

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART I

PD-ABP-332  
94592

1. BEFORE FILLING OUT THIS FORM READ THE ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS
2. USE LETTER QUALITY TYPE. NOT DOT MATRIX TYPE.

IDENTIFICATION DATA

A. Reporting A.I.D. Unit: Mission or AID/W Office: USAID/AA/AFR/DRC  (Es# _____ )	B. Was Evaluation Scheduled in Current FY Annual Evaluation Plan?  Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Slipped <input type="checkbox"/> Ad Hoc <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>  Evaluation Plan Submission Date: N/A	C. Evaluation Timing  Interim <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Final <input type="checkbox"/>  Ex Post <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>
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D. Activity or Activities Evaluated (List the following information for project(s) or program(s) evaluated: if not applicable list title and date of the evaluation report.

Project Nos.	Project Program Title	First PROAG or Equivalent (FY)	Most Recent PACD (Mo/Yr)	Planned LOICost	Amount Obligated to 09/30/95
625-0517 and 698-0517	Africa Emergency Locust and Grasshopper Assistance (AELGA) Project	4/03/87	4/97 (As of the date of the evaluation)	\$46,035,000	\$31,932,063

ACTIONS

E. Action Decisions Approved by Mission or AID/W Office Director	Name of Officer Responsible for Action	Date Action to be Completed
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Action(s) Required

1. Given the nature of the evaluation report, a committee will be formed to provide comments on the draft report and later the final report. The committee will be composed of technical and project development officers who will evaluate the report and its recommendations. There comments will be provided to AA/AFR/DRC.	D. Adams AFR/DRC	November 1995
2. Since the Project Activity Completion Date (PACD) is April 2, 1997 and USAID reengineering guidance requires Operating Units to develop Results Frameworks for all activities, the accepted recommendations of the final evaluation report will be used to assist AA/AFR/DRC to redesign a new activity in the format of a results framework.	J. Rifenbark AFR/DRC	By March 1997
3. The Chief of AA/AFR/DRC will decide if the final evaluation report will be attached to this PES. His decision will be guided by recommendations from the AELGA technical staff, the DRC Project Officer, and the evaluation committee.	D. Adams Chief, AFR/DRC	At Submission of PES.

**APPROVALS**

F. Date of AID/W Office Review of Evaluation: March 19, 1997

G. Approvals of Evaluation Summary and Action Decisions:

Name (Typed)	Project/Program Officer	Representative of Borrower/Grantee	Evaluation Officer	Mission or AID/W Office Director
	John T. Rifembark	N/A	Jim Govan	David Adams
Signature	<i>John T. Rifembark</i>		<i>Jim Govan</i>	<i>DA</i>
Date	<i>March 19, 1997</i>		<i>8-15-97</i>	<i>8/19/97</i>

**COSTS**

I. EVALUATION COSTS

<p>1. Evaluation Team:</p> <p>Roger Popper, Team Leader, Management Systems International (MSI)                  Robert McAlister, Evaluation Specialist                  Dr. George Cavin, Entomologist</p>	<p>Contract Number: IQC No. AEP-5451-I-002049-00,                  Delivery Order 30</p> <p>Person Days: 106 person days</p> <p>Contract Cost: \$87,945</p>	<p>Source of Funds                  DFA from                  AELGA</p>
<p>2. Mission/Office Professional Staff</p> <p>Person-Days (Estimate) 15 person days excluding time of AELGA staff for comments and the time of the evaluation committee to review report and its recommendations.</p>	<p>3. Borrower/Grantee Professional</p> <p>Staff Person-Days (Estimate): 15 person days which equals the number of days the team was in the field.</p>	

## OPERATING UNIT'S COMMENTS

The Africa Emergency Locust/Grasshopper Assistance (AELGA) project was evaluated by Management Systems International (M.S.I.) from September 11 to October 13, 1995. The first draft report was revised twice and the final report was submitted to AA/AFR/DRC in April, 1996.

It must be stated up front that the evaluation report failed to provide project management clear guidance for future activities. Moreover, there were irreconcilable technical differences and controversies between the project's technical staff and the evaluators and their report. The intensity of the division was so great that negotiations to develop a workable report became impossible. As a consequence, the final evaluation report contained the full unabridged comments from the project staff as an annex. Furthermore, AA/AFR/DRC formed an independent review committee to review the draft and final reports and its recommendations.

