


**USAID MALI
1996 RESULTS REVIEW
AND FISCAL YEARS
1997-1999
RESOURCE REQUEST**

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RESULTS FRAMEWORK 1996-2002

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MAP OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALI



PART I. OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

Strategy Implementation

In 1996, USAID Mali began the first year of implementation of its 1996-2002 Strategic Plan. During the past year, Mission staff acted methodically to finalize indicators and targets, review the relationship of existing activities to the new strategy, weed out those that don't fit, and shape a program that contributes as effectively as possible to USAID results. While there is no impact data available for many of the Mission's indicators, USAID is confident that all of its strategic objectives are on-track and capable of achieving their results within the period of the strategic plan.

The Mission's Management Contract (USAID Mali still prefers the term Partnership Agreement) with USAID Washington established during the September 1995 Strategic Plan review required the finalization of indicators. Following the dissolution of USAID's sectoral offices, the newly established strategic objective teams worked together with USAID Washington virtual team members in clarifying the logic of these indicators, which were not finalized until October 1996. For some of these indicators, targets could not be set realistically until baseline data was available. While the availability of baseline data from the 1995/1996 Demographic and Health Survey has enabled the Mission to establish targets for many Youth SO indicators, other baseline data is still being collected.

The 1995 Results Review reported on the progress in achieving the results of the previous strategic plan. The descriptive nature of the former strategy allowed the Mission to include in the report impact from Mission investments made in the previous decade and perhaps earlier. Given the greater results focus of the new strategy, this report must focus more narrowly on the approved strategic objectives and activities being designed to support them. Links will be made with prior USAID Mali projects and activities, when possible. It must be emphasized, however, that the impact of USAID's longstanding presence in Mali is significantly understated by the indicators of the current strategic plan.

In efforts to develop a set of activities supporting the new strategic objectives, management of ongoing projects and PVO grants was assigned to the relevant strategic objective teams. For those activities not directly supporting the new strategic plan, management was assigned to the Program Team. Each SO team evaluated, reviewed and analyzed the contribution of ongoing activities to achievement of its results. This process was coordinated by the Program Team, particularly for those projects or grants cutting across SO teams. As a result, the Mission has decided to eliminate some activities, modify others and design new activities. USAID Mali is allowing contracts and grants to expire and taking steps to limit the number of management units overseen by the SO teams.

As part of this process, USAID has worked closely with its twelve PVO partners to develop common concepts of synergy, performance monitoring and the linkage of activities to results. All strategic objective teams participated in reviews of PVO activities, in order to assure the maximum synergy and impact on each teams results. Many PVOs now are poised to reconfigure their programs to contribute more effectively to USAID results.

The Mission's Results Center, while not fully staffed, helped focus attention on missed opportunities for synergy and new opportunities for increasing impact. Through establishment of a geographic information system (GIS), the Center gave USAID and its partners a visual idea of the location of thousands of activities funded by the Mission and other donors. This system has great potential for future decision-making and has already been useful in guiding the location of community schools and AIDS awareness and prevention activities.

Because of the Mission's intensive self-examination associated with being a Country Experimental Laboratory for reengineering, USAID Mali staff are strongly committed to the values of reengineering. Virtually all uses of human, financial and time resources are judged by the degree to which they are expected to contribute to Mission results. In order to develop the capacity to use these resources more effectively, USAID has invested heavily in staff training, particularly aimed at changing our organizational culture. Such training has enabled the Mission to make better, more well-informed programming decisions and create a sense of ownership of all Mission activities and results. USAID believes a commitment to intensive staff training is key to achieving its results.

Progress in Achieving Goal and Subgoals

USAID staff do not lose sight of the Mission Goal: *Mali achieves a level of political, social and economic development that alleviates the needs for concessional assistance.* While progress toward this goal cannot be measured accurately from year to year, USAID is able to assess progress toward the subgoals: *the rate of economic growth remains above 5% on average and the rate of population growth decreases to less than 3%.*

The rate of growth of real GDP was 4% in 1996, compared to 6.4% in 1995. The IMF considers the 1996 growth rate to be good, matching macroeconomic objectives of the structural adjustment program. While 1995 was an excellent crop year, the 1996 cereal production of 2.193 million tons was considered medium to good compared to the average of the previous five years, 2.217 million tons. In addition, economic growth may have slowed between 1995 and 1996 due to reduced opportunities for adapting existing investments to the incentives created by the 1994 devaluation. Private investment has jumped from 10.7% of GDP in 1993 to about 14% of GDP in 1996. Much of this investment was in the cotton and gold sectors, with lags expected in increased output. Unexpected power outages for a six week period affected industrial production in Bamako, but had little impact on the major industries contributing to economic growth - cotton, gold, livestock and cereals. Cotton production was at a record level (460,000 MT) for the second year in a row, while gold exports will be continuing to increase into the near future as new mines initiate production. Sales of livestock and livestock products increased to \$134 million, a 24% increase from the 1994 value of \$109 million. Livestock exports tapered off in 1996 following the post-devaluation surge recorded in 1994 and 1995. For 1997, the IMF believes economic growth should increase to 5%. USAID is satisfied that progress is being made to increasing the average economic growth rate to above 5%.

While no recent data is available on the population growth rate, information from the 1995/96 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) indicates that there has been some decrease in population growth since the 1987 survey. According to the 1995/96 DHS, the total fertility rate for all Malian women remained steady from 1978 to 1988, but demonstrated an important decrease in the years following, reaching 6.7 children per woman in 1994. In addition, the use of modern contraceptive

methods by all women increased from 1% to 5% between the two surveys. These indicators demonstrate that modest progress is being made, but still more is needed to bring population growth down below the Mission's three percent target. Population growth figures will not be available until after the 1998 Census.

Progress in Achieving Strategic Objectives

It is difficult to assess USAID's impact from each of the strategic objectives in 1997 in the absence of impact and sometimes baseline data. Nevertheless, anecdotal information combined with some data gives USAID confidence that it is making satisfactory progress toward achieving its results.

The Youth strategic objective has had excellent impact on basic education and is on-track for family planning, child survival and AIDS. USAID's impact in these areas is mainly due to investments that predate the strategic plan. Activities have not yet been initiated to improve skills; their implementation will depend upon the availability of economic growth funds in the years ahead. In efforts to increase its impact in these areas, USAID is focussing ongoing and new activities on youth.

The Sustainable Economic Growth strategic objective is on-track, with the promise for excellent impact in development of non-traditional crops. USAID has helped entrepreneurs to increase exports and the value-added of such products as hibiscus flowers, green beans, mangos and animal hides and skins. The Mission has catalyzed increased rice production with the successful privatization of rice mills and restructuring of the parastatal *Office du Niger*. Livestock exports have increased since 1993, and new opportunities have been identified for export of red meat and poultry. USAID has prepared a database of its microfinance investments through a geographic information system, which shows that it is reaching over 21,000 Malians through 311 institutions, all of which are targeted well on the poor and women. The Mission has a clear idea of what is needed to increase the scope and sustainability of its microfinance investments.

The Democratic Governance strategic objective also is on-track, starting with pilot activities in 92 community organizations supported by the PVO World Education and some small training activities preparing Malians for the 1997 elections. The Mission understands better the needs and capacities of community organizations and is developing a program to help them become partners in local development decision-making. Through the work with World Education, the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective Team has validated its approach, which is expected to have the greatest impact with the establishment of decentralization following the 1997 communal elections.

The Information and Communications Special Objective is on-track and has the potential for excellent impact on increasing access to information through rural radio and the Internet. In support of the 62 private radio stations, the Information and Communications Special Objective team has initiated training to increase financial sustainability through production of development-oriented messages. It has created a partners group to coordinate support to rural radio. Through its facilitation of the Leland Initiative in installing an Internet gateway in Mali, the team has gained a commitment from the Government and the private sector to make Internet accessible to a broad range of the Malian population through private means. Future efforts will focus on developing the ability of users to exploit the Internet.

Activities Supporting Strategic Objectives Indirectly

During a transition period, USAID is managing some other activities that support achievement of its strategic objective results indirectly. Through USAID efforts, progress has been made in computerizing the national budget system and allowing program budgeting to be implemented in seven of seventeen Ministries and two of eight regions. This enabled the Government to submit the annual budget request to the National Assembly on time for the first time ever. With USAID support for training and publicity, commercial and administrative courts have become effective tools for arbitrating complaints among businesses and between citizens and the Government. USAID continued its efforts to improve the effectiveness and communications of the Presidency and the Prime Minister's Office, which increased their ability to plan strategically and prioritize their work. Through training of the National Audit Authority and inclusion of their staff on USAID project audits, the Mission contributed to increasing the transparency and credibility of the Malian Government. As a member of the joint donor-Government Cereals Marketing Reform Program, USAID helped the Government prepare for the phase-out of donor support of Mali's food security system. With the advent of peace in the North, USAID contributed to the multi-donor fund supporting demobilization of 7,000 ex-combatants, allowing them to initiate small income-generating projects such as the establishment of small shops, restocking of herds, development of vegetable gardens and production of desert sorghum. As a result, confidence in the Government has increased. Groups that once fought each other are now investing together in income-generating projects.

Evaluations as a Decision-making Tool

In line with new reengineering philosophy, USAID commissioned evaluations to answer questions about the degree to which activities were contributing to Mission results. In response to the final evaluation of the Policy Reform and Economic Development (PRED) Project, USAID determined that none of the ongoing activities contributed significantly to achievement of Mission strategic objective results. Hence, the Mission terminated the Project's technical assistance contract. However, the Project's impact on the Government's budgeting process was so important, and the indirect benefits to our four strategic objectives were so great, that the Mission sought and received funding to continue the PRED budget reform component.

A similar evaluation was carried out of the activities implemented by World Education, including community schools, microfinance, NGO institutional development and urban sanitation. Each strategic objective team reviewed the activities from the perspective of their results, and as a result, the Mission is ending its support to World Education's urban sanitation activities.

The Sustainable Economic Growth (SEG) Team assessed the Animal Productivity for Export (APEX) Project to determine what was necessary to make it contribute most to the results of the Team's Livestock Result Package. All Results Package Managers on the Team participated in the evaluation, in order to build understanding of the synergies between activities and create a sense of ownership of all SEG activities and results. The Team determined that it should focus more on export-targeted private sector activities and ensure a better fit with USAID-funded technical assistance.

Factors Affecting USAID Strategy

USAID's strategy has been impacted by several events during 1996, including consolidation of peace in the North, the appearance of data showing high levels of malnutrition and higher than expected rates of infant mortality, the preparations for the 1997 elections, the organization of three sectoral Round Tables for donors, and an average to good cereals harvest.

Following agreement of all parties to end the conflict in the North in June 1995, the Government organized a donor round table in Timbuktu. During 1996, joint donor-Government meetings were held regularly to monitor implementation of the recommendations of the round table. In March 1996, the Government organized a symbolic burning of weapons laid down by ex-combatants, at which the rebel movements dissolved themselves. USAID supported demobilization by contributing to the UNDP-managed demobilization trust fund. Up to 120,000 refugees are expected to have returned to Mali during 1996 and 1997, and the Department of State has contributed \$3 million to the UN High Commission on Refugees to facilitate their reintegration into Mali. Given the importance of rehabilitation of the North to the political stability and development of Mali, USAID has decided to establish a new special objective focussing on the North. The Mission recognizes that it could not assure the sustainability of the results of its four existing strategic objectives without working to increase the confidence of northern Malians in Government, the private sector and civil society institutions. USAID's work will be complemented by the efforts of the Malian Government, which is reestablishing administrative and technical services in the North, and other donors, which are reinstating projects put on hold during the rebellion.

The 1995/1996 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) found malnutrition rates that are alarmingly high, levels that are typically found in emergency situations. It determined that the level of wasting (weight for height), a measure of acute malnutrition, for children under three years of age was 23 percent, the highest level measured by similar surveys in sub-Saharan Africa. Stunting, an indicator of chronic malnutrition, affects 33 percent of children under three years. Underweight, which reflects wasting and stunting, affects 40 percent of these children. This is the highest level of underweight found among the 20 sub-Saharan countries having DHS surveys. Maternal malnutrition is 16 percent and is the second highest level of maternal malnutrition recorded by DHS (in a smaller number of countries). The Mission has commissioned more intensive studies to explain the high levels of malnutrition, which were not signaled in the 1987 DHS. The Youth Strategic Objective Team will adapt its activities accordingly.

The 1987 DHS also seriously underestimated the severity of infant mortality. In 1987, the infant mortality rate (centering on 1983-1984) was estimated at 108 per thousand. The 1995/1996 DHS recalculated the rate for that time period at 152 per thousand. Using this recalculation, it is clear that progress occurred through the years centering on 1993, when the rate dropped to 123 per thousand. Nevertheless, infant mortality is a greater problem than was previously understood. USAID is recasting its child survival activities in response.

The Malian Government is preparing for legislative, Presidential and communal elections, scheduled for the first half of 1997. It established the legal framework for elections that will create over 700 communes, as the first major act of decentralization. The donors are assisting the Government to carry out these elections, and USAID in cooperation with the American Embassy is supporting the work of the National Democratic Institute and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems in assuring their fairness and transparency. Mali's National Assembly led the initial effort by the ruling political party, ADEMA, to adopt an electoral code. However, the code approved by the

Assembly was not supported by opposition parties. In a triumph of the rule of law, the electoral code was declared unconstitutional by Mali's Constitutional Court and a new one put in place with the mediation of the Malian Bar Association. In preparing for the elections, political parties have been appealing to disaffected elements within Malian society, including faction of the student movement and the federation of labor unions. USAID is monitoring political developments so that it can adapt its strategy and activities accordingly.

As a follow-up to the 1994 Donor Round Table, the Malian Government in cooperation with UNDP has been holding sectoral Round Tables. In 1995, it held Round Tables on the North and on Education. In 1996, it organized Round Tables on Population, the Private Sector and the Region of Kayes. These meetings allowed USAID to understand the different approaches of actors in the respective sectors, to better determine its comparative advantage, and to coordinate its activities.

Total cereal production for 1996 was estimated at 2.193 million tons, a medium to good year compared to the five year average of 2.217 million tons. The country is expected to import 65,000 tons of cereal, including 30,000 tons of rice and 35,000 tons of wheat. In comparing needs to availability, Mali has a surplus of 37,000 tons, which will allow it to export millet and sorghum. Cereal prices rose during the year based on predictions of a poor crop and inadequate competition among rice importers. They fell as the size of the harvest became clear and with increased imports of rice by a wider range of traders beginning in August.

Government Commitment to Development

The Malian Government is coping seriously with almost overwhelming problems of low institutional capacity, corruption, desertification, poor health and educational levels and poverty. It is committed to both economic and political liberalization while increasing resources for social spending, such as for education, health and reintegration of ex-combatants into the armed forces and civilian life.

The Government has successfully met the targets of the first year of its second Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility program with the IMF. Growth of real GDP was 4%, and inflation was limited to 6.2% as prices completed their adjustment to the January 1994 devaluation. The Government's budget deficit dropped to 8% of GDP from 10.5% in 1995. Through increased efforts to collect custom duties and taxes, revenues as a percentage of GDP increased from 14.4% in 1995 to 15.9% in 1996. Salary levels did not increase. The external current account balance (excluding official transfers) is projected to have decreased from 14.6% to 13.2% of GDP. Mali's performance encouraged the Paris Club in 1996 to provide debt relief, decreasing Mali's debt service ratio from 14.9% to 14.4% of GDP.

The Malian Government's program for decentralization is ambitious, including creating 700 elected communal governments to replace arrondissement offices, devolving power to these governments and transferring some technical personnel. There is a genuine commitment to the democratic process and consolidating institutions necessary for the rule of law. Great challenges remain, however, in strengthening the justice system, combatting corruption and increasing transparency.

The Government of Mali's commitment to the health and education sectors is demonstrated by increased funding. The percentage of the budget going to health increased from 8.0% in 1995 to 8.31% in 1996. It is expected to increase to 9.57% in 1997. Education received 21.2% of budget

revenues in 1995 compared to 22.7% in 1996. The share of the education budget going to primary education increased from 40% in 1995 to 43% in 1996, despite formal creation of a national university made up of the former post-secondary schools. The Government is facing the long-term requirements of health and education through preparing ten-year development programs for each of these sectors.

The Malian Government is developing a national environmental action plan to address the growing concern about desertification, air pollution, water quality and sanitation in urban and rural areas. Central to the new strategy is a policy objective requiring environmental impact assessments as integral considerations of all economic development activities. The Government is meeting regularly with donor representatives to determine levels of funding and coordinate activities.

PART II. PROGRESS AGAINST STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

YOUTH STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: IMPROVED ECONOMIC BEHAVIORS AMONG YOUTH

The Youth Strategic Objective is showing some excellent results and has the potential to deliver increasingly important results. The Youth Strategic Objective Team spent 1996 improving the targeting of ongoing activities on youth. The team members also deepened their understanding of the importance of youth to Mali's development.

The Mission's rationale for the Youth-focussed approach is as follows: Development as a process implies improvement in economic and social welfare above and beyond the current status. A focus on qualitative development side by side with quantitative expansion requires addressing Mali's extremely high rate of population growth, while simultaneously addressing the needs of the existing 66% of Mali's population currently under 25 years of age. Sustainable improvements in the quality of education, health and the environment can only occur when the rate of economic growth exceeds that of the population.

Realism warrants acknowledging the force of population momentum. Demographically-speaking, the Youth Team's analysis revealed that targeting youth would focus limited resources not only on the majority of the population in their reproductive years (56%) but on the portion of that population with the highest fertility levels. The results-oriented rationale of this approach is that a youth-centered target is a moving one - allowing the program to gain strength from the force of population momentum, rather than attempting to resist it.

