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**FINAL REPORT:  
THE IFES INTERIM EVALUATION**

DECEMBER 2, 1993

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## SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL REPORT

### Increasing IFES' Contribution to Democratic Development

*Note: The following is to be read in conjunction with consideration of the Conclusion and Recommendation sections of "The IFES Interim Evaluation" prepared by Thunder & Associates. It suggests an alternative substantive model for a future IFES, but does not develop the administrative arrangements within which this IFES would be housed.*

In support of the burgeoning area of democratic development, IFES was organized to perform needed functions in the electoral area. In spite of a general lack of background in the area, its staff has served this function well. In the process, it has developed invaluable in-house understanding of elections, the political conditions in which A.I.D. operates, and the many difficulties that line the way from authoritarian political systems to sustainable or reliable democracy.

While there is a great deal of overlap between the services that IFES offers and those offered by other nonprofits in the democracy field, IFES is unique in at least three ways. First, it operates in all countries, unlike organizations with more restricted charters, such as the Asia Foundation and CAPEL. (For several reasons it is doubtful that these organizations would initially operate effectively outside the regions with which they are identified -- even if they wanted to.) Second, while IFES concentrates on elections, with the exception of CAPEL all the other organizations in the area regard elections as a relatively small part of their mandate. Third, IFES is not identified with a political or other special interest beyond that of the U.S. government's commitment to support democracy; that is, IFES characteristically does not have special relationships with particular parties, other foreign governments, or NGOs in host countries.

By concentrating on elections -- their preparation, administration, and evaluation -- IFES is in the fortunate position of concentrating on the area in the democracy development field on which it is easiest for Americans and others to focus. Elections are discrete events. There are many standard ways to judge whether elections have been successfully carried out or not -- either viewed narrowly or more broadly. They are often watersheds, marking the point of transition between democratic and pre-democratic systems, or between oligarchical and more democratic systems. Because of their relative transparency, elections will always be useful to the democratic development effort in that their character provides a handy means of measuring movement toward or away from democracy or improved democracy. It is through progress or lack of progress in the fairness and credibility of elections that most observers have judged success or failure in the past. This is likely to continue to be a primary basis on which future observers will judge the credibility of A.I.D.'s democratic development initiative as a whole.

This is not to argue that elections are the beginning and end of democracy. They are only the most visible aspect of what must be a much more complex system if it is to be effective. Yet we are unlikely to come up with "indicators" that will be more acceptable to interested audiences.

This implies that elections will continue for a long time to be a keystone of A.I.D.'s democracy program, and that, unless derailed, IFES will be at the center of the democracy effort. This may strike many within A.I.D. as either untrue or unfortunate, because they do not take IFES seriously enough to regard it as a major player in the democracy effort. This disjunction suggests that it should be a priority task of A.I.D. to strengthen IFES' long-term ability to play a positive role in electoral assistance by deepening and broadening IFES' ability to contribute to the development of A.I.D.'s democracy program as a whole. If IFES has

been viewed by some as superficial in its approach to democracy and elections, this has reflected the "targets of opportunity" approach that has to date characterized so much of the collaborative effort of A.I.D. and IFES. As A.I.D. moves beyond this learning phase, it should make an effort to help IFES move in parallel.

This can be done most effectively, and to the advantage of both organizations, if work contracted with IFES comes to have a built-in and expected component of institutional learning. The Resource Center is a beginning in this direction, but one that has developed slowly because of concentration on developing its ability to support continued "adhocery" in the provision of consultants and commodities. The organization's full potential (and thus the Resource Center's full potential) will only be developed to the extent that IFES personnel come to see the organization as a research and development organization committed to democracy and with a special expertise in elections.

Beyond the Resource Center, this approach would mean the explicit addition of feedback components to IFES activities. It might mean that for certain selected activities, IFES should add to its teams academics concerned with research on democratic development (this occurs now only on an ad hoc basis). If such opportunities were known in advance, it might be possible to obtain supplementary funding for such individuals outside A.I.D. It would also be desirable for IFES to develop retrospective case studies based on situations where it has been most prominently involved (such as Madagascar, Yemen, Mali, or Guyana; now Dominican Republic or Romania). To some extent, these would be self-criticism or "lessons learned" documents, but they could also contribute to the democracy development community's understanding of how democracies develop, and the role of outside assistance in this process. (In discussion, one senior IFES staff member found the possibility of such reassessments quite exciting.)

Traditionally, IFES' strength has been in its understanding of the regions in which it works. This should make it possible for the organization to construct a continually updated survey of the status of democracy in the world, concentrating on the performance of electoral systems, but without ignoring those adjunct systems (such as the media) that make elections meaningful. Data in the Resource Center already provide the tools to begin this process. Given such a capability, at any one time A.I.D. should be able to ask IFES, for example, what the state of democracy is in the NIS, where the positive or negative transitions are most likely to take place in the near future, and where and how specific U.S. interventions (through IFES or other means) would be most likely to be helpful in promoting democracy or resisting its decline. Such "wish lists" might or might not be acted on, but at least they would provide a more forward-looking means of prioritizing A.I.D. efforts in an area than exists at present. Obviously, as the research component of IFES activity begins to bear fruit, it should be possible to improve the validity of the arguments that can be made for specific interventions in specific situations.

An organization well on the way toward developing such capabilities would be an organization able to contribute to the design and implementation of democracy support projects that go far beyond elections. It should also be able to help A.I.D. in developing meaningful ways to measure the effectiveness of democracy programs that emphasize issues other than elections, such as those intended to strengthen the rule of law, the role of NGOs, or the independence of the media. For whatever the program emphasis, the characteristics of subsequent elections are likely to provide the most credible real-world evidence for the extent to which such reforms have taken hold in a society. Examining and demonstrating this connection could thereby become an essential part of the democracy program assessment process.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) was established in 1987 to meet the need of A.I.D. for an organization that could provide technical assistance in support of elections in new democracies, or in democracies in developing countries that had fallen away from acceptable democratic practices. As the number of these elections escalated and interest in democratic development increased, requests for assistance from IFES increased. Therefore, the original agreement with IFES was redrawn in 1991 for a much larger amount. Now, halfway through the five years envisaged in this agreement, it is time to reconsider what has been accomplished, the problems that have surfaced, and the ways in which agreements might be tailored in the future to meet changing environments.

The tasks of IFES have been to provide pre-electoral assessment, technical on-site electoral assistance, poll worker training, the identification and provision of electoral commodities, civic education, election observation, symposiums, conferences and exchanges among electoral officials, the development of an electoral resource center and data base, and publications. In practice, these functions often overlap. The majority of IFES work has been in pre-electoral assessment, technical on-site assistance, and commodities.

IFES operates in a field in which a few other organizations perform similar services. The closest organization to IFES in purpose, CAPEL in Central America, was also established with A.I.D. funds, but its work has been regionally limited. Other organizations, particularly the party institutes (NDI and IRI), are sources of valuable assistance in the area. However, their main focus has been on working with political parties, and much of their electoral work also reflects this interest. IFES has achieved a reputation for being an organization perceived to be less "political" than some of its competitors, and therefore easier for many host governments to relate to. IFES' role in the provision of electoral commodities is not filled by any other organization.

The assessment found that IFES is viewed by people within A.I.D. and others in the field from many different perspectives, and their expectations and criticisms come from as many angles. Some see it as largely a passive organization that does what it is told and is politically naive. Some among these hope that it would develop a stronger self image and be more ready to initiate projects on its own. Others see it as an organization too often unwilling to follow Mission, A.I.D., or Embassy directives, and therefore not "responsive".

The evaluation found, however, that most respondents viewed the substantive field work of IFES to be excellent. To these observers, the primary problems in the A.I.D. relationship with IFES were in the management area, particularly its sluggishness in meeting some A.I.D. bureaucratic requirements. They were concerned that IFES had not responded to A.I.D.'s request that they do more strategic planning and develop a longer time horizon. Nearly everyone was bothered by the inefficiencies in the principal Cooperative Agreement between IFES and A.I.D., particularly its provision for "add-ons". This latter provision has in practice led to disappointing delays when teams had to get into the field quickly.

Among other suggestions, the evaluation recommended that IFES:

1. Develop and follow a systematic set of operational procedures and establish staff responsibilities more clearly.
2. Articulate a comprehensive vision of its role and an operational strategy to serve this vision.
3. Consider with the R&D Bureau and the Office of Procurement, at the highest levels, ways in which a cooperative agreement can be redrawn to serve common interests.
4. Pursue its present course of development toward a more thoroughly professional organization able and willing to serve a growing number of roles in the democratic development area.

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## FOREWORD

This evaluation was undertaken by a five-person team put together by Thunder & Associates. The leader was Raymond D. Gastil, a political scientist with wide experience in issues in the development of democracy and A.I.D. democratic development programs. Other team members were: Robert Gaarder, an expert on training and education, as well as institutional development; Deborah Lindsay, project manager and management expert; Deborah Seiler, an expert on electoral systems, commodities and governance; and Ramiro Valderrama, a management and financial systems analyst.

assistance, and commodities often run together. In addition to the field activities listed under the first seven categories, IFES documents refer to "other activities" that do not fall neatly under these headings (for example, an analysis of the UN's plans for elections in Cambodia recently completed for the Asia Bureau). IFES has also put together a series of manuals, or "how-to" publications, in five of the field categories. Again, the overlap should be noted: for example, the manual for on-site technical assistance covers other activities as well, notably commodities.

Before looking at the substantive areas of IFES work, it will be useful to make a few general remarks on the methods IFES uses to address specific projects. To understand this process, it is first necessary to note that IFES staff has been developed on a regional rather than substantive basis. Staff members are expected to understand their regions and elections, but in carrying out specific projects it is necessary to recruit substantive experts in relevant electoral fields and with necessary language skills. For example, for a training project in a Portuguese-speaking African state, IFES would bring together perhaps three people with expertise or experience in training election administrators or observers and/or experience operating in the election area in similar countries. In so far as possible, those selected would be Portuguese speaking. The fourth person, generally the team leader, would be from IFES' African staff. Because of the crush of work and its own staff's inexperience, and the very short time in which teams have sometimes had to be put together, recruiting the exemplary team described above has not always been possible in the past, but this ideal is increasingly being approached. (For very small countries, there may still be one or two person teams in the future, such as the single person who operated very effectively in Comoros.) In most substantive areas, IFES has employed paid consultants, although some pro bono work has occurred in the relatively minor (for IFES) area of election observation.

