

**Greater Horn of Africa
Initiative**

**Results Review and
Resource Request**

March 1997

I. OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

Signs of both hope and despair continue to emerge from the Greater Horn of Africa. Full-scale civil war continues in Sudan, and Somalia is still characterized by sporadic fighting and the lack of state government. New emergencies were declared in Kenya (localized drought and crop failure), Somalia (drought) and northern Uganda (intensified fighting). A new civil war in Zaire created refugee flows and threatens to draw in Rwanda and Uganda. The return of over a million Rwandan refugees was welcomed by the Government of Rwanda and the international community, but also led to increased tension and human rights violations in the countryside. Burundi remains a powder keg, but did not blow up this year.

On the positive side, Tanzania enjoyed its first year under a government elected in multi-party elections and made great progress toward bringing its economic policies in line with international norms. Uganda once again conducted successful parliamentary and presidential elections. Young governments in Eritrea and Ethiopia enjoyed relatively stable years and were able to pursue sustainable development. Ethiopia enjoyed its second bumper crop in a row.

Most importantly, the governments of six Greater Horn countries successfully revitalized the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), demonstrating commitment to African ownership and leadership in addressing the region's problems. The United States encouraged this revitalization and will utilize IGAD as its primary regional development partner for the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.

What is the GHAI?

The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative pursues two goals (food security and conflict prevention) by means of five operating principles:

- African Ownership
- Strategic Coordination
- Linking Relief and Development
- Regional Approaches
- Promoting Change in Continuing Unstable Environments

The GHAI has received funding of about \$15 million per year to facilitate linking operating principles with strategic objectives and to leverage other funds. However, Mission Directors and Ambassadors in the region have agreed that GHAI "is" not just the GHAI-specific funding but all the relief, development and conflict prevention money spent by the USG in the region.

II. PROGRESS TOWARD OBJECTIVES

The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) Task Force in Washington has operated since its creation without explicit

objectives, indicators and targets. However, this time was not wasted. During this period, GHAI achieved several significant accomplishments, including:

- ▶ Creating a consensus, across the U.S. Government and donor community, of the priority of addressing food insecurity and crisis in the Greater Horn, and the principles upon which to base the Initiative.
- ▶ Creating innovative interagency teams, including "virtual" field participants -- a testing ground for then-new reengineering concepts.
- ▶ Systematically analyzing the state of relief-to-development linkages within USAID, and identifying a comprehensive set of recommendations for improving USAID's practice of this principle. As a result, linking relief and development has become one of the most important and most talked-about principles of improving USAID's practice of development assistance.
- ▶ Cataloguing all organizations working in food security in the region, as well as documenting all USAID projects and activities in food security in the region.
- ▶ Funding a number of innovative projects, proposals, and/or analytic studies, many managed by bilateral missions or REDSO/ESA, that illustrated ways of doing business differently and attacking the problems of food insecurity and crisis in the Greater Horn of Africa utilizing GHAI principles.

In 1996 we began the difficult task of defining exactly what the GHAI is, what it is not, what we plan to achieve and how we will measure it. This process will result in a strategy document to be reviewed and approved in Washington in the Spring of 1997. For this Results Review, we are able to present only qualitative discussion of progress. This document contains a tentative framework for performance monitoring, but the framework will not be finalized until the strategy is approved.

GHAI seeks to achieve results not only by expending its own relatively modest budget, but also by infusing GHAI principles into the spending of USAID bilateral programs and appropriate Department of State programs in the region. Not all of the results discussed below were achieved primarily by explicit GHAI resources, but all the activities were significantly affected by GHAI principles and the institutionalization of GHAI. Our taking credit for the achievements here is not meant to detract from the credit due to the other operating units with primary involvement.

1. Performance Analysis

The GHAI seeks results on several different levels -- people-level impact, capacity and process.

a. People-level

The ultimate beneficiaries of the GHAI are the people of the Greater Horn of Africa region, where we hope to see fewer crises and increased food security. By itself, GHAI as an operating unit cannot expect to measurably affect such large-scale problems. However, GHAI principles combined with the resources of bilateral missions can and are having people-level impact.

Good rains in Ethiopia combined with a good food policy environment (partly the result of USAID's influence) to produce the second bumper crop in as many years. The environment for regional trade is slowly opening up, again partly due to USAID's assistance, allowing part of the Ethiopian surplus to be sold in Kenya to help cover Kenya's food deficit.

USAID's emergency programs relied more on local organizations than has been usual in the past. In Rwanda, USAID is exploring ways to monetize about \$10 million in food aid, in accordance with an analysis of ways to use the money to serve the most vulnerable population while enhancing markets, creating employment, and avoiding dependence.

In Tanzania, a road rehabilitation project, originally motivated by the need to move emergency aid to refugees in the area, was designed to be sustainable and to have a development impact on the local population as well. Already it has resulted in increased food production and cross-border trade in some areas. As the system becomes institutionalized at district levels, even greater impact will be seen for national and regional food security.

b. Capacity

Africa's relationship to the international community has been characterized by dependence. Achieving GHAI's vision of sustainable (less precarious) development requires African institutions with increased capacity to forge solutions with less dependence on outside expertise and resources.