AA/AFR/DRC followed best management practices in preparing the Scope of Work (SOW) for the evaluation and obtaining approval from the Africa Bureau and the project staff. Three Indefinite Quantity Contractors were short-listed and each of these firms proposed individuals for the evaluation. Selection of the M.S.I. was based on their proposed team whose resumé's were reviewed and approved by the project staff, AFR/DP, and AFR/DRC. However, once the contractor was informally selected, the firm substituted an individual for the original team leader position. The new individual was also reviewed and approved by the project staff and AFR/DRC.

The Project Officer and the Senior Technical advisor of the project attended a team planning meeting with the three evaluators before the actual evaluation began. The first day of the evaluation began with a meeting of the evaluation team and all project staff, former and the current project officers, and many of those who had been associated with the project since its inception in 1987.

Notwithstanding all these best practices for designing and conducting successful evaluations, during the first week of the evaluation AA/AFR/DRC was notified that the individual responsible for the institutional analysis and a French speaker was unable to travel to Africa because of medical reasons. Thus only two of the three-person team participated in the four week field effort and only the team leader had a working knowledge of French. This had a detrimental impact on the outcome of the evaluation and the content of the report. The quality of the recommendations was such that only eight of the 17 recommendations were fully accepted by the evaluation committee. When these factors are coupled with the irreconcilable technical differences and controversies between the project's technical staff and the evaluators, the resulting report left much to be desired. The evaluation process accomplished little to assist AA/AFR/DRC form a basis for future project direction.

## EVALUATION SUMMARY PART II

### 1. The purpose of evaluation was to

Qualitatively determine past successes of the project in accordance with the project's purposes and its success in the following the recommendations of past evaluations and assessments and refine project direction through project completion, and provide rational direction for designing a new project for sustainable control of locust/ grasshopper and other emergency pests.

### 2. The evaluation methodology

focused on five evaluation issues at the Purpose-Level Impact and the Goal-Level Impact levels. Resources for the impact study were reports, prior evaluations, project files, interviews, meetings, and visits conducted in Mali, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Kenya, FAO headquarters in Rome, and AID and AELGA headquarters in Washington, DC. The overall time for preparation of this report was five weeks, and the field work was accomplished over a four week period.

### 3. Project Goal and Purpose

The project's goal is to "contribute to the improved nutritional status and well being of Africans by reducing the threat of locust and grasshopper plague-induced famine, and its associated economic and social suffering".

The AELGA project purpose has evolved from that stated in the 1987 project paper: "To treat recovery and rehabilitation aspects of problems caused by the current locust and grasshopper pest problem threatening many African countries and to help bring it under control." Now a more broadly interpreted objective is to minimize the risk of locust plagues and other emergency pest outbreaks in Africa through the development of sustainable economically and environmentally sound tactics for helping to mitigate food security and environmental concerns in Africa.

#### 4. Findings, Conclusions

Because of irreconcilable technical differences and controversies associated with the evaluation report, a committee was formed to review the report and its major recommendations. The composition of the committee was the Chief of AA/AFR/DRC, the AELGA Project Officer, an entomologist from the Africa Bureau and another entomologist from the Global Bureau, and two representatives of AFR/DP. The findings and conclusions of the evaluation report will not be summarized in the PES.

#### 5. Evaluation Recommendations

Out of 17 major recommendations from the final report, only eight were approved by the evaluation committee. Some have been superseded by re-engineering guidance or events since the report was submitted. Each of the recommendations was responded to by the committee. The response to the eight recommendations are listed below.

a. AELGA should design and install a Logical Framework, work plan approval, and progress monitoring systems that meet AELGA and USAID Africa Bureau objectives and needs.

Response:

The recommendation for developing a logical framework and progress monitoring systems is superseded by re-engineering guidance. Future activities will be structured according to a results framework (RF); thus performance in achieving strategic objectives (SOs) and intermediate results (IR) will be quantified and assessed further.

b. Concentrate training on crop protection services with: a) separate locust and grasshopper (l/g) control units and agents stationed in l/g breeding areas; b) on services that are strong and show promise of major improvement in overall organizational strengthening.

Response:

The AELGA training model and curriculum appear to have been quite effective. However, the committee does not agree that training should be concentrated on plague prevention only. General crop protection training with a locust component is preferable for sustainability of crop protection units (CPU). Governments tend to support units that deal with a broad range of crop pests, including locusts. African regional institutions such as Center for Applications of Agrometeorology and Hydrology for the Sahel (AGRHYMET) and Desert Locust Control Organization/East Africa (DLCO-EA) if it can overcome its weaknesses, ideally should become more involved in national-level specialized training. AELGA will develop a transition plan to transfer the responsibility for training from AELGA to African institutions. Longer term training continues to be key for sustainable capacity building of CPUs.

c. Consider five-year funding for bio-control research, either through USAID or another donor. Search for a series of bio-control products, perhaps for different climates. Building African bio-control research capacity, and bio-control industry may be directions for the future.

