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Master Copy
of
PPUERA TEAM
LEADER NOTEBOOK
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PPMERA TEAM LEADER'S NOTEBOOK

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INTRODUCTION

This team leader's notebook is an effort to pull together key documents that you will need to provide effective assistance to a field mission in program planning or monitoring, evaluation and reporting assistance (fondly known as PPMERA, or some variation thereof). We continue to add, delete and rearrange its contents as more assistance teams return with more lessons learned and more materials developed, so we welcome comments on its strengths and weaknesses. We wish you a successful TDY.

Many of you have asked "Why am I doing this, anyway?" A fair and logical question. In the paragraphs below, we give you a brief history of the evolution of field-based PPMERA. This section, as well as others in the team leader's notebook, assume a minimal familiarity with the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) and the precepts under which the Africa Bureau has chosen to carry out its mandate.

To assist missions with the shift in emphasis under the DFA to a results orientation, the Africa Bureau, through its Evaluation Working Group, recognized that some external training or on-the-job assistance in defining program objectives (as standards for monitoring and evaluation) and setting up program-level evaluation systems would be necessary. It was also recognized, however, that the resources would be limited.

After some consideration of alternatives, the Group chose, in 1989, an in-depth approach to providing assistance as a way of moving toward this new level of monitoring and evaluation as rapidly as possible. An in-depth approach meant that assistance was to be provided on a mission-by-mission basis so that all staff in the mission could participate and benefit.

The Bureau began to offer technical assistance teams to DFA priority (so-called "Category I") missions, and specifically targeted missions with upcoming Program Weeks at which they were scheduled to present and discuss their Country Development Strategy Statements or Action Plans.

Although the program planning/evaluation assistance was customized to meet the needs of a specific mission, its host country counterparts, its PVO partners, and, in some

cases, contractors for various projects, the standard approach has been to provide a team of at least two people:

- an Africa Bureau representative to convey the priority of the effort as well as the basic approach the Bureau recommends; and
- a contractor with program planning and evaluation experience¹

In addition, team members from key offices in the Bureau or the Agency (e.g., AFR/TR, PPC/CDIE and PPC/WID and their respective technical contractors) have participated in a number of teams and have brought their additional perspectives to these efforts.

The teams have most often provided two weeks of assistance to address the following tasks:

- introduce all staff members to the Country Program Logframe approach (using objective trees as the basic analytical tool);
- develop a draft program logframe with participation from all mission staff;
- establish suggested indicators for the program logframe including key assumptions and cross-cutting issues; and
- identify the linkage studies which the mission would have to undertake to evaluate program level performance.

These tasks represent the range of necessary tasks, but experience has shown that not all of them can be covered in any given TDY.

Over time, we have found that to get from the point where a mission is first introduced to the new approach to country program planning and evaluation to the point where there is a functioning monitoring and evaluation system in the mission capable of reporting regularly on impact (i.e., through an Assessment of Program Impact, or API),

¹The firm tapped has been Management Systems International (MSI) because of their extensive experience with monitoring and evaluation systems and, specifically, their familiarity with the Africa Missions evaluation systems gained through their management of the Collaborative Evaluation Workshops.

takes approximately three teams of assistance, with coverage of all the tasks listed occurring over a period of 18 to 24 months. During that two year period, significant commitments of mission time are required to fully implement the system.

Typically, the first team assists the mission to define a program logframe and begin the discussion of indicators. The second team assists the mission in refining the program logframe and identifies indicators. The third team refines the choices of indicators, develops data sources & tracking systems and addresses issues of management responsibilities.

The notebook contains both substantive and practical information. From a substantive point of view, you will find the Africa Bureau Evaluation Guidelines to be particularly useful. This not only gives detailed information on the rationale for the Africa Bureau's approach to program planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting, it also speaks to the roles and responsibilities of the Mission and of AFR/Washington. On the process side, the notebook includes information on various steps in the process of organizing and briefing a team and samples of relevant documents that the team leader, or the entire team, will be required to prepare - everything from guidance cables to trip reports.

We hope you find the notebook useful, and would welcome any feedback to AFR/DP/PPE. Bon voyage - you are now officially a Keeper of the DFA Flame.

FEB 1991

To: See Distribution
From: AFR/DP/PPE, *David Hess* and *Cindy Clapp-Wincek*
Subject: Direct Hire Team Leader Role and Resources in Providing Program Planning and Program Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting Assistance

Welcome. We are so glad to have you working with us on providing program planning and evaluation assistance to the Missions. The Missions you will be working with are especially pleased you are taking on this responsibility. This memo pulls together the lessons of the experience some of us have had in order to make future work more effective and efficient. The thoughts and advice provided here are to help orient your work - nothing in this area is hard and fast - which makes it more interesting and more challenging. The attached cables should be seen as examples rather than as models to copy.

1. The Direct Hire is the Team Leader. You represent the Africa Bureau on the requirements and expectations for program planning evaluation and reporting under the DFA. (You are authorized to say "Larry (or Scott) says"). You should be as versed in the Bureau's approach as you possibly can be. While we are not overly concerned that the DH be familiar with the country or the Mission program, you should become as informed as you can prior to the TDY. The more you know, the better you will be able to play your role (& the more you'll learn).

2. The Direct Hire must take the lead in preparatory communication with the Mission. While DP/PPE will be contacting the Mission about the exercise and its timing, once the DH Team Leader is designated, she/he should then initiate and continue close communication with the Mission Director and whoever else is relevant in the Mission on timing, preparation, expectations on both sides, etc. The scope of the assistance should be laid out in a cable and two examples are attached, one from the Guinea PPA and a generic MERA cable. FAX and telephone should, obviously, be used as needed. Above all, the Mission should be allowed to tailor (team planning) to best meet their needs.

3. The Direct Hire should organize the Team Planning Meeting which is a preparatory meeting before the team leaves Washington. While MSI or whoever else will be participating on the team will have roles in the TPM and our office is very willing to provide support, the DH should work out the agenda and make sure that the appropriate people and documents are available for the TPM. At a minimum, the TPM should review DFA program planning and evaluation methodology, discuss the perspective of key Bureau actors, especially the geographic office, on the country and involve any other offices as appropriate, eg. TR, MDI, DP/PAR, and/or whatever these offices become under our reorganization. One very important

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item to clarify is the schedule for submission of upcoming documentation, such as the CPSP, with desk. The TPM should also produce a solid draft work plan agreed upon by all team members. Roles should be assigned and clarified and tentative schedules set. The Team Leader should draft an ETA cable at the end of the TPM.

4. The Direct Hire, once in country should finalize the schedule and work plan and be ready to brief, formally or informally, any and all Mission people who want to know what exercise is about. You aren't a cheerleader, but you do need to clarify the importance of the exercise and emphasize that the entire Mission staff need to be stakeholders in program planning/evaluation. This may be done by meeting the Mission Director, his/her senior staff, the individual offices, or during after-hours events. Show them how this will be helpful in their work (eg CPSP preparation, API reporting, project and NPA design etc.)

5. Unless this is your first TDY of this type, the Direct Hire should be the primary facilitator, in explaining the methodology of the exercise and in working through the material to be produced, whether it's program logframe or MER systems. While you may feel more or less confident about your own skills as a facilitator or trainer, you should try to be the key spokesperson as you work with the Mission. You can work out roles for your MSI or other person to do most of the flipcharting, but you should be the leader of the exercise however it works out.

6. The Direct Hire should make sure that results of the exercise are finalized in whatever form makes the most sense - via memo, charts, etc. By doing this, you are providing a "deliverable" for the Mission and a point from which their on-going work can take off. Of course, the Mission Director should approve in your initial meeting what the particular product is and the Mission should be provided copies. Remember, however, you are not going out to write a CPSP or API for the Mission. Your product should summarize the process and the substantive suggestion you offered the Mission on program logframes and/or the development of monitoring, evaluation & reporting systems.

On technology and techniques -

- You must be sure to have flipchart paper, markers, masking tape, and Post-It's either with you or available at the Mission. The latter must NOT be assumed. If you must, take these materials in your luggage.
- Our office and MSI can provide you with the material for basic methodological presentations (the Spiel and Son of Spiel) - and, as noted above, we can help at your TPM's - just let us know.
- There are reportedly several software programs which help in building objective trees. The only one that we can personally vouch for is called ORGPLUS. It is an IBM compatible program

FEB 7 1991

and is very simple, ie. user friendly. Given the many edits and modifications which necessarily are made as these exercises transpire, putting objective trees on software is advised. As we have worked through these exercises, using the software has allowed printing of progressive versions of charts and more efficient and widespread participation in the Missions. If you want to know more about this program, please let us know.

Distribution:

AFR/DP/PAR:JSmith
AFR/TR/PRO:DKreslins
AFR/PD/SWA:PFeiden
AFR/TR/ANR:THobgood
AFR/PD/EA:Banderson

DFA PROGRAM PLANNING AND MEASUREMENT

Steps in Development of Program Monitoring System

1. Setting Up an Analytical Framework for Results
 - Develop objective tree with draft country goal, strategic objectives and targets.
 - Identify analytic and data gaps which need to be considered in CPSP.
 - Re-examine targets and choose appropriate levels for measurement.
2. Moving from Objective Trees to Strategic Choices
 - Identify preliminary indicators for targets.
 - Reality test target link with existing and planned portfolio elements.
 - Re-focus strategic objectives and reduce targets as needed.
3. Verifying and Refining Choices and Setting Up M/E/R System
 - Verify strategic objectives and select performance indicators for them.
 - Reality check target to strategic objective links.
 - Identify preliminary data source for all indicators.
 - Discuss selected objectives and indicators with government, NGOs, other contractors to ensure acceptability of targets and indicators and feasibility of reporting schedules.
 - Review country goal and set appropriate indicators.

4. Refining and Developing the M/E/R System

- Refinement of objectives/indicators for API use based on results of consultation with partner organizations who will provide data.
- Organizational responsibility assigned for each indicator or data measurement task.
- Internal reporting system and API development tasks clarified and schedules set for baseline reporting.

Notes on Using the Script

Each team leader should assess whether a general session on program planning, or monitoring, evaluation and reporting (MER) is needed. The attached script, visuals and definitions, as well as flip charts provided by MSI enable each team to present such a session if it is required.

The script is generic, predates the visuals that accompany it, and will have to be tailored for each use. For program planning assistance TDYs, you will want to dwell longer on the basic definitions, maybe actually complete an objective tree exercise, and skip the last three visuals re: characteristics of good indicators and program measurement responsibilities. For MER TDYs, much of script will be review, and you can move through it more quickly, but will want to be sure to include a discussion of the last three visuals, which pertain directly to MER. It is your responsibility to assess, together with the mission, how much to include in your presentation, and how to gauge it to meet the mission's needs.

It is recommended that you review the script prior to presenting it, and assure that the flip chart pages and/or visuals are in the same order as the materials you plan to present.

You may use either the health or agricultural marketing objective tree as illustration. Each illustrates something different, and you should use the one that you are most comfortable with and that makes the points you want to make.

You may wish to make sure that each person in the mission attending the session receives a set of the visuals and definitions. You can either hand them out at the beginning and let people follow along and take notes on the pages, or not, according to your preference.

The program planning video tape that each mission was sent in June 1991 can be used to further supplement your presentation, and/or for mission review of the programming principles.

SCRIPT FOR CONSULTANCY

ON

PROGRAM DESIGN, MANAGEMENT
AND EVALUATION

UNDER THE

DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AFRICA

November 21, 1989

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Introduction

1. DFA -- Contract between the senior management of the Africa Bureau and the US Congress
 - more flexibility & more assured budget in return for
 - more information on impact in the short term & greater impact in the longer term
2. Washington subcontracts with the missions -- this plays out in the Action Plan process
3. Last spring we did six Program Weeks and Larry/The Bureau repeated the same set of messages:

FLIPCHART:

DFA Message

RESULTS

FOCUS

CONCENTRATE

TRACKING

SCRIPT:

DFA MESSAGE

- RESULTS -- the emphasis under the DFA is on results -- people level impact
- FOCUS -- focus attention on those problems where our assistance can make a difference and lead to results
- CONCENTRATE -- your resources on fewer problems in order to increase the likelihood of achieving results
- TRACKING -- both to increase the impact/results of our assistance by improved management decision making and for reporting to Congress.

PURPOSES
[of this spiel]

- Better understand what AFR means by "program performance"
- Develop shared vocabulary and concepts
- Better understand the process of developing strategic objectives, targets and benchmark indicators for a country program
- Better understand what kind of management contract between the Missions and AFR/W is possible



FLIPCHART:

**COUNTRY
PROGRAM**

**MISSION PORTFOLIO OF PROJECTS AND NONPROJECTS PLUS THE POLICY
ANALYSES, DIALOGUES, ETC THAT THE MISSION SUPPORTS OR DOES
(INCLUDING FOOD AID, DIRECT HIRE RESIDENT STAFF, ETC)**

OBJECTIVE TREES


- A graphic display of the cause and effect relationships between a number of inter-related factors
- Each level identifies the necessary and sufficient requirements to reach the next higher level



FLIPCHART:

LOGFRAME
[is AID's version of this for projects]

[Arbitrarily decided on 4 levels]



⑤ If purpose is achieved then this will contribute to achievement of the goal]

④ If outputs are produced then purpose will be achieved]

③ If inputs are managed properly, then the outputs will be produced]

⑥ [manageable interest: in project design, they teach that output is in the manageable interest of the project manager. Go to next page --]

FLIPCHART:

MANAGEABLE INTEREST

- MANAGEMENT CONTRACT
- RESULTS VS. ACTIVITIES AND PROCEDURES
- RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT AUTHORITY

SCRIPT:

1. Management contract that the outputs will be accomplished
 2. Read the RESULTS VS. ACTIVITIES AND PROCEDURES and RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT AUTHORITY
 3. "The project manager has the authority over the inputs -- he can make the commodities arrive and hire the TA team -- but he has the responsibility over the results of those activities i.e. the outputs
 4. But because the mission can control assumptions through the authority to redesign, the project purpose is in the manageable interest of the mission i.e. the project manager takes the assumptions as a given. If an ag project in the Sahel assumes rain and fails, it is not the responsibility of the project manager. But if the mission has ag projects that fail for fifteen years because of too little rain, then they are making the wrong set of choices. They are responsible for purpose level achievement -- it should be in their manageable interest.
- [while making this spiel, I usually flip back to the logframe chart and I also flip forward to the complete logframe chart]

FLIPCHART:

PROJECT LOGFRAME

**OBJECTIVELY
VERIFIABLE
INDICATORS**

**MEANS
OF
VERIFICATION**


ASSUMPTIONS

	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS
GOAL			
PURPOSE			
OUTPUTS			
INPUTS			

SCRIPT:

1. Note that the narrative column is different from the ~~key~~ ^{OVI} -- we noted that in many of the Action Plans last spring, that this was not a clear distinction
2. Assumptions -- in good design, you only put things in the assumption column that you expect to hold

FLIPCHART:



SCRIPT(Begins on the flipchart for program logframe but goes to other charts as well -- see [] below):

1. In the same sense that you have a project logframe, there is a country program logframe. Using the pre-existing jargon from the Action Plan guidance (and it is common to all the Bureaus), we have defined a logframe for the mission's country program. [Point to levels and names].
2. The strategic objective is what should be in the manageable interest of the mission -- and at the same time should be defined in terms of people level impact.
3. [Flip back to the manageable interest chart, review if necessary, and ADD
"-- HIGHEST LEVEL RELATED TO MISSION ACTION"]
4. Back on this chart, at strategic objective level -- "have to remember that this objective has to be affected to a measurable degree." Any mission should probably have no more than two to three strategic objectives.
5. Anything above the strategic objective level should have "goal" in the name to indicate that it is something to which the mission contributes.
6. Targets are simply the row of boxes on the objective tree below the strategic objective.
7. Number of levels not important -- put in as many levels as you want either below targets or above strategic objectives. One of the things people did not like about the logframe was that they felt constrained by four levels. For the program logframe, you need however many levels are necessary to do the analysis of what is necessary and sufficient to accomplish the program. [Of course, a project logframe could have more than four levels anyway].

8. "In defining strategic objectives" [flip back to the example on flipchart # ___], do not distort strategic objectives in order to include everything in the program that is related to them. Don't make them so broad that they cover everything. In the health example, AIDs was redefined as something called a target of opportunity. The definition of a target of opportunity is :


- something that the mission has compelling reasons for doing (and that includes earmarks where the mission was compelled by Washington/Congress), or
- something where the relationship to impact is so distant that even making the case would be difficult (e.g. some of the NRM activities -- they are important to the government, the mission, the Bureau and the Congress but actual people level impact is not in the manageable interest of a mission)

Targets of opportunities are currently recognized as acceptable in Washington, but realistically any mission that came in with too many would be begging the question.

9. [Flip back to the full logframe chart] "in the same way that the means of verification are different from the narrative column, using the jargon from the preexisting Action plan guidance, we have defined benchmarks and indicators as synonymous. Although this is not the way evaluation people use benchmark, it was causing too much confusion and we have simplified. Benchmark indicators are simply what tells you if you are achieving your stated objectives" [Draw a column of boxes next to the program logframe. Fill in the bottom one with "BENCHMARK INDICATOR".] "At the strategic objective level, because this is the level Washington is most interested in, we have given the benchmark indicators the name 'performance indicators' -- still they are simply what will tell you if you are achieving the objectives you set out.


In the sense that the program goal tends to be the overall development of the country the mission is assisting, the indicators will be the same as the country trend indicators -- the data collected by the World Bank, WHO, FAO, whatever. But that depends somewhat on how the mission defines their program goal.

PROGRAM LOGFRAME




LINKS


PROJECT
LEVEL



COUNTRY
PROGRAM
LEVEL



BUREAU
LEVEL



SCRIPT:

1. Project level logframe, country program level, and Bureau level -- the DFA Action Plan defines the Bureau level.

2. Through this process of defining a country program in different terms, we have said that the relationship between the country program [point to strategic objectives] is very tightly linked with the project level. This whole process requires that the projects be more tightly linked to the country program. And it is the missions' responsibility to define objectives and report on their performance in achieving those objectives.

3. What is less clear is the relationship between the Bureau and Country program levels. In the LAC Bureau, in their management by objectives exercise, they defined some 20 objectives for the Bureau -- the equivalent of the DFA's four strategic objectives. But LAC said that everything in the Mission programs had to contribute to those 20 objectives. In addition, they told missions what indicators they had to report on. If that indicator was useful to the mission, they probably did a good job of collecting the data -- but if it was not a good fit: well they are busy people with more important things to do than get useless numbers for Washington. They probably did not do a very good job of collecting that data. This gets "numbers" without really getting data that we can use with any confidence -- something we will try to avoid in Africa Bureau.

[Pointing to the right column with Bureau level] The Bureau defined the Strategic objectives in the DFA Action Plan with the expectation that mission portfolios would address those issues increasingly over time, but it is acceptable for mission portfolios to have strategic objectives that do not necessarily address the four DFA strategic objectives directly.

Workshop Objectives

- ☛ Understand Development Fund for Africa (DFA) advantages and commitments.
- ☛ Understand DFA Program Planning Methodology (Objective Trees)
- ☛ Improve skills in developing objectives.
- ☛ Define preliminary Mission Program goal.
- ☛ Establish work plan for Program Planning

Development Fund for Africa

Advantages:

- Meet more challenges in African development
- More flexibility in programming
- Greater realism in implementation
- Congressional interest and support

A.I.D. Country Program



1. Project assistance
2. Non-project assistance
3. Food aid assistance
4. PVO/NGO grants
5. Policy dialogue
6. Donor Coordination
7. Analysis and studies
8. Field mission presence:
 - U.S. and FSN direct hires
 - Contract employees

Commitments


- Emphasis on results:
Improvements in people's lives — People Level Impact
- Increased strategic focus
- Greater concentration of resources
- Measure and report impact on people

Objective Trees Offer:

- Graphic display of causes and results
- Identify necessary and sufficient elements to produce results



Example:



Objective Tree Exercise

1. Develop objective tree for at least three levels.
 2. Put on chart.
 3. Present to group.
-

Starting Point:

Improve access to ag. production technology for women and men

Project Logical Framework


Narrative	Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions
Goal:			
Purpose:	End of Project Status		
Outputs:			
Inputs:			

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
Program Logical Framework

	<u>Narrative</u>	<u>Other Nec/Suffic Elements</u>	<u>Indicators</u>	<u>Data Source/Responsibility</u>
Goal:			Country Trend	
Strategic Objective			Performance	
Target				

Program Logframe




Program Logframe




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
Project/ NPA Level




Country Program Level




Bureau Level





SOME STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES WILL FIT CLOSELY WITH OFFICES -- OTHERS WILL CUT ACROSS BOUNDARIES



Sustainability

- ☛ Natural Resources
- ☛ Institutional
- ☛ Policy Environment

Gender

- ☛ Equity
- ☛ Understand Differential Impact

DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AFRICA

A GLOSSARY OF PROGRAM PLANNING JARGON

- ATTRIBUTION** The process of making a direct causal link between resource allocation and outcome or result. This word is not, repeat not, to be the operative word in monitoring and evaluation of the Development Fund for Africa.
- ASSESSMENT PROGRAM IMPACT** A document which reports Mission program progress on an annual basis to AFR/W. It is based upon the program logframe. "Doing the API" is often heard as a shorthand for "program monitoring, evaluation, and reporting." This is somewhat inaccurate as the API is only the reporting document itself, due on October 31 each year.
- ASSOCIATION** The process of relating AID program activity to a development process which results in a particular outcome. It differs from "attribution" in that the cause-effect relationship involves others as well as AID. IT may not be possible, ever, to "prove" that AID or someone else did something which led to the result. Or the "credit" for the effect must be shared as it cannot be separated.
- CONCENTRATE** To allocate program resources (both financial and human) in a limited enough way so that the chances of "making a difference" are enhanced
- COUNTRY PROGRAM** See also Program. A country program is the sum of project and nonproject assistance, food aid assistance, PVO/NGO grants, policy dialogue, donor coordination, analysis and studies, and the field mission presence (U.S. and FSN direct-hires, contract employees).
- DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AFRICA** Special legislation which gives AID authority and budgetary resources to provide assistance to Africa in a unique manner (no functional accounts, "targets" instead of budgetary earmarks, two year funding, etc.). Better known as the DFA. In return for flexibility and "assured"

budget levels, Congress expects development results. Special reporting requirements are also associated with the DFA.

EVALUATION	A management activity that is undertaken selectively to inform managers about key issues before major decisions are made regarding existing AID-funded activities or future program development, that is, the issues of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability. Evaluation involves analysis of the cause-effect relationships which occurred, intentionally or unintentionally, in the implementation of an activity or program.
FOCUS	To select the objectives for a country program that can be feasibly achieved given the resources available or other factors of importance.
GOAL (or PROGRAM GOAL)	What a country program wants to accomplish over the long term. The highest level objective in a Mission's program (and program logframe). It should be expressed in terms of positive changes in the lives of Africans, i.e., imply "people-level impact." The goal is likely to be long-term, achievable only in a timeframe of ten years or more.
HOW?	One of the questions to ask in constructing an objective tree. By constantly asking "how?" as one is moving down the objective tree, it is essential to understand which "causes" will lead to the desired "effect" or "result" at a higher level.
INDICATORS	Measures, data points, variables or statements which can be counted or assessed on a regular basis to quantitatively or qualitatively demonstrate progress (or lack of progress) toward achieving a given objective. Indicators should be time-bound (so many widgets produced in 1992), quantified, and, where possible, related to people. Three classes of indicators are normally associated with a program logframe. (1) Country trend indicators help in monitoring progress toward a program goal or subgoal. Program performance indicators facilitate monitoring of achievement of strategic objectives. Just plain indicators provide a framework for monitoring achievement of targets and subtargets achievement.
MANAGEABLE	Those elements of a Mission program logframe for which Mission

INTEREST	management is prepared to accept responsibility for achievement, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting, i.e., that highest level of an objective tree associated with Mission action. In other words, strategic objectives. The Mission will probably not control all the necessary and sufficient elements which achieve the objectives (or produce the results) for which it is taking responsibility. For those elements which it does not control, the Mission must monitor whether progress is being made so it can know if its objectives can and will be achieved.
LEVEL OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	The indicator levels which tell the person monitoring the program that an objective (goal, subgoal, strategic objective, target, subtarget) has been achieved. Sometimes referred to as the "target level". This use of "target," however, is confusing so level of achievement is preferred.
MONITORING	A continuous management activity that requires information about (1) the use of assistance resources according to plans and regulations and (2) the interim results and effectiveness of resources in light of initial or revised objectives ("ongoing evaluation"). A monitoring system is an organized process with assigned responsibilities and functions to specific individuals or offices and a defined product (e.g., a PIR, API, or other document which uses and/or reports on changes in the values of various indicators).
OBJECTIVE TREE	A graphic display of cause and effect which can be used as the framework for establishing a hierarchy of objectives and used as the basis for making the strategic choices identifying desired impact and leading to the specification of the Mission's country program logframe.
PEOPLE-LEVEL IMPACT	Positive changes in the lives of African people as a result of AID's and others' assistance efforts. Such impact stated in individual terms generally implies rising per capita incomes, expanded employment, declining fertility rates, increased levels of educational achievement, improved nutritional status, etc. Sometimes referred to as PLI, but this is taking jargon much too far.
PROGRAM	See also Country Program. A country program is the sum of project

and nonproject assistance, food aid assistance, PVO/NGO grants, policy dialogue, donor coordination, analysis and studies, and the field mission presence (U.S. and FSN direct-hires, contract employees).

PROGRAM LOGICAL FRAMEWORK (PROGRAM LOGFRAME) The hierarchy of objectives (from program goal down to sub-targets) selected by the Mission as the planning framework for the provision of U.S. development assistance to a particular country under the Development Fund for Africa.

REPORTING Communicating results of AID programs and activities both between units within the Agency and Bureau and outside of the Agency.

RESULTS The outcomes to be achieved, at least in part, by AID assistance. Results at the strategic objective and program goal levels should relate to positive changes in the lives of Africa people to the maximum extent practicable.

SO WHAT? The question to be asked as one verifies a draft objective tree for logic and completeness. Starting from the bottom, one moves up the tree verifying that lower-order objectives indeed contribute to and are necessary and sufficient to the achievement of objectives at the next higher level up. The "so what?" question may also be asked as "why?"

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE The highest level of objective(s) in a Mission program logframe which is in the manageable interest of the Mission. Under the DFA, strategic objectives should be articulated in such a way that: (1) results are as close to people-level impact as possible; (2) are achievable (or can be substantially achieved) in a period of five to seven years; (3) are measurable with a set of program performance indicators; and (4) relate in some way to the strategic objectives or targets of the DFA Action Plan. However, it is possible that, because of Mission resources and capacities or the local situation in different sectors or problem areas, the Mission may choose objectives which are not closely related to the DFA Action Plan and/or are at different levels on the objective tree.

SUB-GOAL The level(s) of objectives in a program logframe which lie between the program goal and the strategic objectives.

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- SUBTARGET** The level(s) of objectives immediately below targets. In large mission programs, it is sometimes useful to articulate subtargets to make the link between activity objectives and the program logframe clearer. Accomplishment of subtargets contributes to achievement of a target.
- TARGET** The level of objective(s) immediately below that of a strategic objective in the Mission program logframe. A target should be attainable, or substantially achievable, within a three to five year timeframe. Accomplishment of a target contributes to achievement of a strategic objective.
- TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY** An objective or activity for which there are compelling reasons to include it in the Mission's basic program strategy (as expressed in the program logframe). Some of the compelling reasons noted are historical, political, humanitarian, or public relations..
- TRACKING** The generic word for monitoring and evaluation, with a little sector studies and subsector analysis thrown in for good measure.
- WHAT ELSE?** The question to ask in constructing an objective tree as one moves across a level. "What else" refers to all elements which are necessary and sufficient to achieve the objective above.

6/24/91 (Note this date. No doubt this list will be expanded and/or refined with use.)

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AFRICA BUREAU EVALUATION GUIDELINES

I. Introduction

These guidelines update the Africa Bureau Supplementary Guidelines of March, 1990, and should be read in tandem with the A.I.D. Evaluation Handbook prepared by PPC/CDIE and the Africa Bureau's Guidebook for Project Development Officers. These guidelines incorporate all previous relevant guidance, and include new guidance on impact reporting and sustainability. Tentative information on the effect which the Africa Bureau reorganization will have on the Bureau's monitoring, evaluation, and reporting system is also provided.

What we are trying to accomplish by strengthening our monitoring, evaluation and reporting efforts in Africa can be captured in three words: **impact, effectiveness, and sustainability**. Each of these words can, in turn, be defined with a simple question:

- Impact: Are Africans better off?
- Effectiveness: What works and what doesn't?
- Sustainability: Will the impact last?

Impact: Are Africans better off?

"Impact" is synonymous in the Africa Bureau with "results under the DFA." Both are defined to mean measurable, positive changes in peoples' lives associated with A.I.D. action. The Bureau also uses "program performance" to mean demonstrated results or impact associated with Mission actions in the implementation of the country program.

The history of the DFA "clearly shows that Congress expects A.I.D. to implement the DFA in a manner that will have a measurable impact on Africa's economic development"¹ and further, that this means "meeting human needs, such as health and education, while at the same time meeting larger economic development needs of the country."² The Africa Bureau does not find these directives inconsistent and, therefore, emphasizes that all country program designs and evaluations should be oriented, to the extent practicable, with what has become known in shorthand as "people-level impact".

Good design of country programs and activities should lead to positive intended impacts (Figure 1). Positive unintended impacts are not unwelcome but, when they are identified in the course of an evaluation or sector study, they imply that there is more we need to understand about the situation in which we are acting. This also the case with negative impacts.

Figure 1. Possible Impacts of Programs and Activities

	Intended	Unintended
Positive	Most often the subject of MER systems in Missions	Often found in evaluations, not unwelcome
Negative	Rarely the point of a development program or activity	Found in evaluations, generally not welcome

Effectiveness: What works and what doesn't?

There is a tremendous sense of satisfaction in simply being able to report on positive impact, as it implies we have been supporting something long enough and intelligently enough to have made a difference. But most managers in AID feel that knowing what impact we have had really only matters if we go on to understand how it was achieved and use that understanding to increase the chances of having greater impact in the future. We need to know what works best to get the most positive impact with the least time, trouble, expense and staff.

Development professionals are constantly making choices to improve the effectiveness of a program. Who has not asked:

-- Which development theories should

A.I.D. follow? Which best explain the cases in which good results were achieved? Which have not produced expected results?

-- Should A.I.D. focus on the direct provision of immunizations and oral rehydration therapy or should we help build the country's primary health care system so that it can sustain continuous provision of these services in the future?

-- Should A.I.D. be supporting policy reform or providing technical solutions?

-- Should A.I.D. be focussing on agricultural production enterprises or on the businesses in the private sector which ensure markets for farmers and raise income and consumption outside of the agricultural sector?

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-- Should A.I.D. be using more project or nonproject assistance if it wishes to increase the sustainability of program results? Does NPA generate more negative, unintended impact and is it less effective?

In short, A.I.D.'s development professionals are constantly challenged to determine which are the most effective approaches to maximize impact, i.e., where each dollar or unit of effort will yield the most result. Further, since time is money, a consideration of effectiveness requires us to assess in what timeframe these approaches will produce results.

It is clear that effectiveness and impact are related -- but they are not the same. If one has twenty years to accomplish something and limited funds to do it, the most effective way may be to start out with training a cadre of professionals who can then implement the task themselves with domestic resources and assure that the impact is sustainable with such resources. If one wants the same result, but within five years and funding is not a constraint, it may be advisable to import some professionals ("technical assistance") to help out in the short term and to use external funding to make up for limited domestic resources.

The specification of the desired impact is critical and should derive from the analysis of the problems and opportunities of particular circumstances -- most often analyzed at the country level and presented in the Country Program Strategic Plan -- as well as from Agency

and/or Bureau policy. But there are often many routes to achieve the desired impact and this requires us to exercise judgements as to what is likely to be most effective in a given situation. This is why evaluation is only as good as planning -- and good managers must do both.

Sustainability: Will it last?

There are both sustainable and unsustainable ways to achieve impact. Impact can result from a donor *directly* providing the necessary goods and services, e.g., childrens' lives being spared as they are protected from measles through externally-financed and staffed immunization campaigns. Such campaigns, used extensively to eliminate smallpox as a global disease, have demonstrated that they can indeed bring down the rate of infant mortality.

But many of the results stemming from programs in which donors provide all necessary goods and services are only sustainable so long as the donors continue to provide funding or personnel. Turnkey provision of a rural road network, for example, might provide the necessary infrastructure for cheaper transport of agricultural goods and, thus, cheaper food supplies for urban consumers and an overall increase in their consumption and nutrition levels. However, a lack of road maintenance by the local government or populace will soon guarantee that urban food prices will once again creep upward, with negative impacts on peoples' food budgets and consumption.

We need approaches to development that lead to impact in such a way that the flow of such results (benefits) is sustained independently of external assistance. The Africa Bureau's strong emphasis on impact under the DFA should not, therefore, be interpreted to mean that short-term impact achieved with unsustainable approaches is preferable to a more-delayed impact which is sustainable. Some kind of balance must be sought.

As we look at the Bureau's evaluation system, we recognize that current monitoring and evaluation systems may have difficulty capturing sustainability. Indeed, there is some danger that the emphasis on impact alone could lead to:

- a lack of emphasis on development efforts which will lead to long-term institutionalization processes which are, in many cases, essential to sustaining positive impact; or
- avoiding provision of support for such efforts because they will require a high and long-term commitment of missions' monitoring and evaluation resources to track impact.

This danger can, however, be averted if one is alert to it. To focus on short-term impact and to neglect sustainability would be a distortion of the intent of the DFA. To better understand how the balance should be struck and why, keep reading.

II. The Priority of Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting and the Development Fund for Africa (DFA)

The Development Fund for Africa (DFA), created in the appropriating legislation of late 1987, revolutionized evaluation in the Africa Bureau. Prior to that time, evaluation was one priority among many. But the DFA's emphasis on having a measurable impact on economic and social development in Africa (i.e., results) and the need to track and report on those results moved evaluation up the priority list.

By the elimination of functional accounts from A.I.D.'s sub-Saharan African assistance program, the DFA increased the Bureau's flexibility in programming resources. At the same time, it provided a degree of budgetary protection during an era of generally declining resources. This new flexibility encouraged the Bureau to ensure that the lessons of experience played a larger role in programming decisions across sectors and countries. At the Bureau level, this was reflected immediately by the inclusion of short discussions of the lessons of experience with regard to each of the proposed objectives laid out in the DFA Action Plan. Sustained, effective use of the DFA, however, required the Bureau as a whole to strengthen its monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems to improve program effectiveness and impact.

With the DFA, therefore, the

Bureau explicitly shifted resources to enhance the use of monitoring and evaluation process:

- as a key tool for increasing impact by permitting program management decisions to be based on better information on what is being accomplished;
- as a regular source of information on the cost-effectiveness of various approaches, permitting resources to be concentrated on those areas which seem to be working and focused on problems that respond to external support; and
- to support the kind of reporting requested by the Congress, including whether or not the impacts achieved with short-term DFA funding would be sustained over the long-term.

The Bureau evaluation system in 1987 was not designed to meet the level and types of demand placed on it by the DFA. A period of system development was begun with the explicit participation of all offices in the Bureau (see Annex G for more detail on how this process worked).

The first step was to define the system as including "reporting" as well as "monitoring" and "evaluation" and to begin to define the operating concepts associated with each of these terms. The second step involved focusing on laying out clear objectives for development performance at the country program,

rather than project, level. The third step, currently in process, emphasizes systematic measurement and reporting of country program results.

