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**ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT**  
**USAID/RWANDA**

October 1991  
USAID/Rwanda  
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## PREFACE

USAID/Rwanda did not submit, with AID/W concurrence, an Assessment of Program Impact (API) in 1990. The October 1990 invasion by Rwandan rebels and subsequent partial evacuation of USDH and contractor staff made it impossible. Unfortunately, as discussed below, the fallout from that invasion, which was unsuccessful in a military sense, succeeded in disrupting the economy and the USAID program throughout 1991. Thus, this API was prepared under less than ideal circumstances and without the benefit of AID/W comments and suggestions on an earlier API. Similarly, this API is based on a "proxy" program logframe based on the current portfolio and the Action Plan logframe approved by AID/W in late 1989, not on an approved CPSP. USAID is currently in midst of preparing its CPSP and revised program logframe for submission in FY 1992.

### I. SPECIAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE USAID PROGRAM

This past year was marked by tremendous turmoil for the USAID program and for all Rwandans as well. Special factors affecting the program have been grouped into those related to Rwanda and to AID.

Rwanda Factors. Three sets of events shaped Rwanda in FY 1991: the rebel invasion, the new structural adjustment program, and the decision to change to a multiparty political system.

The most disruptive set of events is related directly to the fallout from the initial October 1990 invasion by Rwandan rebels living in Uganda. It includes: the arrest of roughly 8,000 Rwandans without due process; the imposition of very tight movement controls enforced by military roadblocks throughout the entire country; the establishment, through forced displacement of peoples, of a wide buffer in Rwanda along the contested parts of the border with Uganda; the closing of Rwanda's major external transport route to an ocean port, i.e., through Uganda to Kenya; the tripling of the Rwandan Army from roughly 9,000 to over 30,000; and the continued fighting between the Rwandan Army and rebels.

Further complicating matters, in the month following the invasion, the Government of Rwanda (GOR) launched a comprehensive Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) -- before it had signed

agreements with the World Bank or IMF on its exact content.<sup>1</sup> The SAP marks a major shift from the GOR's dirigist policies to those relying more on market forces. Among the policy changes implemented between November 1990 and October 1991 are: a 40 percent devaluation of the Rwandan franc to correct for the overvaluation; the starting of an interim transparent and nondiscriminatory foreign exchange allocation and import licensing system; the reduction in the maximum tariff rates from over 250 percent to 100 percent; the lifting of import quotas for most commodities, the elimination of GOR price and profit controls for most goods and services, the adjustment of interest rates by raising the maximum lending rate to above the estimated rate of inflation for 1991, and the freeing of all other rates on deposits; the increase in petroleum prices by an average of about 75 percent to reflect the actual cost to the country; the increase in electricity and water rates, both by an average of 50 percent; and the raising of the sales tax by two-thirds.

Finally, the pace of democratization by the GOR accelerated markedly after the October invasion. Specifically, a new constitution was drafted and approved; six political parties, including the one currently in power, were created and legally registered; almost all of the 8,000 Rwandans arrested after the October invasion were released by May 1991; movement controls were eased albeit marginally; a general amnesty for all Rwandan refugees abroad was passed; and a free press was allowed to develop, which it rapidly did.<sup>2</sup> Also, the party in power has started to return to the GOR assets purchased with government funds.

Actions taken to date by the GOR on the economic and political fronts are substantial by most standards. Nevertheless, a USAID-financed report on democratization (July 1991) concluded that many Rwandans are encouraged by the recent changes, yet are uncertain about exactly what the future political or economic systems will be or how they will relate to them and their businesses. Two USAID rapid appraisals of Rwandan business climate (July and October 1991) identified similar

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<sup>1</sup>The GOR Public Investment Program (PIP) was approved by the World Bank and the IMF in April 1991, six months after the GOR launched its reform program. It signed a \$42 million Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) with the IMF in April 1991 and a \$90 million dollar First Structural Adjustment Credit (FSAC) with the World Bank in June 1991. The GOR signed a \$25 million AEPRP supporting specific sectoral policy reforms with USAID/R in September 1991.

<sup>2</sup>Rwanda went from a country with essentially one weekly newspaper published by the GOR to one where, in September 1991, there were over sixty independent papers.

sentiments. Businesses are generally encouraged by the economic changes made to date and those proposed, but few planned to take advantage of the changing economic policy environment. Near-term employment and investment plans continued to show no turnaround in business confidence. Capacity utilization in manufacturing, commerce, and services, already a low 50 percent in the late 1980s (USAID MAPS), declined even further in 1991 to between 25 and 30 percent for many companies (July and October appraisals).

