

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART I

PD-ARN-190  
91407

1. BEFORE FILLING OUT THIS FORM, READ THE ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS.
2. USE LETTER QUALITY TYPE, NOT DOT MATRIX TYPE.

IDENTIFICATION DATA

<p>A. Reporting A.I.D. Unit: Mission or AID/W Office <u>USAID/G-CAP</u></p> <p>(ES# _____)</p>	<p>B. Was Evaluation Scheduled in Current FY Annual Evaluation Plan? Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Slipped <input type="checkbox"/> Ad Hoc <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Evaluation Plan Submission Date: FY <u>95</u> Q <u>IV</u></p>	<p>C. Evaluation Timing</p> <p>Interim <input type="checkbox"/> Final <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ex Post <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/></p>
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D. Activity or Activities Evaluated (List the following information for project(s) or program(s) evaluated; if not applicable, list title and date for the evaluation report.)

Project No.	Project / Program	First PROAG or Equivalent (FY)	Most Recent PACD (Mo/Yr)	Planned LOP Cost (000)	Amount Obligated to Date (000)
596-0176	Establishment of the Central American Development Coordination Commission (CADCC)	1991	04/96	497	




ACTIONS

E. Action Decisions Approved By Mission or AID/W Office Director	Name of Officer Responsible for Action	Date Action to be Completed
<p style="text-align: center;">Action(s) Required</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Send letter to all the Commissioners, key former Sanford Commission members and national CADCC representatives informing about the closure of the project.</li> <li>2. Conclude all assistance to CADCC and all disbursements to SIECA for expenses not incurred prior to the amended Project Assistance Completion Date.</li> </ol>	<p>CADCC/USAID/G-CAP</p> <p>SIECA/USAID/G-CAP</p>	<p>Completed.</p> <p>Pending on audit results.</p>

APPROVALS

F. Date of Mission Or AID/W Office Review Of Evaluation: \_\_\_\_\_ (Month) (Day) (Year)

G. Approvals of Evaluation Summary And Action Decisions:

	Project/Program Officer	Representative of Borrower/Grantee	Evaluation Officer	Mission of AID/W Office Director
Name (Typed)	Randall B. Peterson, TEA		MKromhout, PDM	William Stacy Rhodes
Signature				
Date	9-9-96		7-10-96	7/11/96

**ABSTRACT**

H. Evaluation Abstract (Do not exceed the space provided)

The purpose of this final evaluation was to assess the extent and significance of the actual versus planned progress toward the achievement of the project goal, purpose and outputs after approximately four years of implementation. Based on these findings, the evaluator identified the short term effects of the project and the probability of sustained impact.

The CADCC and this project that supported its establishment emerged from the Central American crisis in the 1980s. In 1987, although the crisis remained, the Central American governments initiated the peace process to terminate the conflict in the region. In December 1987, the International Commission for Central American Recovery and Development (ICCARD) was created by Democratic Senator Terry Sanford to respond to the region's crisis. The group of 47 leaders from various sectors in 20 countries analyzed the region's problems and proposed a strategy included in the commission's final report submitted in February 1989. This report contained a recommendation for the creation of the CADCC as a multisectoral forum with representatives of the public sector, business, labor, academia, and other nongovernmental groups to discuss economic, social and political issues and to coordinate external assistance.

However, two years went by before the Central American Presidents reached an agreement to establish the Commission and to ask President Bush to provide funds. The environment in the region had begun to change and the sense of crisis was beginning to fade. In November 1991, the first plenary meeting of the CADCC was held. The meeting led by former members of the Sanford Commission set forth objectives for the commission consistent with those established by Sanford; added Panama; and named an Executive Committee.

Dr. Francisco Mayorga was named the Executive Director and the commission office was established in Nicaragua. The commission's activities, not guided by any action plan, were irregular and unfocused. During its four years, the CADCC held three regional plenary meetings and attended three country-level sessions. The regional meeting held in August 1994 dealing with NAFTA and its implications for Central America, was regarded as highly successful based on high-level, diverse attendance and high quality presentations. Labor, academic and nongovernmental organization participation significantly lagged that of government and business. CADCC provided little follow-up to the meeting. The results of the project have been exceedingly modest.

**COSTS**

I. Evaluation Costs

1. Evaluation Team		Contract Number OR TDY Person Days	Contract Cost OR TDY Cost (U.S. \$)	Source of Funds
Name	Affiliation			
Dr. John Lovaas	Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI)	12 days	\$29,284	Project funded
2. Mission/Office Professional Staff Person-Days (Estimate) <u>10 days</u>		3. Borrower/Grantee Professional Staff Person-Days (Estimate) <u>4 days</u>		

## A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART II

### SUMMARY

J. Summary of Evaluation Findings - Conclusions and Recommendations (Try not to exceed the three (3) pages provided)

Address the following items:

- |                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                          |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Purpose of evaluation and methodology used</li> <li>● Purpose of activity(ies) evaluated</li> <li>● Findings and conclusions (relate to questions)</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Principal recommendations</li> <li>● Lessons learned</li> </ul> |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Mission or Office  
USAID/G-CAP

Date This Summary Prepared:  
11/25/95

Title And Date Of Full Evaluation Report:  
The Central American Development  
Coordination Commission Project

The CADCC is a US\$497,850 project implemented in 4 years through the Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) by Dr. Francisco Mayorga. The goal of the CADCC project was "to create a Central American coordination mechanism, composed of multisectoral representatives, to provide for dialogue, comment and advice to Central American participants at regional fora". The project's purpose is twofold: The intraregional purpose is to support the creation of a Central American Development Coordination Commission as a forum for a dialogue and consensus building on regional issues and objectives among the public, private, labor, academic, cooperative, nongovernmental and other in Central America; the extraregional purpose is to create a coordinating mechanism for (1) development of regional positions on regional issues and objectives and (2) channeling of these positions to Central American representatives to multilateral forums.

In pursuing this broad purpose, two implementation phases were foreseen: Phase I to establish the CADCC, focusing on its roles and responsibilities, administrative and legal structures, internal functioning, immediate goals and membership and representation; Phase II was to start the CADCC's consultive mechanism to solicit ideas on key issues, serve as a catalyst for forging consensus and recommend positions for representatives in key multilateral forums. Also, in this phase was contemplated to support establishment of National Recovery and Development Commissions in each country.

The purpose of this final evaluation is to provide USAID/G-CAP with a complete analysis of the impact of the implementation of the Central American Development Coordination Commission.

The methodology used by DAI was to review all the available information of the project in the technical and administrative management. The evaluation started in Washington with the collection of background documents and project-related correspondence, continued in Guatemala with meetings with key personnel (USAID/G-CAP, SIECA, former members of the Sanford Commission, and members of the national CADCC); in El Salvador with meetings with US personnel, Salvadoran government officials as well as several Sanford and national CADCC. Finally, in Nicaragua, where the Consultant held extensive meetings with the CADCC Executive Director and Assistant Executive Director.

The areas covered by the evaluation were: a) the regional/country context when CADCC was conceived; b) the individual's organization's role and participation in CADCC; c) the original objectives of CADCC; d) the individual's view of project implementation and CADCC performance; e) the impact of CADCC to date; f) other donor involvement; g) the individual's view of the continued validity of the original goals; and h) the individual's ideas for ways in which progress toward the goals could be accelerated.

The main recommendations are:

#### ORDERLY CONCLUSION OF A SAD TALE

- (1) Conclude all assistance to CADCC and all disbursement to SIECA for expenses not incurred prior to the amended Project Assistance Completion Date.
- (2) Send a thoughtful letter relating USAID's decision and reasons for bringing its financial assistance to CADCC to an orderly close.

SUMMARY (Continued)

POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES TO ADDRESS THE ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES OF THE SANFORD COMMISSION AND THE US CONGRESS

The CADCC as structured under this project has failed. In considering alternatives for addressing the original objectives and with the balance of funds still available, the following alternatives were considered:

1. Adopt a modified version of the concept suggested by Dr. Monge. A series of regional seminars and workshops to promote a thoughtful exchange of points of view among a diverse group of young, future leaders from all the sectors identified by the Sanford Commission.
2. Fund a study by the Council of the Americas or a similarly prestigious private organization to ascertain the progress that has been made since the report of the Sanford Commission in addressing the problems identified by the commission and to outline the most serious ones remaining.

The main conclusions of the evaluation were:

- a. The CADCC project was hurriedly authorized at the end of Fiscal Year 1991 without an implementation plan or design to guide its course.
- b. The incipient CADCC's sponsoring and support institutions ROCAP/USAID and SIECA have experienced turmoil and change, which weakened their ability to focus on the commission when they were needed most.
- c. The selection of SIECA as a channel for funds to the new commission and as a source of logistical support was not the best.
- d. CADCC has failed to build support for its operations and to stimulate the activities of national commissions. The Executive Committee members have rarely met and have exhibited little interest in generating support for CADCC or in encouraging the executive office to take a more active leadership role in planning activities.
- e. The CADCC has not met the great expectations of either the Sanford Commission or USAID in its first four years.