East Africa's capacity to address its most serious problems took a great leap forward this year with the revitalization of IGAD. The GHAI played a major role in supporting the African states who believed that IGAD should begin leading the donor community on regional development and conflict issues. IGAD arose out of a moribund organization called IGADD. The

revitalization process included:

- ▶ A strong recommitment by the member states, as evidenced by funding the organization with membership dues from their own treasuries, and the member states covering the membership dues of Somalia which was unable to pay.
- ▶ A change in process rules which allows more decisive action through majority vote rather than the old consensus rules.
- ▶ A new charter, which significantly includes conflict prevention as an aim of the organization for the first time. In fact the revitalized organization is already actively pursuing conflict resolution in Sudan and Somalia.
- ▶ A strategy for pursuing a regional vision of infrastructure and trade development, food security and environment, and crisis prevention and humanitarian assistance.
- ▶ A larger secretariat, headed by a widely-respected Executive Secretary, to provide technical leadership in the region on issues related to the IGAD charter. USAID, through its Horn of Africa Support Project (HASP), is positioned to play a major supportive role in strengthening the capacity of IGAD.

In Ethiopia, GHAI's efforts at strategic coordination have changed the way food needs assessments are done. Formerly, several international organizations worked independently. Today, the Government of Ethiopia chairs a coordinated working group of donors. Food needs are assessed more efficiently, and with greater African ownership.

A GHAI-funded project sought to answer four questions: What are the priority constraints to food security? Which of these constraints can the private sector potentially address? What are the constraints that have prevented the private sector from making this contribution? What can the private sector do now to enhance food security? In Kenya, a private sector "core group" was formed as a forum for the regional business community to press forward the opportunities identified in the project.

The capacity of the Government of Eritrea to implement its food security strategy is being enhanced by an ongoing Title III program. Under GHAI's influence, a unique Title III program was devised with unprecedented African leadership in that the resources were not made conditional, but were provided as a result of the policy changes Eritrea was already proposing.

Under Ugandan leadership, with USAID assistance, four countries in the region are dealing with a disastrous aquatic weed infestation on Lake Victoria. The countries involved are Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, which border Lake Victoria, and Rwanda, the riparian source of much of the problem. Already there is a modest people-level impact; the situation has been stabilized, as mechanical harvesters have succeeded in

dramatically reducing the accumulation at the critical Owen Falls Dam site and as 40 percent of the water hyacinth bound for Lake Victoria from Rwanda are intercepted on the Kagera river and removed before reaching the lake. However, to date most of the accomplishments are in capacity-building. USAID assistance is focused on helping the appropriate government ministries develop the tools and information they need to attack the problem. Donors and governments in the region are working together to reach a consensus on an environmentally-acceptable integrated control effort. The effort is expected to reduce the massive quantity of weed already in the lake by 50 percent during 1997, and then to a manageable level by 1998. When realized, the weed reduction will have an important impact on economic activity and food security, because the current infestation has severely disrupted economic activity in the region by adversely affecting fisheries, commercial navigation, power generation, and water works. The project also enhances the mutual security of the region because of the precedent it sets for joint problem solving of shared-resource issues, and the government-to-government links it creates at a technical level.

With the exception of IGAD, we made little progress this year in building capacity in explicit conflict prevention organizations. Our primary planned activity, a joint workshop with USG and African participants, fell through for a number of reasons. We have decided to pause and think carefully about appropriate partners before forging ahead.

c. Process

To date, many of the results achieved by GHAI have been in the process category -- changing the way we do business. Infusing all our activities and processes with the GHAI principles was a necessary first step. As a result we are beginning to do a better job of linking relief and development and promoting capacity-building in African institutions. Eventually these practices and institutions will achieve sustainable people-level results of decreased conflict and increased food security.

The GHAI released a report on USAID constraints to linking relief and development in May, 1996. In July, USAID's Administrator endorsed the report's 47 recommendations for changing the way we do business. Already many important changes have taken place. The Agency's relief and development professionals are working together more than ever before in formal and informal ways, including on Integrated Strategic Plans (ISPs) in the Greater Horn region (see below). However, much remains to be done, particularly in the area of integrating emergency and non-emergency resources. The GHAI Transitions Team, which is charged with monitoring the implementation of the

recommendations, is regularly assessing and reporting on results and planning next steps accordingly. The team has also funded a training course on linking relief with development, which has been given to USAID personnel and implementing partners.

From the inception of the GHAI, the USG recognized that it must work in concert with other donors, and promote GHAI principles among other donors as well as among African partners. The GHAI has had great success in this endeavor. The donor nations of the Joint IGAD-Partners Forum fully support African ownership and other GHAI principles. A recent speech in East Africa by the European Union Development Minister emphasized African ownership and linking relief and development. The USG is also beginning to explore a partnership with the UN High Commissioner on Refugees dovetailing their relief programs with our development programs. The Commissioner and USAID's Administrator have exchanged views on the subject and agreed on the need for further collaboration.