Overall, the economic decline which began in 1989 will continue through 1991. Real gross domestic product declined 6 percent in 1989, 2 percent in 1990, and about 2 percent in 1991, thus bringing it to a level which is nearly 4 percent below that achieved in 1983. A number of macro-economic indicators have improved, such as inflation, international reserves, and the trade balance, but for the wrong reasons: reduced economic activity reduced the rate of inflation and the demand for imports, hence foreign exchange. In turn, fewer imports improved the balance of trade and helped increase international reserves. Indeed, between June 1991 (when the new foreign exchange allocation system began) and September 1991, only three-quarters of the foreign exchange made available for imports by the GOR (and largely supplied by donors supporting the SAP program) was demanded by importers.

Unless Rwanda can overcome the disruptive effects of the continued conflict with the rebels, the possible benefits of structural adjustment and USAID development assistance will remain suppressed. Increasingly, it appears that the outcome of Rwanda's political reforms holds the solution to the conflict.

**A.I.D. Factors.** The effects of the October 1990 invasion did not pass by USAID. Contractors on several projects and non-essential USAID staff and consultants were evacuated from Rwanda. Today, more than a year later, several of the contractors must operate from Kigali as the areas where they work are still considered insecure by the GOR and still are under curfew. Kigali also still has a curfew and has numerous roadblocks throughout the town. Movement constraints also made it difficult to conduct the appraisals and studies that would provide baseline data or update information for an API or CPSP exercise. Several Rwandan counterpart project coordinators were arrested. USAID's FSN economist was arrested in November 1990 (released after four and one-half months). One project (PRIME) went through four temporary coordinators between October 1990 and October 1991; another, three (ASPAP); all to the detriment of project implementation.

During this year, all the mission's USDH technical staff changed: PRG, PO, HPN (still vacant), and ADO; three-quarters of the positions were unoccupied for some time. This was an additional burden during a period when only seven USDH were assigned to Rwanda. Then at the end of March 1991, the Mission

was advised that it would have to develop an AEPRP for obligation by September 30th. With AID/W assistance, a \$25 million program was designed, negotiated and finally signed (in late September). While 1991 was a stressful year, the recently proposed USDH staff increases and the expectation of completing the CPSP in 1992, is encouraging. Given the disruptions in Rwanda and in USAID, the Mission simply did not have much time to focus on API activities.

## II. PROGRESS TOWARD OVERALL PROGRAM GOALS AND SUB-GOALS<sup>3</sup>

It would be unrealistic to make definitive quantitative statements on Mission progress toward its Country Program Goal of sustained broad-based increases in per capita income in rural areas. The problem of assessing progress lies, in part, with the inherently disruptive effects of insecurity, structural adjustment and political reform noted above. It is unlikely that any national-level progress has been made in 1991 on the Program Goal. As noted above, overall, the economy is expected to continue its decline in 1991. Any measurement of this impressionist assessment of Mission progress on the Program Goal is compounded by the limited amount of acceptable national baseline data and updates. Even macroeconomic data must be interpreted with more than the usual caution. The GOR asked that the IMF postpone publishing data on Rwanda's effective exchange, pending a future review of basic data sources (IMF, EBS/91/61, April 4, 1991).

Nevertheless, since the early 1980s, USAID has been making investments in data collection and analysis. The creation of an agricultural survey and analysis unit resulted in Rwanda's first agricultural census. The unit continues to produce issue-based surveys and analyses. Through one of AID/AFR's first AEPRPs, the Mission funded a series of studies on private sector activity in Rwanda, later supplemented by a MAPS exercise and complemented by other World Bank and UNDP surveys.

The current USAID program continues this "information" thrust through its financing of the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), halted temporarily by the fighting; a portion of the current national census of population; and analysis of the latest national household budget and consumption survey. To date, the greatest demanders of information generated by USAID-supported activities continue to be the Mission and other donors. For example, in preparing the 1991 Agricultural Sector Survey, the World Bank commissioned two of the four special background reports from the USAID-created agricultural statistics unit, and used much of its data and analyses. To more fully integrate data collection and analysis with national planning, USAID is

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<sup>3</sup>The AID/W approved Program Logframe is attached as Annex 1.

supporting the establishment of a unit in the Ministry of Planning to monitor and evaluate the impact of its Structural Adjustment Program, in particular, the sectoral policy reforms supported by USAID.

