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DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT
DRAFT PROJECT PAPER

Africa Bureau Democracy and Governance Project
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DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The goal of the Zambia Democratic Governance Support Project is to promote accountable government. In late 1991 Zambia became the first English-speaking country in independent Africa to undergo a democratic transition. While the new MMD government of Frederick Chiluba appears committed to the goal of public accountability, there are worrisome signs that democratic institutions will be difficult to consolidate. Accountable government in Zambia is an important goal in itself and a vital component in economic growth.

The purpose of the Project is to render decision-making in Zambia more accessible and effective by providing assistance to strengthen selected governmental and non-governmental institutions with a particular focus on linkages between state and non-state actors. The components reflect current thinking in the development community and in Zambian society on the need to address simultaneously two complementary dimensions of democratic governance -- both the "supply" and "demand" sides -- in order to maximize synergy in obtaining the goal of accountability.

In reality, Zambia still lacks the full range of civic and governmental institutions necessary to sustain democratic governance. Most existing institutions, both inside and outside government, are pervaded by practices of arbitrary decision-making and an ethic of administrative control. Within the central government, top down decisions now emanate from an uncoordinated array of cabinet ministers rather than from the Cabinet. The historically weak National Assembly is as yet institutionally incapable of playing an effective role in initiating or scrutinizing legislation. The media remain largely government-owned and the MMD's commitment to freedom of the press remains tentative. And the civic associations that emerged to propel the democratic transition forward now find themselves in a vulnerable and fragile position in the era of democratic consolidation.

The activities of the Project are therefore concentrated in four strategic and critical areas:

- * strengthening civil society through civic education and the promotion of legal rights
- * promoting a professional and independent media
- * enhancing the capacity of the National Assembly to contribute to policy decisions and to respond to constituents
- * establishing mechanisms to coordinate policy formulation and implementation within the Cabinet Office

The Democratic Governance Support Project is an integral component of USAID/Zambia's overall assistance program and directly supports the Mission's strategic objective of broadening political and economic pluralism. The project is also consistent with USAID's Democratic Initiative and with the Africa Bureau's Democracy and Governance strategy. Given current circumstances in Zambia, the governance activities proposed here directly address immediate constraints to the restoration of sustainable economic growth.

The project is designed to generate the following benefits and achievements:

- * an increase in citizen awareness of political rights and duties
- * a better-trained media community and an improved environment for freedom of expression
- * an enhanced capacity for constituents, through their elected representatives, to influence and oversee key national policies.
- * improved coordination and management of policy formulation and implementation

II. BACKGROUND

A. Political and Economic Context

In late 1991 Zambia set a major developmental precedent in Africa by becoming the first English-speaking country on the continent to undergo a democratic transition. In this transition, power was peacefully passed from one civilian president to another without the intervention of military forces. Moreover, at least temporarily, the regime of governance shifted away from the monopolistic restrictions of single-party rule and towards the more pluralistic and competitive practices of multi-party democracy.

The democratic transition in Zambia was extremely rapid. It began in late 1989 in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall, when trade unionist Frederick Chiluba challenged the incumbent president, Kenneth Kaunda, to abandon his outdated commitment to single-party socialism. Riots in June 1990 to protest an increase in the price of the staple food were soon followed by mass demonstrations to support the call for a restoration of multiparty politics. In a series of landmark liberalization reforms -- first to allow a referendum on multipartyism, then to move directly to elections, and finally to amend the constitution -- Kaunda gradually ceded ground to the opposition. The transition culminated in October 1991 when, in general elections judged by neutral observers to be largely free and fair, an opposition coalition rallying under the banner of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) soundly defeated the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). The Third Republic of Zambia was born on November 2, 1991, when Frederick Chiluba was sworn in as Zambia's new president.

Because events unfolded so quickly, the supporters of political reform had little opportunity to firmly establish institutions that could guarantee democracy over the long run. Chiluba came to power as leader of a social movement which loosely stitched together a diverse coalition of business, labor, professional and student groups. These groups were united less by shared fundamental interests than by the immediate objective of ousting the Kaunda regime. The MMD itself was a rudimentary political structure, whose party organization was hastily erected for the purpose of contesting the elections. The political openings provided by the transition also gave birth to a host of new organizations in Zambian civil society, ranging from independent newspapers to election monitoring groups. These elements remain fragile and urgently in need of institutional strengthening if they are to play a constructive role in helping to consolidate democracy in Zambia.

Most significantly, the new government inherited a set of governmental institutions that had been designed to control the society and the economy. Under Kaunda, the Office of the President was an all powerful center of decision-making, and the Cabinet and civil service were reduced to the role of implementing presidential

policy directives. The contribution of technocrats to policy analysis was denigrated, leading to low morale throughout the executive branch. The legislature was occupied by parliamentarians elected in single-party elections and served principally to ratify instructions emanating from the presidency and the UNIP central committee. The print and electronic media were owned by the government and were used to disseminate official propaganda. These institutions remained largely intact after the 1991 elections and the new government faced the task of undertaking their fundamental political and administrative reform.

Already, the euphoria and high expectations that accompanied the MMD victory have begun to rapidly fade. The contradictions involved in trying to consolidate democracy and privatize the economy at the same time are being starkly revealed. On the one hand, the austerity measures necessary to put the economy on a sound footing threaten to undermine the new government's hard-won legitimacy. On the other hand, the refreshing atmosphere of pluralism and debate in Zambian politics sometimes distracts leaders into unproductive political squabbles.

The economic obstacles are formidable. Zambia faces a monumental debt, high inflation, chronic shortages of development capital and skills, and a reputation for high risk and unreliability among international investors. On the positive side, President Chiluba has taken bold policy initiatives that his predecessor had always resisted. In December 1991, he announced the removal of the subsidy on super-refined maize meal and the reduction to 10 percent of the subsidy on the staple roller meal. Significantly, this announcement was not followed by urban riots, as had occurred following previous subsidy cuts. At least at the outset, the legitimacy of the electoral victory outweighed potential opposition to austerity. The policies of privatization and public sector retrenchment have not encountered such smooth sailing. Zambians in many walks of life express a fear that the pain of structural adjustment will not be equally shared and that those in political positions will derive inordinate benefit from privatization.

Moreover, power struggles among the leadership of the MMD have caused uncertainty and fluidity, and delayed institutional consolidation. Within the Cabinet, there are two main factions: the "idealists" (including Chiluba) who actively promote the values of democracy, accountability, and transparent governance, and the "opportunists," who are popularly perceived to be using political office as a means to personal enrichment. Within this context, President Chiluba has been reluctant to exercise the powers of the presidency and has allowed his Ministers considerable latitude in policy making. Ministers have often disregarded the norm of collective responsibility by making unauthorized and uncoordinated policy announcements which sometimes have to be withdrawn later. As a result, the MMD government has been slow to articulate coherent policies and has been unable to ensure their coordinated

implementation.

The resource of political legitimacy is easily dissipated, and the MMD government has already spent some of its endowment. But, given diligent husbandry, governments can also renew and expand their legitimacy. In part this can be done by providing people with tangible economic benefits. But governments also renew legitimacy by distributing political goods such as genuine participation in decision-making. Between elections, this is best achieved by granting citizens a stake in the public policy process. In Zambia, the challenge facing the government is to spin out its store of its legitimacy until such time as the benefits of economic restructuring become widely felt. This suggests the need for concerted effort at strengthening political institutions both within and outside of the state, and at providing linkages that allow for popular participation in the policy process.

The democratic governance project identified in this document derives from the above premises. The consolidation of democracy in Zambia is an important goal in itself, a vital component in economic growth, and a model of political change that is being closely watched throughout Africa. For all these reasons, substantial USAID assistance for democratic governance in Zambia is warranted at this time.

B. GRZ Strategy

1. MMD Manifesto and Platform

The basic strategic direction of the Chiluba government is set forth in the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy Manifesto of 1991. Its key tenets include:

- respect for fundamental human rights, including rights of expression, of political organization, of the rule of law, of property, and independent judiciary, freedom of religion, of movement, and of conscience;
- the end of discrimination against women and minorities;
- the decentralization of government to local units responsible to the people they serve;
- privatization of public corporations and a redefinition of government's role as creator of an "enabling environment" for a market economy.
- progress toward steady economic growth and improved social welfare; and,
- the end of the 27 year old state of emergency.

MMD campaigned on this platform with particular emphasis on ending the monopolistic, one-party rule of Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party. At his inauguration, the newly elected President Chiluba stressed Zambia's perilous economic circumstances and the need for several years of hard-work before circumstances would improve.

2. MMD Government Performance

Since election, the MMD government has generally stuck to this platform. It has moved most aggressively in the area of economic reform, for example by substantially reducing the consumer subsidy on staple food (maize meal), spurred no doubt by heavy debt, spiraling inflation, and donor expectation. It has begun the retrenchment process as well as a number of initiatives with various donors to begin upgrading civil service performance.

Privatization has moved more slowly, as the GRZ has run into the complications common to reforming states: an inadequate legal framework, concern over the discharge of redundant employees, lack of domestic capital to purchase enterprises, and concern over the fairness and effectiveness of various privatization procedures.

In the area of democracy the MMD government has maintained a generally positive, though at times uneven direction. On the one hand, UNIP has been recognized as the legal opposition party in parliament. An independent newspaper, the Weekly Post, has been established which has taken, at times an aggressively critical posture to the government. Various organs of civil society (interest groups, civic organizations) are quite active both in promoting sectoral interests and serving as watchdogs of the public good. And key ministries appear open to the input of relevant organized bodies. In general the political climate of Zambia is full of public debate, which does not exclude vigorous criticism of the government and its policies.

Still, there are disquieting signs that some within the MMD coalition government are restive in this atmosphere and have begun to display the habits of one party rule. For example, certain Cabinet Ministers have proven intolerant of independent opinion and have threatened to withdraw public benefits from persons supporting opposition parties. They appear to have incomplete understanding of the prerequisites of democracy and the role of constitutional protections. In part, these problems are due to the disorganization of a coalition that moved from founding to power in little more than one year and in which the struggle between "idealist" and "opportunist" factions is still being played out.

Having successfully moved through the transition from a socialist, single-party state to a marked-oriented, multi-party democracy, Zambia faces challenges in consolidating that change. USAID/Zambia

takes the government seriously in its professed commitment to a liberal, market-oriented, multi-party democracy. It is to sustain that commitment and strengthen the forces in Zambian society supporting the MMD's basic democratic strategy that this project initiative is directed.

3. Donor Support of Democracy and Governance in Zambia

Along with the rapid pace of change in Zambia has been a significant increase in the activity of the donor community. Donor priorities have reflected greater awareness of needs to strengthen democracy and governance. Technical governance initiatives include strengthening the civil service through improving the budgeting and financial audit capacity, decentralization (ODA), a performance appraisal system, and a general upgrading of the management skills of senior civil servants. (UNDP and World Bank.) (See assessment, p. 43 - 45)

At the same time, donors (SIDA, NORAD and USAID) have continued and expanded assistance to NGOs active in numerous areas critical to democratization including women's issues, small farmers cooperatives, and various organizations concerned with human rights. These have not been met with government opposition. Moreover, various government officials have requested democratization assistance.

In sum, USAID/Zambia believes that the overall commitment of the GRZ to democratic governance is strong. This can be seen in the GRZ's basic policy directions and its continued encouragement of donor assistance in a variety of democratic governance areas. That there are some "fits and starts" in the government's response to criticism, we believe, does not reflect a fundamental change of directions, but instead are part of the consolidation process. They however, should be taken seriously, and considered carefully in formulating donor initiatives. The initiatives proposed here are intended to sustain the government's momentum in positive directions, and strengthen those elements of Zambian society likely to constructively oppose significant backsliding.

C. USAID Development Strategy in Zambia

USAID is developing plans to assist the democratically-elected government of Zambia without benefit of an approved Country Program Strategic Plan. The subject design is, rather, occurring simultaneous to mission preparation of an overall country strategy. The last Country Development Strategy Statement for Zambia was prepared in 1986 only to be quickly overtaken by GRZ delay and eventual noncompliance with economic restructuring plans. As such, no relevant approved country strategy currently exists.

The Mission's provisional program around which the country strategy is being built identifies the overall program goal of market-oriented, sustainable, broad-based economic growth in Zambia. Subgoals are a socially stable, politically active and economically productive population, and a diversified economy. Three specific objectives have been specified: (1) to decrease the transmission rate of HIV; (2) to broaden economic and political pluralism; and (3) to improve the economic performance of the food and agriculture sector. USAID initiatives in democratic governance relate to the strategic objective of broadening economic and political pluralism.

USAID is developing a democratic governance project which emphasizes the strengthening of public accountability as pivotal to economic and political pluralism. Project strategy emphasizes the coequal importance of addressing both civil society and the government sector. Democratic governance will not result only from interventions on the "supply side" of the policy process alone, that is, through internal reforms to centralized government agencies. The "demand side," namely the organized interests in society whose demands and criticisms are the best defense against abuse of power, also needs to be addressed. Streamlining the performance of policy-making and service delivery institutions must simultaneously be supported while also strengthening institutions that lie beyond the boundaries of the state apparatus. Institutions within civil society need help to develop a sustainable capacity to channel demands constructively and responsibly into the policy process.

USAID believes public accountability is a core bridging concept and activity of democratic governance. Procedural reforms within the public service address the problem of administrative accountability, that is the responsibility of civil servants to ministers for the implementation of policy instructions. But the other dimension of accountability is political accountability, that is of the government to its citizens. Supporting institutions that express social interests and insert popular preferences into the decisionmaking process are also key to USAID D/G strategy.

USAID D/G strategy thus targets mutually reinforcing program opportunities within the central government and within the civil society in Zambia. This approach to the problem of accountability offers the best chance of obtaining sustained improvements in democratic governance in Zambia.

D. Conformity with A.I.D. Africa Bureau Strategy

The activities under the Democratic Governance Project are consistent with A.I.D.'s evolving Democracy Initiative and with substantive elements of the AID Africa Bureau policy framework. Specifically, the project responds directly to key elements of the

current Africa Bureau D/G strategy of emphasizing democratic governance, which combines elements of public management effectiveness, legitimacy and public responsiveness, accountability, information openness, and pluralism and participation. The project also seeks to enhance prospects for long-term sustainable economic development in Zambia -- a critical objective of the Development Fund for Africa. As stated in the AID Democracy and Governance Policy Paper and the Africa Bureau's Working Paper on Governance, a system of democratic governance provides the most promising enabling environment for broad-based economic growth, by fostering not only competent and effective public management, but offering the opportunity for non-state actors to have access to information about and influence on decisionmaking in key areas:

Consistent with the Africa Bureau approach of field-driven initiatives in the D/G area, the Project is designed to ensure that activities strongly reflect Zambian priorities, i.e. in defining the agenda, in formulating the solution including choosing the most appropriate mechanisms, and ultimately in measuring whether the solutions were correct and had the desired effect.

The proposed project will be funded under the Development Fund for Africa (DFA), with joint authorization under Section 116(e). This approach is consistent with the guidance, provided in May 1991 by the Africa Bureau's General Counsel, which advises such an approach in instances where the project is supportive of the development objectives reflected in the DFA, but equally supportive of the overall 116(e) framework by virtue of its direct linkage to supporting civil and political rights.

III. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

A. Perceived Problems

In the wake of a rapid political transition, Zambia still lacks a full range of civic and governmental institutions to sustain democratic governance in the long run. Most existing institutions ~~are pervaded by practices of arbitrary decision-making and an ethic~~ of regulation and control that originated in an earlier period of autocracy. A whole generation has grown up without direct experience of how a democratic polity operates. The challenge is to support those Zambians, within both government and civil society, who perceive the urgent need to institutionalize recent democratic gains, and to provide a counterbalance to the reemergence of the habits of single-party rule.

Because Zambia has yet to develop a democratic political culture, citizens have not taken full advantage of opportunities for political participation. For example, the voter turnout in the 1991 general elections (45 percent) and 1992 by-elections (below 20 percent) was disappointingly low. A legacy of violent intimidation still surrounds elections which inhibits ordinary people, especially the less educated, from exercising their constitutionally guaranteed rights. And constituents remain uninformed and passive about requiring accountability from their parliamentary representatives after elections. There is thus a glaring and widespread need for basic civic education.

Within the central government apparatus, policy-making had previously been overcentralized in the Office of the President. In the new Third Republic, the locus of decision-making has shifted to individual Ministers who often act without regard to collective responsibility. There is thus need to support the government's aim to restore the primacy of the Cabinet as the constitutionally-mandated center of decision-making. In particular, the Cabinet Office seeks support to strengthen its capacity in the strategic management of policy implementation, especially with regard to complex policies that involve more than one ministry. In addition, the MMD has reconceptualized the role of government to deemphasise intervention and control in favor of functions that facilitate private and voluntary initiative. Accordingly, all executive agencies must be retooled with appropriate skills. Civil servants, who still display old habits of caution and passivity, badly need incentives to reward entrepreneurship and to be trained in policy analysis.

Both constitutionally and in practice, the legislative branch of government is weak in relation to the executive. The 1991 constitution added legislative powers, for example by increasing the number of MPs to 150 and strengthening their hand to repeal a state of emergency. But the MMD government foresees the need to further rebalance decision-making powers in favor of the

legislature and will undertake a constitutional reform process, beginning in late 1992, to achieve this objective. Nonetheless, the National Assembly will not be able to play its fully appointed role in the decision-making process until several other fundamental problems are addressed. The neophyte MMD MPs lack complete understanding of legislative procedure and have yet to take full advantage of opportunities to influence legislation. The staff of the Assembly is currently ill-equipped to provide MPs with timely and relevant information. Moreover, Parliament inherited an image as a closed and secretive institution which does not sit well in the new atmosphere of pluralism and openness of debate in Zambia.

The media remains largely government owned, including all radio and television outlets, two of the three major national newspapers, and the only two printing presses in the country. Although freedom of the press was one of the basic rights that MMD pledged to uphold in its campaign manifesto, there are indications that the new government may seek to retain controls on the media. Pronouncements by cabinet Ministers, notably denying the right to criticize the state president, have had a chilling effect on a press traditionally used to conformity with authority. The laws of Zambia grant the government sweeping powers, among the strictest in the world, with regard to matters such as sedition, censorship, public morality, public order and state security. A promised freedom of information act was redrafted by the MMD government to empower the government to license journalists and regulate their conduct. While most journalists seek greater press freedoms, they remain undertrained and resource-poor. There is pressing need to enlarge and strengthen the sector of independent journalists in Zambia.

B. Project Goal and Purpose

The overall USAID/Zambia program goal is to achieve market-oriented, sustainable, broad-based economic growth, in part by encouraging economic and political pluralism. Within this context, the general goal of this Project is to promote accountable government in Zambia. The project will strengthen the capacity of institutions in civil society to demand public accountability. The project will also increase popular participation in public policy formulation and improve the coordination of policy implementation. In sum, the purpose of the Project is to make public decision-making more accessible and effective.

C. Expected Achievements and Beneficiaries

The project will achieve the purpose of rendering public decision-making more accessible and effective. It will do so by strengthening civil society and improving public governance. At the level of project components the following achievements are

expected:

- an increase in citizens' awareness of their political rights and duties;
- a more professional and independent media community;
- an enhanced capacity among Members of Parliament to initiate and scrutinize legislation, and to attend to constituency demands;
- finally, improved management and implementation capacity for policies involving more than one ministry.

The Project will strengthen the communications media, by expanding its professionalism, making its practitioners more aware of press freedoms and strengthening their access to equipment needed for this function. The Project will promote a democratic political culture in Zambia by supporting programs of civic education and strengthening the NGOs which deliver the program. These activities will encourage a general understanding of democratic rights and duties, and improve the ability of citizens to defend those rights and fulfill those duties.

A particular focus in the civil society component will be on education about women's rights, and on employment of women's organizations to implement these activities. Organizations with a proven track record of representing women's interests and needs will be relied upon to strengthen Zambian women's knowledge of their rights and increase their capacity to assert their civil and political rights in the new political environment.

In the area of public governance, the project will strengthen the ability of government to make and implement policy, and to respond to a new and evolving role as an enabler in a market-oriented system. It will do this via activities in the Cabinet Office. Finally, through activities in the National Assembly, the project will strengthen the legislative check on executive power, as well as the ability of society to engage in a policy dialogue with the executive branch as the latter defines and implements policy.

In general, the beneficiaries of this project are the Zambian people as a whole, who are directly affected by the accessibility and effectiveness of public decisionmaking, particularly in the key areas of political and economic policy reform.

D. Project Elements

The specific program elements proposed for this Project are to:

1. Strengthen Civil Society

Two activities fall under the rubric of civil society:

(a) Civic Education. The Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), a non-partisan non-governmental organization in Zambia, will be supported to conduct a nationwide civic education campaign. FODEP acquired relevant experience while monitoring the 1991 general elections and has demonstrated capacity to mobilize urban and rural residents through a network of church-based, school-based, and women's community groups. Drawing upon expert knowledge on the laws of Zambia and adult education, FODEP will design a curriculum to inform Zambians of their rights and duties as citizens. It will produce materials for dissemination through a variety of media (including print, television, radio and theater) and train trainers to fan out across the country from provincial to district to local levels, working through collaborating NGOs. Trained volunteers will target the campaign at audiences of adults, school children, security personnel and political leaders. The campaign is expected to result in improved civic awareness among Zambian citizens and increased popular participation in civic life, including elections. FODEP will follow up the training program by providing citizens with legal assistance on civil rights complaints and the ability to pursue test cases with public officials and in the courts.

(b) Media Resource Center. The Zambia Institute for Mass Communication (ZAMCOM) will be assisted to establish a media resources center in order to provide a wide range of facilities for the journalistic community. ZAMCOM is a quasi-independent public corporation chartered under its own Act of Parliament which permits the appointment of independent representatives to its governing board. ZAMCOM enjoys broad support from journalists and their representative bodies. The purpose of the center is to nurture an independent press corps and to enable individuals already employed by the publicly-owned media to undertake freelance projects. The Center's services will include professional training courses, a library on media law, and a shared equipment pool for desk-top publishing. The Center will sponsor policy studies with practical recommendations, for example, on the legislative environment for press freedom and options for the privatization of the media in Zambia. The training needs of the journalistic community will be addressed through a comprehensive training plan that will include an appropriate mix of short and long-term training, both in-country and abroad.

2. Improve Public Governance

Two activities are under the rubric of improving public governance:

(a) National Assembly. The National Assembly of Zambia requires assistance to execute fully its representative role in the legislative process. Members of Parliament (MPs) will be enabled to become more professional and accessible. The Assembly's excellent physical facilities will be augmented with improved human resources and up-to-date equipment for the Committee Office.

Publications Office, and library. Staff will be developed in economics, financial analysis, accountancy, law, and legal drafting. Computer equipment will be installed for the production of internal documents and external publications such as Hansard. The library will be stocked with selected items on democratization, human rights, privatization and market economics for the use of MPs and research staff. MPs will be offered ~~training seminars~~ on parliamentary procedure and constituency relations, along with overseas contact visits for small delegations of committee chairs and support staff. Assistance for this package of assistance will be conditioned on the relaxation of rules restricting citizen access to Parliament.

(b) Cabinet Office Monitoring Unit

Cabinet Office has been given responsibility for implementing the government's public service reform program. The task facing the Cabinet Office is huge: to change the procedures and structural relationships from those that enabled UNIP to control the government to new ones that reflect the government's augmented decision-making role in its new relationship to civil society and MMD's commitment to effective, accountable governance. The Cabinet Office has set up a Management Development Unit to manage the implementation of the public service reform program. In order to support the objectives of the reform program, the project will strengthen the policy analysis and management capacity of the unit. The unit will develop a management strategy for implementing all the components of the reform program. It will also overhaul the government's planning and budgeting functions and redesign the structural and functional relationships between the Ministry of Finance, NCDP, and the Bank of Zambia, and improve coordination among the line ministries and provincial planning units. After initial studies to determine which government procedures require revision, the unit will oversee the rewriting of procedures and the development of training materials. In the long term the skills developed in the unit will strengthen the Cabinet Office in its traditional role as manager of the government decision-making flow in and out of Cabinet meetings.

The specific project components were chosen according to needs identified by Zambians, and whether they represented targets of opportunity in which the time was ripe for foreign assistance support. Other potential sectors of involvement -- such as gender issues or the legal system -- will be addressed in the project components as cross-cutting elements. For instance, the proposed civic education component incorporates providing legal assistance to communities, and will target women's civil and political rights in particular. In addition, the media component envisions a study of current legislative restrictions on freedom of the press.

It should be noted that the U.S. country team envisions legal and gender issues to also be addressed in its future proposals for

activities under the Democracy and Human Rights (1166) Fund project. For example, the U.S. Embassy is actively exploring the possibility of providing assistance to the Ministry of Legal Affairs to support its efforts to reform the constitution.

IV. FACTORS AFFECTING PROJECT SELECTION AND DEVELOPMENT

A. Socio-Political Considerations

While the timing of popular protest in Zambia was prompted by the collapse of one-party regimes and control economies in Eastern Europe, the underlying causes of political reform lay in resentment among ordinary Zambians at their loss of purchasing power and political liberties. These concerns were vented spontaneously through food riots and more systematically through demands for multiparty elections by an array of labor, business, student, professional, church, and media organizations. These institutions of civil society were the building blocks of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD).

MMD won the October 1991 elections by a landslide, capturing 75 percent of the presidential and parliamentary votes and securing majorities in eight of the nine provinces countrywide. This convincing margin of victory provides the new government with its most valuable resource: political legitimacy. The Chiluba government obtained a mandate from the electorate to undertake sweeping structural reform in both economic and political life.

However, despite public proclamations regarding continued commitment to democratization, the democratic transition within Zambia is by no means complete. Because the political transition was very rapid -- less than two years from the ZCTU's first calls for multiparty competition in December 1989 to the election of October 1991 -- the MMD had little time to develop a firm institutional base for democracy and governance. Moreover, power struggles at the pinnacle of the MMD structure have caused uncertainty and delayed institutional consolidation.

The government operates under a compromise constitution that contains many features of centralized presidential rule. The opposition is also weakly institutionalized. The official opposition party, UNIP, has a small parliamentary presence and a narrow popular base, mainly in the Eastern Province. Instead, parliamentary backbenchers within MMD have played the most articulate opposition role, despite a disturbing proclivity by some in the party to attempt to stifle dissent in the party ranks. Because political party structures are fragile, many of the tasks of loyal opposition fall to institutions in civil society. The media, economic interest groups and civic associations thus take on added importance in Zambia as sources of pressure on the MMD to fulfill its electoral promises including upholding democracy and

human rights.

Historically, Zambia did not develop a democratic political culture. Traditional political systems -- whether the centralized state of the Lozi, or the village-kin groups of the Tonga -- vested authority in male elders and allowed few opportunities for participation in decision-making by women and younger people. British colonial rule was also hierarchical; it superimposed a strong administrative state whose influence was felt by most Zambians through the extensive discretionary powers of the District Commissioner. Resistance to colonialism led to mass political mobilization and, for the first time in Zambia ushered in a brief interregnum of multiparty politics during the First Republic of Zambia (1964-1973).

A far more formative influence on contemporary political culture, however, was the single-party rule of Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) during the Second Republic (1973-1991). Power was centralized in the office of the presidency and elections were transformed into rituals of affirmation for the ruling party, thus depriving ordinary Zambians of political expression and self-determination. As UNIP leaders exercised tight control over the distribution of development resources, deference to authority was even further ingrained as Zambians concluded their best hope of upward mobility was through participation in party patronage networks. Leaders used a combination of threats and inducements to ensure popular compliance and passivity to "the party and its government".

It is therefore not surprising that Zambians are ill-prepared to defend their fledgling democracy. First, they are grievously under-informed about the new multiparty political system. They have limited knowledge of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, the protections of the constitution, the mechanics of the electoral code, or of legal procedures and processes. The charter document of the Third Republic -- the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1991 -- has never been published in vernacular languages, has had limited circulation, and is currently unavailable from the government printing office. As a result, most rural dwellers, especially women, do not know that they have a right to run for elected office. And small farmers are unaware that the cooperative movement belongs to them.

On the positive side, other attributes of modern Zambian society provide fertile soil for the growth of a more active citizenry. The 1990 census conservatively estimates that urban dwellers constitute 42 percent of the population. And, despite the breakdown of education services, Zambia's nominal literacy rate of 76 percent (World Development Report, 1991) is among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. There is thus a modernized sector of the population that is relatively detached from traditional mores and attracted to universal democratic values. Most importantly, these

Zambians now have first hand experience of the disadvantages of single-party rule and have asserted a preference for basic political liberties. The educated classes of Zambia's urban areas will not easily again accept monopolistic political controls. Their commitment to checking the authority of politicians creates opportunities to spread a democratic political culture more widely among the Zambian population.

Women in Zambian society have benefitted less than men from services and opportunities provided by the government. Customary law and prevailing mores in Zambian society subordinate women to a traditional male dominated authority system. Inheritance of land, the division of labor, and unequal access to education and income-producing activities all tend to disadvantage women in their attempts to participate fully in the socio-economic and political spheres.

Traditional and customary obstacles to women's advancement have been reinforced by discrimination in modern law and administrative practice. According to a report from a recent seminar conducted by the Non-governmental Organization Coordinating Committee (NGOCC), a woman's group, while Zambia has ratified international conventions against gender discrimination and both past and present governments have made proclamations against discrimination, to this time, there has been little real progress made in terms of fully integrating women into development activities and into the political system.

In recent years, Zambia has witnessed the flourishing of women's associations and human rights groups who are determined to address this problem. Women played a critical role in spearheading efforts to achieve a democratic transition within Zambia. The MMD has committed itself to ending discrimination against women and in favor of affirmative action to achieve equality of access, services and benefits provided by the government. Yet, little concrete progress has been made by the new government in addressing gender issues.

B. Economic considerations

Since taking office the MMD government has made a number of sound economic policy decisions and a few unfortunate ones. The initial economic policy statements by the MMD government stressed its commitment to an entirely new approach to economic management -- reliance on the private sector as the engine of growth and a new era of openness and honesty with the donors. The government quickly moved to reduce the budget-crippling maize subsidy and allowed the kwacha to depreciate to its appropriate level.

The new government has done well on its first priority: the stabilization of the economy. The inflation rate in the last two months is down sharply from earlier in 1992; the budget deficit is

becoming under control; the exchange rate is depreciating rapidly and the government has successfully renegotiated its debt repayment schedule with the Paris Club, easing balance of payments constraints for the next several years. Bank of Zambia economists believe that the recent increase in the money supply will relieve some of the private sector's working capital credit squeeze without adding to inflation. The government has expedited the privatization effort begun under the previous government and has moved in the right direction on maize prices. On the other hand, it reversed its decision to reduce the size of the civil service and, in addition, awarded large wage increases. Having gained a fair measure of credibility with the donors, which resulted in good support levels from the latest CC, the government raised donor hackles by firing, for political reasons, the Canadian Governor of the Bank of Zambia, whose contract had been renewed by the MMD government.