Although the system development phase is not yet complete, and, in a sense, can never be, as staff come and go in the Bureau and the Agency evaluation environment is evolving in new ways, the Bureau's monitoring, evaluation, and reporting system has been substantially modified.

III. Brief Overview of the Bureau's Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting System

The basic operation of the Bureau's monitoring, evaluation, and reporting (MER) system involves the collection, analysis, use, and transmittal of information for decision-making.³

Generally speaking, **monitoring** has to do with the ongoing collection of information which is then compared against some standard or some expected value/condition in order to assess progress or lack of progress. **Evaluation** looks at an activity (or group of activities) at a point in time to analyze and interpret the monitoring data.

Without evaluation, monitoring tells a decision-maker how different parts of an activity (or group of activities) are doing but without clarifying whether the planned causal relationships are holding true.

Evaluation permits decision-makers to verify whether or not the planned causal relationships are true and are leading (or have led) to the desired result, or whether there are other factors, not originally taken into account, which are affecting the outcome.⁴ Because evaluation relies so heavily on monitoring in A.I.D., the term "evaluation function" is often used to include monitoring, but they are, in fact, separate and distinct functions. For convenience, even this guidance uses "evaluation system" to characterize the whole monitoring, evaluation, and reporting system but that short phrase should be understood to encompass all functions.

Reporting refers to the transmittal of monitoring and/or evaluation information between or among managers or decision-makers in an organization. An effective reporting system culls information from each level in a management hierarchy that which will be useful at other levels but it does not distort what is produced at each level. In the Africa Bureau, we try to avoid information overload by asking Missions or offices to "report out" only what is useful to other parts of the Bureau or the external audiences we are trying to reach.

A. **MER and Decision-Making**

The Africa Bureau's monitoring, evaluation, and reporting system has been developed along lines laid out in a series of cables, written guidance messages, and organizational statements regarding the

processes and standards for monitoring, evaluation, and reporting on U.S. assistance at **three decision-making levels.**

- **Activity.** Both projects and nonprojects (or sector assistance) can be considered individual "activities." They form a common basis for the Bureau's evaluation system. The managers of most activities tend to be technical officers, although in the case of some large nonproject activities, top Mission decision-makers may also play direct management roles by leading policy dialogues, conducting policy negotiations with the government and other donors, etc.

- **Country Program.** Prior impact evaluations of activities had strongly indicated that, in Africa, any individual activity was generally too small to overcome all the constraints to achieving a level of impact which could be said to have made a significant, sustainable difference in peoples' lives. It followed, therefore, that if we were to respond to the mandate of the DFA to make such a difference, we not only had to try to better evaluate our activities, but we actually had to cluster (or concentrate) activities and resources to increase the chances of achieving impact. The level at which it seemed realistic to expect to both achieve and measure impact is that of the country

program. A country program is defined as all resources the Mission has to bring to bear on development problems. The Mission Director, therefore, has principal responsibility to manage for country program impact, although this responsibility is shared with top AFR/W management which allocates budgetary and staff resources to the country program.

-- **Africa-wide.** As a decentralized organization, most AID managers are concerned almost solely with the activity and country program levels of decision-making, monitoring, and evaluation. However, Congress and the American taxpayer also expect answers to questions such as "What have been the results of U.S. assistance to Africa?" or, more narrowly, "What has been the result of A.I.D.'s Child Survival programs in Africa?" It is essential, under the DFA, to avoid the simple answers: "Sixty percent of A.I.D.'s activities in Africa have achieved their objectives." Such a response tells the interested taxpayer a little about A.I.D.'s effectiveness as an organization but absolutely nothing about the results being achieved -- especially since country program objectives can vary so widely. To look at Africa-wide impacts, it is necessary to go beyond country program reporting and to place the "point estimates" which Missions

can provide into some sort of comparative context. This is the responsibility of AFR/W rather than the field, although Missions share some of the responsibility for contributing information in a format in which AFR/W can use it.

While there is a certain need for worldwide and Agency-wide monitoring, evaluation, and reporting, the Bureau's direct responsibilities are limited to coordinating with CDIE on this type of evaluation and to reporting results from Africa as feasible.

Figure 2 shows the linkages between the levels and the key actors at each level.

B. The Rationale for the Current System

As is evident from the description so far, the Africa Bureau monitoring, evaluation, and reporting system is decentralized. The rationale for such decentralization stems from our concern with both quality and efficiency. Experience in development of monitoring systems has shown that both quality and efficiency of information collection, processing, and use are enhanced when responsibility for gathering and analyzing the information is located as close to the user as possible.

Activity monitoring and evaluation is clearly the predominant concern for the greatest number of people in the Bureau. Monitoring and evaluation of activities has

Figure 2. Who Does What in the Africa Bureau MER System

Source of MER Information	PRIMARY USERS	SECONDARY USERS	KEY DOCUMENTS FOR REPORTING
Activity	Activity managers; AFR/W backstops	Mission managers	Activity evaluations; PIRs
Country Program	Mission managers; Bureau managers in AFR/W	External audiences; other Bureaus	Assessments of Program Impact (API)
Africa-Wide	Bureau managers in AFR/W; AID/W; External audiences	Technical communities; Mission feedback (incentives)	"DFA Report"; CP Overview Testimony

traditionally been focussed on efficiency issues: managing the delivery and utilization of a given set of resources on a timely basis with the least amount of funds or effort. In project logframe terms, such monitoring, evaluation, and reporting primarily addresses the input-output linkages.

It follows that most activity managers pay most attention to indicators which tell them that contracting, logistics, procurement, and task implementation are (or are not) on track. However, there has been a debate in recent years as to the level of attention which activity managers can and should give to tracking of progress toward purpose-level outcomes (EOPS). There is clear agreement that an activity's MER system must be geared toward such tracking.

Given this, one oft-suggested approach to designing an Africa-wide evaluation system asserts that all impact monitoring and reporting should be completely activity-based, given that activities are the "building blocks" of all that AID does. Activity monitoring and evaluation information, it is argued, can be used not only by activity managers, but also at both the country level and in the continent-wide summation of a sector/subsector. Such a linear system would imply, however, that activity managers would not only have to devote considerably greater effort would have to monitoring the impact of activities in their portfolios but to actually carrying out post-project impact evaluations as well. Further, steps would have to taken at the Bureau level to ensure that activities would have to be done in great enough numbers so that these would be sufficient

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to meet all Africa-wide reporting needs.

Experience indicates that such a completely activity-based system for assessing and reporting on the impact of AID activity in Africa would be neither efficient nor effective. Occasionally, missions have undertaken independent efforts to look at the impact of activities. But more often the approach has been of AFR/W or AID/W sending external teams to a series of countries to assess the impact of similar activities after the termination of the externally-supported phase of the activity rather than requesting individual missions to assess each of their activities.

There are several reasons for the cross-country, multiple-activity approach to evaluating the results of projects and sector assistance (nonprojects). The most obvious are practical ones. The association of impact with a single activity is often very difficult and requires special effort to determine association and causality. At the time the evaluation should be done (post-project implementation), the Mission has generally moved on to other priority actions, including implementation of follow-on phases of the activity. "Wrapping up" kinds of activities tend to get lost in the press of current business.

Other reasons are more persuasive:

- A reliance solely on activity monitoring and evaluation under-represents all the other resources in the system.

In AID's Africa program, projects and nonprojects are the dominant building blocks of country programs, but emergency food aid, policy dialogue, PVO collaboration, donor coordination, and the technical skills of the Mission staff itself are the cement that holds the blocks together and brings a certain synergy to the project/nonproject portfolio.

- When overworked project managers are required by fiat to report information only tangentially related to the focus of their particular activity, it will not be directly useful to them. The quality of data collected and transmitted will inevitably be poor and will require corrective actions to be taken outside of the activity system anyway.

- Although the information in the Africa Bureau's and missions' systems is largely based on the same set of activities on the ground (i.e. projects, nonprojects, local currency programs, etc.), the information must be looked at in different ways for different audiences. Activities and Mission managers are not generally aware of contacts with the variety of audiences reached by AID/W.

A country-program orientation in the design of an impact monitoring, evaluation, and reporting system

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overcomes many of the drawbacks encountered in a solely activity-based evaluation system. A monitoring, evaluation, and reporting system focussed on the country program level can both make more efficient use of mission staff time and more readily capture impact.

While any one activity may be too small to lead to sustainable impact, the Mission management team can concentrate resources on a few objectives likely to positive affect peoples' well-being and focus all resources (activities, personal energy, and analytical support) on the achievement of these objectives. The emphasis on the country program is also consistent with the way in which resources are allocated by AFR/W and permits a linkage to be made between program performance, financing, and staffing.

Development of country program MER systems in the DFA priority (Category I) countries is about halfway complete, i.e., about half of the Missions have developed "objectively verifiable" program strategies, complete with strategic objectives, targets, and indicators, and have begun to set up information collection, analysis, and reporting systems which reflect more than just the sum of their activity MER systems.

This process has required a substantial reorientation of mission thinking and the introduction of new program documents, the Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP) and the Assessment of Program Impact (API).

The CPSP was introduced as a document combining aspects of the Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS) and Action Plan for DFA priority countries as a result of two years of intensive efforts to "change the way we do business" for effective implementation of the DFA. Over this period, various approaches were tried and their efficacy debated. By December, 1989, the first efforts were made to communicate the planning for the CPSP process to the field (Annex c). Since then, time has been spent making it work as envisioned.

The first step in evolving the CPSP was taking a critical look at the way that country programs were being designed and their objectives negotiated by AFR/W and mission managers. The second level of inputs came from broad discussion of how to improve the concentration and focus of the programs and to increase their orientation toward results. The third contribution came from Bureau leadership as AFR/W managers recognized that changing documentation requirements could reinforce efforts to accomplish the program concentration/focus objective and foster better tracking of results.

The process of revising and refining the AFR/W approach to strategic planning goes on. There is an active program of technical assistance to individual missions in program planning and monitoring, evaluation, and reporting (in which direct-hire staff from AID/W participate with contract specialists in the technical assistance process).

The Assessment of Program Impact (API) was introduced as a separate document in late FY 1990. According to the initial guidance: "The API will be the principal vehicle for Category I missions to report to AID/W on the performance and impact of their country programs...summarizing information gleaned from monitoring systems and special analyses undertaken by the mission over the past year" (Annex c).

A memorandum on the status of the API (included in Annex C) summarizes the outcome of the FY 90 cycle and presents issues and recommendations for the FY 91 API. From the point of view of the Bureau's evaluation system, the key issue is that the API review process neither becomes an Action Plan-like process in which programming decisions are made nor allows the Bureau's need for aggregated information to drive the process.

In short, while projects have long been the building blocks of A.I.D.'s assistance, thinking has definitely shifted to the country program level. What makes the shift understandable and legitimate to the mission staff is the role that country program reporting plays in analyzing, planning for, and evaluating people-level impact. The constraints of time, poor quality data, and an emphasis on the future in the normal programming cycle are recognized by mission as well as AFR/W staff. What is remarkable is that Mission staff have been willing to make this difficult transition even when they have misgivings, as has been true in a

number of cases, and a heavy workload of day-to-day management tasks in hand.

Six missions (Kenya, Malawi, Zaire, Botswana, Mozambique, and Mali) have MER systems that are now functioning well enough to do good API reporting and presumably, therefore, provide adequate information for decision-making at the mission level. About another half dozen (Burundi, Madagascar, Guinea, Rwanda, Zambia, and Lesotho) need additional, serious attention to defining a country program logframe and are, therefore, some time away from having identified the indicators to monitor, the linkage studies carried out, and analyzed information to report. The rest of the missions fall somewhere in the middle of this continuum -- doing well in some areas and need further MER system development in others.

All the Category I missions have invested at least some time in identifying the indicators to measure their country programs as all were required to submit the new API report on October 31, 1990. Completeness and quality of program monitoring, evaluation, and reporting systems still vary widely, but, because of the API, all Missions have made a first stab at the process of trying to identify indicators to measure progress toward country program objectives. This should make it easier for us to address the indicators issue as they complete, revise, or refine their program logframes.

In building the Africa-wide monitoring, evaluation and reporting

system, efforts so far have focussed on two sources of information: the country program level information in Category I missions (because that is where Bureau resources have been concentrated to date) and special impact evaluation series (on rural credit and on economic policy reform). However, the MAPS exercises in several countries have established valuable comparable baselines for a range of private sector-related interventions. A major study of global warming issues done by the Oak Ridge Laboratory for AFR/TR/ANR provides at least a starting point for regional assessments of environmental and natural resource management issues. Other sectoral or sub-sectoral studies have begun to develop multicountry analytical databases which will also help to shape the Africa-wide monitoring, evaluation, and reporting efforts of the next few years.

This multi-track approach to Africa-wide MER is the result of the Bureau Evaluation Working Group agreement in principle that the reporting of results on African social and economic development is the responsibility of the Bureau as a whole and, therefore, should be carried out by the Bureau as a whole.

Relying on Mission staff to figure out how their results relate or contribute to the overall situation in Africa is unrealistic from both a substantive and a managerial perspective. One Mission Director at the May 1991 API Workshop represented this viewpoint well. She noted that her staff had become heavily involved

in and committed to monitoring, evaluation and reporting because it was a useful extension of their country program planning and implementation processes. But, she further remarked, if the staff were given the additional burden of collecting data not of direct use to them but only of use for [fairly distant] external reporting, the levels of willingness and interest would decrease markedly.

Experience from the Latin America Bureau in their Management by Objectives (MBO) exercise was also informative in weighting the relative roles and responsibilities of Mission and AFR/W staff for Africa-wide MER. In the LAC MBO system, it was said that Missions felt overburdened by the requirement to collect data that was of no use to them and they did not give it the priority it needed to do a good job of data collection. The Bureau did not, therefore, have the quality of data it needed to make decisions and/or report, but the missions were burdened with an additional task.

While some preliminary thinking as to how the responsibility might be shared among all elements of the Bureau (Washington as well as the field) has been done, it seems clear that AFR/W staff will have to play a substantial role in summing up the "data points" submitted by Missions in their APIs (and the source documents for the APIs) and providing them with the context needed to translate scattered country results into an Africa report. This means using international data sources and special studies and evaluations to complement the country program

information coming from the field.

An example of the approach which might be taken is the 1988 report on The Impact of Child Survival Activities jointly developed by AFR/TR and AFR/DP; this report summarizes the data available from secondary sources. Although it was very useful both to go through the process and have a quick summative piece available to begin showing results, the report clearly shows the limitations of relying solely on the existing data even in one of the "stronger" sectors (i.e., with well-defined indicators and special survey mechanisms in place).

In general, the Bureau must balance competing needs: generating and using information in the short term for immediate reporting requirements vs. the longer term task of building monitoring, evaluation, and reporting systems which are cost-effective and, preferably, are used by the host country as well as AID.

On the one hand, it is necessary to pull together evaluative information through syntheses of secondary data (such as was done with child survival) or through rapid appraisal evaluations (such as the 1989/90 series on the impact of rural credit, the 1988 series of policy reform assessments, and the 1990/91 impact evaluations of economic policy reform programs).

On the other hand, it is necessary to think through the fundamentals of monitoring and evaluation systems at both the activity and program levels and to

make sure that we are generating appropriate information on a regular, sustainable basis. This requires in-depth as well as rapid approaches.

AFR/TR, for example, has sponsored monitoring systems development, specifically trying to identify proxy indicators that would strengthen our ability to estimate the impact of AID support for agriculture and agricultural research in a cost-effective manner. AFR/TR also initiated an evaluation of agricultural research programs using somewhat more rigorous techniques, looking both at country case studies in six countries and an analysis of historical development of research on two commodities and the impact research had on increased production levels.

To better describe and understand the economic and social impacts of economic policy reform, the technical office in charge (AFR/DP/PAR) also began with rapid appraisal techniques and moved on to more rigorous approaches. Because they face the most skeptical audience, they have employed a fuller range of evaluation approaches than others might have done. AFR/DP/PAR and its consultants began with policy reform assessments which asked the question: can policy reform have positive impact on poor Africans? Next PAR carried out a series of rapid appraisal impact evaluations on the AEPRPs in coordination with CDIE. Like their AFR/TR colleagues, they found it necessary to explore creative evaluation techniques to try to capture impact in the

developing world. The specific challenge for policy reform was to assess the negative impact on poor Africans in the absence of reformed policies. This has been the task of an analytical team from Cornell University.

These are sectors where the Bureau has already been investing time and effort in developing our Africa-wide MER system. Other areas of the Bureau's portfolio now need attention as well. And so do other audiences.

The DFA highlighted the importance of reporting on the impact of AID's support to Africa as a tool to better directing and focusing the programs, but stressed also the importance for the Bureau of improving reporting to external audiences -- particularly the U.S. Congress. Evaluative information is needed for written reports to the Congress as well as testimony by senior Agency officials.

The appropriating legislation that initiated the DFA was verbally accompanied by a requirement for a Report to Congress in 1992. The Bureau took the opportunity to begin to hone its reporting skills by focussing each Congressional Presentation Overview since 1989 on results rather than plans -- emphasizing what "has" happened rather than what "will" happen. In the first year, the DFA progress we reported was mostly organizational (management) progress, but in subsequent years, the Bureau has presented increasingly results-oriented reporting. Acting on the information that no congressmen and very few staffers

actually read the Congressional Presentation, AFR/DP extracted the overview for the 1992 CP and printed it as a separate document that has been very widely distributed.

In 1990/91, an additional foray into strengthening Bureau reporting for external audiences was made. The 1991 DFA Report was produced from APIs and other evaluative material and is intended to reach a more general audience less familiar with the development scene.

C. Specific Responsibilities by Office and Position

1. USAID Mission Roles and Responsibilities

a. Project Design Officer

As the key officer in the project design process, the PDO becomes the first person in the project cycle to define the monitoring, evaluation, and reporting functions for a given activity. At the PID/PAIP stage, the PDO must ensure that the scope of work for the design includes provisions for monitoring and evaluation at the project purpose level and above. During the PID review, the PDO must also make certain that the potential linkage of the new project to current strategic objectives set out in the program logframe are articulated at the purpose and/or goal levels in the project's logical framework. Attention should also be

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given in the PID/PAIP logframe review to End of Project Status (EOPS) indicators and to the potential for the project to gather data to measure country program performance.

These considerations should be finalized in the PP/PAAD design, with careful attention given in the monitoring and evaluation plan to data collection for measurement of impact, effectiveness, and sustainability. As the leader of the design process, the PDO should develop scopes of work for design teams that emphasize these aspects of monitoring. Project budgets must demonstrate adequate resources for monitoring activities, regular evaluations, and potential impact studies.

In the evaluation process, the PDO should participate fully in reviews to be able to use results in improving the project development process, scopes of work for future designs and the relationships of new projects to the overall country strategy.

b. Program Office

As the key player in coordinating the preparation of the Mission's Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP), the Annual Budget Submission (ABS), and the Assessment of Program Impact (API), the Program Office monitors overall country performance and assists senior mission management with strategic decisions by gathering and analyzing information on impact and performance.

The relationship of the Program Office to the technical divisions becomes crucial in fulfilling this role since project

managers must supply the Program Office with relevant monitoring data through the PIR and API processes to enable accurate assessments of progress (or lack thereof) to be made. Impact measurement is a joint undertaking of the technical divisions and the Program Office in the selection of indicators, the design of database systems, the analysis of results, and any subsequent resource allocation or programming decisions.

The Program Office should be involved in all evaluations and impact studies to monitor project and program performance as they relate to the mission's program objectives as articulated in the program logframe.

c. Technical Divisions

Increased emphasis on activities' purpose level accomplishments (EOPS) and country program performance requires technical divisions and activity managers in these divisions to assume greater responsibility for both project and program monitoring, evaluation, and reporting.

Evaluation of individual activities (project, nonproject, emergency food aid distribution, PVO development grant, etc.) is the responsibility of the activity manager. Each activity manager is responsible for gathering data and analyzing the information he or she needs to manage well. The activity manager is responsible for sharing that information with other parts of the system -- mostly through the semi-annual project

information reporting (PIR) system but also, increasingly, through participation in the Mission's program monitoring and evaluation system.

d. Mission Evaluation Office

The Mission Evaluation Officer (where one exists) works with the Program Office, PDOs, and technical divisions to plan and coordinate all evaluation activities and any special impact studies. This requires collaboration in the preparation of the CPSP, the ABS evaluation schedule, and the API as well as the preparation of scopes of work for evaluations and special studies. Regular participation in PIR preparation is also necessary to ensure that results reported include impact measurement to the fullest extent possible. The evaluation summary to be sent to AID/W for an activity should also be prepared jointly by the evaluation officer and the activity manager.

The AID Evaluation Handbook states that an evaluation report and a completed AID Evaluation Summary are required for all activity evaluations. The AID Evaluation Summary (see Annex H) replaces the PES form. The report and summary should be sent within 60 days of receipt of the final version to AFR/DP/PPE, PPC/CDIE/DI/Acquisitions, and SER/MO/CPM/P. (SER/MO/CPM/P further circulates copies of evaluation reports and summaries within AID/W offices in accordance with standard distribution lists.)

e. Mission Director and Senior Staff

The overall country program monitoring, evaluation, and reporting system is the Director's responsibility. Mission managers are responsible for gathering and analyzing country program information and sharing it through the API process.

Country program evaluation -- looking at the Mission's program not as individual activities but as a group, particularly focussing on what their results have been -- is the responsibility of the Mission as a whole. Its primary purpose is for use in decision-making within the Mission to improve the results of our activities and the efficiency in achieving them. This information is also reported to Washington because of the shared responsibility for decision making (in terms of budget levels, etc.) The new reporting document which communicates information from the Mission to the Bureau level is the API.

2. Africa Bureau/Washington (AFR/W) Roles and Responsibilities

a. Regarding Activities

AFR/W's direct responsibilities for activity-level monitoring and evaluation systems are confined to those regional activities which are designed and managed by AFR/W staff.

Missions' activity-based PIRs are to continue to be sent into AFR/W (geographic desks post-AFR

reorganization) for information purposes, but they will not be formally reviewed or commented upon by AFR/W staff.

b. Regarding Country Programs

AFR/W responsibilities for review of documents regarding country program monitoring, evaluation, and reporting planning and implementation are more comprehensive. Review of the CPSPs for Category I countries during a Program Week provides an opportunity for AFR/W staff in all offices to address the mission's experience with program monitoring and evaluation and its plans for strengthening the mission MER systems in the future. The November arrival of the Assessments of Program Impact from all Category I countries provides an annual opportunity for AFR/W to review the progress (or lack of progress) being made by a mission in achieving the objectives set out in the program logframe.

With the Bureau reorganization, the geographic desks are to play a key role in monitoring country program performance and in ensuring the missions are adequately staffed and supported in their efforts to use monitoring and evaluation as a tool to improve the overall impact of their programs. In coordination with AFR/ARTS, AFR/ONI, and AFR/DP, country desk officers should monitor progress toward meeting individual country program strategic objectives and targets as well as contributions which the country programs are making to the achievement of Bureau (DFA) objectives.

As the API guidance (Annex C) indicates, a more collaborative style of program design and evaluation involving AFR/W as well as mission staff is, over time, expected to lead to increased delegations of authority for implementation decision-making to the mission management team and to an increased emphasis in AFR/W on understanding the results achieved and ensuring that lessons of experience derived from evaluations are fed back into the development planning process.

c. Regarding the DFA as a Whole

The Africa Bureau in Washington has the responsibility for evaluating and reporting on the results of U.S. assistance continent-wide. The findings are to be used by senior management in decision-making as well as reporting to external audiences.

Overall coordination, guidance, training, support and quality control are provided by the evaluation staff (two persons after the reorganization) in AFR/DP. AFR/DP/PPE (soon to be renamed PSE) houses the Bureau Evaluation Office and is responsible for Bureau evaluation policy, guidance and improvements in the monitoring, evaluation, and reporting system. PPE (or PSE) coordinates with AFR/TR (ARTS) and the desks on mission strategy reviews (CPSPs) and on Mission reports on the impacts of their programs (APIs). By focussing on monitoring of country program strategic objectives with the

country desk officer, PPE can assist senior bureau management in conducting a realistic and effective dialogue with mission management on country program progress. PPE also coordinates with CDIE/E on country program and activity evaluation issues.

The responsibility for sectoral monitoring, evaluation, and reporting currently rests largely with AFR/TR and AFR/MDI and, under the new reorganization, will be a major responsibility for AFR/ARTS and, to some extent, for AFR/ONI. As key actors in the review process of important activities and for country program strategies, AFR/TR(ARTS) and AFR/MDI(ONI) can contribute substantially to the technical content of the measurement process through advice to AFR/DP regarding the suitability of activity and country program performance and impact indicators. With an overview of continent-wide practice and progress in technical areas, AFR/TR(ARTS) should review and provide timely advice to missions on monitoring issues on a regular basis through various kinds of reviews. AFR/TR(ARTS) and AFR/MDI(ONI) views should also be sought on the design and installation of systems for country program measurement, where possible.

A new position has been created in the AFR/DP reorganization for an Outreach person. Among other tasks, this person will take evaluation analyses and turn them into finished reporting

appropriate for external audiences.

While AFR/TR(ARTS) and AFR/MDI(ONI) have for some years tapped consultants to assist in the construction of sectoral databases important to Africa-wide monitoring and evaluation efforts, additional expertise has been recently contracted with the assistance of CDIE/DI to assist in broadening the access to computerized databases in AFR/W.

Senior Bureau management participates directly in the Bureau's monitoring, evaluation, and reporting system by using input from country program and sectoral monitoring, evaluation, and reporting systems for several purposes: dialogue with senior management, geographic desks, AFR/DP and AFR/ARTS on information needs, feedback to other components in the system on the suitability of information being generated, ongoing bureau-level needs in directing and/or modifying strategy, and Congressional responses.

The DFA legislation contains a specific request for a "consultative process that is informal and self-critical." Congressional communications have, therefore, taken on a new dimension with the DFA. Africa Bureau managers must be able to clearly and carefully outline needs, define objectives, clarify indicators, describe successes and make appropriate linkages between sectors. In short, the DFA challenges the Bureau and its leaders to demonstrate, using its strengthened MER capabilities, that

budgetary stability does not lead to complacency and that programming flexibility improves effectiveness.

IV. A Look to the Future

Experiences so far should help the Bureau to plan for continued improvements in monitoring, evaluation and reporting, to be better able to convey a message of African development as opposed to a series of stories about a project-here and a project-there. It is essential that further strengthening efforts should begin very soon. In spite of the considerable accomplishments thus far in country program and Bureau level evaluation, only a few of the Bureau's priority sectors and areas of emphasis have yet received attention. And while the requirement for a major DFA report in 1992 has apparently been lifted, there's a strong justification for taking a five-year look at the DFA in any event.

Better reporting on private sector development is perhaps the highest priority. It is not clear that the MAPS studies will provide the types of information necessary but it is likely that in concert with the program reports from Missions with private sector strategic objectives, there will be some input from the field. At a minimum, however, significant further analysis will be necessary to identify findings and

conclusions. There are likely to be other areas that need summative evaluation work as well -- education, democratization, gender. The experience with the 1991 DFA Report suggests that doing the quality of reporting the Bureau thinks necessary is a time-consuming task.

Clarifying what sectors will be included in what kinds of reports for which audiences, who has responsibility for sector reports, who is responsible for producing the final product, including text, graphics, and printing, and how the report will be distributed is essential. Given the Bureau reorganization, the responsibility for summarizing the Bureau's evaluation results on a "sectoral" basis (defining "sector" in its broadest terms) will fall increasingly to the technical offices with coordination and support from AFR/DP. Although much of the task of selecting and writing up the information will fall to AFT/ARTS and AFR/ONI, production of the report itself will remain an AFR/DP responsibility.

The difficulty of doing a good job of Africa-wide monitoring, evaluation, and reporting should not be underestimated. But with the growing skills of mission staff in country program impact assessment and reporting and the reorganization of AFR/TR into AFR/ARTS and the addition of more evaluation and outreach staff in AFR/DP, the next two years should see a strengthening of the Africa-wide MER effort.

1. From the GAO report on "Progress in Implementing the Development Fund for Africa," GAO/NSIAD-91-127, April, 1991.

2. Taken from the House Appropriations Committee report 102-108 of June 12, 1991.

3. Each of the terms (monitoring, evaluation, reporting) is fully defined and described in the A.I.D. Evaluation Handbook, 1989 (and repeated in the glossary in Annex ___ here. Information is defined as both quantitative and qualitative data.

4. Objective trees are one means for laying out one's understanding of the causal linkages likely to be involved in a particular development activity or group of activities. Evaluation thus permits verification of objective trees and the strategic choices made on the basis of them.

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AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON D C 20523

ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR

May 15, 1990

MEMORANDUM TO ALL MISSIONS AND AFR/WASHINGTON OFFICES

FROM : A-AA/AFR, Walter G. Bollinger *WGB*
SUBJECT : Guidance for Country Program Strategy Design

The attached guidance on preparation of Country Program Strategic Plans (CPSPs) is part of our effort to improve our effectiveness in providing development assistance to Africa and to increase the impact of what we do on improving the lives of Africans. It has not yet been approved by the Administrator of the Agency. As those of you who received draft copies of proposed new Agency CDSS guidance are aware, the CPSP marches to a different drummer -- emphasizing pragmatic analysis of program options and the process of strategic choice which each Mission faces in laying out its program logframe.

As chairman of the Agency's management streamlining task force, convened last August at the request of the AID Administrator, I endorsed a task force recommendation to "abolish CDSSs and/or Action Plans and/or ABSs." Our feeling was that there was a great deal of redundancy in the current program documentation and that redefining what we wanted to see in each document -- or eliminating the document altogether -- would be an important contribution to streamlining.

I feel that this CPSP guidance responds to both the mandate for the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) and to the objective of streamlining our management processes in a way which will enhance our effectiveness.

With the solid testing of the draft CPSP guidance by the Missions in Malawi, Mozambique, and Kenya, I feel we can make a cogent and demonstrated case to the Administrator for further delegation of authority to the regional bureaus for development of program strategy guidance. I will be doing so as the management streamlining task force reconvenes in the next few weeks to pursue the refinement and implementation of earlier proposals. I will keep you informed of our progress in these discussions.

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With the implementation of this CPSP guidance by all Category I Missions in Africa, I look forward to seeing country programs focussed on fewer, more results-oriented strategic objectives, with progress toward achievement of these objectives more closely monitored.

Work on guidance for the next element of the revised program documentation process is still underway. I expect, however, that draft guidance for an annual Assessment of Program Impact (API) will be circulated by cable in the very near future.

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Clearances:

AAA/AFR/DP, JRWestley
AFR/DP, JGovan (Draft)
DAA/AFR:ELSaiers

Program Documentation Requirements for Missions in Africa
under the DFA: Country Program Strategy Design
April 20, 1990

I. Introduction

This memorandum lays out new guidance for the Africa Bureau's Category I Missions' use in the development of strategies and operational plans for providing assistance to their host countries within the framework provided by the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) legislation. This guidance for the preparation of Country Program Strategic Plans (CPSPs) replaces all previous guidance on CDSSs and Program Weeks (Refs A through F, Ref Q) with the exception of material contained in Refs A and Q on Special Agency Concerns, New Policy Developments, and Congressional Earmarks and Guidance. The most recent Bureau guidance pertaining to Action Plans (Refs G and H) remains relevant. As will be clear below, the new Country Program Strategic Plan fully incorporates all elements of the Action Plan. For your convenience, Annexes A, B, and C repeat portions of earlier guidance which remain relevant.

This guidance explicitly reflects Bureau efforts to take full advantage of the DFA to improve the effectiveness and impact of our development assistance to Africa. It also reflects feedback from Missions (Ref J through P) and from AID/W reviews of the draft guidance circulated in 89 STATE 403039. It is not inconsistent with the thrust of the recent draft Agency guidance on CDSSs, but details differ.

II. The Concept of the Country Program...

A. ...Historically

AID's decentralized, country-specific approach to the programming and implementation of development assistance has been judged, by analysts within and outside of AID, to be a principal strength of the bilateral U.S. assistance program. By having professional staff on the ground on a permanent basis, AID Missions are potentially able to be aware of changing country social, economic, and institutional conditions, to interact on a continuous basis with people of all classes and opinions, and to direct assistance where and when it can be of most use in a form in which it can best be used.

While this potential is difficult to realize due to the limitations of lengths of tours and other constraints on

effective Mission knowledge-building, AID Missions regularly overcome these difficulties by institutionalizing the capacity to understand country situations in the long term by strengthening host country institutions, fostering relationships between U.S. and host country institutions, coordinating in-country with PVO's and other donors, and hiring Foreign Service National staff.

AID's country programs are, moreover, constantly evolving as the program managers and associates analyze, implement, and assess current and future opportunities for providing U.S. assistance for development. In addition, AID Missions are challenged to design and manage country programs so that they respond to the foreign policy needs of the U.S. government and implement the assistance policy directives of Congress and Agency leadership.

The relevant definition of an AID country program, therefore, has come to include not only project (bilateral, regionally, and centrally funded) and nonproject activity, but also the programming of food aid (both projectized and non-project), collaboration and consultation with other donors and private voluntary organizations, policy analyses and dialogue with the host government and representatives of the private sector, and direct provision of technical assistance to development efforts.

B. ...Under the DFA

Under the DFA, Congress has provided an explicit challenge to AID to make its country programming process more efficient in terms of management and more effective in terms of impact. The DFA legislation calls for supporting "a process of long-term development in Sub-Saharan Africa that is equitable, participatory, environmentally sustainable, and self-reliant..." by "...focus[sing] on certain critical sectoral priorities" through "direct interventions to enhance human welfare as well as indirectly through sectoral support designed to alleviate specific policy, institutional, or resources constraints". Further, "it is expected that these approaches w[ill] be integrated into a single country strategy whose different components complement one another...".

In short, AID assistance to Africa needs to be tightly and coherently integrated at the country level with all resources (program, OE, food aid, and staff) focused on a limited number of strategic objectives in order to achieve the measurable impact desired.

III. Design and Implementation of Country Programs...

A. ...Historically

It has been found useful, over the years, for Missions to develop country development assistance strategy statements (CDSSs) or small program strategy statements (SPSSs) every five or six years. As stated in Ref (A), the purpose of the CDSS process has been to provide an analytical basis for the proposed assistance strategy. That guidance asserted that the CDSS should be a thorough, realistic and insightful analysis of the host country's development prospects and problems, both macroeconomic and sector-specific. These analyses have traditionally reflected Missions' understanding of the local scene and proposed a role for AID assistance. Again, according to Ref (A), the CDSS has been expected to lay out analytical arguments in favor of a course of action and to describe alternatives to as well as reasons for the recommendations made. In the best of circumstances, and thus something rarely achieved completely, strategy formulation has been an iterative process. Learning from previous strategy implementation -- the test of reality -- should be reflected in the formulation of the new strategic statement.

While all countries, regardless of population or program size, have been expected to prepare strategy documents, Missions in small countries have been required to do a somewhat less thorough document -- the Small Program Strategy Statement (SPSS).

Review of both CDSSs/SPSSs in AID/W ensured that the analyses were adequate and that the AID role proposed accurately reflected policy directions, operational priorities, and financing and staffing availabilities and that it was broadly feasible. Approval of the CDSS/SPSS document in principle signified commitment of the entire Agency to the strategy and its implementation.

A few years ago, the Concept Paper was added to the lexicon of program documents in Africa. The Concept Paper was felt to be appropriate for relatively important countries in which some sort of interim strategy was needed but in which conditions were too fluid to project the utility of the strategy five to six years in the future.

