

PID-ABN-468

32020

National Democratic

FORUM

CONFERENCE

USAID Final Report
Cambodia: Strengthening Democratic Institutions
Contract No. 442-0111-G-2392-00

September 30, 1992 to September 30, 1996

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

USAID Final Report
Cambodia: Strengthening Democratic Institutions
Contract No. 442-0111-G-2392-00

September 30, 1992 to September 30, 1996

FINAL REPORT
CAMBODIA: STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
FINAL PROGRAM REPORT
September 30, 1992 to September 30, 1996
Contract No: 442-0111-G-00-2392-00

I. SUMMARY

NDI received a three-year, \$1.2 million grant from AID/Phnom Penh in September 1992 to assist the development of Cambodia's political parties to compete in May 1993 Constituent Assembly elections and to become viable and sustainable democratic political institutions after these elections. In June 1993, NDI also received a grant from the National Endowment for Democracy to assist political parties and members of the newly elected Constituent Assembly to focus on specific organizational and procedural issues confronting the assembly and on substantive issues relating to the drafting of the new constitution.

As NDI began its program, most of Cambodia's political parties faced the daunting challenge of making the transition from being popular movements to being peacefully competitive political parties. During the first phase of the program, from January 1993 through the May 1993 Constituent Assembly elections, NDI worked with all 20 political parties that registered with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to compete in the historic elections. NDI divided its activities into a six-month and a 30-day plan. The former addressed general issues of party organization and mobilization as well as discussions of general democratic principles. NDI's activities included an introductory multiparty conference, single-party consultations, multiparty provincial workshops and public relations workshops. NDI's 30-day plan, which took effect during the period immediately before the elections, included a series of election monitoring workshops and a round table discussion on the electoral Code of Conduct.

Following the elections, NDI worked with the three political parties that were represented in the new assembly -- the former ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP), the royalist National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) -- to develop their organizations into strong, representative and sustainable institutions. This program, which included support for the parliament itself, continued through December 1994. At this time, NDI closed its office in Phnom Penh and suspended further program activities.

During this time, NDI worked in conjunction with the International Republican Institute (IRI), which also received an AID grant to conduct political development programs in Cambodia, on many political party programs during the pre- and post-election period. During the post-election period, NDI shared an office with IRI in Phnom Penh.

In August 1995, NDI was granted a no-cost extension for this program. This allowed NDI to work with Cambodian NGO's to form coalitions to conduct voter and civic education and plan election monitoring efforts. It also allowed the Institute to invite Cambodian parliamentarians, party

leaders, NGOs and Ministry of Interior (MOI) Election Committee members to study elections and election-related processes in other countries.

II. BACKGROUND

The October 1991 Paris peace accords led to cautious optimism that Cambodia's 20 years of war and civil strife would come to an end and that meaningful democratic elections in 1993 could usher in a new and peaceful chapter in Cambodia's tragic history. The "Perm-Five" agreement provided for the largest United Nations role in a sovereign nation's electoral process and daily governance ever attempted. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was granted a comprehensive mandate to supervise any and all "administrative agencies, bodies and offices which could directly influence the outcome of elections." will be placed under direct United Nations supervision or control.

Cambodia's history, however, did not augur well for fair and open elections. After gaining independence from France in 1954, Cambodia held regular elections for its national assembly, but vote-buying, fraud and intimidation regularly marred these exercises. With the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in 1970, the new military government of Lon Nol's Khmer Republic began usurping political power. By the spring of 1973, this government had suspended most basic civil liberties. Widespread corruption, along with a mismanaged war effort against radical Khmer Rouge (KR) rebels and communist Vietnamese forces, bankrupted the nation and alienated the population. The government and the army gradually disintegrated, and on April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge marched into Phnom Penh.

The extreme human rights abuses that occurred under the Khmer Rouge regime continue to shape Cambodia today. For nearly four years, a policy that included mass murder of skilled and otherwise educated members of society, destruction of the family unit, forced evacuation of cities and the complete abolition of private property, the financial system and religion systematically violated a proud and ancient society and terrorized its people. By design or neglect, over one million Cambodians are estimated to have been killed. Government took the form of party fiat, and compliance and loyalty were enforced through systematic terror.

The Vietnamese invasion and installation of a puppet regime in Phnom Penh to replace the Khmer Rouge in January 1979 led to continuation of the civil war and to a massive Cambodian resistance movement based in neighboring Thailand that included an unlikely coalition of royalist, republican and KR elements. The civil strife of the 1980s allowed for little rebuilding, particularly in the political arena. One-party rule and tight restrictions on political expression under the Heng Samrin government ensured that political life in Cambodia remained dormant and, that the Cambodia people remained alienated from their government.

With the imminent establishment in Paris of a framework for peace between warring Cambodian factions, an NDI senior program officer visited Cambodia and met with leaders of Cambodia's non-communist resistance in Bangkok in July 1991 to gauge the prospect of a democratic reconciliation in Cambodia. In Phnom Penh, NDI received assurances from senior Cambodian officials that the government of Cambodia was fully committed to both the establishment of an interim government and free elections consistent with the forthcoming Perm-Five peace plan. Cambodian officials also affirmed their commitment to providing a secure election environment and welcomed an international presence before, during and after the national elections. In Bangkok, leaders of the Cambodian resistance requested NDI's party-building assistance. Cambodian party leaders reiterated their requests during visits to NDI's headquarters in Washington D.C.

III. PRE-ELECTION PROGRAM: POLITICAL PARTY TRAINING, November 1992-June 1993

A. OBJECTIVES

During the initial phase of NDI's multi year program in Cambodia, the Institute sought to assist and strengthen the development of political parties in anticipation of the historic May 1993 parliamentary elections. The NDI six-month program focused on four specific areas: organizational strategy and planning, the Code of Conduct, voter outreach and domestic election monitoring. NDI reasoned that constructive and peaceful competition between parties combined with multiparty efforts to improve the campaign environment would contribute to greater popular confidence in the electoral process. Increased interaction between the parties and enhanced popular confidence in turn would encourage broad voter participation and enhance the prospect of a legitimate and stable post-election regime.

The pre-election program, which was developed in consultation with U.S. embassy and AID officials in Phnom Penh, sought specifically to achieve the following objectives:

1. To strengthen the internal management and communications systems of political parties in order that they may develop and deliver their message effectively and efficiently to the electorate.
2. To facilitate the development of regional party branches to promote local activism and leadership;
3. To assist political parties in developing and deploying a nationwide network of election monitors in order to deter election-related fraud and intimidation during the pre-election period and on election day;
4. To help parties to develop and implement a comprehensive and well-documented reporting system using these monitors; and

5. To promote public participation in the election process and cultivate a base of civic activism and experience that may be tapped during the post-election period or for future elections.

B. ACTIVITIES

Survey Mission

NDI, in conjunction with the International Republican Institute (IRI), conducted a survey mission to Cambodia from November 16 to 21, 1992. The mission was designed to evaluate the political situation in Cambodia and the needs of the country's political parties. While in Phnom Penh, survey team members Michael Marshall and Robert Wood met with AID and State Department personnel at the U.S. mission, senior UNTAC officials and eight Cambodian political parties. The team also traveled to two neighboring provinces to visit political party offices outside the capital. In addition, NDI co-sponsored a reception attended by leaders from 14 parties, the largest such gathering in Cambodia in almost 20 years.

Upon their return to Washington, Marshall and Woods, in consultation with senior NDI staff members, developed a detailed project implementation plan for placing four experienced grassroots organizers and a fifth supporting staff member in Phnom Penh for the five months before the May elections. This was a revision to the original proposal, which called for only two in-country representatives. NDI requested the revision in response to the short time frame before elections and the rapidly increasing number of registered political parties in Cambodia.

Placement of Field Staff

NDI Program Officer Michael Marshall headed NDI's in-country team during the pre-election period. Following his arrival in Cambodia on December 28, 1992, Marshall immediately established the joint NDI/IRI offices in Phnom Penh and began preparations for the joint NDI/IRI introductory political party seminar that was scheduled for January 30 and 31, 1993. By the opening of the conference, three additional experienced political organizers -- David Costello, Kate Head and Carl Larkins -- joined Marshall as NDI field representatives during the pre-election period. NDI program assistant Robert Wood, who was well-versed in the history and culture of Cambodia, arrived in Phnom Penh in early March to provide programmatic and administrative support through the elections.

Multi-Party Conference: January 30 - 31, 1993

Program activities began in early 1993 with the organization of a joint NDI-IRI multiparty conference on January 30 to 31. The conference was held in Phnom Penh and was attended by 238 representatives from 18 of Cambodia's 20 political parties. Thirty four of the participants were women. The conference marked the first multi-partisan gathering in Cambodia in more than 20 years.

The conference provided broad perspectives on the role of political parties in the process of democratization and in introducing specific techniques for party and election planning. Parliamentarians Dr. Art-Ong Jumsai of Thailand and Frederico Mekis of Chile offered international perspectives during several plenary sessions. Both men discussed the role of political parties in emerging democracies and offered valuable insights and information about their own experiences as party activists in their countries. Glenn Cowan, a senior advisor to NDI and international elections expert, co-chaired the conference. The NDI field staff members addressed organizational techniques in smaller workshop sessions.

Although the participants in some cases were reluctant to engage in debate and dialogue, the conference achieved a healthy exchange of views on several levels. The multiparty setting served as a valuable opportunity for party activists to become acquainted with one another. The forum also served to introduce Cambodia's parties not only to NDI's field staff but also to some of the concepts these representatives would be emphasizing through the elections in May. In return, the conference helped to educate NDI about Cambodia's current political situation, including the many fears, concerns and other obstacles each party faces in overcoming the legacy of recent Cambodian history. NDI came away from the conference with a better understanding of the two most critical challenges confronting Cambodia's political parties: the fear that to organize and campaign effectively would invite reprisal from the governing SOC regime, and the severe shortage of resources, financial and otherwise. NDI staff members drew upon the experience of this conference repeatedly when developing subsequent phases of the pre-election program.

Individual Party Consultations

Following the multiparty conference, NDI and IRI met with each party individually to evaluate their organizations and specific needs. The four NDI field officers were each assigned responsibility for developing and maintaining a relationship with five of Cambodia's 20 formally registered political parties, and, in joint NDI/IRI teams, conducted meetings and needs assessments with each of them. During these meetings NDI and IRI offered their services to each party upon request. The meetings served as useful personal introductions to individuals within the parties and provided insights valuable to subsequent program planning. Over the ensuing months, NDI staffers met regularly with their assigned parties to answer questions as well as to offer advice and encouragement.

NDI/IRI Provincial Party Workshops

Based on these consultations and the multiparty conference, NDI and IRI developed a training program of multiparty workshops in provinces throughout Cambodia over the following four months. In preparation for these workshops, NDI conducted intensive 10-day advance trips to the provinces to introduce the Institute to local political party officials and UNTAC representatives. The workshops were divided into three categories and were organized to address the evolving needs of the 20 registered parties through the end of the election campaign. In all, 3,734 party members participated in NDI's provincial party workshops.

(For a consolidated accounting of the location, date and participation in these workshops, see Appendix One).

- Workshop I - The Role of Political Parties in a Representative Democracy

The first series of workshops reinforced broad concepts introduced in the opening conference. These concepts included the role of political parties in a democracy and technical aspects of party organization. The seminars were held in 15 of Cambodia's 21 provinces between February 22 and March 20, 1993, and were attended by 1,680 provincial party representatives. Two hundred and six participants were women. NDI invited all parties registered with UNTAC at the provincial level to send an equal number of participants. This number differed in each location based on the size of the workshop venue and of the parties active in the province.

NDI selected provinces based on the size of the registered voting population. With the exception of Kampong Som, NDI held workshops in all provinces that would send at least two representatives to the Constituent Assembly.

The workshops focused primarily on introducing participants to the technical aspects of political party work, including campaign planning, message development, election monitoring and voter education. The Institutes distributed demographic data for each province and used them to illustrate resource targeting and message development. NDI also produced and distributed a training manual outlining the workshop's agenda and subject areas. NDI and IRI staff members revised the training agenda and manual periodically during the training period to accommodate reassessments of participants' needs and level of development. (A copy of this manual is enclosed in Appendix Two).

Other evolutionary revisions contributed to the strength of the program. Three of the first eight workshops were conducted individually by one of the two Institutes, while the other five were conducted jointly. Subsequent seminars were conducted jointly when both institutes determined that integrated training teams were more productive. Integrated teams also illustrated to participants that opposing political parties could work together on an issue of mutual interest.

NDI and IRI also attempted to improve the imbalance in participation of men relative to women by reminding the parties in letters of invitation and personal visits of the importance of including women. NDI found that women's participation increased in subsequent workshops as a result of this effort.

- Workshop II - Democratic Elections

NDI and IRI organized the second series of multiparty workshops in response to the perceived need for political parties to focus more intently and specifically on their Constituent Assembly election campaigns. The seminars were held in seven provinces between March 30 and April 7, 1993, and involved a total of 842 participants. Ninety participants were women.

The workshops focused on techniques of planning and conducting an effective electoral campaign. The Institutes utilized a sample campaign plan based on a fictitious Cambodian party, dubbed the "Rice Party," to demonstrate the importance of campaign strategy. A party plan outlined the Rice Party's campaign goals and strategy and described in detail how it planned to conduct its six-week electoral campaign for the Constituent Assembly in a given province. The plan contained specific staff assignments, budget guidelines, voter contact activities and targets and a daily operations calendar.

Pursuant to the expressed interest of many party leaders, at the conclusion of a workshop two members from each party would remain to continue discussing the Code of Conduct and to ask questions about general principles of democracy. Most parties had not received copies of the election law and Code of Conduct and were ignorant of their basic principles. Before the workshop, NDI provided the parties in each province with five copies of both documents and distributed additional copies of the Code of Conduct to each participant at the workshops.

The less formal setting of post-workshop dialogue allowed for a freer exchange of information, ideas and opinions, and promoted inter-party communication in helping the parties arrive at a common understanding of the Code's provisions. NDI encouraged participants to discuss any apparent abrogations they may have witnessed to that point. In most instances, UNTAC officials were present to assist in answering questions.

- Workshop III - Election Monitoring

At the end of April, NDI/IRI approached the national leadership of the political parties in Phnom Penh to assess their plans to monitor the election and their interest in using materials NDI/IRI had developed and distributed earlier to assist the parties to conduct a comprehensive monitoring effort. These materials included reporting forms, monitoring procedures, intra-party reporting systems and explanations of the relevance of election monitoring. The materials also discussed relevant provisions of the UNTAC electoral law.

Based on a generally positive response from the parties, NDI/IRI organized a third series of multiparty workshops on election monitoring. The workshops were held in 14 provinces between May 5 and May 20, 1993. They involved 1,212 party trainers, 123 of whom were women. NDI also sent workshop materials to political parties in two other provinces (Banteay Meanchey and Siem Reap) in which the Institute had scheduled workshops but was forced to cancel at the last moment for security reasons.

As with all previous workshops, NDI invited each party that was registered with UNTAC at the provincial level to send an equal number of participants. Turnout for this round of workshops was somewhat lower than previous workshops due in part to heightened security concerns following the official April 7 opening of the campaign and because many smaller parties did not intend to monitor the elections. Nonetheless, the workshops were successful in enabling some of Cambodia's parties to mount an effective monitoring campaign in the short period that remained before the

election. The workshops also included multiparty discussions on the electoral Code of Conduct as well as a limited evaluation of the campaign period.

At the workshops, NDI/IRI provided each party with enough forms to cover approximately one-third of the polling sites in each province -- over 300,000 documents in all. The NDI/IRI package also addressed the roles and responsibilities of individual party agents and their superiors as election monitors. NDI discussed the relevance of election monitoring and its importance in assuring party as well as public confidence in the process. The proposed NDI/IRI system required party agents to track ballots all the way from polling station to the tabulation site.

Each monitoring workshop took approximately four hours, including a one-hour presentation on voting procedure conducted by UNTAC officials. Immediately after the conclusion of the seminar, NDI and IRI staff members answered questions regarding the system and provided additional forms to those parties that requested them. NDI and IRI staff members also made return visits to 10 provinces to consult further with the parties as they developed their election monitoring plans.

In some provinces the NDI/IRI workshop was the only election monitor training parties received. NDI's program filled a void when violence against UNTAC officials led to the cancellation of UNTAC party agent training. NDI worked with UNTAC later to facilitate political party communication on election day to create a fax network between the provinces and Phnom Penh. (For materials used for Workshop II and III see Appendix Three).

Single-Party Workshops

NDI conducted 17 single-party seminars to address the individual needs of parties during the pre-election period. Most of these workshops were held during the second and third weeks of March following the first series of multiparty workshops. The single-party format was designed to encourage the parties to be more forthcoming about their needs and concerns. For the most part, these meetings reviewed topics introduced at the earlier workshops, including general principles of democracy, human rights, campaign planning and tactics, message development and election monitoring. NDI held these workshops primarily in Phnom Penh, though a few were also conducted in Kompong Speu and Kandal.

Ten of the 17 single-party workshops involved FUNCINPEC, the Liberal Democratic Party or the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party. The remaining seven workshops assisted the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and six smaller parties, respectively. NDI offered these workshops to all parties, but many did not accept the offer due to human and financial resource constraints. In all, 1226 party members participated in these workshops.

(For a breakdown on participation and timing of these workshops, see Appendix One).

Media Training

- **Multiparty Radio Workshop**

NDI and IRI conducted a one-day joint radio communications training seminar in Phnom Penh on March 30, 1993. The seminar involved 30 representatives from 13 of Cambodia's political parties. Four participants were women. Each Cambodian party was invited to send three representatives.

The workshop addressed how political parties and campaigns can effectively use radio broadcasts to mobilize popular support. Participants were advised about techniques of drafting, editing and formatting effective radio messages and advertisements as well as technical aspects of audio production. NDI and IRI staff members produced and distributed a number of sample "Rice Party" spots in Khmer to offer participants useful examples of varying formats and substance. Transcripts of subsequent UNTAC Radio programs revealed that several of the parties incorporated advice from the workshops into their broadcasts.

- **Multiparty Workshop for Television Spokespersons**

NDI and IRI also conducted a joint television communications workshop in Phnom Penh on April 6, 1993. During the campaign period, UNTAC provided each party with five minutes a week to present itself to the Cambodian voters. NDI's workshop sought to assist the parties to take full advantage of this opportunity. The workshop involved 18 spokespeople from 18 of Cambodia's political parties, one of whom was a woman. All Cambodian parties were invited to send one representative.

The workshop was divided into two sessions, a morning meeting involving 10 participants and an afternoon meeting involving eight participants. The program discussed common problems associated with on-camera appearances, including failing to look directly into the camera, slow and monotone delivery, ruffled attire and bad posture. Each participant performed on videotape and critiqued his or her own performance. Each spokesperson retained a copy of his or her videotape for further study following the workshop.

UNTAC officials later told NDI that party spokespeople showed a marked improvement in their broadcasting skills following NDI's workshops.

Election Period: May 23 to 28

During the May 23-28 election period, NDI/IRI staff members observed the voting to evaluate the monitoring efforts of the country's political parties. Staff members traveled to nine provinces to witness the voting. They observed many party agents using the monitor reporting systems NDI/IRI had offered. NDI also observed that many members of the provincial party leadership also used the NDI/IRI system to compile reports from district leaders and individual monitors.

During the immediate post-election period NDI/IRI attempted to conduct assessments with smaller political parties. The largest parties were preoccupied with the continuing announcement, evaluation and implications of the election results. In both Phnom Penh and the provinces, NDI and IRI found that many of the smaller parties had already closed their offices because of violence or threats of retribution against local party workers from FUNCINPEC and BLDP. Indeed, many of the party leaders with whom the Institutes had worked had already left the country by this time.

C. EVALUATION

In its program proposal, NDI set forth four indicators by which the Institute would assess the impact of its pre-election party-building program:

- > Did the parties use the information and materials provided in NDI seminars to organize subsequent party-building training sessions?
- > Were the parties successful in recruiting highly qualified volunteers and staff?
- > Did the parties, subsequent to NDI training sessions, initiate or improve their voter education program planning, including the preparation of written planning documents?
- > Did the parties succeed in developing and communicating effectively a program or policy message?

Operating in a climate of violence, mistrust and underdevelopment, NDI's program sought foremost to develop confidence among Cambodia's political parties in their ability to compete effectively within a neutral and transparent electoral process. NDI encouraged the opening and maintenance of lines of communication between the parties and assisted in the development of forums for multiparty interaction and cooperation, particularly through attention to the electoral Code of Conduct. In all, NDI held over 50 workshops in 16 of Cambodia's 21 provinces. The program involved a total of 5,236 participants from all 20 of Cambodia's registered political parties. Five hundred and eighty participants were women.

The election monitoring component was the most concrete and significant contribution NDI made to the Cambodian elections. Every one of the parties monitored the election to some degree. The four largest parties -- CPP, FUNCINPEC, BLDP and the Liberal Democratic Party -- each had polling agents in an estimated 70 % or more of the polling sites. NDI observed that virtually all party agents on election day used monitoring forms provided by NDI during its workshops. Many of these monitors employed reporting techniques NDI had introduced in its program. Both FUNCINPEC and CPP officials later told NDI that the election monitoring materials the Institute developed had served the parties well.

NDI also emphasized throughout the program the importance of maintaining visibility during an election campaign. A critical component of visibility, NDI noted, was establishing local party offices. From February through May, the 20 registered parties opened more than 1100 party offices

around the country. Though these offices often consisted of not much more than a sign and a few posters, but the nationwide presence of party offices promoted an environment of democratic competition. Provincial party leaders sometimes organized rallies, but the ongoing specter of violence precluded most from employing organizing tactics NDI introduced. To circumvent this problem, NDI encouraged UNTAC and local parties in many of the provinces to organize multi-party rallies to provide party members a degree of safety and anonymity while at the same time re-enforcing an environment of general popular support for the democratic process.

Nonetheless, the violent campaign environment necessarily affected NDI's activities. Security considerations limited the provinces in which NDI could conduct programs and forced NDI to cancel election monitoring workshops in two provinces at the last moment. Contending parties continually asked NDI about how one conducts a political campaign in a violent environment - a question to which there is perhaps no good answer. However, at a time when other organization evacuated the capital in the face of increasing violence, NDI maintained a heavy pace of visible programming in Phnom Penh and in the provinces. NDI believes that this active presence was an important component to the program as reassurances to the parties of the continued possibility of civic activity in an increasingly tenuous environment.

The parties never undertook ownership of the program by organizing their own training sessions. Their level of organizational and political development was generally so low, their resources so few and the threat of violence so great that they relied on NDI, UNTAC and other electoral NGOs to initiate party-building activities. The parties seemed to note and appreciate NDI's electoral advice, however. NDI observed, for instance, that subsequent to the Institute's discussion of the practical need for parties to educate supporters about voting procedures, the four largest parties included voter education language in all their posters. NDI also noted that both FUNCINPEC and CPP allocated some of their UNTAC-allocated air time to instructing citizens on the balloting process.

The NDI program could have done a better job focusing Cambodia's political leadership on the need to include women in every aspect of party operations. Women run more than 60 % of Cambodian households and make up more than 60% of the electorate. Yet few women were placed on party candidate lists or held leadership positions within the parties. While NDI did address the issue during its programs and actively encouraged parties to recruit women to participate in its training seminars, the Institute should have focused more directly and consistently at least on the important opportunity foregone of ignoring the political potential of women in Cambodian society.

Large numbers of Cambodian citizens braved threats of violence to take part in these historic elections. Their faith in the promise of democracy was reflected in the simple act of casting a ballot. Through its electoral assistance program, NDI was very successful in developing trust and constructive relationships with each of the parties and other segments of Cambodian society. By contrast, for instance, immediately after the election the new members of the Constituent Assembly strictly refused to listen to the advice of UNTAC because of sensitivities about Cambodia's newly achieved autonomy. Likewise, NDI observed that the Cambodians commonly disregarded

representatives from other international organizations, because the Cambodians did not know or trust them. From its record of activity during the pre-election period, NDI felt that it had built a level of trust that placed the Institute in a unique position to work with the new parliament and its party representatives during the post-election period.

IV. POST-ELECTION PROGRAM PLANNING: June to September 1993

From June 26 to 27, 1993, NDI conducted a series of single-party consultations with members of the newly elected Constituent Assembly of Cambodia. The program was funded by a grant from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). In all, 81 of the 120 newly elected members attended, including 49 of FUNCINPEC's 58 members, 24 of CPP's 51 and 8 of BLDP's 10 representatives. NDI recruited parliamentarians Dr. Moyeen Khan of Bangladesh and Edward Feighan, a former United States congressman from Ohio, to facilitate discussions on a wide range of issues facing newly elected parliamentarians. These issues included relationships within government institutions, parliamentary rules of procedure, inter-party communication, party structure within an assembly, the concept and operations of referenda and drafting of a constitution.

In July, NDI's five-person field staff reconvened in Washington after departing Cambodia to participate in a comprehensive in-house evaluation of the program. This evaluation included a review of organizational and programmatic facets of NDI's pre-election program. NDI hosted a formal briefing attended by officials from USAID/Washington, the State Department and members of the local NGO community. NDI held additional individual meetings with members and staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In early August, NDI placed Jamie Factor, an experienced civic organizer from the United States with extensive experience in Cambodian affairs, and Carol Bean, who had served as NDI program assistant for Cambodia in the Institute's Washington office, in Phnom Penh as full-time field staff members. NDI postponed hiring two additional field representatives, who were to manage the political party and parliamentary aspects of the program, until AID provided final concurrence on the annual workplan. Factor and Bean reestablished NDI's field presence and conducted a series of consultations with political party leaders, members of the Constituent Assembly and leaders of local and international NGOs in preparation for implementing the program. They also revised the local staffing structure, hired Khmer staff and initiated program coordination discussions with the IRI and other AID Democracy Initiative grantees in Cambodia.

In meetings with party officials during this transitional period, NDI found that both FUNCINPEC and BLDP were focused on drafting and debating the new constitution and on determining the composition of the new government. Neither party attended to developing its internal party structures in the aftermath of the election, though they both expressed interest in exploring the matter in the future. The CPP, on the other hand, was keenly interested in receiving specific information on party building in a non-electoral environment. This sentiment ran exactly contrary to how the parties approached NDI assistance during the pre-election period. As a result,

NDI remained in close contact with all three parties, but prepared actively for a CPP party conference that took place in early December (see below).

During August and September, NDI observed the debate within the Constituent Assembly in its entirety. From this debate, NDI received its first indication of the skill level and procedural knowledge of the newly elected parliamentarians. In addition, at the request of individual members of the assembly, NDI provided copies of constitutions and supporting materials from countries with varying political systems to assist them in debate. NDI also traveled to two provinces to observe town meetings on the draft constitution. Two local NGOs organized and facilitated the meetings in an effort to enhance public participation and government transparency.

V. POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT IN A NON-ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT: October 1993 to December 1994

A. OBJECTIVES

Beginning in July 1993, NDI used the recommendations of NDI's Phnom Penh field staff, the internal assessment of the pre-election program and the specific needs identified by party officials, local Khmer contacts and other Cambodia experts to develop an AID proposal for 1993-1994. Many of the obstacles that affected party development before the election continued to prevail in the post-election environment: lack of practical experience in democratic processes and organization, scarcity of resources and infrastructure, intra-party divisions and rudimentary civic institutions. Thus, NDI proposed a year-long workplan that built upon the relationships established during NDI's pre-election activities to focus on the development of Cambodia's parliamentary political parties as democratic institutions that can play a constructive intermediary role between the state and the people of Cambodia. The proposed program encompassed not only the development of parties' internal structure but also their roles as representatives in the new National Assembly.

NDI submitted the draft program proposal and budget to AID/Phnom Penh in August 1993 and a revised version in December following consultations with AID officials. AID provided concurrence on this workplan on April 20, 1994.

NDI's program proposal set forth the following general objectives:

- to strengthen the internal structure and organizational skills of the elected political parties; and
- to foster an understanding of the role of political parties in the legislative process.

B. ACTIVITIES

Party Development: Party-building

- Political Party Training: Cambodian People's Party

From December 3 to 7, 1993, NDI and IRI jointly conducted a three-day party-building seminar for the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). Fifty three central and provincial party members and leaders attended the seminar. The NDI/IRI team included international representatives Gabor Gellert Kis, a member of the Hungarian Socialist Party, Tserendaashiin Tsolmon, an organizer from the New Democratic Party of Mongolia, and Bob Mulholland from the Democratic Party of California in the United States. Members of the team gave comparative presentations on transforming a non-democratic organization into a democratic political party and addressed such topics as democratic party structure, leadership and decision-making, intraparty communication, the relationship between parliamentary and party functions, party congresses, provincial party activities and party operations. (For a copy of the seminar agenda see Appendix Four).

NDI also conducted follow-up consultations with provincial officials who attended the seminar to review party activities and structure at the local level. During these post-seminar consultations, local officials raised similar questions to those that came up during the seminar, including fundraising, personnel and intra-party communication.

Early in 1994, NDI provided audio and video tapes of the seminar to the CPP leadership.

- Political Party Training: FUNCINPEC

From March 16 to 17, 1994, NDI and IRI conducted jointly a party-building seminar for the FUNCINPEC party. Though NDI invited only 60 party members to attend, 283 FUNCINPEC government officials, MPs and party workers from across Cambodia participated. NDI recruited an international faculty including Dr. Krasae Chanawongse, a parliamentarian from the Palang Dharma party of Thailand, Krzysztof Dowgiallo, a former Democratic Union Party deputy in the Polish *Sejm*, NDI parliamentary expert Jean Lavoie of Canada, Margaret McCormack, an American political party specialist, and NDI Senior Program Officer Michael Marshall, who headed NDI's pre-election Cambodia team, to share their experiences and facilitate dialogue. IRI recruited Peter Cleveland, staff director of the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The NDI/IRI team addressed topics including party priorities during a non-election period, party structure and organization, identification, recruitment and training of party activists, building local structures, intra-party communication, debate and decision-making, allocating scarce resources, public communication and long-range planning.

Prince Norodom Sirivuth, the secretary-general of the party, gave a keynote address on the importance of political parties in Cambodia's transitional democracy and commended local activists for their dedication and loyalty during a very difficult campaign and election. The prince reminded all present of the need and importance of local grassroots support. A brief statement of support by Prince Ranariddh, the party leader, was also read.

The seminar marked the first time that FUNCINPEC provincial party members had convened with their Phnom Penh colleagues since the election in May 1993. Despite the presence of party membership ranging from high-ranking party officials, government ministers and parliamentarians, local party activists were very candid in raising sensitive subjects, such as their continued fear of political intimidation and violence. Indeed, local members put the party leadership on the defensive throughout the conference over the latter's lack of operational and resource support. They also raised concerns over the party leadership's failure to strengthen party identity and unity, especially in light of the government's policy of national reconciliation. NDI was particularly encouraged by the active participation and assertiveness of FUNCINPEC's women members, who were unrestrained in their open expression of disappointment in the national leadership and energetic demands for change.

Before the seminar, the NDI/IRI team visited the FUNCINPEC party office in Kandal province to provide the international participants a better perspective on the party's provincial circumstances and needs. The team also conducted post-seminar consultations with party leaders and conducted an in-house evaluation of the program.

Provincial Party-Building Workshops

Between May 7 and June 4, NDI conducted provincial party workshops in six provinces for each of the three major parliamentary political parties. NDI recruited and deployed Momar Diop, a top organizer from the Democratic Party of Senegal, Ed Norton, a veteran American political and organizational strategist of the environmental movement and Democratic Party politics, and Margaret McCormack, who had participated in NDI's FUNCINPEC training seminar (see above), to conduct the workshops.

NDI's provincial program sought to expand on issues raised during the single-party seminars NDI had conducted with the CPP and FUNCINPEC parties. The program developed more fully the concepts of message development, intra-party communication, membership recruitment, resource development and organizational structure. Each workshop lasted for a full eight-hour day. Morning sessions generally were devoted to introductory presentations, group discussion and questions and answers. In the afternoon, small group breakout sessions provided participants the opportunity to work interactively through scenario exercises addressing issues of party membership, party activities and communication. General themes addressed during the workshops included the role of political parties in a multiparty democracy, identification of party goals and objectives and strengthening the party at the local level.

During the four-week period, a total of 1,066 local party leaders from 49 provincial districts attended single-party workshops in Kandal, Kompong Speu, Takeo, Prey Veng, Kompong Cham and Svey Rieng. Of these 1,066 participants, 332 were members of the CPP, 397 from FUNCINPEC and 337 from BLDP. Fifty eight participants were women: 17 from the CPP, 22 from FUNCINPEC and 13 from BLDP. Participants included provincial chiefs, district leaders, governors, deputy governors and members of parliament. NDI also invited IRI Field Representative Paul Grove to take part in workshops in Prey Veng, Svey Rieng and Kompong Cham.

The provincial party workshops provided local party leaders from FUNCINPEC and BLDP their first opportunity to convene among themselves since the 1993 parliamentary elections. NDI's team designed workshop agendas and training materials to fit the party's individual needs and interests. The team re-evaluated and refined agendas and materials throughout the four-week period.

(For dates, location, participation and other data on these provincial workshops, see Appendix Five).

From August 19 to 24, NDI Field Representative Sarah Malm joined IRI to conduct two-day provincial party workshops with each of the three parliamentary political parties in Battambang province. The workshops were limited to 30 participants and addressed topics including message development, public relations and internal party communication.

In all, NDI's provincial party workshops benefitted over 1,156 party activists in 7 provinces.

- Political Party Training: BLDP

NDI and IRI organized a single-party seminar for the BLDP party on May 21 in Phnom Penh. Momar Diop, Peggy McCormack, Ed Norton and Jamie Factor, who had all participated in the May-June provincial party workshops, served as facilitators. The conference addressed issues of local party organization and structure, resource management, intra-party communication and coalition politics. Similar to previous single-party conferences, the BLDP forum focused on the lack of communication and resources from the national leadership. Party members complained of closed offices and lack of visibility.

One hundred and forty five BLDP members attended the program. Four were women. Eighteen were members of BLDP's executive committee, and 127 others traveled to Phnom Penh from 19 provinces. All ten BLDP members of parliament attended.

- Political Party Reports and Meetings

Based on NDI's provincial party workshops and three national party conferences, NDI produced comprehensive individual reports for the national leadership of each party. These reports outlined the methodology and format of the single-party workshops and address the issues and concerns raised by the participants. Each report also includes an assessment of each party's organizational strength based on NDI's observations during the provincial workshops. NDI also suggested short- and long-term recommendations for future party activities to assist in strengthening party organization and outreach.

NDI presented the reports to the party leadership at individual meetings held in late September 1994. During these meetings, NDI's field representatives Jamie Factor and Sarah Malm reviewed the reports' findings, clarified the reports' recommendations and discussed with each party

its plans for the future. In addition to the report, NDI provided each party with a notebook that included Khmer and English versions of all program materials used during the provincial workshops, participant lists and copies of program evaluations filled out by workshop participants.

NDI packaged the party reports for distribution to AID and other interested parties. (A copy of this report is enclosed in Appendix Six).

Party Development: Parliamentary Assistance

- Multiparty Parliamentary Seminar, Phnom Penh, October 1 to 3, 1993

From October 1 to 3, 1993, NDI and IRI convened a NED-funded multiparty seminar entitled "Prospects for Peace and Democracy in Cambodia: The Role of the National Assembly." Forty-nine Cambodian parliamentarians attended. An international team of parliamentarians and legislative experts participated, including Abul Kalam Azad and Zia Khan of Bangladesh, Socorro Reyes of the Philippines, Russ Schieffer, Ellen Bork and NDI Senior Associate for Governance Thomas Melia of the United States, conducted plenary sessions and workshops on topics including the rights and obligations of members of parliament, parliamentary procedures, committee structure and the lawmaking process. The NDI/IRI team discussed legislative caucuses, the importance of public accountability and the role of an opposition. Participants expressed particular interest in the role of a parliamentary General Secretariat.

Participants viewed a video on a "day in the life" of an American congressman, while a follow-up discussion adapted the information to a far more resource-poor Cambodian context. Participants also engaged in an unprecedented open discussion of the draft parliamentary rules of procedure. Though initially resisted by some who objected that rules committee members were not present, a majority of Cambodian MPs ultimately determined that such open discussion was an essential component of a free and democratic society. On the final day of the seminar, participants engaged in a mock bill-drafting exercise.

- Parliamentary Delegation to the Thai National Assembly

In November, NDI staff members accompanied a six-person Cambodian parliamentary delegation on its first official visit to the Thai National Assembly. The invitation had been extended by Udorn Tantisunthorn, a Thai parliamentarian who participated in the October parliamentary seminar at the invitation of IRI. The delegation, which included five MPs and one member of the General Secretariat, met with the leadership of the Thai National Assembly, observed the parliament in session and was briefed by committee counterparts and the Thai General Secretary. The delegation also visited several agricultural and industrial sites in a nearby province.

NDI coordinated the five-day trip in conjunction with the Asia Foundation in Phnom Penh and the Policy Studies Institute in Bangkok.

- Consultations on Distribution Strategy for Cambodian Constitution

During the fall and winter of 1993-94, NDI consulted with the staff of the General Secretariat of Cambodian National Assembly on a strategy for distributing the new Cambodian Constitution. Pursuant to these consultations, Cambodian authorities decided to distribute copies to MPs, local and international NGOs, human rights activists and public employees. Using funds from the National Endowment for Democracy, NDI provided financial assistance to the National Assembly to print 5,000 copies of the official English translation and 35,000 copies in Khmer.

- Congressional Visit to Cambodia

In early November, former U.S. congressman and NDI Senior Advisory Committee member Stephen J. Solarz visited Cambodia on a private visit. During his stay, NDI sponsored an information luncheon for Solarz and 12 members of the Cambodian National Assembly at which the multiparty delegation briefed Solarz on the development of the Cambodian parliament. The group exchanged views about the UN-sponsored May elections, and the Cambodians solicited recommendations for international assistance to the National Assembly.

- Parliamentary Survey

NDI conducted ongoing consultations with individual members and leaders of the National Assembly to build and strengthen its relationships during the early months of the post-election program. From November 1993 through March 1994, NDI hosted several small-group (two- to three-person) discussions with MPs to develop a demographic and attitudinal database of members of parliament. At these meetings, each MP would complete a survey form that assisted NDI to develop and design future parliamentary programs.

- Multiparty Parliamentary Workshops

Beginning in late April and continuing through May, NDI organized weekend parliamentary workshops to address specific topics involving the roles and responsibilities of individual MPs as legislators and representatives. NDI Field Representative Jean Lavoie led workshops on topics including the role and functioning of parliamentary commissions, legislative development and constituency servicing.

NDI's first workshop on April 23 addressed the role of parliamentary commissions. The 16 participants included representatives from seven of the nine commissions, including two of the five women members of parliament. NDI invited Paul Grove, IRI's resident representative in Cambodia, to join Lavoie in leading the discussion. The team compared the committee and commission systems of the United States and Canada, respectively, described their roles and responsibilities, discussed comparative commission structures and emphasized the importance of debate, tolerance and compromise in parliamentary work. Scenario exercises focused on how to conduct a hearing and the parliament's government accountability function.

Six parliamentary commissions were represented at NDI's second parliamentary workshop, which addressed legislative development and was held on April 30. Nineteen MPs took part in this workshop, including two women. Brad Adams, a representative from the Asia Foundation in Phnom Penh, joined NDI staff members to explain to participants the conceptual and operational process by which legislation is designed and adopted. Consideration was also given to the short-, mid- and long-term benefits of a piece of legislation, its political, social and financial feasibility, the importance of consulting with broad sectors of society and of heeding general public opinion and identifying the resources and infrastructure required to implement a law. A scenario exercise involving a prospective law on education served to elucidate many of the points discussed in the workshop.

NDI's third workshop took place on May 14 and focused on outreach to constituents. The workshop addressed how to identify issues of concern to constituents and methods of resolving them given the limited material and human resources available. Cambodia's secretary of state for parliamentary affairs and his under secretary of state discussed how MPs can best communicate their constituents' needs to ministers and civil servants in the executive branch. Twenty-six MPs took part in this workshop, including three women. All parties and all commissions but one were represented.

- Consultations On Parliamentary Rules of Procedure

At the request of Acting National Assembly Speaker Loy Sim Chheang, NDI, in conjunction with The Asia Foundation (TAF), advised a special commission of the National Assembly assigned to review the parliamentary rules of procedure. From August 8 to 10, 1994, NDI and TAF conducted a three-day seminar in Phnom Penh with the special commission. The seminar enabled commission members and international facilitators to identify and discuss specific problems Members faced with respect to the rules and to determine what type of solutions parliamentarians sought. The NDI/TAF team offered comparative examples of rules of procedure from Hungary, the United States and Canada, discussed whether specific provisions in these jurisdictions might be adaptable to the Cambodian system and encouraged general discussions on political and technical considerations in amending the rules.

Following this seminar, the special commission established three subcommittees and assigned each group a number of chapters of the existing rules of procedure for consideration. Each subcommittee met for two days a week throughout September. The NDI/TAF team attended all meetings of each sub-committee to advise and consult as needed. The team provided comparative legal information from 14 international jurisdictions, helped identify gaps and problems with the current Cambodian rules and made recommendations. Each sub-committee examined the recommendations and made comments. The NDI/TAF team would draft new rules based on these conclusions and submit the drafts to sub-committee members for approval.

Once the sub-committees completed their review process, the NDI/TAF team harmonized the three separate drafts and submitted the final document (in French, English and Khmer) to the entire National Assembly membership. Further consultations with the National Assembly leadership

and individual parliamentarians provided MPs the opportunity to ask questions. Pursuant to requests from a number of MPs, the NDI/TAF team prepared a chart comparing article by article the current rules with the new draft rules of procedure. This chart included annotated comments describing why a change was made so MPs could more easily assess the value of proposed changes and to ensure that the new rules were well-structured and consistent. At the termination of NDI's field presence in Cambodia in December 1994, the Special Commission had considered nearly half of the new draft. The National Assembly expected to adopt the new rules by the end of February 1995.

- Sam Rainsy Visit to Washington

On December 15, 1994, NDI hosted a roundtable discussion with former Finance Minister and FUNCINPEC parliamentarian Sam Rainsy in its Washington, D.C., headquarters. U.S. government officials, congressional staff, NGO representatives and other interested members of the Washington community attended the forum. Rainsy emphasized the need for continued political development support from the international democratic community. He warned of the threats to democratic prospects in Cambodia, including the corrosive effect of corruption on the Cambodian people's faith in the democratic process. He decried the lack of democracy at the local level in Cambodia and added that a democratic culture would not develop in the provinces until local elections were either held or at least scheduled. Most urgently, Rainsy commented that the two leading parties, FUNCINPEC and CPP, were discussing formally integrating their organizations to suppress any semblance of dissent and multipartisanship that remains in Cambodia's political society.

C. ADMINISTRATION

Staffing

NDI's field staff and Washington support team changed periodically over the next year. NDI Senior Program Officer Karen Clark served as Cambodia program manager in NDI's Washington D.C., headquarters from May 1993 through May 1994. Beginning in May 1994, Director of Asia Programs Eric Bjornlund replaced Clark in this capacity. Program Officer Derek Mitchell oversaw the day-to-day affairs of the project in Washington beginning in January 1994. Senior Program Officer Michael Marshall also served as a consultant to the program.

In Phnom Penh, Carol Bean left NDI in March 1994 and was replaced by NDI Program Assistant Demetrius Jordan. Rob Black, who had worked as a member of NDI's logistics staff in Washington, replaced Jordan in July. Program Officer Sarah Malm arrived in Phnom Penh in late July 1994 to conduct political party consultations through September. NDI parliamentary expert Jean Lavoie joined the team in March 1994 and departed Phnom Penh in December as NDI's last remaining field representative until April 1995.

AID/Cambodia Democracy Initiative Independent Evaluation

In late spring 1994, AID commissioned an informal evaluation of its Democracy Initiative programs and grantees, including NDI, IRI and The Asia Foundation. The report was produced by Dr. David Steinberg, then a professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University. Dr. Steinberg had met briefly with members of NDI's field staff in early June to discuss NDI's program and the evaluation process. The report was completed on June 24 and released to NDI on July 26.

The report recommended that AID not provide further funding for immediate future political party-building work of NDI and IRI. NDI and IRI, however, took substantial issue with the evaluation report. To document its many concerns, NDI drafted a 12-page letter noting numerous problems in the evaluation's methodology, analytical consistency, approach to and attitude about political party development, and understanding of NDI's institutional history and philosophy. The letter was circulated on August 21 to relevant State Department and AID personnel in Cambodia. (For a copy of the Steinberg evaluation and NDI's response, see Appendix Seven).

As a result of AID's apparent lack of support for political party development assistance in Cambodia, an NDI evaluation team (described below), in close consultation with NDI/Washington, determined that the Institute should phase down its operations in Cambodia by the end of September. NDI President Kenneth Wollack explained in a September 20 letter to AID Mission Director Lee Twentyman the Institute's reluctance to expend further AID funds and NDI resources on a program that no longer enjoyed the support of its funder.

