

**ZAMBIA DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT:
FINAL EVALUATION**

Evaluation Team

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Executive Summary

This evaluation reports on the Zambia Democratic Governance Project since the Mid-Term Review of July 1995. The analysis which follows focuses on lessons learned from the performance of the various components of the project, the effectiveness of the management of the project, and possible future directions USAID/Zambia might take with respect to democratic governance.

We have attempted in our analysis to be frank about the strengths and weaknesses of the project. While the latter may seem too critical to those involved, we want to emphasize that we believe all the staff and the beneficiaries have been most diligent and resourceful in promoting the goal of democratic governance.

The political context in which the Project was implemented has deteriorated as the Chiluba government's relations with opposition parties and advocacy groups became increasingly polarized. The conflict has revolved around issues related to constitutional revision, the poorly managed voter registration process, and the refusal of a number of opposition parties to participate in the 1996 elections. In effect, on each of these matters, the legitimacy of the present government structure with respect to its democratic character has been challenged by the opposition and civic groups. The intensity of the conflict has made implementation of some project components difficult if not impossible.

Our summary conclusions on the various project components are as follows:

1. Program support for constitutional revision was frustrated in promoting a more liberalized constitution by the fact the government insisted on focusing the revision process on its own political objectives of limiting the effectiveness of the opposition, particularly with respect to preventing the candidacy of former President Kenneth Kaunda in the 1996 Presidential elections.
2. The Civic Education component did not reach the grassroots population to any significant extent through the institutional strengthening of the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP). Aid to FODEP only succeeded in training a cadre of democracy trainers. The Project did in the last two years reach the community level in terms of democratic education through its Civic Action Fund(CAF). In addition, the Civic Education component provided for a complete revision of the junior secondary school civics curriculum (including two new textbooks) which should have a major impact in terms of school children being exposed to democratic values.
3. Assistance to the Zambia Institute of Mass Communication (ZAMCOM) resulted in sufficient strengthening of this short term journalist education program that the organization has become autonomous of the Zambian government structure. However, USAID failed to deliver on a significant portion of its promised media training

equipment, a result of Washington's decision to sanction Zambia for regressing on democratization. The consequence is that ZAMCOM's survival over the long run has been made more tenuous.

4. The strengthening of the Cabinet's Policy Analysis and Coordination unit has progressed steadily; however, it has not achieved a number of objectives including training in policy analysis and intergovernmental negotiation and the installation of a local area network system. In part, this project was not completed because of the United States (US) government's decision to cut democratic governance aid to Zambia in 1996.

5. The Legislative Performance component was suspended in 1995 as a result of the refusal of the National Assembly Administration to come to a working agreement with Project staff on the specific activities to be undertaken.

Michigan State University (MSU) produced the monitoring and evaluation products envisaged in the project paper and its cooperative agreement (CA). However, the impact of MSU's reports on the project seems to have been marginal in a number of instances. The baseline study focused on developing indicators for measuring democratic progress but little data was collected; the Mid-Term Review made recommendations which focused on structural improvements which were only partially implemented due to the Mission Director's concerns about the report's objectivity. MSU produced a number of special studies which were excellent as far as providing information of scholarly interest but of little relevance to project staff decision making. Thus, it is not clear that the project itself benefited much from MSU's effort.

The arrangements for management of the project were somewhat different from those in the Project Paper, which underestimated the complexity and degree of effort. The contracting of many management functions to Southern University (SU) under a second project CA and assumption of more line functions by the Democracy Governance Advisor (DGA) allowed for the development of an effective management system in terms of delivering support to the various components. One major management flaw has been the lack of Zambian ownership, particularly with respect to Zambian involvement in high level Project decision making. Also of concern is the high cost of the two CAs (MSU and SU) relative to the services delivered by the project. Finally, the top management structure consisted of three relatively independent actors (DGA, the Principal Investigator for MSU, and the Chief of Party (COP) for SU) who were not well coordinated through an overall authority structure.

Among others, the following lessons can be learned from this project: democratization and economic reform can proceed concomitantly without interfering with each other; democratic governance projects must assume that the local political climate may become adverse to their goals; DG projects may effectively use patronage under certain circumstances to sustain their objectives; policy research should focus on important decisions confronting project staff; local participation in project decision making is imperative and requires exploration of innovative approaches; caution should be exercised in asking social organizations to undertake new

functions; democracy projects can easily become part of domestic political conflicts and thus lose effectiveness; more controversial programs are better undertaken at the local level rather than at the national level.

On the basis of our review of this project we recommend that designers of the next stage develop a program which is focused, flexible, politically cautious, simple to monitor, inclusive in terms of Zambian participation, targeted on concrete gender objectives, explicit with respect to lines of authority and less expensive to manage, promoting progressive reduction in financing provided to beneficiaries, and realistic in its goals. Possible components of a Democratic Governance Project could include in order of priority: judicial and legal reform, civic action fund, civic forums, media independence, civil society dialogues with government, and a national visioning exercise.

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List of Abbreviations

CA	Cooperative Agreement
CAF	Civic Action Fund
CCC	Committee for a Clean Campaign
CG	Consultative Group
COP	Chief of Party
CRC	Constitutional Review Commission
CSAC	Civic Society Action Committee
CCJP	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
D/G	Democracy/Governance
DG	Democratic Governance
DGA	Development Governance Advisor
FODEP	Foundation for Democratic Process
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIS	Management Information Systems
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MOE	Ministry of Education
MRC	Media Resource Center

MSU	Michigan State University
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PAC	Policy Analysis and Coordination
PAU	Project Administrative Unit
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNZA	University of Zambia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ZAMCOM	Zambia Institute of Mass Communication
ZIMT	Zambia Independent Monitoring Team

Political Environment

Introduction

The Mid-Term Review does an excellent job of recounting the political struggle in Zambia from the downfall of United National Independence Party (UNIP) in 1991 to June of 1995. This section will concentrate on the evolution of political conflict related to democratic governance subsequent to June of 1995. Certain conclusions from the Mid-Term Review, however, will serve as a baseline indication of where matters stood with respect to democratization at the point where this report takes up. Most important, the Mid-Term Review concluded that the "window of opportunity for political liberalization" was "closing." The authors noted the following: Voter turnout was low because the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government was not keeping the voters' roles current and there was considerable voter apathy. While there was doubt that some by-elections were free and fair, they were competitive. Genuine freedom of expression existed. The liberal element in the MMD cabinet had been reduced to a small number. Opposition political parties could not coalesce into a united front and were thus weak in terms of holding the regime accountable. Stepping into the breach in terms of accountability were the independent press and the donors. The latter were particularly influential because they were financing over 70 percent of the development budget.

In the remainder of this section we consider significant events related to democratization which have occurred since June of 1995 and the reaction of the donor community. The basic argument we make is that the Chiluba government's commitment to democratization has further declined as evidenced by its: 1) attempt to exclude former President Kaunda from the next presidential election and its refusal to seek a popular consensus for constitutional revision; 2) haphazard reregistration of voters; and 3) occasional arbitrary use of force against oppositional elements. Attempts by the donor community to confront the government on this anti-democratic actions only served to bring charges that the donors were engaged in unwarranted interference in Zambia's domestic politics.

Constitutional Reform

The most controversial issue in the MMD's five years of rule was the constitutional reform process. Never before in Zambia's history has a single issue so dominated the national debate and created so much division. The MMD accepted the 1991 constitution as an imperfect document, which they promised to change if they came to power. In 1993 Chiluba appointed a Constitutional Review Commission to collect views on the desired content of the new constitution. Chiluba also gave the CRC a wide mandate to suggest the modalities by which constitution would be adopted. The donors, including USAID, agreed to support the CRC so long as the process was transparent and consensual. However, when the Commission completed its work in 1995, the Government rejected most of the recommendations (including all those

related to human rights) and concentrated on a few changes designed to improve its chances in the next election.

Two key issues in the Government White Paper on the constitution caused considerable dispute. These were the presidential eligibility clause and the mode of adopting the constitution. The eligibility clause required that a presidential candidate must not only be a Zambia citizen but born of Zambians who are/were citizens by birth or descent. The provision was designed to prevent former President Kaunda from contesting the presidency. While the desire to prevent Kaunda from active politics was motivated by the fear that Kaunda might win the 1996 election, there were other more democratically accepted ways of achieving this end, such as a term limit placed on holding the presidency.

The other controversial issue in the constitutional debate concerned the mode of adoption of the constitution. The CRC unanimously recommended that the constitution be adopted through a Constituent Assembly followed by a national referendum. The government rejected this proposal in favor of having the national assembly approve a constitutional amendment bill. The CRC had argued that because the national assembly was dominated by MMD, it was not representative of Zambian society. On the other hand, an elected Constituent Assembly could be structured to be all-inclusive. And, if the product of its labors were then approved in a referendum, the new constitution would rest on a solid basis of public confidence.

The campaign against the government's "white paper" approach was spearheaded by twenty-seven civic NGOs, under the umbrella of the Civic Society Action Committee (CSAC). Between June 1995 and May 1996 the CSAC organized public demonstrations, workshops and a convention urging government to withdraw the constitutional provisions and allow the draft bill to be discussed by a constituent assembly. However, despite all the protestations from opposition political parties, civic groups, churches, trade unions, students, and donor organization, the MMD-dominated parliament passed the Constitutional Amendment Bill, and President Chiluba signed it into law on 28 May 1996. While the government succeeded in its goal of adopting a constitution biased in its favor, the constitution now lacks popular legitimacy, particularly among the more educated segments of the population including many MMD members.