In Mali, where the vast proportion of the population is rural, tremendous gains will be made in responding to current levels of unmet need by expanding access to health and family planning services for youth. However, a successful program will not only respond to the current demand, but also will generate increased demand for those services and commodities, a precondition for improved health and environmental behaviors. Increased demand will result from an expansion of educational opportunities, in particular among that segment of society primarily responsible for insuring individual and society's health and environmental well-being - girls and women.

Youth everywhere are society's innovators. Mali's youth must be harnessed to ensure that its energy is employed constructively in the building of a democratic, equitable, productive society. Integration of the young generation of today into the productive workforce of tomorrow requires investments today. It will become increasingly difficult for Mali to compete for production and marketing of even the most basic commodities and services if it retains one of the lowest primary education rates in the world.

The Youth Strategic Objective seeks to be as dynamic as the population it addresses, prioritizing the development of human capacity and productivity through implementation of cost-effective interventions and focused targeting of beneficiaries. Two Results Packages make up the Youth Strategic Objective: 1) Health and 2) Education. The Health Results Package is the more difficult to adapt to a youth focus, but much progress has been made during 1996. The Education Results Package is already targeted on youth, and is continuing to have excellent impact.

Health Results Package

The Health Results Package of the Youth Strategic Objective is on-track. Ongoing activities continue to produce results while the Youth SO Team puts in place a program that is more consistent with the Youth Strategy. This reporting period coincides with the publication of the final report of the USAID-financed 1995/96 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS-II) in January 1997. The Survey provides most of the baseline data for the Youth SO as well as a wealth of information to assess the Mission's impact from ongoing child survival and reproductive health activities.

The following is a summary of the subgoal impact to which the Health Results Package has contributed, the major impact of the Results Package and ongoing activities at the strategic objective and intermediate results levels, as well as a discussion of how the Youth Strategic Objective Team has addressed the issues of demand, quality, access, capacity, service use and behavior change in achieving its results. The availability of DHS-II data has enabled the Youth Team to establish more realistic indicators and targets for this results package, which also are described below.

Subgoal indicators

Over a 15-19 year period preceding the DHS-II (approximately 1978-1993), infant mortality declined by approximately 23%, and child mortality by approximately 30%. However, during the more recent period (0-4 years preceding the 95/96 survey), the rate of decline in infant mortality has accelerated, whereas the rate of decline of child mortality has slowed. An important reduction in neonatal mortality essentially explains the decline in infant mortality. This implies that improvements in biological factors and factors related to pre-natal, childbirth and post-natal care have improved relative to improvements in environmental conditions which influence post-neonatal mortality. USAID's investments in PVO community health programs and training of Ministry of Health staff have contributed to improvements in maternal health. The Mission is reinforcing and refocusing its investments in child survival, in light of the above results.

Mali's DHS-II estimates the total fertility rate (TFR) for the three years preceding the survey (centered on 1994) to be 6.7 children per woman (based on age-specific fertility rates for women aged 15-49). The DHS-II estimated age-specific fertility rates for up to nineteen years before the survey. This analysis reveals that fertility remained relatively stable between 1978 and 1988, but has demonstrated an important decline during the last five years, a period that coincides with USAID's interventions in family planning and reproductive health. It is clear that USAID's success in increasing modern contraceptive use by all women five-fold since 1987 has had an impact on fertility, although the absolute level of fertility still remains among the highest in the world. The Mission is examining means for dynamizing its social marketing program and extending its community-based distribution program to meet this challenge.

Comparing age-specific fertility rates from the DHS-II with estimated rates between five and nine years earlier, important decreases are noted for all age groups up to 34 years. Importantly for the Youth SO, the age-specific fertility of the 15-19 age groups evidences a noteworthy decline of 14% (from 217/1000 to 187/1000). The age-specific fertility rate for the 20-24 aged cohort evidences a decrease of 14.7%, from 350/1000 to 299/1000. Under the Youth SO, USAID will be targeting both of these age groups.

Strategic Objective indicators

In 1995/96, 5% of all women and 4.5% of women in union used a modern method of contraception, as opposed to 1.0% and 1.0% respectively in 1987. The DHS-II reported that women aged 15-19 had a 3.2% modern contraceptive prevalence rate while women aged 20-24 had a 5.5% modern contraceptive prevalence rate. This compares to rates of 1.1% and 1.3% for 1987. Among all women and women in union in 1987, the prevalence of use of modern methods was higher than the prevalence of use of traditional methods. The opposite was true for all women and women in union in 1987.

Comparing current use of contraception among all men in 1995/96 and 1987 - approximately 11% of the former group used any modern method as compared to 5% among the latter group - more than a 100% increase. The DHS-II reported that men aged 15-19 had a 7.2% modern contraceptive prevalence rate, while men aged 20-24 had a 22.3% modern contraceptive prevalence rate. No comparable data is available from 1987. As in the case of women, the prevalence of traditional method use was higher than the prevalence of modern method use among all men in 1987, with the opposite being true in 1995/96. USAID, as the major donor in family planning, can take credit for these behavior changes.

USAID's focus on increasing access to quality reproductive health services (including contraception) has begun to address the unmet need for contraception in the country. This is demonstrated by the increased rate of expansion of modern methods relative to traditional ones as well as by dramatic differences in contraceptive usage between urban and rural areas. Among all women in union, 11.6% in urban areas use a modern method (23% in Bamako), whereas only 2% in rural areas use a modern method. Among all men in union, 15% in urban areas use a modern method (16% in Bamako) whereas only 6% in rural areas use a modern method.

Modern contraceptive prevalence rate among all men and all women in Mali is higher than the corresponding modern contraceptive prevalence rate among men in union and women in union. This observation is explained by the extraordinarily high levels of modern contraceptive use among men out of union and sexually active (47.3%) and women out of union and sexually active (27.3%) - a large proportion of whom fall within the mission's target age groups for "youth." For 15-19 year old men out of union and sexually active, modern contraceptive use was 37.1%. The similar figure for 20-24 year old men out of union and sexually active was 44.4%. For out of union and sexually active women, 15.7% of those 15-19 year old and 44.8% of those 20-24 year old used modern contraceptive methods. When one considers use of any method of contraception (traditional and modern) among sub-groups of women - the comparisons are even more striking (42% of women out of union and sexually active use any method of contraception whereas only 7% of women in union use any method. Given that a large percent of the unmarried sexually active women are "young" (aged 15-24), USAID is making modern contraceptive services more accessible to this group, with the expectation that a large percentage of these women will choose modern methods over traditional methods.

Mali has made important strides in assuring child survival, as conveyed by a nearly five-fold increase in the percent of children 12-23 months old with vaccination cards (12% in 1987 and 56% in 1995/96) and a doubling of the percent with cards who have received all vaccinations (15% in 1987 and 29% in 1995/96). Thus, the percentage of children 12-23 months who have a vaccination card and have received full immunization coverage is estimated by the DHS-II at 16% compared to 1.8% measured by the DHS-I in 1987. Taking into consideration reports from mothers, the DHS-II

concluded that 20.8% of living children 12-23 months old have received each of the recommended childhood vaccinations before their first birthday. USAID has contributed to these major improvements through funding PVO community-health programs and procurement of vaccines by UNICEF for the Enlarged Program of Vaccination. However, ultimately it should be noted that completeness of coverage remains low and that impact in preventing illness is partly a function of the age at which children receive the various vaccines.

Intermediate Result Indicators

During the three years preceding the DHS-II, 47% of births to all women were assisted by trained attendants (physicians, nurse/mid-wives, auxiliary mid-wives/matrons but not including traditional birth attendants). In that the safe motherhood interventions envisioned by the Youth Strategy focus on infant health and infant mortality reduction (as opposed to maternal mortality reduction), Mission impact is better demonstrated by the percentage of births to all women assisted by trained attendants than to a subgroup of these women. For women under 20 years of age, 50% of births were assisted while for women aged 20-34, 47% of births were assisted. The definition of the analogous indicator estimated by the 1987 DHS-I precludes a direct comparison of change over time. However, during the five years preceding the 1987 survey, 33% of births to women under the age of 30 were assisted by trained medical personnel (physicians, mid-wives/nurses/nurse auxiliaries or matrons, hospitals, medical posts or dispensaries). USAID will continue its support for community health and development of the community health centers to increase the availability and demand for these services.

The DHS-II provides indicators for all sexually active men using contraceptives, broken down by age group and by marital status but not further broken down by age group. Of sexually active men from 15 through 19 years, 22.4% report using condoms in the most recent sexual intercourse. For ages 20-24, this rate rises to 24.1%. Of all men in union, 5.3% reported using condoms in the most recent sexual intercourse. Of all men out of union, 30.1% reported using condoms in the most recent sexual intercourse. 22.1% of previously married men out of union reported doing so. Of all men, 10.7% reported using condoms in the most recent sexual intercourse. The nature of the 1987 DHS-I instruments does not allow a direct comparison with the DHS-II estimates. USAID's work with social marketing and community based distribution of condoms and promotion of AIDS and STD awareness is the most significant factor explaining the increased use of condoms.

The percentage of babies under four months who were exclusively breastfed in 1995/96 was 12.1%. No comparable measure exists from the 1987 DHS-I. Perhaps a more important problem is that only 65.2% of newborns are breastfed during the first day after birth, the only time when they can receive colostrum, containing essential anti-bodies to fight against infection. In addition, few Malian women complement breastfeeding effectively with other foods after the sixth month. USAID has supported community health programs both through PVOs and through the Government, which raise consciousness on the importance of breastfeeding. These programs will increase the attention they pay to increasing understanding of proper breastfeeding and weaning.

Subresults

Assessments of levels and trends in health sector indicators at the SO and intermediate result levels (behavior change and service utilization) are informed by the analysis of differential contributions at the sub-results level (*access, quality, demand and delivery capacity of services*).

DEMAND

The DHS-II data suggests that USAID Mali's health investments in the recent past and in 1996 have been most successful in increasing demand for health services, as reflected by relatively high and increasing levels of knowledge and positive attitudes, particularly in the reproductive health sector and among the 15-19 and 20-24 age "youth" cohorts. Knowledge of a modern method of contraception is high for both genders, particularly among men and women out of union and sexually active (95% and 91% respectively). Similarly, the DHS-II evidences a noteworthy increase since the 1987 DHS-I in the percentage of men and women in union intending to use contraception in the future, and access to and approval of dissemination of media messages on contraception remains high. The DHS-II also revealed high levels of knowledge of AIDS among the Malian population with 77% of women and 96% of men claiming to have heard of the disease. Furthermore, men and women demonstrate a fairly high level of knowledge concerning means of prevention (only 5% of women and 16% of men did not know any means of prevention) and the knowledge demonstrated was accurate.

USAID Mali believes that its investments in behavior change and IEC interventions through its many PVO/NGO activities throughout Mali, its community based distribution of contraception program (with technical assistance from Population Council) and most importantly its five years of investment in contraceptive social marketing (The Futures Group) are largely responsible for raising family planning and AIDS-awareness. Few other donors in Mali have invested resources in this sector - thus reinforcing the assumption of direct causality between AID's reproductive health investments and increasing demand. In this regard, the results are more remarkable in areas targeted by specific programs funded by USAID. For example, in just 2 years (December 1994 - December 1996), contraceptive prevalence rate in the areas targeted by the Child Survival Pivot Group's 31 partner NGOs increased from 1% to 31%, showing that community based distribution (CBD) is an effective means of increasing access to contraceptives in rural Mali. Other significant results achieved by the Pivot Group's partners include the findings that 98.7% of women in the target zone are able to name at least one method of modern contraception (up from 28.3%); 88.6% of women are able to explain the benefits of birth spacing; and 97.4% of women can cite at least one mode of HIV/AIDS transmission. These rates are consistently higher than national rates observed in the DHS 1996 survey.

Conversely, USAID Mali acknowledges that it has been less successful in improving child survival knowledge and attitudes. As an example, the DHS-II demonstrated that 30% of mothers of children born during the 3 years preceding the survey would diminish liquids given to a child with diarrhea, 37% would decrease the child's food intake, and nearly 1/4 would nurse less. In an effort to address this programmatic weakness, USAID Mali financed in 1996 a situational analysis of health IEC activities in Mali, the development of a national IEC health strategy, the production of numerous IEC materials, and regional IEC training in 6 of Mali's 8 regions. Again, the impact in this sector is much more notable in the targeted areas covered by USAID-funded PVO programs. For example, in the 37 villages targeted by the Africare Dioro Child Survival Project, the following significant results have been achieved between 1990 and 1996: 78% of children 0 - 11 months received the full

range of vaccinations (up from 14%) ; 100% of women know the dates and places for vaccinations ; 63.8% of children are exclusively breastfed during the first 4 to 6 months (up from 28.9%) ; 56.8% of mothers know two sources of vitamin A (up from 17%) ; 83% of children are weighed at least once a quarter (up from 1%) ; and 59.8% of women received two injections of Tetanus Toxoid (up from 25.8%).

QUALITY

During the recent past and in 1996, USAID Mali has essentially focused its interventions to improve the quality of services on the reproductive health sector. In this capacity, USAID Mali financed the development of and training in reproductive health norms and procedures for community health center personnel. This intervention has facilitated the integration of reproductive health services (especially family planning) into the "Minimum Package of Activities" mandated by Mali's *Health Sector Policy*. The Population Council and the Child Survival Pivot Group continue to provide training in community-based distribution of contraception with a focus on quality issues - having financed a situational analysis of service delivery points to ascertain constraints on service use resulting from inadequate attention paid to quality concerns. The Mission's preoccupation with service quality is largely based on a recent USAID-financed study undertaken by the Center for Applied Research on Population and Development (CERPOD) on "*Adolescent Reproductive Health in the Sahel*" which argues that the poor quality of the patient-provider interaction in health service delivery points is a major constraint on service use by young adults. Finally, in 1996, USAID financed ongoing technical assistance from JHPIEGO to develop pre-service training materials in reproductive health. Over the coming year, the CDC STI/AIDS Advisor will work closely with government counterparts and JHPIEGO to modify and expand pre-service and in-service training modules to address quality of care (norms and procedures) for STI diagnosis, case management and prevention.

In the Child Survival sector, Mali's poor performance in quality of care is suggested by DHS-II indicators including: immunization (inappropriate timing), case management of the sick child (i.e. inappropriate feeding practices during diarrhea episodes) and safe motherhood (low proportions of women assisted by trained attendants during birth). The mission intends to increase its investment in quality of care activities in part through BASICS' technical assistance in developing norms and procedures for the Integrated Case Management of the Sick Child to be used by health center personnel. In a concerted effort to encourage training of health personnel in these new norms and procedures, USAID Mali assisted the GRM in the development of a National In-Service Training Strategy for health in 1996 and intends to follow-up on the strategy implementation through discrete training interventions.

ACCESS

One of the critical assumptions underlying the Youth Results Framework is that other donors would be working with the GOM in increasing access to health services through the creation of community health centers (CSCOMs) as per procedures determined by the *Health Sector Policy*. With the exception of a very small number of CSCOMs developed with USAID support through PVO grants, USAID Mali does not directly finance (nor can it take credit for) changes in access to CSCOM services. While the GOM continues to make progress in health care reform and decentralization of health services, the development of CSCOMs (and thus access to services) is proceeding more

slowly than scheduled. Consequently, the mission believes that among the four sub-results impacting on health service utilization, the least progress has been made in increasing access.

A number of CSCOMs created are no longer functioning and USAID intends to undertake in 1997 a "CSCOM Autopsy" investigating causes for failure. In addition, partners in the field are debating how to address the shortfall in health personnel. It is commonly believed that for every new CSCOM created, a nurse hired is taken from another CSCOM - thus perpetuating the shortage and not "dealing" with the problem's cause.

Despite limited advances in access to service delivery points, USAID Mali's investments in contraception procurement and distribution, contraceptive social market and community-based distribution have had a tremendous impact on one component of access: "availability of contraceptives" and consequently contraceptive use. Through technical assistance supplied by JSI and in collaboration with FPLM, USAID provides training of representatives of recipient organizations in contraceptive estimation and logistics management - critical activities to avoid stock-outs and to ensure contraceptive continuation. A major policy constraint in the social marketing sector in which the mission has had to invest much time during 1996 is the reticence of certain public sector partners to accept an increased role of the private sector in the reception, repackaging and distribution of social marketing products. Considerable progress has been made nonetheless, with the MOH currently debating whether to issue an RFP for a private national distributor of social marketing products.

In the child survival sector, USAID began to undertake assessments in 1996 concerning the feasibility of widening the number of products distributed through community-based distribution programs to include oral rehydration packages, vitamin A and chloroquine. The mission intends to begin implementation of expanded community-based distribution programs in the coming year. While the DHS-II demonstrated an important increase in the percentage of children possessing immunization cards as compared to the situation in 1987, the mission has identified numerous "missed opportunities" for increasing access to immunization services and will be pursuing these in 1997, in part through expanded support to UNICEF. Finally, USAID has undertaken preliminary work in 1996 to ensure that contraceptives and medicines for sexually transmitted disease case management are included among the "essential medicine" list within the CSCOMs implementing the "Minimum Package of Activities." The Youth Team acknowledges that ability to pay for services is one component of access, and as a result will be assessing "Youth's" ability to pay for reproductive health services - particularly their ability to purchase drugs for STI treatment.

CAPACITY

Undoubtedly the major constraint in realizing health sector results has its source in the poor performance of the public sector supervisory system. With respect to the national community-based contraceptive distribution program (technical assistance provided by the Population Council), efforts to increase service delivery points have come into conflict with the necessity of integrating services with CSCOM zones of intervention. At its source, the problem originates in the CBD's original design which included payment of per diem for CBD supervisors. The public sector has labeled this vertical approach as being in opposition to Health Sector Policy strategies (integrated supervision) and has consequently blocked the further extension of the CBD program. USAID Mali has supported the efforts of Population Council and the MOH's Division of Family Health to convene

a national consultation to address the problem of integrated supervision. USAID Mali will continue to lobby for supervision reform at the national, regional and district levels in an effort to improve health sector service delivery capacity.