There are, however, preliminary indications that there has been measurable progress on one of the Mission's two subgoals. In the ABS prepared in 1989, the first subgoal was to decrease the total fertility rate (TFR) from 8.6 to 8 by 1994. Progress on this Subgoal directly contributes to progress on the Program Goal in that reducing Rwanda's total fertility rate will reduce the rate of population growth. In turn, the lower population growth rate means that there will be fewer people amongst which the total income must be distributed. Any given increases in income will thus be larger per capita, hence contributing to part of the Program Goal. The family planning program serves both "urban" and "rural" areas with comparable success.<sup>4</sup>

Fragmentary data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), which was about 30 percent complete when the October invasion halted all work, suggests that Rwanda's TFR is now about 7.3. If ultimately proved to be correct, this TFR figure suggests either that USAID-supported efforts in family planning can be associated with having had a major impact, that the Mission's and other donors' initial baseline estimate of 8.6 may have been overestimated, or a combination of the two. The combination is most likely to be the case since the adoption of family planning methods by Rwandans is on the increase (detailed in the Section III below) and the DHS is the first reliable survey on fertility in Rwanda in the last eight years. USAID plans to recommence the DHS in June 1992. Barring any further unforeseen delays in completing the DHS, a more accurate update of actual progress on this Subgoal can be made in the FY 1992 API. The Mission is also seeking to verify the quality of its initial baseline TFR estimate.

On the Mission's second sub-goal of sustained increases in food production at least equal to the population growth rate, it is less clear if there has been progress. Progress on this Subgoal contributes to the Program Goal in that increased food production translates into increased household income, either as

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<sup>4</sup>The family planning experience in Rwanda has shown there is no need to distinguish between urban and rural family planning strategies. Indeed, USAID's social and institutional analyses have argued that any distinction between rural and urban is likely to be misleading given the very small size of the urban (or formal) sector. In Rwanda, many "urban" households engage in agricultural production activities within city limits, a fact readily observed by a cursory drive through the capital Kigali, which casts the flavor of a small rural town in the United States.

cash earned from the sale of food or the imputed value of food produced and consumed directly by the household.

There is no national-level data for 1991 in which the Mission places much confidence that measures progress on this Subgoal. They are only impressions extrapolated on data from earlier years. On the surface, it appears that no or slightly negative progress has been made nationwide. Those displaced by fighting or moved by the creation of a buffer zone along the border, unofficially reported at around 60,000 (less than 1 percent of the population), no longer have access to their fields. Clearly, their food production will be lower and nutritional status will suffer. Nevertheless, the Mission's and other donors' assessment of Rwanda's overall real need for food aid, emergency or regular, -- an indication of the level of food production nation-wide -- is that it was no different in 1991 than it was for 1990.

A question often raised when reviewing USAID's second Strategic Objective is whether Rwanda even produces and imports enough food to meet FAO minimum caloric requirements. For example, the USAID-commissioned 1990 Food Needs Assessment reports that per capita food production in Rwanda declined the each of the five years prior to 1990, and in 1990, was "unable to cover 'status quo' consumptions levels." This view stems from a conception of Rwanda is a country drowning in people with no new areas to bring into cultivation. With a population growth rate reported to be over 3.6 percent and with less than 20 percent of all farms being larger than 1.6 hectares, there is justifiable reason for such a concern. Nevertheless, USAID is not at all convinced the actual situation, while certainly not favorable, is necessarily alarmist. A 1988 farm-level survey, as opposed to national food balance sheets based on dubious estimates of production, found that only 0.8 percent -- 8 out of 1,030 farms -- were not producing calories equal to or greater than the FAO minimums. This is a small number. A special study currently underway is also providing indications that unregistered food imports are greater than suggested by official data. Indeed, some of the analysis now coming out of the Household Budget and Consumption Survey (partly financed by USAID) provides additional insights on the dynamics of food production and nutrition in Rwanda. More on this subject will be presented in the forthcoming CPSP.

With USAID's assessment of progress on the Goal and Subgoals presented, the next section outlines progress on USAID's Strategic Objectives, Targets, Sub-Targets, and Targets of Opportunity.

