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**ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
IN RWANDA,  
FISCAL YEAR 1993**

November 1993  
USAID/Rwanda/PRM

## PREFACE

This is the first annual assessment of program impact (API) prepared under the new Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP) and with the benefit of the MER exercise. In June 1992, AID/W approved the CPSP. In December 1992, the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting (MER) exercise was initiated by the Mission and AID/W to solidify the selection of indicators and to identify remaining steps needed to complete a system for collecting data on the selected indicators. A final draft MER plan was to be submitted to AID/W by March 1993.

However, progress on finalizing indicators and collecting data for the API suffered as a result of the major military offensive by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in February 1993. The planning and managing of nearly \$29.0 million of emergency food and non-food commodities for nearly a million Rwandans internally displaced by the fighting, the authorized departure program for official Americans, the executing of necessary start-up actions to keep the Mission's three new CPSP projects on-track, and the design of a fourth new CPSP project (an AIDS prevention project) absorbed available staff time throughout the remainder of FY 1993. Then, the early FY 1994 (October 1993) military coup in Burundi resulted in over 350,000 Burundians seeking refuge in Rwanda. This again disrupted planned Mission activities. Nevertheless, several USAID-funded studies and evaluations show where on-going Mission projects and programs are having a clear positive impact on Rwanda. They are in population, economic reform, and cooperative/private sector development. Each are highlighted in a box in the following text.

As 1993 draws to a close, the Mission finds itself in a much better position than at the start of the year. The Arusha peace accord between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF, and the arrival of the UN peacekeeping force helped move Rwanda towards peace and along its path of political liberalization towards democracy. Start-up preparations on the Mission's four new long-term projects remained on-track and the long-term TA teams started arriving and will be fully in place by the second quarter of FY 1994. The start-up of these new CPSP projects and the expected assumption of power by the new transitional government, places the Mission in a good position to implement its CPSP as envisaged. Finally, the early FY 1994 arrival of the new USDH economist provided a further boost to the Mission's capacity to manage the API process.

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## I. SPECIAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE USAID PROGRAM

Two events have profoundly affected Rwanda's on-going economic and political transition in FY 1993. The first was the Rwanda Patriotic Front's (RPF) major military offensive in February. The second was the signing of a Peace Accord on August 4th between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF. These events have set the stage for the emergence of a new era in the country's history. No formal polls have been taken, but Rwandans and others appear more optimistic now than they have been since the war started in 1990. It is premature, however, for improvements to be reflected in any traditional economic indicators.

USAID/Rwanda is well-positioned to capitalize on this optimism. Throughout FY 1993, the Mission continued to execute the necessary start-up preparations for four new long-term projects, all of which are part of the CPSP strategy. By the first quarter of FY 1994, four long-term technical assistance teams will be on the ground in full operation, working on (1) democracy and governance, (2) private sector development through PVOs and NGOs, decentralization and integration of health and family planning services, and an (3) HIV/AIDS prevention program. Additional teams and USAID staff will be working to develop activities to improve the accountability and transparency in the government's budget process -- the only major element of the CPSP-envisaged activities remaining to be designed.

**The Rebel Offensive:** Human rights violations by people supportive of the President of Rwanda reportedly triggered the RPF offensive in February 1993. The offensive disrupted economic activity to a greater degree than any other time in the nearly three-year-old war. When the rebel advance finally stopped within 18 miles of the capital Kigali, nearly one million people had been displaced and crops in Rwanda's most fertile region went unharvested. Implementation of most development activities ceased as bi- and multilateral donors responded rapidly to the needs of the displaced, some of whom had been displaced for the third time since 1990. Food and non-food emergency assistance totalling roughly \$100 million was supplied through makeshift airlifts and other dramatic efforts. Working closely with OFDA and Food For Peace, USAID/Rwanda programmed nearly \$30 million of food and non-food assistance for Rwanda during the March to September 1993 period through cooperating agencies such as World Food Program, CARE, Africare, CRS, UNICEF, and others.

For the Government of Rwanda, the offensive compounded its budget problems further. The new upsurge in already high military outlays made any World Bank and IMF efforts to develop a workable macroeconomic framework futile. Military expenditures in FY 1993 surpassed 8 percent of GDP, almost equalling projected government revenues. Resolving the military conflict became the condition precedent for any development progress. Rwanda could not return to the pre-February state of a cease-fire combined with peace talks with no end-point in sight. After the offensive, the Arusha peace negotiations assumed a more serious tone and culminated in the August 4 signing of the Peace Accord.

**The Peace Accord:** In the Arusha Accord, the two sides agreed to a power-sharing formula that ended the fighting and committed them to a two-year transition process intended to end in multiparty elections. The protocols of the Accord commit Rwanda to democratic pluralism, respect for individual rights, rule of law, national reconciliation between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi ethnic groups, and the right of refugees to return. Also specified in the Accord is the composition of a new transitional government that includes the five political parties now in government plus the RPF. Specific near-term actions to be undertaken by the new government include the disengaging and disarming of the two armies, integrating and demobilizing the armed forces, establishing internal security, assuring the reintegration of the war displaced, revitalizing local government and the civil service, organizing the return and reintegration of long-time refugees, drafting a new constitution, conducting a constitutional referendum, holding local government elections, and finally, holding legislative and presidential elections. Each action poses tremendous hurdles for the new government. For example, due to the war, the GOR army increased from 6,000 in 1990 to nearly 40,000 in 1993. When adding the RPF military force, the number of soldiers to be demobilized will surpass 30,000 -- a number that represents roughly 50 percent of total private employment in Rwanda's modern sector.

Essential to launching the transition process is the arrival of a credible neutral international force (NIF) that will monitor security issues between the GOR and RPF. For both the GOR and RPF, the presence of a fully-manned NIF is a necessary condition before they would launch the new transition government. Fortunately, the UN and OAU have moved rapidly. The UN-lead NIF has assumed peacekeeping duties from the OAU in late October 1993 and troops from UN member nations continue to arrive. December 31, 1993 is the date all parties are now targeting as the date by which the new government is to officially start operations.

