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**DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES AND GOVERNANCE  
PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENT OUTLINE**

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USAID/Rwanda

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PID OUTLINE

	<u>Page</u>
I. Program Factors.....	1
A. Conformity with GOR Strategy.....	1
1. The Transitional Government.....	2
2. Elections.....	2
3. The Civil Society.....	2
4. Requests for Donor Support.....	3
B. Conformity with USAID/Rwanda Strategy.....	4
C. Conformity with AID Africa Bureau Strategy.....	5
II. Project Description.....	6
A. Perceived Problem.....	6
B. Project Goal and Purpose.....	6
1. Project Goal.....	6
2. Project Purpose.....	7
C. How the Project will work.....	7
1. Project Overview.....	7
2. Selecting the Project Components.....	8
3. Project Implementation and Management	
The Management Contract.....	10
Sub-Agreements or Memoranda of Understanding..	11
a. With the National Assembly.....	11
b. With the Ministry of Interior.....	12
c. With an Implementing US PVO.....	12
d. With the Confederation of Journalists....	13
e. USAID Project Support Fund.....	13
Chart 1 - Illustrated Relations among Key	
Project Actors.....	14
D. Expected Achievements and Beneficiaries.....	15
E. Sustainability.....	16
III. Factors Affecting Project Selection and Further	
Development.....	16
A. Social Considerations.....	16
1. Ethnic Rivalry.....	16
2. Population Pressures.....	17
3. Regional Competition.....	18
4. The Role of Women.....	18
5. The D/G Project Focus.....	19
B. Financial and Economic Considerations.....	20
C. Relevant Experience with Similar Projects.....	20
D. Proposed Grantees and Implementing Agencies.....	21
E. A.I.D. Support Requirements and Capability.....	21
F. Estimated Costs and Methods of Financing.....	22
G. Project Design Strategy and Calendar.....	23
H. Recommended Environmental Threshold Decision.....	24
I. A.I.D. Policy Issues.....	24

USAID/RWANDA  
DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES AND GOVERNANCE PROJECT

I Program and Project Factors

A. The GOR Strategy

Since the late 1980s the pressures to reform Rwanda's economy have been accompanied by increasing demands for a parallel process for political renewal. In both realms the GOR's basic strategy has been to retain as much control as possible over a process of inevitable change. In both the economic and political arenas it continues to try to retain the lead while making cautious but incremental changes demanded on the one hand by the donor community and on the other by internal forces.

In July 1990 - at the same time that his Government was negotiating the terms of World Bank/IMF financing to sustain the failing economy conditioned to a far reaching liberalizing Structural Adjustment Program - President Juvenal Habyarimana announced his decision to move quickly from a one-party state toward multi-party democracy.

Within two months he appointed an independent, 30-member national commission to prepare a reform agenda. After extensive and open consultations on a draft political charter, in December 1990, the commission reported back to the president with a proposed national charter for constitutional reform. It proposed independent and co-equal judicial and legislative branches to counter-balance Rwanda's traditionally overpowering executive authority. The commission also prepared the law allowing for the recognition and registration of political parties. Meanwhile, in October 1990, the northern provinces of Rwanda were invaded by an army of 4,000 to 7,000 exiles based in Uganda. A state of emergency was declared and war measures taken. The national army has been increased from 5,000 in 1990 to some 40,000 in 1992. Citing the state of war as due cause, the president rejected a proposal to submit the new constitution to a national referendum, opting instead to send it and the law on political parties to the National Assembly. Revised considerably by the Assembly to retain the traditional strong executive, the constitution was approved in June 1991 along with the law on the parties.

With remarkably few administrative impediments, the registration of new parties has gone briskly forward. Fourteen parties are now recognized. At least four lay credible claims of having mobilized substantial national memberships, long latent or sub-rosa during the years of one-party rule.

As events have unfolded, the government's strategy for managing the democratization process has been adjusted to meet new conditions. The strategic plan of action and policy framework is summarized here:

### 1. The Transitional Government

Opposition parties have been demanding that the president immediately call for a national conference which would draw up the system of national elections under an independent electoral commission and act, in place of the current one-party assembly, as an interim parliament of the people - holding the administration accountable until elections determine who will govern. The president rejected this proposition, offering instead to form a coalition government until elections are held. On April 2, the president named a member of the largest opposition party as prime minister. A transitional government, which will be responsible for the management of state affairs until national elections are held and the winners take office, is expected to be named shortly. It is currently anticipated that under the transitional government, the president's party will retain nine ministries and the remaining eight will be divided among the major opposition parties.

### 2. Elections

In February the president submitted a draft electoral law to the parties, giving them until March for substantive discussion and written reactions. He has announced that he will submit the law, with any revisions, to the Assembly for approval during its April-July session. Two major opposition parties did not attend the meetings on March 10-12, which the government called to explain the law. These parties argue that the draft law flagrantly favors the ruling party and that even if modified with opposition suggestions now, when it is submitted to the current Assembly which is composed exclusively of ruling party deputies, the resulting law will rig the electoral system to assure a win for the regime in power. They insist that a fair and impartial law can be gotten only if issued by the coalition government or, lacking its formation, a national conference. In spite of these objections, the government intends to proceed. It expects a law to be passed early in the Assembly's April-July session with elections to be held by the end of the year.

### 3. The Civil Society

In the new atmosphere of political freedom, some 60 news journals burst on the Rwandan scene during the last two years. The government decided that a law was needed to bring order to a perceived indiscipline. The resulting press law, issued in December 1991, has been generally denounced as repressive. It

sustains the old penal codes' provisions that prescribe severe punishments for published criticisms of the chief of state, his family and high officials as well as other ominous limits on free expression. Even so, the government insists that it supports press freedom that is not libelous, scandalous or threatening to national security. The current strategy seems to be one of encouraging the press to exercise self constraint, knowing that infractions may bring harsh official reprisal. On the other hand, it has encouraged journalists to participate in a series of meetings facilitated by a visiting Swiss expert and appears to be open to suggestions that have come from this meeting for forming an independent council to accredit journalists as well as other suggestions for improving the environment of free expression.

For many years, the government has permitted the formation of independent, humanitarian and development-oriented private associations. Even since the onset of the 1990 war, it has given quick official recognition to several new ones when formalities of registration have been met. Five new human rights associations, many new labor groups, a new association of jurists and lawyers, a national peasant union and several confederations among these groups either have been officially recognized or will soon be. Several of these associations have become active in the defense of civil liberties and early efforts at civic education.

#### 4. Requests for Donor Support to the Democratization Process

The government repeatedly affirms its intentions to maintain orderly progress toward full democratization. In a recent communication to the US embassy, which appears to have been repeated in similar form to other donors, the Ministry of Plan requests assistance across a broad range of matters such as technical and financial support for the up-coming national elections including some funding to assist each of the new political parties in organizing field offices, financial support for improving local government, assistance in civic education, aid to the parliament to improve its administrative support systems, etc.

Summary: The US Mission has concluded that the government of Rwanda is committed to democratization. Progress has been disjointed, adjusting to national security threats and the dynamics of a negotiated process involving numerous political actors. Human rights abuses have occurred and are continuing. Press freedom has not been fully respected, with arbitrary arrests and incarceration in several cases. Partisanship has been evidenced in the regime's management of the movement toward multi-party elections. But the direction forward is clear and evident and will continue even with some detours along the route. It is precisely under these circumstances that the proposed project will provide resources to key actors as they work to

sustain the forward movement toward democracy and responsible governance.

B. Conformity with USAID/Rwanda Strategy

The proposed project is part of a logical progression and appropriate expansion of USAID/Rwanda's strategy over the past eighteen months. This strategy has been developed through a series of appraisals and assessments of the status of important operators in the private and public sectors of Rwanda. USAID's efforts have been supplemented by analyses conducted by virtually all other donors. In addition to having formed the bases for USAID's support to economic reform, these studies have identified complementary activities in support of democratic reform.<sup>1</sup>

In the last few weeks, USAID provided funds for a USIS-organized international visitor program for staff members of the National Assembly. The Ambassador's predeparture orientation of these five key professionals emphasized the role of legislative staffs in making multi-party parliamentary bodies work and the timeliness of this opportunity to prepare them to facilitate the work of a new National Assembly. A week-long USIS seminar for working journalists brought together 70 people from the free press and from the official news media in a training program to increase their professional skills and their sense of reportorial responsibility to the public. Views were openly shared on the need for greater press freedom as well as more, regular opportunity for journalist training.

The Mission has recognized the importance of its participation with other donors in reinforcing the capabilities of the non-state public to stimulate democratic changes in state policies and laws, changes that are necessary not only in providing an enabling environment for economic development, but also in assuring that the potential opportunities and benefits of these changes are understood by a knowledgeable citizenry.

The Democratic Initiatives and Governance project proposes USAID involvement in activities which complement and reinforce its activities in the private sector. Both are multi-pronged efforts to insure the continued movement toward an economic and political policy environment which enables broad based development.

In recognition of the high level of beneficiary participation in the development activities of NGOs in Rwanda, USAID has provided assistance through NGOs in a number of its ongoing projects. This project will provide additional support to the NGO community in Rwanda to mobilize its existing grassroots constituencies,

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<sup>1</sup> Examples: Newbury "Concept Paper," 1991; Stanton "Justice Delayed;" Inades/World Bank: Inventaire des O.N.G. 1989

expanding its influence in the oversight of state functions. The project will further empower locally-organized groups and associations dealing specifically with the rule of law in a pluralistic society by improving their management capabilities, increasing their information base, and providing them with the training tools to increase broad-based civic involvement in protecting democratic processes.

This broader popular participation will in turn influence state institutions toward a more consistent application of the rules governing important elements of economic development such as the rights to land, the fulfillment of contractual obligations, and labor issues. The present openness to democratic change presents an opportunity for the spread of popular participation in defining and overseeing the underlying social structure and processes within which existing USAID economic development activities take place. Thus, the proposed project contributes directly to an enabling environment for the success of other elements of the USAID/Rwanda program.

### C. Conformity with A.I.D. Africa Bureau Strategy

The Democratic Initiatives and Governance activities to be undertaken under the proposed project respond directly to substantive elements of A.I.D. AFR policy framework. They can be linked with equal directness to the exigencies of the DFA in producing long-term sustainable economic development. Their focus is on increasing citizen understanding of the totality of their rights under law and the relationships of the rule of law to their dealings with authority and with each other in a liberal economic regime as well as in a democratic polity.

