

PD-ABP-511

SENEGAL FY 1993 ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

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FY 1993 ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

SECTION I: SPECIAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE USAID/SENEGAL PROGRAM

Political Factors:

- the 1992-93 election year consumed resources and energies, postponing serious attention by the GOS to ongoing macroeconomic and development issues until after the elections.

- the formation of a new government in late May 1993 caused major changes in several key Ministries involved in USAID program implementation, notably the Ministries of Agriculture and Finance. A new Ministry of the Environment and Protection of Nature was created.

Insurgency:

- linked to the election, civil unrest in Casamance accelerated, requiring relocation of the contractor team for one of USAID's most important projects and consequent delays in project activities. A cease-fire agreement was not reached until mid-July. Some areas in the extreme south-west are still not safe.

Poor Crop Results:

- extremely dry weather resulted in a very poor 1992-93 harvest, despite early indications of an increase in area planted, with consequent negative impact on 1993 GDP. Data on yields, however, show improvements for most crops over 1992.

Late-year Positive Developments:

- forward movement on Natural Resource Policy, with the decree creating the Senior Council for Natural Resources Management (CONSERE) signed by President Diouf in early August.

- GOS announcement of an austerity program to restore public finance equilibrium. A new, sober approach seems evident. A key aspect of this new approach is recognition by the authorities that Senegal must find its own solutions to its economic problems. The GOS has also begun a more serious dialogue with unions and the private sector on economic issues, and is actively negotiating with the IMF for renewed financing.

- The GOS has re-started discussions with USAID on policy reform in the rice subsector and approved the second phase of the privatization study for the oil mill, SONACOS.

- The GOS accepted to move forward with a test of private marketing of PL-480 Title III commodities, after substantial delays and the selection of a Senegalese contractor.

- Reinforcing USAID's position on market liberalization, the retailers' union (UNACOIS) is putting pressure on the government to put an end to import restrictions on a number of agricultural commodities, notably sugar and rice.

- Last but certainly not least in the better news department, the 1993 rainy season is now on record as one of the most abundant in recent years. This is a sign of hope for the 1993-94 crop year.

SECTION II: PROGRESS TOWARD OVERALL DEVELOPMENT GOALS

USAID/Senegal's major achievement in terms of overall development goals is the evidence, which still needs to be confirmed, that the fertility rate has declined from 6.6 to 6.0 percent. This is an indication of a movement toward slower population growth, and an encouraging sign that the program is on the right track for the long run -- even though the rate of population increase itself will not reflect this movement for some time to come.

In the short run, the program is aimed at strengthening the general policy environment for natural resource use and management and putting in place activities to contain the degradation of natural resources. Failing to address this issue would jeopardize the Government of Senegal's efforts to re-start economic growth.

With respect to specific indicators, definitive data for 1992 show that results were better at the macroeconomic level, but worse at the sector level than USAID had expected (and reported) last year. GDP increased by 2.9 percent, or just a bit faster than the 2.7 percent population growth rate. The value of natural resources increased by 2.5 percent, compared to the estimated 1.9 percent. We have adjusted Table 1 accordingly. Per capita income from natural resources in the USAID zone of intervention, which had been estimated to increase by almost 20 percent based on early information on area planted (see more detailed discussion in S.O. 2), decreased instead by 5.9 percent. USAID continues to work at understanding better the government's methods for compiling national accounts and sector data, in order to be able to explain some of the apparent discrepancies between these series. Among other factors, it is clear that insurgency in the Casamance disrupted the production cycle -- affecting about 30 percent of cereal production and 20 percent of groundnut production in the USAID zone of reliable rainfall. The value of marketed production

nationwide decreased to CFAF 67 billion, compared to an estimated CFAF 82 billion; similarly, the value of home consumption decreased to CFAF 86.5 billion compared to an estimated CFAF 104 billion.

The year 1993 was not a good one in terms of growth in Senegal. Preliminary national accounts statistics indicate a decrease of 0.3 percent in the real growth rate, which would translate into a decrease of 3.0 percent on a per capita basis. This reflects the lagged impact of the extremely unfavorable weather during the 1992-93 growing season, the third in a series of years of decreasing rainfall, when returns to crop agriculture were particularly hard hit. As an example, oil groundnut yields fell to 780 kg./ha., an 18 percent drop from the baseline average of 959 kg./ha. This is reflected in the deterioration in the manufacturing sector which has continued in 1993, compounding the impact of the absence of appropriate policies. According to national accounts data, the offset provided by modest (though lower than 1992) growth in livestock and forest products, however, helps to limit the estimated nationwide decline in value of natural resource products -- this time due in part to losses from destruction due to torrential rains in mid-summer -- to -6.1 percent.

In the zone of reliable rainfall, preliminary information seems to indicate that per capita income from natural resources may experience a decline of less than one percent. We do not have an explanation for this improvement over 1992, in the face of the national accounts information. Rainfall conditions have certainly been a great deal more favorable during the 1993-94 growing season, although some areas suffered from unusually heavy rain. However another danger looms this year in the form of potential damage to crops from crickets and locusts.

The estimates for 1993 value of marketed production and home production are higher, and, at CFAF 72.4 billion and CFAF 110.2 billion respectively, inch their way back toward the baseline data.

