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United States Agency for International Development
Bureau for Humanitarian Response
Office of Food for Peace - Emergency Division

Results Review and Resource Request

Fiscal Year 1998

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PART I: OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE

Background

Enacted in 1954, Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, was a landmark piece of legislation. It represented one of the first permanent peacetime foreign aid programs. In the more than 43 years since P.L. 480 was conceived, U.S. food aid has saved the lives of millions of people overseas, and has helped improve the lives of millions more.

P.L. 480 provided for the sale of surplus U.S. food commodities in local currency to foreign governments, and for donations of commodities to meet famine and other relief requirements. By the late 1950s, it was widely acknowledged that the potential of P.L. 480 was unrealized -- that U.S. agricultural commodity programs were a powerful instrument for promoting welfare, peace, and freedom on a global scale. For this reason, the revised Public Law 480 became known as the Food for Peace Act. The 1959 legislation encouraged the use of commodities "to promote economic development in underdeveloped areas" and authorized using food surpluses in food-for-work activities.

In the 1960s, P.L. 480 exports grew dramatically, representing a high of almost 25 percent of total U.S. farm exports. Food aid has greatly increased the development of markets for U.S. agricultural products worldwide: in 1994, for example, nine of the ten leading importers of American farm commodities were former recipients of P.L. 480.

Over the years, P.L. 480 has evolved to meet changing priorities and to reflect the lessons learned by Food for Peace staff, and implementing partners, local governments and P.L. 480 recipients themselves. In 1990, Congress passed the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act (FACTA), containing the first comprehensive reorganization of Public Law 480. Once seen as simply an aspect of foreign policy, P.L. 480 programs addressed food security as a primary goal.

The 1995 USAID *Food Aid and Food Security Policy Paper* provided further guidance on food aid programming. Efforts are now intensified to increase donor coordination and to identify innovative mechanisms for joint responses to emergencies. Greater attention and resources are devoted to strengthening the management capacity of the Office of Food for Peace partners: the World Food Program (WFP), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the Bureau for Humanitarian Response Office of Humanitarian Affairs in Rome (BHR/OHA/Rome). In addition, greater priority is being accorded programming within the context of the relief-to-development continuum.

Events Affecting Program Implementation

War and famine continue to threaten millions of families around the world. Food for Peace's prompt response and guidance enabled its partners to respond with massive emergency food aid programs. As emergency needs lessened, many of the organizations programming P.L. 480 food incorporated development activities into their projects: food-for-work and training. Populations on the brink of starvation received the help they needed to become self reliant again. Food aid enables newly emerging democracies to weather the transition from planned economies to democracy and free markets. Food aid can moderate wide swings in food prices and provide crisis support to those most vulnerable to economic upheaval.

The demand for emergency aid has grown dramatically. According to the World Food Program, between 1989 and 1993, worldwide emergency food needs doubled from \$1.1 billion to \$2.5 billion. U.S. food allocated to emergency responses has grown similarly. Emergency assistance now accounts for over 50 percent of all United Nations aid. It is anticipated that emergency food aid needs are expected to rise from 4.8 million metric tons in 1996 to between 5.7 million and 6.2 million metric tons by the year 2005.

An important element of the dramatic upward trend in food needs is the increase in protracted and complex emergencies. Often, ongoing protracted civil conflicts become more complex when exacerbated by natural disasters. From 1989 to 1994, the number of complex emergencies soared from 17 percent to 41 percent of all emergencies worldwide. In current dollars, what had been a \$300 million requirement in the early 1980s had become a \$3.2 billion claim on global bilateral aid budgets by 1993.

From 1985 to 1994, the number of refugees grew by 11 percent per year and the number of displaced persons by 8.5 percent. In 1994, an estimated 35 million "at risk" people needed 4.5 million metric tons of emergency food aid. In 1995, there were at least 50 serious armed conflicts ongoing in the world, generating 20 million refugees and another 20 to 25 million internally-displaced persons. Examples include: Sudan since 1983, Angola since 1989, Somalia since 1991, Bosnia since 1992. Aside from the increase in food needs as a result of increased emergencies, complex emergencies are labor-intensive.

Challenges

The present realities of the global food situation pose major policy and program response challenges. While food needs are increasing there has been a decline in the global per capita output of grain since the 1980s. The high international cereal prices which rose sharply due to decreased cereal production is expected to remain high for the near term. Within this global context, the Office of Food For Peace and its partners face real challenges in implementing PL 480 Title II emergency and development programs. The major challenges are:

Global Financial Situation: The international donor community is facing a serious problem in terms of meeting worldwide food aid requirements. The dramatic increase in emergency food needs while U.S. food aid budgets are being reduced has created a funding gap, not yet filled by other donors. Apart from the static Title II budget, the budgets of both U.S. bilateral food aid opportunities, Title I and Title III, have been substantially reduced. Transfer from Titles I and III are increasingly limited. Furthermore, Section 416(b) allocation, which had provided an important buffer until 1993, is virtually nil and is expected to remain so.

[Title I export credit programs develop foreign markets for U.S. farm markets. Managed by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), this government-to-government assistance is provided on a concessional loan basis and normally entails untargeted food distribution through normal commercial channels. Title III funds government-to-government grants for development activities.]

Personnel: Food for Peace manages over \$1 billion in P.L. 480 assets annually with a staff of 28 direct professional and support staff and 3 Personal Service Contractors (PSCs). In general, management of food aid, both in Washington and in the field, has not been considered "career enhancing." There are only 15 Food for Peace Officers worldwide, which is not adequate to meet the increased demands of food aid management. Consequently, the recommendation made by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to improve USAID's management of food aid poses a significant hurdle.

Commodity Availability: The 1996 and 1997 fiscal years have seen new docket restrictions, and U.S. export prices for cereals remain under pressure from the tight supply situation. Wheat prices have risen steadily. Although the 1996 FACTA "straight lines" Title II minimum and sub-minimum tonnage amounts for the life of the seven-year bill, it remains unclear whether appropriations will be adequate to provide the specified tonnage levels. Price pressures, coupled with uncertainty on appropriation levels, have important implications on the availability of food commodities to meet the increasing food needs of targeted vulnerable groups.

PART II: PROGRESS TOWARD STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

Background

Food for Peace can, in tandem with other emergency interventions, minimize human and economic loss and contribute to sustainable development. Appropriate emergency relief, coupled where possible with transitional activities, saves lives and alleviates suffering. It begins the process of rehabilitation and accelerates the return to development. If humanitarian crises are not addressed before famine or social disorder perpetuate, then the costs of rehabilitation and reconstruction grow geometrically.

The Office of Food for Peace has a history that reflects a high record of success in providing emergency food needs. It is now committed to further strengthening its performance in managing emergency food aid to demonstrate results. It is in this spirit that the results framework was developed. To improve performance during the next five years, Food for Peace recently developed a strategic plan and results framework. Food for Peace's **Strategic Objective #1 (SO1)** for emergencies is stated as “**Critical food needs of targeted groups met**”. Performance at the strategic objective level is measured by the (a) percentage of targeted populations reached by food aid programs as well as (b) impact on nutritional status of beneficiaries. Intermediate Results (IRs) that will lead to the fulfillment of this strategic objective are:

- Improved targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable populations
- Food aid delivered to target groups on schedule
- Improved planning to transition relief activities to development
- Strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs.

Present Progress: Results Framework and Preliminary Baseline

With the strategic plan for fiscal years 1997 - 2001 just completed, this is Food for Peace's first Results Review and Resource Request (R4). As such, it can report only on progress in terms of establishing a preliminary baseline and targets. It can also report on its success in engaging its major partners to manage for results.

Food for Peace successfully engaged its major partners in active participation in developing its results framework and performance indicators. Cooperating sponsors were active participants throughout the development of the strategic plan. Each draft of the results framework was reviewed with the Working Group of the Congressionally-mandated Food Aid Consultative Group (FACG). Separate discussions and meetings were held with WFP. Dialogue continues with all implementing partners to address "next steps", in particular how to coordinate and finance data collection and reporting.

Food for Peace and its partners made a commitment to manage emergency food aid programs for results. This incorporates mutual agreement on what will be accomplished, a system for measuring and reporting results, and realistic measurement of impact. The process is complex because of the varied and sudden nature of emergencies, the difficulties in collecting data in dangerous and politically sensitive environments, and the short time frame (one year or less) for implementing programs. Although Food for Peace recognizes that performance measurement is important to ensure its programs achieve people-level impact, it is understood that *resource allocation will not be affected*. As outlined in the *Fiscal Year 1999 Results Review and Resource Request Guidance*, it is noted that "because the prime factor in determining allocations for emergency programs is immediate humanitarian need, such programs will not be a part of the ranking process."

