				19			13	42	38	45	bd/100	70
	in the Economy												

Source: Ministries; Cereal Marketing Restructuring Program; National Agricultural Development Bank; Commercial Banks.

The more than doubling of this indicator from 1994 to 1995 is explained by the Cereal Marketing Restructuring Program (PRMC) switch from credit for

marketing coarse grains (millet, sorghum and maize) to credit for marketing rice. The 1995 coarse grain credit program was suspended because of reduced demand for coarse grain marketing credit (see narrative explanation for indicator 2.1.c. below) and poor performance of the remaining loans in the portfolio. All 109 participants in the PRMC credit program in 1995 received rice marketing loans. Increased interest in rice marketing is a function of USAID and other donor efforts to restructure the former rice parastatal, *Office du Niger*. The *Office du Niger* is now more akin to a water management district in the US than its previous role as a fully integrated production, processing and marketing parastatal. Private marketing agents have filled in the role previously monopolized by the *Office du Niger*. The 1994 FCFA devaluations' impact on increased regional demand for Malian rice also explains some of the growth in demand for credit for rice marketing. The value of the loan portfolio has declined over the last few years as the PRMC credit program winds down (see narrative explanation for indicator 2.1.c.). Funds available for PRMC activities are diminishing because USAID and other donors no longer provide local currencies from the sales of structural food aid.

#	Description	INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
1.1	Improve Regulatory Policies and Practices	1.1.d. Judicial System: Fully operational commercial and administrative courts in Bamako, Kayes, Mopti and Segou successfully handling business & industrial litigations - cases litigated			base civil court only		actual construct. train judges	actual	actual	actual	pl/act	plan
		Bamako			0		0	351	401	1,130	1,013	
		Kayes			0		0	99	261	43	70	
		Mopti			0		0	26	18	17	21	
		TOTAL			0		0	486	770	1,190	1,200/1,113	1,200

Source: Ministry of Justice.

The Ministry of Justice has recalculated caseload data, showing that the commercial courts in Bamako, Kayes and Mopti have inspired enough confidence among businesspeople to maintain large caseloads. These data do not measure the quality of justice, however. USAID in 1995 addressed the quality of the legal process through continued in-service training programs in commercial and administrative law for magistrates, lawyers and paralegal assistants in four regions. The Mission helped the courts computerize their legal records and relevant laws and regulations from 1991 onward. Previously, this information was practically inaccessible. In 1995, administrative courts in Bamako, Mopti, and Kayes became operational and heard their first cases. In Bamako, administrative courts heard 111 cases. The administrative courts in Mopti and Kayes heard 39 cases and 10 cases respectively. Most of these cases involve requests to overturn the decisions of Governors and other Malian Government administrators. The IMF and World Bank, recognizing the importance of administrative courts to the private sector enabling environment, included their operationalization as a conditionality of the 1995 structural adjustment program. USAID has undertaken a campaign to increase access to the courts, through preparing and distributing guides to the courts, making films and television programs in local languages, and initiating a survey of the perception of the courts by businesspeople. The Mission also has begun working with the World Bank and the Ministry of Justice to create mediating and arbitrating legal bodies and develop recommendations for improving the justice system as a whole.

#	Description	INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
1.2	Decrease Fiscal Burden on the Private Sector	1.2.a. Export promotion - elimination of export taxes - one-stop window for export formalities - market information system for selected export goods			base tax exists		actual tax removed	actual	actual	actual	pl/scl.	plan
								simplified	functional	functional	func/improve MIS/trade point	Improved operational

Source: National Directorate for Economic Affairs.

In fulfillment of the conditionality of USAID's Policy Reform for Economic Development (PRED) project, export taxes were completely eliminated in 1991. The project postponed from 1995 to 1996 its study on the impact of the elimination of export taxes, which will identify existing official and unofficial tax and tariff barriers to exports, and recommend how to continue and improve the implementation of reduced tax and non-tax barriers. During 1995, the National Directorate for Economic Affairs improved the one-stop window for business registration, which has not facilitated adequately the start-up of new formal sector businesses. The Directorate trained Malian businesspeople in business and labor law in 1995, helping them to understand their rights and responsibilities. With USAID assistance, it published a quarterly economic and commercial magazine, including information on laws and regulations affecting the private sector. The USAID project is working with the Directorate to privatize the magazine in 1996. Also in 1995, USAID established a "real time" market information system for business opportunities (import and export) by linking with the UNCTAD Trade Point bulletin board. Because of this service, Malian entrepreneurs have identified new markets for their commodities, and are discovering new sources of goods and services they seek to purchase. The European Union is expected to provide UNCTAD with \$1 million to help the USAID project establish a Malian network for Trade Point. All of these activities have contributed to the significant increase in the value of Malian exports by 26.8% in 1995. Beyond the major traditional exports of cotton, livestock and gold, the value of exports increased by 3.9%.

#	Description	INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
1.3	Improve Public Sector Performance	1.3.a. Support to the Private Sector - reorient National Directorate for Economic Affairs to support the private sector			base exclusive regulatory role		actual mandated support to priv. sector	actual	actual	actual	pl/scl. CCM Independence break/proposed	plan CCM Independent

Source: National Directorate for Economic Affairs; Chamber of Commerce.

USAID funded the first phase of an institutional study in 1993 to review the mission of the National Directorate for Economic Affairs. The study made several recommendations for restructuring the Directorate. In 1994, USAID funded another study to identify the Directorate's personnel capacity and requirements related to implementing the phase one recommendations. The Council of Ministers will review the restructuring recommendations in 1996. The most important parts of the restructuring plan include 1) a reduction in the regulatory functions of the directorate and 2) the creation of an export promotion unit separate from the directorate. The Malian Chamber of Commerce and Industry has been studying the possibilities for its own restructuring. In 1996, the Council of Ministers will review the Chamber's proposal to break its ties with the Government. The Chamber of Commerce's relationship to the export promotion unit will be determined after the Council of Minister takes action on both the Directorate's and the Chamber's proposals.

#	Description	INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
1.3	Improve	1.3.b. Fiscal Performance			base		actual	actual	actual	actual	pl/act	plan
	Public	- GRM fiscal deficit			10.0%			11.2%	9.6%	13.7%	12.4/10.5%	10.0%
	Sector											
	Performance											

Source: National Directorate for Economic Affairs.

The Government maintained tight fiscal discipline in 1995, despite 12.5% inflation and strong pressure to increase wages and other expenditures. Progress was extremely impressive. While the IMF established a target of a slight increase in debt as a percentage of GDP, the Government managed to reduce it significantly. The fiscal deficit decreased from 141.2 billion FCFA in 1994 to 129.6 billion FCFA in 1995 (excluding moratoriums on payments and excluding donor grants). It is projected to increase in 1996 to 135.3 billion FCFA. Revenue increased due to greater cotton exports, improved management of the customs service and strengthened tax collection. Fiscal receipts increased from 103.2 billion FCFA in 1994 to 126.2 billion FCFA in 1995, while non-fiscal receipts increased from 22.8 billion FCFA to 34.6 billion FCFA during the same period. The wage bill increased only slightly, from 44.5 billion FCFA in 1994 to 47.9 billion FCFA in 1995. Spending on scholarships decreased from 4.2 billion FCFA to 3.9 billion FCFA during this period. The percentage of budget revenues spent on education increased to 21.3% in 1995 from 19% in 1993. Primary education's share of education spending increased considerably to 55.5% in 1995 from 31% in 1993. The percent of budget revenues spent on health increased from 6% in 1993 to 8% in 1995. While budget decisions are a manifestation of the Government's political will, USAID, through the Policy Reform for Economic Development Project, has helped the Ministry of Finance better manage its budget. It helped the Ministry move closer toward performance-based budgeting, through standardizing budget planning across all Government organizations, training budget staff in different ministries and computerizing budget operations. This assistance is enabling the Government to better plan budgets and monitor their implementation.

#	Description	INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
1.3	Improve	1.3.c. Revenue Promotion and Equity			base		actual	actual	actual	actual	pl/act	plan
	Public	- revenues increase through expanded tax base and equitable rates			85.6		109.6	100.7	104.7	138.0	120/177.3	184.5
	Sector						16.3%	13.6%	13.9%	13.5%	na/14.4%	13.5%
	Performance											

Source: IMF and USAID.

While total revenues increased by 27.6% in 1995, tax revenues increased by 15%, from 43.2 billion FCFA in 1994 to 49.6 billion FCFA in 1995. Increased cotton revenues explain much of tax receipt increases. This was complemented by a major Government effort in 1995 to limit tax avoidance by large private sector firms and Malians with large incomes and to improve collection of the value-added tax. The tax burden is very unevenly spread, falling almost totally on the small percentage of the population working or operating in the formal sector. Tax rates on formal private sector enterprises are so high that they are believed to discourage investment. The USAID Policy Reform for Economic Development project is working with the Malian Government and other donors to simplify the calculation of taxes owed, broaden the tax base by lowering the rates, and expand and improve tax administration. Together, they will also address issues such as improving customs operations and better regulating transit agents, improving the coordination of revenue collection and clarifying and

**communicating existing tax laws. Customs revenue increased by 30% from 1994 to 1995, from 55.9 billion FCFA to 72.9 billion FCFA, due to reorganization of the Customs service, including the removal of 400 agents and greater restrictions on Customs exonerations.**

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2: INCREASE INCOMES IN AREAS OF HIGH PRODUCTIVE POTENTIAL**

#	Description		INDICATOR		1988	1989	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
SO 2	Increase	A.	value of agricultural production	Index	<i>base</i>		<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>pl/act.</i>	<i>plan</i>
	Incomes In		(grains and cotton)	1988=100	100		83	117	135	196	130/179	137
	Areas of High	B.	value of agricultural exports	billion	<i>base</i>		<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>pl/act.</i>	<i>plan</i>
	Potential		(cotton, cereals, livestock)	FCFA	60		79	62	66	78	90/162	120

*Source: National Directorate for Statistics and Computing; National Directorate for Agriculture; National Directorate for Economic Affairs.*

The decrease in the 1995 index is a function of the reduced rainfall levels in the 1995-96 agricultural season. Reduced rainfall had its greatest impact on the cereals portion of this indicator with cotton reaching record levels of production. In the Upper Niger River Valley, where USAID has funded rural development activities since the late 1970's, the aggregate value of crop production increased from 8.96 billion FCFA for the 1989-90 harvest to 14.27 billion FCFA in 1994-95, representing a 59% increase over five years. This increase was due primarily to increased area placed under production and the introduction of improved farming and soil conservation techniques.

The near doubling in the value of agricultural exports between 1994 and 1995 is due partially to the financial change from the 1994 FCFA devaluation but also the incentives arising from changes in relative prices. Not all growth in the value of exports is attributed to the 1994 FCFA devaluation and subsequent doubling of the exchange rate. Some of the growth is attributed to a suspected supply response, demonstrated by the 59% increase in the value of cotton exports, reaching 127 billion FCFA compared to 79.7 billion FCFA in 1994. Both cereals and livestock, where the value of exports decreased from 51.8 billion FCFA in 1994 to 46.5 billion FCFA, are expected to have a longer lag period. Cereal exports contributed to the rise in the value of agricultural exports because 1995 cereal exports originated in the record 1994 production year (i.e., 1995 exports were produced in 1994). With support for export enhancement from USAID's Animal Productivity and Export project, Policy Reform for Economic Development project and the Cereals Market Restructuring Program, the GRM simplified export procedures for both cereals and livestock, eliminated livestock and cereals export taxes and eliminated the requirement for cereal traders to have a GRM-issued commercial trader's license. These actions were important to creating the enabling environment for supply responses to the devaluation.

#	Description		INDICATOR	1988	1989	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
2.1	Increase	2.1.a.	Staple Grains	<i>base</i>	<i>base</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>pl/act.</i>	<i>plan</i>
	Agricultural		(a) annual grain production	1981-89	1.5	2.23	2.15	2.23	2.46	2.61/2.18	2.60
	Production		% change			27%	-4%	4%	10%	-11%	19%
			(b) annual population growth	% growth	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%

Source: National Directorate for Statistics & Computing; National Directorate for Agriculture.

Annual grain production combines figures for all cereals (millet, sorghum, maize and rice) and is expressed as million metric tons. The percentage reported for annual grain production is the percentage change from the previous year's value. The 11% reduction in cereal production from 1994 to 1995 confirms the reduction in agricultural production absorbed by the traditional cereal subsector of the economy in 1995. This is the first reduction from the previous year since the poor rainfall year of 1992. However, the impact of this reduced production was highly localized geographically with certain areas affected badly while others prospered. Local stocks and markets are deemed sufficient to deal with the problem areas.

The population growth rate is an estimate based upon the 1987 census. It will be updated in 1996 with data from the USAID-funded Demographic and Health Survey presently underway. These survey data will be followed in 1997 by a national census. Both the Demographic and Health Survey and the national census will allow a more accurate estimation of this indicator in the very near future.