B. ...Under the DFA

However, as already noted, the implementation of the DFA mandate also virtually mandated a reconsideration by the Africa

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Bureau of the country programming process. The way that these programs are designed -- as embodied in the CDSS/SPSS document -- and implemented -- as outlined in the Action Plans, ABSSs, and PIRs -- has come under particular scrutiny.

It should be remembered that the DFA resulted from widespread concern, especially in Congress, that country programs in Africa were not as effective as they should be in improving the quality of life of Africans. The language of the DFA, therefore, charges AID to take steps to change the way that assistance is provided in order to increase its effectiveness and impact.

Conclusions which emerged from AFR/W examination of the implications of the DFA for program design and implementation are:

- that the DFA opens up a greater range of assistance programming options which can be combined in new ways and which demand a somewhat different analytical approach than we have undertaken before;
- that better focussing of AID's limited resources on fewer problems is essential if we are to have a measurable and sustainable impact on the lives of people in Africa; and
- that tracking and monitoring, involving data collection and analysis, must be undertaken on a regular basis to assess the impact of Mission programs on the lives of African people.

IV. Changing the Way We Design and Implement Programs and Monitor and Report on Program Performance

Another outcome of the examination of the country programming process under the DFA was the observation that increasing the emphasis on improved country program design, management, and reporting was likely to require more staff time and to increase rather than lighten management burdens. It was proposed that it might be more feasible to do a better job if some modifications were made in document preparation and review and in program management and reporting procedures.

A. Streamlining the Basic Strategy Document

The first procedures examined were those related to the CDSS/SPSS/Concept Paper, in which the rationale for the program strategy and the program structure are laid out, and the Action Plan, in which the strategy and structure are translated into operational terms.

The result of this examination is the decision that Missions in Category I countries with relatively large programs will, every five to seven years, prepare program strategy documents which effectively combine the CDSS and Action Plan concepts into a single document, the Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP). Category I Missions with relatively small programs will prepare CPSPs only when needed. The analytical and strategic planning content of the CPSP is presented in Section V which follows.

The option of combining the CDSS and Action Plan documents was first proposed by USAID/Malawi and has been tested by the Missions in Malawi, Kenya, and Mozambique. The combination offers several attractive benefits: (1) an opportunity for Missions to link more closely their strategic planning and their operational programming; (2) time-saving in terms of document preparation time, since much of the Action Plan material has to be developed in the course of CDSS preparation anyway; (3) OE saving in terms of review time as a full Program Week would be held one year rather than a CDSS review one year and the Program Week based on the Action Plan the next; and (4) it provides a basis for greater delegation of specific project and nonproject authorization and approval authority.

The biennial Action Plan submission and review will be eliminated. The possibility that decycled Action Plans could be useful at some point in the CPSP period is still on the table. This will be more fully examined as the guidance for the Assessment of Program Impact (discussed below) is developed.

B. Tracking Program Performance and Reporting on Impact

The second area of documentation considered for modification was that regarding reporting of program performance and impact. The question was considered in the following way: If Action Plans are eliminated as biennial documents, is there a need for an alternative document through which Missions can regularly inform Washington of the results of their programs, evaluate the efficacy of their program in achieving results, and propose alternative courses of action? The general answer was yes. The logical next question was: What should that document be?

Consideration was given to expanding or revising the role of the semi-annual Project Implementation Reports (PIRs). An initial proposal that the current PIR Overview be modified to fulfill this function was superceded by a proposal to define a separate program evaluation and reporting document. The guidance for an Assessment of Program Impact (API) which will be submitted annually by all Category I Missions is currently

being developed. As currently envisioned, Missions will be requested to assess progress in accomplishing the strategic objectives and targets and report on it in a relatively short, program-focussed document (called the API) at the end of every fiscal year. However, a septel will provide draft guidance on the role of the API in the overall modified program documentation and review process for your review.

One essential element to making this new emphasis a reality is that all program and project personnel must become aware of the need to monitor and report on impact and all Missions should develop the means to do so. It is recognized that personnel may need training and technical assistance to be able to effectively meet those needs.

V. Country Program Strategic Plans (CPSPs)

A. The Purpose of the CPSP

The Country Program Strategic Plan is the principal program analysis and planning document which a Mission will prepare to guide its efforts over a five to seven year period. Review of the CPSP in Washington will provide the needed opportunity to ensure that the proposed Strategic Plan is in conformance with Bureau and Agency policies and priorities and that Bureau leadership concurs in and is prepared to mobilize the resources necessary to accomplish the objectives of the country program laid out in the CPSP. Once agreement is reached on priorities, objectives, and targets, the CPSP should serve to alleviate AFR/W micromanagement of Mission programs and should foster more effective decentralized decision-making.

B. The Structure of the CPSP

The preparation of an A.I.D. country development assistance program strategy which responds both to the broad policy guidelines of the DFA and to the host country development situation requires Missions to undertake three basic analyses. These three analyses should focus on: first, the overall environment for sustainable, broad-based, market oriented economic growth and the likelihood of its leading to a better life for the next generation of Africans in this particular country; second, the specific key constraints to such growth and important opportunities to foster that growth, placing the host government and indigenous private sector clearly in the central focus; and, third, what the host government, local

initiatives, and other donors have done and are doing to address these constraints and take advantage of the opportunities.¹

The three basic analyses must be followed in the CPSP by an assessment of AID's own track record in providing development assistance to the country in question. The assessment should take into account the Mission's capabilities, its installed capacity, the history or evolution of its program, and its on-going relationships with host country institutions. It is important that a sense of continuity be conveyed -- where we started (as many programs and even many projects have long histories and have, or should have, already demonstrated substantial impact at the level of strategic objectives) and where we are today.

Presentation of this information should lead directly to the articulation of a five to seven year strategy which: (a) is analytically sound and provides the rationale for the identification of the key opportunities for alleviating significant development constraints; (b) matches the structures, motivations, political roles and relationships, needs, and absorptive capacity of the host country and its institutions with the resources available; (c) focuses on a limited number of strategic objectives which are in the

¹ These analytical requirements are not, of course, new; they have been a part of the CDSS guidance for some years. Ref (A), for example, required that the recent economic history and current situation of the host country be analyzed to determine whether the basic foundation for sustained development, consisting of broad-based economic growth that provides productive employment as well as higher per capita incomes for an increasing proportion of the population, has been put into place. Ref (Q) called for assessment of economic growth prospects, problems, and assistance needs both generally and for each productive sector: agriculture, industry, and services. That guidance also required discussion of opportunities for participation in the growth process for determining the prospects for a broad-based pattern of growth that will yield results in terms of rising family incomes. Ref (G) called for Africa Missions to focus on their analyses of constraints to economic growth (including various resource gaps -- foreign exchange, investment, budgetary, etc.) -- and the role which U.S. assistance from all sources (ESF, DFA, and PL 480) can play in encouraging sustainable economic growth through the use of market systems so that there can truly be an end to hunger in Africa.

manageable interest of the Mission to achieve (ie. for which Mission management is prepared to declare its responsibility to achieve). (d) relates to the Bureau's priorities in specific sectors; (e) projects a level of significant impact achievement which is measurable; and (f) reflects the interests and unique capacities of the United States Government and the American people.

It is then essential to project the operational implications of this strategy, taking into account available program and OE financing, staff, and time required to achieve, measure and report on preliminary, interim, and final results, especially in development impact terms.

It will be important here to be as realistic as possible given the needs under the DFA to produce meaningful results in terms of impact on the lives of Africans while working within an environment in which U.S. Government resources, except in a very few instances, will not be increasing either in absolute terms or relative to other donors. Finally, it is important to ensure that adequate preparation is made for tracking progress in implementing the strategy (accomplishing the strategic objectives and targets defined) and for designing mid-course corrections that may be needed. Here it will be important to: (a) identify the intermediate steps that lie between project/non-project outputs, program targets, and the strategic objectives of the program, (b) clearly and convincingly draw the analytical links between them, and (c) put in place systems which will measure that interim progress. The resource requirements for effective monitoring should be projected and plans discussed for meeting those needs. The document should specify staff and program and OE funding implications in determining ways in which feasible and effective tracking can be implemented.

These requirements imply that CPSPs in the Africa Bureau should contain six sections:

- I. An Overview of the Environment for Sustainable, Broad-Based, and Market-Oriented Economic Growth
- II. In-Depth Analysis of Key Constraints to Growth and Opportunities for Realizing a Better Life for the Next Generation of Africans
- III. What Other Organizations (Other Donors, International and National PVO's and NGO's, and Host Country Public and Private Sectors) are Doing to Address these Constraints and Take Advantage of these Opportunities

- IV. AID's Role and Experience in Addressing these Constraints and Exploiting these Opportunities
- V. The Proposed Country Development Assistance Strategy or "Program Logical Framework": Goal, Strategic Objectives, Targets, and Benchmarks
- VI. Plans for Implementation: Level and Use of Resources, Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation, Policy Agenda

As already noted, Sections I through III of the CPSP will be very similar to elements of the current CDSS -- although Section III has hitherto been presented after rather than before the AID strategy and often in a truncated fashion. While Missions can exercise some discretion as to the actual outline followed, all six areas must be covered.

In general, it is expected that Section I of the CPSP should provide a succinct overview of the evolution of host country development: economic policies, power structures and politics (per Ref (Q), especially the political economy of reform), major social and cultural institutions and values, degree of equity in the distribution and control of resources, and other relevant historic background.

Section II of the CPSP should expand on the constraints and opportunities most critical to achieving broad-based, sustainable market-oriented economic growth. Previous guidance in Ref (A) suggested that this should be organized along the lines of the "Blueprint for Development" strategy document, i.e., the five principal problem areas of inadequate economic growth, income of low income groups, hunger, health deficiencies, lack of education, and population pressures. Missions are no longer required to use this structure. Rather, Missions should develop an outline for Section II which fits their own perspectives most effectively, taking into account the general constraints to broad-based, sustainable, market-oriented economic growth in Africa as discussed in the DFA Action Plan.

Missions are encouraged, however, in their discussion of constraints and opportunities, to make use of quantitative country trend indicators and A.I.D.'s quantitative standards of achievement. Data should be disaggregated on a gender basis wherever possible. Where data are not available, Missions should make the best possible approximations.

Section III should summarize and evaluate the roles and actions of other donors and the host country public and private sector institutions in achieving such growth. The analysis should be cognizant of the context of total resource availability for development -- from private investors both domestic and foreign, other donors, the host country government, and multilateral development institutions. It should also take into account the strategic priorities associated with those other resources, and should include consideration of ways to help the host country to make the best use of total available development resources in achieving the goals of the strategy.

Section IV of the CPSP should go further than most CDSSs presently do, as it should strongly reflect the lessons of experience based on analytical and evaluative work as well as implementation progress made since the last Action Plan (or the last API after that document supplants the current set of Action Plans). It is very important that, as part of the implementation of the DFA, the Bureau completely, honestly, and clearly identify and learn from its experience. Therefore, this section of the CPSP should not be approached as advocacy of A.I.D. in general or the Mission in particular, but rather as a place to analytically examine the lessons of U.S. development assistance in the country as guidelines for future endeavors.

Section V of the CPSP should be a completely elaborated program logframe. It should be prepared following the current guidance for Section II of the Action Plan (Ref (G), para 4. II.) and should articulate the program target and subtarget levels and benchmark indicators for monitoring and evaluation as well as the strategic goal and objectives. The linkages of the Mission program logframe with the DFA Action Plan program logframe will be important to consider and articulate as clearly as possible. However, AFR/W does not require or want each Mission to attempt to force its strategy to directly conform to that of the Action Plan. Each Mission should consult with AFR/W to determine how their particular case might benefit from articulation with the DFA Action Plan program logframe.

Section VI of the CPSP should be a more complete articulation of the Mission's plans for executing its strategy than is found in a CDSS. Indeed, it should incorporate much of what is now found in Section III of most Action Plans and at the same level of detail.

In short, the analyses should lead very directly to the proposed strategic choices. The strategic objectives for assistance should be complemented with fairly definitive, detailed proposals for implementation. As stressed above, the

indicators for measuring progress in the achievement of the elements of the program logframe must be clearly defined and quantified with baseline data provided. The means for monitoring, evaluation, and reporting must be explicitly stated. The difficulties of projecting detailed program performance indicators five to seven years into the future is recognized, but, given the Africa Bureau's and the Missions' commitments to measuring program performance, the effort must be made in the CPSP. Missions can further refine their indicators and monitoring and evaluation systems as they move into the CPSP period.

C. Some Practical Considerations

The Mission commitment to a particular course of action will be well-developed by the time a CPSP is reviewed in Washington. Because the CPSP goes further down the road in terms of implementation planning than a CDSS, the CPSP has to be a Mission-wide document deserving the full support and commitment of all Mission staff over an extended period of time. Its development, therefore, must include team- and consensus-building efforts. Some Missions have also found it helpful to include key host government and private sector counterparts in the strategic discussions. Greater consultation with private grassroots organizations and with other donors not only responds to the DFA mandate but also ensures that the strategy developed embodies the local perspective which is key to commitment and action. Broader consultations may, however, make for a more protracted design process than usual and Missions should take this into consideration in developing their preparation schedules against a review deadline.

Missions should also ensure that AFR/W is informed as to approaches being taken and options being considered as the process of design and dialogue is going on in-country. The investment of time necessary to produce an informed and useful CPSP is substantial enough that Missions will want to avoid going in directions which are unlikely to meet AFR/W approval. The CPSP review in such a case could be confrontational and the losses, in terms of both effort and time, significant. The logical solution to this potential problem is to establish sufficient communication between the Missions and the key Washington offices during the development of the Strategic Plan. Communication could include training and other staff level interchange (augmented by contractor support) and collaboration between the Missions and AFR/W as well as in-country program reviews in which AFR/W senior staff provide direct feedback to Missions before their strategies are finalized for formal presentation. During the last two fiscal years, this kind of communication has been tested and has proven very useful.

D. Addressing Mandated Concerns and Special Interests

The bottom line of the DFA is improving economic performance and the quality of Africans' lives. The DFA Action Plan lays out the overall Bureau strategy for contributing to the achievement of this bottom line and Missions are expected to be fully aware of this policy and Bureau program context as they undertake the preparation of their CPSPs.

The analytical approach outlined above should permit adequate flexibility for Missions to develop an effective program strategy as creatively as they can while at the same time providing consistency in documentation which will facilitate AID/W review. While the DFA has reduced the number of Congressionally-mandated earmarks for Africa programs, they are not eliminated altogether. Missions must, therefore, ensure that they address at appropriate points in their analyses the issues associated with the three Congressional budgetary targets included in the DFA legislation (health, child survival, AIDS, population/family planning, and natural resource management - including biodiversity).

Missions should also cover the topics which the Agency as a whole has been asked to address in strategy documents: actions necessary for conserving biological diversity and tropical forests; energy; basic education; microenterprises; and women in development. (FYI: It does not follow, however, that each Mission will have an element of its program addressing these topics.)

Missions should also take into account the Bureau's more detailed sectoral guidance, particularly if the country has been designated by the Bureau's sectoral plans as an emphasis country. Missions will be able to call on support from AFR/TR on determining the most effective ways to deal with those plans.

Finally, since the DFA legislation specifically enjoins AID to work more closely and collaboratively with U.S. and African PVOs and with other donors, it is reasonable to expect that these options should have been fully explored in any strategy development. They should, in any event, be addressed in Sections III through V.

The CPSP itself should not exceed the traditional 60 page limit for CDSSs, so Missions should make every attempt to be as concise as possible. Missions should feel free to cite references, use cogent explanatory footnotes, and add supplementary annexes to increase the depth of coverage on particularly important issues. Special annexes can present analyses of particular subsectors (such as those required by

Congress) or crosscutting problems such political or institutional analyses. The conclusions of these analyses should be summarized in the body of the CPSP itself.

VI. Review of the CPSP

The two-hour review of CDSSs has been a point of complaint in the past. All the work which a Mission puts into a strategy document appears to be subjected to a cursory review in Washington while the Action Plans, whose utility and validity depends on the quality of the strategy itself, received a week of intensive discussion.

As the new CPSP will address both strategy development and implementation planning, an extended review of the document along the lines of the Action Plan-based Program Week will be useful. The methodology was tested with the CPSP-based Program Weeks for USAID/Malawi, USAID/Kenya, and USAID/Mozambique. In general, the methodology seemed to work well. On the first two days of the Week, attention was directed to understanding the analyses laid out in Sections I through III and seeing if the analytical foundation was solid (see Section V.D above). The agenda for the third and fourth days then dealt with the program strategy, structure, and implementation and wrapped up the conclusions of the Week. There was sufficient time to nail down agreements on key actions expected from both the Mission and AFR/W in implementing the CPSP.

VII. Concept Papers

As noted above, Concept Papers were developed particularly to meet the need in Africa for interim strategies in relatively important countries in which conditions were especially fluid. In this case, fluid referred to countries where political upheaval or civil disturbances rendered all normal planning and projection techniques suspect, where Missions were being newly established and there was a need to identify some preliminary lines for assistance without having the time to thoroughly analyze the options, and where the AID commitment for establishing a major program was, for any reason, tentative.

The categorization of emphasis countries under the DFA has to some extent reduced the need for Concept Papers. However, the interim strategy document covering a period of two or three years has proven to be an appropriate programming tool in some countries and the Africa Bureau will continue to consider the utility of a Concept Paper on a case by case basis. In any

case, the basic outline of the CPSP should be applied to the extent possible. The USAID/Mozambique strategy document was treated as a Concept Paper, developed on the basis of CPSP guidance but limited in its analysis and planning horizon.

VIII. Conclusion

The Congressional mandate of the Development Fund for Africa and the Bureau's development of an overall Action Plan for implementing this mandate in the FY 89 - 91 period have led the Africa Bureau to propose new approaches to the assistance programming process. The approach described in this guidance focusses on the Country Program Strategic Plan as a key element of the overall process. It also introduces the concept of the annual Assessment of Program Impact (API) which will be elaborated further in future guidance.

The Africa Bureau approach to country programming guidance incorporates four important differences from the traditional Agency approach to strategy formulation: (1) it proposes that one document -- the Country Program Strategic Plan or CPSP -- combine the analytical aspects of the CDSS and the operational planning aspects of the Action Plan; (2) it is less directive as to the specific content of the CPSP itself; (3) it establishes the DFA legislation and the DFA Action Plan as the most relevant policy guidance; and (4) it places greater emphasis on implementation effectiveness and program impact monitoring and suggests an annual review of progress in accomplishing the strategic objectives of each major country program. In so doing, the Africa Bureau intends to take full advantage of the flexibility and budgetary security provided by the DFA and to better respond to the development needs of Africa.

References:

- (A) 87 STATE 340629 (Annex A repeats relevant portions.)
- (B) 87 STATE 299421
- (C) 87 STATE 377729
- (D) 87 STATE 112838
- (E) 88 STATE 030913
- (F) 89 STATE 113988
- (G) 89 STATE 147592
- (H) 89 STATE 283555 (Annex C provides a revised version.)
- (I) 89 State 211501
- [J] Mogadishu 00186
- [K] Nairobi 00448
- [L] Nairobi 02772
- [M] Conakry 0300
- [N] Dakar 0870
- [O] Yaounde 0968
- [P] Banjul 0319
- [Q] 89 State 074592 (Annex B repeats relevant portions).

7544G:AFR/DP/PPE, 4/20/90

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Annex A

This annex recapitulates excerpts from an old CDSS guidance cable regarding Congressional special interests and earmarks. It is useful as current guidance as the legislation has not changed in these respects. The rest of the cable is outdated; some of the actual numbers repeated here are for prior fiscal years and can be ignored. Updated budgetary earmark levels will be provided in separate cables when available.

Excerpts from 1987 State 340629

Part two: Special Agency Concerns and New Policy Developments

Policy Reform, a healthy private sector, technology transfer, and institutional development remain crucial ingredients for a sound economic system conducive to sustainable development. However, sustained longterm development is ultimately the responsibility of the LDC's themselves and the improvement of the indigenous capability to conceive, analyze, plan and implement sound development policies, strategies and programs is essential to success. This must include an enhanced institutional capacity to generate, adapt and transfer technology appropriate to local environments and resources.

In preparing the document, missions should be careful to respond to the following policy guidelines:

1. Missions should be aware that the private sector initiative is inextricably linked with privatization, financial markets and microenterprise development. Missions should also be aware that AFR/PRE, LAC/PS, S and T/RD, and PRE/PD have resources available for assisting missions in developing private sector activities.

- A. Private Sector. Missions should endeavor to have the private sector take a stronger role in implementation of development programs and the delivery of social services. In the past, the SDA and ARDN accounts have been especially effective for channeling resources to the private sector. Program initiatives should encourage the private sector to take on the management and financial responsibility for development efforts. More attention should be given to implementing population, health, child survival, and even education and human resources activities through private sector channels.

The use of the private sector in these areas should be addressed in the CDSS as an inherent part of the problem specific strategies.

B. Privatization. Policy Determination 14 (see 1986 State 189806) defines privatization and explains its many forms, discusses the type of assistance that A.I.D. could offer to facilitate privatization, presents some of the major factors that should be considered in pursuing privatization, and describes sources of technical assistance for privatization. Mission implementation activities should be described in the CDSS. PRE can provide assistance in privatization through its center for privatization; missions should avail themselves of its services.

C. Financial Markets. A review of A.I.D.'s financial markets activities (primarily credit projects) suggests a number of important design features in which assumptions, conventional wisdom, or analysis have resulted in projects somewhat isolated from the broader policy and institutional issues and problems in the LDC's financial sector. Missions should be aware that the draft financial markets development policy paper, undergoing senior staff review in AID/W at present, requires that missions contemplating financial markets activities develop a comprehensive financial markets development strategy for A.I.D. activities before or in conjunction with pursuing additional financial markets projects. Missions pursuing these activities may wish to include a preliminary financial markets analysis in their CDSS. PRE/PD and S and/RD have specialized contracts in financial markets development and rural savings mobilization, respectively, missions should seek to utilize these when possible.

D. Microenterprise. Legislation currently being considered by Congress is likely to designate approximately dollars 50 million for microenterprise assistance. Missions should discuss in the CDSS how they plan to address this sector during the next several years. This could be part of the sections on income of low income groups.

2. Women in Development. Women in Development is a cross cutting issue. WID should be addressed in the problem description and analysis section and in each of the strategy sections. In the problem description section, women and girls should be addressed not only as potential beneficiaries of development progress but also as participants in the development process. Similarly, the strategy section should describe how each of the proposed problem specific strategies will effectively address women's and girl's issues.

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3. Agriculture, Rural Development and Nutrition (ARDN). Missions should be guided by the Agency's agricultural focus statement, as transmitted 5/1/87 (State 131187), which emphasized that the focus of the Agency's agricultural, rural development and nutrition program is to increase the income of the rural poor and expand the availability and consumption of food, while maintaining and enhancing the natural resource base. Assistance to support agricultural export development must be consistent with PD 15 (9/13/86) regarding the Bumper's amendment.

4. Biological Diversity/Tropical Forests. Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1986 require, repeat, require that each Country Development Strategy Statement contain an analysis of (1) the actions necessary for the country to conserve biological diversity and the extent to which the actions proposed for support by A.I.D. meet the needs thus identified and (2) the actions necessary for the country to conserve and sustain management of tropical forests and the extent to which actions proposed for support by A.I.D. meet the needs thus identified. Aspects of biological diversity must be analyzed for all countries, but only countries which have tropical forests need to include them. State 118324 provides information about these requirements and AID/W is now preparing more detailed guidance and a suggested outline for mission use. Copies of exemplary studies submitted in FY 1987 will also be made available. Some technical assistance is available from S&T/FNR and the regional bureaus.

5. Child Survival. The Agency child survival strategy approved in April, 1986, and substrategies approved subsequently on immunization, diarrheal disease control, nutrition for child survival, and child spacing for child survival, provide guidance for child survival programming. Although child survival goals for 1990 will not be met in all emphasis countries, child survival remains an agency priority. Missions should plan their child survival strategies and budgets for the period it will take to accomplish agency goals in their respective countries.

6. AIDS. Policy guidance on AIDS has been transmitted (State 100959, Dated 4/4/87). Missions should consider buy-ins to the centrally funded AIDS umbrella project for most bilateral activities. In addition, all mission activities should be undertaken in the context of a WHO-approved country plan of action, and should complement WHO and other donor-funded activities

7. Population Policy Guidance. The A.I.D. strategic objective for population is expanding access to family planning services to couples in the developing world. Current

population policy emphasizes the needs of individuals and families. A.I.D. supports international family planning because it enables couples to choose the number and spacing of their children, it improves the health of mothers and children, and it reduces abortion. A.I.D. policy also emphasizes providing information about and access to a range of safe and effective family planning services so that couples may choose the method appropriate to their circumstances.

This is not inconsistent with the need in some countries to achieve a balance between economic growth and population growth, the successful expansion of high quality family planning services will increase the practice of family planning and inevitably lead to lower population growth rates. The U.S. supports governments which have demographic targets, but does not set such targets for its own programs.

8. Land Tenure. Policy Determination 13 (5/9/86) sets forth A.I.D. policy regarding assistance to LDC programs and projects in land tenure development, land tenure security and related activities. A.I.D. is prepared, in selected cases and as resources may be available, to assist developing countries to establish or improve marketbased land tenure systems so that producers are able to obtain land or adjust the amount of land utilized in their production processes. Land and other resource tenure matters are key policy concerns in natural resource management. Policy dialogue and action programs should emphasize market-oriented approaches to sustainable resource use.

9. Democratic Initiatives. Democratic institution building has become a refocused priority for A.I.D. consequently, as part of our approach to achieving development objectives, missions should focus not only on economic institution building but on democratic institution building as well. The FAA mandates that A.I.D. programs should place emphasis, quote on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development...through the encouragement of democratic private and local government institutions, unquote. PD 12 on human rights outlines A.I.D.'s legislative requirements and commitment to this approach, and offers examples of projects encouraged for promoting democratic institution building. Missions are encouraged to incorporate democratic initiatives in their CDSS, as well as consider project ideas to be implemented through section 116(E) of the FAA.

10. Housing and Urban Development. The Office of Housing and Urban Programs (PRE/H), in collaboration with the regional bureaus and participating missions, is adopting a sector lending approach to the housing guaranty (HG) program. The

approach emphasizes the use of HG resources to leverage sector policy reforms would facilitate access by low income families to shelter and related facilities. Such programs provide HG dollars which need not be directly linked to specific project expenditures. However, the use of the local currency generated by such programs must be specified and must finance housing and related shelter activities affordable to families below the median income. Sector programs are sought as a more efficient vehicle for addressing fundamental constraints inhibiting the growth of sectoral output and productivity than more traditional projectized assistance.

The constraints which might be addressed could include, for example, inappropriate subsidies or shelter sector policies and standards and inadequate or inappropriate allocation of resources to or within the sector. Institutional or infrastructure constraints in particular might be handled by a comprehensive strategy which includes nonprojectized disbursement with related projects financed with local currency generated by the HG funds. Missions are also encouraged to consider the broader implications of the HG resource in mission programming in areas such as support for private sector and individual household efforts, development of market-based financial institutions, decentralization/local government development/secondary market town development, and the economic efficiency of urban investments.

The regional housing and urban development officers (RHUDO) are available to assist missions in exploring these novel programming opportunities.

11. International Disaster Assistance. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has determined during the last decade that host-country disaster impacts are becoming increasingly costly both in economic and human terms. OFDA's primary goal is to save lives and reduce human suffering. However, recently OFDA has become increasingly drawn into development-related activities for which missions should take greater responsibility such as pesticides management, flood hazards mitigation, rangeland/crop monitoring, landuse impacts analyses, and locust infestations management. Consistent with draft IG guidance regarding missions disaster planning, USAIDs should address in their strategy statement mission disaster preparedness planning and should document efforts to cooperate with host governments in assessing their potential vulnerability to events which cause disasters such as earthquakes, landslides, floods, drought and tsunamis.

Annex B

This annex recapitulates excerpts from an old CDSS guidance cable regarding Congressional special interests and earmarks. It is useful as current guidance as the legislation has not changed in these respects. The rest of the cable is outdated; some of the actual numbers repeated here are for prior fiscal years and can be ignored. Updated budgetary earmark levels will be provided in separate cables when available.

Excerpts from 1989 State 074952

7. While it is our intention to move toward stronger country-based program development, missions must nevertheless be aware of and responsive to congressional earmarks and guidance. For FY 91, these include the following:

8. Microenterprise. The FY 1989 earmark for microenterprise assistance is dollars 75 million from DA and ESF. ESF and P.L. 480 generated local currencies can continue to be used to meet this earmark. PD-17, microenterprise development program guidelines, offers assistance and guidance in addressing the microenterprise sector. Missions should discuss in the CDSS how they plan to address this sector during the planning period.

9. Women in Development. The FY 1989 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act stipulates that A.I.D. shall quote seek to ensure that country strategies, projects and programs are designed so that the percentage of women participants will be demonstrably increased, unquote. The statement of managers accompanying the legislation also directs A.I.D. quote in the design of country strategies...to seek to ensure that the percentage of women participants will be in approximate proportion to their traditional participation in the targeted activities or their proportion of the population, whichever is greater unquote. Therefore, WID should be addressed as a cross-cutting issue in the key development problem section and each of the strategy sections. Where the goals set forth above cannot reasonably be incorporated, legislation directs A.I.D. to ensure that there is a substantive analysis as to the obstacles preventing completion of such efforts, and an explanation of how these obstacles will be overcome.

10. Biological Diversity/Tropical Forests. As reported in (Annex A), the FAA requires all CDSS's to include an analysis of actions necessary to conserve biological diversity. The

legislation also directs that CDSS's for countries with tropical forests present an analysis of what must be done to conserve these forests. A State 32584 (Feb. 1989) provides more detailed guidance and a suggested outline for mission use. Expert technical assistance is available from S and T/FENR and the regional bureaus. In general, missions also should be guided by A.I.D.'s policy paper on the environment and natural resources.

11. Energy. Recent Congressional directives and initiatives stress the importance of energy to sustainable development. The FY 89 Appropriation Act elaborates on previous A.I.D. policy, which regards energy as an essential ingredient for economic growth, agricultural output, industrial productivity, transportation, and social well-being. The Act requires each CDSS to include an examination of how energy-sector assistance can be used to meet agency goals for economic growth, private sector development, science and technology, and trade and investment promotion.

The Congressional language includes five main thrusts: Energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, private sector participation in the energy sector, expansion of rural energy supplies, and price reform. In each of these areas, an emphasis should be on the use of environmentally-sound technologies. The language directs the agency to issue guidance stating that renewable energy resources and conservation are to be the centerpiece of A.I.D.'s energy efforts, and that meeting energy needs through these means shall be discussed in every CDSS. The act also asks A.I.D. to initiate two pilot programs in each of three geographical regions. One on energy conservation and end-use efficiency in the power sector, and a second on private-sector participation in power generation. The agency is incorporating these mandates into a new energy policy paper. Assistance is available from AID/W to help with appropriate treatment of these issues in the CDSS.

12. Basic Education. Under the FY 1989 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, A.I.D. must obligate for basic education activities this fiscal year the equivalent of 50 percent of its section 105 appropriation dollars 64.77 million from the section 105 and DFA accounts. The act further provides that in FY 1989, A.I.D. must initiate at least two new bilateral projects in basic education, at least one of which must be in sub-Saharan Africa. In each of FYs 1990 and 1991, the act provides that A.I.D. shall initiate three new bilateral projects in basic primary and secondary education, at least two of which in each fiscal year must be initiated in sub-Saharan Africa.

In their analysis, missions are encouraged to consider the broad impact of support for basic education on such areas as health, improved nutritional status, declining female fertility, increased agricultural production, and improved human resource bases for industrialization, as well as to assess the fiscal and other macro-economic implications of more efficient national expenditures on basic education. In countries where basic education appears to constitute a significant constraint, missions should include analysis of the basic education subsector in their CDSS, as well as consider projects to be implemented through the DFA and section 105 of the FAA. Specific reference should be made to female participation levels, to programs addressing critical female access deficiencies, and to the private provision of education as an alternative or supplement to publicly-funded education.

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Annex C

THE STRUCTURE OF MISSION PROGRAMS: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, TARGETS, AND BENCHMARKS

I. Introduction

Results and communication about results have assumed an increased priority with Congressional passage of the Development Fund for Africa (DFA). In many ways, the quid pro quo for the DFA's increased flexibility in programming is increased effectiveness, greater impact on people, and better reporting on that impact. Concentrating our resources in fewer countries and on fewer objectives is one of the principal ways that the Bureau has chosen to respond to the DFA mandate.

This annex is a slightly revised version of the guidance provided in 89 STATE 283555 under the title "The Structure of Mission Action Plans." That guidance was written on the premise that CDSSs would continue to identify the main themes and strategic objectives of a country program but that Action Plans (prepared the year after the CDSS approval and every two years thereafter) would be the documents in which those objectives were refined, elaborated, and translated into an actionable program. The guidance to which this annex is attached changes this premise, but it does not change the fact that determination of the structure of the country program is an essential part of the programming exercise whatever the names of the documents in which it is presented. In this revision, therefore, many references to specific documents have been removed to avoid confusion.

The purpose of this paper is to provide some vocabulary and analytical tools which we think Missions will find useful in working through the process of determining where their programs are going and how they are going to be managed to get there -- in other words, defining the strategic objectives, targets, and benchmarks for their programs. Since the programming process starts with the analysis of the country situation and the identification of possible points for providing AID support, it seemed useful to share with the field some of the definitional clarity which evolved in recent CDSS, Action Plan, and CPSP reviews. We think that some of the concepts and terms described here can contribute not only to improved communication but also to strengthening the analyses underlying country programs meant to address the principles of the DFA.

Section II provides some basic vocabulary and relates the process of defining strategic objectives and targets for a Mission's program -- that is, a program logframe -- to the process of defining goals, purposes, outputs, and inputs in a project logframe.

Section III introduces the concept of the objective tree as a useful way of thinking through the goal hierarchy problem which is common to projects and programs. An extended example using some ideas which emerged from one of the completed Program Weeks illustrates the objective tree definition in a program context.

Section IV links the vocabulary and tools to the portions of the Africa Bureau's Action Plan guidance which remain relevant. Section V distinguishes between project performance and program performance. It concludes with a brief discussion of why better definition of performance standards for each country program is an integral part of the challenge of implementing the DFA.

II. Terms and Concepts: The Program Logframe

The experience from Program Weeks in FY 88 and FY 89 has highlighted two issues:

- There are more differences between Program Weeks held before and after the inauguration of the DFA than many of us had realized, principally having to do with the program results orientation of the DFA; and
- We do not as yet share a common language for Mission-AFR/W dialogue about program performance and results.

We are, therefore, in a position that is rather like that in the late 1960s prior to the creation of the Logical Framework (Logframe). We find it hard to talk about the often nebulous level of analysis and objectives which lies between project and nonproject activities on the one hand and country development trends on the other -- namely, the Mission's country development assistance program.

The project logframe was intended to make the process of project design more foolproof, ensuring that the designers thought through the design, implementation, and evaluation process logically, linked inputs to outputs, connected outputs to purposes, and joined purposes to goals. It also introduced the notions of objectively verifiable indicators, end-of-project status, and assumptions. The logframe, its inherent limitations notwithstanding, thus gave AID staff a shared language, format, and organization for discussing project design and evaluation.

In essence, we are trying to do the same thing in providing guidance for the documentation process for the country program, that is, to improve program design and to develop a shared language so that the AFR/W-mission dialogue about the program is made easier.

The basic program logframe vocabulary includes five key terms and is growing slowly as we gain more experience with it. The five key terms are:

- program;
- strategic objective;
- target;
- benchmark; and
- results.