Most field projects have been initiated by requests from the field, often originating in conversations between a host government and the U.S. Embassy. A request for election-related assistance is then transmitted to an A.I.D. regional Bureau that, in turn, asks IFES to undertake the effort. Recently, there has been

a greater tendency for IFES regional experts to identify needs and to suggest projects to the Bureaus directly. Whatever the source, the A.I.D. Bureau will then consider if monies can be made available under the relevant Cooperative Agreement and if the project fits the scope of the Agreement. It then checks with the relevant A.I.D. Mission and U.S. Embassy (and thereby ultimately the host government) before the project is approved.

In May, 1993, A.I.D. entered into a contract with Thunder & Associates to make a mid-course evaluation of the contribution of IFES to A.I.D.'s Democratic Pluralism Initiative under the Cooperative Agreement. In addition, the team put together by Thunder was to examine the effectiveness of the associated and more recent Cooperative Agreement of IFES with the NIS Bureau of A.I.D. for \$526,000 to support the Bureau's democracy program in the states of the former Soviet Union. For the R&D Bureau, the assessment was to suggest any needed mid-course corrections, recommend the future course for the relationship between A.I.D. and IFES, and compare the effectiveness of the management procedures of the overall R&D Cooperative Agreement and the more recent and smaller NIS Cooperative Agreement. For NIS, the assessment would be used as one basis for a projected renegotiation of their relationship with IFES next spring.

In undertaking this assessment, the team was to examine whether IFES carries out its work in an efficient and effective manner. It was to consider how IFES' organization and work compares with that of similar organizations in the field. Particular attention was to be given to the degree to which IFES will be able to sustain its activities through continued work with A.I.D. or other donors, and at what level of core funding. The statement of work goes on to suggest for each substantive field of IFES work, specific questions that should be addressed.

To perform this task, Thunder & Associates put together a team of five individuals. These included two persons with particular knowledge of management and financial issues, one with experience in training and organizational development, one with professional knowledge of election

administration and other election related issues, and one with extensive experience with A.I.D.'s efforts in the area of democratic development.

Although ideally the team would have arranged visits to several of the countries in which IFES has been active, financial and time constraints made this impossible. The methods employed by the team have thus been limited to interviews, the distribution of a questionnaire, and the review of the reports and manuals that IFES has produced. The interviews have been face-to-face or by phone. They have been with persons within A.I.D. that have had experience in working with IFES under the Cooperative Agreements and can compare this experience and that with other organizations, with IFES personnel, with the personnel of other organizations that A.I.D. uses to support the democracy effort, and with persons who have worked for IFES in the past as employees or consultants. An extensive collection of IFES reports was also analyzed by team members.

A questionnaire was developed on the basis of the questions raised in the Statement of Work. The questionnaire was distributed by R&D to all missions where IFES work had occurred. Thirteen responsive mission replies were elicited. The general tendency was clear: eleven rated IFES work as good or excellent (most replies falling under the latter heading). Two missions judged IFES work to have been poor or unusable. Twelve of the thirteen replies were concerned entirely or in part with pre-election technical assessments (including the two negative responses). But, where it applied, mission responses also endorsed IFES' other endeavors: on-site technical assistance (5), poll worker training (4), commodities (2), civic education (2), and observation (5).

In making the judgments in the following report, we generally relied most heavily on the team member or members that were most expert on the subject at hand. However, we went over the material as a team and tried in so far as possible to achieve consensus. The conclusions are necessarily generalizations from the evidence. When examples are given to illustrate the argument, it should be understood that these represent the tendency of the evidence as a whole, rather than isolated or selected cases.

## II. EVALUATION OF IFES WORK BY SUBSTANTIVE AREAS

### A. PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT

#### INTRODUCTION

According to IFES' summary information, the organization has provided pre-election technical assessments to 43 countries (36 under current cooperative agreements). The assessments were conducted in the following regions:

	Under Current CAs				
	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>
Africa/Near					
East	0	0	6	12	2
East/Central					
Europe	0	2	1	5	4
Asia	0	0	1	1	0
Americas	3	1 → 3 <sup>1</sup>	0	1	→ 1 4

<sup>1</sup> Numbers between years (marked with arrows) indicate that activity took place in both years.

## ASSESSMENT TEAM SELECTION/MEMBERSHIP

Assessment teams are generally three or four person teams that may include both U.S. and foreign election experts, academics, IFES staff members, and country experts. Team members are chosen for their background in the particular country, their language skills, and their elections expertise. Individual members may be recommended by A.I.D., and A.I.D. may (and upon occasion does) reject members whose background or skills it deems inadequate.

A.I.D. missions generally have a high opinion of the work of IFES pre-election assessment teams. Of the twelve mission questionnaire responses relating to pre-election assessment, ten rated the teams highly, while two gave them low marks. Our other information suggests that roughly this relationship would hold up if all cases could be polled. Interviews with A.I.D. and Department of State personnel in Washington suggested that most pre-election assessment teams have been responsive, well-informed, and prepared to perform the job at hand.

In contrast to those organizations that supplement core staff with pro bono electoral experts for the purpose of pre-election assessment, IFES team members are generally paid consultants. Evidently, the IFES approach results in highly qualified team members with necessary expertise and language skills. It is significant that a senior member of a "competing" organization expressed the view that IFES excels at preparing pre-election reports, in part because of its practice of using paid consultants.

However, another informant, while agreeing with the positive assessment of IFES pre-election teams, cautioned against hiring short-term consultants rather than trained, core staff for the purpose of pre-election technical assessment. This informant thought that the use of short-term paid consultants causes IFES to be an unknown quantity, with its product overly dependent upon the identity of particular consultants. (For more on team composition, see the foregoing Introduction.)

## CONTENT OF ASSESSMENT REPORTS

Although IFES has developed a picture of its general responsibilities when asked to make an assessment, what is emphasized in an assessment will be greatly affected by the particular issues that the A.I.D. Mission or US Embassy wishes to address. At the one extreme, IFES will be asked to gauge the overall situation, including the feasibility of an election in a particular situation or of US support for an election in this situation. At the other extreme, IFES will be asked to confine itself to providing technical advice to the US agency or the host government on what will be needed to prepare for an election at a specific date, or what support will be needed in a specific area for an election (for example, commodities).

Whatever the scope of the request for advice, assessment reports are meant to lay the basis for decisions about eventual A.I.D. and U.S. Embassy support for particular elections. To this end, most reports contain valuable background information pertaining to the country's history, including its political history, ethnic makeup, political and electoral law, and the electoral system already established. In addition, reports often contain a detailed description of the country's political parties, their involvement in the system, tensions among the parties, and an analysis of the current political climate, including potential for voter intimidation.

The reports describe the electoral structure in detail. In those cases where IFES assumes an election will take place, and US or other donor country aid will be secured, reports are likely to focus particularly on the preparation of voter lists, the design and security of the ballots to be used, poll worker training, and the system in place for collecting and communicating election results. The reports will also contain recommendations directed toward the host country's central electoral commission and A.I.D. These suggest what needs to be provided under such headings as supplies or equipment, training, and remedial changes in laws, regulations or procedures.

Nearly all reports examined appeared to be professionally researched and written. Their recommendations appeared suitable and appropriate for the cultural and political environments in which the prospective elections would have to be held.

## **RELEVANCE/USEFULNESS**

The team's interviews suggested that in the great majority of cases the assessments were found quite useful. For example, responses to the study team's questionnaire indicate that the reports were "extremely useful" and that the assessment teams' recommendations were typically followed by the host government. Where they were not, the respondents generally attributed this to the political situation or other factors unrelated to the merits of the recommendations. For example, the response from the A.I.D. mission in Romania indicated:

This assistance was most appreciated by the government. Recommendations were for the most part followed; if not always to the letter, this was because of financial, political, or other considerations.

In this case the mission rated the contribution made by the IFES pre-election assessment team to the development of the mission's strategy as "excellent."

Contributing to the apparent success of the IFES pre-election technical assessment teams is the recognition reported to us by our informants that IFES assistance is regarded by many host governments and others in the democratic support community to be relatively neutral and technical in nature. This neutrality effectively counters what might otherwise be a concern about bias in favor of the host government due to the fact that requests have generally been, directly or indirectly, generated or approved by the host country.

The reports have been used not only by host governments but by others within host countries, neighboring countries, or the international donor community as

a bench mark for future action. One respondent noted that other donors made fulfillment of IFES report recommendations a pre-condition for further assistance. Pre-election technical assessment reports were also referred to by other political parties and used in some cases by UN teams which had a subsequent role in the country's democratic development.

In a few cases, IFES pre-election assessments have been criticized as not responsive by U.S. missions. We judged these criticisms to be largely the result of cross-cutting pressures on IFES teams. Some have evidently felt they must report situations as they see them, even if this means, for example, communicating the message that particular elections should not be supported even after a political commitment has been made. Other teams appear to have felt they should go ahead and plan for an election even when it appears unwise or unlikely to be actually held. Criticisms have been leveled at both approaches.

One issue will increasingly confront IFES as more emerging democracies hold their first elections: Should the strategy for conducting pre-election technical assessments change for countries preparing for second and third-round elections? IFES staff suggest that in the future reports may focus more on such specifics as improving voter lists and refining voting districts.

#### **SENSITIVE INFORMATION**

In a pre-election technical assessment, the potential for uncovering information critical of the actions or capabilities of the host government or other governments is almost a given. The isolated but serious criticisms of IFES' field performance have stemmed primarily from the irritations that have resulted from open reports containing such criticisms. In spite of a general reputation for passive response, for doing what it is told, in these cases IFES teams have not avoided controversy. Such candid reporting can be valuable in spite of its costs: in this regard, one A.I.D. staff member praised IFES for "saying what needs to be said."