The 2.18 million tons produced in 1995 is 45% higher than the 1981-89 base period average food grain production for Mali. Despite the reduction from the record 1994 harvest, the average annual growth in Mali's food grain production of 7.1% since 1989 outpaced the average annual growth in population of 3 percent. Growth in annual food grain production is attributed to good rainfall as well as the impact of positive incentives created under USAID-supported liberalized marketing, greater market information dissemination under a system funded by USAID and other donors, positive price incentives for rice producers created when devaluation greatly increased the cost of imported rice, and greater adoption of improved agricultural techniques developed with USAID funding.

#	Description		INDICATOR	1988	1989	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
2.1	Increase	2.1.b.	Food Security	<i>base</i>	<i>base</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>pl/act.</i>	<i>plan</i>
	Agricultural		Intra-annual price variation								
	Production		(a) millet	1982-89	11.2%	8.1%	6.4%	6.6%	6.2%	4.0/5.4%	3.0%
			(b) rice	1982-91	6.6%	2.2%	1.9%	1.5%	6.4%	1.5/11.1%	1.5%

Source: Cereal Market Information System; USAID estimates.

The impact of the liberalization of the paddy and rice prices is evident in table 2.1.b., with rice prices becoming more variable after the lifting of price

controls in early 1994. USAID played a major role in liberalizing prices for rice, Mali's last price-controlled cereal. The 1994 FCFA devaluation has also had a greater impact on the more tradable rice as compared to the less tradable millet because of increased demand from neighboring countries for Malian rice. Traditional cereals such as millet now exhibit a reduced variability to that of rice because the demand for rice by other West African countries has increased producer prices. Producers also organized themselves in the *Office du Niger* zone to negotiate higher prices from trading agents. The *Office du Niger*, following its restructuring, is no longer the single buyer. The highly localized impact on traditional cereals of the reduced rainfall in 1995-96 is also reflected in the absence of a strong national level price variability for millet for 1995. Since devaluation, the consumer prices for millet and rice in Bamako increased by 77% and 75% respectively.

#	Description	INDICATOR		1988	1989	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
2.1	Increase	2.1.c. Rural Credit			<i>base</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>pl/act.</i>	<i>plan</i>
	Agricultural	(a) DHV	\$ million		1.10	1.48	1.56	2.11	2.40	3.0/3.8	4.6
	Production	(b) PRMC	\$ million		3.10	2.40	2.60	3.18	1.10	2.5/0.97	0.6
		Total	\$ million		4.20	3.88	4.16	5.29	3.50	5.5/4.77	5.00

Source: *Development of the Haute Vallee Project; Cereal Marketing Restructuring Program; National Agricultural Development Bank.*

The credit program of USAID's Upper Niger River Development project continues to exhibit significant growth. The program has succeeded in creating a rural credit system supported fully by the banks without donor loan guarantees. Strong demand for credit in the project area, mostly to finance agricultural production inputs for cotton and green beans, has increased numbers of village associations, microfinance institutions and commercial banks participating in the program. Out of 951 activities receiving financing in 1995, 386 were implemented by women. This growth is also a reflection of the phased withdrawal of the Government parastatal (*Office de la Haute Vallée*) from involvement in credit and the growing involvement of the private financial services sector.

The Cereal Marketing Restructuring program (PRMC) is beginning to phase out its commercial lending program to cereal traders, as reflected in the progressively decreasing amount of credit lent in the last few years. With USAID and France stopping their structural food aid wheat imports, the counterpart funds for this program are diminishing. Furthermore, the Malian financial sector has evolved to the point where more sources of financial services are now available than before. However, combining the information from the data provided in indicator 1.c. of an increasing number of traders receiving PRMC credit with the information from indicator 2.1.c that the value of PRMC credit has declined implies that the per-trader loan size has decreased over the recent period.

#	Description		INDICATOR		1988	1989	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
2.2	Increase	2.2.a.	New Technologies	1980-89		base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl/act.	plan
	Staple Grain		developed by research	varieties		8	8		8	0	1	extension
	Sector		Institutions & adopted	practices		1		1	2	0	2	extension
	Productivity		by farmers									

Source: International Center for Research in the Semi-Arid Tropics; Institute of Rural Economy; Farming Systems Research and Extension Project Intermediate Impact Indicators, Southeast Consortium for International Development, May 1993.

This indicator reports against the dual criteria of varieties and practices that are both developed by local research institutions and then adopted by farmers. The 1995 closing of the Farming Systems Research project partially explains the reduced activity in the development and adoption of new technologies. However, 1994 focused on the dissemination and testing of already-developed varieties and practices. In 1995, a new variety of millet was extended to farmers, increasing productivity to 1,200 kilograms/hectare compared to 900 kilograms/hectare for previous varieties. Average returns are expected to increase by approximately 2,500 FCFA (\$50) per hectare. A new pesticide that protects seeds against mildew is used by 75% of the farmers in the Segou region. New sorghum varieties have been developed to resist drought, stabilizing yields. During good rainy seasons, their average yield is 1,500 kg/ha, producing a revenue of approximately 120,000 FCFA (\$240) per hectare. Improved cowpea varieties are protecting the crop from the striga weed and viruses as well as increasing yield. Figures on adoption of these technologies will be collected by the National Agricultural Extension Service and the Institute of Rural Economy. A new millet/cowpea weaning food, based on USAID-funded research, is being marketed by a Malian small enterprise.

#	Description		INDICATOR		1988	1989	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
2.2	Increase	2.2.b.	National Agricultural Research			base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl/act.	plan
	Staple Grain		System									
	Sector		(a) reorganized			old	re-org.			budget	fin. system	impact
	Productivity		(b) strategy developed & adopted			none	GRM	donors	finance	downsize	monitor	studies

Source: Institute of Rural Economy.

The planned target for 1995 was: 1) The Institute of Rural Economy (IER) establishes a functional financial system serving multiple research centers; 2) Research programs indicate clear outputs over time; 3) IER monitors research impact on productivity. Significant progress has been made in reorganizing Mali's agricultural research system and adopting the IER's new strategy. The research system of IER has been cited as a model for national agricultural research systems in Africa. USAID, through its Strengthening Research Planning and Research on Commodities project (SPARC), has helped IER establish a functional financial system, which is being extended and applied at research centers throughout the country. USAID also has trained IER staff to prepare research proposals conforming to international norms, stating the resources needed and the expected outputs. IER has established a research project

screening system to assure that its research responds to farmer needs and problems. IER has undertaken impact studies on crop research, with results becoming available in 1996.

#	Description		INDICATOR		1988	1989	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
2.2	Increase	2.2.c.	Farmers adopt Improved			base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
	Staple Grain		farming practices			3	12	17	17	17	na/19	22
	Sector											
	Productivity											

Source: *Development of the Upper Niger River Valley Project; Farming Systems Research and Extension Project; Institute of Rural Economy.*

The Development of the Upper Niger River Valley project continues to be a successful tool for the dissemination of new techniques and technologies to farmers in the zone of intervention. The technologies counted by the project monitoring system surveys are not all developed at the Institute for Rural Economy and hence do not count against the indicator reported in 2.2.a. above. Nevertheless, these technologies are tested and approved by the Institute. The project achieves higher values of practices adopted because its extension agents bring back best practices from field visits to other regions of Mali and other Sahelian countries. The project reaches women effectively, since many of its personnel are women. In 1995, out of 744 persons receiving training as facilitators, 399 were women.

*Office de la Haute Vallée du Niger* staff extended 19 technologies or practices for increasing productivity and preventing environmental degradation. These include increased use of organic fertilizer, anti-erosion techniques, improved fallow, reforestation, small-scale irrigation and live fences by farmers in the project zone. In 1993, 10,000 farm units adopted such technologies. These technologies were accepted by 17,000 farm units in 1994, and an estimated 18,000 farm units in 1995. Adoption of these technologies resulted in increased area under cultivation, increased crop diversity and increased production of cotton and staple food crops. For example, project zone cotton production increased from 9,000 tons in 1990 to 13,650 tons in 1995, producing 1.664 billion FCFA (\$3.3 million) in revenue. Consequently, farm incomes increased. Over twenty village associations have successfully negotiated agreements with Mali's National Water and Forestry Service. These agreements authorize village associations to manage their forest reserves in exchange for agreeing to replant trees and control cutting for firewood within the village perimeter.

#	Description		INDICATOR		1988	1989	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
2.2	Increase	2.2.d.	Land use & forest policies			base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
	Staple Grain		favor private									Increase
	Sector		agroforestry investment			state	review	legislation	de-control	new Code	vl. comm.	Invest.
	Productivity											

Source: *Village Reforestation Project Reports.*

USAID has helped the Malian Government make significant progress in empowering local communities to prevent environmental degradation by investing in and managing agroforestry activities in an environmentally effective manner. USAID's Village Reforestation (VRP) Project, completed in 1993, supported numerous public hearings, regional conferences and national debates on the revised forest code, clarified rural natural resource management priorities, and generated recommendations on land-use and forestry policy to improve efficiency. Such policy recommendations are increasing participation by local villagers in making decisions and managing natural resources. In 1991, the Malian Government reviewed its forestry legislation, covering the areas of forest management, hunting, fishing and land clearing. In 1992, the Government prepared a draft revision of its forestry legislation, after soliciting a wide range of input from the private sector and civil society in local and regional debates. In 1993, the Government held a national conference on the forestry legislation. Legislative drafts were discussed at the local and regional level before sending the final version to the National Assembly for approval. Village natural resource and forest management committees became operational. In 1994, the National Assembly passed the legislation, decontrolling State-owned forest lands. Foresters and village level officials began to be trained in implementing the new legislation. In 1995, the National Assembly approved follow-up legislation, specifying local level rules and regulations. The Government issued administrative orders, ordinances and implementing regulations and guidelines. USAID funded the translation of the new legislation in five local languages and helped organize an information campaign throughout the country through public and private media in local languages. Local level natural resource and environmental management committees are increasing in number, with more than 20 in the upper Niger River valley zone, 12 in Douentza, 5 in Koro, and many others in areas where USAID is not intervening. Erosion control activities, soil and water conservation techniques and agroforestry actions have been widespread throughout the upper Niger River and VRP zones. Even after the completion of the VRP project, the project activities expanded throughout the region because of their demonstration effect. As a result of USAID funding, villagers are increasing production, preventing environmental degradation, have a greater sense of ownership and thereby control over local natural resources, and have a better understanding of the relevant legislation.

#	Description		INDICATOR	1988	1989	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
2.3	Increase Livestock Exports	2.3.a.	Livestock export fiscal and regulatory measures		base exist	actual eliminated	actual	actual	actual	pl/act	plan
			export tax		exist			eliminated			reduce
			other tax procedures		exist		simplified		simplified		transport obstacles
			decentral. marketing		centralized			regional		task force	integration region

Source: *Animal Productivity and Export Project; National Directorate for Livestock; International Monetary Fund reports.*

When the GRM issued the decree to end livestock export taxes in 1990, Mali witnessed an irreversible shift toward liberalization and simplification of livestock exports. Subsequently, in 1993, the GRM issued another decree that authorized operations under a regional livestock marketing policy coordination committee with the mandate to liaison with neighboring countries to enhance regional livestock trade. Thereafter, another decree authorized a Malian task force that clarified export policy. This was followed by another decree revising export procedures and a Ministry mandate clarifying local interpretations of export simplifications.

The livestock sector continues to benefit from foreign direct investment and the 1994 FCFA devaluations' impacts on exports and import substitution. The livestock export "boom" of 1994 leveled off in 1995. The value of exports decreased by 10.2%, from 51.8 billion FCFA in 1994 to 46.5 billion FCFA in 1995. Nevertheless, livestock exports were still 59% above their 1993 level of 29.5 billion FCFA. Mali now has two privately-owned tanneries; Tamali for hides and skins, owned by an American, and TAO (*Tannerie de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*) for small ruminant skins, owned by Spanish interests. USAID livestock project infrastructure investments in two markets were completed in 1995 with three additional markets (Kati Drale, Troungoumbe, Bamako-small ruminants) approved for construction. These markets will provide loading ramps, veterinary certification stations and a one-stop shop for export regulations. USAID's support of liberalization and decentralization of the livestock sector created the environment for these "one-stop shop" markets to be established. The USAID livestock project also supported the second Livestock Fair at the border market of Niono (Mauritania and Senegal) in 1995. The success of this fair led the border market of Sikasso (Burkina and Ivory Coast) to plan a similar fair for February 1996.