Given the tremendous hurdles facing the new transitional government, continued goodwill on all sides is required to make the peace plan work. If this goodwill remains evident, then Rwandans will fully deserve the sustained support from the international community.

**Progress and Slippages on the Structural Adjustment Program:** FY 1993 will be looked back upon as a year of continued slippages on all fronts. Real per capita consumption in 1993 is estimated to be 30 percent lower than in 1985. The quality of health services and primary education continues to decline as expenditures in these areas drops further. Rwanda's nationwide contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) also dipped from nearly 15 percent to 11 percent. The World Bank has argued that most of the welfare gains achieved in the 1960s and 1970s may have already been lost. Military expenditures, already at high levels before the February offensive, continued to rise and crowd out other activities. Foreign exchange reserves have declined from the equivalent of three months of import coverage in January 1993 to roughly 1.5 weeks of coverage in August 1993. The balance of payments gap by year-end is projected to reach \$140 million. Government expenditures are

projected to exceed revenues, before loans and grants, by nearly 170 percent. An out-of-control budget and looming war were undoubtedly factors helping lead donors, including the World Bank and IMF, to suspend their fast-disbursing assistance programs.

Daily GOR operations suffered as well. After February, it became very difficult to get individuals, both government and non-government, to focus on implementing development projects. Likewise, after the signing of the Arusha Accord, the current transition government became a "lame duck," thus further slowing the pace of business. No new major economic policy changes or sustainable development initiatives were launched by the GOR during FY 1993. This contrasts with 1990-1992 period, when the GOR had announced and implemented many substantive reforms despite the on-going war (see earlier APIs).

**The Net Impact:** In FY 1993, Rwanda experienced a psychological swing downward followed by an equally rapid swing back upwards that clearly overshadowed all the major policy reforms implemented by the GOR since 1990. These earlier changes included major devaluations, restructuring of tariffs, removal of price and profit controls, revisions to business registration and labor codes -- all disruptive in their own right. Fortunately, the reasons underlying this upward swing (e.g., peace and continued broadening of political participation) hold the best potential for stabilizing the Rwandan economy since its economic depression began in the late 1980s. Most Rwandans appear cautiously optimistic with the Peace Accord, acknowledging that much remains to be done.

Importantly, the fighting has stopped and the Peace Accord continues to form the basis for an on-going and active dialogue between all the political parties, including the RPF. For example, the lack of a fully-staffed in-country *neutral international force* NIF is not stopping the parties from preparing for the day the new government assumes power. Government and donor representatives have been visiting the RPF to discuss forthcoming government actions and issues. A joint GOR-RPF mission will be visiting the World Bank and IMF in late November to prepare for resuming the now stalled structural adjustment program. Similarly, business, human rights and other Rwandan associations remain active in pressing their concerns. These are all encouraging signs indicating further movement towards a participatory democratic system of government.

Rwanda's short-term prospects now hinge on the new transitional government taking power and staying the course on political reform and economic adjustment, and on continued support from the international community. USAID/Rwanda's program remains well-positioned to support such efforts, particularly since four major projects in democracy and governance, health/family planning, HIV/AIDS prevention, and private sector/NGO expansion will begin full implementation in early FY 1994.

## II. PROGRESS TOWARDS OVERALL PROGRAM GOALS AND SUB-GOALS

The following discussion uses the goal statements as approved in the CPSP reporting cable (92 STATE 204268).

PROGRAM GOAL: Increase Participatory Economic Growth							
PROGRAM GOAL INDICATORS	BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJ-ECTED (A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Real Per Capita GDP	Rwf 28,465 Constant 1985 Rwf (1989)  -2.0% % Change (1987-90)  [Sources: IMF, World Bank, MINIPLAN]	A: Est Rwf26,287  A: -3.1%	A: Est Rwf22,726  A:-13.5%	P: Rwf24,316  P: 7.0%	P: Rwf24,560  P: 1.0%	P: Rwf24,805  P: 1.0%	P: Rwf25,050  P: 1.0%
Total GDP	191.239 (B Rwf) (1989)  1.1% % Change (1987-90)  [Sources: IMF, World Bank, MINIPLAN]	193.682  0.35	172.569  -10.9%	190.300  10.25%	198.100  4.0%	206.200  4.0%	214.630  4.0%
Number of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)	(1994) [Source: USAID/R]						
Share of GDP Originating from SMEs and Small-Farms	Est 70.0% (1994) [Sources: USAID/R]			P: 70.0%	P: 71.0%	P: 73.0%	P: 75.0%

Given the disruptive elements noted in Section I. above and the financial focus of the USAID program in FY 1993 (e.g., \$6.7 for development assistance and \$29 million for emergency relief), it is unrealistic to make definitive statements on the Mission's contribution to

progress in achieving the Country Program Goal this year. Indeed, many donors are working actively and closely together in support of the peace, political and economic reform processes.

As the Table above implies, the Rwandan economy was stagnating in the late 1980s. The modest real growth (slightly more than 1.0 percent per year) resulted in a decline in per capita real incomes of some 2.0 percent per year. While the war has adversely affected the Program Goal indicators, which are economic, a partial rebound is expected in 1994, accompanied by increased economic confidence and greater resources to the productive sectors. In part, a rebound will be fueled by the removal of most curfews and roadblocks throughout Rwanda. Increased freedom of movement will facilitate a rebound in intra and inter-regional trade. This rebound becomes more likely when the new transitional government assumes control. As noted earlier, the events to date represent Rwanda's best hope for beginning a reversal of the steady economic decline witnessed since 1989.

The USAID goal remains to work towards a real growth rate of 4 percent per year by the end 1996. This rate of growth is required to reverse the decline in the real per capita growth rate, given that the population growth rate is about 3.06 percent per year. USAID estimates are more conservative than those presented by the World Bank, which projects a real growth rate of 4 percent by 1995 (WB, SPA, September 1992), due to the potential costs associated with the demobilization and resettlement of displaced Rwandans as well as some of the other hurdles facing the new government (see Section I.) The World Bank and IMF are currently revising their projections, in light of their over optimism of the past.

