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ON DEMOCRACY:

STRENGTHENING LEGISLATIVE, LEGAL, PRESS INSTITUTIONS, AND POLLING

IN INDONESIA

FINAL EVALUATION

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The views in this report represent solely those of the authors, and not necessarily those of The Asia Foundation, the Agency for International Development, or any other institution.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This series of interrelated projects are directed toward important ends central to the future of Indonesia as a major economic force in the region, and to the wellbeing of its citizenry. They are focused on the democratization of Indonesia by providing assistance to improve the fields of legislative action, law, the press, and public opinion polling. All are considered salient to democratization.

~~This evaluation concluded that the relevance of these sectors to project goals was quite real, but that there was considerable hyperbole in what could reasonably be expected to be accomplished within the parameters of the projects and the time of their operation.~~ There are some modest signals of greater openness in the society. Central, personalized control with the primary object of stability within a state that continues to manage all aspects of the political process is evident. ~~Thus the prospects for short or medium term project success in democratization are dim.~~

The evaluation noted the importance of the subprojects undertaken, and recommended continuing programming in all of these fields. Yet it stated that more realistic targets should be set, and conceptually ~~this could be assisted through considering the distinction between 'legal process' and 'legal culture,' and between 'political liberalization' and 'democratization.'~~ Each of the former are actionable and may be assisted with the possibility of achievable results, while the latter elements may be impervious to change through foreign assistance in the foreseeable future, and rather more subject to glacial attitudinal shifts toward which efforts should nevertheless be directed.

The team recommends that both USAID and the Foundation, separately or together, continue to address these issues through stress on both human resource development and access to information as the two elements are likely to contribute to long-term change. It recommends ~~continued attention to the NGO community~~ both as a deliverer of services but also as a force for pluralism.

The legislature, characterized by domination by a strong executive, may play a more important role after the next five years. Support has been helpful but all activities except the research unit are not sustainable without external assistance. That unit is sustainable, but its effectiveness needs assessment. The evaluation recommends that an appraisal be made of it with the collaboration of the legislature itself. The need for some such service in an administrative manner to be determined and with research quality control is important for the day when the legislature assumes a more important, proactive legislative role.

Law continues to be a priority field, and advances have been made. The national law curriculum has been revised under this support. The efforts to transfer law degrees, etc. to CD-ROM for

Better dissemination could not be completed under this project, but the tasks were taken up by USAID under another, major project. The law, advocacy groups, and NGO activity in this area continue to be important.

Improvement in the quality of the press is important. Efforts should be made to ensure the financial viability of the Dr. Soetomo Press Institute, which is the most important private training center in the country in this field, through intensive local fundraising campaigns. No foreign efforts will free the press from constraints.

The public opinion polling is in its early stages, but a follow-up grant from USAID promises a contribution to the field.

The Asia Foundation had some difficulties in monitoring of substance, although financial management through the separate unit established under the grants was sound, according to a USAID audit. USAID management has been stretched too thin on NGO activities, and the Foundation has taken a large share of the available funding from this source, thus creating local jealousies. The team recommends that any major funding of the Foundation be a project line item in the USAID budget.

The evaluation recognizes the difficulties inherent in working in the field of democratization, and commends both USAID and the Foundation for its efforts. It cautions against overly optimistic expectations, which would undercut the credibility of these very useful efforts in both the headquarters of A.I.D. and The Asia Foundation.

ACRONYMS

BPHN	Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional National Law Development Agency
CLS	Pusat Pengkajian Hukum Center for Legal Studies
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Indonesian National Parliament
DPDR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provincial Parliament
DSPI	Institut Pers Dr. Soetomo Dr. Soetomo Press Institute
ICFEL	Pusat Hukum Lingkungan Indonesia Indonesian Center for Environmental Law
IFLA	Federasi Internasional Ikatan Perpustakaan International Federation of Library Associations
KIH	Konsorsium Ilmu Hukum Indonesian Consortium of Legal Studies
KOWANI	Kongress Wanita Indonesia Indonesian Women's Congress
LKPSM	Lajnah Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya dan Manusia Institute for Human Resources Studies and Development
LP3ES	Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information
LP3Yogya	Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan and Penerbitan Yogya Institute for Research, Education and Publishing Yogya
LP3Y	The same as LP3Yogya
MA	Mahkamah Agung Supreme Court
PUSKOWAN	Pusat Koperasi Wanita DKI Jakarta Jakarta Women's Central Cooperative
SEJATI	Yayasan Sejati Sejati Foundation

PREFACE

Some years ago, when evaluating an irrigation project for A.I.D. in rural Korea, I was asked by a team member, after I had launched a series of seemingly extraneous queries about government intervention into the rural sector, whether we were evaluating a project or a society. I answered, to the consternation of my colleagues, that we were doing a little of both, for the milieu in which projects operate are critical to understanding their nature, as well as their successes and failures. There is no project evaluation that I have ever done which calls for greater attention to this issue than the projects now under review.

It was with considerable trepidation, then, that I agreed to do this evaluation, for any analysis of any value that focuses of such broad intellectual and programming issues such as 'democracy' and 'law' must by its nature be of profound difficulty. These are subjects that do not lend themselves to clear and distinct Cartesian rigor or short, contained analyses; indeed, long after this evaluation is over the subjects will haunt one.