Evidence of returns on previous USAID livestock investments were evident in the dairy subsector during 1995. The previously state-owned dairy interest in Bamako (*MaliLait*) was privatized in 1995 and has begun processing milk to create products such as fresh milk, soured milk, butter and yogurt for the local market and export. A second private dairy has arisen in Segou (*Groupe Simaga*) that is competing directly with the newly privatized *MaliLait*. Smaller dairy interests have been created in Koutiala and Sikasso (*KeneLait*). Investments in improved feed availability and its diffusion from previous USAID livestock projects are partly responsible for the increased supply of local milk to support a nascent dairy industry. More recent support through a study of the milk subsector, along with USAID's continued support for liberalization and privatization in Mali, also contributed to this dairy boom.

The poultry sector also received significant stimulus in 1995 with the privatization of the Sotuba Poultry Center to a local group of Mali private sector investors. This Center was originally constructed by USAID funding in the 1970s and had fallen into disuse while in state-owned hands. The poultry sector is presently characterized by peri-urban producers of eggs, broilers and layers, with more modern techniques being adopted.

#	Description		INDICATOR		1988	1989	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
2.3	Increase	2.3.c.	# of private veterinary practitioners			base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
	Livestock			vets		0	60	90	110	162	150/na	160
	Exports			assistants		0	30	70				

Source: *Animal Productivity and Export Project; National Directorate for Livestock.*

The Malian Government is taking initial steps to liberalize veterinary services, but much opposition remains among public sector employees, some of whom see themselves in competition with the private sector. The Malian legislature drafted and passed a law in 1995 allowing private practitioners to provide veterinary health services to specific geographic zones. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Rural Development over-regulates private sector veterinarians, which discourages many veterinarians from practicing in the formal sector. USAID is encouraging the Ministry to strengthen its efforts to privatize veterinary services. From 1991 to 1994, the number of veterinary practitioners at the National Directorate for Elevage dropped from 1,378 to 1,288. In 1994, there were 1,390 practitioners in the public sector, 175 in the private sector and 330 veterinary students.

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: IMPROVE THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES**

#	Description		INDICATOR		1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
SO 3	Delivery of Health Services	A.	Infant mortality rate	per 1000	base 108				est na	est na	est na	est na	pl/act 85/na	plan 84

Source: 1987 Demographic and Health Survey; US Bureau of the Census Survey; World Bank and UNDP Annual Reports; Integrated Family Health and Services Project; Child Survival Pivot Group, *Evaluation of Impact of NGO Members*, February 1995.

The values reported are national estimates based on vaccination rates, nutrition data, and morbidity rates. There is no consensus on the exact figure for the infant mortality rate, with UNICEF reporting 122 per thousand in 1994. Zones with specific child survival interventions exhibit lower rates of infant mortality. The steady decrease in the infant mortality rate is attributed largely to increased access to reproductive health services and greater birth spacing of children. USAID's impact on infant mortality is as a result of its support for bilateral projects, PVOs and NGOs operating in limited geographic areas. Save the Children-US Kolondieba Project is the only project that monitors infant mortality on an annual basis. In this project, which targets 160,000 persons in 250 villages in southern Mali, the rate dropped from 109/1000 in 1989 to 49/1000 in 1993 and rose to 78.4/1000 in 1994. For boys, infant mortality decreased from 67/1000 in 1990 to 52/1000 in 1993. For girls, the rate dropped from 80/1000 in 1990 to 46/1000 in 1993. The increase in infant mortality in 1995 has not been analyzed fully, but may be attributable to the geographical expansion of the project. Other USAID-funded projects have data relating to a specific illness or nutritional status related to the infant mortality rate. For example, in Bamako hospitals, the Malaria Research and Training Center has effected a reduction in the malaria case fatality rate from 20/1000 in 1993 to 9/1000 in 1994. Malnutrition rates in the CARE Macina project decreased from 14% in 1990 to 4.6% in 1993 for acute malnutrition and from 44% to 21% for moderate malnutrition during the same years. In and around the city of Gao, World Vision helped decrease moderate malnutrition from 45% in 1991 to 43% in 1993. In and around Menaka, a town in the Gao region, World Vision interventions helped decrease severe malnutrition from 7% in 1990 to 1% in 1993. In the villages of the Dioro arrondissement, Africare noted a decrease in the prevalence of diarrhea from 41.1% in 1989 to 20.6% in 1993. In its extended project zone in Macina, CARE found a decrease in the prevalence of diarrhea from 48% in 1991 to 14% in 1993. The Demographic and Health Survey of 1995 will provide an accurate national measure of infant mortality.

#	Description		INDICATOR		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
SO 3	QUALITY & EFFICIENCY	B.	# of pupils from a 1000 cohort completing the 1st cycle	Weighted Average	actual 287	actual 284	actual 300	actual 316	actual 411	actual 388	pl/act 435/388	plan 440
				Girls		236	287	279	388	358	408/350	429
				Boys		279	299	335	409	409	430/409	460

Source: Ministry of Basic Education, Planning and Statistics Unit

This indicator provides information on the efficiency of the basic education system by measuring the number of students, out of a cohort of 1,000, that complete the first six years of education. The difference between the figure reported and 1,000 indicates how many students have left the school system or spent more than six years in primary school. Mali has made steady progress in improving the retention of students in primary school from 26% to 39% in seven years, but this remains an area where much greater improvement is needed. Efforts to retain girls in school must continue and be reinforced. USAID emphasizes this area in the newly-approved strategic plan.

The peak reached in 1993 reflects a change in the data collection procedure, when the Ministry of Basic Education began to collect information on both public and private schools. The existence and growing importance of private schools indicate the growing liberalization of the Malian educational system after the popular overthrow of the one-party regime in March 1991. The decline since 1993 is more pronounced when these data are disaggregated by region, with the North exhibiting lower retention rates. This is a function of the instability in northern Mali in 1993 and 1994. The impact of the recent peace settlement in the North should be apparent in any revised 1995 figures or 1996 data.

**PROGRAM OUTCOME 3.1: IMPROVE HEALTH CARE**

#	Description	INDICATOR		1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
3.1	Improve Health Care	3.1.a. New village health centers established, staffed with trained personnel & financed from local community funds	Total			base 0		actual 0	actual 0	actual 5	est. 17	pl./act. 120/134	plan 120

Source: Health, Population and Rural Hydrology Project, Ministry of Health.

These data have been revised, based on information not available during the drafting of the 1994 Assessment of Program Impact. The beginning of the village health center system dates from the popular revolution against the one-party regime in March 1991. Since then, citizens have gained the Malian Government's commitment to decentralize social service management, including the provision of health services. Actual construction, staffing and financing of village health centers was initiated in 1992 with 5 centers being established in 1993. The 1995 total reflects the sum of fully operational health centers established at the village (87 community health centers) and sub-district levels (47 sub-district centers). Of these totals, communities participated in the creation of 51 community health centers and 23 sub-district centers. These values do not reflect private sector-originated health centers, which are outside of the World Bank-led, multi-donor Health, Population and Rural Hydrology Project. Health management by communities has been encouraged by USAID-funded private voluntary organizations and non-governmental organizations. For example, USAID funds World Education's Urban Revitalization Project,

which works with Malian NGOs to help communities in the Bamako District and other regions manage community health centers and organize cooperatives to improve sanitation. The Mission also has supported the efforts of the National Federation of Community Health Associations to influence Government health policy. The Mission works closely with PVOs and NGOs working in the health sector, particularly through technical and management assistance as well as policy coordination provided by the USAID-funded Child Survival Pivot Group. The Pivot Group has been helping NGOs create a sense of ownership of community health centers by the population served.

#	Description	INDICATOR		1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
3.1	Improve Health Care	3.1.b. % of children under 1 year old immunized against major childhood diseases	Total	base				actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
			BCG	5%				41%	34%	45%	58%	65%/na	70%
			DPT3							76%		na/77%	
			measles							45%		na/42%	
										51%		na/51%	

Source: World Vision Koutiala Project Evaluation Report, September 1993, National Immunization Center, PVOs, Child Survival Pivot Group Impact Evaluation, Mission estimates

These data have been revised and corrected from earlier submissions, notably the removal of VAT2, which is the tetanus toxoid vaccination for women reported below in indicator 3.1.c. The move to liberalization and decentralization is credited with the long-term increase in the percentage of children vaccinated. After the 1991 revolution, non-governmental organizations, in addition to Government-run clinics, were allowed to immunize children which resulted in a large increase in the percentage of children covered.

USAID contributed to the immunization program in three ways: through central funding of the UNICEF program in Mali, through Mission funding of PVO child survival activities and through the University Development Linkages Project. UNICEF received \$1 million in USAID central funding to support its Expanded Program of Vaccination, which carried out a nationwide vaccine campaign in 1994 and 1995. In the 9 months of the campaign, 76,000 children were vaccinated against BCG (tuberculosis), bringing levels up to 77%, and 103,000 were vaccinated against measles, maintaining levels at 51%. DPT3 (diphtheria, polio and tetanus) levels fell from 45% in 1993 to 42% in 1995. USAID's PVO Co-Financing project funded several child survival grants to PVO's as well as to the Child Survival Pivot Group, a coalition of Malian NGOs with child survival programs. NGO vaccination activities are not included in National Government statistics. The World Vision Child Survival Project in the city of Koutiala and the 61 villages surrounding it helped increase the immunization coverage rate for children 12-23 months from 0% in 1988 to 85% for urban areas and 66% for rural areas in 1994. The Save the Children Federation-US Kolondieba project indicated an increase in DPT3 from 50% in 1992 to 61% in 1994 for children 12-23 months. Plan International in and around the town of Banamba increased the rate of completely vaccinated children, 0-23 months, from 15% to 54% between 1988 and 1994. Africare in the arrondissement of Dioro helped raise the percentage of fully vaccinated children from 14% in 1992 to 80% in 1994. In the face of a meningitis epidemic in 1995, it responded with an unprecedented 14,000 meningitis vaccinations over the course of ten days. The University Development Linkages Project operates just outside of Bamako. This project is dedicated to using operations research to examine behavior change as a way of impacting on the

immunization coverage rate. Results from this project will be used to impact on the way immunizations are offered to communities. Studies demonstrated that vaccine coverage varied by location and concluded that the target population had insufficient information about the vaccination program. In March 1994, the percentage of children vaccinated completely and correctly varied from 39.7% in Commune IV of Bamako to 16.3% in Nonsombougou, an arrondissement of the circle of Kolkani.

#	Description	INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
3.1	Improve Health Care	3.1.c. % of women of reproductive age vaccinated with 2 doses of tetanus toxoid			base		actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
		Total					19%	8%	10%		na/19%	
		Rural			7%					17%	30%/na	40%
		Urban			30%					44%	60%/na	70%

Source: World Vision Koutiala Project Evaluation Report, September 1993, National Immunization Center, PVOs, Child Survival Pivot Group Impact Evaluation, Mission estimates.

These data have been revised and corrected from earlier submissions, notably the 1993 value of 19% that had been previously reported below in indicator 3.1.b. above. Two doses provide complete coverage to these potential mothers, with a ten-year booster needed to supplement protection. USAID's support of PVOs helped increase the percentage of women vaccinated, but this was not captured in National Government statistics. The World Vision Child Survival Project in and around the city of Koutiala helped increase the coverage rate for women from 6% in 1988 to 84% for urban areas and 50% for rural areas in 1994. The Save the Children US project in the 200 villages of Kolondieba indicated an increase in coverage for women of child bearing age from 86% in 1992 to 93% in 1994. Plan International in and around the town of Banamba increased the rate of completely vaccinated women of child bearing age from 55% to 74% between 1988 and 1994.

#	Description	INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
3.1	Improve Health Care	3.1.e. National contraceptive prevalence rate			base		actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
			1%				na	na	3.5%	5.4%	6.8/7.0%	7.5%

Source: National Directorate for Statistics, Perspectives 1978-2022, 1992; World Vision Koutiala Mid-Term Evaluation Report; Family Health Division, Mali Family Planning Association; Family Health Initiative II; Demographic and Health Survey 1987; Integrated Family Health Services reports; CERPOD.

These national level values include all modern methods of contraception, but do not include any traditional methods. While the base year is a true measure of contraceptive prevalence based on the 1987 Demographic and Health Survey, the rates for subsequent years are calculated from couple-years of protection. Prevalence rates of contraceptive use are much higher in Bamako. The nationwide prevalence rate may be as high as 15% when all methods are included. The 1995 Demographic and Health Survey will provide a more accurate assessment of national contraceptive prevalence.

The national contraceptive prevalence rate is increasing in response to the intensification of USAID's social marketing and community-based distribution of contraceptives and with continued USAID funding for PVO/NGO implementation of family planning and AIDS prevention activities. The Mission is expanding its community-based distribution (CBD) activities to northern Mali. In the rest of the country, the Population Council has trained 1,166 health workers in CBD and established 533 sites. USAID's social marketing program for contraceptives has established 4,000 points of sale in Bamako and 2,400 in the rest of the country. Sales of the Protector condom, introduced by USAID in 1989, now average more than 250,000 per month. Pilplan oral contraceptives, introduced in June 1993, are being sold at the rate of 33,890 cycles per month.