As noted last year, macroeconomic data must be interpreted with more than the usual caution. USAID

continues to make investments in data collection and analysis. During FY 1993, USAID-funded consultants and Government of Rwanda staff presented the implications of policies affecting domestic comparative advantage, inter-regional trade and the drain of coffee subsidies on the treasury in various fora, including the private sector, donor and government groups. In January 1993 the GOR, with USAID-support conducted an assessment to estimate the impact of the structural adjustment program on living standards. The analysis revealed that, based on existing data sets and surveys being conducted by the GOR, household income

#### **IMPACT OF USAID-SUPPORTED REFORM PROGRAM ON HOUSEHOLDS NEUTRAL IN 1991.**

USAID-GOR assessed the impact on living standards of the structural adjustment program, sectors of which were supported by a USAID NPA program. Household incomes (rural and urban) were found to have declined only slightly in 1991. More importantly, since Rwanda is overwhelming rural, rural terms of trade remained stable during 1990-1991. These early results are encouraging for proponents of additional macro and sectoral policy reforms. Further monitoring assessments are planned.

(rural and urban) had declined only slightly and that the rural terms of trade remained stable during 1990-1991. These early results are encouraging for proponents of continued structural adjustment. USAID is working to establish sustainable mechanisms for updating this key analysis. The GOR, for its part and as a result of having worked with USAID's consultants, is now trying to publish a monthly bulletin to disseminate the results of this and other analyses to a wider audience.

USAID-funded Census Bureau staff have been working with the GOR to process the 1991 census. The population growth is now estimated to be about 3.06 percent per annum. This is a major downward revision of the previous estimate of 3.6 percent which was based on the 1978 census and 1983 National Fertility Survey. Officially revised demographic data will not become available until early 1994 -- a delay of nearly a year due to the February fighting. Finally, the USAID-funded Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), which was halted by the fighting in 1990, was restarted and completed. Final DHS data will be available in mid FY 1994 -- again delayed due to events related to the February disruptions.

USAID, with Michigan State University (MSU), has also worked with the GOR to update the agricultural sample frame used to conduct the national agricultural census and special rural studies. Some twelve studies and reports are projected to be completed over the next year, including an examination of farm/off-farm income linkages, impact of exchange rate movements and border trade, and further work on the impact of the Government's coffee policy.

The USAID/Rwanda CPSP has three sub-goals: decrease population growth rate, improve democratic governance on social and economic policies, and increase real income in the agrarian sector. A discussion of each follows.

PROGRAM SUB-GOAL ONE: Decrease Population Growth Rate							
INDICATORS	BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJECTED/ (A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Total Fertility Rate	8.5 (1983)  [Sources: ONAPO, DHS]	A: 6.2  [Prelim. DHS Data]					P: 5.0

As noted earlier, the final results of the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) were not published in 1993 as planned. Nevertheless, the preliminary analysis of the data reveals that measurable progress has been made on this Mission subgoal since the last large population

based survey of the fertility rate (the National Fertility Survey, 1983). The DHS data (1992) show a fertility rate of 6.2 as opposed to 8.5 in the 1983 National Fertility Survey. If the preliminary conclusion remains unchanged after further data processing, as the Mission expects, then both acceptability and accessibility issues are being addressed and Rwandans are increasingly practicing modern contraception. In fact, it would put Rwanda in an elite "club" of sub-Saharan African countries that appear to have begun the demographic transition (others are Zimbabwe, Botswana and Kenya). Indeed, when the final report is released, USAID expects to issue an announcement cable not unlike the recent cable from USAID/Kenya. The Mission's confidence in the DHS is supported by data from the 1991 national census, which also suggests that the total fertility rate had dropped to 6.9. (Data collection for the census took place approximately one year earlier than that for the DHS.)

USAID/Rwanda now expects the final DHS report in the second quarter of 1994 and will revise its FY 1997 projection in next year's API.

PROGRAM SUB-GOAL 2: Improve Democratic Governance on Social and Economic Policies							
INDICATORS	BASILINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJECTED/ (A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Competitive Election System at Local and National Levels	None (as of late 1993)  [Source: Post Democracy Committee]	A: None nationwide	A: None nationwide, but over 20 local referendum elections of public officials was held	P: Comp. Election System in Place	P: Comp. Elections Held	P: Comp. Election System in Place	P: Comp. Election System in Place
Percent of Operating Budget from Local Sources	[Source: IBRD/IMF]						
Public Confidence in Election System	(1994) [Source: Democracy/Governance Project Survey]						
Public Confidence in Government	(1994) [Source: Democracy/Governance Project Survey]						

The Democracy/Governance (D/G) indicators presented in the 1992 API have been modified as a result of the MER exercise. A comparison of the 1992 and 1993 Indicators are found in Annex A to this document.

No data has as yet been collected due to the fact that the Mission Democratic Initiatives and Governance (DIG) Project is just starting in the first quarter of FY 1994, and that USAID staff efforts were directed at the emergency. Nevertheless, positive movements were observed. The inclusion of the RPF within the transitional government clearly represents a significant increase political participation as now their interests and objectives will be addressed in a political (rather than military) forum. Similarly, the absence of any widespread public display of discontent with the Peace Accord and actions taken to date also suggest a relative confidence by the public in the current political process. "Jockeying" within and between political parties also continues as they seek to develop a political foundation which responds to the perceived desires of their constituents. The referendums to elect commune-level public officials in over twenty communes were successful and is still being discussed in terms of their applicability to the rest of Rwanda. The Mission and Embassy are continuing to monitor and support efforts by Rwandans to learn from this "popular election" experience.

To establish a base-line data set in this complex and subjective area, the Mission will be working closely with the DIG project team (already on the ground) to conduct attitude and other surveys and analyses similar to what MSU executed in Zambia. The Mission does not, however, foresee conducting as extensive effort as was completed in Zambia.