The main lessons learned are:

1. The environment in Central America has changed. When the Sanford Commission was doing its work from 1987 to 1989, civil unrest was rampant, three countries were at war, investment was still fleeing, and national economies were in a shambles. In 1995, the crisis has passed. In the absence of crisis, there also seems to be sharply reduced feeling that the region has to come to grips with social and political issues that concerned the Sanford Commission.
2. National-level CADCCs do not seem to be functioning, with the possible exception of Nicaragua's. In Guatemala and El Salvador, it seemed that the representatives of the different sectors barely knew each other in the CADCC context.

Other sources of financial support for CADCC's modest operations have not materialized. The commission has made no systematic effort in developing other sources despite the lack of flow of funds from USAID through SIECA. The Central American governments, which USAID originally hoped would be contributing US\$2,500 each per month by now, have contributed nothing, and CADCC does not appear to have made any sustained effort to obtain such support.

## ATTACHMENTS

K. Attachments (List attachments submitted with this Evaluation summary: always attach copy of full evaluation report, even if one was submitted earlier; attach studies, surveys, etc., from "on-going" evaluation, if relevant to the evaluation report.)

Evaluation Final Report  
Scope of Work/PIO/T

## COMMENTS

L. Comments By Mission, AID/W Office and Borrower/Grantee On Full Report

DAI did an excellent job identifying the major issues, concerns and achievements of the CADCC. Dr. Lovaas showed a broad knowledge of the project and interactive capacity with the persons related to it.

The Mission agrees with the major findings and conclusions of the evaluation team, including:

- Conclude all assistance to CADCC and all disbursement to SIECA for expenses not incurred prior to the amendment Project Assistance Completion Date.
- Send a thoughtful letter relating USAID's decision and reasons for bringing its financial assistance to CADCC to an orderly close.

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91408

**The Central  
American  
Development  
Coordination  
Commission  
Project**

***Final Evaluation***

Prepared for USAID/Guatemala-CAP under Purchase Order 596-0176-C-00-5118-00

John Lovaas

October 1995



7250 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 200, Bethesda, Maryland 20814

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Guatemalan Mission of the United States Agency for International Development has contracted with Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) to carry out the final evaluation of the regional Central American Development Coordination Commission (CADCC) Project. The grant agreement for this two-year project was signed by USAID's Regional Office for Central American Programs (ROCAP, which now forms a part of USAID/G-CAP) and the Permanent Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) on September 30, 1991, with a life-of-project commitment of \$497,850 from USAID. The agreement was subsequently extended for two additional years, until September 30, 1995. USAID asked that the evaluation assess the project's impact, identify areas where implementation could have been improved, and recommend where to focus resources and action if USAID were to extend the project.

The CADCC and this project to support its establishment grew out of the crisis in Central America in the 1980s, a period referred to by many Central Americans as the "lost decade." During the 1980s, economic growth fell sharply, civil conflicts ravaged the isthmus, and millions of people were uprooted from their traditional homes. By 1987, although the crisis persisted, the Central American governments had begun a process for peace and for future cooperation to deal with the troubles in the region. In December 1987, the International Commission for Central American Recovery and Development (ICCARD) was created at the initiative of Democratic Senator Terry Sanford of North Carolina to respond to the region's crisis. This extraordinary group of 47 leaders from various sectors in 20 countries (in Central America, the rest of Latin America, North America, Europe, and Asia) analyzed the region's problems and suggested a strategy to deal with them in the commission's February 1989 final report. This report included a recommendation for the creation of the CADCC as a multisectoral forum — to include representatives of the public sector, business, labor, academia, and other nongovernmental groups — for discussing economic, social, and political issues and for coordinating external assistance. Within a few months of the report's issuance, the U.S. Congress earmarked funds to support the creation of the CADCC.

However, nearly two years passed before the Central American Presidents reached an agreement to establish the commission and to ask then-President Bush to provide funds to assist in the endeavor. The environment in the region had begun to change in the two intervening years. New, democratically elected governments were in place in all countries. The war in Nicaragua had ended. The economies, in general, were reviving. The sense of crisis was beginning to fade. And, several new organizations had established a presence in the region, treating the sources of the 1980s problems; some of those organizations had mandates that crowded the CADCC's roles of multisectoral forum and donor coordinator.

Thus, when ROCAP signed this politically imperative project with a reluctant SIECA in September 1991, the environment that had led to the recommendation for the project's creation already had begun to change. But, the die was cast. In November 1991, the first plenary meeting of the CADCC was held. The meeting, under the leadership of former members of the Sanford Commission, set forth objectives for the commission consistent with those set forth by Sanford, added Panama to its membership, named an Executive Committee consisting of one representative (formerly of the Sanford Commission) from each country, and agreed that each country should have a five-member mini-CADCC.

Several months later, Dr. Francisco Mayorga began functioning as the Executive Director to establish the commission's office in Managua. Funds for Dr. Mayorga and his modest operation were to come from USAID through SIECA in Guatemala because CADCC had no institutional capacity to meet USAID's accountability requirements.

The commission's activities, not guided by any plan of action, were sporadic and seemingly unfocused. The part-time Executive Director, who worked without an assistant until September 1993, had difficulty from the beginning with meeting the book-keeping requirements of SIECA and USAID. This difficulty, combined with administrative inefficiency and accountability breakdowns at SIECA, led to an ongoing disagreement over funds for the commission. Communications between the Executive Director and his Executive Committee and the national commissions were infrequent, usually consisting of requests for topics for regional plenaries or invitations to such meetings. Thus, the organizational structure of the CADCC was not really energized or sustained by its executive office.

In its four years, the CADCC held three regional plenary meetings and assisted in three country-level sessions (one in Honduras, two in Nicaragua). Of the three regional meetings, the one held in August 1994 dealing with NAFTA and its implications for Central America, was regarded as highly successful based on high-level, diverse attendance and high-quality presentations; the other two regional meetings and the country meetings were felt by most observers to have been notably less successful on the same bases. The studies and papers presented at the NAFTA session were regarded as excellent; those presented at other meetings were of mixed quality, often off the shelf. The topics of all three regional meetings related to economics, principally to trade matters. Political and social issues were not featured and, regrettably, sectoral participation was not as diverse as originally envisioned either. Labor, academic, and nongovernmental organization participation significantly lagged that of government and business. Besides distributing some of the studies presented at the plenaries, CADCC provided little follow-up to the meetings. The commission also made no sustained attempts to obtain financial support either from other donors or from the region's governments.

The results of the project have been exceedingly modest, and it has had little, if any, lasting impact that was discerned during the evaluation. Among the factors contributing to the project's disappointing performance were some unrealistic assumptions by both the Sanford Commission and the members of Congress who earmarked funding for the commission about what could be accomplished through such a regional organization, and the diminished perception of the need for such a commission within a region already crowded with regional organizations.

Continued financial support to the commission as constituted is not justified. However, many of the problems that led the Sanford Commission to recommend the CADCC's creation continue to afflict the region. This evaluation concludes by suggesting potential alternatives that would address some of the commission's and the U.S. Congress's original objectives with the balance of the project's funds. The **first**, and favored, suggestion is to conduct a series of regional seminars/workshops to promote an exchange of views among a diverse collection of young leaders from a wide range of sectors as envisioned by the Sanford Commission. The **second** alternative stems from suggestions made by some former Sanford Commission members. One of them, the Costa Rican Co-Chair, was particularly enthusiastic about funding the Council of the Americas or a similarly prestigious private organization to study what has happened politically, economically, and socially in Central America since the Sanford Commission's report was issued. The Sanford Commission itself would then be reconvened and other influential leaders invited to review and discuss the new study's findings, to assess progress, and to consider possible new directions for the region. The **third** alternative presented is to provide the funds to the Secretariat of the Central American Integration System (SICA) to carry out its mandated consultation with the region's *fuerzas vivas* (diverse societal interest groups — 17 of them organized at a regional level) and to report those findings to the region's Presidents for their consideration.

## INTRODUCTION

### Evaluation Scope of Work

USAID/Guatemala-CAP's stated purpose in carrying out this evaluation is to assess the extent and significance of progress toward the achievement of the project goal after four years of implementation. Also, the evaluation is to identify the project's short-term effects and the probability of sustained impact (the Scope of Work of this evaluation appears in Annex A).

The evaluation's three objectives are:

- Provide a complete analysis of the project's implementation impact;
- Identify areas where implementation could have been improved; and,
- Recommend areas where the Central American Development Coordination Commission (CADCC) Project should focus remaining resources and actions needed to attain the project goal if USAID were to extend the project.

### Project Objectives

The goal of the CADCC project is "to create a Central American coordination mechanism, composed of multisectoral representatives, to provide for dialogue, comment, and advice to Central American participants at regional fora . . ." The project's purpose is twofold: The intraregional purpose is to support the creation of a Central American Development Coordination Commission as a forum for dialogue and consensus building on regional issues and objectives among the public, private, labor, academic, cooperative, nongovernmental, and other sectors in Central America; the extraregional purpose is to create a coordinating mechanism for (1) development of regional positions on regional issues and objectives and (2) channeling of these positions to Central American representatives to multilateral forums.