According to a 1995 CERPOD study of contraceptive use in Bamako, 21% of unmarried men use modern contraceptives, while 9% use traditional methods. Among married men in Bamako, 11% use modern contraceptives and 20% use traditional methods. Among married Bamako women, 6% use modern methods and 5% use traditional methods. Among unmarried Bamako women, 11% use modern methods and 6% use traditional methods. The contraceptive use rate increased in the Save the Children - US Kolondieba project area from 1% before activities started in 1991 to 31% in 1994 for women and from 9% to 36% for men during the same period. Knowledge of modern contraceptive methods has increased from 10% to 99% for women and from 43% to 91% for men in this project area. The World Vision Koutiala Child Survival project evaluation of August 1994 reported that the proportion of women in the project zone who know modern contraception methods has progressed from 25.5% in 1991 to 90% in 1994 for rural areas and from 36.71% to 80.7% for urban areas. Usage of contraception methods progressed from 5.6% in 1991 to 71% in 1994 for rural areas and from 14.14% to 68.9% in urban areas. In the villages of Dioro arrondissement, Africare noted an increase in the use of modern contraceptive methods from 3% in 1993 to 13% in 1994. The CEDPA Family Planning project in the villages of the Katibougou area conducted a survey in 1992 which showed an increase in the modern contraceptive prevalence rate from 1.3% in 1985 to 57.7% in the project area. The condom usage rate in the project area was found to be very high. Preliminary estimates show that 40% of men use condoms. Baseline data from the Malian Family Planning Association on the impact of family planning publicity in Bamako showed the modern contraceptive prevalence rate at 6% before publicity and 13% after publicity. Plan International is strengthening the capacity of NGOs in the Sikasso Region to communicate AIDS prevention measures, which should result in increased use of condoms in the region with the highest incidence of HIV seropositivity.

#	Description	INDICATOR	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
3.1	Improve Health Care	3.1.f. # of village pharmacies fully stocked with essential drugs and contraceptives				base	actual	actual	actual	est.	pl./act.	plan
						0	na	257	300	347	437/850	500

Source: National Directorate for Statistics; USAID records and Mission estimates.

The dramatic increase in these figures is attributed to the move to decentralization and liberalization of the health sector since the 1991 popular overthrow of the one-party State. USAID support for liberalizing the health sector has contributed to this increase. USAID funds the contraceptives stocked in the village pharmacies. The Government of Mali relies on other donors, not USAID, to fund essential drugs. Because of this division of roles, USAID will review this indicator, to determine its usefulness to decision-making and reporting. In 1995, USAID funded training of Government agents and community health center personnel in stock management. As a result of this training, fewer stock-outs should occur.

#	Description		INDICATOR		1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
3.1	Improve Health Care	3.1.g.	# of private health practitioners	Total Bamako				base	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
								9	na	41	118	231	200/na	225

Source: *Division of Health Establishments and Sanitary Infrastructure, National Direction of Public Health, Ministry of Health.*

The dramatic increase in these figures is attributed to the move to decentralization and liberalization of the health sector since the 1991 popular overthrow of the one-party State. USAID support for liberalizing the health sector has contributed to this increase. The relevance of this indicator to USAID's decision-making and reporting will be reviewed in light of the newly accepted strategic plan.

#	Description		INDICATOR		1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
3.1	Improve Health Care	3.1.h.	% of prenatal consultations in project areas	Total					base	est	plan	est.	pl./act.	plan
				SCF					66%		68%		na/na	50%
				CARE					31%		68%			
				WV						49%	73%			

Source: *Analyse des Statistiques Sanitaires, 1992, Epidemiology Division, Ministry of Health.*

The number of pre-natal consultations through the public health system has likely increased, given the development of the community health center infrastructure and the improvement in service delivery in the maternal and child protection services and maternities of the completed USAID-funded Integrated Family Health Services project. On the other hand, use of health services has decreased in some USAID PVO child survival project areas since 1993. Baseline data from 1995 for World Vision activities in northern Mali indicate that 18% of mothers in the town of Kidal and 26% in the town of Menaka have pre-natal visits. Save the Children - US found that prenatal visits increased from 66% to 68% between 1991-1993 and decreased to 58% in 1995 in the 250 villages of the Kolondieba project zone. The low figures for the North are attributed to the insecurity in the area during the 1990's and the deterioration of health infrastructure. In Kolondieba, the decrease in pre-natal visits may be attributable to the geographical expansion of the project, but further analysis is required.

**PROGRAM OUTCOME 3.2: IMPROVED BASIC EDUCATION**

#	Description	INDICATOR		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
3.2	ACCESS	3.2.a. # of children newly enrolled in 1st grade									
		(% is the gross access rates)									
			Total	base	actual	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
				57,940	55,637	62,211	66,153	84,487	83,300	104,059/96,167	115,683
				22%	21%	24%	25%	35%	33%	35/33 %	38%
			Girls	21,594	20,465	23,291	25,672	38,744	39,608	45,325/40,610	61,870
			%	16%	16%	18%	20%	29%	28%	29/28 %	33%
			Boys	35,806	35,172	38,980	40,481	55,743	59,694	58,734/55,557	69,813
			%	28%	27%	30%	31%	41%	38%	41/38 %	45%
		7 year old population	Total	262,817	262,026	260,577	262,006	269,558	280,267	292,959	304,979
			Girls	132,894	131,891	130,196	130,722	134,519	139,321	147,208	154,875
			Boys	129,923	130,194	130,441	131,284	135,037	140,946	145,151	150,098

Source: Ministry of Basic Education, Planning and Statistics Unit, Ministry of Plan, *Perspectives de la Population Residente au Mali, June 1992*

The gross access rate is the ratio of the number of newly enrolled children in first grade to the total number of children of first grade school age (7 years old), expressed as a percentage. The total number of seven year old children was projected from the 1987 census, but the lack of increase from 1989 to 1992 is questionable. Nevertheless, the overall impression of this indicator is that first grade inscription rates remain low with only one-third of the possible students being enrolled in first grade. Recall from the information presented in indicator 3.b. that of this one-third of students that enroll at age seven, about three-fifths will not complete the sixth grade with their age cohort. USAID's investments in primary education are improving these figures as the two previous tables indicate, but education remains a major problem in Mali that USAID and the Government of Mali are committed to alleviating.

The gender-related disparity for first grade enrollments is evident when these data are disaggregated by gender, which indicate the rate for boys (38%) is ten percentage points higher than that for girls (28%). However, the percentage growth in the gender-disaggregated inscription rates indicates that progress is being made, with a 70% growth in girls gross access rate, compared to 39% growth for boys over the reporting period (1989-1995). Clearly, much work remains to be done in primary education inscription rates. The newly approved strategic plan for USAID Mali continues the Mission's focus on improving access to primary education with a special emphasis on girls' inscription.

#	Description	INDICATOR		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
3.2	ACCESS	3.2.b. # of children enrolled		base	actual	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
		In grades 1 to 6	Total	311,873	323,354	340,573	374,041	438,302	497,888	547,367/542,881	601,554
		(% is the gross enrollment rates)		22%	22%	23%	25%	29%	33%	35/35 %	38%
			Girls	115,300	118,284	124,407	139,430	165,683	182,207	213,226/212,833	236,543
			%	16%	16%	17%	19%	22%	25%	28/27 %	30%
			Boys	196,573	205,070	216,166	234,611	272,609	305,682	334,141/330,058	365,011
			%	28%	29%	29%	31%	36%	40%	44/42 %	46%
		7 to 12 year old population	Total	1,407,085	1,454,042	1,482,974	1,496,287	1,509,784	1,531,313	1,565,987	1,584,140
			Girls	715,134	736,955	748,898	743,893	753,460	766,006	780,618	795,507
			Boys	691,951	717,087	734,075	752,394	756,324	765,305	785,369	788,633

Source: Ministry of Basic Education, Planning and Statistics Unit, Ministry of Plan, *Perspectives de la Population Residente au Mali, June 1992*

The gross enrollment rate reported in the previous table is the ratio of the number of pupils in grades 1 to 6 to the total number of children within the primary school age group (7 to 12 years old), expressed as a percentage. The total number of 7-12 year old children was projected from the 1987 census, but the figures are questionable. Nevertheless, examination of the entire primary school population demonstrates that primary schools are accommodating roughly one-third of Mali's children. The gender-disaggregated data indicate that the percentage of boys in primary school (42%) is significantly greater than that for girls (27%). The growing gap between boys and girls between the inscription and enrollment rates is attributed to the difficulty in keeping young girls in school once they have begun. This, in turn, is attributed to high demand for girls' labor in the home and the traditional opposition to sending girls long distances to school. While previous efforts have focused on the latter supply-side problem, the new strategic plan emphasizes increasing the demand for schooling for young girls through information, education and communication campaigns. As with the other indicators in this group, progress is being made, but much work remains to be done. For example, the percentage growth in the gender-disaggregated enrollment rates indicates that progress is being made, with a 69% growth in girls' gross enrollment rate compared to 48% growth for boys over the reporting period (1989-1995).

#	Description	INDICATOR		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
3.2	EQUITY	3.2.c. Net enrollment rate						base	actual	pl./act.	plan
	&		Total					26%	24%	31/26 %	33%
	ACCESS		Girls					20%	20%	22/21 %	25%
			Boys					31%	27%	36/32 %	40%
		3.2.d. # of 1st cycle classrooms		base	actual	actual	actual	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
				7,413	7,461	7,591	7,788	7,884	8,566	8,566/8,978	8,930

Source: Ministry of Basic Education, Planning and Statistics Unit

The net enrollment rate reported in the above table is the ratio of the number of pupils aged 7 to 12 in grades 1 to 6 to the total number of children within the primary school age group (7 to 12 years old), expressed as a percentage. This indicator yields an appreciation of the number of over-age students within the primary school system whose continued presence limits access to new entrants. The 35% figure from the gross enrollment rate reported in indicator 3.2.b. for 1995 compared to the 1995 net enrollment rate of 26% implies that 9% of the student population is outside the normal age range for primary school. This difference is worse for boys (10%) than girls (6%) implying that once girls have entered and remain in school, they can and do outperform their male counterparts. This net figure shows the shocking fact that in Mali only one out of four primary school-age children are receiving an education. Again, the indicators show that progress is being made, but much remains to be done, and education in Mali warrants increased resources from the Government, communities and donors.

The indicator of the number of classrooms provides a preliminary idea of the supply of school opportunities. Classrooms have increased by 21% over the reporting period (1989-1995). Unfortunately, this indicator does not give any idea of whether these classrooms are equipped with basic pedagogical materials or if instructors are present. USAID is refining this indicator to measure the supply of primary schools more accurately. Such information is needed to guide the allocation of resources between supply and demand concerns for primary education.

The Basic Education Expansion project focussed its efforts on renovating and equipping classrooms and organized a massive awareness campaign for schooling. In general, both gross access rates and gross enrollment rates improved in direct correlation to project inputs. However, population growth rates of at least 3% negate much of this effect. To sustain the improved access and enrollment rates, efforts to increase access and enrollment rates must be accompanied by efforts to reduce population growth. USAID's activities in family planning and girls' schooling are addressing this issue directly and indirectly, given the strong relation between the combination of girls' education and access to family planning services with fertility. In 1995, the Basic Education Expansion project helped the Government rehabilitate 36 classrooms and Save the Children construct 234 classrooms in 117 schools.

#	Description	INDICATOR	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
3.2	EFFICIENCY		<i>base</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>actual</i>	<i>pl/act.</i>	<i>plan</i>
		3.2.e. Promotion rate	59%	na	na	63%	67%	64%	74%/na	75%
		3.2.f. Repeater rate	31%	na	na	31%	30%	30%	24%/na	23%
		3.2.g. Drop-out rate	10%	na	na	6%	3%	5%	2%/na	2%

Source: Ministry of Basic Education, Planning and Statistics Unit

These figures are national averages, masking major differences between schools in Bamako, which teach approximately half of Mali's primary school students, and those in the rest of the country. For example, drop-out rates range from less than 2% in Bamako to over 16% in Timbuktu. From 1989 through 1995, USAID has helped Mali make significant progress in increasing the promotion rate (increased by 25%) while reducing the repeater and drop-out rates (decreased by 23% and 80%, respectively). The exceptions to these overall trends occurred in 1994, which were attributed to the insecurity in northern Mali. With the restoration of peace in the North, these trends have re-established themselves. When these data are disaggregated by gender, they indicate that girls are dropping out more frequently than boys. Progress in reducing the drop-out rate below 1995's 2% rate will require USAID to increase

its efforts on keeping girls in school. The indicators of the new strategic plan will capture these data on a gender-disaggregated basis to monitor expected progress in reducing the drop-out rate of young girls.