If doubts and questions will linger, the evaluation cannot. The usual time and financial constraints make review of the pertinent literature on law and democracy impossible, and events in Indonesia move less glacially than the outside world might suspect, and analysis cannot be postponed.


Timing did prevent the visit to each individual subgrantee institution, and shortages of staff limited our access to many of the detailed files. We have tried to balance specific subgrantee activities with a review of the broader elements of the rationale for the project in accordance with the scope of work, and indeed with logic and need.

These gnawing doubts and dilemmas aside, it has been a pleasure to attempt to articulate some of the myriad issues inherent in projects of this sort. I am indebted to The Asia Foundation Jakarta staff, especially, Jon Summers, Representative, and Ardith Betts for their openness and support without which this evaluation could not have been written. I am also indebted to my colleague, Dr. C.P.F. Luhulima of LIPI, my partner in analysis. His views and intuition have been invaluable. USAID staff have been very supportive of an objective evaluation, especially Dr. Tin Myaing Thein and Ms. Nancy Langworthy, the project officer and evaluation officer respectively.

Indirectly I would like to thank those in Indonesia whom I have interviewed, and I have ranged rather far afield to ensure that contextual elements were not overlooked. They are intentionally not named here to protect their anonymity, but they nevertheless have been critical to this review. Others in the United States have been intellectually supportive: Daniel Lev at the University of Washington; and William Cole, Lee Ann Ross, David

Merrill, Richard Whittiker, and Robert Thurston, all of A.I.D.

Responsibility for sins of commission or omission are mine alone.



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A FINAL PROJECT EVALUATION

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I INTRODUCTION

This set of projects, begun in 1990, was an attempt to assist in the process of democratization in Indonesia with specific, actionable elements, employing The Asia Foundation as the project manager. It was based on a set of sometimes articulated, sometimes inchoate, hypotheses and assumptions about the nature of democracy both in general and in Indonesia, the roles of legislatures, the law, and the press in the process toward that end, as well as on the record, competence, and acceptability of The Asia Foundation generally, but more specifically within the Indonesian milieu.

In all projects, even the most technical, consideration of the environment in which it was conceived (by donor and/or recipients, and in this case, intermediary) and operated is important to understanding the project's potential and dynamics, its timing and acceptance. The scope of work for this evaluation (see Appendix 1) provides for broad consideration of both the project and programming in furthering the democratic context. In this section, we will explore these issues, leaving the Indonesian context for a later section, and a fuller consideration of the democracy issue toward the end.

A. Hypotheses and Assumptions

The emphasis on democracy as a topic for foreign aid programming is not new, even if it has received increased stress in the new American administration. Closely related to human rights, which acquired particular significance during the Carter administration and was one of the major reasons why U.S.-Korean relations soured during that period, concerns about it in foreign aid terms began in earnest in the 1970s. Although the American ambassador in Taiwan in the 1950s could claim that democratic political reform was not part of the U.S. foreign aid agenda there, by the 1960s and 1970s it had become one element of American foreign policy, although often subservient to security interests.¹ Some of these activities in Asia were carried out through intermediary organizations (e.g., AAFLI and The Asia Foundation), others attempted to broaden pluralism through non-governmental organizations (NGOs, both domestic and expatriate), and yet others through more direct political activity through the institutes sponsored by the U.S. political parties, e.g., the National Democratic Institute. Various set-aside accounts were established to encourage such programming. These changes were reflected in the augmented bureaucratic capacities of the State Department and A.I.D. to monitor progress and ensure (wherever possible) compliance.

At a fundamental level of U.S. interest, there has been an inherent--perhaps ethnocentric--belief in the efficacy of the U.S. democratic institutions,² and the concept of law in various forms emanating from the European tradition. From this grew the U.S. belief in the appropriateness of exporting these concepts and institutions. This has been coupled with the hypothesis that democracies generally do not initiate wars.³ More recently, there has been a premise that there is a close, causal link between democracy and economic development, more specifically between growth under free markets and free political systems.⁴ This model, which seems intellectually flawed as a universal principle, may be based on an Eastern European pattern, and specifically seems to have less relevance in Asia, where the fastest growing states have been those

¹ In 1963, the U.S. threatened a cut off of the aid program if Park Chung Hee did not hold an election.

² For a discussion, see, for example, Robert Bellah, The Good Society.

³ It becomes necessary to distinguish between democracies and populist regimes. One might argue that the Third Reich was populist, as was Italy under Mussolini.

⁴ For a discussion of various opinions on this subject, see Stephan Haggard, "Democracy and Economic Development: A Comparative Perspective," Democratic Institutions. New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1992, Vol. 1.

who make the electorate

under some form of authoritarian control.⁵ Although freer markets may be one element that places eventual pressures on authoritarian regimes to reform politically, and a free flow of information is important for markets to function, the time parameters under which such reforms actually have occurred (1961 to 1987 in Korea, 1949 to 1991 in Taiwan, etc.) may offer little solace to the programmatically perplexed foreign aid agencies, which seek quantifiable, rapid progress.