PROGRAM SUB-GOAL 3: Increase Real Income in the Agrarian Sector							
INDICATORS	BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJECTED/ (A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Growth in Real Rural Income Per Capita	-0.3% p.a. (1980-90 Ave.) [Source: MINIAGR/IBRD]	-3.1% (Est)	-18.6% (Est)	P: 14.0%	P: 0.7%	P: 1.0%	P: 1.0%
(a) Growth in Income Per Capita Generated from Off-Farm sources	1.3% p.a. (1980-90 Ave.) [Source: MINIAGR/IBRD]	0.5% (Est)	-26.4% (Est)	P: 18.5%	P: 1.5%	P: 1.7%	P: 1.7%
(b) Growth in Income Per Capita Generated from On-Farm Sources	-1.5% p.a. (1980-90 Ave.) [Source: MINIAGR/IBRD]	-3.6% (Est)	-9.6% (Est)	P: 10.5%	P: 0.0%	P: 0.3%	P: 0.3%

As noted earlier and detailed in last year's API, the GOR has made dramatic economic policy reforms intended to make the economy more responsive to market forces in the 1990-1992 period. In addition to the macro reforms under Structural Adjustment, the GOR has improved labor mobility by reducing its role in controlling hiring and firing; begun a review of export promotion policies, and removed regulations which limited what an importer was authorized to import. The GOR has also completed the analyses supporting the further rationalization of tariffs. For example, the technical level is recommending a further reduction from a maximum rate of 100 percent to 60 percent. The GOR is also -- with USAID counterpart funds and a private businessmen's association -- still examining the feasibility of establishing a free zone with Burundi. Unfortunately, work on this subject has been delayed by illnesses among the consultant staff and, now, the turmoil in Burundi.

In spite of these efforts, political problems in Rwanda and its neighbors have helped depress significantly economic activity in 1993. The decline in agricultural production is due largely to the displacement of roughly one million Rwandans from their farms in the northern part of the country. Since the north is the most productive agricultural region of the country, the displacement of what amounts to 15 percent of the population resulted in a decline of national agricultural output by an estimated 19 percent (USAID and Food Security II project). The negative economic consequences of such a decline, although significant, are less than would have been the case if Rwandan agriculture had been better integrated with the rest of the economy as a buyer and seller of goods and services. Due to the sector's very low level of purchased inputs and very high proportion of home consumption of agricultural produce, the negative impact of the decline was largely limited to those people affected.

In the non-agricultural sector, USAID also examined how Rwanda's manufacturing firms responded to the changing economic conditions -- both the structural adjustment program and the war. This 1993 study found that the structural adjustment program affected the business sector primarily through price adjustments and increased competition with imports. The devaluation significantly increased the cost of imports upon which Rwandan firms depend for their inputs. The war further increased the cost of domestic inputs and reduced the demand for final products. Most Rwandan businesses perceive 1993 to be a crisis. Numerous firms criticized the Government for having limited the private sector's capacity to adjust to the reforms. For example, the suspension of the investment code and the non-application of the new export incentives reduced private profits when the situation was becoming most difficult. Indeed, it limited the private sector's ability to search out new markets and respond to opportunities identified (USAID/R-DAI, 1993). With continued peace, political and economic reform, and the reduction of the Government's budget deficits due to war expenditures, the expectation for growth in income is realistic.

### **III. PROGRESS TOWARD STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, TARGETS, SUB-TARGETS, AND TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY**

The following tables are presented in the format suggested in the AFR/DP API guidance cables (91 STATE 273190; 92 STATE 306484; and E-Mail of 26-Oct-93).

## STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: POPULATION

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1: Increase Use of Modern Contraceptives							
INDICATORS	BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJ ECTED/ (A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate	3.7% (1988) 8.3% (1991) [Source: ONAPO]	A: 15.1% (1/92)  [Source: ONAPO]	P: 11%	P: 15%	P: 18%	P: 20%	P: 22%
Couple Years of Protection	13,400 (1988) [Source: ONAPO]	185,535  [Source: ONAPO]					P: 300,000

By the end of CY 1992, the Rwanda program was exceeding even the most optimistic estimates for the Mission's family planning project's indicators of success (e.g., the old Action Plan's Strategic Objective target rate of 8.3 percent by the end of 1991) was exceeded by more than 50 percent. With an early 1992 contraceptive prevalence rate of 15.1 percent, USAID had every reason to believe that its investment in family planning programming since 1981 was paying off handsomely. In early 1992 statistics began a widely fluctuating but generally downward trend. The drop has been attributed to the same disruptive effects as reported last year. That is, family planning is perceived to have become less of a priority among Rwandans in light of the war to the north (particularly since February of this year), the association of the national family planning organization with one particular political party (the former ruling party), and the general instability of Rwanda's social, economic and political fabric during this difficult transition period. In two prefectures, family planning programs were virtually halted for much of 1993 due to the February hostilities. Nevertheless, the demand for services is fully expected to rise again when Rwanda's current difficulties subside. A significant proportion of the population has already become familiar with and depends upon modern contraception.

This year, for the first time, USAID and ONAPO have some hard data on couple-years of protection (CYP). Though not as high-quality as the Mission would like, the preliminary estimates suggest impressive improvements since 1988 --- 13,000 to over 185,000 CYP. The Mission expects to put more reliable projections in next year's API. For example, this year's estimate does not include condoms sold through private channels.

The "abakangurambaga" network, which is a large (+/- 8,000 people) network of community-based family planning workers, remains in flux (See earlier APIs for USAID's relationship with this IEC network). Due to management and motivational problems, it remains to be learned exactly what impact these workers (who have generally been accorded a large measure of credit for positive results since 1988) are currently making on the program.