Despite the above caveat, Food for Peace made significant progress in establishing a preliminary baseline for its framework. It conducted an assessment of its fiscal year 1996 performance through the review of a comprehensive group of program documents available at the Office of Food for Peace. Information obtained from proposals, reports and correspondence were corroborated by Food for Peace Officers.

Realizing that the review is based on unverifiable "reported" information, Food for Peace will use fiscal year 1997 data that is being collected for the next Results Review and Resource Request (R4) to validate this preliminary baseline data. *The yearly performance targets will be revised on the basis of the revised baseline data if significant discrepancies are found*. In addition, to operationalize its performance monitoring plan, Food for Peace will initiate a management information system (MIS) which will facilitate the collection, analysis and compilation of data. This will become fully operational by fiscal year 1999. Technical support will be provided to implementing partners to ensure that appropriate tools are available to collect, analyze and report data.

Accomplishments and Anticipated Results

While it is too early to report performance in terms of meeting targets, Food for Peace can demonstrate that it has met the critical food needs of the most vulnerable groups through selected case studies. These are largely drawn from programs implemented in partnership with PVOs and the World Food Program during fiscal year 1996. Preliminary baseline and targets for achieving the major results indicators are summarized by Tables 1-11 which follow:

Table 1: Strategic Objective 1, Indicator 1

Strategic Objective No. 1: Critical food needs of targeted groups met			
Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency			
Performance Indicator 1: Percent of targeted population reached by food aid			
Unit of Measurement: Percent of targeted populations by (a) gender and (b) age (where available)	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor semi-annual & EOP reports	1996	(baseline year)	67%
	1997	67%	
Indicator Definition: "Targeted population" as defined at program start	1998	70%	
	1999	75%	
Comments: No age or gender baseline information available	2000	80%	
	2001	85%	

Critical Food Needs of Targeted Groups Met: Percent of Targeted Population Reached by Food Aid

Targeted groups are defined by each program at the beginning of each intervention. Vulnerable populations are generally identified based on needs assessments undertaken by the cooperating sponsor or by other agencies. During emergency situations, there are fluctuations in beneficiary levels throughout a program. Initial estimates may be widely skewed with later proper assessments, thereby impacting on program implementation and reporting. This is an important challenge which will be addressed during the course of Food for Peace's efforts to manage for results. Efforts will be made to improve rapid data collection and reporting techniques, and in particular, the accurate and updated profile of beneficiaries targeted and reached.

In fiscal year 1996, Food for Peace reached a total of 11.5 million beneficiaries through emergency food aid. This represents 67 percent of the total population targeted by its partners, the World Food Program and PVOs. A total of 30 programs were implemented in 18 countries with the majority in Africa. The special groups most frequently targeted are children, women and individuals who are malnourished.

One of the programs implemented in 1996 was in *Sierra Leone*, where an estimated 840,000 internally-displaced persons -- almost half of the country's 1.8 million population -- required emergency food assistance. USAID played a major role in establishing the Food Aid Coordinating Committee (FAC) which included the Government of Sierra Leone, the World Food Program, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), PVOs and other donors. General food distribution has been replaced with targeted feeding in previously inaccessible areas. The strategy, developed by the Committee, sets forth guidelines to

standardize size and frequency of food aid rations throughout the country. It also provides criteria for categorizing beneficiaries. The strategy facilitated the resettlement of internally-displaced people, and the rehabilitation of destroyed villages and local infrastructure. Food-for-work complements the resources allocated by other Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) offices such as the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) toward the resettlement and reintegration process.

Table 2: Strategic Objective, Indicator 2

Strategic Objective No. 1: Critical food needs of targeted groups met			
Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency			
Performance Indicator 2: Change in nutritional status of target groups			
Unit of Measurement: Prevalence of malnutrition in children 6-59 months, in percentage, by gender (as measured by percent of programs reporting change or maintenance of nutritional status)	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor semi-annual & EOP reports (rapid assessments, secondary data)	1996	(baseline year)	37%
	1997	37%	
Indicator Definition: Change in nutritional status of children 6-59 months, compared with status at pre-intervention (baseline)	1998	50%	
	1999	55%	
Comments: Includes "maintenance" of nutritional status For baseline, measured by percent of programs reporting change or maintenance of nutritional status	2000	60%	
	2001	65 %	

Critical Food Needs of Targeted Groups Met: Change in Nutritional Status of Target Groups

Despite difficulties in collecting data under emergency conditions, Food for Peace and its partners believe that the impact at the beneficiary level should be measured. Implementing partners will monitor nutritional status of target groups to determine whether there is change. Since most programs currently seek to *maintain* nutritional status of beneficiaries, rather than change status, maintenance will be included in the performance measurement. Theoretical assumption is that food aid is to be complemented with non-food resources, such as potable water, sanitation, shelter, and basic health services. In the absence of this "emergency relief package", beneficiaries may not be nutritionally stabilized even with adequate food aid supplementation. With this in mind, cooperating sponsors have agreed to collect regular information (obtained through rapid assessments or secondary data) on nutritional status of children aged 6 to 59 months.

Currently, programs undertake nutrition surveys or use secondary data to assess nutritional status. This information will now be reported to Food for Peace on a semi-annual basis. During fiscal year 1996, 37 percent of emergency food aid programs reported to have contributed to change or maintained nutritional status.

The contribution of food aid to improved or maintenance of nutritional status is best exemplified by USAID's program in *Angola* which was successful in achieving "people-level" impact. It is estimated that, during the 30-year war, 500,000 people died, 3.5 million were internally displaced and hundreds fled to neighboring Zaire and Zambia. Food for Peace began its Title II emergency operation in Angola in 1985. To date, it contributed a total of 558,102 tons of emergency food aid, valued at \$292 million. Emergency food assistance benefitted 800,000 people per month in 1994. In 1997, with assistance being more targeted, only 300,000 beneficiaries receive food aid. The program is administered through WFP, as well as USAID bilateral programs with PVOs: Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Save the Children (SCF), World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD), and CARE. The WFP functions throughout Angola, while each of the PVOs serve as cooperating sponsors in specific regions. Beneficiaries include internally-displaced persons, refugees, demobilized soldiers, children, pregnant and lactating women, handicapped persons and social destitutes.

The most important achievement of the program was keeping thousands of Angolans alive during and after the war. Nutritional status and social stability, both in the quartering areas and in the large cities of the interior, were maintained within acceptable norms. A 1994 nutritional surveillance of children aged nine years and under, conducted by Action Against Hunger (ACF), found an average malnutrition rate of 15.2% global and 4.4% severe malnutrition. Through the emergency interventions funded by USAID and other donors, malnutrition slowly decreased to average rates of 8.7% global and 2.3% severe by the end of 1996. Throughout 1996, a pattern emerged whereby rapidly improving nutritional status was observed following interventions in areas which had previously been cut-off from humanitarian assistance due to insecurity. The continued improvement in infrastructure rehabilitation and access to the countryside indicate that the improving nutritional situation seen in 1996 will continue.

Table 3: Intermediate Result 1, Indicator 1

Intermediate Result 1: Improved targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable populations			
Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency			
Performance Indicator 1: Percent of programs that have instituted a continuous process of needs assessment and recalibration of targeting			
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: Needs assessment reports, cooperating sponsor proposals, semi-annual & EOP reports	1996	(baseline year)	53%
	1997	55 %	
Indicator Definition: Needs assessment guideline to be established - to include assessment of vulnerabilities (including gender & ethnic issues), local capacities, nutritional status "Vulnerable populations": groups that (a) will experience acute decline in food access, and are unable to sufficiently meet their basic food needs (b) are susceptible to natural or man-made disasters	1998	55 %	
	1999	60%	
Comments: Initial needs assessment for proposal, recalibration at program start, then semi-annually	2000	65%	
	2001	65%	

Improved Targeting of Food Aid to the Most Vulnerable Populations: Percent of Programs that have Instituted a Continuous Process of Needs Assessment and Recalibration of Targeting

Food for Peace seeks more effective and continuous targeting of the most vulnerable groups. Periodic needs assessments and recalibrations will identify target groups, and to what extent local capacities can respond to the disaster. In fiscal year 1996, 53 percent of programs reported to have instituted periodic needs assessments (or used information from other agencies). However, since various methodologies are being utilized by cooperating sponsors, efforts are being made to standardize data collection. In particular, the draft *"PVO Guidelines for Title II Emergency Food Proposals and Reporting"* will be issued in final during fiscal year 1997.