The definition of democracy is complex and disputed, the literature on the subject vast, and discussion here inappropriate. It is not, however, simply the holding of free elections (witness Myanmar, Algeria, Russia, and Haiti in recent memory) as much of the press would have it, nor is it the institutionalization of elected legislatures (of a single or multi-party stripe). It arguably involves some form of popular expression of will through a widespread electorate, however defined by age, gender, or property rights (women could only recently vote in Switzerland, Governor Patten's present plan to lower the voting age in Hong Kong is causing recriminations in Beijing, etc.), a legislature or similar body purporting to represent the popular will, a public means to express widely societal concerns and dissent, and a set of predictable laws with legal institutions to enforce them. All these operate within a context (explored later in this essay) that determines their roles and effectiveness. The ultimate test of democracy, if not its definition, is the peaceful, electoral transfer of power between competing groups (parties), in contrast to competing factions of the same group. Under this consideration, Japan just recently passed that test, Korea has yet to do so.

Since this project was initiated, democracy has become both a hallmark of the Clinton administration and a reinforced pillar of the A.I.D. programming process. A State Department confidential draft policy directive is currently circulating within the administration that explicitly sets forth this continuing concern, with detailed guidelines on possible avenues of programming.

Anecdotal evidence from those in USAID who initiated the project indicates that the expressed need for some Indonesian activity in this field was a product of USAID interest, recognizing that Washington (both in the headquarters and in the Congress) was seized with the issue. USAID believed that there might be opportunities in Indonesia to assist in the process, and that The Asia Foundation had already established its credentials in assisting this field. To this end, The Asia Foundation was informally approached to provide a proposal.

⁵ Consider South Korea, Taiwan, China, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore specifically said in November 1992 in Manila that democracy and economic development were incompatible.

The project progenitors were neither naive nor unsophisticated in their estimation of the complexity of goal achievement nor of what might be accomplished. They were well aware of the history and nature of the Indonesian regime, and the difficulties inherent in any approach to change it. It is evident that the host country did not initiate support for democracy programming, as much as individual Indonesian institutions may have requested specific sub-project activities aimed at improving particular fields (e.g., law school curriculum reform, etc.). The Foundation noted that Indonesia "does not intend to accept de jure or de facto linkage of development assistance with human rights or environmental issues."⁶ This statement has extensively been repeated in the press since that date.

A set of inchoate hypotheses seemed to have been behind this thinking; they were directed toward both the project components and their administration. The first of the set of three (later a fourth was added) project concerns was that a functioning, active (and at least partly elected) legislature was an inherent part of the democratic process. The second was that a well-trained press could contribute to the system. The third was that the legal process needed to be improved as a step toward democracy.⁷ A fourth, smaller element was later added that was based on the hypothesis that competence in polling techniques could assist the process by providing an avenue of information to a hierarchical regime on popular thinking on key issues. The project premises were that the improvement in each of these fields was both possible and could assist democratization in Indonesia. We will consider separately how realistic these premises were.

The designers recognized that no single, defined project (or set of projects) could alone achieve any major change in democratization, but that over time the institutional infrastructure so enhanced through the project could contribute to the process when other conditions were in place. The elements of the project, seemingly somewhat disparate, were grouped together both because intellectually they were seen as contributing to the overall democratic goal, as well as for bureaucratic and management convenience.

If the goal of the project could not be reached through it alone while it was operational (since projects for bureaucratic, if not programmatic, reasons are kept short), then it becomes apparent that the inchoate hypothesis of the planners was that the reforms

⁶ Foundation Semi-Annual Report to USAID, October 1, 1991-March 31, 1992. A distinction will be made in this report between broad policy conditionality, which is said to be unacceptable, and project conditionality, which may be quite appropriate.

⁷ The issue of the commercial code was separate, and was, and is being, addressed through a major separate project.

initiated under the project could be sustained and/or institutionalized so that at some future, more auspicious, moment they would indeed contribute to projects ends, and/or the project would be continued until such a time.

Intrinsic to this set of assumptions was another component: that USAID did not have the capacity in staff time and/or background to undertake the administration of this effort, and/or that it may have been inappropriate as a governmental organization for it to do so directly. Thus, a foreign non-profit organization with greater programmatic flexibility (read less local government interference) than an indigenous one was a reasonable means through which to operate, and that The Asia Foundation had the necessary acceptability as well as knowledge and administrative competence to carry the project forward.

If these were the hypotheses and assumptions underlying the project, then what was The Asia Foundation's presumed record in this field?

B. The Asia Foundation--Experience and Record

The Asia Foundation from its inception was dedicated to the furtherance of democratic ideals and institutions. It was built into its Articles of Incorporation in 1954. As a small-grant organization, it may generally be characterized by working through elites to achieve broad-based reforms, and with considerable local country flexibility to design and implement projects. Although caught occasionally in cold-war rivalries in a variety of neutral countries (including Indonesia), the Foundation has grown in stature over the years. It is funded by a core grant from the U.S. Congress, and supplemented by both private donations and specific project activities supported by individual USAID missions.