TABLE 1

USAID/SENEGAL PROGRAM GOALS

	Baseline	ACTUAL			PLANNED		
		FY 91	FY 92	FY 93*	FY 93	FY 95	FY 97
GOAL: INCREASE PRIVATE INCOMES FROM NATURAL RESOURCES (percent)	(1986-89)						
Indicator:							
1. GDP Growth Per Year	2.6	1.0	2.9	-0.3	3.2	3.2	3.2
2. Natural Resources Annual Growth (excluding Fishing & Mining)	3.3	-3.5	2.5	-6.1	3.6	3.6	3.6
SUB-GOAL 1: INCREASE NATURAL RESOURCES INCOME PER CAPITA (percent)	(1986-89)						
Indicator:							
1. GDP Growth Rate Exceeds Population Growth Rate (percent)	-0.1	-6.2	0.2	-3.0	0.5	0.5	0.5
2. Per Capita Income from Natural Resources in Zones of Reliable Rainfall (percent)	-0.6	-12.2	-5.9	-0.7	1.8	1.8	1.8
SUB-GOAL 2: INCREASE VALUE OF MARKETED OUTPUT (CFAF Billion)	(1989-91)						
Indicator:							
Value of Marketed Production	80.3	77.7	67.0	72.4	85.3	88.6	91.9
SUB-GOAL 3: INCREASE VALUE OF HOME CONSUMPTION (CFAF Billion)	(1989-91)						
Indicator:							
Value of Home Consumption	113.5	113.7	86.5	110.2	108.0	112.0	116.3

* indicates estimates

Sources: GOS data, Mission data

Notes:

1. The 1992 figures have been revised on the basis of actual results. See text.
2. This report assumes that the proportion of cereal grain production actually marketed is between three and five percent.
3. The value of marketed production and home consumption could be expanded by about 20 percent to include the value of fruits and vegetables and livestock.

SECTION III: PROGRESS TOWARD STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

While factors beyond the control of the USAID program result in discouraging news for the goal level this year, we are able to point with pride at achievements at the strategic objective level, particularly in family planning and reforestation/tree management. We have also completed a solid baseline for our crop productivity objective and have been able to re-start the key agriculture sector policy dialogue with the GOS.

TABLE 2
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 1

	Baseline	ACTUAL			PLANNED		
		FY 91	FY 92	FY 93	FY 93	FY 95	FY 97
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1: DECREASE FAMILY SIZE	(1986)						
Indicator National Total Fertility Rate	6.6			6.0	6.3	6.2	6.0
TARGET 1.1: Increase Use of Modern Contraceptives	(1986)						
Indicator: Urban Contraceptive Prevalence (Modern Methods)	6.7	10.4		11.9	12.4	15.4	18.0
TARGET 1.2: Increase Knowledge of Modern Contraceptive Methods in Rural Areas							
Indicator: 1. Women's Knowledge of Modern Contraceptive Methods (percent) [1]	(1986)						
a. One Method:	58.1	75		62	82	86	90
b. Three Methods:	23.4			34	49.6	55	60
2. Men's Knowledge of Modern Contraceptive Methods (percent) [2]	(1992/93)						
a. One Method:	68			68	-	75	90
b. Three Methods:	43			43	-	51	60

Sources: DHS, KAP, National Census

[1] indicates married women of reproductive age 15-49

[2] indicates men age 20 and over

Strategic Objective 1: Decrease Family Size

Major Achievements:

- . Demographic and Health Survey results (preliminary) indicate a fertility rate reduced from 6.6 to 6.0.
- . Implementation of USAID's new generation of projects is underway.
- . The RAPID III model has been presented to the Council of Ministers and the President.

Thanks to the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) results, USAID has been able to complete the baseline information for Table 2, at least tentatively, pending confirmation of the data. We are encouraged by the progress in the spread of family planning awareness and practice, and report on it at some length. A condition of continued progress is availability of services, which depends substantially on continued improvements in the efficiency of the public health system and particularly on the decentralization of primary health care planning and management.

The preliminary results of the 1992-93 DHS indicate that the total fertility rate has dropped by over "half a child" in only 6-7 years. This drop mirrors the tremendous success of the Kenya family planning program, where the fertility rate dropped by one within a decade.

In its original plans, based on past trends, USAID had estimated that a fertility rate of 6.0 could be achieved by 1997. Though the 1993 figure must be verified before modifying the target, it appears that the rate of decrease in fertility has accelerated, and that it may be possible to lower our target fertility rate to the 5.6-5.8 range. The new target will be finalized and presented in next year's API.

The steady decrease in the fertility rate is not surprising as the DHS showed that Senegalese women are marrying later and later, and thus delaying the first birth. For example, the percentage of unmarried women among women of 15-19 years increased from 57 in 1986 to 68 in 1992-1993. Among the cohort of women 20-24 years old, the percentage of unmarried has doubled.

The contraceptive prevalence rate, the second determinant of fertility, for urban areas nationwide is also progressing well. The observed rate of 11.9 percent falls within the acceptable range of our target of 12.4 percent, and permits us to verify that an

increase in use of contraceptives of one percent per year is in fact occurring.

The change in Dakar (not shown in the table) is even more encouraging. From a 10.4 percent rate in 1990 (1990 Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices --KAP-- survey) to 13.8 percent (1993 preliminary DHS), this indicator has increased almost two percent per year on average. Since Dakar has the most highly educated population, we expect to see this region ahead of the others. However, to achieve USAID's objective of 18 percent prevalence in urban areas in 1997, efforts to expand services must continue. An average rate of increase in services of 1.5 percent per year is essential. USAID's new Senegal Child Survival/Family Planning project has been designed to do exactly that.