Although improvements are needed in this area, several examples demonstrate that needs assessments are being undertaken by programs to improve targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable populations. For example, in *Bosnia-Herzegovina*, a needs assessment was conducted by a joint mission from WFP, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), and USAID. The assessment found that significant levels of food aid was necessary: to maintain social stability, improve household purchasing power, and assist in the overall rehabilitation of the country. More importantly, the assessment resulted in the re-directing of the program from general nutritional support to income support, and helped to identify the most vulnerable groups. The mission was undertaken in response to Food for Peace's request for an

assessment to follow-up an earlier provision of 178,000 metric tons of wheat and pulses to feed 1,900,000 beneficiaries through WFP.

Similar efforts to ensure more timely and accurate identification of vulnerable groups were undertaken in *Somalia*, where USAID established the Somali Aid Coordinating Body (ACB). The Food Security Task Force (FSAU), in collaboration with USAID's Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), developed an early warning system to identify groups vulnerable to drought and flood. Twelve different food economy zones in Somalia and the various factors affecting recovering, such as community and individual coping mechanisms are being studied. Survey methodologies to rapidly identify malnourished groups and appropriate response procedures, such as targeted supplementary feeding, are being developed.

Table 4: Intermediate Result 1, Indicator 2

Intermediate Result 1: Improved targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable populations			
Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency			
Performance Indicator 2: Percent of programs that have incorporated special needs of different targeted groups			
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor proposals, semi-annual & EOP reports	1996	(baseline year)	90%
	1997	90%	
Indicator Definition: "Targeted population": those selected at program start by cooperating sponsor Food ration level to be defined and agreed to at program start should take into consideration assessed needs of different groups (e.g., pregnant & lactating women, children, handicapped, resettled & demobilized groups)	1998	92%	
	1999	94%	
Comments:	2000	96%	
	2001	96%	

Improved Targeting of Food Aid to the Most Vulnerable Populations: Percent of Programs that have Incorporated Special Needs of Different Targeted Groups

Programs address food requirements of special groups, especially those moderately or severely malnourished. Supplementary and therapeutic feeding programs are operated by some cooperating sponsors, using the World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines for ration levels. During fiscal year 1996, a majority of programs incorporated special needs of various vulnerable groups. The most frequently targeted special groups include, in order of frequency: (a) children - orphans, preschool and school-aged children, unaccompanied minors, (b) women, including

pregnant and lactating women, war widows, (c) malnourished, including children under five years old, (d) handicapped, disadvantaged and social destitutes, (e) internally-displaced persons and refugees, (f) elderly, (g) sick population in hospitals, clinics, (h) demobilized soldiers, and (I) flood-affected farmers. Ration levels will be continuously reviewed to ensure that the special needs of these various groups are being met.

Examples to illustrate how Food for Peace programs incorporated special needs of different targeted groups can be drawn from *Afghanistan* and *Angola*. In *Afghanistan*, WFP provides food aid to 700,000 internally-displaced persons, refugees, returnees and victims of natural disasters. Through a bakery program in Kabul, WFP targeted women and war widows. Established with the assistance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local authorities, the bakery program provides flour and small grants to women to produce bread. This is then distributed to the urban poor and other vulnerable groups. In keeping with Afghan tradition where women ensure that family members are fed, women in the program identify beneficiaries and ensure that the bread is delivered to families most in need. The program targets 700,000 beneficiaries of which 30,000 are women. The women are allowed to sell a small percentage of the leftover bread in the free market. As of June 1996, proceeds from the program amounted to \$634,660. A further evidence of activity success is the fact that the Taliban-dominated government formally asked WFP to continue the program during fiscal year 1997. And, a similar program is being established in Kandahar.

In *Angola*, following the Lusaka Protocol which called for the integration of warring forces into a single army under control of the government, and the demobilization of excess former soldiers, Food for Peace provided assistance to support a peaceful transition to civil society. Through WFP, Food for Peace provided 18,880 metric tons of food to 180,000 dependent family members of former combatants. Food aid was complemented by other USAID assistance including essential medicines and supplies, such as basic household items, tools to construct homes, agricultural tools and seeds. This targeted food aid helped to stabilize this special group as political issues are being resolved, and as the country is transitioning to civil society.

Table 5: Intermediate Result 2, Indicator 1

Intermediate Result 2: Food aid delivered to target groups on schedule			
Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency			
Performance Indicator 1: Percent of programs experiencing Title II pipeline shortages			
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor semi-annual & EOP reports, FFP MIS	1996	(baseline year)	30%
	1997	30%	
Indicator Definition: "Pipeline shortages": food commodities not delivered per schedule agreed to with cooperating sponsors and outlined in call forwards	1998	25%	
	1999	20%	
Comments:	2000	20%	
	2001	15%	

Food Aid Delivered to Target Groups on Schedule: Percent of Programs Experiencing Title II Pipeline Shortages

Food for Peace seeks to reduce delays in the delivery of emergency food aid. The schedule for shipping and arrival of food commodities will be tracked to determine pipeline shortages. Food commodities distributed through WFP will have to be similarly monitored to effectively assess progress made in this area. Although improvements can be made in the delivery of food aid commodities, there are several cases when food aid was expedited to meet extreme needs. One example is in *North Korea*, where commodities were procured, shipped and delivered within 70 days, instead of the normal 90-120 days. Food for Peace, in coordination with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), provided 13,100 metric tons through WFP to assist 1,150,000 flood victims. The timely delivery of food aid helped to curtail mass rationing by allowing a change in the daily ration for flood victims from 250 grams per day to 350 grams per day.

Table 6: Intermediate Result 2, Indicator 2

Intermediate Result 2: Food aid delivered to target groups on schedule			
Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency			
Performance Indicator 2: Percent of proposals reviewed and cooperating sponsors notified of decision within 21 calendar days of receipt			
Unit of Measurement: Percent of proposals	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: FFP MIS	1996	(baseline year)	8%
	1997	15 %	
Indicator Definition: Reviewed and acted on by FFP/ER: approval 1 or rejection of proposal in its entirety or parts thereof	1998	50%	
	1999	60%	
Comments:	2000	60%	
	2001	80%	

Food Aid Delivered to Target Groups on Schedule: Percent of Proposals Reviewed and Cooperating Sponsors Notified of Decision within 21 Calendar Days of Receipt

In fiscal year 1996, only 8 percent of proposals were reviewed and cooperating sponsors notified of decision within 21 calendar days. Performance in this area could be dramatically improved if standardized formats and systems are in place. The draft "*PVO Guidelines for Title II Emergency Food Proposals and Reporting*", which will be issued in fiscal year 1997, will guide cooperating sponsors to include required information in their proposal submissions. This, together with the availability of standard criteria for assessing proposals by responsible Food for Peace staff, will expedite the review and decision-making process.

Table 7: Intermediate Result 3, Indicator 1

Intermediate Result 3: Improved planning to transition relief activities to development			
Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency			
Performance Indicator 1: Percent of programs that have developed resettlement or rehabilitation plans to link relief to development or relief exit strategies			
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor proposals, semi-annual & EOP reports	1996	(baseline year)	63%
	1997	63%	
Indicator Definition: Programs: emergencies coming to an end, or in transition. The plans must include transition or exit strategies.	1998	63%	
	1999	75%	
Comments:	2000	80%	
	2001	85%	

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Improved Planning to Transition Relief Activities to Development: Percent of Programs that have Developed Resettlement or Rehabilitation Plans to Link Relief to Development (or Relief Exit Strategies)

Although "relief" food aid and "development" food aid have often been managed as distinct entities, they are increasingly seen as elements of an essential continuum. Recurring famines in the Greater Horn of Africa are not sudden events caused only by drought but rather the result of such factors as war, failed economic policies and disenfranchisement.

The concept of a "relief-to-development continuum" is an evolving idea that is the result of many development agencies' efforts to go beyond the traditional bipolar model of assistance that categorizes needs and response as either emergency or developmental. Several key elements of the continuum include: (a) interventions should seek to serve both disaster mitigation and long-term sustainable development; (b) relief programs should use the development principles of capacity building, participation, and sustainability, (c) development activities should reduce the need for future relief by addressing current vulnerabilities, and (d) programs should seek to maintain productive capacity, prevent migration, reinforce development efforts, and enhance disaster mitigation and management capacity.

The review of fiscal year 1996 performance indicated that efforts are being undertaken in these areas. Policy guidelines on transitional program design and evaluation and improved coordination among Bureau for Humanitarian Response offices will help programs progress out of emergency relief.