#	Description	INDICATOR	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
3.2	QUALITY	% of tested 2nd grade pupils able:				base	actual	actual	pl./act.	plan
		3.2.h. to write				75%	85%	na	na	97%
		3.2.i. to read & understand				13%	38%	na	na	60%
		3.2.j. to calculate				14%	17%	na	na	50%

Source: Ministry of Basic Education, National Pedagogical Institute.

In 1992, USAID's Basic Education Expansion Project established and trained a monitoring and evaluation team to assess student performance in reading, writing and calculation at the second grade level. Tests are carried out in a limited number of schools receiving a package of integrated services. They therefore cannot be generalized to the national level. Results for 1992 and 1993 show that these schools were improving their ability to make second grade students learn. The National Pedagogical Institute has not yet made available test results for 1994 and 1995. Donors are competing with each other for the time of the National Pedagogical Institute staff. Most of the staff's time is spent collecting data. These activities leave little time for analysis of data collected, particularly with the financial incentives to collect data away from Bamako (per diem). The data for the other indicators on the primary education system reported above originate from the Planning and Statistical Institute of the Ministry of Primary Education, which has benefitted, as has Mission monitoring efforts, from direct technical and material assistance from USAID. USAID will address the question of incentives for data collection and analysis, as well as the demand for information, as part of the new strategic plan's activities in youth education.

#	Description	INDICATOR	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
3.2	QUALITY	3.2.k. # of student years to complete	base					actual	pl./act.	plan
	&	the 1st cycle	21					21.5	7/na	na
	EFFICIENCY	Girls						23.5	7/na	na
		Boys						20.5	7/na	na

Source: Ministry of Basic Education, Planning and Statistics Unit

This indicator measures the number of years required by the school system to graduate one student from the sixth grade. Factored into the figure are the number of students repeating and dropping out. The Ministry has revised its figures for 1994, which were incorrectly calculated for the 1994 Assessment of Program Impact. The shocking base value of 21 years in 1989 for a student to complete primary school reflects the grave problems of the Malian school system prior to the 1991 popular revolution. The previous regime clearly disfavored education. It saw educated students as a major threat to the continuation of one-party rule in Mali. Since then, Mali's democratic Government has demonstrated a political commitment to education. It will not be able

to undo quickly the damage to Mali's educational system prior to 1991. As a result, there has been little progress in reducing the number of student-years required to complete the first six grades. Since this indicator depends upon a wide variety of factors beyond the Mission's control, USAID will not use it as a measure of the success of the 1996-2002 strategic plan.

## SECTION III: STATUS OF THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

### A. Strategic Objective Refinements

Following Washington's approval of USAID Mali's strategic plan in September 1995, one strategic objective has been refined. With the assistance of an outside technical assistance team and a representative of the Global Bureau Center for Democracy, USAID has refined the Governance Strategic Objective, renaming it the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective. The new strategic framework, presented in table 1, makes no substantial change to the previous strategic framework, presented in table 2. Instead, it clarifies the causality by regrouping the intermediate indicators and using more appropriate terminology. The new indicators are similar to the previous ones but provide better measures of the strategic objectives and intermediate results than those agreed to in Washington.

A monitoring, evaluation and reporting team visited the Mission from February 25 to March 8. The team worked with the strategic objective teams for youth, sustainable economic growth, and democratic governance to refine indicators and develop an appropriate monitoring plan. In April, a Leland Initiative staff member will assist USAID Mali's information and communication special objective team in the same tasks. As a result, the strategic

framework for each of these teams may be refined. These refinements will be reported in the Resource Request.

#### Democratic Governance

##### Strategic Objective Statement

The previous formulation of the Democratic Governance strategic objective was:

Community organizations play a leading role in governance, including development decision-making and planning, in targeted geographic areas.

The new formulation is:

Target community organizations are effective partners in democratic governance, including development decision-making and planning.

There are three changes in the wording:

- 1) "Governance" is replaced by "democratic governance";
- 2) "Community organizations in targeted geographic areas" is replaced by "targeted community organizations";
- 3) "Play a leading role" is replaced by "are effective partners."

Democratic governance describes better the objective than does governance, which could denote such disparate systems as monarchical governance, authoritarian governance, or even anarchy. USAID is interested in promoting democratic governance, with its focus on participation, representation, majority rule, minority protection and checks and balances. Democratic governance is defined as shared governance in which not only central state institutions but also civil society and local governments have a right to participate in governance matters at both the local level and beyond.

This strategic objective will target a limited number of community organizations in approximately 25% of Mali's approximately 600 communes. Since it will not be targeting all of the community organizations within the selected communes, it would be misleading to state the objective as community organizations in the targeted geographic areas. Referring to targeted community organizations indicates clearly the limited scope of the strategic objective and provides a better guide to measuring impact. Non-targeted community organizations are expected to benefit from the spread effect from targeted community organizations. Under the new strategic objective formulation, USAID will be able to measure

this impact, without taking direct responsibility for accomplishing it.

After much debate, the Mission decided that it could not be responsible for helping community organizations play a leading role in democratic governance. In 1997, communal governments will be elected, and these representatives of the local population should not be expected to play subsidiary roles to community organizations in governing. Instead, each party must play its role effectively within a partnership - community organizations both supplying good governance to their members and demanding good governance from elected governments, and communal governments supplying good governance to the larger public. USAID's role, then would be to help community organizations become effective partners with communal governments in democratic governance, including development decision-making and planning.

#### Intermediate Results Statements

Previously, there were four intermediate results, all at the same level.

- 1) Strengthened institutional capacity of community organizations.
- 2) Strengthened institutional capacity of non-governmental organizations.
- 3) Strengthened institutional capacity of professional, civic and trade associations.
- 4) Enabling environment supportive of community organizations.

The revised intermediate results establish a hierarchy of results, including two primary, two secondary and two tertiary intermediate

results.

The primary results are:

- 1) Target community organizations are engaged in democratic self-governance and civic action at the local level and beyond.
- 2) Enabling environment empowers target community organizations and representative and partner organizations.

All secondary and tertiary intermediate results support primary result 1, community organizations.

One set of secondary and tertiary intermediate results is:

Secondary result 1: Target Malian non-governmental organizations and federations support community organizations' democratic self-governance and civic action.

Tertiary result 1: The capacity of target Malian NGOs and federations is strengthened.

The second set of secondary and tertiary intermediate results is:

Secondary result 2: Target representative and partner organizations effectively aggregate and represent community organization interests at the local level and beyond.

Tertiary result 2: The capacity of target representative and partner organizations is strengthened.

The major change in the intermediate results is in defining better their respective priorities. The capacity of community organizations and the degree to which the enabling environment empowers them are the most important intermediate results contributing to making these organizations effective partners in democratic governance. The need for partner and representative organizations to strengthen and represent community organizations was judged as essential, but was determined to be subsidiary to ensuring that community organizations are engaged in democratic self-governance and civic action.

The concepts of self-governance and civic action were added to primary result 1. Self-governing associations are those associations that supply public governance to either their members or to the larger public, whether at the local community level or for a larger societal grouping. Civic action means holding the State accountable for its governance performance and/or trying to influence the shape of public policy.

The new strategic framework differentiates partner organizations, such as NGOs, from representative organizations, such as federations, with respect to their relationship with community organizations. Partner organizations are those multi-purpose civil society organizations that work with client organizations. Client groups have an indirect voice in partner organization decisions concerning their activities. Partner organizations must have direct linkages with and knowledge of their target or client groups.

Representative organizations are grassroots membership-based associations and the federations that represent them at higher levels of state governance. All decision-making concerning what activities will be undertaken is

directly made by the members of the representative organization.

The major change to the primary objective concerning the enabling environment is to ensure that representative and partner organizations, in addition to community organizations, are empowered. For both elected governments and community organizations to supply good governance, representative and partner organizations need to be equally strong as community organizations in advocating policy change.

#### B. Special Concerns or Issues

1. Partnership agreement cable: USAID Mali has received an approval cable, and is working with Washington on a cable with the official record of the guidance emerging from the review of the plan. Nevertheless, the Mission has made significant progress in responding to Washington concerns, particularly with respect to finalizing indicators, reexamining the governance strategic framework, restructuring the Mission, reducing staff levels, and preparing to phase-out activities that do not support the strategic plan directly. The strategic plan will be finalized, taking into account the new indicators and any modifications in strategic frameworks. A copy of the revised strategic plan will be forwarded to Washington, along with the Results Review and Resource Request reports. USAID appreciates the priority given by Washington to Mali for budget and personnel resources. Clearly, the FY 1996 budget and personnel levels demonstrate the seriousness with which the Agency is taking the partnership agreement.

2. Hiring freeze: USAID Mali appreciates the

approval of a hiring freeze waiver allowing the Mission to hire an AIDS advisor. Please act urgently on USAID's request to hire a PSC governance specialist, to enable the Mission to reduce its USDH staff levels to the target levels.

3. Regional programs: The Mission recognizes the progress made in addressing regional project issues at the February West African Mission Director's Conference. USAID Mali plans to be an active virtual partner with REDSO/WCA in the preparation of a regional strategy for West and Central Africa.

4. Operating Year Budget: USAID is preparing to obligate by strategic objective in FY 1997. In 1996, it will continue to obligate by project, given the apparent impasse between the Agency and Congress over notifications. USAID's Governance and Information and Communications strategic objectives, having no current projects, will design and obligate new activities. The Mission will need to work in partnership with Washington offices to ensure funding for these strategic objectives early in the fiscal year.

# Democratic Governance Strategic Objective Results Framework

## Target community organizations are effective partners in democratic governance, including development decision making and planning

- average number of new or modified development decisions resulting from consultations between governing councils (communal and community levels) and target community organizations
- number of target COs initiating their own delivery of public services or management of public services
- percentage of target COs delivering public services which receive government support in this effort (financial, material or technical)

### Target COs are engaged in democratic self-governance and civic action at the local level and beyond

- number of target COs that attend meetings of governing councils discussing relevant concerns
  - + community and commune levels
- number of open and organized meetings between governing council members and targeted CO representatives initiated by targeted CO representatives
  - + community and commune levels
- number of relevant development decisions, including policies, laws, and regulations which target COs
  - + analyze, influence, advocate, and formulate
- number of target COs that are engaging in democratic self-governance that have
  - + recognition (legal status) by the State
  - + democratic internal procedures
  - + independent audits done and published
  - + apply strategic planning and budget plans
  - + gender analysis and awareness
  - + ethics and professional standards
  - + conflict management and resolution
- gender
  - + percent of targeted community organizations employing gender analysis
  - + percentage of women in leadership positions of COs
  - + number of women's issues advocated by COs
  - + number of COs advocating women's issues


### Enabling environment empowers target COs and RPOs

- targeted COs, NGOs, federations and RPOs have the right to full legal recognition
- targeted COs and RPOs have information on identified laws, regulations and policies which affect their interests
- number of people reached by civic education communication channels in local languages


January 1996

# Secondary and Tertiary Intermediate Results and Indicators

January 1996



**Community Organizations Play a Leading Role In Governance, Including Development Decision-Making and Planning, in Targeted Geographic Areas**





**USAID MALI**  
**FY 1998 RESOURCE REQUEST**

I. THE CONTEXT FOR THE FY 1998 SUBMISSION -

As a Country Experimental Laboratory for Re-Engineering, USAID Mali has undergone profound re-engineering in FY 1996. This has involved getting USAID/W approval of its new Country Strategic Plan, organizing programmatic personnel into Strategic Objective Teams based upon it, and then starting to totally re-align programmatic activities in light of the new Plan and mission organization. The process of re-aligning the portfolio is not yet completed, as older projects and activities that do not fit well with the new Strategic Plan are modified or phased out, and the new Democratic Governance Strategic Objective and the Information and Communications Special Objective prepare their activities, to be authorized under Strategic Objectives. Additionally, the Mission has developed and begun to implement new procedures for managing existing activities that cut across the new Strategic Objectives, e.g. grants to PVOs, the Human Resources Development Assistance project, and interventions in northern Mali to increase domestic peace and stability. This will continue throughout FY 97.

Looking ahead to FY 1998, the Mission foresees the stabilization of the revised portfolio and the preparedness to undertake new investments, particularly in Democratic Governance and Information and Communications, to deliver more dramatically the results that they are already starting to produce. It also foresees the streamlining of the Mission portfolio in general, as the Mission focuses more on getting results, undistracted by activities that are being closed out or honed more finely today.

Although the national elections scheduled for January through April of 1997 are key to solidifying democracy and decentralization, they are not expected to result in any major programmatic shifts for USAID. However, the remaining tension in northern Mali due to the return of 100,000 refugees and demobilization of ex-combatants continues to represent a potential "wild card" in USAID Mali's program planning.