Nevertheless, both the sensitivity and the importance of information needs to be taken into account. In cases where such a clash of desiderata is likely, mechanisms should be used whereby sensitive information could be conveyed in an accompanying document, such as a cover letter or memorandum, or oral briefing, rather than in the formal and public report.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- To adopt a more proactive stance, IFES should offer missions and embassies some basic criteria for determining whether services they request are appropriate under the circumstances. (As explained elsewhere, this is part of the pre-pre-election assessment function that IFES should begin to take on as it matures.)
- To avoid compromising IFES' work and fueling a notion of IFES as an extension of the U.S. government, A.I.D. should give IFES full authority to select project consultants.
- IFES reports should continue to provide a thorough-going assessment of a country's pre-election situation. However, in sensitive cases, rather than suppressing information or judgment that may be valuable but politically unacceptable, IFES should include the information in a separate document, through oral briefings, or in other forms.

## **B. ON-SITE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

IFES typically works with central electoral commissions and governmental officials in providing assistance in election administration. This is in contrast to other organizations, such as NDI, IRI, or the Asia Foundation that work with

nongovernmental organizations and political parties. IFES is the only U.S. organization to provide technical assistance specifically in election administration on all continents.

According to IFES' records, on-site technical assistance has been provided to 21 countries.

Region	1989	1990	Under Current CAs		
			1991	1992	1993
Africa/Near East	0	0	1 <-1->6		4
East/Central Europe	0	1	0	3	1
Asia	0	0	1	0	0
Americas	2	0	<-1->	0 <-1->0	3

**TYPES OF ASSISTANCE**

On-site technical assistance may take a variety of forms. In some cases IFES may fund certain research efforts, help automate registered voter lists, or assist in logistics and transportation planning for an upcoming election. Assistance often takes the form of poll worker training, civic education or provision of election commodities and supplies. These specific types of direct assistance are discussed under their separate headings below.

An example of on-site technical assistance that does not fall into one of the specific categories is the logistical planning undertaken by IFES in Guyana. Because of doubts about the validity of the Voter List and other issues, the election was delayed for 10 months. By the time it was over, IFES had taken on a variety of responsibilities. The organization:

- arranged for ballots to be printed in Miami when distrust of the Guyana government printing office threatened the credibility of the election.

- worked with UNDP to install an Emergency Information System (EIS), a logistical tracking database to detail the movement of people and supplies and to ensure that commodity shipments could be located. The system was also capable of showing polling station locations, political boundaries, radio reporting locations and other information on maps. The computer network was also used to process the Voter List. These computer functions were developed by UNDP but were eventually maintained in operation by IFES.
- developed a radio network to facilitate pre-election administration, election day supervision, and election results reporting
- helped locate transportation for supplies sent to polling places
- helped develop a list of polling stations
- developed the packing list and packing procedures for supplies to be sent to the polling stations.
- supervised the process of packing ballot boxes during an operation that, in the final days before the election, consisted of three eight-hour shifts per day.
- developed a form used to compile information about international media that planned to cover the election. The information was used to assess the media's credentials and to evaluate and meet their needs for technical support such as telephone and telex access.
- helped develop tally sheets used to comply with Guyanese election laws requiring polling place vote tabulation. The forms were designed to accommodate the transmission of election

results by radio, telephone, or personal delivery and were used to enter the results into the computer program that tabulated the results.

- designed the form used to display and report election results for media and international observers. The form was programmed to update results automatically, both regionally and nationally; to calculate vote percentages attained by each candidate; to show the probable allocation of seats in parliament; and to calculate turnout percentages.
- helped obtain police protection for election administrators. An IFES consultant was responsible for enlisting the help of former President Jimmy Carter who convinced the host government to protect the Central Election Commission headquarters when it came under mob attack.

#### **RESPONSE FROM A.I.D. MISSIONS**

Responses to the evaluation team's questionnaire revealed a high degree of satisfaction with technical assistance provided by IFES. Although in a few instances subsequent political conditions interfered with IFES work or the realization of its efforts, most respondents indicated the assistance was practical and acceptable to host governments. The A.I.D. mission in Togo, for example, noted that IFES was "full of practical systems, many of which were wholeheartedly adopted by the government."

The assistance was described as neutral, technical, fair, nonpartisan and professional. Assistance was considered an excellent contribution to the overall success of the election. However, as one respondent noted, the assistance did not establish a self-sustaining electoral process in an assisted country because no permanent body was established to administer elections. In this instance,

IFES had argued strongly for creation of a permanent central electoral bureau, but to no avail.

One member of the NIS Task Force in Washington, D.C. noted that IFES has extensive and reliable contacts in NIS countries. The task force staff rely on IFES to alert them about upcoming elections; they have recently requested the organization to provide them with a quarterly update in this regard.

### **OBSERVATIONS**

In nearly all instances reported by our informants, IFES' on-site technical assistance was valuable and expertly executed. Due to the individual needs of each country, the activities of other organizations assisting the electoral processes, and the newness of the entire effort, some of IFES' efforts were necessarily "ad hoc." In these situations IFES demonstrated its ability to work in concert with other organizations, to bring to bear valuable and appropriate expertise, both on the part of IFES staff and IFES consultants, and to respond rapidly in fluid situations.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

- Prepare and disseminate to A.I.D. missions and embassies information about the on-site technical assistance services IFES has to offer.

## C. ELECTION COMMODITIES AND SUPPLIES

### INTRODUCTION

According to IFES summary information, the organization has provided election commodities and supplies to 15 countries.

Region	1989	1990	<u>Under Current CAs</u>		
			1991	1992	1993
Africa/Near East	0	0	0	1	2
East/Central Europe	0	2	0	2	1
Asia	0	0	0	0	0
Americas	2	1	<-1->	0 <-1->1	1

The purpose of election commodity and supply assistance is to facilitate electoral processes and to ensure and enhance the integrity of elections. IFES' approach to this aspect of its program is first to evaluate the host country situation and to identify its needs. While other, additional, needs may be identified during the course of a project, most assistance is provided on the basis of the pre-election technical assessment report, if one has been done.

All persons interviewed by the evaluation team agreed that IFES' procurement policies and practices are sound and in line with A.I.D. procurement policies. The organization attempts to arrange bulk purchases for consumable items such as paper or ink to obtain better prices. To assist this process, IFES is developing a list of vendors, both from experience and through a conscious effort to establish a database of international vendors and their supplies.

One A.I.D. official commended the organization for its responsiveness and ability to procure commodities in one particular instance on "incredibly short notice." This ability was deemed indicative of IFES' overall skills in this area.

## **ASSISTANCE PROVIDED**

The election commodities and supplies IFES recommends for use in various stages of the administration of an election include:

- . cameras and camera equipment
- . power supply equipment, such as batteries and generators
- . ink, stamp pads, paper, forms
- . typewriters and related supplies
- . fax machines, rental photocopiers, and related supplies
- . ballot boxes, seals, and locks
- . voting booths
- . computers and related supplies
- . calculators and related supplies
- . communication equipment, such as cellular telephones, radios, televisions, and VCRs
- . lease vehicles.

## **ISSUES**

### Who Buys, and Where?

IFES recommendations for commodity assistance do not presuppose a willingness on the part of the U.S. government to automatically fund them. Instead, the recommendations are made with the intent that some items are supplied by the host government, some by other governments, some by the private sector, some by NGO's, and a portion by A.I.D. or other U.S. governmental organizations.

Often multiple donors are involved in supplying election needs. Here IFES may act as a coordinator to guard against gaps as well as redundancies in the assistance effort. An example of IFES' role in this regard occurred in Guyana

where the British, Canadian, and U.S. governments contributed commodities to the election under IFES coordination.

Whether commodities and supplies are purchased in the host country or externally depends on several factors, including: 1) whether the host country's items are of an acceptable standard; 2) whether political factors mitigate for or against in-country purchase, (for example, if the local ink supply was owned by a relative of a governmental leader, it would be desirable to purchase it elsewhere); and 3) the amount of time remaining before the election.

### The "Shopping List" Phenomenon

The purpose of IFES commodity recommendations is to identify those absolute commodity requirements that must be met if the election is to be conducted properly and those desirable but not absolutely required commodities that would facilitate the process. Both lists are meant to offer guidance to NGO's, international organizations, governments, and private sector groups that may wish to assist the process. However, the subsequent use of IFES work by host governments as the basis for requests has led to at least one criticism that IFES was producing what were, in effect, "shopping lists" that fueled demand for U.S. government support.

IFES appears to be concerned with the cost-effectiveness of their recommendations. In Georgia, for example, the host country asked for tons of multi-colored paper. Because of the relative expense of multi-colored paper, IFES refused the specific request and instead suggested that a colored stripe be used. In some instances vehicles are identified as necessary for transportation and administration during an election. IFES' is occasionally asked by host governments to buy vehicles for this purpose. However, IFES recommends short-term lease arrangements in lieu of purchasing vehicles.

## Commodity Pools

IFES attempts to recover reusable items to be used in future elections, and these items are stored in various locations for safe-keeping. There is a particular need to recover commodities where host countries do not establish a system of on-going election administration to manage them. However, the final decision whether to recover items is made by A.I.D. missions which often assist in the commodity recovery effort. In some instances, as much as 95% of the dollar value has been recovered, for example, the radio systems used in Guyana and Haiti.

Recently, IFES has proposed establishing commodity "pools" for such items as radios, lanterns, computers, metal ballot boxes, cellular telephones, fax machines, printers, and photocopiers. These are relatively expensive items to provide, may be needed on short notice, and can be stored readily in secure locations. Effective management of commodity pools has the potential for decreasing the cost of supplying these items to many countries.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

IFES should:

- Prepare and disseminate to missions and embassies information regarding the types of commodity assistance IFES supplies, noting any restrictions in the extent of that assistance.
- Make explicit to potential host countries and donors the commitment of IFES and USAID to cost consciousness and to the restriction of use of election-related commodities (such as those provided for voter registration) to electoral purposes.

- Establish a computerized tracking system within its Resource Center that will allow IFES to more efficiently store for subsequent use electoral commodities and supplies.