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<sup>3</sup>USAID, Rwanda Food Needs Assessment (1990), August 24, 1990, page 1.

### III. PROGRESS TOWARD STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND RELATED PROGRESS INDICATORS

The following Strategic Objectives, Targets, Sub-Targets, and Targets of Opportunity were approved by AID/W in July 1989 as part of USAID/Rwanda's Action Plan review. The most noteworthy points regarding progress on each are briefly summarized below. The Program logframe is then presented in the format suggested in the AFR/DP API guidance cable (State 273190).

-- The current contraceptive prevalence rate exceeds by nearly 25 percent the Strategic Objective rate projected for end 1991 (actual rate of 10.3 percent versus a projected rate of 8.3 percent). This is widely believed to have been assisted by USAID's contribution to the training of 17,000 village-level volunteers ("abakangurambaga"), who now spread knowledge of family planning methods and services, as well as the continued USAID/R support for family planning. USAID/R has been the major donor supporting family planning in Rwanda since the early 1980s. The Mission recognizes that while abakangurambaga continue to recruit new family planning clients, more work needs to be undertaken to assess what percentage of these new users remain as continuing users.

-- The actual number of new users of family planning methods in 1990 already exceeded the Target objective set for end FY 1991 (actual of 104,809 users by December 1990 versus an objective of 98,000 by end FY 1991).

-- Through its family planning policy dialogue and donor coordination efforts, USAID/R has "leveraged" its population assistance by convincing the GOR and World Bank of the need for additional support for family planning. The GOR and World Bank recently signed a \$19 million, four-year project, which essentially expands the current GOR-USAID family planning strategy by providing additional resources and technical support. This is now allowing USAID to address next generation FP/MCH issues through its new project (RIM).

-- The completion of the Demographic Health Survey (DHS), a key management step, was halted by the October invasion. It has been scheduled to recommence in June 1992, assuming travel restrictions ease and security in rural areas improves.

-- The Mission's primary activity designed to generate new agricultural production-increasing resource-conserving technologies and practices, the Farming Systems Research Project (696-0110), was in the area most affected by the October 1990 invasion and was arguably the USAID project most adversely affected. The security situation also made it impossible to

confirm the extremely rapid highland farmer adoption rates of FSRP's "magic bean" technological package reported by FSRP project staff. Thus, USAID will include data on the highland farmer adoption rates of FSRP packages in next year's API.

-- USAID's initial studies of the marais (Rwanda's valley wetlands) are nearing their conclusion. They are providing preliminary indications of the potential and the problems surrounding wetland protection, management, and development.

-- The National Environmental Action Plan, whose development was supported by USAID, was approved by GOR and donors in May 1991. In addition, USAID signed cooperative agreements with four environmental PVOs to initiate activities in the Nile/Zaire watershed: CARE, Africare, WCI, and the Digit Fund.

-- USAID support, which began in the early 1980s and will end in late 1992, has established a survey and analysis unit in the Ministry of Agriculture whose outputs are demanded by donors and others interested in planning (see Section II. above). In 1991, the Unit created a mobile analysis team capable of undertaking special studies on current policy issues. The World Bank and UNICEF have already commissioned such studies with the Unit. While there are still improvements to be made, the Unit is widely recognized to be the best Rwandan institution collecting data on the rural sector, covering both agricultural and non-agricultural activities.

-- As a result of a USAID/R project, there is now a self-financing organization that is meeting a demand for business advisory services in Rwanda. Technoserve, a U.S. PVO which specializes in small and medium-scale private sector development and which came to Rwanda to implement a private sector development project for USAID (696-0121), has completely Africanized its staff and decided to continue working in Rwanda after USAID funding ended in September 1991. Rwandan cooperatives and other donors are continuing to purchase Technoserve's advisory services.

-- To date, under PRIME, through loan and vocational training programs, often designed and implemented with other donors interested in supporting the development of medium and small scale enterprises, over 450 new artisanal jobs have been created, and well over 300 artisanal workers have had their skills upgraded. One artisanal center, USAID-funded, is now managed and maintained by the artisans themselves. They also continue to repay the loan (interest rate of 12 percent versus an estimated 17 percent rate of inflation) for the building. As a result of this experience, USAID is funding two additional artisan centers,

with the accompanying training programs in other regional centers.