The overwhelming exogenous factor affecting the economy in 1992 is the drought, whose full effects have not yet been seen. Although copper prices are stable and copper production is up approximately 20% over last year, real GDP can be expected to fall. The effect of the drought on the government budget deficit will be cushioned by the emergency aid the government has received. Export earnings should be at least as high as in 1991, with increased copper earnings offsetting lower agricultural exports, as long as the rains are normal for the 1992-1993 growing season.

But, if the new government has articulated an appropriate economic framework and has taken some key policy steps, it continues to have substantial difficulty in transforming its aims into effective working policies. Several factors appear to account for these problems. The most important is weak executive institutions in relation to the Office of the President and the ruling party. Additionally, there is the inexperience of new personnel, the multiplicity and seriousness of current policy problems, and weaknesses in institutional devices to integrate the policy process at the center.

Of particular importance is the serious deficiency of policy analysis and management audit capacity at both cabinet and ministerial levels. Key policy making personnel, as a rule, lack staff support to develop, analyze, co-ordinate, implement, evaluate and reappraise policy and program options. This is particularly weak at the cross ministerial level, but applies within ministries as well.

In general, ministries do not appear successful in setting clear priorities, defining specific objectives, allocating resources accordingly (including reorganization around priority tasks, reallocating personnel and other resources and following up with staff support), evaluating their performance, learning from their environment, and adjusting policies and programs accordingly.

Rather, each year's plans and proposals seem to be driven by the previous year's budget and program it defined. Ministries have by no means collapsed in Zambia. They remain and perform certain service regulative functions. But they do so at low levels of efficiency, without self-reflection, and appear unprepared to mobilize resources to assist senior personnel deal with crises or major policy innovations.

President Chiluba's speech of August 5 attempted to put an end to a period of policy disarray during which the President appeared helpless to lead the Cabinet into coherent and consistent decisions. He identified the problem of lack of consensus and coordination on a number of ministerial initiatives, and promised change. At this point a number of ministries are taking steps to reorganize their operations. However, ministries tend to operate in chronic crisis mode due to the inexperience of ministers, the drought, and even because of the need to spend large amounts of time with donors. By addressing an unsatisfactory situation squarely, Chiluba may have begun to break the logjam on the accumulated problems of government ministries. President Chiluba's speech left no doubt that he intends full accountability from public officials. While such changes cannot be achieved overnight, donors are now entitled to expect consistent efforts.

C. Institutional Considerations

a. The Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) is a non-partisan, non-profit, non-governmental organization whose purpose is to strengthen the operations and institutions of democracy in Zambia. FODEP emerged from the Zambia Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC) which was formed by eight civic organizations to oversee Zambia's October 1991 general elections. It is governed by a nominated 16-person Board and an elected 6-person executive committee drawn from several member organizations: the Christian Council of Zambia, the Zambia Episcopal Conference, the Non-Governmental Organizations' Coordinating Committee (NGOCC), and the National Womens' Lobby Group (NWLG).

Relying mainly on volunteer effort, FODEP has established a credible track record of impartial civic action. During the 1991 election campaign, ZEMCC organized an imaginative media campaign to inform Zambians of their right and duty to vote. For election day, some 4000 volunteers were recruited, trained and deployed for pollwatching. After the election, FODEP convened a national workshop on "Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Zambia" attended by a wide range of civic groups, political parties, and international donors. Recently, FODEP mounted teams of monitors to scrutinize by-elections and issued reports noting that MMD officials sometimes resorted to tactics of intimidation and bribery of voters previously associated with UNIP. FODEP expressed concern that the low voter turnout in 1992 by-elections

(below 20 percent) indicates a disturbing lack of popular understanding of and commitment to democracy.

FODEP now seeks to establish a permanent organization with a mandate to secure and deepen gains made in the democratic transition. It urgently requires a core grant to cover overhead expenses for its office and field operations, which include a civic education program. FODEP also wishes to staff a legal aid clinic to seek redress of civil rights abuses identified during the civic education campaign.

b. The media in Zambia are ill-equipped in both human and material resources. Zambian journalists are generally poorly educated, trained, and paid compared to other professionals in the country. Fewer than one in ten has a college degree. These low educational levels and weak professional skills have serious implications for the media's ability to play an effective role in promoting civil society and holding government accountable.

The University of Zambia recently introduced a four year bachelors degree in communication with an enrolment of 30 students, some of them from neighboring countries, especially Botswana and Namibia. But staff development is required to train the next generation of media educators. The Zambian Institute of Mass Communications (ZAMCOM) offers in-service training for working journalists through seminars, workshops and short concentration courses lasting between one and six weeks. In part due to funding from the German Friedrich Naumann Foundation, ZAMCOM has the best physical plant and equipment of all media training institutions in Zambia. With a legislative reform to ensure the full autonomy of ZAMCOM from government interference and a further infusion of resources, especially for printing, ZAMCOM could serve as a site to establish a media resources center for independent and freelance journalists.

c. As stated earlier, the parliament of Zambia is weak relative to the executive. Even today, all legislative proposals emanate from the executive branch, usually through the cabinet. And, because the MMD has a large enough parliamentary majority to pass any legislation, the potential for arbitrary policy making still exists. But MMD also contains a new generation of MPs, many of whom have professional qualifications and experience, who are making use of the legislative process to democratize the process of decision-making. For example, MPs amended the important Privatization Act in July 1992 to include additional safeguards to ensure the independence and accountability of the agency overseeing the sale of public corporation.

Weaknesses in the operations of the National Assembly can be traced to resource constraints. There are only three offices and 8 generalist committee staff to service 150 MPs. This staff is undertrained and unable to offer effective informational or procedural advice to members. MPs also lack personal staffs and

are even unable to rely on the National Assembly for basic secretarial or more than minimal telephone services. Also, the Assembly's capacious modern library is seriously short of relevant and recent books and periodicals. Since the parliament does not control its own budget it is unable to address the problem of these missing amenities.

d. The Cabinet Office plays multiple important roles in a parliamentary system, and Zambia's hybrid presidential/parliamentary system increases its importance. The Secretary to the Cabinet is the premier civil servant. All Permanent Secretaries report to him, and he reports directly to the President. Under the First Republic the Cabinet Office controlled decision-making flows. Memos from ministries did not become Cabinet agenda items until the Cabinet Office had determined their basic feasibility and had obtained clearances from all relevant ministries. The implementation of Cabinet decisions was negotiated between the Secretary to the Cabinet and the relevant Permanent Secretaries, and the Cabinet Office monitored the ministries' implementation efforts to ensure that they conformed to the Cabinet's decision. Like all government ministries during the Second Republic, the Cabinet Office became politicized at the top level and ineffective at middle and lower levels.

The President has recently given two signals that the Cabinet Office is again to become the key institution for decision flows: he has appointed a highly experienced and respected civil servant to the post of Secretary to the Cabinet and he has given the Cabinet Office the responsibility of managing the public sector reform program. Cabinet Office at present does not have the management capacity to carry out its responsibilities effectively; the Secretary is working actively with donors to acquire in an orderly fashion the support he knows the Cabinet Office needs.

D. Grantee and Implementing Agencies

Following the signing of the Project Agreement with the Ministry of Development Planning, or concurrently, USAID will execute a Memoranda of Understanding or sub-project agreements detailing the joint undertakings and implementation arrangements with each of the cooperating Zambian institutions.

F. A.I.D. Support Requirements and Capabilities

The mission, using project funds, intends to recruit a D/G adviser, through a personal services contract (PSC), to serve as the primary project manager in USAID/Zambia. This individual needs to be capable of playing a multifaceted role of providing both governance expertise and traditional management, including procurement of technical assistance and training. However, the sensitivity of the

project is too great to place complete responsibility for project monitoring, policy guidance, and general oversight in the hands of the personal service contractor. The full Country Team Democracy Coordination Committee is already functioning and in place for overall policy and program guidance as well as for US inter-agency coordination. The Mission Director will also be directly engaged - ~~actively coordinating key issues with the Ambassador, the~~ DCM/Political Officer, the PAO and other country team members.

F. Relevant Country Team Experience

The U.S. country team in Zambia is already active in the D/G arena. During the elections the U.S. country team contributed diplomatic leadership and approximately \$200,000 through the Democracy and Human Rights Fund (DHRF, also known as 116e) to support the first comprehensive effort at election monitoring in independent Africa. The U.S. funds were specifically aimed at building domestic monitoring capacity within Zambian NGOs, including the forerunner of FODEP. The project also builds on USIS D/G initiatives, including teleconferences, study tours and technical assistance for Zambian parliamentarians, journalists and NGO leaders. IESC funds have been applied to workshops on entrepreneurship in the civil service. DHRF funds were also used to help sustain the National Womens' Lobby Group (an institutional member of FODEP) at a time when it was under attack by anti-democratic elements in government. While such efforts have laid a valuable foundation for a more comprehensive program in the democratic governance area, interventions by the U.S. government have clearly been relatively modest to date.

Private U.S.-based organizations also remain engaged in D/G work in Zambia. The Carter Center of Emory University cosponsored a workshop with FODEP in February 1992 and a consultation between government and business interests on foreign investment in Zambia in June 1992. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) will implement a project to build capacity within political parties in Zambia with funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (U.S.) and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (U.K.).

G. Estimated Costs and Method of Financing

Funds have been reserved at the level of \$15 million for the Democratic Governance project. But as the project design progresses, it is anticipated that the total project cost will be below the original anticipated funding level. As of this writing, the design of the individual project components has not advanced to the point where realistic estimates are possible. It is anticipated that a large portion of expenditure will consist of the D/G PSC, and whatever long-term technical assistance is needed.

Training and commodity costs will also be significant, but relatively minor compared to technical assistance costs. A portion of the total project costs will be contributed by host country subgrantees through the provision of in-kind goods and services.

The project will be incrementally financed with Development Funds for Africa from the USAID/Zambia regular OYB over the four year period of FY 92 through FY 96. The A.I.D. contribution is to be entirely grant funded.

H. Design Strategy

The assessment that preceded the PID was prepared in May/June 1992 by ARD consultants contracted through the AFR/ONI Democracy and Governance project. PP development was initiated July 28 and is also being assisted by ARD, MSI, IPC, and AFR/ONI. Joint ARD/MSI/IPC team of five persons is being financed with Mission PD & S funds. An AFR/ONI USDH is on TDY to Lusaka is also participating in the design effort. The team is as follows:

Michael Bratton, Political Analyst and COP, four weeks;
David Gordon, Political Economist, two weeks;
Tina West, Public Administration Expert, four weeks;
Peter Kareithi, Media Expert, four weeks;
Jesse McCorry, Design Specialist, three weeks
Jennifer Windsor, AFR/ONI staff member, two weeks.

PP design work is expected to be completed by August 27. The Mission requests delegation of authority to approve the PP and authorize the project in Lusaka. The CN expired without comment, and FY 92 funds for the initial obligation have already been allotted to the Mission. REDSO/ESA assistance in the preparation of the PROAG and accompanying MOUs has been requested. Project authorization and obligation are planned for September.

I. Recommended Environmental Threshold Decision

None of the activities to be undertaken under the proposed project have an effect on the natural or physical environment. The Initial Environmental Examination finding required is a Categorical Exclusion per 216 (c) (1) (i). In accordance with this Exclusion, an Initial Environmental Examination, Environmental Assessment and Environmental Impact Statement are not required.

Pursuant to 216.3 (a) (2) the Initial Environment Examination Threshold Decision is included as part of this PID.

J. Project Paper Design Issues

1. Sustainability. Guaranteeing sustainability beyond the life of the project is an important issue, as external assistance poses the danger of creating dependencies or masking a lack of internal capacity to continue over the long term. Sustainability of project components ~~dealing with state institutions~~ will depend on the degree to which they are integrated into the functioning of the evolving order. For example, the Cabinet or the National Assembly will have to provide budgetary support to sustain any new staff functions after end of life of the project. With regard to the media and civic education components, USAID resources must be employed to facilitate independent operations, rather than create a need for and dependency on external assistance. Sustainability of individual organizations and their efforts will depend on the continued willingness of existing or new constituencies to maintain the functions of the organization and to make efficient use of limited resources.

2. Levels/Types of Technical Assistance. The project deals in an area in which heightened sensitivities exist about perceived outside "interference" in internal politics or attempts to "export" systems which are inappropriate to the Zambian context. As a result, a key issue in the PP design is how best to approach the provision of technical assistance, especially long-term TA. Quite clearly, such assistance should be specifically requested. While both the Cabinet office and members of the media have requested long-term TA, there have been no requests for long-term TA in NGOs and National Assembly. In addition, the exact nature of the TA needs to be carefully considered, i.e. whether an American specialist may be counterproductive because of the negative connotations of being an outsider. For that reason, Africans or indeed Zambians, may need to be identified to provide some of the TA in the project.

3. Management Aspects. The PP design team will face a series of issues in project management. There is a need for a mechanism to handle a multifaceted role of providing both governance expertise and traditional management, including procurement of technical assistance and training. For example, is an institutional contract in which a separate office in Lusaka is established via a U.S. organization/firm necessary to manage the project, or can a PSC based in the mission handle most of the management responsibility, assisted by appropriate administrative staff hired under the project?

4. Government commitment. An obvious issue is whether the reversals in the evolving nature of the political and economic context will derail the momentum of USAID's efforts. For example, if the current government fails to make sufficient progress in resolving its considerable economic problems and experiences a

serious erosion of its legitimacy, this will have a deleterious impact on strengthening a system of democratic governance. Not only will a weakened government be unable to effectively implement its economic reform policies, but it may result in governmental attempts to reduce freedoms of expression and association in civil society.

While the project is premised on the assumption that the GRZ maintains its commitment to democracy and good governance, the design team will make every effort to design components so that they will continue to have an impact even if there is some backtracking. Building the policy implementation capacity of government, civic education efforts, strengthening the capacity of NGOs and the media, all will be critical to enhancing the prospects for institutionalizing the democratic trend.

5. Conditionality. Given Zambia's political legacy of governmental control, there is a danger that providing support to "unreformed" institutions might have the result of undercutting rather than reinforcing democratic governance. This potential problem is most acute with reference to the National Assembly and the Zambia Institute of Mass Communications. Close attention must be given during future stages of project development to establish guarantees that beneficiary institutions have the latitude for independent action. The PP team must design the right mix of conditions and incentives to ensure that parliamentarians and journalists have the opportunity to operate freely and without unwarranted pressure from the executive branch of government. If legally enforceable guarantees of independence cannot be obtained, then the PP team should consider moving the media and parliamentary support functions into the private/voluntary sector, or terminating such elements in the project entirely.

INPUTS:

1. Civic Education
2. Media Independence
3. Legislative Capacity
4. Coordinated Policy
Implementation
5. Project Management
6. Evaluation and Audit
7. Contingency

<p>OUTPUTS:</p> <p><u>1. Civic Education</u></p> <p>a. FODEP institutional capacity strengthened.</p> <p>b. Zambian citizens receive civic education</p> <p>c. Legal rights are clarified in key areas</p> <p><u>2. Media Support</u></p> <p>a. access to resour. improved.</p> <p>b. Journ./Media educ. trained.</p> <p>c. Leg./instit. constnts identified.</p> <p><u>3. Parl.Capacity</u></p> <p>a. NA Comm.staff capac. augmntd in pol.anal. and leg. drafting</p> <p><u>4. Coordinated Policy</u></p> <p>a. Progress in sel. elements of pub. sector reform prog.</p> <p>b. Cab.off. play role in info. flow.</p> <p>c. Inter-min. coord. improved.</p>	<p>MAGN.OF OUTPUTS REQUIRED TO SHOW PURPOSE ACHVEMNT</p> <p>1 a.1. FODEP receives req'd support and add'l. tng.</p> <p>a.2. FODEP carries out civic educ. activities, incl. workshops and nat'l. info. exchnng network.</p> <p>1.b. Citizen part. in civic educ. activ.</p> <p>1.c Judicial rulings on key legal questions.</p> <p>2.a. Media res. cntr estbl'd.</p> <p>b. Journalists and media educators receive tng. and apply new skills and educ. devlp impr.curr.</p> <p>c. Approp. studies conduc.</p> <p>3.a. Relevant training/TA/resources provided.</p> <p>4.a. incr. analytic and mang. capacity in CO.</p> <p>b. Implmnt. of cab. dec. subjt. to monitor.</p>	<p>Note:M&E system part of PP design.</p> <p>1. NGO record, contractor reports, spec. assant, field trips, civic educ. document., legal records, etc.</p> <p>Contractor reprts, mid-term eval. of press quality, new courses, text of study,etc.</p> <p>3. Legisl. proceedings, mid-term eval, contractor rprts.</p> <p>4. donor reports, mid-term eval, contractor reprts, relevnt Cab. docum.</p>	<p>* FODEP cont. to have public conf. and to be involv. in civic educ.</p> <p>* Demand cont. for civic educ.</p> <p>* Jud. system respnsive to rel. legal quest.</p> <p>2. * training/ resources/studies are desired and can be utilized.</p> <p>3. Training is utilized and MPs demand more from staff.</p> <p>4. Cab.Off. wants and can utilize extrnl aid.</p>
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<p>PURPOSE : Make Public Decisio n- making More Accessi ble and Effecti ve</p>	<p>1. <u>Accessibility:</u> a. The initiation or amending of legislation by MPs on political and economic reform is increased. b. Diversity of opinion and well-informed debate in all media increased. c. Citizens ability to effectively articulate and present preferences to public officials is increased.</p> <p>2. <u>Effectiveness:</u> a. Cabinet increasingly implements decisions according to stated goals. b. Cabinet increasingly coordinates implementation of programs involving more than one ministry.</p>	<p>1.a. Legislative records: including legis.intro, invest. reports, press releases, etc. b. Press articles, opinion pieces, letters to the editor, etc. c. Documentation presented by citizens to public officials. Evidence of changes of administrative behavior. Survey reports/polling results/mid and final evaluations; fieldtrips.</p> <p>2. Cabinet memos, minutes, and instructions, M&E reports of unit, other donor reports, contractor reports.</p>	<p>* MPs are not blocked from initiating or amending legislation by party discipline. * Citizens are able to overcome inhibitions or constraints to participation, including legal, administrative or cultural obstacles. * Media operates in an environment which allows free access to public information and freedom in reporting and publishing information. * GOZ has political will and adequate budgetary and human resources to implement decisions.* Cabinet has adequate authority to coordinate implementation of programThe GOZ continue to desire outside technical/institutional support. * Zambians at all levels of society, particularly in leadership, continue to embrace principles and support norms of accountability</p>
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NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIF. INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p>GOAL: Promote Accountable Government</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Improved governance capabilities in national government structures. * Strengthened civil society institutions as channels for citizen accessibility. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * International Human Rights Reports, including State Department Country Reports, other donors reports, especially UNDP and World Bank public Sector Management reports, national events reports. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * GOZ maintain commitment and significant steps to achieve accountability. * Zambian citizens actively seek hold their government accountable. * GOZ continue welcome donor support for political and economic reforms.

ATTACHMENT B

BASIS FOR WAIVER OF 25 PERCENT GRZ CONTRIBUTION

The Mission is requesting a waiver of the requirement under Section 110 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended that the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) contribute financially or in kind at least 25 percent equivalent to the budget. USAID-financed projects in Zambia qualify for this waiver because Zambia is on the list of low-income countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD.

The country is characterized by extreme poverty, limited infrastructure, and limited administrative capacity to implement basic human needs growth strategies. Financial constraints inhibit the government from meeting the requirement for a 25 percent contribution, particularly at a time when the country is facing the effects of the worst drought in living memory. The government has demonstrated keen interest in the objectives of this project by its action to open the political system to more political parties and encourage more participation in the political process.

The nature of the project is largely oriented to non-governmental organizations. During the design of the Project Paper, contributions in kind will be calculated for the Memorandum of Understanding with such government entities as the National Assembly, the Cabinet Office. The MOUs with the Zambia Institute for Mass Communication and the Foundation for Democratic Process will require careful PP team negotiation and analysis in order to arrive at a realistic plan for sustaining new initiatives.

Draft Project Paper Text

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

When Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) government took power by means of free and fair elections in October 1991, Zambia became the first English-speaking country in postcolonial Africa to undergo a democratic transition. As a result of a landslide electoral victory, President Chiluba enjoys a mandate for sweeping reform and has promised his fellow Zambians a market-based economy and a democratic policy.

~~Yet the obstacles are formidable. On the economic front, Zambia inherited a monumental~~ international debt, declining living standards, and a severe shortage of capital and skills. Politically, the institutions and habits of one-party rule are proving to be deeply embedded in the Zambian political culture. In the wake of a rapid political transition, Zambia still lacks a full range of civic and governmental institutions to consolidate and sustain democracy.

The goal of the Democratic Governance Project is to promote accountable government in Zambia. Where the structure of existing governmental and civic institutions impedes accountability, resources will be directed to organizational reform and strengthening. Where the process of decision-making encounters blockages in the free flow of information, resources will be provided to produce and disseminate democratic and policy-relevant ideas. The Project emphasizes the complementarity of interventions to support "demands" for accountable government from civil society and to enable a "supply" of accountable government by the public service.

The purpose of the Project is to render public decision-making more accessible and effective. By accessibility is meant enhanced involvement in decision-making by citizens and their representatives; by effectiveness is meant the implementation of public policies consistent with stated goals. Whether the Project purpose is achieved depends upon progress achieved in four strategic areas:

- increasing citizen awareness of civil rights;
- enabling independent and professional journalism;
- enhancing the legislative performance of the National Assembly; and
- co-ordinating policy implementation in the Cabinet Office.

The Democratic Governance Project is consistent with goals of public accountability expressed in AID's Democratic Initiative and the Africa Bureau's Working Paper on Governance. The Project also contributes to the goals of the Development Fund for Africa by helping to create, through popular participation, a more conducive environment for economic development. The Project fits squarely within the evolving USAID/Zambia country strategy to promote broad-based economic growth by directly enhancing economic and political pluralism.

Above all, the Democratic Governance Project is a field-driven initiative which reflects needs expressed by Zambian citizens and their government and which evolved in full consultation with prospective grantee institutions. Project components were selected according to criteria of short-term targets of opportunity and long-term potential to contribute to the consolidation of democracy. Beneficiaries include the civic and governmental institutions receiving direct support from the Project and Zambian citizens who, through these institutions, participate more fully in governing and developing their country.

~~The following activities will be undertaken within four Project components:~~

A. Civil Rights Promotion. After public consultation, the Ministry of Legal Affairs will revise the Constitution of Zambia to enhance individual rights and legislative powers. The Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) will launch a nationwide education campaign on the rights and responsibilities of citizens. Other civic associations and NGOs will provide legal assistance on rights cases, particularly for women.

B. Media Independence. Journalists will be trained at the University of Zambia (UNZA) and the Zambia Institute of Mass Communications (ZAMCOM). A Media Resources Center will be established, possibly including a printing press, to provide resources to independent journalists. Studies will be conducted on the feasibility of the printing press, the legislative environment for press freedom, and options for privatization of the media.

C. Legislative Performance. In the National Assembly, Members of Parliament will improve their capacity to initiate and scrutinize legislation and to communicate with constituents. The Project will provide MPs with an augmented committee staff, a legal drafting fund, study tours, and equipment for the Committee and Publications offices. Assisted by consultants, MPs and staff will undertake studies to recommend changes to the structure and procedures of the parliament.

D. Policy Coordination. The Cabinet Office will create a policy and management unit. Its role is to screen ministerial policy proposals for consistency with government policy and to develop implementation plans for Cabinet decisions. The Project will provide international and Zambian short and long-term technical assistance, short-term training, and relevant equipment. This component will enable the Cabinet (rather than individual ministries) to become the nerve center of accountable and effective government.

Because the Democratic Governance Project marks the entry of USAID/Zambia into a sensitive and complex area of assistance programming, the USAID Mission will take an active part in Project management, rather than passing management responsibilities to an independent contractor. The Mission will recruit a resident Country Democracy/Governance Adviser under a personal services contract to monitor the evolving D/G environment in Zambia and to devise appropriate policy, program and Project responses.

The D/G Adviser will be supported administratively by a resident Project Manager. On policy matters the adviser will be guided on policy issues by a D/G Policy Advisory Committee drawn from the U.S Country team, and on management issues by a D/G Project Management Board composed of Zambians representing grantee and beneficiary interests.

The Project will be jointly authorized under the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) and the Democracy and Human Rights Fund (section 116(e)). This approach is consistent with the ~~guidance provided in May 1991 by the Africa Bureau's Office of General Counsel, which advises such an approach in instances where projects are equally supportive of both economic development and civil and political rights objectives.~~

The U.S. contribution over the five year life of the Project is estimated at \$15 million. Where possible, technical assistance will be provided through by-ins, for example to the Implementing Policy Change (IPC) project, the Human Resources Development and Governance (HRDA) facility, and the Africa Bureau Democracy and Governance (AFD/G) Project.

[Summary of Project's financial plan, inserted here by Mission]

Implementation will begin immediately upon Project authorization with high priority given to the GRZ's constitutional reform initiative and to recruiting a D/G Advisor. Project design will be constantly reviewed in the light of the dynamic evolution of the Zambian political economy. To this end, a comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation plan will gather data on Project inputs, outputs and impacts. The Project will also support special studies on the effect of democratization on economic reform, political culture, and gender issues in Zambia for use by the GRZ, AFR/ONI, USAID/Zambia and other 'Missions' with D/G programs.

Measurable achievements will be manifest by the end of the Project period. Public decision-making will have become more accessible and effective as a consequence of the following Project outcomes: a new set of liberalized political rules under a revised Constitution; a better informed and more active citizenry; a strengthened array of civic associations; a professionalized and independent corps of journalists; a more pluralistic legal and business environment for the media; a stronger parliament in which MPs play an enhanced role in initiating and scrutinizing legislation; and a Cabinet Office which is able to effectively coordinate the making and implementation of government policy. In sum, by promoting accountable government, the Project will make major contributions to the consolidation of democratic institutions and processes in Zambia.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Political Setting

Zambia recently set a major developmental precedent in Africa by becoming the first English-speaking country on the continent to undergo a democratic transition. In late 1991, power passed peacefully from one civilian leader to another as the result of free and fair elections and without the intervention of military forces. ~~Moreover, at least temporarily, the regime of governance shifted away from the monopolistic restrictions of single-party rule and towards the more pluralistic and competitive practices of multi-party democracy.~~

The democratic transition in Zambia was extremely rapid. It began after the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989, when trade unionist Frederick Chiluba challenged the incumbent president, Kenneth Kaunda, to abandon his outdated commitment to single-party socialism. Riots in June 1990 to protest an increase in the price of the staple food were soon followed by mass demonstrations calling for the restoration of multiparty politics. In a series of landmark political reforms -- first to allow a referendum on multipartyism, then to move directly to elections, and finally to amend the constitution -- Kaunda gradually ceded ground to the opposition.

The transition culminated in the general elections of October 1991. A coalition rallying under the banner of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) soundly defeated the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). In an electoral landslide, MMD secured 125 out of 150 parliamentary seats and Chiluba won 75 percent of the presidential vote. The convincing margin of victory endowed the new government with a valuable resource: political legitimacy. Chiluba obtained a clear mandate from the Zambian electorate to undertake sweeping changes in economic and political life. When he was sworn in as President of the Third Republic of Zambia on November 2, 1991, Chiluba solemnly promised his countrymen not only a liberalized economy, but also democracy and human rights.

Already, some ten months after the elections, the euphoria and high expectations that accompanied the MMD victory have begun to rapidly fade. The difficulties involved in an effort to consolidate democracy and privatize the economy at the same time are being starkly revealed. On the one hand, the austerity measures necessary to put the economy on a sound footing threaten to undermine the new government's hard-won legitimacy. On the other hand, the refreshing atmosphere of pluralism and debate in Zambian politics sometimes distracts leaders into unproductive political squabbles.

Indeed, power struggles within the MMD leadership have caused uncertainty and fluidity, and delayed institutional consolidation. There are two main factions: the "idealists" (including Chiluba) who actively promote the values of accountable and transparent governance, and the "opportunists", who are popularly perceived to be using political office as a means to personal enrichment. Two Cabinet Ministers resigned in July 1992 charging

corrupt practices in the upper echelons of government. Within this context, President Chiluba has been reluctant to exercise the powers of the presidency and has allowed his ministers considerable latitude. The latter have often disregarded the norm of collective responsibility by making unauthorized policy statements and actions. As a result, the MMD government has been slow to articulate coherent policies and has been unable to ensure their coordinated implementation.

~~Moreover, the habits of one-party rule die hard. Certain MMD party bosses have displayed an intolerance for political nonconformism and a proclivity to overstep their authority. In the~~ view of one Lusaka observer, "the government feels threatened by anyone who won't take orders". Supporters of opposition parties have been threatened with deprivation from development benefits and dissenters within the MMD with expulsion from its ranks. The struggle over these issues is by no means settled; but by default as much as design, the MMD government may find itself emulating the authoritarian political style of UNIP. Already, its early commitments to uphold freedom of association and freedom of speech are in danger of ebbing.

Opposition political forces are not well organized to counter tendencies towards political monopoly. The official opposition party, UNIP, has a small parliamentary presence and a narrow popular base, mainly in the Eastern Province. Instead, parliamentary backbenchers within MMD have played the most articulate opposition role. In addition, many of the tasks of holding government accountable fall to institutions in civil society. The media and civic associations take on added importance in Zambia as sources of pressure on the MMD to uphold its electoral promises of democracy, human rights, and good governance.

Because the political transition in Zambia unfolded so quickly, the supporters of political reform had little opportunity to firmly establish democratic institutions. Chiluba came to power as leader of a social movement which loosely stitched together a diverse coalition of business, labor, professional and student groups. These groups were united less by shared fundamental interests than by the immediate objective of ousting the Kaunda regime. The MMD itself was a rudimentary political structure, whose party organization was hastily erected for the purpose of contesting the elections. The political openings provided by the transition also gave birth to a host of new organizations in Zambian civil society, ranging from independent newspapers to election monitoring groups. These elements remain fragile and urgently in need of institutional strengthening if they are to play a constructive role in helping to consolidate democracy in Zambia.

Most significantly, the new government inherited a set of governmental institutions that had been designed to control the society and the economy. Under Kaunda, the Office of the President was an all powerful center of decision-making, and the Cabinet and civil service were reduced to the role of implementing presidential policy directives. The contribution of technocrats to policy analysis was denigrated, leading to low morale throughout the executive branch. The legislature was occupied by members elected in single-party elections and was virtually indistinguishable from the parliamentary caucus of UNIP. The government-owned

print and electronic media were used to disseminate official propaganda and to limit the flow of information. Since these institutions remained intact after the 1991 elections, the new government faces formidable challenges. Not only must it transform fundamentally the structure of inherited governmental institutions, but also initiate a new relationship between state and society based on the free flow of information.