The 1996 Voter Registration and National Elections

The registration of voters was as controversial as the adoption of the constitution. In November 1995, the Government signed a contract with NIKUV Computers (Israel) Limited to carry out the registration exercise. The contract let to NIKUV was tainted in the minds of many because NIKUV's tender was higher than those offered by several other companies with demonstrated capability. Opposition parties and NGOs vehemently rejected the use of NIKUV to carry out the voter registration exercise because they were certain that it was being paid to rig the 1996 elections in favor of the MMD. There was a prolonged campaign for the cancellation of the NIKUV contract and reverting to the old system of registering voters. The Government resolutely pressed ahead and used NIKUV for the exercise.

In December 1995 the registration process began. It was to run for six weeks and was aimed at updating the voters' roll of 1990. There was a very poor response which prompted the Electoral Commission to extend the registration period three times. Of the 4.2 million eligible voters, at the close of the exercise in February 1996, 2.3 million people had registered. This low figure was due to poor management, lack of manpower, inadequate transport, and poor publicity. Compounding the problem, UNIP urged its supporters not to register.

The variety and number of irregularities served as a means by which the opposition sought to undermine further public confidence in government. Some of the more egregious irregularities were:

- (a) Omission from the register of thousands of persons who had registered;
- (b) Incorrect coding used for polling stations and districts so that voters in one voting district were found in another, sometimes several hundred kilometers apart;
- (c) Thousands of voters had not collected their cards from polling stations because of distance and poor publicity;
- (d) Registration of persons who were under-age;
- (e) Police arrests of people attempting to sell voter's cards;
- (f) Duplicate voter's cards found in different polling stations.

The opposition complained bitterly and continually about these irregularities. After the election, they have continued their campaign by filing 17 petitions in the High Court alleging that corruption and the poor administration of the election required that it be rerun. One pending petition has been brought by five opposition parties against the nomination of President Chiluba.

Whatever the validity of these petitions, there is no doubt that the turnout for the 1996 elections was very poor. Part of the problem was due to a registration decline. Whereas there were 2,931,909 registered in 1991, this figure dropped to 2,267,382, a decline of 22.6 per cent. The actual turnout was less than 1.3 million. In other words, the electorate consisted of slightly less than one-third of the eligible population.

The presidential and parliamentary elections took place on November 18, 1996. Five presidential candidates contested and President Chiluba emerged the winner with 69 per cent of the votes cast. Kaunda's party (UNIP), and seven others boycotted the contest. Eleven parties participated, fielding a total of 593 candidates. The ruling MMD obtained 131 seats in parliament, independents ten, the National Party five, and Agenda for Zambia and Zambia Democratic Congress two each. Most of the successful independent candidates were MMD members who had not been nominated by their party.

While the election results have been disputed by the main opposition parties, this team has seen no evidence of systematic rigging. There is, however, evidence of gross incompetence in the handling of the voter registration and a deliberate attempt to exclude a potential challenger in the case of Kaunda. Many independent observers and monitoring groups, including the Committee for a Clean Campaign (CCC), Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), and the

Zambia Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT) concluded that the elections were not free and fair.

There is also evidence that the ruling party took full advantage of its incumbency, using government resources in various ways to manipulate voter thinking. For instance, in June 1996 President Chiluba ordered the sale of Local Council (i.e. local government owned) houses below their market value to sitting tenants (and in a number of cases houses were given free). He also distributed "donations" in amounts of K20 million to selected constituencies. Further government kept the date of the election a secret until a month before the elections. Such maneuvers, while typical incumbent tactics in election campaigns, have added insult to injury as far as the opposition and advocacy groups are concerned.

Political Intimidation

During the period 1995-1997 there have been several cases of political intimidation. Opposition politicians have been searched and detained for expressing views critical of the government, and UNIP leaders were incarcerated on treason charges (later thrown out by the court for lack of evidence). In other cases the government has declared some opposition politicians as non-Zambians and either deported them or threatened them with deportation. For instance, two UNIP politicians, John Chiluba and William Banda, were deported to Malawi in 1995 on accusations that they were non-Zambians. Eventually the high court reversed the decision.

Journalists are another group that has been harassed by the government. Government has brought them to court for irresponsible reporting on public issues. There is a certain measure of validity to these charges; however, in a number of cases journalists have been prosecuted for reporting the truth. In early 1996, an issue of *The Post* newspaper was banned by the government for exposing a plan by the government to hold a snap referendum on the contentious clauses in the draft constitution. In another case, two of their editors were sent to jail by a Committee of Parliament for criticizing the Speaker and Vice President over government's criticism of the judiciary. Currently, there are plans to introduce a Press Council to regulate the activities of the media, even though journalists working for private papers are opposed to such control.

Government has moved against advocacy-type non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in a most uncivil manner, particularly after the 1996 elections. Several of the NGOs that declared elections as not being free and fair had their homes and offices searched and their bank accounts frozen or seized. Most recently the Zambian Revenue Authority seized \$56,000 from FODEP's bank account for back taxes. The Authority is alleged to have been willing to come to an agreement with FODEP for a small portion of what was seized but was pushed to change its approach by some top government officials. There are reports that the regime is preparing to adopt a tougher policy toward NGOs, including enforcing legislation prohibiting NGOs from receiving funds from a foreign donor without government approval.

Donor Reactions to the Decline of Democratic Governance

Donors and international NGOs wholeheartedly supported the political transition which culminated in the election of Frederick Chiluba in 1991. They were not supporting Chiluba and MMD but rather the process of competitive politics involved in the new democracy. Assistance for the elections was forthcoming, particularly for monitoring to help assure Zambians and the world that the results were legitimate. Most governments raised their aid levels substantially in response to the change. A portion of this assistance was directed toward assisting the advocacy NGOs to monitor future elections and to educate Zambian citizens on their new rights in a pluralistic political system.

A number of events since 1991 have raised alarm bells with donors about the Zambian Government's commitment to a democratic transition. These matters came to a head in 1995 and 1996. The constitutional reform and poorly managed registration process produced a major breach between the MMD and the donor community. Donors were so angered by the way constitutional reform was carried out that key governments suspended assistance, much of it critical balance of payments support. This breach has been exacerbated by the Government's subsequent reaction toward advocacy NGOs for their role in the elections, viewing them as opposition political groups rather than civic groups trying to ensure fair play.

A variety of high-level efforts were made to convey to Government that donors expected it to adhere to democratic governance precepts and practices. The Government has ignored these concerns. In one instance a number of individuals representing donor governments, including USAID's Democracy Governance Advisor(DGA), were publicly attacked by government supporters as in league with opposition parties and advocacy groups.

At present the impasse remains with no obvious way forward. The Consultative Group (CG) meeting at which new pledges for 1997 were to be made, was postponed from December 1996 because the situation was intractable. Efforts to reschedule have not yet been successful. One of the factors preventing serious discussion is that there is no obvious point of contact for government and donors to discuss their concerns. Because of the linkage which has occurred between economic assistance and governance issues, the Minister of Finance has tried to play the role of intermediary. Compounding the situation, individual donors differ from each other as to which governance issues most critically need to be addressed.

Conclusion

The foregoing political context is much more liberal than was the situation under the Kaunda government prior to 1991. In this sense there has been progress. However, the current political conflict is one in which the consolidation of democracy through the Democratic Governance Project has been made difficult, if not impossible. It is time to explore what sort of program is sufficiently meaningful to be conducted without that program itself becoming the primary locus of conflict between the government and the opposition.

Project Design and Implementation

Overall Strategy for Project

The overall strategy of the Zambia Democratic Governance Project was to support the Government of Zambia to "render public decision making more accessible and effective." By accessibility the project was to seek to increase the "involvement in decision making of citizens and their representatives." By effectiveness was meant "the implementation of public policies consistent with stated goals." The project eventually contained five components for achieving these two goals:¹

1. Constitutional Reform. USAID would assist the Government of Zambia in reviewing and writing a new constitution. Although not stated in project documents, the implicit assumption was that the new constitution would be more liberal.
2. Civic Education. USAID would facilitate civic education in Zambia through a) various advocacy NGOs, with primary emphasis on making FODEP a viable mass civic education organization, and b) development of a new civics education curriculum for junior secondary schools.
3. Media Independence. USAID would support professional training of journalists, particularly through ZAMCOM and University of Zambia (UNZA), so that journalists could acquire the skills necessary to act effectively and responsibly in their reporting of political affairs.
4. Legislative Performance. USAID would provide assistance to upgrade the technical and managerial performance of the National Assembly so that it could become a significant part of the policy making process.
5. Policy Coordination. USAID would provide technical assistance and office equipment for a newly created policy and coordination unit in the Cabinet Office which would insure that policy proposals from the ministries were clearly articulated and coordinated with other ministries and , after they were approved, the unit would monitor implementation.

USAID committed \$15,000,000 to be spent over the five years of the project, beginning in September of 1992. The reason for committing such a large amount was that Zambia was one of the first countries in Africa to democratize after the end of the Cold War. It was felt that Zambia could be an example for the rest of Africa. In order to insure that the progress of the

No attempt will be made in this report to detail changes made in the content of this project subsequent to the 1992 Project Paper. For instance, there were originally only four components to the project. The only exception will be when such changes are relevant to explaining project outcomes.

project could become a learning component for USAID and other African countries, a significant part of the project funds were committed to a very extensive monitoring and evaluation program which was conducted by the MSU Political Science Department under a CA.

The management of the project came to be structured as follows: A Democracy and Governance Advisor (DGA), employed under a Personal Services Contract, was to provide overall policy and programmatic direction. Most of the "time consuming administrative functions" were transferred to Southern University under a cooperative agreement (CA). Excluded were matters related to constitutional reform and policy coordination, which were retained by the Mission under the supervision of the DGA. The project management received direction from a Democratic Governance (DG) Project Advisory Committee consisting of representatives from the resident US Country Team and chaired by the Ambassador. Never established was a DG Project Management Board composed of representatives from grantee organizations and three persons representing the public, private and voluntary sectors.