July 1994 Internal Evaluation

In light of program disagreements with AID and the aborted coup attempt of July 3, Senior Program Officer Michael Marshall and Program Officer Sarah Malm traveled to Cambodia in late July to evaluate the status of NDI's political party and parliamentary programs and to determine options for future programming. In early August NDI Director of Asia Programs Eric Bjornlund and Program Officer Derek Mitchell arrived in Phnom Penh to participate in the final stage of NDI's programming assessment. The team held intensive discussions about recent NDI activities and the current political climate in Cambodia with NDI's in-country staff. They met with leaders from each of the three parliamentary political parties as well as several international journalists and representatives from international and domestic nongovernmental organizations. They also met with U.S. mission officials, including AID personnel and the U.S. ambassador. Despite an appointment set up before the team left Washington, the team was unable to meet with AID/Cambodia Mission Director Lee Twentyman during its visit.

Upon his return to Washington, a report on the team's findings was prepared. This report reflected many of NDI's conclusions about the status of Cambodia's political party development and the effectiveness of NDI's programming at the conclusion of current grant.

General Accounting Office (GAO)

On September 27 and 30, Jamie Factor and Sarah Malm met with representatives from the General Accounting Office in Phnom Penh. The GAO was conducting a worldwide review of U.S.-funded democracy programs and chose Cambodia as one country on which to focus. GAO representatives had met with NDI staff members working on the Cambodia program in Washington on July 13. They discussed NDI's programmatic focus and activities over the previous year as well as NDI's general institutional approach to democracy building. NDI also discussed its relationships with AID, IRI and the National Endowment for Democracy. The meetings in Phnom Penh covered similar topics from a field perspective. During and after both sets of meetings, NDI provided copies of materials from its programs as well as other useful reports indicating the results of NDI activities in Cambodia.

Closing of Phnom Penh Office

NDI and IRI officially closed their Phnom Penh office as of September 31, 1994. NDI recalled all but one of its field representatives and terminated its political party building activities. The remaining field representative continued to work on the NDI/Asia Foundation parliamentary rules of procedure consultations out of his home in Phnom Penh. He completed his work and departed Cambodia in the middle of December as scheduled.

D. EVALUATION

Through regular field reports, direct communication with its Phnom Penh office and senior staff assessment trips, NDI monitored the development of its post-election political party program and continually sought to evaluate the program's efficiency and effectiveness. NDI's proposal set forth five categories of "indicators" by which the Institute would assess the impact of the program:

- whether the parties have "reviewed their election performance and identified and documented their post-election plans;"
- what materials or programs political parties, individual members of parliament and non-governmental organizations have sought from NDI;
- whether the parties or parliamentarians have "established consultative relationships" with NDI;
- whether parties or parliamentary leaders have used and distributed materials supplied by NDI; and;
- to what extent the leaders and party members of the nonparliamentary parties have "remained active in the political life of Cambodia."

During the immediate post-election period, NDI was disappointed at the parties' limited interest in assessing their election performance and in maintaining and developing their organizational and support base. FUNCINPEC and BLDP in particular were slow to take full opportunity of the services NDI offered. As indicated above, many of the leading party figures from the election became more interested in the constitutional debate and in positioning themselves within the new government than on attending to their party-building duties. The formation of a government

of national reconciliation effectively undermined the role of an opposition party and led some party figures to fear the implications of establishing their party's identity separate from their coalition partners. Such fears were also founded on the partisan violence and intimidation that marked conditions in the provinces before the election and that continued into the post-election period. FUNCINPEC's unique and confusing situation of having won the election yet feeling that it had lost control of the government to the CPP also dampened enthusiasm for party-building activities. Finally, political divisions and power struggles within these parties distracted attention from the need for maintaining a unified, viable and sustainable political party.

Therefore, by the time the parties did agree to participate in NDI-sponsored single-party conferences, i.e. December 1993, March and May 1994, the issue of assessing the elections was no longer timely. Parties were less interested in addressing the subject than in looking forward to building organizational and management skills in a new non-electoral environment.

The CPP, though initially reluctant, was the first party to focus on post-election party-building activities. By late fall 1993, the CPP agreed to participate in NDI/IRI's first post election single-party conference. CPP leaders worked closely with NDI staff members and international trainers to develop the program agenda and suggest training materials for distribution. From this point onward, the CPP leadership regularly expressed to NDI its desire to develop more democratic internal structures and procedures and were consistently receptive to NDI programs. Provincial leaders were eager to demonstrate to NDI representatives that the party made use of the organizational techniques and management training the Institute presented in its seminars and workshops. Unlike FUNCINPEC and BLDP, the CPP had well-developed financial and human resources and, as a former communist party, an organizational and management base on which to build. The CPP also expressed less fear of intimidation or violence against its members in the countryside.

None of the parties, however, took the initiative to seek additional materials from the Institute or took ownership of the Institute's program in general. The leadership of each of the parties remained dependent on NDI initiatives and continued to contend that they were not yet ready to conduct party training on their own. NDI may be partly at fault. The provincial party program, for instance, did not sufficiently include members of the national party leadership and therefore did not encourage follow-up planning or party ownership.

By early 1994, however, it became clear to NDI that while the FUNCINPEC and BLDP leadership may not have been ready or able to pursue the development of their party's institutional base, the rank-and-file party membership was eager to pursue party development at the local level. High turnout for the NDI/IRI FUNCINPEC party conference in March and for NDI's provincial workshops in May-June revealed that large numbers of local party officials, despite the continuing threat of violence and intimidation and lack of any resource support from the central leadership, remained engaged and eager to develop and maintain their party's presence in the provinces. It was these lower-level but highly dedicated political activists and democratic practitioners that NDI's programs in large part sought to engage as the potential future leadership of Cambodian political

development. Were the party leadership to have the will to expend the resources, local party branches indicated they would be receptive to party-organized training and prepared to follow up with party-building activities at the local level. NDI's party seminars and provincial workshops provided unique forums at which local leaders could reveal their frustration and pressure party leaders to consider the costs of allowing local party branches to wither.

NDI maintained constant contact with leaders and parliamentary components of the program both in conducting the seminars and in designing the program from the start. The provincial party workshops, for instance, could have focused more on the role of parliamentarians in developing a party's popular base. Conversely, the parliamentary workshop on constituent servicing could have discussed the role of party leaders in facilitating better communication with the public to build or maintain a support base for its representative.

Nevertheless, NDI's parliamentary consultations were highly successful in promoting parliamentarians' understanding of their role in the legislative process. NDI's workshops were well-received, and the trust the Institute engendered led to a personal invitation from the acting president of the National Assembly to participate in the assembly's review of the parliamentary rules of procedure. NDI established strong relationships with a number of parliamentarians and members of the parliamentary leadership throughout the year but especially in the latter stages as NDI parliamentary programming increased. By the conclusion of NDI's program, MP's regularly consulted the Institute on a number of substantive and procedural issues, which reflected continued trust in NDI's work. Uncertainty throughout the year over AID's support for parliamentary work, however, delayed its inception until the middle of the programming year and diminished its potential for even greater accomplishments.

NDI was similarly hindered in its political party work by delays in receiving official AID concurrence on its year-long post-election workplan. The long process of discussion between NDI and AID on the matter, which lasted from NDI's initial submissions of a draft annual plan in July 1993 until formal AID concurrence in April 1994, obstructed NDI's planning, including the deployment of a political party specialist in Phnom Penh who would have conducted regular consultations and programming with party leaders on issues of party building.

VI. THE ROLE OF NGO'S IN THE ELECTION PROCESS, OCTOBER 1995-FEBRUARY 1996

A. Background

In August 1995, NDI submitted a proposal to reprogram remaining AID funds and extend the termination date to March 31, 1996. NDI used the reprogrammed funds to conduct an elections program focused on election law development and the role of NGO's in the election process. David Katz, an experienced American political organizer who worked for NDI in the summer of 1995 in Cambodia, returned to Phnom Penh in September 1995 to reestablish NDI's office and begin program work.

B. Objectives

This program had three main objectives:

- to begin to involve Cambodian NGOs in the election process through coalition building;
- to help Cambodian NGO's assert their role in political affairs; and
- to provide Cambodian NGO's with organizational support and assistance with long-term planning for election monitoring and voter education efforts.

C. Activities

Seminar: Election Monitoring, Voter Education and the Role of NGOs in the Election Process

In December 1995, NDI conducted a seminar for Cambodian NGO leaders. *Election Monitoring, Voter Education and the Role of NGOs in the Election Process* provided a forum for discussion of the role of NGOs during elections with a focus on election monitoring and voter education. NDI hoped to encourage NGO leaders to discuss specific ways to begin preparing for elections through coalition building, election monitoring and voter education. NDI invited representatives from NAMFREL in the Philippines, PollWatch in Thailand and the Movement for Free and Fair Election (MFEE) in Sri Lanka to share lessons learned from experiences with transitional election in their own countries. NDI had anticipated about 80 participants and ultimately had almost 150 representatives from NGOs and the government.

Follow-up Consultations

From January through March 1996, NDI conducted consultations with various NGOs that had participated in the December seminar. As a result of NDI's efforts, two election monitoring coalitions were formed. The Committee for Free and Fair Elections (COMFREL) was established by three existing Cambodian NGOs: LICADHO, ADHOC and Vigilance. The second coalition the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections (COFFEL), was formed by the Khmer Institute for Democracy. NDI field representative David Katz met with leaders of the coalitions regularly in an effort to encourage the formation of a single coalition. Rivalries between various organizations in the coalitions effectively prevented the formation of one organization, but the groups did agree to try to coordinate their efforts.

Katz worked with the leadership of both coalitions on how to build an election monitoring coalition. His consultations covered a range of topics from general organization building to specific voter education and election monitoring techniques. Katz stressed curriculum development, the formation of regional, provincial and district training teams and the development of evaluation methodologies. The coalitions currently plan to conduct voter education programs as well as organize, train and deploy election monitors.

D. Evaluation

Participants in the December seminar found the program useful, and the number of participants alone indicated a strong interest in the subject. Cambodian NGO leaders recognized that many of UNTAC's election-related responsibilities will fall to them, and that they must begin preparing their organizations to take on these tasks. Many said it helped to hear the experiences of other Asia monitoring organizations, and to have the opportunity to discuss specific issues with these groups' representatives. Although NDI would have preferred that a single coalition emerge from the December conference, the fact that the two coalitions agreed to coordinate their efforts was a positive step, given the rivalries between the various leaders of the organizations.

VII. ELECTION OBSERVER MISSIONS, JUNE-OCTOBER 1996

A. Objectives

In April 1996, NDI was granted a no-cost extension through September 30 for its Elections Program. The extension allowed NDI to invite Cambodian parliamentarians, party leaders, election monitoring coalition representatives and Ministry of Interior Election Committee members to study elections and election-related processes in other countries. The objective of this program was to allow participants the opportunity to learn about transitional election, development of election systems and the important role of domestic election monitoring organizations.

At the specific request and recommendation of Ambassador Kenneth Quinn in June, after NDI had invited Mr. Sam Rainsy of the Khmer Nation Party to participate in an international observer delegation to Bangladesh (using other funds), NDI expressly committed to use the remaining funds to ensure the participation of the CPP, FUNCINPEC and BLDP in election observer missions. Unfortunately, NDI was not able to extend an invitation to a suitable election before the expiration of the grant. NDI field staff informally requested another no-cost extension through the end of the year, but this was not granted. NDI was able to find other program funds to fulfill the Ambassador's request by the end of October 1996.

B. Activities

- **Bangladesh, June 1996**

Mr. Pok Than, Chairman of the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections (COFFEL) and President of the Center for Social Development, participated in NDI's international observer delegation to the June 12 elections in Bangladesh. NDI's 30-member delegation, headed by former Australian Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock and US Congressman Stephen Solarz, worked closely with the Fair Election Monitoring Alliance (FEMA) in observing the election. FEMA deployed approximately 25,000 monitors on election day. Pok Than's coalition plans to deploy at least two monitors to every polling station in Cambodia in the 1997 local and 1998 national elections.

Other program funds paid for Dr. Kek Galabru, a member of the board of directors of the Committee for Free and Fair Elections (COMFREL) and President of LICADHO, to participate in

NDI's program. Dr. Kek served as a member of the pre-election observer team. Other program funds also paid for Mr. Sam Rainsy, former FUNCINPEC MP and head of the Khmer Nation Party, to join the international observer delegation.

- Dominican Republic, June 1996

H.E. Seng Ronn, an MP from FUNCINPEC, joined NDI's observer delegation to the June 30 parliamentary election in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic elections took place in the context of a country badly split over a seriously flawed election process just two years earlier, but the losing candidate gracefully accepted a narrow defeat.

- Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), The Philippines, September 1996

Mr. Chem Vuthikar, Deputy Director of the Ministry of Interior's Central Election Bureau, was nominated by H.E. Sar Kheng and Mr. Ok Serei Sopheak, of the CPP and the Ministry of Interior, to join a small NDI program to observe the regional election in ARMM. Mr. Chem was joined by Mrs. Srey Chan Phallars, Secretary of the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections (COFFEL) and President of the Outreach. The delegation worked closely with the well-know Philippine election monitoring organization, the Citizens' Movement for Free and Fair Elections (NAMFREL).

Participants were given extensive briefings by both NAMFREL and the Philippine Election Commission (COMELEC) as well as experts on Mindanao and the longstanding conflict there. Participants deployed with members of NAMFREL to each of the four ARMM provinces, where they observed the distribution of election materials, the polling itself, and the count. ARMM elections marked the first use of automated ballot machines in Philippine history, and this was widely considered a pilot test for the upcoming national elections. Upon reconvening in Manila, the delegation did not issue a statement but extensively debriefed both NAMFREL and COMELEC on the widespread procedural violations. The delegation informally recommended that the counting machines be tested in an urban area before being used nationally.

- Albania, October 1996

Using other program funds, H.E. Pol Ham, MP and Deputy Secretary General of the BLDP, joined an NDI international observer delegation to the local elections in Albania on October 20, 1996. These elections marked the conclusion of the second set of elections that Albania has witnessed since its emergence from communist rule in 1992. The parliamentary elections in May 1996, raised questions about prospects for democracy in Albania and fear that, rather than continuing to move forward, Albania was returning to an authoritarian form of governance. The October elections reflected some improvement over the May elections, although there remained some concern about the general lack of transparency during the managing of the election process, (particularly in restrictions on international and domestic monitors, and in the fact that detailed official election results have not been made public).

Prior to the elections, the delegation met with local election commissioners, candidates, party leaders and others, to be briefed on local issues and to observe election preparations. Pol Ham was deployed in the rural area of Permet (in the South, where the Greek ethnic minority predominates), where he was able to observe the election process in general, and the balloting at various polling stations.

C. Evaluation

NDI believes that this program has resulted in substantial benefits for the participants. Overall, they expressed great interest in these study missions. Most found it an excellent way to learn about election administration, processes, and monitoring in other countries.

Both Pok Than and Seng Ronn reported that the missions provided them with insights into elections in other countries and a useful perspective on the current electoral environment in Cambodia. Pok Than was able to learn many lessons from the Bangladesh domestic election monitoring organization FEMA and its preparations to conduct an election monitoring effort.

Srey Phallara and Chem Vuthikar were appreciative of NDI's study mission in the Philippines and said that they learned a great deal about NAMFREL and the challenges and mechanisms involved in organizing civic and voter education programs and election monitoring efforts. Chem Vuthikar was also given the opportunity to meet with the Philippine Commission on Elections and observe the preparations and organization of COMELEC during an election period.

While Chem Vuthikar was intrigued by the new computerized voting system, he found that such modernization did not necessarily eliminate all difficulties encountered in managing an election. He was able to assess whether such a system would be useful for Cambodian elections in 1997 and 1998. Vuthikar came away with a positive impression of NAMFREL's role in the election process and its contribution to ensuring a fair election. Vuthikar was also able to share information about the electoral system in Cambodia and the electoral process and preparations for 1997 with the provincial governor and NAMFREL officials. Chem Vuthikar presented NDI's field staff in Cambodia a video and a bound report on his experience in the Philippines.

Srey Phallara was interested in NAMFREL's efforts to conduct voter education in a region that has a population that suffers from illiteracy and is culturally and linguistically different from the other regions of the Philippines. She took away valuable lessons from NAMFREL's experience as her organization COFFEL plans to conduct voter education programs for Cambodian elections in 1997 and 1998, in regions that face similar challenges to those in Mindanao.

Pol Ham was able to learn many lessons from his experience as an international observer during the local elections in Albania. In particular, he was persuaded that international observers played a positive role, and their presence provided a positive influence on the behavior of election managers, political parties, and domestic election observers. He very emphatically encouraged

international observers, especially NDI, to observe Cambodia's local elections in 1997 and national elections in 1998.

Appendix One

**NDI/IRI Provincial Party Workshops:
Multi Party Workshops and Single Party Workshops
Accounting of the location, date and participation of these workshops
January-May, 1993**

NDI AND IRI TRAININGS

January-May, 1993

MULTIPARTY WORKSHOPS

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u># OF PARTIES</u>	<u># OF PARTICIPANTS</u>	<u># OF WOMEN</u>
Phnom Penh (Introductory Conference)	1/30-31	18	238	34
Phnom Penh (Radio Workshop)	3/30	13	30	4
Phnom Penh (TV Workshop)	4/6	18	18	1

Workshop I - The Role of Political Parties in a Democracy

Kampong Cham	2/22	12	118	6
Prey Veng	2/22	10	131	0
Takeo	2/24	10	163	1
Battambang	2/24	11	138	23
Kampong Speu	2/24	9	106	10
Kampot	2/25	7	70	4
Kandal	2/25	7	96	15
Siem Reap	2/26	6	121	19
Phnom Penh	3/12	14	130	36
Kampong Chhnang	3/12	7	78	10
Kratie	3/18	7	100	21
Banteay Meanchey	3/19	7	113	13
Svay Rieng	3/19	9	103	20
Kampong Thom	3/19	9	95	15
Pursat	3/20	9	118	13

Workshop II - Provincial Campaign Planning

Prey Veng	3/30	10	93	15
Kampong Cham	3/31	11	103	12
Kampong Speu	4/2	10	116	12
Takeo	4/5	13	108	23
Battambang	4/5	9	110	8
Phnom Penh	4/6	12	112	10
Siem Reap	4/7	8	100	13

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u># OF PARTIES</u>	<u># OF PARTICIPANTS</u>	<u># OF WOMEN</u>
-----------------	-------------	---------------------	--------------------------	-------------------

Workshop III - Election Monitoring

Kampong Chhnang	5/5	11	87	15
Svay Rieng	5/5	11	105	3
Takeo	5/5	13	112	10
Kampot	5/6	12	117	20
Prey Veng	5/7	9	63	5
Pursat	5/7	11	106	12
Battambang	5/8	8	120	10
Banteay Meanchey	CANCELLED			
Kampong Speu	5/10	10	89	7
Phnom Penh	5/11	7	67	10
Kampong Cham	5/12	8	102	5
Kampong Som	5/12	8	70	5
Kratie	5/12	9	87	9
Kandal	5/14	8	70	2
Siem Reap	CANCELLED			
Kampong Thom	5/20	10	107	10

SINGLE PARTY WORKSHOPS

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u># OF PARTICIPANTS</u>	<u># OF WOMEN</u>
BLDP	1/17	100	4
Free Republican Party	2/7	50	3
Molinaka	2/8	40	1
BLDP	3/8	250	5
CPP	3/10	200	25
Republican Coalition Party	3/11	40	6
FUNCINPEC	3/11	30	5
BLDP	3/15	50	8
LDP	3/17	110	10
Khmer Farmer's Lib. Dem.	3/17	45	7
FUNCINPEC	3/22	200	34
BLDP	3/29	40	3
LDP	4/16	35	4
LDP	4/17	28	3
FUNCINPEC	5/12	8	1

National Democratic Institute
for International Affairs

International Republican
Institute

PRESS RELEASE

For Immediate Release
February 19, 1993

Contact: Mike Marshall (NDI), 018 810273 or 27467
Ron Abney (IRI), 018 810448 or 27467

NDI/IRI SPONSOR EIGHT PROVINCIAL POLITICAL PARTY WORKSHOPS

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute will jointly sponsor political party strengthening workshops in eight provinces during the week of February 22-27. All 20 Cambodian political parties will be invited to attend. The four hour agenda will introduce the participants to the technical aspects of political party work including, campaign planning, message development, election monitoring and voter education.

The workshops will be organized as follows:

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>
Kampong Cham	Feb. 22	Mekong Hotel	7:30-12:30
Prey Veng	Feb. 22	Teacher's Training School	7:30-12:30
Takéo	Feb. 24	Takeo Tonn Theater	7:30-11:30
Battambang	Feb. 24	Paradise Restaurant	7:45-12:00
Kampong Speu	Feb. 24	Teacher's Training School	8:00-12:30
Kampot	Feb. 25	Hotel Phnom Chamchay	7:30-11:30
Kandal	Feb. 25	Transport & Communication Bldg.	7:30-12:30
Siem Riep	Feb. 26	Grand Hotel	7:45-12:00

These workshops are a continuation of the NDI/IRI efforts to support the development of Cambodia's political parties. This program will extend over a three year period and is made possible by a grant from the United States Agency for International Development. NDI and IRI are the respective international secretariats of the Democratic and Republican party's of the United States.

By working with the political parties, NDI/IRI seek to promote, maintain and strengthen the democratic process in Cambodia. Both institutes have conducted similar programs in more than 70 countries including the Philippines, Burma, Mongolia, Hong Kong, Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Albania, Romania, Namibia, Angola, Nicaragua, Russia, Georgia and the Ukraine.

National Democratic Institute
1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Suite 505
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone (202) 328-3136
Fax (202) 959-3166
Telex 5106015068NDILA

International Republican Institute
1212 New York Ave., N.W., Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone (202) 408-9450
Fax (202) 408-9462
Telex 5106000161 (IRI)

Political development institutes working for democracy



Appendix Two

**Training Manual from Workshop I: The Role of Political Parties in a
Representative Democracy
January - May, 1993**

National Democratic Institute
for International Affairs

International Republican
Institute

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN A DEMOCRACY

Prepared by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute as part of their ongoing effort to help strengthen Cambodia's political parties. If you have any comments or questions concerning the information contained within, please contact the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute in Phnom Penh. Paid for by the people of the United States of America.

National Democratic Institute
1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Suite 503
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone (202) 328-3136
Fax (202) 939-3166
Telex 5106015068NDILA

International Republican Institute
1212 New York Ave., NW, Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone (202) 408-9450
Fax (202) 408-9462
Telex 5106000161 (IRI)

PROVINCIAL DEMOGRAPHICS

Province	District	POPULATION					VOTERS					90% Turnout
		Total	Women	Men	Women %	Men %	Total	Women	Men	Women %	Men %	
PREY VENG	Ba Phnom	70,960	37,491	33,469	53%	47%	35,451	19,885	15,566	56%	44%	31,906
	Kaachay Mear	66,991	34,920	32,071	52%	48%	32,241	18,583	13,658	58%	42%	29,017
	Kaompong Trabek	105,038	55,426	49,612	53%	47%	51,293	29,290	22,003	57%	43%	46,164
	Kanh Chreach	57,663	30,868	26,795	54%	46%	28,918	16,480	12,438	57%	43%	26,026
	Mesang	88,362	46,655	41,707	53%	47%	44,820	25,498	19,322	57%	43%	40,338
	Peam Chor	45,427	23,066	22,361	51%	49%	20,471	10,742	9,729	52%	48%	18,424
	Peam Ro	44,763	23,921	20,842	53%	47%	22,251	12,716	9,535	57%	43%	20,026
	Peareang	110,295	57,970	52,325	53%	47%	52,419	29,076	23,343	55%	45%	47,177
	Preah Sdech	102,069	53,942	48,127	53%	47%	47,195	27,053	20,142	57%	43%	42,476
	Prey Veng (DC)	83,051	44,360	38,691	53%	47%	42,734	23,787	18,947	56%	44%	38,461
	Prey Veng (PT)	43,071	22,937	20,134	53%	47%	22,309	12,715	9,594	57%	43%	20,078
	Sithor Kandal	63,770	33,865	29,905	53%	47%	33,529	18,951	14,578	57%	43%	30,176
Prey Veng	12	885,170	465,425	419,745	53%	47%	434,438	244,776	189,662	56%	44%	390,994

27

ROLE OF THE POLITICAL PARTY

PROVIDING A VISION

In a democracy, people who share similar political views and goals often come together to form political parties. They do this in order to strengthen their ability to influence the political and governmental decisions of their country.

In forming political parties, party founders usually promote a common set of beliefs and values (ideology), and develop a message which conveys to others their collective ideology, as well as their plans for governing.

I. Developing a Message.

- A party's ideology serves as the foundation of its overall message for governing. For instance, if a political party believes in democracy it will generally send a message which promotes some form of representative government.

- However, because "democracy" is such an unclear term, most party messages focus on proposals that seek to address the needs and concerns of the people the party wishes to represent. In order to do this effectively, a party must:

- 1) Identify the needs and concerns of the people it wishes to represent (For example: better roads, schools and jobs);
- 2) Develop policies which address those needs and concerns (e.g. party proposals to improve roads, schools and the economy); and
- 3) Devise ways for disseminating their ideas (for example: distributing party platforms and leaflets, writing news articles and press releases and talking on the radio).

II. Governing: Delivering on Promises.

In representative democracies, political parties that win elective offices participate directly in governing the nation. In order to govern effectively, parties must:

- 1) Know how the government works and operates (for example: study the country's government, laws and constitution);
- 2) Teach their members and candidates how to govern (for example: produce educational guidebooks and conduct training seminars);
- 3) Develop comprehensive plans for governing (party platforms, issue papers and transition outlines); and

4) Prepare plans, so that, if it does not win enough elective offices to govern alone, it is ready to serve as a partner in a coalition government.

III. Democratic Opposition.

In a democracy, political parties which do not receive enough votes to win elective office still play a valuable role by serving as a voice for their members and supporters, as well as for other people who might oppose some of the policies and activities of the elected government.

PARTY BUSINESS

Once established, political parties undertake a broad range of activities, administrative and otherwise, to ensure their growth and success.

I. Organization.

Modern political parties prepare for success by establishing well managed party structures. How well a political party organizes itself internally, often determines the quantity of work it will accomplish and the amount of success it will achieve. In order to manage your party efficiently, its important to:

A. Establish a command management structure.

- Individuals should be assigned specific titles and duties and be held accountable for carrying out those tasks to a supervisor or the party committee. It is important that decisions are made quickly, that work gets done, and that the party spends time talking to the people not just each other at the office. Also, It is important that the person who is assigned a big job like keeping track of finances is not put in charge of issue research.

B. Constantly monitor your party's structure and its progress.

- As your party grows, so too do your party's tasks and responsibilities. Alter your party structure when necessary to address your party's ever changing needs.

C. Assign people to:

- **Recruit and involve new party members.** Provide membership identification cards and information on the party's positions, meetings and structure. Invite prospective members to party activities. A new member today may be a party leader in a year;

- **Research and monitor governmental and constituent assembly laws and issues.** Political parties need to know what's going on in their country at all times;

- **Collect information.** Parties should gather newspapers, news magazines and policy publications. Parties should get ideas and opinions from its members and non-member groups. For instance, asking cyclo drivers about traffic laws and conditions;

- **Establish and maintain good relations with the press and public.** Its important for parties to continually publicize their efforts and ideas. Doing so allows them to expand there base of support and strengthen their identity;

- **Monitor the country's election laws and procedures.** Watch for changes, requirements and deadlines;

- **Recruit and train party candidates.** Provide candidates or potential candidates with information on the party's positions and current issues. And then train them to speak and become known in the communities;

- **Create and monitor a party budget.** Parties need to create budgets which highlight their needs and expenses;

- **Raise money.** Parties should establish and carry out plans to raise money to cover their needs and expenses; and

- **Plan for the next election.** Party campaign responsibilities do not end with the close of election day. In a representative democracy, there is always another election. In order to grow stronger, parties must constantly prepare for the next election. Be sure to review your party's performance in the last election. Past election results give parties a good sense where to focus their attention and resources in future elections. What campaign activities worked well? Which did not? Where did the party do well? Where did it do poorly? Where did other parties do well, and why?

II. Open and maintain offices.

Its important to maintain as much of a presence as possible. Pick and choose your office(s) according to your objectives, needs and resources. If you open an office, keep it active and productive,

III. Plan regular party meetings and conferences to discuss current issues and party business.

IV. Work together with other parties to ensure a free and fair electoral process.

Work together with other parties when monitoring the campaign or elections. Conduct multi-party activities to ensure that information about your party gets to the people.

EDUCATING THE VOTERS

In September of 1992 Romania held elections for parliament. None of the political parties made any effort to educate their supporters about why voting was important and how to vote. As a result, only 65% of the population bothered to vote. Even worse, more than 12% of the people who did vote marked their ballots wrong and so their ballot was not counted. In Romania, a political party must receive 3% of the vote nationally in order to win a seat in parliament. In the September elections ten parties won seats in parliament. There were three other parties which received just 2.9% of the vote and therefore are not represented in parliament. There are people in Romania who are not represented in today Parliament because they did not know how to vote properly on election day.

Political parties cannot depend on the election officials to educate voters. The political parties must educate voters if they want to be sure to win as many votes as possible.

I. Six Questions the Voters Need Answered:

- 1) Why should I vote?
- 2) What is the role of the Constituent Assembly/Parliament?
- 3) Do I need identification in order to vote?
- 4) Where do I go vote?
- 5) How do I vote?
- 6) IS MY VOTE SECRET?

PLANNING THE CAMPAIGN

The two most important things to remember about a campaign plan are: 1) you must have one; and 2) if your plan is not written down you don't have one.

Losing campaigns are the ones that have no strategy, no direction, and no allocation of time, people and resources...in short, those that have no plan.

Another key point to make is that if you write a campaign plan that you don't follow, or that you can't finance, then you shouldn't have one at all. Campaign planning should include:

I. A written plan.

- In writing a plan, make sure you have the capabilities and time to accomplish what you want to do.
- Include your strategy and message and how it is to be delivered (voter contact).
- Write it down and follow it.

II. Delegating responsibilities/assigning tasks.

- Create an organizational chart and assign people specific responsibilities for implementing your plan. Put the names of the people assigned in the organizational boxes.
- Establish a reporting mechanism. Every one should be ultimately responsible to someone else. There should be no one without an assignment.

III. Creating a calendar.

- Early on, construct a realistic time line for all of the campaign activities you have planned (For example: advertising, campaign events, etc.). And remember to always assign specific people to oversee all assignments.

IV. Formulating a budget.

- Be sure to write it down and once it is written, follow it.
- It must be realistic. Estimate how much money you need to raise, based on how much you are likely to spend. Will your money go for staff, advertising etc?
- Set fund raising goals based on your overall campaign objectives and always be sure to have enough cash on hand to cover any crucial activities toward the end of the campaign?

V. Setting goals.

- In setting goals, determine such things as: how many seats your party realistically wishes to win in the constituent assembly; the type of organization you want to establish in every province, city and village; and how many voters you want to contact, and in what manner?

VI. Evaluating the Campaign.

- During the campaign, monitor your campaign organization weekly to make sure that all of your party's campaign assignments are being carried out. Any problems should be identified and resolved immediately.

- After the election, evaluate and assess how well your campaign plan was implemented. Identify its strengths and weaknesses, so that all future campaign plans will work better than the ones which preceded them.

CONTACTING VOTERS

How well a party does on election day is often determined by how well it communicated with the voters before the election. Voter contact activities provide parties with many ways in which to communicate with the voters. Such efforts are essential for encouraging and persuading people to both support and work for the party. The party who first, and most effectively, reaches the most voters usually wins. In order to reach and win the support of voters on election day, a party should implement a voter contact plan that includes the following:

I. Delivering an effective party message.

- The message a political party or its candidates communicate verbally, visually or otherwise, assists the voter in determining who to vote for.
- A party's message generally summarizes its own vision of how the government should be run. To ensure that the voters understand its message, a party's message should be distinguishable from the messages of other parties, and it should be constantly repeated.
- Sample message: The Banana Tree party, if elected, will provide economic opportunity, education and health care for all Cambodians.

II. Choosing and Using a Party logo.

- A logo is an image, marking or word that in some way symbolizes or embodies a party's message. It should be highly visible, easily identifiable, and, of course, present on all party and campaign material.
- Sample logo: A party that uses a bushel of rice stalks as a logo is perhaps symbolizing farming as its top concern.

III. Educating Voters.

- A party must instruct its supporters on how to vote for it. The instructions should be simple and they should be repeated continually.

IV. Targeting Voters.

- Which voters should a party contact? Aside from its members, a party should

TARGET voters who are likely to be persuaded by its message. Yet, before it does that, it should first know where all the voters are located and in what numbers. This kind of information can be obtained by reviewing the country's demographics.

- Demographics equal such things as the age, gender, occupation, income, ethnicity, religion, and living style of the voter.

- Example: Knox province has 1,000 African American voters who earn \$400 a year and live in rural farm houses.

a. 500 of the voters are male, and 500 of the voters are female.

b. Of the 500 male voters 50 % are under the age of 30, and of the 500 female voters 40% are under the age 30.

- Beyond knowing the numbers and demographic make-up of the voters, parties should, as mentioned above, tailor their campaign message to garner the support of certain voting groups.

Example:

GROUP	ISSUE
Women	Health care
Farmers	Farm subsidies
Cyclo drivers	Road conditions
Fishermen	Fishing rights
Young Adults	Economic opportunity

V. Contacting Voters.

- A party can contact voters by:

- Distributing leaflets at the market, home campaign rallies, or on street corners.

- Visiting with the voter at their home (door-to-door visits).

- Holding campaign events and rallies.

- Talking to specific groups of voters about specific issues that

might interest them.

- Organizing human posters. Campaign workers holding up posters in highly traveled areas.
- Having community leaders and others talk positively about the party to prospective voters.
- Producing television, radio and newspaper advertisements. Produce TV, radio and newspaper ads which contain the party's message and a copy or description of the party's logo.
- Utilizing free media. Write press releases and invite the press to all newsworthy party events (news conferences, provisional office openings, campaign rallies, etc.)
- Posting posters. Produce a poster that contains the party's message, logo and possibly picture of party's candidates or leaders. Include information on how voters can contact the party.
- Conducting general visibility activities. General visibility activities include such things as banners, campaign signs and sound vehicles.

BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Holding a free and fair election in Cambodia is very important for the people and future of Cambodia. It is also important, however, that the people and the political parties know the elections were free and fair. The best way to know the elections are free and fair is for each of the parties to exercise their right to monitor the campaign and observe the voting on election day.

I. Monitor the Campaign.

During a campaign there are always many rumors about intimidation, violence, and assorted other campaign violations. It is very difficult for election officials and international election observers to make judgements about the quality of the campaign based on rumors.

That is why it is important for political parties to document campaign violations. If someone reports a violation be sure to write a report on the incident. Without a written report it is hard for anyone to make a judgement about the complaint. Some helpful guidelines when writing a report:

- Write down the name, address, age and profession of the person reporting the violation
- Write a thorough description of what happened. Include the time, the date, the location, and a description of the violation. Ask the individual reporting the violation to sign the description.
- If someone is injured take pictures of the injuries. If an office or home is damaged take pictures of the damage.
- Write down the names and addresses of any witnesses.

After writing the report give a copy to the district or provincial electoral officer. The party should keep the original copy in a very safe place. At the end of the campaign the party then can review the reports from around the country and determine if these violations affected the overall outcome of the election.

II. Monitor the Election.

Every registered political party has the right to have an agent present in every polling station in Cambodia. The best way for a party to know that the voting was fair in every polling station is to have a party agent monitor every polling station.

There are three things that a party agent needs in order to perform his or her job correctly:

- 1) Training. All party agents should know the election law.
- 2) Complaint Forms. Each agent should have a form to fill out each day recording any violations that they witness.
- 3) Reporting System. It is important the party agent know how to contact the leadership of the party to report a significant violation. It is also important for the party leadership to receive a verbal or written report from the agent at the end of each day of voting.

CODE OF CONDUCT

Annex - Code of Conduct

1. All persons, all political parties, their leaders, members and supporters, all provisionally and officially registered political parties, their leaders, members, supporters and candidates, shall abide by this Code of Conduct.
2. All political parties are entitled to and shall enjoy, the fundamental right of a free and fair election, including the freedom to campaign.
3. All political parties shall respect the right and freedom of all other parties to campaign, and disseminate their political ideas and principles without fear.
4. In particular, all political parties, officially and provisionally registered political parties, their leaders, members, supporters and candidates shall obey the following rules:
 - (1) Intimidation, in whatever form, shall be prohibited, and manuals, instructions and orders of political parties and provisionally and officially registered political parties shall reinforce and emphasise this prohibition.
 - (2) The possession and use of any weapon of any kind, or of any instrument capable of use as a weapon, at any political rally, meeting, march or demonstration shall be prohibited. Parties' manuals, instructions and orders shall reinforce this prohibition.
 - (3) Parties and candidates shall inform the local UNTAC office of any planned public meetings or political rallies, and shall in good faith take all necessary steps to avoid violent confrontation or conflict between their supporters, and shall comply with all directions, instructions or orders issued by UNTAC in relation to such meetings.
 - (4) All parties shall avoid the coincidence, in time or place, of their meetings, rallies, marches or demonstrations with those of other parties, and to this end they shall liaise and cooperate with UNTAC and with other parties.
 - (5) All parties, their members and supporters, shall refrain from disrupting the meetings, marches or demonstrations of other parties.
 - (6) Parties and candidates shall at all times avoid, in speeches, broadcasts, pamphlets, newsletters, press statements, posters, their party platforms, campaign advertisements or otherwise, using inflammatory language or other language which threatens or incites violence in any form against others.
 - (7) All political parties shall refrain from obstructing persons from attending the meetings, marches or rallies of other parties.

- (8) All parties shall refrain from plagiarising the symbols of other parties, and shall not steal, destroy or disfigure the political or campaign material or posters of other parties, or the election information material of UNTAC.
- (9) All political parties, and especially their leaders, shall ensure freedom of access of other parties to all potential voters on public or private property, in camps or reception centres, or wherever they may be. Parties shall ensure that potential voters wishing to participate in political activities are free to do so.
- (10) All parties shall consistently reinforce and emphasise to their supporters and to all voters that the ballot will be secret, and that no person will know how any individual has voted.
- (11) All parties shall establish effective communication with one another at the central, provincial and district levels, and shall appoint liaison personnel, to be available for this purpose at all times, to deal with any problem arising during registration of voters, the campaign or the polling.
- (12) All parties shall attend, at least once every two weeks a meeting under the chairmanship of the Chief Electoral Officer, to discuss any matters of concern relating to the campaign. In addition, a standing committee of leaders of registered political parties shall attend at least every two weeks a meeting under the chairmanship of the Special Representative or his deputy to deal with matters of concern relating to the campaign. The abovementioned meetings shall commence from a date to be determined by the Special Representative.
- (13) All parties shall bring all information or complaints regarding intimidation or other allegations of unlawful conduct immediately to the attention of UNTAC.
- (14) Parties shall not abuse the right to complain, nor make false, frivolous or vexatious complaints.
- (15) All parties shall cooperate fully with the Special Representative's Electoral Advisory Committee.
- (16) All parties shall issue instructions and orders to their members and supporters to observe the Electoral Law, this Code, the instructions of UNTAC officials, and all orders and directives of the Special Representative, and take all necessary steps in good faith to ensure compliance with the Electoral Law and this Code.
- (17) The Special Representative and all parties shall publicise this Code and the electoral Law throughout Cambodia by all means at their disposal.

National Democratic Institute
for International Affairs

PHNOM PENH

International Republican
Institute

DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

Prepared by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute as part of their ongoing effort to help strengthen Cambodia's political parties. If you have any comments or questions concerning the information contained within, please contact the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute in Phnom Penh. Paid for by the people of the United States of America.

NDI & IRI
STREET 51, HOUSE 140
PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA
TEL. (855) 23 27467

National Democratic Institute
1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Suite 503
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone (202) 328-3136
Fax (202) 939-3166
Telex 5106015068NDIA

International Republican Institute
1212 New York Ave., N.W., Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone (202) 408-9450
Fax (202) 408-9462
Telex 5106000161 (IRI)



WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?

Democracy means many things to many people. As a word, it is sometimes misused and misinterpreted for bad purposes. Put simply, democracy is a form of government in which the people choose their own government, and tell it how to govern. All adult citizens participate openly and freely in these governing decisions.

While the structure and practice of democracy may vary greatly from country to country, most democracies share these common characteristics:

1. **In a democracy, the people control and limit the government.** In non-democracies, the government limits and controls the people.

e.g.: In democracies, it is the right of all people to express their opinion. To guarantee this right, the people create laws which forbid the government from interfering with this right.

2. **In a democracy, the people have the power.** The government does not take power for itself, and the power it does have is sharply defined and limited by law.

e.g.: Democracies write constitutions which limit governmental authority and the restrictions it can place on individuals. Any power not specifically given to government in the constitution belongs to people.
In a democracy, people can do whatever they wish, as long as that activity is not prohibited by a specific law.

3. **In a democracy, the government is accountable and responsive to the wishes and views of the majority of its people.** If the government acts against the peoples' wishes, the people can and should vote to replace it.

e.g.: If a political party does something which displeases the people who voted for it, the people can vote for a different party at the next election.

4. **In a democracy, governing decisions are made by majority rule, but minority viewpoints are respected and protected.** Democracies guarantee the rights of all citizens, not just the most powerful or numerous.

e.g.: In a democracy, not everyone may share the same religion. Most people who live in Cambodia are Buddhist, but some people who live here may choose a different religion. Democracies allow for freedom of religion, so that everyone may worship how he or she pleases.

5. **In a democracy, certain fundamental rights reside with the people.** People are born with these rights; they are not granted the rights by the government.

Democracy is a constant balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community.

Some of these individual rights include:

Freedom of speech, freedom to assemble, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, right to a fair trial, freedom from unjust punishment, and the right to equal protection for all citizens.

In practical terms, these rights mean that you can't be beaten or jailed for speaking your opinion. They mean that no one, not even the military or police, can enter your home without permission. It means that newspapers can publish freely without being shutdown. It means that no one, and no organization, can force you to make false statements against your will.

In a democracy, people have many rights, yet they also have many obligations. A citizen's first obligation is to participate in his or her government. To participate, he or she must vote. The citizen must also educate him or herself on the issues confronting government, so that he or she can cast an informed vote. Democratic citizens must also be tolerant of those who hold opposing views, and they must be willing to cooperate to reach compromises acceptable to all.

Types of democracy:

There are basically two types of democracies:

a) **Direct.** In a direct democracy, all citizens can participate directly in making public decisions. This type of democracy works best among smaller groups of people.

e.g.: A village council, where all village members meet to discuss and vote on issues of common interest.

b) **Representative.** In a representative democracy, citizens elect representatives to represent them in government. Citizens grant authority to their representatives to make governing decisions on their behalf. Once elected, democratic representatives make and administer laws for the good of all the people. This is the most common form of democracy, and is best suited for governing large groups of people, such as nations and provinces.

e.g.: In May, the people of Cambodia will elect a transitional form of representative democracy: a Constituent Assembly.

Characteristics of Democratic Elections:

1. Democratic elections are **competitive**. All political parties, both incumbents and challengers, must be guaranteed freedom of speech and assembly. The rules of conduct must be fair and closely followed.
2. Democratic elections are **periodic**. They occur regularly, usually every 2-4 years. Democratic elections happen regularly in order to hold the elected officials accountable for their actions in office.
3. Democratic elections are **definitive**. The election determines who will lead the country and guide its legislative process. Losers leave office graciously. They do not fight to remain in control against the peoples' will.

The Role of Political Parties in Democracies

Political parties form one the most fundamental institutions in a democratic society. For a country to be truly democratic, it must allow for a variety of different political parties, just as it allows for an independent court system, a popularly-elected legislature, and a free press. A democracy cannot exist without a strong diversity of political parties.

Voice

In democracies, everyone has a right to think and believe as he chooses. He also has the right to express these opinions. Political parties provide a strong and effective means of communicating these opinions, both to other citizens and to the government. Political parties give a voice to the different elements of society, as well as a safe means of competing with one another without violence. Political parties also take the lead in promoting the interests of citizens, and motivating citizens to participate in government.

For instance, in Germany there is a party called the Green Party. The Green Party gives a voice to citizens who are concerned about the environment. They want to protect natural resources such as trees, land and water, and to keep people from destroying these resources or using too much of them. Citizens who share these concerns support the Green Party, so that the government will listen to them, and create policies which protect the environment.

Choices

One democracy's most basic characteristics is that it provides people choices for how they want to live and be governed. Political parties offer a wide menu of choices, to allow citizens to select among different ideas of governance and ways of life. In fact, one characteristic shared by all democracies is that they have at least two or more strong political parties, which offer voters real choice in government. These parties differ from one another in how they think government should work, and what it should provide to its citizens. In democratic countries, most parties will have the opportunity to govern at some point.

On the other hand, antidemocratic government allow for only one main political party. It forbids the existence of other parties, or keeps them so weak that they cannot compete effectively. The Communist parties in China and Cuba operate this way today, and they cannot be considered democratic.

Continuity

Political parties are most effective when they are founded upon a political ideology, or a set of ideas for governance. This is because ideas live longer than people do. If a political party has a strong grounding in ideology, it can keep its members and supporters together even if the leadership changes. Yet sometimes parties are created which center around a particularly dynamic leader, rather than a set of ideas or principles. These parties are usually more fragile than ideology-based parties, because they only strong as long as their dynamic leader remains popular and alive.