As has been pointed out in the most recent documentation, two key dimensions of governance are legitimate authority and public responsiveness. In the context of present-day Rwanda, with its tentative efforts at establishing a democratic atmosphere, the set of rules for managing conflict and allocating resources is, to a great extent, in a state of becoming. Concurrently with the development by state actors and non-state publics of a set of rules based on democratic precepts, the project will promote efforts by the non-governmental organizations presently dealing with the unveiling of this set of rules to create public responsiveness and civic responsibility on the part of the general population.

"The most basic requirement of legitimate authority is the existence of a set of rules which are widely known, accepted and

respected (adhered to) by public actors."<sup>2</sup> In addition to providing assistance to the development and promulgation of a set of democratic rules, the project responds directly to the requirement of public knowledge of the rules and thus to the creation of a stable climate for investment which can exist when the risks and costs of transactions can be more fully assessed. Where the rules are clearly known, it is possible that both the risks and costs may be decreased. Improved knowledge of the set of rules among a larger population links directly to an improved environment for individual investment and long-term economic development.

## II. Project Description

### A. Perceived Problem

For three centuries the peoples of Rwanda have been governed by authoritarian regimes controlled by self-perpetuating elitists with minimal checks on the monopoly of power. Inclusive institutions that school people in sharing power, that build capacities for rule making and enforcement for the greater good, and that produce self-governing processes accountable to the majority and watchful for the rights of the minority have not been encouraged. Indeed, they have most often been suppressed, or until quite recently, have been almost wholly absent. The problem that this project addresses is how to accelerate and reinforce the process of social learning for self-governance. The object is to help the people of Rwanda to draw up a new social contract based on democratic rule under just laws, fairly administered, and subject to their continuous and unimpeded oversight. Their freedoms, the dignity of their persons, the quality of peaceful governance and just order for conflict resolution as well as their economic prosperity depend upon the outcome.

### B. Project Goal and Purpose

#### 1. Project Goal - Democratic Self-Governance

The project goal is to produce a new social contract in Rwanda through which all the Rwandan people share equitably in the processes of democratic self-governance, peacefully enjoy

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<sup>2</sup> Governance Working Paper (Draft), Associates in Rural Development, January 1992

See also Edward Spriggs, GC/AFR, Memorandum: "Guidance on DFA Funding of Democratization/Governance Activities," May 17, 1991

basic freedom and justice under the rule of just laws, openly and regularly select public officials held accountable to the public's trust and thus sustain a humane order that seeks prosperity for all while protecting the rights of the few.

## 2. Project Purpose - Effective Civic Action

The project purpose is to facilitate and broaden popular participation in shaping the terms of the new social contract and the institutions through which that contract will be carried out.

This purpose will be achieved by improving the means of informing the people so that their participation may be based on a knowledge of issues, people and events, by engaging them through private civic associations, directly in their communities, and through their elected representative in extending the rule of just laws into all their affairs including the economic order, and by engaging them in a continuing process of bringing communal governance closer to the people while improving the means of holding those in positions of elected or appointed public trust responsible under the law and the people's mandate.

### C. How the Project will Work

#### 1. Project Overview

The project is designed to leverage Rwanda's rapid progress toward democratic practice in four key arenas:

- First, by assisting its first freely-elected National Assembly under a multi-party regime, to act efficiently and effectively in the enactment of law, in overseeing the operations of the executive and judicial branches, and in representing the people's aspirations for accountable, transparent governance under the rule of just and equitable law.

- Second, by supporting a series of cooperative needs assessments, studies and subsequent actions with the Ministry of Interior and with local elected authorities that will strengthen local self-governance through training of elected officials, through decentralization of authority, and through new institutional arrangements to stimulate dynamic local public economies.

- Third, by increasing the capacity of a wide range of free private citizens' associations dedicated to building a dynamic civil society: some through organized popular action to defend and extend human rights, to reform unjust laws, and to demand that the administrative and judicial systems fairly apply the law; others through the civic education and mobilization of electors, citizen action groups, women, farmers cooperatives, peasants unions and organized labor to actively and effectively

participate in selecting candidates for public office, in holding elected officials to their trust, in freely voicing their aspirations and grievances, and in demanding that the will of the majority of the people be followed while the rights of all minorities are defended; yet other groups through direct action among themselves to form democratic, self-governing associations to provide social services, manage productive natural resources for their mutual benefit, and take on other functions of social governance.

- Fourth, by assisting Rwandan journalists to strengthen the free press through training to enhance their professional skills, through the sharing of resources that will reduce the costs of publication and increase the access of the public to reliable and timely information on the economy, on public affairs, and other events, and through cooperative efforts to defend the free flow of information against censorship or control that might hide government action from public scrutiny or reduce the full accountability of officials before an informed electorate.

- Finally, the project reserves funds for direct use by USAID to be used in dealing with unfolding targets of opportunity as the democratic process evolves and to audit and evaluate the performance in the four principle components summarized above.

Each of these project components is discussed in detail in sections 1 through 5 of Annex I.

## 2. Selecting the Project Components

The project is designed to provide direct assistance from USAID to the most promising agents of progressive change in Rwanda. It leaves to other donor leadership areas of their comparative advantage and in which interest or commitment for support has been expressed or is already in place. It avoids for the present areas that appear to be too uncertain, too costly for expected returns, or too susceptible to distortion, diversion or delay.

But the uncertainties involved in this process of change require a capacity for flexible response. Although the following areas are not now included for direct US action, the USAID project support that is recommended could be drawn on, should the need and the opportunity arise.

- **The Electoral System:** The Germans have assisted the government in preparing the draft law that will form the basis for the electoral system. The Canadians have indicated willingness to assist the GOR in election administration. Although it is not certain that full financing for the national election is assured through donor and national resources - an issue that can be more fully assessed during PP design - the PID team did not recommend that this project become directly engaged

in this area. If the final electoral arrangements are fairly made, the US Mission could invite the Democratic and Republican Institutes - centrally funded by A.I.D. - to provide observers once a date is set definitively. If requested, a mission from the US International Foundation for Electoral Systems could field an assessment team to examine the program.

- **Judicial Administration:** The PID team found no evidence that the current regime has serious intent to reform the inept, ill-trained, corrupt and maladministered justice system. The need for reform is dramatic. The French are providing some training for magistrates and technical assistance to the police. But until it is clear that reform will be welcomed and that steps toward an independent, self-policing judiciary can be instituted, the US should be wary of direct engagement. Meanwhile the project supports action by citizen associations to promote reforms in the law and the administration of the law that incrementally improve the system while building support for the integral reform that is needed. USAID should be alert to reform openings that may be leveraged by selective use of support funds.

- **Public Auditing:** Here, too, the PID team failed to find that a direct effort to engage the Court of Accounts in a national reform for fiscal accounting and auditing was apparent for the purposes of this project. It is our judgment that general auditing reforms are part of a much larger budget and financial responsibility question which should be addressed as part of the IBRD/IMF/USAID structural adjustment program. Meanwhile, the project encourages greater transparency in government fiscal operations through its support to the Assembly's oversight and budget review functions, through support to the press for investigative journalism in the economic realm, and through citizen action groups and civic education. Should a breakthrough occur, perhaps in the National Assembly, the Mission's flexible response capacity could provide timely technical assistance to orient a reform and, with the IMF or the World Bank, help lay out the working framework for a transparent national auditing system. Implementation of this system should be a long-term effort of its own rather than a component of this project.

### 3. Project Implementation and Management

The Agreement: The overall project will be obligated in an agreement with the GOR Ministry of Plan. Suitable language will establish the GOR's concurrence in the "philosophy" of the program as well as the project's operational elements. A major objective is to establish the GOR's concurrence in USAID's direct engagements with NGOs - through the Support Center and through the Confederation of Journalists to establish and support the National Press Center.

In the agreement the GOR will affirm that it:

- has requested US assistance in promoting the development of democratic institutions and in promoting a democratic approach to the socio-economic development of Rwanda;

- recognizes that the freedom of association and the promotion of civic responsibility by private associations is essential in building citizen participation and responsible collective action;

- will welcome USAID's direct assistance to non-governmental organizations and associations in furthering the objectives of democracy and good government through civic education, in promoting direct action to support the Constitution's respect for human rights and the rule of law, in promoting the electorate's responsibility for overseeing public affairs, and in taking initiative for advancing democratic practice in all areas of public life;

- welcomes US support in assisting Rwandan journalists in developing the capacity to sustain a responsible press - private and official, to provide the public with timely and accurate information on public affairs, to engage the public in civic affairs and to report current developments in the economy; and

- concurs in USAID undertaking direct contracts to implement the project as well as memoranda of understanding and sub-project agreements with the National Assembly, the Ministry of Interior, the Confederation of Rwandan Journalists and with a US Private Voluntary or Non-Profit Institution to carry out the intent of the undertaking.

#### The Management Contract:

USAID will issue a Request for Proposals and will conduct the competitive selection of a single contractor responsible for overall project management and implementation. Criteria for contractor selection will include the ability to deliver appropriate technical services, directly or through sub-contracts as necessary, to execute the several elements of the program. The contractor will provide a fully-qualified resident project coordinator/manager for the life of the project. The contract may provide for a buy-in to the USAID Mission's project support unit for assistance in commodity procurement, logistical support to technical personnel, and other services.

The contractor will be required to employ a small Rwandan support staff to assist in allocating and accounting for project funds, for assisting in monitoring project progress with the cooperating institutions and in providing USAID with timely requests for processing formal implementation orders. The contractor's

resident project coordinator/manager will be expected to have sufficient technical knowledge of project elements that he or she can maintain effective direct liaison with the Assembly, the Ministry of Interior, the National Press Center and the NGO Support Center during times that project technical advisors are not present in these institutions.

The contractor will recruit, directly or through sub-contracting arrangements with other firms and institutions, the technical advisors required for each element of the project and for the NGO Support Center and will engage a US Private Voluntary Agency as manager/coordinator for technical services and to administer the local association support fund for special activity grants.