Also at issue is the involvement of the NGO community and private sector in providing services. This critical element to expanding access and capacity will be the focus of a national consultation this year organized by the MOH as input for development of its ten year strategy.

USAID Mali's current and past investments in management information system development demonstrated important results in 1996. The Programming and Monitoring software system developed to track the establishment of CSCOMs and to monitor their yearly activity plans was finalized. The Mission financed the first phase development of software for essential drug management and supported preliminary work undertaken on the "personnel" sub-system of the MOH health information system. It is hoped that implementation of this module will improve the MOH's capacity to program health personnel requirements and to prevent staff-outs before they occur. Finally, USAID Mali continues to provide technical assistance for ongoing reform of the MOH health information system and anticipates closer collaboration between the Planning Unit of the Ministry of Health and the mission's Results Center in tracking the impact on USAID Mali's investments in the health sector through applications of the SIS and GIS systems.

SERVICE USE AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE

Summarizing the sub-result successes and constraints provides the basis for what USAID has learned and how it will adjust and re-orient its program. A first important conclusion is that demand generation activities must be modified to bring about real behavior change and not just increase levels of knowledge and awareness. In the reproductive health sector, this implies focusing on recognition of the signs and symptoms of STI and the appropriate response vis-a-vis partners and case management. In both the reproductive health and child survival sectors - greater attention will be paid to "missed opportunities" for education and information communication. The Mission will seek to develop non-formal sector interventions through synergistic approaches with the "Education and Skills Development" Results Package - providing information, developing health behavior change programs and increasing service delivery points for youth through outreach programs, peer counseling, school health modules and services. In general, the Youth Team will be narrowing in on its target population by designing and implementing interventions intended to improve access to and the quality of reproductive health services for young adults.

The most important re-orientation of the health portfolio over the coming year will most certainly focus on Child Survival interventions at all sub-result levels - demand generation, quality of care, improved access and service delivery capacity. Of all the DHS-II findings documented in the Final Report, the singular most alarming is the level of malnutrition in the under 3 population. 44% of children aged 3-35 months in Mali are underweight - the highest level of malnutrition (as measured by this indicator) among all sub-Saharan African countries surveyed by the DHS Project. As stated in the document entitled Nutrition among Infants and Young Children in Mali, 1995-96: "Because underweight represents children who suffer from chronic or acute malnutrition, or both, underweight is influenced by both short-term and long-term determinants of malnutrition. Underweight is often used as a general indicator of a population's health status (p.4)" As such, the level of this indicator

has riveted the mission's and all of Mali's partners' attention. Assessments and interventions are being planned to address this "crisis".

Specifically in the Child Survival Sector, the Youth SO Team will focus on improving the content and quality of certain interventions within the Minimum Package of Activities targeting the under 5 population including: nutrition, safe motherhood and sick child care. Planned activities encompass the: i) provision of additional support to PVOs and to UNICEF for its expanded program of immunization, malaria, ARI and control of diarrhea diseases throughout Mali, and with a particular emphasis on the Northern regions, ii) definition and implementation of a more focussed human resource development strategy; iii) provision of technical assistance for focusing child survival IEC and Behavior Change strategies; and iv) expansion of community-based distribution efforts to include sales of micronutrients and oral rehydration packages.

Indicator Changes and Data Problems

The Mission is reevaluating some of the Youth SO's indicators and targets based on data derived from the DHS-II. Following is a brief overview of the evolution of changes in the Youth-specific sub-goal, strategic objective and intermediate result indicators.

SUBGOAL LEVEL

Infant Mortality Rate (probability of dying between birth and first birthday):

The DHS-I (1987) and DHS-II (1995/96) provide inconsistent estimates for the IMR for the period 0-4 years prior to the 1987 survey. Whereas the former estimates the IMR to be 108/1000 for this time period, the latter estimates the IMR for the same time period to be 152/1000. The DHS-II estimates the IMR for the 0-4 years period prior to the 95/96 survey to be 123/1000. Secondary analyses revealed that the DHS-II seriously underestimated infant mortality for the 0-4 years prior to the survey. Consequently, only the data from the DHS-II will be used to evaluate levels and trends in infant mortality.

Fertility: Comparisons of fertility estimates derived from the DHS-II with the fertility estimates from the DHS-I and the General Census (1987) suggest either that the DHS-II overestimated fertility for previous time periods or that the other two sources underestimated the same. Given the likelihood of underestimation is greater, this finding suggests that the appearance of no decline in fertility in Mali is likely to be an artifact of changes in data quality over time and is masking real declines in fertility which have occurred.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE LEVEL

Contraceptive Prevalance Rate (CPR): Numerous factors constrain access to CPR data by age group:

- i. Only in the case of DHS or specific KAP surveys is contraceptive use recorded by age of respondent. However, as in the case of the final report for the Mali DHS-II - the CPR is not always given by age groups due to the small numbers within age groups if the sample size is small (i.e. men - whether in union or out).
- ii. If the CPR is estimated based on CYP data derived from contraceptive distribution statistics - no specific information on use by age is obtained.

Based on these considerations and given AID/W's desire to have standardized indicators at the SO level (i.e. CPR for all ages as opposed to CPR for age-groups), USAID Mali will report on CPR for all ages and will track use by "youth" through differentials in use among those in union and those out of union but sexually active (tends to be a "younger" population).

STI/HIV/AIDS Indicator: With the recent arrival in Mali of an STI/HIV/AIDS advisor, the Youth SO team has finalized the indicator to monitor program outcomes at the SO level in this sector. The indicator is defined as follows: *Prevalence of STIs among pregnant women monitored in sentinel surveillance sites*. This is similar to the common indicator recommendation: Percent of pregnant women aged 15-24 with positive serology for syphilis. The baseline indicator is not yet available as the sentinel sites will only be established in 1997.

INTERMEDIATE RESULTS LEVEL

Births assisted by a trained attendant: This indicator was chosen in an effort to estimate improvements in safe motherhood behavior, acknowledging the impact of improved pre-natal, childbirth and post-natal care on infant health outcomes. In that the safe motherhood interventions envisioned by the Youth Strategy set forth a potential impact on infant health and infant mortality reduction (as opposed to maternal mortality reduction) - there is no need to limit the age grouping of the target population to the 15-24 age group. Rather through safe motherhood programs implemented through community health centers, all pregnant women are potential beneficiaries of improved services to protect infant and child health.

Secondly, given the ambiguity that exists with respect to women's knowledge of the qualifications and professional status of their birth attendant and given that some traditional attendants have received significant training, it has been determined that the indicator may not be the most valid measure of safe motherhood outcomes. Consequently, this indicator will be replaced by the arguably more valid and reliable safe motherhood indicator: *Percent of births for which the mother received 2 or more TT immunizations during pregnancy*.

According to the DHS-II, 2 doses or more of TT vaccine was received by 32% of the mothers of all births occurring during the three years prior to the survey (centered on 1994). The DHS-I only provides an indicator on the number of births during the preceding five years for which the mother received an injection anti-tetanic (18%) - not strictly comparable with the recommended indicator.

Condom use: USAID is prepared to use the following indicator, which provides useful information for measuring the impact of the Youth SO and is almost the same as one of the Agency's common indicators: *Percent of men and women 15-49 (with particular attention paid to those out of union and sexually active) who report use of condom during most recent act of sexual intercourse*. See common indicator document - p.11)

Breastfeeding: To be in closer alignment with WHO recommendations on breastfeeding, USAID will adopt the following indicator: *Percent of infants less than 4 months exclusively breastfed*.

Education and Skills Development Results Package

The Education and Skills Development Results Package is making excellent progress and having a significant impact. Impact data is available from the 1995/96 Demographic and Health Survey, Ministry of Basic Education statistics and Mission monitoring of community schools. Ministry statistics include public schools, medersas (French-Arabic schools registered with the Ministry of Basic Education) and some community schools. The Mission had not been reporting on medersas under the previous strategy, but will do so from 1995/96 onward, in order to better reflect the state of education in Mali. Ministry statistics exclude the Save the Children community schools, which have not been recognized by the Ministry. These schools are now being registered and will be reported on in future years.

Subgoal indicator

Increased level of education

Mali's level of education is abominably low and increases slowly, but it is clear that young Malians are better educated than their elders. According to the 1995/96 DHS, the percentage of 15-19 year old women who have had no schooling is 75.5%, while the percentage of 45-49 year old women with no schooling is 94%. For men, comparable figures are 62.8% and 80.8%. While only 8% of women and 17% of men aged 15-49 have finished primary school, increased educational opportunities have allowed 19% of women and 29% of men above 5 years of age to have attended school. It is too early to see any progress in the average years of classroom instruction for the 15-24 cohort, however. For women of this age group, the figure was unchanged between 1987 and 1995/96, at 1.2 years. For men of this age group, the average years of schooling decreased from 2.3 to 2.2 years. The impact of the excellent progress in primary enrollment rates for the mean level of education of the 15-24 cohort will be documented in the next DHS of 2000 and is expected to be more significant in the following DHS.

Strategic Objective Indicators

Increased gross enrollment ratio

Gross enrollment in primary schools, including medersas, increased from 42.3% in 1995/96 to 46.5% in 1996/97, well ahead of planned targets for achieving the GRM and USAID's goal of 56% gross enrollment in 2000/2001. The number of primary school students has increased by 14% between the 1995/96 and 1996/97 school years, from 683,161 to 779,189 students. Gross enrollment of girls showed even greater progress, increasing from 33.4% in 1995/96 to 38.4% in 1996/97. The number of girls increased from 268,895 in 1995/96 to 318,423 in 1997/97, an increase of 18%. An additional 12,060 girls attended Save the Children community schools not counted in the national statistics. Enrollment of girls in all community schools makes up 6% of gross enrollment, taking into account the Save the Children data.

Three major factors explain the increase in gross enrollment:

1) the Government promoted and relies increasingly upon double shifts (using one classroom for two shifts in one day). Students from double shift classrooms in a sample of twenty public schools were found to perform about ten percent better than in those in regular public schools. The analysis shows that difference results from the smaller class size and teacher training. USAID has supported training of the teachers working the double shifts;

2) the percentage of promoters, repeaters and drop outs decreased from 64%, 30% and 5% in 1993/94 to 76.0%, 17.4% and 6.6% in 1995/1996, most likely due to improvements in the quality of education. For girls, the promotion, repeater and drop-out rates were 74.9%, 17.8% and 7.2% for 1995/96, demonstrating the greater difficulty of retaining girls than boys in school. USAID has supported extensive teacher training over the past seven years and the procurement and distribution of textbooks for each primary school student in 1992 and 1993;

3) the number of community schools (schools owned and managed by local communities) increased by 120% to 616.

While USAID Mali contributes substantially to the first two factors, it plays a leading role in the development of community schools.

Increased sixth grade attainment rate.

This indicator provides information on the efficiency of the basic education system by showing the percentage of students who have left the school system or spent more than six years in primary school. Mali has made steady progress in improving the retention of students in primary school from 26% in 1988/89 to 45% in 1996/97, but this remains an area where much greater improvement is needed. Progress for girls has been almost as significant but started from a lower base, moving from 24% in 1989/90 to 40% in 1996/97. A disturbing finding is that the difference between boys and girls widened between 1995/96 and 1996/97. Efforts to retain girls in school must continue and be reinforced. USAID emphasizes this area in the Education and Skills Development Results Package.

The national averages mask regional disparities, with the three northern regions exhibiting lower retention rates. This partially is a function of the instability in northern Mali from 1990-1995 and the exodus of over 120,000 refugees. As refugees return following the peace settlement and as greater investments are made in education in the North, education statistics should improve for this area in the years ahead.

Initial projections were modified to take into account the targets developed by the ten-year planning effort currently underway by the Ministry of Basic Education. The Education and Skills Development Results Package implementation strategy will take into account the results of the ten-year planning exercise.

Increased gross access ratio

The percentage of children aged seven years enrolled in first grade increased substantially from 40.9% in 1995/96 to an estimated 44.9% in 1996/97. For girls, this figure jumped from 33.6% to 37.4% between these two school years. Girls gross access is still far behind the 52.6% gross access of boys, but is increasing at a faster rate than during the previous three school years.

In 1992, the Malian Government adopted a policy, thanks to USAID policy dialogue in the girls education component of the Basic Education Expansion Project, to enroll as many girls as boys. As a result, there was a thirty percent increase in the percentage of girls entering first grade between the 1991/92 and the 1992/93 school years. This tendency has been sustained over five school years, but

the greatest increase has been during the past two years. This is mainly due to the equity criteria of community schools financed under the USAID program. The large increase this past year is mainly due to the 120% increase in the number of community schools and a 130% increase in the number of students attending them. Most of these schools have been created with the assistance of PVOs and NGOs benefitting from USAID funding. In addition, the figure for 1996/1997 is well above projections because of USAID's efforts to assist the Ministry of Basic Education in enrolling as many girls as boys.

Intermediate Results

Increased percent of community school students passing sixth grade exams.

USAID Mali began the community school initiative in 1992 in partnership with Save the Children by launching a pilot program in the circle of Kolondieba. World Education, with USAID funding, has taken another approach in helping organize schools in the district of Bamako and the region of Koulikoro. As a result of USAID's effort in these initiatives, the development of community schools has become a national policy supported by the Government and donors alike. In efforts to comply with a condition of USAID non-project assistance, the Government established in December 1994 a legal framework governing the creation and the status of community schools. The Ministry of Basic Education has recently created a special cabinet level unit to oversee the development of community schools.

The number of community school students has increased by 130 percent in one year, from 20,500 during the 1995-1996 school year to 47,000 during the 1996-1997 school year. None of the schools has been in existence long enough to have a sixth grade class, and only four of them have a fifth grade class.

Two important observations can be made about community schools. First, students in community schools perform better than students in public schools. Achievement tests were administered to 440 third grade students from 16 community schools and 349 third grade students from 11 public schools. They show that the former score 25% higher than the latter in math, reading and dictation. The determining factors were found to be the quality of the teacher/student relationship and the student/teacher ratio being lower than in public schools (39/1 vs. 70/1), the frequency of supervision from the PVO/NGOs, and the involvement of parents and the community in the management of the school. Second, the percentage of girls enrolled is higher in community schools than in public schools (43% vs 41%). For example, in the district of Kolondieba where the pilot program was launched, the number of girl students has increased by over 350 percent in just 5 years, from 1,630 in 1992 to 6,050 in the 1996-97 school year.

Increased application of solutions to urban and environmental problems

Activities, the impact of which will be measured by this indicator, will begin in 1997.

Access

Decreased percentage of villages outside 5 km. radius of a primary school

In the Cercle of Kolondieba where Save started implementing schools, the number of villages outside the 5 km radius of school is only 8 according to the 1996 GIS school map, the lowest of any Cercle in the country. The development of additional community schools throughout the country will help to increase access for isolated villages.

Gross Access and enrollment ratio in targeted areas

A cost analysis was undertaken this year between the two models currently existing under the two USAID Grants for Community Schools. The application of the findings is being discussed with the partners as lessons learned and as tool for improving the models in terms of quality and sustainability. Initial data analysis shows substantially higher cost recovery (a sustainability factor) for the World Education model while the Save the Children model invests more heavily on pedagogical materials and supervision (quality factors). Students of Community schools funded under World Education will be tested during this school year in order to be better able to compare quality and cost between the two models.

Quality

Student-teacher ratio in community schools

For the 616 community schools, the average student-teacher ratio is 39/1. For the 392 community schools supported by Save the Children, the student-teacher ratio is 30/1. For the 143 World Education-supported community schools, the ratio is 78/1. For the 81 community schools supported by NGOs, associations and by the communities themselves, the student-teacher ratio is 44/1. The disparity in student-teacher ratios reflects the different approaches of Save the Children and World Education, the cost-effectiveness of which USAID is now evaluating.

Increased awareness of urban and rural environmental issues by youth

Activities, the impact of which will be measured by this indicator, will begin in 1997.

Demand

Community School registrations

In 1995/96, 131 community schools were registered with the Government, the first step in gaining access to Government resources and other support.

Ratio of girls/boys in community schools

In the 616 community schools, the ratio of girls to boys is 20,300 to 26,700 or 75%. For Save the Children, an equal number of girls and boys attend classes. For World Education, the ratio of girls and boys is 5,261 to 8,763 or 60%. World Education is focusing its attention on increasing the girl-boy ratio.

Capacity

The number of primary school classrooms has been increasing, but the numbers of teachers has not kept up with the number of students. In 1995/96, there were 9,303 classrooms among public, private and community schools, excluding Save the Children schools. For 1994/95, there were 8,978 classrooms among the same types of schools. For the 1996/97 school year, Save the Children supports the management of community schools with 684 classes, 450 of which USAID helped to build in 1996. The student/teacher ratio has been steadily deteriorating as enrollment has increased. In 1993/94, it was 50/1, while in 1995/96, it was 70/1. The Government has limited flexibility to hire additional teachers under its structural adjustment program, but it has been encouraged by the IMF and World Bank to favor the educational sector in hiring. Teachers have been hired on contract to fill the gap, but this is only a temporary measure. Through supporting community schools, USAID is helping to increase the number of teachers in Malian schools.