For instance, lets pretend that Cambodia has a political party called Literacy, led by a teacher, Mr. Book. The main goal of this party is to teach at least 60% of all Cambodians to read by the year 2010. Mr. Book is a nice man, and everyone likes him, but he is not the reason that people support the party. They support the party because they know literacy is important, and will help their country become more modern. Eventually, Mr. Book decides to retire, and the party elects a new leader, Ms. Librarian. Even though the leadership has changed, the party remains as strong as ever, because its supporters are united around the idea of literacy, rather than Mr. Book's popularity.

Loyal Opposition

One of the most difficult ideas to accept, especially in countries with undemocratic traditions, is the idea of a loyal opposition. This is a crucial part of all democracies. You do not have to like or agree with your political opponents, but you must tolerate their right to their own opinions, even when they may differ from your own.

After all, elections are a competition between parties for the opportunity to serve the people, not a fight for power. In a democracy, every one can survive and live peacefully with one another, because genuinely democratic governments treat all citizens fairly and equally. Those who are not chosen to govern still have the obligation and opportunity to represent alternative views to those of the government. They must also monitor the government to be sure it is acting responsibly, in accordance with the law and the peoples' wishes.

Democracy is not only a process for governing, it is also a way of living and working together. Democracies continually evolve to meet the ever-changing needs of their citizens. To succeed, democracies require the participation and tolerance of all of their people. Creating and sustaining a democracy isn't easy; at times, it can even be dangerous. But the benefits which democracy brings --- the right to live peacefully, without fear, and the right to have a say in the governmental decisions that affect one's life and opportunities -- are well worth it.

A DEMOCRATIC DICTIONARY

Accountability:

Holding elected officials responsible for their actions; especially with regard to campaign promises and commitments. Failure to fulfill these obligations may result in removal from office, failure to be re-elected, or formal punishment.

Coalition:

A political alliance of different parties who join together to achieve a common goal, such as leading the government.

Code of Ethics:

A formal statement of rules and principles which define duties, obligations, and morally appropriate behavior.

Commonwealth:

An association of self-governing, autonomous states loosely affiliated in a common allegiance.

Confederation:

A system of government in which individual state or provincial governments create and give policy-making authority to a central national government.

Constituent Assembly:

A temporary legislative body which convenes to write a constitution.

Constitution:

The ultimate legal document of nation or state. It contains a country's basic laws, the process by which future laws can be made, and who has the authority to make them. It outlines the structure of the government, and defines who has power and authority within that structure. It also provides ways of conflict resolution, both within government, and in society at large.

Democracy:

A system of government, or way of living, in which power belongs to the people, and is applied by the people through a system of regular elections.

Freedom:

The right of every individual to live and act as he pleases, provided he does not interfere with another person's right to do the same. It is the absence of coercion or constraint in individual choice and action.

Human Rights:

An idea which gives basic rights to all people of the world. Legally, these rights cannot be taken away, no matter what form of government someone lives under.

Liberty:

The ability to exercise various political, social, and economic rights without interference or punishment.

Loyal Opposition:

Political parties or elected officials who stay in the democratic process despite the fact that their party does not hold the main power in the government. They continue to represent the people who voted for them by staying active in politics and government. They also provide opinions that are different from those of the current government. The loyal opposition seeks to replace the government legally and peacefully through the democratic process at the next election.

Majority Rule:

In politics, a majority is defined as 50% of all the voters, + 1 vote. Under majority rule, the majority of voters determine public policy, even if a significant number of the minority would prefer a different policy.

Minority Rights:

A governing concept which provides fundamental rights to all citizens, even if they make up only a small percentage of society, and if their way of life is very different from that of the majority.

Pluralism:

A political concept that asserts that all citizens have the power to influence their government, especially if they belong to a political party. No one party or group can monopolize power.

Political Party:

An organized group of individuals who share ideas in common, and support candidates and laws which support those ideas.

Politics:

The struggle to make policies that meet the needs and demands of citizens through a process of conflict and compromise.

Popular Sovereignty:

The idea that ultimate political power rests with the people, who have the power to create, alter, or replace their government as they wish.

Referendum:

The submission of a proposed law, set of laws, or constitution to the direct vote of the people, rather than to their elected representatives.

Separation of Powers:

The separation of the three main branches of government --- executive, legislative, and judicial. They each have separate powers and responsibilities so that no one branch will become too strong.

In looking over the demographic information for each of the province's _____ districts, the Rice Party has decided to focus its campaign activities and resources in the following five districts: _____, _____, _____, _____, _____ . Together these districts comprise _____ voters. The Party plans to contact at least half of the voters in these districts. It has chosen not to campaign as hard in the remaining districts because these districts are harder to reach and their voters are less likely to support the Rice Party's campaign message. The party does, however, intend to open a provincial office in _____ (the largest city district in the province), yet doesn't expect to do as well as the larger, more urban-oriented parties.

CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE: The provincial campaign will be headed by the Provincial Campaign Director Ou Kim Po Chin. Ou Kim will supervise all campaign related activities and operations in the province and will assign party workers to fill the following campaign positions:

Administration

- Campaign Treasurer (budgeting and accounting)
- Provincial Office Manager
- Events and activities scheduler
- 3 Office assistants
- Party worker (volunteer) coordinator

Organization and Management

- Field Director (voter contact supervisor)
- _____ District Representatives (field supervisors)

CAMPAIGN MESSAGE: The Rice Party's primary campaign message is: "The Rice Party Puts Cambodia's People First." The Party's intent is to show that it cares most about the basic aspirations, needs and concerns of the majority of Cambodia's people (rural farmers). And, that it has specific plans to address these aspirations, needs and concerns.

e.g., Improved rural health care and education, land reform, expanded irrigation, de-mining and transportation, etc.

RESOURCES AND BUDGET: The Rice Party has budgeted _____ riel to cover all anticipated campaign expenses for _____ province. The expenditures are itemized as follows:

Office Rental

_____ Province Office (3 months rent) _____

District Offices _____

Office Supplies (food and equipment) _____

Worker Salaries

Province Director _____

Provincial Headquarters Staff _____

District Directors _____

Voter Contact

_____ Leaflets _____

_____ Posters _____

_____ Cassettes _____

Transportation Expenses _____

Miscellaneous Expenses _____

e.g., sound vehicles, cassette players.
rally supplies, etc.

TOTAL _____

VOTER CONTACT PLAN FOR _____ PROVINCE: The party will have six weeks to reach its objective of contacting _____ voters in _____ Province. It intends to accomplish this by:

1. Setting up a leaflet and poster distribution program which distributes approximately _____ party leaflets and _____ party posters per week;
2. Scheduling the use of _____ sound vehicles;
3. Having party workers visit the homes of _____ targeted voters per week;
4. Routinely scheduling noon-time public rallies in targeted villages throughout the province. Assigning a team of 4 to 6 party workers to visit at least 1, possibly 2 villages per day;
5. Distributing informational cassettes and videos throughout the province; and
6. Having party members and workers contact at least _____ family members and friends each week to discuss the Rice Party and its progressive plans for governing Cambodia.

SAMPLE DAY CALENDAR: The following is one day's worth of scheduled assignments and activities taken from the Rice Party's prioritized six week campaign calendar for _____ province.


Date: April 23, 1993

- 7:00 - 9:00 Three teams of five people distribute _____ posters and _____ leaflets in market areas located throughout _____ and _____.
- 9:00 One team of four party workers to travel to _____ to prepare for a noon-time rally.
- 9:00 - 17:00 One team of six party workers travels to _____ to visit the homes of _____ voters.
- 10:00 - 11:00 Weekly district directors meeting in _____.
- 12:00 - 1:00 Noontime rally in _____. Projected crowd of 130 people. Sitha Sok and Sao Mary, Constituent Assembly candidates, will speak on behalf of the party.
- 12:00 - 18:00 Sound vehicles 1 and 2 to continue their travels throughout the districts airing the Party's health care and education reform cassettes. Sound vehicles 3 and 4 to travel to the _____ districts to air the Party's agricultural reform cassette.
- 18:00 - 20:00 Three teams of two party workers set up party video displays in _____ and _____.


Note: Attached is an abbreviated example of a 45 day campaign calendar. If it were a real provincial campaign calendar it would include many more campaign events and activities than those listed above.

THURSDAY APRIL 5	FRIDAY APRIL 6	WEDNESDAY APRIL 7	THURSDAY APRIL 8	FRIDAY APRIL 9	THURSDAY APRIL 10	FRIDAY APRIL 11
PRINT MATERIAL	MEET DISTRICT WORKERS	VISIT WATS	PUT UP POSTERS	MEET CAMPAIGN WORKERS	MARKET CAMPAIGNING	WAT
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
MEET VOLUNTEERS	KHMER NEW YEAR	KHMER NEW YEAR	PUBLIC PUBLIC RALLY	PUBLIC PUBLIC RALLY	SOUND AT MARKETS	WAT
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
DISTRICT PARTY MEETING	VISIT COMMUNE ①	VISIT COMMUNE ②	VISIT COMMUNE ③	VISIT COMMUNE ④	SOUND AT MARKETS	WAT
26	27	28	29	30	MAY 1	MAY
DISTRICT PARTY MEETING	MEET WITH MONKS	VISIT BY NATIONAL PARTY LEADER	CONTD.	CONTD.	VISIT HOSPITAL	WAT
3	4	5	6	7	8	
ELECTIONAL MONITORING MEETING	VISIT TEACHERS	YOUNG PEOPLE RALLY	PUT UP POSTERS	MEET BUSINESS LEADERS	PROVINCE LEADER VISITS DISTRICTS	MULTI-PA RALLY
10	11	12	13	14	15	
BUDGET MEETING	MARKET RALLY	MARKET RALLY	MARKET RALLY	MARKET RALLY	MARKET RALLY	WAT
17	18	19	20	21	22	
DISTRICT PARTY	FARM RALLY	CAMPAIGN ENDS				

THE RICE PARTY PUTS PEOPLE FIRST




THE RICE PARTY CARES
ABOUT YOU




FARMERS:

LAND RIGHTS
IRRIGATION & WELLS
DE-MINING FARMLAND



HEALTHCARE:

RURAL HOSPITALS
IMMUNIZATION
NUTRITION



EDUCATION:

ADULT LITERACY
FARMING CLASS
TEACHER TRAINING

YOUR VOTE IS SECRET!

V / O T F /

Annex - Code of Conduct

1. All persons, all political parties, their leaders, members and supporters, all provisionally and officially registered political parties, their leaders, members, supporters and candidates, shall abide by this Code of Conduct.
2. All political parties are entitled to and shall enjoy, the fundamental right of a free and fair election, including the freedom to campaign.
3. All political parties shall respect the right and freedom of all other parties to campaign, and disseminate their political ideas and principles without fear.
4. In particular, all political parties, officially and provisionally registered political parties, their leaders, members, supporters and candidates shall obey the following rules:
 - (1) Intimidation, in whatever form, shall be prohibited, and manuals, instructions and orders of political parties and provisionally and officially registered political parties shall reinforce and emphasise this prohibition.
 - (2) The possession and use of any weapon of any kind, or of any instrument capable of use as a weapon, at any political rally, meeting, march or demonstration shall be prohibited. Parties' manuals, instructions and orders shall reinforce this prohibition.
 - (3) Parties and candidates shall inform the local UNTAC office of any planned public meetings or political rallies, and shall in good faith take all necessary steps to avoid violent confrontation or conflict between their supporters, and shall comply with all directions, instructions or orders issued by UNTAC in relation to such meetings.
 - (4) All parties shall avoid the coincidence, in time or place, of their meetings, rallies, marches or demonstrations with those of other parties, and to this end they shall liaise and cooperate with UNTAC and with other parties.
 - (5) All parties, their members and supporters, shall refrain from disrupting the meetings, marches or demonstrations of other parties.
 - (6) Parties and candidates shall at all times avoid, in speeches, broadcasts, pamphlets, newsletters, press statements, posters, their party platforms, campaign advertisements or otherwise, using inflammatory language or other language which threatens or incites violence in any form against others.
 - (7) All political parties shall refrain from obstructing persons from attending the meetings, marches or rallies of other parties.

- (8) All parties shall refrain from plagiarising the symbols of other parties, and shall not steal, destroy or disfigure the political or campaign material or posters of other parties, or the election information material of UNTAC.
- (9) All political parties, and especially their leaders, shall ensure freedom of access of other parties to all potential voters on public or private property, in camps or reception centres, or wherever they may be. Parties shall ensure that potential voters wishing to participate in political activities are free to do so.
- (10) All parties shall consistently reinforce and emphasise to their supporters and to all voters that the ballot will be secret, and that no person will know how any individual has voted.
- (11) All parties shall establish effective communication with one another at the central, provincial and district levels, and shall appoint liaison personnel, to be available for this purpose at all times, to deal with any problem arising during registration of voters, the campaign or the polling.
- (12) All parties shall attend, at least once every two weeks a meeting under the chairmanship of the Chief Electoral Officer, to discuss any matters of concern relating to the campaign. In addition, a standing committee of leaders of registered political parties shall attend at least every two weeks a meeting under the chairmanship of the Special Representative or his deputy to deal with matters of concern relating to the campaign. The abovementioned meetings shall commence from a date to be determined by the Special Representative.
- (13) All parties shall bring all information or complaints regarding intimidation or other allegations of unlawful conduct immediately to the attention of UNTAC.
- (14) Parties shall not abuse the right to complain, nor make false, frivolous or vexatious complaints.
- (15) All parties shall cooperate fully with the Special Representative's Electoral Advisory Committee.
- (16) All parties shall issue instructions and orders to their members and supporters to observe the Electoral Law, this Code, the instructions of UNTAC officials, and all orders and directives of the Special Representative, and take all necessary steps in good faith to ensure compliance with the Electoral Law and this Code.
- (17) The Special Representative and all parties shall publicise this Code and the electoral Law throughout Cambodia by all means at their disposal.

ELECTION MONITORING

Prepared by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute as part of their ongoing effort to help strengthen Cambodia's political parties. If you have any comments or questions concerning the information contained within, please contact the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute in Phnom Penh. Paid for by the people of the United States of America.

NDI & IRI
STREET 51, HOUSE 140
PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA
TEL. (855) 23 27467

National Democratic Institute
Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Suite 503
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone (202) 328-3136
Fax (202) 939-3166
Telex 5106015068NDIIA

International Republican Institute
1212 New York Ave., N.E., Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone (202) 408-6450
Fax (202) 408-9462
Telex 5106000161 (IRI)

CREATING AN EFFECTIVE REPORTING SYSTEM

It is not enough to simply have a party agent stay at a polling location all day and observe the voting. It is equally important for that party agent to write down everything that occurs and to report these events to the party leaders. In order for the party leaders in Phnom Penh to know exactly what is happening they need to gather information from each district and each province in the country.

Even with limited resources a party can organize an effective way to deliver the reports from the party agent to the district office to the provincial office. The key is for the party to appoint directors at the district and provincial level to organize the reporting system.

District Director. Each party should appoint a district director for each district in which the party has agents monitoring the voting. The district director is responsible for compiling a list of all the polling locations in the district (available from UNTAC) and recruiting and training agents for as many polling locations as possible. The "District Tracking Form" is meant to assist with this effort.

The District Director is also responsible for developing a system for gathering daily reports from the party agents at each polling location. Either the party agents must be instructed to bring the reports to the District Director or the District Director sends someone to pick up the report after the polls close. If someone is sent to pick up the report remember that the party agent will not be finished with his report until approximately 4:30. If there is not enough time to pick it up before it gets dark then plan with the party agent for the messenger to pick it up early the next morning.

The District Director is then responsible for compiling all the information from the party agent reports on the District Tally Form and delivering the form to the Provincial Director. The District Tally Form should be delivered at a pre-arranged time even if the District Director has not received all the reports from the party agent. It is important that the Provincial Director receives the reports at a set time because he will have to send the reports to Phnom Penh by a specific time.

Provincial Director. The Provincial Director is responsible for appointing the District Directors and working with them to develop a reporting system that is timely and effective. The Provincial Director is responsible for gathering the District Tally Forms from the District Directors. This means the District Director must deliver them to the Provincial Director or the Provincial Director must send someone to pick them up. The forms should be delivered or picked up by a certain time. The time should be predetermined and based on how quickly the District Director can gather the reports from the party agents. If the District Director cannot gather reports from the polling locations until the day after each day of voting, then the Provincial Director should not plan on having the information from the District Directors until the next day.

Once the Provincial Director has the information from the District Directors he must fill out the Provincial Tally Form. This form must then be sent to the party offices in Phnom Penh. UNTAC might arrange to have a helicopter fly from your province

to Phnom Penh each day for the purpose of carrying all of the parties Provincial Tally forms. It will leave at a set time--talk with the UNTAC Provincial Director prior to the election to find out when it will leave. You must deliver the form to UNTAC with your Party name clearly written in English two hours before the helicopter leaves. Your party will have someone pick it up from UNTAC when it arrives in Phnom Penh.

If UNTAC does not allow the parties to send the Provincial Tally Form by helicopter the Provincial Director can hire a taxi to deliver it to Phnom Penh. Your Provincial Director should contact the Provincial Directors of other parties and discuss sharing the cost of a taxi. The Provincial Director might also try to call Phnom Penh from the post office and give the information on the Provincial Tally Form over the phone. Some parties might have radios which would allow direct communication between the province and the party headquarters.

The big challenge will be for the District Director to gather the reports from the party agents. The easiest way for this to occur is for the party agent to deliver the report himself each day after the voting ends and all the extra ballots are counted. Ask each party agent if they have a family member who has a bicycle or motorbike to help with this. If the party has the money to hire someone to pick up the reports they should pick up the reports that are farthest from the District Director. Party members with bicycles should be sent to pick up the reports from the polling locations which are closer to the District Director.

The same is true for the Provincial Director. If he has only one motorbike it should be used to pick up the reports from the districts that are farthest away--the District Director's that are not so far away should deliver the report to the Provincial Director.

OBSERVING THE ELECTIONS IS OF LITTLE USE IF NO ONE KNOWS WHAT WAS OBSERVED. EVERY PARTY MUST TRY AS HARD AS POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A SYSTEM TO DELIVER THE INFORMATION LEARNED BY THE INDIVIDUAL PARTY AGENTS TO THE PARTY LEADERSHIP IN PHNOM PENH.

PARTY AGENTS

With all the other party responsibilities you have right now, you might be tempted to ask yourself, "Isn't this a waste of my time?". After all, UNTAC will have International Observers at the polling sites. And yet the most pressing issue relevant to these elections is whether or not they will be free and fair. Believe it or not, the people best qualified to answer that question are in this room today. As party agents, you will witness first hand, how the vote is proceeding and whether or not irregularities occur. You will also have the authority to assess the overall fairness of the elections.

Elections must be judged on the basis of facts and factual observation, not rumor and hearsay. In the absence of impartial observers, rumors --- usually negative ones, often proliferate, causing people to lose confidence in, criticize, and discredit the voting process.

Election monitoring may seem tedious at times, but it's importance cannot be overemphasized. Everyone in this room has worked hard to see that her/his political party can do its best on election day. If you don't carry that effort through to the actual voting itself, you can't know for certain that the voting went appropriately, that all parties and candidates --- including your own, were treated equally inside the voting site, and that voters were allowed to vote their conscience, free from bribes, threat or intimidation.

Attributes of Party Agents

Party Agents should be:

1. Objective, observant, and reasonable in her/his judgements.
2. Informed as to what party agents can and cannot do.
3. Informed as to what to look for in terms of irregularities.
4. Advised of the recording and reporting method her/his party has established.
5. Prepared to monitor at her/his site for the full election period, if necessary.

WHY A PARTY ELECTION MONITORING PROGRAM ?

Your country is about to experience its first democratic elections in 25 years. Since your formation, Cambodia's 20 political parties have shared common experiences on the march towards Democracy. Gaining recognition as a political party was the first challenge, monitoring the voter registration process was your second. Currently, you as parties are engaged in efforts to mobilize support for the May election, while at the same time you are continuing to acquire knowledge about Cambodia's electoral process. The final challenge confronting the parties is to monitor the elections, to observe the voting process first-hand and to assess your own performances as political parties. These observations will allow you to make judgements independent of outside observers as to whether or not the election process was conducted freely and fairly.

ELECTION MONITORING

The training of your party agents is the first step towards implementing an election monitoring program. By effectively monitoring the elections, you will be able to develop an accurate historical account of the election. By assuming this role you not only take responsibility for this elections but for future ones as well. The monitoring of the elections will help the parties evaluate their performance over the course of the six days of balloting. Additionally you will be able to determine how the vote is proceeding, if irregularities occur and recommend possible solutions as problems arise. Monitoring elections will help you as political parties verify the official election results so you can be satisfied with the fairness of the process. Long after UNTAC has departed the people of Cambodia will look to you, their political parties, to assure them that their vote was not in vain.

At the end of each day of voting, the parties will have an overall view of voting that day. Some views might be:

- I.
 - a. The number of polling sites covered by party agents.
 - b. The number of ballots cast on a daily basis.
 - c. The number of challenges issued.
 - d. The number of tendered ballots cast
 - e. Problems with the party's communication network.

- II.
 - a. The elections process functioned normally with few problems.
 - b. The election was free and fair.
 - c. There were quite a few irregularities, but they didn't seem to affect the overall outcome of the elections.
 - d. There were significant irregularities which could affect the overall outcome of the elections.
 - e. The election was so problematic that almost no voter was able to vote in secret, free from intimidation or harassment, or in a timely fashion.

PARTY AGENT - ELECTION MONITORING FORM
(ONLY ONE REPORT PER SITE!!)

NAME _____ DATE _____ PARTY _____

UNTAC POLLING SITE ID# _____ FIXED _____ MOBILE _____

PROVINCE _____ DISTRICT _____ COMMUNE _____
VILLAGE _____ LOCATION _____

PRESIDING OFFICER _____ IPSO _____

1) NUMBER OF TEAMS AT SITE _____

2) NUMBER OF YOUR PARTY'S AGENTS AT SITE _____

3) NUMBER OF BALLOTS DELIVERED AT START OF VOTING _____

4) NUMBER OF BALLOTS ISSUED TO VOTERS: _____

5) NUMBER OF TENDERED BALLOTS CAST: -- _____

6) NUMBER OF SPOILED BALLOTS: -- _____

7) TOTAL # OF ORDINARY BALLOTS CAST: = _____

8) NUMBER OF BALLOTS LEFT OVER (line 3 minus line 4) _____

9) NUMBER OF REGISTRATION CARDS CHALLENGED BY YOUR PARTY'S AGENTS: _____

10) NUMBER OF CONFISCATED REGISTRATION CARDS _____

11) NUMBER OF REPORTS MADE TO UNTAC: _____
REASONS:

OTHER PROBLEMS: _____

Checklist

- () Party Agent checks in with P.O. 0730hrs
- () Morning inspection of ballot boxes and seals
- () Polling station open at 0800hrs
- () Polling station closes at 1600 hrs
- () Evening inspection of ballot boxes and seals

() Record-Seal Numbers: 1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____
4. _____ 5. _____ 6. _____ 7. _____
8. _____ 9. _____ 10. _____ 11. _____
12. _____ 13. _____ 14. _____ 15. _____

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

ELECTION INCIDENT REPORT FORM

Date: _____ Time: _____ Party: _____

UNTAC ID number of polling site _____ Team number _____
Assistant Presiding Officer _____

Province, District, Commune, building: _____

Name of party agent filing report: _____

Brief description of the incident and UNTAC response (if any): _____
(include names and other details)

ELECTION INCIDENT REPORT FORM

Date: _____ Time: _____ Party: _____

UNTAC ID number of polling site _____ Team number _____
Assistant Presiding Officer _____

Province, District, Commune, building: _____

Name of party agent filing report: _____

Brief description of the incident and UNTAC response (if any): _____
(include names and other details)

INSTRUCTIONS: NATIONAL TALLY SHEET

The National Tally Sheet allows you to gauge how many sites and teams your party organized to monitor the election throughout the country, how many party agents were assigned and reports returned, and the overall status of voting in the country as observed by your party's agent.

Information on polling sites and the total number of ballots cast can be obtained from UNTAC electoral officials. All other information must be gathered from your party's completed provincial tally sheets.

Column 1: List the names of the provinces where your party's agents monitored polling sites.

Column 2: Note the total number of polling sites in Cambodia.

Column 3: Note the total number of sites your agents were able to monitor for the country.

Column 4: Note the total number of teams monitored by your agents for each province.

Column 5: Note the total number of party agents you deployed for each province throughout the country.

Column 6: Note the total number of completed monitoring forms submitted by your party's agents in all provinces.

Column 7: Note the total number of ballots cast at the sites in each province where your party had agents present.

Column 8: Note the total number of challenges made by your agents in each province.

Column 9: Note the total number of tendered ballots cast in each province.

Column 10: Although unlikely, there may be an extreme case where an issue could not be resolved at the actual polling site and had to be referred to UNTAC APEO or PEO. Any such cases should be noted in this column.

When all of the provinces have reported the findings of their District Party Agents, tally all of this information, and consolidate a report on your findings.

INSTRUCTIONS: PROVINCIAL TALLY SHEET

The Provincial Tally Sheet allows you to gauge how many sites and teams your party organized to monitor the election in each province, how many party agents have been assigned there and reports returned, and the overall status of voting for your province.

Information on the polling sites and the total number of ballots cast can be obtained from UNTAC electoral officials. All other information must be gathered from your party's completed district monitoring forms.

Column 1: Write the name of each district within the province.

Column 2: Note the total number of polling sites within the province.

Column 3: Note the total number of polling sites your agents were able to monitor for each district within the province.

Column 4: Note the total number of teams monitored by your agents for the province.

Column 5: Note the total number of your party's agents engaged in monitoring within the province.

Column 6: Note the total number of completed monitoring forms submitted by your party's agents within the province.

Column 7: Note the total number of ballots cast at the polling sites monitored by your agents within the province.

Column 8: Note the total number of challenges issued by your agents in each district.

Column 9: Note the total number of tendered ballots cast at the polling sites where you had agents present.

Column 10: Although unlikely, there may be an extreme case where an issue could not be resolved at the actual polling site and had to be referred to UNTAC APEO or PEO. Any such cases should be noted in this column.

Upon the completion of the voting in the districts within your Province, you should tally all columns vertically and enter the totals on the bottom line for each section. Forward this sheet to your national leadership.

DISTRICT TALLY SHEET-- Complete Record DISTRICT: _____

PROVINCE: _____

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
DATE	Total # of sites in district	# of sites Monitored	# of Polling Teams in district	# of Agents Deployed for the party	# of Reports Received from the party agents	# of Total Ballots Cast at Monitored Sites	# of Challenges Issues by the party	# of Tendered Ballots Cast at monitored sites	# of formal Reports to UNTAC
FIXED SITES									
May 23									
May 24									
May 25									
MOBILE STATIONS									
May 23									
May 24									
May 25									
May 26									
May 27									
May 28									
TOTAL >									

(TALLY1D)

District Tally Sheet:

- The District Tally Sheet allows you to gauge how many sites your party is able to monitor, how many agents were assigned, and the overall status of voting in your district.

Column 1: Date

Column 2: Number of Polling Sites

Note the total number of polling sites in that district.

Column 3: Number of Polling Sites Monitored

Note the total number of polling sites monitored by your agents for that district.

Column 4: Number of Teams Monitored

Note the total number of polling teams at all sites in the district.

Column 5: Number of Agents Deployed

Note the total number of agents deployed by your party to monitor polling sites.

Column 6: Total Number of Monitoring Forms Received

Of the party agents deployed, note the total number of those who turned in their completed monitoring forms.

Column 7: Number of Ballots Cast

Note the total number of votes cast, both regular and tendered.

Column 8: Number of Challenges Issued

Note the total number of challenges made by your Party's agents and approved by the appropriate APOs.

Column 9: Number of Tendered Ballots Cast

Note the total number of tendered ballots cast.

Column 10: Number of Formal Reports to UNTAC

It is unlikely, but there may be an extreme case where an issue could not be resolved at the actual polling site and had to be referred to the UNTAC APEO or PEO. Any such cases should be noted in this column.

At the end of each day of voting, vertical columns should be tallied and the totals entered on the bottom line for each section. The tally sheet should then be delivered to the Provincial Director of your party.

DISTRICT TALLY SHEET-- Daily Record

DISTRICT: _____

PROVINCE: _____

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
DATE	Total # of sites in district	# of sites Monitored	# of Polling Teams in district	# of Agents Deployed for the party	# of Reports Received from the party agents	# of Total Ballots Cast at Monitored Sites	# of Challenges Issues by the party	# of Tendered Ballots Cast at Monitored sites	# of formal Reports to UNTAC
FIXED SITES									
MOBILE STATIONS									
TOTAL									

(TALLY2D)

District Tally Sheet:

The District Tally Sheet allows you to gauge how many sites your party is able to monitor, how many agents were assigned, and the overall status of voting in your district.

Column 1: Date

Column 2: Number of Polling Sites

Note the total number of polling sites in that district.

Column 3: Number of Polling Sites Monitored

Note the total number of polling sites monitored by your agents for that district.

Column 4: Number of Teams Monitored

Note the total number of polling teams at all sites in the district.

Column 5: Number of Agents Deployed

Note the total number of agents deployed by your party to monitor polling sites.

Column 6: Total Number of Monitoring Forms Received

Of the party agents deployed, note the total number of those who turned in their completed monitoring forms.

Column 7: Number of Ballots Cast

Note the total number of votes cast, both regular and tendered.

Column 8: Number of Challenges Issued

Note the total number of challenges made by your Party's agents and approved by the appropriate APOs.

Column 9: Number of Tendered Ballots Cast

Note the total number of tendered ballots cast.

Column 10: Number of Formal Reports to UNTAC

It is unlikely, but there may be an extreme case where an issue could not be resolved at the actual polling site and had to be referred to the UNTAC APEO or PEO. Any such cases should be noted in this column.

At the end of each day of voting, vertical columns should be tallied and the totals entered on the bottom line for each section. The tally sheet should then be delivered to the Provincial Director of your party.

INSTRUCTIONS: DISTRICT MONITORING FORMS

Congratulations on being selected a District Captain. Before sending your party agents to their assigned polling sites, complete columns 2,4, and 6 on your tracking form. At the end of voting for the day, fill-in the rest of the tracking form. The tracking form is designed to serve as a tool to ensure that your party is covering as many polling sites as possible, and that you are keeping track of which agents are assigned where.

District Tracking Form:

Information on the polling sites and the number of votes cast can be obtained from UNTAC electoral officials. All other information must be gathered from your election monitors.

Column 1: UNTAC ID # of Polling Site

UNTAC has designated a seven or eight-digit number for each polling site. If you don't have a list of the numbers beforehand, your party agent can simply ask the APO at the site to which she/he is assigned.

Column 2: Location of the Polling Sites

Give the name and location of the polling site monitored, such as _____ school in _____ commune, _____ village.

Column 3: Number of Teams

Most polling sites contain more than one polling team, each of which is lead by an APO. Mark the number of teams for the site being monitored. If you assign agents to specific polling teams you must account for them specifically on your tracking form.

Column 4: Name of the Agent Assigned

Note the name of the agent assigned to monitor that site.

Column 5: Date

Column 6: Was the Agent Trained?

Note whether or not the agent was formally trained to do election monitoring, and if so, by whom - UNTAC, your own party official, or someone else.

Column 7: Did the Agent File a Report?

Note whether or not you've received a completed report from your agent.

Column 8: Were Any Official Complaints Lodged to UNTAC?

Were there any problems which couldn't be resolved at the polling site by the APO, IPSO, or PO, and had to be taken to the APEO or PEO?

Column 9: Comments

How was the voting conducted overall? Did it go slowly, or rapidly? Was it interrupted for any reason? Were there many problems? Did any voters require special assistance?

DISTRICT TRACKING FORM

DISTRICT

PROVINCE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

UNTAC ID # of polling site	Location of polling site: commune, village, building	Polling Team	Name of Agent assigned	DATE	Was Agent Trained?	Did Agent File Report?	# of Formal Reports to UNTAC, if any	Comments
				23/5				
				24/5				
				25/5				
				23/5				
				24/5				
				25/5				
				23/5				
				24/5				
				25/5				
				23/5				
				24/5				
				25/5				
				23/5				
				24/5				
				25/5				
				23/5				
				24/5				
				25/5				

(DTF)

INSTRUCTIONS: DISTRICT MONITORING FORMS

Congratulations on being selected a District Captain. Before sending your party agents to their assigned polling sites, complete columns 2,4, and 6 on your tracking form. At the end of voting for the day, fill-in the rest of the tracking form. The tracking form is designed to serve as a tool to ensure that your party is covering as many polling sites as possible, and that you are keeping track of which agents are assigned where.

District Tracking Form:

Information on the polling sites and the number of votes cast can be obtained from UNTAC electoral officials. All other information must be gathered from your election monitors.

Column 1: UNTAC ID # of Polling Site

UNTAC has designated a seven or eight-digit number for each polling site. If you don't have a list of the numbers beforehand, your party agent can simply ask the APO at the site to which she/he is assigned.

Column 2: Location of the Polling Sites

Give the name and location of the polling site monitored, such as _____ school in _____ commune, _____ village.

Column 3: Number of Teams

Most polling sites contain more than one polling team, each of which is lead by an APO. Mark the number of teams for the site being monitored. If you assign agents to specific polling teams you must account for them specifically on your tracking form.

Column 4: Name of the Agent Assigned

Note the name of the agent assigned to monitor that site.

Column 5: Date

Column 6: Was the Agent Trained?

Note whether or not the agent was formally trained to do election monitoring, and if so, by whom - UNTAC, your own party official, or someone else.

Column 7: Did the Agent File a Report?

Note whether or not you've received a completed report from your agent.

Column 8: Were Any Official Complaints Lodged to UNTAC?

Were there any problems which couldn't be resolved at the polling site by the APO, IPSO, or PO, and had to be taken to the APEO or PEO?

Column 9: Comments

How was the voting conducted overall? Did it go slowly, or rapidly? Was it interrupted for any reason? Were there many problems? Did any voters require special assistance?

PARTY AGENT - ELECTION MONITORING FORM
(ONLY ONE REPORT PER SITE!!)

NAME _____ DATE _____ PARTY _____

UNTAC POLLING SITE ID# _____ FIXED ___ MOBILE ___

PROVINCE _____ DISTRICT _____ COMMUNE _____
VILLAGE _____ LOCATION _____

PRESIDING OFFICER _____ IPSO _____

1) NUMBER OF TEAMS AT SITE _____

2) NUMBER OF YOUR PARTY'S AGENTS AT SITE _____

3) NUMBER OF BALLOTS DELIVERED AT START OF VOTING _____

4) NUMBER OF BALLOTS ISSUED TO VOTERS: _____

5) NUMBER OF TENDERED BALLOTS CAST: -- _____

6) NUMBER OF SPOILED BALLOTS: -- _____

7) TOTAL # OF ORDINARY BALLOTS CAST: = _____

8) NUMBER OF BALLOTS LEFT OVER (line 3 minus line 4) _____

9) NUMBER OF REGISTRATION CARDS CHALLENGED
BY YOUR PARTY'S AGENTS: _____

10) NUMBER OF CONFISCATED REGISTRATION CARDS _____

11) NUMBER OF REPORTS MADE TO UNTAC:
REASONS: _____

OTHER PROBLEMS: _____

Checklist

- () Party Agent checks in with P.O. 0730hrs
- () Morning inspection of ballot boxes and seals
- () Polling station open at 0800hrs
- () Polling station closes at 1600 hrs
- () Evening inspection of ballot boxes and seals
- () Record-Seal Numbers: 1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____
4. _____ 5. _____ 6. _____ 7. _____
8. _____ 9. _____ 10. _____ 11. _____
12. _____ 13. _____ 14. _____ 15. _____

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

ELECTION INCIDENT REPORT FORM

Date: _____ Time: _____ Party: _____

UNTAC ID number of polling site _____ Team number _____
Assistant Presiding Officer _____

Province, District, Commune, building: _____

Name of party agent filing report: _____

Brief description of the incident and UNTAC response (if any): _____
(include names and other details)

ELECTION INCIDENT REPORT FORM

Date: _____ Time: _____ Party: _____

UNTAC ID number of polling site _____ Team number _____
Assistant Presiding Officer _____

Province, District, Commune, building: _____

Name of party agent filing report: _____

Brief description of the incident and UNTAC response (if any): _____
(include names and other details)

Appendix Four

**Agenda for the Political Parties Seminar
December, 1993**



NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Fifth Floor, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 328-3136

■ FAX (202) 939-3166
■ Telex 5106015068 NDIIA

SEMINAR FOR POLITICAL PARTIES IN CAMBODIA

*Phnom Penh, Cambodia
December 3 - 7, 1993*

INTERNATIONAL FACULTY

Bob Mulholland
Political Director
California Democratic Party
United States

Gabor Gellert Kis
Hungarian Socialist Party
Hungary

Jean Lavoie
International Elections Consultant
Canada

NDI STAFF

Ms. Karen Clark
Senior Program Officer for Asia

Ms. Jamie Factor
Cambodia Program Manager

Ms. Carol Bean
Cambodia Program Assistant





NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Fifth Floor, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 328-3136

■ FAX (202) 939-3166
■ Telex 5106015068 NDIIA

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS STRENGTHENING POLITICAL PARTIES Phnom Penh, Cambodia

DRAFT PROGRAM AGENDA December 3-7, 1993

DECEMBER 3:

Arrival of International Participants

Pre-Seminar Briefing

Meeting with CPP Party Leaders

DECEMBER 4:

SEMINAR AGENDA

I. WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION

A. Introduction by Sar Kheng

B. Overview: The Role and Characteristics of Political Parties in a Democratic Society

II. PARTY DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATION: Promoting Participation, Communication and Accountability

A. Principles of Party Management

1. Evaluating Electoral Performance
2. Committees
3. The Party Congress
4. Intra-Party Elections
5. Budget: Distribution of Party Resources

B. Overview of Party Structure

1. Party Organization: From Local to National Level
2. Staffing Structure and Job Responsibilities
3. Accommodating Parliamentary and Electoral Functions



C. Intra-Party Communication: The Flow of Information

1. Meetings
2. Publications and Materials
3. Print and Electronic Media

II. TRANSFORMING PARTY STRUCTURES

- A. Identifying Political Objectives/Priorities
- B. Developing and Implementing Reorganization Strategy

III. PARTY ACTIVITIES

- A. Membership Building
- B. Platform Development
- C. Parliamentary Support
- D. Resource Development/Distribution
- E. Community Outreach
- F. Intra-Party Communication

SAMPLE INTERACTIVE WORKSHOP TOPICS:

Selecting Delegates for Party Congress
Strategy for Distribution of Resources
Media Strategy

Appendix Five

**Provincial Party Training Workshops
Agenda and Participant Information
May, 1994**

**NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT
WORKSHOP SCHEDULE
(Revised)**

Apr- May	CPP	FCP	BLDP
23	PHNOM PENH WORKSHOP:	PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONS**	
30	PHNOM PENH WORKSHOP:	DEVELOPING LEGISLATION**	
7	KANDAL	*	KANDAL
8	KG SPEOU	*	KG SPEOU
14	PHNOM PENH WORKSHOP:	CONSTITUENT SERVICES**	
14	PREY VENG	*	TAKEO
15	TAKEO	*	PREY VENG
21-22	PHNOM PENH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR: BLDP (with IRI)		
28	KG CHAM	*	SVEY RIENG
29	SVEY RIENG	*	KG CHAM
<hr/>			
Total workshops scheduled: Single party (12) **Multi-party (3)			

* Functions to be confirmed.



BLDP Workshop

Kandal - May 7, 1994

GENERAL BACKGROUND

BLDP has historically been a resistance party. Now BLDP faces the problem of becoming a "modern" political party. BLDP has no structure created with the goal of becoming a governing party. We can expect resistance by some BLDP members to clearly defining goals and objectives for the party. As expressed by one BLDP member, the primary goal is "survival." Therefore, the BLDP workshop must stress the need for defining the BLDP and what the stands for, setting goals, and explaining how a structure can help accomplish goals.

I. NDI INTRODUCTION

What NDI is and why we are here.

Endorsement from ^{BLDP} leadership.

II. WHAT IS ~~PPP~~ BLDP

We want to open with a general discussion with the workshop participants of BLDP and how the party defines itself. This opening discussion has several important purposes to keep in mind:

- The participants give us their context for the workshop.
- The discussion establishes a dialogue and "warms up" the participants and the trainers.
- Most important, the structure and party building activities follow from the party's self definition mission, goals, and objectives.

Suggested opening discussion questions are:

- What does BLDP stand for?
- How is BLDP different from the other Cambodian parties?
- How do BLDP members distinguish their party from the other Cambodian parties? How did the participants in this workshop distinguish BLDP in the election last year?
- What are BLDP's strengths as a political party?
- What are BLDP's weaknesses?

- Who voted for BLDP in last year's election? What do the workshop participants know about the parties existing base of support?

- How do rank in file, average BLDP party members view BLDP?

- How do members of the other political parties view BLDP?
[O would God the gift 'e give us, to see ourselves as others see us, - Robert Burns]

BLDP

III. BLDP PARTY GOALS

This discussion should focus on having the workshop participants identify BLDP's short term and long term goals, both structural goals for building the party and substantive, political program goals that the party wants to accomplish.

Suggested goals to discuss are:

- Increasing the number of seats held by BLDP in the next parliamentary election.

- Specify substantive governmental policy goals.

IV. BUILDING THE BLDP

This discussion focuses on having the workshop participants the specific objectives, strategies, and major tasks and activities to accomplish the goals identified on Section III above. The participants will discuss two principal topics - building party structure and building party membership. Specific subjects include:

(A) Building party structure

(1) party communications

- top down communications

- bottom up communications

- lateral communications - province to province and district to district.

(2) the structure of decision making

(3) developing party leaders

(B) Building party membership

(1) issues identification; determining what local constituencies want, setting priorities, and developing a program to respond.

(2) party activities

- entertainment
- festivals
- public events
- holidays
- civic improvements and ribbon cutting events
- sports
- common gathering places, such as markets

(3) communication to the public

- use of media
- letters in newspapers
- party newsletter and information sheets

(4) enhancing party visibility

- caps, T shirts, and membership cards
- presence of party leaders at significant events
- signs

CPP Workshop

Kandal - May 7, 1994

GENERAL BACKGROUND

A CPP structure is in place. However, CPP leaders have raised the question of whether they want to keep the structure; that is, whether they want to engage in "structural transformation" from a communist structure to a democratic structure. We need to ask the questions:

- What does the CPP want?
- What do local CPP leaders want?
- What do national CPP party leaders want?

In the provincial workshops, NDI will be working with the CPP from the "bottom up." However, we need to check with the CPP party leadership in Phnom Penh.

I. NDI INTRODUCTION

What NDI is and why we are here.

Endorsement from CPP leadership.

II. WHAT IS CPP

We want to open with a general discussion with the workshop participants of CPP and how the party defines itself. This opening discussion has several important purposes to keep in mind:

- The participants give us their context for the workshop.
- The discussion establishes a dialogue and "warms up" the participants and the trainers.
- Most important, the structure and party building activities follow from the party's self definition mission, goals, and objectives.

Suggested opening discussion questions are:

- What does CPP stand for?
- How is CPP different from the other Cambodian parties?
- How do CPP members distinguish their party from the other

Cambodian parties? How did the participants in this workshop distinguish CPP in the election last year?

CPP

- What are CPP's strengths as a political party?
- What are CPP's weaknesses?
- Who voted for CPP in last year's election? What do the workshop participants know about the parties existing base of support?
- How do rank in file, average CPP party members view CPP?
- How do members of the other political parties view CPP?
[O would God the gift 'e give us, to see ourselves as others see us - Robert Burns]

III. CPP PARTY GOALS

This discussion should focus on having the workshop participants identify CPP's short term and long term goals, both structural goals for building the party and substantive, political program goals that the party wants to accomplish.

Suggested goals to discuss are:

- winning the next parliamentary election to govern Cambodia.
- Specify substantive governmental policy goals.

IV. BUILDING THE CPP

This discussion focuses on having the workshop participants the specific objectives, strategies, and major tasks and activities to accomplish the goals identified on Section III above. The participants will discuss two principal topics - building party structure and building party membership. Specific subjects include:

(A) Building party structure

(1) party communications

- top down communications
- bottom up communications
- lateral communications - province to province and district to district.

