

**RESULTS REVIEW  
&  
RESOURCE REQUEST**

**USAID/NIGER**

**1997**

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## **Part I: Overview and Factors Affecting Program Performance**

### **A. Overview**

During the course of 1996, the environment in which USAID operates in Niger changed suddenly and dramatically.

On January 27, 1996, a military *coup d'etat* overthrew the elected government, prompting the U.S. and most other donors to immediately suspend development assistance. The coup triggered implementation of Section 508 of the 1996 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act (FAAA) and predecessor statutes. Preparations were begun for the orderly wind-up of development assistance activities.

The Wind-up Plan was submitted to USAID/W in April 1996. It recommended the termination of all activities, with the exception of those which were permissible under “notwithstanding legislation”. The permitted activities constituted approximately half of the program formerly approved in the Strategic Plan.

On June 21, 1996, the Administrator approved the Wind-up Plan and FY96 funding of programs involving: (a) child survival and HIV/AIDS; (b) U.S. and Nigerien NGO efforts in strengthening democratic governance and civil society; (c) Peace Corps child survival, biodiversity and tropical forestry; (d) regional activities; and (e) completion of participant training.

However, massive fraud in the July presidential elections prompted a new USAID/W review of Agency commitments to Niger and a decision to terminate all bilateral programs to Niger. The FY96 program was reduced to less than \$4.6 million. On September 23, 1996, the Mission was instructed to submit a plan to close down the Niger program and close the USAID Mission (State 198217).

The Mission submitted its Programmatic Closeout Plan in October 1996. As of the R4 submission date, (March 14, 1997), The Administrator's approval of the program in Niger is still pending.

### **B. Factors Affecting Program Performance**

The USAID/Niger program was significantly affected by the suspension of all development assistance for five months, followed by the failed election and the unequivocal determination that all bilateral support for the Government of Niger was to be terminated. During the course of the year many ongoing activities were terminated, many approved activities were not started, and most others were implemented intermittently. The continuing uncertainty and intermittent implementation were key constraints in achieving stated objective during the period. A number of data collection activities were cancelled, reducing USAID/Niger's ability to evaluate progress and report results. Nonetheless, the analysis will demonstrate that none the less considerable results were achieved.

The fact that on June 21, the Administrator did not approve the continuation of PVO activities in support of natural resources and rural financial services further constrained the Mission's ability to achieve results in these sectors since these programs were then subject to automatic termination eight months after the coup or on September 27. Ultimately, the CARE Maradi Microenterprise activity and the Niger Credit Union Development activity were extended to June 30, 1997, to enable them to obtain other donor support. USAID support for other PVO activities and all bilateral support to the Government of Niger was terminated on December 31, 1996.

During the past year, USDH staff was reduced from eleven to five and USPSC staff from four to one. FSN staff was reduced from 112 to 62, with most of those working in the support area as the Mission goes through the laborious process of closing. The numbers continues to decline as employees find alternative employment.

Following decisions made during the last R4 review, the Mission revised the Strategic Plan to include the following objectives, which are the basis for this report. The Mission has subsequently developed a new set of objectives that will be discussed under Part II section C, "Transition Issues".

Strategic Objective 1: Increased use of Selected Family Planning and Maternal Child Health, and Disaster Mitigation Practices and HIV/AIDS control practices.

Special Objective 1: Restoration of Democratic Government and Stronger Civil Society.

Special Objective 2: Increased Use of Natural Resources Management with NGO's.

Note: As the Niger program has been modified and reduced, there have been a number of changes in the SOs. These are the SOs in the NMS. Once the program is approved, the SOs may again be changed.

## Part II: Progress Toward Objectives

### A. Performance Analysis

#### 1. Strategic Objective 1: Increase use of maternal/child health services and child survival, disaster mitigation and HIV/AIDS control practices.

**Introduction:** This Strategic Objective Agreement was designed to address the specific constraints to Niger's development of an exploding population and low health status of women and children. Activities target the health needs of the Nigerien family, specifically the family planning and maternal and child health (FP/MCH) needs of women and children. SO1 was to have been realized by 2002 with its results contributing to Niger having a healthier population and, eventually, an economically sustainable rate of population growth. This strategy was to be implemented in four specific sectors:

- the public health sector at the district, departmental and national health levels;
- the private sector—private practitioners, NGOs and social marketing providers;
- the health policy and financial support sector; and
- the national food security sector.

The January 27, 1996 coup occurred during a period of programmatic transition for SO1. Two major projects were ending, yet most new activities had not begun. The Mission had initiated but not completed the procurement of a prime contractor. Other contractors funded under Global Bureau agreements had carried out initial planning visits, and their workplans were under consideration by USAID and the Government of Niger, but had not yet been finally approved.