One major contextual change in the education sector that could have an impact on the Education and Skills Development Results Package is the Government initiative to design a ten year sectoral investment program for education. Sectoral investment programs are based on the assumption that long-term comprehensive programs are more likely to bring about sustainable results than individual short-term projects designed and carried out with little or no coordination and synergy among the various actors/interventions. A task force composed of Malian experts has been set up by the government to design this ten year plan. The task force is expected to present the plan at a round table to be held in June 1997. When the plan is officially approved by the Government, donors who intend to invest in the sector (including USAID) will adjust their program to fit in the plan.

Indicator Changes and Data Problems

Data, both qualitative and quantitative, from Education Management Information Systems has been available since 1990 thanks to USAID's investments in the Ministry of Basic Education. There are two new elements this year: the testing of students from double shift classrooms and the processing of data from the regional level. Data has been processed in all eight regional Directorates of Education, thanks to USAID equipment and institutional capacity development. The data is being cross checked for accuracy.

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective

APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:SO 1 Improved Social and Economic Behaviors Among Youth

INDICATOR:Increased contraceptive prevalence rate (modern methods) for men and women (all ages)

UNIT OF MEASURE:percentage of all women and men.

SOURCE: (1996, 2000) Demographic and Health Survey; (intervening years) national level - couple years of protection from SOMARC contraceptive distribution statistics, targeted geographic areas - USAID-funded PVO KAP surveys

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:Women and men using any modern method of contraception as a percentage of all women and men

COMMENTS: 1987 figures are not totally comparable, in that they measure only women and men in union while 1996 figures measure all women and men

YE A R	PLANN ED	ACTUAL
1987		1% w in union 5% m in union
1996 (B)*		5% all w 11% all w
1997		
1998	10% w 20% m	
1999		
2000	20% w 30% m	
2001		
2002 (T)**	30% w 40% m	

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE: Youth Strategic Objective APPROVED: 9/95 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Mali			
RESULT NAME: SO 1 Improved Social and Economic Behaviors Among Youth			
INDICATOR: Increased contraceptive prevalence rate(CPR) for modern methods for 15-24 years cohort (men)			
UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of men aged 15-19 and 20-24 SOURCE: Demographic and Health survey(DHS) INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Men aged 15-24 using any modern method as percentage of men in those age groups COMMENTS: This indicator is being replaced by increased contraceptive prevalence rate (modern methods) for men and women (all ages).	YEA R	PLANN ED	ACTUAL
	1996 (B)*		7.2% (15-19) 22.3% (20-24)
	1997		
	1998		
	1999		
	2000		
	2001		
	2002 (T)**		

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective
APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:SO 1 Improved Social and Economic Behaviors Among Youth

INDICATOR:Increased contraceptive prevalence rate(CPR) for modern methods for 15-24 years cohort (women)

UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of women aged 15-19 and 20-24	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
SOURCE: Demographic and Health survey(DHS)	1987		1.1% (15-19) 1.3% (20-24)
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Women aged 15-24 using any modern method as percentage of women in those age groups	1996 (B)*		3.2% (15-19) 5.5% (20-24)
COMMENTS: 1987 figures are not totally comparable, in that they measure only women of these age cohorts in union.This indicator is being replaced by increased contraceptive prevalence rate (modern methods) for men and women (all ages).	1997		
	1998		
	1999		
	2000		
	2001		
	2002 (T)**		

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective

APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:SO 1 Improved Social and Economic Behaviors Among Youth

INDICATOR:Increased percentage of children 12-23 months receiving full range of immunizations(DPT3, BCG, OPV3, measles) by their first birthday

UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage

SOURCE:national level: Demographic Health Survey (DHS) and other Immunization surveys (UNICEF, WHO); targeted geographic areas: USAID-funded PVO immunization records and KAP surveys

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:Proportion of living children 12-23 months old, who have received each of the recommended childhood vaccinations before their first birthday

COMMENTS: Targets are both for the national level and targeted geographic areas. Baseline is at the national level.

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
1996 (B)*		20.8%
1997		
1998	50%	
1999		
2000	70%	
2001		
2002 (T)**	80%	

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE: Youth Strategic Objective
APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME: SO 1 Improved Social and Economic Behaviors Among Youth

INDICATOR: Increased gross enrollment ratio
(Total)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Student, percentage	YE A R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
SOURCE: GRM Education Statistics	1995 (B)*		42.3%
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of girls and boys of any age enrolled in primary school (1st cycle, grades 1-6) as a percentage of total population (girls and boys) aged 7-12 years	1996	45.0%	46.5%
COMMENTS: This includes all children in school: public, private, community and medersa. Merdersa are bilingual (Arabic and French) schools which are registered with the Ministry of Basic Education	1997	47.6%	
COMMENTS: This includes all children in school: public, private, community and medersa. Merdersa are bilingual (Arabic and French) schools which are registered with the Ministry of Basic Education	1998	50.1%	
COMMENTS: This includes all children in school: public, private, community and medersa. Merdersa are bilingual (Arabic and French) schools which are registered with the Ministry of Basic Education	1999	52.9%	
COMMENTS: This includes all children in school: public, private, community and medersa. Merdersa are bilingual (Arabic and French) schools which are registered with the Ministry of Basic Education	2000	55.9%	
COMMENTS: This includes all children in school: public, private, community and medersa. Merdersa are bilingual (Arabic and French) schools which are registered with the Ministry of Basic Education	2001	59.2%	
COMMENTS: This includes all children in school: public, private, community and medersa. Merdersa are bilingual (Arabic and French) schools which are registered with the Ministry of Basic Education	2002 (T)**	62.5%	

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective

APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:SO 1 Improved Social and Economic Behaviors Among Youth

INDICATOR:Increased gross enrollment ratio
(Girls)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Student, percentage

SOURCE: GRM Education Statistics

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of girls of any age enrolled in primary school (1st cycle, grades 1-6) as a percentage of total population (girls) aged 7-12 years

COMMENTS: This includes all children in school: public, private, community and medersa. Merdersa are bilingual (Arabic and French) schools which are registered with the Ministry of Basic Education

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1995 (B)*		33.4%
1996	34%	38.4%
1997		
1998		
1999		
2000	44%	
2001		
2002 (T)**		

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective

APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:SO 1 Improved Social and Economic Behaviors Among Youth

INDICATOR:Increased 6th grade attainment rate
(**Total: girls and boys**)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Student, percentage

SOURCE: GRM Education Statistics

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of students(girls and boys) of any age group enrolled in sixth grade(terminal year of the 1st cycle) as a percentage of total cohort(girls and boys) entering 1st grade five years earlier

COMMENTS:

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1995 (B)*		41%
1996	47%	45%
1997	49%	
1998	51%	
1999	53%	
2000	54%	
2001	55%	
2002 (T)**		

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective
APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:SO 1 Improved Social and Economic Behaviors Among Youth

INDICATOR:Increased 6th grade attainment rate
(for girls)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Student, percentage

SOURCE: GRM Education Statistics

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of girls of any age group enrolled in 6 th grade(terminal year of the 1st cycle) as a percentage of total cohort (girls) entering 1st grade five years earlier

COMMENTS:

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1995 (B)*		39 %
1996		40%
1997		
1998		
1999		
2000		
2001		
2002 (T)**		

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective
APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:SO 1 Improved Social and Economic Behaviors Among Youth

INDICATOR:Increased gross access ratio
(Total: girls and boys)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Student, percentage	YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
SOURCE: GRM Education Statistics	1995 (B)*		33.4%
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of students(girls and boys) of any age newly enrolled in first grade of primary school as a percentage of total population (girls and boys) aged 7years	1996	41%	41.5%
COMMENTS: Planned targets do not include medersas.	1997		
COMMENTS: Planned targets do not include medersas.	1998		
COMMENTS: Planned targets do not include medersas.	1999		
COMMENTS: Planned targets do not include medersas.	2000	51%	
COMMENTS: Planned targets do not include medersas.	2001		
COMMENTS: Planned targets do not include medersas.	2002 (T)**		

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective

APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:SO 1 Improved Social and Economic Behaviors Among Youth

INDICATOR:Increased gross access ratio
(girls)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Student, percentage

SOURCE: GRM Education Statistics

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of students(girls) of any age newly enrolled in first grade of primary school as a percentage of total population (girls) aged 7years

COMMENTS:

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1995 (B)*		32.6%
1996	33%	37.4%
1997	39%	
1998	43%	
1999	47%	
2000	51%	
2001		
2002 (T)**		

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective

APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:IR 1 Healthier young women and men making responsible decisions about child survival and reproductive health in targeted geographic areas

INDICATOR:Increased percentage of births assisted by a trained attendant by 15-24 years cohort

UNIT OF MEASURE: births, percentage

SOURCE: DHS, KAP survey, PVOs/NGOs'reports

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Percentage of births attended by trained attendant as a proportion of all births in the age group

COMMENTS: 1987 figures are not totally comparable, since they measure the percent of births to women under 30 assisted by trained medical personnel. The 1995/96 DHS-II used a denominator of births during the previous three years, while the 1987 DHS-I used a denominator of births in the previous five years. This indicator is being replaced by two indicators: percent of births assisted by a trained attendant, and percent of births for which the mother received 2 or more Tetanus Toxoid immunizations during the last pregnancy.

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1987		33%
1996 (B)*		45% <20 39.6% 20- 34
1997		
1998		
1999		
2000		
2001		
2002 (T)**		

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective

APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:IR 1 Healthier young women and men making responsible decisions about child survival and reproductive health in targeted geographic areas

INDICATOR:Increased percentage of births assisted by a trained attendant

UNIT OF MEASURE: births, percentage

SOURCE: national level: (1996 and 2000)
Demographic and Health Survey; targeted geographic areas: USAID-funded PVO KAP surveys

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Percentage of births during the last three years attended by trained attendants.

COMMENTS: 1987 figures are not totally comparable, since they measure the percent of births to women under 30 assisted by trained medical personnel. The 1995/96 DHS-II used a denominator of births during the previous three years, while the 1987 DHS-I used a denominator of births in the previous five years. This indicator has problems of reliability, because of inconsistent vocabulary used to describe birth attendants. The definition of trained personnel changed between DHS-I and DHS-II. Traditional birth attendants are excluded from this measure.

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1987		33%
1996 (B)*		40%
1997		
1998	50%	
1999		
2000	70%	
2001		
2002 (T)**	80%	

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective

APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:IR 1 Healthier young women and men making responsible decisions about child survival and reproductive health in targeted geographic areas

INDICATOR:Increased percent of births during the last three years for which the mother received two or more Tetanus Toxoid immunizations during pregnancy.

UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage

SOURCE: national level: Demographic and Health Survey; targeted geographic areas: USAID-funded PVO immunization records and KAP surveys

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Percentage of births during the last three years for which the mother received two or more Tetanus Toxoid injections during pregnancy

COMMENTS: 1987 figures are not totally comparable, since they measure percentage of births for which the mother received at least one Tetanus Toxoid injection during pregnancy. Baseline and target for 2000 is national, while other targets are for targeted geographic areas.

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1987		18%
1996 (B)*		31.7%
1997		
1998	50%	
1999		
2000	70%	
2001		
2002 (T)**	80%	

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective
APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:IR 1 Healthier young women and men making responsible decisions about child survival and reproductive health in targeted geographic areas

INDICATOR:Increased percentage of reported condom use among unmarried, sexually active males aged 15-24 years in the most recent sexual intercourse

UNIT OF MEASURE: male, Percentage	YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
SOURCE: DHS, KAP survey, PVOs/NGOs report	1996		22.4% 15-19 24.1% 20-24
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of unmarried, sexually active males ages 15-24 years who report the use of a condom during the most recent act of sexual intercourse			
COMMENTS: The 1996 data do not exactly match the indicator, since they measure the percentage of men of these age groups <u>who have ever used a condom</u> who reported using a condom during the last sexual intercourse. The sample size for this measure is too low to provide reliable data, especially for the rural areas. This indicator is being replaced by the percentage of reported condom use among men who have ever used condoms during the most recent sexual intercourse.			

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective

APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:IR 1 Healthier young women and men making responsible decisions about child survival and reproductive health in targeted geographic areas

INDICATOR:Increased percentage of reported condom use among men who have ever used condoms during the most recent sexual intercourse

UNIT OF MEASURE:male, Percentage

SOURCE:national level: (1995/96 and 2000) DHS;
targeted geographic areas: USAID-funded PVO KAP surveys

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Proportion of men who have ever used condoms who report the use of a condom during the most recent act of sexual intercourse

COMMENTS:

YEA R	PLANN ED	ACTUAL
1996 (B)*		10.7%
1997		
1998	25%	
1999		
2000	40%	
2001		
2002 (T)**	50%	

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective

APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:IR 1 Healthier young women and men making responsible decisions about child survival and reproductive health in targeted geographic areas

INDICATOR:Increased percentage of under four month olds exclusively breast-fed

UNIT OF MEASURE:individual, percentage

SOURCE: national level:DHS; targeted geographic areas: USAID-funded PVO KAP surveys

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Proportion of infants 0-4 months who are exclusively breastfed

COMMENTS: This replaces the indicator measuring exclusive breastfeeding under three months. Four months is the appropriate time for exclusive breastfeeding according to international standards, and the DHS measures it for infants 0-4 months old.

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1996 (B)*		12.1%
1997		
1998	25%	
1999		
2000	40%	
2001		
2002 (T)**	50%	

Example:

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective

APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:IR 2 Better educated young women and men with skills relevant to the market economy in targeted geographic areas

INDICATOR:Increased percentage of community school students passing sixth grade exams (Total: girls and boys)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Student, percentage	YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
SOURCE: GRM education statistics	1996 (B)*		N/A
	1997		
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of students (girls and boys) from community schools passing the sixth grade exam as a proportion of total sixth grade community school students	1998	55%	
	1999	55%	
	2000	60%	
	2001	60%	
	2002 (T)**	60%	
COMMENTS: The data collection will start in 1998 because none of the community schools have students who are ready to enter the sixth grade			

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE:Youth Strategic Objective

APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME:IR 2 Better educated young women and men with skills relevant to the market economy in targeted geographic areas

INDICATOR:Increased percentage of community school students passing 6th grade exams (for girls)

UNIT OF MEASURE: Student, percentage

SOURCE: GRM education Statistics

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of girls from community schools passing the sixth grade exam as a proportion of total sixth grade community school girls

COMMENTS: The data collection will start in 1998 because none of the community schools have students who are ready to enter the sixth grade

YE A R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1996 (B)*		N/A
1997		
1998	55%	
1999	55%	
2000	60%	
2001	60%	
2002 (T)**	60%	

*(B): Base Year

** (T): Target

OBJECTIVE: Youth Strategic Objective

APPROVED: 9/95 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME: IR 2 Better educated young women and men with skills relevant to the market economy in targeted geographic areas

INDICATOR: Increased application of solutions to both urban and rural environmental problems by youth

UNIT OF MEASURE: individual

SOURCE: GreenCom

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of targeted youth who apply at least two solutions to environmental problems

COMMENTS: GreenCom buy-in is still in process. The activity is expected to start in the 2nd semester of 1997.

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1996 (B)*		0
1997	TBD	
1998	TBD	
1999	TBD	
2000		
2001		
2002 (T)**		

*(B): Base

** (T): Target

Sustainable Economic Growth Strategic Objective

The Sustainable Economic Growth Strategic Objective is on-track and shows excellent promise in several areas, especially in increasing value-added in alternative crops. The SO encompasses four projects, Animal Productivity for Export(APEX), Strengthening Research Planning and Research on Commodities (SPARC), Development of the Haute Vallee (DHV), Food and Agricultural Policy Support (FAPS), as well as several PVO grants. The SEG SO Team spent the last year adapting these activities to the framework of the strategic objective: increasing value-added in specific economic subsectors. Significant impact of the existing activities was demonstrated at all levels of the results framework. Data at these levels both measure the impact of USAID's previous and ongoing investments as well as serve as baselines for the new strategy. Data is not yet available for all indicators. Only those indicators for which baseline or impact data is available will be discussed.

Strategic Objective Indicators

Data for strategic objective indicators is not available. The SEG Team is analyzing the problems in getting this data and will support the data collection or analysis needed to report on it in the 1997 Results Review.

Intermediate Results Indicators

Some of the Mission's investments prior to 1996 are beginning to demonstrate positive impact through increased communication, cohesion, improved decision-making, and a greater commitment to achieving consensus and working together. As a result, USAID Mali has seen a greater willingness by its partners to invest additional resources, money and effort. This phenomenon is improving the SEG Team's ability to achieve intermediate results.

CEREALS RESULTS PACKAGE

Under the Cereals Results Package, the value-added of cereal products increased from \$357.4 million to \$375 million between 1995 and 1996. These figures reflect a burgeoning interest in opportunities created by the currency devaluation and the efforts of USAID to increase production through research, liberalization of the cereals market, privatization of rice mills and private investment.

USAID also has influenced the volume of cereals production, which reached 2,293,000 MT, making 1996 a medium to good year compared to the five year average. The value of cereals production was over \$200 million. In terms of processed cereals products, 55,000 MT were produced, valued at \$18.7 million. Official cereal exports were 45,000 MT valued at \$12.6 million, although significant unofficial exports also occurred.

To the extent possible, the SEG Team has encouraged changes in research orientation to achieve greater linkages with the intermediate results. A new Research for Results activity identified numerous opportunities, many of which were incorporated in the SEG Results Plan. A pilot effort to grow corn and produce industrial food products for the local brewing industry, is on the threshold of showing significant commercial impact.

LIVESTOCK RESULTS PACKAGE

No information is yet available on the value-added of livestock and livestock products. However, USAID has had a positive impact on and is tracking several other subresults indicators. The number of cattle has increased from 5.5 million to 5.7 million, while the number of small ruminants has increased from 12.5 million to 13.2 million between 1994 and 1995. During the same years, the number of cattle sold decreased from 176,000 to 107,000, while the number of small ruminants sold increased from 340,000 to 426,000. The weight of animals products processed increased from 19 million kilos in 1995 to 22 million kilos in 1996.