Response:

USAID should continue to fund a medium term effort in biocontrol research. Based on past experience there is a consensus that there needs to be a requirement for competition for the selection of research institutions for future biocontrol research. This would foster peer review of the research proposals, and open dissemination of research results.

Other options discussed could involve the USAID Integrated Pest Management Cooperative Research Support Program (IPM CRSP) and the International Center for Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE). Both institutions are designed to manage and implement international research in pest management. Other options for research should not be involved in l/g control operations. AELGA should develop a research agenda focussing on a range of biocontrol and biorational tactics and strategies and on the development of the most promising ones through the pilot study phase.

d. All parties should prepare for frequent requests for aircraft, and calls on aerial services and donors for reactive control of l/gs. AELGA and USAID should set up an *emergency fund* to be used for control operations only, and not to be used for training, research, or awareness programs.

Response:

The committee agreed with the recommendation that USAID should set up an emergency fund or at least a procedure for obtaining emergency funds in the event of an emergency outbreak. USAID must ensure that Reg. 16 and the country-specific SEAs are followed. Furthermore, in accordance with the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAJ), African institutions must be thoroughly consulted and supportive of emergency actions. A core group of USAID staff should

determine if an emergency exists and if USAID funds should be utilized. It is noted that AELGA has had grants with the FAO for emergency control. In fact the current grant with the FAO was used for emergency procurement of pesticide for Eritrea.

e. For the time being, AELGA's future can generally not be "devolved" to bilateral mission portfolios, but must be developed at either the regional or global level within USAID, in support of agency-wide objectives.

Response:

The committee agreed with the recommendation with one major exception: during an emergency situation of substantial proportions the bilateral or regional USAID mission(s) must play a major coordination role. Any future activities should have a "buy-in" mechanism, as does the current AELGA project.

f. Yearly work plans should be approved and signed off on by USAID/AFR/DRC. The main criterion for approval is clear contribution to the objectives of: 1) reducing the frequency and size of l/g plagues; 2) reducing the damage done by l/g plagues; and 3) reducing disaster assistance expenditures.

Response:

In general, the committee agreed that work plans need to be prepared for approval by DRC; however, the criteria specified in the recommendation would depend on the results framework for the new l/g activities.

g. Bio-Control Research

1. All AELGA bio-research should be analyzed for the possibility of building a permanent bio-research capacity and developing a bio-control business or industry with African scientists and business partners.

Response:

Capacity building is already a part of the grantee's scope of work. A strategic approach to building long-term capacity in African institutions will be promoted, including public sector research and development institutions, as well as the private sector. (Also, see recommendation seven.)

2. USAID should provide five-year financing and a regional program for the AELGA bio-control research, or USAID should finance the research until it has been transferred to more stable hands and act as a marketer and go-between.

Response: Accept the recommendation.

3. All contracts USAID has with bio-control research organizations should be analyzed to determine: 1) intellectual property rights; 2) responsibility of research groups to share profits with the countries, people and governments who collaborated on the research. This is not to suggest that there are existing problems with the current contracts or contractors.

Response:

The recommendation is valid, but its effects extend far beyond the AELGA project. This issue should be referred to the newly formed Permanent Committee on Biosafety, Biotechnology, Bioethics and Biodiversity (B4). It is recognized that through the current grants, Montana State is successfully working with the governments of Eritrea and Madagascar to carry out research, and has worked with Cape Verde and Mali. Both private and public sector entities should be included as potential producers/vendors of biocontrol agents.

h. AELGA should not offer l/g control on demand for national crop protection services.

Response:

There was agreement with this recommendation that routine services should not be offered by AELGA. The FAO is the entity that should respond to crop protection units and host country needs for l/g control. It is recognized that AELGA should play a role in the objective monitoring/verification of FAO, regional institutions, and the host country practices involving USAID resources in terms of the SEA and FAO's grant agreements. In the future, if USAID's l/g activities are reduced, USAID will still require a mechanism to respond to emergencies. USAID's bilateral and regional missions will have to be involved if there are severe outbreaks or plagues.