#### **Result 1.1: Increased and improved maternal/child health, child survival and HIV/AIDS control services in the public sector**

Because of the constraints discussed above, most of the 1996 performance indicators show little or no change from baseline. Some indicators, such as the number of women receiving prenatal care, became moot as assistance to health centers to provide such services never materialized. Other indicators, initially planned to be measured on a nationwide scale, had to be reduced to those areas serviced by PVOs. Nonetheless, some PVOs did achieve significant results working in cooperation with local level health service providers.

**Helen Keller, International** has been working to improve the micronutrient nutritional status of children, with a particular focus on Vitamin A deficiency. Vitamin A capsule distribution rose from a baseline of 7.5% of children under age 6 to 25.4% of children nationwide as a result of their work promoting such distribution. In some targeted groups, coverage as high as 71.4% was reached. This shows a remarkable level of accomplishment in an area where achievements are rare. The case fatality rate for measles was cut by more than half from 2.2% in 1990-94 to 0.9% in 1995 and 1996, due in part to their efforts. Vitamin A deficiency, a disease not previously addressed by any government programs, has become an integral part of curative and preventive practice nationwide.

**CARE, International** works in three districts near the eastern city of Zinder. In the districts they service, measles immunization rates in children aged 12 to 23 months soared from 20% in 1995 to 60% in 1996, far surpassing the USAID goal of 42%. While not as striking, the number of women receiving prenatal tetanus immunization also rose, with one district surpassing expectations going from 26% to 38% of pregnant women receiving such immunizations in a single year.

CARE also started immunization in the North, where armed insurrection has prevented delivery of such services this decade. In the first seven weeks of their program, more than 35,000 immunizations were given, and nearly eight thousand children received Vitamin A capsules. This activity is being done in a region so hostile that neither the Mission nor CARE dared to set targets.

The **Quality Assurance** and **BASICS** project teams spent much of the year consolidating their work and disseminating the results that they had achieved in improving management of district level health care, and clinical management of childhood illnesses, respectively. QA was able to establish quality assurance teams in all health facilities in the Tahoua department, which will help provide significant improvements in care even at the rural dispensary level. Of these sixty facilities, some three quarters are already actively engaged in problem solving. Linking into other USAID objectives, 12 teams chose problems in family planning acceptance or continuation as their focal problem, and another 13 chose nutritional rehabilitation. The activity of the teams at the local level has led to increasing demands for autonomy both in terms of decision-making and in terms of demands for resources. This is one of the places that health programs feed into democratization, where people at the local level are truly empowered to begin governing themselves rather than awaiting largesse from the central government.

For both of these Global Bureau projects, the Niger programs are further advanced than similar programs elsewhere in Africa. Several dissemination conferences were held within Niger, and representatives of these two programs made presentations in other parts of the world, ensuring that lessons learned in Niger would be made available to others. Presentations were made in Nairobi, Brazzaville, Rabat, Ouagadougou, and at the American Public Health Association annual meeting in New York.

The **Niger Health Sector Support** and the **Family Health and Demography** projects, which have been the most important USAID health projects in Niger for the last decade, came to a close this year. All policy reforms were accomplished, and are in the process of being fully implemented throughout the country. Some of them, such as rural cost recovery, have the potential to revolutionize the way health care is provided in Niger, and to ensure that necessary drugs and services are available when needed. Others, like the legalization of contraceptives in 1988, are crucial to Niger's people being able to control their lives. Late in the year, the final set of computerized management programs was installed in the Ministry of Health, bringing a greater degree of control over finances, personnel and inventories.

### **Result 1.2: An expanded and improved private sector, including NGOs, providing maternal/child health, child survival and HIV/AIDS related services**

Activities to achieve this result centered around the Condom Social Marketing program, which suffered from the suspension of assistance. During 1995, more than 1,125,000 condoms were distributed, a remarkable accomplishment for the second year of a social marketing program. Unfortunately, due to program suspension, only 400,000 condoms were distributed during 1996. Since this program is the only one that makes condoms widely available for the prevention of HIV/AIDS, the reductions place the Nigerien people at serious risk of infection. In 1997, CARE will take over this program and restore it to its previous level of achievement.

### **Result 1.3: Improved environment for health, including policy reform**

Most aspects of policy dialogue with the GON were eliminated. However, the National Health Information System continued to provide quality information to decision makers. Its most important achievement came during the epidemic season of January to June, when it provided Ministry of Health personnel with the data needed to track meningitis, measles, and cholera epidemics, and to ensure that the yellow fever epidemic in neighboring Benin did not cross the border and require intervention. Because program managers had access to good information and timely interventions, neither cholera nor yellow fever materialized into a major threat, and specific areas with meningitis and measles could be identified and targeted for emergency vaccination programs.