In pursuing this broad purpose, two implementation phases were foreseen.

Phase I was to be the establishment of the CADCC, focusing on its roles and responsibilities, administrative and legal structures, internal functioning, immediate goals, and membership and representation.

Phase II was to put the CADCC's consultative mechanism into operation so that it would do the following:

- Solicit ideas on key issues of regional importance;
- Serve as a catalyst for forging consensus on such issues; and
- Recommend positions for representatives in key multilateral forums such as the Partnership for Democracy and Development, Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, Regional Consultative Group, Presidential Summits, and the like.

Phase II also was to support establishment of National Recovery and Development Commissions in each country. And, CADCC was to seek the involvement of regional institutions and multilateral organizations as consultative partners to enhance project design, implementation, and coordination. These organizations could include the Inter-American Development Bank, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, the Economic Commission for Latin America, and the United Nations.

This ambitious mandate was to be accomplished in two years.

### **Evaluation Methodology**

Work on the evaluation began with a day in Washington to collect background documents and project-related correspondence. Initial interviews were conducted in Washington with key current and former officials of the Bureau for Latin American and the Caribbean familiar with CADCC's evolution and with a former Sanford Commission member once fieldwork was completed.

Fieldwork began in Guatemala with meetings with key USAID/G-CAP personnel, including the Mission Director, Deputy Director, Chief of the Mission's Trade and Economic Analysis Office, and the Project Manager. The evaluator met with the Secretary General and administrative and project liaison personnel of the Permanent Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA), former members of the Sanford Commission, and members of the national CADCC. The evaluator also reviewed the Mission's project files.

In San Salvador, senior U.S. and Salvadoran government officials as well as several Sanford and national CADCC representatives were interviewed.

In Managua, the evaluator held extensive meetings with the CADCC Executive Director and Assistant Executive Director and reviewed CADCC files. In addition, CADCC arranged meetings with a former member of the Sanford Commission and the national CADCC, a consultant to CADCC, and two national private sector leaders. USAID/Nicaragua attempted to arrange meetings with Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Economy officials, but was unsuccessful. From Managua, the evaluator was also able to speak by phone with a Honduran representative of the nongovernmental organization sector on the Honduras national CADCC.

Although the specific questions asked and exchanges varied with each interview (a list of all those interviewed is contained in Annex B), the evaluator sought to cover the following areas:

- The regional/country context when CADCC was conceived;
- The individual's/organization's role and participation in CADCC;
- The original objectives of CADCC;
- The individual's view of project implementation and CADCC performance;
- The impact of CADCC to date;
- Other donor involvement;

- The individual's view of the continued validity of the original goals; and
- The individual's ideas for ways in which progress toward the goals could be accelerated.

Although the Scope of Work originally projected travel to all CADCC member countries, the number to be visited was reduced to three in final contract negotiations. Obviously, this change reduced the range of persons whose recollections and views could be obtained during the fieldwork. Nevertheless, 31 interviews were conducted during the course of the evaluation.

The range of opinions obtained was good, but not as extensive as desired. The most represented sector — apart from the organizations party to the USAID-funded project — was private business. Conversely, appointments could be arranged with only one labor representative and one academic, and contact with a nongovernmental organization (NGO) representative was limited to only one telephone interview.

Lastly, it is worth noting that all those I interviewed were generous with their time and seemed, with few exceptions, to give candid, thoughtful responses. Similarly, the parties to the project were all exceedingly open and forthcoming with information to contribute to this evaluation.

### **CREATION OF THE CADCC/EVOLUTION OF PROJECT 596-0176**

#### **The International Commission for Central American Recovery and Development (ICCARD) or the Sanford Commission**

Many Central Americans have referred to the 1980s as the region's "lost decade." The crisis atmosphere was pervasive within the region and in the outside world. Economies declined sharply after the late 1970s, wars raged in three countries (and spilled over into neighboring ones), and millions of people were uprooted from their homes.

As a result of the recommendations of the 1983 U.S. *National Bipartisan Commission on Central America* (commonly known as the "Kissinger Commission," after its chairman), USAID assistance programs in Central America (except in Nicaragua) were dramatically increased.

By 1987, the political crises and conflicts persisted, although a Central American peace process, highlighted by accords reached by the five Central American Presidents at Esquipulas in August 1987, offered considerable promise for dealing with the war in Nicaragua and for future cooperation in the pursuit of peace on the isthmus. In December 1987, the International Commission for Central American Recovery and Development, an initiative of North Carolina's Democratic Senator Terry Sanford, convened in San Jose, Costa Rica. This unique commission consisted of 47 leaders from various fields — government, business, organized labor, academia, international organizations, and NGOs — from 20 different countries in Central America, elsewhere in Latin America, the United States, Canada, Europe, and Asia. Nearly half were from Central America. The commission, supported by private foundations, met several times over 15 months and issued its final report in February 1989.

The commission's report assessed the problems afflicting the region and made recommendations in three areas — peace, democracy, and sustained development. Among its recommendations was the

creation of the CADCC, which Sanford Commission members saw as a vehicle to foster social peace and democracy, as well as external donor diversification and coordination:

"A forum such as the CADCC should be created... where donor and recipient countries and international organizations can coordinate aid policies and programs . . . . Within the CADCC, donors and recipients would seek agreement on broad guidelines for development assistance . . . . The operations of the CADCC would . . . be an exercise in democracy, involving social partners from each donor and recipient country . . . . Therefore, the CADCC . . . should include representatives from unions, business, cooperatives, nongovernmental organizations, and other groups."

### **Public Law 101-167 and the Central American Presidents' Request**

Eight months after the commission issued its report, the U.S. Congress earmarked funds to support the establishment of the CADCC. In P.L. 101-167 (contained in Annex C), the Congress seemed to focus on the donor coordination role of the CADCC, based on the assessment that increased assistance would be flowing from Europe and elsewhere (while massive flows from USAID diminished), in part as a result of the work of the Sanford Commission. The law stated: "Upon the request of the governments of Central America, the President shall provide . . . assistance in the development of a coordination mechanism agreed by the governments . . . which shall be designated as the Central American Development Coordination Commission (CADCC) . . . . The President shall . . .

- (1) Encourage and participate in the creation of a multidonor, multisectoral coordinating mechanism known as the CADCC; and
- (2) Provide not less than \$500,000 or more than \$1,000,000 . . . to assist in the implementation of such commission."

"In establishing the CADCC, consideration should be given to

- (1) Involving representatives of . . . the public and private sectors, including . . . trade unions and business communities, and nongovernmental organizations at the regional level; and
- (2) Involving regional institutions and multilateral organizations."

Unfortunately, whereas the Congress had acted rather quickly on this Sanford Commission recommendation coming from one of its own members, movement elsewhere was slower. Some observers noted that there was little or no follow-up or "selling" of the commission's report and recommendations — perhaps because the commission's funding had run out. Also, the period 1989-1991 was one in which elections took center stage and a change of government occurred in every country on the isthmus.

At the same time, the U.S. State Department, in particular, was pushing a parallel initiative, its own Partnership for Democracy and Development (the now defunct PDD). The PDD also was envisioned as having a major donor assistance coordination role within a multilateral framework (one involving the United States, Japan, the industrialized democracies of Europe, Central America, Canada, and selected major Latin American countries) that would also monitor progress in building democracy and development. This vision probably led to efforts to ensure that the CADCC's role did not duplicate that of the PDD in donor coordination.

The United States was also interested in seeing the CADCC created and the funds made available — especially as time passed and was running out on the two-year Economic Support Fund earmark. Finally, the group of new Central American Presidents created the CADCC by a joint accord and, in early September 1991, sent a letter to President Bush seeking assistance ". . . to create a regional forum of dialogue and support for integration in which not only the government but also business, labor, academic and other interested sectors participate." The commission would meet in Managua and ". . . constitutes a consultative mechanism for governments with diverse sectors . . . for the economic reactivation of the region."

### **Project Design and Project Agreement**

With this interest and the approaching end of the U.S. fiscal year, the pressure became intense to authorize and obligate a new project for creation and support of CADCC in the portfolio of the Regional Office for Central American Programs (ROCAP). As the Presidents' letter was being finalized, a meeting was held in San Jose on August 21-22 to conceptualize the project. The meeting included a representative of the USAID Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, ROCAP staff, a U.S. Senate staffer, and a few members of the former Sanford Commission (including the co-chair). In this meeting, SIECA was selected as the intermediary for funds and logistic support.

The ROCAP Director and SIECA's Secretary General, who had been pressed into participating in the project, signed a Limited Scope Grant Agreement obligating the entire \$497,850 on September 30, 1991. The final project purpose as contained in the agreement had been refined somewhat as described under project objectives above. That is, it had an "intraregional purpose" to support CADCC as a forum for multisectoral dialogue and consensus building and an "extraregional purpose" to create a coordinating mechanism for developing regional positions and channeling those positions to multilateral forums. The project's original completion date of September 30, 1993, was extended first to September 30, 1994, and subsequently to September 30, 1995.