The resource of political legitimacy is easily dissipated, and the MMD government has already spent some of its endowment. But, given diligent husbandry, governments can also renew and expand their legitimacy. In part this can be done by providing people with tangible economic benefits. But governments also renew legitimacy by distributing political goods such as genuine participation in decision-making. Between elections, this is best achieved by granting citizens a stake in the public policy process. In Zambia, the challenge facing the government is to sustain its legitimacy and public support until such time as the benefits of economic restructuring become widely felt. This suggests the need for concerted effort at strengthening political institutions both within and outside of the state, and at providing linkages that allow for popular participation in the policy process.

The democratic governance project identified in this document derives from the above premises. The consolidation of democracy in Zambia is an important goal in itself, a vital component in economic growth, and a model of political change that is being closely watched throughout Africa. For all these reasons, substantial USAID assistance for democratic governance in Zambia is warranted at this time.

B. Economic Setting

The economic challenges facing the MMD government and the new Third Zambian Republic are daunting. Zambia faces a monumental debt, a continuing high rate of inflation, chronic shortages of both capital and developmental skills, a deteriorating infrastructure, and a reputation of high risk and unreliability among international donors and investors. Most of these problems are the outcome of two decades of economic mismanagement by the former ~~UNIP regime. These long-term problems are now exacerbated by the current Southern~~ African drought, which has drastically reduced output in the agricultural sector and put even additional strain on limited resources. Finally, Zambia faces what is perhaps the most difficult adjustment challenge in all of sub-Saharan Africa, as its copper-based economy can no longer effectively sustain the high-levels of urbanization and industrialization earlier achieved. But while the challenges are many, the opportunities are also great. Zambia is a resource rich country with tremendous agricultural potential, strategically located at the crossroads of central and southern Africa. With an energetic new government committed to market-based economic development, and with continuing support from the international community, Zambia has the ability to reverse its long period of economic decline.

Since independence, the Zambian economy has been dominated by the production and export of copper. On the basis of copper exports, a generation ago Zambia became the most urbanized, and one of the most industrialized countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Per capita GDP in the early 1970s reached nearly \$ 800; Zambia was a middle-income country. However, the UNIP government utterly failed to take advantage of its copper resources to successfully diversify the economy. Rather, Zambia became an extreme example of "Dutch Disease", in which the growth of a dominant sector coexisted with the drawing away of resources from other key areas of economic life leading to overall economic decay. Copper resources were used to dramatically expand the public sector, promote import-intensive consumption, and subsidize key consumer items. Mining industry wages swelled and set the standard for those in the public service and in import-substituting industry. Agriculture and non-copper export production suffered, and there was little incentive for efficiency in production.

By the mid-1970s, with the collapse of international copper prices, it was evident that such a system was not going to be sustainable. But, for years, nothing was done and the economy steadily deteriorated until reaching a crisis point in 1982, when international trade credits to Zambia were suspended. From this point, throughout the remainder of the 1980s, the UNIP government became dependent upon the IMF and World Bank for financial breathing space. In turn, these institutions, along with bi-lateral donors such as USAID, attempted to promote economic policy changes designed both to restore basic macro-economic balance and to enable the country to reduce its dependency upon copper.

With support from the IMF and the World Bank, the UNIP government initiated several attempts to stabilize and restructure the economy. None of these reform programs was sustained, however, as they challenged the ideology and political interests of key elements of

the UNIP regime and its constituency, and were inconsistent with the patronage-based system of governance that UNIP maintained. Economic reform was turned on and off, depending on the balance of political and financial exigencies. Throughout the course of the 1980s the economic crisis deepened.

The most comprehensive of the economic reform efforts was the 1985 - 1987 program, the centerpiece of which was the foreign exchange auction. Despite initial signs of real success, ~~this program was abandoned in May, 1987, amidst rising popular discontent. During the next two years, the~~ ~~Zambian government attempted to implement a program that combined~~ elements of economic reform with elements of the traditional UNIP control regime that had marked earlier periods of policy-making. This too failed and in 1989, the UNIP government again turned to the IMF and the World Bank for support. This time, there was evidence that a deeper consensus had been reached on the need for fundamental economic reform, both within the UNIP leadership, among government technocrats, and in the country in general. The reality had set in that time was running out before Zambia's copper resources would be virtually spent. A highly ambitious reform program was articulated; and actual implementation was begun. By this time, however, the UNIP regime was politically spent, and faced mounting domestic unrest. Its capacity to undertake and sustain politically challenging fundamental economic reform was virtually nil. It was Zambia's good fortune that the process of political liberalization had established momentum, and UNIP was ousted from power in the November 1991 election.

The new MMD government, led by Frederick Chiluba, rode to power with a promise to thoroughly reverse the statist and inward-looking economic strategy followed by UNIP. The new government's economic policy team is dominated by private businessmen with a market-oriented philosophy. They immediately recognized both the need for fundamental economic reform and the need to act quickly in politically difficult but needed policy initiatives, both to take advantage of domestic political legitimacy and to win the confidence of the donor community.

Thus, in December, 1991, President Chiluba announced the removal of the subsidy on super-refined maize meal. More recently, it has totally eliminated the consumer subsidy on all maize meal and fertilizer. The government has articulated ambitious goals for itself in both economic stabilization and structural transformation. The fiscal deficit, which increased dramatically in the run-up to the November election, is targeted to be reduced this year to less than 2 % of GDP, the main element of the government's efforts to gain control over inflation. Fiscal and monetary restraint will be especially important given the continuing need to depreciate the kwacha. In June, Parliament passed the Privatization Bill, which authorized the initiation of a sweeping program of selling off of state-owned companies and set up a privatization agency to run the program. The government is also undertaking an ambitious public sector reform program designed to rationalize the bureaucracy and re-shape the way government does its business.

But despite the policy turnaround, the Zambian economy remains in a precarious state. In

1991, GDP fell by close to 2 percent, implying a drop in per capita income of 5%. In 1992, the drought has ruined hopes for an agricultural production - led recovery. The maize harvest was only 30% of normal and other crops were also down. Many manufacturing industries have been hurt by lack of inputs from the agricultural sector. Continuing shortages of foreign exchange, as well as low levels of domestic demand, also hamper the manufacturing sector. On the bright side, the improved performance of ZCCM and stabilizing copper prices have helped the balance-of-payments, which has also benefitted from quite generous debt relief and re-scheduling. ~~Other mining revenues have also increased, and the depreciation of the kwacha has also enabled an expansion of the revenue base, a crucial component of the government's fiscal efforts.~~ Unfortunately, strikes have led to large wage settlements, including in the public sector, limiting efforts at expenditure control. Public sector retrenchment efforts are also well behind schedule.

In sum, while the MMD government has made some important policy initiatives in the area of economic stabilization, and has rapidly moved to improve the environment both for exports and for private investment, the road to economic recovery is still very difficult. In particular, important legacies of the UNIP one-party state -- a plethora of inefficient state-owned enterprises, the bloated public service, and a maze of bureaucratic procedures -- remain continuing constraints to sustainable economic growth. The economic challenges facing government will continue to be intense, complicated by the unpredictabilities of the newly open political environment.

But the opportunities for expanded output and for new investments are many: in agriculture, in mining, in tourism, and in industry. If the new government continues to implement consistently its economic reform program, it will gain the credibility investors need to risk their capital and energy.

C. Perceived Problems and Opportunities

In the wake of a rapid political transition, Zambia still lacks a full range of civic and governmental institutions to consolidate and sustain democracy. Most existing institutions are pervaded by practices of arbitrary decision-making and an ethic of regulation and control that originated in an earlier period of autocracy. A whole generation has grown up without direct experience of how a democratic polity operates. The challenge is to support those Zambians, within both government and civil society, who perceive the urgent need to institutionalize recent democratic gains.

The accession to power of the MMD government offers an unprecedented opportunity to promote a more liberal regime of governance. Under President Chiluba, a powerful faction of "idealists" in the leadership plans to change fundamentally the rules of the political game in Zambia. For example, the Ministry of Legal Affairs intends to honor an MMD election pledge to reform the Constitution. The aim is to expand protections for individual citizens under the Bill of Rights and to embody checks and balances on executive power, for example by enhancing the independence of the legislature. Instead of convening another expensive

public commission of inquiry, the Ministry has opted instead to reopen the files of the 1991 Mvunga Commission on constitutional reform. For the first time, the Ministry would publish the full range of public opinion expressed to the commissioners, reopen the debate on constitutional rules, and promulgate a new and liberalized Constitution during 1993.

There are also opportunities for Zambia to begin to develop a more democratic political culture. Even though many citizens enthusiastically participated in the 1991 elections, voter turnout remains disappointingly low, especially in local and by-elections. A legacy of violent intimidation still inhibits ordinary people, especially the less educated, from fully exercising their constitutionally guaranteed rights. And constituents remain uninformed and passive about requiring accountability from their parliamentary representatives after elections. Fortunately, there are groups of citizens in Zambia who are determined to address such problems. A coalition of NGOs, which was mobilized for election monitoring in 1991, is now poised to apply civic education and action programs to the longer-term task of consolidating democratic institutions and practices in Zambia.

Within the central government apparatus, policy-making had previously been overcentralized in the Office of the President. In the new Third Republic, decision-making is far more pluralistic, having shifted to individual Ministers. In the last nine months, the pendulum of decision-making in Zambia swung swiftly and uncontrollably from Presidential to Ministerial decision-making without coming to rest in Cabinet. There is thus need to support the government's aim to restore the primacy of the Cabinet as the constitutionally-mandated center of executive branch decision-making. In particular, the Cabinet Office seeks support to strengthen its capacity in the strategic management of policy implementation, especially with regard to complex policies that involve more than one ministry. In addition, the MMD has reconceptualized the role of government to deemphasize intervention and control in favor of functions that facilitate private and voluntary initiative. Accordingly, all executive agencies must be retooled with appropriate skills. Civil servants, who still display old habits of caution and passivity, badly need incentives to reward entrepreneurship and to be trained in policy analysis.

Both constitutionally and in practice, the legislative branch of government is weak in relation to the executive. The 1991 constitution added legislative powers, for example, by increasing the number of MPs to 150 and strengthening their hand to repeal a state of emergency. Backbench MMD MPs have taken full advantage of new opportunities to criticize and amend legislation and appointments proposed by the executive branch, making the current parliament the most lively and productive in recent Zambian history. Though the new MPs are better educated than their predecessors, they still lack complete understanding of legislative procedure and the technical aspects of economic reform measures. The staff of the Assembly is currently ill-equipped to provide MPs with timely and relevant information. Moreover, Parliament inherited an image as a closed and secretive institution which does not sit well in the new atmosphere of pluralism and openness of debate in Zambia.

The media remains largely government owned, including all radio and television outlets, two

of the three major national newspapers, and the only two printing presses in the country. Although freedom of the press was one of the basic rights that MMD pledged to uphold in its campaign manifesto, there are struggles within the government over whether to retain controls on the media. Pronouncements by some Cabinet Ministers, notably denying the right to criticize the state president, have had a chilling effect on a press traditionally used to conformity with authority. On the other hand, the appointment of a liberal Minister of Information in August 1992 gives a signal that the government, at least for the moment, does ~~not intend to use the sweeping legal powers available under a battery of inherited press~~ legislation. Most importantly, the continued activity of independent newspapers is a signal that the fourth estate, if strengthened and protected, could play a vital watchdog role in Zambia's Third Republic.

III. PROGRAM FACTORS

A. Conformity with Africa Bureau Strategy

The activities under the Democratic Governance Project are consistent with A.I.D.'s evolving Democracy Initiative and with substantive elements of the A.I.D. Africa Bureau policy framework. Specifically, the project responds directly to key elements of the current Africa Bureau D/G strategy of emphasizing democratic governance, which combines elements of public management effectiveness, legitimacy and public responsiveness, accountability, information openness, and pluralism and participation. The project also seeks to enhance prospects for long-term sustainable economic development in Zambia -- a critical objective of the Development Fund for Africa. As recognized in the A.I.D. November 1991 Policy Paper "Democracy and Governance", and the Africa Bureau's June 1992 Concept Paper on Governance, a system of democratic governance provides the most promising enabling environment for broad-based economic growth, by fostering not only competent and effective public management, but offering the opportunity for non-state actors to have access to information about and channels to influence decision-making in key areas.

Consistent with the Africa Bureau approach of field-driven initiatives in the D/G area, the Project is designed to ensure that activities strongly reflect Zambian priorities, i.e. in defining the agenda, in formulating the solution including choosing the most appropriate mechanisms, and ultimately in measuring whether the solutions were correct and had the desired effect.

The Project will be funded under the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) (Section 496 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended), with joint authorization under Section 116(e) of the Act (concerning Human Rights). This approach is consistent with the guidance, provided in May 1991 by the Africa Bureau's General Counsel, which advises such an approach in instances where the project is supportive of the development objectives reflected in the DFA, but equally supportive of the overall 116(e) framework by virtue of its direct linkage to supporting civil and political rights.

B. Conformity with USAID/Zambia Strategy

USAID/Zambia is developing plans to assist the democratically-elected government of Zambia without benefit of an approved Country Program Strategic Plan. Rather, the Project has been developed simultaneously with the preparation of an overall country strategy. The last Country Development Strategy Statement for Zambia was prepared in 1986 only to be undermined by GRZ delay and eventual noncompliance with economic restructuring plans. Thus, no relevant approved country strategy currently exists.

The Mission's provisional program around which the country strategy is being built identifies the overall program goal of market-oriented, sustainable, broad-based economic growth in Zambia. Subgoals are: (a) a socially stable, politically active and economically productive

population, and (b) a diversified economy. Three strategic objectives have been specified: (a) to decrease the transmission rate of HIV; (b) to broaden economic and political pluralism; and (c) to improve the economic performance of the food and agriculture sector. Together with the USAID/Zambia Privatization Project, the Democratic Governance Project directly addresses the Mission's strategic objective of broadening economic and political pluralism.

The Democratic Governance Project will directly support the GRZ Economic Recovery Program and will enhance economic growth in Zambia. ~~It will contribute to ensuring that~~ the government's many-faceted and complex economic reform strategy is effectively coordinated and implemented. It will help ensure that the Public Investment Program is both efficiently designed, and avoid the possibility of "white elephants." Through monitorable implementation guidelines, ministries will be held accountable for their actions. Central government will be enabled to effectively manage what, up until the present, has been an ill-coordinated set of public entities.

Other elements of the program will also enhance economic growth, albeit less directly. By strengthening institutions that hold government publicly accountable, the Project will reduce the likelihood of corrupt practices, and for ineffective policies being continued. It will increase the availability of reliable information, the lack of which is now an important component of Zambia's poor investment climate. Finally, the Project enhances the ability of Zambian citizens to demand effective economic performance from their government.

C. Government of Zambia D/G Strategy

The basic strategic direction of the Chiluba government is set forth in the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy Manifesto of 1991. Its key tenets include:

- respect for fundamental human rights, including the rights of expression, religion, movement and association, as well as a commitment to an independent judiciary and the rule of law;
- the ending of discrimination against women and minorities;
- the decentralization of government to local units responsible to the people they serve;
- privatization of public corporations and a redefinition of government's role as creator of an "enabling environment" for a market economy;
- progress toward steady economic growth and improved social welfare; and
- an end to the 27-year state of emergency.

MMD campaigned on this platform and against Kenneth Kaunda's disastrous record of economic mismanagement and political repression. Before the election and at his

inauguration, Chiluba stressed Zambia's perilous economic circumstances and warned that many years of hard-work lay ahead before circumstances would improve. At a press conference on August 5 1992, at which he dismissed two Cabinet Ministers, President Chiluba warned his Cabinet colleagues against power hunger and corruption. He confirmed that he intended to "continue to reform Government so that it becomes more accountable, transparent and responsive to the needs of the people" (Times of Zambia, August 6, 1992).

USAID/Zambia takes President Chiluba seriously in his professed commitment to a liberal, market-oriented, multi-party democracy. It is to sustain that commitment and strengthen democratic forces in Zambia -- both within government and without -- that the Democratic Governance Project is directed.

D. Other Donor D/G Strategies

Now that democracy and governance have been recognized as essential components of sustainable and equitable economic development, several donors are moving swiftly to establish programs in these areas. In Lusaka, interested heads of donor missions meet periodically for informal consultations on governance.

The UNDP is undertaking an important series of initiatives to improve civil service performance. These include the establishment of a performance evaluation system intended to help government ministries set and meet objectives, and new management techniques aimed at encouraging entrepreneurship and participation among middle-rank administrators. While the UNDP assistance program aims encompass the whole arena of "economic management" in Zambia, its actual scope of actions within Cabinet Office is limited to upgrading managerial ability of civil servants. Relevant UNDP and Zambian personnel, consulted during design of this Democratic Governance Project, agree that a policy-coordination function supported by the USAID project would nicely complement, and would not conflict with, their priorities.

UNDP, together with the Government of Australia, is also providing technical assistance and equipment to facilitate drafting of privatization legislation in the Ministry of Legal Affairs. This assistance does not equip the Ministry to conduct its anticipated revision of the republican constitution.

The World Bank is in the process of defining problems and project activities under its public sector management reform program in Zambia. For this purpose, the Bank has convened two workshops (in Livingstone in February 1992, and in Ndola in July 1992) with senior Zambian civil service and donor personnel. World Bank projects in public sector management are expected to come on line in early 1993 (see Public Sector Reform Management Workshop, Volume II, Technical Annexes, Cabinet Office, 1992). One likely activity is a retraining project in small business management for employees retrenched in the government's program to reduce the size of the public sector.

Among bilateral donors, the Swedish Embassy in Lusaka played a lead role in the consortium which supported the administration and monitoring of the 1991 elections. The newly elected government in Stockholm has given a high profile to human rights in Sweden's foreign policy. Funding in this area for Zambia will rise in FY 1993 to cover small projects in institution building (ombudsman and local government elections commission), legal services, and training on democratic rights for youth and women. The Swedish Embassy is also assisting the Elections Office to acquire voting booths and balloting supplies. Their work with voluntary agencies will be conducted through Swedish NGOs.

The Norwegian picture is similar. NORAD's activities in the democracy area are primarily with NGO's, and are reactive rather than initiative. They respond to requests to support seminars, meetings, pamphlets, educational programs, and some operating expenses for groups such as the Women's Lobby Group and Non-governmental Organizations Coordinating Council.

The British Government has made recent increments to aid levels for Zambia, to the point that the country is now the largest recipient of ODA aid and drought relief in Africa. There is a major British D/G initiative on decentralization, based on integrated institutional development at the local level. Among the external donors in Zambia, the British support of programs in local government and field administration are deemed paramount. The National Assembly is not presently receiving significant amounts of assistance from bilateral sources. It has, however, received support from the independent Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in the form of short-term training visits in parliamentary procedure.

E. Relevant Country Team Experience

The U.S. Country team in Zambia is already active in the D/G arena. During the 1991 elections, the U.S. contributed diplomatic leadership and approximately \$200,000 through the A.I.D. Democracy and Human Rights Fund (DHRF) to support the first comprehensive effort at election monitoring in independent Africa. The U.S. funds were specifically aimed at building domestic election monitoring capacity within Zambian NGOs, including the forerunner of the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP). The Embassy has indicated its intention to make an additional small grant to FODEP for monitoring the 1992 local government elections.

This Democratic Governance Project also builds upon previous D/G initiatives by USIS/Zambia which have included teleconferences, study tours and technical assistance for Zambian parliamentarians, journalists and NGO leaders. A.I.D. funds through the International Executive Service Corps (IESC) have been applied to workshops on entrepreneurialism in the civil service, and DHRF funds were used to help sustain the National Women's Lobby Group (NWLG) at a time when it was under attack by anti-democratic elements. While such efforts have laid a valuable foundation for a more comprehensive program in democratic governance, interventions by the U.S. government have clearly been relatively modest to date.

Private U.S.-based agencies remain engaged in D/G work in Zambia. The Carter Center of Emory University cosponsored a workshop on civil society in February 1992 and a consultation on foreign investment in June 1992. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs will implement a project to build capacity within political parties in Zambia with funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (U.S.) and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (U.K.).

In light of the cited activities, the Democratic Governance Project presented here excludes support for political parties. Nor will the Project extend support to the judiciary given that this branch of government has already established a credible reputation of independence from the executive.

Instead, the Project will enable USAID/Zambia to enter several strategic D/G areas of pressing need that are largely unoccupied by any other donor. When this Project is authorized, USAID will become the lead donor in sponsoring democratic governance in Zambia.

IV. PROJECT RATIONALE

A. Project Strategy and Approach

The Democratic Governance Project is designed to contribute directly to the USAID/Zambia strategic objective of broadening economic and political pluralism. Apart from USAID/Zambia strategy, the Project serves as an important target of opportunity for USAID/Zambia in the context of rapid change in the premises for Zambia's economic development. The Project will help to pluralize the political and economic environment in Zambia. It will do so by building, strengthening and reorienting institutions in the governmental and non-governmental sectors, and by opening-up flows of information to and between citizens and institutions.

Accordingly, the Project goal of achieving accountable government is addressed through a pluralistic strategy that emphasizes the coequal importance of both civil society and the governmental sector.

Accountable government clearly requires interventions on the "supply side" of the policy process, that is, through internal reforms to centralized government agencies. The problem of administrative accountability is best addressed through organizational and procedural reforms in the public service. Such reforms ensure that civil servants are accountable to cabinet ministers (who in Zambia are elected parliamentarians) for the implementation of policy instructions. Thus, one Project component's activities are designed to streamline the coordination and oversight of policy implementation.

By the same token, accountable government also requires interventions on the "demand side" of the policy process. By this is meant measures to strengthen independent institutions in civil society to demand accessibility to governmental decision-making. Such an approach addresses the issue of political accountability, that is the responsiveness of a democratic government to the electorate that voted it into power. Other Project components will enable such institutions to express a wide spectrum of social interests and to insert popular preferences into decision-making processes.

The Democratic Governance Project thus targets mutually reinforcing program opportunities within the central government and within the civil society in Zambia. The Project features multiple (four) components whose objectives converge on improving governmental accountability in Zambia. This pluralistic approach offers the best chance of obtaining sustained improvements in democratic governance.

The Project begins from premise that USAID/Zambia must make careful and deliberate choices in order to help consolidate democratic institutions in the immediate post-transition period. The number of opportunities for creative D/G interventions far exceed the available resources. Realistic limitations must be placed on Project scope and choice of Project investments must be weighed by competing criteria such as critical need and potential for

meaningful impact. Moreover, the Project must address a set of locally identified needs, and support initiatives for which there is clearly expressed commitment by Zambians.

In addition, the D/G Project is designed in the full knowledge that the political environment in Zambia is fluid. After less than a year in power, the new MMD government is still finding its feet and testing means of converting its election promises into deliverable programs. The government's efforts are buffeted by recurrent tensions between political forces that favor institutional change and counterforces that find advantage in keeping ~~institutional arrangements as they are. Thus the political context allows some hope that aid~~ can make a positive impact. It is clear, however, that unanticipated opportunities and constraints for D/G work are likely to keep unfolding for some time to come.

In this uncertain environment, the Project approach is flexible. Project management must be equipped to respond appropriately to changing circumstances. For this reason the Project includes features which maximize design flexibility and enable the possibility of mid-course adjustments to ensure achievement of Project purposes and goals. For example, most of the Project components include phased plans of implementation. These require that carefully targeted conditions must be satisfied during initial project steps before resources are released for subsequent project activities. In addition, the Project manager is charged to continuously gather information on the changing political environment and provided with the mandate to redesign Project components and activities accordingly.

Because of the sensitivity and complexity of D/G issues, Project management must be located within the USAID/Zambia Mission rather than with an outside contractor, and be subject to continuous guidance from the U.S. Country Team through a D/G Policy Advisory Committee.

B. Project Goal

The general goal of the Democratic Governance Project is to promote accountable government. The concept of accountability lies at the heart of both democracy and governance in the best current theoretical and practical thinking. The goal of accountability also reflects the stated objectives of the Government of Zambia and is a core element in A.I.D. D/G strategy in both Washington and Lusaka.

In order to help achieve governmental accountability, the Project will address both the structures and processes of decision-making in selected institutions both within and outside government. Where the structure of governmental organizations impedes accountability, resources will be directed to organizational and managerial reform. Where the process of decision-making is impeded by blockages in the free flow of information, resources will be provided to produce and disseminate policy-relevant ideas.

Achievement of the overall goal of accountable government is beyond the scope of the Project alone. Much depends trends in the wider political environment. For example,

accountable government is only achievable if the GRZ maintains its current commitments to transparency and professionalism within government, if donors continue to provide adequate levels of support to assist in these efforts, and if Zambian citizens continue to pursue the commitment to political change that they displayed as voters in the 1991 elections.

Objectively, goal achievement can be verified by assessing the government's records on human rights and financial management, and on continued initiatives to make necessary political and economic reforms. It will also be manifest in cognitive and behavioral changes among public officials and citizens which demonstrate that they understand and act according to norms of accountability.

C. Project Purpose

The purpose of the Project is to make public decision-making more accessible and effective.

By accessibility is meant increasing the number of stakeholders actually involved in arriving at a public decision. These stakeholders may be individual citizens or they may be institutional interests, even within government. For example, Members of Parliament increase accessibility when they articulate the views of their constituents through legislative amendments to Cabinet bills and through committee investigations of administrative performance. Accessibility of decision-making is also enhanced when citizens gain information about governmental activities, for example through the media or civic education.

By effectiveness is meant the implementation of public policy according to stated goals. This element of decision-making lies almost exclusively within the governmental sector. For example, effectiveness of decision-making is enhanced when the Cabinet Office screens policy proposals for conformity with government policy and coordinates implementation of Cabinet decisions when more than one government ministry or department is involved.

Whether public decision-making in Zambia becomes more accessible and effective depends on progress achieved over the next five years in four strategic areas:

- increasing citizen awareness
- enabling independent journalism
- enhancing legislative performance
- coordinating policy implementation

Details of Project components to address each of these sub-purposes are provided in the Project Description below.

D. Expected Accomplishments and Beneficiaries

The project will achieve the purpose of rendering public decision-making more accessible and effective. It will do so by strengthening civil society and improving public governance. At

the level of project components the following achievements are expected:

- an increase in citizens' awareness of their political rights and duties;
- a more professional and independent media community;
- an enhanced capacity among Members of Parliament to initiate and scrutinize legislation, and to attend to constituency demands;
- improved management and implementation capacity for policies involving more than one ministry.

The Project will strengthen the communications media, by expanding its professionalism, making its practitioners more aware of press freedoms and strengthening their access to equipment needed for this function. The Project will promote a democratic political culture in Zambia by supporting programs of civic education and strengthening the NGOs which deliver the program. These activities will encourage a general understanding of democratic rights and duties, and improve the ability of citizens to defend those rights and fulfill those duties.

A particular focus in the civil society component will be on education about women's rights, and on engagement of women's organizations to implement these activities. Organizations with a proven track record of representing women's interests and needs will be relied upon to strengthen Zambian women's knowledge of their rights and increase their capacity to assert their civil and political rights in the new political environment.

In the area of public governance, the project will strengthen the ability of government to make and implement policy, and to respond to a new and evolving role as an enabler in a market-oriented system. It will do this via activities in the Cabinet Office. Finally, through activities in the National Assembly, the project will strengthen the legislative check on executive power, as well as the ability of society to engage in a policy dialogue with the executive branch as the latter defines and implements policy.

In general, the beneficiaries of this project are the Zambian people as a whole, who are directly affected by the accessibility and effectiveness of public decisionmaking, particularly in the key areas of political and economic policy reform.

V. DETAILED PROJECT DESCRIPTION

A. Civil Rights Promotion

This component of the Project will enable ordinary Zambians to obtain improved levels of understanding of their rights and responsibilities as citizens. They will subsequently act on this knowledge; by exercising the duty to vote and asserting their civil liberties, citizens will demand accountability from elected representatives and public officials. By urging the government to respond to their needs, they will increase the accessibility and effectiveness of government. In the process of raising citizen awareness and ability to act, the Project will enable the Ministry of Legal Affairs to revise the Zambian Constitution. The Project will also strengthen the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) and other NGOs to become major permanent institutions in Zambia's civil society and a leading civic force for the consolidation of democracy.

The achievement of objectives in this Project component will be measured according to a variety of indicators. At the level of outputs, the first measureable product will be a new Constitution. Project evaluators will also measure the number of civic education media messages delivered and community training workshops held. At the level of project outcomes, public opinion surveys (which are possible to conduct in Zambia for the first time in two decades) will be initiated to measure changes in mass political culture: in the knowledge of citizens about their political system, their levels of attachment to democratic values, and their degree of involvement in civic action. The sustainability of FODEP and other NGOs as self-reliant and free-standing institutions will also be assessed as an indicator of project progress and success.

The activities in this component of the Project are as follows:

1. Constitutional Reform.

The Ministry of Legal Affairs has set in motion a constitutional reform activity. With a grant from the Danish Embassy/Lusaka, the Ministry is printing for general distribution multiple copies of transcripts from the public hearings of the 1991 Mvunga Constitutional Commission. During the subsequent three months, the Ministry will record public comments to these transcripts and receive new written submissions of proposals for constitutional reform.

The Project will then step in by providing short-term technical assistance in the form of a specialist in constitutional law drafting and allowances for two Zambian counterparts. Under the guidance of the Minister, these experts will draft an amended Constitution which addresses proposals made by the government and the public. (The Chief Parliamentary Draftsman will be otherwise preoccupied with drafting privatization legislation.) The Project will also provide resources for the production and printing of short pamphlets in local languages summarizing the Commission transcripts and the new constitutional proposals.

Support will also cover seminars, radio and TV publicity spots, and equipment and printing costs to publish the new Constitution.

2. Civic Education.

a. Curriculum Development. FODEP will design a civic education curriculum and produce educational materials for a campaign to inform Zambians of their constitutional rights. Project assistance will be used to prepare pamphlets containing simplified versions of Zambian and international human rights instruments in English and four local languages. Women's rights will be included and curriculum development will be synchronized with the constitutional reform initiative being taken simultaneously by the Ministry of Legal Affairs. Key campaign themes will be presented in posters, print ads, radio and TV ads, and popular theater presentations. In order to develop an accurate and appropriate curriculum, FODEP will draw on the services of expert Zambian consultants in such fields as law, graphic design, and adult education. Given Ministry of Education approval, FODEP will commission a local political scientist to rewrite the civics textbooks used in Zambia's government secondary schools to reflect the new norms of political pluralism and rules of democracy.

In order to produce educational materials, FODEP will require its own basic facilities (equipment for desk-top publishing, video equipment), but will draw for sophisticated production jobs on the Project-sponsored Media Resources Center (see Media Strengthening below) as this becomes established. FODEP will produce pilot educational materials, undertake field testing, and continuously adapt messages and materials in response to feedback from the field.

b. Educational Outreach. FODEP will disseminate its rights' awareness messages through a national campaign to reach a broad cross-section of citizen in urban and rural communities. The FODEP methodology, tested in its election monitoring programs, involves training of volunteer trainers. Volunteers are drawn from NGOs, womens' groups, church congregations and parent-teacher associations in each locality. Each year, FODEP will convene one-week training workshops in each of Zambia's nine provinces to infuse trainers with skills for civic education. These trainers will form a network of district and community committees to serve as a conduit for training and other activities. The FODEP National Coordinator will design and manage a program to closely monitor the performance and results of workshops held in the field (see Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, below).