### **Result 1.4: National capacity to predict and respond to food security and health related disasters**

Food insecurity and epidemics are major impediments to development in Niger. Each event sets the population back and prevents it from making progress towards sustainable development. Mitigation activities seek to reduce the severity of developing emergencies by timely and targeted interventions while coping mechanisms are still effective and/or recovery is still possible. A reliable early warning system and adequate preparedness is essential to effective mitigation. The **Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Project** (DPM) has been one of the activities supporting the improved national capacity to recognize, prepare for, and respond effectively to developing disasters. Technical assistance worked with the GON to develop the *System d'Alert Precoce et Gestion d'Catastrophe*<sup>1</sup> (SAP/GC).

Considerable progress was made towards institutionalization of the national system for early warning and response. The National Disaster Response and Management Plan was developed and accepted by the Niger government. Forty-nine of the sixty regional and sub-regional early warning and response committees were trained in mitigation monitoring and evaluation and rapid food security assessment. The Mission estimates that more than 50% of the nationwide SAP/GC system is in place. However, it is clear that withdrawal of much of the support by the USG and

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Early Warning/Disaster Management System

other donors will place the national early warning system and response capacity at risk. It could again become the political tool it was before USAID intervened.

One measure of the success of mitigation is the volume of food transferred to vulnerable populations through food for work activities. In 1996, USAID Non-Project Assistance program provided resources to the emergency fund, which purchased more than 4,000 metric tons of cereals locally. This represented 4.6% of the national requirement. The disaster response system delivered more than 49,000 metric tons through food for work and general distribution, which represented another 52% of the national requirement. The USAID food for work supported 409 discreet projects in 67 locations. These activities will improve food security in the future through land recovery, fire break construction, and anti-erosion activities.

The new system is utilized by other donors, which helps ensure its sustainability. Despite general donor retreat from support to the GON, the SAP/GC system has been utilized by the French and Italian Governments, the FAO and the Red Cross and has secured technical assistance from the European Union to develop a rapid rural food security assessment capacity.

The SAP/GC is increasingly prepared to respond to small scale disasters like fires and floods. Relief supplies were procured and delivered to at least 36 disaster sites and housing reconstruction supported in several others. The Mission sees this increased response as a direct result of exposure on SAP/GC management to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the U.S.

During 1996, the SAP/GC, through technical assistance provided by the project, developed and implemented 509 discreet mitigation activities. These activities were designed to move resources immediately to vulnerable groups and to address the root cause of food insecurity, environmental degradation and poor productivity.

An essential component of food security is support to protect crops. As a follow-on to the Africa Emergency Locust and Grasshopper Emergency Project (AELGA), DPM resources focussed on the key operational and logistical elements needed for the Directorate of Crop Protection in their efforts to control pests. As a result of the coup, the originally programmed support was cut by 80%. Nonetheless, these resources still resulted in the DCP being able to protect more than over 100,000 hectares of crop land.

Effective December 1996, all of the activities leading to the achievement of Result 1.4 were terminated since they constituted direct support to the GON.

## **2. Special Objective No. 1: Restoration of democratic governance and stronger civil society**

USAID has always emphasized supporting Niger's fledgling democracy as one of its main policy objectives in Niger. Since the establishment of a democratically elected government in 1993 the Mission has focussed a great deal of attention on this issue. In the Mission strategic plan of 1996, it was considered to be an issue that cut across all three SOs and was an integral part of every

strategic objective. Prior to the coup, most activities were designed to strengthen basic democratic institutions and to inform people of their rights and responsibilities as citizens in all areas of development, and encourage their participation, individually and in groups, in the democratic process. Following the coup, the Mission refocused its activities on a special objective supporting the return to democracy.

At the time the Wind-up Plan was written, the Mission expected that Niger would return to democratically elected government following the July presidential elections, and designed the Results Framework to support a newly elected government. When the elections were stolen, less than ten days after the Wind-up Plan was signed, USAID had to revise its efforts to address the new reality. The global results are clear: democratic government has not returned to Niger, and civil society is weaker than a year ago. Nonetheless, USAID has been one of the most significant players in this political arena.

The first and most important thing that USAID did to show its strong disapproval of the coup, was to suspend assistance. The U.S. Government's immediate and ringing denunciations of (1) the coup, (2) the stolen elections, and (3) human rights violations, coupled with a suspension of all direct assistance sent a hard message to the military leaders in Niger and throughout Africa. The Mission is aware of a number of African countries on the verge of military overthrows of elected governments, that were swayed by the immediate American response. In addition to suspension of assistance, the U.S. Government has been consistent in international fora, condemning the leaders of the coup, and reducing support to the regime. This has kept pressure on the GON, resulting in presidential elections being scheduled for less than six months after the coup.