Critique of Project Design Assumptions.

The designers of the Zambia Democratic Governance Project made a number of assumptions which proved to be tenuous at best. The designers were explicit about each one and aware that at least some could prove to be unwarranted. As part of this review, we believe it is important to articulate these assumptions for the purpose of both indicating the very serious problems which project staff have had to confront and to indicate the need to take a more cautious approach in the future in both Zambia and other African countries in making assumptions about the process of democratization and the means by which progress is assessed. The five questionable assumptions were:

1. *The democratic climate of 1991 would continue and be enhanced.* The Project has had to adjust to the fact that the Chiluba government's commitment to democracy is not what it appeared at first. The MMD government has from time to time harassed NGOs; imprisoned journalists and opposition politicians; adopted a new constitution without seeking popular approval; intentionally excluded former President Kaunda from running for the Presidency in 1996; and caused most of the MMD's leading democrats to leave the cabinet. In retrospect, project planners might have been wise to assume that there were going to be ups and downs in Zambia's democratization. At times, rather than consolidation, there would be retrogression. Thus, the project would need to be flexible to the point that its primary objective might be adjusted to a concern for simply laying the ground work for consolidation sometime in the future.
2. *FODEP and other advocacy groups had sufficient institutional capacity to mobilize their members for general civic education functions.* During the 1991 elections, a number of advocacy groups were able to mobilize a massive monitoring effort which covered most of the polling stations in the country. While these groups were funded by international donors, they showed considerable organizational capacity of their own in terms of mobilizing their members throughout the country. The architects of USAID's

democracy project assumed that it would be possible, though not necessarily easy, to turn these organizations, and particularly FODEP which had taken the lead in monitoring, into vehicles for educating the general public as to democratic values and practice. In point of fact, many members of these organizations lacked much knowledge about democracy, the desire to engage in teaching their fellow citizens about pluralist politics, and the organizational loyalty to overcome the conflict which this major transformation spawned.

4. *Key government leaders could support the implementation of the Project.* The designers of Democratic Governance Project worked primarily with some of the more liberal members of the government to identify the five project components -- particularly Rodger Chongwe, Dipak Patel, Sikota Wina, and F. K. M. Sumaili. When the project had been underway for little over a year, these individuals were all replaced by persons much less sympathetic to the project. The result was that it was difficult for project staff to establish effective communications with top government officials. The Chiluba government took advantage of this situation to argue, without providing any compelling evidence, that the project staff were engaged in unsanctioned activity. Such criticism made the staff feel the government was deliberately undermining them, which was certainly true. Making the situation worse, the Project Proposal had not been tabled in the Cabinet, thus allowing some in Cabinet to claim they had no collective responsibility for what was a very politically sensitive project.

5. *Zambia was ready for the more conflictual elements of liberal democracy, including legislative oversight, adversarial interest groups, and investigative journalism.* This assumption was probably premature in that Zambia's colonial and UNIP governments operated with strong and independent executive leadership. As a result, many politically aware Zambians were shocked by the kind of democracy being fostered by USAID and its donor allies. The Speaker of the Assembly opposed any move away from a Westminster system in which, as the project proposal envisaged, legislative committees review legislation proposed by the executive. The political leadership of MMD was angered by the public pressure which advocacy NGO's, with support of the Project, were putting on the party regarding irregularities in the Constitutional revision process, the registration of voters, and the conduct of the 1996 elections. Finally, some attacks by journalists in the private press on government were seen not as the price of a free press, which those who visited the U.S. and studied with U.S. trainers were taught, but unfair attempts to undermine the government's popularity. In the view of a number of political leaders in the Chiluba government, USAID's project envisaged an open society which would create chaos while they attempted to deal with the economic disaster left by UNIP. If this chaos continued, they perceived the U.S. would be guaranteeing the MMD's fall from power in 1996.

6. *Monitoring and evaluation procedures could be incorporated easily within government and NGO structures.* The project planners assumed implicitly that Zambia was ready for computer driven forms of policy formulation and monitoring, which are standard practice

in U.S. institutions. All that was required was for the Democratic Governance Project to supply the necessary hardware and training. Over the course of the project, it has become clear that few Zambians have the skills and computer background required to implement a management information systems (MIS) approach within their work environment. In addition, project staff were faced with trying to promote democracy in an increasingly hostile political environment. This meant that they had to be flexible in terms of their objectives and the means they used to achieve these objectives. Such a fluid approach does not allow sufficient time to identify measures and set up a data analysis apparatus.

One additional assumption proved unnecessary. Democratic Governance Project planners assumed political reform would be dependent upon successful economic reform. They expected that economic reform must bring tangible improvements to the mass of the population; otherwise the new democratic government would not acquire legitimacy, and the regime would have to become authoritarian. The reality has been different. While the government has pursued an economic reform package designed to bring about the structural adjustments required by the World Bank and the IMF, economic experts we interviewed could provide little or no evidence of positive change thus far. Yet, in spite of this lack of change, no significant political or social movement has arisen to blame the situation on democracy. In so far as Chiluba's government has become more authoritarian, it is because he and his colleagues perceive Zambia's relatively weak advocacy groups and opposition parties as a threat.

Project Component Performance.

In this section, we review the progress made with respect to each of the five components of this project. Our analysis is based on our interviews with project staff, beneficiaries, and independent political observers. In addition, we have reviewed project files. We begin each subsection with a brief summary of the Mid-Term Review's conclusions regarding the first three years of the project. In the course of our analysis we provide an assessment of the overall change made with respect to project goals.

A. Constitutional Reform

The Project's Mid-Term Review termed the constitution recommended by the CRC a "significant improvement over the existing constitution in its incorporation of recognized, accepted democratic precepts." The problem the Project confronted after July of 1995 was twofold: 1) the Government insisted on incorporating into the constitution a provision which required that the President be born of parents who were Zambians by birth or descent; and 2) the Government resolved that the draft constitution should be approved by the National Assembly, which it dominated, rather than by a specially elected Constituent Assembly and a mass referendum.

The organized opposition to Kaunda's exclusion quickly realized that the only way this provision would not become part of the Constitution was if there was an elected Constituent

Assembly and a popular referendum. The threat of such a ratification process would cause Chiluba's followers to back off their objective for fear of losing and being shown to be politically ineffective. The USAID Democratic Governance Project supported the idea of expanding popular involvement in the constitutional review process, beginning with the publication of the CRC report for distribution throughout the country. Nevertheless, the Chiluba government pushed its limited constitution revisions, which excluded all civil rights improvements, through Parliament in the face of an aroused and emotional opposition. The consequence was that the Democratic Governance Project's objective of helping Zambians to write a more democratic constitution supported by a broad consensus was aborted. At a minimum, the Project helped to insure that the public was made aware that the Government did not act in a liberal or inclusive manner with respect to revision of the constitution.

B. Civic Education

The bulk of the civic education program consisted of funding three activities: 1) support for FODEP and its workshops; 2) small grants for civic action education at the community level; and 3) development of a new civics curriculum for the 8th and 9th grades. Each is examined in this section.

FODEP. The Project Paper in 1992 envisaged that a major need of Zambian democracy was that ordinary citizens be educated as to their rights and responsibilities as citizens. The designers identified the Foundation for Democratic Progress (FODEP) as the main organization to undertake this instructional mission with some assistance from other organizations. It was expected that once informed of their role in a democracy, Zambians would begin to make the demands on elected representatives who would then be forced to speak up for the public.

As the Mid-Term Review makes clear, FODEP was not prepared to move from being an election monitor to a mass education organization. The leadership quickly split into warring factions in attempting to define its educational mission. Most important, its new task required that it develop a professional staff for creating and carrying out its educational program. This meant that the Board would have reduced involvement in the policy making process. The professional Secretariat and the Board struggled until last year when the Project Administration Unit (PAU), i.e. Southern University, insisted that the Board allow its Secretariat to run the day-to-day operations of the organization.

In spite of this struggle, FODEP has managed to develop considerable capacity to provide civic education throughout the country. However, as yet Southern University staff has no evidence that this capacity has served in any serious way to provide civic education at the community level. Indeed, Southern staff report that no organized effort has been made by FODEP at the local level. FODEP would dispute this conclusion, but USAID has not allocated funds for a systematic civic education effort at the local level. It would appear that the education which has taken place is at best ad hoc. Most of FODEP's resources from USAID have been

spent training the trainers, not in having these trainers teach ordinary citizens, who were supposed to be reached by the project.

Also preventing FODEP from developing and implementing its civic education program was its inability to manage its financial affairs. At the time of the Mid-Term Review this was still a major problem. Since then, with the help of the Southern University staff there has been some improvement. Southern staff keep FODEP on a very short leash in financial terms. They do not release quarterly payments without a budget from FODEP and an accounting of the last quarter's expenditures.

Another weak point in FODEP's operation is that it cannot run successful workshops for its "volunteers" unless attendees receive a sitting allowance, a per diem, and a transportation subsidy. The total payments are approximately \$8.00 a day, excluding transportation. In many cases, the workshop participants earn more from FODEP events than they earn for a day's work. FODEP staff are not happy about these payments but indicate that this was the general pattern for most so-called "advocacy" organizations in Zambia.

USAID provides the funds by which these payments are made. If USAID decided not to fund workshops, FODEP would collapse as an organization. This patronage in the form of sitting allowances and per diems creates the active membership. In essence, the agents of democratic change must operate within the same patronage political culture within which the politicians operate: provide gifts to your clients for their support. There is as yet no culture of community service without remuneration.