TARGET 1.1: Increase Availability of Quality Family Planning Services							
INDICATORS	BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJECTED/ (A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Number of Service Delivery Points	319 (1991) [Source: ONAPO]	A: 323					P: 1,200
Number of Service Delivery Points Offering Five or More Methods	50 (1991) [Source: ONAPO]	A: 72					P: 145

The number of service delivery points (SDP) offering five or more family planning methods increased significantly between 1991 and 1992. This is particularly important since the number of centers that go from four to five is a good indicator of the number of centers that have commenced in offering the longer-term contraceptive methods such as vasectomy, Norplant and tubal ligations. USAID has played a material role in this change as the Mission has funded voluntary surgical contraception training courses. Voluntary surgical contraception training, including vasectomy, continues to be supported strongly by USAID as demonstrated by USAID's sponsoring a long-term resident advisor to help reinforce GOR efforts. Anecdotal information suggests the number of private service delivery points is increasing. At present, however, there is no formal survey to substantiate this conclusion. Both the USAID-funded SOMARC Program, which began in the first quarter of FY 1992, and Population Services International (non-USG funded) have begun operations in Rwanda. These two organizations are expected

#### **USAID SUPPORT SIGNIFICANTLY RAISED CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN RWANDA**

USAID has been the largest supporter of population policy implementation in Rwanda since it helped establish the national organization promoting family planning. From a base of nearly zero in 1983, contraceptive prevalence has surpassed 11 percent, in spite of the 4 percent decline in 1992 and 1993 due to the war and other instability. Given Rwanda's starting point and the experience with other such programs in sub-Saharan Africa, this change in attitude toward modern contraceptives by Rwandans is dramatic.

to give a boost to private marketing of family planning commodities. The Rwandan Consultative Group for Private Sector Family Planning Activities, formed in 1991, continues to operate and includes SNAF, the Catholic church natural family planning activities; CARE International; and the International Planned Parenthood Affiliate, ARBEF (a Rwandan association for family health).

ONAPO has much better data on its traditional service delivery points (health centers and health posts) than non-traditional delivery modes, such as the new pilot community based distribution program. In the case of the latter, each distributor could conceivably be a service delivery point. Similarly, data from the new social marketing of contraceptives program has not yet been incorporated. Mission and USAID project staff will be working with ONAPO to decide how to incorporate this data in the next reporting period. To date, seven methods are monitored by ONAPO. They are: condoms, IUDs, oral contraceptives, injectable hormones, tubal ligations, Norplant insertions and vasectomies. Natural family planning is not being monitored by ONAPO. It currently relies on reports from the Catholic Church-affiliated organizations.

TARGET 1.2: Increase the Demand for Family Planning Services							
INDICATORS	BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJECTED/ (A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Desired Family Size a. Male b. Female	6.0 (1990) (5 m.)  [Sources: ONAPO, DHS]	Data Currently Being Processed  [Source: DHS]					P: 5.0 (4 m.)
Percent of Couples Desiring Family Planning a. Male b. Female	37% Male Want No More Children  36% Female Want No More Children  42% Female Want to Wait 2+ Years [Source: DHS]	37% Male Want No More Children  36% Female Want No More Children  42% Female Want to Wait 2+ Years [Source: DHS]					P: ??

Preliminary DHS results are very encouraging. Some 36 percent of the women reported that they wanted no more children. (About 37 percent of the men stated that they wanted no more children.) Another 42 percent of the women reported that they wanted to wait two or more years before having more children. In combination, this shows that nearly 80 percent of Rwandan women have an expressed desire to limit or space their births. This indicator suggests an unmet demand for family planning services. Another USAID indicator,

contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR), supports this conclusion, particularly since the CPR is 11 percent.

The final DHS report will provide more data. It is also expected to provide better information on the percent of couples expressing a desire for family planning. Once the report is received and the Mission sees how the data is presented, a decision to combine these indicators made be made.

## STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: GOVERNANCE

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2: Increase Accountability of Government on Social and Economic Policies							
INDICATORS	BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJECTED/ (A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Public Documentation and Adherence to Government Budgets at the National Level	2 on a scale of 1-10 (low to high) (1992) (NB: Index is 0-3 Publication; and 0-7 Adherence) [Source: IMF, WB, Focus Country Exercise]	A: 2  (1 Pub., 1 Adhere)	A: 1.5  (1 Pub., 0.5 adhere)				P: 7
Effective Budget Process being used (Number of Public Policy Issues Brought to the Attention of GOR Policy-Makers):  (a) Executive Branch (b) National Assembly (c) Public Interest Groups	(1994) [Source: DIG Project Baseline Survey]						
Public Debate and Policy Formulation/Modification on Budget Issues (National Assembly, Public Interest Groups, Media)	(1994) [Source: DIG Project Baseline Survey]						
Formal Analyses are used by Interested Parties in the debate of Public Budget Issues:  (a) Executive Branch (b) National Assembly (c) Public Interest Groups	(1994) [Source: DIG Project Baseline Survey]						

As discussed earlier, the GOR has made many needed policy changes. However, executing many of them involves difficult institutional changes that touch upon both the political and

economic spheres, or in other words, the sphere of "democracy and governance." It is in this area that the Mission expects to contribute most significantly to Rwandan development.

Substantial progress in selecting indicators that could help confirm the anecdotal evidence was made during the MER exercise. Due to the February fare-up and its after effects, less progress was made in establishing the processes and mechanisms to collect the data for each indicator. Now that the DIG project team is on-the-ground, the Mission expects to make progress in this area. Indeed, the baseline and follow-up surveys to be conducted with the DIG Project will be the principal means of gaging public opinion and government responsiveness. The Mission and DIG staff would like to utilize a methodology similar in nature to the surveys conducted in Zambia. Support from AFR/ONI/DG will be sought.