In the run-up to these elections, USAID was in the forefront of donors helping ensure that these would be free and fair. Working through the National Democratic Institute (NDI), USAID trained 800 of 1200 election observers. These were the people who ultimately provided evidence that the elections were stolen, enabling the world to know, and other nations to respond to what happened in Niger.

Throughout the process, USAID has been the donor that most consistently supported a return to democracy and keeping pressure on the government to reform. Without USAID support, the independent democracy network probably would have collapsed. USAID also supported establishment of NGO watchdogs to observe what is going on, and to ensure that efforts to subvert the democratic process would not be swept under the rug.

In addition to activities that were directed at bringing about a change in government, each of the other strategic objectives sought to improve democracy and governance. These are discussed in more detail under SO1 and SPO2. Under SO1, citizens formed health committees to learn ways of better managing the health care that they are receiving from public sector health facilities, and how they have responsibilities in terms of co-payments for health care. Under SPO2, community organizations were founded, both for better natural resource management and to ensure availability of credit. These are governed on democratic principles, teaching participatory democracy at a very grass roots level.

## **Specific Results:**

### **Result SPO 1.1: Increased public understanding of and participation in political and legal processes**

In addition to the general impact in D/G, as listed above, some specific activities contributed to USAID overall objectives:

The Mission initiated five civic education projects with NDI using 116(e) funding. These projects helped sensitize Nigeriens about (1) their rights and responsibilities; (2) the fundamentals of a democratic society; (3) the constitution, electoral code, political party charter and other legal and regulatory texts (rural code, commercial code, civil code, family code, etc); (4) land tenure issues; (5) government structure, functioning and accountability; (6) multi-party competition, election and voter's rights and responsibilities; (7) women's issues and women's role in promoting democracy; (8) relationships between democracy and development issues; etc.

The Legal Clinics and the Legal Assistance Center for Women projects targeted a broad audience of rural and semi-urban men and women in Madarounfa, Magaria, Konni, Agadez and Niamey; showed them how to handle legal disputes; and improved their awareness of rights and responsibilities and their knowledge of laws, regulations and democracy principles. The Judiciary Project promoted legal and political rights and influenced the day-to-day work of judges, magistrates, lawyers, state investigators, human rights activists and other legal experts.

The Democracy and School Curriculum project funded the elaboration of 11,000 democracy manuals for the primary and secondary schools of Niger. The manuals are now the nationwide reference books for the introduction and teaching of democracy within the Nigerien school system.

### **Result SPO 1.2: Increased capacity of local civil society groups to play an active role in political and legal processes**

From 1992 to 1996, Mission funding helped ten democracy and human rights associations to emerge, including five that now play a nationwide role. These democracy and human rights associations are now the strongest and best organized defenders of human rights in Niger and a political force of significant importance.

The NDI Niger Civic Organizing and Legislative Outreach project was developed to strengthen democratic institutions by working with the National Assembly to build relationships between the parliamentarians and their constituents. Local democracy and human rights associations were to play an advocacy role by assisting constituents to make their elected representatives more responsive to their needs and concerns. The project had only conducted the orientation seminar for newly elected legislators when the *coup d'etat* occurred in January 1996.

### **3. Special Objective No. 2: Increased use of Natural Resource Management with NGOs.**

**Introduction:** SPO2 has two major components, one supporting conservation of the natural environment, and the second improving producer's access to financial markets. This special objective combined assistance to prior programs in natural resource management and microenterprise development. Following the failed election, the Agency decided to terminate all activities under this special objective by June 30, 1997. Unfortunately, overall results could not be measured because the household survey was cancelled.

The Mission's natural resources management (NRM) portfolio was designed to help rural producers reverse rapid environmental degradation and increase productivity by practicing more sustainable natural resource management. The program addresses pressures from an expanding population. The adoption of improved management practices directly contributes to a reduction in the vulnerability of rain-fed crops and to the diversification and intensification of rural production systems.

The Mission has long recognized the importance of supporting decentralized financial services and community empowerment as a means to achieving good natural resource management. Project personnel therefore established a network of rural credit unions and other financial institutions in Niger to ensure that rural producers have access to financial resources.

**Result SPO 2.1: Niger's rural producers, men and women, gain greater control over their productive environment.**

**Result SPO 2.2: Increased producer access to technical information in selected areas through community based activities.**

**Result SPO 2.4: Capacity of the NGO/CBO community to promote and sustain NRM activities is improved.**

Because they are interrelated, these three results will be discussed together. Indicators include an increase in the number of community organizations managing natural resources (Results 1 and 4), as well as an increased citizen awareness of laws regulating the use and management of natural resources.

USAID has engaged in policy dialogue, using NPA as an incentive, to achieve a more permissive policy environment. During 1995, the GON met the conditionalities for Tranche II A. In 1996, most conditionalities for Tranche II B were met, though the disbursement was canceled as a result of the Section 508 sanctions.