Sub-Agreements or Memoranda of Understanding:

Following the signing of the project agreement with the Ministry of Plan or, concurrently, USAID will execute Memoranda of Understanding or sub-project agreements detailing the joint undertakings and implementation arrangements with each of the cooperating Rwandan institutions as follows:

a. With the National Assembly

The President of the National Assembly will agree to receive the planned assistance and will, in turn, agree to designate the Secretary General for Administration as the regular counterpart charged to work directly with technical advisors for joint project implementation. The Assembly will provide suitable office space for all long and short-term advisory and training personnel. The President will further agree that the Assembly will give timely consideration to all technical recommendations for improving the Assembly's operations including its information management system, archives and research service, publications, and staff analysis functions. As may be appropriate, the Assembly will agree to increasing the permanent support staff to perform new, expanded or improved functions and will incrementally increase its budget to cover the staff salaries and the maintenance of any equipment procured under the AID financed agreement and new systems adopted to strengthen the Assembly's operations. The President of the Assembly will also agree to inform the AID advisor at the Assembly or, lacking a technical advisor at any time, the overall project manager, of any requests the Assembly may make for associated assistance from other donors so that full coordination of donor efforts can be facilitated.

A joint activity implementation calendar will be developed within the first three months of the arrival of an advisor to the Assembly and will be signed between the President of the Assembly and USAID.

b. With the Ministry of Interior

The MOU with MININTER will detail anticipated studies to be pursued along with the follow-on technical assistance for the implementation of study results. MININTER will name a senior officer at the Secretary General or Director General level in the ministry as the program coordinator and will agree to provide counterpart personnel for each of the planned studies while AID will agree to fund travel and per diem as needed for these personnel while assigned to work in the field with the AID-funded technical advisors. The MININTER will agree to give timely consideration to all recommendations for improved operations, legal reforms, and for training of ministerial staff both at headquarters and in the field. The MININTER will agree to inform the AID project coordinator/manager of requests that they may make to other donors for associated assistance so that full coordination of donor efforts to improve local government can be facilitated. The agreement will commit the ministry to engage locally-elected officials in all project activities and to facilitate the cooperation of all prefectural and sub-prefectural authorities.

The ministry will agree that project-funded technical personnel will have direct and unimpeded access to local government officials throughout the national territory in carrying out studies, technical consultations, advisory and training activities, and in providing support to their undertakings.

c. With the Implementing Non-Governmental Organization  
(US Non-Profit, Voluntary Organization)

During PP development USAID will have to decide whether it will execute an assistance agreement directly with a US PVO, separately from the overall project contract with a consulting firm, or whether, as stated above, the consulting firm will be required to include such an arrangement in its proposal. Whichever route is selected, the implementation requirements will have to cover all elements of the anticipated activities of the proposed NGO Support Center as detailed in Annex I. 3. and as will be further designed into the project during the intensive review process.

A major issue to be resolved is the authority that a US PVO, as a sub-contractor to a US firm may have to manage a grants mechanism for Rwandan NGOs participating the project. Also, the degree of USAID's involvement in approving such grants will also have to be defined, whether the Mission wants only to approve the criteria for such grants and to have post-audit reports, or if it wants to have a pre-audit veto on grants written into the procedures to be followed.

The agreement should clarify the degree to which the formation of a Rwandan consortium of NGOs for management of the Support Center is expected and in what approximate time frame the consortium might be formed.

d. With the Confederated Association of Rwandan Journalists:


With the new officers of the Confederation, the PP team will develop a clear understanding of the character of the joint undertaking. This should be reflected in the memorandum of understanding signed by USAID. At a minimum it will commit the Confederation to a joint program, as outlined in Annex I. 5., to establish a National Press Center for which the Confederation will agree to accept full responsibilities. The memorandum will clearly show that the Confederation agrees that by the PACD it will assume full financial responsibility for maintaining the center and will agree to a dues and fees-for-use system, early in the project, that will incrementally arrive at self-sustainability before the end of year 5.

e. The USAID Managed Project Support Fund

As indicated in Annex I. 5., the USAID Mission will retain full responsibility for use of the project funds earmarked for targets-of-opportunity technical assistance and studies, for special training programs for emerging leaders, and for funding audits and evaluations. The contractor, through the resident project coordinator/manager, may be tasked to implement task orders for this special technical assistance and training and may be tasked to identify and engage accounting firms to conduct the required audits of project components.

The relationships among the key actors in the project, as described above and detailed further in Annex I sections 1 through 5, are illustrated in Chart 1 on the following page.

Chart 1  
 Democratic Initiatives and Governance Project  
 Key Actors - Illustrative Relationships



#### D. Expected Achievements and Beneficiaries

The project is expected to strengthen and, over time, institutionalize the important components of a democratic system which are targeted for assistance. It will benefit both the institutions themselves and the people who participate in their activities.

In the state arena, the project will help to reorient the Ministry of Interior from a command and control function over local governments to a support and servicing function toward independent local authorities. It will also provide local governments with the information necessary to function efficiently in a decentralized administrative structure and improve the financial framework in which they operate. It will also provide the legislative branch with the training and materials necessary to improve its efficiency and reinforce its role as an independent, law-making body responding to the will of the people through their elected representatives.

Among the non-state publics, including the press, the project will strengthen the institutional capabilities of presently evolving organizations which, during the transition toward democracy, will maintain pressure on the regime for tangible progress. Support for these groups will produce widespread civic understanding of democratic processes and their role in them. This understanding, together with the improved capabilities of broad based non-state public groups, will help insure that the regime promotes the rule of law in all its affairs: administrative, judicial, political, social and economic.

While the direct beneficiaries of project activities will be major actors in the institutions targeted, the long-term beneficiaries will be that segment of the general population which is empowered with the understanding of democratic principles and which exercises that power.

The incorporation of women's associations into the ensemble of non-state entities which will be promoting civic awareness of democratic principles and understanding of the rule of law is especially relevant. The project will present these associations with an opportunity to give priority to women's rights in Rwandan social and economic practice. By strengthening cooperation among these associations, the legal community and human rights organizations, the project will serve to highlight women-specific concerns at the national and at the community level, with new conflict resolution measures that use statutory law to leverage change in the unequal and unfair aspects of customary practice.

### E. Sustainability

Sustainability of project components dealing with state institutions will depend on the degree to which they are integrated into the functioning of the evolving order in the National Assembly, local governments, and the administrative and judicial agencies. The project will exert firm and direct leverage to incorporate these components into the structure of public finance for sustained budgetary support.

With regard to non-state publics, i.e., the NGOs, associations, unions, the press and others targeted for project support, USAID resources must be employed, not to create dependencies on external aid, but to facilitate independent operations. The project is aimed at initial strengthening of the sector as a whole, not a specific institution. Sustainability of the individual organizations will depend, in part, on the continued willingness of each entity's existing constituency to maintain the functions of the organization and, in part, on the continued cooperation of groups in sharing resources. Individual groups may merge or consolidate in order to make more efficient use of limited resources; one or more of the evolving consortia among the NGOs may be chosen to take on the support functions of the services center, but the net effect of the project will be that the various public interests involved will be preserved and strengthened. The PP design team will want to explore the readiness of the NGOs to move toward a consortium modality as a specific target on the project's implementation calendar.

### III. Factors Affecting Project Selection and Further Development

#### A. Social Considerations

1. Ethnic Rivalry: Rwandan society is deeply divided. In spite of decades of intermarriage, the ethnic divisions between the 80-85 percent Hutu majority and the 10-15 percent Tutsi minority persist. Since the 1959 revolution that overturned the Tutsi monarchy, government power has been held by Hutu-dominated regimes. Periodic ethnic conflicts, oftentimes regime-instigated, have driven some 400,000-700,000 Tutsi Rwandans into exile primarily to Uganda and in Burundi. The continuing incursions of Tutsi forces from Uganda, comprise only one of many attempts by exile groups to return to the country by force. Some have been serious attempts to overthrow the government. Others may have been efforts to establish a strong negotiating position for the return of traditional lands and a protected minority status. Each Tutsi incursion has been accompanied by reprisals, frequently heightening tensions with neighboring Burundi whose ethnic makeup mirrors that of Rwanda, but whose government has remained in control of its Tutsi minority since independence.

The solutions offered for the problem have ranged from two extremes. Hutu extremists offer little more than the final solution: total expulsion or annihilation of the Tutsi threat. Tutsis in the diaspora dream of restoring the monarchy. Neither, of course, is an acceptable course. Perhaps the most urgent task of the new democratic movement is to find the middle course. In the near term, ethnicity will not be erased from the national consciousness. But moves toward that end are essential. The new constitution is a major step in this direction. While the government has promised to issue new identification documents that eliminate the now-required declaration of ethnic identity, it has not yet done so. The new law on political parties prohibits the recognition of parties organized on the basis of ethnic and/or regional affinities. These are but initial, if essential steps forward. Most important is that the positive social forces, the new human rights associations and other NGOs including the peasant cooperatives, must carry within their civic education programs powerful messages of social reconciliation. A new consciousness of national solidarity must be incorporated into the polity with easy-to-understand safeguards for minority rights built into the order of majority rule at every level. Nowhere is this more important than in ethnically-mixed rural communes throughout the country. It is for this reason that the D/G project proposes working on civic education - through NGOs and the free press - and at the same time on reordering local government with emphasis on the education of locally-elected officials, especially in conflict resolution techniques. The long-term task is nothing short of a transformation of social psychology. The short-term task is to build in workable constraints to prevent abuse.

2. Population Pressure and Refugee Resettlement: With the most dense population in Africa and one of the highest population growth rates in the world at 3.06 percent per year, this predominantly agricultural country has seen the average holdings of small peasant farmers - 85-90 percent of the population - drop to below half a hectare. The numbers of landless are growing at an alarming rate. Although some marsh lands may be suitable for increasing the stock of arable land, such capital intensive efforts to relieve this social pressure can have only marginal impact on the problem in the near term. The current strategy, supported by the World Bank and other donors, is to intensify agricultural production while protecting the already-threatened natural resource base. At the same time, through market incentives, the plan is to encourage import substitution industries and other labor-intensive productive investments which can respond efficiently to domestic and regional demand and absorb surplus labor.

In this context, a democratic regime must come to terms with the refugee problem. Until it is resolved, neither the threat of new destabilizing invasion attempts nor internal inter-ethnic

reconciliation and partnership can be effected. At the same time, negotiated agreements with neighboring states to regularize the status of Rwandans in exile in those nations - many for two and three generations - must be simultaneously undertaken.