## **PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT**

### **The Beginning/Organizational Arrangements**

The files on the first year of the project are sparse, as was project activity. However, in November 1991, the first plenary meeting of the CADCC was held in San Salvador and did serve to set the commission's own parameters. The meeting was clearly led by a handful of Sanford Commission members — Sonia Picado, Bobby Murray Meza, Enrique Dreyfus, Francisco Mayorga, and Juan Ramón Martínez. In addition, Panamanian Foreign Minister Julio Linares attended, and Panama was formally welcomed into CADCC and asked to name its national CADCC representatives from the various sectors.

It was agreed that sector representation on national commissions had to be broad and include various sectors, particularly labor, as envisioned by the Sanford Commission. At the same time, apparently reacting to the legislation giving rise to the ROCAP-SIECA Grant Agreement, those assembled clarified that the CADCC was free to establish its own objectives and was not bound by the agreement. It was further noted that the first plenary was, in fact, financed by Swedish cooperation funds provided through the Interamerican Institute of Human Rights. The assembly went on to set commission goals that centered on being the agent of regional dialogue for civil society and coordinating external assistance to the region.

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The question of the most appropriate legal status for the commission was not resolved. (It was subsequently decided to seek legal status only in Nicaragua, not regionally because of the complexity of the latter. Four years later, even Nicaraguan *personería jurídica* has not been obtained.)

Lastly, the plenary session named the Executive Committee of the commission, selecting one former Sanford Commission member from each of the six member countries, and retained Alfonso Robelo as the Acting Executive Director. Thus, the general organizational framework of the commission was established. Plans of action and operating procedures would have to come later.

Subsequent to this organizational plenary meeting, Dr. Francisco Mayorga — former member of the Sanford Commission and former Nicaraguan Central Bank President — became the Executive Director of the commission. Dr. Mayorga was contracted initially directly by USAID and subsequently by SIECA. He established the CADCC's Executive Office in Managua. The office consisted of Dr. Mayorga, contracted by SIECA on a "flexible schedule," which seems to have been understood to mean part-time (although the contract did not specify part- or full-time), and secretarial support. Only in September 1993 did SIECA, with USAID approval, contract for an Assistant Executive Director, Roger Paguaga. Mr. Paguaga assisted Dr. Mayorga in handling the CADCC's substantive responsibilities and in performing administrative and book-keeping support functions. During the organization's start-up phase — when intensive effort is needed to plan the commission's work, organize and legalize it, and, perhaps most importantly, do the networking essential to stimulate and nurture six country-level multisectoral commissions and cement relationships with regional organizations and the international donor community — it might have been better had the Executive Director worked full-time on this challenging array of tasks, supported by a part-time bookkeeper to manage the accounting requirements of USAID and SIECA.

## Major Events

From the November 1991 organizing meeting in San Salvador until the extended Project Assistance Completion Date of September 30, 1995, nearly four years later, the CADCC sponsored three additional plenary meetings on different subjects and invited scores of leaders from various institutions and sectors throughout the region and beyond. These plenaries have been centerpieces of CADCC activity. In addition, the commission was involved to varying degrees with contributing to three national-level seminars, two in Nicaragua and one in Honduras. During all this time, it appears that communications from the Executive Director to national CADCCs, the *fuerzas vivas* in the region, the donor community, and even its own Executive Committee were infrequent. This lack of communication was doubly unfortunate because it prevented the commission from keeping pace with the proliferation of regional initiatives and organizations; the return of peace, stability, and economic growth to the isthmus; and the fading of the perception of the immediacy of social and political issues. CADCC's Executive Committee, for example, was convened only twice during these four years.

The second plenary, and the first to treat substantive issues, was held in Managua in March 1993, nearly 15 months after the first plenary. At this meeting, the themes were economic integration and international trade challenges for the region. Three principal presentations were made, including one based on a paper prepared by Dr. Mayorga. The CADCC did not adequately publicize the session and, thus, it received little public attention. Only a couple of the people interviewed could remember attending the meeting. The presentations seem to have had little impact, because none of those interviewed could remember specifically the topics and there was no apparent follow-up — for example, dissemination of the papers or national meetings to continue discussions of key issues.

CADCC's third plenary was held in Guatemala in August 1994 (the subject was NAFTA and Central America). It was better organized; featured high-quality presentations backed by papers prepared specifically for the meeting; and drew a large, high-level group of people from the region, the United States, and Europe. It also featured a special tribute to former Senator Terry Sanford. There was lively discussion following the presentations. This meeting was clearly a success for the CADCC. One could argue that NAFTA and its implications for the region were subjects already being discussed in many forums on the isthmus and that CADCC might have done better to address a different topic. I am inclined to believe that given the tremendous, widespread interest in the subject, the choice was a good one for a new, struggling organization trying to get some visibility and recognition. It also offered a promising multisector forum for discussion not offered elsewhere. Unfortunately, although two of the studies were circulated in the region and small, less-well-attended follow-up sessions were held in Managua and Tegucigalpa, the follow-up elsewhere did not occur. Thus, the impact of this event for the commission was not all that it could have been.

There was a significant falling off of the quality and attendance of the fourth plenary, staged in Managua in August 1995. The focus again was trade and a post (hemispheric)-Presidential Summit strategy. The meeting, repeatedly postponed by CADCC for a variety of reasons from February to April to June to August, featured three modest papers with little new material. One presenter indicated he thought it was a waste of time presenting a paper previously presented elsewhere. The senior public sector official in attendance after the opening ceremony was a new Vice-Minister of Economy who found himself chairing half of the meeting. There has been no follow-up to the meeting.

Aside from a minor CADCC role in one other national-level meeting on the transition to democracy in Nicaragua, there are no other visible CADCC events or products to report.

## **Relationships**

The stars were not properly aligned for the birthing and infancy of CADCC and this project. By the time CADCC was created, two years had passed from the days of the Sanford Commission and its intensive focus on the political, social, and economic problems in the region. Governments in all countries had changed during those two years, and the situation, politically and economically, had improved. At the same time, organizations with competing mandates already existed, and new ones were still emerging.

The project, which came as a political imperative from the U.S. Congress, was not well received in either ROCAP or SIECA, according to observers. None of this augured well for the implementation or success of the CADCC — nor did the turmoil of transition and reduction affecting ROCAP and USAID and the turmoil at SIECA, which lasted until the arrival of the latest Secretary General last year.

The relationships among CADCC, SIECA, and ROCAP/USAID since the setting up of the office in Managua and Dr. Mayorga's accession to the Executive Director's position have been troubled. Funds simply have not been available on a timely basis for CADCC operations, and CADCC in Managua has been unable to fulfill the accountability requirements of SIECA and USAID. Reams of correspondence on administrative and book-keeping matters reflect continuous bickering, particularly between CADCC and SIECA. USAID became involved from time to time in trying to resolve issues between SIECA and CADCC. CADCC, for its part, continually failed to get in front of these issues by improving its planning and taking steps (presumably with USAID and SIECA's support) to improve its record- and book-keeping. Regrettably, the written archives do not reflect efforts to further the project purpose or goals of the Sanford Commission.

Given the unusual and political nature of the project, how could ROCAP and USAID have contributed more to its success? In the first place, they could have ensured that the project received higher priority and greater attention from management — two things that are always easier to talk about, especially with hindsight, than to provide. And USAID could have communicated more frequently with, and developed relations with, a number of key Central Americans from the various sectors targeted by the Sanford Commission and worked with them to encourage the forging of plans and to keep the executive office focused on the commission's objectives and accelerating progress. There is little in the written records or the recollections of the many Central American leaders including those linked to the Sanford Commission and this project to suggest that sustained networking efforts were undertaken by ROCAP or USAID. One unfortunate result is a widespread perception among those interviewed that USAID's bureaucratic requirements and failure to release funds, as well as SIECA's additional bureaucratic requirements, were major factors in CADCC's failure to carry out the role originally envisioned. Far less criticism is directed at the mixed quality of CADCC's initiatives or at its definite lack of sustained leadership in building the CADCC and in networking with its constituent organizations in Central America and elsewhere.

## Results

As indicated in the preceding sections and in the section that follows, the results from and impact of this project through September 30, 1995, are very modest. The third plenary meeting was the project's major achievement. The studies (copies of which have been collected by the evaluator and left with USAID/G-CAP) produced, according to more knowledgeable experts are of mixed quality and little impact because they have not been widely disseminated. Most people interviewed believe the commission is not accomplishing any significant part of its admittedly overly ambitious mandate. Its credibility and *poder convocatorio* (ability to get people's attention) are very low among most of those interviewed, many of whom believe that the problems that led the Sanford Commission to recommend creating the CADCC are no longer priority concerns for the region. Few believed that continuation of CADCC as constituted was worth the effort.