Specific policy changes include shifting the function of forestry agents from policing and enforcement to supporting development activities. Dialogue between NGOs, donors and the GON have started addressing concerns in natural resource management. Reform of laws governing cooperatives has begun.

While many donors have NRM projects, only USAID targeted the national level NRM planning and institutional development. As a result of this support to policy, programming, and monitoring, the GON is better able to promote coordination of donor efforts and develop new activities. USAID has worked to ensure that some of this policy and planning work will continue in the recently launched \$40 million World Bank project.

Communities have directly benefitted from NRM interventions: trees planted as windbreaks and along field boundaries have contributed to a 20% increase in crop yields in the Majjia valley; rock bunds, infiltration ditches, and other soil and water conservation practices have increased yields by over 50% in many places; demi-lunes and zai holes combined with mulching and increased manure fertilization are restoring degraded lands and renewing soil fertility. Using demi-lunes, farmers in the departments of Tillaberi and Tahoua have increased yields from 300 to over 800 kg. of millet/hectare. Using zai holes, farmers have produced harvests of 200-600 kg/hectare from land that had been unproductive. In Badaguicheri, degraded sites have been restored and production increased from less than 200 kg/ha to 1500 kg/ha.

**Result SPO 2.3: Increased resources available for communities and individuals to invest in NRM practices in project areas.**

Rural producers require timely access to agricultural inputs to be able to plant and harvest their crops. Traditionally, the only access to small loans has been through money-lenders since banks do not function in rural areas. To address this problem, USAID and other donors have invested in the establishment of credit unions.

There have been remarkable successes in this sector. From a base of zero a few years ago, the number of financial institutions making small loans has increased from 213 in 1995 to 289 in 1996, exceeding expectations. Amounts saved in credit unions and lending capacity has increased dramatically. Most indicators for decentralized financial service (DFS) institutions have improved. However, credit unions receiving support through the USAID program with WOCCU did not reach the targeted number of customers in 1996 because of a climate of uncertainty resulting from USAID's suspension and impending closure. Several credit unions have lost members and USAID is anticipating that between 10 and 15 of the 65 existing unions will close.

The credit programs of CARE and CLUSA also suffered from the suspension. While overall savings declined slightly, per capita savings by women increased 3%.

At this point, all three of these programs are expected to continue operations with other donor support. At this point only microenterprise or rural production programs which have received support from USAID have the potential to become self-sustaining.

**B. Expected Progress Through FY 1999 and Management Actions**

The major management action to be undertaken in FY97 is the reduction of Mission size from 5 USDH and 55 FSNs to a residual management unit, currently expected to number one USDH or USPSC and five FSNs. All other Mission functions will be transferred to REDSO or terminated.

**1. SO1:** As a result of the *coup d'etat* and the subsequent failed elections (see Part I above) the Mission has prepared a Programmatic Closeout Plan which includes the strategic objective essentially unmodified in statement but substantially reduced in scope. At the time this part of the R4 was prepared, final approval of the plan had not been given, so it is impossible to predict what activities will be implemented and what results will ultimately be achieved. Within this strategic objective, the Mission has proposed the following activities:

1. Continuation of CARE and Helen Keller, International Bureau of Humanitarian Resources PVO grants.
2. Continuation of CARE/North immunization program among the Tuareg.
3. Continuation of the existing Social Marketing program under CARE's auspices.
4. Continuation of the Quality Assurance and BASICS centrally contracted research projects.
5. Restart of the AFRICARE mitigation activity in the North
6. Awarding a new Disaster Prevention and Mitigation grant to be administered by US PVOs already established in Niger that have experience working with USAID projects.

As soon as approval is granted, the Mission will work with NGO/PVO partners to: (1) develop appropriate goals and objectives for the closeout period, (2) establish written MOUs to facilitate their functioning in a non-presence country, and (3) establish monitoring plans with REDSO/WCA.

**2. SPO1:** Even though USAID alone cannot return democracy to Niger, it will continue its efforts aimed at the "restoration of democratic government and a stronger civil society" in Niger. The Mission will establish systems to (1) monitor progress and measure performance for the return to democratic institutions; (2) assess the effectiveness of civic education programs; and (3) assess the growth of civil society and the effectiveness of the role the civil society is playing in political and legal processes.

The democracy and human rights program will continue to (1) instill the basics of democracy and human rights at the grassroots level; (2) promote rule of law; (3) increase the participation of citizens in the political and legal processes; and (4) strengthen the institutional capacity of local democracy and human rights associations. Due to a lack of financial, organizational and human resources and the constraints of the political and legal environment, it will probably take several

years for these associations to play an effective advocacy and political role. More resources will be directed to promote the involvement of Nigerien women and women's groups in politics.