Country program designers should also use the general concepts of performance and effectiveness. The discussion in Sections III and IV which follow will expand upon the definitions of strategic objective, target, and benchmark. Program, results, performance, and effectiveness are defined briefly here.

- The word program is currently used in three ways in A.I.D. parlance. For clarity, program should only be used to refer to the Mission's country assistance program, that is, the combination of all project, nonproject, policy dialogue, and miscellaneous activities done by the Mission staff using A.I.D. human and financial resources. To avoid confusion, the other two common definitions of program should not be used, i.e., [1] as in program assistance -- the alternative term, nonproject assistance, is readily available; and [2] as in a collection of activities, both project and nonproject, in a particular sector, e.g., the research program, the agricultural program, the policy reform program -- an alternative word is portfolio.
- Results in DFA terminology should refer to people-level impact, not to process indicators of actions undertaken, or intermediate indicators of results that are probably going to be achieved. Thus, increased incomes of rural populations are results, the number of entrepreneurial training courses held is a process indicator, and the number of tons of fertilizer sold through the private sector is an intermediate indicator. Governments issuing revised investment codes are process indicators and dollars of capital invested subsequent to that revision are intermediate indicators. Numbers of jobs added to the economy and income increases generated and such are results. In earlier Mission Action Plans, many of the benchmarks and targets were stated in process or intermediate indicator terms, not in the language of results. Even in the overall DFA Action Plan, many of the targets and benchmarks are process/intermediate indicators. But results/impact are what the DFA is to produce and we will be refining the DFA Action Plan to be characterized in those terms.
- Performance is how the Bureau, Mission or country does in terms of actually attaining the results it is shooting for. In DFA terms, this means achieving the objectives and targets of the DFA Action Plan, the Mission's program, and, in general, in staying on the structural adjustment wagon. There is, of course, a strong relationship between the three so we hope that performance at all three levels will be mutually-reinforcing.
- Effectiveness is based on an assessment of how results are achieved: in retrospect, was the way we went about things the best way?


III. Defining Strategic Objectives, Targets and Benchmarks: The Objective Tree

The basic planning problem which any organization must solve is defining what it wants to accomplish over the long term -- that is, its goal -- and what it must do in the short and medium term to accomplish that goal. Definition of short and medium term objectives requires the planner to think through the problem in a sequential manner (this must be accomplished before that) as well as conceptually (e.g., increased production requires greater amounts of inputs, new techniques, capital, etc.). The diagramming of an objective tree is useful in addressing this planning problem systematically. In a graphic way, it helps the planner to think through and specify the cause and effect relationships between a number of inter-related factors.

A. Constructing an Objective Tree

As Figure 1 illustrates, the objective being analyzed is put at the top of the tree and the factors which are linked to this objective are laid out in a logical order below. The key question to be asked in working down the tree from the objective is: how? How can I assure that my objective will be achieved? Each successive answer to the "how" question becomes a box on a lower level of the tree.

Figure 1.



Thus, if one's objective is decreased malnutrition among two-year olds, then the answer to the "how" question might include one box indicating increased food consumption, another might be improved quality of the diet, another might be reduced impact of diseases which cause loss of appetite, etc. The level below the increasing food consumption box can then be filled in with more boxes containing the answers to how this objective can be achieved e.g., training mothers about childrens' needs, increased household incomes, etc.

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This example of downward movement in constructing the objective tree also illustrates that, after filling in one box on a particular level, the relevant question as one moves to the side is: what else? What other factors are necessary to accomplish the objective in the level above, and, are these factors sufficient? After asking "how" and "what else" enough times, the analyst/planner should have a fairly large tree and a pretty clear picture of how things fit together, the magnitude of the issues to be addressed, and so forth.

B. Using an Objective Tree

Verification of the objective tree logic, then, should be from the bottom level up. To verify a tree so constructed, it is essential to work back up the levels, asking the question: so what? Households have larger incomes, so what? Will that really lead to increased food consumption among the two-year olds? Kids are eating more food, so what? Does this really result in decreased malnutrition?

Boxes at one level of the tree should not simply add up to equal the result or objective in the level above. Rather, the boxes should represent things that work together synergistically to result in the objective. Together they constitute the preconditions necessary to the objective being achieved.

A real-life example follows to show how an objective tree works and how it can be used to clarify choices in a program design context.


The example is from an Action Plan recently reviewed in Washington. This Mission did not use the objective tree approach explicitly, and it is, therefore, a good example to show some of the differences between what may be called the old and new approaches to country program planning. Like many other Mission's programs, the program in question evolved over time in response to specific needs in that country. This led to a patchwork quilt of activities that were each developmentally sound but did not add up to a coherent program.

Prior to the DFA, patchwork quilt programs were perfectly acceptable in that they were viewed as most likely to respond to the host governments' needs. Two aspects of the DFA changed this: (1) the need for program impact reporting, and (2) the commitment to the principle that concentration of resources will lead to increased impact.

The mission defined decreasing infant mortality as one of its strategic objectives. If a Mission analyst had used the objective tree, s/he would have put this at the top of the tree, and would have filled the next level of the tree with factors that contributed to this objective (Figure 2).

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Figure 2.



In other words, our hypothetical mission analyst should have filled the boxes in the blank level here by asking how decreased infant mortality could be brought about, i.e., what are those things that are necessary and sufficient to achieve, if one wishes to have a measurable impact on decreasing infant mortality in that country. Perhaps starting with reduced levels of diarrhea, our Mission analyst would then have asked "what else" is necessary to decrease infant mortality and have added boxes until they reached a sufficient number of factors to achieve the objective in the box above, i.e., greater calorie intakes, inoculation for immunizable diseases, wider spaces between births, reduced incidence of acute respiratory infections, reduced AIDS incidence among mothers. Then, again asking "how?", the Mission could have moved on to create the boxes in the tier below.


Having worked through this process, the analyst would have been able to see the relationships between the factors needed to achieve the objective and to select those factors A.I.D.'s program in that country might contribute to with full awareness of what factors were not being addressed.

C. The Project Logframe: Extracted from the Objective Tree

The application of the objective tree just described should be familiar to project designers. Indeed, it was this methodology which underlay the logframe concept developed specifically for A.I.D. projects. When the Project Logframe was developed, it was arbitrarily decided that four levels would be enough to capture the important linkages. Reading the following graphic from the bottom up summarizes the logic (Figure 3).

Figure 3.

CONCEPT OF PROJECT LOGFRAME



D. The Level of Manageable Interest and the Project Logframe

Specification of the four appropriate levels for a project logframe is not, however, automatic. It requires some judgement. The most crucial level is that of the project purpose because it is at this level that the Mission defines its responsibility for the results of the activity.

The Project Design Course Handbook defines the "project purpose" as the "result of the good management of the outputs." Good management plus good design, including assumptions that hold true, together are expected to lead to accomplishment of project purpose, the highest level of achievement that can be associated with the project intervention itself.

The project manager has the responsibility for the achievement of outputs and thus contributes to the achievement of purpose. Mission management, on the other hand, has responsibility for achievement of the purpose because the Mission as a whole controls both design and implementation. It must be noted, however, that the Mission management does not have the authority, not being in control of the assumptions, to guarantee achievement of project purpose.

The concept used to denote this distinction between responsibility and authority is manageable interest. It is in the manageable interest of the project manager to work toward the delivery of project outputs; it is in the manageable interest of the Mission manager to work toward the accomplishment of project purpose.

In good project design, the designers work out an objective tree for the development problem to be addressed, decide what is in the manageable interest of the Mission and design the logframe (that is, choose the levels which will be designated as goal, purpose, outputs, and inputs) around that.

IV. Constructing a Program Logframe: Defining the Structure of a Country Program


The utility of the project logframe in improving the logic and coherence of project design, implementation, and evaluation led the Bureau to consider further adaptation of this concept to country program strategy design and implementation. The results orientation of the DFA combined with the Bureau's decision to concentrate resources in fewer countries and on fewer objectives led fairly naturally to the tentative requirement that Missions should begin to structure their programs in a way very similar to that used in defining a project using the Logframe.

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As Missions have gained experience in doing so and as Washington/Mission reviews have tested the success of the outcomes, it has become increasingly clear that developing a program logframe (Figure 4) is a useful approach to defining a program and to AFR/W and the Mission coming to an agreement on how the projected results (the strategic objectives and targets) are to be achieved.

Figure 4.

CONCEPT OF PROGRAM LOGFRAME



A. The Program Logframe and the Mission's Manageable Interest

In the same way that the project purpose is defined as what is in the manageable interest of the Mission, in country program planning, strategic objectives of the program should be in the manageable interest of the Mission. Developing the country program logframe essentially requires the mission to: work out the

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hierarchy of objectives it could (or plans to) address -- using an objective tree approach to develop the hierarchy; make a judgement about which objectives are in the manageable interest of the Mission; and define those as the strategic objectives.

Targets are the level of boxes below on the objective tree that make up the necessary and sufficient factors to achieve the strategic objective. Targets may be project purposes, "goal" statements for a group of projects and nonprojects, expected outcomes of policy dialogue, or an objective that is part of a project depending on the size of the Mission and level of resources committed to it.

If a strategic objective is in the manageable interest of the Mission, the Mission should be able to demonstrate measurable progress toward accomplishment of that result over time. Trying to articulate a strategic objective in measurable terms can be a practical way of helping the Mission decide if a strategic objective actually is within its manageable interest. Note that this means in some cases a strategic objective may not be the level just below the program goal; it may in fact be one or two levels down the tree. For example, if the Mission's country program goal is a better life for rural people, a subgoal might be increased farm income, the subsubgoal might be increased agricultural production, and the strategic objective might be increased cereals production.


What we have found through experience is that more than four levels are generally necessary to lay out an objective tree for a program and that careful assessment of manageable interest is essential to designating the goal, strategic objectives, targets, and, often, subtargets which the Mission will actually adopt.

To illustrate again with an example in the health area -- again, drawn from a real-life case. A Mission presenting its program noted activities in birth spacing, ORT and AIDS. These choices were based on their assessment -- not using an objective tree -- that these relatively small activities were on a scale commensurate with the mission's available resources and were complementary to activities being undertaken by other donors.

Trying to respond to guidance on program documentation which asked them to focus their program on a few objectives only, the mission attempted to group these disparate activities under one quote strategic objective unquote, that of decreasing infant mortality. While, in theory, birth spacing, ORT, and AIDS activities might all contribute to decreasing infant mortality, they will do so in varying degrees and are far from sufficient to do so in a measurable way. Moreover, the actual activities being implemented make measurement even more of a problem. In ORT, for example, the

Mission program supports private sector production and distribution of oral rehydration salts, quite a long way away in objective tree terms (Figure 5) from a dehydrated child actually receiving the salts and not dying.

Figure 5.



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In short, there are at least three levels of objectives not being directly addressed by the Mission activity before the strategic objective can be attained. The manageable interest criterion of the strategic objective would not appear to be met.

B. The Program Logframe and Reporting on Performance

From a performance tracking point of view, therefore, it appears clear that, in the example just given, the Mission's program will not have a measurable effect on the objective the Mission has stated. The chosen objective is too high up the objective tree. In an environment where performance and reporting on results is important, i.e., the DFA, a better approach would be to define a strategic objective as the highest level at which achievement can be related to Mission action. Particularly in the areas of a Mission's portfolio that are not the main focus, objectives should not be characterized in such global terms.

Defining strategic objectives at too high a level on the objective tree, i.e., trying to make them global enough that discrete activities appear to be part of a cohesive strategy, undercuts their measurability and their utility as performance assessment tools.

The level defined as a strategic objective should simply be the highest level on the tree that the mission thinks it can affect in a measurable way. As already noted, there may be instances where more tiers of the objective tree are necessary to convey the mission's program and the objectives which it truly feels it can achieve. Missions should not feel straitjacketed by the jargon but modify it to convey their program. Specifying subtargets is a perfectly acceptable solution; there may be other such solutions as well, including greater specification when it comes to timeframes for achievement.

Achieving real progress in development is a long-term process. For both management and external reporting reasons, however, we need to track progress and report on performance in fairly short-term intervals. AID reports to the Congress each year. With this in mind, strategic objectives should be defined as objectives which can be achieved in five to seven years. Targets, the objectives included in the tier of boxes on the objective tree just below what the mission picked to be their strategic objectives, should be achievable in a 3-5 year timeframe. As mission programs will vary in terms of how long they have been working in an area and what constraints remain, two missions might have strategic objectives or targets in the same sector that would be at very different levels of an objective tree.

for U.S. assistance to have an impact. There is currently a willingness in AFR/W to recognize this.

Frankly, however, as a key purpose of the country program planning process is to increase the effectiveness of U.S. assistance by concentrating resources, a program with too many of these so-called targets of opportunity is likely to beg the question of which of them makes the most sense. Moreover, the new standard of measurable strategic objectives makes it increasingly difficult to bury a myriad of targets of opportunity and slide them past Washington.

D. The Program Logframe as a Means of Communication

The definition of the program logframe -- strategic objectives, targets, and benchmarks -- for the Mission's program provides the basis for AID/W to understand the Mission's efforts in a program rather than project context and for AID/W and the Mission to agree on program priorities and directions.

When the strategic objectives, targets, and benchmarks are too general, they provide poor guidance and contribute little to better comprehension of the program; when they are too specific, they invite AID/W micromanagement and run the risk of putting the Mission in a performance straitjacket. When they are properly specified, however, they provide an excellent framework for further program design as well as for performance-oriented program management and evaluation, a fundamental requisite for DFA implementation.

The logframe/objective tree approach does not fill all the communication needs, however. It provides only part of the vocabulary for Mission-AFR/W dialogue about program performance and results. What remains difficult to address is the incorporation of Mission efforts outside of the project/nonproject arena into the objective tree and program logframe. As was stated earlier, a country assistance program goes beyond the project/nonproject portfolio and includes donor coordination, research and studies as well as the technical assistance, policy dialogue, and miscellaneous services in which Mission staff engage directly. While there should be an awareness, in verifying the objective tree, that it is not only project or nonproject activities funded by the Mission which can make the difference, but also the qualities and organization of the Mission staff itself. Objective trees should identify boxes which cover these areas if they exist. Alternatively, however, this can be, as it has been in the last two years, the subject of the Mission representative's oral presentation of the country program during Program Week meetings.

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Benchmarks are indicators of progress toward target achievement and should, therefore, be monitorable on an annual basis. This means that benchmark tracking and reporting will, in fact, be the major short-term means for reporting on program performance. Unfortunately, the definition of good benchmarks is difficult. This is the area where the Bureau has had the most difficulty in reaching a common understanding. Benchmarks do not show up on the objective tree. Rather, they are indicators that the target to which they relate is, or is not, being achieved. Some pieces of the definition of benchmarks have been agreed upon.

-- Benchmarks are indicators of objective achievement [i.e. numbers, facts, observable phenomena] in which incremental change can be seen over a relatively short period of time.

-- Benchmarks should not be management steps such as "approval of the PP for a new project". Missions most likely will want to identify key management steps for their own purposes.

-- Benchmarks should not be simple progress markers on project activity. Not every activity in the Mission's portfolio will be able to demonstrate performance in the short term. If all that will occur in a project in the reporting timeframe is management oriented, that project should be linked to the appropriate strategic objective in the discussion but not be represented by spurious benchmarks.

C. The Program Logframe and Pieces that Don't Fit

The problem faced by the Mission whose health sector objective tree was noted above was trying to come up with a strategic objective that encompassed all three of its activities in the health/population areas. In this case, they faced an insurmountable problem. They were implementing, for very good reasons, three relatively small, discrete activities (at least compared to the needs in that country) which are not sufficient to achieve the program result identified. The activities need to be recognized as discrete.

Mission portfolios, for a variety of historical reasons including Congressional earmarks, are not tidy packages. While under the DFA the emphasis is on focussing and concentrating resources, it is unlikely that AID programs in Africa will ever become completely tidy packages with all activities neatly grouped under two strategic objectives to make it appear as though the program is more coherent than it really is. Where there are compelling reasons for pursuing an activity which does not quite fit, such as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome in a central African country, we should acknowledge such activities as targets of opportunity

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V. Conclusion

The objective tree seems to be a highly useful tool to look in an analytical way at our overall country programs. The tree can help in understanding relationships logically and can facilitate an assessment of Mission action in terms of its necessity and sufficiency to reach the identified results. Using the objective tree as a first draft of a program logframe and giving names to particular boxes on the tree -- strategic objective, target, subtarget -- can also help Washington and the Mission to more easily discuss what results the Mission expects to help achieve.

Because results and communication about results have assumed an increased priority with the passage of the DFA, the country program review process has become an important vehicle for assessing progress in achieving the strategic objectives and targets of the country program, clarifying country program priorities particularly at the target level, and reviewing resources needed to fulfill the strategic objectives of the mission's country program. This paper has tried to provide tools and concepts to assist in this process.

FY 91 GUIDANCE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

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FY 91 GUIDANCE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

I. INTRODUCTION

This guidance supersedes all previous API guidance. It draws on the FY 90 API experience and the observations made by the several AFR/W offices that reviewed the FY 90 APIs. This guidance has also benefitted from the input of Mission Directors' comments and suggestions.

II. BACKGROUND

Under the Development Fund for Africa (DFA), the Africa Bureau has been mandated to improve the impact of its development programs in the region. The DFA gives the Bureau the flexibility to program its resources to the countries and sectors where these resources can make the most difference. The Bureau is attempting to concentrate resources where the potential for measurable and sustainable results (or impact) is greatest.

The DFA has also challenged the Bureau to develop systems/processes for Missions and AFR/W to regularly assess program impact at the country and regional levels, and to report on this impact. The Assessment of Program Impact (API), a yearly exercise for all Category I Missions, was introduced for this purpose (90 STATE 215400) as part of a larger effort to improve the country program strategy, monitoring, and impact reporting systems in the Africa Bureau. This effort, which focused on DFA priority (so-called Category One) countries, included the replacement of the CDSS and Action Plan by a unified country program strategic plan (CPSP), replacement of the Semi-Annual Project Implementation Reports (PIR) overview statement, and elimination of formal AID/W review of semi-annual PIRs with a yearly API.

Because systematic impact reporting at the country program level was new to the Bureau, it was intended to proceed carefully in developing the API in order not to create expectations that could not be met. It was early recognized that the depth and breadth of information that could be reported in an API would vary from country to country, especially in the early years. Many Missions do not yet have fully developed program logframes and/or are still working on the articulation of strategic objectives and targets that are truly in their manageable interest. Some Missions are further along than others in developing monitoring

and evaluation systems for the country program and for major project and non-project activities. It was decided, however, that limited API reporting that did not provide a complete reading of country program performance in any given year would nonetheless contribute to our regional information base for DFA reporting. It is expected that API information will be additive from year to year and over time will paint a picture of country program impact.

Further, the Africa Bureau intends, during the 1990s, to move toward further decentralization in its program management. If this is fully successful, once a country's program strategy (i.e., program logframe) is agreed upon as a result of a Bureau review of a collaboratively developed CPSP, the Mission would then assume full authority for the selection, design, and approval for all new project and non-project activity. The API would become the basis for an annual process to (1) assess progress toward the achievement of the program logframe, (2) review the continuing relevance of the country strategy and programs, and (3) as appropriate, given the outcome of the review, modify planned program levels (including oe and personnel requirements). In other words, the API would become the basis of a joint annual review by the Mission and AFR/W of the program quote contract unquote. It would also be a source of information and data (minimizing other program submissions) for other routine documentation and reporting requirements that will be assumed by AID/W, as well as a principal source of information for impact reporting to congress. It is expected that over the next five years the Bureau will move toward this more fully decentralized system once monitoring and evaluation systems are fully established and the Bureau has gained experience with impact reporting through the API.

The AFR/W Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group is studying how it can best support Missions in developing and strengthening systems for assessing country program impact, particularly as AFR/W reorganizes itself and PPC/CDIE takes on new responsibilities. A continuous flow of AFR/W - Mission communication is expected as the API evolves so that its utility as an analytical, reporting, and feedback system on program impact can be continually improved.

This guidance incorporates the standard Bureau terminology on program evaluation. STATE 283555 of 1990 provides a complete definition of these terms.

III. The Purposes of the API for FY 1991

A. Primary Purpose of the API

In the short to medium term, the API will be the principal vehicle for Category I Missions to report to AFR/W on the performance/impact of their country programs.

The framework for API reporting will be the Mission's strategic objectives, targets, and subtargets (i.e., its program logframe) and the corresponding indicators. The API will be a unique report summarizing information gleaned from monitoring systems and special analyses undertaken by the Mission over the past year (including monitoring and analysis undertaken by the host country and other donors).

In reviewing APIs, AFR/W will be concerned with:

- The extent to which the program is achieving its strategic objectives, targets, and subtargets; and,
- The measures by which program performance is being monitored and evaluated.

B. Secondary Purposes of the API

The basis for strengthening the Missions' strategy and program implementation. While not specifically designed as an instrument for program strengthening, the API will furnish information that is useful and, in some cases, critical for improving the effectiveness and impact of country programs. In answering the question of what impact a program is having, preparation of an API will in effect be the first step in determining if a program or strategy revision is warranted. In some cases a Mission would follow up on an API by proposing through a separate cable a type of strategy revision (ranging from revision of one target to the complete program logframe) and a process for revision (e.g., in-country consultation, sector assessment).

Assessment of impact at the regional and sectoral levels. The Bureau will begin to develop a system for regional and sectoral level impact reporting under the DFA, using country API reports as building blocks for analyzing impact at these levels. It is envisioned that the APIs will become a critical, although not the only, source of information for AFR/W analyses at regional and sectoral levels. In the revised AFR/W structure, AFR/ARTs (the planned replacement for AFR/DP/PAR merged with AFR/TR -- analysis, research, and technical support) will play a key role in supplementing Mission-specific impact information

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with broader regional and sectoral analysis so that we can better understand and report on what is happening in africa as a whole.

Use of program information. There are several other expectations regarding the information communicated to AID/W by Missions in their APIs. In the initial years of the API, AID/W will be especially concerned with using API information in two ways:

- to facilitate Congressional reporting under the DFA (thereby reducing Mission workload for CP preparation); and,
- to facilitate the exchange of operational program experiences among Missions (lessons learned).

Adjustments to quantified indicators. An annex to the API can be used to document a change in an indicator or a revision to the expected level of achievement, corresponding to a strategic objective, target, or subtarget, for subsequent years. An indicator would only be revised through an API where the overall strategy as well as the specific strategic objective, target, or subtarget continues to be valid. As already noted, if Mission management review or API material indicates that not only is a strategic objective, for example, not going to be accomplished at the level projected, but that AID's efforts are not going to make any difference at all, then the Mission will wish to take other steps to communicate this finding to AFR/W.

Geographic offices have also expressed interest in using the APIs for program and strategy review, dialogue purposes, and broader performance reviews on an experimental basis. The geographic offices wishing to carry out this exercise will communicate directly with their respective Missions.

IV. The API format

A. A Change from FY 90

The format for the API, which has been the subject of extensive discussions over the last year, implies a more structured document than was the case for the semi-annual PIR overview statement. Consistency in strategy over time, reported through the use of a similar structure, will increase the utility of the document in tracking on a country program level and facilitate impact analysis on the regional level. The API looks at progress to date (in

relation to expectations documented in a CPSP or older action plan) as a critical yet distinct first step in the on-going strengthening of AID assistance at the country and regional levels.

While actual length will vary from country to country, based on breadth and maturity of the program and availability of data, the typical API should be in the 8 to 15 page range, including supporting tables. The section that follows offers more specific guidelines on the appropriate length of each of the three sections that make up the API report. Emphasis should be on substance rather than form, and succinct rather than prolific reports are preferred. It is suggested that Missions study the APIs submitted by other Missions in FY 90 (a compendium was distributed at the Mission Directors' Conference) for ideas and examples.

One new (if minor) requirement for FY 91 is that each API include a one-page graphic form of the program logframe. Mission directors who perused the FY 90 API compendium remarked that this would be helpful in getting a quick grasp of a Mission's program logframe.

A standardized worksheet for Section III of the FY 91 API was developed on the basis of the FY 1990 APIs submitted. What is thought to be the best elements from several worksheets have been retained. The prototype received at least nominal approval from the Mission directors at the 1991 Mission directors conference. A prototype of the worksheet to be used in the FY 91 API is presented below in tabular format.

To make it more comprehensible, information from a composite Mission (MODAPI, developed for the Mission Directors' Workshop) is included. For demonstration purposes, only one strategic objective is reproduced to show the essential elements of the worksheet. Ideally, one strategic objective (SO), related targets, and indicators should all fit on one page to facilitate readers' grasp of logic and linkages.

The one point which is still left open on the prototype worksheet is that regarding sources of information for indicators. Where it is appropriate to do so, Missions may wish to indicate sources for each indicator, rather than sources for clusters of indicators as is shown on the prototype Section III table format.

Section I: Special Factors Affecting the USAID Program

This section should discuss only those recent unforeseen events or emerging, previously unrecognized or unappreciated, trends that have had or are expected to have an effect (positive or negative) on the Mission's program, or which create opportunities to

PROGRAM LOGFRAME: USAID/MODAPI ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

REPORTING YEAR: FY 1990

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS	PLANNED AND ACTUAL (1)								
		No.	Year	Baseline	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1										
Increase food production	1. Gross food crop production (million MT) (2)	1	1981	1.6/1.7	2.1(2)	2.5	2.9	3.4	3.8	
	2. Area planted in foodgrains (million ha) Source: Annual Ministry estimate	1.25	1978	1.05/1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	
TARGET 1.1										
Intensify smallholder production of food grains	1. Maize production(MT)/ha increases: all smallholders -- women-headed households only	0.9	1989	1.0/1.9	-	1.2	-	-	1.8	Date are not currently disaggregated by gender
	2. Smallholder purchases of new maize seed (MT)	2	1989	3.0/4.0	-	7	-	-	18	
	3. Smallholder purchases of fertilizer ('000 MT): all -- women buyers only	90	1989	100/100	-	110	-	-	130	Date are not currently disaggregated by gender
	4. Use of farm credit (M\$ million): all borrowers -- women farmer borrowers Source: Ministry statistics	45	1989	52/60	-	73	-	-	95	Date are not currently disaggregated by gender
TARGET 1.2										
Increase land utilization of estates larger than 30 ha	1. Land utilization increases	-	1990							
	- estates 30 - 100 ha			35/38%	-	39%	-	-	40%	
	- estates over 100 ha			20/23%	-	25%	-	-	28%	
	2. Effective average estate way rate Sources: (1) USAID: MKANDAWIRE, Jafee and Bertolli, "Beyond Dualism," 1990									Date for effective average estate wage rate not currently collected.
TARGET 1.3										
Reform and strengthen agricultural institutional framework	1. Agricultural Budget-GOM budget: Recurrent (%)	4.7%	1990	4.7/4.7%	-	5%	-	-	5.5%	
	2. Agricultural research budget increases in real terms: Recurrent budget (M\$ million)	-		7.0/7.0	-	8.5	-	-	11.5	
	3. Number of smallholds adopt agroforestry techniques									To be statistically monitored
	4. Proportion smallholder lands devoted to HYV maize Source: Budget documents, 1990/91									To be statistically monitored

Notes: (1) Reporting year column shows actual (A) and Planned (P) levels.

(2) Assumes fertilizer use increases annually. To be monitored.

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strengthen the program. Under this section a Mission might find it necessary or useful to discuss a change in government policy that affects a particular strategic objective of the country program, a natural disaster that makes attainment of a target impossible, a major new donor initiative related to the Mission strategy, a significant change in the terms of trade where Mission strategy is to promote trade, etc. A more general overview of development issues should not repeat not be presented in Section I.

The experience from the FY 1990 APIs indicates emphasis on the following points. Section I should only deal with the major factors which affect the country. It should also touch on broad themes that do not necessarily relate to specific strategic objectives and targets; it can include major management issues as well. Portfolio descriptions are firmly discouraged. The purpose of this section is to lay the background necessary to understanding Sections II and III of the API.

The FY 90 APIs and discussions with the Mission Directors have led the API Working Group to decide that keeping Section I no longer than one or two pages is good practice.

Section II: Progress toward Overall Program Goals

Missions should report on movement in the critical country trend indicators that relate to the program goals and sub-goals as contained in the CPSP, CDSS, or recent Action Plan. Where the country program goal is very general (e.g., "support broad-based economic growth"), the selection of indicators should also be based on the portfolio composition, program strategy, and the accessibility of reliable and relatively up-to-date data. Given the emphasis on "people-level" impact in the DFA, it is expected that IMF/World Bank macroeconomic indicators will usually be supplemented by indicators related to household income/consumption, infant mortality, income distribution, etc.

A tabular format with text accompanying is an option for those Missions that wish to present this section in this way. (See, for example, Chad and Cameroon APIs for FY 90.)

Section II, which should not exceed four to five pages, is particularly useful to ensure that the linkages between the strategic objectives, sub-goals and goals are strong and clearly articulated.

Section III: Progress toward Strategic Objectives and Related Progress Indicators

This is the major section of the API, in which progress should be most closely associated with program strategy and performance. Progress should be measured against the indicators developed by the Mission and endorsed by AFR/W in Program Week or other ECPR level discussions. Performance should be reported for each strategic objective (SO) and target.

Some Missions have chosen to include sub-targets. Criteria for inclusion of sub-targets are twofold: they must represent results (similar to targets), and, second, they should not imply an additional management step.

Reporting on targets of opportunity in Section III should be the exception rather than the rule, simply because of the definition of such targets as somewhat outside of the Mission's principal responsibility for development impact.

The format for Section III is a now standardized worksheet. As noted above, the format was selected by analysis of the FY 90 subMissions and noting what worked and what didn't work. The tabular worksheet is presented here with prototype information for the mythical MODAPI.

The text accompanying the worksheet/table(s) can come before or after the worksheet. In preparing section III, however, Missions are encouraged to balance the amount of text and tables. Missions may want to summarize some of their textual comments in bulletized format based on the program logframe.

B. Fixing a Common Problem: The Baseline Year

The most misunderstood concept of the APIs from FY 90 was that of the "baseline" year. A clear understanding of baseline conditions is fundamental to any evaluation (or to interpreting any results reported in an evaluation). Yet the results from the FY 90 APIs showed that Missions tended to define their "baseline" year as when their CPSP began and/or 1990. This meant that no understanding of progress to date was communicated. This was especially frustrating when it was well known that the Mission had been working toward a particular objective for some years and had, for example, made substantial progress over the last five years. Therefore, the following guidelines for choosing a baseline year should be observed.

- In essence, we are looking for quantifiable historical data in the quote baseline unquote area. Regardless of when indicators were formally established as part of the country program logframe, the Mission's challenge is to communicate a sense of recent progress (or conditions, or lack of progress) achieved to date. Data from the early 1980s which are related to longstanding efforts in child survival or agricultural research or agricultural extension, for example, could be used to determine a relevant and reasonable baseline year.
- There also seemed to be a tendency to designate one baseline year for all the indicators related to a Mission's entire program. This is not necessary as a Mission's early efforts were unlikely to have begun in precisely the same year for all sectors. It also seems to get in the way of creatively finding sources of information that would give the basis for understanding a trend.
- The baseline year should be determined based on a Mission's experience with the sector for which it is assessing impact. It is, therefore, understandable that different baseline years in the same country program for different goals are perfectly acceptable. Indeed, the most likely scenario should, in fact, be one where most Missions with two strategic objectives involving two or more different sectors will have no less than two baseline years.
- Another likely possibility for the FY 91 API is that Missions will want to adjust their baseline year from 1990 to a more adequate baseline year. However, once chosen, the respective baseline years are to be kept in subsequent reporting years. The process by which a Mission wishes to change a baseline year to a more recent year will have to be developed at some future date, but should only become an issue in future years (at a minimum three years from now).

C. Indicators

It is suggested that all indicators for a target (or, if possible, a strategic objective) be fitted on one page. This helps those working on the selection of indicators to better keep track of the various targets. Furthermore, it is also useful, especially for AFR/W review, to project into the future, and have expected impact for upcoming fiscal years, say, for FY 1990 (the baseline year) through FY 1995. However, indicators should be used sparingly, as what goes in an API Year One should ideally be included in all subsequent years. Recognizing that many Missions have still not identified a set of indicators with which they feel entirely

comfortable, it is nevertheless recommended that an abundance of indicators be avoided and a great deal of selectivity in the choice of indicators be exercised.

D. Frequency of Indicator Analysis

In any one year, due to lack of current data, quantitative reporting at all levels will not be possible. Missions should try, nonetheless, to assess their performance annually, at all levels of the program logframe, with whatever information is available. This effort will also serve to indicate areas where greater investment in analysis and tracking is necessary. In some countries, monitoring systems that provide comprehensive data on all components of the country program logframe are not yet fully established. Missions are expected to report available data while more comprehensive monitoring systems are being established.

In sum, it is perfectly acceptable not to include information on the level of accomplishment (status) of all indicators each year. If, in a particular year, the Mission chooses not to report on a target/indicator (choosing to focus on another set of indicators for example), it is still useful, for AID/W review, for the Mission to provide a discussion at the strategic objective or sub-target level if at all possible.

AFR/W expects variability in the depth and detail of reporting, especially in the early years of the API. Where recent data or analysis is more extensive in one area than in another, this should be reflected in the API. When, for example, a Mission and host country have just completed a demographic and health survey, the Mission may find it useful to discuss in more detail program performance in the family planning or child survival component of the country program strategy than one of its other strategic objectives or targets.

E. Data Sources

There is agreement that it is important to identify sources, since the API is used for Congressional and other reporting, credibility is important. Furthermore, for the purposes of consistency in data sources for subsequent years, and so that trends may have some meaning, it is important to give sources wherever possible.

Some of the FY 90 APIs that listed sources only gave sources for information related to strategic objectives. If possible, Missions should attempt to identify data sources by indicators. This enables the reader to get a sense of the type of data information used and the potential degree of credibility that can be associated with the indicators.

F. Gender Disaggregation

Agency and Bureau mandates regarding the proportional participation of women in AID activities necessitate the ability to report progress on a gender-disaggregated basis. A recent review of the FY 1990 APIs against Missions' Women in Development Action Plans revealed very few gender-disaggregated indicators in APIs, and virtually zero actual information on women. Missions are strongly encouraged to re-examine indicators in light of the women in development mandate, and to identify quantitative and qualitative approaches to maximizing gender-disaggregated reporting at the program level.

G. Changing Strategic Objectives, Targets, or Sub-targets

Rearticulations of strategic objectives (SO) and targets were allowed only for the FY 90 API. Rearticulation of strategic objectives in the API should not be done in the FY 91 API. If a Mission, while evaluating the content of a draft API, or in working with a program policy assistance (PPA) or a monitoring/evaluation team, decides to rearticulate a SO, that Mission should cable AFR/W upon completion of that rearticulation, and explain, with supporting data, the reasons for those changes. Either the geographic desk or AFR/DP will be responsible for responding to the Missions' proposal as appropriate.

Targets can, however, can still be rearticulated in this FY 91 API. Rearticulations should be included in Section III with appropriate indicators. Missions should bear in mind, however, that rearticulation does not mean redesign. If the change is so significant in magnitude or direction that the strategy is effectively modified, then the cable procedure just described should be followed.

When the program logframe in a CPSP (and any variation thereof) is approved through a Program Week process, the next API is to be based on the new program logframe. Any way the Mission can help to link performance under previous programs to the current program design is encouraged. Any agreement regarding a changed strategic objective, target or sub-target resulting from a program week or other ecpr-level review agreement should be reflected in the API (especially Section III) that same year as well as in subsequent years.