(2) the structure of decision making

(3) developing party leaders

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
AND THE
INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE

WORKSHOP AGENDA
PROVINCIAL PARTY TRAINING

KG CHAM PROVINCE
MAY 28-30, 1994

8:00 AM WELCOMING REMARKS:

Provincial Party/Elected Officials

Introduction of Trainers:

* Peg McCormack, United States - NDI Field
Representative for Political Party Training

* Paul Grove, United States - International
Republican Institute, Chief of Delegation

* Momar Diop, Senegal, NDI, International
Consultant Political Party Training

8:30 AM PLENARY: "The Role of Political Parties in a Multi-
Party Democratic System"

- What political parties do
- What is a political party in a democracy
- The importance of continuity
- The loyal opposition
- What makes a political party democratic
- The challenge to maintain party discipline

Summary/Questions & Answers

9:45 AM BREAK

10:00 AM PLENARY: "Identifying Party Goals and Building the
Party"

Identifying Party Goals

- Political Party as Bridge between individual and the
government
- Identifying the issues

- Who must be involved in solving problems in a modern democracy?
- Defining the parties distinctive message
- Looking at your supporters, strengths and weaknesses

10:40 AM PLENARY: "The Importance of Structure to build a Strong Base"

Building the Party

- The importance of organization and structure
- Building party structure
- Building party membership
- Building broad public support for the party _
 - A. Party Activities
 - B. Membership
 - C. Communication to Party Members & the Public

Summary/Questions & Answers

12:00 BREAK FOR LUNCH

1:45 PM PLENARY: EXPLANATION OF SMALL GROUP WORKSHOPS and DRAFT COMMITTEE

2:00 PM GROUP # 1 Topic: Membership

GROUP # 2 Topic: Party Activities

GROUP # 3 Topic: Communication

GROUP # 4 Topic: Draft Committee

3:15 PM BREAK

3:30 PM PLENARY: Small Group Reports

4:30 PM PLENARY: Drafting Committee Report

Adoption of Participants' Strategy Document

4:45 PM QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

CLOSING

**PROVNCIAL PARTY TRAINING
WORKSHOP SCHEDULE**
Revised - Total Single-party workshops (18)

MAY- JUNE	CPP	FCP	BLDP
7	KANDAL		KANDAL
8	KG SPEOU		KG SPEOU
12		KG SPEOU	
14	PREY VENG		TAKEO
16		PREY VENG	
15	TAKEO		PREY VENG
18		KANDAL	
23		TAKEO	
28		KG CHAM	
29			KG CHAM
30	KG CHAM		
2		SVEY RIENG	
3			SVEY RIENG
4	SVEY RIENG		

NAME LIST OF PARTICIPANTS FOR PROVINCIAL WORKSHOPS:
By Province and Parties

Kg. Spue Province: BLDP

1. Vann Sokha
2. Chourn Chanthol
3. Chouk Lunn
4. Sam Sakhan
5. Pich Sareth
6. Kong Dara
7. Sok Socheath
8. Keo Sophal
9. Kong Soeun
10. Yau Saroeun
11. Phon Pheng
12. Chea Sarun
13. Vann Sokhom
14. You Sourng
15. Tep Samnang
16. Lor Sitha
17. Um Pom
18. Man Kounty
19. Khun Sorn
20. Um Bunthan
21. Thorng Bunthan
22. Mao Maneth
23. Prak Sokhun
24. Sous Sovann
25. Gnim Rim
26. Leng Seng
27. Path Sem
28. Doung Pum
29. Chea Saphan
30. Chheung Heng

TOTAL: 30 Participants.

Kg. Spue Province: CPP

1. Ly Son
2. Lay Lem
3. Ngoun Lon
4. Sok Yon
5. Moeung Sen
6. Chhoeung Noen
7. Y. Lang
8. Neang Mon
9. Chum Trouk
10. Pen Sombo
11. Om Chan
12. Lek Neang
13. Men Pum
14. Sea Cheng
15. Kuy Savouen
16. Pol Samoeun
17. Tith Ney
18. Ouch Samoeun
19. Nov Kim Sreng
20. Sok Born
21. Sim Sophong
22. Sithya Vuthy
23. Men Yean
24. Pen Sokhamony
25. Im Sophal
26. Mith Sipha
27. Khoun Nath
28. Chourng Voeur
29. Mech Nhean
30. Chay Sunly
31. Pok Sok Lim
32. Chay Keng
33. Ok Sophonn
34. Uy Savuth
35. Sun Sam Ban
36. Im Chhoun

37. Lim Bunleap
38. Mok Sorn
39. Pol Vorn
40. Um Thai
41. Chrok San
42. Meach Samoeun
43. Uk Sophal
44. Ly Orm
45. Tuy Savann
46. Sok Saphon
47. Men Muth
48. Sam Pisei
49. Men Khun
50. Im Savoeun
51. Tep Mean

TOTAL: 51 Participants

Kg. Speu Province: FUNCINPEC

1. Touch Nim
2. Lang Bun Thoeun
3. Sin You
4. Poul Sokthan
5. Kang Chandy
6. Sem Khim
7. Khoun Sok
8. Im Sarin
9. Teng Phos
10. Touch Bun Chhaeng
11. Pen Samrong
12. Chey Siphon
13. Yoeun Kim Srun
14. Yin Sophal
15. Pay Sarith
16. Men Sambath
17. Leng Kim Ly
18. Ou Seng

19. Im Vanrin
20. Bun Hun
21. Mao Sorn
22. Sam Vandy
23. Ek Mo
24. Or Choeun
25. Sao Chan Seang
26. Hang Chan Than
27. So Van
28. Kheav Khoeun
29. Dara Rith
30. Chem Phun
31. Kong Sim
32. Vath Non
33. Chey Sun Heng
34. Sok Soeung
35. Sok Sophat
36. Hul Soeun
37. Kroch Meas
38. Chub Samol
39. Ek Chin
40. Sun Khun
41. Nay Puthly
42. Khun Dim
43. Svay Chhoeun
44. Hor Nhanh
45. Pring Sol
46. Chun Chea Sarin

TOTAL: 46 Participants

Prey Veng Province: BLDP:

1. Ieng Mouly
2. Sieng Lapress
3. Chea Chun
4. Mao Borim
5. Chhom Youn
6. Sun Khut

7. Pol Sameth
 8. Keo Yan
 9. Keo Sith
 10. Kang Chhum
 11. Poeung Pring
 12. Samrith Siphon
 13. Hor Kim Tan
 14. By Lum
 15. Nay San
 16. Ou Sun
 17. Keo Ith
 18. Kok Meng
 19. Lor Try
 20. Khleang Saran
 21. Phal Samnang
 22. Sem San
 23. Den Than
 24. Pov Nanh
 25. Chea Kon
 26. Som Choeun
 27. Kith Chek
 28. Sao Sokhunthea
 29. Pen Mech
 30. Sok Veng
 31. Ly Leang Phean
 32. Hour Nop
 33. Sok Kung
 34. Nem Ban
 35. Has Sun
 36. Ban Horm
- TOTAL: 36 participants.

Prey Veng Province: CPP

Date: May 14, 1994

1. Nin Sean
2. Keo Sen
3. By Bon
4. Kith Chheoun

5. Mom Heng
6. Touch Chheang
7. Lim Em
8. Sun Kon
9. Soy Soth
10. Hang Savuth
11. Keth Chhean
12. Tep Samon
13. Keo Saphay
14. Keo Chhean
15. Sou Sean
16. Duch Kady
17. Soun Leath
18. So Samnang
19. Sin Sarak
20. Sao Sapor
21. Chhoun Soeun
22. Em Phalla
23. Pich Sok
24. Vin Young
25. Hin Samol
26. Khiev Sambath
27. Sam Sun
28. Sous Meng
29. Phil Chhom
30. Keo Sarith
31. Sean Chantha
32. Prak Chhoy
33. Pich Sok
34. Sok So
35. Chhoun Leng
36. Tan Kim Hong
37. Phea Im
38. Sok Say
39. Cheam Im
40. Puth Sarun
41. Peng Sung
42. Tith Tummon
43. Khim Sava

44. Khim Saron
45. Sok Teang
46. Chea Sroy
47. Em Sakhun
48. Hou Hon
49. Chan Ouk
50. Sim Vann
51. Hin Veasna

TOTAL: 51 Participants

Prey Veng Province: FUNCINPEC

Date: May 16, 1994

1. Mao Touch
2. Om Veng
3. Hul Savan
4. Theam Phoung
5. Phim Pan
6. Meas Chem
7. Ung Lon
8. Moul Samoeun
9. Mon Sreng
10. Sieng Davuth
11. So Samath
12. Hel Eng
13. Theang Hu
14. Houn Hon
15. Doung Prach
16. Khim Samoeun
17. Nob Mony
18. Theang Ly
19. Yim Rasmey
20. Cheang Im
21. Meng Bunntheng
22. Kong Chhoukrath
23. Phat Kosal
24. Chun Bunkhean
25. Ky Sou

26. Kong Bon
27. Sek Lok
28. Chea Han
29. Khut Ky
30. Heng Meng
31. Sim Nakry
32. Prom Bory
33. Eng Um
34. Thoeung Hu
35. Chin Borin
36. Lam Var
37. Hul Limeng
38. Yem Yany
39. Chhay Chhap
40. Srey Soy
41. Chea Heang
42. Pro Neary
43. Try Houng
44. Ko Sarong
45. Om Khon
46. Ngoun Song
47. Kim Soun
48. Doung Prak
49. Chhum Vutha
50. Meas Phan'
51. Hout Hen
52. Eath Sean
53. Pin Ban
54. Em Phoung
55. Khem Khun
56. Ouch Cheng
57. Hang Sambath
58. Eng Chhum
59. Chhum Chhean
60. Choeung Pres
61. Chhoun Soy
62. Un Oung
63. Sim Sun
64. Ros Nhel

65. Bun Sothea
66. Dok Dara
67. Em Yin
68. Kong Virak
69. Sou Sam
70. Sreng Von
71. Mao Sreng
72. Chek Phoun
73. The Sarath
74. Kheth Oung
75. Kong Hom
76. Lach Sim On
77. Sao Nom
78. Yea Yom

TOTAL: 78 Participants

Kg. Cham Province: FUNCINPEC

Date: May 28, 1994

1. Hul Thay Sreng
2. Chim Chey Rithy
3. Nget Saroeun
4. Yin Sophean
5. Chhung Koy
6. Chay Kimly
7. Peang Sunheng
8. Nay Channy
9. Son Savat
10. Hong Chheng Sim
11. Ou Soth
12. Sar Leap
13. Kheam Kimmok
14. Eng Vanna
15. An Sopheap
16. Tim Leang Chhoeun
17. Im Kim San

18. Koy Thoeun
19. Hong Sear
20. Nget Sarin
21. Nhim Touch
22. Long Bunseng
23. Ly Chheng Hout
24. Chhun Chheng Houn
25. Chhay Kim Ann
26. Nhek Chon
27. Men Sarom
28. Mon Bun Heng
29. Chan Samnang
30. Leng Peng Lay
31. Sam Sarom
32. Leng Kim Hong
33. Chhay Kim Sou
34. Tek Buntha
35. Mao Sokhunthea
36. Dul Chin
38. Prum Sam
39. Kim Chivon
40. Chi Limheng
41. Sun Nath
42. Kao Lim Heng
43. Kong Simen
44. Kru Tiengkry
45. Thuch Thet
46. Yim Samol
47. Thon kimsrun
48. Touch sok
49. Son Soeun
50. Ros Soeung
51. Top Kongkhun
52. Long Hean
53. Ou Saroeun
54. Lor Sophoan
55. Him bunhean
56. Sor chhouk
57. Hak chhayheang

58. Srun hout
59. Lom chinnan
60. Su lay yong
61. Choup chhoun
62. Ouch Brak
63. Put vimean
64. Pech chansopheap
65. Khem pisith
66. Chan bunthoeun
67. Ket mengla
68. Sroung ramet
69. Put vanna
70. Y MARY\
71. Heng sommon
72. Keu long
73. Ke Bunleng
74. Thong Sophal
75. Soeun Sokhunthy
76. Ouk Han
77. Sen Sak
78. Sal Sry
79. Chhin Peng Ser
80. Uy Samean
81. Dom Doeun
82. Hak Chhay Heang
83. Hem Samol
84. Chay Vanna
85. Meas Sothea
86. Yam Chan
87. Kim Pheak
88. Eng Long
89. Houng Kim San
90. Meas Sarat
91. Heang Srun
92. Pov Vichaka
93. Y. Sun
94. Kim Sean

TOTAL: 94 participants

Kg. Cham Province: BLDP

Date: May 30, 1994

1. Khut Lang
2. Soy Kim Or
3. Eng Sopheap
4. Ngov Kim Chhoeun
5. Mon Mady
6. Yon Sokhom
7. Bun Peng
8. Toun yoeun
9. Phon Yon
10. An Soth
11. Sok Sao
12. Nhem Sarin
13. Koung Lim
14. Ung Kim Soeun
15. Touch Sitheara
16. Ouch Yun
17. San Sytha
18. Vong Samkan
19. Soeun Seng
20. Ouch Sim Chhun
21. Toeun Yin
22. Sun Peng Thang
23. Hout Phally
24. Touch Samon
25. Khut Sothea
26. Moung sophan
- 27.. Son sim
28. SOK kimol
29. Nghov kimleng
30. Ek chhon
31. Kim phol
32. Cham khon
33. Din on
34. Kheu sarith
35. Y phally

36. Phon chanthea
37. Keo thon
38. Por mengtheang
39. Cheam chanthon
40. Van yeu
41. Moun vannarin
42. Meang chhorvy
43. Chhay yeun
44. Khin mon
45. Va sok
46. CHOUV IENG
47. Pal siyan
48. Kung van
49. Uch y
50. Mao sreynoun
51. Heang chantha
52. Vung thon
53. Siuve saveun
54. Pen chhon
55. Nin yang
56. Youk sreynin
57. Ros deun
58. Veng vuthy
59. Nhem sareun
60. Thoang saron
61. Kung va
62. Uch try
63. Krouch sison
64. Tit mala
65. Yich lon
66. Khieu sopha
67. Meng sieng
68. Nor kheang
69. Tang kim long
70. Chher kimhon
71. Preap khon
72. Chea san
73. Vey buntheun
74. Sun sophal

75. Vung merrithy
76. In nhel
77. Ly peng nghoun
78. So chea
79. Tep cheun
80. Hout Phally
81. En ben
82. Kao lim
83. Neang sokha
84. Su hach
85. Hour kimheng
86. Lonh kimsan
87. Kung long
88. Ouch sieng
89. Nop sameun
90. Tu chheangveng
91. Kit mengseang
92. Koung ser
93. Hak kimhor
94. Cheng sunheang
95. Va run
96. San chan
97. Heng him
98. Chhim sropun
99. Ros borra
100. youch sreynna
101. Lim peng nghoun
102. Cheap visal
103. Van chheang
104. Chhim much
105. Chea vanno
106. Khi chhin
107. Phat sok
108. Nghet srun
109. Tong an
110. Chea chanreun
111. Krouch An
112. Van Thoeun

TOTAL : 112

KG. Cham Province: CPP

Date: May 29, 1994

1. Tong Chhay Lip
2. Pong Yen
3. Sim Eng
4. Sam Cheth
5. Mok Sim
6. Som Kim Chour
7. Im Chien
8. Noun Chhoeun
9. Thuch That
10. Im Neath
11. Meas Yuth
12. Hem Meng Kheam
13. Bun Sokhum
14. Som Chan Dasong
15. Sum Sok ly
16. Touch Chhay
17. Sun Thote
18. Chiem Rom
19. Chhay Vansy
20. Heng Lim Hour
21. Chan Len
22. Tiem Dam
23. Ros Lauth
24. Chea Kan
25. Chem Savay
26. Khong Suneng
27. Lom Laing
28. Duk Touch
29. Meas Davuth
30. Soun Dy
31. Kim Dy
32. Misna Mut
33. Tea Vath
34. Kam Tay

35. Ros Chhin
36. Meas Pha
37. Hay Ngoun Ly
38. Ek Thorn
39. Vann Sao
40. Kim NuthVuthy
41. Yin Sarith
42. Khun Tha
43. Mao Nem
44. Pan Sas
45. Pan Chhiv
46. Sot Dim
47. Sok An
48. Dan Chhen
49. Thun Phan
50. Uch On
51. May Chan Seng
52. Ung Don
53. Svay Pholla
54. Kol Thearit
55. Thaung Sam
56. Ngoun Van Chanthly
57. Pal Salim
58. Ung Samrit
60. Moeun tha
61. Khim Kimchun
62. Khim Chanthly
63. Bo Ros
64. Kim Srey Pov
65. Noun Polin
66. Hak Bunny
67. Krouch Phoan
68. Touch Leng
69. Siv Huy
70. Nong Sokhen
71. Ly Kimsen
72. Sor Sina
73. Siem Sok

TOTAL: 73 Participants
Takeo Province : FUNCINPEC
Date: 23/05/94

1. An Tong
2. Toch Pheng
3. Yen Socheat
4. Nget Chanthou
5. Sorn Phanna
6. Ou vannak
7. I Kim Sean
8. Chan Somny
9. Pol Ly
10. Thai Nara
11. Chao Khan
12. Chheng I
13. Say Chheang
14. Nhem Sam' An
15. Ok Try
16. Khem Vanthy
17. Liv Pothea ron
18. Sok Sokhom
19. Seak Sithoeun
20. Chan Kiri
21. Ek Eng
22. Bun Sarin
23. Bun Sarong
24. Las Pich
25. Teb Kong
26. San sok
27. Ok Thorng
28. Touch Dai
29. Leng Keng
30. Meng Samnang
31. Dam sreng
32. Ieng Kouy
33. Mea Kavuth
34. Kok Deab
35. Nob sam' Ol

36. Ieng Sophat
 37. Chhong Chheang
 38. Chhoeung I
 39. Pen Mai
 40. Nob Pisar
 41. Tob thorn
 42. Tes Saum Sok
 43. Lau Sari
 44. Chhoeum Chen
 45. Long Sem
 46. Pen Sam 'at
 47. Ok Sat
 48. Hean Horn
 49. So Sarim
 50. Nget Sot
 51. Srey Poe
 52. Soy Son
 53. Sam Sean
 54. Sang sim
 55. Chhoem Chan Moni
 56. Chea Chhoel
- Total Paticipants : 56

TAKEO PROVINCE : BLDP

Date:

1. Sek Samoeun
2. Svay Hoeun
3. Men Pich
4. Prak Kim Leng
5. Kang Sokhon
6. Em Korm
7. Hang Cham
8. Srey Eng
9. Dum Chan
10. Sun Kril
11. Sek Syneang
12. Long Hay
13. Sok Phan
14. Ses Som

15. Chey Loeumg
16. Kong Hout
17. Chim in
18. Nget Ry
19. Mom Son
20. Lay Kim Srun
21. Than Thit
22. Nao Phim
23. Kim Sarun
24. Sean Von
25. Chhim Nget
26. Long Saray
27. Ros Chay
28. Sar Sarin
29. Sok Phos
30. Long Kao Mony
31. Prak Chan thari
32. Seng Simoun
33. Bin Heng
34. Chea Vandy
35. Tao Sokhun
36. Chap Savuth
37. Chum Khoeun
38. Koy Cham
39. Nou Samoeum
40. Nou Ouk
41. Kiev Long Min
42. Sin Trey
43. Peng Sovann
44. In Phan
45. Nou Sarin
46. Hem Him
47. Kiev Sama
48. Mao Mean Samnang
49. Min Channa
50. Nak Sim
51. Kiev Sarun
52. Chap E
53. Ngak Kim Sray

54. Phieng Phear
55. Koy Chem
56. Meas Yon
57. Ngon Srey Mom

TOTAL: 57 Participants

Takeo Province: CPP

Date: May 15, 1994

1. Noun Sangnim
2. Sar Din
3. Chour Sengkhiev
4. Pich Chanrith
5. Cheav Hor
6. Tek Tonglim
7. Om Han
8. Chim Choun
9. Che Sandy
10. Kin Neth
11. Kin Neth
12. In Samol
13. Nhep Ly
14. Nou Sang Va
15. Ith Sarun
16. Prak Thouch
17. Khiev Houn
18. In Khun
19. Ky Hak
20. Om Samoeun
21. Chao Sophon
22. Van Sarun
23. Ith Vandy
24. Sok Yan
25. Sam San
26. Puth Kdav
27. So Sarou
28. Sou Phirin

29. Hot Chem
30. Nouy Sorn
31. Vol Chin
32. Kong Phov
33. Kang Samdoeun
34. Venh Hin
35. Kham Sophan
36. Em Chhum
37. Srun Kimheng
38. Te tong Sin
39. Uth Ngun
40. Kong Sokhun
41. Thor Sen
42. Hong Chin
43. Chap Sophaphan
44. Noun Chan
45. Pich Sasun
46. Mao Phan
47. Trak Sophath
48. Plok Phan

Total Participants 48.

Kandal Province: FUNCINPEC

Date: May, 18 1994

1. Ing Kim Chhay
2. Prum Bunnath
3. Uk Chim
4. Sang Korn
5. Seng Sambath
6. Mean Veasna
7. Ing Heng
8. Chea Leang
9. Phouk Chan Phal
10. Touch Leang
11. Chok Huy
12. Bou Sothy
13. Chea Boeun

14. Sam Penh
15. Chea Sambath
16. Long Sar Orn
17. Pol Sok Phay
18. Hor Heng
19. Phan Na
20. Sim San
21. Keo Vibol
22. Sok Chan Tha
23. Keo Vitou
24. Sam Bo
25. Hong Chea
26. Ek Sam Oun
27. Seng Gnoun Chit
28. Mom Sambo
29. Hang Hel
30. Sam Rithy
31. Soy Som
32. Soung Keo
33. Ponh Sokhun
34. Morn Mon
35. Leng Mon
36. Chap Voeung
37. Cheng Chom
38. Neap Khoun
39. Hul Khin
40. Keo Kim Chin
41. Chan Phal Sarath
42. Chok Van
43. Kran Sary
44. Pou Heng
45. Heng Chanda
46. Peng Chun Seng
47. Seng Sambath
48. Kong Roeun
49. Oung Samoeun
50. Um Heng
51. Ouk Sorn
52. Choun Mao

TOTAL: 52 Participants

Kandal Province: CPP

Date: May 7, 1994

1. Roy Chhunly
2. Khiev Nin
3. Kin Heang
4. Chum Sarun
5. Meas Sophanarith
6. Youn Phoun
7. Keo Meas
8. Mam Soeung
9. Pich Leang Hy
10. Hun Son
11. Kim Hong
12. Sieng Tek
13. Ou Samnang
14. Ngov Horn
15. Tith Sieng
16. Sam Vanthy
17. Chrea Savath
18. Sant Year
19. Sok Bun Sin
20. Uch Yorn
21. Khiev Khin
22. Tach Hun
23. Nay Sokha
24. Peov Sokhan
25. Mith Chan Sokhunthy
26. Sous Saram
27. Noun Neardey
28. Sin sim
29. Oum thon
30. Hak vandy
31. Cheang ratanak
32. Chea Reun
33. Touch samath
34. Prak chamroeun
35. Top San

36. Chea REOUN
37. Nuth path
38. Phlok phan
39. Tep Sothy
40. Ou samourn
41. Khieu som ath
42. Nghet norm
43. Thao Chamroeun
44. Kun kim
45. Mak sam Oeurn
46. Tep Ngoun
47. Chhim Chhon
48. Vong Soth

TOTAL : 48 PARTICIPANTS

KANDAL PROVINCE: BLDP

Date:

1. Sin Seam
2. Chich Morn
3. Orn Ma
4. Kry Tuy
5. Rous Samon
6. Kao Sam 'ol
7. En Saven
8. Benh Sambath
9. Nong Sat
10. Prak Bun Meng
11. Kong Sok
12. Khem Sok Kun
13. Um Sam Bath
14. Song Hout
15. Chhorn Pheap
16. Pen Saven
17. Bun Chan Thorn
18. Oeng Tech Leng
19. Iv Visal
20. Sak Khem Reth

21. Keo Hok
22. Sang Visoth
23. Mao Savuth
24. Sok Reth
25. Mean Thy
26. Pang Khut
27. Ma Chan Leab

Svay Rieng Province: CPP

Date: June 4, 1994

1. Doung Sarouen
2. Touch Sak
3. Kim Nang
4. Sam Tha
5. Doung Vanna
6. Mork Sim
7. Chom Hatt
8. Kim Thea
9. My Lon
10. Thong Cheng
11. Reach Tieng
12. Bun Savann
13. Prak Phoeun
14. Prak Cham
15. My Un
16. Chun Sarim
17. Ros Chay
18. Men Khuy
19. Mom Tith
20. Mao Virak
21. Morn Chan
22. Sok Yorn
23. Khien Phorl
24. Nhem Lass
25. Kong Rem
26. Chem Nath
27. Chea Yieng
28. Pich Savann

29. Nep Sarun
30. Kao Sath
31. Soth Kim Chan
32. Yin K Vanna
33. Keo Samoeun
34. Prak Kong
35. Sao Leng
36. Prum Vannak
37. Srey Hoy
38. Yin Samouth
39. Danh Than
40. Lek SOrn
41. Puth Soy
42. Sok Chanda
43. Tep Thun
44. Som Sorn
45. Keo Chan
46. Keo Chan
47. Neang Samath
48. Men Vibol
49. Sok Sareth
50. So Tith
51. Hem Kan
52. Tieng On
53. Pao Sopheap
54. Nea Hon
55. Ing Bora
56. Sous Dim
57. Keo Sokhon

TOTAL: 57 Participants

Svay Rieng Province: FUNCINPEC

Date: June 2, 1994

1. Chin Sao
2. Hem Cheat
3. Sok Khun

4. Neth Bunna
5. Lor Nget Vuthy
6. Dan Chansan
7. Chim Sarin
8. Meas Thon
9. Pich Men
10. Mom Om
11. Tep Meanrak Sorya
12. Chin Savuth
13. So My
14. Sek Som
15. Meas Von
16. Keo Cheap
17. On Ty
18. Chea Samon
19. In Keath
20. Prum Phon
21. Hy Sun
22. Srey Som Pov
23. Chan Som
24. Som Sen
25. Sum Cheang
26. Cheang Kim Heng
27. Keo Som
28. Lim Nhean
29. Sok Vanna
30. Pich Sary
31. So Thay
32. Peng Bunnarith
33. Chum Phang
34. Khem Ngoy
35. Ouch Chor
36. Ngoun Som
37. Phon Narith
38. Kong Mean
39. Soung Yong
40. Yin Sokhun
41. Phok Yeun
42. Chhon Chay

43. Srey Sampov
44. Pol Phan
45. Mao Samith
46. Khiev Dy
47. Ny Men
48. Mao Sakean
49. Chap Chean
50. Kang Savuth
51. Kong Sarun
52. Nounng Sarath
53. Prak Uth
54. Chhun Sarom
55. Bun Savuth
56. Prum San Ang
57. Yin Yath
58. Kol Sokhom
59. Rath Sean
60. Bou Chhon
61. Ty San
62. Y Thun
63. Chap Chhoeun
64. Kang Ravuth
65. Pen Tham
66. Ouk Bunath
67. Keo Sean

TOTAL: 67 Participants

Svay Rieng Province: BLDP

Date: June 3, 1994

1. Lach Ngorn
2. Pen Phirum
3. Nang Sarum
4. Mom Sam An
5. Ram Hoeun

7. Sun Sokheang
8. Prak Socheat
9. Sok Saravuth
10. Chan Say
11. Chey Ron
12. Ouk Lami
13. Hol Phol
14. Kim Vuthy
15. Then Nhow
16. Mak Savon
17. Soun Siv
18. Nget Sophat
19. Minh Savong
20. Keo Samoeun
21. Minh Savann
22. In Vuthy
23. In Soeun
24. Sok Sarouen
25. In Setha
26. Ouk Sambath
27. Sin Bora
28. Rous Sarorn
29. Morm Monophai
30. Phon Kim Chheng
31. Mom Boribo
32. Ouk Sambath
33. Sor Sara
34. Hing Sakorn
35. Seang Sina
36. Mom Sareth
37. Kroch Khan
38. Sor Kean
39. Tet Pheap
40. Sam Phat
41. Ou Toeu
42. Hol Kea
43. Sao Sary
44. Lanh Sarin

45. Prak Chak Riya
 46. Nhorm Sotheavuth
 47. Sath MengHeng
 48. Sok Sokha
 49. Koul Van
 50. So Sophal
 51. SO Sokhorn
 52. So Sopheak
 53. Sek Potheabuthset
 54. Ham Sokhun
 55. Yen Nhorn
 56. Tep Saman
 57. Mao Sok Tea
 58. Keo Kiman
 59. Mao Sophanna
 60. Noun Vibol
 61. Norng Son
 62. Pen Samoeun
 63. Men Samoeun
 64. Thab Soben
 65. Ven Chea
 66. Kong Sao
 67. Soch Heng
 68. Keo Sabay
 69. Mom Socheat
 70. sous Pann
 71. So Samkhan
 72. Meas Chanthorn
 73. Noek Sithol
 74. Sor Sophal
 75. Prak Sophon
- TOTAL: 75 Participants

Appendix Six

**Provincial Party Training Workshops
Reports
September, 1994**

MEMORANDUM

TO: Samdech Son Sann
H.E. Son Soubert
H.E. Ieng Mouly
H.E. Pen Thol
Members of Parliament
Other Members of the BLDP Executive Committee

FROM: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)

SUBJ: BLDP Provincial Party Training Report

DATE: September 1994

SUMMARY

During the four-week period from 7 May to 4 June, 337 BLDP party members attended political party workshops conducted by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). Workshops were held at BLDP party offices and other sites in the provincial towns of Kandal, Kompang Speou, Takeo, Prey Veng, Kompang Cham, and Svey Rieng. Participants included local party representatives, election workers and other BLDP provincial supporters. Sixty-two provincial districts were represented. Among the total number of participants, 13 were women. NDI trainers included resident field staff and international political party experts from Senegal and the United States. A representative of the International Republican Institute (IRI) also participated in the workshops in Prey Veng, Kompang Cham and Svey Rieng.

The provincial workshops were organized in consultation with BLDP's General Secretary and other members of the Executive Committee in order to determine the most appropriate approach to take at the local level. During these discussions, BLDP representatives expressed interest in receiving NDI's assistance in the provinces, with particular focus on local party structure and organization, membership, communications, party activities and resource development.

During this same time period, NDI and IRI jointly convened an international seminar in Phnom Penh on 22 March. With the principle theme of "grassroots growth and development", the seminar covered the importance of local party structure and the role of third-party coalition partners. NDI's provincial trainers served on the expert panel during this one-day seminar as well.

METHODOLOGY

(1) Workshop Agendas and Topics:

Ongoing consultations with BLDP officials in Phnom Penh provided the foundation for the preparation of workshop agendas. The comments and suggestions of BLDP's Members of Parliament were especially helpful in designing the structure and content of the provincial workshops. Through these pre-workshop meetings, a range of party development issues, including local organization and structure, membership, party activities and communications, were discussed in order to identify and prioritize the topics to be included on the agendas. From this process, draft agendas were prepared by NDI's resident party training field staff and then reviewed by BLDP officials in Phnom Penh. Final agendas incorporated the comments and suggestions that emerged from this process of review and discussion.

Topical themes included:

Role of political parties in a multi-party democratic system:

- what political parties do;
- what makes a party democratic;
- the importance of continuity;
- the concept of loyal opposition;
- the challenge to maintain party discipline.

Identifying party goals and objectives:

- assessing the party's strengths and weaknesses;
- defining short and long-term party term goals;
- identifying issues;
- developing the party's distinctive message;
- identifying the party's substantive policy goals.

Strengthening the party at the local level:

- importance of organization and structure;
- membership retention and recruitment;
- party activities;
- internal party communication;
- relationship to other political parties;
- strategies for gaining public support.

(2) Logistics:

Logistical arrangements for each workshop were made by NDI logistics staff members in close coordination with local party leaders. BLDP MPs were very helpful in this process by providing the names of provincial party leaders and introducing our logistics staff to local contacts in advance. Before each workshop, NDI staff members visited the provincial town and met with BLDP's provincial representatives to survey and prepare the workshop site, to review necessary transportation, meals and lodging arrangements for the workshop participants, and to deliver workshop invitations to BLDP members in the provinces.

WORKSHOP FORMAT

Each workshop covered a full 8-hour day and began with an introduction by the local party leader to NDI's trainers and an explanation about the purpose of the workshop. Morning sessions were devoted to general plenary presentations by the trainers, group discussion, and questions and answers. Presentations covered the major themes on the agenda--for example, the need for local party and structure and identifying and achieving party goals--as well as specific topics such as building party membership, communication to party members and the public, and organizing local party activities.

Through different scenarios on membership, party activities, and communications, small group breakout sessions in the afternoon provided participants with the opportunity to interactively work together (see attachments). The purpose of the scenarios was to address practical examples of different issues of importance to local party activities in order to encourage problem-solving, positive interaction and effective internal communication. In addition, the small group sessions were intended to offer participants an opportunity to work together to build skills and self-confidence. NDI's Cambodian training assistants sat in on these sessions and were available to answer questions about the scenarios and to encourage active participation by everyone. Trainers were also available as needed throughout the afternoon sessions. Written materials, designed to supplement each topic on the agenda, provided additional explanation of the issues discussed throughout the day.

WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS

General Themes:

The level of interaction among BLDP participants varied in each province. In some provinces, participants were very candid about expressing their concerns about a number of issues that had been foremost on their minds since the election. In these workshops, participants appeared to believe that they might not have the opportunity to state their views to party leaders in Phnom Penh directly and wanted NDI to communicate their concerns for them. In other workshops, participants were indirect in their complaints about the national leadership but were nonetheless quite vocal about the political and organizational barriers they face in the provinces, particularly from CPP.

While numerous common themes emerged during the four-week period that NDI spent with BLDP members in the provinces, the two issues raised most frequently were:

- * a continuing fear of political violence and intimidation from CPP partisans;
- * the lack of financial, human and material resources to support local party offices, staff and activities.

It should also be noted that these two issues were raised repeatedly by BLDP provincial participants at the NDI/IRI seminar in Phnom Penh in late May and appear to represent critical obstacles for the party in strengthening the morale and confidence of BLDP's supporters at the local level. These, and other issues raised during the provincial workshops, will be addressed in more detail below under the following headings:

- * Party Structure;
- * Party Communications;
- * Expectations;
- * Accountability/Transparency at the National and Local Levels;

Party Structure:

(1) Local Level:

The most serious post-election barrier for BLDP in the provinces is the lack of resources and skills needed to establish and sustain an operational party structure at the provincial, district, communal and village levels. The absence of local structure presents numerous challenges for BLDP, both now and in the future, and it is illustrated in several different ways. First, while certain individuals are clearly acknowledged as local party leaders, BLDP's limited human, financial and material resources impedes the ability of these individuals to take positive action at the local level as provincial representatives of the party. Second, provincial party leaders reported that they do not convene party meetings and have not done so since the election. Third, local party structure is an essential organizational tool for building a constituency for the party in the provinces yet the lack of structure makes it virtually impossible to expand the party's local base of support.

To address these issues, BLDP members expressed strong interest in (a) raising money to be used for party activities in the provinces; (b) strengthening their own skills and confidence through leadership development training; and (c) devising specific strategies to improve local party structure. To accomplish these goals, local leaders need the support of their national leaders in Phnom Penh.

(2) National Level:

For more than a decade, BLDP, like Funcinpec, operated as a resistance movement *in exile*. For this reason, it is difficult to determine, with any degree of certainty, the genuine strength of support that BLDP enjoys at the national or local levels. BLDP's most skilled and active resistance and pre-election party leaders now serve in the National Assembly or the Royal Government. They are understandably faced with carrying out new responsibilities under very difficult circumstances.

BLDP has taken few steps since the election to transform itself from a resistance movement to a modern political party. The attention of top party leaders has shifted toward managing a complex and uncertain relationship with its coalition partners. As a result, BLDP's long-term viability and success in the provinces has been subordinated to other pressing matters in the capital. While this post-election trend may be necessary in the current environment, BLDP will be unable to compete effectively in a multi-party system in the future without an overall party structure that incorporates, supports and promotes its leaders at the local level.

Communications:

(1) Internal:

Related to party structure is the important tool of intra-party communication. The lack of a viable local structure, manifested in particular by the failure to convene local party meetings, suggests that BLDP's communication system is not working adequately, if at all. Also clearly absent is a system of reporting in which a two-directional level of input at the local level is maintained on a regular and reliable basis. Follow-up on information that is communicated also appears to be limited as well. This lack of regular communication, both from the top down and from the bottom up, has left local party leaders feeling abandoned and unappreciated.

(2) External:

The role that local party leaders play in informing the national leadership about pressing local issues is very important. The absence of regular internal communication limits the availability of information about governmental and parliamentary decisions and action. As a result, local party leaders find it very difficult to communicate substantively with supporters outside the party apparatus and with the Cambodian population in general.

(3) **Inter-Party Communications:**

In every workshop, BLDP members uniformly cited a continuing fear of political intimidation and violence by CPP despite the appointment of Funcinpec governors and vice governors. The pre-election assassinations of both BLDP and Funcinpec officials, participants noted that many of those believed responsible continue to serve in local administrative positions. The protection of local activists remains the highest of priorities yet provincial leaders do not believe that their safety will be guaranteed if they begin to organize or emerge with any heightened degree of party visibility. Official and informal communication between BLDP and CPP and Funcinpec provincial officials can provide a very important mechanism for allaying these concerns and for strengthening inter-party interaction and cooperation.

Expectations

In general, provincial leaders reported no significant change at the provincial, district, communal or village levels and they appear impatient for some evidence to the contrary. BLDP workshop participants also expressed great frustration that the party did not gain more seats in parliament and attributed this both to an unsafe and non-neutral campaign environment and to an identity that merged with that of Funcinpec during the pre-election period. The inability of national leaders to secure jobs following the election through the expected integration of BLDP members into the security and military forces was another complaint expressed repeatedly at the provincial workshops. To these issues, NDI explained that no political party, whether it wins or loses, is able to provide jobs for all of its campaign supporters. NDI trainers also pointed out that this type of complaint is commonly heard following elections and is not unique to Cambodia.

To BLDP's provincial leaders, the party's performance in the election appears to represent failure. Yet it also presents the party with an unexpected advantage. Although BLDP officials serve in the government, Funcinpec and CPP are far more vulnerable to public disaffection than BLDP if the government fails to meet public expectations for change. It is important for national leaders to take the time to explain to local supporters the basic characteristics of governing coalitions in which power and equal credit for the successful implementation of policies and programs are shared among the partners in the coalition.

At the same time, the absence of a formal government opposition presents a challenge for BLDP that is considerably greater than that of its coalition partners, particularly given the party's lack of resources. To address this, it is important that national leaders communicate BLDP's achievements and activism in the capital, particularly through its work in the National Assembly, to its provincial supporters on a regular basis. For example, the high profile role of BLDP officials in the Ministry of Information and the Human Rights Commission provides the party with a unique opportunity to develop and maintain a distinct identity in support of the democratization process without destabilizing the coalition. By sharing the party's accomplishments with provincial leaders, and supporting their efforts to communicate these to the local population, BLDP will be able to demonstrate that the party is working hard to transform its fundamental principles into practice.

Accountability/Transparency:

The presence and involvement of BLDP MPs at the workshops indicates that they are more active in the provinces than their Funcinpec and CPP counterparts. While this impression was supported by workshop participants, they nevertheless expressed disappointment that their national leaders in the parliament and government do not spend more time visiting their local districts. While most local leaders appear ready and willing to support the party in the future, their loyalty should not be taken for granted.

Local leaders are especially concerned with how to work on behalf of the party when national leaders are largely invisible and unaccountable to party members and voters in the provinces. In particular, provincial leaders have limited knowledge about what the government is doing and reported that they must expend considerable effort to travel to the capital for the minimal information they gain.

Participants also expressed apprehension about what they can do to promote the party's interests at the provincial level without adequate financial resources. On this point, they appear to believe that national leaders are raising money for the party but are keeping it all in the capital to support their new status as parliamentarians or government officials. Financial transparency within the party can be promoted by opening the internal budgeting process to local leaders and allowing them to have some input into how the party's limited resources are allocated.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are several short-term and long-term measures that BLDP can begin to implement including:

Short-Term:

(1) Communication and Information:

Comments made by local leaders and supporters during provincial workshops and at the March seminar indicate that BLDP risks losing its *existing* membership through inaction and by default. Regular contact with local offices in the provinces should be initiated immediately. This contact should be maintained as frequently as possible and can be accomplished without significant expense to the party. For those who are not already doing so, BLDP MPs should visit their districts at least once a month. While there, MPs may convene meetings with provincial representatives to discuss party policy, enacted and pending legislation, relations with other parties, executive decisions and other relevant governmental action. Provincial leaders should be given the opportunity to report and discuss local issues, *whether or not immediate solutions to such local problems exist*. Regular face-to-face contact is essential to ensuring that provincial party members remain motivated and inspired.

(2) Local Party Structure:

Without solid party organization and structure, political parties operate inefficiently. Equally important, without organization and structure, people remain individuals and are more inclined to act in their own self-interests. BLDP should move immediately to implement a local structure at the district, commune and village levels. In order to do this, BLDP will have to allocate resources, however limited they might be, to the provinces for establishment of local branches at these different levels. By reviewing BLDP's performance in the election, the party can prioritize and target these resources strategically. If BLDP does not do this, the party will find it difficult to retain its membership, attract new supporters, communicate its message and accomplishments to the public, or support its elected officials as they act to represent the people who voted for BLDP in the election.

(3) Party Identity and Message:

Over time, strong political parties become associated with particular issues and positions. These issues and positions help shape the party's identity. Regardless of ideology, any political party has two major goals. These are (1) to win elections at the national and local levels so that it can govern and (2) to promote its policies through governmental action in important sectors of national life. To achieve its goals, BLDP must transform its policies into action so that the party's identity becomes known to as many people as possible. Because effective communication is the key to success for any political party, transparency is also an important tool. In a multi-party system, a political party cannot be a secret organization. On the contrary, political parties must increase and attract support from as many people as possible in order to outnumber its competitors.

During the campaign, BLDP was identified as the non-royalist, anti-communist, pro-democracy party. BLDP candidates attempted to incorporate these basic principles into their campaign message to the voters. With the restoration of the monarchy, BLDP should evaluate and refine its pre-election message so that it is clear and concise and then develop a strategy for communicating it to the public. In addition, the Royal Government drafted a government policy statement that was unanimously approved by the National Assembly. This government policy covers everything from health to human rights, from foreign policy to national sovereignty. Within the framework of the government policy document, BLDP has begun to identify specific issues it wants the government to address and its works actively to enact related legislation in the parliament. This approach can provide a positive contribution to the complex process of national reconstruction and should be continued and strengthened wherever possible.

In addition, BLDP should begin to establish relationships with organizations that operate outside the governmental arena and the party structure. Such relationships can provide a low-cost opportunity for BLDP to become more visible in the provinces. There are more than 150 international NGOs and 30 local NGOs providing development assistance to Cambodia. In an

continuing effort to develop and strengthen Cambodia's human resources, foreign NGOs transfer skills and knowledge about the development process by employing and training Cambodian staff to carry out this work. In the future, skilled Cambodians may then establish additional independent local NGOs. NGOs are operational in almost all provinces and work at the district, communal and village levels. Cambodian NGO workers help to implement rural development and small credit programs. Working actively in support of basic human rights and needs, they are also building schools, wells and hospitals.

Cambodian NGO workers have access to valuable information about what people think and what they need. The value of this information to the party should not be underestimated. This information would be very useful to BLDP MPs in their oversight role with the government, particularly with those who are responsible for overseeing the development of specific operational sectors such as agriculture, health and education.

Cambodian NGO workers are also voters. Through the solid contacts that local NGO workers have established at many levels throughout the country, they are in a unique position to help mobilize new BLDP supporters in the future. Provincial party leaders can initiate and maintain regular contact with Cambodian NGO workers in order to inform themselves about development projects in their provinces. In this way, local party leaders they can serve as informal intermediaries between BLDP MPs, government officials and citizens in the provinces.

These relationships can also be used to establish a positive association between BLDP and the improvements that are achieved through the efforts of NGOs at the local level. Through this process, the party can also begin to develop and implement its own community projects such as painting a wat or school, organizing youth and sports leagues, and inviting ministers and MPs to address village meetings about pressing local issues.

Long-Term:

(1) Leadership Development and Training:

Although leadership is a quality that not everyone has, leadership development is a process that almost anyone can benefit from. Informal leaders exist at every level of Cambodian society, whether or not these individuals are recognized through appointed or elected title and position. BLDP lacks the human resources it needs to insure the growth of the party. To address this, new leadership at different levels of the party should be cultivated and encouraged. Particular emphasis should be placed on recruiting and training lower-level members in the capital and the provinces. Using this report and supplementary materials as a guide, BLDP can organize its own provincial training activities focusing on improving organizational, management, and political development skills.

A combination of cultural and social factors continue to constrain the economic and political advancement of Cambodian women yet the plight of most, in the provinces and the capital, remains desperate and untenable. Yet, while nearly 75 percent of an estimated population of 9 to 10 million are believed to be women and their dependent children, NDI noted the absence

of women and younger people both at BLDP's provincial workshops and at the seminar in Phnom Penh. Cambodian women have long been acknowledged as essential to the social and economic well-being of their families yet they are routinely neglected in the country's political affairs and leadership positions remain firmly out of reach. In addition, students and young people represent Cambodia's voters of the future and they are vitally important to the development of the party. Population estimates make a compelling argument for specifically targeting women and young people through membership recruitment drives, as participants in party training activities, and for leadership positions, particularly at the local level.

The strategic planning process described below can also be used one vehicle through which emerging local leaders are identified and given responsibility for undertaking specific tasks on behalf of the party.

(2) Strategic Plan:

In addition to the short-term measures described above, BLDP could develop a 3- or 5-Year Strategic Party Plan. Key elements of this plan would include identifying and developing

- * party goals and objectives;
- * electoral and post-electoral party activities at the national and provincial levels;
- * resources (human, financial and material);
- * timeframe.

Throughout this process, BLDP should solicit and incorporate the views of members from all levels of the party, both in Phnom Penh and the provinces. A special commission of BLDP MPs, government officials, other executive committee members, and representatives from important electoral districts could be established to carry this out.