## FINDINGS

- The CADCC project was hurriedly authorized at the end of Fiscal Year 1991 by ROCAP at the direction of the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean. Because the project emerged from the recommendations of the Sanford Commission and a Congressional earmark for ROCAP/USAID to support this Central American dialogue mechanism, its authorization was not preceded by the analytical and design effort that characterizes standard USAID projects. The project carried a political imperative to support an as yet nonexistent regional organization. However, ROCAP might have consulted immediately with the Central American leadership, including former Sanford Commission members, to assist in shaping the proposed commission and in drafting its plan of action for the project. Active ROCAP support at the formative stage might have strongly enhanced the commission's chances for success. Unfortunately, the CADCC never had an overall implementation plan or "design" to guide its course.
- Although annual work plans were prepared by CADCC for 1993-1994 and 1994-1995, they were the first ones, and there seems to have been little follow-up by CADCC, SIECA, or USAID to monitor progress. It is not clear that such plans were requested in the project's early years.

- By the time the CADCC was about to come into being, the Partnership for Democracy and Development, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the Secretariat of the Central American Integration System (SICA), regular Central American Presidential Summits, and other initiatives may have been crowding the commission's roles of both regional dialogue forum and development coordinator.
- The nascent CADCC's sponsoring and support institutions — ROCAP/USAID and SIECA — have experienced turmoil and change, which weakened their ability to focus on the commission when they were needed most. ROCAP underwent the transformation blending its functions into a combined, but greatly reduced, bilateral and regional mission. CADCC has had three USAID project managers in its four-year life. SIECA, meanwhile, has had four Secretaries General and has undergone wrenching changes.
- The selection of SIECA as a channel for funds to the new commission and as a source of logistical support was not the best. SIECA has been crippled struggling with problems of its own. It has failed in channeling funds efficiently and in helping CADCC build its capacity to be accountable.
- Communications among the parties to the project, and between SIECA and CADCC in particular, reflect a constant state of disagreement over minor accounting matters. Confidence and trust have been low, although the arrival of the current USAID Director and the new SIECA Secretary General has resulted in some improvement.
- CADCC has failed to build support for its operations and to stimulate the activities of national commissions. The Executive Committee members have rarely met and have exhibited little interest in generating support for CADCC or in encouraging the executive office to take a more active leadership role in planning activities, building relationships, or generating support for CADCC.
- The environment in Central America has changed. When the Sanford Commission was doing its work from 1987 to 1989, civil unrest was rampant, three countries were at war, investment was still fleeing, and national economies were in a shambles. The region and the world were seized with the Central American crisis. In 1995, the crisis has passed. In the absence of crisis, there also seems to be a sharply reduced feeling that the region has to come to grips with political and social issues that concerned the Sanford Commission and were a major part of the CADCC's original mandate.
- The few substantive forums sponsored to date by the commission have dealt almost exclusively with economic — principally trade — issues despite some efforts by ROCAP/USAID to encourage the CADCC to broaden its agenda. There is no clear evidence of any consensus among the various sectors forged as a consequence of CADCC-sponsored forums, although expectations in this respect may have been overly optimistic. The mandate to address social and political issues has not been achieved.
- National-level CADCCs do not seem to be functioning, with the possible exception of Nicaragua's. In Guatemala and El Salvador, it seemed that the representatives of the different sectors barely knew each other in the CADCC context. Certainly, the national commissions are not functioning regularly or promoting any dialogue.

- The project's second, or extraregional, purpose of developing regional positions on key issues and channeling them to Central American representatives to multilateral forums has not been achieved. Given the still incipient stage of achievement of the first purpose, this second purpose seems unrealistic.
- The original mandate for the CADCC was unrealistically grand. A full-time Executive Director with part-time accounting and book-keeping help for USAID and SIECA accountability requirements might have enhanced CADCC's performance, but would not likely have made the critical difference.
- Other sources of financial support for CADCC's modest operations have not materialized. The commission has made no systematic effort in developing other sources despite the lack of flow of funds from USAID through SIECA. The Central American governments, which USAID originally hoped would be contributing \$2,500 each per month by now, have contributed nothing, and CADCC does not appear to have made any sustained effort to obtain such support.
- The CADCC has not met the great expectations of either the Sanford Commission or USAID in its first four years, nor is it likely to do so.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Orderly Conclusion of a Sad Tale**

- (1) Conclude all assistance to CADCC and all disbursements to SIECA for expenses not incurred prior to the amended Project Assistance Completion Date.
- (2) Send a thoughtful letter relating USAID's decision and reasons for bringing its financial assistance to CADCC to an orderly close to the CADCC Executive Director, CADCC Executive Committee members, key former Sanford Commission members, and national CADCC representatives.

### **Potential Alternatives to Address the Original Objectives of the Sanford Commission and the U.S. Congress**

Clearly, the CADCC as structured under this project has failed. In considering alternatives for addressing the original objectives and with the balance of funds still available, the following questions should be answered:

- Does the need identified by the Sanford Commission in the late 1980s still exist? Are there political, economic, or social problems affecting Central America that can be addressed in part at a regional level by involving various sectors of society?
- Do many Central Americans share the perception that such problems are matters of priority and can be addressed at a regional level?

The answer to the first part of the first question would seem to be a resounding **YES**. Poverty is still alarmingly prevalent in most of the region, and there are extremely serious deficiencies in education systems, for example. And, although elected national governments are in place, the bases for democracy over the long haul remain thin and shaky. The second part of the first question would also seem to merit an affirmative answer. Dialogue among various sectors in itself can contribute to social peace and to building democratic processes.

The second question is harder to answer on the basis of the soundings taken during this brief evaluation. Many of the persons interviewed believed that the problems were less significant than they were a few years ago and expressed skepticism about CADCC's or other regional institutions' ability to address them efficiently in any case. Others still saw the problems identified in the late 1980s as vital for the countries of the region. In one case, the person being interviewed reminded me that the troubled times were not so long ago and that many of the changes were more on the surface than in the roots of the problems.

On balance, examining some possible alternatives to the failed CADCC/SIECA arrangement seems justified even though the question of these problems as a priority at a regional level draws a clouded response from those Central American leaders interviewed. Whether the balance of funds remaining in the project (about \$200,000) can be utilized without the present commission is a matter requiring further study by the USAID Mission. Possible alternatives USAID might want to consider include the following:

- (1) **Adopt a modified version of the concept suggested by Dr. Mayorga** in a brief proposal (contained in Annex D) entitled *Central America 2000: The Vision of the Emerging Leaders*. The proposal calls for a series of regional seminars and workshops to promote a thoughtful exchange of views among a diverse group of young, future leaders from all the sectors identified by the Sanford Commission, and then some. Criteria and procedures would have to be developed for the selection of future leaders and an **efficient** institutional mechanism (not the CADCC as suggested in the proposal) engaged to carry it out over a few years. The mission should consider competitively contracting with a U.S. firm or contracting with an organization such as ICEG, with which we understand the Mission has had favorable experience, to implement the activity. Any institutional development objective would be forgone, but this seems to be a pragmatic necessity in view of the limited financial and Mission staff resources available to be applied to the project.

A fall-back option if the funds must be left with SIECA to remain available would be to allow SIECA to contract for the Mission, while leaving all management responsibility and authority with the Mission.

- (2) **Fund a study by the Council of the Americas or a similarly prestigious private organization** to ascertain the progress that has been made since the report of the Sanford Commission in addressing the problems identified by the commission and to outline the most serious ones remaining. This concept was suggested in different forms by a few of the people interviewed during the evaluation (former Sanford Commission members). The most enthusiastic proponent was the Costa Rican Co-Chair of the Sanford Commission; another was the Salvadoran private sector representative. Once the study was completed, the original Sanford Commission would be reconvened, along with other interested and influential leaders, and would review and discuss the study in a highly publicized meeting. This meeting or conference might even be co-funded by a philanthropic organization such as the Ford Foundation, one person suggested. The conference would then presumably recommend that

some or all of the study's key findings by followed up by Central Americans and interested multilateral, bilateral, and private assistance organizations. Hopefully, this could stimulate renewed Central American and external donor attention to still serious problems in the region.

- (3) **Allocate the remaining funds to the Secretariat of the System for Central American Integration (SICA)** to carry out its mandated consultations and dialogues (or *concertacion*) with all the diverse sectors and interest groups (the *fuerzas vivas*) organized at a regional level. There are currently 17 such groups on the SICA list, and they seem to represent a tremendous range of sectors and interests of society. For example, the regionally organized groups include labor, women's groups, environmental organizations, chambers of commerce and other business groups, small farmers, and more. The USAID funds might be used to contract with a firm to assist the thinly staffed SICA Secretariat to organize such a dialogue or series of conferences and to synthesize the dialogue into a form useful for consideration by the Summit of Central American Presidents, which is supposed to be the ultimate recipient of the results of the dialogue.

The last suggestion is not one the evaluator recommends very highly to USAID because of serious reservations about the capacity and clout of SICA. These reservations increase exponentially when one considers that the funds may have to continue to flow through SIECA as well. The prospects for inefficiency are high indeed. However, SICA's mandate is very consistent with the Sanford and congressional objectives of multisectoral discussion. And if the funds went to a contractor managed directly by USAID, such an arrangement could conceivably be workable and could address some of the original objectives.