## D. INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATIONS

### INTRODUCTION

Election observation has lower priority for IFES than for party institutes such as NDI or IRI. However, IFES observer delegations play an important role if the institutes are perceived as too political or too closely involved with a particular political party.

According to IFES' summary information, the organization has sponsored international observer delegations in 30 countries (13 under the current cooperative agreements).

Region	1989	1990	Under Current CAs		
			1991	1992	1993
Africa/Near East	0	0	0	5	3
East/ Central Europe	1	3	0	3	0
Asia	1	1	1	1	1
Americas	9	4	0	0	0

Not all host government requests for observers can or should be honored, and IFES has exercised discretion in this regard. When Ethiopia asked for 80 election observers, their request was refused by NDI because of the timing of the request. Subsequently, IFES also turned them down for similar administrative and logistical reasons, pertaining to the timing of the request. Later, when another organization attempted to provide the requested observers, the result was, according to one A.I.D. administrator, a "debacle". The example underscores the continuing need for IFES not only to be responsive, but also to

seriously analyze requests. To properly exercise this judgment, IFES requires dynamic leadership and a willingness to exercise its organizational clout.

## **TECHNICAL VS. POLITICAL ORIENTATION**

Persons interviewed, including IFES staff members, note that IFES observer teams adopt a relatively technical approach to their evaluations of elections. This is evident in IFES comments and in the composition of the teams. In contrast to NDI, for example, IFES relies less on political "VIP's" and exercises a lesser role in affecting the host country's political situation as it relates to the election.

IFES evaluations tend to focus on the technical standards met by the election and on discovering areas for further improvement in election administration. IFES teams do not normally address issues such as political party building or campaign ethics and financing.

Although it is a common expectation that election observation teams will declare an election to have been "free and fair" or not, IFES does not believe that it is necessarily its mission to make such a judgment. As a result its reports emphasize whether electoral procedures were reasonably effective and legitimate in terms of international standards. Contextual or "political" issues that often determine election outcomes are given less attention, although not ignored. Even in regard to the technical issues it emphasizes, IFES tends to regard its mission to be not so much condemnation or approval as the identification of problems in a particular election so that these problems may be addressed before subsequent elections. In these terms, our informants report that IFES has done excellent work. We believe that it serves A.I.D.'s purposes to have an organization with this electoral focus. This is particularly true in those many instances in which other U.S. and non-U.S. observers are involved.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- IFES should consider adopting a fixed terminology for characterizing elections and brief observer teams on its use so that they may adhere to it consistently.
- IFES should distribute its manual for conducting international observer missions for comment and use by other organizations.
- IFES should consider whether to continue to conduct stand-alone delegations or focus on joining other delegations as election administration experts. Where stand-alone delegations continue to be appropriate, it should be sure that all concerned are aware of the terms of reference for its team's activities.

## E. IFES POLL WORKER TRAINING

### FINDINGS

Poll worker training or assistance in developing a poll-worker training capability has been provided in the following instances:

Region	1989	1990	Under Current CAs		
			1991	1992	1993
Africa/Near East	0	0	0<-1-> 2		4
East/ Central Europe	0	0	0	1	1
Asia	0	0	0	0	0
Americas	1	1	0	1	2

Training of poll workers is a natural extension of the IFES' mandate to advance the electoral process in evolving free and democratic societies. It cannot be

taken for granted that poll workers or other electoral employees in countries beginning their democratic careers know how to organize and administer a free and independent election. In most cases, the opposite is a safer assumption. From the interviews and the materials reviewed by the evaluation team it can be concluded that in most instances IFES poll worker training contributed to better organized and fairer elections.

The IFES manual, "How to Organize a Poll Worker Training Project" (December, 1992) is intended for use by IFES field teams and trainers hired to do poll worker training. For this purpose the manual is very good. Our impression is that it gives IFES a competitive edge in the area of poll worker training, since the assessment team did not come across any other document like it from other organizations. More generally, the manual can be seen as a summary of "lessons learned" through the organization's efforts in this area.

The manual appears weak, however, in its discussion of training needs assessment -- determining training needs of poll workers on a country by country basis to insure that the training has the highest relevancy to host country needs. The only country where the needs assessment process has been somewhat formalized is Mali. There, once the "core trainers" were trained by IFES, they were asked to revise and finalize a poll workers training manual for use in the field. This process is currently being replicated in Guinea. It should be progressively improved as more experience is accumulated.

It is hard to quantify the impact of IFES poll worker training, since IFES' objective has been to help train trainers to train other poll workers (the "multiplier effect") and there has been little monitoring of this training. IFES provided this kind of poll worker training of trainers in several countries. In each, it is estimated that these poll workers went forward and held training sessions that involved hundreds and perhaps thousands of poll workers. This method of training is very cost effective and contributes to building a national capacity of administrators for elections.

For example, in Malawi only four core trainers were trained but it has been reported that this effort eventually reached many thousands. In Mali, 20 trainers of trainers were trained, and these were subsequently used effectively to train many more. In Haiti, IFES provided oversight to the training of 42 poll worker trainers of trainers who directly and indirectly trained over 3000 poll workers. IFES trained 160 trainers of trainers in Madagascar who in turn trained uncounted numbers. In Yemen, however, the 90 officials they trained as trainers ended up unable to do the work because of conflicting responsibilities.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite its' relatively limited experience, IFES has developed a valuable capacity to do poll worker training. To strengthen this capacity, the following steps should be taken:

- **Systematize the process for planning and conducting these activities.** Formalize a "needs assessment" process that works. Use a checklist (such that on page 26 of the poll workers manual) of possible training topics.<sup>2</sup>
- **Provide for formal feedback.** Specific poll-training proposals should include provision for feedback/evaluation of IFES training efforts to capture the learning of each training experience. This can be done with poll workers who received the training and with the electoral commissions or equivalent bodies in host countries.

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<sup>2</sup> Given the political sensitivities of some of the countries that IFES has worked in may make it difficult to systemize their efforts. In the Congo and Togo for instance training efforts were aborted by the governments of those countries. In Yemen the government wanted strict control over the training process. In Comoros IFES was not invited into the country until three weeks before the election. In cases like these, a formal needs assessment process may be impossible.

- **Conduct a training of trainers for potential IFES training consultants.**  
The quality of the training and education efforts has varied depending on the quality of IFES consultants. The training of consultants will allow IFES to evaluate talent before they are sent overseas and should insure a higher level of quality.

## F. CIVIC EDUCATION

### FINDINGS

Civic education activities have been provided in the following instances:

Region	1989	1990	Under Current CAs		
			1991	1992	1993
Africa/Near East	0	0	0<-1-> 2	1	
East/ Central Europe	0	0	0	0<-1-> 2	
Asia	0	0	0	0	0
Americas	0	2	0	1	1

Civic education potentially includes such a broad category of activities that it cannot be easily defined. However, following IFES' definitions it can be understood in terms of two types of activities: (1) **Election Specific** -- educating the public on specific issues such as ballot format and voter registration, or broader issues such as the names of the candidates among which voters are being asked to choose; and (2) **Issues of Living in a Democracy** -- long-term efforts to instruct or train the public in the rights and responsibilities of living in a democratic society. Except for the on-going efforts in Estonia and Romania, IFES' civic training efforts fall into the first category, "election specific" training.

Like poll worker training, "election specific" civic education is a natural extension of the IFES mandate to advance the electoral process in democratizing states.

Given the combination of their experience in establishing electoral systems with their experience in civic education training, IFES also appears to have a competitive advantage in this area. Some IFES civic education efforts have been quite extraordinary. For example, in Malawi, where television is not available, a play was developed with a local theater company that was put on twelve times around the country and video taped to get out the vote in the coming election. In Guyana, a special strategy was developed using radio spots to promote voting by younger people. The spots included night club and party scenes. In the IFES Guyana report, it is mentioned that the Guyana Broadcasting corporation received requests for a rebroadcast of one radio spot in rap music format.

On the other hand, long-term civic education, what we are calling **Issues of Living in a Democracy**, is a newer activity of IFES and is less directly connected with its original mandate. Other organizations such as the National Democratic Institute and the National Education Association are also involved in long term civic education efforts in newly emerging democracies. IFES' primary long-term civic education activity has been in Romania, and another program has recently been initiated in Estonia. In these countries, IFES is working with both governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). In Estonia, the training efforts have been funded by the PEW Foundation. In Romania IFES has a permanent office directed by Mr. Obie Moore. In both cases, IFES has received high praise for their civic education efforts. The A.I.D. mission in Romania compares the IFES efforts favorably to those of other organizations, mainly due to the efforts of IFES' in-country director.

The long-term efforts, such as those in Estonia and Romania, may have a better chance of being institutionalized than the election specific training. Institutional capacities to do civic education are being strengthened with the NGO's IFES is working with in those countries. In other countries where it has been election specific, it is impossible to say whether or not the IFES-developed written materials, posters, or radio and TV spots will ever be used or referred to again.

In conclusion, it is impossible to gauge how much individual behavior or attitudes have been changed as a result of the IFES Civic Education efforts, but it appears that hundreds of thousands of people have been affected by the IFES civic education work. As with poll worker training, IFES has produced an excellent manual to serve as a guide for future IFES efforts in both long- and short-term civic education.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

IFES should:

- **Collaborate more with other Western European and American organizations doing civic education.** IFES should actively share their manual and learning with other organizations and vice-versa. To increase cost-effectiveness, the organization should endeavor wherever possible to collaborate with other organizations in its long term civic education efforts.
- **Systemize the approach or process for planning and conducting these activities.** This would include formalizing the "needs assessment" process and the use of a checklist (such as that in the poll workers manual) of possible training topics.
- **Build in follow-up feedback/evaluation of IFES training efforts.**

## G. IFES SYMPOSIUMS, CONFERENCES AND EXCHANGES

### FINDINGS

IFES' symposium, conference, and exchange activity can be summarized as follows:

Region	1989	1990	Under Current CAs		
			1991	1992	1993
Africa/Near East	0	0	0	0	0
East/Central Europe	1	1	1	1	1
Asia	0	0	0	1	0
Americas	0	1	2	1	1

IFES has taken some direct responsibility for convening seven events -- four inter-country and three intra-country.<sup>3</sup> The inter-country events included two symposiums or seminars in Budapest for election officials from Eastern Europe, a conference for officials throughout Latin America in Venezuela and an exchange of Russian and American election officials. In the exchange of Russian and American election officials, the Russians came to observe elections in Virginia and Illinois. This was followed by a visit of American election officials to Russia to observe the Russian election process and provide on-sight assistance/training to the officials of the Russian Central Electoral Commission. The American officials often traveled with the Russians who had visited America.