USAID has helped Malian livestock herders and traders profit from the 1994 currency devaluation. The value of livestock and livestock products sold has increased from \$109 million to \$135 million between 1994 and 1996. Still more can be done, especially in promoting exports, and USAID is refocussing its activities to take advantage of this opportunity.

The positive impact of the SEG Team also is demonstrated by the following anecdotes:

- Production and marketing of animal vaccines has increased significantly;
- Graduates of the Livestock Entrepreneur Program expanded the scope of their operations (veterinary services and poultry feed), increased their degree of vertical integration, increased inventory and began extending credit terms to clients;
- Sales of dried meat expanded significantly into new markets including trial shipments into Switzerland;
- USAID efforts to promote cooperatives, plan markets and facilitate public-private partnerships helped cooperatives to self-finance improvements in the Bamako small ruminants market and the Segou livestock market totaling \$23,000;
- As a result of successful livestock fairs in the past, regional traders (Senegal & Ivory Coast) have expressed strong continuing interest in further access to markets in the west and southern regions of Mali;
- (one-stop window) Where four or more documents were required before for exports, one is required now, with the direct benefit of a reduction in the time expended on assembling the necessary papers;
- (unauthorized collection of road taxes) The reduction in payments per truckload of animals shipped from Segou to Abidjan represents savings on all exports of about \$280,000;
- (Training in Livestock Management) Procedures for collecting money from market participants and the keeping of accounts has been much improved as a result of increased efficiency in the charges for some services and increases in the numbers of animals passing through the markets;

NEW OPPORTUNITIES RESULTS PACKAGE

USAID does not yet have good data on the value-added of alternative crops. With USAID assistance, the value of alternative crops exported increased from \$1.5 million in 1995 to \$5.4 million in 1996. These crops included green beans, hibiscus and mangoes. USAID in collaboration with the private sector and the Malian Government helped arrange private air charters for fruit and vegetable exports to Europe, thus undermining the Air Afrique monopoly. The green bean processing, packaging and export operations have been improved, and high value products have been exported by private firms in retail packs. This year, the Mission encouraged the testing of

commercial production and export of hibiscus flowers. The test results were positive, and the American firm, Celestial Seasonings, is in the process of concluding a contract with the *Office du Haute Vallee du Niger* for a commercial-scale quantity to be sold in the U.S. This will require expanded production and important producer involvement.

FINANCIAL SERVICES RESULTS PACKAGE

Several networks of hundreds of savings and credit associations supported by USAID and a number of NGOs mobilized \$134,000 in savings and had \$780,000 in loans outstanding at the end of 1996. The Mission's microfinance program under SEG is just beginning. The SEG Team is reviewing the microcredit components of existing projects and grants to ensure that they reflect the "best practices" generally accepted in the area of microfinance. The current level of funding of existing programs is about \$3,513,623. The Team will assess the needs for technical assistance and training to increase the outreach and sustainability of these programs. The Financial Services Results Package aims to help Mali improve its rate of domestic savings mobilization, create a policy environment for improved operations of non-bank financial institutions, and improve the operational and financial sustainability of microfinance institutions. The Mission seeks to expand the availability of financial services to the largest segment of the population, according to the criteria of outreach and sustainability mentioned above.

Activities

A common feature of the development orientation of projects comprising the SEG portfolio has been a focus on the impact on beneficiaries at the grass-roots level. This approach involves strong participation of individuals and groups of farmers to address concerns about sustainability. Under the SPARC project, the research validation program depends on the degree to which production problems are substantiated at the farm level. This requires planning, programming and scheduling the approach to implementation as well as identifying, informing, and gaining the agreement of the targeted individuals, groups and communities. The current SEG focus on results at the subsector level continues this approach, but also includes assessing the value-added that could be achieved through providing additional services or transforming products.

The SEG Team envisions a fundamental shift in USAID's approach to meeting the ongoing institutional support requirements of its traditional partners in the Ministry of Rural Development and Environment. Until now, institutional support was programmed as part of the overall project support budget for the development activities envisioned and authorized in the Project Agreement. Under the SEG Results Plan, the indirect costs associated with an institution's contributions to a new activity will be met through the application of audited overhead rates. Once approved, they will be applied to the prospective activity budgets for individual performance-based contracts. It is expected that this new approach will require close monitoring of cost and oversight of services delivery. It also will encourage an institutional approach more in line with the performance and accountability orientation planned under the Country Strategic Plan.

In a similar vein, the extended relationship of support USAID has provided the *Office du Haute Vallee du Niger* (OHVN) has had a positive impact on its management, financial, and operational structure and approach. Accurate costing of its extension services now has become an integral element of the specific interventions that are being undertaken in support of the SEG agribusiness

(New Opportunities) program. This has enabled OHVN to provide support services at cost, which would otherwise require a larger, expensive and more complicated agreement to obtain. With time and a reasonable degree of success, this approach is expected to encourage further autonomy and privatization of the OHVN in support of decentralization.

During this year of transition between the old and the new strategic plan, the SEG Team has learned the following lessons:

1. While the process of defining the SEG strategy was undertaken in a collaborative, open and participatory manner, it caused us uncertainty about the implications for future relationships with partners and anxiety about their ability to satisfy SEG's new focus on results.
2. The level of understanding among SEG partners regarding the Strategic Objective is clearer in concept than in practice. Concerns include:
 - a. During the transition, being able to convert to new orientations while maintaining continued access to the necessary resources;
 - b. The level of accountability associated with the expected performance; and
 - c. New more proactive involvement and direct engagement with the change process;
3. Communicating the SEG strategy is an ongoing process. It requires reenforcement, refinement, clarification and consistency in application to achieve the common vision needed to advance the Mission's objectives.
4. Shifting to the new SEG strategy requires changes in the traditional roles of FSNs. They have no clear role-models. New, more team-oriented behaviors need to be reinforced continuously.
5. Certain steps, such as staff empowerment and reenforcement, cannot be skipped over or accelerated beyond the capacity, skills, confidence of the staff in place.
6. Other lessons:
 - a. SEG failed to anticipate the impact on the portfolio transition of such events as:
 - The restructuring of the Ministry of Rural Development, its staff re-alignment and the resulting loss of continuity;
 - The upcoming national elections and the heightened interest in producing results before the beginning of the electoral campaign;
 - The amount of time required and the difficulties inherent in developing new Strategic Objective Agreements;

Adjustments Made:

1. FSN and USDH staff alike are improving their ability to identify the key elements of the transition process, to concentrate on the specific actions needed for a solution and to work as a team to advance the objectives agreed upon.
2. A concerted effort was made to produce tangible evidence of progress toward SEG objectives in the short term, even as the Strategy itself was undergoing continued refinement and focus.

3. The existing Project Agreements were allowed to overlap with the new Strategic Objective Agreement in order to help implementing partners make the transition from earlier orientations and the new focus on results. This was accomplished by innovative approaches to evaluations, which mobilized teams of SEG and counterpart staff. These teams evaluated two of SEG's three projects quickly in order to identify linkages to the new Strategy.

4. Project management and implementation procedures were simplified and streamlined. Planned interventions were reoriented to concentrate on those activities most closely supportive of, or otherwise related, to the new focus on tangible results and value-added improvements.

5. Staff training needs in leadership and facilitation skills were identified, addressed quickly and made relevant through making training part of the Mission's approach to issue identification, problem resolution and decision making.

6. Expanded use of direct, performance-based, acquisition instruments for delivery of services;

- a) Emergence of a new, consolidated strategy focusing on exports;
- b) Re-enforcement of complementary commercial ties and business relationships between and among client entrepreneurs, e.g. improved forward and backward linkages among economic participants in the livestock subsector;
- c) A streamlined and simplified project management structure;
- d) A shift in activity analysis from economic justification to identification of practical applications required for technical and commercial viability;
- e) Improved access to quality market information resulting in enhanced bargaining positions for producers and cattle buyers.

Beginning in 1997, more attention will be directed to complementarities and synergistic opportunities with other SOs, notably Democratic Governance and Information and Communications.

Indicator Changes and Data Problems

The \$3 million in value-added target in the first year of the Country Strategic Plan was overly optimistic, given the inescapable lag time involved in mobilization and difficulties in linking results to our initial efforts. Measuring progress toward macro-level indicators may not be entirely appropriate, given that many of the interventions focus on micro-level activities. The assumption that secondary sources of data would be readily available and closely match SEG's focus on value-added contributions was not realistic. A concerted effort to identify sources of information for establishment of baseline indicators and the periodic monitoring that followed the in-house evaluation revealed significant limitations in the accuracy, availability and general suitability of secondary data sources. This points to the need to mobilize field surveys for collection of primary data and the need to closely define parameters within which our performance indicators can be measured. It is now evident that the SEG Team must establish systems to gather systematically the primary data needed to measure progress toward our strategic objectives. The Mission's Results Center will guide the Team in these efforts.

SEG is changing one indicator, under Intermediate Result 4.1 *Increased availability of savings, loans and capital services in targeted areas*. One of the previous indicators was *the number of functional*

non-bank financial institutions. The definition of functional is problematic, so the indicator will be replaced by the following more measurable indicator: *Number of NBFIs accessing commercial credit*.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: Sustainable Economic Growth			
APPROVED: 9/95		COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Mali	
RESULT NAME: : IR 1 Increased value-added of the cereal subsector in targeted areas			
INDICATORS: Increased value-added of cereals products in targeted areas			
UNIT OF MEASURE: Dollars (Million)	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
SOURCE: GRM, PVOs, Private Businesses, R.P. Manager	1995 (b)*		357.4
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: value-added contributed by the cereal subsector in targeted areas	1996	361.0	375.1
COMMENTS: Nation-wide figures, including USAID's contribution.	1997	TBD	
	1998	TBD	
	1999	TBD	
	2000	TBD	
	2001	TBD	

* base year

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: Sustainable Economic Growth

APPROVED: 9/95

COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID Mali

RESULT NAME: IR 3 Increased value-added of alternative crops in targeted areas

INDICATOR: Value-added of alternative crops in targeted areas increased

UNIT OF MEASURE: Millions of dollar	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
SOURCE: Reports and surveys	1995 (b)*		.63
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Value-added of alternative crops in targeted areas	1996	.71	
COMMENTS: Crops include green beans, hibiscus flowers and mangos.	1997	.79	
	1998	.87	
	1999	.95	
	2000	1.03	
	2001	1.11	
	2002	1.19	

* base year

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: Sustainable Economic Growth

APPROVED: 9/95

COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME: IR 4 Increased savings mobilized and credit provided by NBFIs in targeted areas

INDICATORS: Amount of savings mobilized in targeted areas, Number of savings accounts in targeted areas

UNIT OF MEASURE: Dollars - Number	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
SOURCE: Financial Institutions, Donors, GRM	1995 (b)*		6,000 (m)(t) NA (m) (w) 1,094 (n)(t) NA (n) (w)
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: . Amount of Savings at Yr End/Fixed Point in Time/Gender, Nber of Savings Accts/Yr End/Fixed Pt in Time/Gender in targeted areas	1996	140,000 (m)(t) NA (m)(t) 311 (n)(t) NA (n)(w)	180,000 (m)(t) NA (m) (w) 1,302 (n)(t) NA (n) (w)
	1997	560,000 (m)(t) TBD (m)(t) 2,439 (n)(t) TBD (n)(w)	
	1998	TBD	
	1999	TBD	
	2000	TBD	
	2001	TBD	
COMMENTS: NBFIs: Non Banks Financial Institutions; m: savings mobilized; n; number of accounts; t: total; w: women	2002	TBD	

* base year

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: Sustainable Economic Growth

APPROVED: 9/95

COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME: IR 4.2 Increased availability of savings, loans and capital services in targeted areas

INDICATORS: Amount lent by financial institutions to NBFIs in targeted areas

UNIT OF MEASURE: Dollars	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
SOURCE: Financial Institutions, GRM	1995 (b)*		80,000
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Amt of credit provided by financial institutions to non-bank financial institutions in targeted areas for onward lending	1996	200,000	NA
	1997	320,000	
	1998	TBD	
	1999	TBD	
	2000	TBD	
	2001	TBD	
COMMENTS: NBFIs: Non Bank Financial Institutions	2002	TBD	

* base year

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: Sustainable Economic Growth

APPROVED: 9/95

COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID/Mali

RESULT NAME: IR 4.2 Increased availability of savings, loans and capital services in targeted areas

INDICATORS: Number of NBFIs in targeted areas accessing commercial credit

UNIT OF MEASURE: NBFIs, number	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
SOURCE: Financial Institutions, GRM	1995 (b)*		1
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of non-bank financial institutions in targeted areas accessing credit from commercial sources	1996	4	3
	1997	5	
	1998	TBD	
	1999	TBD	
	2000	TBD	
COMMENTS: NBFIs: Non-Bank Financial Institutions	2001	TBD	
	2002	TBD	

* base year

Democratic Governance Strategic Objective

The Democratic Governance (DG) Strategic Objective is on-track, building on USAID's investments in PVOs and NGOs, and expanding the focus to community organizations. As the Strategic Objective Team refines its approach, it is supporting activities of limited scope, such as community school management associations, women's credit and savings associations and civic organizations.

The following is a summary of the impact of these limited activities at the strategic objective and intermediate results levels. They refer to a grant made to World Education to support 92 community organizations and 25 NGOs. Impact was measured after World Education had been working with these organizations and after nine months of Democratic Governance SO funding. A formal baseline survey is now being undertaken, which will provide baseline data for the 750 community organizations and 40 intermediate NGOs and federations to be targeted by the DG Strategic Objective.

Strategic Objective Indicators

For the strategic objective, *Community organizations in target communes are effective partners in democratic governance, including development decision-making and planning*, the only indicator for which there was progress was *The percentage of target community organizations forming a good partnership with local government in delivering public services*. Of the 92 community organizations supported by World Education, 3 formed good partnerships with existing urban communal governments, or 4%. While several urban communes have been in existence since 1991, the 701 rural communes whose boundaries have been identified have not yet been established.

Intermediate Results Indicators

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS RESULTS PACKAGE

Information is available for some indicators of the intermediate result, *Target community organizations are engaged in democratic self-governance and civic action at the local level and beyond*. Of the 92 community organizations supported by World Education, 48% govern themselves democratically, 73% have women in leadership positions, 7% pursue issues with civic action of any type, 3% pursue issues with effective civic action, and 3% mobilize non-USAID, non-member resources.

No information is available on indicators for the subresult of the Community Organizations Results Package, *Target intermediary NGOs and federations effectively aggregate and represent community organization interests at the local level and beyond*.

DECENTRALIZATION RESULTS PACKAGE

This results package is essential to achievement of the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective, but is the responsibility of actors other than USAID, such as the Malian Government and other donors. A great deal of progress occurred in 1996 setting the stage for the 1997 communal elections, expected to take place in June. For the intermediate result, *Effective decentralization occurs by the end of 1999*, there has been progress on two indicators, *Percent of communal boundaries decided*

and *Planned laws and regulations about communal councils, boards and mayors' authority and resources decided by the end of 1999.*

The Decentralization Mission, the Malian institution in charge of the decentralization reform, has successfully completed the planning phase of this reform. It has guided the decision-making of 11,000 villages in selecting the communes to which they will be incorporated. Communes will replace the arrondissement level of the National Government. This has been a difficult political task, requiring a significant amount of education, organization, mediation and arbitration. Due to the Decentralization Mission's efforts, ten major laws affecting decentralization have been promulgated, most importantly the laws on the definition of communal boundaries. The mandate of this institution has been extended for one year with a new scope to assist the Government and decentralized communities with the implementation of the reform.

ENABLING ENVIRONMENT RESULTS PACKAGE

The DG Team commissioned a study of the legal status of civil society organizations and found no major problems that need to be addressed now. Nevertheless, the Government and civil society are working together to address obstacles to empowerment of civil society. In addition to the decentralization laws passed by the National Assembly, there have been other Governmental efforts to improve legal recognition of civil society organizations. The National Assembly has drafted a law improving the regulation of cooperatives. This effort has been supported by other donors (UNDP and ILO). CCA/NGO, the Malian federation of NGOs, also has begun a series of discussions with the Government to address the status of NGOs in Malian society.

Activities

During 1996, The DG Team invested in activities that both support its strategic objective directly and support the consolidation of Mali's democratization process. It funded the following activities:

1. World Education activities improving democratic self- governance and effective management of 92 community organizations (52 student parent associations of public schools, 25 civic groups and 15 women's credit associations), building a federation of student parent associations, and improving its capacity to advocate and work for better school conditions.
2. Training of 27 leaders (Presidents, Managers, Treasurers) of 10 cooperatives in financial management/basic accounting, and cooperative legislation. This training was successful and as a result, 100% of these cooperatives govern themselves democratically, 43% have effective management systems and 85% are capable of obtaining financial assistance on their own from local financial institutions. The DG team will continue to work with these organizations to provide them training in civic education and civic action. This pilot activity has the potential for great impact in the strengthening the cooperative movement and in enhancing the participation of these organizations in their local development.
3. Training of 30 women parliamentarians and municipal counselors in political science, constitutional law and tools for legislative strengthening. This training not only will strengthen the capacity of these women to carry out their tasks and represent their constituents efficiently, but it will

and has increased their self- confidence to get more involved in the political arena and to encourage more women to participate.