3. Regional Competition: The first Hutu regime 1959-72 was dominated by a hegemony of elites largely from the south-central provinces. The second, since 1973, has been dominated by Hutu elites largely from the North. Not surprisingly government resource flows - development projects, public services - have followed these biases as have privileges and position. At present, the governing party (MRND) which was until this year been the single legal party and still holds the power, though clearly national in scope, is associated with the northern bias. The largest opposition party, the MDR - also national in scope - is associated with the southern bias and contains in its membership many who associate themselves with the first Hutu government that was overthrown in 1972-73. There is a disturbing depth of bitterness to these rivalries. And there is an alarming tenor of "old-score settling" underlying this transitional process and the issues of power-sharing. For these reasons, project analysts urge special attention to local government as part of the overall strategy. Concepts of equity and balanced development in the national territory, perhaps joined with elements of federalism through the devolution of real power over resources and investment flows to local authorities, must be incorporated into the new polity to defuse and constructively channel the socio-political regional conflicts.

4. The Role of Women: In general, statutory law in Rwanda provides equality between the sexes in most matters. Customary law and prevailing mores in rural society, however, subordinate women to a traditional, male-dominated socio-economic regime. Inheritance of land is, by tradition and practice, exclusively through male progeny. Even widows, women heads of farm households, hold land at the arranged sufferance of senior males, at great insecurity to the female farmers and their children. The division of labor in the rural economy also favors males. And males have disproportionate control over cash incomes.

Progressive NGOs, human rights groups, and women's associations are becoming increasingly seized with the problem. It is proposed that special attention be given to these issues through the NGO support center. Laws must be developed that will give rural women direct access to remedies. Women's rights to secure land tenure must be established, through land courts or tenure councils mandated to enforce statutory rights over customary practice. Women's rights, even within matrimonial arrangements, to control their cash incomes and equal rights in causes of divorce and in cases of property conflicts must be enforceable if, over time, the just cause of sexual equality under law is to reorient customary practice to the modern world. These issues

are intimately linked to USAID's strategy in its gender considerations in its development programs. The Mission will buy into the AID/W GENESYS project for the services of a gender specialist/social scientist to participate in the PP design effort.

5. The D/G Project Focus: The project would reinforce an ongoing and unfolding process for working on two sides of the social equation in Rwanda. Central government pronouncements on its commitment to moving Rwandan society toward an open democracy with full citizen participation in the establishment of legitimate authority have been regarded with a certain amount of skepticism by many, if not most, not-state institutions. Nevertheless, the plethora of groups and associations that have been formed recently: human rights organizations, the private press, the jurist/lawyers association; together with established NGOs and women's groups, have proceeded with activities in the face of rather erratic government responses.

Government initiatives for reform, begun in mid-1990, have been widely publicized, and citizen awareness of the range of democratic options outlined in the National Political Charter published at the end of that year is pervasive. The door was opened to both the pressure of the population, through its more articulate representatives in the non-state sector, and the pressure of international donors, for movement in the direction of changes endorsed by the Charter.

The balance between the non-state public and present authority is delicate. It's fragility presents an undeniable risk for any donor activity. However, the approach of the project to broadening popular participation in democratic processes on the one hand, and addressing problems of efficiency in the development of democratic rules by the authority on the other, substantially increases the costs and reduces the benefits of repressive action as an option for the state.

Because of its emphasis on popular awareness of the importance of the rule of law, the project benefits all members of the populace engaged in productive endeavors that are guided by laws. Its efforts to improve the efficiency of women's organizations in particular address major disequilibriums in the rights of women to control elements of production. Furthermore, by stimulating cooperative action by the various implementing organizations, women's participation in the democratization process will be strengthened as part of the whole.

Given their prior experience and contacts with their constituencies, potential NGO collaborators should be able to provide more detailed estimates of expected beneficiaries at the time of project design.

## B. Financial and Economic Considerations

During intensive review by the PP team, a value will have to be placed on the in-kind contributions anticipated from the Ministry of Interior for counterpart personnel salaries and other support; from the National Assembly in space, counterpart salaries and other support; and on the financial and in-kind contributions anticipated from the Confederation of Rwandan Journalists to the Press Center and the Rwandan NGOs. These will represent the counterpart contributions to USAID financing. The Mission will request a waiver from any formal GOR contribution given the nature of the undertaking.

Since none of the three counterpart organizations will manage US funds, a financial capability analysis will not be required.

## C. Relevant Experience with Similar Projects

USAID/Rwanda, as well as other donors with whom it maintains strong contacts, has substantial experience dealing with the NGOs, groups and associations which will be involved in the implementation of this project.

USAID has provided substantial support to IWACU, an association of cooperatives which undertakes training for a number of local NGOs. Under the proposed ARTS project, the Mission already plans to work with NGOs to assist in stimulation of private sector activities. USAID is currently funding NGO projects in natural resources development, forestry and conservation.

In the wider world of A.I.D., the establishment of support units to provide training, management assistance and other services to the NGO community has become a frequent phenomenon, particularly in Africa. These units have contributed substantially to empowerment of local NGOs and their constituencies by helping develop their abilities to mobilize citizen groups and to function efficiently in responding to the development needs identified by those groups.

These A.I.D.-funded units have helped hone techniques employed by NGOs in mobilizing broad-based participation in the decision processes related to planning local development activities in a number of African countries. The same approach has been judged appropriate for application to increasing citizen understanding and action in reinforcing democratic change in the larger context.

## D. Proposed Grantees and Implementing Agencies

The sub-grantees and implementing agencies for activities planned under this project will be local Rwandan NGOs, associations, cooperatives and other civic groups, as well as selected public

institutions. The USAID funding will be managed by an institutional contractor which will provide discrete management and technical services using its own expertise or through long and short-term subcontracts with U.S. and other PVOs or institutions.

Among the many local associations, NGOs and groups which have been contacted and which have expressed their eagerness to participate in cooperative efforts among such groups to promote citizen rights and responsibility training are the Association of Jurists/Lawyers, the Association of Journalists, the two major women's associations, the recently formed human rights organizations, and a number of NGO consortia groups and organizations made up of small farmer associations and cooperatives.

The Ministry of Plan, which is responsible for coordination of NGO activities at the national level, has also expressed its support for the activities planned. The Ministry has had a substantial amount of experience in dealing with NGOs working in development in Rwanda, and has exhibited a hands-off approach in its involvement with the implementation of their activities.

A number of the organizations and groups contacted were proceeding with the development of their programs of citizen training at the time this PID was being prepared. Many of these plans should be available at the time of detailed preparation of the project design.

#### E. A.I.D. Support Requirements and Capabilities

The contract with the implementing consulting firm will be carefully drawn up to incorporate as much project implementation work as the USAID Mission can legally delegate. On the other hand, the sensitivity of the project is too great to place the remaining responsibilities for project monitoring, policy guidance, and general oversight in the hands of a personal service contractor. As shown in Chart 1 above, the full Country Team Democracy Coordination Committee is the mechanism already functioning and in place for overall policy and program guidance as well as for US inter-agency coordination. Although the USAID Program Officer will be designated as the D/G project officer, the Mission Director will be directly engaged - actively coordinating key issues with the Ambassador, the DCM/Political Officer, the PAO and other country team members.

<u>F. Estimated Costs</u>	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	<u>\$ 9,000,000</u>
1. D/G Project Management & Coordination		
Resident Manager/Coordinator 5 yrs	\$ 1,250,000	
Home Office Spt: HL & SL backup,		
Supervisory Visits	500,000	
Rwandan Office Staff: 5yrs		
Program Officer/Financial Mgt.		
Admin. Asst./Secretary		
Messenger/Driver/Gnrl Asst	250,000	
Office: Rent, Furn., Supply	140,000	
Vehicle, computer, other commodities	50,000	
SUB-TOTAL		2,190,000
2. Assistance to the National Assembly		
Technical Assistance	\$ 400,000	
Commodities	400,000	
Training	170,000	
SUB-TOTAL		970,000
3. Assistance for Communal Governance		
Needs Assessment	175,000	
Technical Assistance	400,000	
Publications, etc.	200,000	
Training	100,000	
SUB-TOTAL		875,000
4. NGO - D/G Support Services Center		
Technical Assistance	1,640,000	
Operations (includes commodities)	400,000	
Sub-contracts, sub-grants	400,000	
SUB-TOTAL		2,440,000
5. National Journalism Center		
Technical Assistance	275,000	
Studies	100,000	
Operational Support & Commodities	450,000	
SUB-TOTAL		825,000
6. USAID Reserve Funds		
Technical Assistance	250,000	
Training	300,000	
Audits and Evaluations	800,000	
SUB-TOTAL		1,350,000
7. Total All Project Components		8,650,000
8. Inflation and Contingency		350,000
GRAND TOTAL		<b>\$ 9,000,000</b>

## G. Project Design Strategy:

1. Intensive Review and Project Paper Completion: USAID Rwanda will submit a final PID by mid April for A.I.D. AFR review and approval no later than the end of May. Authority will be requested for the Mission to proceed to final design and for a delegation of authority for the Mission Director to approve the project at post.

USAID/Rwanda will issue a PIO/T to contract a PP design team through the AFR Governance and Democracy Project. The team composition may be as follows:

- A Team Leader with extensive experience in Democracy/Governance and specific experience in local government.
- A Project Design Specialist with at least five years' experience in AID design and evaluation and expertise in legislative administration. This Specialist will be responsible for the Economic Analysis of the PP.
- An NGO Expert with a minimum of five years' experience with NGOs in Africa, preferably with NGO consortia and the organization of umbrella support arrangements. This Specialist should also have knowledge of media operations in the developing world, preferably in Africa, with emphasis on print journalism.
- Under a separate PIO/T, USAID will buy into the GENESYS Project for the services of a Social Scientist/Gender Considerations Specialist. This individual will be responsible for ensuring gender is incorporated in the project and for writing the Social Soundness section of the PP.

The contractor will assemble the team for initial orientation in the US and will allow three full days for orientation on the PID team's working files and other documentation and for discussions in A.I.D. AFR and with other donors based in Washington. The team will arrive in Kigali in mid-June and will complete the PP by mid-July. The Team Leader and the PDO will remain in Kigali for the Mission PP review and will assist in making any revisions required before authorization, will assist in drafting a Project Agreement and the associated Memoranda of Understanding or Sub-Agreements and material to be used in the formal Request for Proposals. The Team Leader and PDO will depart in late July.

2. The Project Agreement: The Mission Director will sign the project agreement with the GOR Ministry of Plan in mid-

September and concurrently or immediately thereafter will execute the Memoranda of Understanding or Sub-Project Agreements with the National Assembly, the Ministry of Interior and the Confederation of Journalists.

#### H. Recommended Environmental Threshold Decision

None of the activities to be undertaken under the proposed project have an effect on the natural or physical environment. The Initial Environmental Examination finding required is a Categorical Exclusion per 216(c)(1)(i). In accordance with this Exclusion, an Initial Environmental Examination, Environmental Assessment and Environmental Impact Statement are not required.