These inter-country events have contributed to significant knowledge generation and fostered support networks for election officials, in particular the Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials. In addition, they can be very cost effective. For example, the first Budapest symposium was

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<sup>3</sup> There have been other conferences in which IFES has participated, such as Nepal in 1992, but it has not played a direct role in organizing these events.

supported by a private contribution of \$ 35,000; the second, by another private grant of \$ 25,000. Each of these events was recorded, so that the lessons learned and the issues identified were captured not only for those attending the conferences, but for those who were unable to attend as well. In some cases, IFES has done a good job of writing reports and synthesizing what has taken place. The Venezuelan report is a particularly good example. It has been published in book form in Spanish. The function of documentation performed by IFES is an important one.

In addition to inter-country networking, IFES has provided specific intra-country dialogue and exchange in Romania, Argentina, and Nicaragua. In each case, the participants were from the local countries, but outside experts were brought in to address the specific issues identified by the country. In Argentina, for instance, the purpose was to look at across-the-board electoral reform. In Nicaragua, the focus was on civic education: the task was to diffuse democratic concepts throughout the country.

It is clear that these symposiums and conferences have supported election officials and the advancement of the "professionalization" of their work. Their ultimate impact on electoral laws and procedures is less clear. A conference or symposium is necessarily only one of many inputs to the process of changing election laws and procedures. It could be argued that intra-country events have had more impact on current laws and procedures since country specific recommendations result. However, the scope of work of this evaluation did not permit us to test this hypothesis; in any event, it would be years before one could adequately judge the impact of this activity.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- **Develop demand for Symposiums, Conferences, and Networking.** These are keys to professionalizing and thus institutionalizing election processes and developing the profession of electoral officials. This is central to IFES' mandate to advance the electoral process in developing democracies. Unfortunately, at present

these activities remain limited and many continue to doubt the need for them.

- **Develop proposals for holding conferences on a regular basis.** For example, IFES could help set up annual conferences for African election officials, Eastern European election officials, etc. It is logical that the professionalization of election officials' work and the ultimate impact these events will have on existing election laws and procedures will be increased the more they are recognized as recurring events.
- **Ensure the high quality documentation of Symposiums and Conferences.** If IFES is the only organization that has the capacity to assemble a specific activity, it should take the responsibility. They are useful to election officials and provide an historical record of the events.

#### H. RESOURCE CENTER AND DATA BASE

Under the Cooperative Agreement, IFES has developed an automated data base system to serve as a repository of knowledge on consultants, supplies and electoral commodities, electoral laws and regulations and countries. The system is intended to be available for the use of people throughout the electoral community.

Other organizations have data bases related to elections, but because of regional, subject, and language differences the IFES effort remains unique in some respects. One informant suggested a need to avoid duplication. She suggested that since IFES seems furthest along with its computerization of technical electoral information and consultants it might become a centralizing point for such information in the future.

IFES personnel regularly consult the Resource Center for background material and briefing books, and to identify qualified consultants. The data base represents IFES' institutional memory and facilitates the putting together of knowledgeable teams. Beyond this, use by A.I.D. officers or others remains in the beginning stages. Overseas missions and even A.I.D. bureaus are barely if at all aware of its existence or of how they might use it.

The Resource Center currently generates only a small newsletter, with reports written solely by staff personnel. The resources devoted to this activity are modest and the impact appears also to be modest.

By contrast, as a center of an electoral network (see Part III below), and in connection with its resource center, CAPEL publishes a variety of documents that are widely circulated in the Americas and well regarded. These are written by electoral consultants and regional scholars as well as staff.

The Resource Center is already an integral part of IFES' in-house capability, but it has yet to fulfill its broader task of serving potential users in USAID, the broader international community of election officials and experts, and officials or scholars of developing democracies. Informants' criticisms of the Resource Center effort, direct or implied, are based on this fact. Unless IFES moves rapidly to show that the Resource Center can serve this wider audience usefully, further development of the system will be truncated.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- IFES should strive to strengthen the visibility and effectiveness of the Resource Center through more widely publicizing what it has to offer, as well as through establishing an ability to respond promptly and effectively to outside requests for information. In part, this might be accomplished through the publication, as part of the core program, of substantial documents describing and comparing electoral processes.

- The Resource Center should work closely with other organizations to avoid duplication, to enlist their aid in developing its capability, and eventually to mount joint research or publication projects in the electoral area.

### III. COMPARISON OF ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS

The task of comparing electoral assistance organizations was greatly complicated by the differences among them. We compared IFES with CAPEL, IRI, NDI, the Carter Center, and the Asia Foundation. Each of these organizations has a different emphasis and a different pattern of support. With its activities concentrated in the last three years, IFES is, in effect, "younger" than most of these organizations. Its budgets are smaller, and its degree of dependence on A.I.D. funding much greater (95% compared to about 50% for the others).

CAPEL's mission is closest to IFES'. Its area of activity is also confined to electoral and associated problems; however, it does not handle commodities. Although founded with A.I.D. money, CAPEL has benefitted from its connections with the Organization of American States. It is simultaneously also the secretariat of two Inter-American organizations of electoral officials. Headquartered in San Jose, Costa Rica, CAPEL's work is confined to the hemisphere, with an emphasis on Central American and Spanish-speaking areas.

The International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) were established by Congress under the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). NDI's budget and staff are much the larger, and in most of the world NDI is the organization that A.I.D.'s Bureaus are most likely to look to as the "alternative" to IFES. The emphasis of both NDI and IRI has been on working with political parties in developing countries. This theme also plays a role in their activities in the electoral area, which parallel those of IFES except in the provision of electoral commodities.

The Carter Center in Atlanta works in the electoral area from a different perspective. The Center's focus is on conflict resolution, although this is often in

the context of an election. Its electoral assistance activities have been confined to Latin America and Africa.

The much larger Asia Foundation has become involved in elections only peripherally (primarily civic education). Comparison with the Asia Foundation is also difficult because its work is conducted almost entirely through nongovernmental organizations in host countries. Regionally, its efforts have been confined to Asia.

In spite of the difficulties in comparison we have noted, some differences in the work of these organizations in the electoral area need to be taken seriously. Although members of IFES management have had previous electoral experience, the focus of recruiting for in-house staff at IFES has been on regional specialists, with those consultants used on particular projects split between regional experts and electoral experts. At the other extreme, CAPEL, based on associations of electoral officials and with its regional staff by definition "regional experts", employs a staff and fixed core of consultants defined by technical electoral expertise. IFES generally sends much smaller teams than the other organizations, but this may be largely a reflection of the nature of its project by project agreements with A.I.D. (For example, in election observation missions, one informant suggested that for small missions IFES would be the choice, while NDI might be for larger ones.) On the other hand, IFES and CAPEL both depend largely on paid consultants, unlike IRI and NDI that are much more dependent on pro bono assistance.

Several other reported differences, apparently related to the differences already noted, should be mentioned. CAPEL reports extremely short pre-project start-up and recruitment times (4-8 hours); a difference again related to its fixed environment and core of Western Hemisphere electoral officials. This may also explain why CAPEL can report that it has a smaller staff in relation to its budget, that its staff spends much more of its time in travel status, and that its overhead is considerably lower than IFES' (25% to 42%). Location in Costa Rica and the smaller friction in their work (a built-in audience in a definite region) is no doubt one cause. The lower overheads of IRI and NDI (33% and

40% respectively) may be primarily due to their larger overall size and their ability to rely on NED for a substantial part of their support. We are also informed that differences in overhead rate are explained, at least in part, by IFES' inclusion of fringe benefits in its rates.

The much more frequent use by outsiders of its library resources reported by CAPEL may be largely due to their earlier start in this area and their positioning geographically and organizationally (as the secretariat of electoral organizations). The "planning horizons" reported by the organizations are also very different, with the "competitors" thinking in terms of two years, and IFES in terms of a few months. Again, the dependence of IFES on one source and the always changing nature of its requirements may be part of the difference. But the differences should not be dismissed.

The comparisons, particularly with CAPEL, suggest that the cost-effectiveness of IFES would be greatly increased if it could become more stably situated within a network of regional and international electoral officials and organizations. Through their efforts in Eastern Europe and planned efforts elsewhere, and through the data bank that is only now becoming useful, they may be able to attain the efficiencies that are reported to be available to CAPEL in Latin America.

## IV. OVERALL MANAGEMENT ISSUES

### METHODS OF OPERATION AND REPORTING

Most requests for pre-election electoral assistance have been initiated by A.I.D. Mission staff or U.S. Embassy personnel in the host country. Embassy requests often follow requests by the host government; all requests must be supported by the host government.

When a request is received, IFES evaluates the request, proposes the nature and size of the effort, and organizes a team made up of IFES staff and/or paid consultants. This process may take one to three weeks, or longer. Once permissions are obtained and the project is approved by A.I.D., the team is dispatched to the host country for a period ranging from one to three weeks -- or longer.

This suggests that generally IFES projects have been reactive rather than proactive. Where this is the case, the process will depend on whether an A.I.D. Mission or U.S. Embassy is aware of, and fully understands, the services IFES provides. It should be noted that changes in A.I.D. and Embassy staff occur roughly every two years. This turnover contributes to the uneven distribution of information about the availability of IFES' services.

However, recently there have been several cases in which prior to field requests IFES staff has proposed projects that might be undertaken within existing cooperative agreements. IFES clearly realizes it must become more proactive. For example, some staff members believe they should perform regional fact finding missions to become better aware of a country's or region's electoral environment. This effort would compliment the establishment of regional electoral organizations and conferences, such as those that are now being held in CEE countries. As IFES has moved into new areas, there also has been a tendency for longer-term projects to develop, for example year-long projects in Dominican Republic and Romania.