The Foundation's record in working with the press, law, and legislatures is virtually continuous and ubiquitous. The Foundation has been one of the premier organizations supporting press freedom and training in Asia since the 1950s. It provided assistance to press institutes in such countries as Burma and Korea, supported press groups (including paper for journals in some countries where it was inaccessible), and was the original support for Asian press training under the Nieman program at Harvard. Other examples abound. The Foundation has long recognized that a free press is an inherent and critical component of any functioning democracy.⁸ It also has felt that journalists in many states have been members of the intellectual community, and that their influence far exceeds the individual organizations for which they may work.

⁸ Tom Stoppard in his play Night and Day has a dictator say that he supports a 'relatively free press'--'one controlled by his relatives.'

Law has been an early emphasis of the Foundation. The first major program was in 1962-63 in Korea, but over the years the activities have so grown that law has become one of the premier categories of foundation expenditure.⁹ Estimates in recent years range around \$1 million annually. These activities have involved almost every conceivable level of legal program from the various supreme courts to village legal aid. They have included training of judges, lawyers, and prosecutors internally and abroad, support to bar and other professional associations, work with paralegal groups, reforming legal administrative systems, publishing and/or disseminating court records, research on attitudes toward law, legal aid, family courts, provision of advisory services, assistance to international legal organizations, and a virtual myriad of other, related activities. The only other American organization working extensively in this field in Asia is the Ford Foundation, but The Asia Foundation is paramount in this emphasis compared to Ford in the countries under consideration.

Programming with legislatures, although somewhat later in introduction in the Foundation, has become so widespread that there is virtually no legislature in countries in which the Foundation operates that has not had Foundation projects. Here, again, Foundation activities have transcended narrow approaches, and included long and short-term training and observation travel for legislators and staff, and the building of the capacities of these institutions to consider and more effectively draft proposed legislation, do related research, and to conduct state business. A project in Thailand was the specific model for the Indonesia effort.

In summary, it is apparent that a review of the record would indicate that if there were a single, private American organization to which any USAID could have turned to conceptualize and manage such a project, it was to The Asia Foundation. Even more specifically, the Foundation had previously engaged in projects in support of these types of objectives in Indonesia, often with USAID support. The Foundation's record in Indonesia was prima facie evidence of its acceptability.

No matter what the general experience of the Foundation or USAID may have been in conceptualizing or operating in these fields, the final, governing factor is the Indonesian milieu in which the project must exist and toward which reforms and improvements were directed.

⁹ It is difficult to obtain exact figures on this activity because over the years the Foundation has shifted its reporting categories to include such areas as 'law and government,' 'law and development,' 'law and administrative services,' etc. See David I. Steinberg, "Administration of Justice. Asia Report" (Development Associates for AID/CDIE), March 1, 1992. See also by the same author "The Administration of Justice in Asia: A Conceptual and Project Survey." (Development Associates for AID/CDIE) November 8, 1992, pp. 24-28.

C. The Indonesian Milieu

The political and economic importance of Indonesia is reflected in the burgeoning literature in these disciplines. Its history since its independence demonstrates the wide range of political and economic policies pursued by its two administrations--that of Sukarno and Suharto, the Old and the New Orders. Although acutely disparate though its economic policies and performance may have been, both regimes have been marked by strong central leadership to which no internationally acceptable adjectival modification can be added to justify in the international context the term 'democratic'--guided or other.

The New Order under President Suharto is a controlled, paternalistic regime with (since approximately 1986 and the fall of oil revenues) a set of generally enlightened economic policies that, while yet to create a 'level playing field' internally in the society, has created much growth, a remarkable alleviation of poverty, and the potential for further successes.¹⁰ Its internal economic performance has received generally favorable reviews from donors.¹¹ Because of this and low wages, it has attracted massive foreign investment--until 1991 over \$15 billion from Japan, Taiwan, and Korea alone.¹² It is not without its economic problems, which create political difficulties. There are growing class disparities based on spreading income inequalities as all groups rise. There has also been an increase in the economic role of the Chinese--two percent of the population controlling 70 percent of the private capital,¹³ and continuing criticism of these 'conglomerates' in the press. According to the Indonesian Minister of Science and Technology, the 10 top Chinese conglomerates control 30 percent of the Gross Domestic Product.¹⁴ Alliances between them and the elite are a cause for widespread rumor and innuendo.

¹⁰ See, for example, Amar Bhattacharya and Mari Pangestu, The Lessons of East Asia. Indonesia, Development Transformation and Public Policy. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1993.

¹¹ The exception has been the Dutch economic aid program. It has called for more equity in the Indonesian plans. The program was then expelled from the country in 1992.

¹² There has been a fall in foreign investment as Indonesia is perceived to be still administratively cumbersome, as wages rise (some 40 percent beginning in January 1994), and as China and Vietnam offer more conducive environment for labor-intensive industries.

¹³ Richard Robison, Indonesia. The Rise of Capital. Sidney, Allen & Unwin, 1986. Asian Studies Association of Australia, Southeast Asia Publications Series #13.

¹⁴ The Straits Times, December 11, 1993. A Chinese businessman indicated in a private interview that this figure may be inflated--they may control only 20 percent!