It is extremely important to compare these urban figures to the national and rural prevalence rates. The contraceptive prevalence rate (modern methods) for the country as a whole is 4.8 percent; in the rural areas the rate is only 1.4 percent, or eight and half times lower than the urban rate. Though an urban/rural difference is to be expected, the difference in Senegal is much larger than that experienced in many other countries. This situation may be explained in part by the difference in knowledge of contraceptive methods: among rural women, 62 percent have knowledge of one modern method and only 34 percent have knowledge of three modern methods. This compares to USAID's targets of 82 and 49.6 percent respectively, and to the 1991 one-method estimate of 75 percent.

Information, Education and Communication (IEC) activities are key to rapid dissemination of knowledge. These activities must be carefully targeted, however, to promote behavior change in specific audiences. IEC activities in Senegal have slowed during the last eighteen months, especially in the smaller rural areas, while materials and dissemination strategies are reevaluated to this end.

In addition, previous studies have shown that the joint availability of family planning and maternal and child health services is an important determinant of contraceptive use and impact on health utilization. Many of the constraints on the use of family planning services are equally relevant to the utilization of the health services -- transport costs, difficulty of access, and quality of services. Thus, through USAID's project, the National Family Planning Program has been evaluating specific IEC materials to ascertain their applicability for continued use, and pre-testing them prior to development of an overall IEC strategy. Ongoing activities have been maintained but no new outreach has been initiated. However we feel that, with the strong base already developed, we can maintain the existing targets for now and expect that the program will regain momentum over the next three years. Moreover, we will examine the relationship between service availability and contraceptive use.

TABLE 3

Knowledge of Contraceptive Methods (percent)

	WOMEN	MEN
Knowledge of 1 modern method: urban	88	84
rural	62	68
total	70	74
Knowledge of 3 modern methods: urban	74	69
rural	34	43
total	47	53

Source: DHS 1993

The difference in knowledge of contraceptive methods between urban and rural populations is significant, as demonstrated in Table 3 above. In addition, the difference between knowledge and practice is immense. Though the urban population is more knowledgeable of contraceptive practices, the urban rate of contraceptive prevalence, as noted above, is only 11.9 percent.

Other interesting preliminary results from the DHS show that 25 percent of urban and 17 percent of rural women desire no more children and 38 percent of urban and 40 percent of rural women wish to space the next birth. It appears that the fertility preferences are virtually the same in urban and rural areas; this is not the case for the prevalence (modern methods) rate, where the 11.9 percent rate for urban areas contrasts with a rate of 1.4 percent in rural areas.

USAID will confirm these results and investigate further this difference. If it appears that there are stronger constraints to contraceptive use in rural areas, the IEC program will adjust its messages to reduce this resistance. If, however, the main impediment is lack of services, USAID will work with the GOS and other donors to devote more resources to service delivery to rural areas than currently anticipated.

Rates of knowledge among men are also shown above. As anticipated, these are lower than women's rates in urban areas. It is surprising, however, to find that rural men appear more knowledgeable of contraceptive methods than rural women. Though men's level of education is much higher than that of women, the IEC outreach in the past has been targetted at women. The documented results may suggest that the IEC methods used (e.g. radio, printed materials) have been better received by men, with their higher

education levels, and that the face-to-face, interpersonal methods used to reach women have not been as effective. We must look at this data more closely in order to modify IEC outreach to develop specific gender-related messages and delivery modes.

On the basis of these preliminary DHS results for men's knowledge of modern contraceptive methods, the baseline and impact targets for this indicator have been completed on a tentative basis. A confirmation of these data must await the finalization of the DHS. USAID is confident, as with the women's IEC targets, that the program is on track and that, given successful implementation of the Senegal National Family Planning Program and USAID project support, these targets can be achieved.

PROGRESS ON DECENTRALIZATION:

While it does not appear as an explicit target, decentralization of health services, which incorporate family planning, is extremely important to the impact of USAID's activities in the family planning area. Under the Rural Health Delivery Services/Child Survival (RH/CS) project, USAID sponsored decentralized maternal and child health care (including family planning services) in the three targetted regions of Kaolack, Fatick and Louga. All of the 16 health districts in these regions are now responsible for their own planning process by setting their objectives and prioritizing their activities. Thus the central level of the Health Ministry is only playing the role of providing technical support during training sessions, supervising activities and defining guidelines and policies for each Child Survival component.

Among the main factors contributing to the efficiency of Family Planning and Health Strategy implementation are: manpower training and reorientation; the allocation of specific responsibilities to staff at regional and district levels; the increased use of appropriate technologies; the support of the GOS and NGOs for Public Health Management training and improved administrative systems; the integration of USAID Projects into the existing Ministry of Public Health and Social Action (MPHSA) structure; and including primary health care and community participation as part of the projects' various activities.

The results obtained so far are encouraging. Yet further improvement will demand continued efforts in staff management of limited resources and improved quality of specific services.

The relationship between population growth and economic growth as major determinants of health will also have to be further emphasized and promoted by the Government of Senegal, in addition to addressing morbidity and mortality, the main features of the Senegal Health Plan.