-- Through PRIME, GOR procurement regulations have been amended to promote domestic procurement from small domestic producers, where cost competitive. As a result, during 1991, the GOR terminated a purchase order and decided to procure domestically all the school desks and bureaus needed under a World Bank-financed education project. Working closely, the Ministry of Industry and Artisans, French Cooperation, and Swiss Cooperation, and PRIME have up-graded the skills of 3 to 5 artisanal woodworkers from each of Rwanda's 142 communes, provided loans for tools, and established quality standards for the school furniture. Through this school furniture activity alone, over 300,000 person days of work will be created, over \$9 million in foreign exchange will be saved. Additional follow-on work is expected.

-- Government procedures to create and register new businesses have been simplified through PRIME's efforts, reducing administrative delays by upwards of two years and reducing up-front cash outlays of new businesses. In particular, three formerly mandatory studies (market appraisal, financial study, and technical feasibility) are no longer required; the permit to commence operations has been replaced by simple registration; and Trade Licenses have been decentralized, making it easier for firms to obtain them. These regulatory changes complement other GOR policy changes noted in Section I above (e.g., removal of price and profit controls).

-- Three Rwandan organizations assisting small and medium-sized enterprises and artisans assisted by USAID's private sector institutional development effort: DUTERIMBERE, a women's association; IWACU, a cooperative training center; and SERDI, a small business services center.

-- The Mission continues to strive to integrate gender considerations into its on-going development portfolio. Through short-term technical assistance, the Mission is currently working to convert theoretical concepts into useful project implementation applications. USAID expects to be able to present more gender-related impact information in the FY 1992 API.

PROGRAM LOGFRAME: USAID/RWANDA API  
REPORTING YEAR: FY 1991

OBJECTIVES (Strategic Objectives, Targets, Sub-Targets, and Targets of Opportunity)	INDICATORS	BASELINE E NO.(YR)	FY 90 (Projected/ Actual)	FY 91 P/A	FY 92 P/A	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A
<u>1. S.O.:</u> Increase contraceptive prevalence rate from 3.7 % in 1988 to 8.3 % in 1991 to 13.5 % in 1994	contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR)	3.7% (1988)	6.6%/9.62%	8.3%/ 10.5% (as of 6/91) (a)	10.0%/ 	11.8%/ 	13.5%/ 	
Data Source(s): ONAPO Reports, various Notes: (a) Assuming a constant increase in the CPR for the rest of 1991, the CPR will be 11.25% by end December 1991.								
<u>1.1. TRGT:</u> Increase number of users of family planning methods from 40,000 in 1988 to 98,000 in 1991 to 179,000 in 1994	numbers of new acceptors and continuing users	40,000 (1988)	78,700 users/ 105,078 users	98,000/ 119,481 women using modern methods as of June 1991 (a)	125,000/ 	152,000/ 	179,000/ 	
Data Source(s): ONAPO Reports, various Notes: (a) Data for men using contraceptive methods is not available.								
<u>1.1.1. Sub-TRGT:</u> Improved Access to family planning services	1: increase the number of non-governmental family planning service delivery sites	25 (1989)		28/in the capital alone, 10 private clinics offer all FP services			35/ 	
	2: increase the number of retail outlets selling contraceptives	30 (1989)		(a)			500/ 	
	3: at least 4 family planning methods available at 100% of Ministry of Health hospitals and health centers by 1991			100%/ 100% offer integrated MCH/FP info and services				
	4: natural family planning methods available at 35% of catholic health centers by 1994	Not Available		(b)			35%/ 	

OBJECTIVES (Strategic Objectives, Targets, Sub-Targets, and Targets of Opportunity)	INDICATORS	BASELINE NO.(YR)	FY 90 (P)rojected/ (A)ctual	FY 91 P/A	FY 92 P/A	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A
	5: sterilization available at 10 public hospitals, IUDs inserted at 14 public hospitals and 50 Ministry of Health health centers, by 1994	Not Available		at least 4 hospitals offer sterilization and at least 8 hospitals and health centers offer IUD insertions (8/91) This is due to AVSC training courses.)			Ster:10 hospitals IUDs:14 hospitals, 50 health centers	
<p>Data Source(s): ONAPO Reports, Ministry of Health Reports, and USAID Studies and Trip Reports</p> <p>Notes:</p> <p>(a) Social marketing program expected to begin the last quarter of CY 1991 by USAID-funded SOMARC and ARBEF. In addition, 123 teachers and 51 auxiliaries were trained in how to disseminate information regarding family planning services.</p> <p>(b) Data on NGOs, including catholic health centers, are not available. The newly created Consultative Group for Private Sector FP Activities, formed in February 1991, includes the SNAF, the Catholic natural family planning group financed by Catholic Relief Services.</p>								
1.1.2. Sub-TRGT: Improved quality of family planning services	1: sterilization available at 10 public hospitals, IUDs inserted at 14 public hospitals and 50 Ministry of Health health centers, by 1994	Not Available		See 1.1.1.5 above. (a)			Ster:10 hospitals IUDs:14 hospitals, 50 health centers	
	2: improved program management such that training is targeted; supervision visits carried out regularly; commodities are always available; equipment is available and functioning; and information from the Family Planning Health Information System is used for decision-making	Not Available		numerous management improvements made (b)				