The outreach methodology will include community-level workshops, discussion sessions, and a national media campaign. The methodology will vary according to region and target audiences, which will include adults (literate and non-literate), women, schoolchildren, and political leaders, especially local government councilors. Besides providing general information about citizens rights and responsibilities, FODEP plans to train constituents to demand accountability from Members of Parliament. In order to operate a national outreach program, FODEP requires one four-wheel drive all-terrain vehicle and one utility vehicle,

together with adequate provision for fuel and maintenance.

3. Institutional Strengthening of FODEP.

a. Institutional Infrastructure. In support of the civic education campaign, the Project will provide FODEP with selected core institutional resources. These resources will enable FODEP to firmly establish itself as a leading force and permanent presence in Zambia's civic sector. The following infrastructural inputs are required in order to operate a national civic education program in Zambia: salaries for a small, three-person staff; per diem for staff on rural assignments; training for staff in desk-top publishing; and a modest national office.

FODEP has the potential to be highly cost effective because of its proven capacity to mobilize voluntary effort at the community level. But this voluntary effort requires backing from a professional staff and core institutional funding. USAID would be joined by other donors in underwriting FODEP's overhead costs; NORAD/Zambia and the Swedish Embassy/Lusaka are expected to contribute to FODEP's core budget as part of their planned support for monitoring the 1992 local government elections. The Christian Council of Zambia is expected to continue to cover salaries for a fourth staff member. Moreover, in order to make FODEP sustainable, the Project would provide a short-term consultant to help develop and implement a plan aimed at achieving financial self-reliance within five years.

b. International Exchange. The Project will assist FODEP to establish linkages with like-minded organizations elsewhere in the region and the world. Such contacts are vital to gain access to new ideas, share information, and to raise funds. After consultation with the D/G Advisor, a FODEP delegation (one Board member, one staffer, and one volunteer) will make a brief international study tour in each of the first three years, principally to learn about civic action programs and to gather relevant educational materials. And each year for the life of the Project, FODEP will invite one or two individuals from similar organizations outside Zambia to participate in ongoing educational programs. The Project will cover travel and maintenance costs for international exchange.

4. Civic Action Fund.

The D/G Advisor will administer a small grants fund to respond to, and to help develop, proposals for rights initiatives from civic associations in Zambia. These initiatives are expected to arise in the wake of FODEP's educational campaign as citizens attempt to act on the basis of their new-found awareness. For example, the NGO Coordinating Committee and the Law Association of Zambia already have expressed interest in delivering legal advice on cases of rights violation, especially regarding women. Other NGOs may request assistance with activities to broaden the base of popular participation in the political process, or to improve NGO performance at strategic management, financial management, or internal democracy.

Assisted by an administrative staff, the D/G Advisor will help nurture NGO proposals into fundable form and have delegated authority to dispense small grants. The Project Management Board will serve as a review and selection committee for project proposals. The five-year civic action fund of \$100,000 per year will provide five to eight small grants annually (along the lines of the USAID Human Rights small grants fund in South Africa). During the life of the Project, the D/G Advisor will explore the possibility of devolving administration of the small grants' fund to an umbrella NGO in Zambia, perhaps FODEP itself.

FODEP is expected to accumulate sufficient legitimacy and experience from implementing the civic education program that it will become an effective umbrella body for all NGOs concerned with civil rights action in Zambia.

B. Media Independence

The three main constraints to the development of an independent media in Zambia can be summarized as follows:

- Shortage of professional skills among journalists and other media operators, especially in policy analysis;
- Excessive government control and ownership of media institutions; and
- Inadequate resources for independent media operators to counterbalance government ownership and control of the media.

The Project will fund two policy studies with practical recommendations for press freedom and for the privatization of the media in Zambia. To promote the professional skills of media operators in Zambia, the Project will sponsor comprehensive and well targeted plans for training journalists at the Zambia Institute of Mass Communications (ZAMCOM), and journalism teachers at the University of Zambia's Department of Mass Communications (UNZA). The project will also sponsor deserving Zambian journalists and media managers to undertake internships with US media organizations.

The Project will fund the establishment of a Media Resources Center at ZAMCOM to nurture an independent press corps and to promote the development of an independent media in Zambia. This it should do by providing shared facilities to enable individuals already employed by the publicly-owned media to undertake freelance projects and by providing the fledgling private media (e.g. the Weekly Post) access to facilities such as machine printing outside government control. The Center will also support FODEP's civic education campaign by providing institutions involved in the campaign the facilities to produce materials for dissemination through a variety of media.

The Project will also produce a feasibility study of the printing press to be located at the

proposed Media Resources Center.

The training programs under the Project will provide journalistic skills and improve professional standards of media operators while also helping create a core of professional local media trainers. The program provides for the production of professionally trained entry-level journalists from UNZA and for the retraining and re-orientation of already working journalists through ZAMCOM. The studies on privatization and media legislation will suggest ways of reducing government ownership and control of the media, while the Media Resources Center will increase the access of independent media to the resources necessary to challenge this government monopoly at affordable cost.

Taken together, the three activities will promote the development of the kind of strong independent media necessary for the sustenance of democracy.

1. Studies

a) Legislative Environment. This study by the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) will examine all legislation currently in force in Zambia that limits the access to, and dissemination of, public information. It will review those laws that restrict freedom of expression and, or, restrict the operations of the media through excessive government regulation of the industry. The study will recommend which laws ought to be repealed or amended, and suggest where new legislation is required.

The study will be conducted by a four-person task force consisting of two lawyers and two journalists with extensive knowledge of media law and its application, both in the developing world and in developed democracies (one Zambian, one international in both categories).

(b) Privatization. The Zambia Confederation of Industries and Chambers of Commerce (ZACCI) will undertake this study to establish to what extent and in what fashion the currently government-owned media institutions can be privatized. The study will, for instance, review the merits of the government divesting itself of Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation or of restructuring ZNBC into a federated public broadcasting network outside direct government control or ownership. It will also review the current climate regulating media investments in Zambia, including access to resources such as newsprint, advertising revenues, and air-space allocation and recommend how it could be made more competitive and attractive to private investors.

This study will be conducted by a four-person task force consisting of a divestiture specialist, a financial analyst, a media lawyer, and an international consultant with extensive experience in the management of media systems - private and public - and especially broadcasting.

(c) Feasibility of Printing Press. The Country D/G Advisor will commission this study at the beginning of the second year of the project to do the following:

- Establish the level of demand for the Center's resources;
- Determine the printing capacity necessary to meet that level of demand;
- Determine what impact providing the Media Resources Center with a printing press of that capacity may have for the commercial printing sector and the local publishing market; and
- Determine the commercial viability of providing the printing press.

USAID/Zambia will use this report to determine the printing capacity to be installed at the Center.

2. Training

(a) At UNZA. The Project will assist UNZA's Department of Mass Communications' staff development program by sponsoring two faculty members for graduate training abroad. International resource persons contracted for the training program at ZAMCOM will also be used to conduct training seminars for UNZA faculty during their stay in Zambia.

The Project will also provide desk-top publishing equipment to the department's training program in publishing (the only one in the region).

(b) At ZAMCOM. To help improve the policy analysis capability of working journalists, the Project will sponsor well-targeted short-term courses for working journalists in such specialized areas as economic and political reporting, investigative journalism and news analysis. ZAMCOM plans to conduct three such courses a year running for not longer than 12 weeks. The Project will meet the cost of local resource persons who are not ZAMCOM faculty as well as funding three international resource persons per year for periods not exceeding four weeks per course. This arrangement ensures cost sharing where ZAMCOM meets the cost of its own trainers who provide the bulk of the training resources, and employers meet the fees for the training of their staff and for their accommodation at the Institute where required.

3. Internships

To broaden local journalists' perspectives, the Project annually will sponsor two Zambian journalists and one media manager from independent media to undertake internships with US media organizations for a period of not more than six weeks each. The Country D/G Advisor will be responsible for the management of this training component, including the selection of the participants.

4. Media Resources Center

The Project will provide the Center with a media library, a desk top publishing equipment pool, sound and video recording/editing equipment, a photographic unit, telex and facsimile equipment, and a printing press. The feasibility study required under the media component of the Project will determine the capacity of the printing press to be installed at the Center. The Project will provide for short-term TA for the installation of all equipment and for a two-year resident expert to ~~train ZAMCOM staff to run the Center~~ and advise local journalists on such things as how to use the facilities and how to sell their stories abroad.

Funding for these facilities will depend on the established level of demand and accessibility and on the ability of ZAMCOM to meet other conditions required by the Project regarding its autonomy and management efficiency.

In addition to the terms set out in the Conditions and Covenants, and in order to provide for maximum effectiveness of the Media Center, USAID/Zambia will encourage the GRZ to allow media practitioners, especially journalists, employed by the publicly-owned media to contribute professionally to non-competing media outlets locally and elsewhere in the region and abroad on a freelance basis. USAID/Zambia will also urge the GRZ to eliminate the monopoly currently exercised by the government-owned Zambia News Agency (ZANA) over the flow of foreign news into Zambia to allow independent media and the Media Center free access to the services of foreign wire news agencies of their own choice.

ZAMCOM will be expected to manage all the project activities funded under the Institute, including the Media Resources Center. The Project will provide assistance in the initial stage of the Project to assist ZAMCOM to develop sound financial management capability.

It is difficult to measure the social impact of the Activities provided under the media component. Evaluation indicators for the training activities will include records of the number of courses and seminars conducted; the number of participants in such course and seminars; the number of press reports, radio features or television documentaries produced by journalists who have undergone the training; and the records of responses from the media audience to such reports, features and documentaries through letters to the editor and other opinion pieces such as op-eds.

Indicators for the Media Resources Center will include records of the numbers and categories of users to measure the demand for and accessibility to the facilities at the Center. They will also include records on the quantities and frequency of contracts or jobs from the various users.

C. Legislative Performance

The Project will assist the National Assembly of the Republic of Zambia to perform its constitutionally mandated role as a sovereign policy-making body. Members of Parliament,

with the assistance of professionalized staff, will enhance their capacity to initiate and amend legislation and to scrutinize the performance of the executive branch. Accordingly, the Assembly will begin to abandon its old function of simply providing a stamp of approval for decisions taken in State House or in the national executive of the ruling party.

By the end of the first parliament of the Third Republic in 1996 there should be clear evidence that the National Assembly is playing a more active and critical role in policy-making and oversight. The impact of specific project interventions will be measured by a variety of target indicators. For example, project-sponsored studies will lead to a reorganization of structures and opening up of procedures within the Assembly. Staff upgrading, study tours and improved library research resources should result in increases in the proportion of parliamentary debate conducted by opposition or backbench members, and in the quantity and quality of select and sessional committee reports. Finally, as a direct result of project-provided legal drafting services, the numbers should increase of private members' motions and bills that are introduced and carried.

The activities in this component of the Project are as follows:

1. Studies

Under the sponsorship of the National Assembly, the Project will produce a set of studies that comprehensively assess the institutional changes necessary to reorient parliament to an expanded role in Zambia's Third Republic. Approval for the studies will be negotiated by the U.S. Country Team with the Speaker of the National Assembly. The studies are a top priority and first activity in this component of the Project and will provide recommendations to the Speaker's office. Release of funds for subsequent activities in this component will be guided by consideration of whether the Speaker's office makes good faith efforts to address key recommendations emanating from the studies.

Three studies are initially envisaged on the following topics:

(a) The relationship of parliament to other decision-making institutions. The key questions are: To what extent can MPs participate fully in decision-making? Are there factors that overly constrain their participation?

(b) The structure of the National Assembly, especially the distribution of functions within the committee system. Do existing committee structures and resources equip MPs to initiate, appraise and oversee legislation in a new era of economic and political reform? In particular, are the Public Accounts Committee and the committees responsible for parastatal bodies and privatization adequately prepared?

(c) Parliamentary administration, including personnel administration. How should the Assembly's Standing Orders be updated (e.g. to remove references to the Prime Minister, UNIP and Humanism) and revised (e.g. to enable the roles of parliamentary committees to

maximum effect)? Also, how can appointments and dismissals of Assembly staff be made transparent and justiciable?

Each study will be conducted by a four-person task force consisting of a senior National Assembly officer, a Member of Parliament, and two short-term consultants (one Zambian, one international). The D/G Advisor will assist Assembly staff in the identification of consultants and the Project will cover all consultant costs.

2. Staff appointments

The project will augment the National Assembly staff in key areas where professional skills are missing. In advance of the above studies, the following posts have been identified:

- a full-time lawyer/legal draftsman (with expertise in constitutional and/or corporate law) in the Legal Counsel Department,
- a senior accountant for attachment to the Public Accounts Committee; and
- an economist/financial analyst to support sessional committees on parastatals and privatization.

By offering competitive salaries, the Project will recruit Zambian professionals for these posts. The National Assembly will provide counterparts to be trained by these professionals and who will take over by the end of the life of Project. The project-supported professionals will provide specialized analytic services to key committees, especially those charged to oversee legislation on political and economic liberalization.

3. Study Tours

The Project will enable Zambian MPs and staff to study the role and operations of legislatures in other parts of the world. Study tours will be organized around specific project themes such as legislative research, committee operations, legal drafting, and constituency relations. Preference in participant selection will be given to MPs on key committees (e.g. Standing Orders, Parliamentary Procedure, Public Accounts, Parastatals/Privatization) and to heads of staff offices targeted in the project (i.e. Committee Department, Legal Counsel, Research Department, Library, and Parliamentary Debates [publications] Office). The preferred venues are Third World countries outside Africa, for example India and Sri Lanka, which constitute relevant and cost effective alternatives to Britain or the U.S. But, for specialized purposes, study tours to the latter countries could be considered.

Over the five-year life of the project, provision is made for five study tours, each for eight persons (four MPs and four officers). Responsibility for selecting the purpose, venues, and participants for each study tour will be shared by project management and the Clerk of the National Assembly.

4. Legal Drafting

The project will provide a small fund to supplement the legal drafting capacity of the Legal Counsel Department of the National Assembly. Its purpose is to enable MPs to draft private members' motions and private members bills for introduction on the floor of the Assembly. MP initiatives could include motions to repeal or amend legislation which is unsuited to the democratic aspirations of Zambia's Third Republic. The fund will be applied to purchasing short-term drafting services at commercial rates from private legal practitioners. The fund will be disbursed in annual tranches to ensure proper use. If necessary, the D/G Advisor will explore whether the administration of this fund should be fully privatized, for example to the Law Association of Zambia.

5. Library

The Project will help MPs to conduct better informed parliamentary debate by improving the information available to the Research and Committee staffs in the Library of the National Assembly. Books and periodicals on strictly selected subjects will be acquired. The target subjects are political liberalization (e.g. human rights, democratization, elections, legislatures) and economic liberalization (e.g. market economics, stabilization and adjustment, privatization, and business management). In addition, the Assembly library will be assisted to acquire long-term subscriptions to major international news journals (e.g. International Herald Tribune, Time, The Economist), in order to broaden the current general knowledge and intellectual horizons of MPs and staffers. The Librarian will draw up an acquisitions plan in consultation with the D/G Advisor.

6. Documentation and Publication

The Project will address administrative bottlenecks in Assembly operations which prevent timely production of documents for both MPs and the general public. Accordingly, the Committee Department will be equipped with wordprocessing, photocopying equipment and with new audio recording facilities for committee rooms. This will enable parliamentary committee meetings to be held more regularly and simultaneously, each with its own background briefs, minutes, and reports. The Parliamentary Debates [Publications] Department will receive reel-to-reel recorders, transcribing equipment, desk top and offset printing equipment. This will enable significant gains in the timely publication of Hansard and reports of select and sessional committees. The department will also be provided with consultant services to design a business plan for the distribution and sale of documents to the public.

D. Policy Coordination

This component of the Project facilitates the creation and institutionalization of a Policy Analysis and Management Unit in the Cabinet Office. This unit will be a new unit in the Cabinet Office and will be headed up by a Permanent Secretary, supported by a Deputy

Permanent Secretary. The head of the unit will report directly to the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, and will be responsible for coordinating the unit's activities with other units within the Cabinet Office.

A professional staff, with expertise in economics, policy analysis, management, legal issues, and information management should be assigned to the unit. This professional staff should number eight to ten (in addition to the PS and the DPS) and would be largely drawn from existing personnel from the Economic and Finance Unit, which will be folded into the Policy Analysis and Management Unit, and from elsewhere within the Public Service.

The central tasks of the Policy Analysis and Management Unit are two-fold.

First, the Unit will examine and analyze Cabinet Papers that are sent in from various ministries with the aim of: 1/ assessing their consistency with government policy; 2/ examining their implications for other units of government; and 3/ providing an independent analytical assessment, from a "national" as opposed to a "ministerial" perspective, to Cabinet. Thus, the unit will act as an "analytical screen" for material coming into Cabinet from the line ministries. In its analytical function it will not usurp the policy formulating role of the responsible ministries, but will provide an independent review and assessment for central decision-makers.

Second, the Unit will take the decisions of Cabinet and will assist the ministries to develop implementation plans that carry out the intention of Cabinet. It will put into place systems for monitoring the implementation of government policy, and ensure that ministries and statutory bodies are accountable for achieving specific objectives in implementation. This will enable the Cabinet Office to play a definitive voice as the expression of government on policy matters.

The project support to the Cabinet Office will be given in two phases: Phase One would last for six to nine months, to create the Policy Analysis and Management Unit. Phase Two activities will cover start-up of the Unit, and see it into full implementation.

1. Phase One Activities

Three Phase One activities are planned:

(a) Short-term technical assistance to work with senior Cabinet Office Staff in generating a detailed Terms Of Reference for the unit, including relationships with other GRZ bodies that have coordination functions, reporting relationships within Cabinet Office, and interactions with other units in the Office. The details of the appropriate staffing for the unit will also be determined, and scopes of work will be developed for all of the staff. Scopes of Work will also be developed for the two long-term advisors who will be supported under this component of the project. A training needs assessment will be undertaken to determine the training needed for enabling the personnel who will be in the unit to

accomplish the tasks of the unit. This assessment should begin from the assumption that all of the training to be supported under this activity will be short-term, and that most should be in-country. An equipment needs assessment to determine what additional equipment will be needed to enable the unit to achieve its aims will also be undertaken. This assessment will examine the degree to which underutilized equipment elsewhere in Cabinet Office can be used by the unit.

~~(b) Workshop funding, with technical assistance, to plan and facilitate a series of strategic management workshops that will serve to introduce the unit and its functions to other agencies of government. Three workshops, each with a somewhat different aim, are envisioned. The first would be for other central government units which also have coordination functions. These are Bank of Zambia, Ministry of Finance, State House, NCDP, Macro-Economic Coordination Unit, and Ministry of Local Government. The aim of this initial workshop will be to ensure that the various coordination functions within government are effectively rationalized. The second workshop would be for line ministries, and would focus on the liaison mechanisms to be created between Cabinet Office and ministries to ensure effective policy coordination, implementation, and accountability. The third workshop will target the National Assembly, and will focus on establishing a set of communications and relationships that are consistent with the enhanced role of Parliament in the Third Republic and government's commitment to more transparent operations.~~

(c) An overseas study tour for five to seven senior Cabinet Office staff, including those identified to play a leadership role in the Policy Analysis and Management Unit. The purpose of the Tour will be for Cabinet Office staff to learn more about the operational details of policy coordination and implementation in countries that are recognized as performing these functions effectively.

During Phase One, the GRZ will have the responsibility for announcing the formation of the Policy Analysis and Management Unit; making senior staff available to work with the consultants in generating the TOR for the unit and in determining the specific staffing pattern for the unit; and beginning the process of identifying staff to be assigned to the unit.

2. Phase Two Activities

Phase Two activities will focus on providing the support needed to get the Policy Analysis and Management Unit up and running effectively. In order to achieve its aims, the Unit will have to achieve a high level of technical and analytical capacity; build political credibility by operating effectively and proving its utility; deepen its understanding of the workings of government agencies and their inter-relationships; and develop effective lines of communications, and management and information systems, to achieve effective liaison with line ministries and statutory bodies. Project support in Phase Two is designed to enable the Unit to achieve these aims.

The following activities will be supported during Phase Two of this component:

(a) Long-term technical assistance to work with the Permanent Secretary of the Unit to ensure that it becomes effectively operational as rapidly as possible. Two long-term technical staff are envisioned. The first, an expatriate with extensive experience in government operations and strategic management, will be responsible for facilitating the myriad systems that have to be put into place, for coordinating the functioning of the staff, and for ensuring that the appropriate lines of communication are created and maintained. Thus, the role of the expatriate technical advisor will be to ensure the installation of ~~procedures and systems rather than engagement in the content of Cabinet decisions. Because~~ ~~of confidentiality requirements of the work undertaken in Cabinet Office, the expatriate~~ advisor will have an office physically outside of Cabinet Office. The GRZ may wish to bind the expatriate advisor formally to the same rules of confidentiality as others in the Cabinet Office; in any case the Scope of Work should reflect this. Given the high cost of expatriate technical assistance, and the political sensitivity it involves, it is envisaged that the expatriate advisor will work for only 12 to 18 months. The task will be to get the unit going, rather than supporting its day-to-day operations or for the indefinite future.

The second advisor should be a resident Zambian, recruited from either within or outside of the Public Service. This individual will be responsible for advising the Permanent Secretary on the day-to-day operations of the Unit, and for providing technical inputs into the analytical activities of the Unit. This person should have extensive experience in policy analysis, public management, and strategic planning. The individual will be appointed for a three year period.

(b) Short-term technical assistance will be provided for a range of activities. First, to support the installation of Monitoring and Evaluation Systems and Management Information Systems that will be needed by the Unit to fulfill its objectives. Second, to plan and facilitate an annual strategic management workshop, the purpose of which will be for relevant units to provide feedback to the Unit on progress towards achieving its goals of effective policy coordination and implementation, and for all involved to re-assess the adequacy of the systems that have been put into place. Third, to support the Unit undertaking strategic policy and management audits of ministries and provinces. This will involve consultants and Unit staff visiting, and holding discussions with managers of various units in order to understand which units are currently undertaking what activities, and how these units are organized. This will provide both a data set that will be needed for the Unit to make operational directions for policy implementation. It will also provide the baseline needed for the Public Sector Reform Program (PSRP) Performance Management System. Fourth, for general technical support and trouble-shooting as needed.

3. Short-term training, as identified in the training needs assessment under Phase One.
4. Equipment, as identified in the equipment needs assessment under Phase One.

Before the initiation of Phase Two, the GRZ will be responsible for ensuring that the Unit is effectively staffed on the basis of the recommendations made during Phase One; providing adjacent office facilities and administrative support services needed to ensure the effective operation of the unit; providing office facilities outside of Cabinet Office for the expatriate advisor; and ensuring that sufficient budgetary resources are provided for the operation of the Unit.

Taken together, the activities supported under this component of the Project will enable the Cabinet Office to more effectively perform its role of "nerve center" of government, that is, coordinating and monitoring the implementation of government policy. In particular, the Cabinet will attain better understanding of the implications of ministerial proposals to it, ministries will become accountable for specific implementation tasks, and, in general, the business of government should become more transparent. By the end of the third year of the project, there should be clear evidence that Cabinet Office is playing a more active and effective role in policy coordination and implementation.

E. Linkages Among Project Components

Constitutions establish the basic rules of the game for democratic governance. The new Constitution in Zambia is expected to provide enhanced guarantees of individual liberties and to clearly define and separate the functions of the various branches of government, especially by enhancing the powers of the National Assembly. Thus, the constitutional reform activity supported by the Project is a necessary adjunct to the successful implementation of other project activities, particularly civic education and legislative performance.

Other Project activities will, in turn, link up with one another. For example, the FODEP civic educators will make use of the ZAMCOM Media Resources Center to develop their media outreach messages. FODEP will also invite Members of Parliament to attend local civic education workshops in order to facilitate exchange of information between citizens and their representatives. As another example of linkages within the Project, the Cabinet Office policy coordination Unit will target some of its strategic management seminars at MPs in order to improve the flow of communication between the legislative and executive branches. And legislators are expected to play a leading role in supporting the reform of the ZAMCOM Act and other legislation to enhance press freedom.

Thus the Project is designed to hang together as a coherent whole. Each Project component contains aspects which help promote the intended achievement of other activities. During the life of the Project, the D/G Advisor is expected to actively foster similar savings and synergies.

In some instances, however, the Project will purposely promote duplication. The Project will install desktop publishing and fax facilities within every institution supported under the Project. These facilities will enable grantees and beneficiaries to generate and disseminate items of information of their own design. This approach is entirely consistent with the

Mission's strategic effort to promote pluralism and with the Project objective of improving the free flow of information in Zambia. The democratic revolution that has swept the world in the late twentieth century is in many respects an information revolution; it has broken the propaganda monopoly of one-party governments and placed the means of communication in the hands of ordinary people. The Democratic Governance Project will contribute to this process in Zambia.

VI. MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. Overview of Project Management

The Democratic Governance Project marks the entry of USAID into a new area of programming in Zambia. Democracy and governance are complex issues about which all participants, USAID included, have a great deal to learn. D/G programs can take aid agencies into sensitive areas of political life which directly concern bilateral government relations and may impinge on host government perceptions of national sovereignty. Thus, any Project in democracy and governance must be handled with modesty, sensitivity, and flexibility.

USAID/Zambia will therefore take an active role in directing the Project by housing senior Project personnel within the Mission itself. Democracy and governance are not subjects that can or should be managed by an independent contractor, especially during the early days of implementation and ongoing project evolution. Instead of issuing a single institutional contract, USAID/Zambia will employ a Country Democracy/Governance Advisor on a personal services contract and directly hire a Democracy/Governance Project Manager to provide administrative support to the D/G Advisor.

By housing the Project within the Mission, the number of resident expatriate personnel hired to implement project activities will be held to a minimum. A restrained use of resident expatriates accords with Zambian preferences and has the added advantage of making available a larger proportion of funds for direct project purposes. Most importantly, USAID/Zambia believes that the selected option enhances the prospects for project accountability and accessibility to the Country Team in a manner that is not usually present when the institutional contractor mechanism is employed.

Where technical assistance is needed it will be provided, to the extent practicable, through existing A.I.D. mechanisms, notably buy-ins to centrally-funded projects. The Mission plans to use a limited competition Request for Proposal (RFP) (Gray Amendment-eligible firms only) for managing the Project's procurement requirements.

The management of the Project will be structured as follows:

1. Country Democracy/Governance Advisor

Policy and programmatic direction of the Zambia Democratic Governance Support Project will be the responsibility of a Country D/G Advisor to be employed under a Personal Services Contract (PSC). The incumbent will report to the Program Officer of USAID/Zambia and work closely with other members of the U.S. Country Team. The D/G Advisor will monitor the evolving D/G environment in Zambia, advise the Mission and Country team on such, and devise appropriate policy, program and Project responses. The D/G Advisor will also develop close working ties with Project grantees and beneficiaries and

act as a catalyst for coherent policy direction in Project activities.

A draft job description for the D/G Advisor is attached at Annex G. An illustrative list of functions is as follows:

- oversee the management and implementation of the Project, for instance by preparing biannual workplans and an overall monitoring and evaluation plan

- propose and develop new Project activities

- manage the small grants fund for NGO civil rights activities
- ensure that project maintains links with beneficiaries and other relevant D/G organizations in Zambia
- maintain effective and regular communications with the Regional D/G Advisor in REDSO/Nairobi
- as requested, advise the GRZ on matters relating to its own democratization initiatives
- ensure that the Mission and members of the Country Team are kept abreast of D/G developments in Zambia

2. Democratic/Governance Project Manager

The Project Manager will report directly to the D/G Advisor. S/he will be responsible for the management of all project operations. This includes recruitment and deployment of long- and short-term technical assistance, preparing quarterly reports on project activities, and assisting grantee organizations with management problems as requested. The incumbent in this post will also have the principal responsibility for developing terms of reference for all technical assistance. The D/G Project Manager will also oversee the timely production of information according to the Project monitoring and evaluation plan. The Project Manager will enter into D/G policy discussions with governmental and non-governmental grantee organizations upon specific delegation from the D/G Advisor.

The following list of tasks is illustrative of the types of actions for which the D/G Project Manager will be responsible:

- advise and support the D/G Advisor on Project operations
- prepare, execute and monitor implementation schedules for the Project workplan
- supervise the immediate staff of the Project

- manage the Project budget consistent with financial management requirements of USAID
- devise and monitor delivery schedules for Project commodities

The candidate is expected to be a personal services contractor, possibly (but not inevitably) an American national. The D/G office will employ a two-person local hire support staff of one secretary and one general worker. The office will be equipped with one sedan, one motorbike, and requisite office equipment.

The D/G Advisor and the D/G Project Manager will collaborate in the preparation of documents and official correspondence, such as Project Implementation Letters, Project Amendments, and Orders (both Technical and Commodity). The USAID/Zambia Program Officer will execute these documents.

3. The D/G Policy Advisory Committee

The project will benefit from the creation of a D/G Policy Advisory Committee comprised of representatives from the resident U.S. Country Team. The Committee will be chaired by the Ambassador and consist of the USAID Mission Director, the Deputy Chief of Mission, the USAID Program Officer, and the USIS PAO. The D/G Advisor will serve as Secretary to the Committee.

The committee will meet regularly as needed, but not less than once per month.

The principal role of the Policy Advisory Committee is to guide the D/G Advisor on matters of policy that arise in the course of Project implementation. The Committee will also serve as a resource for the D/G Advisor, for example to call upon assistance for sensitive or high-level negotiations with the GRZ over Project issues. The Committee will also serve as an institutional bridge between the Embassy and the Mission that will bring to bear on the Project the best available skills in both political analysis and project operations.

4. The D/G Project Management Board

Complementing the Committee is a D/G Project Management Board composed of one representative from each grantee organization (i.e. FODEP, ZAMCOM, National Assembly, Cabinet Office). In addition, there would be one representative each from the public, private and voluntary sectors who are otherwise unaffiliated with the Project. All members would serve on an uncompensated, voluntary basis. The Board would elect a rotating chairperson from among its members for an annual term. The D/G Advisor would sit on the Board in an ex officio capacity but would not be eligible to vote or serve as chairperson. The D/G Project Manager would serve as secretary to this body.

The functions of the D/G Project Management Board are advisory and not operational. The

Board aims to build a sense of Project ownership within grantee institutions and among the wider Zambian population. The Board will provide Project staff with a "reality check" on the appropriateness of Project activities to the evolving needs and situation in Zambia. The Board will also propose linkages among Project activities to enable cost-effectiveness in resource use and the attainment of a Project impact that is greater than the sum of its parts. The Board would meet quarterly.