The Greater Horn of Africa (GHAI) Presidential Initiative was conceived in 1994 to facilitate linkage of relief and development activities. The GHAI seeks new ways of coordinating all USAID resources, including food aid and development assistance, plus non-food relief resources, to facilitate crisis prevention and the relief-to-development transition. This initiative stresses the principles of African ownership, regional approaches, and donor coordination. The GHAI includes ten countries: Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

In another part of Africa, *Angola* was selected as an USAID "pilot" for integration of food aid, non-food disaster assistance, and regular development resources to form a "post-emergency" or transition country strategy. Starting in 1995, by the provision of seeds, tools and food aid, PVOs assisted populations to return to their homes and resume crop cultivation. Food is also provided to resettling populations through food-for-work activities to rebuild the rural infrastructure. Food-for-work programs rehabilitated 56 schools, 26 health posts and clinics, 6 rural markets, 16 wells, 15 bridges, 764 kilometers of roads, and more than 105 kilometers of canals for irrigation. Resettlement programs are revitalizing rural communities and reducing the absolute dependence on humanitarian aid. The quantity of food provided in feeding programs decreased, while the amount for food-for-work and agricultural activities steadily increased.

The program in *Bosnia-Herzegovina* seeks to promote economic growth by rehabilitating the ailing food milling and processing industry. During 1995, following a positive assessment of the wheat flour milling industry, WFP contracted the services of three local mills to mill 85 percent of wheat grain for food aid distribution. The remaining balance was retained by mill operators to cover processing and maintenance costs. Two additional mills joined the program the following year. To date, approximately 68,700 metric tons of P.L. 480 wheat have been milled. More importantly, the mills provide employment to 500 workers. WFP also used local commercial haulage companies to transport food commodities to distribution points. By the end of 1996, local companies milled and distributed the entire WFP's wheat, approximately 25,000 metric tons per month. Of this, 170 metric tons of wheat flour is processed into high-protein biscuits by the main Sarajevo bakery, which are distributed to the most vulnerable people. The use of local industries not only provided food to the needy, but created local employment opportunities, and stimulated the economy. It also resulted in a more streamlined and cost-efficient WFP logistical operation.

Table 8: Intermediate Result 3, Indicator 2

Intermediate Result 3: Improved planning to transition relief activities to development			
Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency			
Performance Indicator 2: Percent of programs that have paid specific attention to avoid the negative impacts of food aid in program design and implementation (do no harm)			
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs which meet design criteria	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor proposals, semi-annual & EOP reports - verified by site visits	1996	(baseline year)	00%
	1997	65 %	
Indicator Definition: Programs are designed and implemented per established criteria that they should include: (a) An exit strategy which supports community stabilization (b) Local capacity building, beneficiary participation (c) Not undermining local agricultural production, stabilization of local markets (d) Integration with development assistance (e) Gender and ethnic equity based on need (assumption: this is culturally acceptable and does not endanger safety) (f) Impartial and neutral distribution network	1998	70%	
	1999	75%	
Comments:	2000	80%	
	2001	85%	

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Improved Planning to Transition Relief Activities to Development: Percent of Programs that have Paid Specific Attention to Avoid the Negative Impacts of Food Aid in Program Design and Implementation (do no harm)

Food aid must incorporate the "do no harm" concept for progress to take place from emergency relief to development. For example, when private sector markets are functioning, channeling food through them is preferred to direct distribution. This strengthens market channels and logistical systems. Displacement of families is minimized as the supplies available in marketplaces are supported by food aid commodities. The successful intervention during the 1992-1993 Southern African drought depended on delivering a major part of food aid through the commercial market system.

Food for Peace and its implementing partners have limited control in stabilizing societies and communities recovering from major catastrophes and emergencies. However, efforts can and will be directed in emergency food aid program design and implementation to ensure that attention is paid to avoid the negative impacts of food aid. Criteria developed, in dialogue with the PVO community, are included in the management-for-results framework.

The fiscal year 1996 performance review indicated that 60 percent of programs are already addressing this issue to some extent. The principal areas are: (a) stabilizing local markets and not undermining local agricultural production, (b) gender and ethnic equity issues, and (c) local capacity building and beneficiary participation. Improved reporting will provide information on what specific actions were undertaken and progress made.

One program which illustrates how attention was paid to avoid the negative impacts in food aid is *Mozambique*, where over 21.6 million people suffered the effects of war, drought and the 1994 cyclone. In 1992, USAID/Mozambique, with Food for Peace's assistance, developed a rapid and flexible response and undertook a massive relief program involving WFP and 80 PVOs and NGOs. During 1994, the program began focusing on transitional and development activities. To avoid negative impacts of food aid in program design and implementation, World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD) monitored the overall food security situation. The effort was made to better target food resources and avoid disincentives for local production when, for example, monetizing P.L. 480 food. After analyzing agricultural data they found that rice, wheat flour and vegetable oil could be sold in Maputo and other cities during the pre-harvest months, December through February, when commodities are in short supply. Selling these commodities enhanced supplies to city areas without destabilizing local market prices.

During fiscal years 1995 and 1996, 17,690 metric tons of rice, flour and oil were sold to generate income. Proceeds were used to fund the food-cash-for-work projects that rebuilt critical infrastructure such as health clinics, agricultural posts, irrigation systems, roads and schools destroyed during the war. Furthermore, 6,600 metric tons of locally-produced food staples were also purchased for distribution among refugees. WVRD assisted a total of 594,300 beneficiaries with P.L. 480 monetization proceeds. Food for Peace emergency food aid dropped from a monthly average of 1,100,000 beneficiaries in 1994 to 500,000 in 1995, to 154,000 nationwide during 1996. Mozambique's growth was attributed to initial agricultural recovery, enabled by macro-economic reforms, improved security and access to markets.

Table 9: Intermediate Result 4, Indicator 1

Intermediate Result 4: Strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs			
Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency			
Performance Indicator 1: Percent of ISG grants supporting emergency planning and evaluation			
Unit of Measurement: Percent of ISG grants	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor proposals, FFP MIS	1996	(baseline year)	44%
	1997	44%	
Indicator Definition: ISG grants used to strengthen cooperating sponsor capabilities to better manage emergencies as defined by each ISG proposal	1998	50%	
	1999	60%	
Comments: For baseline, this was measured by percent of programs utilizing ISG grants to support emergency planning and evaluation.	2000	70%	
	2001	80%	

Strengthened Capabilities of Cooperating Sponsors and Host Country Entities to Manage Emergency Food Aid Programs: Percent of ISG Grants Supporting Emergency Planning and Evaluation

Institutional Support Grants (ISG) are provided to PVOs to enhance food aid program management. The grants help to build institutional capacity in food security assessment, program design and evaluation. They are used to establish policy structures and administrative systems required to implement programs, and to institute regular program reviews. Some PVOs, such as the Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA), focused on developing and improving human resources, establishing internship programs and training course modules with food aid issues incorporated into the training. Other PVOs, such as Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Save the Children Federation (SCF), utilized the grant to provide technical assistance to country offices, and to conduct workshops on emergency programming and resource management. Most PVOs including Catholic Relief Services (CRS), World Vision Relief and Development (WVRD), Africare and CARE utilized ISG grants to support feasibility studies and assessment of emergency food aid needs in several countries, including in *Bosnia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, Mozambique, and Angola.*

Substantial efforts have been made in developing PVO institutional capacity to manage and implement emergency food aid programs. These efforts have resulted in important accomplishments in food aid delivery.

Table 10: Intermediate Result 4, Indicator 2

Intermediate Result 4: Strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs			
Approved: In review Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency			
Performance Indicator 2: Percent of programs collaborating with local institutions for activity results			
Unit of Measurement: Percent of programs	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor proposals, semi-annual & EOP reports	1996	(baseline year)	93%
	1997	93%	
Indicator Definition: Collaborating with local institutions defined as: (a) Activities implemented by local host entities with support from cooperating sponsors (b) Joint activities with local host entities (c) Local entities participate in needs assessment, selection of beneficiaries, monitoring of food aid, training, etc.	1998	90%	
	1999	95%	
Comments:	2000	95%	
	2001	95%	

1.4
✓

Strengthened Capabilities of Cooperating Sponsors and Host County Entities to Manage Emergency Food Aid Programs: Percent of Programs Collaborating with Local Institutions for Activity Results

The majority of programs (93 percent) collaborated with local institutions during fiscal year 1996. These collaborations have helped to build local capacity to plan and implement food aid programs. For example, in *Sudan*, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), helped to provide technical and management support to a local NGO, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA). Staffed by ex-military personnel, SRRA lacked management skills to monitor and manage the relief program initiated with CRS. CRS encouraged SRRA to submit stringent monitoring and accountability reports, and instigated beneficiary registration and food distribution ration coupons. This resulted in the formulation of the Rules and Regulations Governing Food Distributions and the Operational Roles and Responsibilities of SRRA. With training and technical assistance, SRRA's organizational capacity and skills in community participation and mobilization were greatly improved. The program was soon re-directed to foster self-reliance whereby beneficiaries produce a third of their own cereals and pulses for four months, and food aid rations are provided for the remainder of time. The success of this program is evident by its use as a model by other PVOs.