While FODEP has not been credible as a civic education enterprise, it was able to mobilize its membership again in 1996 to monitor the elections in a most extensive manner. Most probably the funding it received from USAID helped it to survive as viable organization in the period between 1991 and 1996. The problem is that it was not able to reengineer itself to take on the new function of civic education at the grassroots level.

Civic Action Fund(CAF). To their credit, the DGA and SU have sought to find alternative ways to provide grassroots civic education with project funds. They thus have increasingly directed their monies toward the CAF, which in the 1992 Project Plan was projected to expend \$100,000 per year on an average of eight projects. No grants were actually made until January 1, 1995 -- over two years after the program began.

In the last two years, the process has speeded up considerably, with an allocation of close to 9 grants every three months. Approximately \$700,000 has been expended. The average grant has been around \$9,000. Most of the grants have gone to projects which provide some form of civic education in local communities. Many are done by church groups or groups concerned with election monitoring. The vast majority of grants fit into two categories. One consists of workshops on voting, the role of the elected representative, and citizen rights. These programs generally emphasize the need for citizens to hold their representatives accountable. Some in the

MMD found these workshops to be anti-government, in that participants or workshop leaders openly concluded that the local representative was not doing his job.

Most of the other small grant workshops concentrated on some form of artistic presentation, mostly theater, in which one or more themes were developed with regard to democracy. For instance, one theater group emphasized the need for non-violence during the forthcoming elections. Usually some formal discussion of the message by the audience was held before or after the performance.

Recipients of grants almost always put on a number of sessions. Theater productions in particular tended to be touring companies which gave as many of 40 to 60 performances. The number of people reached was often quite considerable. Thus the Tilipo Theater Company claimed to reach 44,814 persons through 100 performances. How many of these persons were voters is an open question.

The effectiveness of these workshops and theater performances is another matter. Neither SU nor MSU provided us with any compelling data. Two of the Southern staff did visit on a random basis villages where the projects had been staged to determine whether the grant was fulfilled. They are satisfied that there were no cases where the grant was not used for the purpose for which it was intended. The detailed reports from the grantees provide considerable anecdotal evidence that spirited discussions were generated in village centers and churches about the meaning of democracy.

While the CAF became a way of reaching the ordinary citizens when FODEP was failing to do so, these two aspects of USAID's civic education program were not completely separate. In some areas, such as the Eastern Province, a FODEP organizer is reported to have facilitated the development of a number of successful grant proposals. There is also no doubt that some of the persons putting in for small grants had been to FODEP workshops at the national and province levels. In many cases, however, the small grant program was a means of getting around FODEP to other NGOs which were engaged in election monitoring and civic education.

The Project Paper had proposed that the DGA explore the possibility of having the small grant program administered by a national NGO, possibly FODEP. Southern was not required in its CA to investigate this possibility. Therefore, it made no attempt to find such an NGO for the small grants program. It would appear that a considerable amount of the time of the Civic Action Fund Coordinator and the Training and Evaluation Coordinator is spent dealing with CAF activities. While their monitoring is commendable with respect to civic education, it is regrettable that no Zambian organizational base has been found to administer this program.

Also of concern is whether this sort of grass roots education can be sustained without a small grant fund. None of the reports we read gave us much reason for optimism. At the very least, these grants did provide a means by which USAID has mobilized a considerable array of civic activists to inform the grass roots populace about some elementary ideas about democracy. This education process took place at the same time as the debate over the new constitution took

place, the preparation of the new voter roll, and the 1996 national election campaign. In short, many ordinary citizens were receiving civic education while they were observing important events related to the content of this education. Generally, such a parallel process of education and citizen activity has a positive learning effect.

Civics Education Curriculum. At the time of the Mid-Term Review, the project to develop civics textbooks for eighth and ninth graders was still waiting the signing of a memorandum of understanding. The process picked up speed shortly thereafter. The Project sponsored a National Civics Symposium on the 1st and 2nd of November, 1995. Members of the symposium debated the themes and concepts to be included in the new texts. On the basis of this discussion the staff of the Curriculum Development Centre in the Ministry of Education wrote first drafts. Next, in each province civics teachers participating in two week workshops reviewing the texts. After reflecting on the workshop discussion, Centre staff undertook extensive revisions. Currently, the Ministry of Education is in the process of training all social science teachers regarding the instructional approach to be used with the texts. Out of almost a thousand junior secondary social science teachers in the country, only 150 remain to be trained. The text was made available in March 1997. In summary, the whole project has been completed in little over two years.

USAID provided most of the funding including the cost of publication of the texts. The Southern University staff are to be commended for the open and expeditious way in which the development and implementation of this project took place. The need for the new text was beyond question. Not only had most of the old texts been largely destroyed from two decades of use, but their contents glorified the one-party regime.

The new texts contain forceful statement of liberal democratic principles. Included are such topics as, the reintroduction of multi-partyism in Zambia, democratic governance, political parties, UN conventions on human rights, gender issues, and non-governmental organizations. The one reservation we have about the texts is that their content seems very advanced for eighth and ninth graders. For instance, the texts discuss a series of economic topics including labor markets, functions of money, types of inflation, and insurance. Hopefully, the trial use of the texts in Central and Lusaka provinces during 1996 established that teachers can be trained to deal with such materials.

C. Media Independence

The media independence component of the project was designed to achieve three ends: 1) training journalists to be more professional and thus responsible; 2) providing improved technical assistance which will enhance the quality of journalism in Zambia; and 3) advanced equipment to be used for a permanent training program. The Mid-Term Review comments that this component of the project began very slowly but had picked up speed once Southern University took over the management of the programs involved.

The subsequent achievements are significant. ZAMCOM which provides short term courses for public and private journalists has become independent of government. It must now support itself by effective programming of its courses, providing services to clients, and obtaining grants for development of new endeavors. ZAMCOM's board of directors consists of a spectrum of people from various parts of society. It should be helpful to the executive director in mobilizing public support. The Project has funded once-a-month, two week (some longer) seminars on advanced topics in journalism at ZAMCOM over the last two years. While most of the instructors have come from the United States, in each case there has been a Zambian local understudying the visiting expert and preparing to teach the course in the future. By the end of the project ZAMCOM will have developed 32 advanced short courses by this method. Each course has been fully enrolled (12). More than half of the professional journalists in the country have attended at least one course. In the future, ZAMCOM expects to establish itself as a regional center for short term journalism training. There is every reason to believe it will do so.

The hope is that over time ZAMCOM's programs will produce a more professional cadre of Zambian journalists. Because of neglect of such training during the UNIP years, there is much that still needs to be done. The opportunity for press freedom under the MMD government has not been accompanied by serious adherence to professional reporting standards. During our two week stay in Lusaka, three journalists appeared in court for writing highly political stories which appear to have been unsubstantiated by anything but rumor. Continuation of such behavior is almost certain to provoke a Government clamp down on the private media. This would be unfortunate, because independent newspapers are the most viable challenge to the government given the weakness of opposition political parties.

The other major part of the media independence component was to be the purchase of media equipment to establish a media resource center (MRC) at ZAMCOM. The MRC was to provide technical support for independent journalists and smaller private newspapers and radio stations. The Centre was to have computers, Internet access, and radio and video equipment. ZAMCOM would use the Centre to support its advanced training programs and also to derive income through rentals. When the USAID director (on orders from Washington to make a reduction in US aid to Zambia) cut the Project budget in reaction to Government's insistence on excluding Kaunda from the Presidential elections, he took seven hundred thousand dollars from the MRC line item, effectively stripping most of the radio and video items from the Centre. Delivery of the other items has been delayed for over five months by the Southern University purchasing system. In summary, at the time of the writing of this report, the Project has not been able to deliver much of the equipment promised for the MRC, except for computers.

Several minor aspects of the media independence component have been completed. The computer laboratories for desk-top publishing have been delivered to UNZA and ZAMCOM. They are both operational and being used by students. Both staff development fellows sent to the United States for MA degrees have returned to UNZA.

D. Cabinet Policy Coordination.

One of the more perceptive ideas of the Project planners in 1992 was to recognize that with the end of one party rule wherein UNIP's organization formulated major policies, the MMD would need to upgrade the ministries and the Cabinet in the policy making process. This did happen, and the Policy Analysis and Coordination (PAC) Division was created to streamline and coordinate the policy formulation process, channeling ministerial proposals into the Cabinet for approval. In addition, it was expected that the PAC could monitor implementation of Cabinet decisions.

This component of the Democratic Governance Project sought to insure that Cabinet was provided with clear decision choices by the ministries and that conflicts among ministries with respect to a given issue are resolved as much as possible before the Cabinet makes a decision as to its recommendation to Parliament.

This component had two main thrusts: 1) provision of a networked computer system for use by the twelve staff of the PAC and 2) short-term technical assistance supplied by MSI/Abt Associates for training PAC staff in computerized policy analysis and monitoring. The computers are in place at PAC and are being used, although to this point only for word processing. The technical assistance has resulted in an upgrading of ministerial submissions to Cabinet. To be sure there are some decisions, often made by the President in the absence of ministerial consultation, that do not go through the process. Most impressively, the PAC has even produced a detailed handbook outlining the new, improved process for ministerial submissions to Cabinet. Several persons we interviewed, including a minister, praised the advances which PAC has brought to the Cabinet decision making process.

The Mid-Term Report states that the PAC staff "do not yet know how to make use of appropriate software...for ...data processing...policy formulation and analysis, or for planning." Nothing seems to have changed as a result of subsequent technical assistance. We suspect that such data analysis will require much more training than the short term type which has been utilized in this component of the Democratic Governance Project. In particular, such training requires a firm grounding in quantitative analysis, economics, and the policy realms being examined. At a minimum, this means a masters degree program lasting two years.