OBJECTIVES (Strategic Objectives, Targets, Sub-Targets, and Targets of Opportunity)	INDICATORS	BASELINE E NO.(YR)	FY 90 (Projected/ (Actual)	FY 91 P/A	FY 92 P/A	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A
	3: All Ministry of Health hospitals and health centers have a physician, medical assistant, and/or nurse trained to provide family planning services	Not Available		100% of all Ministry of Health clinics offer modern family planning methods.				
<p>Data Source(s): ONAPO Reports, Ministry of Health Reports, and USAID Studies and Trip Reports</p> <p>Notes:</p> <p>(a) Mission awaiting ONAPO/MOH approval to expand effort to all ten health regions.</p> <p>(b) The 10/91 PIR for MCH/FP II notes that timely procurement and logistical systems at ONAPO, the national family planning coordinating organization, are operating. Annual family planning program plans are now being developed (the 1991 plan was approved 4/91 and the 1992 plan will be submitted by 12/91).</p>								
1.1.3. Sub-TRGT: Increased demand for family planning services	1: percentage of women who do not desire more children increases	Not Available		30%/			40%/	
	2: desired family size decreases	6.0 (1988)		5.0/			4/	
	3: 20% of youth aged 10-20 years and 85% of married adults know of a modern or natural family planning method			DHS indicates women's knowledge of modern methods is 96.6%				
	4: 75% of married adults can spontaneously name a modern family planning method			see 1.1.3.3. above				
<p>Data Source(s): ONAPO Reports, Ministry of Health Reports, USAID Studies and Trip Reports, fragmentary DHS results</p>								
2. S.O.: Farmers using new production-increasing resource conserving technologies and practices	1: increase the number of highland farm households by 42,000 in the year 2000	120 (1987)		400/ over 18,000 highland farmers reportedly using FSRP developed "magic bean" technology				1000/
	2: increase the number of fish farming households	2,400 (1987)					2,900/	
<p>Data Source(s): USAID NRMP PIR 10/91</p>								

OBJECTIVES (Strategic Objectives, Targets, Sub-Targets, and Targets of Opportunity)	INDICATORS	BASELINE E NO.(YR)	FY 90 (Projected/ (Actual)	FY 91 P/A	FY 92 P/A	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A
<b>2.1. TRGT:</b> Production-increasing resource conserving technologies and practices generated	1: highland technologies generated	none (1987)		6 tech. packages/ 12 improved technologies identified and being tested on farmers fields (a)				
	2: integrated technological package for fish culture generated		1 tech. package/ a package developed					
Data Source(s): USAID FSRP PIR, 10/91; NRMP PIR, 10/91 Note(s): (a) The packages included combinations of 4 improved bean varieties, 4 improved wheat varieties, and 2 improved potato varieties combined with liming, agro-forestry, and other new cultivation techniques.								
<b>2.2. TRGT:</b> production-increasing resource conserving technologies and practices extended	1: extended to 4 highland communes by the year 2000, and 72 highland communes by the year 2010			FSRP project extension staff working with 6,700 farmers in two highland communes				
	2: integrated technological package for fish culture extended to fish farming families			- 7 sites selected for commune-level demonstration fish farms - 72 fish farmers (31 women) trained - 10 fish extensionists training - 5 fish pond constructors trained			80%/	
Data Source(s): USAID FSRP PIR, 10/91; NRMP, 10/91								