Criticism of IFES within the A.I.D. community has often centered around failures in meeting administrative requirements. The effective implementation and use of procedures is important to IFES in meeting its institutional and donor (A.I.D.) requirements. A.I.D. had cited concern that many times authorizations for hiring, submissions of C.V.'s, travel and work was not submitted as required. The reporting of time spent on different projects through the use of time sheets has also been criticized. Policy and procedure manuals are being developed internally by IFES, but have not yet been completed.

In a few instances, A.I.D. program officers or others also have been highly critical of IFES work when IFES reports touched on sensitive issues or went against what was otherwise desired by persons in the system. In some cases, this may have been due to inexperienced teams or ineffective IFES supervision of team reports. But often such problems have resulted from miscommunications or still to be resolved differences of opinion over the relationship between the organization's right to independent decision making (for example, in regard to team composition or report conclusions) and the supervisory rights of A.I.D. Some, but not all these problems, will be ameliorated if IFES adopts and follows appropriate policy and procedures.

#### **TIMELINESS OF REPORTS**

Several A.I.D. Bureaus and Missions expressed concern that, at times, required reports were late. Country reports were cited as being one or two months behind schedule. For most projects, reports are generally to be completed immediately after field work, although for some projects report submission times are not formally established. Typical relationships between the completion of field work and the completion of reports are suggested by the following examples of completed pre-election assessments:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Visit</u>	<u>Report Issued</u>
Burundi	Mar/April 1992	April 1992
Gabon	May, 1993	June/July, 1993
Ghana	April/May, 1992	June, 1992
Guinea	March/April, 1993	June, 1993
Russia	June, 1993	September, 1993
Venezuela	June/July, 1993	August 1993 (draft)

We are told the Gabon reports were actually a few days late, but that in the case of the Guinea and Russia reports delivery dates were not specified. Thus, while most projects seem to be reported quickly, in some cases, such as the Russian project cited here, report writing drags on; such cases may occasion criticism in spite of the lack of clear specification. Lateness is often explicable. Preparation of the required reports takes at least two to four weeks. In those cases where a lengthy review process ensues, the issuing of a final report will occur far beyond the contractual time period. In other cases, lateness may represent a management deficiency. In any event, lateness in some cases significantly reduces the value of the work.

#### **INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY AND FOCUS**

Although the IFES Board, and IFES staff are quite clear and enthusiastic about the purposes of their activities in the sense of improving electoral practices worldwide, and, through this, prospects for democracy, the organization has suffered, particularly in the eyes of many at A.I.D., from the lack of a formal strategic plan or planning process. A.I.D. has repeatedly requested documents on future planning and "lessons learned" without adequate response.

IFES does not have a strategic plan detailing steps and activities which it plans to focus on in years three, four, and five of the cooperative agreement. Nor has it established a set of financial priorities. Much of the long term planning revolves around when elections are scheduled to take place in particular

countries. Some at IFES may believe that it is impossible to look further, given the nature of the electoral business.

On April 5, 1993, IFES management prepared a memo to the Board of Directors: Financial Plan/Revenue activities for 1993. This document serves as initial guidance on IFES' direction in generating additional and diverse funding. IFES is aware that the financial strategy outlined in the memo is a concept paper. The effort to develop its corresponding operational plans, implementation and development has yet to be made. It does however, present IFES with a direction to proceed.

In the cooperative agreement, IFES is required to develop an evaluation strategy for all program activities. IFES has responded to this requirement through publishing an annual final report citing each deliverable and how it was met by IFES. While IFES cites how each sub-task is met there is no mention of the IFES strategy to ensure the efforts are coordinated and effectively support the objectives of IFES and the clients (primarily A.I.D.). Evaluations of projects and lessons learned appear limited to addressing specific task orders. Consequently, there is no overall institutional analysis of the contribution to stated objectives that could serve to focus staff communication and direction. Without a formal evaluation strategy that relates to a strategic plan IFES will continue to perpetuate its current mode of operation in which each project is an end in itself instead of a part of a greater institutional capability.

#### **SUSTAINABILITY**

In FY 1992 IFES core grant expenditures amounted to a total of \$611,983.98. IFES expected in 1993 a total of \$500,000 of expenditures associated with the deliverable outputs. Under the present Cooperative Agreement with R&D the Core money will decrease and soon disappear. In year one IFES received \$600,000 with an additional incremental funding of \$1 Million, in year two IFES received \$500,000 with incremental funding of \$472,630.84. Core money is being expended well ahead of the scheduled rate. The add-on rate is also in danger of ending prior to schedule.

Currently, IFES believes that in the next two years up to ten percent of its revenue can be expected to be generated outside A.I.D. Interviews with other electoral organizations suggested that all of the activities that IFES is currently performing under the cooperative agreements are marketable to other government agencies, other countries, and foundations. However, currently IFES management spends less than 5% of its time on marketing. This reflects three problems: the belief that IFES will continue to have as much work as it can handle under present and developing arrangements, the legal restriction on using government-derived funds to try to find new funding sources, and doubt as to how significant these alternative funding sources are likely to turn out to be (particularly for an organization identified in the eyes of the democratic development community as being well supported by, and very close to, the U.S. government).

IFES managers believe that the organization is not sustainable without A.I.D. funding for the short and medium term. They believe IFES must be sustained at the current dollar and percentage levels for the medium term. However, IFES believes that in five years they could potentially be reduced to receiving 70% A.I.D. funding. This might necessitate IFES establishing new overseas offices and further internationalizing its Board in order to be recognized as an international entity. The recent establishment of long-term offices in Bucharest and Santo Domingo may be steps in this direction.

The foregoing does not imply that IFES is not making attempts to diversify its base. Discussions are underway with UNDP in an attempt for IFES to be accessible to the UNDP missions for democratic initiative support. Five additional areas for funding diversification are being analyzed: USIA for civic education and internships; FEC for funding of commodity standards and record retention; fund raising; third party organizations; and private elections management (for example, on Amerindian reservations). Other areas that may be looked at in the future include mapping and demographics.

IFES is discussing with OAS and the UN a cooperative venture to work on the development of a larger data base. These organizations appear to have little

money for utilizing IFES on a fee basis and would rather work with IFES to increase the quality of the Data Base in return for its use. This is a long term proposition that would improve the quality of data but would not make the center financially self-sufficient. Use of the Data Base to generate revenue may also be constrained by the government claim to ownership.

Long term support of administration functions are likely to require an increase in fund raising efforts. Endowment campaigns are particularly needed to ensure that IFES obtains long term stability in its day to day operations.

### **STAFFING AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES**

IFES has not done a personnel and budget cycle analysis. When questioned on how the statement in the PIP, "anticipated workload . . . requires maintaining staff levels . . . eighteen full-time" was derived, no formal support or justification could be given. IFES recognizes the need to review the new budget cycle to ensure that they are properly staffed. Current justification is based on continuation of current levels or increases. If this does not occur, minimum staff requirements might allow for the reduction of two persons through combining program areas, as well as possibly through increased travel and bill-ability. Given present projections, a more thorough analysis of IFES' organizational needs would be necessary before such changes could be recommended.

Although the roles and responsibilities of the current IFES staff are depicted in PIP year II by level of effort and in the action plan, the roles and responsibilities of staff members are not well defined in IFES internal documents. In particular, defining more clearly the roles of Director and Chief of Staff might be helpful: this would allow one to have clear responsibility for keeping projects on track and the other clear responsibility for long-range planning and marketing.

Budgeting of IFES personnel for core, buy-in and external donor financing is not currently possible due to the lack of a budget review process. The best information is found in the time sheet for FY 1992 and information provided in the "IFES Staff Allocated by Level of Effort to Core Deliverables and Add-ons

and Other IFES projects for FY 1993", as well as the action plan accompanying the Program Implementation Plan for Year II. This information gives IFES best "sense" as to past time allocations and expected allocations in the future. This provides a basis to begin a personnel budgeting process. IFES should examine its current rates so that it can justify them simply. This will allow it to more effectively and competitively address other potential funding sources.

Currently, IFES states that all charges are G&A activities with the exception of those specifically project related. The project related are charged a G&A fee. The difference between the sum for these activities and total expenses is the core money. A better method might be the use of an indirect recovery mechanism. IFES needs to be able to identify the indirect costs associated with its operation and how these costs can be allocated to multiple donors, to ensure that all funders are paying their fair share of the costs in running IFES.

#### **IFES' COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH A.I.D. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT**

The present R&D Cooperative Agreement provides IFES with project support through both core and add-on funds to which A.I.D. regional Bureaus contributed (although the primary purpose of core money was originally institutional support). Because of the difficulties the Bureaus have had with using the add-on mechanisms, the parties concerned have been crafting alternative means of A.I.D. financing. The result is a trend toward a proliferation of A.I.D.-IFES arrangements, a trend with both advantages and disadvantages.

Most informants agree that it would be in the best interest of A.I.D. and IFES to unify all cooperative and bilateral agreements under one contract mechanism. This would reduce IFES contractual reporting obligations for technical and financial information, and assist A.I.D. in reducing those contractual and project management responsibilities that are now duplicated (such as contract officer and legal counsel work). IFES would prefer that the entire cooperative agreement be handled as core money from which Bureaus could obtain

project funds. Without the opportunity to utilize a rapid-response mechanism such as that provided by the availability of core money, Europe and other Bureaus feel compelled to develop separate cooperative agreements such as that currently being renegotiated with NIS.

Because of experience elsewhere, the NIS Bureau decided that it was more effective to prepare their own PIO/T and agreement than to use the add-on approach of the R&D cooperative agreement. At present, the Bureau is unsure whether it would prefer an all-core cooperative agreement for all Bureaus. This would make it possible for R&D to write the statements of work and performing reviews without an undue additional charge to the activity. On the other hand, the Bureau fears that any A.I.D.-wide agreement will remove the Bureau's activities one step further from the activities themselves.