Training of the PAC staff and implementation of the local area network was terminated in July of 1996 when Washington (USAID and State) instructed the Zambian Mission to cut its assistance to the government because of the MMD's anti-democratic actions. This meant that no training could begin on preparing the PAC staff for the task of resolving interministerial conflicts which plague most policy making at the Cabinet level. Also, it was not possible to train staff in the ministries in policy analysis skills required to participate effectively in the Cabinet decision process being established. In short, the termination of this part of the project has meant that the goal of achieving policy coordination between Cabinet and the ministries is only in the beginning stages. Most unfortunate in this regard is that the consultants seem to have done a very good job in the training they provided, and the PAC staff are highly motivated individuals who are enthusiastic about the training.

In effect, USAID aborted this program not because of its ineffectiveness but because of the government's anti-democratic behavior. This decision showed no concern for the fact that the results being achieved were actually promoting a more transparent democratic system. The termination was particularly unfortunate in that the Secretary to the Cabinet is reliably reported to have said that this component of the project was "so successful that we should plant the American flag on it."

E. Legislative Performance

The Mid-Term Review provides a detailed examination of the events which led to the termination of this component in January of 1995. We agree with the Review team on their conclusion that as long as attitudes within the Parliament mitigate against direct US assistance, not much will be possible in terms of strengthening legislative performance. We also concur with the team's suggestion that alternative opportunities should be explored.

The one option we support is working with the Zambia Law Development Commission. The Commission was hived off from government and is now an autonomous body which receives part of its funding from government. The Director indicated to us that his organization will be working with groups in society seeking to do research on and submit legislative proposals to Parliament. He expects that the Commission will develop a "democracy agenda" which would involve drawing up legislation on such matters as voter registration, regulation of civic groups and media policy. The Director envisages the Commission as a neutral forum in which hitherto polarized groups in society can talk.

Cross Cutting Elements

Two considerations cross cut all elements of the project: 1) a monitoring and evaluation component and 2) a concern for gender issues. The first was explicitly and extensively articulated in the Project Paper. It was to be undertaken by a cooperative agreement with a US based research institution.

The cross cutting element related to gender did not appear in a major project document until a March 1994 review of the gender dimensions of the USAID/Zambia's DG Project. The Mid-Term Review devoted six pages of text to evaluating the extent of the project's focus on gender issues.

The next two sections evaluate the performance of project staff and beneficiaries related to these two aspects of the project.

A. Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E)

Michigan State University's Political Science Department was engaged under a CA to perform the monitoring and evaluation function related to this project. The CA specified that three products were to be delivered:

1. an MIS to enable staff to monitor inputs and outputs.
2. a series of evaluation studies (baseline, mid-term, and final).
3. a series of special studies to provide analysis to USAID and others on "issues of democratic consolidation in an African country."

The MSU team has delivered on the products it promised, including an MIS, a Baseline Study, a Mid-Term Review, and a series of special studies on Zambian politics. The special studies examine general political attitudes, political culture and democracy, democratization and economic reform, and gender issues in democratization. In addition, one of the MSU doctoral students wrote a report on "legislative programming." One special study remains. It will focus on political participation, including an analysis of changes in participation between the 1991 and 1996 elections, comparison of participation in Zambia with a sample of other countries, and, most interestingly, an examination of whether Zambians experiencing various forms of civic education differ from the national sample. A first draft of the civic education analysis became available while we were in Zambia. The remainder of this section provides a brief review of the quality of the products provided by MSU.

Baseline Study. The major focus of this study was on establishing a conceptual framework for a rigorous gathering of data on all components of the Project with respect to their contribution to the "project purpose" (making public decision making more accessible and effective) and specific aims of "each participating institution." In both regards, what was sought preferably were quantitative "performance measures." To achieve this end, an MIS was to be established to, "as a matter of routine, capture data on institutional performance." Mr. Frank Zinn from MSU came to Zambia in June of 1994 to work with the PAU on the establishment of a project MIS and to conduct training in its use. The idea appears to be that the PAU would then train Project beneficiaries in establishing their own MIS.

In our discussions with project and beneficiary staff, we identified no significant gathering of performance measures using the MIS system. The Mid-Term Review did not comment on the implementation of MIS except to call on the "Mission" to find "more suitable program outcomes and indicators." Subsequently, MSU and project staff, as far as we could determine, did not make a serious attempt to deal with this problem. Needless to say, the absence of the envisaged MIS data made it impossible for members of our team to obtain the quantitative measures required to perform the third objective of our scope of work, namely to provide measures to appraise Project impacts.

A final comment is necessary on the quantitative approach envisaged in the project paper and baseline study. While many social scientists find quantitative analysis compelling as an

ideal, such an approach is very difficult to employ for such complex social and political processes as the development of democracy. This difficulty is apparent in many of the quantitative measures proposed in the baseline study. Some were trivial in significance, e.g., measures for legislative influence. Others would have been very time consuming to obtain, e.g., increased citizen access to media fora. And, still others did not measure what they were supposed to measure, e.g., reduction in state media dominance. In short, even if the capacity had existed among beneficiaries and staff to obtain the data they were supposed to collect, there is every likelihood that their efforts would have been very costly for the results obtained.

Mid-Term Review. The Review is quite complete in terms of reporting on project activities accomplished. Most of the recommendations, however, involve tinkering with project activities in order to improve somewhat the effectiveness of various components. To be sure, there is a recommendation that the legislative performance section be terminated because of resistance to this component of the project by the National Assembly Administration.

In some respects the Review did not seem, at least in retrospect, to go far enough. The Baseline Study stated that the Project "rests on the key assumption that 'the Government of the Republic of Zambia maintains or expands its commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law'". In the Mid-Term Review, the authors report a "gradual, though not yet debilitating, erosion of democratic gains." Their expectation is that the MMD will use "increasingly hard-line tactics." Interestingly, this prescient analysis led to no discussion of what should be done if this anti-democratic trend continued to undermine the key assumption on which the project was based.

Another subject not addressed in the Mid-Term Review is that project staff and beneficiaries would be able to implement various forms of quantitative evaluation. While the report calls for a redesign of the indicators earlier suggested by the MSU baseline study, it did not address the much more serious problem, which should have been evident, that the capacities of project and beneficiary staff to handle quantitative data were very limited. The Review should have at least raised the question of the need for a much less quantitative approach to project monitoring.

Special Studies. Michigan State staff have produced four special studies which show a higher class of professionalism than is to be found in most scholarly journals concerned with African politics. More than anything else, these reports provide a description of the political context in which the Zambia DG Project was operating and the barriers which USAID and its local partners needed to confront, especially undemocratic elements of the political culture, the paucity of political knowledge, extensive sexism, powerful forces resisting change in the Parliament, and lack of communication between citizens and their representatives. In addition, van de Walle and Chiwele make an excellent case that thus far democratization has not been inimical to economic reform in Zambia (The authors are less compelling that this will be the case in the future.). Certain elements of the political system affecting democratization are given consideration only in passing in these studies. Most importantly, there is little attention to ways

in which traditional leaders, patronage politics, and elite political culture fit into the process of democratic change in Zambia.

While all four studies and the legislative programming report are praiseworthy from a political science point of view, they leave something to be desired in terms their policy relevance or utility. The Project Paper calls for these studies to be concerned with “the consolidation of democratic governance” and to provide "lessons and recommendations" for USAID/Zambia and Africa Bureau programs in the DG area. In the CA, MSU is also asked to “contribute to the scholarly literature on democratic change.” The primary focus of the MSU research for these special studies was on this latter objective of contributing to the scholarly literature. In terms of informing USAID programming, the results are disappointing. The only major “lesson” learned comes from the van de Walle and Chiwele paper which shows that a relatively tough economic reform program can proceed concurrently with democratization. Otherwise, the papers have little to say about how democracy is being or is not being “consolidated” in Zambia. It is possible that the delayed paper on participation will provide some lessons. The “recommendations” provided thus far to the Zambia DG Project are very scant; little more than two pages out of a total almost 170 pages in the special studies. In terms of policy relevance, the studies, except for van de Walle and Chiwele, outline problems (related to participation, political culture and gender) existing in Zambia with respect to democratization and briefly suggest actions which might be taken to deal with these problem. There is no evaluation of whether the suggested actions could work, and if so, under what conditions.

There are a number of reasons for this lack of policy relevance. First, and most important, under the CA, MSU was to undertake the studies before the Project’s components could have much effect. Second, the Project Paper and the CA do not articulate topics for the special studies in a form which would direct traditional academics toward research and analysis relevant to policy makers. This is not surprising since USAID staff had little idea in the early nineties about the type of policy relevant research it needed. Third, there does not appear to have been much substantial discussion between Project and MSU staff about the type of studies which the staff needed². The only exception to this appears to be the recent study of civic education in which the SU and MSU staffs cooperated in designing and carrying out a some research which is clearly policy relevant.

We would presume that this recent collaborative paper entitled “The Impact of Civic Education on the Knowledge, Values and Actions of Zambian Citizens” is a first draft and will be revised. Thus it is not appropriate to comment in detail on the analysis. The results are encouraging in that they suggest that civic education sponsored by USAID has made a difference with respect to political knowledge, values and behavior at the mass level. However, we do have

We are not talking about technical, trip and financial reports or amendments to the CA. Rather, our concern is with discussion of overall substantive direction of the research to be undertaken. As we make clear in the management section, this is not so much a function of personalities as of the way the MSU CA was articulated.

one concern about the sample of persons exposed to civic education. The paper gives the impression that the sample was taken from average citizens who were instructed by trainers who themselves were trained as part of the Project. When we discussed the sample with PAU staff, who collected the sample, we gained the impression that a significant portion of the sample did not consist of grassroots citizens. Rather, it included mostly: 1) persons who received training as FODEP trainers and 2) teachers who were being trained to teach the new junior secondary curriculum. These persons received training which ranged from two entire days to one week. As such, it is not the type of civic education which was envisaged in the project, which was to be training conducted in local communities.