OBJECTIVES (Strategic Objectives, Targets, Sub-Targets, and Targets of Opportunity)	INDICATORS	BASELINE NO.(YR)	FY 90 (P)rojected/ (A)ctual	FY 91 P/A	FY 92 P/A	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A
<b>2.3. TRGT:</b> Continued supportive food production policies and planning	resource monitoring and studies used in planning and decision-making			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- national research links established with 5 IRACs</li> <li>- 15 B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. researchers trained</li> <li>- survey data for FSRP project area was analyzed and integrated with other data bases</li> <li>- over sixteen workshops/training sessions held for extension and other senior staff</li> </ul>				
Data Source(s): USAID FSRP PIR, 10/91; NRMP PIR, 10/91								

OBJECTIVES (Strategic Objectives, Targets, Sub-Targets, and Targets of Opportunity)	INDICATORS	BASELINE E NO.(YR)	FY 90 (Projected/ (Actual)	FY 91 PIA	FY 92 PIA	FY 93 PIA	FY 94 PIA	FY 96 PIA
<b>TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY</b>								
<b>A. T.O.:</b> Expand employment in new and existing micro, small, and medium rural private enterprises	jobs created in new and existing micro, small, and medium rural enterprises	(a)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 500 artisanal wood and metal workers trained, of which 200 are new jobs</li> <li>- one privately-managed artisanal center operating</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- equivalent of 300,000 person days of work created (b)</li> <li>- two more privately-managed artisanal centers being constructed</li> <li>- GOR makes policy changes supported by USAID (c)</li> </ul>				
<p>Data Source(s): USAID PRIME PIR, 10/91, PMPR PIR, 10/91, PRIME Project</p> <p>Note(s):</p> <p>(a) PRIME convinced GOR to purchase schools desks and other equipment in Rwanda, as opposed to importing them under a World Bank project. PRIME, in conjunction with French Cooperation, Swiss Cooperation, and the GOR, has established programs to train wood workers to make school furniture up to specifications required, and has trained artisanal woodworking enterprises in all of Rwanda's communes. The foreign exchange savings from manufacturing them domestically is estimated at \$9 million.</p> <p>(b) Among the policy changes made to increase competition through "leveling the playing field" include: changed business registration requirements; a 40 percent devaluation of the Rwandan franc to correct for the overvaluation; the starting of an interim transparent and nondiscriminatory foreign exchange allocation and import licensing system; the reduction in the maximum tariff rates from over 250 percent to 100 percent; the lifting of import quotas for most commodities, the elimination of GOR price and profit controls for most goods and services, the adjustment of interest rates by raising the maximum lending rate to <u>above</u> the estimated rate of inflation for 1991, and the freeing of all other rates on deposits; the increase in petroleum prices by an average of about 75 percent to reflect the actual cost to the country; the increase in electricity and water rates, both by an average of 50 percent; and the raising of the sales tax by two-thirds.</p>								
<b>B. T.O.:</b> Preserve bio-diversity of Nile/Zaire watershed and volcanic areas, and marais (wetlands or swamps)	approve 3 cooperative agreements with environmental PVOs		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- National Environmental Action Plan approved by GOR and donors, 5/91</li> <li>- Coop Ags signed with CARE, Africare, WCI, Digit Fund</li> <li>- marais research project results being prepared</li> </ul>					
Data Source(s): USAID NRMP PIR, 10/91								

OBJECTIVES (Strategic Objectives, Targets, Sub-Targets, and Targets of Opportunity)	INDICATORS	BASELINE NO.(YR)	FY 90 (P)rojected/ (A)ctual	FY 91 P/A	FY 92 P/A	FY 93 P/A	FY 94 P/A	FY 95 P/A
<u>C.T.O.</u> : Increase knowledge and understand of the risks of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 24% of target population of 102,000 were reached through IEC activities.</li> <li>- knowledge of specific AIDS prevention techniques increased from between 3% and 34% to 46% and 88%.</li> </ul> (a)					
<p>Data Source(s): CARE HIV/AIDS, "Final Evaluation of The Southeast Byumba Integrated AIDS Education and Training Pilot Project, (898-0474.96)," October 1991.</p> <p>Note(s):            (a) The major Mission AIDS activity was the CARE project, which focused primarily on IEC activities. Due to hostilities in the project area, the project was extended until December 1991. The referenced evaluation is currently being conducted to assess project impact and lessons for future USAID/R and CARE AIDS activities.</p>								

**ANNEX 1. APPROVED USAID/RWANDA PROGRAM LOGFRAME**