**3. SPO2:** USAID direct involvement in these activities will be terminated in June, 1997. Funding will be provided to the Peace Corps for an additional two years, which will enable them to reach an additional 550 families during the next two years. ASDG II's Grants Management Unit will also continue as an autonomous institution, and will disburse just under \$2 million in counterpart funds to NGOs and Community Based Organizations. It will also continue to provide intensive capacity building support to the NGO sector.

### **C. Transition Issues**

As is clear from the narratives above, the entire year has been consumed with transition issues. The Mission revised its strategic plan twice during the year, and the latest version is expected to be approved between the submission of this report and its review. The closeout objectives that have been proposed are designed to address U.S. strategic interests in Niger, as expressed by the Department of State:

1. Maintenance of regional peace and stability by supporting the April 1995 GON-Tuareg Peace Accord.
2. Creation of economic and social conditions which encourage democracy and discourage Islamic extremism.
3. Mitigation of the effects of disease and drought, which also substantially impact neighboring countries.

To address these strategic interests, the Mission has proposed the following Results Framework to be implemented whether USAID/Niger ultimately closes out or remains as a limited presence Mission:

Objective 1: Strengthened civil society supporting a return to democratic governance.

Result 1.1: Risk of breakdown of Tuareg Peace Accord is lessened.

Result 1.2: The political action capacity of communities and PVOs is strengthened.

Result 1.3: Women's political participation is strengthened.

Objective 2: Increased use of maternal/child health services and child survival, disaster mitigation and HIV/AIDS control practices.

Result 2.1: Child immunization services available in the North, making health services available to the Tuareg population.

Result 2.2: Food shortages which increase child mortality are mitigated, including those affecting the Tuareg population in the North.

Result 2.3: PVO child survival activities are strengthened.

Result 2.4: The child survival research program is completed and results made available to other African countries.

Result 2.5: Epidemics are detected, tracked and managed more effectively.

When this plan is approved, the Mission will meet with NGO/PVO partners and determine how to measure the results. Because of the uncertain political situation and the relative lack of resources, the Mission has specifically chosen results that will be measured in a qualitative rather than quantitative manner.

Detailed plans, and the means of achieving their goals are not presented here, since they are set forth in the Programmatic Closeout Plan, the 508 Action Memorandum to the Administrator, the action memorandum to the Closeout Coordinator, and the Operational Closeout Plan.

## D. Performance Data Tables

### Strategic Objective 1: Increased use of selected family planning and maternal child health and disaster mitigation and HIV/AIDS control practices

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> SO1: Increased use of Selected Family Planning and Maternal Child Health and Disaster Mitigation Practices and AIDS Control			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 06/27/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> USAID/Niger			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b>			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> % of children age 12-23 months who received measles immunization before 12 months of age			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> % of children meeting above criteria living in CARE catchment areas <hr/> <b>SOURCE:</b> CARE Service Statistics <hr/> <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> <hr/> <b>COMMENTS:</b> From CARE service Statistics in three districts of Zinder department	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1993		11%
	1994		4%
	1995		20%
	1996	42%	60%
	1997	65%	
	1998	70%	
1999	75%		

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> SO1: Increased use of Selected Family Planning and Maternal Child Health and Disaster Mitigation Practices and AIDS Control			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 06/27/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> USAID/Niger			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> Increased and improved child survival and HIV/AIDS control services in the public sector			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> % of pregnant women receiving two doses of tetanus toxoid			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> % of Pregnant women living in CARE catchment areas <hr/> <b>SOURCE:</b> CARE Service Statistics <hr/> <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> <hr/> <b>COMMENTS:</b> Data from three CARE districts in the Zinder Department	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1993		18%
	1994		20%
	1995		25%
	1996	30%	
	1997	75%	
	1998	80%	

**OBJECTIVE:** SO1: Increased use of Selected Family Planning and Maternal Child Health and Disaster Mitigation Practices and AIDS Control

**APPROVED:** 06/27/1996 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** USAID/Niger

**RESULT NAME:** National capacity to predict and respond to food security and health related disasters

**INDICATOR:** % of estimated food aid requirement met by emergency distributions and mitigation activities within vulnerable areas

**UNIT OF MEASURE:** Quantity of cereal distributed to vulnerable populations compared to the total estimated cereal deficit

**SOURCE:**  
SAP/GC, OPVN, Maradi Conference summary report, TA quarterly reports

**INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:** The indicator measures the effectiveness of the mitigation component both in terms of immediate response capacity and as a measure of the institutionalization of the SAP/GC system.