4. Attendance of three Malian women at an Africa-wide seminar on women in politics. They returned to Mali to initiate a lobbying group on women in politics. Currently they are very active in undertaking civic education training and consciousness-raising seminars for Malian women in several regions to increase their participation in the upcoming elections. It was reported at their last seminar that 132 Malian women are potential candidates for both the legislative and municipal elections. This is a tremendous change in comparison with the last elections in 1992, when the number of women candidates was very low.

5. Funding of a Malian non-governmental organization to organize a network of NGOs for ensuring fairness and transparency of the 1997 elections throughout the country. The members of this network have received training from the National Democratic Institute (NDI), through a USAID centrally-funded project. The training is helping them to become effective election observers and to conduct civic and voter education training for Malian citizens. The network and NDI have trained 500 Observers for all the regions in Mali. NDI has prepared and printed 5,000 copies of an election observer manual written for the Malian elections. These manuals have been distributed through the network of NGOs and other organizations.

6. Organization of democratic governance education sessions for PVOs, NGOs and customers. As a result, several Mission partners, including CARE , CLUSA and World Education, have modified their program to include civic education as a basis for civic action. In addition, some USAID customers have an increased awareness of the need for civic education training as a basis for participating in local democratic governance.

7. Funding of two Malian parliamentarians and one civil society representative to attend a U.S. political party presidential nominating convention. Upon their return to Mali, they went on national television to explain that elections are not only a competitive process, but also a cooperative process to guarantee the survival of democracy. This concept appealed to the Malian President, who has repeated it throughout the presidential campaign.

Indicator Changes and Data Problems

One the most important learning experiences for the SO Team was groundtruthing its proposed indicators and targets, which have been characterized as the most sophisticated civil society indicators in the Agency. The DG team undertook field visits to groundtruth the indicators, targets and assumptions and to validate the logic of the results framework using the rapid appraisal methodology. During this exercise, team members interviewed a total of 52 potential customers and partners in six of the country's eight regions. These 52 interviews included administering questionnaires to 5 American PVOs, 12 Malian NGOs, 8 federations, and 27 community organizations. Federations interviewed included: 3 federations of Students Parent Associations at both the Arrondissement and Cercle level; a union of 53 village savings and credit associations; a coordinating body for associations working in sanitation and environmental protection; 2 associations of villages associations (AVs) undertaking natural resource management activities, and 1 Cercle level cooperative of fishermen. Community organizations (CO) interviewed included: 10

women's associations, 8 village associations, 4 savings and credit associations, 1 community health center association, 1 rural radio station association, and 3 civic groups.

Based on the findings of this groundtruthing exercise, the team concluded that the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective responds to the essential needs of grassroots organizations to participate in democratic governance and local development. These organizations would like to change the mentality of National Government representatives and help local governments inspire the trust of their communities, both of which are vital for the effective participation of community organizations in local democratic governance. Most of the proposed indicators were found to be appropriate, except the following:

1) Under the Community Organizations Results Package, the indicator: *Target COs have sound management practices*; used the criteria: *External audit done and published for COs*. This criteria was found to be unrealistic and probably too costly, given the low education/literacy level of COs members as well as limited CO resources. As a result, the audit criteria has been changed to: *COs maintain adequate financial systems and records that are reviewed by NGOs and PVOs and published in general assembly*.

2) Under the Community Organizations Results Package, the indicator: *Target COs govern themselves democratically*: used the criteria: *CO leadership elected for a specific time period according to by-laws*. This criteria was found to be inappropriate in many cases. In fact, in most of the COs interviewed, consensus was used not only to choose leaders but also to change them when necessary.

3) The Team also found that the gender indicator: *Percent of mixed gender COs with at least one women in a leadership position*; might not measure USAID's impact fairly in all cases, especially in village associations.

Overall, the Team found evidence to conclude that proposed DG activities are appropriate. There is a tremendous need for capacity building in democratic self-governance, management, literacy/numeracy, civic education and civic action. These needs complement other needs expressed by the same COs, such as financial, technical, and material assistance for social and economic activities. The latter set of needs will be addressed by the Mission's other strategic objectives.

It should be noted that this validation exercise was not undertaken as a qualitative research effort in which the DG team attempted to remain disinterested outsiders. Its use of the rapid appraisal methodology led it to engage NGOs, federations and community organizations in a frank dialogue concerning their opinions about the DG team's strategy and intended interventions. The team thinks the approach worked well. While the "sample" may have been somewhat small and biased compared to a more scientifically applied survey, team members strongly believe that the majority of what they heard was representative of the situation of similar organizations in other parts of the country.

A team of American and Malian researchers has collaborated to design and implement a survey to collect baseline data. This task is a difficult one, given the unknown universe of Malian community associations and NGOs. It also is complicated by the fact that the 750 NGOs to be supported by the DG SO have not all yet been selected. The data collection for this survey is now underway.

OBJECTIVE:Democratic Governance Strategic Objective

APPROVED: September 1995 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID Mali

RESULT NAME: S.O.3: Community Organizations in Target Communes are Effective Partners in Democratic Governance, Including Development Decision-Making and Planning.

INDICATOR: percent of target COs forming a good partnership with local government in delivering public services

UNIT OF MEASURE: Percentage of target COs

SOURCE: CO logbooks; interviews; annual survey

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: percent of target COs that can demonstrate growing or high levels of cooperation with government in the provision of services. Cooperation can be financial, material or technical. Financial support can include the provision of personnel, such as school teachers for community schools.

COMMENTS: t - total COs; w - women's COs. To give an idea of the baseline, data is provided from a pilot activity with the US PVO World Education which targeted 92 COs and 25 NGOs. Collection of the formal base line is in process.

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1996		3% (3/92)
1996 (b)*		
1997	25% (t) TBD (w)	
1998	30% (t) TBD (w)	
1999	40% (t) TBD (w)	
2000	60% (t) TBD (w)	
2001	70% (t) TBD (w)	
2002	75% (t) TBD (w)	

* base year

OBJECTIVE: Democratic Governance Strategic Objective APPROVED: September 1995 COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: USAID Mali			
RESULT NAME: IR 1 Target community organizations are engaged in democratic self governance and civic action at the local level and beyond.			
INDICATOR: percent of target COs that govern themselves democratically			
UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of targets COs SOURCE: CO logbooks and interview, annual PVO/NGO partner assessment; sample survey INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: percent of target COs that meet the following criteria: a. They are voluntary in founding & membership; b. the leadership is elected in accordance with the by-laws and for a specific time period that allows alternation; c. meetings are held according to the by-laws; d. attendance at meetings averages 75% for board meetings and 60% for general meetings. COMMENTS: To give an idea of the baseline, data is provided from a pilot activity with the US PVO World Education which targeted 92 COs and 25 NGOs. Collection of the formal base line is in process.	YE A R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
	1996		48% (45/92)
	1996 (B)*		
	1997	50%	
	1998	60%	
	1999	60%	
	2000	70%	
	2001	75%	
	2002	85%	

* base year

OBJECTIVE:Democratic Governance Strategic Objective

APPROVED: September 1995 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID Mali

RESULT NAME: IR 1 Target community organizations are engaged in democratic self governance and civic action at the local level and beyond.

INDICATOR: percent of mixed gender COs with women in leadership positions

UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of target mixed gender COs

SOURCE: CO records, NGO sample survey

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: percent of target mixed gender COs with at least one woman in a leadership position.

COMMENTS: To give an idea of the baseline, data is provided from a pilot activity with the US PVO World Education which targeted 92 COs and 25 NGOs. Collection of the formal base line is in process.

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1996		72% (67/92)
1996 (b)*		
1997	10%	
1998	20%	
1999	20%	
2000	25%	
2001	35%	
2002	50%	

* base year

OBJECTIVE:Democratic Governance Strategic Objective

APPROVED: September 1995 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID Mali

RESULT NAME: IR 1 Target community organizations are engaged in democratic self governance and civic action at the local level and beyond.

INDICATOR: percent of target COs that are pursuing civic action

UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of targets COs

SOURCE: COs logbooks, information to be collected by NGO and PVO partners in sample survey

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: percent of COs pursuing civic action at and **above** the commune level.

COMMENTS: t - total COs; w - women's COs. To give an idea of the baseline, data is provided from a pilot activity with the US PVO World Education which targeted 92 COs and 25 NGOs. Collection of the formal base line is in process.

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1996		7% (6/92)
1996 (b)*		
1997	50% (t COs) TBD(w COs)	
1998	60% (t COs TBD(w COs)	
1999	70% (t COs TBD(w COs)	
2000	90% (t COs TBD(w COs)	
2001	95% (t COs TBD(w COs)	
2002	100% (t COs TBD(w COs)	

* base year

OBJECTIVE:Democratic Governance Strategic Objective

APPROVED: September 1995 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID Mali

RESULT NAME: IR 1 Target community organizations are engaged in democratic self governance and civic action at the local level and beyond.

INDICATOR: percent of target COs that are pursuing issues with effective civic action

UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of targets COs

SOURCE: COs logbooks, interviews, NGO/PVO sample survey

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: percent of target COs for which there is evidence that for any single issue a) the problem was analyzed; b) a position was developed; c) an action plan was formulated; d) the gov't, population, and (if relevant) other COs or intermediary NGOs or federations were contacted; e) the membership was involved in civic action; and (if relevant) (f) joint CO or INGO/fed. action took place.

COMMENTS: t - total COs; w - women's COs. To give an idea of the baseline, data is provided from a pilot activity with the US PVO World Education which targeted 92 COs and 25 NGOs. Collection of the formal base line is in process.

YE A R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1996		3% (3/92)
1996 (b)*		
1997	10% (t COs) TBD(w COs)	
1998	20% (t COs) TBD(w COs)	
1999	30% (t COs) TBD(w COs)	
2000	50% (t COs) TBD(w COs)	
2001	55% (t COs) TBD(w COs)	
2002	60% (t COs) TBD(w COs)	

* base year

OBJECTIVE:Democratic Governance Strategic Objective

APPROVED: September 1995 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID Mali

RESULT NAME: IR 1 Target community organizations are engaged in democratic self governance and civic action at the local level and beyond.

INDICATOR: percent of COs that mobilize resources from non-USAID, non-member sources

UNIT OF MEASURE: percentage of targets COs

SOURCE: CO interviews or financial records, annual sample survey

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: percent of COs that a) secure credit; b) raise money from the community; or c) obtain non-U.S. grants.

COMMENTS: To give an idea of the baseline, data is provided from a pilot activity with the US PVO World Education which targeted 92 COs and 25 NGOs. Collection of the formal base line is in process.

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1996		3% (3/92)
1996 (b*)		
1997	10%	
1998	25%	
1999	40%	
2000	60%	
2001	75%	
2002	75%	

OBJECTIVE:Democratic Governance Strategic Objective

APPROVED: September 1995 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID Mali

RESULT NAME: IR 3 Enabling Environment Empowers Target COs and Intermediary NGOs and Federations

INDICATOR: Progress towards legal recognition of cooperatives, village associations and federations adapted to decentralization

UNIT OF MEASURE: Qualitative assessment of legal recognition

SOURCE: GRM law

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:

COMMENTS:

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1996 (b)*		Draft law prepared
1997	draft law submitted to Gov't and National Assembly	
1998	Law promulgated	
1999	Amendment to law proposed	
2000	Full legal recognition	
2001	Full legal recognition	
2002	Full legal recognition	

* base year

Information and Communications Special Objective

The Information & Communications (Infocom) Special Objective aims to increase the access to, and enhance the use of, information in Mali. It is on-track towards achieving its results and taking advantage of a favorable information environment. Inclusion of the Special Objective in the Strategic Plan was fortuitous and timely; it coincided with the proliferation of private radio stations in Mali (from 1 in 1991 to 62 today) and the exponential growth of the Internet worldwide. The new democratic environment resulted in a sudden thirst for information that could not easily be quenched by traditional methods, setting the stage for a blossoming growth in information dissemination using a variety of media.

Prior to launching specific activities, the Special Objective undertook in 1996 a thorough analysis of Mali's telecommunications policies. This study determined that there existed no significant legal, regulatory or policy constraints that would inhibit Malians' access to or use of information, or that would hinder the attainment of results expected under the Special Objective. This favorable policy environment, which will be monitored continually for changes as information technologies evolve, guarantees Malians' rights to full and open access to information. It has enabled the start-up of Special Objective activities, which began in earnest in late 1996.

Start up was somewhat hindered by the fact that funding did not become available for obligation under PD&S until August, 1996. Until a Special Objective Agreement is negotiated with the Malian Government in 1997, PD&S funds will be the only source of funding for Infocom activities. To ensure that implementation of these activities is not impeded by the restrictions against commodity procurement inherent in PD&S financing, the Mission received a waiver for the use of up to \$300,000 of FY 96 PD&S funds for the purchase of computer and radio equipment.

The most important result of this reporting period was the successful negotiation of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of Mali and the U.S. for the establishment and installation of a national Internet gateway (under the auspices of the Africa Bureau's Leland Initiative). This activity required a large amount of the Special Objective Team's time, since Mali was the first country in which a gateway was installed and there were many technical and configuration issues to be addressed. Although this activity was not directly financed under USAID Mali's budget, the establishment of an Internet node is critical to the achievement of Infocom's Communications Intermediate Result. Since as of March 1997, the gateway is not yet providing service to local Internet Service Providers, no results on Internet use can be reported. In addition to the establishment of the national gateway, the Information & Communications Special Objective team identified over fifteen potential Internet Service Providers, and created an enthusiastic demand for Internet services among selected partners (university-level schools, PVO and NGO associations, the chambers of commerce and agriculture, local businesses and individuals interested in establishing Internet "kiosks") through promotion and demonstration campaigns.

The Information Resources Center, which is to be a facility for promoting and demonstrating modern information technologies, is not yet equipped and fully staffed. Nevertheless, approximately 180 demonstrations and uses of the one existing computer have been recorded, and this number is expected to increase significantly once the Center is fully operational. The services provided by the Information Resources Center included technical research, promotion of Malian products and services (via Trade Point), linkages with international development organizations, business

promotion exchanges, and access to international databases. Clients included NGO/PVO representatives, Malian business entrepreneurs, students, and Mission employees.

The intermediate result on enhanced communication calls for “improved capacity of existing and creation of new community radio stations.” Since this Special Objective was elaborated, new radio stations have been created, but existing ones are experiencing serious sustainability and operational problems. Given this trend, the Special Objective Team is considering increasing its funding of existing radio stations to shore up their managerial, technical and programming capabilities. To date, the Mission has trained 132 radio staff employees (of which 37% were women), who have used their skills to produce programs in child survival and health, decentralization, democracy, and women’s rights. USAID trained an additional 48 employees in radio station management. The programming training included hands-on production techniques in real-life rural settings, in which programmers were required to produce a 10-minute spot for use by their radio stations.

To ensure collaboration between partners operating in this sector, USAID founded a “Partners Committee for Community Radio in Development.” This informal group meets monthly and pools resources, ideas and efforts to provide better support for improving the capacity of community radio stations while avoiding the division of the sector by donors. The committee coordinates all its activities with the newly-created association of private radio stations in Mali (URTEL).

In efforts to promote synergy with other Mission Strategic Objectives, the Infocom encouraged production of radio programs on themes directly related to the Youth Strategic Objective (child survival, children’s rights and health), the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective (decentralization and the rights and responsibilities of citizens), and the gender (women’s rights).

OBJECTIVE: Information & Communications Special Objective
APPROVED: September 1995 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID Mali

RESULT NAME: Enhance existing liberal enabling environment in the information and communication sector

INDICATOR: Continued favorable and liberal policy environment

UNIT OF MEASURE: Laws and policies in telecommunications	YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
SOURCES: Ministry of Communications, association of private radio stations, USIS, national telephone company, High Commission on Communications, potential Internet Service Providers, press and media	96 (b)*		No significant policy constraints identified in this sector
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Policy environment dealing with access to information.			
COMMENTS: The Special Objective team will monitor this indicator to ensure a continued favorable policy environment.			

* base year

OBJECTIVE: Information & Communications Special Objective
APPROVED: September 1995 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID Mali

RESULT NAME: More Malians obtain and use current development information

INDICATOR: Information Resources Center consultations

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of consultations of the Information Resources Center	YE A R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
SOURCES: Information Resources Center management staff	1995 (B)*		0
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of times the Information Resources Center is consulted per year	1996	NA	200
COMMENTS: Does not cover a full 12-month period	1997	+10%	
	1998	+10%	
	1999		
	2000		

* base year

OBJECTIVE: Information & Communications Special Objective
APPROVED: September 1995 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID Mali

RESULT NAME: More Malians obtain and use current development information

INDICATOR: Internet users

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of people using the Internet

SOURCES: National telephone company (operators of Internet gateway) and Internet Service Providers

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Number of Internet searches or “hits” and number of people using Internet services

COMMENTS: As of March 1997, the national Internet gateway is not yet operational.

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1996 (b)*		0
1997	TBD	
1998		
1999		
2000		

OBJECTIVE: Information & Communications Special Objective
APPROVED: September 1995 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID Mali

RESULT NAME: Enhanced communications

INDICATOR: IR-4.3.1 Improved capacity of existing and creation of new community radio stations

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of radio station staff using newly acquired skills in program production, station management and technical repair/maintenance

SOURCE: URTEL (Union of Private Radio and Television Stations)

INDICATOR DESCRIPTION: Radio station staff using newly acquired skills in the production of programs on democracy and governance, the protection of children's rights, elimination of discrimination against women, and radio station management.