CONCLUSION

Cambodia's post-election policy of national reconciliation represents the highest test of national will and self-determination. Last year's UN-organized parliamentary elections brought 90% of registered adult voters to the polls. Confronted with recurring political violence, BLDP's perseverance during the campaign demonstrated an impressive force of party unity and courage. Today, as a partner in the Royal Government, BLDP is faced with the need to simultaneously balance several distinct but inter-related governance, parliamentary, and electoral functions at once. The retention, recruitment and training of members who can effectively serve BLDP's long-term interests is essential. A strategy to improve the leadership skills and active participation of members at all levels is equally central to the development and success of the party in the future.

This report has been prepared as a party management, organizing and training tool for the benefit of BLDP national and provincial party leaders and members. The information contained in this report primarily reflects the observations and analysis of the NDI party development field staff who have worked with BLDP in Cambodia since January 1993. It is intended to assist BLDP with identifying and achieving its short and long-term party development goals. We hope that this report will contribute to this process.

MEMORANDUM

TO: H.R.H. Prince Norodom Ranarriddh, First Prime Minister,
President of Funcinpec Party

H.R.H. Prince Norodom Sirivudh, Minister of Foreign Affairs
and International Cooperation, Vice Prime Minister, General
Secretary of Funcinpec Party

Members of the Funcinpec Party Steering Committee

FROM: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)

SUBJ: Funcinpec Provincial Party Training Report

DATE: September 1994

SUMMARY

During the four-week period from 7 May to 4 June, 397 Funcinpec party members attended political party workshops conducted by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). Workshops were held at Funcinpec party offices in the provincial towns of Kandal, Kompang Speou, Takeo, Prey Veng, Kompang Cham, and Svey Rieng. Participants included local party chiefs, election workers and other provincial Funcinpec supporters. Sixty-one provincial districts were represented. Among the total number of participants, twenty-two were women. NDI trainers included resident field staff and international political party experts from Senegal and the United States. A representative of the International Republican Institute (IRI) also participated in the workshops in Prey Veng, Kompang Cham and Svey Rieng.

In consultation with Funcinpec's General Secretary, the provincial workshops were organized in response to requests for assistance from more than 200 Funcinpec provincial leaders and activists who attended the NDI/IRI seminar on 16-17 March in Phnom Penh. At that time, Funcinpec members expressed interest in receiving further training in the provinces, with particular focus on local party structure and organization, membership, communications and party activities. Following the March seminar, NDI continued to meet with Funcinpec party officials in Phnom Penh in order to determine the most appropriate approach to take at the provincial level.

METHODOLOGY

(1) Workshop Agendas and Topics:

Ongoing consultations with Funcinpec officials in Phnom Penh provided the foundation for the development of workshop agendas. The comments and suggestions raised by Funcinpec participants at the March seminar were also very helpful in designing the structure and content of the provincial workshops. Through pre-workshop meetings with Funcinpec MPs, steering committee members and the General Secretary, a range of party development issues were prioritized as topics for inclusion on the workshop agendas. From this process, draft agendas were prepared by NDI's resident party training field staff and then reviewed by Funcinpec officials. Final agendas incorporated the comments and suggestions that emerged from this process of review and discussion with Funcinpec officials.

Topical themes included:

Role of political parties in a multi-party democratic system:

- what political parties do;
- what makes a party democratic;
- the importance of continuity;
- the concept of loyal opposition;
- the challenge to maintain party discipline.

Identifying party goals and objectives:

- assessing the party's strengths and weaknesses;
- defining short and long-term party goals;
- identifying issues;
- developing the party's distinctive message;
- identifying the party's substantive policy goals.

Strengthening the party at the local level:

- importance of organization and structure;
- membership retention and recruitment;
- party activities;
- internal party communication;
- relationship to other political parties;
- strategies for gaining public support.

(2) Logistics:

Logistical arrangements for each workshop were made by NDI logistics staff members in close coordination with local party leaders. The administrative staff at Funcinpec's Phnom Penh party headquarters were very helpful to this process by providing a list of provincial party leaders and introducing our logistics staff to local contacts through written communication sent out to the provinces in advance. Before each workshop, NDI staff members visited the provincial town and met with the Funcinpec representatives to survey and prepare the workshop site, to review any necessary transportation, meals and lodging arrangements for participants, and to deliver invitations to attend the workshops.

WORKSHOP FORMAT

Each workshop covered a full eight-hour day and began with an introduction by the local party leader to NDI's trainers and an explanation about the purpose of the workshop. Morning sessions were devoted to general plenary presentations by the trainers, group discussion, and questions and answers. Presentations covered the major themes on the agenda--for example, the need for local party and structure and identifying and achieving party goals--as well as specific topics such as building party membership, communication to party members and the public, and organizing local party activities.

Through different scenarios on membership, party activities, and communications, afternoon small group breakout sessions provided participants with the opportunity to interactively work together (see attachments). The purpose of the scenarios was to address practical examples of different issues of importance to local party activities in order to encourage problem-solving, positive interaction and effective internal communication. In addition, the small group sessions were intended to offer participants an opportunity to build skills and self-confidence. NDI's Khmer training assistants sat in on these sessions and were available to answer questions about the scenarios and to encourage active participation by everyone. Trainers, however, were also available as needed throughout the afternoon sessions. Written materials, designed to supplement each topic on the agenda, provided additional explanation of the issues discussed throughout the day.

WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS

General Themes:

The level of interaction among Funcinpec participants varied in each province. In some provinces, participants were very candid about expressing their opinions and concerns regarding a number of issues that have been foremost on their minds since the election. In these workshops, participants clearly believed that they might not have the opportunity to state their

views to party leaders in Phnom Penh directly and wanted NDI to communicate their concerns for them. In other workshops, participants were indirect in their complaints about the national leadership but were nonetheless quite vocal about the political and organizational barriers they face in the provinces, particularly from CPP.

While numerous common themes emerged during the four-week period that NDI spent with Funcinpec members in the provinces, the two issues raised most frequently were:

- * CPP's continued position of power and control in the provinces despite Funcinpec's win in the election;
- * The failure of Funcinpec's national leadership in the government and the parliament to visit or communicate with local leaders and supporters in the provinces on a regular basis.

It should also be noted that these two issues were raised repeatedly by Funcinpec provincial participants at the NDI/Funcinpec seminar in Phnom Penh in March. It was also evident by the time NDI travelled to the provinces 1 1/2 months later, that little action had been taken by national leaders to address these concerns. These issues, however, represent critical obstacles to sustaining the morale and confidence of Funcinpec's supporters at the local level. These, and other issues raised during the provincial workshops, will be addressed in more detail below under the following headings:

- * Party Structure;
- * Party Communications;
- * Expectations;
- * Accountability/Transparency at the National and Local Levels

Party Structure:

(1) Local Level:

The most serious post-election barrier for Funcinpec in the provinces is the absence of an operational party structure at the provincial, district, communal or village levels. This absence of local structure represents numerous challenges for Funcinpec, both now and in the future, and it is illustrated in several different ways. First, while certain individuals are clearly acknowledged as local party leaders, Funcinpec's limited human, financial and material resources impedes the ability of these individuals to take positive action at the local level as provincial

representatives of the party. Second, reaffirming what was heard at the Phnom Penh seminar in March, provincial party leaders reported that they do not convene party meetings and have not done so since the election. Third, local party structure is an essential organizational tool for building a constituency for the party in the provinces. The lack of local structure makes it virtually impossible to expand the party's base of support in the provinces.

To address these issues, Funcinpec members expressed strong interest in (a) raising money to be used for party activities in the provinces; (b) strengthening their own skills and confidence through leadership development training; and (c) devising specific strategies to improve local party structure. To accomplish these goals, local leaders need the support of their leaders in Phnom Penh.

(2) National Level:

For more than a decade, Funcinpec operated as a resistance movement *in exile*. For this reason, it is difficult to determine, with any degree of certainty, the genuine strength of support that Funcinpec enjoys at the national or local levels. Funcinpec's most skilled and active resistance and pre-election party leaders now serve in the Royal Government or the National Assembly. They are understandably faced with carrying out new responsibilities under very difficult circumstances.

To this end, while Funcinpec has taken some steps since the election to transform itself from a resistance movement to a modern governing political party, the attention of top party leaders has shifted toward managing a complex and uncertain relationship with the CPP and to the continuing threat of political and economic instability from the Khmer Rouge. As a result, Funcinpec's long-term viability and success in the provinces has been subordinated to other pressing matters in the government and the parliament. Nevertheless, while this post-election trend may be necessary in the current environment, Funcinpec will be unable to compete effectively in a multi-party system in the future without an overall party structure that incorporates, supports and promotes its leaders at the local level.

Communications:

(1) Internal:

Related to party structure is the important tool of intra-party communication. The lack of a viable local structure, manifested in particular by the failure to convene local party meetings, suggests that Funcinpec's communication system is not working adequately. Also clearly absent is a system of reporting in which a two-directional level of input at the local level is maintained on a regular schedule. Follow-up on information that is communicated in either direction also appears to be limited as well. This lack of regular communication, both from the top down and the bottom up, has left local party leaders feeling abandoned and unappreciated.

(2) **External:**

The role that local party leaders play in informing the national leadership about pressing local issues is also important. The absence of regular internal communication limits the availability of information about governmental and parliamentary decisions and action. As a result, local party leaders find it difficult to communicate substantively with supporters outside the party apparatus and with the Cambodian population in general.

(3) **Inter-Party Communications:**

Funcinpec members cited a continuing fear of political intimidation and violence by CPP despite the appointment of Funcinpec governors and vice governors. Funcinpec members are still angry about the pre-election assassinations of Funcinpec officials and the fact that many of those believed responsible continue to serve in local administrative positions. While the protection of local activists remains the highest of priorities, provincial leaders do not believe that their safety will be guaranteed if they begin to organize or emerge with any heightened degree of party visibility. Within the framework of Cambodia's policy of national reconciliation, official and informal communication between Funcinpec and CPP party officials in the provinces provides a very important mechanism for allaying these fears and for strengthening inter-party interaction.

Expectations

Internally, the inability of Funcinpec's national leaders to deliver on promised jobs was one complaint expressed by participants at the provincial workshops. In response, trainers pointed out that no political party, whether it wins or loses, is able to provide jobs for all of its campaign supporters and that this is not unique to Cambodia. This sentiment appears to be attributed by party members to Funcinpec's position of perceived weakness relative to CPP. In general, they report no significant change at the provincial, district, communal or village levels and they are impatient for some evidence to the contrary. As a result, they fear that Funcinpec has lost credibility with the people and the advantages that the party had before the election. Overall, Funcinpec members are confused about why the party won the election but appears to have limited power in the provinces. This last issue was raised repeatedly in every workshop.

Because Funcinpec promised peace and a change from the status quo during the campaign, the party's burden of failure with the population-at-large is also greater. Funcinpec is more vulnerable to public disaffection than CPP if the government fails to meet public expectations for change. It is important that national leaders take the time to explain the basic characteristics of governing coalitions in which power and equal credit for the successful implementation of policies and programs are shared among the partners in the coalition. In the current

environment, this challenge for Funcinpec is considerably greater than that of CPP. Thus, it is important that national leaders communicate Funcinpec's achievements within the government to its provincial supporters on a regular basis. For example, journalists in Phnom Penh have reported that the new policies of the Minister of Education have eliminated fraud and corruption in high school examinations and that this claim has been supported by students and teachers. By sharing these types of accomplishments with provincial party leaders, and supporting their efforts to communicate them with the local population, Funcinpec will be able to demonstrate that it has taken action to improve access to quality education on the basis of merit and not fraud and that it is working hard to transform the party's principles and platform into action.

Accountability/Transparency:

During the provincial workshops, Funcinpec members expressed frustration with national leaders and are disappointed that Funcinpec MPs and ministers spend little time in the provinces. While most local leaders appear ready and willing to support the party in the future, their loyalty should not be taken for granted. Local leaders are uncertain about how to work on behalf of the party when national leaders remain invisible and unaccountable to party members and voters in the provinces. In particular, provincial leaders have limited knowledge about what the government is doing and reported that they must expend considerable effort to travel to the capital for what little information they gain. They also expressed apprehension about what they can do to promote the party's interests at the provincial level without adequate financial resources. On this point, they generally believe that national leaders are raising money for the party but are keeping it all in the capital to support their new status as government officials or parliamentarians. Financial transparency within the party can be promoted by opening the internal budgeting process to local leaders and allowing them to have some input into how the party's resources are allocated to the provinces.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are several short-term and long-term measures that Funcinpec can begin to implement including:

Short-Term:

(1) Communication and Information:

Comments made by local leaders and supporters during provincial workshops and at the March seminar indicate that Funcinpec risks losing its *existing* membership through inaction and by default. Regular contact with local offices in the provinces should be initiated immediately.

This contact should be maintained as frequently as possible and can be accomplished without significant expense to the party. As the elected representatives of their party, Funcinpec MPs should be authorized and encouraged by Phnom Penh leadership to visit their districts at least once a month. While there, MPs may convene meetings at provincial party offices to discuss party policy, enacted and pending legislation, relations with other parties, executive decisions and other relevant governmental action. Provincial leaders should be given the opportunity to report and discuss local issues, *whether or not immediate solutions to such local problems exist*. Regular face-to-face contact is essential to insuring that provincial party members remain motivated and inspired.

(2) Local Party Structure:

Without solid party organization and structure, political parties operate inefficiently. Equally important, without organization and structure, people remain individuals and are more inclined to act in their own self-interests. Without local structure, Funcinpec limits its ability to retain its membership, attract new supporters, communicate the party's message and accomplishments to the public, or support its elected officials as they act to represent the people who voted for Funcinpec in the election. To address this, Funcinpec should act immediately to implement a local structure at the district, commune and village levels. In order to do this, Funcinpec will need to allocate resources to the provinces for the establishment of local branches at these different levels. By reviewing where Funcinpec won its votes during the election, the party can prioritize and target these resources strategically.

(3) Party Identity and Message:

During the campaign, Funcinpec's basic message was "peace" and "change." Following the election, the Royal Government drafted a government policy document that was unanimously approved by the National Assembly. The government policy covers everything from health to education to foreign affairs and national sovereignty. Within the framework of this policy statement, Funcinpec has begun to identify specific issues it to address and actively works to enact related legislation and directives in the parliament and through the ministries. The changes in the examination procedures by the Ministry of Education is an example of how this process can work positively to the benefit of Funcinpec.

Over time, strong political parties become associated with particular issues and positions. These issues and positions help shape the party's identity. Regardless of ideology, any political party operating in a multi-party system has two major goals. These are (1) to win elections at the national and local levels so that it can govern and (2) to promote its policies through governmental action in important sectors of national life. To achieve its goals, Funcinpec must transform its policies into action so that the party's identity becomes known to as many people as possible. To do this, Funcinpec can evaluate and refine its pre-election message and develop

a clear strategy for communicating it to the public. Because effective communication is the key to success for any political party, transparency is also an important tool. In a multi-party system, a governing party cannot be a secret organization. On the contrary, political parties must increase and attract support from as many people as possible in order to outnumber its competitors.

In addition, Funcinpec should begin to establish relationships with organizations that operate outside the governmental arena and the party structure. There are more than 150 international NGOs and 30 local NGOs providing development assistance in Cambodia. In an continuing effort to develop and strengthen Cambodia's human resources, foreign NGOs transfer skills and knowledge about the development process by employing and training Cambodian staff to carry out this work. In the future, skilled Cambodians can establish additional independent local NGOs. NGOs are operational in almost all provinces and work at the district, communal and village levels. Cambodian NGO workers help to implement rural development and small credit programs. They are also building schools, wells and hospitals.

Cambodian NGO workers have access to valuable information about what people think and what they need. The value of this information to the party should not be underestimated. Such information would be very useful to Funcinpec ministers who are responsible for overseeing the development specific operational sectors such as agriculture, health and education. Cambodian NGO workers are also voters. Through the solid contacts that local NGO workers have established at many levels throughout the country, they are in a unique position to help mobilize new Funcinpec supporters in the future. Provincial party leaders can initiate and maintain regular contact with Cambodian NGO workers in order to inform themselves about development projects in their provinces. In this way, local party leaders they can serve as informal intermediaries between Funcinpec ministers, MPs and citizens in the provinces.

Such relationships can also be used to establish a positive association between Funcinpec and the improvements that are achieved through the efforts of NGOs at the local level. Through this process, the party can also begin to develop and implement its own community projects such as painting a wat or school, organizing youth and sports leagues, and inviting ministers and MPs to address village meetings about health and education.

Long-Term:

(1) Leadership Development and Training:

Although leadership is a quality that not everyone has, leadership development is a process that almost anyone can benefit from. Informal leaders exist at every level of Cambodian society, whether or not these individuals are recognized through appointed or elected title and position. Funcinpec lacks the human resources it needs to insure the growth of the party. To address this, new leadership at different levels of the party should be cultivated and encouraged. Particular emphasis should be placed on recruiting and training lower-level members in the capital and the provinces. Using this report and supplementary materials as a guide, Funcinpec could organized its own provincial workshops that focus on improving the organizational, management, and political skills of party members.

In addition, a combination of cultural and social factors continue to constrain the economic and political advancement of Cambodian women and the plight of most, both in the provinces and the capital, remains desperate and untenable. While Cambodian women have long been acknowledged as essential to the social and economic well-being of their families, they are routinely neglected in the country's political affairs and leadership positions remain firmly out of reach. Nevertheless, nearly 75 percent of an estimated population of 9 to 10 million are believed to be women and their dependent children. Such population estimates make a compelling argument for specifically targeting women for membership recruitment drives, as participants in party training activities, and for leadership positions in the party at the local level.

The strategic planning process described below can also be used one vehicle through which emerging local leaders are identified and given responsibility for undertaking specific tasks on behalf of the party.

(2) Strategic Plan:

In addition to the short-term measures described above, Funcinpec could develop a 3- or 5-Year Strategic Party Plan. Key elements of this plan would include identifying and developing

- * party goals and objectives;
- * electoral and post-electoral party activities at the national and provincial levels;
- * resources (human, financial and material);
- * timeframe.

Throughout this process, Funcinpec can solicit and incorporate the views of members from all levels of the party, both in Phnom Penh and the provinces. A special commission of MPs, ministers, other steering committee and representatives from important electoral districts could be established to carry this out.

CONCLUSION

Cambodia's post-election policy of national reconciliation represents the highest test of national will and self-determination. Last year's UN-organized parliamentary elections brought 90% of registered adult voters to the polls. Confronted with recurring political violence and intimidation, Funcinpec's perseverance during the campaign demonstrated an impressive force of party unity and courage. Today, as a partner in the Royal Government, Funcinpec is faced with the need to simultaneously balance several distinct but inter-related governance, parliamentary, and electoral functions at once. The retention, recruitment and training of members who can effectively serve Funcinpec's long-term interests is essential. A strategy to improve the leadership skills and active participation of members at all levels is equally central to the development and success of the party in the future.

This report has been prepared as a party management, organizing and training tool for the benefit of Funcinpec national and provincial party leaders and members. The information contained in this report reflects the observations and analysis of the NDI party development field staff who have worked with Funcinpec in Cambodia since January 1993. It is intended to assist Funcinpec with identifying and achieving its short and long-term party development goals. We hope that this report will contribute to this process.

MEMORANDUM

TO: H.E. Heng Samrin
Samdech Chea Sim
Samdech Hun Sen
H.E. Sar Kheng
H.E. Say Chhum
H.E. Ngoun Nhel
H.E. Ith Samheng
Other Members of the CPP Central Committee

FROM: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)

SUBJ: CPP Provincial Party Training Report

DATE: September 1994

SUMMARY

During the four-week period from 7 May to 4 June, 332 CPP party members attended political party workshops conducted by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). Workshops were held at CPP party offices in the provincial towns of Kandal, Kompang Speou, Takeo, Prey Veng, Kompang Cham, and Svey Rieng. Participants included local party chiefs, election workers and other provincial CPP supporters. Fifty nine provincial districts were represented. Among the total number of participants, seventeen were women. NDI trainers included resident field staff and international political party experts from Senegal and the United States. A representative of the International Republican Institute (IRI) also participated in the workshops in Prey Veng, Kompang Cham and Svey Rieng.

In consultation with CPP's deputy chief of cabinet, the provincial workshops were organized in response to CPP's request for assistance following the NDI/IRI international seminar convened in December 1993. At that time, CPP party leaders and members expressed interest in receiving further training in the provinces, with particular focus on local party structure and organization, membership, communications and party activities. Following the March seminar, NDI continued to meet with CPP officials in Phnom Penh in order to determine the most appropriate approach to take at the provincial level.

METHODOLOGY

(1) Workshop Agendas and Topics:

Ongoing consultations with CPP officials in Phnom Penh provided the foundation for the development of workshop agendas. The comments and suggestions raised by CPP participants at the December seminar were also very helpful in designing the structure and content of the provincial workshops. Through discussions with the deputy chief of cabinet, CPP MPs and other central committee, a range of party development issues were prioritized for inclusion as topics on the workshop agendas. By incorporating the comments and suggestions that emerged from this process of review and discussion with CPP officials, final agendas were prepared by NDI's resident party training field staff.

Topical themes included:

Role of political parties in a multi-party democratic system:

- what political parties do;
- what makes a party democratic;
- the importance of continuity;
- the concept of loyal opposition;
- the challenge to maintain party discipline.

Identifying party goals and objectives:

- assessing the party's strengths and weaknesses;
- defining short and long term party term goals;
- identifying issues;
- developing the party's distinctive message;
- identifying the party's substantive policy goals.

Strengthening the party at the local level:

- importance of organization and structure;
- membership retention and recruitment;
- party activities;
- internal party communication;
- relationship to other political parties;
- strategies for gaining public support.

(2) Logistics:

Logistical arrangements for each workshop were made by NDI logistics staff members in close coordination with local party leaders. The deputy chief of cabinet at CPP's Phnom Penh party headquarters was especially helpful in this process by providing a list of provincial party leaders and introducing our logistics staff to local contacts through written communication sent out to the provinces in advance. Before each workshop, NDI staff members visited the provincial town and met with the provincial party chief and other CPP representatives to survey and prepare the workshop site, to review any necessary transportation, meals and lodging arrangements for participants, and to deliver invitations to party members.

WORKSHOP FORMAT

Each workshop covered a full eight-hour day and began with an introduction by the local party chief to NDI's trainers and an explanation about the purpose of the workshop. Morning sessions were devoted to general plenary presentations by the trainers, group discussion, and questions and answers. Presentations covered the major themes on the agenda--for example, the need for local party and structure and identifying and achieving party goals--as well as specific topics such as building party membership, communication to party members and the public, and organizing local party activities.

Through different scenarios on membership, party activities, and communications, afternoon small group breakout sessions provided participants with the opportunity to interactively work together (see attachments). The purpose of the scenarios was to address practical examples of different issues of importance to local party officials in order to encourage problem-solving, positive interaction and effective internal communication. In addition, the small group sessions offered participants an opportunity to work together in order to build skills and self-confidence. NDI's Cambodian training assistants sat in on these sessions and were available to answer questions about the scenarios and to encourage active participation by everyone. Trainers, however, were also available as needed throughout the afternoon sessions. Written materials, designed to supplement each topic on the agenda, provided additional explanation of the issues discussed throughout the day.

WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS

(1) General Comments:

The level of interaction among CPP participants varied in each province. In general, CPP participants were highly disciplined, listened attentively and took extensive notes. In some provinces, participants were obviously comfortable with the morning lecture format, willing to ask and answer questions, and were very candid in expressing their concerns regarding a number of issues that have been foremost on their minds since the election. In other workshops, CPP members were uneasy when asked to speak spontaneously in front of the group or when asked

for an opinion about some aspect of party organization or policy. Participants were clearly nervous about stating their views in the presence of provincial party leaders. However, this appeared to depend on the extent to which a high ranking local party official, such as a governor or vice governor, encouraged people to speak openly.

Overall, CPP members demonstrated a high level of political awareness and sophistication. This sophistication is best represented by the types of issues that were raised--rather complex and global in scope--in discussions about Cambodia's transformation from a communist single-party regime to a democratic multi-party system. These issues include:

- rule of majority vs. rights of minority;
- emergence of anarchy as a consequence of multipartism;
- democracy and reform in the military;
- anti-democratic effect of veto rights, ie, UN security council;
- democracy vs. pluralism in the U.S. system;
- authoritarianism vs dictatorship ;
- barriers to democracy in developing countries;
- maintaining party identity within coalition governments.

CPP members were also very interested in the American system. Participants were quick to note the vast differences between the U.S. and Cambodia yet they were also anxious to find any similarities that might help strengthen CPP's ties to the international community.

In discussions about the party's strengths and weaknesses, CPP members were quite vocal on the subject of Cambodia's 1993 parliamentary elections. When asked why CPP won more votes than Funcinpec in certain provinces, participants responded that CPP was understood by the people to have more experience in governance and that CPP was consistently opposed to the Khmer Rouge. When asked why they thought CPP lost the election overall, participants cited election irregularities and pointed out that UN-sponsored election was not "Cambodian" and thus not genuine. They also commented that Funcinpec was viewed by the voters as the party of change and benefitted from the symbol of the King. One person in attendance stated that the actions and behavior of CPP officials in some districts and communes were viewed unfavorably by local people and that the party lost support as a result.

Other issues raised during the provincial workshops will be addressed in more detail below under the following headings:

- * Party Structure;
- * Party Communications;
- * Expectations;
- * Accountability/Transparency at the National and Local Levels

Party Structure:

(1) Local Level:

It is evident to NDI that CPP has a solid party structure at the provincial, district, communal and village levels. At the same time, NDI noted during the provincial workshops that CPP's structure is not fully deployed or operational in the provinces where the training occurred. For example, provincial party leaders reported that they do not convene regular party meetings and have apparently not done so since the election. CPP's local structure represents a distinct organizational advantage for the party over that of its partners in the coalition government. Yet, local party structure, essential as an organizational tool for maintaining and expanding the party's base in the provinces, provides only a framework for activities. Without activities, party members become passive and unmotivated: CPP's organizational advantage, evident by the party's ability to mobilize people quickly, should not be taken for granted.

To address these issues, CPP members expressed strong interest in (a) raising money to be used for party activities in the provinces; (b) strengthening their own skills and confidence through leadership development training; and (c) devising specific strategies to improve local party structure. To accomplish these goals, local leaders need the support of their leaders in Phnom Penh.

(2) National Level:

For more than a decade of single-party rule in Cambodia, CPP had the opportunity to build a sophisticated centralized party apparatus with the full weight of state resources behind it. Since the election, CPP has taken few steps to accommodate the shift to a multi-party system. CPP's existing structure, formulated during the communist period, does not provide CPP leaders with an adequate opportunity to build support for the party among people who voted for CPP in the election but who may choose not to join the party officially.

In addition, the attention of national party leaders appears to have shifted toward managing its complex and uncertain relationship with Funcinpec and to the continuing threat of political and economic instability from the Khmer Rouge. As a result, CPP's long-term viability and success in the provinces appears to have been subordinated to other pressing matters in the government and the parliament. While this post-election trend may be necessary in the current environment, CPP will be unable to compete effectively in a multi-party system in the future without an overall party structure that incorporates, supports and promotes its leaders at the local level through opportunities for decision-making, communication and activity.

Communications:

(1) Internal:

Related to party structure is the important tool of internal party communication. No matter how viable CPP's party structure may be, the failure to convene regular meetings at the local level suggests that the party's communication system is not working as well as it could. In addition, CPP's continued reliance on a two-directional system of reporting, while useful as mechanism for insuring party discipline and loyalty, is probably inadequate. Follow-up on information that is communicated--both from the top to the bottom and from the bottom up--appears to be limited as well. The absence of regular communication and a local meeting schedule has left some local CPP supporters feeling abandoned and unappreciated.

(2) External:

The role that provincial party leaders play in informing the national leadership about emerging local issues is very important. The absence of regular internal communication limits the flow of information about governmental and parliamentary decisions and action to the provinces. Equally important to CPP's external relations is the continuing reliance on an internal process in which all communication and decision making rest *within* the party. As a result, it very difficult for local party leaders to communicate with supporters outside the party apparatus and with the Cambodian people in general. Because communication occurs only bi-directionally from the top down and the bottom up, lateral communication among party leaders across provinces appears to occur infrequently. This structural characteristic will continue to affect the ability of local leaders to attract new support. By utilizing the skills and local knowledge of CPP's existing membership, the party can begin to establish new relationships with organizations and individuals who operate outside the party system. In this way, CPP can begin to attract more support for the future.

(3) Inter-Party Communications:

While CPP continues to yield influence and power in the provinces, the relationship among the three parliamentary parties at the local level is beginning to change. At the same time, despite the appointment of Funcinpec governors and vice governors, CPP's coalition partners cite a continuing fear of political intimidation and violence by local officials acting in the name of CPP. Within the framework of Cambodia's policy of national reconciliation, regular official and informal communication between local CPP party leaders and the other parties provides a very important mechanism for allaying these fears and for strengthening inter-party interaction and cooperation in the provinces.

Expectations

The presence of UNTAC, and the electoral process that took place during its tenure, reinforced the principles of democracy without adequately preparing Cambodia's citizens for the responsibilities of living under a democratic system. As a result, CPP, like Funcinpec, is vulnerable to tremendous public disaffection if the government fails to meet public expectations for change. For this reason, it is important that CPP's national leaders take the time to explain the basic characteristics of governing coalitions in which power and credit for the successful implementation of policies and programs are shared among the partners in the coalition. In the current environment, it is also important that national leaders communicate CPP's achievements within the government to its provincial supporters on a regular basis. By sharing the party's accomplishments in governance with provincial party leaders, CPP will be better able to demonstrate what action is taking to improve overall security and quality of life for the local population.

Also related to the issue of expectations--both internal and external--is communications. CPP members appeared confident that the party can win a decisive majority in the next parliamentary elections. Yet they are concerned about the lack of communication between national headquarters and the provincial offices and the absence of information about the policies and actions of the government. Local party leaders seemed especially concerned about how to advance CPP's party interests given Cambodia's policy of national reconciliation. Also within the context of Cambodia's new multi-party democratic system, provincial party leaders are interested in finding out what they should do between now and the next election to help meet public expectations and to strengthen the party's organizational advantage and competitive edge at the local level. It is to these public expectations that CPP must respond if it is to build credibility and garner support for the difficult policies of transformation that are required.

Accountability/Transparency:

During the provincial workshops, CPP members expressed frustration that national leaders in the government and the parliament spend little time in the provinces. While most local leaders appear ready and willing to support the party in the future, their loyalty should not be taken for granted. Local leaders are uncertain about how to work on behalf of the party when national leaders remain invisible and unaccountable to party members and voters in the provinces. As noted above, provincial leaders have limited knowledge about what the government is doing and reported that they must travel to the capital for what little information they gain from the considerable effort that this requires. They also expressed apprehension about what they can do to promote the party's interests at the provincial level without adequate financial resources. Financial transparency within the party can be promoted by opening the internal budgeting process to local leaders and allowing them to have some input into how the party's resources are allocated to the provinces.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are several short-term and long-term measures that CPP can begin to implement including:

Short-Term:

(1) Communication and Information:

Comments made by local leaders and supporters during provincial workshops and at the March seminar indicate that CPP risks losing its *existing* membership through inaction and by default. Regular contact with local offices in the provinces should be initiated immediately. This contact should be maintained as frequently as possible and can be accomplished without significant expense to the party. As the elected representatives of their party, CPP MPs should be authorized and encouraged the national leadership to visit their districts at least once a month. While there, MPs may convene a meeting at the provincial party office to discuss party policy, enacted and pending legislation, relations with other parties, executive decisions and other relevant governmental action. Provincial leaders should be given the opportunity to report and discuss local issues, *whether or not immediate solutions to such local problems exist*. Regular face-to-face contact is essential to ensuring that provincial party members remain motivated and inspired.

(2) Local Party Structure and Activities:

To ensure party unity and cohesion, it is important that provincial party officials undertake activities at the local level that are firmly supported by the CPP leadership in Phnom Penh. CPP can use its existing structure in order to retain the membership it has, attract new supporters, communicate its message and accomplishments to the public, and support its elected officials in their attempts to represent the people who voted for CPP in the election.

In addition, to expand its base of support, CPP should begin to look outward by establishing relationships with organizations that operate outside the governmental arena and the party structure. There are more than 150 international and 30 local NGOs providing development assistance to Cambodia. In an continuing effort to strengthen Cambodia's human resources, foreign NGOs transfer skills and knowledge about the development process by employing and training Cambodian staff to carry out this work in the future through the establishment of additional independent local NGOs. NGOs are operational in almost all provinces and work at the district, communal and village levels. Cambodian NGO workers help to implement rural development and small credit programs. They are also building schools, wells and hospitals. Cambodian NGO workers have access to valuable information about what people think and what they need. The value of such information to the party should not be underestimated. This information is also very useful to CPP ministers who are responsible for overseeing the development specific operational sectors such as agriculture, health, education and other important issues.

Cambodian NGO workers are also voters. Through the solid contacts that local NGO workers have established at many levels throughout the country, they are in a unique position to help mobilize new CPP supporters in the future. Provincial party leaders can initiate and maintain regular contact with Cambodian NGO workers in order to inform themselves about development projects in their provinces. In this way, local party leaders they can serve as informal intermediaries between CPP ministers, MPs and the people in the provinces.

Such relationships can also be used to establish a positive association between CPP and the improvements that are achieved through the efforts of NGOs at the local level. Through this process, the party can also begin to develop and implement its own community projects such as painting a wat or school, organizing youth and sports leagues, and inviting ministers and MPs to address village meetings about health and education.

(3) Party Identity and Message:

Over time, strong political parties become associated with particular issues and positions. These issues and positions help shape the party's identity. Regardless of ideology, any political party has two major goals. These are (1) to win elections at the national and local levels so that it can govern and (2) to promote its policies through governmental action in important sectors of national life. To achieve its goals, CPP must transform its policies into action so that the party's identity becomes known to as many people as possible.

During the campaign, CPP's message was opposition to the Khmer Rouge and experience in governance. CPP should evaluate and refine its pre-election message to determine that it is still viable and adequate in Cambodia's post-election environment. Because effective communication is the key to success for any political party, it is also important to develop a clear strategy for communicating this identity and message to the public. In addition, transparency is an equally important organizing principle. In a multi-party system, a governing party cannot be a secret organization. On the contrary, political parties must increase and attract support from as many people as possible in order to outnumber its competitors.

Following the election, the Royal Government drafted a government policy statement that was unanimously approved by the National Assembly. This government policy covers everything from health to education to foreign policy and national sovereignty. Within the framework of the government policy document, CPP can identify specific issues it wants the government to address and actively work to enact related legislation and directives in the parliament and through the ministries.

Long-Term:

(1) Leadership Development and Training:

Although leadership is a quality that not everyone has, leadership development is a process that almost anyone can benefit from. Informal leaders exist at every level of Cambodian society, whether or not these individuals are recognized through appointed or elected title and position.

CPP members in the provinces are inactive. To address this, new leadership skills are required. Particular emphasis should be placed on recruiting and training lower-level members in the capital and the provinces. Using this report and supplementary materials as a guide, CPP can organize its own provincial training workshops that focus on improving the organizational, management, and political skills of party members.

In addition, a combination of cultural and social factors continue to constrain the economic and political advancement of Cambodian women and the plight of most, both in the provinces and the capital, remains desperate and untenable. While Cambodian women have long been acknowledged as essential to the social and economic well-being of their families, they are routinely neglected in the country's political affairs and leadership positions remain firmly out of reach. Nevertheless, nearly 75 percent of an estimated population of 9 to 10 million are believed to be women and their dependent children. Such population estimates make a compelling argument for specifically targeting women for membership recruitment drives, as participants in party training activities, and for leadership positions in the party at the local level.

The strategic planning process described below can also be used one vehicle through which emerging local leaders are identified and given responsibility for undertaking specific tasks on behalf of the party.

(2) **Strategic Plan:**

In addition to the short-term measures described above, CPP can develop a 3- or 5-Year Strategic Party Plan. Key elements of this plan include identifying and developing

- * party goals and objectives;
- * electoral and post-electoral party activities at the national and provincial levels;
- * resources (human, financial and material);
- * timeframe.

Throughout this process, CPP should solicit and incorporate the views of members from all levels of the party, both in Phnom Penh and the provinces. A special commission of MPs, ministers, other central committee members, and representatives from important electoral districts could be established to carry this out.

CONCLUSION

Cambodia's post-election policy of national reconciliation represents the highest test of national will and self-determination. Last year's UN-organized parliamentary elections brought 90% of registered adult voters to the polls. Today, as a partner in the Royal Government, CPP is faced with the need to simultaneously balance several distinct but inter-related governance, parliamentary, and electoral functions at once. The retention, recruitment and training of

members who can effectively serve CPP's long-term interests is essential. A strategy to improve the leadership skills and active participation of members at all levels is equally central to the development and success of the party in the future.

This report has been prepared as a party management, organizing and training tool for the benefit of CPP's national and provincial party leaders and members. The information contained in this report reflects the observations and analysis of the NDI party development field staff who have worked with CPP in Cambodia since January 1993. It is intended to assist CPP with identifying and achieving its short and long-term party development goals. We hope that this report will contribute to this process.

Appendix Seven

David Steinberg Evaluation and NDI's Response

CAMBODIA

USAID

DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES PROJECT

[#442-0111]

A FORMATIVE EVALUATION
FINAL

David I. Steinberg
Georgetown University

June 24, 1994

The views expressed in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Agency for International Development, the Department of State, or any grantee organization discussed herein.

DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES PROJECT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ACRONYMS

PREFACE

I INTRODUCTION.....1

- A. The Cambodian Milieu.....1
- B. The USAID Cambodian Strategy.....5
- C. The Evaluation: Goal and Purpose.....6
- D. The Nature of the 'Formative Evaluation'.....7
- E. Democracy in Cambodia and the Project.....8
 - 1. Democracy--General Considerations.....8
 - 2. Project Components.....11
- F. Project Grantees.....12
 - 1. The Asia Foundation.....12
 - 2. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs/
The International Republican Institute.....13
 - 3. Asian-American Free Labor Institute.....14

II PROJECT EVALUATION.....15

- A. The Rule of Law.....15
 - 1. Law and Foreign Aid.....15
 - 2. Law in the Cambodian Context:
The Rule of What Law?.....16
 - 3. Legal Programming.....17
 - 4. Conclusions on Programs in the Rule of Law....19
- B. Political Pluralism and Democracy in Cambodia.....19
 - 1. Programming Elements.....21
 - 2. Conclusions: Programs in Political Pluralism..23
- C. Civic and Non-Governmental Development.....23
 - 1. Civic Organizations in Cambodia.....24
 - 2. Programming Elements.....25
 - 3. Coordination in the Civic Sector.....26
 - 4. Conclusions on Programs in Civic Development..26
- D. Economic Liberalization.....27
 - 1. The Market and Cambodian Society.....27
 - 2. Economic Programming.....27
 - 3. Conclusions on Economic Liberalization.....28
- E. Labor.....28
 - 1. Labor in the Cambodian Context.....28
 - 2. Conclusions on Programs in Labor.....29
- F. The International University.....29
- G. Administrative Performance.....30
 - 1. USAID Embassy.....30
 - 2. The Asia Foundation.....33
 - 3. The National Democratic Institute & The
International Republican Institute.....34
 - 4. AAFLI.....37
 - 5. Administrative and Program Coordination.....37
 - 6. Findings and Conclusions.....38

F.	Cross-Cutting Issues.....	38
	1. Sustainability and Absorptive Capacity.....	38
	2. Replicability.....	39
	3. Human Resource Development.....	40
	4. The Role of Women.....	42
	5. Ethnicity and Development.....	43
	6. The Role of Technical Assistance.....	39
	7. The Role of the Khmer Language.....	44
	8. The French Connection.....	44
	9. Grantee Costs.....	47
III	FUTURE PROGRAMMING AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	48
	1. USAID.....	48
	2. The Asia Foundation.....	50
	3. AAFLI.....	51
	4. The Institutes.....	51
IV	SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS.....	51
V	LESSONS LEARNED.....	52

APPENDICES

1. Scope of Work
2. Financial Summaries of NDI and IRI
3. Bibliography

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Democracy Initiatives Project (\$15 million) is a major USAID effort to capitalise on the momentum toward democratic process in Cambodia begun with the elections of 1993. The project is presently centered on four grantees: The Asia Foundation, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and the Asian-American Free Labor Institute. All but the first are associated with the National Endowment for Democracy. This evaluation is a collaborative one that effectively focuses on the period since the elections of May 1993.

The Foundation programs, after a very troubled first year, have received extensive respect. The Institutes, widely noted as having a very productive period before the elections, have not been as active as their administrative costs would warrant. AAFLI is too new to evaluate.

The Foundation has programmed in the fields of law, human rights, governance, the legislature, the press, non-governmental pluralism, and economic liberalization; with the political parties by the Institutes, and with labor by AAFLI. All these small-grant organizations have expensive administrative costs.

The evaluation notes that concepts of democracy and law represent core values or aspirations related to power, its organization and distribution. Foreign aid's possible effects on these fields are limited, although programs are important and should continue.

The evaluation cautions that the Cambodian political situation is highly volatile, and power personalized and hierarchical, and that progress toward democracy is not irreversible. Expectations should not be inflated, progress is likely to be slow, and USAID support needs to continue over a long period. Perhaps the most important avenue toward pluralism, and eventually democracy, is through the NGO community.

The evaluation recommends that the project be extended, but that USAID administrative control over all grantees, which has been restrictive, should be liberalized. It recommends that the funding for both Institutes be allowed to run out over the next six months and a resident program not be renewed, but reconsidered at an appropriate period before the next election. The evaluation makes specific suggestions for improvement of the operations of USAID and each of the grantees, and draws some general lessons concerning the need for country knowledge and clear administrative authority, together with improved AID contracting procedures.

Noting the importance of the American presence in Cambodia at this time, it warns against complaisance in view of the uncertain prospects. It suggests negotiations with the Cambodian government on official recognition of Foundation-supported education programs, and with the French on programmatic rivalries.

ACRONYMS

AAFLI	Asian-American Free Labor Institute
AID	Agency for International Development
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
FUNCINPEC	National United Front
ILO	International Labor Organization
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
IRI	International Republican Institute
USAID	United States Agency for International Development, Field Office

PREFACE

This evaluation is designed to assist USAID/Cambodia in considering the future directions and institutional relationships of the Democracy Initiatives Project. The period since project initiation is too short to allow any substantive evaluation of the subprojects or activities of each of the four grantees, although the evaluator attempted to visit or meet with as many of the principal institutions, staff, and technical assistance personnel as possible. He also visited Battambang to view provincial efforts in that area. At this stage, the subprojects, most of which are recent, are not subject to evaluation because they are too new, and time in any case would be too short to do any comprehensive analysis. In any case, they are less important within the scope of this evaluation than reviewing the overall policy directions of the USAID and the Project within the Cambodian context, as well as discerning the directions of the individual grantee institutions.

The relationships between USAID and each of the grantees loomed large as the evaluation began to take shape because of two questions: what effect did these relationships have on both USAID's and the grantee's program, and did the relationships strengthen or hinder project effectiveness.

The special circumstances of Cambodia with the UN intervention and the resulting elections created a degree of uncertainty at the beginning of the project. This caused plans to shift to meet changing circumstances. This resulted in less attention paid here to the earlier period of programming except as background to present activities and future plans. This is also in keeping with the "formative evaluation" concept, which is designed to be forward looking.

This evaluation raises a series of delicate and difficult issues. The evaluator understands their significance, and the recommendations suggested herein are not casual observations, but attempts to combine his perceptions of U.S. interests and public responsibilities with an assessment of future Cambodian needs.

It must be stressed that the views presented here are solely those of the author. Under no circumstances should they be attributed to any other individual or institution. Because of the delicacy of these conclusions, no list of those interviewed is included; all must remain unindicted co-conspirators. The author wishes, however, to thank all those with whom he met and who graciously offered of their time from their busy schedules to present their views and explain their programs. He especially would like to thank the USAID and grantee staff for their invaluable help. They remain anonymous only here, for all are well known elsewhere.

It has been an important opportunity for the evaluator to see firsthand recent developments in Cambodia and meet with many leaders. One cannot come away without respect for many who are grappling with a set of problems the magnitude of which is

enormous--perhaps matched only by the potential.

David I. Steinberg
Georgetown University

CAMBODIA

USAID

DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES PROJECT

[#442-0111]

I INTRODUCTION

No country in Asia has weathered as severe a set of political and social traumas as has Cambodia. Devastated by over three decades of war and revolution, massive executions, forced displacements, institutional destruction, the exodus of much of its talent, and foreign invasion, Cambodia finally won the acclaim of the international community through the extensive intervention of the United Nations in creating the conditions for and monitoring of a nation-wide election that was considered both fair and had an extensive turnout. Indeed, it was one in which the ruling party lost the election and accepted its defeat.

These events have shaped the contemporaneous politics, social structure, and psyche of the state and its people. It is within this context that The United States through its USAID in Cambodia has attempted to seize the moment and move to help the process of democratization, first by supporting the preliminaries to the election, and then by attempting to institutionalize the democratic gains that have been made.

This project, authorized for \$15.0 million in 1992, was designed to work through a variety of intermediaries to assist the process. This essay reviews the various aspects of the project in midstream, and makes recommendations and draws lessons for the future.

The task for all has been daunting; and donors, grantees, and the ultimate recipients of support have been haunted by the spectre of the past and present Cambodian milieu in which virtually all issues still remain unresolved.