The principal shortcoming of the Senegalese health system is still the unsatisfactory level of efficiency at the periphery. In addition to strengthening district level health functions and continuing to improve supervision, ways must be found to reduce the cost of drugs, medical supplies, and transport to outlying villages. A more difficult problem is related to the "medical culture" of health providers in Senegal. This is reflected in (1) negative attitudes towards family planning on the part of some health officials and workers; (2) poor understanding of quality of service, resulting in a lack of appropriate counseling; and finally (3) a clinic-based, curative approach to medical care with insufficient attention to community outreach via paramedical and extension agents focusing on preventive care.

TABLE 4

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 2

	Baseline	ACTUAL			PLANNED		
		FY 91	FY 92	FY 93*	FY 93	FY 95	FY 97
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2: INCREASE CROP PRODUCTIVITY IN ZONES OF RELIABLE RAINFALL							
Indicator:							
Adjusted kg/ha for:							
-Millet	786	731	741	787	820	850	880
-Sorghum	850	800	948	788	880	910	940
-Rice	1,254	1,078	1,176	1,368	1,380	1,440	1,505
-Groundnuts (for oil)	959	852	780	910	1,055	1,100	1,150
-Groundnuts (edible)	1,006	866	870	1,011	1,105	1,155	1,205
-Maize	1,202	1,144	1,093	1,135	1,115	1,154	1,195
TARGET 2.1: Increase Soil Productivity (no indicator)							
TARGET 2.2: Increase Use of Adapted Technologies							
Indicator:							
Percent of Compounds Using Adapted Technologies.							
(1988)							
-Windbreaks	2-3		4.5		5	7	8
-Live Fence	0-3		2.7		1	3	5
-Field Trees	20-25		2.4		25	30	30
-Fallow Land	1		15.3		-	-	5
-Manure	20		51.7		20	20	20
-Crop Rotation	2		42.6		-	-	-
(1992)							
-Fertilizer	25.1		25.1				
-Water Management	6.8		6.8				
-Improved Seed	14.0		14.0				
-Erosion Control	13.5		13.5				

* indicates estimates

Sources: Annual Farm Survey and Ministry of Agriculture Crop Production Estimates; 1992 KAP Survey

Strategic Objective 2: Increased Crop Productivity in Zones of Reliable Rainfall

Major Achievements:

- . Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices (KAP) survey of technologies yields encouraging results.
- . Participatory research grant program initiated.
- . Rice land reclaimed/protected under SZWM project increased one and a half times over the previous year from 750 to 1880 hectares.

As noted in Section II, the 1992-93 crop year was extremely disappointing due to lack of rainfall. Nevertheless, the USAID program has moved ahead vigorously with the implementation of the Natural Resources-Based Agricultural Research (NRBAR) and Kaolack Agricultural Enterprise Development (KAED) projects, and completed the design of the Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) project. Thus, along with the Southern Zone Water Management (SZWM) project, the basic project interventions through which USAID will be addressing this objective during the remaining four years of our current strategy are firmly in place. Furthermore, the results of the Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices (KAP) survey of rural populations has enabled us to complete the baseline for the use of adapted technologies (target 2.2). Several anomalies between the 1988 baseline and 1992 performance are discussed below. The research grant program under the NRBAR project is underway and will help refine USAID's approach to promoting widespread technology adoption.

With this information base, and as we move into a more dynamic implementation phase, USAID will be able to track the impact of the program more accurately. The time it has taken to reach this stage, however, reveals the difficulty of establishing a sound and cost-effective monitoring system at the program level. With few exceptions, we rely on the monitoring/evaluation components of existing projects to provide program level data.

The area planted to major crops in 1992-93 was 2,180 hectares -- in line with the three-year average of 2,170. Within the USAID "zone of reliable rainfall", area planted was about 1,880, or 30 percent above the average of 1,440 hectares for this zone, with most of the increase occurring in Kolda, Ziguinchor, and Tambacounda regions. So at the start of the season, in May-June 1992, it appeared as though harvest results might show modest gains. By the time of FY

92 API preparation however, the repercussions of the lack of rain were fairly obvious, although only estimated data were available at the time.

The final data compiled by the Ministry of Agriculture reveal the excessive optimism of even those estimates. Yields per hectare for all crops except sorghum, which is cultivated on only a small percentage of cropped land, were below the baseline three-year average. Oil groundnuts were particularly hard hit, with an average yield of only 780 kg./ha., due to unfavorable rain conditions in much of the Groundnut Basin. Millet yields were also adversely affected by these conditions in the Kaolack and Fatick regions. The goal indicators in Table 4 show corrected FY 92 data: almost invariably, the results are worse than the original estimates reported last year.

The 1993 preliminary GOS estimates, based again on area planted and estimated production, indicate yields closely approximating the baseline, except for rice (higher) and sorghum (lower). Rice yields, if validated, would closely approximate our planned figure for FY 1993 of 1,380 kg./ha. Groundnuts (both oil and edible nuts) would lag our target by about 10 percent.

By contrast with this generally static short term situation, the results of the KAP survey enable us to show some encouraging trends for adoption of natural resource management technologies. Compared to the 1988 baseline data, the KAP reveals surprises in four of the 10 technologies surveyed. Manuring, fallow, and crop rotation practices seem to be far more widespread than the earlier information indicated: over 50 percent of compounds use manure, more than double the earlier figure; 15 percent use fallow, compared with only 1 percent earlier; and over 40 percent use crop rotation, compared with 2 percent earlier. The negative surprise is in the use of field trees: the 1992 KAP finds only 2.4 percent of compounds using this technology, compared with an estimate from 1988 of 20-25 percent. Finally, among the previously surveyed technologies, windbreak use has approximately doubled, although it remains modest. The reason for the discrepancies noted above may be largely related to the difference in coverage between the 1988 and 1992 surveys. We will need to look into these differences and make a decision for the FY 1994 API on revising the 1988 baseline.