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## II. FULL-FUNDING SCENARIO

### A. Sustainable Economic Growth Strategic Objective

Activities supporting the Sustainable Economic Growth Strategic Objective comprise ongoing projects in the agriculture, natural resource and private sectors, and several grants to PVOs. USAID Mali is modifying these activities and designing new ones to use its resources more effectively. USAID's ability to achieve this Strategic Objective depends upon the level and regularity of its funding, as well as its flexibility to program funds where they are needed. Inadequate funding or overly restricted use of funds will delay accomplishment of the desired results, related targets and, in general, achievement of the Strategic Objective.

Fortunately, shortages and constraints are not a problem now for this Strategic Objective. The revised level of \$14.25 million for FY 97 and the proposed FY 98 level of \$12.7 million are respectively, 158 percent and 141 percent of the \$9.0 million in annual program funding requested in the Country Strategic Plan through the year 2002. The soft earmarks for environment and other economic growth are consistent with the results plan of this Strategic Objective. At these levels, the Mission can preserve the balance between Strategic Objectives, meet Mission targets for Congressional soft earmarks, and finance its ongoing and planned activities. These activities will enable Mali to seek new market opportunities for cereals, livestock, new products and financial services, developed through extensive consultations with USAID's customers, partners and stakeholders.

The Mission has revised its Sustainable Economic Growth targets by taking the full funding for FY 97 and FY 98 into account. For FY 97 and FY 98, respectively, selected goals by specific sub-sectors are noted next. In cereals: increase the production of all types of cereals by 150,000 and 160,000 metric tons; increase the value of cereals production by \$22.5 and \$24 million; increase the volume of processed cereals products by 100,000 and 150,000 metric tons; increase the value of domestic cereals consumption \$50 million and \$130 million; decrease the volume of cereal imports 15,000 and 25,000 metric tons; and decrease the value of cereal imports by \$5.4 and \$7.4 million. In livestock: increase the value-added of livestock products by \$3 and \$4 million; increase the value of livestock exports by \$1.5 and \$4.0 million; and, starting with a baseline of two, complete one livestock market in FY 97 and FY 98 each. In financial services: increase the savings mobilized by \$90,000 and \$120,000; increase the credit

mobilized by \$400,000 and \$600,000, and; increase the number of women accessing credit by 7,000 and 8,000. In new opportunities: increase the number of new export markets by one in FY 97 and by one more in FY 98; increase the value of exports to new markets by \$40 million in FY 97 and by \$45 million in FY 98; increase in the number of new products sold on the local market by one in FY 97 and by one more in FY 98, and; increase the value of new products sold on the local market by \$13,000 in FY 97 and by \$17,000 in FY 98.

B. Youth Strategic Objective

The Youth Strategic Objective seeks to bring about changed economic and social behaviors among the Malian population under age 25, which constitutes approximately two-thirds of Mali's total population. USAID will progress toward this objective through interventions that improve and increase the access to, quality of, demand for, and capacity of basic and reproductive health services and basic and non-formal education services. The Youth Strategic Objective addresses and monitors gender equity, community action and environmental conservation as cross-cutting issues while it develops and implements activities across the health and education sectors.

The Youth Strategic Objective team will continue to fund several project initiatives - several PVO grants, Community Health and Population Support, AIDS Awareness and Prevention, Basic Education Expansion - for an anticipated transition period of approximately 18 months. In FY 97, a new comprehensive Youth Strategic Objective agreement will be negotiated and signed with the Government of the Republic of Mali.

In FY 96, the health and education portfolio have been reviewed and re-oriented to better fit within the Youth Results Framework. Consequently, they will have stronger and more focused impacts in FY 97 and 98. Within the health sector, increased resources will be invested to expand child survival activities, principally through increasing access to basic services that include immunizations, and by preventing, diagnosing and treating the major causes of infant and child morbidity and mortality. USAID will accelerate and integrate the reproductive health-supported activities in FY 97 and FY 98 that address the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of AIDS and other sexually-transmitted diseases. USAID will modify and re-orient important advances made in contraceptive marketing and community-based distribution to address the specific supply and demand issues for contraceptives among Malian youth. Finally, across the

health sector, USAID will invest increased levels of resources in activities that address public-private partnerships in health care delivery, policy reform, quality of care and information needs. In the health sector, USAID Mali has set as targets to increase the percentage of children 12-23 months old receiving the full range of immunizations from a 1996 baseline of 32 percent to 40 percent by the end of FY 97 and 50 percent by the end of FY 98. By the end of FY 97 and FY 98, respectively, USAID plans to increase the percentage of the population within 15 kilometers of a fixed health facility that offers focused child survival interventions from a 1996 baseline of 22 percent to 25 percent to 30 percent, and increase the percentage of women receiving two doses of tetanus toxoid from a 1996 baseline of 51 percent to 55 percent and 60 percent.

The Education Skills Development package of activities will increase significantly the number of skilled youth and better-educated children through FY 98. In FY 98, the number of schooled children will increase 20 percent, or about 150,000, compared to the baseline of the 1995-96 school year due to a strategy of increasing access and demand, improving quality and increasing the relevance of school. By the end of FY 98, this focus on access and demand will result in an increase of classrooms by 1,000; with 600 new community schools or an increase of 300 percent from 1996. Sixty thousand more girls will be enrolled in public and community schools. USAID will integrate both an environmental and a health component within the national school curriculum to make it more relevant.

C. Democratic Governance Strategic Objective

To achieve the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective, the team will target 750 community organizations in 25 percent of Mali total communes, which represent 25 percent of Mali's total number of communes (i.e. approximately 3,000). From the 750 community organizations targeted over the life of the program, by the end of 1998, 300 are expected to have received democratic-self-governance, effective management and civic action training (100 in F-97 and 200 in FY-98). USAID Mali expects that the effects of its activities will spread from targeted community organizations to non-targeted community organizations within targeted communes, as well as spread from targeted communes to non-targeted communes.

By the end of 1998, 40 percent of targeted community organizations are expected to affect two or more development decisions, and 30 percent will form good

partnerships with local governments in service delivery. The team has a plethora of related results, for example, that 60 percent of community organizations will govern themselves democratically, 40 percent will use effective management skills, and 60 percent will pursue effective civil actions. To achieve these results, the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective Team has identified three first order Intermediate Results and other subsidiary ones whose combined attainment is expected to lead to the achievement of the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective. These Intermediary Results are discussed in section V, Changes to the Country Strategic Plan/Management Contract. The Mission believes that the achieving the specified results will require at least the full amount of funding for both fiscal year 97 and 98, and hopes to be able to program its funding more efficiently in order to assure this.

The resources requested will be used to strengthen community organizations, strengthen NGOs and federations, and facilitate the enabling environment. Community organizations will be strengthened through training in democratic self-governance, effective management and civic actions; micro-grant civic action funds to finance civic actions at local, regional and national levels; and matching funds for the construction of centers for civic education, action, information and extension. NGOs and federations will be strengthened through training trainers in democratic self-governance, effective management and civic actions; and through grant and technical assistance to enable them to aggregate and represent the interests of community organizations. The enabling environment will be facilitated through civic education, literacy training, and information dissemination in local languages. The resources requested for FY 98 will also support local short-term technical assistance to develop civic education curriculum and correct baseline data, an expatriate advisor and an implementing contractor.

D. Information and Communications Strategic Objective

With the requested resources, the Information and Communications Special Objective expects to achieve several results so that Malians can have greater access to, and make better use of, information. Some of these selected results are that, by the end of FY 98: at least four university-level schools representing approximately 7,000 students - and three or four PVOs/NGOs representing about 500 members - will have full Internet access; two new rural radio stations will be created that reach 20,000 people who are currently not served by any radio stations; approximately 15,000 public service messages will be

broadcast on a variety of subjects such as improved health practices, family planning, AIDS prevention, educational issues, market and price information, and programs on the roles and responsibilities of citizens in a democratic society, and; 200 radio staff persons will be trained.

The Information and Communications Special Objective will achieve these results through a series of focused activities centered around three results packages that employ the most appropriate technologies, e.g. community radio stations, to do so. The three results packages are Information Resources, Communications, and Enabling Environment. The Information Resources Results Package will establish, staff and equip an Information Resources Center, and create full-Internet access facilities at three client sites (e.g. university-level schools, NGO and PVO groups, Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture). The Communications Results Package will create one new community radio station and provide training and technical support for an additional 10 stations. In addition, it will create a Mali World Wide Web site on the Internet. The Enabling Environment Results Package will provide legal assistance to the Ministry of Culture and Communications for writing a telecommunications policy, and hold a public information campaign to make Malian citizens aware of their rights to access to information.

### III. REDUCED FUNDING SCENARIO

#### A. Sustainable Economic Growth Strategic Objective

Ten percent less funding would result in new levels of \$12.825 million in FY 97 and \$11.0 million in FY 98, both still considerably over the \$9.0 million annual level requested for this Strategic Objective in the Country Strategic Plan. A reduction of this magnitude would not require significant modification of the plans proposed in the Country Strategic Plan. Existing pipelines in current project activities would enable Sustainable Economic Growth to remain at current planning levels. No adjustments would be necessary in the content of the planned Strategic Objective. Under this revised scenario and certainly under the initial allocation level, the program can be expected to evolve as planned in the Country Strategic Plan toward an emphasis on increasing the value-added contributions from the four priority sub-sectors, i.e. cereals, livestock, new opportunities and financial services with an increased emphasis on micro-enterprise development. However, the targets specified in the full-funding scenario would need to be revised downward.

B. Youth Strategic Objective

A 10 percent decrease in the FY 97 and FY 98 funding levels will limit progress toward achievement of Youth's educational and health (population, AIDS and child survival) access targets, and slow expansion of the skills development component. Quality targets would continue to receive funding, although the scope of these efforts may be curbed. This means less funding to PVOs and NGOs, resulting in fewer people benefitting from the reduced investments.

C. Democratic Governance Strategic Objective

Full funding in both FY 97 and FY 98 will be essential for the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective to achieve its planned results. A 10 percent reduction in FY 97 will require an immediate downward revision in the FY 97 targets. A dual reduction of 10 percent in both FY 97 and FY 98 would jeopardize tremendously the achievement of this Strategic Objective by decreasing the number of community organizations, NGOs and federations whose capacity would otherwise be strengthened, and seriously undermining their anticipated spread effects to non-targeted community organizations and communes.

D. Information and Communications Strategic Objective

The attached chart shows the reduced activities undertaken and results attainable if the Information & Communications Special Objective receives 10 percent less funding than planned in both FY 97 and FY 98. In FY 97, these would be that: one computer system (instead of three) would be procured for the Information Resources Center; no new community radio stations would be created (as opposed to one); no policy reform or public information campaigns would be conducted; the Mali World Wide Web site on the Internet would not be created, and; fewer training programs would be conducted. If funding levels were also cut for FY 98, the following additional reductions in activities would be made: no new computer systems (instead of one) would be procured for the Information Resources Center; two community radio stations would be created (as opposed to three planned); no policy reform or public information campaigns would be conducted, and; fewer training programs would be conducted. The specific outputs, with the resources required to attain each, are attached.

IV. OPERATING EXPENSE AND WORKFORCE REQUIREMENTS

A. Operating Expense

1. Fiscal Year 96

The Mission's current operating expense funds this fiscal year are \$3.0 million. The Mission has requested an additional \$200,000 to cover shortages in FSN separation pay and to fund costs associated with the reduction in force of one USDH employee and the possible retirement of another USDH. Due to budget constraints, it is able to procure only a very small amount of non-expendable property.

2. Fiscal Years 97-98

The Fiscal Year 1997 request is based on Operating Expense levels of 11 USDH, 9 FSNDH and 54 FSNPSC. In FY 98, the levels will be 10 USDH, 8 FSNDH and 52 FSNPSC. The Mission has made significant decreases in the office operations portion of the budgets. Some of the operational costs will be absorbed by appropriate charges to program activities. The budget assumes no non-expendable property procurement in FY 97 and a minimum amount in FY 98. The decrease in the amounts under Personnel Benefits is due to the reduction in force in FY 97 and FY 98.

B. Workforce Requirements

USAID Mali will require higher workforce levels than those provided in the controls, if it wishes to make adequate progress in achieving its strategic plan. It will need at a minimum a workforce level of 116 both in FY 97 and FY 98, down from 120 in FY 96. This is the greatest personnel reduction possible, at a time when the Mission's Operating Year Budget is increasing from \$27.3 million in FY 96 to almost \$35 million in FY 97 and over \$33 million in FY 98.

In the past, it was suggested that Missions whose funding is reduced should reduce their workforce levels correspondingly. Ironically, USAID Mali's control figures in the next two fiscal years increase by approximately 20 percent, yet USAID/W expects it to simultaneously reduce workforce levels. USAID Mali has been especially creative in getting down to present levels prior to the end of FY 96 by already reduced its staff by 1 USDH, 1 PASA, 1 USPSC, and 12 FSN's. Having already made such significant personnel reductions, USAID Mali believes that it must maintain the 9/30/96 levels until the completion of its strategic plan in 2002.