5. Specialized Technical Assistance

Specialized technical assistance will be available to the project through the use of selected buy-in mechanisms, for example:

- Implementing Policy Change (IPC) Project, a centrally funded activity of the R&D Bureau, for long and short-term technical support for the Cabinet policy coordination element;
- The Human Resources Development Assistance project (HRDA), for short-term technical assistance for training, management strengthening, and skills development in the media component and on civil rights activities;
- USIS Academic Specialists Program for the media component;
- Africa Bureau PVO/NGO Initiatives Project (PIP) for short term technical assistance and international exchange visits for FODEP and small grants recipients; and
- Africa Bureau Democracy/Governance Project to assist with evaluation studies.

6. Procurement

The Project contains a number of discrete components and activities, each of which will carry a distinct commodities burden. To minimize management demands, procurement should be rationalized. A single contractor will be sought for the life of the project to handle these requirements. The Mission intends to prepare, in consultation with REDSO/LA, a solicitation of bids on a "limited competition" basis from qualified Small and Disadvantaged Businesses.

B. Implementation of Project Components

1. Civil Rights Implementation Plan

USAID/Zambia can promptly start up the civil rights component of the Project since there are no conditions precedent to be satisfied. Because the constitutional reform initiative is an urgent priority for the overall Project and for the Government of Zambia, it should be funded

A small fund to augment the legal drafting capacity of the Assembly's Legal Counsel Department will be supported by the Project. This fund will be used to purchase short term legal drafting services at commercial rates from private practitioners.

4. Policy Coordination Implementation Plan

This component of the Project will, except for the provision of commodities, be executed through a series of Buy-Ins to the centrally-funded Implementing Policy Change (IPC) Project of the R and D Bureau. Phase One activities will be undertaken through a short-term Buy-In, while Phase Two activities will be undertaken through a long-term Buy-In. The IPC project was selected because of its very close fit to the purposes and activities of this component of the project. The IPC project supports host-country managers in their use of strategic management techniques to convert enunciated policy changes into actual policy changes. IPC is dedicated to working very closely with host-country managers in implementing politically complex and technically difficult changes. Improving the overall coordination and implementation of government policy in Zambia clearly falls in this category. The IPC project is working on similar project components in a number of countries including Jamaica, the Phillipines, and Uganda.

As soon as funding for the project is on-line, the AID/Zambia project manager, with assistance from AID/R&D/EID, will execute a PIOT to initiate the short-term IPC Buy-In. The IPC Project will then designate an "activity manager" who will be responsible for ensuring that each of the activities described in the PIOT is completed. The activities are designed to be undertaken over a six month period. During Phase One, the AID project manager, along with the D/G Advisor will be responsible for ensuring that the GRZ undertakes announcing the formation of the unit, making staff available to work with IPC consultants, and begins the process of identifying staff for the Policy Analysis and Management Unit. Their doing so will trigger preparation for Phase Two.

To prepare for Phase Two, the AID project manager, with assistance from AID/R&D/EID will execute a PIOT to initiate the long-term IPC Buy-In. Again, the IPC Project will designate an "activity manager", who will be responsible for ensuring that the work described in the PIOT is accomplished. Actual initiation of Phase Two, the centerpiece of which is the deployment of the two long-term advisors, will only ensue after the GRZ ensures that the Unit is effectively staffed, that office and administrative support is in place, and that sufficient budgetary resources have been provided. It will be the responsibility of the AID project manager, and the D/G advisor, to monitor GRZ compliance with these conditions. Year One of the long-term Buy-In will see the deployment of the long-term technical staff, the installation of the monitoring and evaluation plan and the management information systems for the Unit, and the undertaking of the strategic policy and management audits of all ministries and provinces. Equipment, as needed, will have been procured and the training program begun.

Year Two of the long-term Buy-In will see the conclusion of the long-term expatriate support

to the Unit. By this time, all of the basic procedures and systems for the Unit should be well in place. The long-term IPC Buy-In will continue to support the Zambian technical advisor to the Unit, as well as the facilitation of the annual strategic management workshops, and short-term technical training.

During years three and four of the long-term Buy-In, the main focus of activity will be to ensure the viability of the Unit in the aftermath of the ending of AID support.

C. Summary of Implementation Plan

The Democratic Governance Project implementation plan is separated into three principal phases, with two stages in each phase. The implementation plan isolates the four distinct Project components, each with its own set of activities, as well as overall coordinating and managerial responsibilities of the D/G Advisor with administrative and support staff.

While the Project is to be obligated in FY 1992, start-up and implementation will not commence until FY 1993. The Project will be grant funded under a Project Agreement with the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ), and the Implementation Plan assumes execution of that Agreement and Project obligation by September 30, 1992. The Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) is fixed at September 30, 1997. It is assumed, for purposes of the Implementation Plan, that Project operations will be completed six months prior to the PACD. Thus, the Implementation Plan covers the 4 1/2 years from October 1, 1992 through March 31, 1997.

The character and estimated duration of the three Phases and subordinate Stages of the Implementation Plan are:

Phase I. Project Initiation (6 months: Oct '92 - Mar '93)

Stage 1: Formation and Procurement Actions

Stage 2: Operational Design and Programmatic Actions

Phase II. Project Operations (42 months: Apr '93 - Sep '96)

Stage 1: Operational Start-up (3 months)

Stage 2: Full-scale Operations (36 months)

Phase III. Wind Down/Redesign (6 months: Oct '96 - Mar '97)

Stage 1: Final Evaluation (3 months)

Stage 2: Close-out or Redesign

1. Phase I: Project Initiation: October 1992 - March 1993

Phase I begins immediately after signing of the Project Agreement and Project obligation (September 30, 1992). It is essentially a transition or bridging period to the full-scale operations. This Phase is delineated here in two functionally separate but chronologically overlapping stages. Stage 1 covers start-up formation and procurement activities initially managed by USAID/Zambia (assisted by REDSO-DG), including the key actions of forming the D/G Policy Advisory Committee, securing the D/G Advisor and Project Managers under personal services contracts (PSC). Stage 2 covers preparation of the detailed implementation and operational plans as the principal actors come into place. Stage 2, however, also covers those programmatic actions that will have to be undertaken even before all Project actors and mechanisms are assembled. (E.g., inauguration of the Constitutional Reform Program.)

Just as the Project components are conceptually linked (see Section IV, Project Rationale), programmatic linkage of the various Project components into a coherent whole is essential to the success of the Project. Thus, the Implementation Plan specifically notes that the WorkPlans of the Democracy/Governance Unit (DGU) are to address both administrative as well as program linkage activities.

Stage 1: Formation and Procurement Actions

<u>Action¹</u>	<u>Principal Actors</u>	<u>Completion</u>
Recruit D/G Advisor	USAID/REDSO-DG/ ² AFR/ONI	Oct '92
Form Policy Advisory Committee	USAID	Oct '92
Solicit procurement agent	USAID/REDSO-LA	Nov '92
Hire D/G Advisor (PSC)	USAID/REDSO-DG	Nov '92
Recruit, hire Project Manager (PM)	USAID/PSC	Dec '92
M&E design, baselines	USAID/DGU/AFR-ONI	Dec '92
Initiate procurement of Legal Specialist for MLA	USAID/REDSO-DG/ Checchi	Dec '92
FODEP PVO regis. w/USAID [A.2,3]	USAID/DGU	Dec '92
Hire DGU local staff	PSC/PM	Jan '93
Coop agreement for M&E	USAID/DGU/AFR-ONI	Jan '93

¹ See notes at end of table for reference symbols used. Project's specific component actions noted in bracketed reference. Other actions are for Project administration/management.

² REDSO/EA D/G Advisor to assist USAID/Zambia in start-up activities with monthly TDY until D/G Advisor (PSC) in place.

Coop. agreement w/FODEP [A.3]	USAID/DGU	Jan '93
Procure media policy studies [B.1]	USAID/DGU	Jan '93
Procure A.I.D. cent.-funded mech. for PAMU	USAID/DGU	Jan '93 ³
Procure media training [B.2]:		
UNZA	DGU/USIS	Mar '93
ZAMCOM	DGU/USIS	Mar '93
Design media internship prog [B.3]	DGU/USIS	Mar '93
Coop. agreement w/ZAMCOM [B.4]	USAID/DGU	Mar '93⁴
Form Project Management Board.	USAID/PAC	Mar '93

Stage 2: Operational Design and Programmatic Actions

<u>Action</u>	<u>Principal Actors</u>	<u>Completion</u>
Const. Reform WorkPlan [A.1]	USAID/REDSO-DG	Nov '92
MOU with GRZ, Const/Reform [A.1]	USAID/REDSO-DG	Dec '92
MOU with National Assembly [C]	Embassy/USAID	Dec '92
FODEP WorkPlan [A.2,3]:		
Curriculum development		
Educational outreach		
Institutional strengthening	FODEP/DGU/USAID	Jan '93
Inaugurate FODEP civic ed. program (re Const. Reform)[A.1]	FODEP	Feb '93
DGU Year 1 WorkPlan:		
Admin. plan/budget	DGU	Mar '93
Component linkage plan	DGU	Mar '93
Civic Act. fund mech./plans [A.4]	DGU	Mar '93
Media policy studies:		
Press freedom [B.1]	LAZ	Mar '93
Privatization [B.1]	ZACCI	Mar '93
MOU w/ Nat'l Assm. re studies [C]:		
Staff support		
Facilities/services support		
Study tours	Country Team/ REDSO-DG/DGU	Mar '93
PAMU WorkPlan [D]	DGU/IPC	Mar '93
LOP TA procurement plan	DGU/USAID/PAC	Mar '93
LOP M&E Plan	DGU/M&ECA/USAID	Mar '93

³ Projected to be Implementing Policy Change Project (IPC), through R&D. Even with independent implementation entity, this component subject to oversight, and linkage to other components, by the DGU.

⁴ For establishment of Media Resources Center; Cooperative Agreement subject to ZAMCOM establishing eligibility as autonomous institution. See Institutional Analysis, Annex E.1.

from FY 1992 funds obligated under the DFA. For the FODEP's institutional and civic education activity, USAID/Z may wish to explore the option of a buy-in to the Africa Bureau's PVO/NGO Initiatives Project (PIP).

The constitutional reform activity will be implemented and completed in Year One. An immediate start should be on this activity, even before the Country D/G Advisor is recruited. As an interim measure, USAID/Zambia should request the Regional D/G Advisor from REDSO/Nairobi to come to Lusaka in September 1992 to finalize a grant agreement with the ~~Ministry of Legal Affairs. This will require at least one, and probably several additional~~ meetings with the Minister and Chief Parliamentary Draftsman to discuss evolving needs and to finalize a budget and implementation plan. As soon as agreement is reached, recruitment of short-term TA for legal drafting (possibly from the State of Minnesota Bar Association which has a twinning arrangement with the Law Association of Zambia) and procurement of word-processing equipment should begin immediately.

Concurrently, and within the first six months of project start-up, FODEP will prepare the first of its civic education materials for field testing. The educational outreach activity will begin in the second half of Year One. Accordingly procurement of office equipment and vehicles for FODEP should begin as soon as possible, again using FY 1992 DFA funds.

2. Media Independence Implementation Plan

The staff development program at the University of Zambia Department of Mass Communications and the Internships will be managed by the Country D/G Advisor who will also be responsible for the selection of local participants to be sent to the US for training. USIS/Zambia should be requested to provide assistance in the identification of both external resource persons and of US media organizations and training institutions where the Zambians would undertake their internships and training.

The D/G Advisor will also be responsible for the management of all the short-term and long-term TA under the ZAMCOM training program and the Media Resources Center. Here again, USIS/Zambia should provide support in identification and recruitment of international resource persons.

ZAMCOM will be responsible for the recruitment of local resource persons for its training program. ZAMCOM will also be responsible for the management of all operations under the Media Resources Center, except for the TA under the D/G Advisor. The D/G Advisor will be responsible for the support to ZAMCOM to develop its financial management systems, including the recruitment of any TA necessary.

The activities in the media component will be funded in three phases. In the initial stage, the Project will embark on the training and studies activities, and the financial management systems support to ZAMCOM. The project will also begin the provision of media library facilities at ZAMCOM. The library facilities complement the teaching activities, even

though the library is intended as part of the Media Resources Center whose funding does not actually begin until Year Two. USIS/Zambia should be requested to provide support in identification of appropriate library materials and texts.

Upon ZAMCOM meeting the terms set out in the Conditions and Covenants before the end of Year One of the Project, the Media Resources Center activities will begin in Year Two with the provision of video and sound studio equipment, a photographic unit, shared desk top publishing facilities and telex and telefax facilities. Long-term T/A at the Media Center will commence at this stage. USIS/Zambia should be requested to assist in the identification of appropriate hardware and software in all cases.

Towards the end of Year Two, the D/G Advisor will commission the feasibility study on the printing press. USAID/Zambia will use the outcome of the study to decide on the capacity of the printing press to be installed at the Media Center in Year Three.

In the event that ZAMCOM does not meet the terms set out under Conditions and Covenants by the end of Year One, provision should be made for USAID/Zambia to relocate the Media Resources Center to another institution with the prerequisite autonomy, such as a revitalized Press Association of Zambia (PAZA), or the proposed Zambia National Media Foundation. The D/G Advisor should monitor the progress of these associations with the support of USIS/Zambia.

3. Legislative Performance Implementation Plan

A critical initial step in the implementation of this component will be carried out by the US Embassy. Due to the political sensitivity of the issues involved in working with the National Assembly, the Ambassador will carry out discussions with the relevant GRZ officials concerning these political matters. Subsequent to these discussions the Project proposes that three studies on the utilization of Parliament staff and a full organizational analysis of the National Assembly.

The three studies are to be conducted under the auspices of the National Assembly and each study team will consist of (a) one MP, (b) one National Assembly Officer and, (c) two short term external experts, one international and one Zambian. Upon completion these studies will present their findings and recommendations to the Office of the Speaker of the National Assembly. The Speaker's Office will take appropriate actions after consultations with the Government and the relevant representatives of the US Country Team.

Support to enhance the capacity of the Assembly to respond to the needs of its members and their constituencies is envisioned in the following areas: Project supported staff augmentation for three years that will consist of a lawyer/legislative drafter, a senior accountant and an expert in financial analysis and management. The actual programming of this support will depend upon decisions taken by the GRZ in response to the findings and recommendations of the studies mentioned above.

2. Phase II: Project Operations: April 1993 - September 1996

Phase II covers the period when all institutional actors are secured and in place as necessary for beginning operations. The Stages are: Stage 1, covering operational start-up and initial "shakedown" (i.e., through the first six months of operation, with opportunity for design and planning refinement drawing on the perspectives and experience of the implementation actors as well as the principal studies undertaken during Year 1 of the Project); and Stage 2, three years of full-scale operations (after any refinement or redesign at the end of the "shakedown" stage).

Stage 1: Operational Start-Up/Shakedown

<u>Action</u>	<u>Principal Actors</u>	<u>Completion</u>
Const. Law Spec. for MLA [A.1]	DGU/Checchi	Apr '93
Procurement Plan - Const.Ref.[A.1]	DGU	Apr '93
Procurement Plan - NA [C]	DGU/REDSO-DG	Apr '93
Procurement Plan - PAMU [D]	DGU/IPC	Apr '93
DGU admin./financial systems developed, approved	DGU/USAID	Apr '93
Implementation Plan for National Assembly Support [C]	DGU/REDSO-DG	May '93
Nat'l Assm. Needs Assessment [C]:		
Staffing		
Study Tours		
Legal Drafting		
Library		
Documentation/Publication	DGU/REDSO-DG	May '93 ⁵
Launch NGO Civ Act. Fund [A.4]	DGU/PMB	Jun '93
Complete M&E special studies	DGU/M&ECA	Jun '93
Media internship selection [B.3]	DGU	Jun '93
Creation of PAMU [D]	Cab. Office	Jun '93
Procure print.press study [B.1]	DGU	Sep '93
Shakedown evaluation	USAID/DGU/PAC/PMB M&ECA	Sep '93

⁵ Illustrative date. Actual timing, and topics, to be established through negotiation by U.S. Country Team with National Assembly.

Stage 2: Full-scale Operations

<u>Action</u>	<u>Principal Actors</u>	<u>Completion</u>
[DGU and Project component activities and reporting schedules as per approved WorkPlans.]		
[PAC meetings projected on monthly basis; PMB meets quarterly.]		
DGU Year 2 WorkPlan:		
Admin. plan/budget	DGU	Mar '94
Component linkage plan	DGU	Mar '94
FODEP Year 2 WorkPlan [A.2,3]	FODEP/DGU/USAID	Mar '94
PAMU Year 2 WorkPlan [D]	DGU/IPC	Mar '94
Mid-Term evaluation	USAID/DGU/PAC/PMB/ M&ECA/External Eval.	Dec '94
DGU Year 3 WorkPlan:		
Admin. plan/budget	DGU	Mar '95
Component linkage plan	DGU	Mar '95
FODEP Year 3 WorkPlan [A.2,3]	FODEP/DGU/USAID	Mar '95
PAMU Year 3 WorkPlan [D]	DGU/IPC	Mar '95
DGU Close-out WorkPlan:		
Admin. Plan/Budget	DGU	Mar '96
Component Linkage Plan	DGU	Mar '96

3. Phase III: Wind Down/Redesign: October 1996 - March 1997

Stage 1: Final Evaluation

<u>Action</u>	<u>Principal Actors</u>	<u>Completion</u>
Final Evaluation	USAID/DGU/PAC/PMB/ M&ECA/External Eval.	Dec '96

Stage 2: Close-out or Redesign

<u>Action</u>	<u>Principal Actors</u>	<u>Completion</u>
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[USAID will determine after the final evaluation whether the Project will terminate as per original design or be extended through a redesigned Project.]

Reference symbols used in Implementation Plan:

Project Components:

A	Civil Rights Promotion
A.1	Constitutional Reform
A.2	Civic Education
A.3	FODEP Institutional Strengthening
A.4	Civil Action Fund
B	Media Independence
C	Legislative Performance
D	Policy Coordination
AFR-ONI	Africa Bureau, Operations and New Initiatives
Checchi	Checchi & Co., Legal Services IQC (AFR-ONI)
Country Team	U.S. Embassy/USAID/USIS
DGU	Democracy Governance Unit
FODEP	Foundation for Democratic Process
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
IPC	Implementating Policy Change (A.I.D. centrally funded Project)
LAZ	Law Association of Zambia
M&ECA	Monitoring & Evaluation Coop Agreement
MLA	Ministry of Legal Affairs
NA	National Assembly
PAC	Project Advisory Committee
PMB	Project Management Board
PSC	Personal Services Contract(or)
REDSO-DG	Democracy Advisor, REDSO/EA (Nairobi)
REDSO-LA	Legal Advisor, REDSO/EA (Nairobi)
UNZA	University of Zambia
USAID	U.S. A.I.D. Mission, Zambia
USIS	U.S. Information Service, Zambia
ZACCI	Zambia Confederation of Industries and Chambers of Commerce
ZAMCOM	Zambia Institute of Mass Communications

VII. COST ESTIMATES AND FINANCIAL PLAN

[being prepared at USAID/Zambia]

VIII. SUMMARY OF PROJECT ANALYSIS

Zambia has undertaken the transition to democracy through free and fair elections. Zambia's efforts to consolidate and improve upon its conditions for democratic governance are being undertaken at the same time that Zambia is seeking a more open, market-oriented economy, against a backdrop of inherited debt burdens, a shattered public infrastructure, and an untimely and devastating drought.

Economic growth and democratization are mutually reinforcing processes: growth enables the social mobility and educational opportunity that underpin democratic citizenship; democratization, in turn, releases private initiative and helps to restrain government from making unwise policy interventions.

The purpose of this Project is to render public decision-making more accessible and effective, **including decision-making conducive of broad-based economic growth in Zambia.** "Accessibility" in this context means enhanced involvement in decision-making by citizens and their representatives. "Effectiveness" means implementation of public policies consistent with stated goals, including those of broad-based economic growth. Achievement of the Project's purpose depends upon progress in the following four strategic areas:

- increasing citizen awareness of civil rights
- enabling independent and professional media
- enhancing the legislative performance of the National Assembly
- co-ordinating policy implementation in the Executive Branch

The Project Analyses in Annex E should be understood in the context of these indicia of Project purpose achievement.

A. Technical and Insitutional Analyses

(See Annex E, Part 1)

1. Increasing Citizen Awareness of Civil Rights: Within civil society, Zambians face formidable cultural obstacles in attempting to exercise the rights and responsibilities of democratic citizenship. Both traditional norms and the one-party political procedures of almost three decades have instilled habits of deference to authority. During the 1980s, independent-minded persons denied opportunities for free association and expression in party-dominated institutions took refuge in civil society. The institutions of civil society -- through a coalition of church, student and womens groups -- were a major factor in the electoral process of 1991.

To some extent, Zambia's civil society lost a measure of energy and direction in the aftermath of the unifying context of the general elections. One of the principal challenges facing the institutions within Zambia's civil society is to aggregate the small organizations into larger, federated structures with a more effective voice on policy issues.

The post-electoral presence and role of civil society institutions in Zambia have been preserved in large measure in the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP). Only FODEP and its affiliated organizations have continued to work actively on the problem of transforming Zambia's political culture from below.

FODEP, through a network of member organizations, reaches down to the community level in both urban and rural areas. It is uniquely poised to continue play a leadership role in civic education and promoting civic action as an element in consolidating democracy and transforming Zambia's political culture from below. However, FODEP and related organizations require institutional strengthening and support to enable them to play a significant role in impartial civic education and fostering civic action.

2. Enabling Independent and Professional Media: During its 17-years under the one-party state, the UNIP government owned and controlled all media institutions in Zambia. The only non-government publication in the country was the *National Mirror*, a monthly magazine published by the Catholic Church. Despite this, the Zambia media played a significant role in the process leading to the re-introduction of political pluralism in the country.

The principal challenge of the media in Zambia is to consolidate their gains and enhance their position as a vital institution of civil society in the emerging democratic culture of Zambia. The principal constraints to development of an independent media in Zambia are:

- shortage of professional skills among journalists and other media operators, especially in policy analysis;
- excessive government control and ownership of media institutions; and
- inadequate resources for independent media operators to counterbalance government ownership and control of the media.

The Zambia Institute of Mass Communications (ZAMCOM) is a quasi-independent public corporation chartered in 1980 under its own Act of Parliament. It was established as a unit within the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services to provide refresher courses on journalistic skills. Currently ZAMCOM offers practical in-service training, usually in courses lasting two to six weeks, to meet specific needs of journalists in the print media, television, and radio.

With passage of the ZAMCOM Act of 1991, the Government agreed to change the status of the Institute from a government department to a statutory board. ZAMCOM is currently financed almost totally out of the Government's budget, although external support (largely for equipment and classroom rehabilitation) has been provided by the German Friedrich Naumann Foundation.

ZAMCOM is now commencing the process of converting from a government entity to an independent, non-governmental institute, and requisite legislative enactments and structure/governance provisions are now being prepared. While the Government will retain a financial commitment to ZAMCOM, and, thus, a role in ZAMCOM's governing Council, ZAMCOM management is developing plans for funding diversification, including external financial assistance (in the short run) and capacity for earnings generation (e.g., through such means as operation of a printing unit and provision of facilities and services at competitive rates).

ZAMCOM enjoys broad support from journalists and their representative bodies, and its role in upgrading journalists and other media representatives will become even more useful in a democratic Zambia, especially when the government fully liberalizes of the media.

In furtherance of ZAMCOM's emergence as an independent, viable force supporting media independence in Zambia, the Democratic Governance Project will fund two policy studies with recommendations for free freedom in Zambia:

- The Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) will be responsible for a study on the media legislative environment; and
- The Zambia Confederation of Industries and Chambers of Commerce (ZACCI) will undertake a study on the privatization of the media.

In addition, a Media Resources Center will be established at ZAMCOM to provide facilities and services available both to government-related as well as independent media. The Center will also provide pooled facilities (including printing press) for independent media use both in civic education campaigns as well as for fledging private sector media ventures.

3. Enhancing Legislative Performance of the National Assembly: Zambia abandoned the Westminster model on gaining independence in 1964, and was the first former British colony in Africa to establish a republican form of government under a directly-elected president. Under the constitution of the one-party Second Republic, there evolved a highly centralized presidency, and a marginalization of the role of the National Assembly.

The National Assembly stands **potentially** as the main representative institution of Zambian democracy and as the source of enabling legislation for Zambia's private sector strategies. In this role, the National Assembly is the sovereign policy-making body of Zambia. In addition, under Zambia's democratic constitution, the National Assembly is invested with

important powers in a check-and-balance system, including in such areas as approval (or not) of Presidential Cabinet appointments.

The National Assembly, however, has serious structural and managerial weaknesses. These include such matters as the relatively unchecked authority of the Speaker and Clerk of the House to administer Assembly affairs and staff independently of the needs and prerogatives of the MPs. Assembly staff are not only quite few in number (and underpaid), they are not ~~protected by basic civil service rules which engender initiatives independent of arbitrary wishes of the Speaker and Clerk.~~

The National Assembly staff, including the very limited staff assigned to legislative committee work, are virtually without research and analysis capability of their own. Thus, analyses supporting legislative proposals tend to be limited to those prepared and presented by proponent Ministries, without independent check by Assembly staff.

There are severe limitations on information flows in the functioning of the National Assembly, both within the Assembly processes themselves and in communications between the Assembly and the public. Press and public liaison is extremely limited, and the MPs themselves lack suitable experience, facilities, and materials for keeping constituents informed of Assembly deliberations, thereby enabling wide public representation.

The lack of trained research staff, or appropriate library materials, inhibits MP and committee needs for background material. Staff (and MP) deficiencies in key process areas (e.g., legal drafting, constitutional law, parliamentary procedures) as well as substantive areas (e.g., economic reform, parastatal organization, privatization issues) inhibit effective Assembly engagement in policy deliberations.

4. Co-ordinating Policy Implementation Within the Executive Branch: In Zambia's hybrid presidential/parliamentary system, the Cabinet Office has been the nerve center of government operations. Its essential roles include:

- The Secretary to the Cabinet is the premier civil servant, with all Permanent Secretaries reporting to him, and exercising administrative authority over all public service personnel;
- The Secretary to the Cabinet serves as chief advisor to the President, advising and briefing him on the operations of government;
- The Cabinet Office provides supporting service for Cabinet meetings, including recording and disseminating Cabinet deliberations; and
- The Cabinet Office is responsible for answering questions to the government during Question Time at the National Assembly.

Under the Third Republic, and with the June 1992 appointment of a senior and well-respected civil servant as Secretary to the Cabinet, the Cabinet Office unquestionably will retain its status as a vital cog in the functioning of government. While the Cabinet Office is well organized to oversee a Public Service Reform Program (lodged under the Permanent Secretary for Manpower and Training), the Cabinet Office presently serves only a passive role in the policy formulation process, as a channel for exchange between and among Executive Branch agencies.

There does not exist within the Cabinet Office (or elsewhere in Government) a unit mandated and equipped to coordinate or reconcile ministerial policy initiatives, to serve as a definitive point of contact between the Executive Branch and the National Assembly on legislative enactment of Government policy proposals, or to monitor government performance in policy/legislation implementation.

B. Governance and Economic Performance Analysis

(See Annex E, Part 2)

Between the middle 1970s and the present, Zambia has been ravaged by a virtually unbroken process of economic decline. There has been more than a 50% reduction in per capita income, and Zambia has deteriorated from an emerging middle income country to a heavily indebted, poor country. This condition has been the result of an interplay of external economic factors (the fall in copper prices, oil price increases, international recessions, weak global growth) and internal factors of poor governmental policies (overvalued exchange rate, unsustainable increases in public expenditures including urban food subsidies).

While Zambia was without influence on the external factor, poor governance and have compounded the impact of the external factors. Poor governance in Zambia resulted from the interplay between governmental structure, political processes, the bureaucratic environment and culture, and the ideological atmosphere. Poor governance and the lack of a democratic environment were the principal factors why Zambia was unable to sustain a viable economic reform program to combat the external factors. It is now widely recognized that governance factors have been an important contributor to Africa's economic crisis. In many ways, Zambia has been a prime example of these processes at work.

The Democratic Governance Project is intended, then, to address severe internal constraints to Zambia's sustained and broad-based economic growth. It is intended to make public decision-making more accessible and effective, aiding public authorities and non-State actors to play an appropriate role in maintaining an enabling environment in which economic actors can flourish and generate development outcomes.

The strategy underlying this project draws upon experience in Asia and Africa that shows the importance of good governance to economic development. The rule of law, the free flow of information, bounded governmental authority, and effective and efficient public

administration all are linked to developmental success.

In addition, there is strong evidence that over the long term, democratization and broad-based economic growth are mutually reinforcing processes; one is difficult to obtain without the other. Democratic values and institutions can only flourish in an atmosphere of expanded opportunity for education, economic gain, and social mobility. A democratic context is vital for allowing the flow of information upon which market decisions are made and for enabling the social groups generated by economic growth to achieve compromise and cohesion. At the same time, the development of market institutions and entrepreneurial groups is central to creating strong foundations for democracy.

C. Financial Analysis

(See Annex E, part 3.)

D. Social Soundness Analysis

(See Annex E, part 4.)

Historically, Zambia did not develop a democratic political culture. Traditional political systems -- whether the centralized state of the Lozi, or the village kin groups of the Tonga -- vested authority in male elders and allowed few opportunities for participation by women and younger people. British colonial rule was also hierarchical, superimposing a strong administrative state whose influence was felt by most Zambians through the extensive discretionary powers of the District Commissioners.

Contemporary political culture, however, has been most influenced by the single-party rule of the UNIP during the Second Republic (1973-1991), now supplanted by the democratically elected Third Republic. However, the Constitution of the Third Republic has not been published in vernacular languages and has had very limited circulation. Thus, most rural dwellers -- and especially women -- are unaware of such rights as the right to run for elected office.

Zambia has a high nominal literacy rate (76 percent) and level of urban dwellers (46%), providing a positive environment for independent media and civil society institutions to communicate a new political culture. Thus, the Democratic Governance Project will reach far beyond the directly participating institutions; because of its emphasis on popular empowerment, the rule of law, and the rights and responsibilities of the individual, the Project benefits a wide range of Zambian society. The Project will empower small-scale farmers and businesspeople to articulate their needs on economic policy issues. It will also unclog channels of communication between various sectors of society and the Government on such vital issues as privatization, land reforms, and gender-specific constraints.

Traditional and customary obstacles to women's advancement have been reinforced by discrimination in modern law and administrative practices. With urbanization, there has been a trend toward female-headed households in outlying provinces (where income levels are lowest). The concentration of women's economic activities in urban areas have been in the informal market, in the least profitable sectors of Zambia's marketplace.

Women played a critical role in Zambia' democratic transition, including through such organizations as the National Women's Lobby. The MMD has committed itself to ending discrimination against women and in favor of affirmative action to achieve equality of access to services and benefits provided by the government. The Democratic Governance Project is designed, and aimed, to give specific content to this policy.

IX. Monitoring System and Evaluation Plan

A. Overview

In any new development assistance area, such as democracy and governance in Africa, there is obvious need for adequate and monitoring and evaluation. A comprehensive monitoring system is a key management tool. It ensures that critical information is collected on project ~~inputs and outputs in order to guide project implementation toward the achievement of~~ planned objectives. A thorough evaluation of project outcomes and impacts is also vital.