Fertilizer, which was not covered by the 1988 KAP, is used by 25 percent of compounds. Over the next few years, this figure is likely to decrease, since farmers may well experience a decline in purchasing power as a short term result of the restructuring which must take place in the agriculture sector, as explained in USAID's 1991 Agriculture Sector Analysis.

The remaining three technologies are currently practised at levels that will require adjusting our previously defined outyear targets, which were based on the conjecture of a very low level of use for

all three. Water management is practised by almost 7 percent of compounds, and improved seed and erosion control by 14 and 13.5 percent of compounds respectively.

Water management technologies are addressed by USAID in the context of the Southern Zone Water Management (SZWM) project. In spite of the relocation of the SZWM team from Ziguinchor to Kolda due to civil unrest in the Ziguinchor region, project activities were carried out satisfactorily. The project adopted a new approach to technology diffusion: instead of multiplying the number of demonstration plots, the project decided to focus on farmers who already have access to inputs and are willing to apply the improved technology package. One group of farmers organized itself into a GIE -- an economic enterprise -- in order to be able to qualify for bank credit to purchase inputs. As a result of this new approach, the project has seen a one-and-a-half-fold increase in hectares protected and or reclaimed, over the 1992 season. Rice yields in the project area increased by 6 percent in 1992, and are expected to increase by a further 4.5 percent in 1993.

The next KAP survey will be conducted in the post-harvest period of October-November 1994. Its results will therefore not be available until the FY 1995 API. This survey will focus on the use of technologies and on farmers' perceptions of the impact of these technologies on production.

TABLE 5

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 3

	Baseline	ACTUAL			PLANNED		
		FY 91	FY 92	FY 93*	FY 93	FY 95	FY 97
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: INCREASE VALUE OF TREE PRODUCTION	(1990)						
Indicator:							
1. Income Increased per Compound from Forestry Products							
-Rural Share of Marketed Value (%)	36	32	38	35	40	50	
-Per Capita Cash Revenue							
Kaolack (CFAP)	590	566	432	600	1,000	2,000	
Kolda (CFAP)	1,300	1,225	1,971	1,500	2,000	4,000	
2. Marketed Value of Tree Stocks per Compound (CFAP)	n/a						
TARGET 3.1: Plant More Trees							
Indicator:							
1. Trees Planted and Surviving per Year Nationwide	(1990)						
-Number (million trees)	1.26	1.66	3.6	2.00	4.0	10.0	
-Percent Survival (one year)	20	20	58.6	25	30	40	
2. Compounds Engaged in Forestry (percent of total compounds)	(1988)						
	39			40	45	50	
TARGET 3.2: Increase Conservation of Trees	(1990)						
Indicator:							
1. Increase in Hectares Protected/ Managed to permit Regeneration	4,248	4,329	4,941	5,733	5,000	10,000	
2. Trees/ha on participating Farms	18				25	40	

* indicates estimates

Sources: Project data, GOS Forestry Service Records, Ministry of Agriculture and Farm Surveys

Strategic Objective 3: Increase Value of Tree Production

Major Achievements:

- . Three-fold jump in the one-year nationwide tree survival rate.
- . Forestry Code adopted and implementing measures drafted and distributed to local officials.
- . Senior Council for Natural Resources Management and the Environment created.
- . CBNRM project design completed and grant signed.

The increasing momentum of concern for the environment and attention to forestry issues became clearly evident in 1993. Both on the policy and institutional fronts and at the grassroots level, the impact of this concern is being felt. USAID has been a leading force in its ongoing support and encouragement of GOS actions in this domain.

In addition to the adoption of the Forestry Code and the creation of the Senior Council on the Environment, the GOS manifested its resolve to provide leadership and address environmental issues in a comprehensive manner by creating a new Ministry of the Environment. Heightened attention to a broad range of environmental issues, including natural resource management, became evident in the last months of the API reporting period.

The adoption of the new Forestry Code in January 1993 is a big step forward in encouraging a more rational exploitation of forestry resources. In a long-awaited move, the Code affirms the property rights of private individuals, groups, and public bodies developing these resources. It embodies far greater flexibility regarding the exploitation of farm-planted trees as well as forest lands.

However the Forest Service can restrict or withdraw rights to the use of forest lands if deemed necessary to defend the general interest. Thus one of the limitations of the Code may be the lack of safeguards to prevent long delays in obtaining authorizations to act or to sanction forestry agents refusing to give authorizations despite the fact that the exploitation of forest land meets the conditions of the local land use plan. Fine tuning of specific provisions may be in order as problems are identified. Nevertheless, with a generalized application of the new Code, USAID expects private forestry activities to increase and to provide a more reliable additional source of income for the rural population.

The forest products market information system that USAID expected to be operational for 1993 could not be established, largely due to the civil unrest in Casamance which prevented execution of the required survey. As a result, the information on income derived from forest products is not as complete as we had expected for this report. In particular, we are still not able to provide data on the market value of tree stocks per compound. The information we present comes from Ministry of Agriculture data on tree crops and Forest Service data on wood products.