**COMMENTS:** The first indicator of 4.6% represents USAID resources and the second of 52% reflects total including other donor support and GON "borrowing" from the food security stock

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
1995	10%	10%
1996	20%	4.6% 52%
1997		

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> SO1: Increased use of Selected Family Planning and Maternal Child Health and Disaster Mitigation Practices and AIDS Control			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 06/27/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> USAID/Niger			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> National capacity to predict and respond to food security and health related disasters			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> % A verifiable and reliable legally constituted nationwide SAP/GC system in place			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Number of fully trained operational SAP committees and sub-committees at the regional and sub-regional levels compared to the total target. <hr/> <b>SOURCE:</b> SAP/GC, TA Quarterly reports S))))))))) <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> This indicator measures the extent to which a fully functioning SAP/GC early warning and disaster response system is in place. <hr/> <b>COMMENTS:</b> There is both an objective and subjective component to this indicator. The objective component is the measure of SAP/GC Units trained and that fact that draft legislation institutionalizing the SAP/GC system has been prepared. The subjective component is the Mission assessment as to how far the SAP/GC has evolved to sustainably carry out early warning and mitigation functions in a transparent and efficient manner.	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1995		40%
	1996	50%	50%
	1997		
	1998		

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> SO1: Increased use of Selected Family Planning and Maternal Child Health and Disaster Mitigation Practices and AIDS Control			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 06/27/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> USAID/Niger			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> National capacity to predict and respond to food security and health related disasters			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> # of times and to what degree the SAP/Emergency fund or SAP/GC mechanism is used by other donors.			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Number of other donor interventions with or in support of the SAP/GC. <hr/> <b>SOURCE:</b> SAP, TA Quarterly reports <hr/> <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> This indicator measures the degree to which the USAID supported and funded SAP/GC system is sustainable after USAID technical assistance is concluded. It is a measure of the credibility of the system with other donors. <hr/> <b>COMMENTS:</b>	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1995		2
	1996	6	5

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> SO1: Increased use of Selected Family Planning and Maternal Child Health and Disaster Mitigation Practices and AIDS Control			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 06/27/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> USAID/Niger			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> National capacity to predict and respond to food security and health related disasters			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> # of disaster type events followed by emergency response			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Number of emergency interventions. <b>SOURCE:</b> SAP/GC reports, TA Quarterly reporting <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> This indicator measures the capacity of SAP/GC to respond to short term emergencies such as fires and floods which are so common and destructive. It is a measure of the institutional capacity of the evolving system. <b>COMMENTS:</b> The 32 responses indicate that while institutional capacity has evolved the disaster response system is limited by available resources.	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1995		13
	1996	15	32

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> SO1: Increased use of Selected Family Planning and Maternal Child Health and Disaster Mitigation Practices and AIDS Control			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 06/27/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> USAID/Niger			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> National capacity to predict and respond to food security and health related disasters			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> # of mitigation activities coordinated by SAP/GC			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Mitigation projects managed by SAP committees at regional and sub-regional levels <b>SOURCE:</b> SAP, RONCO quarterly reports, SAP conference report <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> This indicator measure both institutional capacity and resource availability, both constraints. <b>COMMENTS:</b>	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1995		388
	1996	600	509

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> SO1: Increased use of Selected Family Planning and Maternal Child Health and Disaster Mitigation Practices and AIDS Control			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 06/27/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> USAID/Niger			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> National capacity to predict and respond to food security and health related disasters			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> % of pest-threatened hectares protected to control agricultural pests			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Number of hectares sprayed compared to the number of hectares infested <b>SOURCE:</b> Directorate of Crop Protection (DCP) <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> This indicator measures the ability of the DCP to conduct early warning (pest surveillance and egg pod survey), and control. While the level of infestation varies each year the capacity of the DCP should over time evolve to be able to meet even the worst situation or 100% coverage. <b>COMMENTS:</b>	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1995		43%
	1996	50%	27%

**Special Objective 1: Restoration of democratic government and stronger civil society.**

Because of the special factors mentioned in the text, there are no data to be presented in tabular fashion.

**Special Objective 2: Increased use of natural resource management with NGOs**

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> SPO 2: Increased use of natural resource management with NGOs.			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 06/27/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> Niger/USAID			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> Niger's rural producers, men and women, gain greater control over their productive environment.			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> # of community based NRM organizations receiving USAID support			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Community based NRM organizations <b>SOURCE:</b> Small grants program database <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> Number of NGOs/CBOs receiving grants from the ASDG II Funds for grassroots NRM activities <b>COMMENTS:</b> No target given as this SPO is being cancelled	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1995		48
	1996	60	63
	1997		

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> SPO 2: Increased use of natural resource management with NGOs.			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 06/27/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> Niger/USAID			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> Niger's rural producers, men and women, gain greater control over their productive environment.			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> Cumulative # of community forest management schemes			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> # of local forest management schemes <b>SOURCE:</b> <i>Cellule Gestion Ressources Naturelles</i> , Records Review, Annual; Ministry of Environment and Hydraulics, Environment Division (including National AGRHYMET Center); Energy II Project; Records review, Annual; <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> development of forest management schemes by local populations in order to increase their control over their forestry resources <b>COMMENTS:</b> No target given as this SPO is being cancelled	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1993	14	14
	1995		28
	1996	35	42
	1997		