In summary, MSU delivered products which are clearly within the scope of work outlined in its CA. However, we suggest that future monitoring and evaluation should be more attuned to assisting project staff in their decision making. On the basis of the Zambia experience it would be helpful if

1. monitoring measures, which can be either quantitative or non-quantitative, be designed to capture non-trivial concerns and be appropriate to the skills of beneficiaries;
2. evaluations include a consideration of the relevance of project assumptions and suggestions for alteration in project objectives required by violation of original assumptions;
3. academic research should focus on alternative change strategies and actors participating in Project programs.

B. Gender Focus

The Mid-Term Review of gender issues provides a fairly accurate picture of the way in which the project has dealt with the gender issue up to the present time. In effect, there was little attention to this issue. This is the case even though the Ferguson and Ludwig paper called for a substantial expansion of gender oriented programs in all components of the project. We were only able to identify a gender component in two aspects of the project: 1) the Civic Action Fund and 2) the new civics curriculum. A small number of the Civic Action Fund grants went to womens groups. However, in spite of the recommendation in the Mid-Term Review, we see no indication that the number subsequently increased. The civics textbooks have a well developed chapter detailing the ways in which Zambian laws and customs discriminate against women, the changes which must be made, and the various organizations fighting to bring about this change. Over time the textbook could work a major change in the thinking of future generations of voters and political activists

There is every reason to believe more could be done in the future to promote gender equality. Whatever the components of future democracy projects in Zambia, particular concern

ought to be taken to insure that specific gender oriented enterprises are incorporated in every component.

Management of the Project

Overall Management Structure

This is a complex project, addressing a series of five discrete objectives unconnected with each other except for their long term goal. The designers underestimated the difficulties such complexity could cause. Later USAID actions compounded the situation. The CA with Michigan State defined the monitoring and evaluation function as being conducted largely outside the administrative structure of the project. There was delay in hiring a Project Manager. Then, a CA with Southern University transferred an unclear amount of administrative responsibility to staff from that university. Even this decision was delayed for almost a year.

Considerable credit must be given to the efforts of the DGA in coordinating the resulting structure. When he arrived in March 1993, he assumed the duties of Project Officer while also performing his advisory function. His duties required that he learn about USAID procurement and other internal procedures, a not inconsiderable undertaking for someone who had never worked for USAID.

Several advisory groups were specified in the Project Paper. One was the U.S. Mission's Democracy/Governance Project Advisory Committee. The other was a Project Management Board which was to serve as a means for involving Zambians in project decision making. It was never established. The DGA also synchronized aspects of the project with other donors through various consultative bodies.

The discussion which follows examines the critical management aspects of the project related to the Democracy and Governance Advisor, the Project Administrative Unit, the Monitoring and Evaluation CA, coordination of the project with other actors and organizations in Zambia concerned with democratic governance, and the costs of management of the project.

Democracy and Governance Advisor

The central figure in project implementation is the Democracy and Governance Advisor (DGA), a Personal Services Contractor, reporting to the USAID Program Officer. He is responsible for providing USAID and the overall U.S. Mission with expertise on DG matters and for ensuring sound management of the project. The Project Paper Annex G and the DGA's contract provide a list of his duties. The DGA is basically expected to interact within the Zambian democracy/governance 'community' for the purpose of receiving and imparting knowledge relevant to democratic development and for analyzing the evolution of events.

The DGA is a unique concept. It is both part of the USAID Mission structure carrying out a range of duties within its bureaucracy and a proactive participant within the Zambian and donor communities on matters having to do with Zambia's evolution in the DG area. Its existence recognizes the absence within USAID of the skills and knowledge in this new area of development.

The project was fortunate in obtaining as DGA an individual who proved very capable at performing his duties, both administrative and advisory. By his skills and commitment the DGA has become the fulcrum not only for the implementation of project activities, but for representing US views in this sensitive area of interaction and assistance. It is a high profile position, one which would be difficult for a career civil servant to carry out because of the restraints such status entails.

Given the somewhat volatile nature of Zambia's first years of multi-party democracy, it is not surprising that the DGA has on occasion been caught up in controversy. His very presence at politically charged events caused some people to question the purpose or propriety of his attendance. At a press conference related to last year's elections, he and a number of other donor officials were personally criticized for their (incorrectly presumed) involvement in the preparation of reports by Zambian monitoring organizations.

It is commendable that the DGA has continued to risk (or, perhaps better expressed, not to avoid) such criticism by remaining fully engaged and publicly supportive of good governance, despite the MMD's vocal resentment. However, a negative consequence is that the incumbent has become identified in some quarters as being an active participant in Zambian opposition politics. Like some NGOs and some other donor representatives, he has become a victim of the government's resentment of those whose views are critical of its policies. One observer commented that the DGA's effectiveness may have been irreversibly compromised.

Despite raising hackles in some official quarters, the DGA as a person has won high marks with a wide spectrum of Zambians and from other donors for his performance and his obvious commitment to promoting forward movement toward a more accountable and effective government. Favorable comment was also made about retaining such a position in any future democratic governance program.

The DGA is both a position and a person. The project has been fortunate in both circumstances. But, by combining the functions of the DGA with that of a Project Manager, the question has to be asked whether the impact of the advisory role might have been lessened. It is certainly a question to be considered in the future if the position is continued.

The Cooperative Agreement with Southern University, which was signed in March 1994, was based on a decision, after the project was authorized, to seek outside resources to assist in implementation. This decision resulted from reassessment of the management workload this complex project would impose on USAID's own resources. The SU agreement had a budget of \$7.7 million to cover 39 months of operations. SU as the Project Administration Unit (PAU) moved expeditiously to place staff, including a Chief of Party (COP) in the field within weeks of the signing of the agreement.

All project components, with the exception of Constitutional Reform and Cabinet Policy Coordination, were to be implemented by the PAU, albeit with oversight by USAID as well as approvals of all contractual arrangements. Included in its responsibilities were direct management of the Civic Action Fund, inputs to media independence activities, the institutional strengthening of FODEP and supporting its civic education activities, and the development of a civics curriculum for the schools.

The PAU has a staff of 19 employees, its own offices, and vehicles. The quality of the staff appears quite high. The COP is an impressive professional who exudes confidence and full knowledge of her responsibilities. Her two most senior Zambian professionals display similar qualities. Generally the PAU can be given credit for fulfilling USAID's expectations for enabling the implementation of the various components for which it is responsible.

A major item of the PAU's responsibilities is the direct management of the CAF. In theory applications are sought through advertising in the printed media. But given the limited coverage of the media, the PAU seeks to spread the word through various informal networks. The system appears to work well since after each quarterly 'advertising' about 200 submissions are received. Awards have been dispersed throughout the country. PAU staff do extensive field visits to follow-up with the grantees to ensure they have carried out the proposed activities. The PAU's assessment is that the grantees have been very reliable in fulfilling their commitments and in accounting for the funds.

The PAU has two responsibilities with regard to the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP). As mentioned above, FODEP has been trying to transform itself from what was an ad hoc coalition to a permanent institution. For this purpose, PAU has paid and trained FODEP's staff, covered the rent and equipped its premises, and provided a series of experts both for improving its management and as resource persons for workshops and seminars. FODEP's transition to a well established and managed organization has been difficult. There have been six executive directors of FODEP, and reports continue of serious ongoing conflict within the organization's Board. The task of turning FODEP into a viable, self-sustaining entity remains a formidable one. Yet there have been accomplishments. FODEP was the primary election monitoring organization in the 1996 elections. It has carried out a series of training and workshop exercises which give it the capacity in theory to perform civic education at the community level.

From both the PAU's and FODEP's perspectives their relationship has been bumpy. From FODEP's side the approach taken by the PAU in trying to assist it has been paternalistic, even dictatorial. FODEP staff feel that they are not treated as a 'partner' in that they are not consulted sufficiently regarding prior clearance of consultants and clear understandings on budget allocations. The PAU has had cause on many occasions to be frustrated with the shortcomings of FODEP in terms of its staff being willing to learn and manage their resources efficiently. The end result is that both sides are very frustrated with their relationship.

The experience of the PAU and ZAMCOM has been more positive. The fact that ZAMCOM benefits from having a highly capable Zambian head who has his own organizational vision is a key ingredient to the progress made. ZAMCOM expressed satisfaction with the quality of consultants provided by PAU. It too would have preferred more prior consultation, particularly in the selection of instructors brought in from the U.S. An outstanding issue has been the long delay in procurement of radio and video training equipment by the PAU. The suppliers seem poised to cancel the order if payment cannot be made (five months have transpired since the order was placed). The problem is reported to rest with the home office of SU which has been unable to unravel a bureaucratic blockage imposed by Louisiana law with regard to prior payment for items purchased abroad (Germany in this case).

The PAU's management of the development of the junior secondary civics textbooks was a successful endeavor from beginning to end. The COP did a superb job of working with the Ministry of Education in initiating the endeavor and ensuring Zambian involvement and ownership of the entire curriculum development process.

Overall, one caveat needs to be stated. The PAU was supposed to be the mechanism by which USAID sought to relieve itself of much of the implementation burden for the project. In point of fact, the Mission continued to be very deeply involved in the details of implementation. The files indicate a fair degree of interaction with the DGA with regard to procurement actions and a range of other issues. While the CA allowed for "substantial involvement" on the part of the Mission, the degree of involvement in a number of cases seemed to be excessive. Certainly the rules on procurement are such that a CA recipient can be given more latitude in decision making on such matters.