**ANNEX A**  
**SCOPE OF WORK**

## SCOPE OF WORK CADCC PROJECT EVALUATION

### I. INTRODUCTION

The following scope of work is for the final evaluation of the Central American Development Coordination Commission (CADCC) Project No. 596-0176. The Permanent Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) is the grantee for this project. The CADCC executive director is Dr. Francisco Mayorga.

This project was designed as a follow-up to the Sanford Commission report to support the creation of a Central American Development Coordination Commission as a forum for dialogue and consensus building on key regional issues and objectives among the public, private, labor, academic, cooperative, non-governmental and other sectors in Central America on economic, social and political matters.

### II. ACTIVITY TO BE EVALUATED

Project Number:	596-0176
Title:	CENTRAL AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION COMMISSION (CADCC)
Cost:	\$497,850 (USAID financing)
Authorization date:	9/30/91
Project Assistance Completion Date:	9/30/95

### III. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the final evaluation of the CADCC (596-0176) Project is to assess the extent and significance of the actual versus planned progress toward the achievement of the project goal, purpose and outputs after approximately four years of implementation. Based on these findings, the evaluator should identify the short term effects of the project (planned vrs. unplanned, positive vrs. negative) and the probability of sustained impact.

The results of the evaluation will be used by USAID/G-CAP to determine if this project should be extended or ended by its PACD. If its extension is recommended, changes in the design and implementation procedures must be identified in order to increase the probability that project investments will meet the stated purpose and goal of the project.

This evaluation has three objectives, which are as follows:

- A) Provide a complete analysis of the implementation impact of the project, including expected accomplishments by the PACD;
- B) Identify areas where project implementation could have been improved; and
- C) If a decision to extend the project is made, determine in which areas CADCC should focus the remaining resources of the project and future actions needed to ensure completion of the project goals.

This evaluation report will provide answers to the questions contained in Section V (Statement of Work) of this scope of work, conclusions (interpretations and judgements) that are based on the findings, and recommendations based on an assessment of the evaluation exercise.

#### **IV. BACKGROUND**

In February 1989, the International Commission for Central American Recovery and Development (better known as the Sanford Commission), issued a report which recommended establishing a Central American coordinating mechanism to promote regional cooperation, unity and strength in the international arena. Subsequently, Public Law 101-167, Sec. 596, dated November 21, 1989 stipulated that upon the request of the Presidents of the Governments of Central America, support and assistance would be provided for the development of a mechanism to be designated as the Central American Development Coordination Commission (CADCC). On September 3, 1991, the Presidents of Central America submitted a letter to U.S. President Bush requesting that the resources made available for this purpose.

SIECA was designated by the Central American Presidents to establish CADCC as a regional, multisectoral coordinating mechanism. CADCC was not designed to take a proactive advocacy role, but rather as a staff-level entity responsible for: 1) promoting dialogue and forging consensus on key regional issues and objectives among the public, private, labor, academic, cooperative, non-governmental and other sectors; 2) coordinating the development of regional positions on key issues and objectives; and 3) channeling those positions to Central American representatives for consideration and presentation at multilateral fora. An agreement was signed with SIECA in September 1991 to create CADCC.

The goal of the project was twofold. The intraregional purpose was to support the creation of the Central American Development Coordination Commission as a forum for dialogue and consensus building on key regional issues and objectives among the public, private, labor, academic, cooperative, non-governmental and other sectors in Central America on economic, social and political matters. The extraregional purpose was to create a coordinating mechanism for the development of regional positions on key issues and objectives and for the channeling of those positions to the Central American governments, to Central American Associations represented in the Commission and to Central American representatives to multilateral fora, such as the Partnership for Development and Democracy (PDD), Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, Regional Consultative Group, Central American Presidential Summits, the Special Plan for Central America (PEC) and the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA).

The project was implemented in two phases, with the first phase concentrating on formally establishing CADCC and setting up its mandate, roles and responsibilities, administrative and legal structures, internal functioning, immediate goals and membership and representation. The second phase of the project focused on the operation of the CADCC consultative mechanism. Since project implementation began in 1991, CADCC has held three plenary meetings on various topics of regional interest.

#### V. STATEMENT OF WORK

This evaluation of the CADCC will provide USAID/G-CAP with information on key issues related to two specific areas of interest:

- 1) The first part of the evaluation will address the conditions at the time of design, the assumptions employed, and the original goal and purpose of the project. It will continue with the project paper amendments, objectives, purpose, and output-input relations.
- 2) The second part of the evaluation will contain an assessment of the degree to which the project met its original objectives, an identification of the reasons why the project did not meet its objectives (if this is the case), the areas where project implementation could have been improved, positive and negative lessons learned for future projects, a recommendation as to whether this project should be extended and if a recommendation is made to extend the project, an outline of how the remaining project funds should be focused to ensure fulfillment of the project goal.

## **VI. METHODS AND PROCEDURES**

The contractor shall submit an initial work plan as part of their proposal (see Report Section), and recommend evaluation methods to be used. The data collection and analysis methods to be used by the contractor should include at a minimum:

- a review of the CADCC Project Paper
- Project HB 3 Agreement and amendments with SIECA
- USAID, CADCC and SIECA records and documentation
- semi-annual project reports and project assessments, especially those related to the Plenary meetings
- documents produced with Project funding

Interviews should be conducted with key personnel in the following institutions:

- 1) CADCC (Dr. Francisco Mayorga, Executive Director and Roger Paguaga, assistant - located in Managua, Nicaragua)
- 2) SIECA (Lydia Zachrisson, Administrative Director and liaison on the CADCC Project; Gustavo Ruiz, former USAID/G-CAP project manager; Dr. Enrique Delgado, liaison on USAID projects - located in Guatemala)
- 3) USAID/G-CAP (Ana Vilma Pocasangre, project manager; Randy Peterson, Trade and Regional Integration Office Chief; Mike Alban, Program Development and Support Office; Stacy Rhodes, Mission Director - located in Guatemala)
- 4) USAID/W (Mark Schneider, AA/LAC and ex-member of the Sanford Commission; Toni Christianson-Wagner, DAA/LAC)
- 5) Selected CADCC members (CADCC is made up of five members from each Central American country, which include two cabinet-level government representatives (from the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Foreign Relations), one representative from the private sector, one representative from the labor sector and one representative from the academic sector/non-governmental organizations. Members include:

Guatemala

Martha de Vielman, Minister of Foreign Relations  
Erick Meza Duarte, Minister of Economy  
Carlos Torrebiarte, private sector  
Juan Francisco Alfaro, labor sector  
Mario Torres Marroquin, academic sector

El Salvador

Eduardo Zablah, Minister of Economy  
Don Eduardo Trabanino, private sector  
Manual Amaya, labor sector  
Roberto Murray Meza, ex-member of the Sanford Commission

Honduras

Guillermo Bueso, private sector/ex-member of the Sanford Commission  
Julio Cesar Cabrera Hernandez, labor sector  
Dr. Rene Sagastume, academic sector  
Juan Ramon Martinez, ex-member of the Sanford Commission

Nicaragua

Ernesto Leal, Minister of Foreign Relations  
Pablo Pereira, Minister of Economy  
Enrique Dreyfus, private sector/ex-member of the Sanford Commission  
Jose Espinoza, labor sector  
Dr. Nicolas Marin, academic sector

Costa Rica

Edwin Menendez Mata, private sector  
Alcimiro Herrera, labor sector  
Dr. Sonia Picado, ex-member of the Sanford Commission

Panama

Juan Antonio Nino, private sector  
Mariano Mena, labor sector  
Dr. Stanley Muschett, academic sector

6) CADCC Executive Committee (one representative per country: Dr. Sonia Picado, Dr. Federico Linares, Roberto Murray Meza, Juan Ramon Martinez, Juan Francisco Alfaro)

It is anticipated that conducting the evaluation will require approximately 2 weeks of field work.

## **VII. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS**

The Contractor shall provide the following series of reports on this evaluation:

- A. A proposed report outline shall be prepared and submitted prior to arrival in country. This will serve as the principal basis for discussions and planning.
- B. The Consultant shall provide USAID/G-CAP with a detailed workplan, schedule, methodology, list of proposed interviews, and assignment of team member responsibilities within one working day after arriving in country.
- C. The Consultant shall provide USAID/G-CAP with an oral briefing and a draft copy in English of the evaluation report before leaving country. The draft report will include issued discussed in the exit review and will contain the following sections:
  1. Executive Summary, stating the development objectives of the project being evaluated; purpose of the evaluation, methodologies, findings, conclusions, recommendations, and lessons learned about the design and implementation of these activities.
  2. Table of contents
  3. Body of report, that includes discussions of:
    - Economic, political and social context of the project
    - Team composition and methodology
    - Evidence/findings of the assessment
    - Conclusions drawn from the findings
    - Recommendations based on the assessment
    - Appendices, including a copy of the evaluation scope of work, a list of documents consulted, and individuals and agencies consulted. Additional appendices may include a brief discussion of methodologies and technical topics if necessary.