Pursuant to 216.3(a)(2) the Initial Environment Examination Threshold Decision is included as part of this PID.

#### I. A.I.D. Policy Issues

The Country Team Democracy Coordinating Committee and the USAID Mission have no substantive issues to raise for proceeding with the final design of the Democracy Initiatives and Governance Project.

1. Is the Project flexible enough to survive even drastic changes in the local political environment? The dynamism of the local process towards a more liberal democratic system means that this project exists in an arena of considerable uncertainty. The emerging new social contract could be derailed at some point, the new multipartism could be abandoned, the recent political openness could be overturned.

We believe that the project, as conceived, will be effective no matter which way the winds of change may blow. While it is premised on the assumption that Rwanda continues down the road to democratic pluralism, the activities it proposes, particularly in the support for local organizations, are equally important if there were to be a reversal of this route. The activities to empower local organizations, sensitize the legislative leaders and develop civic responsibility are fundamental to keeping the country moving along the road to democratic pluralism as they increase the costs of returning to more authoritarian approaches. In the unlikely event of a return to authoritarianism, or a drifting from the path of democratization, these organizations form the basis for negotiation of a return to liberalism and a constituency for consideration of human rights.

2. Is it possible, through an institutional contract mechanism, to assign all management responsibility for assistance to local organizations to the subcontracted PVO?

The Mission wishes to concentrate management responsibility for the entire project in one institutional entity. It does not wish to engage itself in numerous small grants to local organizations. Thus we foresee that the institutional entity would have a bifurcated role of providing traditional management, technical assistance, training, etc., while also being an umbrella organization for small grants to local organizations.

We are unsure about what kind of contractual relationship would permit this role and request AID/W guidance on this issue.

### 3. Other Donor Activities

The approach of the USG in the area of democracy and governance is consistent with our approach in other sectors. We encourage other donors to take the leadership, and provide support where appropriate. We do not wish to be the leading donor on the issue of political reform, but do intend to compliment the efforts of other donors to encourage the process.

Other donors enjoy a considerable comparative advantage in many of the areas covered by the concept of democracy and governance. The Belgians, and to a lesser extent the French, are far more familiar with the intricacies of the Napoleonic Code as a judicial system than we can ever be, and we look to them to take the leadership in this area. The Germans, through the Adenauer Foundation, have been very active in defining the multiparty approach, and we expect them to continue in this role. The Canadians have provided considerable assistance to define the electoral process, and we anticipate that they will continue to lead this effort. The Swiss have been assisting the nascent free press establishment with training programs and seminars, and we encourage them to continue. In each of these cases, we may be of some assistance in a minor role but we relinquish the leadership to the other donors.

The US did initiate a donor coordination process for Democracy and Governance at the Ambassadorial level, with a meeting of all involved Ambassadors in December, 1991. Since that time, the process has been continued by the Belgian Ambassador with the full encouragement of the US Ambassador. USAID and the PID team investigated other donor programs and defined activities that appear to be consistent with them. The PP team will contact each of the other donor groups to clarify their plans for the future before finalizing our interventions. We anticipate that, as this project fields its technical team, the chief of party will be tasked with coordination at a technical level to assure that the activities undertaken are in concert with and complimentary to other donor activities.

4. The Mission requests a waiver of the 25 percent GOR contribution given the nature of the undertaking as a largely

non-governmentally orientated program. During PP design work however, contributions in kind and in fact will be calculated for the Memoranda of Understandings with the two official agencies: the Ministry of Interior and the National Assembly. The MOU with the Confederation of Journalists, as indicated in Annex I, section 4, will require careful PP team negotiation and analysis in order to arrive at a realistic plan for sustaining the Center by the PACD.

ANNEXES

Annex I - Detailed Description of Project Components

Annex II - Logical Framework Summary

Annex III - Initial Environmental Examination

ANNEX I

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT COMPONENTS  
OUTLINE

1.	Strengthening the National Assembly.....	1
	a. Setting and Rationale.....	1
	b. The Proposed A.I.D. Response.....	2
	i. Developing Staff Support to Facilitate Work of the Assembly.....	2
	ii. Commodity Support.....	3
	iii. Observation training for Deputies.....	3
	c. Estimated Costs.....	4
2.	Strengthening Communal Governance, Local Democracy and the New Rwandan Social Contract.....	4
	a. Setting and Rationale.....	4
	b. The Proposed A.I.D. Response.....	6
	i. Communal Governance and Local Democracy Needs Assessment.....	6
	ii. In-Depth Studies.....	6
	iii. Provision of Reference Texts.....	7
	c. Estimated Costs.....	8
3.	NGO Support Services Center: Promoting Civic Education and Action.....	8
	a. Setting and Rationale.....	8
	b. The Proposed A.I.D. Response.....	8
	i. Training Needs Assessments.....	10
	ii. Management Planning and Coordination Workshops.....	10
	iii. Development of Training Materials.....	10
	iv. Development of Training Plans.....	10
	v. Training of Trainers.....	10
	c. Institutional Development.....	11
	d. Estimated Costs.....	11
4.	The National Press Center.....	12
	a. Setting and Rationale.....	12
	b. The Proposed A.I.D. Response.....	13
	i. The Rwandan National Press Center.....	13
	c. Estimated Costs.....	16

5.	USAID Project Support Funds.....	17
	a. Setting and Rationale.....	17
	b. Recommended USAID Funds Provision.....	17
	i. A Proposed Fund for "Target of Opportunity" Technical Assistance.....	17
	ii. Training for Emerging Leaders.....	18
	iii. Project Audits and Evaluation.....	19
2	c. Estimated Costs.....	19

## ANNEX I

### Detailed Description of Project Components

#### 1. STRENGTHENING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

##### a. Setting and Rationale

The new Rwandan constitution adopted in June 1991, as did the old, affirms the "separation and collaboration of the executive, legislative and judicial powers..." It does not, however, provide for full equality and independence of the latter two branches. These remain to be won through law and through incremental turf fights by the legislature and the courts themselves. In the revised charter, as in the past, the executive and the unicameral National Assembly have concurrent authority to initiate legislation. The executive has veto authority. In order for the executive's law initiatives to enter in full force and effect, they must be authorized by the Assembly during its next session. Since 1973, however, during the history of the Second Republic and its single party rule, there is not one instance in which the Assembly initiated a major law or in which it exercised its authority to reject law presented by the President.

Multi-party elections, due within a year, will produce a legislature quite different from the compliant, single-party assemblies of the past. Under the draft electoral law now awaiting approval, the country will be divided into 51 parliamentary districts - each will elect one deputy by direct popular vote from among party candidates. The remaining 19 seats will be filled from national party lists based on the proportional share of that party's total vote in the national balloting. A party that reaches only 5 percent of the national vote would thus have a seat in parliament, assuring that significant national minorities, which could not win a majority in any one electoral district, will still have a voice in the affairs of state. In a clean election, it is likely that a substantial opposition block, if not a majority of seats in the Assembly, will be elected from the various opposition parties.

The new Rwandan democratic polity needs a legislature capable of performing independent oversight of the administration, of demanding accountability and performance from the public agencies, of controlling the public purse, and of initiating law reforms for economic and social development outside the executive's own program in response to constituent demands. Under the constitution it can, if it wills, do this, providing a restraining or a proactive balance to the executive in representation of the people's interests. The transparency of public affairs depends on the assembly's oversight and its

support for an independent "Court of Accounts" to audit government finances. But to perform this role, the elected deputies will need staff and resource support that is currently gravely inadequate, as well as training on how a multiparty assembly can organize itself for effective action.

The purpose of this element of USAID's Democratic Initiatives and Governance project is to assist in building the minimum capacity for the national assembly to function effectively.

During PP development the design team will need to expand on the following initial estimates of required assistance, prepare a joint implementation calendar with the assembly's officers, and develop a schedule of counterpart contributions to A.I.D.'s project inputs:

b. The Proposed A.I.D. Response

i. Developing staff support to facilitate work of the Assembly

The current support staff of only 20 must provide all services required by the 70 deputies: staff work for the 5 working legislative commissions (Political, Social, Economic, Scientific, and Foreign Affairs) and for the Assembly's Committee for Administration; prepare the order of the day, the verbatim record of debates, draft legislative projects under consideration, prepare and print the official gazette including the text of laws passed, manage the small reference library and attend to all correspondence including interrogatories to the Government. Deputies do not have individual aids or secretaries. There are only two legal aids to assist the 5 commissions in their legislative analysis - neither has a law degree. There is no economist or financial analyst to assist in budgetary and fiscal oversight or legal development.

Five senior members of the assembly's support staff are now in the US under an USAID training grant. USIS has arranged for them to follow an international visitor orientation program that will expose them to the organization and staff services in some "multiparty" legislatures. They will have returned by the time a PP team is in-country to cooperate in the project design.

Periodic TA and On-Job Training: The Assembly's current staff, plus those not trained abroad, will need some short-term assistance to assess the staff needs of the new Assembly and to develop a training plan for personnel to meet those needs. The plan will need to take into account the role of the parties and their need for caucus facilities and support, the need for qualified professional staff to support the five commissions, and the technical personnel needed for legal research and routine operations - publishing the order of the day, the report of

debates, and the official gazette. Based on this assessment, a recommended increase in staff level should be presented to the Assembly for inclusion in its budget. Short-term TA and training can be programmed in accordance with the Assembly's response, starting immediately with staff on-board and subsequently and sequentially for new staff. Estimated TA inputs from A.I.D. would include a full-time resident advisor for the first year and a pool of about 18 person months for short-term assistance over the life of the project.

Estimated total cost of Technical Assistance: \$ 400,000.

(Other donors may be prepared to share in the provision of TA under a coordinated plan with incremental specialist inputs that could be jointly planned to meet key needs. A.I.D.'s costs might be consequently reduced.)

#### ii. Commodity Support

- Automated Information Management System: The CND (current Assembly) has a 1991 study from the GOR's Ministry of Plan for automating its core system for information management. Extrapolating from that study, it may be estimated that an adequate system, including in-house publishing capacity, could be installed and maintained for the life of the project at a cost of approximately \$ 300,000.

- Although the establishment of a more functional and effective parliamentary reference library and research service was not included in the CND study referred to above, such a study should be made under the TA proposed above. Preliminarily, we estimate that stocking and equipping the library/reference service will take an additional \$ 200,000. At least half of this amount should be sought from among the francophone donors: France, Belgium, and Canada, leaving AID's share at \$ 100,000.