This New Order is under singular command, but its hold and sway is significantly assisted at this stage by a set of institutions and factors that have retarded the growth of pluralism in the society.¹⁵ The most prominent of these elements is the military. It is significant in the administrative structure both central and provincial, it retains a massive influence over the legislature (100 of its 500 seats are reserved for it), and has major involvements in the economy (e.g., BULOG, or the central procurement organization that is primarily responsible for secure supplies of rice and sugar). Through GOLKAR, which became a militarily controlled organization that started out as a social group and has become the regime's political party, it is virtually ubiquitous. The military is not, however, monolithic; at times significant elements of it are at odds with the leadership. As the country approaches its next elections in 1997, a jockeying for power may be expected. Some have suggested that the new military leadership may be far more technically qualified than their predecessors, but they may also be more narrow in outlook. In classical central Javanese style, President Suharto has yet to indicate definitively his successor to what some expect to be his last term in office. This creates opportunities for liberalization, as well as significant dangers.

The state has proclaimed a national ideology, pancasila, which is required to be taught in the schools and to which all, including the two sanctioned opposition parties, must adhere. As the press noted, "He [Suharto] stressed that Indonesia is pursuing the development of a democracy that is based on pancasila. [Suharto said] 'It is not a liberal democracy or any other kind of democracy based on other ideology. If anyone is trying to develop other forms of democracy, we have to watch them.'"¹⁶ By promoting pancasila through public education and requiring courses in it for bureaucratic advancement,

the government was, in effect, seeking to achieve widespread acceptance of its authoritarian corporatist orientation. The wider significance of the 1985 [pancasila] law is that it represents the highwater mark of the New Order's restrictive corporatist strategy for the management of political life in Indonesia.¹⁷

Public expressions of disapproval are constrained, the press is harnessed, the legislature has yet to initiate legislation, political parties are limited to three by the state (the fourth fraksi [group] in the legislature is the military, the fifth is regional representation). As an article in the Jakarta Post

¹⁵ For some of the more abstract issues, see Section III below.

¹⁶ Jakarta Post, December 18, 1993, reporting on an interview with President Suharto.

¹⁷ MacIntyre, op. cit., p. 28.

stated:

Since the beginning, the New Order government under the leadership of President Soeharto, has based its development policies on the principle that political stability is the necessary pre-condition for economic development. One of the ways to provide political stability is to tightly control the existing political parties. Political parties must not be mass-based. They must be made dependent on the state bureaucracy.¹⁸

Although non-governmental, non-profit groups are allowed to exist, they are registered, severely constrained by the state, and must avoid 'controversial' subjects. In 1993, the President was elected for another term without dissent, not by the legislature but by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), of which the legislature is a part. Both are handpicked bodies in terms of the GOLKAR, abri, and regional fraksis, while the executive has veto power over the two opposition party memberships. The only functions of the MPR are to perform that act and set the national ideological guidelines for the next term. Theoretically, the DPR can call the MPR into session to recall the president.

There are, in addition, serious human rights concerns, including unlimited detention of individuals without trial, and repression in East Timor. As a recent article stated:

A reflection on the current position of human rights in Indonesia will bring us the awareness that it is not a priority on the national agenda. It seems that it is lined up behind a score of other national interests, such as unity of the nation, economic growth and security. Human rights have never been and will never become a prime mover behind the drafting of government policies. This is the reason why human rights are so frequently rejected and condemned as ideological 'importations' from the West, therefore having no cultural roots in this country. Worse still, the government seems to be fanning suspicions toward human rights by labeling them an instrument of the Western economic expansion.¹⁹

Virtually no serious academic observer of the Indonesian scene has characterized Indonesia as a democracy, however defined. Some have called it 'bureaucratic authoritarianism,' 'bureaucratic plu-

¹⁸ Jakarta Post, December 13, 1993. "An Elegy for the Democratic Party," p. 1.

¹⁹ T. Mulya Lubis, The Jakarta Post, December 14, 1993. That this speech was published and that activists such as its author are free indicate that the regime has agreed to a few symbolic elements of liberalization. It also could mean, as one observer mentioned, that the state has appraised the influence of the English-language press in Indonesia and found it wanting. On December 28, 1993, The Jakarta Post reported that the Indonesian Bar Association (Ikadin) said that 1993 was a poor year for human rights in Indonesia. In addition to the problems noted elsewhere in this essay, it cited the fact that certain individuals were prevented from even speaking before academic fora.

ralism,' or 'restricted pluralism,' or (after Max Weber) a patrimonial society. Even as many have praised its economic liberalization, none have predicted its political transformation to a democracy over the middle term (the next five years).²⁰

Parenthetically to illustrate how others view the continuity of strong military control, it is to Indonesia that the military in Myanmar (Burma) have looked for an administrative model. It is likely that the new constitution now being formulated in Rangoon will stipulate that the President must have a military background, and that the military will be in the legislature and administration, and that civilians will not control military administration. On September 15, 1993 the military formed the Union Solidarity and Development Association, a potentially nationwide organization with millions of members, which seems patterned on GOLKAR. General Khin Nyunt in Jakarta said, "The most valuable lesson that we can take away from Indonesia is the way it has created stability."²¹

Yet there are apparent changes in objective conditions in Indonesia, if not in leadership and bureaucratic attitudes. Education has vastly expanded. Information is far more readily available than heretofore, satellite television is widespread and unrestricted in contrast to many states in the region, and if the local press is constrained, the foreign press is no longer censored. ~~Some say that it is in the major urban centers that dissent is more apparent and more tolerated.~~ The government apparently feels the need to appear more open.²² Thus, over time, more pluralistic attitudes and institutions will develop. Pressures may also be expected from increased knowledge and information, from an expanding business community, from the anonymity and relative safety of the burgeoning urban settings, and from an administration cognizant of foreign interest in this development.