Table 11: Intermediate Result 4, Indicator 3

Intermediate Result 4:		Strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs		
Approved:	In review	Organization: BHR/Office of Food For Peace - Emergency		
Performance Indicator 3:		Percent of cooperating sponsors able to meet reporting requirements		
Unit of Measurement: Percent of cooperating sponsors		Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: Cooperating sponsor semi-annual & EOP reports		1996	(baseline year)	17%
		1997	25%	
Indicator Definition: Reporting requirements: performance indicators outlined in results framework		1998	40%	
		1999	60%	
Comments: For baseline, measured by percent of programs able to meet reporting requirements		2000	80%	
		2001	80%	

1.4
✓

Strengthened Capabilities of Cooperating Sponsors and Host Country Entities to Manage Emergency Food Aid Programs: Percent of Cooperating Sponsors able to Meet Reporting Requirements

Only a small percent of programs (and cooperating sponsors) are meeting reporting requirements. New reporting guidelines will enable cooperating sponsors to provide essential information. This is an area where considerable progress is anticipated once standardized reporting formats and monitoring systems are established. However, funding to establish standardized formats and data systems with PVOs and WFP is greatly needed.

PART III: STATUS OF MANAGEMENT CONTRACT

Food for Peace recently developed a strategic plan covering fiscal years 1997 to 2001. Food for Peace and its partners are committed to managing emergency food aid for results. The strategic plan outlines what will be accomplished, the plan for measuring and reporting performance, and how impact will be measured. The strategic plan has just been reviewed and approved. The achievement of targets outlined in the document form the basis of the "management contract" for the SO1 team.

PART IV: RESOURCE REQUEST

Background

The financial and human resources required by Food for Peace to achieve Strategic Objective 1 are described in this section. Three important overriding considerations must be kept in mind. *First*, although considerable progress has been made in improving the management of emergency food aid, much more needs to be done. Specific areas for improvement are: WFP and PVO project accountability, the establishment of performance indicators, and standardized reporting on results and overall progress. In response, Food for Peace and its partners developed the Strategic Objective 1 results framework. The strategic objective is to meet critical food needs of targeted groups, to be measured by the percentage of targeted populations reached by food aid programs, and by the impact on nutritional status of beneficiaries.

Cooperating sponsors have agreed to collect, analyze and compile data at the field level, primarily in determining and monitoring needs of vulnerable populations, monitoring coverage and nutritional status of targeted groups. Intermediate performance indicators that will be collected are: (a) improved targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable populations (b) food aid delivered to target groups on schedule (c) improved planning to transition relief activities to development, and (d) strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs. Food for Peace will monitor performance indicators and critical assumptions on a regular basis. It will also review, analyze and compile data for the yearly reporting of achievements as part of the Results Review and Resource Request (R4) process.

The *second* important consideration is that food aid needs are expected to double over the next decade. In 1996, the total food aid needed to maintain minimal nutritional standards and meet emergency needs was 15 million metric tons. By the year 2005, this will increase to 27 million metric tons.

The *third* consideration is that emergency food needs still exceed funding resources due to the upward trend of commodity prices. Despite encouraging transition activities in countries such as Angola and Mozambique, and significant reduction of refugees in the Rwanda/Burundi subregion, the demand for emergency food aid resources is likely to continue during fiscal years 1998-2001.

Human Resources Plan

The staff allocated to manage the Title II emergency food aid program worldwide, currently at \$400 million annually, continue to be inadequate. This is primarily due to the fact that complex emergencies are very labor-intensive. Many bilateral and multilateral donors are involved, and frequent consultations are required to determine needs accurately and avoid duplication of

efforts. Furthermore, food aid to targeted groups requires coordination on the ground with partners and other donors, as well as with frequently hostile governments, and even unsavory businessmen. The inadequate staffing situation has been exacerbated further by: (a) downsizing or eliminating many field missions; (b) the decision in fiscal year 1996 to discontinue DOD/OFDA funding of emergency food aid for Northern Iraq and substitute Title II funding; and (c) the recent policy decisions to permit Title II resources to be used in Eastern Europe and in the Newly Independent States (NIS). It is abundantly clear that there is a critical shortage of human resources in Washington D.C. and in the field to manage the standard Title II emergency requests and responses. Although Food for Peace (Emergency) has taken steps to deal with budget constraints, for example, by reallocating staff time from other Food for Peace divisions for the Strategic Objective 1 management team, additional staff is crucial.

For fiscal year 1999, Food for Peace requests the addition of the following three U.S. direct hire (USDH) Food for Peace officers for emergency food aid management:

- One officer to manage and monitor emergency programs in East Asia. This is particularly important with new developments in emergency food aid including: North Korea is becoming a major recipient of Title II food aid; Title II is now being provided to NIS countries; and there is a major restructuring of programs in Afghanistan;
- A second officer to address a range of emergency feeding and food aid transition issues in the Central and West Africa regions. This includes: support for the Peace Accord in Liberia; improved targeting of food aid programs in Guinea; managing the movement toward a post-relief assistance phase in Sierra Leone and the post-drought program in Chad; and,
- A third officer to assist in the review of emergency food aid requests and accelerating the delivery of food aid to targeted beneficiaries on or before schedule. This officer will also spend up to 50 percent of his/her time coordinating Food for Peace's results management and reporting exercise.

If the full-time employee (FTE) ceiling for the Bureau does not permit the establishment of three new USDH positions then it is requested that OE and/or program funding be made available to hire PSCs and/or expand the support services available under the existing Institutional Support Contract. The point to be reiterated here is that the mechanism used to acquire three additional staff should be kept flexible, including, if appropriate, the recruitment of a fellow or intern for one of the three new positions.

Table 12: SO1 STAFF PLANNING LEVELS, FISCAL YEARS 1997 - 2001

STAFF LEVELS	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001
Full-time USDH	5	8	8	8	8
Part-time USDH	13	15	15	15	15
Full-time PSC	4	3	1	1	1
Total staff	22	26	24	24	24

Although the Chief of Food for Peace, Emergency Response Division, serves as the SO1 team leader, a coordinator for SO1 is essential to manage the operationalization of the results framework. The coordinator will:

- liaise with the Strategic Objective 2 (Development Program) team;
- review results reports, make recommendations for appropriate "course corrections"; and,
- coordinate the review and application of lessons learned with other bureaus and BHR offices.

The Institutional Support Contract is also essential to provide support to the SO1 team. The detailed requirements are outlined in the section on Development Assistance Funds (DA), on page 26.

If the request for additional staffing is not approved, Food for Peace *will not be able to move forward with its plan to implement the management-for-results framework*. It will not have the management capacity to meet the time frame or preliminary targets outlined in its results framework and strategic plan. In particular, Food for Peace will have to discontinue all management support related to achieving two Intermediate Results: (a) Intermediate Result 3: Improved planning to transition relief activities to development, and (b) Intermediate Result 4: Strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs.

The Government Accounting Office (GAO) made a strong recommendation that food aid management improvements are needed to achieve program objectives. It would be an unacceptable risk to not respond to this recommendation to effectively manage this high impact, valued and highly visible U.S. resource. In addition, Food for Peace would not have the staff to participate in any of WFP financial management and other reform activities, such as full-cost recovery and standardized reporting. Finally, Food for Peace (Emergency) will not have the capacity to provide the same level of management and technical support to BHR/OHA/Rome.

Financial Plan

Operating Expense (OE)

The Office of Food for Peace requires operating expenses for *basic* operations to:

- respond quickly to emergency food aid requests;
- coordinate more effectively with other bilateral donors, WFP, PVOs, and BHR/OHA/Rome; and,
- respond to queries from Congress and requests for information from other bureaus and offices.

Other essential activities such as site visits, travel for monitoring emergency activities, and training have been sporadic because of insufficient staffing and funding levels. Adequate advisory services, including studies, analyses and evaluations, are also not available because of insufficient operating expense resources. If Strategic Objective 1 is to be achieved, OE funds must be increased to an appropriate level. This said, it should be noted that given the severe limitations on operating expense funding, the fiscal year 1998 request level was straight lined (\$507,000). Therefore, reallocation within the fiscal year 1998 \$507,000 level will have to be made to cover the increased travel and other costs associated with the addition of three USDH officers. See Table 13 (below) for a summary of OE budget required.