According to this data, the revised figures for 1992 indicate that 38 percent of the marketed value of forestry products accrues to rural households. This is a net increase over our baseline, and an improvement over our target figure for 1993 of 35 percent. Per capita cash revenue turns out to be substantially better than expected (and about 30 percent over our target figure) for Kolda region, but much less (by about 28 percent) for Kaolack region. One explanation provided for this change in Kaolack is that the Forest Service, in line with the Forestry Code guidelines for better tree resource management, authorized fewer exploitation permits.

Forest Service data give evidence of a dramatic change in the one-year survival rate for newly planted trees: from 20 percent in 1991 to over 58 percent in 1992, a year of poor rainfall. Thus, the national level performance seems to have caught up with the performance registered under the Reforestation Project (54 percent survival rate in 1992). It also surpasses by far USAID's target of a 40 percent survival rate estimated for FY 97.

Several explanations are given for this result. First of all, fewer trees were planted because of a recognition that more is not necessarily better and that there was a limit to the number of saplings that could be cared for properly (watering, protection from animals). In 1991 about 30 percent more trees were planted than in 1990 (8.3 million compared to 6.3 million). The failure to improve the survival rate indicated that planting fewer trees but giving them better care would be preferable.

Second, at the grassroots level, a significant increase in the attention given to trees by local populations is credited with the increased survival rate. This seems to be due to an improved appreciation of the value of trees. The new approach to tree management embodied in the new Forestry Code has been instrumental in developing this more positive perception, even before the formal adoption of the Code by the National Assembly.

For 1993, we report only one estimate: land area managed for regeneration. It appears that this indicator increased by 16 percent over 1992 -- to 5,733 hectares -- surpassing our target figure of 5,000 hectares by about 15 percent.

USAID does not have reliable information at this time to explain the lack of change in compounds engaged in forestry, given the observed jump in tree survival. This discrepancy highlights the fact that we must continue to improve our understanding of the dynamics of forestry related issues.

TABLE 6

USAID Contribution to Strategic Objective 3							
TARGET NUMBER	ACTUAL				PLANNED		
	FY 90 Base	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93*	FY 93	FY 95	FY 97
3.1a Trees Planted and Surviving ('000 per year)	220	406	452		600	1,000	2,100
3.1b Trees Planted and Surviving (percent after 1 year)	41	45	54		45	45	50
3.2 Increase in Area Protected/Managed to Permit Regeneration ('000 hectares)				0.8	1.0	5.0	10.0

* estimates from Forestry Service report

In addition to the strong results on tree survival, the Senegal Reforestation project has also provided examples of productive private sector involvement in tree management and income generation which give a positive outlook for continued progress in the future.

**** New Firms Qualify for Reforestation Contracts**

In 1992 over 100 enterprises were qualified to perform roadside plantings on contract, thanks to the project's training program, compared with only three in 1988. More than 90 percent of the project's contracts are successfully carried out. In addition most of these newly created enterprises, which signed their first contract with the Reforestation project, have demonstrated their vitality by signing numerous contracts with other clients.

**** Potential Domestic Production of Poles for Electricity Cables**

Working with the national electric company (SENELEC), the private sector component of the Reforestation project is testing eucalyptus poles to determine their suitability for use in supporting low-tension electric cables. If the poles

pass the tests, a new market will be created for locally produced eucalyptus.

The FY92 API reported the cutting of trees on 45,000 hectares of the Khelcom forest. The issue appeared as a setback in efforts to increase tree production in Senegal. Now recent information on this controversial question enables us to report the efforts that have been made to manage the Khelcom environment. These include development of a two-hectare tree nursery, which produced almost 650,000 plants in 1992 (about 5.4 percent of total national production); and planting 70 kilometers of windbreaks, using about 389,000 saplings, equivalent to about 50 percent of the number of trees planted under the Senegal Reforestation project matching grant program. The land area is divided into 15 plantations of 3,000 ha. each, which in turn are expected to establish windbreaks around individual fields and woodlots to provide fuelwood to the villages.

TABLE 7

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 4

	Baseline	ACTUAL			PLANNED		
		FY 91	FY 92	FY 93	FY 93	FY 95	FY 97
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 4: INCREASE LIBERALIZATION OF THE MARKET FOR AGRICULTURAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES-BASED PRODUCTS	(1989-91)						
Indicator							
1. Reduce Marketing Margins to Their Competitive Levels (percent margin)	17- 26		14- 17		15- 20	10- 15	10- 15
2. Agricultural Product Marketed through the Private Sector (percent of total)	46		46		50	95	95
TARGET 4.1: INCREASE PRIVATE SECTOR ACTIVITIES	(1992)						
Indicator:							
Number of Major (at least 10 clients) Wholesale Cereal Traders							
-Dakar (Rice)	279		279		285	300	300
-Outside Dakar	185		185		190	190	200
TARGET 4.2: DECREASE GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS		Actual/Expected Implementation Period					
Indicator:							
1. Eliminate Rice Transport Subsidy					x	x	x
2. Eliminate Buying/Processing Local Rice by SAED				initiated	x	x	x
3. Eliminate Wholesaling of Local Rice by CPSP					x	x	x
4. Deregulate Prices and Imports (whole rice)			x		x	x	x
5. Implement Deregulation of prices for Broken Rice (except Dakar wholesale)							
-All Regions except Kolda/Ziguinchor					x	x	x
-Kolda/Ziguinchor						x	x
6. Reorganize Agricultural Development Bank						x	x
7. Privatize Groundnut Parastatal (SONACOS)					x	x	x
8. Implement Forestry Code				initiated		x	x