COMMENTS:

YEA R	PLANNE D	ACTUAL
1995 (b)*		0
1996	NA	180
1997	TBD	
1998	TBD	
1999	TBD	
2000	TBD	

* base year

PART III: STATUS OF PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (MANAGEMENT CONTRACT)

MODIFICATIONS TO THE SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH S.O. RESULTS FRAMEWORK

USAID/Washington objected to the 18 subresults of the 4 SEG intermediate results presented in the Strategic Plan. The Mission agreed that this was an unworkable number and has reduced the number of subresults to eleven, only two of which are reported on formally to Washington. For the cereals, livestock and alternative crops results packages, the subresults are parallel: 1) *Increased production in targeted areas*; 2) *Increased processing in targeted areas*; 3) *Increased trade*. For the financial services results package, the subindicators reported to Washington are: 1) *Increased financial and operational sustainability of NBFIs in targeted areas*; 2) *Increased availability of savings, loans, and capital services in targeted areas*. These subresults allow the SEG to gather simple, comparable data to monitor its progress towards achieving the intermediate results and still provide meaningful information to Washington on SEG results.

While the strategic objective is being measured at the national level, these results reflect the work of a host of donors, NGOs, private sector actors and Malian Government agents. At the intermediate results level, USAID determined that it would be fairer to measure SEG impact in the targeted areas of the Team's interventions. For this reason, the words *in targeted areas* have been added to each of the intermediate results.

The new opportunities results package has been reworded from: *Widen and diversify economic output* to: *Increased value of alternative crops in targeted areas*. This change was to describe more precisely this intermediate result, the achievement of which is needed to accomplish the strategic objective results.

MODIFICATIONS TO THE YOUTH S.O. RESULTS FRAMEWORK

The original version of the Youth Strategic Objective Results Framework was presented together with USAID Mali's Country Strategic Plan to USAID/Washington in September 1995. Following the review process of the Strategic Plan by USAID/Washington, and internal discussions/consultations inside the Mission, four main modifications have been made to the original Results Framework.

1. The Strategic Objective Statement, which is the highest level result to be reached, has changed from: " Youth utilize skills and behaviors to meet their needs and those of society" to "Changed social and economic behaviors among youth in targeted geographic areas" and recently to "Improved economic and social behaviors among youth". The new statement reflects better the highest level result to be achieved under the strategy: not just a change in behavior but a positive change in behavior and not just in targeted geographic areas, but in the nation as a whole. The Youth Strategic Objective is consistent with other Mission Strategic Objectives, in that it take responsibility at the strategic objective level for national results, but only takes responsibility for results in targeted geographic areas at the intermediate results level. The causal assumption is that achieving results in targeted geographic areas is essential to achieving results at the national level. While USAID is

not the only actor contributing to achievement of Youth Strategic Objective national level results, it is confident that it can have a national impact.

2. In the original Results Framework, there were four Intermediate Results (second level results) which were stated as follows:

- Quality reproductive health services benefit youth;
- Young parents capable of insuring child survival;
- Increased gender equity in, and expansion of, basic and vocational education;
- Youth increase and improve their income and environment.

In an attempt to integrate, and work across, the traditional sectors (reproductive health, child survival, basic education, skills development, etc) and foster synergy in the interventions, the four intermediate results were grouped into two:

- Healthier young women and men making responsible decisions about child survival and reproductive health in targeted geographic areas;
- Better educated young women and men with skills relevant to the market economy in targeted geographic areas.

3. The original Results Framework consisted of 12 sub-results (third level results) under which activities would be carried out. In the modified Results Framework, all the sub-results under each Intermediary Result are grouped under Access, Quality, Demand, and Capacity. The hypothesis is that the activities to be implemented will contribute to increasing access to, quality of, and demand for services (in reproductive health, child survival, basic education, and skills development) and fostering an institutional capacity at appropriate levels (central, regional and local government units; PVO/NGOs; and community organizations) to sustain the delivery of services.

4. Finally, the indicators in the original Results Framework have been streamlined in an attempt to have a set of valid, reliable, and practical indicators to measure and report on our performance. At the end of the process, four indicators have been moved to the sub-goal level:

- Decreased infant mortality rate;
- Decreased under five mortality rate;
- Decreased age-specific fertility rate;
- Increased level of education.

The Youth S.O. Team's decision to move these four indicators up to the subgoal level was based on the understanding that many factors beyond the Team's control influence the attainment of these results. The Team is tracking the four indicators through the Demographic and Health Survey, which is usually conducted every 5 years.

PROPOSAL FOR SPECIAL OBJECTIVE 2 - North: The peoples of northern Mali are confident in and support the institutions laying the groundwork for sustainable development.

One of the justifications for USAID Mali's strategic plan is the need to prevent Mali from becoming another "failed state," à la Liberia and Somalia. In order to achieve the Mission's goal of eliminating the need for concessional foreign assistance, the strategic plan recognized the need not only for social and economic development, but also for political cohesion and stability. The fate of northern Mali is key to avoiding a failed state and establishing political stability. In developing its strategic plan, the Mission understood that ignoring the unique needs of the North could jeopardize its entire strategy. After a year of implementing the 1996-2002 Strategic Plan, USAID Mali recognized the limited capacity of its existing strategic objectives to address the special needs of the North. As a result, it has decided to establish the North Special Objective: *The peoples of northern Mali are confident in and support the institutions laying the groundwork for sustainable development.*

Rationale for North Special Objective

Mali's three northern regions contain only ten percent of the population, but two-thirds of the country's land. A harsh climate, high transport costs, limited resources and a high illiteracy rate result in poor agricultural productivity and limited economic activity. The massive influx of up to 150,000 returning refugees during 1996 and 1997 is decreasing the zone's already low standard of living. Yet Mali cannot develop without paying special attention to the North. This was demonstrated during the rebellion of 1990 to 1995, when development efforts in the North were curtailed because of insecurity. In the South, development activities progressed more slowly than expected and social discord increased when Government leaders concentrated their attention and resources on the northern rebellion. Northerners know that their region lacks the natural and human resources needed to develop as quickly as the rest of the country. However, if they remain unconvinced of the Government's commitment to development of the North, they are likely once again to threaten the country's security and stability.

Before a process of sustainable development can be initiated in the North, the peoples of that region must develop the commitment and capacity to participate in the process. They can only do so through developing a stake in and supporting the institutions carrying out the recovery and rehabilitation activities so urgently needed. These institutions include the Malian Government, locally elected governmental bodies, non-governmental organizations, private sector firms, and community organizations. These institutions can no longer play the same role they did prior to the rebellion and the initiation of the decentralization process. Each of them must demonstrate an interest in listening to and not controlling the local population, the resources necessary to address urgent requirements and the capacity to adapt nationwide programs and activities to the unique needs of the North. The working hypothesis of this special objective is that low confidence in the institutions of northern Mali is the major impediment to rehabilitating the region and preparing for sustainable development activities. With increased public support for central and local governments, the private sector and civil society, these institutions will improve their capacity to secure the resources needed to lay the groundwork for sustainable development.

The Touareg rebellion began in June 1990. The National Pact was signed among the disputing parties in April 1992, establishing the conditions for peace. The Government had difficulty meeting

the conditions of the Pact because of budgetary restrictions and slow donor reactions, giving the impression that it was not serious about increasing the flow of resources to the North. The Pact came undone, and fighting resumed. Peace was fully established in June 1995, based on a process of conflict resolution that left both the Government and the rebel movements winners. In July 1995 the Government organized a donor round table to coordinate assistance to the North. Donors have now begun to reactivate the projects put on hold during the rebellion.

Given the difficulty and fragility of the environment, the poor rainfall during the last 20 years, the lack of natural resources and the nomadic nature of many of its inhabitants, the North and particularly the Touareg population, has been deprived of many of the services delivered by the Government to other regions. The authoritarian Moussa Traore regime (1968-1991) neglected the North, stationed few technical staff there and allowed local administrators to treat the peoples of the region heavy-handedly. Few educational and health services were provided, and those that were available were of poor quality. Most donor funding was directed to the South, apart from emergency relief. Donor-funded projects, the majority of which focused on agriculture and water resource development, had inadequate support by local officials and were restricted to limited geographic areas. The rebellion caused almost all of these projects to suspend work. While donors promised significant resources for development projects in the North in support of the National Pact, the ongoing rebellion inhibited disbursements until 1996. In sum, the North has not had the investment in infrastructure and social services that are a precondition for development and a foundation for peace.

AID is committed to helping countries overcome the effects of civil war through accelerating the movement from disaster to development. Often in these situations, development cannot occur until more basic needs are met: relief, recovery and rehabilitation. For countries such as Mali emerging from political crises, military demobilization is also essential. In order to ensure a basis for sustainable development, people must have the tools to respond to instability, communities must reduce their vulnerability to crises and there must be a secure environment for investment. While there has been significant progress in meeting these conditions in southern Mali, there has been little progress in meeting them in the North.

The immediate needs of many returning refugees and some of the population that remained in place will be for relief, but soon after they will require assistance in recovering their economic livelihood and rehabilitating their environment. Many returning refugees have expressed the desire to abandon their nomadic lifestyle if they can find alternative and sustainable sources of income. USAID estimates that it will take at least six years for the northern population to be able to use its resources as efficiently as the southern population uses its own resources. Thus, this special objective is expected to be achieved in all targeted areas by the completion of USAID's Strategic Plan, in FY 2002. In many targeted areas of the North, this objective will be achieved earlier, allowing the inhabitants to initiate real development activities.

Given the unique needs of the North and the low return from pursuing the targets of the Mission's existing strategic objectives in that region, USAID believes it is vital to establish a separate special objective (SO) for northern Mali. In line with Agency policy concerning special objectives, only a small percentage of USAID's Operating Year Budget will be devoted to the North SO. By establishing a separate Special Objective, the Mission would ensure that its investments in the North would not inhibit the ability of the other SOs to achieve their national level targets.

A host of donors is assisting the Malian Government and other institutions in the North to rebuild infrastructure and improve the delivery of social services. Needs are greater than resources available, and USAID plans to supplement the work of other donors in the sectors in which it has a comparative advantage and previous experience, based on its investments in PVO projects and nationwide activities. These include livestock exports, microfinance, community-based health and education, the strengthening of community organizations, and rural radio. USAID will also respond to urgent needs for potable water and food relief, which in many zones are preconditions for undertaking any other recovery or rehabilitation activities.

The Results Framework

The Mission has developed a preliminary results framework, shown in the attached matrix. It will use the next year to refine indicators, which are likely to be a subset of the indicators of the four other Mission strategic objectives, and set targets appropriate to the capacity and needs of the North.

The North Special Objective will have been accomplished when:

- (1) Taxes and fees collected by the (soon-to-be-established) locally elected communal governments make up of 50% of Government expenditures in the North.
- (2) Membership in targeted community organizations triples.
- (3) The number of targeted community organizations working with communal governments to provide services increases by a factor of five between 1998 and 2002.
- (4) On a scale of one to ten, with one being the lowest and ten the highest, the population in targeted areas rates its confidence in the military, Central Government technical personnel and Communal Government officials at 7,8 and 9 respectively.
- (5) Private investment in the North increases by a factor of five between 1998 and 2002.

To achieve the special objective, USAID must achieve three intermediate results and monitor the achievement of one intermediate result:

- IR 1 Central and local governments in the North are capable of and committed to ensuring recovery and rehabilitation
- IR 2 The private sector has greater access to sources of financial and technical services
- IR 3 Civil society is an effective partner with government in decision-making in the North
- IR 4 The Malian armed forces play a responsible role in maintaining order and reestablishing Government authority in the North

USAID will take responsibility for achieving IR 1,2 and 3, while it will monitor the U.S. Embassy and other donors' activities in achieving IR 4.

These intermediate results focus on the institutions that need to reestablish the confidence of the northern population. The causal assumption is that increasing the capacity of these institutions to respond to needs and opportunities in the North will increase the confidence of the local population.

While the intermediate results address the three regions of the North, USAID's activities will focus on targeted areas within the regions. Thus, Mission impact will be greater in these areas than in the North as a whole. A large number of donors and NGOs are active in the North, and they together with USAID will help achieve the above intermediate results.

The indicators for the intermediate results will be developed by the North Special Objective Team in coordination with the Mission's Results Center. To the extent practical, they will be a subset of those established for the Mission's other strategic objectives. By using the same indicators, the Mission would be able to measure its impact both in the North and nationwide in selected sectors.

USAID will finance activities that have the greatest potential to achieve the intermediate results. In selecting activities, the Mission will focus on building upon previous USAID investments, encouraging sustainability and ownership of activities, developing human resources and ensuring good monitoring systems. Some of these activities will contribute to more than one intermediate result, since recovery and rehabilitation activities usually require the involvement of government, the private sector and civil society. It is essential that Mission have a good understanding of the complex socioeconomic environment in the North before establishing a full portfolio of activities. USAID will commission a solid social analysis of the North and ensure that all activities are based on its conclusions and benefit the widest spectrum of ethnic and social groups. Such an approach will encourage creativity in linking activities to achievement of Mission results.

The Government Results Package will include some of the following activities: teacher training, construction of schools, and provision of school supplies; improving access to, quality of and demand for government child survival and reproductive health services; training of education and health inspectors and rehabilitation of government offices; and support for nutritional surveillance and food security activities.

The Private Sector Results Package is likely to include improvement of livestock production and promotion of exports, assistance in the development of small and microenterprises (handicrafts, gardening), establishment and development of microfinance networks, and assistance in the creation of alternative sources of financial services. USAID also may help community radio stations become financially sustainable through helping them prepare and find funding for targeted messages on education, child survival, reproductive health, natural resource management, cereals and livestock market information, availability of financial services, civic education, community news and information of general interest to communities in the North.

The Civil Society Results Package is likely to include management training of NGOs and community organizations, particularly with regards to development of community schools and community health centers. USAID will give high priority to helping these groups improve food security, better manage the environment and increase access to potable water.

The need for a USAID Mali North Strategic Objective has been expressed by a wide range of the Mission's partners and stakeholders, including PVOs, NGOs, central government officials, and other

donors. Many of these groups have guided the Mission in the development of this strategy. USAID will continue to consult and coordinate with these groups as well as with community organizations in the North to refine the results framework, develop relevant indicators, and choose appropriate activities.

Reporting and Monitoring Mechanisms

Governmental data on the North is poor, but may improve as technical and administrative staff return to the region. USAID will work with Government personnel to improve the reliability of data, particularly in the fields of education and health.

USAID currently supports the activities and performance monitoring systems of three PVOs, who provide relatively reliable data for the areas where they are working. The Mission would like to increase the number of PVOs it supports in the North. It will solicit concept papers from PVOs in Mali on how they might achieve the North SO results. A major factor in judging their submissions will be the degree to which they can measure and report on results.

In preparation for the annual R4 report, USAID will hold two sets of meetings. Following submission of the annual PVO progress report, the North special objective team will meet with all of its partners at one time to discuss their progress toward achieving SO results. Other strategic objectives will meet with their own partners during the same period. Second, the Mission as a whole will meet with each PVO to examine the synergy between activities in achieving each SO team's respective results. The North team will gather other impact information from reports prepared by the Embassy, other donors, the Malian Government, NGOs, and the private sector. The Mission's Results Center will play a key role in assuring the quality and availability of data as well as the analysis needed to ensure activities are contributing as effectively as possible to North SO results.

Program Management and Resource Implications

The North Special Objective will be managed by a team, with the leader reporting directly to the Deputy Director. He or she will be assisted by a Deputy Team Leader/Administrative Assistant. No other permanent team members are currently planned. However, the North Team leader is expected to assemble a team with selected members of the other strategic objective teams. The North Team will use the Program Team as a resource, including the Gender Specialist, the Training Specialist, the Project Development Officer and the Engineer. In addition, the team leader will be able to call on the services of the Deputy Contracting Officer as well as the financial analyst currently serving the Democratic Governance and Information and Communication teams.

The team leader will coordinate closely with the Embassy, other donors, PVOs and Malian Government officials. Representatives of some of these organizations will become part of the North SO extended team. Team members will participate in country team meetings on the North and attend meetings with the Joint Donor-Government Commission on the North as well as several sectoral donor-Government-PVO working groups. They also will maintain regular contact with other USAID Missions and Embassies in neighboring countries that have been impacted by unrest in Northern Mali and the influx of Malian refugees.

USAID is already active in the North, and the North SO will provide a framework for programming existing activities in that zone. A list of ongoing activities is attached in Annex B. In addition to the resources already set aside for these activities, USAID will need approximately \$3 million annually to achieve the North SO. This is less than 10% of the Mission's annual Operating Year Budget.

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USAID and American Embassy Activities in Northern Mali					March 28, 1997	
USAID Ongoing Activities						
Project Name	Partner	End Date	Life of Project	Funds Remaining	Region	
			for North	for North		
			(\$000)	(\$000)		
Basic Education Expansion	Ministry of Basic Education	29 September 1999	6560	2940	Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal	
Niafunke Natural Resources Management	Africare	31 July 1997	1835	1400	Timbuktu	
Seventh Region Initiatives	World Vision	31 July 1997	3500	500	Gao	
African Emergency Locust and Grasshopper Assistance	National Plant Protection Service	annual	2000	100	Kidal	
Famine Early Warning System		annual	194	194	Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal	
Food Aid monetization	Cereals Market Reform	NA	854	400	Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal	

	Program						
Food Security Initiative	Africare		4500	4500		Timbuktu	
Goundam Community Health	Africare	28 February 1999	2580	1500		Timbuktu	
Pivot Group for Child Survival	Save the Children-US	31 December 1998	19	9		Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal	
Pivot Group for Family Planning and AIDS	Save the Children-US	31 December 1999	350	250		Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal	
7th and 8th Region Child Survival	World Vision	30 September 1998	2770	1800		Gao, Kidal	
AIDS and STD Awareness and Prevention	National AIDS Committee	30 September 2001	3750	3300		Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal	
Community Health and Population Services	Ministry of Health	30 September 1999	2075	1000		Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal	
Community Health	Islamic American Relief Ass.	30 September 1999	3000	2500		Timbuktu	

Demobilization Assistance	UNDP	30 September 1998	2000	500		Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal	
TOTAL USAID			35988	20893			
American Embassy Ongoing Activities							
Human Rights Fund	various	annual	45	45		Gao, Timbuktu	
Self-Help Fund	various	annual	27	27		Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal	
TOTAL AMERICAN EMBASSY			72	72			

PART IV. FY 1997 - 1999 RESOURCE REQUEST

FINANCIAL PLAN

USAID Mali has established four strategic objective teams and abolished sectoral offices to link resources as closely as possible with results. The teams have been given the authority to determine their financial and human resource needs and have been encouraged to devote 100% of their time to achieving strategic objective results. They are shielded from other Mission responsibilities and activities that might divert their results-orientation. USAID's FY 1997-1999 Resource Request reflects our best estimate of the financial and human resources needed directly by the teams to achieve their results, as well as the programmatic and management support they need to be effective.