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> SPO 2: Increased use of natural resource management with NGOs.			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 06/27/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> Niger/USAID			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> Niger's rural producers, men and women, gain greater control over their productive environment.			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> numbers of hectares under community-managed natural forest management			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> # number of forest hectares managed by community based organizations <b>SOURCE:</b> <i>Cellule Gestion Ressources Naturelles</i> , Records Review, Annual; Ministry of Environment and Hydraulics, Environment Division (including National AGRHYMET Center); Energy II Project; Records review, Annual; <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> <b>COMMENTS:</b> No target given as this SPO is being cancelled	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1984 (correct date)	0	0
	1995	113,250	352,000
	1996	400,000	430,000

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> SPO 2: Increased use of natural resource management with NGOs.			
APPROVED: 06/27/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> Niger/USAID			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> Niger's rural producers, men and women, gain greater control over their productive environment.			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> # of land use plans in communities supported by USAID activities			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> number of local land use plans <hr/> <b>SOURCE:</b> <i>Cellule Gestion des Ressources Naturelles</i> <hr/> <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> the development of local land use plans aims to strengthen community based NRM planning and institutional development and to pursue the crucial issue of community empowerment through legal recognition <hr/> <b>COMMENTS:</b> No target given as this SPO is being cancelled	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1995		48
	1996		100

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> SPO 2: Increased use of natural resource management with NGOs.			
APPROVED: 06/27/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> Niger/USAID			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> Increased resources available for communities and individuals to invest in NRM practices in project areas. [sub-result A: more decentralized, viable, and transparent financial institutions]			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> Total # of institutions providing small loans			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> # of Institutions <hr/> <b>SOURCE:</b> World Council (WOCCU), Cooperative League of the USA (CLUSA), and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) <hr/> <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> This is the total # of USAID supported institutions operating with WOCCU (Credit Unions), CLUSA (cooperatives) and CARE (agencies) <hr/> <b>COMMENTS:</b> No target given as this SPO is being cancelled	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1985	0	0
	1995		213
	1996	244	289

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> SPO 2: Increased use of natural resource management with NGOs.			
<b>APPROVED:</b> 06/17/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> Niger/USAID			
RESULT NAME: Increased resources available for communities and individuals to invest in NRM practices in project areas. [sub-result A: more decentralized, viable, and transparent financial institutions]			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> # of Customers/members of decentralized financial institutions in target areas			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> # of Men # of Women # of Corporate <hr/> <b>SOURCE:</b> World Council (WOCCU), Cooperative League of the USA (CLUSA), and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) <hr/> <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> Cumulative # of Credit Union members plus # of loans given by CARE and CLUSA <hr/> <b>COMMENTS:</b> This indicator combines all persons who benefitted either from savings or credit services of USAID projects during the year  No target as this SPO is being cancelled	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1987 (B)		0
	1995		16,877 7,283 125
	1996	17,000 8,000 (130)	16,500 7,428 (306)

**OBJECTIVE:** SPO 2: Increased use of natural resource management with NGOs.

**APPROVED:** 06/27/1996 **COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:** Niger/USAID

**RESULT NAME:** Increased resources available for communities and individuals to invest in NRM practices in project areas. [sub-result A: more decentralized, viable, and transparent financial institutions]

**INDICATOR:**

.Amount lent and saved (in billion current FCFA)

**UNIT OF MEASURE:**

(in billion FCFA)

Men

Women

**SOURCE:** World Council (WOCCU), Cooperative League of the USA (CLUSA), and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE)

**INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:**

This indicator combines the total amounts either borrowed or saved by customers of Credit Unions, Cooperatives, or the rural bank BRK which are serviced by USAID projects.

**COMMENTS:**

No target given as this is being cancelled

YEAR	PLANNED	ACTUAL
1987(B)	0 0	
1995		0.870 0.406
1996	0.900 0.400	1.088 0.554

### ***Part III: Status of Management Contract***

The impact of the events of the past year, which has seen the Mission pass from being a 'sustainable development' Mission with a \$60 million pipeline, a \$19 million OYB, and 11 Direct hires to either closeout or limited presence Mission with, at best, a \$3.5 million OYB and one direct hire with five FSNs has been discussed above. The changes have been wrenching, not only to the Mission and staff, but to those in Washington who have been dealing with the process. The various options have been discussed above, particularly in part 2 section 3, 'Transition Issues', and will be dealt with at length in the programmatic and operational closeout plans.

### ***Part IV: Resource Request***

To be completed following Administrator approval of the Niger program.