There is a delicate dance or tenuous balancing act being performed between the executive and the public. In the past several months, the authorities have given in to public opinion on five issues: ~~the leadership of one opposition party (Sukarno's daughter); a dam in Madura, a woman worker who was killed~~ the state

²⁰ For an excellent discussion of the various academic schools of thought in analyzing the Indonesian state, see Andrew MacIntyre, Business and Politics in Indonesia. Sidney: Allen & Unwin and the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Chapters 2 and 3.

²¹ Jakarta Post, December 22, 1993, on the visit of Khin Nyunt and six ministers to Indonesia.

²² The Jakarta Post (January 3, 1994) indicated that the President has decided that 'openness' will continue. What is significant is that this statement came as a determination from on high, not as a result of democratic processes.

lottery, and the central government's appointment of a governor of Central Kalimantan. At the same time, the state repressed opposition demonstrations, explicitly evoking the spectre of the Communist Party (dead over 20 years) in their instigation. To date, it is the state leadership that determines the pace of change, although it is evident that it is increasingly conscious of public opinion.

How fast politics are transformed and over what period, and how they will be manifested in the Indonesian context are still unclear. Government control is said to be more apparent and stronger in rural areas where the military commanders and governors have greater powers and where the population has less access to outside information. Yet a reasonable prognosis is that over time liberalization pressures will increase.

This is the milieu in which programming directed toward democratization has and is taking place.

II PROJECT EVALUATION

A. Project Origins

Although the earliest written file reference to project formulation is dated September 14, 1989, when the USAID Mission Director wrote to The Asia Foundation suggesting discussions on the possibility of cooperation, in fact there were precedents both in Washington and in Jakarta. On August 25, 1989, AID/W's Asia and Near East Bureau sent a cable to all field posts setting forth its 'Democratic Pluralism Initiative'--"Open Markets--Open Society." It stated this new emphasis in strong, optimistic terms, specifically mentioning Indonesia at a number of points.

In Jakarta, this was followed by the USAID development of its own 'Democratic Program Initiative' and a paper entitled "Proposal for a 3-Year Management Plan for the Democratic Initiatives DPA."²³ In it, the author called for concentration on four areas: law, the legislature, the media, and advocacy groups. Efforts were to be made both inside and outside government, and he recommended seven organizational/funding foci: The Asia Foundation; private sector advocacy; NGO co-financing; human rights under [section] 116 e; informal sector work; training under the general participant training project; and technical assistance under that project.

In addition, the USAID office, through its PVO-Co-Financing Project had been providing support to the Foundation for a variety of activities in law, the press, and in the legislature, and at the

²³ William Cole, USAID, Submitted to the PPS Office, October 1989.

time of the original project under consideration had five active projects here with the Foundation. This confluence of views and program interests resulted in a series of discussions culminating in a revised Foundation proposal of December 12, 1989 that led to the first grant.

In an undated document (probably September 1989), the Foundation set forth its own outlines of objectives. Its 'Sector Goal' was "to increase the role of the ordinary Indonesian citizens to influence the formation and implementation of law and public policy through constituent advocacy organizations and through well-functioning, elected legislatures."

In descending hierarchical order was its 'Program Goal:' "To increase the role and effectiveness of the DPR [legislature] in the formulation of Indonesian law and public policy." 'Project Purposes' included "to accelerate the process of achieving national consensus through the DPR;" "To increase the ability of the DPR to independently assess the country's needs, intelligently debate the issues involved, and to modify (when required, to originate) legislation for passage...to establish an effective and sustainable legislative research service."

B. General Grant Provisions

1. Grant 497-0336-G-88-0041

The first grant agreement was signed on March 23, 1990, incorporating in it the Foundation's proposal of December 12, 1989. It was from its inception to be an incremental grant of \$1,203,725, of which \$600,000 was initially funded for the period ending September 30, 1991. On August 26, 1991, the grant was modified to extend the period to September 30, 1992, and to round the amount to \$1.2 million. The grant was amended on June 8, 1990 to add an additional \$600,000 to the funding. USAID funds were to cover not more than 75 percent of the total funds needed (there were no specifications as to where these other funds were to originate, and total USAID budget was estimated at 74 percent). The breakdown of USAID funding was as follows:

Parliament	\$290,000
Legal	225,000
Journalism	253,100
Program Management	83,518
Office Expenses	31,716
Direct Program Costs	98,497
Indirect Costs	221,894

Thus about 64 percent of the planned expenditures under this grant were for programs; the remainder were for administrative costs. 'Indirect costs' were established as 22.6 percent of total direct

costs.²⁴ The additional funds were generally provided from Indonesian sources, although The Asia Foundation did contribute to peripheral but related projects.