H. Annex A - Revision of Indicators and Expected Levels of Achievement

It is recognized that in some cases Missions have, understandably, developed quantified indicators of program progress without benefit of indepth analysis of the validity of existing data and the level of improvement attainable over a given period of time. We

want to avoid the situation where the strategy continues to be valid, but the quantified indicators have become irrelevant, leaving the Bureau and the Mission with no realistic expectations against which to measure yearly progress. This annex to the API can be used to change SO and target indicators (the type of indicator used to gauge performance) and expected levels of achievement (the quantification of the indicator).

Missions are cautioned to use this adjustment provision sparingly and only when they are confident that the underlying strategy (the strategic objectives, targets, and subtargets) continues to be valid. If a major adjustment of measurement is necessary, this might actually indicate that some aspect of the strategy itself warrants review. This strategy review should then be pursued through another process.

V. Submittal and Review of the API

A. Schedule for Submittal

Who and when? The answer continues to be all Category I Missions. API reports are due October 31 of each year. Recognizing that several Missions have not yet done new CPSPs (e.g., Rwanda, Burundi, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Togo), this means that they will have to continue with "proxy" program logframes based on their current portfolios.

B. Mission Review of the APIs

Missions will, of course, develop their own standards and procedures for in-house reviews of APIs. Some Missions will probably find it useful to link API reviews to regular portfolio reviews; others might find a consultative process that involves participation by the host country and other donors a useful approach. Another option might be a two-stage process of internal Mission review followed by review with outside parties.

C. The API in Washington

One recurring criticism from Missions regarding the FY 90 APIs was the lack of response and feedback on API reporting from AFR/W on their APIs. For this reason, the following section is provided to make clear where responsibilities lie. In FY 91, although all geographic offices and several sectoral offices in AFR/TR held reviews, only two geographic offices and some of the AFR/TR offices subsequently sent cables to the Missions summarizing the comments on specific APIs, as well as an assessment and general comments on broader themes concerning all the APIs reviewed. This was felt by most Missions to have

been insufficient. AFR/W reviewers agree but note that, as the quality of information in the APIs improves, it will be possible to provide Missions feedback which will be more substantive and meaningful.

The Washington API review process consists of four elements.

- The first review of the APIs is coordinated by the geographic desks. In FY 90, the desks reproduced the API reports, distributed them to AFR/DP, AFR/PD, AFR/MDI, and AFR/TR, and organized a review/discussion at a country or regional level. For the FY 90 APIs, each country API was reviewed by a small committee of three to five people led by the desk, including AFR/TR, AFR/PD and AFR/DP. Each geographic office director then chaired a meeting to summarize and discuss the impact findings for that region. This same process will be followed for the FY 91 reports.
- Another review process is a technical one, undertaken by AFR/TR for FY 90 and by AFR/ARTS for FY 91. ARTS will continue to organize reviews on a sectoral basis and may select key cross-sectoral issues for review as well.
- A third review is broader, conducted by AFR/DP. All FY 90 APIs were analyzed for possible use of the information for external reporting as well as for general understanding for program performance. Because the AAA/AFR/DP is also the Bureau's WID officer, it is expected that she will chair a review of the FY 91 APIs for wid-reporting purposes.
- The format watchdogs. For the FY 90 APIs, the Working Group which conceptualized the document in the first place also conducted a format review to see what styles of presentation worked best and which did not. Much of this cable is based on the observations of the format group. While the need for this group to continue to play a review role is expected to diminish as the APIs become more standardized, it will probably carry out such reviews regarding the standardized worksheet for the FY 91 cycle.

Feedback to Missions can -- and should -- come from all four sets of AFR/W reviewers. AFR/DP has already used some of the API material for Congressional and other reporting on the DFA. (See the Africa overview in the CP or the new DFA report and the July "DP Notes" for an article describing how this process worked). AFR/TR has begun to use API information in building a Bureau system to review program performance in specific sectors and subsectors.

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It is expected, however, that for the FY 91 reviews the geographic office desks will be the most prompt, and their comments will contain inputs from the various Africa Bureau offices which participated at the desk-led review. Missions are reminded, however, that the API report is a reporting document for Missions. While feedback will take on many forms, it is not the principal purpose of the API report.

D. Distribution of the APIs

The 1991 API Washington review process was criticized both within and without the Africa Bureau as the system laid out above did not operate as smoothly as envisioned. Some officers never saw all of their region's APIs, nor did they see all reporting cables sent out resulting from the geographic desk-led reviews. Finally, although regional meetings corresponding to the geographic offices were held, information was not well distributed within the Bureau.

In part to remedy these distribution problems, compendiums of all FY 90 APIs were printed and distributed in early spring of FY 91. Given the mixed quality of the first-year effort, however, they are being distributed in a limited fashion. Yet, given the high demand to date, we expect to produce compendiums of the FY 91 APIs for internal AID distribution and for all Missions in africa.

E. An Overall Assessment of the API Submission and Review Process

Despite these glitches, useful lessons were learned and the API is apparently here to stay. As one geographic office director summarized his conversations with Mission Directors about the API: the API report has been accepted; the report makes sense and has value (for management purposes, for Mission portfolio review, etc.); it is a difficult exercise, yet . . . Missions acknowledged that they should focus more on it; and, finally, the collaborative support from AFR/W and AID/CDIE and contractors is essential.

F. Mission Participation in AFR/W Review of the APIs

It is envisioned that Mission representation at a Bureau review of the APIs for a select number of countries each year might be particularly useful. With careful scheduling, it should be possible to have Mission participation in several of these reviews while imposing no additional TDYs on Missions. In this first year of the API, we requested participation only from Mission staff traveling through AFR/W on other business during the November 1990 - March 1991 API review period. These first reviews with Mission participation were

used primarily to learn more of field experience and problems in conducting impact analysis.

As the API is currently a reporting document, participation in review would most likely be for information and broadening AFR/W staff understanding of the program. If geographic offices selectively move toward experimenting with this as a program review, however, the substance of Mission participation would change accordingly.

VI. Supplemental Analytical Support to Missions: Training and Consulting Services

Several Missions have raised the concern that the evolving impact reporting standards of the DFA and API are not being matched by Agency resources for data collection and analysis. Clearly, a number of avenues need to be established through which Missions, depending on their particular needs, can be supported in generating and analyzing the kinds of information necessary for comprehensive program impact.

The FY 89/90 experience with joint MSI-CDIE-AFR/W teams to work with Missions on program planning seems to have worked well in getting the new CPSP and program logframe concepts off the ground. The Bureau has, therefore, negotiated a new IQC workorder with MSI to continue this assistance and will continue to do so until all Category I countries have had an opportunity to learn and apply the program planning methodology and have had at least one consultancy on the design and development of a program monitoring and evaluation system.

To assist Missions in developing their monitoring and evaluation systems further, however, more assistance may be needed on the nuts and bolts of data collection and analysis, on facilitating the linkage between project and non-project evaluation systems and program information needs, on staff training to improve the capacity to handle quantitative information, and on organizing staff time to actually apply skills in program impact analysis. PPC/CDIE, for example, is competing a new contract for program performance monitoring and this might be a new avenue in the future. It may be necessary to develop additional vehicles specifically to meet these support needs. Mission inputs on what priority needs are and how they might best be met are welcomed.

Limited funding may be available in FY 92 to assist Missions to develop or strengthen impact analysis. Direct hire staff and an existing IQC contractor could provide some assistance. Mission expressions of interest for short-term technical assistance on impact analysis during the next several months are welcome now.

It may be appropriate for AFR/W to provide funding for analytical needs identified through the API, but which cannot be readily addressed directly by Mission personnel or with project/non-project and PD and S resources already available to the Mission. In the future, the Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group will examine the possibility of reserving some PD & S funds for supplemental allocation to Missions based on the conclusions of an API. Further suggestions on appropriate funding mechanisms would be useful.

Africa Bureau staff constraints in providing assistance to the Missions to work through the logframes is another big issue. Until such time as this gap is filled, there may be difficulties in ensuring the quality of logframes, and thus sound APIs. Several of you will shortly receive separate communications to help address this issue in your Missions.

Your contact points regarding training and technical assistance for program planning and monitoring, evaluation, and reporting will be the following, until further notice: Emmy Simmons, Chief (until September 1, 1991) of AFR/DP/PPE; Carlos Pascual who is Emmy Simmons' designated replacement after September 1; and Jean-Paul Paddock, AFR/DP/PPE, who will provide continuity. In addition to slugging cables to the attention of these people, should you need help, all of the above named can be reached at the AFR/DP fax number: 202-647-3364. Even with the departure of Cindy Clapp-Wincek, the Bureau's sparkplug for monitoring and evaluation and reporting activities, (she's gone to pursue a career in the private sector and to spend more time at home), AFR/DP/PPE will continue service, and will work closely with the desks, AFR/ARTS, and AFR/ONI (formerly MDI) to serve the Missions' needs.

VII. Solicitation of Comments

As always, Mission comments and suggestions are welcome. The Bureau's effectiveness in implementing the DFA is directly based on the program results which Missions achieve. AFR/W staff are looking forward to working closely with Mission staff on the next round of the APIs. —

Gender Disaggregating Program Performance Indicators

by Mari H. Clark, Office of Women in Development

The WID office is providing technical assistance for integrating gender issues into CDIE's Mission-level program performance monitoring and evaluation pilots and will assist in the Agencywide effort to develop a performance monitoring information system. This article describes this collaborative effort.

Over the past year CDIE has conducted numerous program management and evaluation pilots to help selected Missions develop model performance information systems. Each pilot provides assistance on the following: (1) strategic planning and information needs assessment; (2) design and implementation of appropriate program performance monitoring, reporting,

and evaluation systems; and (3) application of program performance information in Mission management and reporting. The WID Office is placing gender specialists on CDIE teams and providing direct assistance to CDIE staff to assist them in integrating gender issues and gender disaggregated indicators into the model performance information systems.

Based on the lessons learned to date from this collaboration, it is clear that issues related to the status of women and their full participation in activities supported by Missions cut across all programs and influence the achievement of strategic objectives. Thus it is important to measure women's integration into these efforts as participants in, agents for, and beneficiaries of the achievement of strategic objectives. To do so, it is necessary to identify one or more indicators for each strategic objective that measure male and female participation and impacts. All indicators or output measures expressed in terms of individuals or a proxy should be gender disaggregated.

Gender Disaggregated Program Performance Indicators

Gender disaggregated indicators for measuring program performance must be developed on a country-by-country program basis. Most gender disaggregated indicators are found at the level of project and program outputs contributing directly to Mission strategic objectives. Measures developed at the level of strategic objectives should include at least one gender-disaggregated, people-related performance indicator.

A number of indicators appear in a wide range of Mission strategies. The following examples illustrate gender disaggregation of some of these indicators. This list does not include all the indicators that should be gender disaggregated.

- *All Sectors*

Income and employment generated by project activities; number of participants in training by type of training; number of extensionists.

- *Agriculture*

Number of persons receiving technical assistance and extension activities by type of assistance and extension input; number of loans applied for and granted; participation in food production, processing, and marketing.

- *Natural Resources Management*

Changes in time and labor allocation for people who participate in and benefit from project activities, by type

of change; participation in natural resource management and tasks; baseline data on resource management.

- *Health*

Decrease in infant mortality rates; access to and use of health services; improved nutritional status of children (weight for age); number of persons with improved access to clean water and sanitation; use of health services and commodities.

- *Education*

Ratio of girls and boys enrolled to the eligible population in project target areas; completion rates at each level of schooling.

- *Private Sector*

Number and types of jobs created; firm owners and managers by size and type of firm; number and size of loans applied for and granted.

- *Democracy*

Ratio of population voting rates; land ownership and registration; participation in local, regional, and national government (holding office).

- *Housing*

Number of housing/home improvement loans applied for and granted; home ownership.

In many instances indicators and program outputs are not expressed in terms of people participating in or benefiting from Mission activities. Instead they refer to macroeconomic conditions (e.g., government deficit as a percent of GDP), measures of infrastructure development (e.g., kilometers of roads), and the quantity or monetary value of program commitments and returns (e.g., number of export marketing information systems). The indirect impact of these macro-level indicators at the micro level (people-level impact) can be assessed through linking studies. The link between macro and micro levels is an appropriate and necessary component of project design and evaluation.

A.I.D. experience to date suggests the following criteria for developing useful program performance indicators:

- Strong link to impacts on the lives of people—both women and men
- Strong link to A.I.D. efforts
- Relevance and credibility to a broad range of decision-makers
- Feasibility to secure objective measurement at reasonable cost

There are a few basic recommendations for efficiently maintaining and further developing a gender

disaggregated program performance information system.

- Incorporate gender disaggregated program performance information into *existing* reporting, review, and decision-making systems.
- Collect only information that is likely to be used and only when the costs of data collection and analysis are less than the expected benefits.
- Keep program performance information as simple as possible.
- Use existing information as much as possible (e.g., demographic and health surveys, census, and other survey data.)
- Use project mechanisms to collect and analyze most additional gender disaggregated program performance information.
- Place as much emphasis on analyzing and interpreting information as on collecting data.
- Take advantage of opportunities to strengthen private and public program activities in the host country.

Additional information on CDIE's program performance evaluation efforts can be obtained from Gerald M. Brittain, PPC/CDIE, Room 219, SA-18 (703) 875-4964.

PROGRAM PLANNING ASSISTANCE
USAID/GUINEA
NOVEMBER 26-DECEMBER 14, 1990

TEAM PLANNING MEETING
NOVEMBER 14, 1990

AGENDA

- 9AM I. Introduction of Team Members - Review of Objectives of Program Planning and Agricultural Sector Assistance - Agreement on TPM Objectives and Agenda
- 9:30 II. Introduction to DFA Program Planning Methodology
- 10 III. Review of Status of USAID/Guinea Strategy Development
- o 1989 Strategy Documents
 - o 1990 "CPSP" and First PPA
 - o Agricultural Sector PID, Basic Education PAAD, NRMS Document, Stryker Team Paper
- 11 IV. PPA Exercise - Planning and Assignment of Roles/Tasks
- o David Hess - PPA Team Leader, Principal Facilitator, CPSP Planner (11/26-12/14)
 - o Janet Tuthill - MSI PPA Consultant (11/25-12/5)
 - o Mari Clark - PPC/WID PPA Advisor - Gender Issues Integration (11/26-12/7)
 - o Al Smith - AFT/TR Agricultural Sector Advisor (11/26-12/7)
 - o Mike McGahuey - AFR/TR Natural Resource Management Advisor (12/3-12/14)
 - o Bob Delemarre - IRG Agriculture Sector Advisor (11/26-12/14)
- Review cable to mission. Discuss relationship of PPA and Agricultural Sector assistance to overall CPSP development. Plan actions leading up to and during exercise.
- 1:30 V. Work Groups - Draft "final" (subject to Mission modifications) work plans for TDY's
- o Hess and Clark on PPA - Preparation and Scheduling
 - o Smith and Delemarre on Agricultural Assistance - Preparation and Scheduling

3 VI. Discussion of Work Plans - Wrap-Up

For Sessions I. and II., the team will meet on their own. For Session III., we hope to have participation from the desk and possibly the project development office. Session IV. will feature input from Cindy Clapp-Wincek, the Africa Bureau Evaluation Officer. Finally, Emmy Simmons, my boss and chief of AFR/DP/PPE, will participate in Session VI. Please let me know if you have nay suggestions for the TPM or for the work we are about to undertake.

Note: I will try to have sufficient copies of some of the basic documents for the TPM. If you all have any documents, please bring them and we will work on copies.

AGENDA

GHANA PPS/ME TPM

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 9, 1991

- 9:00 Introduction to the Task - David Hess/Cindy Clapp-Winsek
- 9:30 Background on Ghana - Desk Officer/ Emy Simmons
- 10:30 Team Expectations: API, M&E, WID
- 11:30 Logistics, Documentation and Next Steps

We anticipate only a half-day TPM due to scheduling conflicts and the early departure for Gambia of one of the team members.

TEAM PLANNING MEETING

**PROGRAM PLANNING AND MONITORING, EVALUATION AND REPORTING
ASSISTANCE FOR
USAID/LESOTHO - JANUARY 17, 1991**

9-10:30 PROGRAM LOGFRAME AND PPAMERA METHODOLOGY

10:30 BREAK

10:45-12:00 TDY WORK PLANNING

1. CLARIFY SPECIFIC MISSION NEEDS
2. DRAFT SCHEDULE FOR TDY
3. DRAFT INDIVIDUAL WORK PLANS
4. IDENTIFY RESOURCES FOR PREPARATION

12-1:00 LUNCH

1-2:15 USAID/LESOTHO PROGRAM

- STRATEGY
- PROGRAM/PROJECTS
- FUNDING AND STAFFING LEVELS

RESOURCES: KEITH BROWN, AFR/SA
BARRY HILL, AFR/TR

SENEGAL TEAM PLANNING MEETING

July 16, 1991

- o Thomas Riordan of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) will be available July 17 in the morning for consultations (he has offered to come to AID), to talk to the MER team going out to Senegal. He also will very happy to see people the week of July 22 (for Dagnija Kreslins and Mark Renzi).
- o Albert Osey will be coming with Ms. Kwa Kwa -- both from the World Bank's Senegal Desk. They will attend the TPM July 16 starting at 10:30 am.
- o AID participants are:
 - MER Team/July 29-August 6:
 - Al Smith, AFR/TR/ANR/PA
 - Dagnija Kreslins, AFR/TR/PRO
 - Pre-Workshop Team/July 22-29:
 - Mike McGahuey, AFR/TR/ANR/NR
 - Dan Dworkin, AFR/TR/ANR
 - (Al Smith)
 - AFR/DP/PPE:
 - Emmy B. Simmons
 - Jean-Paul Paddack
- o Management Services, Inc. will be represented by Mark Renzi. He will be leaving (at the same time Dagnija is leaving) on or about July 26.

APPR: MB MB
DRAFT: DH DH
OTHER: _____
OTHER: _____
OTHER: _____

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AID/AFR/DP/PPE:DHESS:GW
9/24/90 X7-3305 77196
AID/AAA/AFR/DP:MBONNER

AID/AFR/CCWA:MGOLDEN {DRAFT} _____ AID/AFR/CCWA:MMEARES {DRAFT}
AID/AFR/CONT:MROGAL {DRAFT} _____ AID/AFR/TR:MMAGUHEY {DRAFT}

PRIORITY _____ CONAKRY

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: PROGRAM PLANNING ASSISTANCE FOR COUNTRY
PROGRAM STRATEGIC PLAN PROGRAM LOGFRAME PREPARATION

REF: (A) CONAKRY 04710; (B) CONAKRY 04617

1. PER REFTELS AND VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH USAID/GUINEA, AFR/DP/PPE IS COORDINATING ASSISTANCE FOR USAID/GUINEA IN PROGRAM PLANNING ASSISTANCE (PPA) WHICH WOULD FACILITATE MISSION PREPARATION OF ITS PROGRAM LOGFRAME AND WOULD ADVANCE ELABORATION OF THE CPSP TO BE REVIEWED IN AID/W IN JULY 1991. THIS CABLE BRIEFLY DESCRIBES THE SCOPE OF SUCH ASSISTANCE. THIS CABLE ALSO PROVIDES BACKGROUND ON THE PROPOSED TEAM MEMBERS AND REQUESTS MISSION CONCURRENCE AND COUNTRY CLEARANCE. USDH MEMBER OF PPA AND TEAM LEADER WOULD BE DAVID HESS, DEPUTY DIVISION CHIEF OF AFR/DP/PPE. CONTRACT ASSISTANCE COULD BE PROVIDED THROUGH AN AFR/DP/PPE MANAGED IQC WORK ORDER WITH MSI. THE DETAILED SCOPE OF WORK FOR MSI'S IQC WORK ORDER WAS HANDCARRIED BY ALLAN REED IN SEPTEMBER. THE MSI CONSULTANT WOULD BE JANET TUTHILL. BIO-DATA IS PROVIDED BELOW ON TUTHILL FOR MISSION CONCURRENCE. IN ADDITION, PPC/WID IS PROPOSING

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TO SUPPLY DR. MARI CLARK TO PROVIDE INPUT IN PROGRAM LOGFRAME DEVELOPMENT RELATED TO GENDER ISSUES. ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE WILL ALSO BE PROVIDED FROM AFR/TR AND EDI PER REF (B). THIS CABLE WILL DEAL WITH THE PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR INTEGRATING THE NEEDS LAID OUT IN BOTH CABLES.

2. SCOPE OF PPA. AFR/DP/PPE IS PROVIDING ALL 23 CATEGORY I MISSIONS WITH SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PREPARATION OF PROGRAM STRATEGY DOCUMENTS AND THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAM IMPACT MONITORING, EVALUATION AND REPORTING SYSTEMS. THE ASSISTANCE FOCUSES ON HOW AFRICA BUREAU PROGRAM STRATEGIES CAN BEST IMPLEMENT THE DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AFRICA. AS YOU KNOW, THE DFA PROVIDES THE OPPORTUNITY FOR AID IN AFRICA TO DO BUSINESS DIFFERENTLY AND, HOPEFULLY, MORE EFFECTIVELY. AFR/DP/PPE HAS COLLABORATED WITH MISSIONS IN UTILIZING A PROGRAM STRATEGIC PLANNING METHODOLOGY WHICH PERMITS THE IDENTIFICATION OF GOALS, STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, AND TARGETS AS WELL AS THE MEANS OF MEASURING, MONITORING AND EVALUATING PROGRESS IN ACHIEVEMENT OF THOSE PROGRAMMATIC AIMS. ONE IMPORTANT LESSON FROM THE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO DATE IS THAT MISSIONS HAVE BENEFITTED FROM PPE AND CONSULTANT HELP ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY DEDICATED TIME AND EFFORT IN PREPARATION FOR AND PARTICIPATION IN THOSE EFFORTS.

3. PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE ARE PROVIDED BELOW (AS COMPLEMENT TO THE SCOPE OF WORK HANDCARRIED BY MR. REED):

TERMS OF REFERENCE

- A. INTRODUCE PROGRAM STRATEGIC PLANNING METHODOLOGY
- B. ASSIST IN DEVELOPMENT OF MISSION PROGRAM LOGICAL FRAMEWORK THROUGH IDENTIFICATION AND ARTICULATION OF COUNTRY PROGRAM GOAL, STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, AND TARGETS
- C. ADVISE ON DEVELOPMENT OF MISSION MONITORING AND EVALUATION PLAN THROUGH IDENTIFICATION OF INDICATORS AND REVIEW OF DATA SOURCES

BASIC DESIGN DOCUMENTS AS WELL AS RESULTS FROM ANY RECENT ASSESSMENT OR EVALUATION WORK IN THE KEY SECTORS INCLUDING AGRICULTURE, NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, HEALTH, POPULATION, EDUCATION, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, OR OTHERS ALONG WITH RECENT AND ON-GOING PROJECT/NON-PROJECT DESIGN WORK SHOULD BE READILY

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AVAILABLE IN ORDER TO FULLY INFORM THE ARTICULATION OF THE MISSION'S COUNTRY PROGRAM LOGFRAME. IN SO DOING THE STRATEGY WILL BE FIRMLY GROUNDED IN GUINEAN REALITY AND HELPFUL IN PULLING TOGETHER THE MISSION'S UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT MAKES DEVELOPMENT IN GUINEA TICK.

- THE LOGFRAME CONTRIBUTION TO IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE PROGRAM PRIORITIES FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS IS DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE CPSP. CLARIFYING THE PROGRAM LOGFRAME SHOULD ALSO HELP IN ENSURING THE MOST EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION OF THE INITIATIVES WHICH THE MISSION IS CURRENTLY DESIGNING. AFR/DP/PPE REQUESTS THAT THE MISSION TRY TO MAKE AVAILABLE KEY REPORTS AND CONSULTANTS, IF PRESENT IN GUINEA, FOR DISCUSSIONS DURING THE PPA EXERCISE.

ATTENDANCE BY ALL USDH, FSN, AND CONTRACT STAFF WITH PROGRAM DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND/OR EVALUATION RESPONSIBILITIES IS NECESSARY. IF POSSIBLE, TEAM LEADERS OR REPRESENTATIVES OF CONSULTANT OR OTHER TEAMS WORKING ON ASSESSMENTS OR PROJECT/NPA DESIGN SHOULD ALSO ATTEND AS THEY COULD BE IMPORTANT TO ELABORATION OF THE MISSION PROGRAM LOGFRAME. WHILE MISSION DH STAFF, ESPECIALLY THE DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SHOULD ATTEND ALL SESSIONS, IN THE INTEREST OF ENSURING PARTICIPATION BY CONTRACT STAFF AND CONSULTANTS, THE REMAINDER OF THE TIME SHOULD BE SPENT WITH FULL DAY SESSIONS DEVOTED TO EACH OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COUNTRY PROGRAM. THE REST OF THE TIME LEFT IN THE CONSULTATION CAN BE DEVOTED TO WRAPPING-UP OF PROGRAM LOGFRAME AND THE MONITORING AND EVALUATION PLAN AND SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO THE CPSP DOCUMENT. A WRAP-UP ALL MISSION RETREAT OF ONE DAY WILL BE SUGGESTED.

FOR EACH DAY, ALL REPEAT ALL USDH, FSN, OR CONTRACT STAFF OR CONSULTANTS IN THAT PROGRAM AREA SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THE ENTIRE WORKING DAY. MISSION SHOULD BE PREPARED TO REVIEW ALL KEY DOCUMENTS RELATED TO MISSION PROGRAM INCLUDING: STRATEGY ELEMENTS OF APPROVED CDSS; ALL PROJECT AND NPA LOGFRAMES; POLICY DIALOGUE POSITIONS; AND ANY OTHER RELEVANT DOCUMENTS. MISSION SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO REVIEW ALL ACTIONS CURRENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED AND BEING PLANNED FOR MONITORING AND EVALUATION. WHILE THE SECTOR/ACTIVITY SPECIFIC SESSIONS WILL REQUIRE THE MOST RELEVANT-RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE IN THE MISSION TO BE INVOLVED, IT IS IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT MISSION INTERACTION SHOULD BE MAXIMIZED SO THAT IT MAY BE IMPORTANT TO STRUCTURE TIME FOR OFFICES/DIVISIONS

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NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN PARTICULAR OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS TO CRITIQUE WORK IN ARTICULATING OBJECTIVES OF OTHER OFFICES. THE MISSION MAY CHOOSE TO FORM INTER-SECTORAL OR INTER-OFFICE WORKING GROUPS FOR THE EXERCISE. THE MISSION MAY ALSO DEEM IT APPROPRIATE TO INVITE PARTICIPATION FROM HOST COUNTRY PUBLIC OR PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES IN SOME OF THE PPA SESSIONS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF, AS THE MISSION DEVELOPS ITS IDEAS AND SCHEDULE FOR THIS EXERCISE, THAT YOU ADVISE US TO HELP US PLAN.

3. SCHEDULE. WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING TIMETABLE BASED ON PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES (IT SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE ADAPTED TO THE MISSION'S NEEDS).

SUNDAY {11/25} ARRIVAL OF JANET TUTHILL AT 15:05 ON AIR ZAIRE (PLEASE NOTE AIRPORT PICKUP AND HOTEL RESERVATIONS WOULD BE APPRECIATED)

MONDAY {11/26} ARRIVAL OF REST OF TEAM - EXCEPT MIKE MCGAHUEY - SEE BELOW

TUESDAY-WEDNESDAY {11/27-28} INTRODUCTORY AND PLANNING MEETINGS FOR PROGRAM LOGFRAME WORK LED BY HESS. DOCUMENT REVIEW RELEVANT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM LOGFRAME. INTERVIEWS WITH MISSION STAFF ON EXPERIENCES AND EXPECTATIONS FOR PPA EXERCISE AS WELL AS FOR DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN GUINEA. CLARK WILL BE AVAILABLE IN CONAKRY TO BEGIN HER SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS. CLARK, AS MENTIONED, WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE ON GENDER ISSUES IN PLANNING, IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION.

THURSDAY {11/29} WOULD RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION OF ALL DAY RETREAT AT LOCATION OUTSIDE OF OFFICE TO COVER THE FOLLOWING: INTRODUCTION TO PROGRAM LOGFRAME METHODOLOGY; PRACTICAL EXERCISE ON OBJECTIVE TREE DEVELOPMENT; PRELIMINARY MAPPING OF AID COUNTRY PROGRAM GOALS; AND ORGANIZATION OF WORKING GROUPS AND FINAL SCHEDULE FOR PROGRAM PLANNING EXERCISE

FRIDAY {11/30} - AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SECTOR/INFRASTRUCTURE ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM LOGFRAME: PLEASE NOTE THAT THE WORK ACCOMPLISHED IN THIS SESSION SHOULD PROVIDE ELEMENTS TO ORIENT THE WORK OF THE SMITH-DELEMARRE EFFORT

MONDAY {12/3} - HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM LOGFRAME (NOTE THAT MIKE MCGAHUEY CAN JOIN THE

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PROGRAM PLANNING EXERCISE ON THIS DAY AND PREPARE FOR WEDNESDAY SESSION AS WELL AS PROVIDING ASSISTANCE ON NATURAL RESOURCE ISSUES FOR THE CPSP}

TUESDAY {12/4} - HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT/TRAINING SECTOR ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM LOGFRAME

WEDNESDAY {12/5} - NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND OTHER REMAINING ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM LOGFRAME { JTUTHILL DEPARTS CONAKRY AT COB}

THURSDAY, FRIDAY {12/6-7} - INDICATOR IDENTIFICATION BEGIN QUOTE TEST END QUOTE OF PROGRAM LOGFRAME TO BEGIN DRAFTING PROGRAM MONITORING AND EVALUATION PLANNING

12/10-14 - HESS LEADS WORK ON PLANNING FOR CPSP ELABORATION WITH IDENTIFICATION OF DATA AND ANALYTICAL GAPS, SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE EXERCISE, AND OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE PROCESS. WOULD SUGGEST THAT ALL DAY MISSION RETREAT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR REVIEWING DRAFT PROGRAM LOGFRAME AND FOR DISCUSSING ASSIGNMENTS IN THE CPSP DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. MEANWHILE, SMITH, DELEMARRE, AND MCGAHUEY WILL WRAP UP THEIR SUPPORT ON AGRICULTURAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ELEMENTS OF THE CPSP.

4. BIO-DATA FOR MSI CONSULTANT:

-- JANET TUTHILL - VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL.. M.A. IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES. EXPERIENCE FROM 1983 TO PRESENT INCLUDES: TEAM LEADER ON NUMEROUS PROJECT AND PROGRAM DESIGN, MANAGEMENT, AND EVALUATION TEAMS FOR A.I.D. AND THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK; WORK IN MOST COUNTRIES IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA; MANAGER OF THE IQC WORK ORDER WITH AFR/DP/PPE ON PROGRAM PLANNING ASSISTANCE AND PARTICIPATING CONSULTANT IN THREE PPA EXERCISES. FLUENT IN FRENCH.

5. WE REQUEST MISSION CONCURRENCE FOR OVERALL EXERCISE AND COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR PPA TEAM. MSI PARTICIPATION WILL BE PROVIDED THROUGH AFR FUNDED IQC WORK ORDER AT NO COST TO THE MISSION. SMITH WILL NEED A MISSION FUND CITE. MARI CLARK WILL BE FUNDED BY THE LABAT ANDERSON, INC. SUPPORT CONTRACT WITH PPC/WID. MISSION REQUESTED TO CONCUR WITH THE PROPOSED EXERCISE. CABLE WILL FOLLOW WITH ETA'S FOR ALL TEAM MEMBERS. 44

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INITIALS

APPR: JRE *JRE*
 DRAFT: JM *JM*
 OTHER: NV *NV*
 OTHER: AB *AB*
 OTHER: WAS *WAS*

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AID/PPC/CDIE/PPE:JMASON:BAF:0131F
 06/05/91 875-4972
 AID/AAA/PPC/CDIE:JRERIKSSON

AID/PPC/CDIE/PPE:ABINNENDIJK
 AID/AFR/SA:PGREENOUGH
 AID/PPC/CDIE/PPE:NVREELAND

AID/DAAA/PPC/CDIE:WASTICKEL
 AID/DAA/PPC:JBLACKTON{PHONE}

ROUTINE MBABANE

AIDAC TO JIM BEDNAR

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJ: PROGRAM PLANNING AND EVALUATION ASSISTANCE
 TDY-PHASE TWO TEAM

REF: {A} STATE 090728, {B} BEDNAR/HESS/WINCEK TELECON OF
 3/29/91 {C} MBABANE 02164 {D} BEDNAR/VREELAND TELECON
 6/4/91

1. PPC/CDIE, AFR/TR AND MSI PHASE TWO TEAM SCHEDULED FOR TDY 24 JUNE - 5 JULY. AS UNDERSTOOD FROM REF. C IT IS AGREED THAT THE TDY TEAM WILL FOCUS ON ASSISTING USAID IN REVIEWING ITS MONITORING AND EVALUATION AND REPORTING SYSTEMS SO AS TO ENSURE THEIR UTILITY IN REPORTING ON PROGRAM IMPACT. IT IS NOT EXPECTED THAT THE TEAM WILL REVISIT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES.
2. PPC/CDIE WISHES TO INFORM MISSION THAT THESE STRATEGIC PLANNING/MANAGEMENT INFORMATION EXERCISES HAVE ACQUIRED INCREASED IMPORTANCE IN THE AGENCY AS A WHOLE, IN ADDITION TO THEIR ROLE IN SUPPORTING MISSION MANAGEMENT AND API REPORTING. ADMINISTRATOR ROSKENS HAS RECENTLY INSTRUCTED CDIE TO PROVIDE PERIODIC REPORTS ON AGENCY-WIDE PERFORMANCE IN SELECTED PROGRAM AREAS, TO

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INFORM SENIOR MANAGEMENT AND TO PROVIDE AN IMPROVED BASIS FOR REPORTING TO CONGRESS AND OTHERS ON THE RESULTS OF BILATERAL ASSISTANCE. CDIE BELIEVES THAT AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE/IMPACT AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION MUST BE DERIVED FROM THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS DEVELOPED IN EACH USAID COUNTRY, WHERE THEY ARE GROUNDED IN COUNTRY REALITIES AND UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT MAKES DEVELOPMENT TICK IN EACH COUNTRY. ACCORDINGLY, CDIE WELCOMES USAID/SWAZILAND'S DETERMINATION TO PURSUE THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF THESE SYSTEMS, AND ASSURES THE MISSION OF CDIE'S CONTINUING INTEREST AND SUPPORT.

3. ONE IMPORTANT LESSON FROM THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO DATE IS THAT MISSIONS HAVE BENEFITED FROM AFR/DP, CDIE AND CONSULTANT HELP ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY DEDICATED TIME AND EFFORT IN PREPARING FOR AND PARTICIPATING IN THOSE EFFORTS. TEAM APPRECIATES THAT STAFF EXPECT TO BE BURDENED BY CURRENT DESIGN EFFORTS, AND IS PROPOSING THE FOLLOWING TERMS OF REFERENCE AND SCHEDULE TO ENSURE THE GREATEST POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION BY STAFF, INCLUDING RELEVANT FOREIGN NATIONAL DIRECT HIRE AND CONTRACTOR STAFF. HOST COUNTRY STAFF INVOLVEMENT MAY ALSO BE APPROPRIATE DURING SPECIFIC PARTS OF THE EXERCISE, AT THE MISSION'S DISCRETION. TEAM MEMBERS WILL BE ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITIES INHERENT IN CURRENT DESIGN EFFORTS, E.G., IN TERMS OF ASSISTING THE INTEGRATION OF NEW DESIGNS INTO OVERALL STRATEGY AND OF BUILDING INTO NEW DESIGNS AND/OR AMENDMENTS APPROPRIATE DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS SPECIFICATIONS FOR PROGRAM MONITORING.

4. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE TEAM WILL INITIALLY REVIEW PROGRAM LEVEL INDICATORS AND THEIR LINKAGES TO EXISTING M AND E AND REPORTING FUNCTIONS. THIS RAPID OVERVIEW WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A SERIES OF MORE DETAILED REVIEW ASSESSMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL PROGRAM, PROJECT, AND ACTIVITY-LEVEL INDICATORS. IN THESE REVIEW-ASSESSMENT MEETINGS THE FOLLOWING TASKS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED: (A) THE RELATIONSHIP OF EVALUATION AND REPORTING TO PROGRAM LOGFRAME AND STRATEGY WILL BE DELINEATED; (B) THE MISSION-LEVEL REPORTING FLOW AND RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE FORMULATED; AND (C) A MISSION PROGRAM EVALUATION-MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM WILL BE DESIGNED AND, TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE, OPERATIONALIZED.



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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV. TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

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ORIGIN OFFICE PPCE-01 INFO AFEA-03 PPPB-02 DPPC-01 AGEE-01 /008 A0 21/0202Z INFO LOG-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY: AID/PPC/CDIE/PPE: JMASON: RA: 0040T APPROVED BY: AID/PPC/CDIE: JREPT/SSON AID/PPC/CDIE/PPE: LIEBERSON AID/DAAA/PPC/CDIE: WASTICKEL AID/AFR/EA: CMCCARTHY (PHONE) AID/DAA/PPC: JBLACKTON (PHONE) 333471 210157Z /38

P 210156Z SEP 90 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 320659

AIDAC:

E. O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PILOT TEAM TDY

1. DURING ITS UPCOMING TDY THE PPC/CDIE, MSI AND AFR/EA TEAM EXPECTS TO ADVANCE THE WORK OF THE INITIAL EVALUATION PILOT TO THE POINT WHERE AN OPERATIONAL PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM IS BEING PUT IN PLACE.

2. THE TEAM WILL BUILD ON THE EXISTING PROGRAM LOGFRAME, WHERE NECESSARY DEVELOPING NEW PERFORMANCE CRITERIA. THE OPERATIONAL SYSTEM WILL BE LINKED TO THE HOST COUNTRY DATA BASE TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. THAT SYSTEM WILL INCLUDE ASSIGNMENTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND SCHEDULE OF REPORTING. THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM WILL ALSO ASSESS THE NEED AND RESOURCES FOR NEW DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, INCLUDING SPECIAL STUDIES, SUGGESTIONS FOR SOFTWARE FOR SUPPORT OF THE API, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE FROM LOCAL CONSULTING FIRMS, PSCS AND OTHERS.

3. PPC/CDIE JOHN MASON AND AFR/EA CHERYL MCCARTHY WILL SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEADING THE TEAM. AFR/EA CHERYL MCCARTHY WILL SERVE AS FORMAL LIAISON WITH MISSION MANAGEMENT AND WILL SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF THE WID COMPONENT OF THE PROGRAM. DR. MASON WILL SUPPORT THE PROJECT OFFICE IN DEVELOPMENT OF ITS PRIVATE SECTOR STRATEGY AND INDICATORS. OTHER TEAM MEMBERS INCLUDE MSI SAM TADESSA AND GAIL KOSTINKO. DR. TADESSA WILL ASSIST THE AGRICULTURE OFFICE IN FINALIZING ITS DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND PROGRAM. MS KOSTINKO WILL ASSIST THE HRD OFFICE AND MORE GENERALLY ADVISE THE MISSION AND PILOT TEAM ON EVALUATION METHODOLOGY ISSUES. ALL TEAM MEMBERS WILL DIVIDE THEIR LABOR ACROSS THE MISSION PROGRAM AS DEMANDED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE WORK LOADS. DETAILED INDIVIDUAL SCOPES OF WORK WILL BE PRESENTED AT THE TIME OF ARRIVAL IN THE FIELD. BAKER

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PROGRAM PLANNING ASSISTANCE
IN SUPPORT OF USAID/BURUNDI

Donald R. Mackenzie, AFR/TR/PRO
Richard Newberg, AFR/TR/ANR
Samuel Tadesse, Management Systems International

June 1991

**PROGRAM PLANNING ASSISTANCE
TO USAID/BURUNDI**

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B. Purpose and Scope	1
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D. Methodology/PPA Process	2
E. USAID/Burundi Draft Program Logframe	3
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G. Next Steps/Comments	14

Attachments

1. Program Planning Assistance Schedule
2. List of Program Strategic Planning Definitions
3. Banga Retreat Agenda
4. USAID/Burundi Workplanning Formats
5. Summary of Other Donor Activities
6. Assessment of Program Impact, Section III Format
7. USAID/Burundi Program Objective Tree

**PROGRAM PLANNING ASSISTANCE
TO USAID/BURUNDI**

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**USAID/BURUNDI
PROGRAM PLANNING ASSISTANCE**

A. Background

The Africa Bureau is providing all twenty-three Category I Missions with external support for the development and preparation of program strategy documents and the design and implementation of program impact monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems. Program Planning Assistance [PPA] focuses on how individual program strategies can best be crafted within the context of the goals and management objectives of the Development Fund for Africa [DFA]. In this regard, a program strategic planning methodology has been developed which permits the identification of goals, strategic objectives, and targets, as well as the means of measuring, monitoring and evaluating progress in achieving programmatic aims.

B. Purpose and Scope

The Program Planning Assistance purpose was to assist and facilitate USAID/Burundi's preparation of a Program Logframe as one step leading to the Mission's Country Program Strategic Plan set for review in AID/W in CY 1992. The PPA specific tasks were:

1. Introduce Mission staff to the Bureau's Program Strategic Planning methodology including construction of objectives trees;
2. Facilitate and assist the Mission in the development of a Mission Program Logical Framework through identification and articulation of a country program goal, subgoals, strategic objectives, and targets;
3. Assist and advise the Mission on monitoring, evaluation and reporting through the construction of a draft Section III of the yearly Assessment of Program Impact [API] Report, using the Bureau's new format in order to identify appropriate indicators, data sources, and appropriate reporting periodicity;
4. Assist in identifying analytical, data and indicator gaps need to be addressed during CPSP development; and
5. Assist the Mission, as time permits, in construction and development of a Mission work planning calendar framework to include normal Mission activities as well as those tasks leading to a completed CPSP.

C. PPA Scheduling

The team visited Burundi from June 11th through 22nd, 1991, and worked closely throughout the entire process with the Mission Director, and effectively the entire staff. Special thanks go to Tony Ferrara, David Leong and Mike Fisk who were generous with their time and of great assistance throughout on technical and administrative matters. The team also received extensive support from the various technical personnel, both contract and host country. A schedule for the TDY period can be found in Attachment 1.

D. Methodology/Process

In order to familiarize USAID staff with the methodology, objectives and definitions related to program planning and program logical framework development, a three-hour working session with direct hire and contract staff was facilitated by Team leader, Buff Mackenzie. A consolidated list of relevant definitions appears in Attachment 2. This session provided the DFA context and a common vocabulary for the development of objective trees and the Program Logframe. A practice session in randomly selected groups was held to put the objective tree methodology to a test.

The morning session was followed in the afternoon by beginning program logframe construction through the hierarchical "objective tree" technique to clarify the cause and effect of USAID's development interventions. Prior consultation with the Mission Director in AID/W led to the formation of three groups, each developing its own objective tree, but each having a different focus: [1] Economic Activities; [2] Macro-Economy/Policy Environment; and [3] Health, Population and Nutrition.

The following day was used for an in-Bujumbura retreat for all Mission staff and many project contractors for presentation of findings related to Mission-sponsored household and private sector surveys [by Duca Hart and Elizabeth Adelski] as well as the Women in Development Strategy Report [Mona Fikry]. The sessions provoked lively discussion and the mini-retreat was a first to bring all the "country program" personnel resources together at the same time.

Friday was used to finish up group objective trees which were then to be put together by a smaller team comprised of the Mission Director, representatives from each group and the PPA team. The day-long session confirmed how difficult the process can be to consolidate different objective trees even in a small group. That evening the PPA team put together its own version of a program logframe to allow Mission staff to have a product to which they could react. While the team's extra efforts were appreciated as a means of expressing causal logic and for

clarifying certain some points, general concern was expressed by Mission staff that using the PPA team's variant, even as modified by USAID/Burundi staff comments and suggestions, did not imply full ownership by the collective Mission, especially those members who were not involved in the consolidation sessions. Thus, it was agreed that the two-day retreat at Banga would be used as a vehicle to start from ground-zero to create full Mission "ownership."


The Banga retreat was held on Wednesday and Thursday [June 19-20]. An agenda for the retreat is shown in Attachment 3. The process was facilitated by the Mission [David Leong], with the PPA team serving in resource and devil's advocate capacities. At the end of the day, a program goal, sub-goals, one strategic objective [private sector economic activity], four targets, and various targets had been identified. A second strategic objective [decline in fertility] was tabled pending further assessment as issues of manageable interest and focus [health vs family planning] need to be clarified. The first iteration of the Program Logframe is shown on the following page.

The next day started with Buff Mackenzie providing a special session on Geographic Information Systems [GIS] as an information management and analytical tool, using maps and tables developed during USAID/Senegal's recent CPSP process. The remainder of the retreat focused on Section III of the Assessment of Program Impact which focuses on performance indicators. Rich Newberg and Sam Tadesse led the session which fleshed out indicators and data sources for the goal, sub-goal, economic strategic objective, targets and sub-targets. The details of the program logframe are detailed in the following section.

E. Burundi Draft Program Logframe

See following pages.

USAID/Burundi
Program Objective Tree



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**USAID/Burundi
Draft Program Logframe**

LEVEL	STATEMENT	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Goal:	Improve Quality of Life for all Burundi's People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Per Capita Income . Increase in Life Expectancy . Increase in Literacy 	UNDP World Bank
Subgoal:	Broader Increase in "Wealth"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Savings and material possessions . Increase in Ag GDP . Increase in Household Expenditures (Rural/Urban/Gender) . Imports of Luxury Items . Food Crop Self sufficiency / Cash Crop Production and Export . Increased Demand for Credit . Increased Access to Public Utilities (Electric, Water, Communication, etc.) 	Commercial Banks Ministry of Commerce (MOC) Central Bank of Burundi (CBB) Savings Banks Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) COPEC

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LEVEL	STATEMENT	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Strategic Objective No. 1	Create and Expand Private Sector Economic Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in the Number of New Entrants (Firms) . Increase in the Number of Formal Sector Employees (by Gender) . Increase in Private Sector GDP as a % of Total GDP . Increased Commercialization (Increase in # of licensed commercial vehicles) . Increase in Real Average Wages . Increase in real exports (Traditional/Non-Traditional) 	<p>MOC SME Survey</p> <p>National Statistical Society (NSS)</p> <p>Ministry of Labor (MOL)</p> <p>Development Bank CBB</p> <p>Ministry of Finance (MOF)</p> <p>Ministry of Art & Crafts (MOA)</p>
Target 1.1	Increase Exports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Real Exports by Commodity 	MOC
Sub-Target 1.1.1	Improve Export Promotion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in real exports by country . Increase in the Number of Markets . Increase in the Number of Buyers . Increase in the Number of Exporters 	MOC CBB NSS

LEVEL	STATEMENT	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Sub-Target 1.1.2	Increase Quality of Production	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in the Volume of Sales by Commodity . Increase in the Number of Awards received in International Exhibitions . Increase in the Number of Firms with Quality Controls 	<p>MOC</p> <p>Chamber of Commerce (COC)</p> <p>Special Survey</p>
Sub-Target 1.1.3	Increase Quantity of Production.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Volume of Sales by Commodity 	MOC
Sub-Target 1.1.4	Improve Export Policies & Incentives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in the Volume of Exports by Commodity . Increase in Investment for Production of Export Goods & Services . Increase the Number of Exporters . Increase in Land Use Regulations . Increase in Draw-back Received 	<p>MOC</p> <p>CBB</p> <p>MOF</p> <p>Customs</p>
Sub-Target 1.1.5	Improve Export Infrastructure (communications, transportation & storage)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Infrastructure Investment . Decrease in Marketing Costs 	<p>MOF</p> <p>Special Survey</p>

LEVEL	STATEMENT	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Sub-Target 1.1.6	Increase Entrepreneurial Ability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Average size of Commercial Loan by Gender . % Increased in the Number of Proposals Accepted . Increase in Business Longevity . Increase in the Number of Businesses Conducting Marketing Surveys . Increase in the Number of Businesses Keeping Financial/ Accounting Records 	COC MOC MOF
Sub-Target 1.1.7	Increase Access to Export Financing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in the Number of Firms Receiving Export Credit . Increase in the use of LC as Collateral . Decrease in the Cost of Export Credit (Interest rate) 	CBB Commercial Banks Special Survey
Sub-Target 1.1.8	Improve Market Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Exports . Increase in the Number of New Markets . Increase in the Number of Exportable Goods and Services by Sector 	MOC COC CBB

LEVEL	STATEMENT	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Target 1.2	Improve Enabling Policy Environment		
Sub-Target 1.2.1	Reform Land Tenure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Agricultural Credit by Gender . Increase in Investment by Gender . Increase in the Number of Deeds to Land by Gender . Change in the Average Size of Farm Plots 	MOF CBB Special Survey
Sub-Target 1.2.2	Improve Labor Legislation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Employment by Sector & Gender . Increase in Real Wages by Sector & Gender 	MOL NSS
Sub-Target 1.2.3	Increase Access to Foreign Exchange	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Foreign Exchange Retention Accounts (Number of Accounts and Volume) 	CBB
Sub-Target 1.2.4	Improve Fiscal Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Decrease in the Effective Tax Rate for Businesses 	MOF Special Survey
Sub-Target 1.2.5	Reform Chattel Mortgage Laws	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Business Mortgages by Gender 	CBB

LEVEL	STATEMENT	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Target 1.3	Increase Investment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Foreign Direct Investment . Increase in PS Investment as % of GDP . Increase in Bank Credit for Investment 	CBB COC Commercial Banks
Sub-Target 1.3.1	Increase Labor and Management skills	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Value-added per Worker 	Special Survey
Sub-Target 1.3.2	Improve Investment Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in total Investment as % of GDP . Increase in the Number of Investors 	CBB Special Survey
Sub-Target 1.3.3	Improve Burundi's Investment Image	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in the Number of External Investors . Increase in the Number of Visitors 	COC CBB Ministry of Tourism (MOT)
Sub-Target 1.3.4	Increase Investor Confidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in the Number of Joint Ventures 	COC
Sub-Target 1.3.5	Improve Investment Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in the Number of Published Bulletins 	COC
Sub-Target 1.3.6	Privatize Key Industries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Decrease in Public Sector GDP as % of Total GDP . Increase in the Number of Industries Privatized 	MOF Ministry of Planning (MOP)
Sub-Target 1.3.7	Improve Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Public Investment for Infrastructure as % of GDP 	MOP MOF CBB

LEVEL	STATEMENT	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES
Target 1.4	Increase Regional Integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Cross-Boarder Trade . Increase in the Number of Regional Joint Ventures 	MOC MOF COC PTA NSS
Sub-Target 1.4.1	Improve P.R. on Region	(Same As 1.3.3)	
Sub-Target 1.4.2	Integrate Infra-structure Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Volume of Regional Trade . Decrease in Regional Transportation Costs 	COC MOC PTA
Sub-Target 1.4.3	Define Regional/Country Comparative Advantages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increased Specialization by Region 	COC PTA
Sub-Target 1.4.4	Improve Enabling Policy Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Increase in Labor Movement . Tariff and Non-Tariff Equivalencies . Increase in Number of Regional Joint Ventures 	PTA CPGL

F. Data Gaps and Additional Analyses

Based on discussion with Mission staff and various visiting personnel and a very preliminary analysis of Section E. above, the PPA team has identified the following analytical/information needs. These are in addition to the analysis of each target, sub-target, and indicator required during the CPSP process.

1. HPN Sector

The development of a population/health strategic objective or target will require a more in-depth look at both the family planning and health sub-sectors. The suggested vehicle would be an abbreviated mini-Health Sector Strategic Assessment; we use the word "strategic" to emphasize not the collection of more data per se, but rather to focus efforts on how the sector can support and complement the Mission's tentative program goal and private sector strategic objective. Alternatively, if a health-related strategic objective appears more appropriate, then a strategy will be required to focus on the necessary and sufficient [but no more] components of an A.I.D.-supported intervention. Such an assessment might also include a task to review of whether HIV-AIDS activities should be folded under a strategic objective or kept as a separate target of opportunity.

2. Private Sector

The recently completed Private Sector and Rural Household Surveys are sound initial steps in building Mission knowledge of the workings of the Burundian economy. In order to decide on appropriate targets and sub-targets, further analysis/data in the following areas during CPSP development [and beyond] is indicated. In priority order, they are:

- A concentrated look at the input provision sub-sector for both the agriculture and urban private sectors, including urban-rural linkages, policy constraints, value added, and investment and employment opportunities;
- A look at the medium and long-term impacts of declining soil fertility [including erosion issues] on export and food crop production/productivity and the implications on economic growth and food security;
- An increase in traditional exports will, ceteris paribus, depend on the freeing up of land currently under food crops. With new and highly productive varieties coming out of SAARFA research [white and sweet potatoes; beans] coming on-stream, it would be useful for the FSR project to examine this hypothesis in more depth. In addition, it would provide an opportunity to see what the impact on women will

be should the time they invest in food crop production be reduced significantly. The ability of new varieties to improve or maintain food security in the face of high population growth is another topic of interest.

- A strategic assessment of the benefits of vertically integrating certain agricultural operations [e.g., more processing and transformation in Burundi] in order to retain a higher percentage of value-added in the country.

While not required for CPSP development, the SAARFA evaluation team did identify an opportunity which might be looked at through BEPP/BEST:

- An analysis of pharmaceutical crops and companies in Burundi. There appear to be opportunities to replace foreign imports with locally grown crops for processing and export. This could save foreign exchange and have some employment/income impacts on small farmers and in urban processing.

3. Information Management/Analysis

Based on discussions with Mission staff, other TDY personnel and other expatriate staff in Burundi, the constraint to better analysis in certain areas may not be lack of data, but rather the ability to manage, manipulate and analyze what is currently available. As a example, Mackenzie and Newberg spent much of the Bujumbura-Brussels flight talking with a Belgian geologist with six years experience in Burundi. This conversation confirmed the availability of more cartographic physical data, including soils, through IGN [France], GRB ministries and other donors than we had expected.

As was shown in the Senegal Land-Carrying Capacity study example, digitizing basic physical factors would permit the Mission to analyze and have a much better understanding of soil fertility/erosion issues and their impact on economic growth. Further development, could allow the Mission to further test hypotheses about agricultural productivity/production and export/food crop mixes by geographic region. A Geographic Information System [GIS] could also provide a framework in which to place the Rural Household Survey and Private Sector Survey data.

Better data management/analytical software is just one part of the equation. A local area network [LAN] plus strengthening in hardware, training, and information resources management will also be required. The planned Information Resources Assessment [Mackenzie-Slocum fax, date June 28, 1991] should begin the process to look system-wide at Mission requirements. AFR/TR will work with AFR/MGT and USGS to assure that system configuration will permit use of GIS and other analytical tools.

G. Next Steps/Comments

1. Mission Teambuilding

Consider holding a Mission-wide team building exercise [similar to those carried out recently in USAID/Guatemala, USAID/Ecuador, and USAID/Sri Lanka by TRG] to include all DH, FSN, BEPP/BEST, FSR, TACS, et al. to (1) further deepen and focus CPSP development and (2) strengthen Mission vision and inter-office/project working relationships.

2. ADS Monitoring/Evaluation/Reporting Advisor

Consider hiring a Monitoring/Evaluation/Reporting [MER] advisor through the African Development Support [ADS] Project. This could be more than one person [e.g., a senior PSC/TCN, a junior FSN for outreach/digging/data input and an administrative assistant to support the two professionals]. Follow-up through Randy Roeser, AFR/TR/PRO.

3. Mission Workplanning/Scheduling

Use the workplanning instrument [Lotus/Impress] developed by Buff Mackenzie in two ways [see Attachment 4]. First, analyze workload on current staff for the next 12-18 months [by summing person-weeks for each activity on the vertical axis]; and, second, map out the major Mission activities over the next 18 months, including CPSP tasks, A/L, training et al. The former will be useful in helping Mission management identify staff resource gaps that could be closed through current/additional bilateral projects, PD&S, ADS, and/or regional/central projects.

4. FEWS Assistance in GIS

Send a brief [Buff Mackenzie can provide the detail back in AID/W] cable request to FEWS [Famine Early Warning System] Project Officer, John Wiles in AFR/TR/PRO for USGS/EDC TDY assistance in assessing the feasibility of developing a Geographic Information System [GIS] for use by the Mission/GRB to manage and better analyze data related to agricultural export productivity/production potential, soil fertility/erosion, demography/family planning, rural/urban linkages, and private sector development.

5. Information-Sharing Mini-Retreats

Getting out of the office to Banga was, we feel, an important variable for PPA success. The PPA team also applauds the concept of the mini-retreat out of the office [e.g., the private sector/WID sessions] and urges that more such cross-disciplinary events be held, as appropriate, especially to discuss new study and analytical results coming out of CPSP development [as well those

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to come out of the current project portfolio], and to further support Mission teambuilding efforts.

6. Draft Program Logframe

The draft USAID/Burundi Program Logframe in Section E. is only a first iteration. The number of sub-targets and indicators is clearly beyond the Mission's current, or even future, capability. The same may be true of the targets themselves. The Mission's task over the next 12-18 months will be to prune the "objective" tree down to a necessary set of manageable tasks with people-level impact for the USAID/Burundi country program over the 5-7 year CPSP period. The Mission now has the DP software and files to continue this work. Attachment 5 is a brief summary of other donor activities which may be useful in reviewing the logframe. We have also developed an API Section III format for the Mission [Attachment 6] which can be filled out and used as a point of discussion once the number of sub-targets and indicators is reduced.

7. Second Strategic Objective

The above pruning along with a closer look at the HPN sector should help the Mission to decide the appropriateness and feasibility of a health and/or fertility-related strategic objective. With regard to the mini-Health Sector Strategic Assessment [Section F.1], REDSO/ESA and some IQC-type assistance are probably indicated.

8. Information Resources Management

We cannot reiterate enough the importance as you go through the CPSP process and the expansion of the Mission program of the need for adequate information resources [computers, laser printers, software, local area network [LAN], databases, et al.] to support Mission and project staff. For example, should you go the ADS MER-advisor route, the hiring package contract should include a full set of IRM tools. All projects and the Mission, if possible, should purchase redundant computer equipment to assure that expensive personnel resources are not left idle.

A Lauer/Doherty TDY could have accelerated this process. AFR/TR [Randy Roeser/Stacia Dennie] can help you with specifications and provide information on new innovations. Please suggest that Mission staff make it a habit to drop by AFR/TR when they pass by AID/W to see what's the latest in software, databases, and analytical tools.

FYI. IBM and WANG have agreed to work together. The basic thrust is that WANG will get out of the PC hardware business entirely and market IBM personal computers under the WANG name. IBM is looking for entry into WANG's installed base of mini-

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computers [VS/OIS] and gets proprietary info on WANG's highly regarded imaging system. WANG gets a badly needed and belated infusion of capital and hopes the IBM name will make it more competitive. It is not clear what the impact on prices will be.

We understand the Mission has plans to hire an FSN IRM manager. The amount of equipment, software, data, and eventual networking of the Mission [also with AID/W] will require a full-time person to manage the resources and train staff. Specialized training can be arranged for such a person in REDSO/ESA and AID/W, the latter with AFR/TR, AFR/MGT, IRM and CDIE on specific subjects such as LAN management, hardware diagnosis/repair/maintenance, database design/management, et al.

BURUNDI PROGRAM PLANNING ASSISTANCE

June 1991

Tuesday June 11th	
am	PPA Team Arrives
pm	Introduction to mission personnel; attend Mission staff meeting
Wednesday June 12th	
am	Program Planning Presentation - Buff Mackenzie & Team Small Group Exercise - Mission Staff
pm	Objective Tree Construction in three groups: Economic Activities, Macro-Economy/Policy, and Health/Pop/Nutrition
Thursday June 13th	
am	Mini-retreat: Presentation of Household Income/Expenditure Survey, Informal and Private Sector Study findings [Hart & Adelski]
pm	Mini-retreat [continued]: Presentation of Women in Development Study Findings [Fikry] and group discussion of issues
Friday June 14th	
am	Groups continue on individual development/deepening of objective trees
pm	Groups continue on individual development/deepening of objective trees
Saturday June 15th and Sunday June 16th	
am	Team Mission discussions/retreat planning/workplanning format development
Sun	Trip to Bururi
Monday June 17th	
am	Objective Tree Consolidation
pm	Objective Tree Consolidation [continued]
Tuesday June 18th	
am	Alternative Logframe presented by PPA Team/discussion Continue Work on data sources, indicators and analytical gaps
pm	Finish planning/materials for retreat
Wednesday June 19th	
Leave for Banga at 8:30 am	
*** Mission Program Planning Retreat Objectives ***	
1. Development and vetting of consolidated Program Objective Tree	
2. Development of performance indicators and data sources	
3. Identification of Analytical Gaps and analyses/studies for CPSP	
Thursday June 20th	
am	Retreat [continued]
pm	Return to Bujumbura; PPA team report drafting
Friday June 21st	
am	Finish/deliver draft PPA Report to Mission
pm	PPA Team Debriefings with Mission; Tadesse on to Swaziland
Saturday June 22nd	
am	Mackenzie/Newberg off to sample Belgian beer

DFA PROGRAM PLANNING DEFINITIONS

Program: The sum of project, non-project, Food for Peace, policy dialogue, and all other activities undertaken by an A.I.D. field mission in pursuit of a given set of strategic objectives.

Program Goal: The highest level in the USAID Program Logical Framework -- stated in terms of results which are as close as possible to positive changes in the lives of people. The results to be produced at this level are long term - i.e., ten-to-twenty years or more in the future.

Sub-Goal: An intervening level objective between the Strategic Objective and Goal in the USAID Program Logical Framework. By definition, it is above the level of Mission manageable interest. Results at this level should be obtainable in less time than at the Goal level.

Strategic Objective: The highest level objective(s) in a USAID Program Logical Framework which the mission accepts as within its manageable interest. These objectives should be stated in terms of results which are as close as possible to positive changes in the lives of people, i.e., people-level impact. The results at this level should normally be attainable in five to seven years.

Manageable Interest: Those elements of an A.I.D. Program Logical Framework for which management accepts responsibility for achievement, monitoring, evaluation and reporting. A.I.D. will probably not control all the necessary and sufficient elements which produce the results for which it is taking responsibility. For those elements which it does not control, A.I.D. must monitor whether progress is being made so it can know if its objectives can and will be achieved.

Targets and Sub-Targets: The major accomplishments an A.I.D. field mission is willing to assume direct responsibility for in its efforts to achieve Strategic Objectives. The results at this level should be obtainable in three to five years.

Target Level Performance Indicators: Measures which quantitatively or qualitatively demonstrate progress (or lack of same) in achieving Mission country program objectives. They should be clearly associated with points in time so as to permit judgements on a program's performance in achieving its objectives.

Program Activities: The inputs provided to produce Target and Sub-Target level outputs that, in turn, contribute to achieving the Strategic Objective.

Target of Opportunity: An objective or activity incidental to the A.I.D. field mission's basic program strategy, but nevertheless included in its portfolio for historical, political, humanitarian or public relations reasons.

Assessment of Program Impact (API): Annual Bureau Reporting requirement for Category I Missions which measures actual performance against baseline and estimated indicators for Mission strategic objectives, targets and sub-targets. NB. The API need not report on every aspect of a Mission's program or each indicator annually.

Cross-Cutting Issue: An issue of programmatic or policy concern that permeates an A.I.D. field mission's portfolio and warrants unified planning and monitoring which does not constitute a separate strategic objective.

**USAID/BURUNDI
PROGRAM PLANNING RETREAT
Banga, Burundi
June 18 - 19, 1991**

***** Mission Program Planning Retreat Objectives *****

1. Development and vetting of draft Program Logframe
2. Development of performance indicators and data sources
3. Identification of Analytical Gaps and studies for CPSP Development

Wednesday June 19th

8:30am	Leave USAID building for Banga
10:00am	Welcome and introductory remarks - Glenn Slocum Program Logframe Development - David Leong, facilitator
12:30pm	*** LE DEJEUNER ***
2:00pm	Program Logframe Development [continued]
4:30pm	*** SCENIC BREAK ***
5:15pm	Program Logframe Completion
6:30pm	*** BOISSONS ***
7:30pm	*** LE DINER ***

Thursday June 20th

7:30am	Program Strategy Analysis using a Geographic Information System [GIS]: Senegal Case Study - Buff Mackenzie
8:00am	Program Performance Measurement through the Assessment of Program Impact - Rich Newberg and Sam Tadesse
9:00am	Plenary group exercise to develop indicators, data sources and gaps for each strategic objective and its targets
10:15am	*** BREAK ***
10:30am	Plenary group exercise [continued]
12:10pm	Exercise Wrap Up - David Leong Closing Comments - Glenn Slocum
12:30pm	*** LE DEJEUNER ***
2:30pm	Check-out; return to Bujumbura

USAID/BURUNDI WORKPLAN	JUNE 1991			
	First 3 - 7	Week 2 10 - 14	Week 3 17 - 21	Week 4 24 - 28
I. CPSP Development A. Program Planning Assistance B. Program Logframe C. Monitoring, Eval. and Reporting Assistance D. CPSP Studies/Analysis E. CPSP Document			Mission Retreat First Draft	
II. Program Reporting A. Annual Budget Submission [ABS] B. Congressional Presentation [CP] C. Assessment of Program Impact [API] D. Project Implementation Reports [PIRS]				Draft Section III
III. Portfolio Development/Management A. Burundi Enterprise Promotion Program [BEPP] B. Burundi Enterprise Support/Training [BEST] C. Family Planning D. BHRDA E. Child Survival F. HIV/AIDS				
IV. Mission Development/Management A. Teambuilding B. Staff recruitment C. Vehicle Analysis/Procurement D. Employee Evaluation E. Other Staff Recruitment F.				
V. Coordination/Outreach 1. AID-sponsored Conferences/Meetings 2. Burundi Donor Coordination Meetings 3. World Bank/IMF Meetings 4. Agriculture/Ag Research Coordination 5. Private Sector Meetings 6. Human Resource Development Meetings 7. HIV/AIDS Meetings/Conferences 8.				
VI. Staff Development/Leave 1. Glenn Slocum 2. Larry Dominessy/Rich Newberg 3. David Leong 4. Tony Ferrara 5. Mike Fritz 6. Jimmy DuVall 7. Duca Hart 8. Lorraine Denakpo 9. PDO 10. TACS 11. et al.				

USAID BURUNDI WORKPLAN	JUNE 1991				JULY 1991					August 1991				
	First 3 - 7	Week 2 10 - 14	Week 3 17 - 21	Week 4 24 - 28	First 1 - 5	Week 2 8 - 12	Week 3 15 - 19	Week 4 22 - 26	Last 29 - 31	First 1 - 2	Week 2 5 - 9	Week 3 12 - 16	Week 4 19 - 23	Last 26 - 30
I. CPSP Development A. Program Planning Assistance B. Program Logframe C. Monitoring, Eval. and Reporting Assistance D. CPSP Studies/Analysis E. CPSP Document			Mission Retreat											
			First Draft											
II. Program Reporting A. Annual Budget Submission [ABS] B. Congressional Presentation [CP] C. Assessment of Program Impact [API] D. Project Implementation Reports [PIRS]														
			Draft Section III											
III. Portfolio Development/Management A. Burundi Enterprise Promotion Program [BEPP] B. Burundi Enterprise Support/Training [BEST] C. Family Planning D. BHRDA E. Child Survival F. HIV/AIDS														
IV. Mission Development/Management A. Teambuilding B. Staff recruitment C. Vehicle Analysis/Procurement D. Employee Evaluation E. Other Staff Recruitment F.														
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DONORS ACTIVITIES - SUMMARY FOR PPA TEAM

AS OF JUNE 18, 1991

A. Following are GRB Fifth Five-Year Plan Priority sectors: (1988-92)

1. Rural Development and Agriculture
2. Commerce, Industry, Artisanry, Banks, Mines and Energy
3. Infrastructures and Communications/Transportations
4. Housing
5. Administrative and Social Infrastructures
6. Scientific Research and Technology
7. Regional and Urban Development
8. Decentralization and Planning/Land Management.

Last Donors Roundtable was held in Bujumbura April 25-28, 1989. Since then Donors have continued or undertaken their activities as described in the Five-Year Plan.

Major Multilateral donors:

1. European Community and its European Investment Bank (IEB)

- Rural development, including food crops and social infrastructures: involvement in the 6 northern provinces. EC assistance includes also SAL, cash crop improvement (tea; study is underway to determine the place of tea production in the private sector).
- Transport/Communications: Improvement of this sector in the sub-region (particularly in KBO states members).
- Private sector : SAE Project for assistance to exports of fruits and vegetables. This project is located within APEE.
- Road network improvement in Bujumbura

2. UN Organizations including UNDP (Coordinator)

Most of the UN assistance have specific targets such as UNICEF, UNFPA for children welfare and Population respectively. Others like ILO and FAO are implementing UNDP Projects in forestry, regional development (Swam crops, food processing, institution strengthening, etc.).

3. AFDB/ADF - African Development Bank/African Development Fund
Financing SAL and road network improvement, health including
an underway national health institute, support of sub-regional
organization such as PTA Bank and BDEGL.

4. World Bank/IDA

IBRD and IMF initiated the Structural Adjustment Program.

SALIII is being prepared. The Bank is leading the privatization of
Parastatals and is involved in coffee production and its privatization.
With the UNDP, the Bank is financing the strengthening of GRB
institutions.

BILATERAL DONORS:

Most of the donors are in process of preparing their action plan to
coincide with the VIth Five-Year Plan (1992-1997) with an emphasis on WID
and Social Dimension of Structural Adjustment Program (SDA). Some
organized mid term evaluation like UNICEF last march, Germany held hers a
week ago and Belgium is currently meeting with the GRB for a-week joint
Commission.

1. Belgium

- Agriculture : co-gestion with ISABU
- Health : LMTC (Lutte contre les maladies transmissibles et
carentielles, associated to USAID-funded CCCD.
- Human Resource Development
- Rural development through 5 NGOs.
- WID activities : newly created service.
- Belgium is planning a joint project with UNDP to fund Fonds de Réemploi
(SDA)

2. France/CCCE - Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique

- COOPEC (Saving and Credit cooperatives). Currently 70 branches in 6 provinces with 800 million FBU in savings and 350 millions FBU of credit. By 1994 COOPEC is expected to cover the entire country.

- Rural development (integrated): mostly food production and livestock. (e.g. Nyanza-Lac Project, Kinyinya)
- Cash crops (tea and cotton)
- Livestock in Bururi Province
- Transportation/Infrastructures (Airport and Bujumbura Port).
- Health (Laboratory and Faculty of Medicine)
- Information/Communication (Radio and TV infrastructures/equipment)

3. Japan

Grants for SAL I and SAL II totaling \$ 34 million
Financial aid and TA in Transport Office - OTRABU.

4. Italie

Involvement in rural development estimated at \$ 10 million/year.
Italy aid is mostly oriented toward cooperatives and provided through numerous NGOs (Mutoyi, Butezi: artisanry, food production and poultry).