In addition, the Consultant will draft the Evaluation Summary Abstract and Summary (Sections H and J of the Evaluation Summary form) for use by the USAID Mission.  
(See Attachment F)

- D. The Consultant shall provide USAID/G-CAP with a final report within 15 working days after receiving Mission's comments on the draft report. The final report will incorporate Mission's comments and be produced in English and Spanish, with one (1) original and five (5) copies of each version. A diskette with the report files in WordPerfect compatible software will also be delivered.

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**ANNEX B**  
**INTERVIEWS**

**WASHINGTON**

Kraig Baier - Desk Officer, Central American Affairs (LAC/CEN)

Sonia Picado - Costa Rican Ambassador to the United States

Charles Costello - USAID, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Democracy and Governance

Toni Christiansen - Wagner - USAID, DAA for Policy and Programs

**GUATEMALA**

Juan Francisco Alfaro - Secretary General, CADCC Guatemalan Confederation of Trade Union (CUSG); Member Sanford Commission and CADCC Executive Committee

Juan Belt - Deputy Director for Regional Affairs, USAID/G-CAP

Carlos Gutiérrez-Luna - Former Special Assistant to ROCAP Director

Federico Linares - Banco Continental Manager; Member Sanford Commission; CADCC Executive Committee

Luis Noriega - Vice Minister of Economy for Regional Affairs

Randall Peterson - USAID/G-CAP - Chief, Office of Trade and Economic Analysis

Ana Vilma Pocasangre - USAID/G-CAP - CADCC Project Manager

Stacy Rhodes - USAID/G-CAP - Director

Haroldo Rodas - SIECA - General Secretary

Gustavo Ruiz - SIECA - SIECA Liaison for CADCC Project (and Former USAID Project Manager)

Carlos Torrebiarte - Manager, Calzado Cobán and Private Sector Rep. in CADCC Guatemala

Lidya Zachrisson - Administrative Director, SIECA

**EL SALVADOR**

Kenneth Ellis - USAID/EL Salvador Acting Director

Alan Flanigan, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador

Roberto Herrera Cáceres - SICA Secretary General

Mirna Lievano de Marquez - Director School of Economics & Business; Former Minister of Planning

Roberto Murray Meza - Member Sanford Commission; Member CADCC Executive Committee

Abraham Rodríguez - Member Sanford Commission

Eduardo Trabanino - Private Sector Representative on the CADCC, El Salvador

Eduardo Zablah - Minister of Economy

## **NICARAGUA**

Roger Cerda - Secretary General, Federation of C.A. Chambers of Commerce

Enrique Dreyfus - Member Sanford Commission; Member CADCC Executive Committee; Private Sector Representative CADCC Nicaragua

Mario de Franco - Economist/Consultant

Francisco Mayorga - Executive Director CADCC; Member Sanford Commission

Roger Paguaga - Asst. Executive Director, CADCC

Roberto Terán - President of Federation Central American Chambers of Commerce (FECAMCO)

## **HONDURAS (by Telephone)**

Juan Ramón Martínez - Member Sanford Commission; NGO Representative CADCC Honduras

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**ANNEX C**

**PUBLIC LAW 101-67**

## EL SALVADOR

SEC. 595. With respect to the ongoing political unrest and armed conflict in El Salvador, the Congress hereby—

- (1) welcomes the negotiating process set in motion on September 13, 1989 in Mexico City by the Government of El Salvador and the leadership of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front and the expressed willingness of both parties to continue this process;
- (2) urges the parties to these negotiations to achieve, as quickly as possible—
  - (A) a cessation of hostilities; and
  - (B) an overall political settlement of the ten-year old conflict; and
- (3) calls upon the Secretary of State to consult frequently with the Congress on the status of the Salvadoran negotiations and on the efforts being undertaken by the President to support these negotiations.

**CENTRAL AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION COMMISSION**

SEC. 596. (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that multi-donor foreign assistance funds made available to the Central America region should be channeled through regional institutions which have strong participation in decision-making by Central Americans to ensure adequate coordination among donors.

President of U.S.

(b) ASSISTANCE FOR CADCC.—Upon the request of the governments of Central America, the President shall provide appropriate support and assistance in the development of a coordination mechanism agreed to by the governments of Central America, which shall be designated as the Central American Development Coordination Commission (CADCC). In providing such support and assistance, the President shall, in concert with the governments of Central America, with other nations providing assistance, with the United Nations, and with other concerned international and regional organizations—

- (1) encourage and participate in the creation of a multi-donor, multi-sectoral coordinating mechanism known as the CADCC; and
  - (2) provide not less than \$500,000 or more than \$1,000,000 of funds appropriated to carry out chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to the Economic Support Fund) to be used to assist in the implementation of such Commission, and United States participation therein.
- (c) FACTORS IN ESTABLISHING CADCC.—In establishing the CADCC, consideration should be given to:
- (1) involving representatives from both the public and private sectors, including representatives from the trade unions and business communities, and nongovernmental organizations at the regional level;
  - (2) involving regional institutions and multilateral organizations such as the Inter-American Bank, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the Central American Monetary Council (CMCA), the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the United Nations in project design, implementation, and coordination; and

(3) establishing in each country a National Recovery and Development Commission, modeled after the National Reconciliation Commissions called for in the Esquipulas II Accords agreed to by the presidents of the five countries of Central America in Guatemala on August 6-7, 1987.

(d) **SECRETARIAT OF THE CADCC.**—The United Nations Development Programme shall be designated as the social service and refugee and displaced persons technical assistance secretariat for the CADCC.

(e) **ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE.**—The President is authorized to furnish assistance under this section to each country in Central America which is in compliance with the Esquipulas II Accords.

(f)(1) **ENCOURAGEMENT OF MULTILATERAL CONTRIBUTIONS.**—The Congress urges the President to take the necessary steps to encourage and secure greater international cooperation in, and support for, implementing the recommendations of the International Commission for Central American Recovery and Development.

(2) It is the sense of the Congress that, in carrying out paragraph (1), the President should exert leadership in multilateral and regional forums, and at economic summits to further a multidonor, multisector solution to the crisis in Central America.

**ELIGIBILITY OF POLAND AND HUNGARY FOR OVERSEAS PRIVATE  
INVESTMENT CORPORATION**

**SEC. 597. (a) PROGRAMS.**—Section 239(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by inserting "Poland, Hungary," after "Yugoslavia,"

22 USC 2199.

(b) **PARTICIPATION BY NONGOVERNMENTAL SECTOR.**—(1) In accordance with its mandate to foster private initiative and competition and enhance the ability of private enterprise to make its full contribution to the development process, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation shall support projects in Poland and Hungary which will result in enhancement of the nongovernmental sector and reduction of state involvement in the economy.

(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term "nongovernmental sector" in Poland and Hungary includes private enterprises, cooperatives (insofar as they are not administered by the Governments of Poland or Hungary), joint ventures (including partners which are not the Governments of Poland or Hungary or instrumentalities thereof), businesses in Poland or Hungary that are wholly or partly owned by United States citizens, including those of Polish or Hungarian descent, religious and ethnic groups (including the Catholic Church), and other independent social organizations.

(c) **DEFINITION OF ELIGIBLE INVESTOR.**—Notwithstanding subsection (b), the term "eligible investor" with respect to OPIC's programs in Poland and Hungary has the same meaning as contained in section 238(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

(d) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The authority of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to issue insurance, reinsurance, guarantees, and to provide any assistance under its direct loan and equity programs with respect to projects undertaken in Poland and Hungary shall take effect upon the date of enactment of this Act and shall remain in effect until September 30, 1992.

**ANNEX D**

**CENTRAL AMERICA 2000:  
THE VISION OF THE EMERGING LEADERS**

**Central America 2000:  
the vision of the emerging leaders**

Proposal for a series of regional workshops  
to promote the exchange of views and concerns  
of the new generation of Central American leaders

December, 1993  
Managua, Nicaragua

## **Central America 2000: the vision of the emerging leaders**

Proposal for a series of regional workshops  
to promote the exchange of views and concerns  
of the new generation of Central American leaders

### **What CADCC is**

The CADCC was created in 1991 by the Central American Presidents upon the recommendation of the International Commission for Central American Recovery and Development (ICCARD). It is a regional, non governmental, non partisan, multisectoral, independent organization. Its members are business and labor leaders, academic and non-governmental representatives, as well as the Ministers of Foreign Relations and Economics of the six Central American countries.

### **What CADCC does**

The CADCC serves as a forum for dialogue and consensus-building among public, private, labor, academic, and non-governmental sectors on strategic economic and social issues in the region.

The CADCC seeks the involvement of regional and multilateral institutions as consultative partners in its activities. Some of these institutions are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the World Bank, the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and others.

The CADCC sponsors research, regional and national meetings, multisectoral network building, and is planning to publish the regional newsletter *Foro Centroamericano* in 1994.