A. The Cambodian Milieu

Even as donors and the Cambodian government design for the future development of the state and the potential improvement in the lives of its peoples through longer range planning and institutional development, major questions relate to immediate political stability. It is a frail and tenuous political situation. The "government of national reconciliation" is fragility incarnate, the political parties are fractional. FUNCINPEC, which defeated the CFB in the voting, is weak and is said to be on the verge of

splitting. The CPP, which lost, has the real organizational capacity and is deeply entrenched in the provincial areas and at the working levels in many ministries. It controls the administrative structure of the state. The King is said to be interested in returning to take over political power, but wants to be invited to do so, and accepted by a National Assembly that may be split on the issue.

Although there are powerful forces for fragmentation, there are also strong externally generated reasons for the coalition to hold together. A military coup would, by U.S. legislation, cut off American assistance and could well begin a general retrenchment in desperately needed foreign aid. A state collapse would reduce the society to penury. The inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in a government would raise serious questions among some donors. The United States maintains that any precipitous political change would cause great concern unless it took place through constitutional procedures.

The structure of power, however, is not centered on political parties, but on individuals.¹ Cambodia politically is an example of a traditional society in which power is highly personalized and resides in the authority of the individual, not the institution. Power is also conceived as a limited good; thus sharing power or delegating it reduces the authority of the leader, diminishing his role in society. This gives rise to patron-client relationships in which entourages are built and thus factionalism becomes the modus operandi of the society as a whole and is endemic.² Under these circumstances, which are the inchoate norms of societal operations, political parties become the vehicles of individuals more than party platforms, institutions often the means of personal aggrandizement more than a program or policy agenda, and law is subordinate to leadership, becoming a means for the elite to retain control. Politics becomes more complex than in more modern or transitional societies.

The centralization of power personally, institutionally, and physically in the capital is compromised by the lack of a meritocratic bureaucracy, as one finds in Confucian-oriented societies (including Vietnam). This has further intensified the patronage

¹ It is important to stress here that any broad characterization of a society is not meant to imply that all people or any particular individual acts in any prescribed manner, but that these tendencies are evident and more pronounced than in contrasting groups. It should also be noted that social norms change, and sometimes relatively quickly. The status of women in the United States, which improved in one generation, is just one example.

² Factionalism is strong even when the overall ideological orientation is pervasive. For factionalism among the Khmer Rouge, see Zachary Abuza, "The Future of the Khmer Rouge: Internal and External Variables," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Volume 10, No. 3, March 1984.

aspects of the society. When the Asia Development Bank offered a plan to retire one-third of the vastly inflated University of Phnom Penh staff in return for major assistance, the University turned it down after the elections, explaining that they had instead to hire additional staff to satisfy FUNCINPEC's political requirements.

The problem of movement from traditional norms of control toward the goals set forth by the state itself--a democratic political system under the rule of law with growing economic betterment of the lives of its citizenry under a market system--would raise profound questions under the most benign of circumstances. Instead, Cambodia is in the midst of a civil war with the Khmer Rouge. The charismatic head of state is said to be terminally ill, if not in immediate danger. Travellers say there is no real administration throughout the countryside with renegade soldiers who may not have been paid for months foraging off the peasantry. (On this evaluation, we have personally seen instances of roadside extortion.) There are few funds with which to operate the overblown and inoperative civil service, the military is inept and terminally top heavy. Salaries are below living requirements. The traditional societal restraints were destroyed first by the Khmer Rouge, and then by the Vietnamese. The entrepreneurial spirit was broken first by the planned destruction of the economy and the institutions connected with its operation, and then by the rigidity of a centrally planned socialist economy.

In a society that has traditionally been hierarchical, reflected in its royal institutions and even in its language, hierarchy is not only maintained through royalty, and through power (such as the military), but also through money, which is now largely obtained by corruption. There is a universally held opinion that corruption is ubiquitous--from the customs officer, the soldier demanding funds at an illegal roadblock, the sales of virtually anything, and to every operation including the entrance to schools and universities. Many would identify corruption, in part required by the irrelevant salary scale of most institutions (a high level civil servant may earn \$20-23 per month on which he cannot live), as the single most important immediate issue facing the state. Some say that since the elections corruption has become worse; payments must be made to the two leading parties rather than one.

Corruption is culturally defined and is only of local importance except under three circumstances: when it undercuts internal development; when it destroys the political legitimacy or perceived efficacy of government; and when it interferes with the economic role of the state in the international economic system. In Cambodia today, all three seem to be operative.

This political problem becomes circular and reinforcing. The Khmer Rouge reiterate two themes that observers say are very effective: anti-corruption and anti-Vietnamese (see section II, F.5

below). They both strike responsive chords.

The KR [Khmer Rouge] will either wait for the RNGC [Royal National Government of Cambodia] to collapse as a result of interparty rivalry, or instigate rifts within the government. The KR will seize opportunities created by continuing corruption, the growing urban-rural distribution gap, and the lack of economic growth in the countryside. They will continue to play on the public's fear of the Vietnamese settlers, condemn corruption, and champion the cause of the rural poor.³

Corruption allows the rich to become richer; it enables the rich to pay the necessary bribes to enable children to get into schools and thus qualify for jobs that, unless the system changes, will reinforce their elite status and enable them to gain more from corruption. Economic and social class distinctions will be exacerbated, encouraging the Khmer Rouge (or other future such groups) to attack further these people and institutions, and winning support from those deprived--the 'old people.'

The picture, as starkly painted as it is, is not completely bleak. This developmental miasma is recognized by many Cambodians, who work as they can to alleviate some of the problems and try to train a new generation of leaders to replace those lost over a generation and a half of disasters. New concepts are developing and have strong, if minority, support. There are progressive elected members of parliament. There are those who believe in and work for a free press, others who devote themselves to rural or urban community advocacy. There are honest civil servants, and potentially vital development and democratic institutions. And there is a proliferation of foreign aid--from the multilateral and bilateral agencies, and from the international non-governmental community. But they all operate in the most delicate of circumstances in a society bereft of much of its earlier trained human resources. Foreign aid organizations are thus sometimes competing for the attention and programs of those individuals and institutions recognized as both progressive and with probity.

Within this context, the United States has attempted to play a proactive but balanced role. It has been important in whatever progress toward democracy Cambodia has made. It has remarkable access and acceptability at all levels of government. It acts informally because of its status, trusting that its position will prevail over formalities. The USAID, for example, does not have a formal agreement with the government on this project. The U.S. aid, technical advice, and support are welcomed. Its aid program is visible and pervasive in some fields. It has, many would say, "leverage" in influencing some types of Cambodian events. It is not without its critics, however. Some Cambodians have criticized the interference of American institutions into internal affairs; others argue that it has been somewhat reluctant to use this

³ See, for example, ...

influence in important fields (e.g., freedom of the press, etc.). Then there is obvious and blatant competition with the French in influencing the direction of certain types of reforms, such as in law, higher education, and foreign language instruction (see below). How long this elevated American position will last if internal conditions deteriorate is a question.

The U.S. program in Cambodia seems not only to be designed to assist, but also to buy time for the political and military divisive forces affecting the serenity of the state to dissolve, and for new, progressive institutions to take root. How long a road this may be is unclear at this stage. The potholes in it, however, are many and deep.

In spite of any such factors, the role of USAID is extensively recognized as critical, positive, and influential; and it is to the USAID strategy we must now turn.

B. The USAID Cambodian Strategy

The USAID/Cambodia strategy includes democratic issues as integral to its program, in contrast to many AID missions where it is clearly peripheral. It has three objectives:

- * Strengthening pluralism and governance
"To reinforce democratic gains by further strengthening the capabilities of public interest NGOs, processes and institutions and to strengthen Cambodia's capacity to govern by helping to establish legal, regulatory, and judicial systems;"
- * Supporting broad-based economic growth
"To promote sustainable broad-based economic growth by helping to establish an outward-looking market-oriented policy framework."
- * Meeting basic human needs
"To help meet basic human needs by supporting programs and policies which assure that rural citizens and vulnerable groups have access to services and participate in economic growth."

Thus, in terms of objectives, the Democratic Initiatives Project is one element at the core of USAID programming, in contrast to many missions where, in spite of hyperbole, it has been obviously marginal.

The Democratic Initiatives Project, begun in 1992, is funded at \$15.0 million until its termination in 1997. It is likely that a new project or an extension will be proposed that will continue the program. The concern over democratic institutions is not, however, limited to this project. Much of the PVO Co-financing

project (#442-0112, \$50 million over seven years, 1993-2000) is concerned with the development of pluralistic institutions, which in effect is a more realistic explication of the democratic principles.

Noting the positive and negative aspects of the Cambodian situation, strategic issues, pressing issues, as well as potential risks and vulnerabilities, the document⁴ has three strategic objectives, the first of which is: [1] "To reinforce democratic gains by further strengthening the capabilities of public interest NGOs, processes and institutions and to strengthen Cambodia's capacity to govern by helping to establish legal, regulatory, and judicial systems."

The program outcomes the strategy anticipates are:

- * "Stronger, viable mechanisms and organizations to participate in the democratic process;
- * Increasing participation of individuals and groups in shaping the national agenda and selecting means for implementation;
- * Development and implementation of transparent and predictable legal, regulatory and judicial systems;
- * Improved administrative and analytical support to the legislative process;
- * Improved judicial functioning;
- * Improved administrative efficiency, analytic capability, and management of resources in ministries;
- * Increased public access to legal information."

It is clear that the project under review is one of the more critical elements of the Mission's strategy, and this is reflected in the Mission's close management of the four primary grantees.

This strategy was reviewed in Washington in June 1994, and endorsed.

C. The Evaluation: Goal and Purpose

The goal of this evaluation is to improve the Democratic Initiatives Project, while its purpose is to review and analyze progress toward attaining the general objectives of the project as

⁴ USAID Assistance Strategy for Cambodia FY 1994-97. USAID/Cambodia, May 1994

a whole, as well as the specific accomplishments of each of the grantees. It includes provisions to analyze progress and make recommendations for future activities and means to monitor projected programs. It is also meant to study the impact, sustainability, and cost effectiveness of each of these operations. The issue of the relevance of each of the grantee's objectives to the Cambodian context is to be explored, as well as the mesh between them and the USAID democratic objectives in the country.

Time limits the depth to which each individual subproject or activity of the four grantees can be examined. Efforts have been made to meet with three sets of individuals external to the official U.S. community: the grantee staff, the principal subgrantee leadership of the institutions supported in all fields, and a number of unrelated but knowledgeable observers of the Cambodian scene to try to provide balance and context to the project. Battambang Province was also visited to review specific grantee project activities, meet with other NGOs, and to observe the situation close to the Khmer Rouge front.

D. The Nature of the "Formative Evaluation"

This evaluation is designed to move the Democracy Initiatives Project forward, rather than to concentrate retrospectively on the past performance of the grantees and their relationship with USAID. It offers the opportunity to affect positively the forward motion of an important set of substantive initiatives in a highly politically charged atmosphere.

The evaluation is thus not confrontational, but collaborative among all the parties involved and the evaluator. From it we hope that lessons may be learned from the activities of all parties and their interaction for each of the parties in their future programs, and for the future of democracy-related efforts in other countries.

Because many of these activities are still new, in most cases less than a year old and date from after the national election of May 1993, little statistical data can be accumulated, and the specifics of many of the subactivities of each of the grantees can be evaluated only on the basis of anecdotal evidence. (How does one, for example, evaluate the results of a seminar for political parties without actually witnessing its dynamics and then exploring the follow-up?) This evaluation thus must concentrate on some of the broad conceptual issues, and the potential efficacy of each of the grantees under past and proposed administrative relationships.

Cambodia is one of the most volatile of states at this particular time. It is hazardous at best to predict the future in light of an operative rebellion and the severe ill-health of the charismatic Head of State, who is probably irreplaceable in his present role. The political future of the state must be in some doubt, and any democracy-related project--overtly political in

nature--must be held at least in part hostage to an inscrutable future.

Important and positive efforts have been begun, and uncertainties about the future should not undercut the activities of the present. To procrastinate programmatically would be both inappropriate and indeed a dereliction of duty. No statement of uncertainty, political concern, or caution about inflated expectations should be interpreted to imply a cessation of program action.

It is within this context that the project is being evaluated.

E. Democracy in Cambodia and the Project

1. Democracy--General Considerations

The United States' preoccupation with democracy is not a new phenomenon. Within the context of foreign aid, it dates from the beginning of the post-World War II programs when both the Cold War and the United States' perception of the efficacy of most of its institutions were at their acme.⁵ With the end of the Cold War, the ultimate, universal triumph of democracy seemed inevitable. Even as there was growing cynicism over the condition of the United States and most of its institutions a generation after World War II, this was not true about the democratic system. This optimism was reinforced by economics--the collapse of the centrally planned economies. The claim of a close, causal link between economic pluralism and political pluralism (the American model) seemed to follow inevitably, and this developmental policy seems to have been based on an effective Eastern European experience, but one applied worldwide with more limited relevance to other regions than its proponents may have realized.⁶

Democracy, whichever of the many reasonable definitions one might adopt (in contrast to those adjectivally disadvantaged, such as "peoples'", "guided," etc.), is a continually evolving process and not in stasis. As such, it is subject to a wide spectrum of interpretations from a cultural or sub-cultural perspective as long as the peoples' free execution of their will through elected representation is maintained. Contrary to much of the popular press, however, it is not simply or fundamentally an election, as we have

⁵ See, for example, Robert Bellan, *The Good Society*, for a discussion of the general issue and more specifically foreign aid.

⁶ Larry Diamond is quoted as having said that "the assertion that democracy and economic growth are linked is a probably statement. They tend to be positively correlated." *Finding and Conclusions, Perspectives on Democracy: A.I.D.'s Role in Asia*. AID Bureau for Asia, Kathmandu, Nepal Conference, January 1988. See Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, China, Vietnam, etc.

witnessed in a variety of countries from Algeria and Haiti to Burma. One scholar writing on Cambodia noted:

[T]his paper argues that notions of democracy and aspirations for democratic traditions have little explanatory value when considering the electoral outcome in Cambodia. Rather traditions of authority arising from Cambodia's past as a Buddhist monarchy, and the pervasive hierarchism (patron-clientism) in Cambodian culture are more useful concepts for explaining the choices made by the Cambodian electorate. This paper puts forth the theses that the FUNCINPEC party embodies the royalist heritage which Cambodians sought to recreate through the vehicle of national elections in order to restore social and moral order out of the chaos and disharmony of the past 23 years.⁷

The Cambodian election of 1993, still relatively recent, however successful, thus cannot be considered either a manifestation or a portent of democracy; it could be either, or a temporary sport of an autocratic or traditional organism. It is too early to determine how it might influence that society. To consider this issue in Cambodia, we must first examine some underlying general aspects of democratic societies, recognizing that both states and political institutions, as any good Buddhist would be the first to admit, are always in a state of flux.

According to a AID workshop:

The only absolute requirement for a country to become a stable or sustainable democracy is the commitment of its elites to democracy. This position opposes the well-known thesis that there is a minimum threshold of socio-economic development before a country can become democratic.⁸

This thesis, which may be valid, skirts the issue of who defines and how elites define that commitment--a public posture, a constitution that is ignored, even a belief in theory that is negated in practice, or a real shift in political and social values? Can, then, elites bring along a population and an opposition to this fundamental shift? How long does it take? And is foreign aid essentially peripheral to the process? These are some of the more basic questions pertaining to the thesis.

The primary issue in speculating on the future of democracy in any society is how power is conceived, administered, shared, held, and distributed. In the West, power is generally now inchoately

⁷ Kate Frieson. "The Meaning of the Cambodian Elections: The Quest for Democracy or a Traditional New Order?" Abstracts of the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, March 1994.

⁸ Findings and Conclusions. Perspectives on Democracy: A.I.D.'s Role in Asia. Bureau for Asia, AID, Kathmandu, Nepal. Conference, January 1992. The thesis is from Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution. It is supported by an AID study of rule-of-law programs. See *Weighing in on the Scales of Justice. Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Rule of Law Programs.* AID, February 1994.

considered to be infinite; by sharing it one may accrue more. Many societies, however, view power as a limited good to be hoarded, for to share or distribute it would diminish the prestige, as well as the power, of its possessor. In many such societies, power therefore is personalized, maintained for the aggrandizement of its holder and those who support the leader. Thus, patron-client relationships or entourage systems become paramount means by which institutions function: institutions thus become the means by which to gain or maintain power, and programmatic considerations become non-existent, marginal, or used to manipulate the power base. In societies with relatively small elites, this leads to factionalism, which then feeds on itself and is perpetuated.

The American experience and social science literature demonstrate that there are a variety of institutions and relationships that make up a democratic state. These include a vibrant, elected, legislature; a judicial system independent of the executive branch; the "rule of law," a general separation of powers among the three branches of a central government, and between it and the constituent geographic elements of the state; a free press independent of the executive branch; a multiple political party system; the right collectively to organize labor; private property and business ownership--all of the above operating on the base of a civic society in which citizens join together to pursue their collective and individual aspirations. Indeed, these are all elements of the USAID Democracy Initiative in Cambodia, but at this stage in Cambodia all are tenuous.

It is also evident that even if these institutions were to function effectively, when power is perceived as highly personal or the state considers it has the right, even moral or legal obligation, to intrude intimately into private lives or business relationships, then these elements may be used for contrary purposes. The courts can better administer repressive legislation (as in Burma), political parties can be used for personal agendas (as during much of Korean independent history), the press may be indirectly controlled,⁹ legislatures may be impotent (as in Indonesia).

So when these institutions all function effectively, we may still witness what has been called "procedural democracy," in contrast to "substantive democracy."¹⁰ Since the functioning of political institutions reflect many of the more fundamental societal norms (as we also believe law does--see section II, A below), the role of foreign organizations in affecting change is necessarily

⁹ As a dictator in a Tom Stoppard play says in response to a question on what he meant by a "relatively free press," he says, "A press controlled by my relatives."

¹⁰ This distinction was made in a lecture by Professor Ahn Byong-chun (Yonsei University) in discussing the present state of politics in Korea.

limited. Political liberalization may be improved (voter registration, election watches, legislation, etc.), but affecting how these organizations function in democratic terms is difficult of access for any exogenous group.

This is not to maintain, however, that change is not possible over time, but simply that the role of any foreign organization, regardless of its budgetary allocations, will be limited over any reasonable programmatic time period. This is not to deny the usefulness, even importance, of attempting to influence positively change, creating conditions under which internally generated reforms can prosper, but rather to create realistic expectations of what might be done by the donors and their sponsors, such as the Congress.

Here it is important to note that the project paper on this project by USAID is the most candidly realistic of any such paper produced by AID that the author has read.

2. Project Components

This diverse project, composed of four major American subgrants and a very large number of local subgrantees, may be divided into five essential elements, none of which is exclusive to any of the four grantees. These are:

- a. The "Rule of Law," which includes legal training, legal aid, legislative drafting, work with the legislature, the administration of justice, human rights activities, paralegal training, etc.
- b. Political pluralism, which includes the work with the various political parties within and outside of the National Assembly.
- c. Civic and non-governmental development, or the formation and increased strength of civic organizations in mobilizing for social goals, and an independent press.
- d. Economic liberalization, or assisting the movement from a planned to a more market-oriented economy (in line with the new Constitution).
- e. Labor, or creating legislation that will establish the rights of labor to organize and negotiate for redress.

This regrouping is designed to provide a broad overview, but none are inherently self-contained--they overlap and interconnect. Below, each of the grantee's activities will be considered as part of their program.

F. Project Grantees

Four institutions have been the prime USAID grantees in the Democratic Initiatives Project. Each has had individual capacities and operational styles and philosophies. In the Cambodian context, these diverse organizations share a common attribute: all of their operations in Cambodia are virtually completely dependent on USAID funding. This has led to dependence on USAID for considerable program influence or guidance not only because of the funding, but because USAID had greater experience and knowledge of the country when each of the grantees started operations. This potentially creates an intimacy with USAID that could be a strength or a weakness; it also creates a public identity with USAID in both foreign and Cambodian circles that undercuts the autonomous image of each of the grantees.

1. The Asia Foundation: Experience and Capacity

The Asia Foundation has had broad experience in working toward democracy, one of its primary objectives since its founding in 1954. During that period, it has programmed in each area included in this project, except for direct work with political parties, although it has supported programs dealing more generally with elections and the elective processes. It has the most extensive law-related program in Asia of any U.S. organization, and its work with legislatures spans most countries where it programs. The press has been a continuous concern to the Foundation since its inception, as has fostering and programming with non-governmental organizations. Labor programming has also been of interest to this group over the years.

The strength of the Foundation is the individual authority of its overseas offices, and their capacity to respond flexibly and quickly to the individualized needs of particular societies, for all of which the Foundation has been noted. Staff are normally specialists on Asia with experience within the Foundation framework. The Foundation's generic weakness may be its overidentification with the U.S. government both historically and at present.

The Foundation is funded by a core grant from the U.S. Congress, supplemented by individual grants from Foundations and businesses (including those in Asia as well), and increasingly, as AID has stressed democracy programs, from AID. Usually, AID funds only support a portion of the overseas program in any one country. Cambodia is an exception.

The capacity of the Foundation in experience and administration is thus very strong.

2. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI): Experience and Capacity¹¹

The NDI and the IRI were established by the U.S. Congress as an operating arm of the National Endowment for Democracy (which also carries out its own programs). Both organizations were founded in 1983 with the expressed purpose of working directly with political parties as a part of their political processes to further the growth of democracy. Since they were not focused on Asia, their staff were generalists concerned with the American political process rather than with those overseas. They have brought in specialists on political parties from other countries as well.

The strengths of both organizations lie in their potential to train individuals and institutions in the organizing, operations, fund-raising, and other detailed aspects of political party work as well as in the concepts associated with the democratic process. The weaknesses of both at the operational level relate to resident missions and staffing, although a generic weakness is also their strength--involvement in the political process and how that involvement is perceived in any particular society. In Cambodia, because of a powerful U.S. presence, this did not seem to be an issue in itself.

Neither organization was experienced in establishing overseas offices with continuous programs. Because of this, it was said that the delegation of authority between the field and the headquarters was often indistinct. Core headquarters and some field staff of each organization were not steeped in Asian affairs, and in the case of Cambodia outside staff had to fill this gap.

The programming style of both organizations (and AAFLI as well, see below) was quite distinct from the Foundation. The Asia Foundation generally provides grants to institutions and individuals and refrains from the direct management of projects. The Institutes and AAFLI, however, generally have managed program operations directly by themselves (or staff that they have seconded from other institutions and indeed from other countries) in training seminars, workshops, and other venues. This had begun to change in the planning of the IRI, but has not yet been imple-

¹¹ This evaluation was drafted before an article of the National Endowment for Democracy was brought to the author's attention. This quite favorable article by Thomas Carothers, "The NED at 10," *Foreign Policy*, No. 95, Summer 1994), he makes two criticisms germane to this evaluation. He noted the Institutes have "an insufficient connection between democracy work and the field of development assistance," and that there is a lack of understanding of local milieux. "The NED relies too heavily on the notion that democratic transitions all over the world share basic characteristics. The result is that endowment projects are often swimming on the surface of deep, turbulent political forces, not taking into account the complex histories of relevant persons and groups." These comments apply to the Cambodia situation.

mented.

According to all reports, the work of both Institutes in educating political parties in Cambodia before the elections of May 1993 was highly successful. A relatively short, concentrated (but expensive) effort was necessary to assist the election process and this the Institutes carried out with vigor and skill. The sustaining of party building activities in the post election period, while of theoretical importance, was in both cases more sporadic.

Thus the potential capacities for the Institutes were strong on the political organizational front, but much weaker in sustained field operations.

3. Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI): Experience and Capacity

AAFLI was founded about 1967 as a regional effort by the AFL-CIO to program in Asia as a counterpart to other, separate labor institutes operating in Latin America and Africa. It was originally funded by AID through the Asia Bureau (and subsequent permutations of that office). It was later included in the funding for the National Endowment for Democracy. In addition to core funding, AAFLI receives grants from USAIDs for specialized operations in certain countries (e.g., Indonesia). AAFLI has or had offices in the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Korea, Nepal, Thailand, and Turkey, among other states. The core funding for AAFLI was cut by about 80 percent over the past six or seven years, severely restricting its operations both in its Washington headquarters and in the field.

In the first field evaluation of AAFLI conducted by this writer in the mid-1970s, it was apparent at that time that AAFLI was very strong and competent in its programs concentrating on the organization and operations of unions themselves, but was weak on an understanding of development and the broad, potential role of labor in that process. This seemed to be a result of recruiting most of the representatives from the unions themselves.

AAFLI has been working in Cambodia under a small USAID grant through its Bangkok office since October 1993, and proposes to expand its operation in Phnom Penh to include full time expatriate staff under USAID support. It has worked here on reform of the 1992 Cambodian labor legislation, which it believes does not meet the U.S. and international trading standards.

II PROJECT EVALUATION

A. The Rule of Law

"The Rule of Law" is the cornerstone of American attitudes toward programming toward democracy. It is a slogan around which most Americans would rally. This attitude is the product of the long western tradition of a continuous, integrated dynamic of legal, political, social, and economic growth and development, all of which have been indigenous. In much of the world, however, the legal traditions that presently exist have been both subject to asynchronous relations with other elements of the societies, exogenous, and have been discontinuous. Law has evolved through diverse traditions, including the colonial period, and among some elements of these societies law represented oppressive or extraneous elements of control.¹² Law is, after all, the control and execution of power. In considering the role of law in a society, a distinction should be made between the obvious importance of internationally accepted law in commerce and trade, and the critical issue of what foreign aid can do about concepts of and attitudes toward law and the legal field.¹³

1. Law and Foreign Aid

Law represents in part the norms, expectations, or aspirations of a society. It thus is the codified attitudes that lie at the societal core. To change law and legal attitudes is thus complex.

Law may be divided into two for purposes of analysis of its role in furthering democracy under foreign aid programs. There is a distinction between legal process and legal culture.¹⁴ The former consists of improving the courts, training lawyers or paralegals, promoting institutions that supply legal aid, developing legal materials, and other related activities. The latter concerns attitudes toward power. The question of human rights--intimately

¹² For a discussion of this, see Steinberg's legal papers in the bibliography (Appendix 3).

¹³ In a June 17, 1994 paper presented to the Mekong Region Law Center Conference in Phnom Penh, Thomas Heller discussed the "confluence" or "globalization" of certain aspects of law related to commerce. A questioner raised the issue of the confluence of law in a world Samuel Huntington described as a "clash of civilizations". The issue was not fully discussed, but one might speculate on the social, political, and intellectual tensions that globalization of law might create when at the same time the globe may be fragmenting into a number of clashing cultures.

¹⁴ The point is abstracted from Daniel Lev, "Judicial Institutions and Legal Culture in Indonesia," in Ruth McVey, ed., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972.

associated with law--also may be divided into procedural aspects of protecting human rights, and the culture of power, which is far more fundamental. Legal processes, and the whole field of internationally acceptable commercial law, are subject to foreign influences through foreign aid. Indeed, certain types of foreign aid are contingent on changes in commercial codes or investment laws, e.g. some World Bank structural adjustment lending. Judges can be trained, materials supplied, funds made available for legal assistance, and other important activities. Legal culture, however, is probably directly immune to foreign aid (although over time any legal culture will evolve, and arguably foreign aid might speed the process). The importance of maintaining this distinction lies in the expectations of project results. Improvement in commercial law and legal processes could assist the economic development processes, but are unlikely over any reasonable programming period to affect democratic attitudes. Better courts may or may not mean better justice, and are even less likely by themselves to mean a more democratic society.

2. Law in the Cambodian Context: The Rule of What Law?

Law in Cambodia has been affected by an indigenous hierarchical society, a French legal tradition, a period of antilegal authoritarianism under the Khmer Rouge, communist statism under Vietnamese influence, and today by international (American) influences with a strong attempted resurgence of French legal prominence. Law and legal institutions have never been independent. Dominated by a new constitution that is in part contradictory, and in which new legislation is mandated in a number of areas but which is still lacking, Cambodia is in a state of legal flux.

Law in Cambodia to the average citizen may be conceived as an element of government control--the rights of the state, rather than a reflection of the rights of the individual. If law is to affect social norms, access to and respect for the judiciary and its processes should be encouraged. This will only occur when the law is publicly perceived to produce justice (a culturally determined concept).

This is far from happening. There is no neutral interface between the citizen and law at the lowest, paralegal level, such as a notary, a scrivener, or scribe (depending on the society). In Cambodia, it is the CPP chief at the village or commune (village cluster) level. Appeals to the Appellate Court must be approved by the Minister of Justice, an executive branch political appointee. Courts are often avoided by high level negotiations with a provincial governor. Most serious, perhaps, is the role of the military, which reportedly has its own secret detention system with unknown numbers of civilians incarcerated, its ability to protect its staff and ranks from legal prosecution, its capacity to ignore law and act illegally when it so wishes (according to informants),

and its interference into the legal system at high levels.

The Foundation's program in law is extensive. Major efforts are listed below (some overlap with the activities connected with the National Assembly).

3. Legal Programming

This paper will not catalogue the efforts of the Foundation in the field of law (See Appendix 3 for a general listing). They are extensive, and include work in legal education, training of the judiciary, advisory services related to the Constitution and other matters that are included below under activities in the National Assembly. The Foundation is supporting a contract law course that will provide training for 84 persons, of whom 60 are from various ministries. It is providing assistance for an advisor to the Minister of Justice, and a large number of legal scholars who range through many different legal institutions and fields.¹⁵ Law materials are being produced (including an English-Khmer legal glossary), law books and specialized reference services are made available both through the Foundations Books for Asia Program and through a contract with the American Bar Association. The new Appellate Court is being refurbished and some judges provided with training trips in country and abroad. A provincial court pilot project in Battambang is training provincial judges, refurbishing the court, and is instilling more respect for the process there. Legal technical assistance is provided to the National Assembly's Human Rights and Legislation commission (standing committee), as well as the General Secretariat.

The Foundation has supported a Public Defenders Program in collaboration with the International Human Rights Law Group. A grant of \$350,000 has been used to train 25 public defenders through the technical assistance of three talented and energetic Asian-American trainers. The program is universally thought to be a highly successful continuing education program. The curriculum was developed outside the Ministry of Justice purview, which must approve of the certificates granted to graduates so that they may practice in the court system. This approval has not yet been forthcoming, and it is unclear whether such approval will be given as a group or on an individual basis. Foundation management believes this will not be a problem, but the Ministry is more attuned to the French system, with which aid program the Minister has made an agreement.

The International Human Rights Law Group has proposed to USAID on June 17 that it directly support (not through the Foundation) a \$1.5 million separate program to expand the public defenders prog-

¹⁵ This writer has recently said that the Foundation is running the largest law firm east of Suez.

ram, and expand work to seven provincial courts for members of the judicial system. The proposal raises a number of administrative issues concerning registration of the group as a new organization, the establishment of a small support office, its capacity to instill provincial replicability, as well as its relationships with the Ministry of Justice.¹⁶

The University of San Francisco Law Program, called "Leadership Development in Law," is designed to train 10 Cambodians with legal backgrounds and work-related need for upgraded law skills for six months each at the University. The project was conceived outside of The Asia Foundation by the University, and because it fit within the programmatic rubric of the Foundation it was included in that grant. The total costs of the project are \$500,000.

It is too early to evaluate the success of the training, for five students will leave for training in July, and five more are to go in January. The project is expensive at a per-student cost of approximately \$40,000 for six-months training. The University has also placed an American lawyer in Phnom Penh. He teaches in the contract law program of the Foundation in addition to his University of San Francisco duties, and relies on the Foundation for communications support (no office), and for advice, which is regarded as helpful. There are, however, residual benefits in programs and costs through the teaching in the contract law program.

There has been thought that this grant might be made directly by USAID, if it were renewed. The Foundation seems to have no problem with either option. If the grant were continued under Foundation auspices, the Foundation would receive overhead expenses on it, but has the advantage of the teaching program in contracts law. If the program were directly administered by USAID, then the University would have to establish a small office in Phnom Penh, directly provide or pay for communications costs and other operating expenses. There would be less coordination with the Foundation. In a conversation with university staff, they felt that being a part of the Foundation's program would be most helpful to them, and they indicated a desire that the relationship continue.

If the grant were to be continued, this evaluation recommends that this activity remain with The Asia Foundation and that coordination continue with the contracts law program. USAID staffing does not allow for additional bureaucratic responsibilities that

¹⁶ For a positive view of the UNTAC and its role in human rights and its future in Cambodia, see Terence Duffy, "Cambodia Since the Election: Peace, Democracy and Human Rights," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 15, No. 4, March 1994.

might be avoided without loss (and perhaps even gain) to the program.

4. Conclusions on Programs in the Rule of Law

While noting the limitations of the immediate impact of legal programming on democracy in Cambodia, this evaluation supports the breadth of the effort, and believes it should continue, and expand into certain areas. The Foundation and USAID should make high-level representations to the Cambodian authorities at the appropriate, but early, time to ensure official authorization for the program, and so that a clear, non-competitive relationship is established with the French-oriented legal education system.

Significant legal programming opportunities might still be explored. The Battambang Provincial law project might train other provincial staff and judges in Battambang, before a major effort were undertaken to expand directly judicial reform and training to other provinces. The Asia Foundation advisor to the Minister of Justice indicates that the Ministry's highest priority for him is redrafting the criminal code. Others have told the evaluation team that agrarian law is the most important and volatile issue. Others say that a women's and family court is most needed. Legal specialists, together with political observers, should study various priorities in the legal sphere to see whether any offer programmatic possibilities. Thought might be given to determine whether a judges grouping (as opposed to a bar association) might increase awareness of reform possibilities. Finally, the evaluation team has been told that the role of foreign organizations in the law is both to protect the reformers and highlight progress, thus giving the reform elements ammunition by which to solidify and expand progress.

B. Political Pluralism and Democratic Governance in Cambodia

In a sense political pluralism and democratic governance have yet to exist in Cambodia. It is true, of course, that there are many political parties (three major and one minor (Molinaka) with seats in the National Assembly), and there is vigorous debate, the press is becoming more vital (although in the past two months the Ministries of Information and the Interior have warned some papers against "pro-Khmer Rouge" and anti-Sihanouk sentiments and closed down two), and there is an apparent realization that Phnom Penh cannot forever be the single center of political power.

While there is debate, yet there is no formal opposition under the "government of national conciliation." The state administrative apparatus is controlled by the CPP, which would like to restrict some of the activities of the National Assembly in provincial areas. The heritage of Vietnamese centralism, which reinforced the traditional concepts of the monarch as the center (of the world, under early Hindu theories of statehood, on which Cam-

bodia was based)) and his entourage (administration) as the core of society, is still alive and well and living in Cambodian administrative circles. Some legislators are still unfamiliar with both their National Assembly roles and democratic processes and procedures, some are poorly educated, few have comparative experience or knowledge of comparable institutions or activities elsewhere. The National Assembly has established nine standing commissions (committees), which provide the continuing focus on legislation within their respective areas. The most important for USAID at this stage is the human rights commission, to which the Foundation has supplied a legal advisor. Many of the most progressive and knowledgeable legislators have had extensive overseas experience in either the United States or France.

Power, as we have seen, is highly personalized in Cambodian and other societies. Parties are often mentioned as Mr. X's party, which accurately reflects Cambodian reality. Thus parties become the means by which power is retained or acquired for its leader, and through which entourages are solidified. Factionalism becomes more important than programs; party platforms become marginalized and irrelevant. These forces are neither new nor unique.

What is new, however, has been the United States' ventures into the support for political party development through grants to build party capacities. This support is an effort to build administrative capability both to manage the party internally, and to reach beyond the party faithful to acquire and retain new constituencies. This aid is based on an articulated assumption: first, that in a democratic society a multiple party system is an essential element of representation and governance. This is no doubt true among the established democracies. There is a question, however, whether the connotations of political parties in Khmer convey the same message.¹⁷

There is, however, a second assumption that is more questionable in developing societies. That is, that parties stand for programmatic platforms to which (however much they may be ignored in the reality of governance) the educated citizenry holds the parties responsible to some degree. It is demonstrably true in some societies (e.g., South Korea where the far left was not legal) that party platforms are in many cases irrelevant, but what has been critical was the personal leadership at the top, around which the party was formed and funded.

This is the case in Cambodia. Thus, it might be argued that the strengthening of political parties is in effect the strengthening of personal leadership at the top. This may be benign or

¹⁷ One Cambodian remarked that the term "party" in Khmer among the mass of people is conceived in personalistic terms, and that the word springs from, and still connotes, a "plan."

malignant, depending on the individual, but at this particular stage of Cambodian development it may not strengthen the democratic process. (Obviously, to eliminate the parties would weaken the democratic process.) Over time one might expect this entourage syndrome to change. At present, however, the prospects that party-building will materially improve democratic attitudes must remain highly questionable. The heady experience before the 1993 elections is not a necessary, consistent, and continuous pattern, and as discussed above, elections do not necessarily a democracy make.

USAID, through its grant agreements, has been scrupulous in attempting to avoid charges of interference in the political process and favoritism toward any political party. The grantees have played this role as well; multiple invitations have been issued for seminars and workshops, etc. Yet it is evident that the CPP has been the organization that has realized the importance of this effort and taken advantage of it in a manner that the other parties have not. The Embassy has been prompt to explain to Cambodian critics that all invitations were equal (but as it turned out some responses were more equal than others).

Political parties in Cambodia remain a potentially important factor in democratic governance, and support to the process, although difficult for a foreign group without being charged with political interference, may be possible in the future, but the efficacy of this approach at the present time is questionable.

1. Programming Elements

a. The National Assembly

The Asia Foundation support to the National Assembly (budgeted at over \$600,000) and its functions is an effort that is similar to many undertaken by the Foundation in other countries. Here the situation is different, for this is the first such institution in Cambodian history. The present capacity of the Assembly to initiate democratic reforms is evidently limited if its first year of operation is an example, but it now has a greater capacity to prevent a return to authoritarianism. The Assembly has stopped the passage of a restrictive press law, and sent it back for review. It has the power, should it exercise it, to withhold from the King the two-thirds majority he needs to let him gain the power he is said to want if he is to "save the country" in a De Gaulle-like gesture.

Foundation programming with the Assembly has been diverse. It is assisting in publishing the Assembly records and developing a parliamentary information and resource service facility. It will strengthen the Assembly Secretariat, and provide a legal counsel pool of technical assistance advisors on legislation. Some staff will be sent abroad to Tulane University for training in legislative drafting.

Although the Legislature is weak, the work of the Foundation has begun to give it greater institutional capacity to perform its functions properly, is important and should continue. Cambodia may have a situation and a culture in which this legislature could play a more vital part in governance than, for example, the more mature but impotent one in Indonesia.

These institution-building efforts will not yield immediate returns, but this should not discourage programming to construct a potentially important element of the political process, if other conditions allow that process to continue.

The NDI has also worked with the Assembly, but with individual legislators in fora and lectures focused on basic issues affecting parliamentarians. It has not attempted to improve the Assembly's administrative capacity.

b. Political Parties

This evaluation, since it is designed to address the future, will not dwell on the good work that the NDI and the IRI did with political parties in the pre-election period. There seems to be general admiration for their work at that time, which was characterized by flexibility and responsiveness. Embassy and USAID staff speak highly of it.

Following the elections, however, the organizational needs as viewed by the parties that won seats seemed to slacken off, and as a result NDI and IRI programming in party training both in the capital and the provinces became much more sporadic. We have heard some good things about some of the trainers brought in to speak at workshops, and we cannot personally evaluate these efforts or the Khmer language materials produced to accompany the lectures. What is evident, however, is that the light program intensity does not seem to have justified the heavy infrastructural expenses. The establishment of a resident, joint office creates the need to program, rather than necessarily reflecting the perceived value of such programs in the groups concerned. Because both groups tended to administer programs themselves, their programming flow was more affected by staff changes than if they had given grants to institutions that had programming responsibilities.

In plans for the fiscal year, the IRI had proposed the establishment of a radio station it would run. This plan was rejected by USAID as an inappropriate activity for an American political party, a decision in which this evaluation concurs. More recently, the NDI has proposed the establishment of a Phnom Penh "political party training 'college.'" To this evaluator this seems to be as politically inappropriate as a foreign-sponsored radio station.

7 Politics is in a state of flux in Cambodia. The King has indicated he would like to return to initiate some new, overarching political approach to "national salvation," which even if constitutional might make the political party process more tenuous, or other events may make the immediate organizational activities of the parties impossible or immaterial.

It would seem prudent for the United States to have a lower profile in direct action with the political parties for the next two years or so. This evaluator believes that the overarching position of the U.S. here should produce caution related to the political field. Should the political process remain on course, party organizational work might again be continued. The presence of resident party trainers at that time could be considered.

2. Conclusions on Programming in Political Pluralism

Neither the legislature nor the political parties have yet exhibited their potential to perform their respective roles either efficiently or effectively. The institution of the National Assembly is potentially vital to the functioning of the state and to the development of pluralism and then, eventually, democracy. Although it may be a very long time before it develops the capacity to perform its designated role in the balance of state power, it is important that it be strengthened administratively and that the institution be built that can in future meet its constitutional requirements. This is a program that will require patience and continuous commitment.

Political parties of a representational, rather than mobilizational, stripe are in their infancy. The efforts to make them more effective in the democratic context are laudatory, but may be premature for the state of development in Cambodia and very costly compared with their likely, limited impact.

The forces for pluralism in the society may arise more quickly from civic organizations, which in turn may eventually affect positively the actions of both the legislature and the political parties. We turn now to this consideration.

C. Civic and Non-Governmental Development

The United States has built support to civic and NGO organizations into its aid program for at least five reasons: such groups are one of the few influential constituencies for foreign aid left in the U.S.; the U.S. has a heritage as a "civic culture," of which it is proud, and that this civic growth through such organizations has been an important element in its political development; that such groups have done good work overseas; NGO groups increasingly are devoted to advocacy work that is of international as well as local importance; and that humanitarian concerns are an integral part of American culture.

In programs in which the U.S. focuses more broadly than natural or man-made disasters where NGOs become the principal programming tool, AID has turned to the NGO community as program vehicles. At first, AID focused attention on international NGOs, with which it was acquainted, and then on indigenous NGOs as USAIDs became more knowledgeable about their activities and potentials, and as these organizations grew. USAIDs, for the past generation under pressure to cut staff and administrative costs, saw the NGOs as a means to retain USAID's wholesale assistance role, giving the NGOs the retail functions.

This has been important in several fields of contemporary concern--law, human rights, maternal/child health, women's activities, and the environment, to mention just several fields. There are three types of NGOs: those that deal with local issues of concern to the immediate community, however defined; those that advocate public policies that are broader in scope; and those that coordinate NGO activities in a variety of these or other fields.

Because democracy as a program goal is so difficult of access (see above), the intermediate and critical step of encouraging the development of pluralistic centers of power becomes essential. The NGOs, professional organizations, and related groups are some such organizations that can contribute to limiting the authoritarian power of a central government, improving good governance, furthering programmatic goals, and instilling in the populace a sense of personal and group efficacy and hope.

Thus the NGO becomes not only the medium through which USAID programs (in law, human rights, etc., no matter how important each of these fields may be), but it is in fact the message--in their own right the NGO becomes important. We must remember, however, in this NGO euphoria the danger that if power is personalized at the political level, it is likely to be similarly attuned at the NGO or institutional level.

Because NGO's have this potential, authoritarian governments or those that feel threatened often attempt to limit their growth or activities and their contacts with the outside world and foreign funders.

1. Civic Organizations in Cambodia

The NGO concept, always weak except in religious organizations, was destroyed in Cambodia in 1975, and only recently was resuscitated. Many may be the incipient administrative means for personal notoriety, support, or power. Others are well-meaning but weak. A few are growing important forces for progress as advocates of public policy reform. There still is a strong tendency for centralized control, but increasingly these groups, some of which are supported by some of the approximately 110 international NGOs operating in Cambodia, are assuming importance. For example, there

are said to be some 12 important Cambodian NGOs in the human rights field alone. There are about 100 Cambodian NGOs.

2. Programming Elements

The Asia Foundation has provided major support to the Cambodian Institute for Human Rights (\$247,000) to upgrade human rights instructors, who will train others from the NGO community, and who will also prepare teaching materials in Khmer. The CIHR will also use funds to sustain a series of workshops and seminars on the Constitution. It will also continue a series of NGO training and management courses and needs assessments that in fact upgrade the activities of other NGOs. This aspect of the work is, in effect, a type of activity that AID used to sponsor when it gave DPGs (Development Program Grants) to U.S. NGOs. The program is imaginative and should be monitored closely.

The Foundation has also funded POSOD, an NGO composed of National Assembly members acting in their private capacities (if this is possible in Cambodia) to explore human rights issues in the provinces. Although the leadership of the Assembly clearly wished to exercise control of this activity through screening the Foundation's support, the Foundation has felt that the principle of the private organization should be maintained. Others have argued that for M.P.s to form their own NGO tends to undercut the civic work of local institutions. The Khmer Kampuchea Krom, a human rights group concerned with the Cambodians who have lived in Vietnam but returned to Cambodia have also been assisted by the Foundation.

The Foundation has supported some activities specifically designed for women, such as the Women's Voice Center (formerly called the Women's Committee for Non-Violence and the Election) which produced videos in a public education program. The five women in the National Assembly, about four percent of the membership, are included in those activities, as well as in all Foundation programs. USAID concerns, however, are more clearly articulated through the PVO Co-Financing project, which directly supports women's groups.