Youth Strategic Objective Team

In FY 1997, the Youth Team requires \$17.3 million in OYB, including \$500,000 in field support, to stay on-track toward achievement of its goals. All but \$1.6 million of this money is earmarked in areas of Congressional interest. The Team is adapting ongoing projects to ensure a youth focus and integrating them into a strategic objective agreement. These projects, in basic education, child survival and reproductive health, and AIDS and sexually-transmitted diseases, in addition to several PVO grants, are achieving significant results and require additional funds to maintain their progress. The pipeline for these projects appears large, but a large percentage of expenditures are not reported to the Mission on a timely basis due to inherent delays in the Federal Reserve Letter of Credit payment mechanism. Expenditures are expected to increase through FY 1999, reducing the pipeline by 38% from the beginning of FY 1997. In addition, the Youth SO Team is counting on the \$1.6 million in economic growth funds to initiate activities focussing on developing youth skills, a key intermediate result.

In FY 1998, the Youth SO will require \$17.1 million in OYB, including \$500,000 in field support, to stay on-track. By this time, the Team will have achieved greater synergy of its activities and a closer focus on youth. It will have made commitments to fund PVO activities directly related to its results, and it will have established a single technical assistance contract for the Strategic Objective. The \$2.2 million in economic growth funds will be essential to maintain progress on improving youth skills.

In FY 1999, the Team will need \$16.8 million in OYB, including \$500,000 in field support. Youth skills activities will require fewer economic growth funds to continue ongoing activities. Spending will continue at the same rate for other areas of Congressional interest.

The Youth Team has 21 positions in FY 1997, including one TAACS. It will be able to maintain achievement of its two results packages with one less team member during FY 1998 and 1999. In addition to replacing a USPSC with an FSN Direct Hire, it will reduce the number of program-funded FSNPSC's by one. Given the complexity of its program and the difficulty in measuring its results, the Youth Team has established a monitoring and evaluation unit, which coordinates closely with the Mission's Program Team and the soon-to-be fully staffed Results Center.

In order for Youth Team members to maximize their potential in achieving results, they must have significant training and travel extensively. Funds for these costs are available for program-funded personnel, but are limited for OE-funded team members. Until the Mission has the authority to merge OE and program funding for training and travel, it will be forced to continue requesting additional funds to cover these costs. USAID Mali has budgeted sizable increases in training and travel funds for FY 1998 and 1999.

In the face of major resource cuts, USAID would give greatest priority to the Youth Strategic Objective. It invests in a demographic group whose capacity and initiative is essential for the development of Mali and its ability to wean itself of foreign aid. The performance of the education and skills results package is excellent, and USAID plays a central role in developing the basic education sector. The health results package is demonstrating important results, but will need to be better focussed on youth to meet the tremendous unmet needs. If USAID were to limit its program to the Youth Strategic Objective, it would lose the synergistic results of its other strategic objectives. If no other donors stepped in to replace USAID in these areas, there could be many years of delay in the time when USAID achieves its goal of ending the need for concessional foreign assistance.

Sustainable Economic Growth

In FY 1997, the Sustainable Economic Growth (SEG) Strategic Objective Team needs \$8.9 million to fund the activities needed to achieve its results. The Team is adapting ongoing projects to ensure a focus on increasing value-added and integrating them into a strategic objective agreement. These projects, in cereals, livestock, financial services and integrated rural development, in addition to several PVO grants, are achieving significant results and require additional funds to maintain their progress. The pipeline for these projects appears large, but a large percentage of expenditures are not reported to the Mission on a timely basis. The Team is reconfiguring its technical assistance contracts, which will temporarily reduce expenditures in FY 1997. Expenditures are expected to increase in FY 1998 and 1999, with the start-up of new contracts and increased expenditures of the Food Security Initiative funds. As a result, the pipeline will begin to decrease in FY 1999.

The \$15.6 million requested for FY 1998 includes \$3 million under the Food Security Initiative, which will be used to strengthen Mali's Famine Early Warning System and Cereals Market Information System. In addition, the SEG Team will analyze the linkages between agricultural growth and household level food security, to help ensure that the benefits from Mali's recent progress in agricultural production are being spread to as many people as possible. Spending will increase significantly, as results-oriented PVO grants and a single SEG technical assistance contract allow the Team to implement activities linked directly to achievement of the strategic objective.

In FY 1999, SEG will need \$10.25 million, including \$1.25 million in field support. Spending will increase as full implementation begins. No Food Security Initiative funding is requested.

The SEG Team has 14 positions in FY 1997. It will be able to maintain achievement of its four results packages with one less team member, an FSN Direct Hire, during FY 1998 and 1999. The Team will coordinate closely with the Mission's Program Team and Results Center.

In order for SEG Team members to maximize their potential in achieving results, they must have significant training and travel extensively. Funds for these costs are available for program-funded

personnel, but are limited for OE-funded team members. Until the Mission has the authority to merge OE and program funding for training and travel, it will be forced to continue requesting additional funds to cover these costs. USAID has budgeted sizable increases in training and travel funds for FY 1998 and 1999.

In the face of severe resource cuts, the Mission would continue to fund Sustainable Economic Growth, unless there were inadequate funds to achieve the Youth Strategic Objective. The Mission's impact is good in the cereals, livestock and financial services results packages, while there is potential for excellent impact in the new opportunities results package. While the Youth SO addresses the capacity of Malians to develop their country, the SEG SO focuses on the context in which Malians will demonstrate their potential. The two strategic objectives are so complementary that the Mission would not want to fund one at the expense of the other. However, USAID is not the major donor in most of the sectors covered by the SEG SO unlike for the Youth SO, so it would be more important to focus significantly reduced resources on Youth.

Democratic Governance

The Democratic Governance (DG) Strategic Objective Team received its first funding, under the projects PVO Co-financing, Policy Reform for Economic Development, and Program Development and Support, in August 1996. In FY 1997, it will require \$2.4 million, including \$1.2 million in DG funds and \$1.2 in economic growth funds to develop a full program focused on achieving the SO results. Of these funds, \$90,000 will be used to buy into a Global Bureau Democracy Center IQC. The Team is preparing a strategic objective agreement, which will allow it to finance PVO activities and technical assistance. Technical assistance is likely to be provided through the Youth and SEG contracts.

In FY 1998, the DG Team will need \$2.5 million, including \$900,000 in DG funds and \$1.6 million in economic growth funds. Of these funds, \$60,000 will be used to buy into a Global Bureau Democracy Center IQC. These funds will be needed to initiate the Teams's broad range of activities. Expenditures will increase significantly to cover start-up costs and implementation. In cooperation with other Mission strategic objective teams, the DG Team will fund PVO activities that contribute synergistically to several teams' results.

In FY 1999, the DG Team requires \$3 million, half DG funds and half economic growth funds. Of these funds, \$30,000 will be used to buy into a Global Bureau Democracy Center IQC. The FY 1999 resources will support a continually increasing number of community organizations, NGOs and federations.

The DG Team has nine members, including a half-time financial analyst and a half-time procurement specialist. There are no plans to reduce the size of the team. The Mission has had difficulty recruiting a USDH Democracy Officer and will consider other means of filling the position.

In order for DG Team members to maximize their potential in achieving results, they must have significant training and travel extensively. Funds for these costs are available for program-funded personnel, but are limited for the three OE-funded team members. Until the Mission has the authority to merge OE and program funding for training and travel, it will be forced to continue requesting additional funds to cover these costs. USAID has budgeted sizable increases in training and travel funds for FY 1998 and 1999.

In terms of funding, the Mission gives third priority to the DG strategic objective. There is potential for high impact, as demonstrated by the pilot activities financed in 1996. DG has a strong synergistic effect on the other strategic objectives; its elimination would reduce their impact. Unless funding were severely reduced, the Mission would make a strong effort to continue its funding. Reduced funding for the Democratic Governance SO would reduce the number of organizations targeted, diminishing the impact on civil society and government at the local and national levels.

Information and Communications Special Objective

The Information and Communications (Infocom) Special Objective Team began operations in August 1996 with \$500,000 from Program Development and Support, for which the Agency approved an equipment procurement waiver. It coordinated closely with the Leland Initiative Project to put in place an Internet gateway. In FY 1997, the team will program \$750,000 in economic growth funds through a special objective agreement, enabling it to begin a wider range of activities promoting Internet and rural radio. Some of these funds will support the activities of PVOs and contribute synergistically to achievement of the results of the other strategic objective teams.

In FY 1998, Infocom will require \$800,000 in economic growth funds to enable it to build on its initial experiences. The small activities sponsored by the SO are quick disbursing, allowing the Team to minimize its pipeline.

In FY 1999, the Team will need \$850,000. Since Infocom supports the results of the other SOs so strongly, these funds will be attributed to the environment and democratic governance Congressional interest areas as well as to economic growth.

The Infocom SO Team has four positions, including a half-time financial analyst and a half-time procurement specialist. One Administrative Assistant position has not been filled and will be eliminated in FY 1998.

The Information and Communications Special Objective is experimental. In the face of severe budget reductions, USAID would eliminate it before any of the three strategic objectives. Its elimination would reduce the degree to which the other teams achieve their results, which might increase the length of time required to achieve the Mission's goal, *Mali achieves a level of sustainable political, social and economic development that eliminates the need for concessional foreign assistance.*

North Special Objective

Once approved by Washington, the North Special Objective will be initiated in FY 1997 using funds in the PVO Co-Financing pipeline and \$200,000 in FY 1997 Program Development and Support funds. No additional funds will be required, since the North SO Team will spend most of its time elaborating the SO results framework, preparing background studies and planning activities.

In FY 1998, the North SO Team will need \$3 million to initiate activities. These funds, which support the Congressional interest areas of basic education, population, child survival, AIDS, environment and D/G, are needed as early in the fiscal year as practical. During the fall of 1997, the Team will negotiate a special objective agreement with the Malian Government and will need

funding to initiate activities soon thereafter, given the urgency of recovery and rehabilitation needs in the North.

In FY 1999, the Team will need another \$3 million early in the fiscal year to maintain momentum.

The North SO Team will have two program-funded full time positions. It will complete the team with staff encumbering positions in other teams. The number of positions should remain the same from FY 1997-1999.

While achievement of the North SO is important to achievement of the Mission's goal of ending the need for foreign assistance, there are many other donors involved in the area. In response to severe reductions, USAID would be likely to eliminate the existing intermediate results and replace them by one focusing on water resource development and food security.

Other Mission Activities

In FY 1996, USAID added \$1 million to the Policy Reform for Economic Development Project to continue its budget reform component, which supports indirectly the SEG and Youth SOs. These activities are being implemented in FY 1997 and there are no current plans to continue them beyond this year.

In FY 1997, USAID is requesting \$500,000 to continue the Financial Management and Training Project. This project supports the National Audit Agency, which addresses the need for Government transparency essential to achievement of the Mission strategic objectives. These funds will be expended through FY 1999.

Both of these activities are being managed by the Program Team.

The Mission is establishing the Results Center, which will help the Strategic Objective teams continuously assess the progress they are making towards achievement of their results, improve their data, better link activities with results and share lessons learned. For USAID Mali as a whole, the Results Center will ensure that the strategic objectives are necessary and sufficient to achieve the Mission goal, propose modifications and help communicate results. Each of the SO teams contribute to funding the Results Center, which is staffed by an institutional contractor.

WORKFORCE NARRATIVE

USAID Mali workforce has been declining for the past three years, as the combined result of the reorganization and AID/W's imposed ceilings.

The USDH level has decreased from 14 to 11 positions, which seems adequate to carry out the management and leadership responsibilities traditionally assigned to this category of employees. There could be some resparring within the ceiling as the Mission comes to understand better the limitations of and opportunities provided by increased delegation of authority to FSNs.

The FSNDH level will continue to be progressively phased down, but this will not be a quick process because the incumbents turned down Mission's offer to convert them to PSC's. There are currently eight FSNDH employees at USAID Mali, and that level will be maintained through 1999.

The OE-funded FSNPSC level has also gone down and is at a point where any further reduction will be detrimental to Mission operations. Because of the ceilings imposed on the FSN program-funded category, several program-funded positions have been filled on the teams with OE-funded personnel to permit the implementation of the activities. This has in turn resulted in depriving the support offices with essential resources. For example, the Personnel Specialist will retire in FY 1998 and cannot be replaced. Also, several drivers have retired and one has moved to another position, but it is not possible to replace them within current ceilings.

Finally, with the advent of ICASS and the high costs associated with those services, it is not impossible that Mission OE-funded personnel will be called upon to assume more functions in FY 1998 and 1999.

The program-funded personnel level for FY 1998 is not adequate. The decrease in the USDH level has forced the Mission to shift responsibilities to FSN's to manage the activities. While this has served USAID's objective of empowering FSN's, significant training is required in some cases to assure their effectiveness. There currently are vacant Results Package Managers and other program positions that cannot be filled. To maintain the high quality of the Mission's work, the obvious decision would be either to drop certain activities or results packages from the strategic plan, or to revisit the whole plan based on the staff available. Neither of these alternatives is productive and results-oriented. In order to achieve the results of its strategic plan, USAID Mali will need to keep at least its current level of program-funded personnel through 1999.

As stated in previous reports, USAID Mali has unilaterally done its share of downsizing following its reengineering by reducing the staff level from 128 in 1994 to 110 in 1997 with no reduction in its OYB. In addition, it is initiating a new special objective on the North, and a team will be created staffed by two FSN's. These FSN's will be recruited from within the Mission and not increase the staff levels.

In conclusion, USAID Mali should be empowered to establish its staffing levels based on its budgets and its needs, or at least be given the authority to establish levels for each category, AID/W having set the total staffing ceiling. The accompanying OE narrative and tables are based on Mission staffing needs, since the Mission cannot live with the workforce targets provided by USAID Washington.

OPERATING EXPENSE NARRATIVE

The FY 1997 Operating Expense (O.E.) budget, as currently allocated, is approximately \$200,000 less than the amount needed by USAID Mali to fund "mandatory/statutory" travel.

The Mission funded three medical evacuations this year which, being unforeseen, were not included in its annual budget request. The estimated cost of the medical evacuations is \$45,000.

In the FY 1998 Resource Request, USAID requested OE funds for three known and therefore planned transfers in FY 1997. Due to circumstances beyond our control, the Mission is now faced with six transfers. One of these is to USAID/Washington, which the Mission is obliged to fund in its entirety. Three incoming officers have requested direct transfers with delayed home-leave. This also increases costs dramatically without any cost-sharing from the losing missions. Due to the unexpected loss of staff and the lack of French language skills of several incoming officers, USAID Mali is forced to fund intensive language training in order for these officers to have an immediate impact on the Mission program upon their arrival at post. The unexpected doubling of transfers, the three direct transfers with delayed home-leave and the intensive language training of several officers has increased USAID Mali's funding needs by approximately \$155,000.

USAID Mali requests immediate budget relief of \$200,000 for FY 1997.

The FY 1998 Operating Expense budget is \$1,164,000 higher than the currently approved FY 1997 Operating Expense budget, a 40% increase. Eighty-six percent of the increase (\$1.0 m) is attributed directly to the cost of funding ICASS (International Cooperative Administrative Support Services) at post. The balance of the increase is attributed as follows: a) the funding of several promotions in the FSN workforce, including increases in base salary, benefits and FSN Separation Trust Fund liability, b) the purchase of two off-road vehicles for mission monitoring of results, and c) the purchase of replacement photocopiers. The Mission is actively studying the possibility of outsourcing to the private sector certain services currently provided by ICASS. Such measures are anticipated to reduce our ICASS costs and hence our overall operating cost.

The FY 1999 Operating Expense budget, which is based on required Mission staffing levels, is \$352,400 or 9% higher than the requested FY 1998 Operating Expense level. The increase is almost solely due to the high turnover of staff anticipated in FY 1999, as their tours of duty end. Almost all other categories of expenditures are within 2% of FY 1998 anticipated expenditures, and some categories are anticipated to decrease. The Mission projects a straight-lining of ICASS costs for FY 1999. USAID will continue to actively pursue cost efficiencies under the ICASS system and seek private sector providers when deemed more efficient and economical to the Agency.

The training line item is budgeted to increase from \$65,000 in FY 1997 to \$85,000 in FY 1998 and \$100,000 in FY 1999. In order to develop the capacity to use its human and financial resources more effectively, USAID has invested heavily in staff training, particularly aimed at changing its organizational culture. In the absence of delegation of authority to use program funds for training of OE-funded personnel, the Mission must request and receive these additional funds in order to achieve its results as quickly as planned.

ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE

USAID Mali recommended categorical exclusions for the activities to be conducted by the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective, and the Information and Communications Special Objective. It has prepared negative determinations for the activities to be undertaken by the Youth and Sustainable Economic Growth Strategic Objectives, e.g. school construction and livestock market infrastructure development, for review by the Regional Environmental Officer.