Because core funds have been largely expended, IFES does not look forward to a future based on add-on funding. Without core funding, IFES believes that it would be severely restricted in what could be done to support A.I.D. projects before a contract is initialed, thereby impairing its ability to do necessary project recruitment and preparation. In June 1993, IFES cited that they had met with A.I.D./R&D and reached a tentative agreement to identify site pre-project support activities for each current deliverable.

Senior people in A.I.D.'s Office of Procurement and the R&D Bureau are fully aware of the difficulties that have been produced by current arrangements. This suggests that it should be possible to develop means of resolving the present contractual snarl to the advantage of all parties in the next contractual rounds.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The foregoing analysis suggests that to improve its operational and financial efficiency IFES should:

- implement a budget review process -- financial documentation needs to be reviewed for accuracy and compliance;
- develop clear policy and procedure manuals that identify all applicable A.I.D. procedures, and ensure adherence (especially for time and attendance, and identification of the costs and benefits of each service area) to A.I.D. norms;
- define roles and responsibilities for all individuals on the regular staff;
- make sure each project has specified dates for report deliverables ("draft" if applicable), and that adequate time is allocated for such preparation;
- devise methods to distribute IFES findings promptly and informally to those who need or request them when it becomes evident that it will be impossible to produce a fully authorized final report in a timely manner;
- implement a lessons learned process that relates projects to the strategic plan and direction;
- develop a flexible and adaptable services and training manual;
- perform a financial budget, labor effort, policy and procedures, and strategic planning review to help obtain management control over the organization's activities;

- develop, in consultation with R&D and other Bureaus, a means by which reports that are urgently desired in the field can be made available in draft form before final reviews.

To help structure its future environment, IFES should:

- Initiate a discussion of alternative ways to restructure the Cooperative Agreement. (This recommendation is developed more fully in VI-4 below.)
- articulate a vision of the institution and develop a strategic planning process to implement it;
- strengthen the role of management in planning and marketing;
- seek the aid of the Board of Directors in the global positioning of the organization, its networking with other organizations internationally, and its outside fund raising;
- increase participation in regional and international electoral and democratic development meetings;
- develop opportunities for coordinating work with other organizations to provide services and products.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

IFES was established by A.I.D. to provide technical electoral and related assistance at a time when a ready source of assistance in this area was unavailable. It has created a capability to provide this assistance, and on numerous occasions has fulfilled the often urgent needs of A.I.D. or of overseas Missions in a manner that in most cases has been highly satisfactory to persons in the field, State, and the relevant A.I.D. bureaus. There is substantial evidence for this conclusion. For example, in the opinion of eleven of thirteen respondents to the questionnaire sent to A.I.D. missions, the quality of IFES teams was highly rated and their work was reported to have been "good", "excellent", or "outstanding".

Although established in 1987, most IFES work has been accomplished in the last three years. This has been a learning period for IFES. While initially, few people connected with the organization had experience in fulfilling their tasks in the situations they were asked to enter, today the organization has a small and invaluable cadre of persons that will be able to meet future demands with confidence. This growth is best illustrated by the excellent quality of the set of five manuals produced at the end of 1992 in the primary areas of IFES work. These both represent what IFES has learned in these areas, and provide comprehensive guides for future work. A review of recent reports suggests that the manuals are both useful and used.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that IFES has developed and been "tested" much more in certain areas of responsibility than others. This is, in part, due to the development of other organizations before and during the period of IFES's growth that provide some of the same services as IFES, and that have received A.I.D. funds for comparable services. Each of these organizations has developed a track record with pluses and minuses from the viewpoint of many within A.I.D. or the State Department, and each will continue to be used. It is in this environment that, in the opinion of many, IFES has developed a niche in the democratic development area, a niche that is part reality and part perception.

Perhaps the parameters of this niche can be best described by considering two contrasting views of IFES. We may label the first the *narrow or traditional view* held by many persons in A.I.D. and the democratic development community, and the second the *broad or developmental view* held by many IFES employees and observers. The latter also reflects in good measure the hopes implicit in the Cooperative Agreements.

According to those holding the *traditional view*, IFES is to be used primarily as a source for pre-election assessment, for on-site technical assistance, and for the provision of commodities. The area of commodities may be emphasized in this view because it is the only area in which IFES appears to have no competition. The people it dispatches are regarded as narrow technicians with little more than superficial knowledge of political situations beyond the requirements of their tasks. IFES is often the organization of choice because it is both most likely to perform in the manner desired by the U.S. government (that is, the most controllable) and is likely to be seen by host governments as least likely to be involved in local politics (in contrast, for example, with the perceptions of the party-affiliated institutes). Thus, IFES is most amenable to, and most likely to reflect the needs of, host governments. It is primarily a reactive organization that stands ready to serve, but appears to have little identifiable policy or purpose beyond that. It is important to note that most who take this view nevertheless view the existence of IFES quite positively, for they see it as in many instances the most useful tool with which to attain U.S. policy or development purposes.

According to those who hold the *developmental view*, IFES has demonstrated that it has a much broader potential. In addition to its traditional roles, it has creditably performed in both short and long-term civic educational roles, established a basis in several countries for the extensive training of poll workers, initiated the creation of networks among election officials that can further stabilize past achievements, and developed a staff capable of moving further into the general area of democratic development. Persons with this view emphasize that the resource center and data base program, while slow to get off the ground, provides IFES with an internal capability that will eventually

greatly increase its ability to respond effectively to situations anywhere in the world and will become an incomparable and readily referable source of information in the electoral area for both domestic and foreign audiences. They believe that IFES has shown in its reports, notably in some of its better pre-election assessments, an ability to analyze the political situation in a country that could be useful in the development of more general country strategies for democratic development, for the provision of advice on the demarcation of electoral district boundaries, and a wide variety of other services. They also point out that IFES can no longer be said to be simply reactive or passive. Increasingly, IFES has made proposals under its agreements that precede A.I.D. or embassy requests. It has obtained support for new projects outside the A.I.D. framework. Further, in some instances IFES has refused to take part in electoral work because it thought it to be counterproductive (for example, Ethiopia), or has resisted government requests for it to endorse unduly expensive commodity assistance.

Both views should be understood as reflections of part of the reality; in some continents and periods one would seem to be confirmed, while in others the situation would be reversed. However, *whatever is done to modify the A.I.D. relationship with IFES or to change the nature of IFES, the objective must be to preserve the positive aspects of the traditional view while supporting the fulfillment of the potential represented by the developmental view.*

It is clear that changes should be made. The most obvious need is to modify the structure of the A.I.D. relationship to IFES in a way that preserves accountability while smoothing the bureaucratic processes by which approvals of particular projects are undertaken. Everyone the team contacted on both the IFES and A.I.D. sides pointed to the need, if not its resolution.

Beyond this, it appears that IFES needs to concentrate on organizing internal record keeping to be responsive to A.I.D.'s requests for budgetary or expense justification. Having experienced phenomenal growth, especially over the past three years, it is important that IFES senior management concentrate equal attention and place great importance on the managerial, financial and

program operations of IFES. *The organization's management needs to insure that internal record keeping is organized in a way to be more responsive to AID requests for budgetary information, it needs to develop a long range strategic plan and it needs to make maintenance of a positive working relationship with AID a top priority.*

The restructured IFES will be sustainable for the immediate future on the basis of projected work, primarily under the Cooperative Agreements and other Mission initiated agreements. Longer-term sustainability will depend on political developments within the United States and the developing world. If democratic development continues to be a U.S. government objective, there will continue to be need for IFES' services at least at the present level, particularly if the developmental view of the organization is accepted. Even the majority of those who hold the traditional view of the organization, including those who hold less positive views of its performance, appear to want to keep IFES alive as an alternative provider of services. As one respondent said in regard to IFES and its competitors: "We need them all; there is more than enough work". On the other hand, without major U.S. government support, IFES' future would be in doubt. Perhaps as a much smaller organization it could survive through an aggressive attempt to enter the "markets" that some now suggest, but it would not be fulfilling the purposes for which it was established.

Finally, special efforts need to be made to overcome the gulf in understanding that has developed between IFES and A.I.D. Within A.I.D., IFES has always been a project of the central bureaus rather than the regional bureaus. It has been associated with the rise of interest in democracy, an interest not always fully shared by the bureaus, particularly in regard to elections. IFES projects have often been initiated by requests from U.S. embassies. In these cases, substantive interest in the result is often primarily an embassy or State interest rather than an A.I.D. interest. These factors have contributed to a general lack of understanding about IFES and its activities within A.I.D. This has inhibited, and may continue to inhibit, the contribution that IFES potentially is able to make to A.I.D. and its democracy programs.

## **VI. MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **STRENGTHENING OPERATIONAL AND FINANCIAL PROCEDURES**

1. Adopt and systematically adhere to operational procedures that will adequately meet the needs of A.I.D. and other organizations. These must allow for transparent cost accounting by project as well as donor. This requirement extends, of course, to all aspects of IFES work, including, in particular, commodities.

2. Urgently address the question of defining roles and responsibilities for IFES staff. This should substantially reduce the past inability of the organization to fulfill A.I.D. mandated managerial responsibilities such as the development of a strategic plan.

3. Develop systematic procedures for obtaining feedback from projects so that improvements might be made in a more orderly manner. Providing information on lessons learned should be a regular part of IFES procedure, for both individual projects and project areas.

### **STRUCTURING IFES' FUTURE ENVIRONMENT**

4. Aspects of the overall Cooperative Agreement need to be reconsidered. To this end, IFES should work together with senior persons in R&D and A.I.D.'s Office of Procurement to craft an agreement that will overcome the objections that have arisen. In such an agreement, all money should be available as core money on the model of the NIS agreement. It should also allow Bureaus to input money with assurance that it will in total, or in a specified percentage, be available for use on their projects. It should also guarantee a specified amount or percentage to be spent on IFES institutional development. If such an agreement cannot be reached, then the maintenance and extension of the proliferation of agreements designed, in part, to by-pass the add-on feature

should be envisaged. Such agreements will have at least the advantage of being tailored to, and more controlled by, the individual Bureaus. However, this approach may fail to provide necessary institutional support for IFES' continued development.