Although the project 'purpose' ('methodology' would have been a more appropriate term) was stated to "build on the Grantee's established contacts and extensive programming experience," the project was "to seek both to capitalize on a programming environment that is increasingly receptive to programs in these [three] areas and to encourage--in a sensitive and prudent manner--further progress toward the emergence of a more open, more just and more democratic Indonesia in the 1990s and beyond."

The specific objectives of the three components of the project were:

a. "To work with the Indonesian People's Assembly (DPR) in strengthening its capacity to deal with the executive branch "in channelling popular aspirations in to the law-making and policy-making process" by increasing the demand for its support services, its capacity to deliver such services, and enhancing popular awareness of it among the general populace.

b. "To promote the rule of law and the fair and consistent administration of justice" increasing access to law throughout the society, improving judicial training, supporting improvements in legal education, and increasing the ability of the private sector to utilize the law.

c. To "give special priority" to the development of the Dr. Soetomo Press Institute," and support the establishment of a library and journal servicing that community.

2. Grant 497-0364-G-88-1089

The second grant for Phase II of the project, signed September 4, 1991, provided \$1,781,126, of which \$1,018,773 was obligated under that agreement. Again incrementally funded, the grant's expiration date was February 28, 1993. Additional amounts of the overall grant were added on October 1, 1991, and September 16, 1992. This grant was to run concurrently with the previous grant than it was extended to September 30, 1993.

Under this agreement, USAID (56%) and Foundation (44%) costs were allocated as follows:

²⁴ This was the generally approved A.I.D. overhead rate for the Foundation as a whole at that time.

	USAID	Foundation
Legislative Development	387,500	300,000
Legal Development	570,800	695,000
Press Development	210,250	400,000
Program Management Unit	76,300	
Office Expenses	14,000	
Project Evaluation	22,250	
Direct Program Services Costs	136,994	
Indirect Costs	363,032	

In this case, the indirect costs were calculated at 25.6 per-cent.

The agreement stated, "Sustainability is of primary importance in all segments of the project since The Asia Foundation's overall goal is to promote institutional development conducive to long-term political democratization." Specific targets were set for each grant element (see below).

3. Grant 497-0364-G-88-2091

This grant, signed October 1, 1992, provided \$55,264 in support of a program for "Institutionalizing the Capability of a Leading Indonesian Non-Governmental Organization to Conduct Public Opinion Polls." Again, USAID provided 74 percent of the grant total.

In these grants, 'Program Management' included the provision of a new unit within the Foundation's Jakarta office dedicated overall to support USAID-grant activities. This unit included a chief administrative officer, a clerk/typist, and a driver. Since USAID had five other operational grants with the Foundation at the time of the first project, there was agreement that the unit would oversee the administration of all of these activities. In addition, there was also an unwritten agreement that the administrative officer could also supervise the overall Foundation administration since that was in USAID's interests as well as those of the Foundation.

The 'Office Expenses' category included the purchase of a vehicle, computers, and normal office supplies and expenditures. "Direct Program Costs' prorated Foundation staff time in Jakarta and San Francisco in management of the project, as well as a calculated share of the Jakarta rent. "Indirect Costs' were the AID/W approved overhead figure for Foundation activities.

C. The Legislature (DPR) and Its Functions

1. The Setting

The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), the Indonesian People's Representative Assembly, was established under the constitution of 1945, but (in the words of the Asia Foundation's proposal):

has long been the passive and distinctly unequal partner of the executive branch in Indonesia... Indeed, until recently it was not uncommon for the DPR to be dismissed as simply incapable of fulfilling its Constitutional role of voicing the political aspirations of the Indonesian people and channeling them into a genuine policy dialogue with the Government.

Yet the Foundation's specific assumption in June 1991 was that "the political environment will become increasingly favorable to a greater DPR role in the policy-making, law-making and budgeting process." 'Policy-making' is not, however included in the 1945 Constitution.

In the past thirty years the DPR has not initiated legislation, even though it has that role under the Constitution. The cabinet is not responsible to the DPR, but rather to the President. The DPR is theoretically equal to the Chief of State. It is the executive branch that controls the legislature's budget. The DPR is composed of 500 members: 100 are appointed from the military, the three other fraksi [groups] consist of GOLKAR, the government's all encompassing party-cum-social group, and the two legitimized opposition organizations. The government can, and does, control both the leadership of the opposition and prevent them from gaining mass support, and can, and has, dismissed members of the DPR who have become (in the eyes of the state) too obstreperous. Although

there is a presumption that the Parliament is, at best, only a marginal political arena, and is generally irrelevant to the determination of policy outcomes...it nonetheless remains the case that the Parliament can, and in a limited and sporadic fashion, exercise some influence on legislation and perform some oversight functions... the Parliament is not as irrelevant to the policy-making process as is usually supposed. It is an institution to which groups and individuals in society can and sometimes do look in seeking to have a grievance redressed."²⁵

The value of the DPR is not so much in its overall activities, but in its eleven committees, where debate sometimes takes place on important issues, and in which bills are sometimes altered. As the president is elected by consensus, so too in the DPR bills are passed by that same manner. Neither the committees, nor the individual members have legislative research capacities. This seems also

²⁵ MacIntyre, op. cit., pp. 32,34.



true in Sri Lanka. This is in contrast to Korea, for example, where each member of the National Assembly and each committee has five research staff.