5. Germany

Mostly involved in Rural and Urban Water, Road/Bridges construction, Sanitation, Energy sector, Livestock in Imbo Plain, Small ruminants farming in Ngozi.
Co-financing ISABU research, SAL, Bujumbura Sewage (with AfDB)

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BURUNDI: ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

Draft Program Logframe, Reporting Year 1991


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Last revised: 18-Jun-91

Date printed: 30-Jul-91

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE/TARGETS INDICATORS & SOURCES	Baseline # [year]	PLANNED AND ACTUAL [1]					
		FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993	FY 1994	FY 1995	FY 1996
Strategic Objective No. ____:							
Indicators: Sources							
Target No. __.1							
Indicators: Sources							
Target No. __.2							
Indicators: Sources							
Target No. __.3							
Indicators: Sources							

[1] For prior years, use actuals; for reporting current year, show actual and [planned]; for outyears, use planned.



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USAID/Senegal:

PRISM: Program Information System for Strategic Management

**An Operational Framework
for Performance Reporting**

August 1991

(DRAFT)

Submitted to:

**Julius Coles, Director
USAID/Senegal**

Submitted by:

**Dan Dworkin, AFR/TR/ANR/NRM
Dagnija Kreslins, AFR/TR/PRO
Mike McGahuey, AFR/TR/ANR/NRM
Mark Renzi, MSI
D.A. Smith, AFR/TR/ANR/PA**

USAID/Senegal

PRISM: Program Information System for Strategic Management

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1. Introduction

A. Program Evaluation Assistance to USAID/Senegal

USAID/Senegal was assisted during the period 22 July to 9 August 1991 in Dakar by a Washington-based team in developing its system of program information for strategic management. The team consisted of Dagnija Kreslins, AFR/TR/PRO, D.A. Smith, AFR/TR/ANR/PA, Michael McGahuey, AFR/TR/ANR/NR, Dan Dworkin, AFR/TR/ANR, and Mark Renzi from Management Systems International. The visit was financed by AFR/TR and AFR/DP. Mssrs. Smith, McGahuey, and Dworkin worked with the Mission for one week before the TDY described in this report to help the Agriculture and Natural Resources Office (ANR) develop its program strategy in crops and forestry. Products from the first week's activities were provided separately to the Director, ANR Office.

The team, utilizing the strategy presented in the Mission's recent CPSP, helped USAID/Senegal develop indicators for strategic objectives and targets contained in that planning document and presented a framework for the Mission's MER system. Given the recent approval of the CPSP by AID/W, it was agreed that the team would accept the strategic objectives and targets as given. The team's task was to review the indicators to ensure that they were the best possible measures and to provide the Mission with insights which may lead to strategy modification in a future CPSP. Given that Mission staff had just defended their strategy in Washington, the team's arrival was well-timed to assist the staff in finalizing indicators for the program's monitoring and evaluation system. The Mission's program objective tree, as presented in the CPSP, is reproduced as Figure 1.

B. Products of the Assistance

The team worked with Mission personnel to form "Working Groups" (listed in Annex II) to refine indicators for each of the strategic objectives. Together they developed an operational framework for USAID/Senegal's program monitoring and evaluation system. The system will function as the Mission's **Program Information System for Strategic Management, or PRISM**. It will provide data to report **at the program level** on the Mission's major program emphases in population, crops, forestry, and market liberalization. The PRISM shapes the flow of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) information for a broad spectrum of Mission decision-making and reporting to AID/W.

USAID/Senegal CPSP Summary

Goal

Sub-Goal

Strategic Objectives

Targets




Figure #1

C. USAID/Senegal in the Context of PRISM

Generally speaking, assistance to Missions in establishing PRISMs is intended to support a "results-oriented" development assistance program Bureau-wide, which implies it can be used to inform the decision-making based on improved understanding of program effectiveness. Developing a PRISM can help Missions narrow their program foci to a few or several major areas of national development where a USAID can ultimately have a significant impact, where results can be associated with specific assistance, and where it is within the manageable interest of the Mission to undertake a program.

2. PRISM in the Context of the Development Fund for Africa

The assistance provided by this team arose from the requirement to report annually on Mission program performance stipulated under the Development Fund for Africa (DFA). While the DFA provided budgetary protection and increased programming flexibility by eliminating functional accounts from A.I.D.'s Sub-Saharan African assistance program, it also increased Congressional reporting requirements. The Africa Bureau was required to more carefully outline needs, define objectives, clarify indicators, describe successes and make appropriate linkages between sectors.

This TDY was intended to aid the Mission in monitoring and reporting on program-level impacts. In the simplest terms this means examining the existing information, monitoring and evaluation systems, assessing the level to which they can respond to impact reporting, and suggesting how the Mission can compensate for missing elements and links.

3. Mission Program Evaluation, Management and Information Systems

A. Definition of terms

The Africa Bureau has standardized terminology used in articulating program strategy. Definitions of key terms used in this report follow:

Program: A program is the sum of the project, non-project, food aid and policy dialogue actions undertaken by an A.I.D. field Mission in pursuit of a given strategic objective.

Program Goal: The highest level objective in the USAID program logical framework. It should be stated in terms of results which are as close as possible to positive changes in the lives of people. The results to be produced at this level may be very long term - i.e. ten to twenty or more years into the future.

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Sub-Goal: An intervening level objective between the strategic objective and the goal in the USAID's Program Logical Framework. By definition, it is above the level of Mission manageable interest. Results at this level should be obtainable in less time than at the goal level.

Strategic Objectives: The highest level objectives in program logical framework which the Mission accepts as within its manageable interest. These objectives should be stated in terms of results which are as close as possible to positive changes in the lives of people -i.e. "people-level" impact. Results at this level should be attainable in five to seven years.

Performance Indicators: Criteria for determining or calibrating progress in the attainment of strategic objectives.

Targets and Sub-Targets: The major accomplishments for which an A.I.D. field mission is willing to assume direct responsibility in its efforts to achieve strategic objectives. The results at this level should be obtainable in three to five years.

Target Level Performance Indicators: Measures which demonstrate progress (or lack of same) in achieving Mission country program objectives. They should be clearly associated with points in time so as to enable judgements of that program's performance.

Target of Opportunity: An objective or activity incidental to the A.I.D. field mission's basic program strategy but nevertheless included in its portfolio for historical, political, humanitarian, or public relations reasons.

Manageable Interest: Those elements of a USAID program logical framework for which management accepts responsibility for achievement, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting. USAID will probably not control all the necessary and sufficient elements which produce the results for which it is taking responsibility. For those elements which it does not control, USAID must monitor whether progress is being made so it can know if its objectives can and will be achieved.

People-Level Impact: Positive effects on the lives of people.

Focus: Missions should address problems where the level of US resources and the comparative advantage of American expertise can feasibly be combined to lead to significant results. It is in defining how to address the problems selected that missions can focus their programs in ways that will increase the potential to have an impact on people's lives. How a Mission addresses a given problem may change over time.

Track: What has changed in people's lives as a result of USAID interventions. It is essential to learn what leads to impact in order to improve the targeting of Mission efforts and resources in the future.

PRISM(Program Information System for Strategic Management) A program performance information system which focuses on a broad spectrum of results at the program level.

PRISM sub-system The PRISM method applied to major program areas in the Mission; in the case of Senegal, population, crops, forestry, and market liberalization.

B. Organizing Principles for Defining Performance

Data and Reporting Needs

A number of basic principles have been identified to guide program and project managers in organizing performance information for program reporting purposes. These include:

1. **Incorporate program performance information into existing reporting, review, and decision-making systems.** Ultimately the goal is to make program performance information as routinely available and easily used as financial data is now.
2. **Only collect performance information that is likely to be used and only collect it when the costs of collecting and analyzing it are exceeded by the expected benefits.** Information should only be collected if there is a reasonable prospect that it will affect Mission or government decisions and behavior, or if it is required for external reporting.
3. **Keep program performance information and evaluation as simple as possible.** Only rarely will more than three or four indicators be needed as a basis for analyzing any particular performance element. (Note: in some cases more indicators are provided so that Mission can later select the most appropriate, as the program evolves).
4. **Use existing information sources as much as possible.** Available secondary data often provide a sufficient basis for convincing program performance measures, particularly at goal, sub-goal, and strategic objective levels. Much information on performance at the target and sub-target levels can be obtained from routine project monitoring and evaluation.

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5. **Use project mechanisms to collect and analyze most additional program performance information.** In general, project-funded data collection and analysis activities should be sufficient for routine reporting on program performance, at least at the target and sub-target levels.
6. **Place more emphasis on analyzing and interpreting information and less on data collection.** Unless attention is clearly focused on interpreting and using data, any effort to improve program performance information is likely to be greeted skeptically.
7. **Clearly delineate program management and evaluation roles and responsibilities.** Program performance information will never become routinely available for reporting and decision-making unless roles and responsibilities for obtaining, analyzing, and using such information are delineated.
8. **Take advantage of appropriate opportunities to strengthen host country program performance evaluation capabilities and institutions.** Much of the program performance information that is useful to USAIDs will also be useful to host country organizations or institutions that are developing, implementing, or managing related development activities. Where appropriate a Mission may want to assist organizations or institutions to improve collection and use of performance monitoring in decision-making.

Following the above organizing principles in designing performance evaluation and information management systems should facilitate program manager's reporting on performance.

C. Mission-Level Reporting Flow and Responsibility

Responding to the Congressional reporting requirements on results under the DFA, the Africa Bureau has established the Assessment of Program Impact (API) which reports on program impact based on the program logical framework developed and approved through the CPSP process. In the past, Mission reporting occurred in the Congressional Presentation, Project Implementation Review reports, mid-term and end of project evaluations, and ad hoc impact assessments. None of these regularly reported results and impact at other than project output levels and, occasionally, project purpose levels.

In contrast, the API is intended to report progress, impact, and results at the sub-target, target, strategic objective, sub-goal, and goal levels. To do this requires Missions to examine their

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existing monitoring, evaluation and information systems for their appropriateness and ability to respond to both project and program impact reporting requirements. Team member Dan Dworkin explained to Mission staff the advantages of using a Geographic Information System (GIS) to collect and analyze data. A description of how GIS functions is included in Annex III.

D. The Mission PRISM Work Flow Chart

The PRISM work flow chart was devised to provide a basis for analysis of the relationship between data sets and reporting requirements. In addition to listing data sets, it specifically identifies responsibilities and resources involved in maintaining or developing each data set and the reporting frequency of each. The chart for each Mission strategic objective, presented in Sections 4-7, provides the sequence of data management beginning at the source or location of information and continuing through analysis and reporting requirements. That sequence is as follows:

Sequence of Data Flow Management

- data set name
- level of reporting (sub-goal, strategic objective, target, sub-target)
- source of data (government, contractor/grantee, project, other AID offices, special studies, other donors)
- form in which data is received (raw, aggregated, compiled, un-analyzed, anecdotal)
- physical format of data when received (hard copy or computer disk)
- where source data is processed
- level of aggregation of source data (national, regional, sub-regional, smaller)
- frequency of updating

The work flow chart also delineates the position in each office responsible for managing the PRISM sub-system, reports generated by that sub-system, and a determination of funding sources for collection and analysis. The following sections present the Mission PRISM sub-systems for each of the four strategic objectives. Indicators at the goal and sub-goal level are presented in Table I, below.

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Table I: Goal and sub-goal indicator matrix

Statement	Indicator	Source	Responsibility
GOAL			
0. Increase private incomes from natural resources	GDP increased by 3.2% per year.	GOS statistics	PROG Office
	Natural resource income increased by \$ ___ million annually by 1997 over 1991 baseline.	MDRH crop production estimates.	ANR Office
Sub-Goal			
0.1 Increase availability of natural resources income per capita	GDP growth rate of 3.2% per year exceeds population growth rate of 2.7% per year.	GOS statistics	PROG Office
	Per capita income from natural resources in zones of reliable rainfall increased from ___ in 1991 to ___ in 1997.	MDRH crop production estimates	ANR Office
		Baseline and follow-on surveys.	
0.2 Increase value of marketed output	Value of marketed production increased from ___ in 1991 to ___ in 1997 (without USAID program) and to ___ in 1997 (with USAID program).	MDRH crop production estimates.	PROG Office
		Baseline and follow-on surveys.	ANR Office
0.3 Increase value of home consumption	Value of home consumption increased from ___ in 1991 to ___ in 1997 (without USAID program) and to ___ in 1997 (with USAID program).	MDRH crop production estimates.	PROG Office
		Baseline and follow-on surveys.	ANR Office

In reviewing the goal and sub-goals, it was noted that the sub-goals closely resemble other Missions' statements at the strategic objective statement. While acknowledging that the sub-goals are the aggregation of expected impacts within the population, crops, and trees strategic objectives, there is a firm belief that there are too many externalities for the sub-goals to be within the Mission's manageable interests.

It was also noted that by failing to incorporate people level impact within the strategic objective of market liberalization, the Mission was underestimating the expected people level impact of its program. As discussed in Section 7 of this report the Mission will provide updated information on expected impact as the marketing portfolio is developed.

Finally, in reviewing the indicators included within the CPSP, it was found that the relationship between the Mission's expected impact and the performance of the Senegalese economy was poorly articulated. For this reason it was agreed that the existing indicators would be complemented by the incorporation of GDP data within the Goal and Sub-Goal 0.1 Statements.

4. Strategic Objective #1: Population Sub-system

A. Introduction

The information, evaluation and reporting systems of the population portfolio are described in this section and presented graphically in Figure 2 and Table II. The PRISM work flow chart for population is in Annex 1.

The major report toward which the population PRISM sub-system contributes is the Assessment of Program Impact (API). Information from the sub-system will also be utilized in the Project Implementation Review report, although input data is not the thrust of the PRISM. The Program Office uses this data in preparing the Annual Budget Submission (ABS) and Congressional Presentation (CP.) The bulk of the Health, Population, and Nutrition (HPN) Office's information system is used for regular project monitoring and evaluation purposes. On a slightly less regular basis, the system also provides requisite information for sector analysis, new project designs and the Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP).

The Health and Population Office operates in a somewhat different context than do the other offices in the USAID. All of its activities contribute to the same strategic objective. The principal distinction between these activities is their project focus which is either family planning or rural health services/child survival. This has resulted in a simplification of data sets not shared by the other program areas where projects overlap strategic objectives.

Rapid population growth has seriously affected the quality of the natural resource base. Senegal is approaching it's human carrying capacity in terms of cereals production and sustained forest yields, in the absence of trade. Reproductive fertility remains high and modern contraceptive prevalence remains low. Therefore, the strategic objective of the HPN Office is to decrease family size which is measured in terms of decreased national fertility rates. The objective tree representing the population program is presented on the previous page as Figure 2. The population strategic objective information matrix, presenting relevant objectives and indicators follows as Table II:

Figure 2

Strategic Objective # 1 : Population Objective Tree




Table II: Population strategic objective indicator matrix

Statement	Indicator	Source	Responsibility
Strategic Objective			
1.0 Decrease family size	National total fertility rate decreased from 6.6 in 1986 to 6.0 in 1997.	National Census DHS KAP	HPNO
Targets			
1.1 Increase use of modern contraceptives (urban, i.e. over 10,000 population)	Urban contraceptive prevalence (modern methods) increased from 6.7% in 1986 to 18.0% in 1997.	DHS KAP	HPNO
1.2 Increase contraceptive awareness in rural areas (concentrating IEC where access exists)	Women's knowledge of modern contraceptive methods increased from 58.1% in 1986 to 75% in 1997. Men's knowledge of modern contraceptives increased from ___ in 1993 to ___ in 1997.	DHS KAP	HPNO
Sub-Targets			
1.1a Increase availability and quality of family health services	FP services increased to 1/4000 (proportional to population) in urban centers w/growth rate over 2.7%. Mothers report decreased prescriptions of antidiarrheal drugs from 23% in 1989 to 12% in 1997. Increased % of health providers correctly performing high risk assessment of pregnancies (in project areas).	GOS statistics DHS KAP	HPNO

B. Managing information at different program levels

i. Mission goal, sub-goal and strategic objective

The Mission's manageable interest in the population sector is identified in strategic objective #1, "decrease family size." This decrease will be measured by a reduction in the total fertility rate from 6.6 in 1986 to 6.0 in 1997 and contributes to the sub-goal and goal. In reviewing the program objective tree, the Working Group noted that progress toward the sub-goal was not only dependent upon strategic objective 1, but also dependent upon progress made in the Mission's other three strategic objectives. Thus, decreasing fertility rates alone could not dramatically affect "increased availability of natural resources per capita" (sub-goal #1). Similarly, achieving or exceeding the family planning strategic objective will not have a marked impact on the sub-goal or goal for at least 17 years. In addition, the indicators for the Sub-Goal were not directly linked to Strategic Objective 1. Thus, the indicators were modified to include an indicator which measured increased GDP growth rate verses population growth rate. The rationale for this indicator is that FP activities should in the short-term at least maintain population growth stable and other program efforts should show GDP increasing.

The Working Group agreed that the primary performance indicator, "decrease in fertility rate", measured impact in terms of people-level impact, was valid, and should remain. The only concern was that the Mission may have underestimated the projected target of 6.0 in 1997. A recent analysis of the 1988 census showed that fertility had already decreased to 6.3 and was projected to decrease further to 6.1 by 1993. It was decided that after the 1993 DHS, the HPN office would reassess the projected target and modify it if necessary.

ii. Targets and sub-targets

Population targets under the strategic objective were not really at the same level and, therefore, do not directly and straightforwardly flow from the strategic objective. Target 1 "increased use of modern contraception in the urban area," directly contributes to decreased fertility rates and decreased family size. However, Target 2, "increased awareness of modern contraception," is only one of several necessary elements to affect decreases in fertility rates. Rural population awareness leads to knowledge which in turn leads to a behavioral change which is translated into an increased use of contraceptives in the presence of adequate access to contraceptives. The Mission understands that the targets are bifurcated and at different levels, but has opted to retain the target which focuses on rural information, education and communication (IEC) to demonstrate progress toward the adoption of family planning methods in the rural areas. It was also decided that IEC activities would be concentrated in areas where access to family planning services

exists. The Mission is aware that increased awareness stimulates demand which should be balanced with an adequate supply. While the focus will remain on the demand side, a small pilot activity in social marketing distribution will be undertaken in a rural target area as a component of the new family planning and population project. In addition, a social marketing project is planned for 1993.

There were no significant changes made to performance indicators at the target level. The only notable concerns were that there was a possibility that the target indicator for urban contraception was too high and that there was no data collected for men. The urban contraceptive rate indicator was lowered to 18% to more accurately reflect present trends and data regarding men would be addressed by the 1993 DHS.

While there were no changes to sub-targets, indicators were either supplemented or deleted -- for example, some indicators were gender disaggregated. Indicators for sub-target 1a, "increase availability and quality of family health services," only addressed family planning service provision outputs. Therefore, the indicator "decreased use of prescription drugs for diarrheal disease" was added as an indicator of quality for child health services and "% of health providers correctly assessing high risk pregnancies" was added as a measurement of quality of maternal health services. The indicator measuring women's continued use of contraceptives was dropped because data was not readily available and required a special survey. Under sub-target 2a, "increase knowledge of child spacing," the working group thought that the indicator, "knowledge of one benefit of child spacing," was too modest. It was pointed out that everyone knows at least one benefit; a greater challenge would be to increase knowledge of three benefits by greater percentages of both men and women.

iii. Special considerations


Strategic objective #1 is targeted to women and collects data primarily for women at the people-level. An urban KAP survey in 1990 will provide data on men's attitudes when the analysis is completed. Wherever useful and possible the Mission should include data on males as well as females. For example, a male sample will be included in the 1993 DHS survey and in the future KAP surveys which will provide the baseline for several indicators identified above.

iv. Population PRISM sub-system work flow chart

Data sets for the population program are standard and straightforward. With the exception of the sets listed under the heading of access to knowledge, they feed back into the critical measure of fertility. Some of the measures are gathered at the national level, while others are geographically focused in

Figure 3

Strategic Objective # 2: Crops Objective Tree



smaller regions, such as separately by urban and rural areas. Management responsibility for the population PRISM sub-system lies with the Direct Hire and FSN Health/Population Officers. These Officers also coordinate the flow of performance information from GOS agencies and private sector organizations through USAID-assisted projects.

It is suggested, to the extent possible, that the Ministry of Health staff be enrolled in the process of PRISM so they may benefit for purposes of their own data collection and reporting needs.

5. Strategic Objective #2: Crop sub-system

A. Introduction

The information, evaluation and reporting systems of the crops portfolio are described in this section and presented graphically in Figure 4 and Table IV. The PRISM work flow chart for crops is in Annex 1.

The crop sector is an important element in the Mission program. The Mission has defined a natural resource development strategy, which together with reduced family size, constitutes the strategic plan for the country. The Mission goal is to increase private income from natural resources. The strategic objective of the crop sub-sector is to increase productivity in the areas of reliable rainfall. This has been defined by the Mission as areas in which the annual rainfall is 400mm or greater in 80 percent of the years. Since crop productivity is the basis of much of Senegal's GDP, reaching the strategic objective will support development of the national economy.

ANR will gather data for both the crops and forestry strategic objectives through an annual ANR survey and by reviewing Ministry of Rural Development and Hydrology (MDRH) and the Centre of Ecological Monitoring (CSE) statistics. The objective tree representing the crops program is presented on the previous page as Figure 3. The crops strategic objective information matrix, presenting relevant objectives and indicators follows as Table III:

Table III: Crops strategic objective indicator matrix

Statement	Indicator	Source	Responsibility
Strategic Objective			
2.0 Increase crop productivity in zones of reliable rainfall	Adjusted Kg/ha. for key crops (rice, millet, maize, sorghum, groundnuts) increased from ___ in 1991 to ___ in 1997 in targeted zone.	CSE Annual farm survey MDRH crop production estimates	ANR Office
Targets			
2.1 Increase soil productivity	Indicators in target 2.2 below are proxies for target 2.1 (see text).	See 2.2	ANR Office
2.2 Increase use of adapted technologies	Number and percent of compounds utilizing improved technologies increased from ___ (%) in 1991 to ___ (%) in 1997.	Annual farm survey	ANR Office
Sub-Targets			
2.2a Establish stronger system to transfer technology	Number of farmers receiving information from government and non-government sources increased from ___ in 1991 to ___ in 1997.	Project and program reports Annual farm survey	ANR Office
2.2b Increase availability of adapted technology	Number of natural resources-enhancing technologies available in target zone increased from ___ in 1991 to ___ in 1997.	ISRA reports Annual farm survey	ANR Office

B. Managing information at different program levels**i. Mission goal, sub-goal, and strategic objective**

The Mission's manageable interest in the crop sub-sector is identified in the strategic objective as increasing crop productivity. This is measured by an increase in the yield per hectare of the key crops: rice, maize, millet, sorghum and groundnut. No absolute figures were provided as targets for the increase. A measure of the productivity in 1991 will be serve as the baseline with 1997 productivity estimates being the target year.

The Working Group decided to use a yield measure based on a normal rainfall year. This will require that yield results be adjusted to compensate for departure from average rainfall conditions. To determine the feasibility for such an adjustment, the group met with the personnel of Centre of Ecological Monitoring (CSE) which has developed and tested a method for determining rainfall where there are no gauging stations. CSE has been developing and testing a method of using satellite data to determine rainfall in small areas. The results correlate well

with actual rainfall estimates. Using rainfall data and adjusting actual yields either up or down based on rainfall, the Mission can report the crop yields normalized for an average rainfall year.

In addition the Working Group noted that the Mission statement on increases in crop yields does not reflect the important concept of sustainability and strongly recommended that this modification be added. The Mission agreed that sustainability of crop increases was essential and interpreted sustainability as being implied within the statement.

ii. Targets and sub-targets

The targets under the strategic objective were not really at the same level and therefore there is not a logical flow from each target to the strategic objective. "Increased use of adapted technology" -- in strict analytical terms -- is really a sub-target of the objective "increased soil productivity." That is, typically an objective tree would place the former beneath the latter since it is one of its causes. However, for purposes of the assignment, the sub-targets were accepted as presented, with the Working Group concentrating on identifying indicators and the source of the data.

iii. Special considerations

In addition to the formulation of the strategy, the Mission staff and the Washington team has reviewed in some detail the methods of data collection and data analysis. An annual sample survey of farming activities will provide the basic data for productivity, adoption of adapted farm practices, technology transfer, and the effect on people in the targeted zones. To the extent that data can be gathered and to the extent that it is significant, it will be disaggregated by gender.

The data collection is not to be used solely to satisfy reporting requirements, but will provide lessons learned as part of the ongoing review of the program. To the extent practicable, the data collection and analysis will involve some branch of the GOS to assure that the necessary data to inform policy changes will become available.

iv. The crop PRISM sub-system work flow chart

The work flow chart for this Strategic Objective may be found in Annex I. As with the forestry strategic objective, the main sources of data are MDRH statistics and the annual ANR rural survey.

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
Figure 4

Strategic Objective # 3: Forestry Objective Tree

Strategic
Objective

Targets

Sub-Targets



6. Strategic Objective #3: Forestry sub-system

A. Introduction

The information, evaluation and reporting systems of the forestry portfolio are described in this section and presented graphically in Figure 5 and Table V. The PRISM work flow chart for forestry is in Annex 1.

The forestry sector is an important element in the Mission program. The Mission has defined a natural resource development strategy, which together with reduced family size, constitutes the strategic plan for the country. The Mission goal is to increase the private income from natural resources by \$6.8 million annually by 1997. The strategic objective of the forestry sub-sector is to "increase the value of tree production nation-wide". Achieving the strategic objective will contribute to the direct increases of rural incomes as well as permit a positive diversification of family income sources. The objective tree representing the forestry program is presented on the previous page as Figure 4. The population strategic objective information matrix, presenting relevant objectives and indicators follows as Table IV:

Table IV: Forestry strategic objective indicator matrix

Statement	Indicator	Source	Responsibility
Strategic Objective			
3.0 Increase value of tree production	Income increased per compound from forestry products from ___ in 1991 to ___ in 1997. Market value of tree stocks per compound increased by ___ CFA annually.	Project and GOS records Annual farm survey GOS records	ANR Office
Targets			
3.1 Plant more trees	___ (#) trees planted and surviving per year. # compounds engaged in forestry increased ___% annually.	Project and GOS records Annual farm survey	ANR Office
3.2 Increase conservation of trees	___ hectares protected and managed to permit regeneration increased.	Annual farm survey Project and GOS records	ANR Office
Sub-Target			
3.1a Increase availability and use of technology	# compounds using recommended technologies increased ___% annually.	Annual farm survey	ANR Office
3.2a Improve management of new and existing trees	Number of compounds involved in natural forestry management increased ___% annually.	Annual farm survey	ANR Office

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B. Managing information at different program levels

i. Mission goal, sub-goal and strategic objective

The Mission's manageable interest in the forestry sub-sector is to increase the value of tree production. Trees are an overused resource in Senegal with charcoal representing the major use. Policies regulating the rights of farmers are unclear. Major deforestation has occurred in an effort to clear more land for agriculture. The strategic objective is an important development intervention for the Mission and for the economic development of the country.

The Working Group approved two indicators for the strategic objective, increased income for the farm unit from trees and an annual increase in the value of tree stocks. Both indicators will be measured by an annual farm survey, the same instrument used to measure much of the data for the crop sub-sector.

ii. Targets and sub-targets

The two targets were directed to the strategic objective, plant more trees and conserve those already planted. There was some discussion of one of the sub-targets, "increase natural regeneration." There was uncertainty as to whether the Mission would be directly involved in any program that would promote natural regeneration. Although there is no Mission program directed towards regeneration, activities of supported PVOs will be directed towards this end.

iii. Special considerations

Both policy change and policy implementation directed toward tree tenure and tree use will be encouraged by the Mission. The present policies do not provide secure tenure to encourage farmers to grow trees. The working group also addressed the need for new and deregulated markets for trees.

iv. The forestry PRISM sub-system work flow chart

The work flow chart for this strategic objective may be found in Annex I. As with the forestry strategic objective, the main sources of data are MRDH statistics and the annual ANR rural survey.

7. Strategic Objective #4: Market liberalization sub-system

A. Introduction

The information, evaluation and reporting systems of the marketing portfolio are described in this section and are presented graphically in Figure 5 and Table V. The PRISM work flow chart for marketing is found in Annex I.

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The marketing sub-system is unlike the sub-systems for population, crops, and trees in that the Working Group consists of economists located in the Agricultural and Natural Resource Office, the Program Office, and the Office of the Controller rather than a single technical office. The data generated as part of the marketing sub-system is integral to that of the other sub-systems as well as to the higher level sub-goal statements.

The major report toward which the marketing sub-system contributes is the API. Information from the sub-system also generates information to contribute to the PIR Report. Due to the inter-relationships between crops, forestry and marketing, data is collected and analyzed initially by the ANR Office. The Program Office uses data from this office in preparing the ABS, CP, API and the PIR summary.

The bulk of ANR's information system is used for regular project monitoring, and evaluation purposes. The data and subsequent analyses, however, will also serve to advise the Mission of the real and expected impact of A.I.D. investments within the agricultural and natural resource sector. This information, complemented by analytic agenda findings and the PIR process is expected to improve the design and implementation of activities.

Increased market liberalization of agricultural commodities is a pressing need in Senegal. If the nation is to achieve the CPSP goal and increase economic output, it is essential that: (1) agricultural markets become more efficient through workable competition which permit a more optimal allocation of resources; and (2) the deficits to the GOS treasury be reduced which will help create a macro-economic environment conducive to growth in investment, incomes and employment. Given this dual objective of market liberalization, the Mission decided it considers market liberalization to be one of its strategic objectives, rather than a target. The objective tree representing the marketing program is presented in Figure 5. The corresponding information matrix is presented below:

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Figure 5

Strategic Objective # 4: Markets Objective Tree




Table V: Market liberalization strategic objective indicator matrix

Statement	Indicator	Source	Responsibility
Strategic Objective			
4.0 Increase liberalization of the market for agricultural and natural resource-based products	Reduced difference between producer/consumer prices and border prices plus in-country marketing costs. Percent of total agricultural product marketed through private sector increased from 46% in 1991 to 56% in 1997.	Rapid market surveys Consumption surveys	ANR Office
Targets			
4.1. Increase private sector activities	Number of wholesale cereal traders increased from ___ in 1991 to ___ in 1997. Number of medium-scale processors increased from ___ in 1991 to ___ in 1997.	CSA/SIM Rapid market surveys	ANR Office
4.2. Decrease government regulations	Rice transport subsidy eliminated. Buying and processing of local rice by SAED eliminated. Wholesaling of local rice by CPSP eliminated. Deregulation of prices and imports for unbroken rice implemented.	GOS reports	ANR Office

B. Managing information at different program levels.**i. Mission goal, sub-goal and strategic objective**

The Mission's manageable interest in relation to the marketing function is identified in strategic objective 4, "Increased liberalization of the market for agricultural and natural resource-based products". The Working Group agreed that by "liberalization" the Mission intended the evolution of a private sector-led market system which transmitted price signals to producers, consumers, traders, and agribusinesses accurately and in a timely fashion. The group was then faced with the quandary of how to best measure people-level impact -- or how to put a human face on the invisible hand of the market.

The Working Group tried to develop an estimate of the direct and indirect impact of market liberalization on producer incomes or consumer welfare -- that is, which groups would benefit or suffer from freer markets. In reviewing the data, however, the group found that this was not a promising tact. First, unlike many other African countries, there is not a consistent policy bias in favor of either consumers or producers. Secondly, if one were to base the impact of market liberalization upon 1991

prices, one would find much less impact than if one projected into the future. Projecting into the future is not easily done, however, because of uncertainties with regard to the prices of rice, groundnuts, and the CFA. Therefore, while the Mission will continue to monitor these implications of the program, it is believed that a more modest indicator of the strategic objective is appropriate.

After lengthy discussions it was agreed that this broad concept could best be measured by examining four complementary and reinforcing indicators: (1) a reduction in the difference between prices for selected goods throughout Senegal and the value of those goods based on border prices plus marketing costs within Senegal; (2) a decrease in marketing margins from ___% in 1991 to ___% in 1997; (3) an increased percentage of farm households who utilize price information when making their cropping decisions; and (4) an increase in the percent of total agricultural products marketed through the private sector. It was agreed that while indicator (1) was the best measure of market transparency, improved markets would only lead to people-level impact if market performance were improved (lower market costs or margins translate to higher prices for producers or lower prices for consumers) and if market information were incorporated in the basic operating decisions of the farm household. Finally, while the private sector is a means rather than an end, the percentage of total agricultural product marketed through the private sector is believed to be a good proxy for improving market performance. In order to decrease the reporting burden, these indicators were eventually decreased to two, eliminating indicators 2 and 3 above.

When the Working Group reviewed the program objective tree, it was found that the strategic objective was also a necessary component to increases in the physical productivity of crops and the increased value of tree production. Indeed, the sequencing of the USAID/Senegal strategy is appropriate to achieving sustainable increases in agricultural productivity. The strategic objective of market liberalization is expected to have a significant effect in years 3-5 of the program. As a result of this change in the pricing environment, the potential impact of the crops strategic objective is further enhanced in years 5-10, and trees in years 7-15. One of the remaining issues that the Mission must grapple with prior to the submission of the API and the design of the Agricultural Sector Grant is what will be the socio-economic impact of the proposed market liberalization program, and what are the appropriate magnitudes of progress at the sub-goal level.

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ii. Targets and sub-targets

Market liberalization or improved market performance requires the development of workable competition within the Senegalese rural economy. Workable competition, in turn, requires both an increased number of private sector activities and a reduced role by the Government of Senegal. Therefore, the group agreed that the targets were appropriate as stated in the CPSP. There was some concern with regard to the sequencing of government deregulation and increased private sector activity. The group concluded that in Senegal the two targets must proceed in an inter-locking fashion moving at a parallel pace.

When considering the private sector, the working group faced the question of which dimension is the most appropriate to examine, and how does one measure it. This issue is vexing at the retail level in the informal sector which is especially vibrant. The working group believes that at some future time a market analysis which examines structure, conduct and performance of Senegalese trade would be appropriate. However, given the resources available, it was determined that the most crucial element of the market chain in Senegal is that of wholesale traders and medium-scale processors. This group is of interest to both USAID/Senegal and the GOS due to the fact that if there is market failure, the emergence of monopolies/monopsonies, or the possibility of exploitation it will be due to the lack of workable competition at this level. The only other modification within this target indicator was to clearly distinguish between wholesale cereal traders and medium-scale processors to better measure the sub-sets of actors.

The target of decreased government regulation remains the same. Indicators of this target in the CPSP focused on reducing subsidies. While the subsidy issue is important, it did not relate to the target of deregulation. Consequently, the group decided that it was most appropriate to include as indicators of deregulation the four regulations which would be addressed by the USAID/Senegal Program.

It was determined that the marketing strategic objective need not be addressed at the sub-target level within the API format due to the fact that these are outputs which are reported in the PIR.

iii. Special considerations

Strategic objective # 4 will affect virtually all elements of Senegalese society--producers, consumers, traders, and agribusiness. While the API Report will capture the broad trends, the Mission will need to go beyond these indicators to examine the economic and social consequences of its investments within this strategic objective. These supplementary analyses

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should examine winners and losers by occupation, scale of occupation, gender, farm size, etc. in order that Senegalese, U.S., and other donor decision-makers may be appraised of actual and expected impact in a timely fashion.

iv. Marketing PRISM sub-system work flow chart

The work flow chart for this strategic objective may be found in Annex I. In addition to the data gathered as part of the annual ANR survey, rural market surveys will be conducted to measure progress towards market liberalization.