Although there is a freer press in Cambodia today than has existed in the past, it is increasingly subject to harassment. Papers have been closed, an editor possibly murdered in a questionable motor vehicle accident, others threatened. English language press and journalists have been warned. The concept of a free press governed by its own code of ethics is an important element in the movement toward pluralism and transparency.

The Asia Foundation support is in keeping with a long tradition of such activities in other countries, and is important for the development of the fourth estate in Cambodia. The Foundation has just requested USAID concurrence for an additional \$40,000 to be provided to this group.

The Foundation, with non-USAID funds and under a separate program objective of "confidence building measures," is assisting the development of the private Preah Sihanouk Raj Centre to act as an independent source of policy analysis and to conduct seminars, conferences, etc. It is too early to determine the effectiveness of this organization.

3. Coordination in the Civic Sector

Coordination within USAID in the NGO programs is in the program office, to which individual project managers report. As far as the USAID portfolio is concerned, it is quite reasonable. USAID is generally aware of the variety of programming by both donors and local NGOs in fields that fit within its priorities.

There are several forms of broad NGO coordination. The largest is the Cambodian Coordination Committee (CCC), which is a membership group of some 70 of the 110 international NGOs. Under CCC auspices are a variety of sectoral groups that coordinate the activities of specialized interests (e.g., the Urban Sectoral Group, etc.). There is also the International Forum, composed of some 40 international advocacy groups. In addition, there are coalitions of organizations that focus on cross-cutting issues, such as women, and who are said to have had an impact on the Constitution. Coordination sometimes involves group agreement on standardized per diem rates and other questions so that groups do not find themselves competing for participants on the basis of money. Some coordination also exists at the provincial level; in Battambang, for instance, three human rights NGOs meet about monthly to discuss specific issues. Further comments of the question of coordination in the NGO community are contained in section G-6 below.

4. Conclusions on Programs in Civic Development

Programming with indigenous NGOs included in this project seem to have generally been effective. That NGO community is not capable of sustainable action without foreign support. Although some of these groups would continue to exist without foreign funds, many more might wither away, but those that remained would be severely handicapped. Although USAID or Asia Foundation assistance to these groups might cease, other foreign organizations would probably step in to support these organization, but with perhaps somewhat different foci.

Over time it is quite possible that there may be nationalistic reactions to the activities of some local NGOs as "agents" of foreign influence. Indeed, the high intensity of this foreign presence make this a natural target for some group's political purposes or to deflect attention from local failures. It is thus important that these organizations seek core support from local sources as soon as the economy enables this to take place. This

would increase their credibility in their own society.

Work with the NGO community offers perhaps the most immediate means to move a society towards the pluralistic goals that it has set for itself, and should continue to be stressed.

D. Economic Liberalization

The movement from a centrally planned economy to one more oriented to the private sector is a tortuous path. Inflation, rent-seeking, redundancies, and social dislocation are often attendant in its wake, as rules and regulations collapse and social safety nets are often lacking.

AID has postulated that the movement from centrally planned economies to open market economies is directly linked to the growth of democracy--plural economies lead to plural polities. This seems based on an Eastern European model that may not be relevant in Asia. One need not question the value of economic competition and the collapse of centrally planned economies to question the link, although it seems evident that market economies will eventually threaten the stability of political mobilization systems.

1. The Market and Cambodian Society

USAID/Cambodia does not make that intellectual leap of faith in its *Strategy*. It calls for a market-oriented approach to reach both broad-based and sustainable growth, efforts that should be supported. It has fostered programs in education that relate to training, essentially for the private sector, as contrasted with normal Cambodian economic training which is designed to deal both with classical economics and prepare individuals for work in various ministries.

2. Economic Programming

The core of the economic education program is the Economic Science Institute's Faculty of Commerce. This is the first attempt in Cambodia to provide a modern business education curriculum. Although this is the second year of the program, the school is in transition from a five to a four-year curriculum. The certificates that will be issued to graduates are recognized by the Ministry of Education.

USAID, through The Asia Foundation, has also supported the Georgetown Program in Business Education (known locally as a "mini-MBA program") that is designed to provide continuing education to those who would like to go into the private sector. Over 200 students have gone through the course, and while attending one of the graduation exercises in writing and presenting a business plan, there was impressive participation and articulation by students,

including women. The project is meeting a need that seems evidently acute, and the program should be continued, either under Foundation auspices or as a separate program.

3. Conclusions on Economic Liberalization

The business programs supported by USAID through The Asia Foundation seem both popular and effective. Students in the Georgetown program seem to have gained the capacity to articulate business goals; women participate freely in the courses, and there is a general level of enthusiasm. The contract law course is a separate course unconnected to any particular school but sanctioned by the Ministry of Justice. It is just beginning, so there is no way to judge what receptivity it will eventually have.

Some of these projects are carried out beyond the normal educational system. They seem effective, but are not sustainable without foreign assistance. They are in apposition to traditional educational programs. The importance of this issue lies not only in problems associated with sustaining these efforts, but also in the acceptance of the certificates awarded to graduates when they apply for other jobs. Some argue that because these individuals will essentially go into the private sector, this question is irrelevant. This may not be the case, for to attract students and to contribute to the society as a whole, the graduates need the mobility that official recognition of such certificates would bring. The Foundation should make every effort to see what can be done to assist in this process.

E. Labor

1. Labor in the Cambodian Context

A very small percentage of the work force is in the industrial or manufacturing sector, an even smaller percentage are in firms or factories that are large enough to warrant organizing or are not family firms.¹⁸ The need for adequate labor legislation and safety regulations, together with the ability to organize, are essential for pluralistic growth, but the real issues in organizing labor may be not in the industrial sector, but in rural communities. There, traditional patterns of cooperation have been destroyed and the populace may be quite skeptical or suspicious of organizations that attempt to mobilize farmers. Rural problems deserve greater attention than the U.S. has given them here.

¹⁸ In a sense, some of the societies with porous borders, inefficient and small scale industries, and weak labor forces and investment climates have effectively abandoned an industrial future to major and efficient, low cost producing countries. Thus Chinese goods dominate Burma and Laos. For the foreseeable future, Cambodia will be subject to Vietnamese, Thai, and Chinese manufactures and Japanese goods through these societies.

Cambodia has a 1992 labor law that AAFLI believes is inadequate. Others say that it is unfriendly to foreign investment because it mandates free medical care, a full-time doctor, and a clinic for every factory employing over 50 people. It also makes firing anyone virtually impossible. Labor legislation evidently needs a thorough, professional review not only by lawyers, but by both labor and management specialists, and within the context of Cambodian-American negotiations on a bilateral trade agreement and GSP and MFN status, which the Embassy believes is important.

2. Conclusions on Programs in Labor

Labor programming is a field still too new in Cambodia about which to draw conclusions. Programming in this area may be desirable, but should be carefully coordinated with that of the ILO, which already has been working there.

F. The International University

The Asia Foundation has been developing the concept of a private International University of Cambodia that would encompass three fields: law, business administration, and general arts and sciences. It has reached this conclusion because of the antiquated, corrupted, and failed archaic government-run university system that meets the needs of neither the students nor the state.

Draft papers are circulating that deal with parts of the curriculum and the rationale for this proposed university. An impressive amount of planning has already taken place. More is scheduled; seminars on the law and business aspects of this University will take place in Phnom Penh under Foundation auspices over the next several weeks, and engage a number of internationally distinguished scholars. They are to critique the existing plans, and develop fuller details of its proposed operation.

There are three options: [1] keeping the programs ad hoc and separate, as they now are; [2] joining the University of Phnom Penh as a fully autonomous, self administered unit (for which there is precedent); or [3] development of the new, private institution.

Since the planning is in process, and there is no final or complete document to which to react, this evaluation cannot judge the merits of the case. Management and budget details are not available at this time. We had thought of suggesting an Asia Foundation-sponsored quick assessment of higher education in Cambodia, but in effect these seminars may perform much of that work.

Several issues will remain whatever the seminars decide. They involve feasibility and Cambodian approval for the effort (thus assuring its graduates' roles within the society commensurate with their education), funding and costs, and the term of commitment.

No specific funding levels have been mentioned, but the project would involve a heavy dose of technical assistance at senior and junior levels. The plans call for partial support through tuition, with 50 percent of students on scholarships of some sort. Now, higher education is theoretically free, but students often pay in bribes some 10 to 15 times the national per capita GNP for a year of school (\$2,000-3,000). A school whose operations or recurring expenditures are funded by tuition (or bribery) becomes elitist, exacerbating class and economic differences that a state such as Cambodia at this time may not politically be able to afford.

The U.S. Embassy has indicated that if it were to back the idea, the funding should be international. This is important not only because of limited U.S. resources, but it would likely be more politically acceptable and less a target for nationalist sentiment if it had multiple donors. This evaluation thus supports acquiring a wide breadth of support should the project proceed under any of the above three options.

Another issue is the length of commitment. Building this institution would probably require a decade of major, sustaining support, and continuing foreign donor assistance thereafter. The bureaucratic issue facing both USAID and The Asia Foundation is this: would moral commitment to this project by either organization mortgage the budgets and prestige of the other one, and is this acceptable to either or both? Could either or both organizations exit gracefully in the eyes of the Cambodians on either success or failure of the effort? Would USAID fund the project without the Foundation should that become necessary, or would the reverse happen?

These questions cannot be answered here, and indeed cannot be adequately considered until the work of the planned seminars are completed, and their studies are available. The plan has several aspects that need high-level attention; most important is Cambodian official acceptance of the desirability of a major private university. A successful venture from a donor perspective might effectively force improvement in the public university, but it could create enmity. The topic deserves serious study.

G. Administrative Performance

1. AID/Embassy

Two aspects of AID's administrative performance should be separated. The first concerns the AID Regional Support Office in Bangkok, servicing Cambodia, the second focuses on USAID/Cambodia itself.

a. AID Regional Support, Bangkok

The regional support office of AID in Bangkok was responsible for the contracting of the grantees. The demands on that office by USAIDs in the region may overwhelm the capacities of the staff there to respond in a timely manner, and it is evident that funds may become available at a late moment, which delays contracting. It should be noted here that USAID/Cambodia has requested additional in-house staff to enable them to respond to the needs locally in a timely manner. Given the number of NGO and other grants and various contracts, this would seem necessary for an efficient operation.

In this project, all three grants were originally made on the last day of the 1992 fiscal year. According to one source, the grantee had no opportunity to see a draft of the agreement before that date, and no chance to consult on the appropriateness of its provisions with his superiors. One grantee was told to sign the agreement or lose the funds.

This last minute pressure, wherever responsibility lies, is an unconscionable mode of operation, and is reminiscent of actions on projects in the predecessors to AID in the 1950s, when certain governments were forced into such an untenable position and no signatory could say to higher authority that he had "lost" these funds by refusing to sign the agreements without negotiating. This mode of contracting by the Agency as a whole could be, and sometimes is, interpreted by grantees as an attitude of arrogance that is inappropriate in the contemporary world.

All agreements/contracts should be properly negotiated with sufficient time for both parties to consult with their respective headquarters over any terms that might be in dispute.

b. USAID/Cambodia

There is a close link between USAID and the Embassy in the operation of the project as a whole. This seems to have been a product of the politically delicate period leading up to the elections in 1993, but it has been maintained. Requests for authorization to shift funds or make new subgrants, once received by the Project Manager in USAID are forwarded under cover of a memorandum recommending action to the Project Officer. In cases where there might be political implications, this is shared with the USAID Director and the Embassy. The Ambassador takes a personal, supportive interest in this USAID project, and is said to want to be kept informed in detail of progress. Since the situation in Cambodia is still quite volatile, and all personnel and training must be approved (see below), many requests for changes come in from each of the grantees. The Project Manager usually responds efficiently, but even if this is the case, the approval process takes time and a great amount of paperwork.

In some programming cases, and in some personnel cases, the USAID has refused to concur in planned events. This evaluation cannot review each of these cases and their relative merits, but it is apparent that in the present fiscal year the times when USAID has questioned the Foundation have been fewer than those related to the Institutes.

Relations between USAID and The Asia Foundation since the arrival of the present Representative are universally said to be excellent. There is close consultation and discussion on substantive programming issues beyond the formal approval process. A firm degree of mutual trust seems to have been generated that obviates the necessity for cumbersome grant procedures that should be amended (see below).

The situation with the Institutes is somewhat different although the same ground rules apply. Here the activities are all politically oriented (even if intentionally neutral), and the degree of concern is greater because the risks are significantly higher. Perhaps because of the degree of easy access the Institutes have in Washington, this may smart more than with the Foundation.

Overall, the administrative style of the USAID has been in accordance with the grant agreements, efficient, and collaborative, although the inevitable, but occasional, disagreements on specific program issues have arisen. The identification of USAID intimately with the subgrantees, as well as with the grantees, has lead some Cambodians to try to deal with USAID on approval of projects even before the grantees (The Foundation, Institutes) have done so. In some cases, USAID is more aware of subgrantee issues than the grantee. This is not healthy for either organization or for the image of the U.S. and the non-governmental field.

It is apparent, however, that the restrictive rules governing review of grantees under this project do not apply with the same stringency with some groups funded under the PVO Co-Financing Project (e.g., PACT). PACT is funded under a cooperative agreement that, while still restrictive, is far more liberal than that under the democracy effort. This may have been suggested because of the close link to politics, but the need for grantee controls in this project should be reviewed (see below).

One aspect of the close relationship which should be monitored is the potential of either organization to imply long-term commitments that are taken in the Cambodian community as mortgages of the funds of one organization by the other. The principle should be kept in mind although no actual case has yet occurred.

2. The Asia Foundation

Consideration of The Asia Foundation administrative performance must be divided into two phases: before October 1993 and thereafter. This conveniently begins the second phase with the start of FY 1994, and also corresponds with the arrival of the present Foundation Representative.

The first phase of the Foundation's program has been virtually universally criticized by the Foundation's own staff in several of its offices, by USAID, and in anecdotal information through a USAID-requested but private audit report that has not yet been officially conveyed either to the USAID or the Cambodia office of the Foundation. During that period, there was a clear administrative failure of the Foundation's systems of control. The phase since October 1993 has been highly acclaimed for the reversal of the decline and its positive recovery.

The issues relate to the staffing of the Foundation, the loci of responsibility for its work, the capacity and extent of monitoring of subgrantee projects, and the types of administrative relationships that the Foundation had with AID (see the above section on USAID).

The Foundation, during the first year of the grant, made the major error of effectively (read ineffectually) dividing the responsibility of the office decisions in Cambodia between three of the Foundation's offices: the staff in Cambodia, the regional Foundation office in Bangkok, and the San Francisco headquarters. This seemed to have been done because of the highly political nature and delicacy of the U.S. effort in Cambodia, as well as the large funding for the Foundation under this four-year program that seemed to require headquarters oversight, as well as logistic and staff support from Bangkok.

The result was administrative complexity that, together with the objective situation in Cambodia where the Embassy prohibited all grantee activities in the month before the election, resulted in programming delays, and USAID programmatic control limited the Foundation. In addition, the assignment of staff who had no previous administrative or programmatic experience with the Foundation resulted in an administrative minefield almost comparable to the real one pervading Cambodia. Accounting was seriously inefficient; the issue of donor counterpart funds required by USAID were not substantively addressed. USAID as a result seriously considered terminating the Foundation's grant.

The situation markedly changed after September 1993 with the arrival of an experienced Foundation Representative and the establishment of the Foundation's Phnom Penh office as an autonomous Foundation operation. Since that time there has been virtual universal approval of the Foundation's activities. The

abnormality of the Foundation's operation in Cambodia, aside from the uncertainties of the state itself, stems not from the Foundation's own operation, but from the administrative relationships with USAID, which may be unique in the Foundation. It has negatively affected the Foundation's capacity to program.

The Foundation's strength has historically resided in two attributes: the autonomy and flexibility of the field office with its capacity to respond to the unique problems facing the society in which it operates, and the speed with which it can respond to appropriate and unanticipated needs. These were both seriously compromised in the Foundation's operation in Cambodia through administrative controls. One could argue that the very attributes that USAID "bought" from the Foundation were vitiated by the regulations USAID imposed on it.

AID inappropriately pressed on the Foundation a "grant agreement" that was in effect a "cooperative agreement" on September 30, 1992, the last day of the fiscal year. It was provided without previous drafts available to that organization, and the Foundation was told to sign it or lose the funds. Under normal time considerations, and if San Francisco staff had been available for consultation at that time, it is likely that this document would not have been signed, but rather renegotiated with some of the more onerous provisions eliminated. In effect, the agreement undercut the autonomy, flexibility, and speed with which in effect the Foundation was hired to perform.

This agreement, still in force and applied as well to the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, contains a variety of restrictions and reporting requirements on Foundation (and Institute) activities. We understand that some of these are regarded as mandated by Washington, but even those should be reconsidered when they fail to serve U.S. interests and Cambodian needs and retard programming. These require:

1. USAID concurrence on all grant activity either through annual plans and budgets, quarterly work plans, or separately for items not included in any of the above; also requires submission of quarterly reports to inform USAID of completed activities.
2. USAID concurrence on all international travel;
3. Concurrence on all local and international participant trainees by name prior to any activity;
4. USAID concurrence on all consultants and staff;
5. Approval on all procurement over \$10,000;
6. Cambodians selected by the Foundation for overseas travel to pass AID-mandated English language tests whether or not the Foundation considers the grantee's English adequate for the assignment.

The Foundation indicates that approximately one-third of the Representative's time is spent on these reporting requirements alone, and that at least three person-years of office staff time is spent conforming to USAID regulations.

It is ironic to note that the Foundation has informed USAID¹⁹ that it "provides the subgrantees with a high degree of autonomy for actual program implementation" after strategy and procedures have been agreed. It is this autonomy that USAID in fact has denied the Foundation itself.

Providing such freedom to subgrantees may be sound policy, but in such a complex and large program one must raise the issue of the administrative capacity of the Representative in monitoring adequately this extensive portfolio, which by its nature is labor intensive. This monitoring cannot appropriately be transferred to USAID. The Foundation will have a new assistant representative in July, which should ease the problem, and the friendly, personal consultations between USAID and the Foundation will have to be redefined.

At present, the Foundation's capacity for monitoring its broad portfolio is too limited. This evaluation believes there is a need for the Representative (not only local staff and contractors) to visit the provinces to check on subgrantee activities, but also to seek new programming opportunities, a function that cannot be fully delegated to others.

This evaluation considers that USAID control has undercut the programming flexibility of the Foundation, and identified the Foundation with the U.S. government in a manner that is destructive of the image of the NGO that the U.S. is pursuing in Cambodia over the longer term. It is only fair to state that USAID believes that its intervention has saved the Foundation from a number of serious mistakes because they had more understanding of the local scene. Both opinions indeed may be accurate.

This evaluation understands the political concerns that may have prompted this close control over the Foundation in the very sensitive pre-election period in Cambodia. It also recognizes that in the period that the Foundation was not operating as an autonomous office in Cambodia with experienced and senior staff this may have been perceived to be necessary. Over the past year, however, and with the record established by the Foundation, this arrangement is no longer administratively appropriate, if once it ever was, nor is it programmatically effective. The present political situation is indeed complex and sensitive. Close coordination with the U.S. Embassy is essential. We believe that it can be accomplished through informal relationships as well as through a more restrictive

¹⁹ The Asia Foundation Workplan, October 1, 1993-September 30, 1994, p. 3

structure.

In Section III below, we strongly recommend that the agreement be completely revised and liberalized to give the Foundation administrative and programmatic autonomy within general programmatic guidelines to be established and negotiated, and that an annual budget and a semiannual reporting system be established to replace the cumbersome activities now in force. All USAID compliance needs should be eliminated. USAID, with its overall U.S. government capacity to cease Foundation funding at its discretion and within the general and accepted responsibilities of the Ambassador, as well as to deny further support, has sufficient inherent controls to satisfy any bureaucratic need. Even AID in Washington need only notify the Congress of new projects not in the Congressional Presentation, and need not receive their explicit concurrence on programs or staffing.

3. The National Democratic and International Republican Institutes

The administrative performance of both the IRI and the NDI has generally been weak. This is perhaps due to the inexperience both in Cambodia and in operating a field office without clear demarcation of responsibilities between the headquarters and the field, and rather extensive changes in personnel at various levels. The program effectiveness in the pre-election period was said to have been very high for both Institutes, whose work was widely appreciated.

Following the elections, however, the parties seemed to have felt less need to engage in organizational training, and the work of the Institutes was more sporadic than continuous. Changes in staffing, the constant movement of international personnel (some of whom were said to be excellent, some major problems) gave little continuity to the effort. This resulted in high administrative costs. Although the Institutes presently share quarters, and one person has remarked that is an excellent physical symbol of how a party in power and one out of power can cooperate in a democratic tradition, the IRI has requested funds to move out in FY 1995. If the program is continued, this should be resisted.

There have been two programmatic problems with the Institutes that came to the attention of this evaluator while in country. An apparently disaffected NDI employee who was due to meet with the evaluator left Cambodia before that meeting could take place. The employee seems to have been one of a number of personnel who have had problems with the NDI project in Cambodia. In the IRI case, a plan to have a mutual project with a Cambodian NGO in developing provincial centers fell apart with a vituperative letter from the leader of that NGO that was widely circulated in Phnom Penh. The IRI has since sought another partner, but this is complicated as the new partner (CIHR) is also the recipient of USAID funds through

the Foundation for a different set of activities. A major issue is the capacity of the CIHR to manage its important human rights portfolio funded by several donors, each with programmatic interests. The IRI, the Foundation, USAID, and the NGO community are subsequently involved in a dispute.

IRI had wanted to fund and manage the planned provincial centers directly (a position on which USAID disagreed) because the operating style of the Institutes is not to make subgrants (as is that of the Foundation), but to manage projects. USAID felt that a politically oriented U.S. Institute should not be in the sensitive position of managing directly provincial democracy centers, and that in any case local NGO administrative capacities should be strengthened.

The costs of managing the Institutes has been very high for the results, which themselves cannot be evaluated here. The programs have been well received, according to some M.P.s to whom we talked, but major questions remain concerning sustaining a resident operation here at this time.

4. AAFLI

AAFLI set up a small resident office in Phnom Penh in January 1994. It hopes to expand it in the next fiscal year. This evaluation has no information and thus cannot comment on its administration. Operating out of Bangkok, AAFLI has sought to influence labor legislation and plans to engage in a full-blown program should USAID approve of its application.

AAFLI normally deals very specifically with unions and related legislation. It has not sought out understanding of or operations in the issue of labor and development as a whole. Suggestions follow on efforts that might make to broaden their range of inquiry to correspond to that of the Ministry with which they would work in order to make their presence here cost effective. We should note that the Embassy does not have a designated labor reporting officer; it is handled by staff with other responsibilities. Insofar as the AAFLI representative understands and programs effectively with labor in Cambodia, it might be of importance to the Embassy.

5. Administrative and Program Coordination

There is close coordination between USAID, the Embassy, and each of the grantees. Coordination among the grantees themselves is a product of personal relations, which seem reasonable.

There are, however, over 200 foreign and indigenous NGOs that are active in Cambodia in addition to 25 bilateral aid programs, and several multilateral programs as well as UN agencies. USAID itself funds 23 NGOs, some of which (PACT, etc.) provide subgrants to Khmer groups. Although many of these groups operate in fields

outside of USAID interest, the building of NGO, pluralistic, capacity is high on the USAID agenda. Thus coordination is important.

It is evident that there is a paucity of trained talent in the country and fragile and limited institutional capacity. With the best of wills, foreign aid organizations often compete for the attention of those who are clearly leaders and are talented, and of those organizations with demonstrated potential. This results in people and institutions that are often overworked, unfocused, and take on commitments that they may not be able to honor.

Within USAID it might be desirable to combine the activities connected with the monitoring of the Democratic Initiatives Project with the PVO Co-Financing Project to ensure coordination at least within the USAID portfolio at a project manager level. It is our understanding that staff changes will occur that might allow that to happen in the natural course of events. The combined portfolio could not, however, be handled by one person unless the administrative and reporting requirement were liberalized as suggested below.

6. Findings and Conclusions

USAID management of the project has been prudent and firm, and the U.S. Embassy supportive and sympathetic. USAID's early control was probably justified by Embassy concerns about political sensitivity. The sensitivities in the Cambodian context remain, but are clearly less acute. The Asia Foundation has in the past nine months demonstrated maturity of judgement and administrative capacity, as well as local authority. Restrictions on its administrative autonomy should be lifted, and the USAID reporting requirements should be markedly liberalized as below. The Institutes still require Embassy and USAID guidance. As long as their programs continue (see below), monitoring of their agreements should continue in force.

G. Cross-Cutting Issues

1. Sustainability and Absorptive Capacity

The issue of sustainability is a cardinal principle of AID programming, and thus of evaluations concerned with USAID-funded projects. The dire state of the Cambodian economy, the fragility of its political coalition and its leadership, the weaknesses of its institutions, and the personalization of power at all levels should explain why the normal criteria for sustainability simply cannot apply here. At this time, how the political process will evolve is uncertain in the post-Sihanouk era that is rapidly approaching. Institutions were destroyed under the Khmer Rouge, some rebuilt on an irrelevant centrally planned model, and now have been restructured to reflect a new era. But the trained staff are lacking, those employed are underpaid to a degree that legal living

has become impossible, and corruption--necessary for survival at a low level--has become ubiquitous and undercuts the political legitimacy of the regime.

No project reviewed can be sustained by local resources at present levels beyond the termination of their funding. Cambodian sources are lacking, and are unlikely to be soon available. Some institutions may continue and even flourish, but they will do so because of the plethora of foreign assistance that has become available to groups operating in the fields of democracy, law, human rights, economic liberalization, and the press.

The government will continue to fund public organizations. The Institute of Economics, for example, will no doubt continue, but without foreign teachers and support over the medium term there would be regression (the Ministry of Education only supplies salaries--\$23 per month--to teachers at the University of Phnom Penh. There are no local funds for maintenance, books, even electricity). The hope, as some have expressed it, is that program continuity over a sufficiently long period (to the end of the century is sometimes mentioned) may result, however, in the indigenization of some reforms (curriculum reforms, for example) that will be sustainable even without foreign assistance even if at lower levels of performance. Thus, achieving sustainability status in Cambodia even in government circles will mean a continued commitment of resources to many of these institutions.

The absorptive capacity of most Cambodian organizations and the government itself is limited. Only about one quarter of the \$800 million in promised foreign aid has been disbursed. They are dependent on foreign assistance for all development activities, there is limited capacity to raise private funds in Cambodia, and the Government is incapable of funding adequately the activities and industries it operates.

2. Replicability

The state of Cambodian redevelopment is so rudimentary at this point that the issue of replicability of projects by the government with its own resources is not germane. The early stages of foreign aid under the new administration make projects, even if noted as pilot ones, too early in their maturation to determine effectively their potential and their replication.

Although many might hold this position, there is a countervailing force one should note. Cambodia is trying to move rapidly on foreign aid projects (the legislature is far slower as it grinds through the unfamiliar legislative procedures that are now being established). The Cambodians want to see progress, and donors are also anxious to demonstrate administrative effectiveness and project efficacy. There is a danger, often noted in foreign aid and already evident here, that a good idea is swept up in the need

for demonstrating progress. Rather than start with one example and study its results, some wish to move too quickly in the hope that something is better than nothing. The idea is tempting, given the needs, but should be resisted. Assuming that the present government holds together until the next election, an assumption on which the odds are almost anyone's guess, as the process toward that election builds up one can anticipate that rapid project replicability will become a major driving force of those in position.

There have been instances when donors and recipients want to move too rapidly into uncharted seas. This is apparent in certain types of provincial programming, in which the proliferation of legal, human rights, or democracy centers in the provinces should perhaps be tested by pilot projects. More specifically, the Battambang court project is an impressive effort that slowly is having an effect. Rather than establishing a number of new provincial court training projects at this time, thought might be given to using Battambang as a first stage training center for other provincial court projects, and then--based on experience--move to a broader provincial base.

Replicability should perhaps take second place to project effectiveness.

3. Human Resource Development

Cambodia is generally bereft of indigenously trained personnel at all technical and managerial levels. Those that were educated fled or were executed after 1975. Those that were trained abroad often have an education unrelated to contemporary needs, e.g., Moscow or Vietnamese economists trained under a centrally planned system.

There are, of course, well-trained individuals. Many were educated in France and are of an older generation, but still influential in determining the policy directions of government in linguistic and cultural terms. There is also a remarkable group of individuals who indeed provide the backbone for many foreign assistance programs. These are Cambodians trained in the camps along the Thai border (especially Site 2), forming almost an alumni group that has found its way into the NGO community and into government as well. There is also, and importantly, the talented group of Khmer-Americans (also Khmer-French) who have come back (sometimes only for temporary periods because of overseas family commitments) to assist in the redevelopment of their country that they may have left as children.

Those trained in Cambodia since 1978 have suffered. Their education has been inadequate, their incentives limited. They have neither the disciplinary training nor the breadth and international experience to bring Cambodia into the world community as it needs to be brought. Although many are well motivated and concerned

about the dire state of the nation, they lack materials, language, breadth of experience, and the training to enable them to compete in international fora.

This evaluator, in earlier studies of foreign aid in a variety of countries, has been told at the highest levels and even in villages that the single greatest contribution of any foreign aid program has been training. That training, in terms of the efficient use of resources, might be done here, some carried out abroad, but whatever aspect of the program is reviewed, training will be important. There is clearly a demand for training, and families will pay exorbitant and illegal fees to place children in schools where parents feel the children will gain the requisite skills to prosper.

Yet the absorptive capacity of existing institutions for new, even talented individuals, is extremely limited. The World Bank has called for reductions in the over 150,000 civil service (some ministries do not even know the number of their own employees), in the 145,000 man military (with 2,000 generals and some 10,000 colonels), and in the state economic enterprises (the public sector). Newly trained individuals need to be absorbed and find adequate employment and not be the intellectual ronin (the wandering, masterless intellectual samurai of Cambodia who could foment social and political trouble). The present and likely future opportunities will be in the private sector, but unless there is major foreign investment, in small firms. This implies certain types of skills and needs, some of which are being addressed for the first time by The Asia Foundation.

Until June 1994, all graduates of the University of Phnom Penh are guaranteed jobs with the government as teachers. Starting next semester this will no longer be true, and the absorptive capacity of the state to employ these people becomes critical. Unemployed students have been a notorious source of political discontent in many societies.

Cambodia and other small states in the region (Laos, Burma) are especially vulnerable in the private sector. It is already evident that economies of scale in China and elsewhere have prevented the development of certain industries, as China can produce goods more cheaply and of better quality than these states. Some private sector employment is not likely. In addition, export-oriented assembly production or plants usually employ semi-skilled females, often leaving the educated males unemployed or underemployed. This was a major factor in two Sri Lankan rebellions. Absorption of increasingly educated labor becomes a priority concern.

If education is important, then the role of the Ministry of Education should be strengthened. It has been suggested to USAID that it provide an advisor on higher education to the Minister, who

is said to be receptive. USAID has refused to consider this request on Asia Bureau policy grounds. This may be shortsighted. The Foundation might wish to consider this possibility, if USAID continues this approach, with non-USAID funds.

Human resource training probably is the highest overall development priority of the nation, although it can be addressed only piecemeal by any individual donor. It is a subject that might well be the focus of a consultative group meeting on Cambodia led by the World bank.

4. The Role of Women

Women now number a significantly larger percentage of the population than men. They are 57.3 percent of the over 15 year age group, and some 53.7 percent of the population as a whole.²⁰ They occupy 60-65 percent of agricultural employment, 85 percent in business and handicrafts, 70-75 percent in industry, and 30 percent of the civil service. In an area of internally displaced people by the Khmer Rouge offensive, almost one-third of households were headed by women. Their role has been changing and their potential is impressive. They operate in institutions of higher learning effectively, and are in the National Assembly (four percent). They are not passive members of the society.

Considerable attention has been played to women in various aspects of this project, and in the NGO community more broadly. The Foundation has worked with women's NGO groups, and more are funded through the PVO Co-Financing Project. There have been discussions to provide legal assistance to women, and perhaps a family court system, designed to protect women and children, might be an activity that should be explored.

A representative of the Cambodian Women's Development Association made a presentation at the June 2-4, 1994 NGO Forum on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. In comments on the USAID/Cambodia strategy, and based on that earlier meeting, the Gender/ Women in Development office of AID made a number of recommendations, including the targeting of women for increased political participation, working more with women's NGOs, dealing more effectively and comprehensively with adult literacy, market access, environmental, and other activities that specifically relate to women. These suggestions should be pursued both through the PVO Co-Financing and Democracy projects, as well as others.

²⁰ Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics, 1990 in the USAID Assistance Strategy for Cambodia, FY 1994-1997

5. Ethnicity and Development

Cambodia today may be unique in Southeast Asia because resident minorities do not play the same vibrant, domineering economic role as in other states in the area. The two entrepreneurial groups that controlled much of the economy have been partly destroyed by the Khmer Rouge: the overseas Chinese and Vietnamese. Other groups, such as the Cham, have been deeply wounded.

There are elements of these groups that still remain, and there is anecdotal evidence that the Chinese still are regarded as the entrepreneurs of greatest capacity here.

There is a strong antipathy to the Vietnamese, Thai, and Chinese along some descending hierarchical social distance scale. These attitudes have been played up in the local press with tragic results. As one article noted:

The process of marginalization [of the Vietnamese] was nourished by frequent racist vitriol in the local press and media, despite UNTAC's mandate to control information. It culminated in the exodus of tens of thousands of Vietnamese, many of whom had once already suffered displacement by ethnic violence and hatred. UNTAC's failure to intervene in these events may have serious implications for the Vietnamese and other ethnic minorities in Cambodia in the future.²¹

Whatever the origins of these attitudes may be, and there are strong historical antecedents to each, the issue for USAID and its grantees relate to the future of the private sector in Cambodia. It may be important that the private sector develop in a manner in which the Cambodians feel that they are in command of their own economy, and that they are not once again being exploited by foreign neighbors. The Khmer Rouge are currently effectively playing on anti-Vietnamese sentiment in their propaganda. Foreign economic domination is a quick means to garner mass support to return to state control of the economy in the interests of nationalism. It also has been used to divert attention from state inadequacies onto unpopular and defenseless groups. Thus, if a middle class is to develop in Cambodia, especially through private sector development, insofar as USAID programming can influence its growth, it should be perceived to be indigenously controlled.

One study maintains that there is a strong element of chauvinism and xenophobia in Khmer society that is related to a sense of paranoia that allows the Khmer to deny responsibility for their own societal failures and hold outside groups responsible for

²¹ Jay Jordens, "The Ethnic Vietnamese Community in Cambodia: Prospects Post-UNTAC." Abstract of a paper at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, March 1994.

all past and present failures.²² Other groups outside of resident minorities could at some future date be seen in this light.

The Foundation is presently programming with the Khmer Kampuchea Krom, those Cambodians returning from residence in Vietnam. Although not a minority in an ethnic sense, they seem to require special assistance. There are 4,000 families in Battambang province alone, and representatives of the local office of this group met with us to discuss their activities.

6. The Role of Technical Assistance

Technical assistance will likely continue to be a major portion of the USAID program. Because the needs in Cambodia are so massive, the future direction of the bulk of the USAID supported initiatives will be in local training in the selected programming fields. For quite some time this will necessarily involve foreign or Khmer-American personnel who in some instances will be able to train the local trainers and arrange for the preparation of Khmer language materials.

The administrative burdens on the grantees in the care of these individuals is extensive, and their costs expensive. It may well be that the majority of the program funds are used for such technical assistance in a training mode. The burden is made greater by the need for approval of such personnel in principle and as individuals, together with their travel schedules, well in advance of the visits. This provision of the grant agreement should be waived.

7. The Role of the Khmer Language

The role of the language of higher education in Cambodia is an issue that reflects nationalistic needs balanced against a greater integration of Cambodia into the world community. Until the victory of the Khmer Rouge in 1975, the medium of most of higher education was French. This had certain advantages and problems for the state and its former colonial power. The use of French was, of course, a great administrative convenience for the colonial authorities, and introduced both French ideas and administrative systems (such as law), but it also served to allow Cambodia to operate within the francophone system, especially in relation to the rest of Indochina.

The need for French has declined, but the French have mounted a major effort to reintroduce French-oriented education in Cambodia. While the United States has fostered English for

²² Penny Edwards, "National Chauvinism, Xenophobia and Political Paranoia in the Cambodian Media, 1992-1993." Abstract of a paper presented at the annual Association for Asian Studies meeting, March 1994

international studies, it has more importantly pushed Khmer in general higher education. This is a sound policy in that it identifies the United States with the Khmer people, but it has the effect of requiring technical assistance staff to either know Khmer (which is possible in the case of Khmer-Americans), or to provide additional funds for translators/interpreters. Translation also slows down the speed of teaching. The costs of textbooks in Khmer are also likely to be relatively high because of the translation or production costs of volumes in relatively small editions.²³

There are two other obvious needs that foreign donors might address. The first is the production of software in Khmer that has an expanded word-processing capability, such as a correction facility (there is Khmer software without that capacity, we have been told); the second is desk-top publishing software in Khmer as well, which might cut the costs of producing teaching materials in Khmer.

The second issue is the development of a local organization with the capacity to write, translate, and publish works in local languages (and which could be funded directly or indirectly through this project. The organization that has fostered this concept in Asia has been OBOR (headquartered as a non-profit organization in Connecticut). OBOR started in Indonesia, but has local, autonomous groups there and in Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. USAID/Jakarta (at least) has had contracts with OBOR. We recommend that USAID/Cambodia explore this possibility (see future directions section).

Although the decision to pursue specialized education and materials in Khmer, English language instruction has not been ignored, and many would consider it critical for Cambodia if it is to be a part of the regional community. The Australians have cooperated in this program as well. It is worth noting here that the USAID Mongolia democracy assessment calls for an "indirect" approach to democracy in that society since it had no earlier experience with its institutions.²⁴ That indirection called for extensive work in the field of English.

²³ Many years ago, the Burma Translation Society determined that the actual costs of producing, printing, distributing, etc. a Burmese physics text in a very small edition that would have to be changed every several years would be in the thousands of dollars. Then, Burma opted for such education in English.

²⁴ The Mongolia Democracy Program (MDP) Strategic Assessment, Bureau for Asia, AID, March 1992.

8. The French Connection

In spite of denials to the contrary, there is a fundamental but silent struggle for influence between the French and Americans, or perhaps more accurately, the Anglo-Saxons. The issues revolve around language, law, and business and economic training and curricula. It extends into such fields as the operations of bar associations. Implicit in this quiet confrontation are concepts of what the role of the state should be, for example in law and legal and court systems, and by extension in other areas as well. Many of the older leaders have been trained in France and retain and affection for France and an affinity toward French.

The French quite clearly have seen their influence fade in Asia. Cambodia is the area where they perhaps have the greatest opportunity to regain prominence, having lost that effort in Vietnam. It is said that they have the largest Alliance Francaise mission in the world in Phnom Penh.

Tertiary education was controlled by the French, and instruction given in French. Today, however, students are said to prefer English because of the better opportunities for employment. The French curriculum is said to be traditional, suited for the education of elites who plan careers in ministries. American supported educational efforts, however, are geared more to the private sector or non-profit fields.

The French are said to demand exclusivity in institutions receiving their assistance--other donor support should not be accepted by an institution or sub-unit, such as a university department, that has accepted French aid, usually in the form of technical assistance. The French are said to have promised assistance to gain such exclusive domains, and then not delivered, or been able to deliver, on their promises, according to the Americans. French influence is very strong in certain ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice, on which USAID must rely to allow certain graduates of Asia Foundation-supported programs to receive graduation certificates that are recognized by the relevant ministry. Without such recognition, they may become peripheral to the field in which they studied.

Some say that the problems between the two groups have mutual antecedents, and that both sides have been to blame. Whether this evident antipathy of the French toward the U.S. is a local, lower level phenomenon, or is orchestrated at a higher level is unclear. The American antipathy (one assumes) is not orchestrated at the top. It is important, however, that the implications of these differences in substance and style be recognized and considered, rather than ignored, in project planning, and taken to an appropriate level for resolution, if necessary and possible.

The U.S. Ambassador has begun discussions with the French Ambassador to work out a joint approach to the Cambodian government in certain educational fields, thus alleviating the problem and securing the cooperation of the Cambodian government in some of the USAID programmatic needs that have involved this competition.

9. Grantee Administrative Costs

When non-official organizations operate overseas in the area of small grants or small, directly administered programs, the operational costs are comparatively high. It is obvious that the costs of programming a set of large grants are about the same as a number of small grants; thus the administrative/programming ratio of the large grant-giving operation is much lower, and thus more favorable.

There are two types of rationales for the small grant process: that concerning the recipient, and that concerning the donor relationship. The absorptive capacity of some societies, institutions, and individuals is often limited. Large grants are thus inappropriate in those circumstances. The small grant often is a means by which to test the capacity of the recipient institution to program at minimum risk to all concerned.

From a donor-recipient relationship, the small grant is more highly personalized, and better monitoring should take place. This should result in closer donor-recipient links. If monitoring is inefficient and follow-up is ineffective, then in many cases the rationale for the small grant is gone. With it goes the justification of the high overhead costs.

Various small-grant organizations deal with their oversight or administrative costs differently. Even in larger grant-giving groups, such as AID, the costs of internal administration are not apportioned among programs, and in technical assistance projects with universities, for example, the total grant is reported to the Congress as program funds, but a substantial portion usually has gone to university administration and overhead.

In the small grant case, this evaluator's experience is that it costs about \$1.00 to give away \$1.00. This seems true across a wide spectrum of organizations. This is not necessarily cost-accounted in this manner. Is a field representative budgeted as an administrative cost, direct support, indirect support, or program expense? Is a representative by virtue of that role alone a program? Some have said so, and in many cases I would agree if he/she is to perform that function effectively. The issue is not where it is budgeted, but that a rationale has been determined and explained and consistently applied.

If the total program budget of a small grant-making office

(Cambodia is only partly in that category now in the case of The Asia Foundation) is added to the authorized, audited overhead costs of the headquarters and weighed against the program itself, it is likely roughly to balance, as noted above. We should consider that the financial and reporting requirements in Cambodia imposed by AID result in three additional person years and one-third of the Representative's time, all of which increase the administrative-program ratio.

All these administrative costs raise two issues: headquarters overhead and program efficacy. This paper cannot address the headquarters overhead. As they are audited figures approved by AID, they cannot be evaluated here. Serious questions would exist, however, if an Asian entity were to provide funds for a program totally administered in an Asian country and the organization still insisted on the same overhead figures. In such circumstances, fundraising would likely to be seriously impaired.

The second issue is program efficacy. Essentially, one should analyze the program effectiveness and the relationships established between donor and recipient, and the donor's acceptability in the local community. If the projects are successful by whatever criteria are established, and if the relationships are close enough to encourage future programming in a desirable mode, then the administrative costs are probably justified.

This subjective approach will satisfy neither the skeptic nor an auditor neglecting programmatic impact. In developing countries one must be prepared to accept this fact of donor existence. One's eye should be on program results, always assuming prudent individual line-item expenditures and respect for the regulations. Individual grantee efficacy is treated elsewhere in this report.

III FUTURE PROGRAMMING AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. USAID

A. USAID should plan to amend its Democratic Initiatives Project to extend project life for five years. At an early period, a review of the general administrative regulations and monitoring requirements should take place in consultation with likely grantees well in advance of any planned extensions of grants.

B. USAID should consider rewriting the 'grant agreement' with the Foundation to conform to normal grant provisions. Within the grant objectives and general program categories, The Foundation should have autonomy to program and staff the office, and provide consultants. Reporting requirements should be limited to semi-annual reports together an annual workplan and financial and other accounts. Travel notifications and participant approvals (except

the normal visa requirements) are no longer desirable. Informal coordination should, however, remain close.

C. USAID should consider combining the monitoring functions of the Democracy Initiatives Project with that of the PVO Co-Financing Project at the project manager level within the context of the overall Project Officer.

D. USAID has two 25 percent co-financing requirements: one for governments and one for NGOs. That for the Cambodian government has been waived. The NGO issue is important in this project. The requirement for NDI and IRI has been waived. The AAFLI issue is unresolved. The Asia Foundation case has been a problem, although the latest Foundation calculations, which this evaluator has not seen and are not yet approved, may resolve the issue. The Foundation issue has in the past revolved around "non-federal funding" or "non-AID funding." USAID should consider waiving the requirement for organizations participating in this project.

E. The Institutes

1. The Institutes are grouped together here because there are several generic issues related to them both. The Institutes differ from The Asia Foundation in that neither has had major experience in operating resident overseas offices. Their activities tend to be sporadic, rather than continuous, and they (with AAFLI) tend to manage projects (seminars, etc.) rather than providing grants to others to manage. Both Institutes have had the 25 percent co-financing requirement waived because it was determined they were not PVOs.

2. The Institutes also should be considered together because we believe that in at least some Cambodian eyes the fact that the Institutes share the same quarters visually illustrates that government and opposition parties in a democracy are not inimical enemies and can work together. Any attempt to split physically the office, which would result in increased costs, should be resisted.

3. Both institutes are subject to the same restrictive grant agreement that affects The Asia Foundation. There is more justification for restrictions to be placed on the Institutes because (a) they have less experience in working overseas; (b) their headquarters have less understanding of their support role; (c) while The Asia Foundation offices overseas have a record of autonomy, the Institutes do not; and (d) the Institutes operate in a more politically charged environment by working directly with political parties, and thus may require more oversight.