#### iii. Observation Training for Deputies

- In collaboration with other donors, the Assembly's leaders should also be trained. Deputies in party leadership positions, the officers of the 5 legislative commissions, the officers of the Assembly who form its Administrative Committee (President, V.P. and Secretary) should be provided with tailored orientation training programs on the operations of multiparty parliaments and legislatures in other developing countries and in the United States. The leading deputies from each of the seated parties should receive training immediately following national elections to aid them in organizing the house. Other deputies should be trained as they are elected to leadership responsibilities for the commissions and other posts. A.I.D. might finance the initial round for some 12 deputies at an estimated cost of \$ 120,000 while the resident TA advisor works

with other donors in programming additional opportunities for seated parliamentarians.

- In addition to these visitation-training programs abroad, the Assembly should be assisted in developing two in-country training packages.

One could be a minimal training package - two or three day orientation - for all official candidates for Assembly seats. This should cover a primer on the electoral process itself, functions of the three branches of government in Rwanda, the constitution, the make up of the public sector agencies, international accords and finance, the national budget, and the duties, rights and obligations of a deputy. It should certainly include some democratic philosophy regarding the self-constraints appropriate for winning majorities regarding minority rights and the role of minority parties as the "loyal opposition" in the legislative process. The PP design team should determine the readiness of the Adenauer and the Neumann Foundations, as well as the francophone donors to cooperate in this part of the enterprise.

A second training package for all elected deputies and their alternates should be prepared to orient them to the operations of the Assembly in detail: its standing rules, the way rules are made by the body, its operational systems and calendar, and the ways that it conducts its business. This should follow the elections, taking place perhaps the week before the Assembly's first session.

Again, other donor support will also be sought for financing the development and implementation of this training package. Estimated total cost (not including TA) - \$ 50,000.

c. Estimated Costs

Technical Assistance	\$ 400,000
Commodities	400,000
Training	170,000
TOTAL	\$ 970,000

2. **STRENGTHENING COMMUNAL GOVERNANCE, LOCAL DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW RWANDAN SOCIAL CONTRACT**

a. The Setting and Rationale

Local government in Rwanda is on the verge of revolutionary change. When national elections are held in the course of the next 9 to 12 months, the 145 Communes (13 urban and 132 rural) will elect burgomasters (the equivalent of a US mayor or an

elected County Executive) for the first time since 1973. Within each commune, "councilors" from each of the 10 or more "sectors" into which communes are divided, plus "responsables" from the ten or more "cellules" (clusters of "collines" or family settlements that make up each sector) will, for the first time, be elected under a multi-party system. In the past the presidentially appointed burgomasters, loyal party members, could assure that all candidates for "councilor" and "responsible" offices were loyal members of the single legal party. From top to bottom, the polity was controlled by the party with the president at its helm, through the Minister of Interior and his ten Prefects at the level of the 10 provinces, and thence through the Burgomasters to the people. At best the entire system was paternalistic and dirigiste; at worst it was controlling, coercive and invasive to the lowest level.

A new generation of leaders at the local level will soon burst upon the scene, untrained in the rights and duties of governance and, in many cases, at ideological odds with national authorities in the Ministry of Interior, provincial Prefects and the Sub-Prefects, all of whom are used to exercising unquestioned authority over local governments throughout the country.

In this new order, the communes, under their own elected leaders, will have the opportunity to play much more important roles than before in local socio-economic development and in the crucial task of building democratic practice through popular self-government and citizen participation. Ministry of Interior officials and the prefectures will have to reorient themselves from command and control to the support and guidance function that the new order will require. For the peaceful evolution of Rwanda's new democratic polity, it is essential that the all of these authorities, especially the newly elected commune leaders, be committed to reducing inter-ethnic strife, to promoting respect for minority rights under the new system that allows for political competition and free debate within majoritarian rule; and to encouraging the diversity that can foster dynamic local public economies. These commune leaders will have to form new modalities for local dispute resolution, on the one hand to replace the quasi-judicial function played in the past by authoritarian burgomasters, and on the other to avoid having disputes referred to the inept and often corrupt local courts.

Recognizing that the forthcoming changes are monumental and beyond the experience of the current government, the Ministry of the Interior has requested outside assistance to undertake a major study that could assist in making the transition toward the new order, including the new terms of relationships between that Ministry, its directly appointed prefects and the provincial authorities, and the "autonomous" local governments.

b. The Proposed A.I.D. Response

i. As urgent, pre-project assistance, USAID Rwanda should finance a substantive communal governance and local democracy needs assessment, including an evaluation of the support and oversight functions of the Ministry of Interior. Such an assessment could be quickly mobilized through a buy-in to A.I.D.'s centrally funded "Decentralization and Financial Management" project, with its substantial experience in local government world-wide and especially throughout francophone Africa. Alternatively the Mission could consider drawing upon the West Africa "Municipal Management Training Program" which is operated by the RHUDO in REDSO/WA. A team of 4 or 5 analysts should be able to complete such an assessment in about 45 days in-country. Its findings, particularly those related to preparations for local elections and transition planning, could be of immediate use to the Ministry of Interior well before the Mission's Democratic Initiatives and Governance project is authorized. There is no doubt that the GOR would see such a quick response as indicative both of important USG support to its democratic opening and of the importance that the US gives to local government in a functioning democracy.

ii. Include in the project itself funding for a series of in depth studies or "operational" research tasks. Several areas where technical work will likely be needed over several years are suggested below for the consideration of the PP team:

- A needs assessment and training design for new politico/administrative leadership (burgomasters, counselors, and "cellule" leaders) and alternative means for providing that training.
- A reform agenda for the laws that define local government's responsibility/authority/resource base and the steps required to undertake an immediate or incremental decentralization/devolution of authorities now with central government agencies or now shared in unclear administrative arrangements between central and local institutions.
- A reform agenda for legal and administrative changes needed to permit local governments to establish viable local public economies including such things as: ability to form consortia among communes for sharing equipment investments for road maintenance or the management of cross jurisdictional resources such as water or forest reserves; the authority to create special-purpose, self-governing districts within their jurisdictions such as water-user associations, communal forest and woodlots management districts, pastoralist associations to manage shared grazing lands, etc.; the

freedom to opt for public service delivery through contractual mechanisms to the private sector (NGOs and firms) rather than direct service delivery through public entities; and the authority to privatize market-oriented production or supply functions traditionally carried out by government, etc.

- Analysis of the financial structure of local government - the local revenue base, central government subsidies (and extractions), official and NGO resource flows, and the role of the recently created "Fonds du Solidarite Communal" (FSC). The study should examine how the latter could be structured to become the genuinely autonomous institution - governed by a board of commune representatives - that it appears it was intended to be. The FSC, or perhaps a new institutional arrangement, could be considered as the structure within which to promote and finance key aspects of local government capacity building such as regular training on accountability to local constituencies, transparency in operations through active citizen oversight and control, responsiveness through flexible service delivery systems with NGOs and local entrepreneurs as well as general efficiency and effectiveness in governmental administrative services. Such an institution may be useful for the efficient channelling of donor grants and loans for communal development through sub-loans or matching grants.

The studies indicated above should be structured as joint undertakings with personnel from the communes, from the Ministry of Interior, and with local NGOs or others. Each study could be seen as a technical assistance contribution with some technician time allowed following the completion of each study for guidance to Ministry officials and to local agents for implementation actions. Short-term follow-on technical assistance thereafter could be programmed at modest levels, wholly under the project or in cooperation with other donors.

iii. The Ministry of Interior has indicated a pressing need to provide local authorities with reference texts of laws and ordinances to facilitate their administration and to guide them on the lawful exercise of their functions. The project could include a fund for the printing and distribution of such a library to each of the prefectures and to the communes as well. The magnitude of this undertaking could not be clearly determined during PID development, but it probably should be an incremental activity to take into account the evolution of a new body of law and implementing ordinances affecting local governments. It must also be determined, perhaps during the needs assessment, what level and type of reference materials would be most useful at the prefecture and commune level. Given the limited educational

levels of many Rwandans in rural areas, providing summary interpretations might, for example, be more practical than the provision of the complex legal language found in the actual laws, etc.

**c. Estimated Costs**

Pre-project assessment: 5 experts for 6 weeks plus per diems for GOR MININTER counterparts - \$ 175,000

Technical Assistance: 6 person/months/year over 4 years - \$ 400,000

Publications, local commodities, etc. - \$ 200,000

Training - \$ 100,000.

TOTAL: \$ 875,000

**3. NGO SUPPORT SERVICES CENTER: PROMOTING CIVIC EDUCATION AND ACTION.**

**a. Setting and Rationale**

The movement toward democratization in Rwanda and the resulting increased participation by citizen groups in public life presents an extremely fluid and dynamic situation.

In spite of the heavy-handed state control of the general order, the regime has been remarkably positive in honoring the right of free association in recent years. As the democratic opening has unfolded, both recently-formed organizations and associations and existing NGOs are defining their roles in the new context. They are taking on activities directly related to the expansion of public knowledge and awareness of their right to share in the process, and how they can pressure the authorities to maintain the pace of evolution of a democratic society. In general these activities are "gut reactions" to a new set of social circumstances rather than established strategies. However, they demonstrate a recognition of the importance of civic awareness and responsiveness in increasing both popular participation in political processes and citizen involvement in the oversight of government policies.

**b. The Proposed A.I.D. Response**

Under the project, USAID will establish, through an appropriate contracting mechanism with a U.S. institution, a support services center which will provide technical assistance and other support to Rwandan NGOs, associations and organizations. This center

would facilitate the implementation of activities planned by the various interest groups through training and technical and material assistance. Substantive participation and collaboration in the support activities by the UNDP and by European NGOs in Rwanda will also be solicited and encouraged.

With one long-term advisor, a small staff of qualified Rwandan personnel and appropriate short-term expatriate technical assistance, the center will assist selected local organizations in implementing activities aimed at broadening the base of popular participation in the political process. In large measure, the assistance provided will be in the area of structured coordination of the impressive human and institutional resources that already exist among the non-state client groups.

All these groups share a common desire for promotion of the rule of law and the expansion of citizen awareness of their rights under the law. This concern has been expressed in activities that have been undertaken recently. Their constituencies and the beneficiaries of their activities are the rural population.