USAID Mali's workforce level is expected to vary through FY 1998 when the reorganization is completed, and the new structures are put into place. Funding sources for personnel may shift from OE to Program in a few instances. The Mission Operating Expense-funded workforce level will decrease due to budgetary constraints, and as a result of the reorganization.

The USDH level at post is presently 14 due to the elimination of one Project Development Officer position. This level of USDH positions will be reduced to 11 by September 30, 1996 due to USAID/W's deletion of the Contracting Officer, the Financial Management Officer and the Education Development Officer positions, and its addition of a Democracy/Governance Officer position. USAID/W's deletion of the Contracting Officer position has already impacted program operations negatively, regardless of the level of support from REDSO/WCA, and will continue to do so. USAID Mali had assigned FSN Acquisition Assistants to the Strategic Objective teams in Specialist positions, with the understanding that the Contracting Officer would provide technical guidance and training. But now, with no Contracting Officer, USAID Mali must get this support from REDSO, whose reduced staffing levels may preclude or curb its level of support to USAID Mali. The same scenario applies to the Financial Management Officer position, as its incumbent is the only alternate certifying officer.

One PASA position and one USPSC position will be eliminated during FY 96 and 97 respectively. USAID Mali has no OE-funded TCN positions.

The FSN DH level has decreased from 10 to 9, which is one less than the approved level. With the progressive phasing out of this category, the levels will decrease to 7 in FY 97, and 6 in FY 98. One such position will be filled with an FSNPSC.

The OE-funded FSNPSC level will decrease as about six employees shift to program funding in FY 97, and others retire: one person both in FY 96 and 97, and three persons in FY 98. One or two of the vacated retiree positions will be filled.

At present, there are 33 program-funded FSNPSC positions, of which seven are vacant. The Mission plans to drop three of these vacant positions in FY 97. However, it expects this level to increase as the result of the shifts described above, and the filling of some key positions that are presently vacant due to the hiring freeze. The program-funded positions are critical to meeting Mission

objectives, especially with both the decrease in USDH levels and the empowerment of FSNs, the latter of which USAID Mali has dedicated itself as an outcome of re-engineering. For example, all Result Package Managers save one, and most Program Development Specialists, are FSNPSC's.

V. CHANGES TO THE COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN/MANAGEMENT CONTRACT

A. Strategic Objective Refinements

Following Washington approval of USAID Mali's strategic plan in September 1995, all but one strategic objective have remained constant. With the assistance of a team from Thunder and Associates and a representative of the Global Bureau Center for Democracy, USAID has modified the Governance Strategic Objective and renamed it the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective. The new strategic framework is presented in table 1. It is not a substantial change from the previous strategic framework, presented in table 2. Instead, it clarifies the causality by regrouping the intermediate indicators and using more appropriate terminology. The new indicators are similar to, but measure better, the strategic objectives and intermediate results that were agreed to in Washington.

A monitoring, evaluation and reporting team visited the Mission in February and March 1996. The team worked with the Strategic Objective teams for Youth, Sustainable Economic Growth, and Democratic Governance to refine indicators and develop an appropriate monitoring plan. In April, a Leland Initiative staff member assisted USAID Mali's Information and Communication Special Objective team in the same tasks. The balance of this section focuses on the changes to the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective.

1. Democratic Governance: Strategic Objective Statement

The previous Democratic Governance strategic objective was: "Community organizations play a leading role in governance, including development decision-making and planning, in targeted geographic areas." It is now: "Community organizations in target communes are effective partners in democratic governance, including development decision-making and planning." There are three changes in the wording: a) "governance" is replaced by "democratic governance"; b) "community organizations in targeted geographic areas" is replaced by "community organizations in target

communes", and; c) "play a leading role" is replaced by "are effective partners."

The term democratic governance describes better the objective than does simply the word governance, which could denote such disparate systems as monarchical governance, authoritarian governance, or even anarchy. USAID wants to promote democratic governance, with its focus on participation, representation, majority rule, minority protection and checks and balances. It defines democratic governance as shared governance in which central state institutions and civil society and local governments all have a right to participate in governance matters at both the local level and beyond.

This strategic objective intends to impact on target communes, rather than more limited group of target community organizations. It is estimated that 750 community organizations in 150 communes, representing 25 percent of a total of approximately 600 communes, will be targeted. That represents a larger share of Mali's population, given that targeting will be done carefully. It emphasizes enabling different kinds of community organizations to aggregate and represent their interests and to affect government decision making at all levels. The Mission has a particular interest in women's groups and will ensure that they are well represented.

Benefits are expected to spread from targeted community organizations to non-targeted community organizations in targeted communes and from targeted communes to non targeted communes. Under the new strategic objective formulation, USAID will be able to measure this impact without having to take responsibility for accomplishing it.

After much debate, the Mission decided that it could not be held responsible for helping community organizations play a leading role in democratic governance. In 1997, communal governments will be elected, and these representatives of the local population should not be expected to play a subsidiary role to community organization in governing. Instead, each party must play its role effectively within a partnership - community organizations providing both the supply of good governance to their members and the demand for good governance by elected governments, and communal governments providing the supply of good governance to the larger public. USAID's role, then would be to help community organizations become effective partners with communal governments in

democratic governance, including development decision-making and planning.

2. Democratic Governance: Intermediate Results Statements

Previously, Democratic Governance had four intermediate results, all at the same level: a) strengthened institutional capacity of community organizations; b) strengthened institutional capacity of non-governmental organizations; c) strengthened institutional capacity of professional, civic and trade associations, and; d) enabling environment supportive of community organizations.

The revised intermediate results establish a hierarchy of results, including three primary, two secondary and two tertiary intermediate results. The three primary results are: a) target community organizations are engaged in democratic self-governance and civic action at the local level and beyond; b) effective decentralization occurs by the end of 1999, and; c) enabling environment empowers target community organizations, intermediary NGOs and federations.

All secondary and tertiary intermediate results support primary result 1, community organizations. One set of secondary and tertiary intermediate results is:

- Secondary result 1: Target Intermediary NGOs and federations support community organizations' democratic self-governance and civic action.
- Tertiary result 1: The capacity of target Malian NGOs and federations is strengthened.

The second set of secondary and tertiary intermediate results is:

- Secondary result 2: Target intermediary non-governmental organizations and federations effectively aggregate and represent community organization interests at the local level and beyond.
- Tertiary result 2.1: The capacity of target NGOs and federations is strengthened.
- Tertiary result 2.2: The civic action skills of target intermediary NGOs and federation are improved.

The major change in the intermediate results is in defining better their respective priorities. The capacity of community organizations and the degree to which the enabling environment empowers them are the most important intermediate results contributing to making community organizations effective partners in democratic governance. The need for intermediary NGOs and federations to strengthen and represent community organizations was deemed essential, but was determined to be subsidiary to ensuring that the organizations are engaged in democratic self-governance and civic actions.

The Mission believes that the Government of the Republic of Mali is committed to decentralization. However, many decisions concerning the implementation of the decentralization program are still pending with the final outcomes yet unknown. The Mission is well aware that these decisions may affect its strategy. Consequently, USAID has added an intermediate result concerning decentralization to the Democratic Governance framework, and will monitor its progress closely. As this is not a USAID-produced result, monitoring will be informal and will include both timetable and content of the decentralization.

The concepts of self-governance and civic action were added to primary result 1. Self-governing associations are those associations that undertake the supply of public governance to either their members or the larger public, whether at the local community level or for a larger societal grouping. Civic action is holding the State accountable for its governance performance and/or trying to influence the shape of public policy.

In the new strategic framework, intermediary NGOs and federations can become effective vehicles for representing community organizations' interests. Establishing vertical linkages between community organizations and larger representative bodies (federations) and horizontal linkages between community organizations should increase the influence of citizens in this group by unifying them in pursuit of common agendas. USAID Mali assumes that NGOs and federations are the appropriate means to fully communicate with community organizations and represent their interests at the commune level and up to the national level.

The major change to the primary objective concerning the enabling environment is to ensure that

intermediary NGOs and federations, in addition to community organizations, are empowered. For good governance to be supplied by both elected governments and community organizations, intermediary NGOs and federations need to be equally strong as community organizations in advocating policy change.

B. Special Concerns or Issues

1. Regional Programs

The Mission recognizes the progress made in addressing regional project issues at the February West African Mission Director's Conference. USAID plans to be an active virtual partner with REDSO/WCA in the preparation of a regional strategy for West and Central Africa.

2. Operating Year Budget

USAID is preparing to obligate by strategic objective in FY 1997. In 1996, it will continue to obligate by project, given the apparent impasse between the Agency and Congress over notifications. USAID's Governance and Information and Communications Strategic Objectives, having no corresponding projects, will have to be funded from Project Design and Support. The Mission will need to work in partnership with Washington offices to ensure funding for these Strategic Objectives early in fiscal year 97.

3. Lack of Strategic Objective Agreement Guidance

Now, almost 12 months after Country Strategic Plan approval, the lack of clear guidance on the structure, content and orientation of the programmatic document under which funding is to be made available to support the Strategic Objectives presents a major constraint. The few examples of Strategic Objective Agreements that have circulated do not appear to be great improvements over earlier Project Agreements. More importantly, the persistent Congressional earmarks and set-asides placed upon Country Experimental Laboratories offers them minimal degrees of program flexibility in pursuit of Strategic Objectives. The degree of flexibility is neither clearly articulated, nor formalized nor promulgated to the field. Instead, the most recent guidance remains strongly influenced by earlier guidance on project authorizations and agreements, appropriations and management.

4. Customer Service

USAID Mali has embraced the concept of providing good customer service through the process of re-aligning former sectoral portfolios in the case of the Youth and Sustainable Economic Growth Strategic Objective Teams, and in designing activities under the new Democratic Governance Strategic Objective and the Information and Communications Special Objective. Doing so has truly paid off in terms of getting the ultimate beneficiaries involved in these development activities from their inception, a precondition for their success. For example, the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective Team undertook extensive "groundtruthing" of its proposed indicators by traveling throughout rural Mali and discussing them with the local population. This resulted in the team gaining a much deeper understanding of the issues involved, and modifying the plan to make it more workable, which should help ensure its success.

As another example, the Information & Communications Special Objective team assessed customer needs, solicited input and designed its activities through initiating and maintaining an extensive network of concerned parties composed of seven international organizations, eight Malian Government units, ten specialized organizations, 12 non-governmental and private voluntary organizations, and 13 private sector users. From these entities, the Information and Communications Special Objective team created an Information Technology Advisory Panel, which provided considerable input into the formulation of this special objective, and therefore supports it strongly. It also created extended and virtual team members from within USAID who provide input on specific issues involving their areas of expertise. Moreover, Information and Communications is developing a Malian Internet Society to advise the managers of the national Internet gateway and Internet users to ensure that all Internet users in Mali have access to the same information and that the network managers take into account the needs of users when making decisions on the expansion of the system.

## USAID FY 1998 Budget Request by Program/Country

### BASE LEVEL

Program/Country: USAID Mali  
Account

	FY 1996 Estim	FY 1997 Request	FY 1998 Request
Development Assistance-Bilateral	27,300	0	0
Development Assistance-Field Support	2,000	0	0
Development Fund for Africa-Bilateral	0	34,700	33,300
Development Fund for Africa-Field Support	0	3,666	0
Economic Support Fund	0	0	0
Eastern Europe and Baltics	0	0	0
N.I.S	0	0	0
PL 480 Title II	0	0	0
PL 480 Title III	0	0	0
Micro & Small Ent. Dev. Credit Program	0	0	0
Housing Investment Guaranty Program	0	0	0
Enhanced Credit Program	0	0	0
Disaster Assistance	0	0	0
Operating Expenses-U.S. Dollar	3,000	2,850	2,708
Operating Expenses-Trust Funds	0	0	0

**USAID FY 1998 Budget Request by Program/Country**  
**CUT LEVEL (show reduction only for FY 98)**

Program/Country Account	FY 1996 Estim	FY 1997 Request	FY 1998 Request
Development Assistance-Bilateral	27,300	0	0
Development Assistance-Field Support	2,000	0	0
Development Fund for Africa-Bilateral	0	34,700	29,700
Development Fund for Africa-Field Support	0	3,666	0
Economic Support Fund	0	0	0
Eastern Europe and Baltics	0	0	0
N.I.S	0	0	0
PL 480 Title II	0	0	0
PL 480 Title III	0	0	0
Micro & Small Ent. Dev. Credit Program	0	0	0
Housing Investment Guaranty Program	0	0	0
Enhanced Credit Program	0	0	0
Disaster Assistance	0	0	0
Operating Expenses-U.S. Dollar	3,000	2,850	2,437
Operating Expenses-Trust Funds	0	0	0

USAID FY 1998 Budget Request by Program/Country  
(\$000)

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Country/Program: USAID Mali  
Scenario: Base Level