Strategic planning of development assistance resources is no longer divorced from food aid and emergency planning. USAID Missions in the Greater Horn are now submitting Integrated Strategic Plans (ISPs) as the basis for their management contracts. ISPs link relief and development by jointly planning emergency and development spending, and by recognizing the volatile nature of crisis, pre-crisis and post-crisis countries and planning contingencies for improving or worsening situations in advance. The ISP concept is new and has had a bumpy journey so far. It requires Bureaus to work together and give up some of their flexibility by making commitments to one another. With only one ISP complete (Somalia) and one ISP (Sudan) underway now, it is clear that ISP procedures must be flexible to accommodate different situations. With each experience we learn new ways of working together and new pitfalls.

In the majority of Greater Horn countries, new strategic plans have not been produced since the advent of the ISP concept. Nevertheless, GHAI principles have explicitly infused USAID strategies and programs in the region. Several missions have included GHAI addenda or appendices in their Country Strategic Plans. REDSO/ESA has added a Strategic Objective on "establishing a strong basis for implementation of the GHAI".

2. Expected Progress through FY1999 and Management Actions

As already mentioned, GHAI is now in the process of formulating its first inter-agency strategy. The strategy will define the precise objectives in pursuit of the food security and conflict prevention goals, the results sought, and the timeframe.

3. Performance Data Tables

Explicit performance indicators have not been determined for GHAI, so no performance data tables have been prepared for this review. A strategic framework, including expected results and preliminary indicators, will be prepared as part of the GHAI strategy submission. Here we would like to document some progress on performance monitoring issues that has already been made.

The underlying premise of GHAI is to improve the way the U.S. Government does business in addressing food insecurity and conflict in the region. GHAI by itself cannot expect to have a measurable impact on goal-level indicators, such as numbers of people with secure access to food or the amount of suffering and disruption due to conflict. However, strategic coordination and new ways of doing business across the U.S. Government, among other donors, and most importantly among African public and private institutions can bring about real progress at the goal level.

We have begun to document our development hypotheses about how increased food security and decreased suffering and disruption due to conflict can be achieved, and, for future use, to represent this information graphically with "results framework"-style diagrams. A next step will be to identify indicators of progress toward each result in the diagram. Ideally (i.e., given infinite performance monitoring resources) for each result we would identify three kinds of indicators: impact (is the result being achieved?), capacity (do organizations in the region have the ability to bring the result about?) and process (are the actors who pursue the result implementing GHAI principles?). In reality we will have to identify a strategic subset of the ideal set of indicators for monitoring.

A more narrowly defined results framework that is appropriate for monitoring the progress of the GHAI operating unit cannot be developed until the strategy is more firmly determined.

III. STATUS OF THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT

GHAI has been operating without a formal USAID management contract. Such a contract may be formalized during the Spring of 1997 strategy review. However, there are several issues that suggest the GHAI management contract, if there is one, should not be cut from the same mold as most USAID management contracts. First, GHAI is a presidential inter-agency initiative. While the Initiative must certainly be held accountable for its actions and results, using USAID's bureaucratic methods as the sole basis for

that accountability raises issues. Second, the budget specifically allocated for GHAI is relatively modest and facilitative. Ways must be found of measuring not only the direct effects of GHAI spending but also the effectiveness of this money in transforming other USG spending in the region.

IV. RESOURCE REQUEST

A complete FY 1999 resource request for GHAI cannot be formulated until after the strategy is approved in the Spring of 1997. However, some elements can be outlined.

1. Financial Plan

The final funding tranche for the Horn of Africa Support Project (HASP) will be due at a level of \$5 million. GHAI may also request \$4-5 million for the strategic objectives to fund regional organizations and training and resources on GHAI issues, none of which would be funded by bilateral missions. Program-funded personnel to assist in the implementation of GHAI may also be requested.

2. Prioritization of Objectives

The original concept of GHAI emphasized how intertwined are the goals of food security and conflict prevention. Indeed it is difficult to imagine the Greater Horn achieving widespread food security if the current level of conflict is not curtailed; nor to imagine a region at peace if the current level of food security is not raised. Even if its direct budget were drastically cut, as long as the GHAI exists as a set of principles, it will continue to pursue both goals. In fact, much of the value-added of GHAI may lie precisely in USAID assuming a leadership role to continue creating linkages between these two goals.

3. Linkage of Field Support, Non-emergency Title II and III

Some centrally-funded programs and resources, including non-emergency Food for Peace programs, may be very important to certain bilateral missions in pursuing GHAI principles, especially linking relief with development. However, GHAI as an operating unit does not require FFP resources.

4. Workforce and OE

OE and staffing directly allocated to GHAI will remain minimal. However, it must also be acknowledged that a substantial amount of OE and staffing goes into implementing and managing GHAI from the resources of bilateral missions, REDSO/ESA and several AID/W offices.

5. Environmental Compliance

While GHAI recognizes the pivotal linkages of environment to food security and conflict prevention, given the level at which the Initiative works, issues requiring IEEs or EAs seldom arise.