8. Mission Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting (MER) Management Structure

The MER system is a unified system with decentralized management responsibilities. The system is comprised of two basic concentric systems: an over-arching system and inner sub-systems (See Figure 6). Each sub-system is comprised of three parts: project monitoring, analytic agenda, and program monitoring (See Figure 7). Though there is considerable sharing of data sets within the sub-systems, each sub-system should be managed separately as the chief source of information for certain reporting requirements. For Senegal, the team proposes two sub-systems, one for natural resources (which includes crops, forestry, and marketing) and another for population. If necessary, a separate sub-system can be initiated to handle goal and super-goal reporting requirements.

Responsibility for managing the sub-system should rest with the director of each office. Responsibility to coordinate the overall system should reside in the Program Office. The Program Office should also be responsible for resource allocation across sectors and for finalizing reports at higher levels.

A. Information Sub-System



i. Project monitoring

Each project manager is responsible for maintaining the management information system for his or her project. Project managers are responsible for achievement of project outputs and strive to achieve project purposes. Indicators selected for this purpose comprise the heart of the PIR with respect to each project. Such indicators spring from project management and are generally not part of the Mission's PRISM. Feedback from the indicators will be used to modify project implementation, as necessary.

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Figure -6

Mission Information System




Responsibility Shared:

- Program Office -
- Coordination
- Resource Allocation across sectors
- Reporting

Figure -7

Information Sub-System



Responsibility: ANR Office
HPN Office

ii. Analytic agenda

The analytic agenda portion of each sub-system is still being finalized. It will provide sectoral understanding necessary to monitor assumptions implicit in the current strategy and to modify the strategy, if necessary, as experience develops. The population analytic agenda will be managed by the head of the HPN Office and the other analytic agenda will be managed by the head of the ANR Office. In addition, the overall Mission analytic agenda will be coordinated by the Program Office. These individuals are responsible for ensuring that data is collected, analyzed and communicated to top management and the Mission. The chief use of the analytic agenda will be to provide the analytic foundation for the CPSP.

iii. Program monitoring

The chief of each office is responsible for measuring and providing data to the Program Office on the achievement of the strategic objectives, targets, and (where applicable) sub-targets. As implementation of each of the strategic objectives becomes clearer, the office chiefs may wish to delegate responsibility for monitoring the achievement of each of the strategic objectives to certain individuals within the office.

Data from the program system will be used to draft the API and to fine-tune or revise the program strategy.

iv. Establishing a baseline

Based on the data sets identified and their sources, the Mission staff should establish baseline data for each performance indicator. Surveys and special studies need to be designed with the objective of developing baseline data for each indicator.

The Senegal Mission has developed a framework for its program monitoring and evaluation system. Senegal Mission management should review the overall framework and the indicators proposed by the working groups. Once the final list of indicators is identified, the Mission should establish quantitative measures for each indicator where they do not currently exist. These indicators could then be shared with contractors and host government ministries so that they can begin to integrate their data collection with Mission data collection needs.

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Annex I: Work Flow Charts

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POPULATION

Name of Data Set	Level of Reporting/Linkages					Source of Data Sets					Form Data Received					Physical Format		Where Source Data		Aggregation Level of Data				Updating		Mgt. & Use of Data Set: Person/Pos.		Reports Generated		Who pays for Data	
	Goal	Sub-Goal	S.O.	Targ	Sub-Targ	GOS	Grants	Proje	USA	Studies	Other	Raw	Aggr	Compile	Unana	Anal	Disk	Har	Processed	Natl	Regl	Sub-Rel	Smaller	Frequenc	Responsible	Name of Report	Collect.	Analysis.			
POP GROWTH	X	X				X								X			X		GOS	X				Annually	Prog. Officer	API	GOS	GOS			
FERTILITY			X			X							X				X		BNR	X	X			4 yrs.	HPNO	DHS/KAP/API	USAID	USAID			
CONTRACEPTIVE PREV.				X		X							X				X		BNR	X	X			4 yrs.	HPNO	DHS/KAP/API	USAID	USAID			
CONTRACEPTIVE KNOW				X		X							X				X		BNR	X	X			4 yrs.	HPNO	DHS/KAP/API	USAID	USAID			
SERVICE COVERAGE					X	MOH							X				X		MOH		X			Annually	HPNO	MOH Report/A	MOH	MOH			
PRECRIP DRUGS DIARR					X	X							X				X		BNR	X	X			4 yrs.	HPNO	DHS/KAP/API	USAID	USAID			
HEALTH PROVIDERS					X	MOH		X					X				X		MOH/Proje			X	X	2 yrs.	HPNO	Project Report/	USAID	USAID			
LEADERS COMMENTAR				X		X							X				X		BNR	X	X			4 yrs.	HPNO	DHS/KAP/API	USAID	USAID			
DESIRED CHILDREN				X		X							X				X		BNR	X	X			4 yrs.	HPNO	DHS/KAP/API	USAID	USAID			
CHILD SPACING BENEFIT				X		X							X				X		BNR	X	X			4 yrs.	HPNO	DHS/KAP/API	USAID	USAID			

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Crops; Forestry, marketing

Name of Data Set	Level of Reporting/Linkages					Source of Data Sets						Form Data Received					Physical Format		Where Source Data Processed	Aggregation Level of Data				Updating Frequency	Mgt. & Use of Data Set: Person/Pos. Responsible	Reports Generated Name of Report	Who pays for Data	
	Goal	Sub-Goal	S.O.	Targ	Sub-Targ	GOS/Grantees	Contract Project	USAID	Special Studies	Other	Raw	Aggreg	Compiled	Unanal	Anec	Disk	Hard	Nat	Reg	Sub-Reg	Smaller	Collect	Analysis					
Annual farm Survey	X	X	X	X	X	X					X	X				X		USAID	X			2 mos	ANR Chief	TBD	AID	AID		
Rapid Market Surveys			X	X				X	X		X	X				X		USAID	X			4 mos	ANR Chief	TBD	AID	AID		
MDRH Crop production estimates	X	X	X	X		X						X				X		GOS	X	X	X	annual	ANR Chief	TBD	GOS	GOS		
CSA/SIM Statistics			X	X		X					X	X				X		GOS	X	X		weekly	ANR Chief	TBD	GOS	GOS @		
GOS Reports (policy change)				X		X					X					X		GOS	X			annual	ANR Chief	TBD	GOS	GOS		
CSE Statistics	X	X	X			X						X	X			X	X	GOS	X	X	X	annual	ANR Chief	TBD	GOS	AID		
ISRA Stats					X	X						X				X		GOS		X		annual	ANR Chief	TBD	GOS	GOS		

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Annex II: PRISM Working Groups

USAID Dakar
Indicators Workshop
July 29 - August 2, 1991

Participants

AID/W -

Dagnija Kreslins - AFR/TR/PRO - Human Resources (Pop & Health) & Bureau Concerns
Dwight Al Smith - AFR/TR/ANR/PA - Agriculture/Nat Resources & Markets
Mark Renzi - Contractor MSI - Agriculture/Nat Resources & Markets

NRM Team 7/22-7/29

Al Smith
Mike McGahuey AFR/TR/ANR
Dan Dworkin AFR/TR/ANR

USAID -

Program Group

J. Coles - Chair

G. Nelson
R. Greene
S. Cisse
O. Sane

D. Robinson
A. Ndiaye
G. Haycock
M. A. Micka
F. Hane

W. McKeel
L. Jepson
R. Kite
L. Thiam
F. Faye

Subgroups

**Economics/Marketing
Working Group**

R. Greene - Chair
M. Renzi
A. Smith
O. Sane
A. Thioune
R. Kite
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M. Kieta
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**Population/Human
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M. A. Micka - Chair
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F. Hane
M. Gueye
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A. Ly
D. Robinson
S. Cisse

**ANRM Crop/Tree
Production Working Group**

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M. Renzi
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R. Kite
A. Burgett
T. Ray
G. Haycock
M. Kieta
L. Thiam
A. Faye
L. Franchette
A. Ndiaye
M. Ndow

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Annex III: Geographic Information Systems

Use of Geographic Information Systems for Mission Management

Why a GIS?

Geographic information systems (GISs) are an important tool for USAID Missions in the collection, storage, analysis, and presentation of data. The current API exercise with its required updates requires Mission management to be able to show the baseline and changes in a number of indicators selected to show progress.

The data needs of the Mission for the API exercise are heavy and will require the collection and analysis of data from government reports, research institution reports, periodic surveys, project reports and evaluations, and reports of other donors. To complicate the problem, data areas in which the Mission operates are not uniform. The Pop office is concerned with urban and a few rural areas. The ANR office concentrates on zones with an average rainfall of 400mm or more. The southern water zone project operates in a more restricted area of the country.

Even these divisions are too broad in some instances. The above 400mm rainfall zone of concern of the ARN office is further divided into a number of agroecological zones. These are again further divided, for purposes of normalizing sample data to represent normal yields during periods of abnormal rainfall. A spatial record of what is happening is a necessity for a program manager to assess the success or lack of success in achieving the targets and sub targets of the program. In addition, the examination of differential success rates in different areas might provide important "lessons learned" to modify the program implementation.

GIS as a Spatial Database

A GIS will assist in the collection, analysis recall and display of data. Such a system is conceptually a data base with a further tag that will identify an area of land to which it applies. By attaching a unique number to any data set, the data can be designated for a geographic defined space. For example any database program can be used to represent a condition applied to a specific land area. For example, to represent a soil condition within a region four numbers could be used. The first could be the region; the second, an administrative district within the region; the third could be soil type (or could be a data layer of all the soil types), while the fourth could be a physical

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location within the district. Data in a GIS can be presented as a table, a graph, or a map.

GIS as a Management Tool

The use of a GIS would provide all levels of the Mission with data for project management and assessment, for monitoring of program results, and for review of the Mission strategy. Such a system could also be used by the Mission as an effective tool to discuss conditions within the country with the government and to depict graphically for AID/W the impact of the country program.

The Mission already has most of the expertise to develop and use such a system. A GOS agency such as CSE could be used to input data. CSE already has a substantial number of data files that would be useful. These files were developed during the operation of FEWS, AGROMET and in research project arising out of an analysis of the data. As an example, Rod Kite working with USGS and CSE developed a report on carrying capacity using a GIS and some of the existing FEWS/AGROMET data.

Hardware and Software

The hardware requirements for a GIS are modest. A fast micro-computer with a large hard disk and a color monitor with a super VGA display format would be ideal. Current competitive costs for such a system are \$3,000. An output device providing color maps cost from \$700. Software programs are available to the Mission at a nominal cost. One that the Mission should consider would be IDRISI, a program developed under a cooperative agreement with Clark University. The cost of the software is \$200. Multiple copies could be supplied to the interested GOS agencies to enter their data. Mission would then be in a position to request data prior to its publication and would be able to access the pertinent records without the need for either the long wait for publication or for re-entry of the data from hard copy to carry out analyses.

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AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Bureau for Africa
Office of Technical Resources
(AFR/TR)
FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET

TO: Janet Tuthill
OFFICE: Management Systems International
VOICE: (202) 484-7170 FAX: (202) 488-0754

FROM: Buff Mackenzie, AFR/TR/PRO
VOICE: 202-647-7197 FAX: 202-647-4238 or 647-2993

Total pages including cover sheet: 2

Janet, here's a response to your July 15 Lessons Learned memo. Buff

- 1. Careful Scheduling:** Must make sure Mission is ready for PPA team and not absorbed with other work. The PPA cable is not enough by itself. I cannot strongly enough emphasize the value of a face-to-face meeting with at least one person from the Mission beforehand. Re. Burundi, we fortunately met with Glenn Slocum after the Mission Directors' conference so he had a much better appreciation of what the process would take [and how time-consuming of DH, FSN and contractor resources].
- 2. Mission Retreats:** Getting away from the office is a tremendous boon. Otherwise the day-to-day niff naff and the telephone will not let people's minds be free to go through the exercise. Glenn agonized over the OE expense [2 days at a place called Banga, 2 hours away] but said afterwards how worthwhile and necessary the investment was.
- 3. Shared Vocabulary:** It is critical that people use the same vocabulary. There is a tremendous differences, particularly when DH, FSN, and contractors from different offices, disciplines, and projects are all put around the same table. Assistance teams need to ever vigilant that people don't slip back into old modes. At several points what seemed to be serious differences turned out to be nothing more than confused and/or crossed-definitions. Sam Tadesse did a nice sheet of PPA definitions mid-way through that was very helpful. A permanent sheet that people keep at hand throughout the process is a better idea.

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4. Mission Ownership: If the Mission as a group [not a few individuals] doesn't feel ownership of the PPA process, the process doesn't work. In the Burundi case, we made a conscious decision with the Mission to go backwards and bring everyone at the retreat up to speed in order to create a full set [mission-wide] of stakeholders. This was done, in part, by carefully defining retreat roles: the Mission lead the retreat; the PPA team was used as resource and led GIS and indicator sessions. Within this comment, the need for unequivocal involvement of the Mission Director goes without saying.

5. Workload Planning: CPSP development et al. doesn't take place in a vacuum. Missions need to better develop a picture of overall claims on resources as well as how workload gets scheduled. We worked out 2 spreadsheet matrixes [using Lotus + Impress] with USAID/Burundi which the Mission seemed to appreciate. The first had tasks [including annual leave, training, regular program and project work, and all the PPA/CPSP/API work] on the left axis and people at the top: putting in rough guesses at person weeks per individual and totaling at the bottom allows a quick approximation of how overextended particular employees may be. The second worksheet places the same tasks on the left and puts months/weeks at the top: by framing/shading blocks [with text as appropriate], one gets a graphic representation of mission workload over time as well as scheduling and personnel conflicts.

6. Information Resources: Teams should have a clear idea of what hardware, software and peripherals are at post and might be available to the team. In the Burundi case, the team was using WordPerfect 5.1, while the mission had only one machine with just WP 5.0 on it. Another major limiting factor [totally unexpected on my part] was lack of a laser printer [3 on order]. It took forever to get reports, logframe diagrams and spreadsheets out [Mona Fikry's final report took about 3 hrs, for example], thereby literally freezing valuable resources [If I had known, we could have brought Rich Newberg's HP laserjet as excess baggage]. There should be a basic package of software that Missions [especially Category I] should have. While not an MSI problem, perhaps a recommendation might spur the Bureau. A standard set of software: WordPerfect 5.1, Lotus 2.01/2.2 plus Impress or Lotus 2.3, Org Plus, Lotus Magellan, Norton Utilities 6.0, PC Tools 7.0, Freelance and/or Harvard Graphics would keep people and machines working for the most part.

7. Prepared Materials: While I realize there was a confusion on Burundi materials, having prepared sets of professionally done flip charts is the way to go. Teams can then pick and choose which ones to use. [The last thing one wants to worry about is preparing flip charts at the very last moment as we did].

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BEYOND ANECDOTE: REPORTING UNDER THE DFA

By Emmy Simmons,
AFR/DP/PPE

The Assessment of Program Impact (API) was introduced in late FY 90 to make reporting on the effects of AID's efforts in Africa a more structured, systematic process. PIRs, project documents and evaluations, of course, have long met at least part of this need -- namely, for internal reporting between missions and Washington. And CPs, CNs, and hearings provided some opportunities for external reporting from the Bureau to the Hill.

But the inauguration of the DFA really called for a rethinking of AID's reporting efforts. Not only was a formal report on the results of the DFA required to be prepared in 1992, but an informal consultation process providing for regular exchange of information between Bureau and Congressional leaders was established. Emphasis was placed, in all the DFA language, on results and on strengthening monitoring and evaluation so as to better measure results. In addition, by encouraging closer collaboration with other donors and with the private voluntary community, the DFA provided an indirect encouragement to greater exchange of information with audiences outside of AID. The demand for information about the DFA -- and its results -- has been evident from the beginning.

So, while the API was set up principally as an improved internal reporting structure, it was also set up to provide information to support reporting on the implementation of the DFA to the world outside the Bureau as well. Further, it was expected that the routine and program-oriented

nature of the API would permit such reporting to go beyond the anecdote or "success story" gathered at the last minute for inclusion in a report or speech. This article shares with you the results of this first-year experience with the API from my particular perspective as the person charged with putting together a first-ever DFA Report and using the APIs to do so.

You will all remember that the conceptualization of the API in the summer of 1990 was a collegial affair in AFR/W. The basic point of reference was the bi-annual Action Plan, which by that time we had decided to abolish by incorporating it into the program planning process and the CPSP. Other reference points for the API in the AID structure of documents and reviews (PIRs, NPDs, etc.) also had to be taken into account, however, and decisions had to be made as to whether or not to permit the API to be used: for an annual revision of program objectives (no); to describe new projects and nonprojects (no); as the basis for a financial reward/punishment for good/bad Mission performance in the form of OYB allocations (no); or as the slimmest possible reporting document on development results (yes). API preparation was expected to require each Category I Mission to check out the status of specified indicators for each level and element of its program logframe (as laid out in a CPSP and revised or not following a Program Week discussion) and to report on what happened over the past year, if anything.

It was recognized, of course, that some Category I Missions still did not have solid program logframes with clearly laid out indicators of achievement for all elements. It was also recognized that baselines were not yet established for some of the indicators that Missions had selected, that Missions did not have time to address all the gaps in either logframes or indicators in the three months allowed them to prepare their first APIs, and that, even when program monitoring and reporting systems were up and running, not all indicators would show measurable progress each year. Both written guidance (STATE 215400) and the API workshop presentations tried to make this clear. So after the last workshop participant went home, those of us in Washington involved in the launching of the process

sat back with our fingers crossed and waited for the first APIs to arrive.

The first one in my in-box was from Malawi. I ripped open the packet and started reading -- a winner! Thank God, the process was do-able and Missions really had stuff to say! Over the next two weeks I read them all and, as rapidly as they came in, thought about what information conveyed was particularly striking and could be translated into the structure of the DFA Action Plan and used for Bureau reporting. Throughout November I extracted and rewrote, confirmed some statistics with a couple of phone calls, and with dozens of clearances, much editing, and a successful printing, we now have in hand the first DFA Report. It has been sent out to you under separate cover, so you should have it in hand soon, too. Much of the information was taken from the APIs, as you will note below, as well as the recent series of policy reform impact evaluations on which AFR/DP/PAR collaborated with PPC/CDIE. In the manner of a chef, I also added dollops of stories composed from other evaluations conducted in 1990. But, bottom line, it couldn't have been done without the APIs.

Nevertheless, you will say when you see the structure of the DFA Report, this is exactly what the APIs were to overcome -- the anecdotal

approach to reporting on what AID is doing. And, you might add, surely it is not cost- and time-effective to do a whole report on the Mission program logframe and then have somebody in Washington just extract one or two tidbits for use in a Bureau report. Surely the old success story cables were good enough for that.

Let me explain why I think the APIs are already taking us beyond anecdote and why, as better indicators are selected, baselines established, and systematic impact reporting on all elements of the program logframes becomes part of the Mission routine, the APIs will serve as a critical and credible structure for the Bureau's monitoring, evaluation, and reporting system. Let me cite a couple of the APIs to illustrate my convictions.

First, detailed comparative statistics such as those presented by USAID/Lesotho for their education assistance don't appear in the IMF tables or the World Bank's Development Report. Nor are they the stuff that most people would put in a success story. Yet I used this API reporting in the DFA Report as the key story to illustrate what we're doing in basic education. Why? The various rates and ratios reported in Section III of the API (25 indicators) clearly confirmed to me -- and I am convinced that they will convey the same impression

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to others -- that somebody concerned with the management of that activity [funded by AID] is also seriously concerned with what results are being achieved by the effort. Not only do the data presented provide some assurance of intelligent management and the standards which they expect to meet, they also provide us with the context of implementation and some sense of what to expect in the future.

A second reason why the Lesotho API was so useful is that it showed the benefit of the program logframe structure by making it clear that the Mission in this particular case must be challenged to track the linkage between its progress in achieving this strategic objective and its contribution to achieving the Mission's (and Lesotho's) goal, increasing rural employment. Because of the connection between the API and the logframe structure, we can look forward to future years' Section II discussions from Lesotho to contribute to our broader understanding of this important education/employment linkage in Africa. Other APIs that left me with a similar, positive anticipation to future years' reporting were Malawi's on infant mortality (where their excellent presentation of factual information easily led to the DFA Report story on "Two New Killers"), Niger's on local management of natural resources (the "Of Governments and Firewood" story), and Kenya's on population policy and family planning ("In Kenya, the Word is Out").

Third, I would expect that other managers of country programs just working on a particular objective for the first time would find their more experienced colleagues' API reporting on what results they were having to be most instructive. To use Lesotho one more time, I would think that those country programs including basic education for the first time should find the Lesotho API very helpful in defining their own indicators -- and this will certainly enhance their own reporting in the future.

While our Bureau evaluation officer, Cindy Clapp-Wincek, worries that 25 indicators are more than Lesotho will be able to cost-effectively collect data on over time, I would question, on the basis of the

API reading, whether the one indicator approach taken by Swaziland and Mali was really enough. If I were in Guinea, thinking about how to report on my new basic education activity at the target level, I would certainly take a close look at my colleagues' APIs to figure out where the optimal balance between time spent managing for results and time spent reporting on results might be. And, from where I sit in AFR/W, this means that the quality of everybody's reporting -- and the grist for the AFR/W DFA Reporting mill -- will be improved over time.

Interestingly enough, API reports this year on strategic objectives and targets having to do with agricultural production and private sector investment proved to be the weakest. Indeed, I could find little information anywhere in the APIs to use for the DFA Report and, particularly where I wanted to use information on agricultural production, had to resort to aggregate data from the USDA database even though it is clear that many countries have agricultural production and agricultural incomes as their objectives. Simply by identifying such gaps, however, it would seem to me that we should be able to better direct our efforts to pull up our monitoring and reporting socks in areas we think are critical.

In short, I am persuaded by experience that the discipline of an annual API will be helpful in sharpening Missions' collective evaluation and program management skills and result in better country program reporting over time. This is fundamental to improving DFA reporting at the Bureau level, particularly for external audiences. A one-year "success" is terrific, but sustained, knowledgeable, in-depth reporting which helps readers to understand the context as well as an event is needed. When that happens, we will truly have gone "beyond anecdote."

P.S. When we get the feedback from our intended readers of the DFA Report -- especially if it involves API-based information, I'll try to let you know.

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TO: See Distribution

FROM: *David Hess*
David Hess, AFR/DP/PPE

DATE: December 6, 1990

SUBJECT: USAID/Guinea Program Planning: Next Steps in Mission Objective Tree and Program Logical Framework Development

INTRODUCTION

Congratulations! You have made it to this point and have developed one of the most comprehensive objective trees that we've seen developed by an AID Mission and you haven't yet felt the need to feed the Washington folks to the sharks. The light can now be seen at the end of the strategy tunnel. But there are plenty of tough steps left to take. I trust that you will take them with the same enthusiasm, competence, and collegiality.

SCHEDULE FOR REMAINDER OF PROGRAM PLANNING EXERCISE

Each strategy group, those that have met to produce the major sections reflected in the attached objective tree segments, should get together and review your work. The tasks which should constitute your review are detailed below. Please review and return to me by Monday, December 10 at 4 P.M. all your comments, editions, deletions, and additions of the objective tree work. Please also identify at least two tentative indicators of achievement of the key objectives in your section of the tree and the sources for data for each one. There is also more discussion on how to identify these indicators in the discussion below. I will amend the objective trees on Tuesday.

On Wednesday, December 12, we will meet in a Program Planning seminar at the Director's house. At the seminar we will:

1. Discuss and complete (for the moment) the Mission's objective tree.
2. Discuss and reach agreement on the identification of the Mission's strategic objectives and thereby its program logical framework.
3. Plan how the Mission will continue the identification of indicators and data sources.
4. Identify gaps in analysis which the Mission may have to fill during CPSP preparation.

REVIEW OF DRAFT OBJECTIVE TREES

The first step will be for you to get together in the groups which produced the draft portions of the Mission objective tree to review them and provide suggestions, modifications and draft indicators for measuring progress in achieving objectives. Specifically, you are requested to look at the objective tree segments to see IF THEY COVER THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT ELEMENTS AS COMPLETELY AS POSSIBLE. Perfection is not expected nor attainable and any element which is left out will probably be discovered as the Mission develops its Country Program Strategic Plan. But please give one more look for completeness.

The second step is to look at the objective trees to begin determining the degree of manageable interest or managerial responsibility which the Mission is willing to accept. This decision leads directly to the identification of the Program Logical Framework and its Strategic Objectives, Targets, and Goal. There are a number of criteria which you should begin to use as you look at manageable interest. These include:

- What will be the FOCUS which limits strategic elements to those few where AID can make a real difference and how will the Mission CONCENTRATE its limited to produce RESULTS with those foci? Here you will apply the Development Fund for Africa's guiding principles to delimit the critical objectives from the vast array of possible or desirable objectives which exist for Guinean development.
- What would be reasonable indicators of progress in achieving the objectives so that Mission can REPORT on its RESULTS? Can they be stated so as to show the amount or degree of change anticipated, the quality or characteristic which should change, and the time period within which the change can be expected to occur? Can they be related to impact on Guineans' lives? Can this impact be disaggregated by gender? If the indicator cannot be logically related to impact on peoples' lives, please don't be overly concerned as the nature of many objectives will not allow indicators to be related to that kind of impact. For each indicator, can you identify a source for data to which AID can reasonably expect to have access? Please try to state that source.
- Is the objective likely to be recognized by Guineans in the public or private sector as understandable and important? Please apply a reality test and think about how the concept of the objective will be seen and interpreted by Guineans.

- Is there a mix of objectives which will be able to produce demonstrable results and include a balance between those which are likely to occur in the short, medium, and long term, cover policy changes, institutional development and tangible economic and social impact, and build on U.S. experience or comparative advantage?
- Are other donors, the GOG, PVOs or NGOs, the Guinean private sector or anybody else committed to achieving the objective? Will the objective or necessary element occur by itself?
- Do the objectives take into account the most important cross-cutting themes for the Mission's program such as accountability, diversification, participation, and any others you feel are key to the development strategy which should be pursued in Guinea?
- Are the requirements for financial, physical, and human resources which must be put in place to achieve the objective going to be within the possibilities of AID? Related to that, how complex will the management of the efforts to put those resources in place be for the Mission?

Those are most of the principal objectives which we need to apply to find the objectives which are in the manageable interest of USAID/Guinea. Do the best job you can, but don't be overly concerned if they get beyond you for the moment.

cc:

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PSI:ABrown
PPD/Cornell:CDelNino
EHR/CCCD:SMckeon
CONT:CLewis
CONT:BKeita
EXO:HBrown

ANNEX A

Country Programming Principles For Implementation over Next Three Years

CATEGORY I:

CATEGORY II:

CATEGORY III:

MEMBER COUNTRIES

Cameroon
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Senegal
Tanzania
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia

Botswana
Burundi
Chad
Gambia
Guinea-Bissau
Lesotho
Niger
Rwanda
Swaziland
Togo

Benin
Burkina
Cape Verde
CAR
Comoros
Congo
Cote d'Ivoire
Eq. Guinea
Mauritania
Mauritius
Namibia
Nigeria
Sao Tome/Principe
Sierra Leone
Zimbabwe

Djibouti
Ethiopia
Liberia
Seychelles
Somalia
So. Africa
Sudan

PROGRAM RATIONALE

Development interest
Large populations
Good macroeconomic
performance

Development interest
Small to medium
populations
Good macroeconomic
performance

Supportive of
development
efforts

Humanitarian and/or
political

2/3

Country Programming Principles For Implementation over Next Three Years

	CATEGORY I:		CATEGORY II:		CATEGORY III:
PROGRAM CONCENTRATION GUIDELINES	3 to 4 strategic objectives; no more than two targets of opportunity	1 to 2 strategic objectives; no more than one target of opportunity except if justified as earmark	3 to 4 activity maximum: Self-help, Peace Corps, central buy-in, OPG to PVO, or food aid		Variable, Case-by-case basis
PROGRAM SIZE GUIDELINES	Average AAPL over \$15 million in DFA	Average AAPL less than \$15 million in DFA	Typically, \$500,000 to \$2 million in DFA		Variable, case-by-case basis
TYPICAL MODES OF ASSISTANCE	DFA (both project and nonproject); PL 480, Food for Progress or Section 206 wherever possible	DFA (both project and nonproject); PL 480, Food for Progress or Section 206 wherever possible	Self-help, Peace Corps, central buy-in, OPG to PVO, Title I/II AFR/W management of either buy-in or PVO activity		PL 480, especially Title II (emergency), ESF
	NPA and PA both planned in up to ten-year timeframes; PL 480 in three-year programs	NPA and PA both planned in up to ten-year timeframes; PL 480 in three-year programs	Three to five-year planning horizon		

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Country Programming Principles For Implementation over Next Three Years

	CATEGORY I:	CATEGORY II:	CATEGORY III:
<i>TYPICAL MODES OF ASSISTANCE (CONT.)</i>	Bilateral is comprehensive with buy into central projects out of OYB	Bilateral is fairly comprehensive with buy into central projects out of OYB	
<i>DOCUMENTATION AND REVIEW REQUIREMENTS</i>	Full CPSP (every 5-7 years); AA/AFR and DAA/AFR chaired review; Annual ABS review; Annual API; Program review every 2 - 3 years either in-country or Washington	Full CPSP as needed, DAA/AFR chaired review; Annual ABS review; Annual API; Program reviews on exceptional basis	Project documents only; Desk and PD review
<i>DELEGATION OF AUTHORITIES TO USAID</i>	Maximum. Most PIDs and non-AEPRP, non-PL 480 PAIPS; selective PPs and PAADs	Maximum. Most PIDs and non-AEPRP, non-PL 480 PAIPS; selective PPs and PAADs	None, Some to REDSOs
<i>CABLE DISTRIBUTION</i>	All	All	Limited

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Country Programming Principles For Implementation over Next Three Years

	CATEGORY I:	CATEGORY II:	CATEGORY III:	
<i>DFA REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES</i>	Substantial. In addition to reporting regularly on progress in achieving program strategic objectives and targets, should report annually on DFA Action Plan targets covered in own activities (expected to be more than five)	Moderate. In addition to reporting regularly on progress in achieving program strategic objectives and targets, should report annually on DFA Action Plan targets covered in own activities (expected to be only one or two)	Only in earmark areas and with PVOs	None
<i>EARMARK RESPONSIBILITY</i>	Five initial primary education targets			None
<i>STAFFING</i>	Minimum mission size = 10 USDH	Minimum mission size = 5 USDH	No USDH in most cases; 2 - 4 USDH in exceptions	Variable; case-by-case basis

5/1/90 version

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ANNEX B

Recommended Country-Specific Resources

It is recommended that the Team Leader assemble for use by the team at least one copy of the most recent version of each of the following documents:

- 1. Country Program Strategic Plan/Country Development Strategy Statement/Concept Paper**
- 2. Review cable for most recent strategy document**
- 3. Action Plan (if applicable) and review cable**
- 4. Women in Development Action Plan**
- 5. Mission staffing pattern**
- 6. Country Policy Framework Paper/World Bank Country Report/IMF Article IV**

Optional:

Most recent PP or PAAD and review cable

Sector assessments

Major evaluation reports

AFRICA BUREAU MISSION PROGRAM LOGFRAMES

Strategic Objectives in 10/91 API

COUNTRY		STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE
BOTSWANA	1	Increase in the number of Botswana owned enterprises in the nonmineral sectors of the economy
	2	Increase of 106,306 new jobs in the nonmineral private sector between 1989/90 and 1996/97
	3	Improved quality and relevance of basic education
	4	Increased contraceptive prevalence rate from 30% in 1988 to 40% in 1996
BURUNDI	1	Improve the nutrition and welfare of small farmers in Burundi
	2	Decrease Infant Mortality Rates (IMRs) by 25%
CAMEROON	1	Increase the role and efficiency of private markets
	2	Increase efficiency with which public services in agricultural (food) research, higher agricultural education and health (in 3 provinces) are provided
CHAD	1	Contribute to the lower cost transport of people and goods over the Chadian road network
	2	Contribute to the administrative and financial stability of the GRC to continue development-related activities
	3	Increase agricultural incomes, production, and food security and develop private businesses in areas affected by USAID activities
	4	Lay the groundwork for making sound investment decisions in health through support for an information system and training health workers and promoting family planning
GAMBIA	1	Increase private sector investment
	2	Increase agricultural incomes through the economically efficient utilization of natural resources

AFRICA BUREAU MISSION PROGRAM LOGFRAMES

Strategic Objectives in 10/91 API

COUNTRY		STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE
GHANA	1	Help create productive employment in the private sector, especially agriculture
	2	Finance some of the costs of the Structural Adjustment Program
	3	Reduce fertility rate to 6.1 by 1995
	4	Establish a quality, equitable and financially sustainable primary education system in Ghana by year 2000
GUINEA BISSAU	1	Create/reinforce a supportive environment for private sector growth
	2	Strengthen rural entrepreneurship
GUINEA	1	Remove structural constraints to agriculture-related development
	2	Establish competitive agricultural marketing environment conducive to increased trading of agricultural goods
KENYA	1	Increase contraceptive prevalence
	2	Increase agricultural productivity and farm income
	3	Increase private enterprise employment while reversing the decline in real wages
LESOTHO	1	Increase portion of the population with basic skills for labor force entry
	2	Improve long run sustainability and increase production in selected agricultural subsectors
	3	Improve health and production of population
MADAGASCAR		None, CPSP due
MALAWI	1	Increase foodcrop production and productivity
	2	Increase off-farm employment
	3	Reduce fertility
	4	Reduce infant and child morbidity and mortality
	5	Control the spread of AIDS

AFRICA BUREAU MISSION PROGRAM LOGFRAMES
Strategic Objectives in 10/91 API

COUNTRY		STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE
MALI	1	Increased private sector participation in the economy
	2	Increase incomes in the areas of high productive potential
	3	Improve the delivery of health and education services
MOZAMBIQUE	1	Sustain an effective food safety net for the urban poor and those displaced and severely affected by war and natural disasters
	2	Reduce, among target population groups, dependence on external food aid to meet subsistence requirements
	3	Establish a policy environment conducive to private agricultural production and marketing
	4	Increase the role of the market in allocating productive resources to private producers
NIGER	1	Increase agricultural growth on a sustainable basis
	2	Increase the scale, diversity and efficiency of agro-pastoral markets
	3	Increase the coverage and quality of the health care delivery system
May be revised CPSP due		
RWANDA		None
SENEGAL	1	Increase Cereals Production
	2	Promote a dynamic market economy
	3	Improve family health
To be revised, CPSP due soon		
SWAZILAND	1	Increase contraceptive prevalence rate from 17 to 30%
	2	Increase the number of Swazis who effectively direct, manage, and participate in national development
	3	Increase the number and size of viable Swazi-owned businesses

AFRICA BUREAU MISSION PROGRAM LOGFRAMES
Strategic Objectives in 10/91 API

COUNTRY		STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE
TANZANIA	1	Increase rural road utilization
	2	Increase birth-spacing practices by men and women
	3	Increase the number of Tanzanian individuals in public and private sectors capable of implementing ESAP
TOGO	1	Reduce infant mortality and fertility
	2	Increase rural savings and volume of food crops stored in FY 91
	3	Increase non-traditional exports
UGANDA	1	Provide sustainable increases in crop yields at acceptable cost, leading to higher rural incomes
	2	Demonstrate the superiority of private sector in production, distribution, and marketing, including exports
	3	Increase and diversify sources of foreign exchange through, (a) support to export production, processing and marketing and (b) tourism associated with natural resource management
To be revised CPSP due in FY 91		
ZAIRE	1	Improve health status, with emphasis on increasing the rate of child survival and reducing the fertility rate
	2	Increased sustainable crop production and productivity for domestic and export market
	3	Improve the provision of sustainable transport infrastructure services and maintain road and river infrastructure
In process of being revised	4	Increase production and productivity of private enterprises, with emphasis on manufacturing, transport, and agribusiness