S.O. # , Title	Approp Acct	Bilateral/ Field Spt	FY 1996 Estim.	FY 1997 Request	FY 1998 Request								Estim Total Cost of SO	Year Final Oblig for SO	Remaining Mortgage of SO			
					Total	Basic Education	Other Economic Growth	Population	Child Survival	HIV/AIDS	Other Health	Environ				D/G		
SO 1: Youth																		
		Bilateral	15,600	18,000	18,100	5,500	1,700	4,800	3,400	2,700	0	0	0	84,000	2,002	65,900		
		Field Spt		355	0								0				0	0
		Total	15,600	18,355	18,100	5,500	1,700	4,800	3,400	2,700	0	0	0					
SO 2: Sustainable Economic Growth																		
		Bilateral	9,900	14,250	12,700	0	7,600	0	0	0	0	5,100	0	63,000	2,002	50,300		
		Field Spt		3,011	0								0					
		Total	9,900	17,261	12,700	0	7,600	0	0	0	0	5,100	0					
SO 3: Democratic Governance																		
		Bilateral	1,300	1,750	1,700	0	400	0	0	0	0	0	1,300	42,000	2,002	40,300		
		Field Spt		250	0								0					
		Total	1,300	2,000	1,700	0	400	0	0	0	0	0	1,300					
SO 4: Information and Communications																		
		Bilateral	500	750	800	0	800	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,000	2,002	6,200		
		Field Spt		0	0								0					
		Total	500	750	800	0	800	0	0	0	0	0	0					
SO 5:																		
		Bilateral			0									Enter Here	Enter Here	Enter Here		
		Field Spt			0								0					
		Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
SO 6:																		
		Bilateral			0									Enter Here	Enter Here	Enter Here		
		Field Spt			0								0					
		Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
		Bilateral			0									Enter Here	Enter Here	Enter Here		
		Field Spt			0								0					
		Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
		Bilateral			0									Enter Here	Enter Here	Enter Here		
		Field Spt			0								0					
		Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
Total Bilateral			27,300	34,750	33,300	5,500	10,500	4,800	3,400	2,700	0	5,100	1,300					
Total Field Support			0	3,616	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
TOTAL PROGRAM			27,300	38,366	33,300	5,500	10,500	4,800	3,400	2,700	0	5,100	1,300					

FY 98 Request Sector Totals	
Econ Growth	16,000
PHN	10,900
Environment	5,100
Democracy	1,300

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USAID FY 1998 Budget Request by Program/Country  
(\$000)

25-Jul-96  
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Country/Program: USAID Mali  
Scenario: Cut Level

S.O. #	Title	Approp Acct	Bilateral/ Field Spt	FY 1996 Estim.	FY 1997 Request	FY 1998 Request							Estim Total Cost of SO	Year Final Oblig for SO	Remaining Mortgage of SO				
						Total	Basic Education	Other Economic Growth	Population	Child Survival	HIV/AIDS	Other Health				Environ	D/G		
SO 1: Youth																			
			Bilateral	15,600	16,200	16,290	5,060	1,200	4,416	3,129	2,485	0	0	0	84,000	2,002	67,710		
			Field Spt		355	0													
			Total	15,600	16,555	16,290	5,060	1,200	4,416	3,129	2,485	0	0	0					
SO 2: Sustainable Economic Growth																			
			Bilateral	9,900	12,825	11,430	0	7,092	0	0	0	0	4,338	0	63,000	2,002	51,570		
			Field Spt		3,011	0													
			Total	9,900	15,836	11,430	0	7,092	0	0	0	0	4,338	0					
SO 3: Democratic Governance																			
			Bilateral	1,300	1,575	1,530		360						1,170	42,000	2,002	40,470		
			Field Spt		250	0													
			Total	1,300	1,825	1,530	0	360	0	0	0	0	0	1,170					
SO 4: Information and Communications																			
			Bilateral	500	675	675	0	675	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,000	2,002	6,325		
			Field Spt		0	0													
			Total	500	675	675	0	675	0	0	0	0	0	0					
SO 5:																			
			Bilateral			0									Enter Here	Enter Here	Enter Here		
			Field Spt			0													
			Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
SO 6:																			
			Bilateral			0									Enter Here	Enter Here	Enter Here		
			Field Spt			0													
			Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
			Bilateral			0									Enter Here	Enter Here	Enter Here		
			Field Spt			0													
			Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
			Bilateral			0									Enter Here	Enter Here	Enter Here		
			Field Spt			0													
			Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
Total Bilateral				27,300	31,275	29,925	5,060	9,327	4,416	3,129	2,485	0	4,338	1,170					
Total Field Support				0	3,616	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
TOTAL PROGRAM				27,300	34,891	29,925	5,060	9,327	4,416	3,129	2,485	0	4,338	1,170					

FY 98 Request Sector Totals	
Econ Growth	14,387
PHN	10,030
Environment	4,338
Democracy	1,170

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Africa Bureau Table I  
 FY 1998 Budget Request  
 (\$000's)  
 Field Support

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FY 1997 Base Level Request

Program/Country USAID Mali	Strategic Objective	Field Support Amount	OYB Trans/ Buy-in	Sector of Support (1)	G Bureau Project/Act.	Project/Act. Number	Obligating Unit
	SO1: Youth	500	Buy-in	E/G	HCD (Girls & Women's Ed)	?	Mission
	SO2: Sustainable Economic Growth	100	Buy-in	ENV	PRIDE	398-0356	Mission
		200	Buy-in	ENV	DESFIL	936-5438	Mission
		50	Buy-in	E/G	INSORMIL	931-5438	Mission
		50	Buy-in	E/G	IPM	936-4196	Mission
		150	Buy-in	ENV	AELGA	698-0517	Mission
		100	OYB Trans	E/G	PRISAS/PARTS	?	Mission
		75	Buy-in	E/G	APAP	936-4201	Mission
		50	Buy-in	E/G	AMIS	936-5447	Mission
	SO3: Democratic Governance	300	Buy-in	D/G	Civil Society IQC w/MSI, # 5468100601200	?	Mission
	SO4: Information and Communications	None					
<b>Total Field Support (2)</b>		<b>1,575</b>					

- (1) Sectors of Support are Limited to:
- POP - Population
  - CHS - Child Survival
  - HIV - HIV/AIDS
  - HEA - Other Health (non-HIV, non-CHS)
  - ENV - Environment
  - D/G - Democracy/Governance
  - BED - Basic Education (Children's Basic Ed Only)
  - E/G - Other Economic Growth (All EG other than Children's Basic Ed)

(2) The amounts listed in this Field Support table MUST MATCH by sector, SO and amount the data entered on the "FY 1998 Budget Request by Program/Country" Table.

(3) A completed Sample Table for the mythical "Republic of Luanda" is presented below.

SAMPLE							
Program/Country	Strategic Objective	Field Support Amount	OYB Trans/ Buy-in	Sector of Support	G Bureau Project/Act.	Project/Act. Number	Obligating Unit
Republic of Luanda	SO1: Improved Health	400,000	OYB Trans	CHS	Pathfinder	936-3062	G/PHN
		300,000	OYB Trans	HEA	ATLAS	698-0475	G/HCD
	SO2: Promoting D/G	150,000	OYB Trans	D/G	IFES	936-5451	G/DG
		50,000	OYB Trans	D/G	HRDA	698-0463	Mission
<b>Total Field Support:</b>		<b>900,000</b>					

Africa Bureau Table I  
 FY 1998 Budget Request  
 (\$000's)  
 Field Support

25-Jul-96  
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FY 1998 Base Level Request

Program/Country	Strategic Objective	Field Support Amount	OYB Trans/ Buy-in	Sector of Support (1)	G Bureau Project/Act.	Project/Act. Number	Obligating Unit
(Type Name of Country/Office Here)	SO1: Youth	500	Buy -in	E/G	HCD (Girls & Women's Ed)	?	Mission
	SO2: Sustainable Economic Growth	None					
	SO3: Democratic Governance	None					
	SO4: Informatin and Communications	None					
	<b>Total Field Support (2)</b>		500				

- (1) Sectors of Support are Limited to:
- POP - Population
  - CHS - Child Survival
  - HIV - HIV/AIDS
  - HEA - Other Health (non-HIV, non-CHS)
  - ENV - Environment
  - D/G - Democracy/Governance
  - BED - Basic Education (Children's Basic Ed Only)
  - E/G - Other Economic Growth (All EG other than Children's Basic Ed)

(2) The amounts listed in this Field Support table MUST MATCH by sector, SO and amount the data entered on the "FY 1998 Budget Request by Program/Country" Table.

(3) A completed Sample Table for the mythical "Republic of Luanda" is presented below.

SAMPLE							
Program/Country	Strategic Objective	Field Support Amount	OYB Trans/ Buy-in	Sector of Support	G Bureau Project/Act.	Project/Act. Number	Obligating Unit
Republic of Luanda	SO1: Improved Health	400,000	OYB Trans	CHS	Pathfinder	936-3062	G/PHN
		300,000	OYB Trans	HEA	ATLAS	698-0475	G/HCD
	SO2: Promoting D/G	150,000	OYB Trans	D/G	IFES	936-5451	G/DG
		50,000	OYB Trans	D/G	HRDA	698-0463	Mission
<b>Total Field Support:</b>		900,000					

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**Africa Bureau Table II**  
**FY 1998 Budget Request**  
**(\$000's)**  
**Microenterprise**

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Program/Country	FY 1998	
	\$ U.S.	Local Cur.
(Type Name of Country/Office Here)		
SO 1:		
SO 2:		
SO 3:		
SO 4:		
SO 5:		
SO 6:		
Total Microenterprise	0	0

Prepared by: PKnepp/AFR/DP/PAB  
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**Africa Bureau Table II**  
**FY 1998 Budget Request**  
**(\$000's)**  
**Microenterprise**

25-Jul-96  
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Program/Country	FY 1997	
	\$ U.S.	Local Cur.
USAID Mali		
SO 1: Youth	500	0
SO 2: Sustainable Economic Growth	250	0
SO 3: Democratic Governance	0	0
SO 4: Information and Communications	100	0
SO 5:		
SO 6:		
<b>Total Microenterprise</b>	<b>850</b>	<b>0</b>

Prepared by: PKnepp/AFR/DP/PAB  
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**Africa Bureau Table III  
FY 1998 Budget Request  
(\$000's)  
Partnership Activity**

USAID Mail	Total SO Funding Level	Institutional Mechanisms (5)								Total PVO/NGO \$	PVO Institutional Development (6) \$
		US PVOs (1)		Local PVOs (2)		3rd Country PVOs (3)		Cooperatives (4)			
		\$	% Total SO	\$	% Total SO	\$	% Total SO	\$	% Total SO		
SO1: Youth Note: \$3m for locals passes thru US PVOs for Ed.	18,100	6,000	33%	3,000	17%	0	0%	0	0%	9,000	500 (included in total)
SO2: Sustainable Economic Growth	12,700	1,900	15%	250	2%	0	0%	500	4%	1,750	795
SO3: Democratic Governance	1,700	400	23%	334	20%	0	0%	0	0%	734	
SO4: Information and Communications	800	100	13%	100	13%	0	0%	0	0%	200	
<b>Total by Category</b>		<b>8,400</b>		<b>3,684</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>500</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>11,684</b>	<b>1,295</b>

Notes:

- Corresponds to "PVU" Special Interest Code.  
Definition: A U.S. PVO registered in the U.S., but not necessarily with USAID.
- Corresponds to "PVL" Special Interest Code.  
Definition: A non-U.S. PVO operating in the country under the laws of which it is organized.
- Corresponds to "PVO" Special Interest Code.  
Definition: A PVO other than those listed above.
- Corresponds to "COP" Special Interest Code.  
Definition: Private, for-profit voluntary associations of persons joined together to achieve a common economic objective.
- Corresponds to "PVX" Special Interest Code.  
Definition: Activities that primarily strengthen the operational capabilities of a PVO, with the provision of development assistance to a third party being of only secondary importance.
- Institutional Mechanisms above cannot exceed 100% of SO funding level when totaled. (They are "either/or" codes).  
Institutional Development is a "non-add" code and may, by itself, represent up to 100% of the SO funding level total.

SAMPLE		Total SO Funding Level	Institutional Mechanisms (5)								Total PVO/NGO \$	PVO Institutional Development (6) \$
Republic of Luanda			US PVOs (1)		Local PVOs (2)		3rd Country PVOs (3)		Cooperatives (4)			
			\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%		
SO1: Improved Health	400	200	50%	50	13%	0	0%	0	0%	250	225	
SO2: Promoting D/G	150	0	0%	100	67%	25	17%	0	0%	125	50	
SO3:										0		
SO4:										0		
SO 5:										0		
SO 6:										0		
<b>Total by Category</b>		<b>200</b>		<b>150</b>		<b>25</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>375</b>	<b>275</b>	

Note: % formulas from this sample table can be copied to label above once SO funding level is entered.

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