5. In any new agreements that are worked out between IFES and A.I.D. or its regional bureaus, attention should be given to defining the substantive interface of the two organizations in such a way that it will preserve the ability of IFES to respond to A.I.D. and State Department requests while giving more attention to the need of IFES and IFES staff to understand their work as that of an independent professional organization that deals with its institutional environment in a proactive manner. Specifically, it is suggested that:

a. Ways be found for IFES to report its findings fully and effectively to A.I.D. and State at the same time as embarrassment of the U.S. government through inclusion in formal reports of sensitive information or judgment is avoided.

b. IFES be encouraged either by A.I.D., or other funding sources to use the information and analysis it has developed on cases with which it has dealt extensively, such as Guyana or Angola, as a basis for *retrospective country analyses* from the viewpoint of democratic development. These would provide an opportunity for IFES to strengthen its corporate visibility in the democratic field and an opportunity for IFES to demonstrate its understanding of political and cultural, as well as electoral, issues.

6. The problems that have been reported in the management of IFES need to be addressed at the highest level. This is not meant to imply a judgment on the ultimate seriousness of reported deficiencies. As stated above, the record of the organization in meeting the needs of A.I.D. for electoral assistance within the broader area of democratic development is substantial, and this achievement is ultimately more important than the managerial deficiencies that have been noted. Nevertheless, until the more important of these problems have been addressed and resolved, the working relationship

between IFES and A.I.D. will be impaired. Therefore, information that the Board is actively engaged in reviewing these matters and is considering meeting more frequently to address them should be welcomed. Some specific suggestions to help address these problems are:

- a. IFES should provide the Board with short quarterly reports summarizing its activities (with copies to A.I.D.).
- b. A senior IFES employee should take responsibility for several urgent tasks that are not at present performed adequately. These are: articulating a vision for the future of the organization, relating IFES work to the larger environment of democratic development, and providing liaison between IFES and A.I.D. (explaining the organizations to one another more adequately than at present, and seeing to the fulfillment of A.I.D. managerial requests). This responsibility might be added explicitly to the responsibilities of the Director; more realistically and effectively, it might be assigned to a special assistant to the Director.
- c. Once a vision has been defined, IFES management must urgently work with its staff to develop a *strategic plan* that will allow the organization to move methodically toward its realization.

7. IFES should be encouraged to develop its networking capabilities with electoral officials in other countries. The process has started in Eastern Europe; parallel initiatives suggested for other geographical areas should be encouraged.

8. IFES should plan on becoming an organization capable of playing a larger role in the development and strengthening of democratic polities. To play this role it should be encouraged to propose work in democratic strategy development, the development and administration of polls or opinion surveys (as a backup to civic education), voting district demarcation, and programs for electoral assistance training (such as a short program for its consultants before they go overseas).

9. IFES should be encouraged to rapidly bring to fruition the promise of its Resource Center. In addition to the entry of more data, this should include the development of an information capability that is accessible to State and overseas missions as well as international organizations such as the UN.

10. IFES should be encouraged to seek alternative sources of funding, such as the recent grant for civic education in Estonia. It is not appropriate for IFES at this time to devote efforts to marketing its services through such means as charging for its publications or its handling of commodities. Nevertheless, appropriate consulting opportunities in the developed world should be investigated if they do not interfere with the organization's major activities.

## APPENDIX A

### PERSONS CONTACTED

Adams, Gregory Project Manager RD/EID/IDM A.I.D.  
Atwood, Susan NDI: Senior Project Officer for East Central Europe  
Bauer, Joseph IFES: Finance Director  
Bayer, Thomas IFES: Program Officer Africa/Near East  
Bernstein, Linda AID/Europe  
Brautem, Margret IRI  
CAPEL staff: Chief of Staff and Program Directors  
Carroll, David Carter Center, Associate Director for LA Programs  
Cepeda, Diana IFES Program Assistant for the Americas  
Chamberline, Laura NDI  
Choate, Alan Asia Foundation, Vice-President  
Cole, William AID: Near East/Democracy  
Cooper, Laurie IFES: Program Officer Africa/Near East  
Countryman, Illona AID: NIS Project Officer and Program Analyst  
(Formerly Asia Bureau)  
(Craver, Robert A.I.D.)  
Dunn, Gene NDI  
Duran, Dennis President Duran and Associates, Management consultants  
Figueredo, Roberto AID: Near East/Democracy (formerly LAC/Democracy)  
Fischer, Jeffrey IFES: Chief of Staff  
Garber, Larry NDI (Elections)  
Hein, Gordon Asia Foundation, Dir. of Program Planning and Review  
Horel, Travis (Former AID project officer for IFES for Policy and R&D)  
Huntley, James R. (former President of Atlantic Council, CCD etc.)  
Hyman, Jerry AID: Europe Bureau/Democracy  
Israelow, Sharon AID: LAC/Democracy  
Kennedy, J. Ray, IFES: Director of Information Resources  
Kiefer, Patricia NDI: Civic Education Officer  
Klein, Keith, IFES: Program Director for Africa/NearEast  
Kryschtal, Jerry Chief, Contracting Office of NIS Task Force

Loken, Kristen AID/NIS, Chief Democratic Initiative  
McFarland, Debra AID/Panama  
Manatt, Charles IFES: Chairman, Board of Directors  
Mehan, Thomas Project Officer RD/EID/IDM A.I.D.  
Mendelsen, Johanna AID/LAC/Democracy  
Moore, Obie IFES: Director of Romania Office  
Morfit, Michael AID/Policy Bureau  
Morgan, John A.I.D.  
Nicastro, Thomas AID/Asia Bureau  
Ortega, Manuel A.I.D./DR  
Palmer, Rhea Human Empowerment and Training International  
Pilon, Juliana IFES: Program Director: Asia, Americas, and  
Central East Europe  
Plath, Roger IFES: Program Officer for the Americas  
Putnam, Diana AID/NIS Deputy Chief  
Richardson, John (Former Asst. Sec. of State and Chairman, NED, etc.)  
Schofield, Kenneth AID/LAC/Democracy  
Siddall, Christopher IFES: Program Officer, East Central Europe and  
former USSR  
Soudriette, Richard IFES: Director  
Stuart, Edward IRI  
Whitaker, Richard AID: Asia Bureau/Democracy  
Windsor, Jennifer AID: Spec. Asst. to the Administrator  
(formerly Africa Bureau)

## APPENDIX B

### WRITTEN MATERIALS REVIEWED

#### IFES COUNTRY PROJECTS: ARRANGED BY COUNTRY:

- Angola: A Pre-Election Assessment, March 1992
- Angola: IFES Angola Summary Report
- Bulgaria: "The 1990 Bulgarian Elections: A Pre-Election Assessment" (May 1990)
- Burundi: A Pre-Election Assessment Report, April 1992
- Cambodia: Report Analyzing the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
- Comoros: Civic Education Project, May 18-June 13, 1992
- Comoros: Pre-election Assessment
- Comoros: "Democratic Transition in the Islands", final report on IFES Civic Education Project
- Congo: "Elections in Congo: The Winding Road to Democracy"
- Ghana: A Pre-Election Assessment" June 1992
- Ghana: Election Observation of 1992 Referendum Election
- Guinea-Bissau: Political and Economic Transition: "A Preliminary Assessment of the Process to Implement Free Elections, 12/20/91
- Guyana: IFES Guyana Election Assistance, Plath
- Guyana: A Pre-Election Technical Assessment, Oct. 31, 1990  
(A Revised version dated March 22, 1991 also produced.)
- Haiti: Haitian Election Project, 1987
- Hungary: IFES Central European Electoral Systems, Hungary
- Lesotho: A Pre-Election Assessment
- Madagascar: Training National Election Observer Teams
- Malawi: Some IFES poll worker training evaluations
- Malawi: IFES Official Presiding Officer's Manual
- Malawi: IFES training program plan
- Mali: "A Pre-Election Technical Assessment Report", July 8, 1991
- Mali: IFES training evaluation

Mali: IFES election Assistance  
Mali: IFES training program plan  
Mali: IFES Rapport de Mission au Mali, Noel  
Mali: IFES/Mali Democratization Project, Quarterly Progress Report,  
Mozambique: "Treading a New Path", a Pre-Election Assessment  
Mozambique: IFES Pre election Assessment  
Nepal: The 1991 Nepalese Elections: A Pre-Election Survey, Nov. 1990  
Romania: A Dream Deferred": Technical Assistance: June 1990  
Romania: Civic Education Project, May 18-June 13, 1992  
Romania: Electoral Systems Seminar, Romania  
Tunisia: Report on the First Tunisian Multiparty Legislative Elections,  
Yemen: Pre-Election Assessment (Issued as trip report April 16, '93)  
Yemen: Trainers Guidebook for Poll Worker Training

IFES ELECTION MANUAL SERIES, DECEMBER 1992:

1. "How to Organize a Pre-Election Technical Assessment"
2. "How to Organize an On-Site Technical Assistance Project"
3. "How to Organize an Effective Poll Worker Training Project"
4. "How to Organize a Program in Civic Education"
5. "How to Organize and Conduct an Election Observation Mission"

OTHER IFES MATERIALS:

All IFES newsletters  
Client correspondence  
Conferencia Interamericana Sobre Sistemas Electorales  
Final Report Year 1, and Quarterly reports

Financial presentations and Project Implementation Plan  
Financial Plan Revenue Activities for 1993  
Guia do votar (Angola) plus other posters and voter information materials  
Guide Du President d'un Bureau de Vote, Mali (written with aid of IFES  
consultants)  
"Lessons Learned" Concept Paper  
"Lessons Learned" Presentation Outline  
Year 2 Program Implementation Plans

OTHER MATERIALS:

Cooperative Agreement: Africa  
Cooperative Agreement: R&D  
Cooperative Agreement: NIS  
Incremental Funding Requirements of Europe Bureau of Estonia Fund  
Modifications recommended for the NIS task force  
National Democratic Institute: Annual Report  
The Rebirth of Civil Society, Siegal & Yancy  
  
Evaluations of IFES work returned from A.I.D. missions