### **Project Need**

The future of a more integrated Central America requires the development of a leadership that shares common values and a long term vision of the regional challenges. The emerging generation of Central American leaders is fragmented and dispersed, both sectorally and geographically. It lacks the mechanisms needed to develop a common vision for the future, as well as the confidence and the capacity to work together. This is a vacuum that has existed for many generations in the region.

Most of the current analyses of the Central American challenges focus on the short term and on sectoral, national perspectives. They often emphasize specialized or in vogue issues, and lack an adequate dissemination among the leaders of the region. Longer term analyses on Central America usually focus on economic and demographic issues, often reflecting the views and priorities of international and governmental organizations.

The identification of the challenges of the future and the hierarchy of priorities must be defined within the region as a result of a productive and permanent dialogue among the key

actors of the society. The emerging generation of leaders must develop a common language and the ability to build a consensus about those issues and priorities. The young leaders of the different sectors - business and labor, academic and professional, religion, grassroots, the media, art and culture - need to find an opportunity to get together and begin to exchange their views and concerns.

This project aims at providing such an opportunity. A series of workshops convening the participation of many young leaders of the different sectors of society will contribute an opportunity for portraying their vision for the future, their points of agreement and the possibility of resolving their differences through dialogue.

## **Project Goal**

To promote the search for a common vision about the challenges of the Central American future among the emerging leaders of the region.

## **Project Purpose**

- To provide a multisectoral, pluralistic, and regional diagnosis of the main problems and challenges of Central America for the year 2000, as seen by the Central American emerging generation of leaders.
- To provide a multisectoral, pluralistic, and regional set of recommendations on the main problems and challenges of Central America for the year 2000, as seen by the Central American emerging generation of leaders.
- To promote regional dialogue, consensus building and cooperation among the future leaders of Central America.
- To help forge a common language and shared vision about the key challenges of Central America among the emerging generation of leaders.

## **Project Methodology**

- Careful selection of a multisectoral, pluralistic, diverse group of emerging leaders of the different sectors of the society, including political parties and the government.
- An initial opinion survey among participants, with a questionnaire asking their views about the relative importance of a tentative list of key issues for the future. That survey will be processed immediately to provide inputs for the conference.
- The participants will be divided in eight to ten working groups, and will be provided guiding questions for discussion of the main issues identified in the survey. The groups will designate a moderator and a speaker, who will be in charge of presenting a summary of their discussion to the plenary. This will serve as a basis for a diagnosis of the future.
- After a plenary discussion of the different issues, the groups will be asked to provide recommendations for concrete actions to be undertaken by the different sectors of society to confront those issues and prevent problems for the future. The process of group and plenary discussion will be repeated to generate a comprehensive set of recommendations.

## **Project Outputs**

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- Six national workshops with the participation of emerging leaders of the different sectors of the Central America countries.
- Six reports portraying the diverse perspectives of the different sectors of the Central American society, a diagnosis and prescriptions about the challenges of the future.
- The basis for a directory of the emerging generation of Central American leaders.
- The basis for a regional workshop with the participation of members of the emerging generation of Central American leaders.

## **Workplan**

- 1) To define terms of reference for the design of questionnaires.
- 2) To define terms of reference for the design of national workshops.
- 3) To define criteria for the selection of sectoral leaders to be invited.  
(i.e.: less than 40 years old, playing a visible role in unions, associations, chambers, universities, political parties, government, the media, arts and culture, and the church)
- 4) To select consultants and coordinators for national workshops.
- 5) To meet with National Coordinators to explain project, discuss criteria of selection of the sectoral leaders, and open a line of communication.
- 6) To define dates for national workshops.
- 7) To identify guests and special guests for the national workshops.
- 8) To send invitations to guests.
- 9) To confirm and arrange itinerary for guests.
- 10) To make hotel reservations for special guests.
- 11) To conduct national workshops.
- 12) To write papers.
- 13) To distribute papers.
- 14) To prepare final report.

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## Tentative list of sectors of the civil society and number of leaders to be invited

- 1 UNIONS (16)
  - 2 Agriculture
  - 2 Industry
  - 2 Commerce
  - 2 Transportation
  - 2 Banking
  - 2 Tourism
  - 2 Construction
  - 2 Government
  
- 2 BUSINESS SECTOR (16)
  - 2 Agriculture
  - 2 Industry
  - 2 Commerce
  - 2 Transportation
  - 2 Banking
  - 2 Tourism
  - 2 Construction
  - 2 Government
  
- 3 MEDIA (12)
  - 3 Newspaper
  - 3 Magazine
  - 2 TV
  - 2 Radio
  - 2 Advertising agencies
  
- 4 ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONALS (27)
  - 3 Economists
  - 3 Lawyers
  - 3 Historians
  - 3 Demographers
  - 3 Engineers (Civil, Industrial, Information)
  - 3 Architect / Urbanists
  - 3 Physicians
  - 3 Sociologists
  - 3 Political scientists
  
- 5 NGO's (16)
  - 2 Cooperatives
  - 2 Children
  - 2 Women
  - 1 Elderly

**Project Inputs**

<i>Pre-Workshops</i>	<b>US \$22,600</b>
Consultant for the design of questionnaires	500
Consultant for the design of sectoral and national workshops	500
Airfare of CADCC's Executive Director and Assistant to meet with National Coordinators and sectoral leaders (2 x 5 countries x \$ 250)	2,500
Per diem, preparatory trips (2 x 5 countries x 3 days x \$170)	5,100
National Coordinators (1 x 6 countries x \$1,000)	6,000
Logistical support (6 countries x \$1000)	6,000
Communications (long distance, fax, couriers)	2,000
 <i>National Workshops</i>	 <b>US \$63,080</b>
<b>TRANSPORTATION</b>	<b>13,160</b>
Airfare of CADCC's Executive Director and Assistant to conduct workshops (2 x 5 countries x US \$ 250)	2,500
Per diem (2 x 5 countries x 2 days x \$ 170)	3,400
Airfare of special guests (6 x 1 x US \$ 700)	4,200
Per diem special guests (6 x 1 x 3 days x \$170)	3,060
<b>WORKSHOPS</b>	<b>49,920</b>
Conference rooms (6 countries x 2 days x \$ 150)	1,800
Seminar rooms (3 x 6 countries x 2 days x \$60)	2,160
Coffee breaks (6 x 4 x 120 x \$ 1,50)	4,320
Meals (6 x 2 meals x 120 x \$12)	17,280
Receptions (6 x 200 guests x \$12)	14,400
Supplies and materials (6 x 120 x \$ 8)	5,760
Rapporteurs (6 x 2 rap x 2 days x \$ 100)	2,400
Secretarial and logistical support (6 x 3 days x \$100)	1,800
 <i>Post-Workshops</i>	 <b>US\$ 14,700</b>
Writing and printing of Directory of leaders (900 x \$ 5)	4,500
Printing of national workshops papers (150 x 6 x \$ 8)	7,200
Mailing and communications	3,000
 <b>TOTAL</b>	 <b>US\$100,380</b>

Note: The CCDCA will contribute the overall coordination and general office expenses of the project.

- 1 Blinds
- 2 Handicapped
- 2 Microenterprise
- 2 Health
- 2 Ecology

6 ARTS AND CULTURE (6)

- 2 Writers
- 2 Painters
- 2 Musicians

7 RELIGION (6)

- 2 Priests
- 2 Nuns
- 2 Lay people

8 POLITICAL PARTIES (different list per country)

1 or 2 per political party

APPROXIMATE TOTAL: 99 plus participants from political parties = 110 per country

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**ANNEX E**  
**SUMMARY OF PLENARY MEETINGS**  
**AND STUDIES PRODUCED**

# CCDCA

Comisión para la Coordinación del Desarrollo de Centroamérica

## Sesiones Plenarias, Temas y Estudios de la CCDCA (1991-1995)

Sesiones Plenarias (Fecha)	I	II (Marzo 93)	III (Agosto 94)	IV (Agosto 95)
Tema de la Plenaria	Organización de la CCDCA	Insitucionalización de la CCDCA, integración y relación internacional de Cenetroamérica	Centroamérica ante el TLC	Centroamérica 1996 Hacia una estrategia post-Denver:
Investigaciones Principales		La nueva política exte- rior de los Estados Uni- dos	El Tratado de Libre Co- mercio de Norteamérica Impactos e Implicacio- nes para Centroamérica	Centroamérica ante el proceso de integración hemisférica: Una evaluación posterior a la reunión de Denver
Estudios / Intervenciones de Expertos Invitados		Los desafíos de Centro- américa hacia el año 2000	Estados Unidos y Cen- troamérica: La era del comercio	Estrategias de la integra- ción económica centro- americana en el largo plazo
		Centroamérica: Transformación econó- mica e integración re- gional	La rama textil-vestuario en la Ronda Uruguay, el TLC de Norteamérica y la paridad para la Cuenca del Caribe	Centroamérica y los acuerdos multilaterales de la Ronda Uruguay: Contenido e implica- ciones de los principales acuerdos
Documentos de Trabajo			Centroamérica 2000: Crecimiento económico y requerimientos de inversión	

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