The organizations targeted include: traditional NGOs, which have extensive experience in mobilizing community groups around the country for participation in development activities; the recently-formed human rights organizations, which have been performing vital services monitoring the violation of human rights, intervening to assert the rights of citizens, publicizing abuse, and seeking redress; the Association of Jurists and Lawyers which, along with the human rights organizations, has the potential to systematically analyze the current legal system, demand reform through elected representatives in parliament, local commune councils, and the executive; women's associations, which are already identifying basic legal problems of women such as the right to own land, and which, with technical input from the Lawyers Association, will be able to propose specific remedies; and, other membership organizations composed of farmer associations or cooperatives around the country.

The priority areas for support of these organizations would be:

- basic human rights, which would benefit from assistance in expanding coverage, in investigating and publicizing abuses and in popular education;
- reforming the law and judicial practice, a prime concern of all organizations which, with appropriate means and cooperation, could bring about an overhaul of the corrupt and inefficient judicial system by action from below;

- civic education and popular mobilization, through the use of existing networks and with support in the development of appropriate training instruments;
- self-governance, through the training of people to recognize that government does not equal governance, helping to identify areas of governance in which organized action by communal groups can assume responsibility for common resource management, service provision, and dispute resolution without waiting for a paternalistic state to act for them;
- reinforcing democratic practices in NGO affairs, by encouraging the measurement of their management practices by democratic norms, whatever their sphere of action.

In its initial phase, the service center will assist the groups in developing and implementing plans in these priority areas through the following activities:

i. Training needs assessments in cooperation with organizations representing numerous rural associations or special interest groups. For example, IMBAGA (240 farmer associations) IWACU (rural cooperatives throughout the country), the women's associations, and human rights associations.

ii. Management planning and coordination workshops which will bring together the organizations to identify their respective resources and roles in an overall training program. For example, AJAR and the Faculty of Law to provide technical legal assistance; INADES and IWACU (with training TA) to develop training materials for the rural population; consortia and membership organizations to plan training programs; human rights and women's associations to develop specialized components for their target groups.

iii. Development of Training Materials

iv. Development of Training Plans

v. Training of Trainers. This training will establish, within the various organizations, a cadre of professionals at the community level which can perform a continuing role as catalysts for informed popular participation in issues of governance. It would focus on methods for increasing the awareness of individual citizens of their rights and recourse under law, and of their roles as responsible participants in democratic processes at the community level.

The center would also reinforce the present climate of resource sharing among the various organizations by providing various

operational support services for its client organizations during this planning period to enable them to improve their ongoing services. Such support might include assistance in document processing, logistics support, and communications support.

c. Institutional Development

In the second phase of its program, the support center would monitor training programs undertaken by its clients and begin its institutional development activities. These activities would be targeted at consortia groups of development NGOs such as CCOAIB, ARDI, and ACOR, and special interest groupings such as *Reseaux des Femmes oeuvrant pour le Developpement* and *Duterimbere*, and the newly emerging "Concertation" of Human Rights organizations.

The focus of the center's activities in this phase would be in the area of management and administration. Short-term technical assistance would conduct training seminars in management for selected organizations as a group, with follow-up assistance and training as needed to individual organizations. The development of long-term strategic plans by the organizations would be an important indicator of success in this phase.

As the organizations develop sufficient management capacity and long-term plans, the center would be able to award subgrants according to a set of criteria established in consultation with the USAID Mission. One major objective of this phase would be to stimulate the emergence of one of the local organizations as a local counterpart and eventual replacement institution which would replace the project service center.

d. Estimated costs

Long-term TA: 1 person/year for 5 years (includes overhead, fringe, installation, house rental)-  
\$1,250,000

Short-term TA (training, financial management, management planning): 6 person/months/year for 3 years;  
4 person/months/year for 2 years - \$390,000

Center Operations (local staff, rent, commodities):  
\$200,000 first year; \$50,000/year, 4 years - \$400,000

Sub-contracts, sub-grants: \$400,000

TOTAL \$2,040,000

#### 4. THE NATIONAL PRESS CENTER

##### a. The Setting and Rationale

An essential element in a functioning democracy as well as in an open market economy is a free press. Through a responsible and competent corps of journalists with the means necessary to present timely and reliable information to the public, citizens can reach reasoned decisions. On the one hand an informed public can make judgments about the competence of their elected leaders only when they have timely and reliable reports on their performance, the consequences of their policies, and the degree to which their personal and official actions accord with the law and the general social contract to which they are to be held accountable. On the other hand, entrepreneurs, investors, producers, consumers and wage earners must have access to timely and reliable information on factor prices, the trends in supply and demand, the supply and cost of money, and other factors to shape strategies and actions responsive to market signals. At no time since its independence in 1962 has Rwanda benefitted from the invaluable service that a free press can provide. Lacking the opportunities for free inquiry and publication, a journalistic profession did not develop in the country.

Now that world, regional and internal events are drawing Rwanda toward a liberal economic regime and a market economy as well as toward a democratic system of governance, the absence of a responsibly-functioning free press is a significant obstacle to the free flow of information that could support the process of change and satisfy an essential condition for the success of the new order.

In the last two years the Government of Rwanda has moved uncertainly toward an open information regime. For years only two or three bi-weekly/monthly private journals (two of these closely associated with the Church) survived under the government's near monopoly of the media and its stern limits on political and economic reporting or commentary. The government radio and its weekly "news" journals, one in Kinyarwanda and one in French, filtered information to the public and provided "spin," propaganda, and public education that served the regime. Hints at a more liberal government information policy plus the president's formal announcement in July 1990 of his intent to move toward a multi-party democracy were sufficient to encourage an explosion of experimental private publications. USIS has counted some 60 new bi-weekly or monthly journals many of which may not long survive. The economics of private publishing in Rwanda are tough: expensive imported equipment for typing or word-processing; high production costs for printing, no paying advertisers and falling discretionary income among the reading public who buy the papers. The politics of publishing are uncertain. Several journalists have been apprehended, beaten,

and jailed for insulting the president and his official family or for alleged libelous or scandalous reporting on official matters. One publisher who ran a political cartoon judged insulting to the president was sentenced this year to four years in prison. A new press law, issued in December 1991, is repressive and threatening and has been denounced by both the private association of journalists and the union of government-media employees who are asking for its repeal or revision. Even so, dozens of courageous, largely untrained but aspiring journalists seem willing to test the limits of their freedom as they continue their publishing ventures.

Several donors have recognized the importance of developing a larger and more qualified cadre of journalists to extend the outreach of the press and to improve on the quality of their work. USIS has been a leader in the field. A recent five-day USIS sponsored seminar drew 74 self-selected journalists from both the private and the official media. Over the years, several journalists have been sent by USIS on international visitor training grants to the US. Other donors have provided similar programs: seminars in-country and training abroad. As this is written a Swiss communications expert is concluding a three-week consultancy which appears to have generated agreement among both government and private journalists on a code of journalistic ethics as well as a plan to form a confederation between their professional groups.

Lacking any source of professional training in-country, these occasional donor seminars, visitation programs and consultancies are very important. But a serious need remains for a systematic program that can provide incremental training modules that could build the operational core of this nascent profession.

The costs of entering the public information field, of information access, and preparing material for publication must be reduced to encourage the free press at this early stage of democratic development and market liberalization.

#### b. The Proposed A.I.D. Response

The AID project is designed to address a number of the identified needs for the development of a flourishing free press and a responsible journalistic profession. The project outline that follows will require further exploration during intensive review.

##### i. The Rwandan National Press Center

Under an agreement with the new Confederation of Journalists, now being formed in agreement between the Association of Journalists (private) and the Journalists' Union (public employees), A.I.D. will provide a full-time technical advisor for 1 year to assist

in establishing the Rwandan National Press Center and in initiating its operations.

The purpose of the center will be three fold:

First, in cooperation with all willing donors, to provide continuous training opportunities to develop a critical mass of competent and productive journalists. Training is needed in:

- responsible investigative reporting in the political, economic and social fields;
- the basic arts of writing and oral reporting;
- the ethics of the profession regarding sources, attribution, slanderous or libelous language, plagiarism, etc.;
- the business of publishing - management, accounting, finance, advertising, promotion, etc.

Second, to provide access to support services at reasonably low cost. Nascent journals cannot afford typewriters and copy machines, let alone computers and desk top publishing equipment and presses, nor can they afford to subscribe to publications and wire services providing timely information on world and regional events; a reference library including, for example, encyclopedias, dictionaries and thesauruses, style manuals, writers guides, texts and biographical materials is also important.

Third, to provide support to the collegium of journalists:

- by encouraging links to associations of journalists outside Rwanda to help support the new press freedoms here as well as develop links for getting Rwanda's stories into the world press;
- by encouraging the center to institute a program of annual recognition for outstanding work through peer review mechanisms, thus raising the standards for investigation, reporting and writing; and perhaps most importantly,
- by mobilizing solidarity and group action to defend the free press, publicly and formally providing defense of its members as needed, advocating reform or moderation in the current press law, and cooperating with the human rights organizations.

What the project proposes to do:

Under an agreement with the new Confederation of Journalists, with USIS and USAID the project could provide:

- Funding for a feasibility study leading to the establishment of the Rwandan Center for Free Journalism.

-- The study should establish the basic requirements of the center including a local staff to systematically plan and program workshops, seminars and lectures, supported by all willing donors through expert visitors, that could build the professional capacity of the journalists.

-- It should also establish the kinds of central services needed to support the development of journals by providing equipment that could be shared on a user-fee basis among the journalists, a suitable locale for these services, and associated support facilities as indicated below.

-- Estimated study cost: \$ 50,000

- Anticipating study results, the PP team could estimate the costs of implementing the probable recommendations for setting up a National Journalism Center. The AID project might fund the following:

-- First two years of space rental for the center and its rehabilitation and next three years on a declining share as the journalists as individuals or their businesses pick up an increasing cost of maintenance.

-- First two years of local staff - EXDir, Computer Tech, AdminAsst/SEC, Maintenance - declining share next three years.

-- Shared equipment pool -computers/desk top publishing equipment/typewriters, laser printer to produce camera ready copy for commercial printers, etc.

-- Estimated locale and equipment costs: \$ 350,000

- A technical advisor should be selected to assist the center director and the staff to develop the modular training plan and to set up general operations, including a monitoring system to assure equitable sharing of the equipment pool. It may be assumed that one of the center's ongoing tasks will be to negotiate with other donors for training support, activities and other support not included in the A.I.D. project budget or available from the USIS program. An advisor will probably be needed for the entire first year to set up the Center, train the new local staff and assist them in mounting initial operations.