USAID, both in Zambia and Washington, will benefit from learning about the impact of new D/G assistance initiatives in Africa. The Zambia Democratic Governance Support Project is hosted by one of the first countries in Africa to undergo a democratic transition. Hence heavy emphasis is placed on evaluation so as to learn as much as possible from this leading case that may be applicable to other countries following on similar paths.

The degree of Project success will be measured by the extent to which decision-making in targetted institutions becomes more accessible and effective. Success therefore depends upon changes in institutional structures, institutional processes, and individual attitudes and behavior. A monitoring and evaluation system will assess not only whether channels and procedures for expression and decision-making are established, but also whether they are actually being used.

The D/G advisor has the overall responsibility for monitoring and evaluating the Project. S/he will depend on the M&E system to determine adherence to Project implementation schedules and to judge whether adjustments need to be made in Project direction and scope. Up to a quarter of the D/G Advisor's time will be spent on monitoring project implementation and on briefing Mission management, the Policy Advisory Committee, and the Project Management Board on the programmatic status of each component and the project as a whole. To this end, the D/G Advisor will also commission a baseline data survey, interim and final evaluations, and special studies.

Documentation related to the experience gained and lessons learned from this Project will be provided to AID/W through AFR/ONI to be used in the design of future D/G projects and programs.

Clearly, Zambians themselves have a stake in whether the project is "on the right track." For example, the Cabinet Office will need to know how well newly established procedures for policy coordination are working. Similarly, NGO civic educators and journalists need to know whether their messages are being heard, and whether the information they provide is actually making decision-making more accessible to Zambian citizens.

Democratization influences the existing distribution of power and resources within society. M and E information will therefore be disaggregated to assess Project outcomes for relevant

subgroups within society, especially along urban-rural and gender lines. The issue of whether and how external D/G assistance can empower women is of great interest to AID/W and R&D/WID.

B. Baseline Data

The first step in monitoring and evaluation is to construct an accurate assessment of the baseline status for each project activity. This will involve ~~data collection and analysis of~~ both institutional capacity and beneficiary perceptions. For example, in order to understand whether FODEP's civic education campaign is successful in increasing awareness of the rights and responsibilities of citizens among urban and rural populations, one must have some knowledge of the level of awareness that currently exists.

Within the first six months, the D/G project manager will commission an indicative baseline study. The report will require one month of short term expatriate TA (preferably a political scientist from a U.S. University with experience in public opinion survey research in a developing country), one month of local TA (a political scientist with skills in sampling and statistics), and a team of one dozen student enumerators. If possible, for purposes of continuity and local capacity-building, the same research team should be contracted to reassemble for subsequent short-term M and E tasks.

The baseline study will generate benchmark data against which progress in implementing project activities can be monitored and the achievement of project goals can be subsequently evaluated. The baseline study will use rapid appraisal techniques to estimate (a) the initial status of institutions targetted in the project in terms of accessible and effective decision-making, and (b) the existing cognitive, attitudinal and behavioral orientations on D/G issues of potential Project beneficiaries.

C. Monitoring Plan

The D/G Advisor and D/G Project Manager require periodic analyses of Project performance. Routine monitoring includes collecting data to assess whether inputs are delivered and outputs are implemented on schedule. To monitor Project inputs, the delivery of technical assistance and commodities will be tracked with receipts, vouchers, contractor and grantee reports, and disbursement reports. Output monitoring will be based on data such as numbers of outreach workshops held and attended, pamphlets and newspaper articles published and distributed, and study tours and study completed and reported on.

Grantee institutions in Zambia will be assisted to take prime responsibility for gathering routine performance and financial data for project monitoring. Zambians are expected to play a significant monitoring role for several reasons. First, the project aims to strengthen local institutional capacities, including for monitoring, as a means of rendering decision-making more accessible and effective. Secondly, monitoring provides an opportunity to promote beneficiary participation; at least one grantee, FODEP, intends to use participatory

monitoring techniques to elicit management-relevant information. Thirdly, the Project needs methods to keep close track of evolving D/G needs and experiences as perceived by Zambians themselves.

The monitoring system will serve as a management tool for the Country D/G Advisor and the D/G Policy Advisory Committee. It will produce timely (quarterly) reports to enable mid-course corrections to the project implementation schedule. Monitoring activities will involve the D/G Advisor, Project staff, and ~~grantee/~~implementing-agencies in Zambia. Where relevant, the monitoring system will also include beneficiary participation in monitoring. The monitoring system is expected to upgrade the capacity of all participating agencies to manage Project implementation.

D. Evaluation Plan

Evaluation focusses exclusively on outcomes and impacts. Data will be collected to assess whether the Project has actually strengthened and reoriented institutions, improved the free flow of information, and affected the attitudes and behavior of intended beneficiaries. This latter outcome requires concrete evidence about the cognitive, affective and behavioral attributes of targeted individuals. Have beneficiaries become aware of how to gain access to the Zambian political system? And have they they actually becoming involved in decision-making.

Basic data needs, including both quantitative and qualitative indicators, will have been initially defined in the baseline survey. The D/G Advisor will call upon short-term technical assistance as needed to help refine indicators in preparation for scheduled interim and final evaluations.

Standard A.I.D. evaluation procedures will be followed in evaluating the D/G Project. Two formal evaluations are scheduled, one mid-way through the project and the second at the end of the five years. While the following provides suggestions as to issues which need to be addressed, the D/G advisor will produce detailed scopes of work for both evaluations. Outside expertise via short term consultants is envisioned as part of both evaluations, but Zambians should also be involved to the maximum extent possible.

The mid-term evaluation will assess the progress, constraints and issues involved in each component and the project as whole. An external team will spend an estimated one month undertaking the interim evaluation. Information generated by the monitoring system -- including standard project management documentation -- will provide the foundation for the evaluators. That base will be supplemented by additional survey work, interviews with Zambian officials and representatives, other donors, and follow-up contacts with participants in sub-activities, as needed. Evaluators will also draw on the special studies outlined below.

Most of the components are phased, in that further studies or policy dialogue must be completed before the necessary conditions before the second phase of the component is

activated. The interim evaluation should be timed so that the studies are completed and substantial dialogue has occurred before the evaluation. Then, evaluators can provide advice and recommendations about whether the conditions have been fulfilled to allow the implementation of particular components to progress to the next stage.

It would no doubt be premature to assess the long-term impact of many of the activities during the mid-term evaluation, but efforts should be made to evaluate the likelihood of the project meeting its objectives and make recommendations as to revisions or adjustments needed in the project. Important issues include:

- What significant socio-political or economic events or trends have occurred which have an impact on the project?
- Are the initial assumptions behind project design still valid, if not, how should the project be redirected?
- Are the areas chosen to focus on still relevant, or should additional sectors be targeted?
- What are the key factors likely to affect the success of the project, either through their effect on a particular component or the project as whole?

The final evaluation is scheduled to be conducted six to nine months before PACD of the project. The primary focus will be on the extent to which progress has been achieved in meeting the stated end of project status indicators. Documentation relevant to successes and shortcomings of the project -- for each component and the project as a whole -- will be included in the evaluation, and accompanied by a detailed analysis. Moreover, the final evaluation must address the extent to which the project performance has further the goal of increased government accountability in Zambia. The final evaluation is expected to make a substantive contribution to the country team's own understanding and information base on Zambia's progress in the area of democratic governance. In addition, the final evaluation should address whether any follow-on activities are anticipated.

For the final evaluation, three external consultants and one local expert will be engaged for approximately four weeks, according to a detailed scope of work prepared by the DG advisor. The D/G advisor should consider including a specialist in women in development to provide expertise in gender issues. Involvement of AID/W via AFR/ONI in designing and reviewing the final evaluation is strongly suggested, given the importance of sharing information and incorporating the experience of democratic governance projects into future Africa Bureau strategy and approach.

E. Special Studies

To maximize learning from Zambia's transition to democratic governance, five special

studies on the consolidation of democratic governance will be conducted during the life of the Project. The special studies are intended to generate lessons and recommendations for USAID/Zambia as well as for other A.I.D. Africa Bureau programming in the Democracy/Governance area.

The special studies will include at least the following three topics:

1. The Political Culture of Democracy in Zambia: In the final analysis, the sustainability of democracy depends importantly on whether citizens are willing to defend it. This study would explore in depth the nature of the old political culture of passivity and patronage and assess whether, under a democratic regime, new values of activism and entrepreneurship are becoming rooted among different subsectors of Zambia's population. This study would take advantage of an unprecedented opportunity now available in Zambia to do public opinion survey research in an African country.

2. Democratization and Economic Reform in Zambia: This study would examine the two-way, multifaceted relationship between political and economic liberalization in the context of Zambia. Does democratization help or hinder economic reform, and if so, how? The focus of the study would be on the effects of democratization on key policy areas such as maize price liberalization, privatization of public corporations, public service retrenchment, and wage policy. And conversely, what effects do such economic policy reforms have upon the popular support and legitimacy of a democratically elected government?

3. Gender Issues in Democratization in Zambia: While women played a major role in promoting political change and were the majority of voters in the historic 1991 elections, they have yet to benefit significantly from appointments or policies of the MMD government. This study would explore opportunities and obstacles to full participation by women in the Zambian political system at national and local levels and in governmental and civic realms. Tangentially, the study would address the issue of internal democracy in women's organizations and other NGOs in Zambia's civil society.

The special studies would be procured through a cooperative agreement with a non-profit institutional contractor selected under limited solicitation procedures. The cooperative agreement holder would be a U.S.-based research institution whose personnel possess expertise in democracy/governance issues (preferably in Zambia) and experience in evaluation studies (including public opinion surveys). The cooperative agreement holder should be expected to work closely with a counterpart research institution in Zambia, secured through subgrant agreement or a separate cooperative agreement, to help build local monitoring and evaluation capacity within Zambian organizations.

The special studies would take place in Year Two and final reports for at least three of the five studies would be deliverable before the interim evaluation team begins its work.

X. CONDITIONS AND COVENANTS

[supplied by USAID]

ANNEX B. Logframe Matrix

ANNEX B.1

ZAMBIA DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE SUPPORT PROJECT: LOGFRAME

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIF. INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS
<p><u>GOAL</u></p> <p>Promote accountable government</p>	<p>Improved governance capacity in national government structures.</p> <p>Strengthened civil society institutions and organizations as channels for citizen accessibility to government</p>	<p>International human rights reports, including State Department Country Reports, Public Sector Management Reports from UNDP & World Bank, national events reports and evaluations, assessments and similar documents from other donors.</p>	<p>GRZ maintains its commitment to political democratization and takes significant, observable steps to improve its performance in regard to accountability.</p>

ANNEX B. 2

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VER. INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS
<p><u>PURPOSE</u></p> <p>To help make Zambia's public decision-making more accessible and effective</p>	<p><u>ACCESSIBILITY</u></p> <p>The initiation and amending of political and economic reform legislation by Members of Parliament increases.</p> <p>The diversity of political opinion and informed public debate increases in all media.</p> <p>Citizen ability to effectively articulate and make their preferences on public issues known to public officials grows</p> <p><u>EFFECTIVENESS</u></p> <p>Cabinet Office increasingly makes implementation decisions according to specific and stated goals.</p> <p>Cabinet Office plays a consistently larger coordination role in cross-ministerial implementation of projects and programs.</p>	<p>Legislative reports, numbers of legislative proposals made by members of Assembly rises, investigative reports or verifiable information given in press releases.</p> <p>Press articles, coverage by non-print media, letters of opinion to press, and viewpoints expressed in other media.</p> <p>Documentation presented by citizens to public officials. Evidence of changes in administrative behavior and procedures. Surveys and opinion polling. Monitoring & evaluation reports.</p> <p>Cabinet memoranda, reports & studies. Routine monitoring & evaluation information on unit functions. Reports on observations from other donors and contractor reports.</p>	<p>Lessening of insistence on party discipline leads to increase in the introduction of legislative measures or the amendment of legislation by Members of Parliament.</p> <p>Citizens demonstrate greater ability to overcome customary, legal and administrative inhibitions to political participation.</p> <p>Operating environment of media gives evidence of increased freedom of access to information and its publication.</p> <p>GRZ demonstrates political will and necessary resources to implement its policy choices.</p> <p>Cabinet receives adequate authority for cross-ministerial project and program coordination</p>

ZAMBIA DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE SUPPORT PROJECT: LOGFRAME

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIF. INDICATOR	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS
<u>OUTPUTS</u>			
<u>Civil Rights Promotion</u>			
a. FODEP institutional capacity strengthened. b. Zambian citizens receive civic education. c. Legal rights of citizens clarified in key areas	FODEP receives required support & training. FODEP carries out proposed civic education program. Zambians participate in FODEP program. Court rulings on key legal issues.	FODEP records, contractor reports, specific assessment of activities. Evaluation of activity reports, materials developed and legal records.	FODEP receives continued public and organizational support. Activities in civic education are sustained. Demand for civic education activities continues. Judicial system responds to requests for legal determinations on public issues.
<u>Media Independence</u>			
a. Media access to resources improved. b. Journalists and media educators receive training. c. Legal & institutional constraints on media independence identified.	Media Resources Center established. Journalists and media educators receive training and apply new knowledge to curriculum development. Studies on institutional & legal constraints carried out.	Mid-term evaluation, contractor reports, study findings, new curricula and materials and specific mid-term assessment of media quality.	Training resources employed appropriately, demand for training is sustained.
<u>Legislative Performance</u>			
Capacity of National Assembly staff to perform legal research, legislative analysis and legal drafting improved.	Studies carried out and recommendations accepted.	Legislative documents, press and contractor reports, evidence of administrative/procedural changes.	Training and technical assistance utilized by National Assembly. Members of Parliament increase demands on staff.
<u>Policy Coordination</u>			
a. Progress in selected aspects of public sector reform program. b. Cabinet role in coordination & information flows increases.	Increased analytic and policy implementation capacity demonstrated by Cabinet Office. Implementation activities monitored on a regular basis.	Donor reports, review of work products, contractor reports and mid-term evaluation.	Cabinet Office desires additional assistance and demonstrates ability to utilize such aid effectively.

Annex B
LogFrame

Annex C
Statutory Checklist

Annex C. Statutory Checklist

C. Statutory Checklist

Listed below are statutory criteria applicable to the assistance resources themselves, rather than to the eligibility of a country to receive assistance. This section is divided into three parts. Part A includes criteria applicable to both Development Assistance and Economic Support resources. Part B includes criteria applicable only to Development Assistance resources. Part C includes criteria applicable only to Economic Support Funds.

1. Host Country Development Efforts (FAA Sec. 601(a)): (a) N/A
Information and conclusions on whether assistance will (b) N/A
encourage efforts of the country to: (a) increase the flow of (c) N/A
international trade; (b) foster private initiative and competition; (d) N/A
(c) encourage development and use of cooperatives, credit (e) N/A
unions, and savings and loan associations; (d) discourage (f) N/A
monopolistic practices; (e) improve technical efficiency of
industry, agriculture, and commerce; and (f) strengthen free
labor unions.

2. U.S. Private Trade and Investment (FAA Sec. 601(b)):
Information and conclusions on how assistance will encourage
U.S. private trade and investment abroad and encourage private
U.S. participation in foreign assistance programs (including use
of private trade channels and the services of U.S. private
enterprise).

The Project will procure supplies and equipment through use of a US commodities purchasing agent.

3. Congressional Notification

a. General requirement (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Secs. 523 and 591; FAA Sec. 634A): If money is to be obligated for an activity not previously justified to Congress, or for an amount in excess of amount previously justified to Congress, has Congress been properly notified (unless the notification requirement has been waived because of substantial risk to human health or welfare)?

A Congressional Notification was sent to Congress as required.

b. Notice of new account obligation (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 514): If funds are being obligated under an appropriation account to which they were not appropriated, has the President consulted with and provided with a written justification to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and has such obligation been subject to regular notification procedures?

N/A

c. Cash transfers and nonproject sector assistance (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 575 (b) (3)): If funds are to be made available in the form of cash transfer or nonproject sector assistance, has the Congressional notice included a detailed description of how the funds will be used, with a discussion of U.S. interests to be served and a description of any economic policy reforms to be promoted?

N/A

a) N/A
b) N/A

4. Engineering and Financial Plans (FAA Sec. 611(a)(1)): Prior to an obligation in excess of \$500,000 will there be: (a) engineering, financial or other plans necessary to carry out the assistance; and (b) a reasonable firm estimate of the cost to the U.S. of the assistance?

No legislative action is required.

5. Legislative Action (FAA Sec. 611(a) (2)): If legislative action is required within recipient country with respect to an obligation in excess of \$500,000, what is the basis for a reasonable expectation that such action will be completed in time to permit orderly accomplishment of the purpose of the assistance?

6. Water Resources (FAA Sec. 611(b); FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 501): If project is for water or water-related land resource construction, have benefits and costs been computed to the extent practicable in accordance with the principles, standards, and procedures established pursuant to the Water Resources Planning Act (42 U.S.C. 1962, *et seq.*)? (See A.I.D. Handbook 3 for guidelines.)

N/A

7. Cash Transfer and Sector Assistance (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 575 (b)): Will cash transfer or nonproject sector assistance be maintained in a separate account and not commingled with other funds (unless such requirements are waived by Congressional notice for nonproject sector assistance)?

N/A

8. Capital Assistance (FAA Sec. 611(e)): If project is capital assistance (e.g., construction), and total U.S. assistance for it will exceed \$1 million, has Mission Director certified and Regional Assistant Administrator taken into consideration the country's capability to maintain and utilize the project effectively?

N/A

N/A

9. Multiple Country Objectives (FAA Sec. 601(a)): Information and conclusions on whether projects will encourage efforts of the country to: (a) increase the flow of international trade; (b) foster private initiative and competition; (c) encourage development and use of cooperatives, credit unions, and savings and loan associations; (d) discourage monopolistic practices; (e) improve technical efficiency of industry, agriculture and commerce; and (f) strengthen free labor unions.

10. U.S. Private Trade (FAA Sec. 501(b)): Information and conclusions on how project will encourage U.S. private trade and investment abroad and encourage private U.S. participation in foreign assistance programs (including use of private trade channels and the services of U.S. private enterprise).

The Project will support activities intended to support democratization in Zambia. While these objectives are of direct concern to the Project, it is expected that its activities will help create a more supportive environment for private initiative, e.g., support for independent media.

11. Local Currencies

a. Recipient Contributions (FAA Secs. 612(b), 636(h)):
Describe steps taken to assure that, to the maximum extent possible, the country is contributing local currencies to meet the cost of contractual and other services, and foreign currencies owned by the U.S. are utilized in lieu of dollars.

USAID has formally waived the FAA Sect.110 requirement for this Project due to the serious financial constraint facing the GRZ.

b. U.S.-Owned Currency (FAA Sec. 612(d)): Does the U.S. own excess foreign currency of the country and, if so, what arrangements have been made for its release?

The US owns no Zambian kwach that could be used in lieu of dollars

c. Separate Account FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 575). If assistance is furnished to a foreign government under arrangements which result in the generation of local currencies:

N/A

(1) Has A.I.D. (a) required that local currencies be deposited in a separate account established by the recipient government, (b) entered into an agreement with that government providing the amount of local currencies to be generated and the terms and conditions under which the currencies so deposited may be utilized, and (c) established by agreement the responsibilities of A.I.D. and that government to monitor and account for deposits into and disbursements from the separate account?

N/A

(2) Will such local currencies, or an equivalent amount of local currencies, be used only to carry out the purposes of the DA or ESF chapters of the FAA (depending on which chapter is the source of the assistance) or for the administrative requirements of the United States Government?

N/A

(3) Has A.I.D. taken all appropriate steps to ensure that the equivalent of local currencies disbursed from the separate account are used for the agreed purposes?

(4) If assistance is terminated to a country, will any unencumbered balances of funds remaining in a separate account be disposed of for purposes agreed to by the recipient government and the United States Government?

N/A

12. Trade Restrictions

N/A

a. **Surplus Commodities (FY 1991 Appropriations Act. Sec. 521(a)):** If assistance is for the production of any commodity for export, is the commodity likely to be in surplus on world markets at the time the resulting productive capacity becomes operative, and in such assistance likely to cause substantial injury to U.S. procedures of the same, similar or competing commodity?

N/A

b. **Textiles (Lautenberg Amendment) (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 521(c)):** Will the assistance (except for programs in Caribbean Basin Initiative countries under U.S. Tariff Schedule "Section 807," which allows reduced tariffs on articles assembled abroad from U.S.-made components) be used directly to procure feasibility studies, prefeasibility studies, or project profiles of potential investment in, or to assist the establishment of facilities specifically designed for, the manufacture for export to the United States or to third country markets in direct competition with U.S. exports, of textiles, apparel, footwear, handbags, flat goods (such as wallets or coin purses worn on the person), work gloves or leather wearing apparel?

N/A

13. **Tropical Forests (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 533(c) (3)):** Will funds be used for any program, project or activity which would (a) result in any significant loss of tropical forests, or (b) involve industrial timber extraction in primary tropical forest areas?

14. PVO Assistance

a. Auditing and registration (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 537): If assistance is being made available to a PVO, has that organization provided upon timely request any document, file, or record necessary to the auditing requirements of A.I.D., and is the PVO registered with A.I.D.?

N/A

b. Funding sources (FY 1991 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Private and Voluntary Organizations"): If assistance is to be made to a United States PVO (other than a cooperative development organization), does it obtain at least 20 percent of its total annual funding for international activities from sources other than the United States Government?

N/A

15. Project Agreement Documentation (State Authorization Sec. 139 (as interpreted by conference report)): Has confirmation of the date of signing of the project agreement, including the amount involved, been cabled to State L/T and A.I.D. LEG within 60 days of the agreement's entry into force with respect to the United States, and has the full text of the agreement been pouched to those same offices? (See Handbook 3, Appendix 6G for agreements covered by this provision).

Mission will comply with the requirement when date of signing is confirmed.

16. Metric System (Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 Sec. 5164, as interpreted by conference report, amending Metric Conversion Act of 1975 Sec. 2, and as implemented through A.I.D. policy): Does the assistance activity use the metric system of measurement in its procurements, grants, and other business-related activities, except to the

N/A

extent that such use is impractical or is likely to cause significant inefficiencies or loss of markets to United States firms? Are bulk purchases usually to be made in metric, and are components, subassemblies, and semi-fabricated materials to be specified in metric units when economically available and technically adequate? Will A.I.D. specifications use metric units of measure from the earliest programmatic stages, and from the earliest documentation of the assistance processes (for example, project papers) involving quantifiable measurements (length, area, volume, capacity, mass and weight), through the implementation stage?

The status and role of women is expected to be enhanced by the Project's democratization initiatives

Regional cooperation, where relevant will be encouraged, e.g., medical training for the region.

17. Women in Development (FY 1991 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Women in Development"): Will assistance be designed so that the percentage of women participants will be demonstrably increased?

No

No

18. Regional and Multilateral Assistance (FAA Sec. 209): Is assistance more efficiently and effectively provided through regional or multilateral organizations? If so, why is assistance not so provided? Information and conclusions on whether assistance will encourage developing countries to cooperate in regional development programs.

N/A

No

N/A

19. Abortions (FY 1991 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Population, DA," and Sec. 525):

a. Will assistance be made available to any organization or program which, as determined by the President, supports or participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization?

b. Will any funds be used to lobby for abortion?

20. Cooperatives (FAA Sec. 111): Will assistance help develop cooperative, especially by technical assistance, to assist rural and urban poor to help themselves toward a better life?

21. U.S.-Owned Foreign Currencies

a. Use of currencies (FAA Secs. 612(b), 636(h); FY 1991 Appropriations Act Secs. 507, 509): Describe steps taken to assure that, to the maximum extent possible, foreign currencies owned by the U.S. are utilized in lieu of dollars to meet the cost of contractual and other services.

N/A

b. Release of currencies (FAA Sec. 612(d)): Does the U.S. own excess foreign currency of the country and, if so, what arrangements have been made for its release?

The U.S. does not own excess
Zambian currency.

22. Procurement

a. Small business (FAA Sec. 602(a)): Are there arrangements to permit U.S. small business to participate equitably in the furnishing of commodities and services financed?

Small businesses are not precluded
from supplying goods and services to
the Project.

b. U.S. procurement (FAA Sec. 604(a)): Will all procurement be from the U.S. except as otherwise determined by the President or determined under delegation from him?

Yes

c. Marine insurance (FAA Sec. 604(d)): If the cooperating country discriminated against marine insurance companies authorized to do business in the U.S., will commodities be insured in the United States against marine risk with such a company?

N/A

d. Non-U.S. agricultural procurement (FAA Sec. 604 (e)): If non-U.S. procurement of agricultural commodity or product thereof is to be financed, is there provision against such procurement when the domestic price of such commodity is less than parity? (Exception where commodity financed could not reasonably be procured in U.S.)

N/A

e. Construction or engineering services (FAA Sec. 604(g)): Will construction or engineering services be procured from firms of advanced developing countries which are otherwise eligible

N/A

under code 941 and which have attained a competitive capability in international markets in one of these areas? (Exception for those countries which receive direct economic assistance under the FAA and permit United States firms to compete for construction or engineering services financed from assistance programs of these countries.)

f. Cargo preference shipping (FAA Sec. 603): Is the shipping excluded from compliance with the requirement in section 901(b) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, that at least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of commodities (computed separately for dry bulk carriers, dry cargo liners, and tankers) financed shall be transported on privately owned U.S. flag commercial vessels to the extent such vessels are available at fair and reasonable rates?

No

N/A

g. Technical assistance (FAA Sec. 621(a)): If technical assistance is financed, will such assistance be furnished by private enterprise on a contract basis to the fullest extent practicable? Will the facilities and resources of other Federal agencies be utilized, when they are particularly suitable, not competitive with private enterprise, and made available without undue interference with domestic programs?

N/A

h. U.S. air carriers (International Air Transportation Fair Competitive practices Act, 1974): If air transportation of persons or property is financed on grant basis, will U.S. carriers be used to the extent such service is available?

Yes, standard clauses

i. Termination for convenience of U.S. Government (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 504): If the U.S. Government is a party to a contract for procurement, does the contract contain a provision authorizing termination of such contract for the convenience of the United States?

j. Consulting services (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 524): If assistance is for consulting service through procurement contract pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 3109, are contract expenditures a matter of public record and available for public inspection (unless otherwise provided by law or Executive order)?

N/A

N/A

k. Metric conversion (Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, as interpreted by conference report, amending Metric Conversion Act of 1975 Sec. 2, and as implemented through A.I.D. policy): Does the assistance program use the metric system of measurement in its procurements, grants, and other business-related activities, except to the extent that such use is impractical or is likely to cause significant inefficiencies or loss of markets to United States firms? Are bulk purchases usually to be made in metric, and are components, subassemblies, and semi-fabricated materials to be specified in metric units when economically available and technically adequate?

N/A

Will A.I.D. specifications use metric units of measure from the earliest programmatic stages, and from the earliest documentation of the assistance processes (for example, project papers) involving quantifiable measurements (length, area, volume, capacity, mass and weight), through the implementation stage?

Yes

l. Competitive Selection Procedures (FAA Sec. 601(e)): Will the assistance utilize competitive selection procedures for the awarding of contracts, except where applicable procurement rules allow otherwise?

N/A

23. Construction

N/A

b. Construction project (FAA Sec. 611(c)): If contracts for construction are to be financed, will they be let on a competitive basis to maximum extent practicable? N/A

c. Large projects, Congressional approval (FAA Sec. 620(k)): If for construction of productive enterprise, will aggregate value of assistance to be furnished by the U.S. not exceed \$100 million (except for productive enterprises in Egypt that were described in the Congressional presentation), or does assistance have the express approval of Congress? N/A

24. U.S. Audit Rights (FAA Sec. 301(d)): If fund is established solely by U.S. contributions and administered by an international organization, does Comptroller General have audit rights? N/A

25. Communist Assistance (FAA Sec. 620(h)). Do arrangements exist to insure that United States foreign aid is not used in a manner which, contrary to the best interests of the United States, promotes or assists the foreign aid projects or activities of the Communist-bloc countries? N/A

26. Narcotics

a. Cash reimbursements (FAA Sec. 483): Will

27. **Expropriation and Land Reform** (FAA Sec. 620(g)): Will assistance preclude use of financing to compensate owners for expropriated or nationalized property, except to compensate foreign nationals in accordance with a land reform program certified by the President? N/A
28. **Police and Prisons** (FAA Sec. 660): Will assistance preclude use of financing to provide training, advice, or any financial support for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces, except for narcotics programs? Yes
29. **CIA Activities** (FAA Sec.. 662): Will assistance preclude use of financing for CIA activities? Yes.
30. **Motor Vehicles** (FAA Sec. 636(i)): Will assistance preclude use of financing for purchase, sale, long-term lease, exchange or guaranty of the sale of motor vehicles manufactured outside U.S., unless a waiver is obtained? Yes
31. **Military Personnel** (FY 1991 Appropriations Act. Sec. 503): Will assistance preclude use of financing to pay pensions, annuities, retirement pay, or adjusted service compensation for prior or current military personnel? Yes.
32. **Payment of U.N. Assessments** (FY 1991 Appropriations Act. Sec. 505): Will assistance preclude use of financing to pay U.N. assessments, arrearages or dues? Yes.
33. **Multilateral Organization Lending** (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 506): Will assistance preclude use of financing to carry out provisions of FAA section 209(d) transfer of FAA funds to multilateral organizations for lending)? Yes.
34. **Export of Nuclear Resources** (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 510): Will assistance preclude use of financing to finance the export of nuclear equipment, fuel, or technology? Yes.

35. Repression of Population (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 511): Will assistance preclude use of financing for the purpose of aiding the efforts of the government of such country to repress the legitimate rights of the population of such country contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human rights? Yes.
No.

36. Publicity or Propaganda (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 516): Will assistance be used for publicity or propaganda purposes designed to support or defeat legislation pending before Congress, to influence in any way the outcome of a political election in the United States, or for any publicity or propaganda purposes not authorized by Congress? Yes.

37. Marine Insurance (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 5633): Will any A.I.D. contract and solicitation, and subcontract entered into under such contract, include a clause requiring that U.S. marine insurance companies have a fair opportunity to bid for marine insurance when such insurance is necessary or appropriate? Yes.

38. Exchange for Prohibited Act (FY 1991 Appropriations Act Sec. 569): Will any assistance be provided to any foreign government (included any instrumentality or agency thereof), foreign person, or United States person in exchange for that foreign government or person undertaking any action which is, if carried out by the United States Government, a United States official or employee, expressly prohibited by a provision of United States law?