Michigan State University CA

The MSU CA was in part to provide the project with a means of monitoring and assessing implementation. The information generated was to be an important management tool. This does not appear to have occurred in any systemic way. Rather the MSU work has taken place almost as a parallel rather than integral activity. This evaluation team was unable to determine the exact quality or extent of interaction which went on between USAID and MSU due to the paucity of communications in the Mission's files. However, both sides reported to us that the extent of communication was less than sufficient, particularly in terms of ensuring that the studies were more geared toward providing recommendations for improving the quality of project activities being undertaken. Since the CA only required that the principal investigator at

MSU consult on monitoring and evaluation issues with USAID/Zambia, no framework or formal guidelines were provided for critical discussion of research issues.

A major contribution of the MSU CA was to assist project staff by undertaking the Mid-Term Review. Completed in July 1995 after a month of intensive analysis, this report contained a wealth of information about the project and an extensive series of recommendations with respect to each component. Yet the Review appears to have been largely shelved. It was reported that the Mission Director of the time termed it a flawed document. His reasoning was that two members of the team had been involved in the Project's design and one was also the principal investigator for the MSU CA. The Director believed that these two individuals could not be objective due to their prior involvement. The participation of both was cleared with the Regional Legal Advisor and measures were taken by the team to ensure no influence by the two individuals on sections having to do with their responsibilities. The Director's insistence, nevertheless, that the Review be disregarded is most troubling since it meant an important opportunity was lost to revisit the project design and examine implementation. Luckily some of the findings were acted upon under the direction of the DGA and Program Officer.

Coordination

Zambia's move to a multi-party system excited not only its own people but also a number of aid agencies. It became essential that whatever USAID did be closely coordinated with its donor allies to ensure that there was no overlapping aid being given and that maximum impact was secured relative to progress in good governance. Also, democracy and governance assistance are related to activities normally within the scope of other U.S. Mission entities. It was thus important that a way be found to ensure close working relationships and mutual understanding.

A number of groups have emerged in the course of the project to promote coordination. Among the donors, the pinnacle of coordination is the Consultative Group which usually meets every year in Paris to allow donors to interact with the Government to establish an agreement on the following year's economic program and to secure donor commitments of support. These meetings have always involved interchanges on issues of dispute related to Government performance. Democracy and governance considerations were until recently almost entirely absent. That has now changed. A link has emerged between donor willingness to support economic development activities and Government performance in DG. Staff of the Democratic Governance Project are not directly involved at this level, but the whole program is indirectly affected by what happens in the dialogue leading up to the CG meeting and the outcome of the Paris discussions.

On a more practical level, there is a monthly Heads of Mission meeting at which DG is discussed. This is an opportunity for the exchange of information on DG activities between embassies. The U.S. Ambassador normally attends these meetings. There is also a lower level group of representatives from diplomatic missions and assistance agencies involved in DG. This usually meets monthly with a rotating chairpersonship. This meeting is where those most directly involved in DG projects and/or Government performance meet to discuss issues, share

information and try to coordinate approaches. A less formal and smaller group referred to as the 'nuts and bolts' meeting also meets monthly, and in times of crisis more frequently, to compare notes. The DGA participates in both of these groups.

Within the U.S. Mission there is a Democracy Governance coordinating meeting chaired by the Ambassador and attended by the USAID Director, United State Information Service Public Affairs Officer, and the DGA acting as secretary. The objective of this meeting is to insure that the Project's activities are consistent with overall U.S. government objectives in Zambia.

The Project Paper also specified a D/G Project Management Board. This was to be composed of representatives of each project component (FODEP, ZAMCOM, etc.) plus representatives from public, private and voluntary organizations unconnected to the project. The mid-term evaluation noted the failure to put this group into place. The reason was that critical government officials did not have the time or inclination to participate. The Review team recommended that the Board be allowed to lapse. It felt that the functions of the Board could best be accomplished through the DGA's consultation within the democracy governance community and linkages between organizations supported by the Zambia Democratic Governance Project. However, the point remains that the existence of a formal consultative group could have played an important role in involving Zambians more directly in the project and thus playing down the perception of foreign manipulation. Such involvement might have avoided some of the feelings on the part of both Government and NGOs that they did not know what was happening in the project. Still another benefit of such an arrangement would have been some good advice from people best placed to provide it.

In conclusion, donor and internal coordination is only as good as the commitment of the people participating. From our conversations, we believe the quality of donor coordination in Zambia has been quite good; better and more intense at times when there are problems with the Government's performance. The only shortcoming is the absence in the project of a Zambian advisory group. Any new program should give serious consideration to utilizing such an approach to better coordinate the disparate elements affected and to build Zambian ownership.

Costs

The SOW specified that an evaluation be made of the costs of various elements of project management. It is not possible to do a cost benefit analysis. Rather an attempt can only be made to determine whether the funds expended for a particular component of management appear to have produced the desired 'bang for the buck'. Trying to do this is highly subjective and based partly on intuition.

The position of DGA has been pivotal to the project. The estimated costs for his services over the life of project come to \$650,000 or an average of \$130,000 a year. In addition to

carrying out the original duties of DGA, he has assumed a number of functions intended for the Project Manager position. The primary value of the DGA is his academic expertise in the area of democracy and governance and his experience in other development settings. His expertise has been well used in terms of providing USAID with sound analysis of the Zambia's political evolution since 1993, particularly as it impacts upon the project's activities. He has also proven a valuable asset to the donor community, conveying to them his knowledge and in turn keeping abreast of its thinking and sharing that with USAID and the U.S. Mission. His interest and commitment have also taken him deep into the Zambian political scene where he has developed an impressive range of contacts with key players in the Government, the NGO community, and politically active citizens. In addition to this advisory role, the DGA managed, with no prior experience, to handle matters normally undertaken by a project manager. The conclusion has to be that the value of a DGA position, particularly during the past four years, was worth the investment. A similar position makes sense in any future DG activity although the skills should be adjusted to fit the area(s) of focus.

The Southern University CA is a substitute for USAID's lack of internal capacity to manage the project. It is an expensive alternative. The costs for the PAU and Southern University's home office come to \$2,146,000 over the four and a half years of the CA. This cost equates to close to forty percent of the total assistance it is implementing (\$5,478,000). This figure is somewhat inflated by the fact that all project transportation costs are included (even for MSU). Nevertheless, the size of administrative overhead involved is beyond a reasonable proportion. Particularly unsettling is the cost of the Southern University home office. We received no information which could justify such expenditures. This is particularly the case in the last year when the level of home office support required by the Lusaka office has declined considerably.

The MSU CA was to provide a sophisticated monitoring and evaluation capability. At the time the project was conceived USAID was a novice in terms of fostering democracy and governance. The need to learn and to have assurance it was receiving well founded information on which to base decisions was real. The cost of the MSU CA effort was considerable - \$1,026,408 according to CA as amended. Given the fact that the Project staff have made very little use of the MSU reports (outside of the Mid-Term Review) in the management of the project's implementation, there is cause to question if this was a good investment. There is still work emerging from this component which could prove invaluable to future planning and to overall knowledge about Zambia's DG development. Also, a wider scholarly audience will be interested in the results of MSU's special studies. On this basis alone the investment may prove worthwhile. However, if USAID incorporates an M&E component in its next DG Zambia program, the management of the project should have the opportunity to insure that the indices of evaluation and the major studies undertaken serve to inform critical project implementation decisions.

Conclusion

The arrangements for management of the project were somewhat different from those in the Project Paper, which underestimated the complexity and degree of effort. The contracting of many management functions to SU under a CA and assumption of more line functions by the DGA allowed for the development of an effective management system in terms of delivering support to the various components. The DGA did a good job of coordinating the project with US mission concerns and other donor activities. One management flaw has been the lack of Zambian ownership, particularly with respect to Zambian involvement in high level Project decision making. Also of concern is the high cost of the two CAs (MSU and SU) relative to the services delivered by the project. Finally, the top management structure consisted of three relatively independent actors (DGA, the Principal Investigator for MSU, and the Chief of Party (COP) for SU) who were not well coordinated through an overall authority structure.

Lessons Learned

The Zambia Democratic Governance Project is one of the first major projects of its kind which USAID has undertaken during the current wave of democratic transitions in Africa. We believe it is important to identify some of the lessons which can be learned from the first four years of the Project's existence:

1. Democratization and economic reform can proceed concomitantly without either seriously undermining the other. The Chiluba government has stuck to its course as far as allowing the market to determine prices and refusing to protect domestic sectors from foreign competition. The suffering at the mass level as a result of economic stabilization and structural adjustment has been considerable, and very little growth is yet evident. Nevertheless, the government has not faced a political movement which seriously challenged its popularity outside of the intellectual classes. The demonstration effect of this outcome for other African governments may be considerable. These governments can anticipate, at least in the short term, that with careful political steps they can discipline the economy while opening up political dialogue with opposition forces.
2. A project should be based on the assumption that the government's support for democratization could decline after the initial euphoria. This means the project should be planned with the idea that there may be times when the activities undertaken will have to involve lowered levels of perceived threat to the government. The reality of democracy projects is that they foster an environment in which opposition to the government has increased opportunity to speak and organize. A continuing concern for project organizers is how much of such political challenges the government can stand without clamping down politically or deciding not to allow further consolidation of democratic institutions.
3. The patronage element of African politics is likely to be a factor in sustaining organizations which promote democracy. As a result, project designers should seek activities where patronage directly finances more democratic behavior. For example, funding FODEP to monitor elections had much more payoff at the grassroots level in Zambia than funding it (as USAID did) to provide mass civic education. In the latter case, the funds went to train the trainers and did not reach a mass education level.
4. In democratic governance projects, monitoring and evaluation of the project should focus on helping administrators choose between various project options. This means that researchers connected with the project should be in continuous dialogue with project management, at least in terms of the topics to be explored. Such dialogue is required because in part democratization must be promoted where immediate opportunities exist. Trying to plan research programs for five years, as the Project Plan and the MSU CA did, leaves such programs unrelated to what is actually taking place in a specific field project. Also, such an approach to monitoring and evaluation means that measures of success

need to be focused on qualitative as well as quantitative considerations and to be understandable to local leaders.