-- Estimated TA cost - \$ 175,000

- In addition, short term technical assistance may be required in setting up support equipment, in financial management and accounting and in other areas which normally would not be available in the USIS program. Perhaps 4 separate short-term consultancies would be needed totaling some 8 person months.

-- Estimated cost of Short-term TA - \$ 100,000

- Jointly with USIS and other donors, AID should assist in funding initial subscriptions to AFP, Reuters, other wire services - major international newspapers and journals and in setting up a basic reference library.

-- Estimated cost reference service: \$ 100,000

- **Radio Study:** The National Press Center or the Confederation of Journalists, in cooperation with interested non-governmental organizations, should undertake - with A.I.D.-funded outside expert assistance - an assessment of alternatives for increasing radio services to the public. At present radio is a closely-held monopoly of the state. Some initiatives have been made to develop plans for alternative radio services to the public. For one, IWACU has an embryonic plan for a nation-wide radio service for peasant cooperatives. Under a cooperative, democratic regime the existing national radio service could be opened up to a broad range of news sources providing open debates of public affairs, shared time for political campaigns, even summaries of news in the local print media, etc. To determine what alternatives might best service the country's need for expanded information and public affairs programming through radio, the project could finance a technical assessment once the Center has reached agreement for the cooperation of the interested NGOs and on the scope of the inquiry.

-- Estimated cost of the radio study - \$ 50,000

c. Estimated Costs

Studies	\$ 100,000
Technical Assistance	275,000
Operational Support & Equipment	450,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$ 825,000</b>

A note for PP design on sustainability: The Memorandum of Understanding (or sub-project agreement) to be entered into with the Confederation of Journalists will have to be carefully discussed during project design to determine how, through membership fee structure and user-fees for the equipment and services in the center, the Center users and the Confederation

will be able to meet the recurring costs for maintaining the Center by the PACD.

## 5. USAID PROJECT SUPPORT FUNDS

### a. Setting and Rationale

The four project elements detailed above are reasoned responses to the existing or evolving institutional environment in Rwanda. They are proposed as initiatives that can maximize the existing potential for local initiative and cooperative action with minimal risk of official resistance or inaction. We may anticipate that during the coming five years that span the life of this project, urgent needs for assistance to promote and consolidate gains in democratic practices will emerge that are outside the scope of the four elements proposed above. Following elections, the new representative government may wish to explore additional reforms as they try expeditiously to inject democratic practice into the old order and build the new polity. The USAID Mission should have ready access to a small reserve of resources to respond quickly and encourage these initiatives as they arise. Since PD and S funding and other discretionary resources cannot with certainty be assured when these situations occur, it is important that they be provided in the project. Examples of the type of opportunities that have been identified during PID development are provided in the following discussion.

### b. Recommended USAID Funds Provision

#### - A Proposed Fund for "Target of Opportunity" Technical Assistance

One of the areas in need of profound institutional reform in Rwanda is the corrupt, inefficient, and maladministered system of justice. The gravity of its short-comings is well documented in recent studies by expatriate experts. Unfortunately, the regime's inaction on recommendations to undertake urgently needed reforms is equally well known. For the present, we recommend an incremental approach to reform through the action of non-governmental change agents such as the human rights organizations and the private association of jurists and lawyers. By supporting their efforts to monitor the justice system, to mobilize support for reform legislation, and to lobby the parliament for action, the momentum can build while these citizen groups take real responsibility for promoting the rule of law. On the other hand, under a new regime, should the government decide that steps will be taken to overhaul this system, making the judiciary a genuinely independent branch of government with qualified jurists and an agile, humane and effective administration, USAID should be prepared to join with other donors in providing immediate assistance. Although the French and Belgians, and even the Canadians, have a comparative

advantage as donors to a system based on the Napoleonic/Civil Law tradition - and should be encouraged to take the lead in the training of magistrates, reform of the codes, and other areas - there are areas in which US judicial administration is highly apposite. The entire field of case management, judicial administration, the documentation of oral proceedings, and conditional release of accuseds pending trial (bail bonding, probation, etc.) have direct application from US experience and from a pool of readily available American experts.

Another area of potential assistance is related to the first. The Rwandan system, patterned after the French and Belgian model, places responsibility for auditing public sector agencies with a "Court of Accounts." Formally in the "judicial sector," these institutions function best when they are closely allied with the parliament, have considerable independence of action, and are well trained and equipped to serve the function of watchdogs over the budget. That is not the case in Rwanda where an opaque public accounting system, with minimal independent oversight has been the rule. Without major reform in this arena the transparent operation of public functions cannot be guaranteed as it must be in a democratic polity. Again, should an elected government decide to forthrightly reform this system, USAID should be prepared, in collaboration with the World Bank, the IMF and other donors, to respond quickly with timely and effective technical resources to assure rapid forward momentum in the reform.

Additional, pressing needs of this sort are certain to arise. They could be associated with reforms in the civil service system, the devolution of key central authorities to local government control, creating "ombudsman"-like authorities to increase administrative responsiveness to citizens and to reduce bureaucratic abuse, major reforms in women's status under the law, and special initiatives for small and disadvantaged businesses.

We recommend a reserved fund of \$ 250,000 for rapid response studies and technical assistance to address such targets of opportunity as they emerge. During PP design it can be determined whether these funds should be directly administered by USAID or should be included under the management of the lead contractor for the project.

#### - Training for Emerging Leaders

Each of the four project elements described above includes resources for training in-country and abroad. But new, promising leadership will emerge from the dynamics of democratic practice. A.I.D. should be able to offer short-term training in the US and abroad, opportunities to attend regional and international conferences (on human rights law, judicial reform, women's law,

civic education, public auditing, etc.) to encourage these emerging leaders in performing their roles in the political transformation process. We estimate that as many as 5 such specially tailored training grants should be available for AID to program in each year, for a total of 25 grants during the life of the project. Funds needed would be in the order of \$ 300,000.

-Project Audits and Evaluation

During PP design, requirements for independent audits will have to be determined for each of the two NGO oriented components of the project (the NGO Support Center and the National Press Center). In addition, two formal external evaluations should be planned: one at mid-course in the project and the other in the final year just before the PACD. Estimated funds to be authorized for audits and evaluations: \$ 400,000.

c. Estimated Costs

Technical Assistance	\$ 250,000
Training	300,000
Audits and Evaluations	800,000
TOTAL	\$ 1,350,000.

## INITIAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXAMINATION

OR

## CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION

Project Country : Rwanda  
 Project Title : Democratic Initiatives and Governance  
 Project Number : 696-0133  
 Funding : FY 1992 \$9,000,000  
 IEE Prepared By : PDO. Claudia Cantell  
 Environmental Action Recommended: Categorical Exclusion

Discussion: This activity meets the criteria for a Categorical Exclusion, per 216.2 (c) of Regulation 16, and is therefore excluded from further review. The entire \$9,000,000 will be used to support the GOR's democratization process through technical assistance, training and commodities. Section 216.2(c)(1)(i) is recommended on the basis that none of the activities under the proposed Project will have any effect on the natural or physical environment. In accordance with this Exclusion, an Initial Environmental Examination, Environmental Assessment and Environmental Impact Statement are not required.

Clearance:




Gary K. Nelson  
 USAID/Rwanda Mission Director

Concurrence: Bureau Environmental Officer

APPROVED:

DISAPPROVED:

DATE:

  
 4/27/92

Clearance: GC/AFR: MAIS Date: 5/18/92

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK SUMMARY Narrative Summary	VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTION
<p>Program Goal (The broader objective to which this project contributes):</p> <p>Improve governance in Rwanda</p>	<p>Measures of <u>Goal</u> Achievement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased citizen participation in the establishment of legitimate authority</li> <li>- Increased transparency in the conduct of state affairs</li> <li>- Independence of legislative and judicial authorities in the promulgation and administration of law</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Election results</li> <li>- Media reports</li> <li>- Records of parliamentary debates</li> <li>- Legislative gazette</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economic and political stability</li> <li>- Increased citizen knowledge will lead to increased citizen participation in governance</li> </ul>
<p>Project purpose:</p> <p>Increase the ability of state and non-state institutions to promote citizen participation in the process of establishing a legitimate authority</p>	<p>Conditions that will indicate <u>purpose</u> has been achieved: end of project status:</p> <p>(to be filled in, general statements along lines of output level indicators)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Election results</li> <li>- Legislative records</li> <li>- Evaluations and audits</li> <li>- Number of governance trainings conducted</li> <li>- Human rights reports</li> <li>- Court records</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- GOR will respect new constitution and laws in practice</li> <li>- Economic and political situation will not impede activities of state and non-state actors</li> <li>- State and non-state actors will commit human and material resources to project implementation</li> </ul>
<p>Outputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased citizen understanding of their rights and responsibilities in a democratic system</li> <li>- Increased citizen participation in the establishment of a legitimate national authority</li> <li>- Improved efficiency and accuracy in the production of public information through the print media</li> <li>- Increased independence and efficiency in the development and promulgation of the rule of law</li> <li>- Improved responsiveness of legitimate authority to public values in the administration of law</li> </ul>	<p>Magnitude of outputs necessary and sufficient to achieve purpose:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Training conducted</li> <li>- Studies completed</li> <li>- Newspaper editions published</li> <li>- Number of printings</li> <li>- Laws proposed and passed etc., etc.</li> </ul> <p>(to be filled in)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Election results</li> <li>- Training statistics</li> <li>- Media financial reports</li> <li>- Legislative records</li> <li>- Court records</li> <li>- Human rights reports</li> <li>- Incidents of civil unrest</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Non-state institutions will retain their constituencies</li> <li>- State institutions will continue to function</li> <li>- Rights of free expression by citizens will be maintained</li> <li>- Donor coordination continues</li> </ul>
<p>Inputs (Activities and Types):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Technical Assistance</li> <li>- Training</li> <li>- Commodities</li> <li>- Other Services/local activities</li> <li>- Sub-grants/contracts</li> </ul>	<p>Level of Effort/Expenditure for each activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Technical Assistance \$6,000,000</li> <li>- Training 650,000</li> <li>- Commodities 1,000,000</li> <li>- Other Costs 550,000</li> <li>- Audit/Evaluation 800,000</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Contracts and subcontracts</li> <li>- USAID Implementation documents</li> <li>- Vouchers</li> <li>- Contractor reports</li> <li>- Audits and evaluations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- AID funds are made available</li> <li>- Necessary commodities are available in a timely manner</li> <li>- Appropriate personnel will be fielded in a timely manner</li> </ul>