Table 13: SO1 (EMERGENCY) OPERATING EXPENSE BUDGET REQUEST

OC WASHINGTON OFFICE & BUREAU REQUESTS	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001
21.0 TRAVEL & TRANSPORTATION					
Training Travel	25.0	25.0	25.5	26.0	26.5
Operational Travel:	200.0	200.0	204.0	208.1	212.2
Site Visits - Headquarters Personnel					
Conferences/Seminars/Meetings/Retreats	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0
Assessment Travel	10.0	10.0	10.2	10.4	10.6
Disaster Travel (in response to specific disasters)	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
Other Operational Travel	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
SUBTOTAL OC 21.0	307.0	307.0	311.7	316.5	321.3
25.1 ADVISORY AND ASSISTANCE SERVICES					
Studies, Analyses and Evaluations	100.0	100.0	102.0	104.0	106.1
SUBTOTAL OC 25.1	100.0	100.0	102.0	104.0	106.1
25.2 OTHER SERVICES					
Other Miscellaneous Services	100.0	100.0	102.0	104.0	106.1
SUBTOTAL OC 25.2	100.0	100.0	102.0	104.0	106.1
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSE BUDGET	507.0	507.0	515.7	524.6	533.5

Development Assistance Funds (DA)

Close collaboration among Food for Peace, USAID mission and PVO staff is essential for successful implementation of the strategic framework. The capability of cooperating sponsors to effectively manage emergency food aid programs, particularly in data collection, analysis and monitoring needs to be strengthened. At Food for Peace, a monitoring information system (MIS) will be developed for data entry, analysis and compilation of performance indicators and will be fully operational by fiscal year 1999. Development Assistance (DA) funds are required to support data collection and analysis, monitoring and results reporting associated with the achievement of Strategic Objective 1. The request for Development Assistance funds consists of the following four items:

FOOD FOR PEACE INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT CONTRACT - \$649,000: This contract provides technical support to all Food for Peace Office divisions. It was awarded in fiscal year 1996 as a three-year contract with an option for a two-year extension. This contract must be expanded to provide support to Food for Peace's Strategic Objective 1 in the following areas: (a) development of a monitoring information system; (b) maintenance of this system including data entry of indicators at regular intervals; (c) data analysis and compilation for program performance review; and (d) technical support to PVOs, WFP and BHR/OHA/Rome. In addition, the contract must facilitate the review process for emergency food aid proposals and requests, and help manage emergency food aid program responses. It will also provide field training and workshops on the performance measurement and results process.

PVO INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT GRANTS (ISG) - \$2 million: In fiscal year 1997, Food for Peace (Emergency) proposes that new PVO Institutional Support Grant (ISG) components stress emergency program management and improved transition of emergency programs to rehabilitation efforts. An annual level of \$2 million is required for improved performance. This is especially important as PVOs attempt to further expand and strengthen their emergency response capabilities and manage emergency programs more effectively. Strengthened PVO capabilities will also help to ensure program and financial accountability in exit and close-out countries, as well as movement toward transition programs whenever possible. ISG funds will support the provision of essential tools and technical assistance associated with the results framework: collection and analysis of data, development of information systems, and development of measurement instruments for rapid assessment of needs and nutritional status.

MONITORING PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATIONS - \$200,000: Emergency activities must be monitored and evaluated regularly as we manage for results and ensure adequate accountability. For example, generic performance indicators will need further analytical review and refinement. This challenge, the refinement of indicators, is key to achieving the desired results.

FOOD SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PLANNING - \$250,000: The Strategic Plan for SO1 describes a process by which emergency food aid programs should move toward transitional and rehabilitative efforts at the earliest possible date. One important element in this process is

carrying out food security analyses to identify options for returning a country to normalcy, or moving affected families toward more sustainable development activities. To ensure the likelihood of graduation to a development program, these analyses will be carried out in consultation with the Development Program Division at Food for Peace, PVOs, USAID missions and the World Food Program. Furthermore, the \$250,000 allocation may be used in co-financing situations with USAID missions, and to leverage funding from other donors, primarily the European Union (EU).

See Table 14 (below) for a summary of Development Assistance funds required to achieve Strategic Objective 1.

Table 14: SO1 (EMERGENCY) REQUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (DA)

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUNDS	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999	FY 2000	FY 2001
FFP Institutional Support Contract	\$627,000	\$649,000	\$728,000	\$750,000	\$773,000
Institutional Support Grants	\$2,000,000	\$2,000,000	\$2,000,000	\$2,000,000	\$2,000,000
Monitoring Performance & Evaluation	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000
Food Security Analysis & Planning	\$250,000	\$250,000	\$250,000	\$250,000	\$250,000
Total	\$3,077,000	\$3,099,000	\$3,178,000	\$3,200,000	\$3,223,000

APPENDIX I: REVIEW OF FISCAL YEAR 1996 PERFORMANCE

APPENDIX II: REPORTING AND MONITORING ISSUES

**RESULTS REVIEW AND RESOURCE REQUEST
FISCAL YEAR 1998**

BHR/FFP/ER

APPENDIX 1: RESULTS REVIEW AND RESOURCE REQUEST, FISCAL YEAR 1998

FOOD FOR PEACE - EMERGENCY REVIEW OF FY 1996 PERFORMANCE FOR PRELIMINARY BASELINE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1 - RESULTS FRAMEWORK

I. INTRODUCTION

Food for Peace conducted a review of its FY 1996 performance to serve as a preliminary baseline for its Strategic Objective 1 results framework. This was accomplished by the review of "FY 1996 P.L. 480 Budget Summaries - Final" program documents available at FFP, and interviews with responsible Action Officers. The information collected are based on written proposals, reports and correspondence from cooperating sponsors. For each program, the information was recorded in a questionnaire which was reviewed and verified by the responsible Action Officer.

The exercise provides a preliminary baseline for each indicator of the SO1 results framework. It also helped identifies areas which require improvement, particularly in regards to the quality of information being provided by cooperating sponsors. In addition, the exercise demonstrated the need to modify some of the indicators to reduce processing time in data compiling and reporting.

Realizing that the review is based entirely on unverified *reported* information (from cooperating sponsors' documents and Action Officers), *FFP/ER will use the FY 1997 data that is being collected for the next R4 to validate this preliminary baseline.* The FFP tracking system being developed to monitor each indicator will help to ensure that information collected in FY 1997 will be more reliable. *Yearly targets will be revised accordingly if significant discrepancies are found.*

II. OVERVIEW OF FY 1996 PROGRAMS

In FY 1996, Food for Peace and its partners served a total of 11,569,627 beneficiaries through the emergency program. This represents 67 percent of the total population targeted by cooperating sponsors. 30 programs were implemented in 18 countries with the majority in Africa. The most frequently targeted groups include, in order of frequency: (a) children - 67% of programs (mostly orphans, preschool, school and unaccompanied minors), (b) women - 40% (mostly pregnant and lactating women), (c) malnourished (no age specified, children under 5 years old) - 30%, (d) handicapped, disadvantaged, social destitutes - 30% (d) IDPs, refugees - 23%, (e) elderly - 13%, (f) sick - 7%, (g) demobilized soldiers - 3%, and (h) flood-affected farmers - 3%.

See Table 1 for detailed information on beneficiaries reached by country and cooperating sponsors.

TABLE 1: TARGETED POPULATIONS BY COUNTRY, COOPERATING SPONSORS

AFRICA						
Country	Cooperating Sponsor	Targeted population/ Reached	Targeted population/ Not reached	Targeted population/ No info	Special groups targeted	Total number of targeted beneficiaries
ANGOLA	CARE	97,722			F, G	97,722
	CRS	170,000			F	170,000
	SCF	186,500			A, B1	186,500
	WFP	817,000			C1, H	817,000
	WVRD	531,700			No info	531,700
Angola total		1,802,922			---	1,802,922
ETHIOPIA	WFP	64,400			A1, A2, A4, B1	64,400
KENYA	WFP	230,000			A6, G	230,000
LIBERIA	CRS			1,750,000	C, G	1,750,000
	WFP			2,130,000	B	2,130,000
Liberia total				3,880,000	----	3,880,000
MADAGASCAR	CARE			38,100	C1	38,100
MOZAMBIQUE	WVRD			200,730	A5, B1, C	200,730
RWANDA REGIONAL	CRS		96,000		A6	96,000
	WFP	2,500,000			C1, C2	2,500,000
Rwanda total		2,500,000	96,000		----	2,596,000
SIERRA LEONE	CARE			70,500	F	70,500
	CRS	239,000			A7, C	239,000
Sierra Leone Total		239,000		70,500	----	309,500
SOMALIA	WFP		158,000		A3, A5, B, D	158,000
SUDAN	ADRA	100,880			A3, A5, B1, E, G	100,880
	CRS	78,825			No info	78,825
	NPA	140,600			C3	140,600
	WFP	720,000			A, A6, B1, E, G	720,000
Sudan Total		1,040,305			----	1,040,305
UGANDA	WFP	320,000			C	320,000
TOTAL AFRICA	21 PROGRAMS	6,196,627	254,000	4,189,330		10,639,957