Sources: GOS Market Surveys, CPSP, CSA/SIM, Mission Records

Strategic Objective 4: Increase Liberalization of the Market for Agricultural and Natural Resources-Based Products

Major Achievements:

- . Private rice mills have processed almost two-thirds of the 1992-93 harvest, compared with 55 percent in 1991-92.
- . Plans to sell SAED mills to the employees have been developed.
- . The first phase of a study to liberalize groundnut marketing and processing by privatizing SONACOS/SONAGRAINES was completed.
- . The GOS decided to move ahead with a pilot program to privatize marketing of imported intermediate and whole grain rice, starting with the Title III program imports.

USAID's market liberalization program became stalled in FY 1993, due largely to the sensitive nature of the reforms anticipated and the unwillingness of the government to address these issues in an election year. By August 1993, however, with a new economic team in place, the GOS reopened the dormant agriculture sector reform agenda and has made it clear that it wishes to move ahead vigorously. In addition, efforts to privatize imported whole and intermediate grain rice, using the PL-480 Title III program as a test case, have gotten back on track.

Although the GOS had reached agreement with donors on the key rice subsector issues in mid-1992, it refused to act on any of its commitments during the election period. This included a commitment to move away from enforcing fixed producer prices in favor of setting a lower "reference price" which would be more flexible since it would essentially serve as a floor price for official purchases while permitting private traders to offer alternative prices according to market conditions. An immediate result of this action would be a drop in official producer prices for paddy from CFAF 85/kg. to CFAF 75/kg.

Due to the interrupted momentum in agriculture sector reform, the expected deregulation of the rice subsector has been delayed by at least one year. Very slow progress has occurred on several of USAID's indicators, however:

--while SAED has not completely withdrawn from purchasing and processing paddy, its share of this market is shrinking in favor of private rice millers.

--the government has signed a protocol whereby it agrees to sell SAED mills to the employees; the financial provisions are being finalized and the action is to be completed by the end of 1993 in order to permit the privatized structures to compete for the February-March harvest.

--marketing of local rice through private channels was more extensive than last year, and recorded prices were slightly lower. In addition to seasonal differences, prices paid to farmers may be lower than the official price to the extent that buyers offer ready cash and that farmers retain control over the by-product.

USAID has delayed conducting a systematic update of rice wholesalers and marketing margins in 1993, pending the actual implementation of the government's reform measures.

In the groundnut subsector, the GOS agreed to a first phase study to identify the parameters for possible privatization of the oilseed processing company, SONACOS, which is 91 percent government-owned. The conclusions of the study were well-received. A second phase is currently underway.

Yet overall progress continues to be tenuous, justifying continued insistence on reform and vigilance regarding policy consistency. In its search for sources of revenue to support its austerity program, the GOS has decided to reintroduce a differentiation between commodity wholesalers and retailers that will permit it to collect taxes from collectors in the weekly markets. This could represent backtracking from the earlier liberalization of local cereals marketing, whereby collectors did not have to be licensed and were freed from the obligation to declare their stocks. USAID will follow this development closely to ensure that additional revenue generation measures do not undermine the basic thrust of reform.

Targets of Opportunity

CREDIT:

The GOS strengthened its outreach to groups interested in forming credit unions or developing financial intermediation activities by holding meetings to elicit advice and comments on proposed regulatory legislation. The Ministry of Finance adopted an ordinance permitting the creation of credit unions as an interim measure, pending the adoption of a financial intermediation law by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). Several groups have already been licensed under this ordinance, including the credit component (ACEP) of USAID's Community and Enterprise Development project, which is in the process of completing its metamorphosis into an independent, self-sustaining institution.

ACEP has continued its highly successful lending program. With \$1.7 million in funds received by the GOS to finance its expansion in the Ziguinchor, Kolda, and Tambacounda regions, ACEP was able to open five new branch offices. Between June 1992 and July 1993, loans totalling \$5 million resulted in creation of some 500 permanent and almost 900 temporary jobs, not to mention the opportunities provided for over 1,000 (generally unpaid) apprentices.

HIV/AIDS:

The implementation of the Senegal AIDS Control and Prevention (AIDSCAP) Project is just starting. However AIDS specific activities such as training of laboratory technicians and research assistants for both HIV and STD testing were already integrated into the USAID/Senegal Family Health and Population Project. As a result, over 800 medical personnel (midwives, doctors and nurses) in both the private and public sectors have been trained. Over one million condoms per year have been provided to the National AIDS Control program for distribution in STD clinics. In addition, this project strengthened laboratories for diagnosis of HIV and STDs by providing equipment and reagents to six regional laboratories and to the central reference laboratory.

With the start of the AIDSCAP activity, USAID will focus on IEC activities particularly in urban areas, to try to maintain a low general prevalence rate. The HIV prevalence rate for the general population is one percent. However, high-risk groups such as prostitutes have prevalence rates of 10 to 30 percent depending on the region.