C. CRITERIA APPLICABLE TO ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS ONLY

- 1. Economic and Political Stability (FAA Sec. 531(a)):**
Will this assistance promote economic and political stability? To the maximum extent feasible, is this assistance consistent with the policy directions, purposes, and programs of Part I of the FAA?
- 2. Military Purposes (FAA Sec. 531(e)):** Will this assistance be used for military or paramilitary purposes?
- 3. Commodity Grants/Separate Accounts (FAA Sec. 609):**
If commodities are to be granted so that sale proceeds will accrue to the recipient country, have Special Account (counterpart) arrangements been made?
- 4. Generation and Use of Local Currencies (FAA Sec. 531(d)):** Will ESF funds made available for commodity import programs or other program assistance be used to generate local currencies? If so, will at least 50 percent of such local currencies be available to support activities consistent with the objectives of FAA sections 103 through 106?
- 5. Cash Transfer Requirements (FY 1991 Appropriations Act, Title II, under heading "Economic Support Fund," and Sec. 575(b)):** If assistance is in the form of a cash transfer:

 - a. Separate account:** Are all such cash payments to be maintained by the country in a separate account and not to be commingled with any other funds?

b. Local currencies: Will all local currencies that may be generated with funds provided as a cash transfer to such a country also be deposited in a special account, and has A.I.D. entered into an agreement with that government setting forth the amount of local currencies to be generated, the terms and conditions under which they are to be used, and the responsibilities of A.I.D. and that government to monitor and account for deposits and disbursements?

c. U.S. Government use of local currencies: Will all such local currencies also be used in accordance with FAA Section 609, which requires such local currencies to be made available to the U.S. Government as the U.S. determines necessary for the requirements of the U.S. government, and which requires the remainder to be used for programs agreed to by the U.S. Government to carry out the purposes for which new funds authorized by the FAA would themselves be available?

d. Congressional notice: Has Congress received prior notification providing in detail how the funds will be used, including the U.S. interests that will be served by the assistance, and, as appropriate, the economic policy reforms that will be promoted by the cash transfer assistance?

Annex E
Project Analyses

Annex E. Project Analyses

1. Technical and Institutional Analyses

(a). Civil Rights

~~The institutions of civil society became politically important during the 1980s at the height of single-party rule in Zambia. Independent-minded persons, who were denied opportunities for~~ free association and open expression within party-dominated institutions, took refuge in civil society. Opposition politics thus came to be channelled and through institutions such as student unions, professional associations, Christian churches, and especially the labor movement. And with the spread of an independent press by 1991, dissenting opinions were widely disseminated for the time in two decades.

Zambia thus entered the Third Republic with a plurality of active civic institutions which, although some were young and fragile, together constituted a promising foundation for democratic governance. Among these were womens' groups such as the NGO Coordinating Committee (NGOCC) and the National Women's Lobby Group (NWLG), professional associations like the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) and the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA), as well as powerful economic interest groups like the Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU) and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).

A distinctive feature of Zambia's civil society were the groups which emerged to monitor the 1991 general elections. The Zambia Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT) was a committee of prominent professionals and the Zambia Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC) was a coalition of church, student and womens groups. During the election campaign and on polling day, ZIMT and ZEMCC performed as impartial watchdogs of the integrity of the electoral process. By educating citizens on the right and responsibility to vote and by mobilizing some 6000 trained pollwatchers nationwide, the election monitoring groups played a significant positive role in helping to ensure that Zambia's historic multiparty elections were conducted in a free, fair and peaceful atmosphere.

In the aftermath of the elections, the member organizations of ZEMCC resolved to create a permanent institution to strengthen the operations and institutions of democracy in Zambia. In April 1992 they established the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), a non-partisan, non-profit, non-governmental organization registered under the Societies Act. FODEP's purposes are to "promote a new political culture of civic responsibility", to "instill a spirit of accountability (among) both leaders and citizens at national and local levels", to "promote a better public understanding that human rights are at the core of democracy", to "encourage a free flow of information between government and citizens" and to "provide a non-partisan forum for the exchange of issues" (FODEP, Background , Activities and 1992/93 Budget).

FODEP is governed by a nominated 16-person Board and elected 6-person executive committee drawn from several member organizations: the Christian Council of Zambia, the Zambia Episcopal Conference, NGOCC and NWLG. FODEP maintains consultative relations with LAZ, PAZA and the University of Zambia Students' Union (UNZASU) and expects to draw representatives from these bodies onto its board in the future. FODEP's main organizational advantage is its national structure that, through a network of member organizations, reaches down to the community level in both urban and rural areas. This network is composed at the grassroots of church committees, parent-teacher associations, and ~~women's voluntary development groups. FODEP can readily mobilize such communities to~~ participate in civic education and action programs as a complement to other developmental activities that they are already undertaking.

Using minimal resources and relying mainly on volunteer effort, FODEP has begun to establish a credible track record of impartial civic action since the election. FODEP convened a national workshop on "Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Zambia" attended by a wide range of civic groups, political parties, and international donors. The workshop identified civic education, along with human rights monitoring and election observing, as top priorities in safeguarding democracy. During 1992, FODEP mounted teams of monitors to scrutinize three parliamentary by-elections and issued reports noting that party officials from both sides sometimes resorted to tactics of intimidation and bribery. In its reports, FODEP expressed concern that the low voter turnout in 1992 by-elections indicates a disturbing lack of popular understanding of and commitment to democracy.

In their own capacity, FODEP member organizations operate specialized civic education programs targeted at key audiences. The National Women's Lobby Group, whose objective is to seek representation for women at all levels of decision-making, offers leadership workshops to encourage prospective female candidates to run in local government elections. The NGO Coordinating Committee has spearheaded an effort to publicize a newly introduced inheritance law which enables widows to maintain possession of property against claims from a deceased husband's family.

At present FODEP is understaffed and underfunded. Its capable National Coordinator is supported by one general office worker. The Christian Council of Zambia and Catholic Secretariat cover salaries and office rent on a month-to-month basis and the Zambia Episcopal Conference lends vehicles for special assignments like by-election monitoring. NORAD/Zambia and the Swedish Embassy/Lusaka are expected to offer co-funding to partially cover core and program costs for monitoring the local government elections in October 1992.

The FODEP National Coordinator has experience managing large refugee relief programs under the auspices of UNHCR, World Vision, and the Lutheran World Federation. In this capacity he directly controlled larger amounts of funds than the grant planned under the current USAID Project. Accounts have been audited and approved for ZEMCC's election

monitoring program in 1991 and FODEP's civil society workshop in 1992. FODEP staff also have prior experience with program monitoring and participatory techniques of evaluation that are pertinent to the civic education activity proposed under the Project.

On balance, the implementation of a national civic education campaign by FODEP appears to be administratively feasible. If provided with core staff, consultancy, office and travel resources, the FODEP possesses the managerial talent and organizational network to design, operate, monitor and provide financial accounting for a national educational outreach program. ~~FODEP's methodology for the civic education program, namely community workshops linked to a media campaign, was proven proved technically feasible by ZEMCC during the 1991 election monitoring exercise.~~

To some extent, Zambia's civil society lost a measure of energy and direction in the aftermath of the unifying crusade of the general elections. Only FODEP and its member organizations have continued to work on the problem of transforming Zambia's political culture from below. Even so, all organizations in this sector remain fragile and badly in need of strengthening, especially for core institutional infrastructure. Civil society in Zambia also remains fragmented. One of the principal challenges facing the sector as a whole is to aggregate small organizations into larger, federated structures with a more effective voice on policy issues. The coalition of NGOs under the FODEP umbrella offers the most promising basis in Zambia for doing so.

(b). Media Independence

The Law Association of Zambia (LAZ), which will be responsible for the study on the media legislative environment, is an independent organization established by an Act of parliament, Chapter 47 of the Laws of Zambia. Its main policy making body is an independent Council elected by members. Membership of LAZ is open to all those admitted to practice law in the Republic of Zambia. Among the association's legal mandates is "to further the development of laws as an instrument of social order and justice and as an essential element in the growth of society". The association is already collaborating with the Ministry of Legal Affairs and other civil society organizations in constitutional reform activities. The Council is empowered by the act to receive grants and donations without restrictions.

The study on the privatization of the media will be conducted under the auspices of the Zambia Confederation of Industries and Chambers of Commerce (ZACCI). ZACCI is one of the main champions of a market economy in Zambia. Among its stated objectives are "the promotion of competition and the abolition of monopoly, whether in business or politics; and the privatization of parastatals." The study will be the responsibility of ZACCI's Investment Code and Privatization Committee.

The Zambia Institute of Mass Communications (ZAMCOM), which will be the locale of most of the media Activities, is a quasi-independent public corporation chartered under its own Act of Parliament. The Institute was first established in 1980 as a flexible (mobile) unit

in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services to provide refresher courses whenever and wherever demand arose within the Ministry and its departments. In 1983, ZAMCOM was upgraded and given permanent premises as an in-house training department at the old studios of the then Zambia Broadcasting Services (ZBS) which had moved to a new site. Four years later, the government renovated the old broadcasting house buildings and acquired new equipment for ZAMCOM through an agreement with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF) of Germany.

Today, ZAMCOM offers a practical in-service training program consisting of short courses tailored to meet specific needs of media practitioners and other people who use the media to disseminate information. Most of the courses are designed for journalists and other media operators in the print media, radio, television and video. The courses last between two and six weeks.

In addition to the training of journalists and other media operators, the Institute offers a program in what it calls development support communications and management-related courses for non-media people who use the media in their fields to disseminate information. The target groups for this program include public and corporate information officers, adult educators, administrators and those working in public health and agricultural extension services.

ZAMCOM runs an excellent campus with air-conditioned lecture and conference rooms equipped with a variety of audio-visual teaching aids. It has radio and television studios with adjacent editing rooms which are backed by audio recording and electronic news gathering equipment. Other facilities at the Institute include a maintenance workshop, a printing unit, a photo-laboratory, a small library with about 1,000 titles, and an audio-visual archive of training-related materials. These facilities will be absorbed into the Media Resources Center and expanded to meet the goals of the Project.

After persistent lobbying by ZAMCOM's management, the government finally agreed to change the status of the Institute from a government department to a statutory board with the enactment of the ZAMCOM Act of 1991. ZAMCOM is, however, still beholden to the government, through the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services, as the Institute's main principal financier. When launching the new statutory ZAMCOM, the Zambian Government committed itself to providing the Institute with an annual grant whose level will diminish progressively each year. In Zambia's FY 1992, ZAMCOM received a grant of only K31.5 million (US\$ 170,000).

While FNF contributions in the past went mostly into the purchase and installation of studio equipment and rehabilitation of classrooms, its support currently centers around the funding of local and foreign resource persons who participate in ZAMCOM's courses, seminars and workshops. FNF also provides some funds for the maintenance of the equipment which it contributed to the Institute. Following the transformation of ZAMCOM into a statutory body, and in line with the new philosophy of FNF, the foundation will no longer make any new

investment in hardware to the Institute. The current support program will, therefore, not be renewed when it expires in 1995.

The Institute's management has been working out plans to strengthen the Institute's income generating activities in preparation for the time the government will cease to assist it financially. The institute has already embarked on the production of television commercials and documentaries and hires out audio and video recording studio facilities for commercial use. It also provides printing, conference and seminar facilities as well as hostel accommodation at competitive rates.

ZAMCOM enjoys broad support from journalists and their representative bodies. But while the Institute has done fairly well so far to help upgrade journalists and other media operators in the country, it's role will become even more critical in a democratic Zambia, and especially when the government fully liberalizes the media sector.

One of ZAMCOM's major plans is to develop the printing unit so it can operate on full commercial lines in order to make the Institute fully independent of external funding for day-to-day functioning. There is also need to upgrade the audio and video studio facilities in line with recent technological developments in these fields in order to improve its commercial electronic media services and make them even more competitive.

The establishment structure of the Institute is headed by a Council which is the main policy making body, with the director as the institution's chief executive officer. There is a program coordinator (in-charge of training); a technical coordinator (responsible for maintenance and other technical services); three course coordinators (print, broadcast and development support communication); and a course assistant. Other support staff include secretarial, library and clerical staff and maintenance technicians.

ZAMCOM's past as a government department deprived it of the opportunity to develop adequate operational procedures and efficient management processes. The ZAMCOM Act 1991 has given the Institute the authority to recruit staff of the right calibre and to establish and develop an effective management style required to provide quality training and research need by the Institute's clients. The Project will provide ZAMCOM with assistance to develop its management capacity in the initial stages.

The ZAMCOM Act 1991 does not give ZAMCOM adequate autonomy to operate freely and without unwarranted pressure from the government. There is a real danger that providing support to the Institute in its current status might undermine rather than reinforce democratic governance. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services reiterated to the Project Team the government's original commitment to making ZAMCOM fully independent and pledged to have the necessary legislative changes made to provide the Institute the level of autonomy necessary to realize the goals of the Project. The Mission will need to satisfy itself that this level of independence has been achieved before the release of funds supporting the activities of the Media Resources Center under ZAMCOM.

ZAMCOM will need to meet elaborate conditions regarding legal autonomy from the government and the independence of its board. These will include the following amendments to the ZAMCOM Act:

1. Section 3 - Functions

This whole section is silent on press freedom and independence of the media. The following changes are suggested:

A clause should be added to sub-section (1) to include the function of promoting freedom of the press and the development of a free and independent media in Zambia.

Another clause should be inserted under sub-section (2) allowing the Institute to "carry out other such activities as promote a free and independent media in Zambia as the Council shall determine".

2. Section 6 - Composition of the Council

This is crucial because it gives too much power to the government (through the minister) over the Council. The following changes are suggested:

USAID/Zambia to get a position on the Council alongside FNF.

The minister to appoint the following members:

- PS Information and broadcasting (representing government.)
- One private individual representing the private sector.

The other four members to be nominated by their respective associations/institutions, without condition for ministerial approval.

The list of associations/institutions nominating the other four members should be amended to read:

- the independent print media;
- the broadcasting media;
- journalism training institutions
- Press Association of Zambia/Zambia Union of Journalists

The chairman and vice-chairman of the Council to be elected by the Council from amongst its members.

3. Section 7 - Tenure of Office and Vacancy

Sub-section (2) should be amended to require members to give notice of

resignation to the Chairman of the Council and to remove the powers currently given the minister to remove "any member at any time".

Sub-section (3) should be amended to require the removal of a member if convicted of a criminal offense by a court of law under the Laws of Zambia, resorting in imprisonment for a term exceeding six months. [The current provision covers administrative detention, including for the legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of express]

4. Section 16 - Prohibition of Publication

Delete this whole section. The current provision strongly militates against access to public information and poses a serious threat to the independent media's freedom to publish such information, especially when the Council is under strong government control. [If necessary, a simple statement could replace this section, giving the council powers to administratively censure those guilty of information leaks.]

5. Sections 9, 17, 18, 19, and 20 - Remove all references in the Act that give the minister sole financial responsibility over the Institute and invest such powers with the Council.
6. Section 20 - Replace the Minister with the Council in this section.
7. A new Council to be constituted under the new legislation before any funds are made available.

The government is still a major financier of ZAMCOM. Under the amendments suggested above, the donors have one member on the Council each, leaving seven members. Broadcasting is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, fully or largely under government control. The government, therefore, gets to appoint three of seven members of the Council (inclusive of the broadcasting representative, while the other four are appointed by the independent media. This way, the minister does not totally control the Council, but it leaves him/her with substantial influence commensurate with the current levels of government's financial commitment to the Institute. Methods and extent of scaling down government levels of future government participation can be worked out at a later stage to reflect continued donor support and/or the trends in ZAMCOM's financial viability outside government subvention.

(c) Legislative Performance

The powers of the National Assembly have been expanded under the interim constitution, e.g, to vote to lift a State of Emergency and to approve some Presidential appointments. The National Assembly has exercised these new powers: it did lift the State of Emergency in

1991, and it rejected the President's nominee for Attorney-General. The National Assembly has made important amendments to several government bills. The new constitution should reflect even more clearly the MMD's commitment to strengthening Parliament as a forum for open debate and a vital legislative body. As the President said on August 5, any other way than law-making with free debate would be disrespectful of democracy. There are, however, some problems with the National Assembly staff which serves MPs and runs the National Assembly complex. These weaknesses must be addressed before parliament can function as the President declares it should.

The National Assembly staff is an independent government agency not governed by Public Service rules. At the top are the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker and the Clerk of the House. Part of the staff assists MPs and the functioning of parliament in several ways: by transcribing and publishing parliamentary debates and committee reports; by assisting committees and individual MPs to become better informed; and by ensuring that MPs and committees follow proper parliamentary procedures when they debate, consider in committee and amend legislation. The rest of the staff run the complex of about 15 acres, which includes a motel for MPs and staff housing as well as the National Assembly buildings. Total employment is 563; of this about 80, including secretarial staff, serve MPs. The Project component focusses on this portion of the staff only. The rest, including 258 administrators, 97 catering and motel staff and 97 security staff, deal with non-legislative related functions. The total budget allocated for 1990 was K67 million; it was overspent by K53 million, or about 80 percent, according to the Report of the Auditor-General. The operating budget for 1992 is K490 million. This does not include the salary increases recently awarded to Mps and staff.

The National Assembly staff in its relationship to the MPs it serves and in its capacity as a functioning unit has more weaknesses than strengths. The weaknesses, many related to its current top management structures are discussed below. It does have some important strengths. One is a consistent set of duties and procedures, which have changed little over the years, are well understood by the staff and are carried out to the best of their ability given the structural problems and equipment shortages they face. The National Assembly complex is an attractive, well maintained plant which serves all its intended purposes more than adequately. The serious omission is offices and telephones for MPs, but it is not impossible that little-utilized parts of the structure could be used to provide some office space for MPs. The existing staff appears to be reasonably competent. Some clearly show initiative and independence in spite of the structural disincentives. Most MPs described that staff as helpful, although not always able to respond quickly and in sufficient depth. Members of the staff are aware of, and in some regular contact with, their counterparts in other Commonwealth countries, so they have a sense of belonging to a profession with international standards and resources.

The most important weakness in the National Assembly staff unit is the relationship of top management (the Speaker and the Clerk of the House) to the staff and to MPs. The structural weaknesses may be exaggerated by the characteristics of the incumbents: the

Speaker, in his day a stalwart defender of the rights of Parliament, is now an old man. The Clerk has been investigated for abuse of office. The fundamental structural weaknesses give the Speaker and the Clerk unchecked authority, which now seems to be wielded arbitrarily and in a way which prevents MPs from freely exercising their prerogatives. The structural weaknesses mostly relate to management.

~~The staff form an independent unit of government not regulated by public service rules. The sole power to hire and fire is vested in the Clerk. Staff have no legal recourse if they are fired arbitrarily. The effect on the staff is that they are reluctant to risk their jobs by acting independently and on their own initiative. As several Zambians described the situation, they are "inhibited." Some staff members appear to carry out their duties to MPs and parliamentary committees as procedures prescribe; some are perceived by MPs to distort the procedures and dampen the occasional criticism of the government emanating from MPs and parliamentary committees, e.g., criticisms are left out of committee minutes.~~

Under the constitution, the Speaker should be elected by Parliament for the life of Parliament, i.e. five years. The current Speaker was for many years an effective and independent holder of the job, who defended parliamentary rights under the Second Republic. He was "elected" at the request of the President at the beginning of this parliamentary session, an understandable appointment since he was such a well respected figure. The removal of both the Speaker and the Clerk involves the active intervention of parliament; this is certainly appropriate for the job of Speaker but it may not be the best way to oversee the job of Clerk, which is a more managerial than political role.

The current National Assembly budget priorities indicate managerial problems at the top. There are 258 administrative workers, while the professional staff lack budget allocations to cover basic functions and keep equipment in use.

Both the staff and the MPs agree that the current structures should be changed to modify the current hiring/firing structures to build an appeals procedure and a clear process for hiring and promoting on merit.

The Speaker and Clerk are also using their authority in an arbitrary fashion to reduce independent debate in Parliament. Private Members motions and bills, and amendments to government bills have been discouraged, according to the MPs interviewed. The Speaker has also ruled out of order an MP effort to establish a Parliamentary Committee charged with examining the organization and administration of National Assembly staff.

Public access to the National Assembly complex is currently extremely limited. It is difficult to get through the gates to keep appointments, parties of constituents are limited to 6 in number, access to the library is limited to MPs, ex-MPs or holders of a permission letter from the Speaker. Given the crime rate in Lusaka, some limits on public access are appropriate; the current limits are not.

A weakness in the current ability of the staff to serve MPs seems to stem partly from the policies of the current top management and partly from the nature of the links between the National Assembly staff and the governance ministries and statutory bodies. On the one hand, National Assembly staff researchers sometimes have difficulty getting cooperation from ministries in their efforts to serve individual MPs. On the other hand, the ministries provide by far the largest share of expert testimony to Parliamentary committees. The National Assembly staff informed us that procedures dictated that only ministries could provide assistance to committees; this was subsequently contradicted by an MP, who gave several instances of outside experts providing information to committees. However, the predominance of assistance from the ministries may distort the judgement of committees in favor of ministry policies and preferences.

A last weakness of the operations of the National Assembly that is important, but cannot be addressed by USAID, is the failure thus far of MPS to organize in their own interests. They complain of MMD party caucuses dominated by the President, of limited access to the President as individuals and as parliamentary delegations. They all agree that more needs to be done to support and systematize constituency relations, office space for MPs, better defense of MPs rights to criticize government legislation and more private members' motions and bills. They are also concerned with the running of the National Assembly staff. While the solution to many of these problems may be within their reach, they have not yet organized or developed a mechanism to deal with their collective problems. While this is not surprising given that about 90% are new MPs, one hopes that progress will be made in this area.

The current functioning of the National Assembly thus places a number of impediments to proper information flows. The lack of equipment slows the work of parliamentary committees and prevents parliamentary debates and committee reports from being produced quickly. The lack of appropriate materials in the library limits the ability of research staff to respond quickly to MP's and committees' needs for background material. The staff lacks some vital professional skills: legal drafting, expertise on constitutional law and parliamentary procedures and the sets of skills needed to deal with the demands of the economic reform program, oversight of parastatals and oversight of the privatization effort. There is currently no developed mechanism to use independent experts to assist MPs when staff skills are insufficient.

For USAID to assist the National Assembly staff is technically straightforward: staff augmentation, study tours, a legal drafting fund, library materials, and equipment. The basic question is not how to help them to function more effectively; they themselves have identified both their problems and solutions well. The question is whether in the Third Republic the management of the National Assembly will be changed so that it too operates in a more democratic and transparent fashion.

(d) Policy Coordination

In Zambia's hybrid presidential/parliamentary system the Cabinet Office is the nerve center of government operations. It plays four essential roles. 1) The Secretary to the Cabinet is the premier civil servant. Not only do all Permanent Secretaries report to him, but all personnel and administrative functions relating to the public service ultimately report to the Cabinet Office. 2) As the senior civil servant, the Secretary to the Cabinet is also chief advisor to the President, advising and briefing him, ~~as well as carrying out instructions from the President in his role as Minister of the Public Service.~~ 3) ~~The Cabinet Office serves~~ Cabinet meetings. Its staff records and circulates memos, minutes and decisions from Cabinet meetings. 4) The Cabinet Office is responsible for answering questions to the government raised in parliament during Question Time.

Since Independence the Cabinet Office has carried out these four roles with varying emphases and varying degrees of effectiveness. During the first five years of independence the Secretary to the Cabinet, Valentine Musakanya, developed a strong coordinating role for the Cabinet Office. He used his authority to set the agenda for Cabinet meetings and to ensure that memos and proposals from individual ministries were assessed and approved by the other ministries involved before the proposal became an agenda item. All proposals involving expenditure, then as now, had to be cleared by the Ministry of Finance. However, the Cabinet Office coordinating role also included ascertaining the compatibility of one ministry's proposal with the priorities and policies of the other affected ministries. The Cabinet Office thus functioned, not as a policy-maker, but as a policy coordinator and filter so that, when items were presented in Cabinet meetings, some basic pre-feasibility work had been done, making the Cabinet's policy decision easier and better informed.

After Cabinet decisions were made, the Secretary to the Cabinet worked with the relevant Permanent Secretaries to draw up an implementation plan that seemed likely to produce the results that the Cabinet decision intended. At intervals the Cabinet Office monitored the implementation effort to ensure that the Cabinet decision was being carried out properly and had not been materially distorted. If a Permanent Secretary came to the Secretary to the Cabinet to revise the implementation plan, the Secretary could approve changes so long as the original objective of the Cabinet decision was preserved; otherwise, the matter had to be re-addressed in Cabinet. Ministers, once they had collectively taken decisions, thus delegated implementation to the public service, with the Secretary to the Cabinet acting as the guardian of the Cabinet's decisions. It was considered improper for Ministers to take a direct role in implementation, particularly in expenditure and procurement activities. By 1969 political in-fighting and heavy government expenditure were converging to create the conditions that prevailed under the Second Republic: a one-party state following inconsistent economic policies that ran the country into the ground. The constitution of the Second Republic immensely strengthened the powers of the President and explicitly assigned the responsibility of policy-making to the Party, while leaving implementation to the government. The State of Emergency, which was in effect from 1964 to 1991, further removed decision-making from both parliament and government ministries. The President

monopolized two powerful instruments: vast powers to appoint job-holders and the initiation of major policy efforts. Frequent job shuffles weakened the implementation capacities of government institutions; grandiose and often poorly conceived policy directives were foisted on ministries.

Although most important policy directives came from levels above Cabinet - the President, the Party or powerful individual ministers - neither the Cabinet nor the Cabinet Office ceased to function entirely. ~~The Secretary to the Cabinet remained a powerful figure because of his leadership of the public service. But the Cabinet Office's policy coordination role was~~ considerably weakened. The information flows in and out of Cabinet meetings lost their clarity. During the later years of the Second Republic, Permanent Secretaries, for fear of making mistakes, put the burden of minor implementation decisions on the Cabinet Office, instead of carrying out agreed plans. In addition, during the Second Republic, Cabinet Office became a dumping ground for politicians and senior civil servants, who had no other place to go but, for political reasons, were impossible to retire.

Under the Third Republic, with the appointment in June 1992 of a senior and well-respected civil servant as Secretary to the Cabinet and with the launching of the Public Service Reform Program, the Cabinet Office is expected to move rapidly to become a strong organization once more. But, in spite of the government's commitment to democratic, transparent and accountable government, policy coordination has so far been a major problem for several reasons. The public service is still somewhat demoralized and without incentives to take appropriate implementation responsibilities. This problem will be addressed by the Public Service Reform Program. Cabinet Office is simply circulating memos and Cabinet decisions in a passive manner most of the time. Some ministers in key ministries are making decisions outside normal channels. The government is committed to a major effort to reorganize and revitalize the public service and the responsibility for implementation has been assigned to the Cabinet Office, underlining its central position. The project is appropriately lodged under the Permanent Secretary for Manpower and Training.

As one component of the Zambia Democratic Governance Support Project, USAID can help the Cabinet Office to regain its role as the coordinator of routine government decision flows. It should again act as a pre-feasibility mechanism for ministerial memos before they become Cabinet agenda items and it should be able to analyse, interpret and convey Cabinet decision to the relevant ministries, and follow up implementation efforts. The governance benefits include: smoother, better informed and more coordinated Cabinet meetings; a standard procedure which can be communicated to the people, the press and the National Assembly to give them an indication of whether the government is functioning properly; a "nerve center" for the network of government agencies with a staff that fully understands how all parts of government relate to each other; and enhanced analytical and managerial capacity in a crucial location.

The central Cabinet Office is a small agency, housed in a single building. However, both its budget and its staffing reflect its responsibility for providing staff and expenditure for State

House operations. The establishment for the central Cabinet Office (which is not currently fully filled) is 138: 20 senior civil servants, 9 professional staff and 109 secretaries, administrators and others. The 1992 budget, less funding for State House operations but including 43 seconded personnel, is K222 million. In 1990 the Auditor-General's report showed some overspending by the Cabinet Office but most was apparently the excess expenditures of a number of special commissions of enquiry.

~~The GRZ is now seeking to rationalize Cabinet Office. The government has stated its aim to restore to Cabinet Office primacy over the coordination and implementation of government~~ policy. Of the Cabinet Office's two major roles, the first, the management of the civil service, has overwhelmed the second, the coordination of government policy. So far, a great deal of attention has been given to assessing, rationalizing, and improving, Cabinet Office's role as manager of the public service. The UNDP-supported Public Sector Reform program is designed to address the many facets of this issue. As yet, little has been done to enhance the capacity of Cabinet Office to play its appointed role as the "nerve center" of government; the prime force in the coordination and implementation of policy. The purpose of this component of the Zambia Democratic Governance Support Project is to do just that. It is thus an important complement of the PSRP, and will interact with it in substantial ways. But, unlike the PSRP, that focuses on Cabinet Office's role as manager of the public service, this project component focuses on enhancing the ability of Cabinet to coordinate and implement government policy.

The Cabinet Office senior staff has worked extensively with team members to design this component to address their perceived needs, to fit within USAID parameters, and to complement the major UNDP-led Public Sector Reform Program and World Bank initiatives in economic management. The top three levels in the Cabinet Office are both technically competent and committed to restoring professionalism and accountability in the management of public affairs. These officers are clearly enthusiastic about moving as quickly as possible to revitalize Cabinet Office functions, and improve the management of the entire public service.

The recommended USAID activities for this component of the Project will achieve the Project's objectives in two ways. First, they provide the management resources to sustain the implementation plan that the Cabinet Office is committed to, and that the Project team recommends. They also provide the short-term technical assistance inputs to design the implementation plan thoroughly.

In the broader range of objectives, a coordinating unit in the Cabinet Office that performs well increases the accountability of government, in the area of Cabinet decisions and their implementation, and makes the process of government more transparent to the National Assembly, the press, and the Zambian people. The component thus not only addresses USAID objectives but also the commitments of the MMD government.

2. Governance and Economic Performance Analysis

The Zambia Democratic Governance Support Project is designed to make public decision-making more accessible and effective. Because of the nature of the project, a flexible activity designed to enhance both the "demand" for and the "supply" of effective policy, it is not practical to do any kind of formal benefit/cost analysis of the project. The Financial Analysis Annex will address the issue of the cost efficiency of each of the project components. In this Economic Analysis, we wish to explore the overall relationship between governance and economic performance in Zambia, and make the case that addressing the governance environment indeed addresses what are binding constraints to sustained and broad-based economic growth. We begin with a general and comparative discussion of the linkages between governance and economic performance, and then go on to look at the specifics of the Zambian context. The focus of most of the analysis is historical, in that we believe that the roots of most of the governance problems in contemporary Zambia lie in the continuing legacies of the failed ideologies, governmental practices, political processes, and bureaucratic norms and practices of the Second Republic. Effectively addressing these contemporary constraints begins by understanding their origins.

Governance refers to the establishment and management of institutional rules for regulating relations between government and citizens. Thus, the concept of governance goes beyond that of government to include a more explicitly political dimension. Governance may be summarized as the structure and use of political authority, and including participation and control in the management of resources for social and economic development. This broad definition encompasses the nature and functioning of a state's institutional and structural arrangements, decision-making processes, policy formulation, implementation capacity, information flows, effectiveness of leadership, and the nature of the relationship between rulers and ruled. Thus, governance has two major components: "top-down" relations by which governmental authorities allocate and utilize public resources; and "bottom-up" relations by which citizens seek to influence the public decisions which affect them.