ASIA/NEAR EAST						
Country	Cooperating Sponsor	Targeted population/ Reached	Targeted population/ Not reached	Targeted population/ No info	Special groups targeted	Total number of targeted beneficiaries
AFGHANISTAN	WFP	1,600,000			B2, F, G	1,600,000
IRAQ	WFP	330,000			B1, C, F	330,000
NEPAL	WFP			90,000	F	90,000
N. KOREA	WFP	1,150,000			A2, I	1,100,000
PAKISTAN	WFP			1,100,000	A5, B2, G	1,100,000
TOTAL ASIA/NEAR EAST	5 PROGRAMS	3,030,000		1,190,000		4,220,000
EUROPE						
BOSNIA	ARC	55,000			G	55,000
	CRS	18,000			A3, E, F	18,000
	WFP	1,900,000			A2, B1, E, F	1,900,000
TOTAL EUROPE	3 PROGRAMS	1,973,000			---	1,973,000
LAC						
HAITI	CARE	320,000			A2, A5, D	320,000
TOTAL LAC	1 PROGRAM	320,000				320,000
GRAND TOTAL	30 PROGRAMS	11,569,627	254,000	5,379,330		17,152,957

Special Groups targeted - Categories:

- | | | | |
|-----|------------------------------|-----|---|
| A. | Children - general | C. | Malnourished (severe/moderate) |
| A1. | Infants | C1. | Under 5 years old |
| A2. | Preschool (young children) | C2. | Adults |
| A3. | School children | C3. | General population |
| A4. | Day care | | |
| A5. | Orphans | D. | Sick population - in hospitals, clinics |
| A6. | Unaccompanied minors | E. | Elderly |
| A7. | Street children | F. | IDPs, refugees |
| | | G. | Handicapped, disadvantaged, social destitutes |
| B. | Women - general | H. | Demobilized soldiers |
| B1. | Pregnant/lactating women | I. | Flood affected farmers |
| B2. | Widows, including war widows | | |

III. FY96 PERFORMANCE RESULTS - BASELINE FOR INDICATORS

Strategic Objective No. 1: Critical food needs of targeted groups met
Indicator #1: Percent of targeted population reached by food aid
<p>RESULT: 67%</p> <p>Yes: 67%</p> <p>No: 2%</p> <p>No information: 31%</p>
<p>Comments:</p> <p>Reflects total population reported by programs. Based on documents available at FFP and verified by responsible Action Officers.</p>

Strategic Objective No. 1: Critical food needs of targeted groups met
Indicator #2: Change in nutritional status of target groups
<p>RESULT: 37% of programs contributed to change (or maintenance) of nutritional status</p> <p>Yes: 37%</p> <p>No: 0</p> <p>No information: 63%</p>
<p>Comments:</p> <p>1. Reflects percent of programs that <i>reported</i> to have contributed to change (or maintenance) of nutritional status.</p> <p>2. Nutrition surveys were conducted by several programs (or by other agencies). These are: (a) Madagascar (CARE) (b) Mozambique (WVRD) (c) Rwanda (WFP) (d) Sierra Leone (CARE) (e) Sudan (ADRA, CRS), (f) Iraq (WFP). Secondary data (UNICEF) were also used in Sierra Leone (CRS). Survey data (or detailed information on findings) are not included in reports - except for Iraq.</p>

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1: Improved targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable populations
Indicator #1: Percent of programs that have instituted a continuous process of needs assessment and recalibration of targeting
<p>RESULT: 53%</p> <p>Initial needs assessment undertaken:</p> <p>Yes: 80% of programs</p> <p>No: 10%</p> <p>No info: 10%</p> <p>Continued to assess needs:</p> <p>Yes: 53%</p> <p>No: 17%</p> <p>No info: 30%</p>
<p>Comments:</p> <p>Needs assessment guideline will be developed to ensure that all programs are addressing vulnerabilities (including gender and ethnic issues), local capacities, and nutritional status. Information from needs assessment conducted by other agencies and partners are included</p>

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 1: Improved targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable populations
Indicator #2: Percent of programs that have incorporated special needs of different targeted groups
<p>RESULT: 90%</p> <p>Yes: 90%</p> <p>No: 0%</p> <p>No info: 10%</p>
<p>Comments:</p> <p>Special groups targeted were, in order of frequency:</p> <p>(a) Children - 67% of programs targeted children: orphans, preschool/school children, unaccompanied minors</p> <p>(b) Women - 40% of programs targeted women: mostly pregnant and lactating women</p> <p>(c) Malnourished - 30% (no age specified, children under 5 years old)</p> <p>(d) Handicapped, disadvantages, social destitutes - 30%</p> <p>(e) IDPs, refugees - 23%</p> <p>(f) Elderly - 13%</p> <p>(g) Sick - 7%</p> <p>(h) Demobilized soldiers - 3%</p> <p>(i) Flood affected farmers - 3%</p>

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2: Food aid delivered to target groups on schedule
Indicator #1: Percent of programs experiencing Title II pipeline shortages
<p>RESULT: 30%</p> <p>Food commodities arrived per schedule = 23%</p> <p>Food commodities did not arrive per schedule = 30%</p> <p>(56% due to FFP/USDA)</p> <p>No information = 47%</p>
Comments: Above analysis is based on interviews with Action Officers.

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 2: Food aid delivered to target groups on schedule
Indicator #2: Percent of programs reviewed and cooperating sponsors notified of decision within 21 calendar days of receipt
<p>RESULT: 8%</p> <p>Yes = 8%</p> <p>No = 19%</p> <p>No info/incomplete data = 73%</p>
<p>Comments:</p> <p>This information was taken from the analysis provided by FFP/ER tracking system. A total of 53 proposals were received from cooperating sponsors, including WFP.</p>

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3: Improved planning to transition relief activities to development
Indicator #1: Percent of programs that have developed resettlement or rehabilitation plans to link relief to development
<p>RESULT: 63%</p> <p>Yes = 63%</p> <p>No = 27%</p> <p>No info = 10</p>
<p>Comments:</p> <p>Included in the "yes" category are programs that <i>reported</i> to have addressed this issue - no written plans or documents were available in the files.</p>

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 3: Improved planning to transition relief activities to development
Indicator #2: Percent of programs that have paid specific attention to avoid the negative impacts of food aid in program design and implementation (do no harm)
<p>RESULT: 60%</p> <p>Yes = 60%</p> <p>No = 13%</p> <p>No info = 27%</p> <p>Criteria/areas most frequently addressed by programs:</p> <p>(a) Not undermining local agricultural production, stabilization of local markets = 43%</p> <p>(b) Gender and ethnic equity = 40%</p> <p>(c) Local capacity building and beneficiary participation = 33%</p> <p>(d) Impartial and neutral distribution network = 27%</p> <p>(e) Integration with development assistance = 20%</p> <p>(f) An exit strategy which supports community stabilization = 17%</p> <p>(g) Other areas (e.g., post-project nutrition monitoring, environmental impact, utilization of local transport system, justice, local culture) = 17%</p>
<p>Comments:</p> <p>Included in the "yes" category are programs reported to have undertaken analysis and action on the issue.</p> <p>Program criteria for design and implementation, above (a) through (f) are those outlined in the results framework for IR3, indicator #2.</p>

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 4: Strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs

Indicator #1: Percent of Institutional Strengthening Grants (ISG) supporting emergency planning and evaluation
*Applicable only to PVOs

RESULT: 44% of *programs utilized ISG grants* for emergency planning and evaluation
Yes = 44%
No = 56%

(Other uses of ISG grants other than for monitoring and evaluation:
Yes = 44% (overall technical support, feasibility studies)
No = 31%
No info = 25%

Comments:

This was analyzed by the *percent of FFP/ER programs utilizing ISG grants*. Since ISG grants are provided to support both development and emergency programs, and reporting of ISG budget is not itemized by emergency or development activities, it is not feasible to determine what percent of ISG grants were used for emergency activities.

The indicator should be revised to read "Percent of *programs utilizing ISG grants* for emergency planning and evaluation".