4. It is unlikely that the demand for the services of either Institute will increase in the next several years over the past months. Assuming a stable political situation, the interest

in organizational training would increase prior to the next election. During the interim period, the programmatic functions and impact of the Institutes would likely diminish.

5. Under these circumstances, the prudent expenditure of public monies would suggest that the Institutes coordinate a series of programs over the next few months, offering training to all parties where the needs are said to be most acute by using the remaining funds available to them from the USAID grants (\$200-300,000 each). At that point, the offices should gracefully close. USAID should, at a point closer to the next election, reassess the situation to determine whether the Institutes should be invited back in, and if so, whether resident or non-resident programs were more appropriate. USAID and the Embassy together should inform Washington that this decision is a joint programmatic one, made after a careful assessment of the probable impact of any new effort, and takes into account the past performance.

E. USAID may not want to concentrate all its democracy initiatives in one grantee organization, but rather to diversify its portfolio for its own protection should the organization prove ineffective, and so that each grantee is not so closely identified with the U.S. government.

F. USAID (and The Foundation) should consider the needs of the rural sector and the growing urban-rural income disparities that could create future political instability, and thus threaten progress toward pluralism and democracy.

2. The Asia Foundation

A. The Foundation should seek additional funding from its headquarters for the Cambodia office for programming in fields separate from those of the USAID grant so that it has a clear, autonomous identity from the American Embassy. This is in the long-range interest of both the U.S. Government and The Foundation.

B. The Foundation should consider studying the complete range of individual office relationships (contracts, grants, cooperative agreements) with various USAIDs to determine what types of relationships have been authorized, and the various implications of each.

C. The Foundation should not open an office, or even assign a new representative to an old one, unless financial and accountability systems are in place and adequately working.

D. The Foundation should expand its high-level monitoring of its subgrantees.

E. The Foundation should explore the need for provincial

programming within the scope of this project, and devote more time and resources to this effort.

F. Within the context of this project, the Foundation should consider rural needs and institutions, rural-urban issues, and the improvement of balanced regional growth.

3. AAFLI

A. AAFLI's presence in Cambodia is in part bureaucratically dependent on USAID waiver of the 25 percent co-financing requirement, which USAID should do, given the budgetary situation of that organization at its headquarters. But if AAFLI is to be resident in Cambodia, it could justify its presence through expanding its focus from the formation of a new labor law and the management of a number of labor seminars to examining a broad range of labor-related activities concerned with the operations of the Ministry of Social Action and Labor. This might involve employment issues, unemployment, skills training, social issues related to labor, etc.

4. The Institutes

The Institutes should begin a process of intensive training initiatives that would last until fall, after which they would remove their resident office. They should continue to monitor the party situation in Cambodia from abroad and through occasional travel back to Cambodia.

IV SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

The Democracy Initiatives Project, obligated at \$15.0 million, is a central element of the USAID strategy in Cambodia. It was proposed with realistic understanding of the problems facing the state, and realistic expectations of results. The initiative, managed by USAID under stringent controls, involved four grantees: The Asia Foundation, the Democratic and Republican Institutes, and AAFLI. These disparate organizations, with different histories and operating principles gave grants or directly operated programs in a variety of field related to democracy.

The Asia Foundation, before the start of FY 1994, had operational initiation problems through split administrative responsibilities and personnel changes that were overcome with the new fiscal year and a new Representative. The relationships that have developed since then have been excellent. On the other hand, the Institutes started in the pre-election period with considerable effectiveness, but following the elections their efficacy lapsed. AAFLI has not had a resident program in Cambodia, although it has had an office since the beginning of 1994.

The evaluation considered that work in the field of law, legal training, human rights, and with the National Assembly by The Foundation was important and should continue. The evaluation also believed that work with the Cambodian NGO community was the primary means for fostering pluralism, the preliminary means to achieve democracy, in Cambodia. Support to press groups and other means to support and demonstrate pluralism were important to the future of Cambodia.

The evaluation recommends that USAID liberalize the restrictions on the Foundation to enable it to operate in the autonomous, flexible manner which was once its strength.

The work of the Institutes since the election has been less concentrated. The evaluation recommends that USAID terminate residential support to the Institutes when the current grant funds run out in some six months because the overhead costs were not commensurate with the program results.

The evaluation believed that AAFLI should have a resident program in Cambodia only if it expands its concept of programming in the field of labor to include related aspects of the development process.

There remain unexplored areas of programming in democracy-related needs in rural and provincial areas that the evaluation recommends be explored.

The evaluation recommends that USAID continue the Democracy Initiatives Project, but reconsider the administrative controls over the grantees that once may have been important during the election period. The evaluation believes that it is in longer-range U.S. national interests that the autonomy of the U.S. NGO community be maintained.

V LESSONS LEARNED

General

1. Expectations of progress toward democracy must be tempered by the reality of the context in which programming takes place. Although this was recognized in Cambodia, it is often intentionally ignored to adhere to the AID's often inflated expectations.
2. Foreign organizations can act as protection for local organizations in fields, such as human rights and law, that may be perceived to threaten local power bases, and these relationships should in such cases be intensified.

For USAID

1. Extensive administrative control over grantees is often not productive of the innovation and risk-taking that is often required in unique overseas situations.
2. The issue of 25 percent cofinancing has affected all four grantees of this project. USAID should consider whether some blanket waiver for certain types of private organizations should be made in certain countries because of the difficulty of raising local counterpart funds.

For The Asia Foundation

1. When a new office is established, clear administrative authority should be vested in a single entity (preferably in the country of programming).
2. An employee staffing such a new office should be of mature judgement and have an intimate understanding of the Foundation's administrative and programming requirements, as well as a reasonable knowledge of that society.
3. A new office should have adequate financial and accountability systems in place at its inception.

For the Institutes

1. The Institutes, should they establish offices overseas, should vest those offices with administrative and programmatic authority to undertake programs without the extensive and expensive approval process from headquarters.
2. The Institutes should not ignore those political parties that lost elections, for from them may come new generations of political, social, and economic leadership.
3. The Institutes should engage country specialists intimately acquainted with local political problems and institutions before programming in any society.

For AAFLI

1. If AAFLI is to function effectively and more economically, it should extend its focus from solely dealing with labor unions and legislation to considering the broad aspects of employment, labor, and unemployment in the development process.

SOW FOR ASSESSMENT CONSULTANT
FOR CAMBODIAN DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES PROJECT

PURPOSE:

To assist USAID/Cambodia in assessing the transitional needs of Cambodia's nascent governmental and civic sectors. To review and assess progress of grantees in the current Cambodian Democratic Initiatives Project portfolio, and make recommendations for improving the program and means for monitoring progress.

RATIONALE:

The Cambodian Democratic Initiatives Project (CDIP) was designed in the Summer of 1992 during a time of great uncertainty over Cambodia's future. The UN-sponsored elections were almost a year in the future and their success and outcome were far from certain. At the time USAID had no official contact with the government in power, then known as the State of Cambodia (SOC), and was openly supporting the opposition FUNCINPEC and KPNLF factions in their capacities on the interim Supreme National Council (SNC).

Since the CDIP was designed and the first grantees were selected, unprecedented change has come to Cambodia's politics, government and society. The UNTAC elections proved to be highly successful, and Cambodia since September 1993 has had an internationally-recognized, coalition government. Over the months since the elections, the NGO grantees comprising the CDIP have, with USAID participation, begun to shift activities and approaches to respond more directly to the emerging needs of the government and society.

Before travelling too far down the post-election path, USAID desires outside assistance to assess the course the project is taking, its fit with emerging needs and future funding options with scarcer resources to assist in the democratic transition. In light of the massive transformations underway in Cambodia, USAID/Cambodia has determined the time is right to bring in outside expertise to undertake the first review and assessment of the CDIP.

TASKS:

The Consultant will:

- A. Conduct a broad review of CDIP-funded assistance to the new Cambodian government, which consists of Executive and legislative (parliament) branches, keeping in mind the dual transition that is underway in Cambodia, from a centrally planned to a market economy and from a one-party, totalitarian state to a multi party, open political system. Address specifically the implications of USAID assistance to the reestablishment of the rule of law, the Parliament, and key ministries such as Justice, Information and Education. The review should include a needs assessment in human resource development related to the project, the impact of CDIP-funded assistance to various elements of the government, and progress on governance issues such as corruption and transparency.

- B. Conduct a broad review of USAID assistance to various elements of Cambodian civic society, with special emphasis on public interest NGO's, human rights groups, public media and gender issues.
- C. Conduct assessments of each of the four CDIP grantees' projects, with special emphasis on impact, sustainability, cost effectiveness, pertinence to the Cambodian situation, and recommendations for the emerging USAID strategy.
- D. Make in-house recommendations to USAID/Cambodia on the current direction of the CDIP and the allocation of project resources. Special focus should be given to the specific constraints affecting the program as it is and could be, including language capability and institutional absorptive capacity.

DELIVERABLES AND REPORTS:

The prime outcome will be a written report in English with descriptive analysis of CDIP progress to date and recommendations on 1) the strategic objectives of the project, 2) the fit of project activities with other elements of the USAID project portfolio and recommendations for the emerging USAID strategy, 3) the allocation of project resources, including the "mix" of grantee activities and their structuring to meet existing USAID objectives, and 4) benchmark indicators and other tools for measuring the progress of grantees in implementing USAID strategy for democratic development, as well as broader indicators of performance in the sector.

MAY 14, 1994

IRI - PROVISIONAL
INCOME STATEMENT
Statement of Expenses MAY 1994
AID 92 CAMBODIA

	BUDGET 94	P-T-D	FY 94	MAY 94	VARIANCE	%REMAINING
TOTAL SALARIES	214,746.00	206,148.98	80,965.42	11,341.44	8,597.02	4.00%
BENEFITS	82,372.00	97,458.56	44,055.25	4,535.36	(15,086.56)	-18.32%
..2610 CONSULTANTS' FEES	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
CONTRACTUAL & PROFESSIONA	49,840.00	39,738.95	21,904.95	1,487.70	10,101.05	20.27%
SPACE AND UTILITIES	0.00	51,900.56	28,839.40	1,077.71	(51,900.56)	
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT	78,000.00	39,962.55	14,839.96	(394.94)	38,037.45	48.77%
DEPRECIATION AND AMORTAZAT	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
COMMUNICATIONS	0.00	66,427.18	28,531.67	2,696.54	(66,427.18)	
TRAVEL AND PER DIEM	242,615.00	136,943.90	29,503.85	5,452.43	105,671.10	43.56%
RESRCH, MEETINGS, & DIR COST	114,894.00	46,027.02	20,796.65	2,087.97	68,866.98	59.94%
SUB-GRANT	65,000.00	0.00	0.00		65,000.00	100.00%
TOTAL INDIRECT ALLOCATED	252,533.00	221,062.08	95,882.62	9,475.21	31,470.92	12.46%
TOTAL EXPENSES	1,100,000.00	905,669.78	365,319.77	37,759.42	194,330.22	17.67%



NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Fifth Floor, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 328-3136

■ FAX (202) 939-3166
■ Telex 5106015068 NDILA

CAMBODIA Combined Budget Summary 06/12/94
(Transaction-to-Date/Budget Comparative Analysis)

Grant No. 442 0111-G-00-2392 00

	REVISED BUDGET 09/28/93	TRANSACTION-TO-DATE 06/09/94
SALARIES AND BENEFITS	236,574.00	233,419.72
Salaries	169,709.00	164,573.19
Benefits	66,865.00	68,846.53
SPACE AND UTILITIES	22,047.00	30,051.67
Office Space - Foreign	18,000.00	26,200.00
Utilities - Foreign	4,047.00	3,851.67
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT	35,200.00	28,142.86
Supplies	16,000.00	13,331.48
Equipment Rental	7,200.00	1,918.90
Equipment Purchases	12,000.00	12,892.48
COMMUNICATIONS	44,000.00	43,175.24
Telephone/Fax	31,500.00	41,567.79
Postage	12,500.00	1,607.45
TRAVEL AND PER DIEM	417,400.00	254,147.37
Travel	194,000.00	184,757.37
Local Travel	46,300.00	36,829.47
Per Diem	167,600.00	25,681.89
Other Travel Costs	9,500.00	6,878.64
CONTRACTUAL SERVICES	148,734.00	53,352.79
Printing	15,000.00	20,579.11
Interns	30,284.00	2,232.00
Photographers	1,200.00	47.47
Interpretation/Translation	48,450.00	3,208.00
In-country administration	53,800.00	27,286.21
OTHER DIRECT COSTS	78,750.00	17,153.70
Bank Charges	1,250.00	821.00
Workshops/Meetings/Conf	54,000.00	14,315.70
Public Info Costs	5,500.00	670.44
Subscriptions/Memberships	18,000.00	1,346.56
INDIRECT COSTS	267,295.00	118,862.36
TOTAL	1,250,000.00	778,305.71

REMAINING FUNDS 147,694.29
Unrest Costs: no used

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Blair, Harry and Gary Hansen, *Weighing in on the Scales of Justice. Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Rule of Law Programs.* AID, CDIE, Office of Evaluation, February 1994.
- A.I.D., *Democracy and Governance.* Washington, D.C., November 1991.
- The Asia Foundation, "Law Program Review." 1993 Representatives' Conference, Hua Hin, Thailand, February 1993.
- Girling, John. "Democracy and Development. A Background Paper." June 11, 1987.
- Columbia University. *Looking to the Future in Cambodia and Vietnam. Findings and Recommendations of American and Japanese Analysts.* January 1994.
- Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. *Politics in Developing Countries. Comparing Experiences with Democracy.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990.
- Steinberg, David I. "On Democracy: Strengthening Legislative, Legal, Press Institutions, and Polling in Indonesia." The Asia Foundation, Jakarta, January 1994.
- _____. "The Administration of Justice in Asia. A Conceptual and Project Survey." Development Associates, November 1992.
- _____. "The Administration of Justice: Asia Report." Development Associates, March 1992.
- Ernst & Young, inc. *Perspectives on Democracy: A Review of the Literature.* Washington, D.C.: A.I.D., 1990
- Duffy, Terence, "Cambodia Since the Election: Peace, Democracy and Human Rights." *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 15, No. 4, March 1994.
- Association of Asian Studies, March 1994 Conference. Session 149, "Cambodia: propaganda, Politics and Violence in the UNTAC Era, (Part 1); Session 165 (Part 2).
- Suksamran, Somboon, "Buddhism, Political Authority, and Legitimacy in Thailand and Cambodia." In Trevor Ling, ed., *Buddhist Trends in Southeast Asia.* Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993.

5-31-94

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Blair, Harry and Gary Hansen, *Weighing in on the Scales of Justice. Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Rule of Law Programs*. AID, CDIE, Office of Evaluation, February 1994.
- A.I.D., *Democracy and Governance*. Washington, D.C., November 1991.
- The Asia Foundation, "Law Program Review." 1993 Representatives' Conference, Hua Hin, Thailand, February 1993.
- Girling, John. "Democracy and Development. A Background Paper." June 11, 1987.
- Columbia University. *Looking to the Future in Cambodia and Vietnam. Findings and Recommendations of American and Japanese Analysts*. January 1994.
- Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. *Politics in Developing Countries. Comparing Experiences with Democracy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990.
- Steinberg, David I. "On Democracy: Strengthening Legislative, Legal, Press Institutions, and Polling in Indonesia." The Asia Foundation, Jakarta, January 1994.
- _____. "The Administration of Justice in Asia. A Conceptual and Project Survey." Development Associates, November 1992.
- _____. "The Administration of Justice: Asia Report." Development Associates, March 1992.
- Ernst & Young, inc. *Perspectives on Democracy: A Review of the Literature*. Washington, D.C.: A.I.D., 1990
- Duffy, Terence, "Cambodia Since the Election: Peace, Democracy and Human Rights." *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 15, No. 4, March 1994.
- Association of Asian Studies, March 1994 Conference. Session 149, "Cambodia: propaganda, Politics and Violence in the UNTAC Era, (Part 1); Session 165 (Part 2).
- Suksamran, Somboon, "Buddhism, Political Authority, and Legitimacy in Thailand and Cambodia." In Trevor Ling, ed., *Buddhist Trends in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993.

5-31-94

National Democratic Institute For International Affairs

conducting nonpartisan international programs to help promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions



1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Fifth Floor
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 328-3136
FAX (202) 939-3166
TELEX 5106015068 NDILA

August 21, 1994

Chairman

Paul G. Kirk, Jr.

Vice Chair

Rachelle Horowitz

Secretary

Kenneth F. Melley

Treasurer

Marvin F. Weissberg

Finance Chair

Elizabeth F. Bagley

Board of Directors

William V. Alexander

Bernard W. Aronson

Emanuel Cleaver, II

William M. Daley

Thomas F. Eagleton

Barbara J. Easterling

Eugene Eidenberg

Dante B. Fascell

Edward F. Feighan

Geraldine A. Ferraro

Hartina Flournoy

Shirley Robinson Hall

John Hendricks

Maxine Isaacs

Geri M. Joseph

Peter G. Kelly

Peter Kovler

Elliott F. Kulick

Leon Lynch

Lewis Manilow

Azie Taylor Morton

Mark A. Siegel

Theodore C. Sorensen

Michael R. Steed

Maurence Tempelman

Andrew J. Young

Raul Yzaguirre

Senior Advisory Committee

Michael D. Barnes

John Brademas

Bill Bradley

Richard F. Celeste

Mario M. Cuomo

Patricia M. Denan

Christopher J. Dodd

Michael S. Dukakis

March Fong Eu

Martin Frost

Richard A. Gephardt

John T. Joyce

John Lewis

Mike J. Mansfield

Donald F. McHenry

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

Edmund S. Muskie

Bill Richardson

Charles S. Robb

Stephen J. Solarz

Esteban E. Torres

Cyrus R. Vance

Anne Wexler

Chairmen Emeriti

Walter F. Mondale

Charles T. Manatt

Mr. Lee Twentyman
Director of Mission
U.S. Agency for International Development
Mission to Cambodia
Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Dear Lee:

Thank you for forwarding a copy of the Cambodia Democracy Initiative evaluation report produced by David Steinberg and dated June 24, 1994. In your note dated July 26, 1994 accompanying the report you offered NDI the opportunity to comment before USAID makes a final determination on the recommendations presented. This letter is intended to serve that purpose.

NDI agrees with the evaluation's concern about the challenges to political party development in Cambodia. The evaluation correctly points out that NDI's program lost momentum after the 1993 elections, and that the program since that time has suffered from interruptions and personnel changes. We address the context for some of these problems below. At the same time, we also agree with the evaluation's call for "realistic expectations of what might be done . . ." (p. 11), and with the statement in its executive summary that "[e]xpectations should not be inflated, progress is likely to be slow, and USAID support needs to continue over a long period." We agree, too, with the evaluation's recommendation that "USAID administrative control over all grantees . . . should be liberalized," although we do believe that AID should continue to exercise necessary oversight.

Nevertheless, NDI takes substantial issue with the evaluation. First, while we understand the practical limitations, we question the evaluation's methodology. Second, we believe that the evaluation fails to systematically apply its own stated evaluation criteria. Third, we take issue with the evaluation's paradigm, or approach, to political party development and the conclusions that follow about external efforts to support that process. While reasonable people can disagree about these matters, we believe that the evaluator's approach pre-determines his conclusions about opportunities for political party development at this point in Cambodia's troubled history. Finally, we seek to correct some inaccurate or erroneous assumptions that the evaluation makes about NDI and its philosophy and programming. This letter will attempt to be as specific and comprehensive as possible in addressing these issues.



I. Problems with Methodology

● **The evaluator did not observe NDI programs firsthand and evidently spoke to few Cambodians who had participated in or had direct knowledge of NDI's programs.** The evaluation was apparently based on a minimal number of interviews with Cambodian politicians and political party leaders, and the evaluation does not quote or refer to the comments or point of view of any Cambodian, either in Phnom Penh or in the provinces, with respect to NDI's program. There is no indication from the report itself that the evaluator met with any Cambodian party leader, party activist or other person who participated in NDI's programs or who had any direct knowledge of NDI's program, and several party leaders with whom NDI has worked have told NDI that they did not meet with the evaluator.

The evaluation recognizes that there are limitations to the methodology it employs: "How does one . . . evaluate the results of a seminar for political parties without actually witnessing its dynamics and then exploring the follow-up?" (p. 7) It uses these practical limitations as a justification for its reliance on anecdotal evidence. But this does not address from whom the evaluator has drawn his anecdotes or relieve him of responsibility for the conclusions he draws from that evidence. Only three sets of individuals were interviewed: "the grantee staff, the principal subgrantee leadership of the institutions supported . . . [not applicable to NDI because NDI has had no sub-grants], and a number of unrelated but knowledgeable observers." (p. 7) Nowhere does the evaluation even recognize the importance of speaking to participants in seminars or recipients of technical assistance and advice. Nor does the evaluation indicate any review of program agendas or reports on particular activities.

Also, the evaluator traveled only to Battambang province, where NDI had not conducted any provincial party workshops. It is unfortunate that he was not able to talk to party members in the provinces where NDI had conducted programs.

● **The evaluation appears to rely unduly on the AID mission.** It must be acknowledged that NDI and the AID mission have had, at times, a difficult relationship during the process of negotiating the substance of this program and of attempting to implement it. And this evaluation is inextricably linked to that process and that troubled relationship.

Viewed through that prism, the evaluator's primary reliance on the views of individuals at the AID mission can be inferred throughout the report. The evaluation says, for example, "it was said that the delegation of authority between the field and the headquarters was often indistinct" (p. 13) and that there was no "clear demarcation of responsibilities between headquarters and the field" (p. 36) This appears to be no more than the mere opinion of one or more individuals at AID; there is no reason to expect, and the evaluation does not give any, why any other individual or organization would even have an opinion or an impression on this matter. These conclusory statements are not further explained or backed up with any evidence, anecdotal or otherwise.

Similarly, the evaluation states that "some [international personnel] were said to be excellent, some major problems." (p. 36) It is not stated by whom this was stated, and the reader can only assume that the evaluation is again merely reflecting the opinion of someone at AID.

Furthermore, one Cambodian political leader told NDI that AID personnel were present during his meeting with the evaluator and that they questioned the value of political party development programs in Cambodia. The mere presence of AID personnel at such meetings raises serious questions about whether Cambodian leaders were able to freely express their actual views, and their reported comments raise questions about whether the evaluation's conclusions and recommendations were pre-determined.

● **The evaluation fails to seriously evaluate the AID mission and does not address the views of the grantees (other than TAF) of AID.** The evaluation seems to unquestioningly adopt AID's view of its somewhat troubled relationship with NDI and, reportedly, other AID grantees. The evaluation states that in responding to approval requests, "[t]he Project Manager usually responds efficiently" (p. 31) and describes AID's "administrative style" as "in accordance with the grant agreements, efficient and collaborative." (p. 32)

The evaluator, however, did not ask NDI to comment on this judgment. In fact, while this is not the place to enumerate our concerns, NDI's experience with the AID mission and with the AID project manager in particular has been substantially different.

● **The evaluation process was hardly "collaborative"; it made no meaningful effort to draw on NDI's substantial expertise and comparative experience in political party building.** Despite promising to do so when he met with NDI in Washington, the evaluator did not make his report available to NDI before his departure from Cambodia to provide the Institute an opportunity at least to correct obvious misstatements of fact in the report before it was submitted to the AID mission. The AID mission then embargoed the report and its conclusions, and NDI did not receive a copy for five weeks after the date it was finally submitted to AID and thus had no meaningful opportunity to comment on the evaluator's conclusions and recommendations. As a result, the report was hardly the "collaborative [exercise] among all the parties involved and the evaluator" (p. 7) that the evaluation claims; rather it reflects the impressionistic, subjective, largely idiosyncratic views of one person working in close coordination with a few AID personnel in Phnom Penh. Ultimately, serious mistakes went unaddressed, and opportunities for a meaningful, substantive dialogue about how best to build political parties and a more democratic political environment in Cambodia were missed.

● **The evaluator did not ask NDI to comment on his impressions and tentative conclusions, to correct his factual mistakes or to respond to his (mostly implicit) criticisms.** Not only NDI did not have the opportunity to comment on the evaluator's report until five weeks after the report was final, but the evaluator never raised his concerns about NDI's programs verbally with NDI representatives, either in Phnom Penh or in Washington. Accordingly, his

evaluation cannot and does not address, even in a cursory fashion, what are NDI's views on his impressions, conclusions and recommendations.

● **The report contains no evaluation of NDI's National Assembly program activity.** NDI has held a series of workshops for members of parliament and of particular parliamentary commissions. These workshops have addressed a number of specific topics regarding the roles and responsibilities of parliamentarians. The participants have credited NDI for this highly successful effort; indeed, the president of the National Assembly has recognized the value of this program by asking NDI to undertake additional activities. Recently, for example, he singled out NDI when announcing to a full session of the National Assembly his request for assistance to the Assembly's special commission established to revise the parliamentary rules of procedure.

The evaluation dismisses the parliamentary program in one sentence: "It has not attempted to improve the Assembly's administrative capacity." (p. 22) But this was never intended to be the goal. Rather, NDI has collaborated closely with The Asia Foundation to avoid such duplication and to seek to ensure that the two organizations would work on complementary, not redundant, programs. NDI's goal in this program has been to improve the institutional capacity of the National Assembly and the parliamentary parties at a political level and to work with members of the Assembly in their individual capacities. Nowhere in the evaluation report are these efforts to contribute to the parliamentary process in Cambodia really addressed.

● **The report draws on unsubstantiated hearsay.** In a paragraph ostensibly dedicated to "two programmatic problems with the Institutes that came to the attention of this evaluator while in country" (p. 36), the evaluation actually addresses only a peripheral topic:

An apparently disaffected NDI employee who was due to meet with the evaluator left Cambodia before that meeting could take place. The employee seems to have been one of a number of personnel who have had problems with the NDI project in Cambodia.

The report gives no basis for the conclusion that the employee was "disaffected" and offers no further discussion on the matter; it seems to imply that NDI sought somehow to hinder the evaluator's effort to examine the allegedly "disaffected" employee. The evaluator never asked anyone at NDI about these matters. When asked with whom from NDI the evaluator should meet, AID had informed NDI that the evaluator would want to talk with the resident program manager and the in-country administrator; the AID program manager expressly stated that it was not necessary to meet with other staff members in the field. Had AID requested that the evaluator meet with others, either before the evaluator's arrival or later, it would have been arranged before this employee's pre-arranged departure from Cambodia.

Neither does the report provide any basis for the suggestion that there were other NDI personnel who "had problems with the NDI project." NDI does not believe that there were other personnel that had such problems.

●The evaluator was inadequately prepared before meeting with NDI field staff members in Phnom Penh. In his meeting with NDI in Phnom Penh, the evaluator admitted he had not read NDI's program proposal, quarterly workplan or concept paper for future programs prepared specifically for the evaluation before the meeting, and thus he was unprepared to take advantage of the opportunity to discuss and clarify points of concern or uncertainty. As a result, his subsequent misunderstandings went unaddressed and uncorrected. For instance, the evaluation makes false assumptions based on semantics about the substance behind the term "political party 'college'" (p. 22); while the term "college" may have been unfortunate, it referred to a planned NDI program to identify and work with a core of political party activists from throughout Cambodia in order to encourage long-term, sustainable political development. If the evaluator had asked for comment, NDI could have clarified that this idea reflected a well-tested "training of trainers" approach.

●The evaluator's close association with one of the four grantees to be evaluated calls into question the evaluation's independence and creates at least the appearance of a conflict of interest. The choice of the evaluator was obviously inappropriate. The evaluator had already accepted a full-time position working for The Asia Foundation and had a previous association with the Foundation. Without intending any criticism of Dr. Steinberg's personal integrity, NDI nevertheless feels that it is highly inappropriate for such a person to evaluate an AID program under which The Asia Foundation is one of four grantees. This appearance problem is only exacerbated by the evaluation's highly impressionistic and subjective conclusions that The Asia Foundation's programs have been effective and should be continued and that the institutes' programs have been ineffective and should be discontinued.

II. Evaluation Criteria

●The evaluation does not actually apply the stated evaluation criteria of "impact, sustainability, cost effectiveness and pertinence to the Cambodian situation." The evaluation provides minimal explanation or empirical data to suggest the basis for its conclusions on NDI program impact and sustainability. Nowhere does the report expressly even state its conclusions on the impact and sustainability of NDI's programming. Indeed, the evaluator at times actually forswears any such attempt when he states that the results of the programs "cannot be evaluated here." (p. 37; see below.) The failure to observe NDI programs, to talk to Cambodian participants in NDI programs and to visit any provinces in which NDI engaged in intensive program activity would have made any conclusions about sustainable impact difficult in any event. NDI's proposed political party training "college" -- a term that, as noted above, unfortunately distracted the evaluator from the substance of the idea -- was an effort to apply a sustainable "training of trainers" approach to party building.

●The evaluation does not actually address the issue of "cost-effectiveness." The evaluation makes only the conclusory statement that the programs have not been cost-effective without making any attempt to assess those costs. It makes, for example, no comment on or attempt to judge the number of people working on the program or their salaries. (NDI salaries,

even in comparison with other non-profit organizations, are modest.) The evaluation makes no comment on NDI's use of pro bono experts and consultants, which represents a significant cost savings to the program, or to compare that experience with that of other AID grantees or contractors. The evaluation provides no specific examples of what is not cost-effective about the involvement in the program of NDI's experienced professional staff in Washington. Indeed, nowhere does the evaluation actually address the issue of cost, in absolute or relative terms.

Indeed, the evaluation cannot fairly assess cost-effectiveness without making judgments about results, something which the evaluation ostensibly does not do. The one-sentence "analysis" of cost-effectiveness is paradoxical at best: "The costs of managing the Institutes has been very high for the results, *which themselves cannot be evaluated here.*" (emphasis added, p. 37) If the results cannot be evaluated than neither, it seems evident, can the cost-effectiveness of achieving results. Only by assessing the results and relating them to the costs involved can one fairly assess cost-effectiveness.

● **The evaluation does not consider or apply the evaluation criteria included in NDI's proposal.** NDI's proposal set forth five categories of "indicators" by which the Institute would assess the impact of the program: (1) what requests for materials or programs have political parties, individual members of parliament and non-governmental organizations sought from NDI; (2) whether the parties or parliamentarians have "established consultative relationships" with NDI; (3) whether parties or parliamentary leaders have used materials supplied by NDI and whether these materials have been distributed; (4) whether the parties have "reviewed their election performance and identified and documented their post-election plans"; and (5) to what extent the leaders and party members of the nonparliamentary parties have "remained active in the political life of Cambodia." (NDI proposal, dated August 5, 1993, p. 10) According to this program proposal, which was the basis for AID funding, these were the applicable criteria by which to judge the program. The evaluation does not acknowledge these proposed criteria or attempt to assess the impact of the program according to the criteria. Nor does the evaluation consider similar, concrete indicators. The evaluation does not, for example, address the number of attendees at seminars and workshops or what follow-up activities may have taken place.

● **The evaluation fails to explain or test its assumption that grant-making is necessarily preferable to technical assistance and advice.** The evaluation seems to use The Asia Foundation's programming style as a benchmark for its assessment of NDI: "The programming style of [NDI] . . . is quite distinct from the Foundation." (p. 13) In the section addressing the "experience and capacity" of NDI and IRI, the evaluation states approvingly that "The Asia Foundation generally provides grants . . . and refrains from the direct management of projects." (p. 13; see also p. 22 and p. 37) The report contrasts this with the fact that NDI, IRI and AAFLI "have managed program operations directly by themselves" (p. 13) and approves that "[t]his has begun to change in the planning of the IRI." NDI does sometimes provide grants to supplement its technical assistance programs; at the same time, the Institute is supportive of The Asia Foundation's approach. But the evaluation is correct that NDI's programming style is different. The evaluator seems unfamiliar with technical assistance programs in the political development field. He seems unaware of his bias for providing grants over technical assistance,

and the evaluation thus finds fault with NDI's program without addressing whether NDI's approach is appropriate under the circumstances.

● **The evaluation's reference to NDI's "sporadic" program activity (p. 22) fails to put this in context.** NDI did not receive concurrence from USAID on its workplan until April 20, 1994. This was nine months after NDI originally submitted a draft annual plan to the AID mission on July 21, 1993, and then a formal proposal on August 5. Following receipt of AID's comments some six weeks later on September 16, NDI responded with substantive concerns in a joint letter with IRI on September 27. AID did not respond to these concerns officially until two separate letters on November 15 and 18. NDI submitted a revised annual plan in December. Discussions ensued in which AID constantly changed its position about such issues as whether NDI should work with the parliament, whether political party training was viable and whether NDI's office in Washington should have an important, substantive role to play in the program. AID's next written response, in a letter dated February 10, stated that they "continue to be largely in agreement with NDI's vision of its future programming in Cambodia" but asked for further clarifications. NDI's verbal responses led to another letter from AID on March 4. NDI responded on March 21 in a letter that, at the specific verbal request of AID, was to serve as an addendum to the revised annual plan submitted in December. AID approved the plan on April 20 but did so conditionally by referring to certain unspecified outstanding issues; the letter suggested that those issues would be addressed through the quarterly workplan process.

This long process of "negotiations" hindered NDI's planning, including its personnel deployment, and ultimately its programming. (Ironically, the final plan approved by AID -- the December 1994 workplan and addendums -- is substantially the same as the original plan submitted in summer 1993 in programmatic scope, objectives and proposed activities.) Certainly AID's official communications were confusing and were hardly timely. Nothing did more to complicate the transition from the admittedly effective pre-election programming than this unfortunate delay in coming to a common understanding of NDI's post-election program.

● **The evaluation contradicts itself with respect to its purpose.** The evaluation states that it seeks, among other things, to "review and analyze . . . the specific accomplishments of each of the grantees" (p. 6-7). But the evaluation also states up front that "The period since project initiation is too short to allow any substantive evaluation of the subprojects or activities" (Preface) and that it cannot evaluate the program's results (see, for example, p. 37).

III. The Nature of Political Party Development

NDI takes issue with the evaluation's approach to and attitudes about the process of political party development.

● **Political parties are part of the process of democratic development.** The evaluation questions whether a multiparty system is an essential element of representation and governance in Cambodia (p. 20). The evaluator appears to be working under the assumption that democratic

development is linear, with distinct stages. Thus, the evaluator apparently sees constructive, meaningful parties as a *post facto* result of democratic development. The evaluator's paradigm does not allow for the possibility that the process of institutionalizing more democratic political parties might actually contribute to the development of democratic institutions and, ultimately, to the wider acceptance of democratic values. NDI conducts programs in the belief that political parties are a fundamental prerequisite for democratic development.

● **The development of democratic, program-oriented political parties does not happen overnight.** NDI acknowledges that democratic change will not happen quickly, that traditional attitudes and modes of operating will die hard. All must recognize, therefore, that "verifiable indicators" of substantially greater acceptance of democratic norms will be difficult to produce. As discussed above in the section about the evaluation procedures in the NDI proposal, however, NDI does believe that there are observable indicators of institutional development and that, measured against these indicators, the Cambodia program would be judged favorably.

● **The existence of personality-based parties argues for, not against, the need for political party development.** The evaluation states that political power and political parties in Cambodia are "highly personalized," merely vehicles through which "power is retained or acquired for its leader," and that "party platforms become marginalized and irrelevant." (p. 20). As the evaluation acknowledges, these are common phenomena that are neither new nor unique to Cambodia. The evaluation goes on to suggest that because political parties in Cambodia are personality-based, "it might be argued that the strengthening of political parties is in effect the strengthening of personal leadership at the top," adding that "at this particular stage of Cambodian development [political party development] may not strengthen the democratic process." (pp. 20-1.)

NDI does not succumb to such pessimism. NDI's programs seek, among other things, to alter this dynamic and to empower and embolden democratically oriented individuals within parties. That political institutions exhibit characteristics common in a transitional environment is hardly a reason in and of itself to cut off efforts to change those unfortunate patterns. Opportunities to influence development during a crucial phase should not be lightly passed over.

The evaluation inadvertently acknowledges this point when it emphasizes the benefits of training: "the single greatest contribution of any foreign aid program has been training" (p. 41). At the end of the report, he speaks directly to the importance of political party training, advising that the Institutes "not ignore those political parties that lost elections, for from them may come new generations of political, social and economic leadership." (p. 53) NDI fundamentally agrees with the philosophy behind these two remarks and urges the same attitudes be applied to training efforts in the area of political party development.

● **The evaluation seems to ignore the importance of political parties beyond elections as vehicles of governance, policy development and articulation of public opinion.** The evaluation seems to question the importance of political parties in governance when it states that "Political parties in Cambodia remain a *potentially* important factor in democratic governance"

(p. 21) (emphasis added). This fails to recognize the importance of parties beyond elections, both within parliament and throughout the society.

The evaluation seems to take a fairly narrow view of political party development programs when it states that these programs seek "to build administrative capability both to manage the party internally, and to reach beyond the party faithful to acquire and retain new constituencies." (p. 20). While this is true, NDI seeks to promote broader organizational development such as promoting democratic decision-making within the party, expanding the ranks of party leadership, and developing platforms and policy positions. NDI views parties as vehicles of governance, as means to articulate and debate public issues and as institutions to maintain a loyal opposition.

● **NDI's program has not favored any particular party.** The evaluation expresses concern about "charges of interference . . . and favoritism." (p. 21) The evaluation charges that "all invitations were equal (but as it turned out some responses were more equal than others" (p. 21). Although some parties have charged the U.S. government with favoritism, NDI does not believe that any party has made this charge against NDI. Moreover, the implicit suggestion that NDI's programs have disproportionately benefitted the CPP is misleading. The implication seems to be that more CPP members than members of other parties have participated in party development programs or even that the CPP as a party has participated in more programs than have other parties. This is not true. While the CPP has often demonstrated superior organization and a greater willingness to participate in Institute programs, Funcinpec and the BLDP have participated in as many party-building programs and in numbers at least as great, if not greater. Moreover, party-specific programs attempt to address the articulated needs of the particular party involved, and NDI has worked just as closely and with just as much apparent acceptance of the assistance with Funcinpec and the BLDP as with the CPP. And, too, it should not be forgotten that party development programs may well contribute to the democratization of the CPP itself.

● **NDI disagrees with the evaluation's suggestion that there is little demand for party-building programs.** The evaluation's conclusions about lack of demand for NDI programs are not consistent with NDI's own experience. The parties have increasingly requested NDI's advice and assistance, as NDI has established relationships and gained the confidence of the parties through a series of national party conferences, parliamentary workshops and provincial party seminars. NDI's programs in the provinces have been particularly well received, and there has been substantial demand for additional such programming. In meetings with the national leadership of each of the parliamentary parties and a recent trip to Kompong Cham province, NDI received support and requests to continue its program to strengthen political parties as democratic institutions, particularly on the local level. NDI and its professional in-country staff have established and fostered relationships with national, provincial and local political leaders. These relationships have enabled the Institute to effectively respond to these requests by actively engaging the party members in the design of program agendas and activities.

IV. Lack of Understanding of NDI

The evaluation makes broad, unsubstantiated and often incorrect assumptions about NDI's experience and approach. It criticizes NDI in summary terms without sufficient analysis or explanation and without seeming to have considered the Institute's point of view.

● **The evaluation displays a fundamental lack of basic knowledge about NDI and its philosophy and programs.** The evaluation's summary of NDI is misleading. NDI is not, for example, an "operating arm of the National Endowment for Democracy" (p. 13). While NDI receives funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), NDI is a separate organization with an independent board of directors, its own mandate and operating philosophy, its own staff to define and implement programs, and other sources of funding. The evaluation also describes NDI's purpose as "working directly with political parties" (p. 13) but fails to recognize that NDI works as well to improve electoral processes, to undertake voter and civic education programs, and to assist parliaments and other institutions of democratic governance in emerging democracies.

● **The evaluation incorrectly presumes that NDI lacks experience in Asia and, indeed, overseas.** The evaluation states that NDI "[was] not focused on Asia," that NDI "staff were generalists concerned with the American political process rather than with those overseas," and that staff members "were not steeped in Asian affairs." (p. 13)

NDI disagrees with these characterizations. The Institute itself, rather than focusing on the American political process, has existed for 11 years for the express purpose of supporting democratic institutions and democratic values *overseas*. In Asia, in addition to Cambodia, NDI has conducted programs in Bangladesh, South Korea, Pakistan, The Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand and the republics of former Soviet Central Asia and has had important contacts and relationships with democratic activists, elected officials and party leaders in numerous other Asian countries. Last year NDI awarded its Harriman Democracy Award to South Korean President Kim Young Sam, and in accepting the award personally, President Kim recognized NDI's efforts in his country and elsewhere in Asia. The Institute's staff includes individuals with extensive experience in Asia and with Asian affairs; several NDI staff members working on the Cambodia program have substantial, widely recognized expertise in Asian and Cambodian affairs, expertise and experience that compare favorably with staff members of other AID grantees.

In citing a *Foreign Policy* article about the NED -- an article that is generally favorable -- the evaluation quotes the author's criticism that *the NED* (not NDI) fails to take into account "the complex histories of relevant persons and groups." (quoted at p. 13) While we could take exception to this criticism of the Endowment, the reference is a nonsequitur in the context of the program work of NDI and IRI in Cambodia. Again, this reflects a basic lack of understanding of two of the four organizations being evaluated.

2016

● **The evaluation incorrectly assumes that NDI lacks experience with field operations.** The evaluation states that "Neither organization [referring to NDI and IRI] was experienced in establishing overseas offices with continuous programs" (p. 13) and that "neither has had major experience in operating resident overseas offices" (p. 49) This is simply incorrect. NDI has conducted programs with long-term, in-country representatives for more than five years, and presently has field offices in 23 countries in addition to Cambodia: Albania, Benin, Bulgaria, Burundi, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Macedonia, Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Ukraine, the West Bank and Gaza, and Zambia. Several more are due to be opened before the end of the year. Many of these offices are larger and have been in place longer than NDI's office in Cambodia. NDI has received many compliments about its field offices from embassies, AID missions and independent evaluations. We would be pleased to provide examples.

More fundamentally, the evaluation fails to recognize that there are different types of field operations. As the evaluation acknowledges but never evaluates, NDI implements programs rather than providing funds. The evaluation fails to seriously address NDI's approach to field operations, an approach that is necessarily different from the approach of an organization that primarily provides grants to local organizations.

Thus, based on the erroneous premise that NDI lacks experience with overseas offices, or the failure to appreciate how NDI programs differ from those of other organizations, the evaluation continues that "it was said that the delegation of authority between the field and the headquarters was often indistinct." (p. 13) The evaluation does not further support or explain this criticism or attribute it any further. The evaluation's claim that "weaknesses of [NDI and IRI] at the operational level relate to resident missions and staffing" (p. 13) is simply not supported by any evidence or analysis in the document, and NDI's alleged deficiencies cannot be explained by a presumed lack of organizational experience with overseas representatives.

● **The evaluation fails to take into account NDI's philosophy, borne out by extensive experience, that political professionals, in addition to regional experts, are critical to the success of democratic development programs.** The evaluation seems to dismiss the value of experts from countries other than the United States and fails to appreciate NDI's emphasis on a comparative, multinational approach. The evaluation refers to "the constant movement of international personnel" (p. 36) without any apparent realization that the involvement of experts and experienced political professionals from other countries can contribute measurably to political development programs in transitional societies.

● **The evaluation incorrectly suggests that in general NDI's "activities tend to be sporadic, rather than continuous."** (p. 49) Actually, NDI has maintained "continuous" program activity in many countries. NDI conducts ongoing programs in many countries in which it does not have permanent field representatives, and NDI currently has field representatives in some 23 countries and has had ongoing field representatives in many others over extended periods in the past. The arguably "sporadic" nature of NDI's program in Cambodia in particular is addressed above.

●The evaluation suggests without analysis that, in contrast to The Asia Foundation, NDI and IRI require "Embassy and AID guidance" because of "political sensitivity." (p. 38). The evaluation contrasts this with the statement that The Asia Foundation has "demonstrated maturity of judgement and administrative capacity" (p. 38). This judgment is mere opinion that is not justified or explained in the document. Actually, NDI has operated successfully in political environments around the world at least as sensitive as that of Cambodia. Embassy officials in Cambodia have expressly recognized the value of NDI observations and analysis of political developments there.

This collaboration is mutually beneficial. NDI believes that it is critically important for the Institute to seek and respond to analysis and advice from the U.S. embassy and AID mission, and NDI recognizes the need for U.S. government oversight. NDI has no objection to travel clearances, approvals for international participants and concurrences on workplans. NDI does object to daily interference on minor issues, micromanagement and frequently changing groundrules. We have been concerned in particular about such interference and micromanagement by those who have not shown appreciation of and support for political development programs in general.

●The evaluator often fails to distinguish between the institutes in his comments. NDI and IRI are separate organizations with different administrative emphases and operational experiences. Despite cooperation and shared offices in Cambodia, NDI and IRI have also administered separate operations, proposed and conducted many separate programs and contributed to differing degrees during the Cambodia project. To fail to ever attempt to separately assess the two institutions is unfair to both organizations and insufficient for a fully competent assessment of their separate programs.

Conclusions

While we must accept your apparent decision not to extend funding for NDI's political development program in Cambodia, we regret that the decision was based in part on an evaluation that fell short of reasonable standards. NDI appreciates this opportunity to respond to the evaluation and would be pleased to discuss these issues further.

Sincerely,

Ken

Kenneth D. Wollack
President