Good governance refers both to effective and efficient allocation of public resources and to open and accountable decisions which take into consideration citizen preferences. The notion of governance is therefore bounded by such concepts as effectiveness and efficiency, and transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs. Governance factors may support, or they may hinder, economic development. Public authorities play an indispensable role in establishing and maintaining an enabling environment in which economic actors can flourish and generate development outcomes. But the establishment of such an environment is never automatic or inevitable. It is now widely recognized that governance factors have been an important contributor to Africa's economic crisis, as well as lying at the root of the contemporary pressures for political change. In many ways, Zambia has been a prime example of these processes at work.

What is the relationship between good governance, democratization and economic development? There is certainly a clear correlation among the three. Both across countries

at a single moment, and over time in individual nations, development does appear to go hand-in-hand with good governance and a trend towards democracy. There is a strong argument directly linking good governance to successful economic development. Many of the studies of Asian developmental success have cited the importance of good governance themes, even in authoritarian settings. The rule of law, the free flow of information, bounded governmental authority, and effective and efficient public administration all appear to be directly linked to developmental success in Asia. Conversely, as mentioned earlier, the ~~lack of these themes appear directly linked to developmental failure in Africa. Among African countries, those that historically have had relatively good governance, such as~~ Kenya, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Botswana have outperformed the remaining African states on a range of development indicators.

While the positive relationship between governance and economic growth is direct and immediate, the relationship between democratization and economic growth is more complex. Over the long term, democratization and economic growth are mutually reinforcing processes; one is difficult to obtain without the other. Democratic values and institutions can only flourish in an atmosphere of expanding opportunity for education, economic gain and social mobility. A political culture of tolerance and peaceful competition is unlikely to emerge under conditions of economic scarcity and impoverishment. The development of market institutions and entrepreneurial groups is central to creating strong foundations for democracy. Thus, economic growth enables democratization.

The causal arrow also runs the other way. Political pluralism and governmental effectiveness stimulate economic growth. Through participation in associational life and parliamentary government, for example, private citizens oversee and influence the behavior of officials and the policy decisions of government. Such democratic institutions ensure that governmental activity supports rather than restricts private initiative. Barrington Moore has summarized his examination of the social requisites of democracy with the epithet, "no bourgeoisie, no democracy." In Africa, a strong case can be made for the obverse, "no democracy, no bourgeoisie." Indeed, a major use of the state apparatus by African single party and military authoritarian regimes has been to restrict the development of a bourgeoisie. There are good reasons to believe that, in the African context, especially in Zambia, a more democratic culture and political structure will facilitate entrepreneurship and market-based economic development.

Especially as economies become more sophisticated and specialized, a democratic context is vital for allowing the flow of information upon which market decisions are made and for enabling the social groups generated by economic growth to achieve compromise and cohesion. Thus, all of the developmental/authoritarian regimes of Asia and Latin America have had to liberalize their political structures to maintain economic momentum. But even in less developed countries, democratic legitimacy is often necessary to make the difficult policy changes needed to sustain long-term development, but unpopular because they necessitate short-term sacrifice. Especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where non-democratic regimes have been strongly associated with economic mismanagement and plunder and not with successful

promotion of development, the promotion of good governance is closely tied to successful democratization.

With these conceptual and comparative comments in mind, let us now examine the relationship between governance factors and economic performance in Zambia. Between the middle 1970s and the present, Zambia has been ravaged by a virtually unbroken process of economic decline. The outcome of this process has been a more than 50% reduction in Zambia's per capita income and ~~a change in status from a middle income country to a heavily indebted poor country. The direct causes of economic decline have been the~~ interplay of international economic factors -- the fall in the price of copper, the oil price hikes of the 1970s, the international recession of the early 1980s and weak global growth since then -- and poor governmental policies -- a greatly overvalued exchange rate, an unsustainable build up of public expenditures, a commitment to cheap food for urban residents.

Obviously, Zambia had little influence over the international economic factors that have affected the country. But poor governance, and the lack of a democratic environment, were crucial in generating the context in which the government's policy response was so damaging. These factors also explain why, in the 1980s, Zambia was unable to sustain a viable economic reform program, despite the growing realization of the necessity of such a program. Poor governance in Zambia was the outcome of the interplay between governmental structures, political processes, the bureaucratic environment and culture, and the ideological atmosphere. Let us explore each of these in turn, focusing on how they limited the ability of Zambia to effectively respond to its growing economic crisis.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Zambian government was a classic example of a self-declared "development dictatorship". From the onset of nationalist politics in Zambia, the leaders of the movement entered into a more or less explicit covenant with their followers to distribute the material benefits of economic development. A basic element of the "development dictatorship" syndrome, that applied fully in Zambia, was the direct responsibility that the ruling authorities, both party and government, took for virtually all economic outcomes. Driven by the combination of social and organizational interests and the "humanism" ideology, economic policy in Zambia focused on redressing the colonial legacy through large-scale government intervention to increase African influence in the economy, the provision of education and social services, and the subsidization of urban basic living costs, especially food. All this was made possible in the late 1960s and through the 1970s by the government's capture of large economic "rents" from the mining of copper. At the macro-economic level, policy focused on maintaining high levels of effective demand and priming the pump of the economy through a loose money policy.

With the advent of the de-jure single party system in 1972, the Zambian government's major means for renewing its legitimacy was through achieving economic growth and distributive justice. At the same time, the government became fully subordinated to the UNIP party. The official rhetoric, which reflected reality, spoke of "the party and its government." A

powerful momentum ensued for UNIP and governmental control over all areas of national life.

In its depth of public-sector penetration of markets, extent of political organization, and party dominance over government, Zambia under the Second Republic was probably the closest approximation in Africa to the party-states of the communist world. The party has made policy while government has been responsible for implementation. While the party did, for many years, retain ~~a broad mass organization~~, control was exerted from the top-down, and ~~there were no mechanisms for renewing ideas, reinvigorating leadership, or being~~ accountable to popular opinion. Within UNIP, control was exerted from the top down. President Kaunda, General-Secretary Grey Zulu, and the provincial Central Committee members were the core of the party elite. Among the Zambian opposition, it was often said that Kaunda and his closest cohorts have effectively "privatized" the state, an assertion that contained more than a grain of truth. Beneath the top leadership, there was a vast bureaucracy which included the Women's League and Youth Brigade. The urban townships, which account for one-half of Zambia's population, provided the focal point for UNIP's organizational efforts. In the rural areas, the party exerted its authority through its domination of the provincial cooperative unions (PCUs) and the district and local governmental authorities.

As in Eastern Europe, the dominance of the party led to a blurring of the lines between party and government, and the frequent use of government resources for highly partisan purposes. For instance, in the urban areas, access to petty commerce was tightly controlled by UNIP, which was the instrument for the political regulation of consumer prices. This was little affected by reform efforts. Under the Second Republic, the GRZ's unremitting hostility to the informal sector has its roots in UNIP's fear of losing control over important sources of patronage and control.

In the 1980s, even as the government undertook several rounds of economic reform initiatives, it was very difficult for the GRZ (and UNIP) to step back from its roles as "director" of the economy and "provider" for the population. Deeply entrenched patterns of party dominance over government were an important source of limited external donor leverage over economic policy in the 1980s, and for the minimal success of foreign technical assistance in influencing policy. The economic reform program envisioned a major shift in the role of the state in Zambian economic life. Several observers have suggested that the donors did not always understand what a revolutionary change the economic reform program implied, since it challenged long-held fundamental assumptions about the relationship between state and market and between government and society. This misperception on the part of the donors was a major cause of what Tina West has termed the "negative synergy" between the GRZ and the donors in the 1980s. The donors had over-optimistic expectations about the pace and consistency of policy reform efforts, but were in fact isolated from, and ill-informed about, the actual policy-making and political processes. The GRZ, for its part, were all too often willing to scapegoat the donors, blaming them for the difficulties of the reform process.

While the new MMD government, led by Frederick Chiluba, has articulated a fundamentally different conception of the role of government, and of its relations with both individuals and groups outside of the state, the patterns of governmental control die hard. Citizens in Zambia do not, as yet, have a strong idea of their rights and responsibilities under a democratic political system. Within government, there remain many who still wish to "control" rather than "enable." Changing the role of government cannot happen over night. Nor is it likely to be accomplished by actions from within government itself. Effecting such a change will require a strong "demand" voice, from outside of government. The civic education and legislative performance components of the Democratic Governance Project have been specifically designed to promote the "demand" for effective governance, both outside of the state and in the key democratic institution linking the state with its citizenry - the national assembly.

Three elements of the political process in Zambia deeply hindered effective governance and interacted to limit the possibility for economic growth and development. The first was the fact that producer interests were initially not represented in the UNIP coalition, and, over time, came to be systematically excluded from political influence. From its earliest days, the political base of UNIP was drawn from the urban and industrialized areas of the country. The party's political organization was strongest in the urban townships among a broad cross-class coalition that was dominated by government workers, the urban middle class, and traders. UNIP was not effectively connected to rural interests, neither commercial farmers, traditional chiefs nor peasants, who had tended to support its main opposition, the ANC. The goal of agricultural policy under UNIP was to provide cheap food to Lusaka, the Copperbelt and the other urban areas. Since independence the party has spread its influence through the rural areas through the creation of a rural job patronage network and control of agricultural marketing through NAMBoard and the provincial cooperative unions (PCUs).

Secondly, UNIP's conception of its own role facilitated the deep political penetration of the bureaucracy. This took several forms. The most obvious was direct presidential involvement in decision-making, by-passing technical and policy input from the relevant ministerial bureaucracy. This facilitated frequent policy lurches that had an immediate payoff (either with domestic constituencies or with international donors), but weakened the overall credibility of policy and limited the supply responses to reforms that were undertaken. A second form of political penetration was the President's active role in personnel matters. As in many sub-Saharan African countries, the Public Service has been a major focal point for political patronage. This has led to a major problem of overstaffing, especially at the lower levels. The direct role of the President in this process is deeper in Zambia than in almost all other African countries, and its effects are perhaps even more deleterious. President Kaunda functioned almost as an individual "public service commission." Over the years, Kaunda's style was marked by frequent changes of position among key associates to assure that no one else acquired a firm bureaucratic base. As early as twenty years ago, Kaunda himself acknowledged the efficiency costs of such practices and pledged to reduce them. But they continued through the end of the Second Republic, and are a continuing source of the lack of policy and implementation coherence in Zambia.

Third, politics in Zambia was a closed process. The UNIP hierarchy developed a paranoid style of politics that, in its language and action, discouraged openness and encouraged political apathy. The lack of meaningful political competition limited the periodic circulation of elites. The small group of close advisors and political mandarins around President Kaunda changed little over the years. There were few diverse inputs into the policy-making process. This was an important reason why it was so difficult for Zambia to adapt to changing international economic conditions. Closed politics facilitated the growing ~~"brittleness" of the Second Republic; its lack of the resiliency needed to respond to new issues and circumstances.~~

Again, the legacies of these political patterns remain in contemporary Zambia. While the new government is very much open to the views and interests of various producer groups, these groups are yet to effectively develop their analytical and policy influence skills. Sustaining the democratic features of the Third Republic will be crucial for enabling these interests to become effectively expressed. The political penetration of the bureaucracy will take years to diminish. Finally, the "paranoid" style of politics is unlikely to change until the flow of information becomes much more extensive, credible and routine. Through the Democratic Governance Project, AID will support the deepening of democracy through constitutional change, support for a more independent and effective media, and for better technical coordination of, and increased accountability for, government actions.

The bureaucratic norms and procedures that have evolved in Zambia have not contributed to economic growth, and have made the implementation of policy reform efforts very difficult. The bureaucratic environment in Zambia is, broadly speaking, not conducive to the implementation of a wide-ranging and ambitious economic reform program. There are some parallels between economic reform efforts in recent years and earlier efforts at socialist planning. In both cases, grandiose and wide-ranging plans were drawn up with little attention being paid to their operational viability. Earlier efforts at socialist planning had little impact on the actual operations of government. While economic reform efforts have led to some real changes, they also remain vulnerable to the bureaucratic and political environments in which they operate.

In the 1980s, a number of bureaucratic features interacted to limit the viability of reform initiatives. Some elements of the bureaucratic environment that have limited the success of reform efforts are improving, if slowly and gradually. The very limited "economic learning" that has taken place is one striking feature of the Zambian bureaucracy. Socialist and statist ideas that long ago went out of fashion in other developing countries still have currency among many Zambian bureaucrats. Bureaucratic opposition to the reform measures was an important source of implementation difficulties in the 1980s; while apparently diminished, it almost certainly continues today. Among a number of fairly senior officials, the perception that Zambia's woes derive from the international environment is being replaced by the theme that they derive from the one-party state. While better than blaming the outside world for all of the country's problems, this view portrays a similar naivete about fairly basic economic principles. While some observers believe that the

Zambian bureaucracy is becoming more sophisticated, the process does not appear to be moving very rapidly. A senior Western technical advisor with long experience in the country commented that if copper prices suddenly skyrocketed, Zambia would likely repeat many of its earlier errors.

This brings us to perhaps the key problems of the Zambian bureaucracy: its technical weakness, severe staffing problems at the senior level, very poor remuneration, and ever decreasing recurrent non-salary operational resources. ~~Many senior Zambian technocrats have inappropriate training, often at Eastern European institutions.~~ Staffing and remuneration problems have worsened in the past few years. Since 1983, the range between the highest public service wages and the lowest have been compressed from ten-to-one to four-to-one. Thus, the impact of lowered real wages has been strongest at the top levels of the public service. This has led to demoralization and ineffectiveness, as well as attenuating the incentives to engage in corrupt practices. The compressed wage and benefit structure has made public employment increasingly unattractive to skilled professionals and technicians. A demoralized, underpaid staff is unlikely to be able to creatively and efficiently implement the reform program.

Effective implementation is made even more problematic due to the lack of budgetary resources for operations. Thus far, the new MMD government has not been able to make substantial moves to limit the size of the bureaucracy nor control wage increases. The result is continuing pressure on the wage account. In this context, budgetary cutbacks remain focused on the investment program and on operational expenses, resulting in continuing reductions in the quality of government services and a weakened capacity for implementation of complex reform programs.

The structure of decision-making and the interrelationships within the bureaucracy further limit the capacity of the public service to promote economic growth and to implement a wide-ranging program of economic reform. Economic policy in the Second Zambian Republic was been marked by non-binding decision-making. Issues were never closed. The potential for reversion always existed. This gives a strong impetus for those on the losing end of a decision to mobilize political pressure and continue to fight. This syndrome has not disappeared in the Third Republic.

As well as non-binding, Zambian decision-making has tended to be non-hierarchical. A clear chain of command has been lacking. In practice, there has been little effective central control over expenditures and decisions in the spending ministries (or in the provincial and district government councils). This gives incentives to bureaucratic entrepreneurs to "grab" policy-issues in an attempt to bring them into their domain. This is a major source of the oft-expressed observation that total bureaucratic output in Zambia is less than the sum of its parts. The result is that institutionally complex policy reforms, such as those involved in public sector management reform and maize and fertilizer decontrol have been, and are likely to continue to be, particularly difficult to accomplish, with major challenges in properly sequencing complementary policy and institutional changes. This element of the bureaucratic

environment will take time and effort to change.

Under the Third Republic, the government is committed to a major initiative to address these bureaucratic constraints to economic reform and to the public sector playing a positive role in promoting economic growth. The main activities are the public sector reform program, the economic management reform program, and the decentralization program. The AID Democratic Governance project will support this overall effort by working on the specific issue of improving the ability of Cabinet Office to coordinate policy implementation and management.

The ideological atmosphere in Zambia is now rapidly changing away from its statist and anti-capitalist orientation. But the legacy of decades of intellectual isolation and the promotion of both official ideology (socialism and "humanism") and unofficial ideology (state of emergency paranoia and xenophobia) will not be easily overcome. Because of the level of urbanization, and the effectiveness of political controls under the Second Republic, the influence of ideology has been especially strong in Zambia. In the 1980s, this was felt in the powerful technocratic opposition to economic reform expressed by a significant faction of senior officials. There is good reason to believe that this feature of the Zambian political economy is substantially changing. The failure of the "own resources" reform efforts undertaken by the GRZ in the aftermath of the 1987 breakdown of the internationally-supported adjustment effort, combined with downfall of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the new economic policy initiatives in the Soviet Union, left the socialist/populist faction of technocrats in disarray. Even before the demise of the UNIP government, there was a growing national consensus on the need for fundamental reform. But economic discourse in Zambia is still very backward. The discussion of economic issues in the mass media, while now less hostile to the private sector, is still naive and ill-informed. The predilection towards controls as a means of managing problems in the economy remains very strong, both among politicians and in the media.

Key to addressing the continuing legacy of the ideologies of the Second Republic is completely freeing the media and upgrading the quality of information available to Zambians. The Democratic Governance Project will directly address this theme in its media independence component.

This analysis has shown how a range of governance factors directly led to poor economic performance in Zambia during the 1970s and 1980s, and impeded the process of economic reform efforts, when those were initiated in recent years. The analysis emphasizes the continuing impact of the governance problems that were generated during the Second Zambian Republic. It also discusses how the project components that make up the Democratic Governance Support Project will address those continuing problems. Addressing these governance issues will be crucial not only in enhancing the sustainability of democracy in Zambia, but will also have a significant impact on the prospects for economic reform and for re-establishing the basis for long-term and sustainable economic growth and development.

3. Financial Analysis

[to be supplied by USAID]

4. Social Soundness Analysis

Historically, Zambia did not develop a democratic political culture. Traditional political systems -- whether the centralized state of the Lozi, or the village kin groups of the Tonga -- vested authority in male elders and allowed few opportunities for participation in decision-making by women and younger people. British colonial rule was also hierarchical; it superimposed a strong administrative state whose influence was felt by most Zambians through the extensive discretionary powers of the District Commissioner. Resistance to colonialism led to mass political mobilization and, for the first time in Zambia, ushered in a brief interregnum of multiparty politics during the First Republic of Zambia (1964-1973).

A far more formative influence on contemporary political culture, however, was the single-party rule of Kenneth Kaunda's UNIP during the Second Republic (1973-1991). Power was centralized in the office of the presidency and elections were transformed into rituals of affirmation for the ruling party, thus depriving ordinary Zambians of political expression and self-determination. As UNIP leaders exercised tight control over the distribution of development resources, deference to authority was even further ingrained as Zambians concluded their best hope of upward mobility was through participation in party patronage networks. Leaders used a combination of threats and inducements to ensure popular compliance and passivity to "the party and its government". The charter document of the Third Republic -- the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1991 -- has never been published in vernacular languages, has had limited circulation, and is currently unavailable from the government printing office. As a result, most rural dwellers, especially women, do not know that they have a right to run for elected office. And small farmers are unaware that the cooperative movement belongs to them.

On the positive side, other attributes of modern Zambian society provide fertile soil for the growth of a more active citizenry. The 1990 census conservatively estimates that urban dwellers constitute 42 percent of the population. And, despite the breakdown of education services, Zambia's nominal literacy rate of 76 percent (World Development Report, 1991) is among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. There is thus a modernized sector of the population that is relatively detached from traditional mores and attracted to universal democratic values. Most importantly, these Zambians now have first hand experience of the disadvantages of single-party rule and have asserted a preference for basic political liberties. The educated classes of Zambia's urban areas will not easily again accept monopolistic political controls. Their commitment to checking the authority of politicians creates opportunities to spread a democratic political culture more widely among the Zambian population.

Zambia's high rates of literacy and urbanization provide a positive environment for independent media to spread this new political culture among the urban population. The civic education campaign under the Forum for Democratic Process (FODEP) is largely targeted at the rural populations who have little or no access to the formal media.

The benefits of the Project reach far beyond the participating institutions who are the immediate beneficiaries. Because of its emphasis on popular empowerment, the rule of law, and the rights and responsibilities of the individual, the project benefits all members of the Zambian society who engage in productive endeavors regulated by laws, be they social, political or economic. It will empower small-scale farmers and businessmen to articulate their needs while also helping expand and strengthen the outlets for public campaigns in such areas as population control and public health. It will also help unclog critical channels of communication between the government and various sections of society on such vital issues as privatization, land reforms and gender issues.

The Project, for instance, should raise the awareness of women about their rights and protection under the law, as well as empower them pursue their rightful social, economic and political benefits through greater participation in the public process. Women in Zambian society have typically benefitted less than men from services and opportunities provided by the government or donors through bilateral economic development programs. Customary laws and prevailing mores in Zambian society subordinate women to a traditional male dominated authority system. Inheritance of land and unequal access to education, credit and income-producing activities all tend to serve as obstacles to any attempts of women to participate fully in the socio-economic and political spheres. The division of labor in which women in Zambia have been emersed in subsistence farming has served as a constraint to their participation in market production efforts.

The trend towards urbanization has affected Zambian women in two ways. There has been a trend towards female headed households in outlying provinces (where income levels are lower) who engage mainly in subsistence agriculture, while males go to cities where wages are higher. There is also a large majority of women in high density residential areas who participate in the informal market, although they are concentrated in the least profitable sectors of the market.

Traditional and customary obstacles to women's advancement have been reinforced by discrimination in modern law and administrative practices. According to a report from a recent seminar conducted by the Non-Government Organizations Coordinating Committee (NGOCC), a women's group, while Zambia has ratified international conventions against gender discrimination and both past and present governments have made proclamations against discrimination, to this time, there has been little real progress made in terms of fully integrating women into Zambia's socio-political system.

Hopes were high that women would benefit from democratic transition. Women played a critical role in spearheading efforts to achieve a democratic transition within Zambia. The National Women's Lobby, for instance, was a critical element in domestic election monitoring efforts. According to a recent study, women turned out in equal numbers as men to vote. Yet despite the efforts of the Women's Lobby to encourage women to stand for political office, only 15 women were nominated as parliamentary candidates, which represented under 5 percent of all candidates. Of these, six are now MPs in a house of 150

members.

The MMD has committed itself to ending discrimination against women and in favor of affirmative action to achieve equality of access to services and benefits provided by the government. The MMD manifesto states that:

"The MMD fully recognizes the specific oppression that Zambian women have continued to suffer. The MMD government will accord full and equal rights to women in all aspects of national life, and accepts the principle of affirmative action on gender issues. The MMD government will review all discriminatory laws against women in all social and economic fields....will remove all discriminatory practices and fight the present prejudices against women in financial institutions."

Many women activists complain that little concrete progress has been made by the new government in addressing gender issues. They are particularly concerned that women have not been appointed in high positions in the government. There is only one woman Cabinet minister and three deputy ministers. Concerns have also been expressed about discrimination against women embodied in laws, including Article 23 of the Constitution.

In recent years, Zambia has witnessed the flourishing of women's associations and human rights groups who are determined to address this problem and promote awareness of women's rights. The FODEP component directly involves women as both trainers and beneficiaries, and women's rights as specific targets of opportunity, including legal rights. The impact of other Components on women in particular will be monitored to the extent possible under the existing system.

Through out the development of the project, the team worked closely with organizations and individuals representing the various institutions expected to participate in this Project. These include the Cabinet, Parliament, civic organizations (FODEP) and the media, both publicly-owned and private. There is genuine enthusiasm for the Project on all sides. There is little doubt that the mandate given by Zambians to the MMD during the multi-party elections clearly still holds. The government has embarked on a major constitutional reform project and there are other moves to review laws that are believed to contravene the rights of Zambians to basic freedoms and protections under the law. Various non-governmental organizations, such as FODEP and the Law Association of Zambia, have expressed their desire to contribute significantly to such reforms, but they lack the means and the resources to make a meaningful contribution. There are clear frustrations from all quarters at the pace at which change is being effected. The MMD has also repeatedly reiterated its commitments to change and its desire for adequate tools to respond to public demands to speed up the democratization process. There are genuine fears that the democratic energies unleashed by the multi-party elections could dissipate if sufficient progress is made to sustain the enthusiasm for change among the various institutions.

The MMD's continued commitment to democratization, and the mandate it still enjoys among

Zambians to effect change reduce the potential for social conflict within the polity over the various Project components, the goals of the Project and the roles of the various participating institutions. While the project design paid close attention to the necessity to avoid social conflict, the Project Team recognizes the potential for vigorous exchange in promoting the kind of public dialogue envisaged in the Project. Public dialogue in recent months has at times tended to be clouded by emotionalism. Some sections within the MMD Cabinet are dissatisfied with the current levels of accountability and transparency in the conduct of government business. President Chiluba is also accused of allowing his ministers the latitude to make unauthorized and uncoordinated policy announcements which have to be withdrawn later. Sections of the MMD backbenchers in Parliament are often seen as in opposition to the government. And the government has tended in the past to treat some of the independent civic organizations such as FODEP and the Women National Lobby as agents of the opposition.

While there appears to be genuine commitment by the government to liberalize the media, the political leadership at times seems petrified about the role of a free press. Recent criticism of the government the independent press has pushed a political leadership accustomed to a more docile media to call for the tightening of an already draconian Defamation Act, even as the leadership continues its rhetoric about commitment to press freedom. Such criticism appears to be at the core of the government's reluctance to divest itself of the media institutions it currently owns and which exercise an almost complete monopoly over the industry. The independent media is dependent on the government sector for many of its operations, such as newsprint, printing facilities and distribution; and there is a real danger that its development could be hampered, if not completely halted, by a hostile government.

Lack of professional skills on the part of the media represents a serious obstacle to meaningful dialogue with the government. There have been examples of genuine complaints against the press for publishing stories with little regard to facts or fairness. Often, the media tend to equate news with advocacy, a problem that could lead to declining public confidence and to official backlash against the media.

The present conflicts are probably an inevitable learning phase in the development of the democratic process and in the building of democratic institutions. Reasonable care must, however, be exercised during project implementation to maintain the delicate balance between the supply and demand sides of the Project to avoid escalation of such conflicts.

5. Environmental Analysis

[USAID to supply]

6. Energy Analysis

[USAID to supply]

Annex G
Scope of Work
Country D/G Advisor

Annex G. Scope of Work: Country D/G Advisor

I. OVERALL POSITION DESCRIPTION AND FUNCTION

Zambia recently set a major developmental precedent in Africa by becoming the first English-speaking country on the continent to undergo a democratic transition. But the consolidation of democracy in Zambia will not be easily achieved. Zambia still lacks a full range of civic and governmental institutions to sustain democratic governance in the long-run. The difficulties involved in an effort to consolidate democracy and undertake an ambitious economic reform program at the same time are being starkly revealed.

USAID/Zambia is currently in the final stages of designing the Zambia Democratic Governance Support Project (Democratic Governance Project). The goal of the project is to promote accountable government. The purpose of the project is to make public decision-making more accessible and effective. The project focuses on: increasing citizen awareness, enabling independent journalism, enhancing legislative performance, and coordinating policy implementation. It will work with a range of institutions, both within government and non-governmental.

As part of the Democratic Governance Project, USAID/Zambia is hiring an expert advisor in the field of democratization and governance in Africa. This individual will be hired under a Personal Services Contract. The Country Democracy/Governance Advisor will be responsible for the policy and programmatic direction of the Zambia Democratic Governance Support Project. The D/G Advisor will monitor the evolving D/G environment in Zambia, advise the Mission and Country team on such, and devise appropriate policy, program and Project responses. The D/G Advisor will also develop close working ties with Project grantees and beneficiaries and act as a catalyst for the evolution of, and linkage among, Project activities.

II. SPECIFIC TASKS

The USAID Zambia Democracy/Governance Advisor will perform the following specific tasks. Additional tasks may be added later to the SOW:

1. Oversee the management and implementation of the Project, for instance by preparing bi-annual workplans and an overall monitoring and evaluation plan.
2. Propose and develop new Project activities.
3. Manage the Democratic Governance Project small grants fund for NGO civil rights activities.
4. Liaise with grantee/beneficiaries and other relevant organizations in Zambia involved in democracy and governance activities, including both Zambian government agencies, non-

governmental organizations, and international agencies.

5. Maintain effective and regular communications with the USAID Regional D/G Advisor in REDSO/ESA in Nairobi.

6. Advise, as requested, various governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations on matters relating to their own democratization initiatives.

~~7. Ensure that the Mission and members of the USG Country Team are kept abreast of D/G developments in Zambia~~

8. Analyze the following issues to provide on-going context for the Democratic Governance Project and other D/G activities that might be undertaken by USAID or by other elements of the US Country Team in Zambia:

- The level of commitment of the GRZ to implement political pluralism, new constitutional reforms, free and fair elections, and an enabling environment for non-governmental organizations of all types;

- The capacity of various organizations, including those assisted in the Democratic Governance Project, to enhance broad-based political participation;

- The relationship between governance and democratization, on the one hand, and economic policy reform and privatization, on the other, with a view towards facilitating the potential conflicts between these two broad goals.

III. QUALIFICATIONS

A. Education

Candidates for the position should have an advanced degree, preferably a Ph.D. in political science. Training in constitutional and/or civil rights law is also relevant. Educational background will be a major consideration in awarding the contract. However, the selection committee will also consider combined experience, educational level, and other relevant qualifying factors in selecting the D/G Advisor.

B. Prior Work Experience

The candidate chosen will have a minimum of five years prior work experience, as a social scientist or development specialist, on issues of governance and maximizing broad-based participation in development. Some of this experience must have been in practical, rather than purely academic, work. Experience in a developing country setting, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, is necessary. Prior experience in project management, and a familiarity with USAID procedures, is highly desirable.

C. Knowledge

The candidate chosen must have a thorough professional knowledge of socio-economic, political, legal, and institutional aspects of development. Area knowledge of Zambia is highly desirable. The candidate must also have a broad background of knowledge in social science theory and in governance and democratization theory and analysis. The candidate must be willing to become fully acquainted with AID procedures and regulations.

D. Skills Required

The candidate chosen must write clearly and concisely and be able to prepare effective reports and analysis under tight deadlines. The individual must have highly developed interpersonal skills in order to effectively relate to both USG personnel and Zambians within and outside government. Computer skills are desirable in order to prepare the necessary reports with minimal office support.

IV. SUPERVISION AND RELATIONSHIPS

A. Supervision Received

The D/G Advisor will report to the Mission Director and work closely with other members of the U.S. Country Team. In particular, the D/G Advisor will be responsible for liaison with the USAID Program Officer-assigned official mission oversight for the Project. The D/G Advisor's work will be accepted as technically competent without detailed review.

B. Employee Guidelines

The Mission Director provides programmatic guidance on overall objectives, priorities and deadlines. General guidance ofn AID procedures are provided in AID Handbook 3.

C. Exercise of Judgment

The D/G Advisor will undertake her/his work according to AID policies, previous training, accepted practice, the programmatic guidance provided by the Mission Director, and the general guidance provided in Handbook 3. As a recognized expert and highly qualified professional, substantial reliance is placed on the D/G Advisor to independently plan and carry out the specific activities involved in fulfilling the responsibilities of the position.

D. Period of Performance

The initial contract will be for a maximum of two years, but will be extended beyond this period subject to the continuing need for the incumbent's services, availability of funds, and the Mission Director's assessment of the incumbent's performance.