TARGET 2.1: Improve Financial Accountability and Control							
INDICATORS	BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJECTED/ (A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Government Financial Control Index	5 (1991)	5	5		P: 30		P: 65
a. Accurate, Accessible Budget Information -- 20%	5	5	5		P: 10		P: 15
b. No. of Audits Performed -- 20%	0	0	0		P: 5		P: 10
c. No. of Audit Recommendations Closed -- 20%	0	0	0		P: 5		P: 10
d. Sanctions Enforced -- 40%	0	0	0		P: 10		P: 30
	[Source: USAID, UNDP, WB/SPA PER]	[Source: USAID, UNDP, WB/SPA PER]					
Primary Budget Deficit	1.3% of GDP	A: 9.0%	A: 9.3%	P: 12.0%	P: 8.0%	P: 5.0%	P: 2.0%
Overall Budget Deficit							
a. Including Grants	9.7% of GDP	A: 9.6%	A: 10.2%	P:	P: 10.0%	P: 8.0%	P: 4.0%
b. Excluding Grants	4.2% of GDP (1989)	A: 16.7%	A: 19.3% (Est)	P: 15.2%	P: 18.0%	P: 16.0%	12.0%
	[Source: IBRD/IMF]			P: 23.8%			

Government expenditures rose dramatically in 1990 and have continued to surpass targets. Unplanned military expenditures increased 140 percent over 1992 budget projections. With the signing of the Peace Agreement in August of this year, the GOR estimates that military expenditures in 1993 will decline by 20 percent from 1992. Nevertheless, the GOR budget deficit (excluding grants) of Rwf 36.1 billion in 1992 and Rwf 41.2 billion in 1993 are very high -- over 19 percent of projected GDP for 1993. The October 1993 WB/IMF team also confirmed that GOR arrears (IOUs to the Rwandan private sector) increased further in 1993. With net increases of Rwf 6.2 billion in 1991, Rwf 4.2 billion in 1992, and now Rwf 7.6 billion in 1993, the stock of GOR arrears stands at some Rwf 18 billion.

The inability of the GOR to establish and implement financial controls continues to be a serious impediment to the realization of the Strategic Objectives of both Governance and Private Sector Development. Indeed, this fundamental problem of accountability and control has been the focus of IBRD, IMF, and bilateral donor discussions with the GOR for over a year. The deficit and lack of budgetary processes to control the deficit continue to be a main stumbling block to the release of the second tranche of the World Bank's structural adjustment credit. The forthcoming Budget Reform (NPA) and Support for Economic Reform Project (PA) are USAID's input into this multi-donor effort that seeks to build upon each donor's respective areas of expertise and comparative advantage. The specific objectives of the USAID effort are to have the equivalent of the USG "anti-deficiency" regulations being enforced in Rwanda and to have a capability to perform audits to ensure compliance.

The data sources will include the regular IMF/WB review missions as well as reports from the World Bank-lead Public Expenditure Reviews (PER). PERs are conducted as part of the Special Program for Africa (SPA) framework. Information on the financial control agencies will be derived from USAID-funded assessments conducted as part of the forthcoming Support for Economic Reform (SER) project.

TARGET 2.2: Increase Responsiveness of Government Policies							
INDICATORS	BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJECTE D/(A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
<b>More Efficient/ Transparent Internal National Assembly Operations</b> a. Number of constituent demands addressed by the Natl. Assembly. b. Sufficiently Timely Publication of Natl. Assembly Documents to Permit public Debate.	[Source: DIG Project/ Embassy]						
Number of National Assembly Legislative Initiatives and Changes to Executive Initiatives Enacted.	(1994) [Source: DIG Project/ Embassy]						
Number and Diversity of Issues of Oversight Meetings held by the National Assembly	(1994) [Source: DIG Project/ Embassy]						

The data sources are expected to be National Assembly records, mass media, and surveys collected in conjunction with the DIG project..

TARGET 2.3: Increase Popular Participation in Public Policy Formulation							
INDICATORS	BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJECTE D/(A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Political Participation a. Political Party Membership (%) b. Eligible Voters Voting (%) c. Absence of Coercive Measures Forcing or Preventing Participation	N/A None  None [Source: DIG baseline survey]	A:40% (est) None					P: 80%
2. Active, Professional, and Independent Media a. Number of Newspapers b. Number of Radio/TV Stations c. Total Circulation & Broadcasts outside Kigali d. Absence of Coercive Measures Limiting Freedom of the Press	(1994) [Source: DIG baseline survey]						
3. Active, Independent Public Interest Groups a. Number/Range of Issues Treated in Public Fora by Private Interest Groups/NGOs. b. Membership in Public Interest Groups/NGOs.	(1994) [Source: DIG baseline survey]						

The discussion concerning Target 2.2 above applies to this Target (2.3) as well. An indicator on the role of other non-state groups already has been included as one of the governance strategic objective indicators and as part of the Mission's sub-target 2.3 indicators.

As the DIG Project will be working directly with an Rwanda umbrella PVO organization, currently being established by PVOs interested in becoming more politically aware and active, and a Rwanda association of journalists (written and oral mediums) comprised of both government and private sector journalists, the Mission still expects that it will be able to gather quality data on this sub-target.

On-going USAID projects designed for other purposes are also having a positive impact on the advancement of democratic principles. A recently evaluation concluded that USAID funds used to establish an effective cooperative movement in Rwanda has also help make the cooperative members, including women, more politically aware and active. Indeed, cooperative members "stressed that participation... [in cooperatives]... helped them gain control over their lives [and] the training received helped them understand the democratic process" (Chemonics, 1993:11). This may reflect that the way U.S. contractors and cooperating agencies -- in this case NCBA -- implement USAID projects can impart the American bias of democratic modes of operation. The cooperative movement supported by USAID has now become active in pressing politically the concerns of its members. It has also helped establish a new umbrella association of Rwandan NGOs interested in advancing the process of democratization in Rwanda.

**PROJECT AIDING COOPERATIVES  
ECONOMICALLY ALSO ADVANCES  
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES**

A USAID project designed for one purpose is also having a positive impact on the advancement of democratic principles. A recent evaluation concluded that USAID funds used to establish an effective cooperative movement in Rwanda has also helped make the cooperative members, including women, more politically aware about democratic processes and active (Chemonics, 1993:11).

## STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: PRIVATE SECTOR

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: Increase Commercial Output by Medium and Smaller Scale Enterprises and Farms							
INDICATORS	BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJECTED/ (A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Increase in the Real Value of Marketed Goods and Services	Rwf 12 (1991) Percent Change [Sources: IBRD, IMF]						P: Rwf 132 billion
New Businesses Formation (Formal and Informal) a. Number b. Percent Change	[Source: Ministry of Commerce, USAID/R]						
Shift of Labor Resources to Higher Earning Activities a. Percent of Households allocating > 50% to off-farm employment b. Percent of Households allocating 25-50% to off-farm employment c. Off-farm Employment 1. Number 2. Percent Change	[Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Plan, FS II, SER]						

Data to be utilized within this table are still being processed by the Ministry of Agriculture and thus unavailable for this year's API. The Mission expects that the table will be complete by 1994 API.

Mission activities in policy reform (the on-going PRIME and PMPR programs) and small enterprise development (the on-going PVO Support Project and recently finished Cooperative Training project) are expected to continue to contribute both directly and indirectly to household income growth in rural areas through market efficiencies and incentive structures that encourage commercialization, and through the provision of technical support to implement new technologies. During FY 1992 the GOR continued to implement policy reforms as noted in Section I above. However, the impact of these reforms is not yet

visible, neither in terms of positive growth in the value of goods and services marketed, nor the percent of people earning the majority of their income from off-farm sources. Forthcoming data from the recent census and expected reports from the planned mini Budget and Consumption survey and other DSA studies may provide a clear indication of the changes taking place.

TARGET 3.1: Expand Financial and Business Services Sector (medium and smaller scale enterprises)							
INDICATORS	BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJECTED/ (A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Formal and Informal Finance Extended to SMEs and Farmers *							
a. Amount Extended	1.3 B Rwf (1989)	1.4 B Rwf	1.7 B Rwf				
b. Share of Total Finance Extended to SMEs and Farmers	20% (Est) (1989) [Sources: National Bank of Rwanda (Central Bank), PVO Support, SER]	A: 20% (Est) A: 7%	A: 17% (Est) A: 21%				P: 35%
c. Percent Change in Formal and Informal Finance Extended to SMEs and Farmers							
Business Services Enterprises *							P: 36
a. Number	20 (1992)	A: 20	A: 17 (Est)				
b. Percentage Change	[Sources: Ministry of Commerce, PVO Support, SER]	0	-15%			table continued on next page	
SMEs and Farmers Accessing Support Services *							
a. Number	[Sources: Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Agriculture, PVO Support, SER]						
b. Percent Change							

\* Mission will gender disaggregate data.

During 1992-93, it became increasingly apparent that there is an excess of liquidity in Rwanda's large formal financial sector. As a result, the GOR, with IMF and WB concurrence, reduced interest rates. The reduction has not resulted in a significant increase in the demand for formal sector credit. The GOR has not borrowed heavily from the commercial banks to finance its deficit. Rather it has borrowed from the central bank and simply accumulated arrears.

The demand for credit in the informal financial sector remains strong, although repayment problems are reported to be common during this period of economic crisis. Through the PVO Support Project, the Mission expects to provide technical assistance to small saving societies to meet the demands of their members. Some such societies have over 6,000 members and are reaching the limits of what they can manage without developing newer management systems. Under the PVO Support Project, the Mission expects to work with several Rwandan PVOs that represent or work with cooperatives, associations, and/or private individuals. These include Technoserve/Rwanda; IWACU, a cooperative training center and AID-registered NGO; Duterimbere, a women's association providing business services; and SERDI, a government/UNDP supported business services center. Given the small size of Rwanda's financial services sector, USAID's activities hold, in and of themselves, the potential for stimulating the expansion and growth of business services. Indeed, in the last several months, private Rwandan services firms have been presenting their credentials to USAID. Where one year ago USAID reported that there were very few local auditing/accounting firms available, now there are at least 5 or 6 qualified firms. A number of them have become associated with international firms, such as Price Waterhouse. While these are encouraging developments, the people-level impact remains to be measured.

Data sources for these indicators are GOR and USAID surveys. Previously, these surveys have been funded under the PRIME project. However, in the future, the PVO Support Project and the planned SER Project will become the Mission's vehicles for collecting this type of information.

TARGET 3.2: Expand Agricultural Processing and Marketing (medium and smaller scale enterprises)							
INDICATORS	BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJECT/ (A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Real Value-Added in Agricultural Processing by SMEs and Farmers a. Value Added b. Percentage Change	[Sources: Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Agriculture, PVO Support, SER]						
Marketed Agricultural Output a. Value Added b. Percentage Change	[Sources: Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Agriculture, PVO Support, SER]						

The data for this table are currently being processed by the noted GOR ministries. The Mission expects that the table will be complete for the 1994 API submission.

## TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY: BIO-DIVERSITY

TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY 1: Conserve Biodiversity through the Improved Management of National Parks and Reserves							
INDICATORS	BASILINE NUMBER (YEAR)	FY 92 (P)ROJECTED/ (A)CTUAL	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A	FY 96 P/A	FY 97 P/A
Environmental Code a. Approved Environmental Code b. Implementation of Code c. Reduction in Net Loss of Resource Base	[Source: Ministry of Environment]	Yes	Yes				
Revenue Generation to Finance Administration of Managed Areas a. Revenues Generated b. Percentage Change c. Revenue/Cost Ratio d. Percent of Revenues Reinvested in Managed Areas	(1994) [Source: Ministry of Tourism]						

Mission plans to specify indicators for this Target of Opportunity during the evaluation of the Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP) did not materialize. The evaluation was conducted, as was planned in last year's API, but it was unable to provide the expected assistance. Thus, the Mission began, in 1993, to seek outside assistance to select objectives and indicators for this Target. AFR/ARTS provided two consultants. The Mission expects further assistance in FY 1994 from REDSO/ESA and AID/W. Also, the Mission is starting the planning for its Bio-diversity Project (foreseen in the CPSP). These actions throughout FY 1994 will, hopefully, allow the Mission to complete this gap in the API. While the MER exercise was useful in furthering the Mission's thought process, what remains is a focusing of priorities and indicators.

## TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY: HIV/AIDS PREVENTION

<b>TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY 2: Reduce the Rate of HIV/AIDS Transmission through Targeted IEC, Condom Social Marketing, and STD programs in Rwanda's large urban centers</b>							
<b>INDICATORS</b>	<b>BASELINE NUMBER (YEAR)</b>	<b>FY 92 (P)ROJECTED/ (A)CTUAL</b>	<b>FY 93 P/A</b>	<b>FY 94 P/A</b>	<b>FY 95 P/A</b>	<b>FY 96 P/A</b>	<b>FY 97 P/A</b>
HIV Seroprevalence and Incidence Rate a. Seroprevalence 1. Male 2. Female b. Incidence 1. Male 2. Female	[Source: AIDSCAP Project]						
Syphilis Prevalence Rate a. Male b. Female	[Source: AIDSCAP Project]						
Percent of Condom Use During High Risk Sexual Encounters Among Targeted Populations	[Source: AIDSCAP Project]						
Number of Reported Non-regular Sexual Partners During a Specified Time Period a. Male b. Female	[Source: AIDSCAP Project]						
Knowledge of 2 Correct Means of Preventing Sexually Transmitted HIV a. Male b. Female	[Source: AIDSCAP Project]						

Since last year's API, the Mission has been able to elaborate -- with AIDSCAP Project personnel -- a Rwanda Country Plan for HIV/AIDS. The above indicators emerge from that Plan. The first two indicators will be obtained from on-going sentinel surveillance. The remainder will be obtained through planned and budgeted population-based surveys of the target groups. These groups include: (a) urban and semi-urban men and women aged 20-35, and (b) urban and semi-urban youth aged 10-19. These two groups will be further segmented into out-of school youth, mobile populations, bar patrons, commercial sex workers and their clients, women and men with sexually transmitted diseases and military personnel. USAID and AIDSCAP Project plans are to have baseline data in the next API. The AIDSCAP Project team is, except for one member, already on-the-ground and working.

#### **IV. PROGRESS IN PRIORITY AREAS**

This section is included as requested in the Draft API Guidelines for 1993 sent as an E-Mail on October 26, 1993. Per the guidance, this section is to be brief and to highlight impacts that the A/AID is interested in and that fall outside the Mission's strategic objectives. The A/AID's interests fall in four areas:

- > encouraging broad-based economic growth;
- > protecting the environment;
- > stabilizing population growth and protecting human health; and
- > building democracy (including governance).

The USAID/Rwanda's CPSP predates the appointment of the new A/AID. Nevertheless, as should be clear from Sections I.-III., USAID/Rwanda's CPSP is built around improving governance (See Annex B: Program Objective Tree, which shows governance at the center of the strategy). The Mission strategy is to improve governance through improving the accountability and transparency of Government of Rwanda (GOR) budget processes and through building the capacity of the national legislature, PVO/NGOs, press groups and others to use improved budget processes. To this end, the Democratic Initiatives and Governance (DIG) Project staff started operations in Rwanda in early October 1993. Simultaneously, the Mission continues to work with other donors and the GOR to finalize a set of feasible steps that will lead to an accountable and transparent budget process, including monitoring and controls (e.g., evaluations and audits). Given the complexity of the subject, the process, the Mission believes, is as important to the final program as in the actions finally agreed upon by all parties. Indeed, a year has already been expended on this effort by USAID and other donors.

In the area of population, the Mission already has had clear measurable impact on the contraceptive prevalence rate and expects to achieve further gains. As noted earlier, USAID has been a major and consistent supporter of Rwanda's efforts to increase family planning and increase the use of modern contraceptives. From a base of nearly zero in 1983, the contraceptive prevalence rate has surpassed 11 percent in 1993, down from 15 percent before the war began and disrupted all development activities. The Mission's on-going family planning efforts are now being complemented by an HIV/AIDS project to extend information, education, and communication project and a new project to integrate family planning activities into existing health service programs and to decentralize authorities from the capital to regional and local levels.

In the area of economic growth, USAID/Rwanda has pursued actions on the sectoral and micro fronts. On the sectoral policy reform front, the GOR has implemented the changes agreed to in the Production and Marketing Policy Reform Program (see earlier APIs), including removal of price and profit controls, rationalization of the tariff structure, and

implementation of new system that transparently allocates foreign exchange were all substantive and important reforms. They are, to date, still being implemented by the GOR. The decision to tackle the need for reforms on the GOR budget process reflects USAID/Rwanda's process of learning and identifying what is now the most binding policy constraint to further development in Rwanda. On the micro front, the Mission has launched the PVO Support Project, which builds on USAID's long involvement with cooperatives, associations and other small scale business development activities (e.g., Technoserve, NCBA, and Appropriate Technology International activities). As noted earlier, a recent evaluation concluded that USAID funds have succeeded in establishing an effect cooperative movement in Rwanda, and that the impact on cooperatives, both social and economic, has been positive. The evaluation also found women "benefiting significantly" from their participation (Chemonix, 1993:2). Perhaps as importantly, cooperative members "stressed that participation... [cooperatives]... helped them gain control over their lives [and] the training received helped them understand the democratic process" (Chemonix, 1993:11). This reflects that the way the U.S. contractors and cooperating agencies implement USAID projects can reflect our bias to democratic modes of operation.

In the area of environment, the Mission continues to support a variety of targets of opportunity under an on-going NRM project. From this activity and the actions planned in FY 1994, the Mission expects to focus its future support to more directly support the conservation of Rwanda's resources through better management.

Overall, the USAID/Rwanda strategy is particularly well-positioned to capitalize on the recent political advances. Most of the projects and programs identified in the CPSP have not only been designed, but implementation has begun. While the war disrupted the program in 1993, the Mission remains cautiously optimistic that ground and time lost can be recovered in 1994 and 1995.