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 4: Strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs

Indicator #2: Percent of programs collaborating with local institutions for activity results

RESULT: 93%
Yes = 93%
No = 3%
No info = 4%

Types of collaboration, in order of frequency:

- (a) Local entities participate in needs assessment, selection of beneficiaries, monitoring of food aid, training, etc. = 73%
- (b) Joint activities undertaken with local host entities = 67%
- (c) Activities implemented by local host entities with support from cooperating sponsors = 53%
- (d) Other (includes overall coordination, provision of technical assistance) = 17%

INTERMEDIATE RESULT 4: Strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs

Indicator #3: Percent of cooperating sponsors able to meet reporting requirements

RESULT: 17% of *programs were able to meet reporting requirements*
Yes = 17%
No = 70%
No info = 13%

Met some reporting requirements = 53% of programs
No = 33%
No info = 14%

Reported on achievements versus stated objectives (proposals) = 30% of programs
No = 30%
No info = 40%

Comments:

This indicator should be revised to read "Percent of *programs able to meet reporting requirements*" to be consistent with other indicators and to facilitate analysis.

APPENDIX II: REVIEW AND RESOURCE REQUEST, FISCAL YEAR 1998

FOOD FOR PEACE - EMERGENCY
REPORTING AND MONITORING ISSUES
REVIEW OF FISCAL YEAR 1996 PERFORMANCE

Introduction

Food for Peace conducted a preliminary baseline for its Strategic Objective 1 results framework. Below is a summary (by indicator) of issues and problems encountered in establishing the baseline. Recommendations are made to improve reporting and monitoring for each indicator of the results framework.

Issues and Recommendations

*Strategic Objective 1, Indicator #1:
Percent of the target population reached by food aid*

Issues:

1. There are changes and regular fluctuation of beneficiary levels throughout the process: proposal, implementation and reporting.
2. Not all reports indicate the targeted number of beneficiaries, beneficiaries reached, or provide explanation for changes or fluctuations in beneficiary level.

Recommendations:

1. Once programs are approved, recalibrate target levels at commencement of program implementation (as part of baseline and needs assessment).
2. Semi-annual reports should provide:
 - (a) Total number of beneficiaries targeted by program
 - (b) Total number and percentage of beneficiaries reached per month, by sex and age (where available)
 - (c) Report changes in target levels
3. End of project reports should provide:
 - (a) Total number of beneficiaries targeted by program
 - (b) Total number and percentage of beneficiaries reached through the life of the program, by sex and age (where available)
 - (c) Information on measures undertaken to verify reported data

***Strategic Objective 1, Indicator #2:
Change in nutritional status of target groups***

Issues:

1. Although programs undertake nutrition surveys, or use secondary data, most reports do not provide data on nutritional status of target groups.
2. Most programs seek to *maintain* nutritional status, rather than change nutritional status.

Recommendations:

1. Semi-annual reports should provide information on :
 - (a) Nutritional status of targets groups. Baseline explained.
 - (b) Indicate whether nutritional status has been improved (or maintained). Provide supporting data (to verify report and quality)
2. End of project reports should provide information on:
 - (a) Indicate whether nutritional status has been improved (or maintained). Provide supporting data so reports can be verified.
3. The indicator should be reworded to include the *maintenance* (not only change) of nutritional status.

IR 1: Improved targeting of food aid to the most vulnerable populations

Indicator #1:

Percent of programs that have instituted a continuous process of needs assessment and recalibration of targeting

Issues:

1. Re-assessment and re-calibration of targets is not systematically performed. Only a few programs continued to assess needs during program implementation.
2. Assessment reports are not provided, in most cases.

Recommendations:

1. Assessment and re-calibrating of targets should become standard. Where feasible, linkages should be made with other agencies and partners undertaking needs assessments.
2. Semi-annual reports should provide information on the findings of assessments or re-assessments. Assessment reports should be included in reports. Standardized guideline to assess needs should be provided to programs.

Indicator #2:

Percent of programs that have incorporated special needs of different targeted groups

Issues:

1. Although the majority of programs target special needs of different targeted groups, most do not provide the number of beneficiaries. It is unclear what percentage of the total targeted population these special groups represent. It is unclear whether they constitute the total targeted population or just a fraction of it.
2. Some, but not all, programs provide information on rations provided to special groups.

Recommendations:

1. Semi-annual reports should provide information on:
 - (a) Special groups targeted. Percentage of special group(s) in relation to total population targeted by program
 - (b) Number and percentage of special groups reached per month, by sex and age (where available)
 - (c) Rations or other measures undertaken to meet specific needs of special group(s)
2. End-of-project reports should provide information on:
 - (a) Special groups targeted
 - (b) Total number and percentage of special groups reached, by sex and age (where available)
 - (c) Any changes in rations (or other measures). Include nutritional data, if appropriate.
3. The special groups most frequently targeted were (a) children - orphans, preschool and school children, unaccompanied minors; (b) women - mostly pregnant and lactating women; (c) malnourished - including young children. Ration levels should be reviewed to ensure the special needs of these groups are being met. Standardized guideline should be provided to programs.

IR2: Food aid delivered to target groups on schedule

Indicator #1:

Percent of programs experiencing Title II pipeline shortages

Issues:

1. When PL480 commodities did not arrive on time, it was frequently due to FFP/USDA.
2. Information was difficult to obtain to determine the baseline.

Recommendations:

1. FFP and USDA should make a concerted effort to resolve bottlenecks and reduce delivery time.
2. Semi-annual reports should include information on arrival of commodities vis-a-vis the agreed-upon schedule.
3. The FFP tracking system should include and monitor this indicator regularly. WFP programs should be included in the tracking system.

Indicator #2:

Percent of proposals reviewed and cooperating sponsors (CS) notified of decision within 21 calendar days of receipt

Issue:

1. There was incomplete data or no information on most programs.

Recommendation:

1. The FFP tracking system should be reviewed to ensure this indicator could be more easily monitored.

IR3: Improved planning to transition relief activities to development

Indicator #1:

Percent of programs that have developed resettlement or rehabilitation plans to integrate relief to development

Issues:

1. Many programs indicate plans are being developed to link relief to development, but reports do not indicate whether these programs were successful, or what the follow-up plans were.
2. There is no set policy to guide programs from emergency relief, transition and development, and graduation from food aid or exiting out. Although OFDA, FFP/ER, FFP/DP and OTI collaborate some of the time, this is not consistent.

Recommendations:

1. Semi-annual reports should provide information on:
 - (a) Plans to integrate relief to development, or to exit out, and progress made

2. End-of-project reports should provide information on:
 - (a) Whether or not the resettlement or rehabilitation plans were successful, reasons for success or failure, and lessons learned
 - (b) Recommendations for follow-up activities, or exiting
3. Policy guidelines should be provided to programs (in coordination with other BHR offices).

Indicator #2:

Percent of programs that have paid specific attention to avoid the negative impacts of food aid in program design and implementation (do no harm)

Issue:

1. Although programs took into account the "do no harm" issue in program design (and implementation), there is no information on whether or not they were successful.

Recommendation:

1. Semi-annual and end-of-project reports should provide information on:
 - (a) What specific actions were undertaken to address the issue
 - (b) What progress was made

IR4: Strengthened capabilities of cooperating sponsors and host country entities to manage emergency food aid programs

Indicator #1:

Percent of Institutional Strengthening Grants (ISG) supporting emergency planning and evaluation

change to:

Number of cooperating sponsors (or percent of programs) using ISG for emergency planning and evaluation

Issue:

1. It is not possible to analyze what percent of ISG grants are used for emergency programs as ISG grants provide overall support to both development and emergency programs.

Recommendations:

1. The indicator should be reworded.
2. ISG grants and reports should include separate sections for (a) emergency and (b) development.

Indicator #2:

Percent of programs collaborating with local institutions for activity results

Issue:

1. The majority of programs indicate collaboration at some level with local institutions. However, there is no standardized reporting.

Recommendations:

1. Reports should provide information on this indicator per the criteria used in the results framework, i.e:
 - (a) Activities implemented by local host entities with support from cooperating sponsors
 - (b) Joint activities undertaken with local host entities
 - (c) Local entities participate in needs assessment, selection of beneficiaries, monitoring of food aid, training, etc.
2. Reports should identify the local institutions.

Indicator #3:

Percent of cooperating sponsors able to meet reporting requirements

Issues:

1. Only a small percent of programs were able to meet reporting requirements.
2. Reports, when available, did not follow a standard format. Crucial information such as progress toward objectives, or number of beneficiaries reached during the reporting report, were not always included.
3. Although improvements have been made in the filing and retrieval system, the central files do have all reports and other important information.
4. Only a few acknowledgments and feedback were provided to programs on reports received.

Recommendations:

1. All programs should be required to provide semi-annual reports.
2. Provide standardized information to be provided by (a) semi-annual and (b) end-of-project reports.
3. The receipt of reports at FFP require better tracking. Master copies should be placed in the central files upon arrival.