5. Local participation in top level project decisions is a very difficult objective to achieve. A number of different possibilities need to be explored rather than insisting on only one approach. For instance, in the present project it might have been better to try obtaining local participation for each component rather than for the overall project. In some cases, it may be possible to create a series of overall project groups including separate ones for politicians, civil servants, and civil society groups.

6. Caution should be taken in funding social institutions to perform activities for which they were not originally organized. In the case of the Democratic Governance Project in Zambia, the expectation was that FODEP would change from undertaking election monitoring to being a civic education enterprise. A significant element in the leadership of FODEP never had much interest in teaching the general public about democratic values. This group was primarily intent on controlling political leaders through elections. Thus far, FODEP has not been able to develop a new consensus around its civic education goal. On the other hand, the Ministry of Education took on the task of developing a new civics text with ease. The product being produced because MOE has textbook production as a mission, and a unit of the ministry is staffed to accomplish this mission.

7. Promoting the development of democracy can easily lead to the involvement of project staff in domestic politics. The result is that project organizations and staff find themselves losing credibility with political groups critical to democratic consolidation. Continuous and careful consideration needs to be given the continuation of specific projects when such politization takes place. In the Zambia Democratic Governance Project support for FODEP may have reached the point where the costs of continued support are too high.

8. More controversial programs in political terms may best be kept at a local level where the national political leadership is not likely to be threatened. For example, the Civic Action Fund supported education projects at the local level which in many cases presented the same message as FODEP at the national level. However, it was only FODEP which tended to become threatening to the government.

Recommendations

This section sets out our recommendations for a follow-on USAID democratic governance program in Zambia. These recommendations should not be taken as an outline or design for such a program. They are rather guidelines for those involved in the development of the next Zambian democratic governance project. We believe that progress toward a democratic governance is a long term process; however, our recommendations focus on a shorter term which relevant to the context of USAID planning. In our view, this new program should be guided by the following principles:

1. *Be focused.* Rather than having five components, it would be better to concentrate funds on one or two areas where progress can be made.
2. *Be flexible.* When progress cannot be made on a particular project component because the political climate has changed from what was assumed to be the case, project staff should have the opportunity to drop or modify an activity which is a target for funding. This might mean that more cautious and more adventuresome components should be kept in reserve to be adopted if there is a change in political climate.
3. *Be politically cautious.* Care must be taken to be sensitive to Zambian perceptions that a particular component is an unwarranted intrusion into the domestic affairs of their country. This is not easy to achieve in a project which seeks to shape internal political structures. However, USAID may be best advised to choose project components which have a less political nature.
4. *Keep monitoring requirements simple.* It is important that project activities be monitored in a way which is within the capacities of grantees and also does not require excessive verification and analysis by project staff. The critical monitoring concern should be that the activity was carried out in a manner consistent with the grantee's proposal.
5. *Expand Zambian participation.* There should be some form of advisory council wherein Zambians from public, private and NGO organizations discuss projects with USAID before design and throughout implementation.
6. *Target concrete gender objectives.* In so far as possible, a gender dimension should be built into each project component.
7. *Make lines of authority explicit and less expensive.* The present system tends to have three actors functioning without any required central direction. This might mean that there should be

one contract rather than three, as is presently the case. Or, there could be one person at USAID's mission who has clear authority to oversee the performance of contractors. In any case, this management structure should be financed at a substantially reduced cost than is the case at present.

8. *Reduce recipient dependence on USAID funding.* Donor contributions have virtually funded all monitoring and civic education activities in Zambia. If USAID is to continue supporting such programs, there should be some provision made for the organizations involved to raise part of their funds outside the donor community. Otherwise, the strong impression is given that Zambians will only take responsibility because donors are interested, which is a dead end as far creating any kind of development process.

9. *Set more realistic goals.* It would be better to have a more limited overall objective than democratic governance. For instance, the project purpose could be fostering a more open society and government. Within this general vision, project designers could select from two or at most three of the following specific programs (listed in order of priority given the present political context):

a) Support for Judicial and Legal Reform. Such a program could focus on improving the functioning of the judicial system, the drafting of laws, and the improvement of existing statutes. It is important, however, that such a component of a democratic governance project also promote understanding of basic human rights by judges, lawyers, and public officials and that it not serve simply to increase the efficiency of the government to enforce the law.

b) Civic Action Fund. The fund would continue, as in the present program, to make grants related to civic education. If possible these grants might be focused on other activities besides civic education, such as the building of institutions which promote a more open society. For instance, the fund might support a women's group coalition to draw up a women's manifesto at election time. It also might make sense to split the grant program into a larger program which can give more than \$25,000 and a smaller one which gives less.

c) Civic Forums. The program would support organizations holding discussions or publishing opinion essays on issues related to democracy and governance. These organizations would have first established a reputation for neutrality between the various political factions concerned with a particular issue. For instance, the Law Development Commission might be supported to hold discussions on specific pieces of legislation which promote more openness in civil society .

d) Press Freedom Program. The program would provide grants to ZAMCOM and other organizations to train journalists in advanced subjects which would enhance their professionalism.

e) Civil Society Dialogue with Government. Support for development oriented groups to work on articulating their interests to government. This might take the form of helping organizations formulate policy analyses which would be presented to relevant ministries or holding conferences of public, private and NGO groups concerned with a particular issue.

f) National "Visioning" Exercise. The objective would be to examine issues of democracy and governance with the idea of developing a consensus on an overall vision for the evolution of Zambian government and politics over the next decade. The process would bring together politicians, top civil servants, and leaders of various civil society groups. Similar exercises have been held in South Africa and Botswana recently.

APPENDICES

Scope of Work

Zambia Democratic Governance Project

Final Evaluation

SCOPE OF WORK

Cooperative Agreement No. 623-0226-a-00-3024-00 between USAID/Zambia and Michigan State University provides for a final evaluation to be conducted in Year 5 of the Zambia Democratic Governance Project. the scope of this final evaluation, which is fully budgeted for under the Cooperative Agreement, is as follows:

Objectives

The final evaluation will, in the words of the Cooperative Agreement, "appraise project performance against stated project goals and purposes." Specifically, the evaluation team will accomplish the objectives listed below:

1. Consider the effects of the evolving political context in Zambia on Project performance.
2. Report on progress and setbacks in all Project components (Civil Rights Promotion, Media Independence, Legislative Performance, Policy coordination) since the Mid-Term Review of June 1995.
3. Provide measurements to appraise Project impacts at organizational and beneficiary levels. Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of such impacts against Project expenditures.
4. Review arrangements for managing the Project with special reference to the roles, skills and costs of the Democracy/Governance Advisor and key institutional contractors (including Southern University and Michigan State University.)
5. Comment on lessons learned from the experience of the Project, including the effects on beneficiaries and the Government of Zambia of the June 1996 suspension of core Project activities.

6. Contributing to USAID/Zambia's DG planning process and acknowledging likely resource constraints, suggest directions for achieving the Mission's DG strategic objective in the future.

Because the primary value to USAID/Zambia is the prospective dimension of the evaluation, the evaluation team is expected to pay particular attention to objectives 4,5 and, in particular, 6.

Reporting Relationships

Because Michigan State University and the USAID/Zambia Democracy Governance Advisor are among the entities being evaluated, the evaluation team will report directly to the Program Officer, USAID/Zambia and the final evaluation is to be conducted and completed to his satisfaction. MSU and the USAID/Zambia D/GA will have opportunities to react to any preliminary or final observations of the evaluation team no greater and no less than those of other Project entities.

Level of Effort

The evaluation team will be composed of three persons with the following skills, one of whom shall be a Zambian national:

- Senior Political Scientist/Team Leader
- Project Management Specialist
- Political Scientist/Legal Specialist

Time Frame

14 days beginning February 8

Deliverables

- Oral briefing to USAID and Ambassador prior to departure
- Final written report by March 8

List of Persons Contacted

U.S. Mission

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Stevenson, McIlvaine, Deputy Chief of Mission, United States Embassy
Walter North, Director, USAID/Zambia
James H. Polhemus, Dr., Democracy Governance Advisor, USAID/Zambia
Edward G. Stafford, Second Secretary, Embassy of the United States of America
Curt Wolters, Dr., Program Officer, USAID/Zambia

Donor Officials

Marianne Bergstrom, First Secretary, Embassy of Finland
Barry Jones, Deputy High Commissioner, British High Commission
Elwaleed Taha, Resident Representative, International Monetary Fund
Ingrid Wetterqvist, First Secretary, Embassy of Sweden

Government Officials

Laurah Norreen Harrison, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information and
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G.K. Chilupe, Attorney-General, Ministry of Legal Affairs
Eva Jhala, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Legal Affairs
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NGOs

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Kalila Chellah-Kunda, Executive Director, Foundation for Democratic Process
Mike Daka, Director, Zambia Institute of Mass Communications
Sipula Kabanje, Dr., Director, Law Development Commission
Alphonse Kamanzi, Senior Research Fellow, Zambia Law Development Commission

William Lewis, Deputy Director, Zambia Law Development Commission
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Private Citizens and Businesspeople

Rodger Chongwe, Dr., ex-Minister of Legal Affairs
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Elizabeth Pemba, Marketing and Public Relations Consultant, Hickey Studios
Ltd./Radio Phoenix
Guy Scott, Dr., National Lima Party

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