DEMOCRATIZATION:

A key cross-cutting theme more and more emphasized in USAID/Senegal's projects is that of local empowerment, reflected in increased and improved local decision-making. Progress in the health and population sector is discussed above, under Strategic Objective One. The NRBAR project, with its stress on improved communication and two-way feedback between farmers and researchers; the CBNRM and SZWM projects, with their strong reliance on village committees; and especially the PVO/NGO project, which helps local organizations improve their capacity to conceive and execute their own development activities, are also instrumental in promoting more active participation of local populations in local and national issues.

Over time, and with encouragement from grassroots organizations such as the Federation of Non-Governmental Organizations in Senegal (FONGS, a recipient of PVO/NGO project grant funds), rural village associations and unions are becoming more active in both traditional and modern local government bodies. Leaders of such groups, which for a long time fiercely protected their autonomy,

now participate in rural councils and are beginning to take on leadership positions in these councils. FONGS, a primarily farmer-based organization, is also developing an capacity to analyze national policies that affect its members. As a result, it has been able to produce a reasoned analysis of the government's proposals for adjustment in the agriculture sector and to claim a seat at the discussion table with both government and the donors. A group more broadly representative of the rural world (including fishermen) in general, the Comité National de Concertation des Ruraux, was created this year as a lobbying group to influence both government and donors.

As all of our project activities enter their full implementation phase, we expect to see a continued increase in the capacity of local populations to participate more fully in and to have an impact on local and national issues that affect their well-being.

SECTION IV: OTHER PROGRESS IN PRIORITY AREAS

ELECTIONS:

The 1993 presidential and legislative election process proved to be less transparent than hoped for and was marred by allegations of registration and ballot fraud. In addition, flaws in the new electoral code, which did not include provisions for conflict resolution, resulted in delays (and possibly questionable procedures) in publishing the election results. Nevertheless, there was marked progress over previous elections in terms of freedom of speech and general respect for the activities of opposition parties and candidates. 36 opposition party members, from 7 different parties, were elected to the 140-member National Assembly. (Three of these parties, for a total of six members, are in fact closely aligned with the dominant Socialist Party.)

The inclusion of several additional parties in the National Assembly seems to be creating a demand for change, a tendency toward pressing for accountability and greater transparency. When it was revealed that Assembly members had been receiving a substantial part of their compensation in unrecorded payments, for example, several of the opposition party members publically declared that they refused to accept such payments. This brought the issue of "black box" funds out into the open for the first time.

There is evidence of growing political consciousness among "civil society". In response to the interest and public debate generated by the election process, one independent newspaper began publishing daily instead of weekly and another moved to three-day-a-week publication. In response to the austerity program, community and university groups have organized public meetings to discuss economic issues.

SECTION V: LESSONS LEARNED

We offer the following thoughts, as solicited in FY 93 additional guidance, in a separate section since they are not as such lessons learned in our strategic objective areas. Rather, they reflect the experience gained in the process of developing a meaningful monitoring system.

1. First of all, the collection, management, and interpretation of appropriate data for Strategic Objectives Two and Three is extremely time consuming at this stage. One reason is that, as we wish to develop close linkages between the project and program impact reporting systems, we are relying on the projects to incorporate program requirements in their monitoring and evaluation plans. For established projects (such as Senegal Reforestation and SZWM) this has proven difficult. For new projects, the systems are just being developed. Thus our whole approach is still subject to growing pains. One opportunity, however, is that we look forward to having reasonably consistent reporting systems across projects with similar targets.

A second difficulty is that we need to develop more detailed familiarity with official GOS data systems at the macro and sector levels in order to have a better sense of the representativeness and consistency of the information they provide. This will help us to do a better job of linking our progress on strategic objectives with impact at the sub-goal and goal levels.

2. USAID/Senegal's particular portfolio provides an interesting contrast in the Mission's level of mastery of each strategic objective. The population/health area is one where we have had consistent interventions over time. We have a solid understanding of the sector, reasonably good data, and targets that are relatively straightforward to document. In addition, the relationships built up with Senegalese institutions and officials are uniformly of long standing, thus we are all agreed on where we are going and why.

By contrast, our approaches to the natural resources management and the market liberalization areas, as reflected in Strategic Objectives Two, Three, and Four, are relatively new. We do not yet have a well-established and understood data base. We are engaging in areas that continue to be controversial for many, if not most, government officials. While we have clearly defined the basic principles at stake in each area, we do not yet have the intimate knowledge of rural sector and household dynamics that would allow us to identify the impact of our program more conclusively, and we are only beginning to be able to identify key intervention points that will help achieve our objectives.

3. Finally, in our experience, impact monitoring -- for all its ultimate benefits -- requires far more in time and allocation

of human resources than we would have imagined at the outset. This is clearly a lesson in the advisability of keeping systems as focused, streamlined, and simple as possible.

ANNEX A: BASELINE/DATA ADJUSTMENTS

1. Program Goals: the FY 1992 data is adjusted to reflect actual figures. The FY 1993 figures are estimates.

2. Strategic Objective 1:

- completed the baseline and outyear performance targets for rural men's knowledge of modern contraceptive methods;

3. Strategic Objective 2:

- updated the FY 1992 yield indicators;
- completed the technology baseline on the basis of the 1992 KAP survey.
- further analysis of the discrepancies between baseline data from 1988 and results from 1992 is required in order to develop a reliable baseline and more accurate outyear targets.

4. Strategic Objective 3:

- updated the FY 1992 performance indicators;
- further analysis of the data on tree survival is needed. Outyear targets will be adjusted in the FY 1994 API.

5. Strategic Objective 4: no changes

11/29/93