The DPR is supplemented by the DPRD--provincial assemblies whose limited functions in their passive modes resembles their national model. Whatever provincial power exists is in the hands of appointed governors (and regional military commanders), who appear to be presidents writ small. The speaker of a DPRD is part of the executive branch of the provincial government. In bypassing the provinces and providing limited authority to the regencies (of which provinces are composed), the state seems to have provided an autonomous sop to the periphery and divided authority so effectively that power remains centrally concentrated.

2. Findings

Programming with the DPR was divided into eight categories in the Foundation's proposal, with total expenditures planned of \$760,000: \$290,000 in Phase I and \$470,000 in Phase II. (See Appendix 2 for a complete statement of sub-grants) These categories were realigned--with funds remaining constant--into nine activities: [1] study tours and training; [2] computerization and a local area network; [3] DPR research and information unit; [4] workshop series in the DPR; [5] English training programs for DPR members/staff; [6] DPR library development; [7] increased public awareness; [8] workshops for journalists; and [9] strengthening provincial legislatures.

The Foundation has reported to USAID semi-annually on the progress in each of these categories, but had not cumulatively dealt with the data until prompted by this report. Thus, we knew how many seminars may have been given in any one reporting period and how much money spent, but only now do we have a clear picture of how many participants in any activity over the life of the grant. It might have been helpful to have had such data earlier, but at this stage it is peripheral to the main issues, which are more substantive. The DPR reports in Bahasa Indonesia to the Foundation are sketchy and unanalytical--pro forma narrations.

From all accounts, several of the activities noted above have been well received and successful. Those interviewed specifically mentioned the English language training (some 240 members and staff trained), the policy seminars (after they were managed directly by the DPR and not by the University of Indonesia). The computerization program with the DPR seems to have worked well, and the demand was so great that it was expanded with additional funds provided. The records indicate that the software was received only in July 1992, and the reasons for the delay are unclear. Only one seminar was able to be arranged for journalists, and that only recently. Study tours have not been instituted since the new DPR was elected. Enhanced public awareness of the DPR's role is an objective toward

which little is likely to be accomplished by foreign aid organizations.²⁶ All of these activities noted above, with the exception of the DPR Research and Information Unit, would probably cease if funding were stopped. They were important in improving capacity, but essentially outside of the mainstream activities of the institution.

The legislative research service is a special case, and the most expensive of the DPR subprojects (\$180,365, or about 28 percent). It has been institutionalized within the Indonesian government system, which means that personnel ceilings have been established and funds budgeted. It will be sustained. Sustainability is not, however, effectiveness, even though, as one consultant said, the leadership "is genuinely interested in making it [the research service] work at some level."

Our initial discussions on this topic proved to be unclear, and further exploration still leaves much miasmal. The team feels caught in a 'Roshomon' type of drama--each participant or observer has their own version of reality. It has become evident that the routine budget has been established for 22 professional positions. This provides civil service salaries at mid-level for university graduates, who are recruited through public advertisements. What has yet to be approved, but may be so in April 1994, is the legal establishment of the unit by presidential decree, which will allow the DPR to pay research allowances to the staff as 'researchers,' a title that has higher status. Operating expenses for the unit (office supplies, maintenance on computers, etc.) are now taken by the Secretary General from other parts of his approved budget, but when the unit is official, then a separate budget for these items and research supplements, one hopes, will be added. Of the 22 professional staff, we were informed 4-5 persons do not have the capacity to be promoted; they cannot be fired, however, only transferred. This seems clearly a generic and major problem of the civil service in Indonesia.

The project has included an advisory, expert team of University of Indonesia specialists, who provide the analytical framework for the unit, which works under their guidance.

Overall, that program has problems of both supply and demand. There seems little understanding on the part of the members of the need for such a service, and what they expect to get from it. (One member is said to have asked questions for his daughter's thesis.) Some have objected to the political even-handedness of some of the replies and seem to want to know what to do, rather than make up their own minds. Although one informant said that only the opposition had asked for information, statistics indicate that the bulk

²⁶ The Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung provides modest support to the DPR for this and some international activities.

of the inquiries come from the abri (military),²⁷ while the Speaker generates about 10 percent of requests. Although there seem to be a growing demand for information, it is modest and limited, and constrained by what is considered to be appropriate; i.e., non-controversial. In the first 1 1/2 years, there were 110 requests; compared to 149 in 1992, and 234 from January through September 1993. These figures, of course, speak neither to the quality of the requests, nor the responses. The initial perception by DPR members was that this was a GOLKAR/abri activity (i.e., government, since all civil servants are required to be members of GOLKAR, and the University of Indonesia advisory staff are also civil servants). This may have changed.

One observer mentioned that a research service is "offensive to some [legislative] members," because it is the younger, better trained staff who are perceived by their elders (and betters) to be telling them what to do; there is, according to one person, a major cultural gap in how such a program might function. There were, in addition, cumbersome procedures, where all requests for information and replies at first had to go through the Secretary General, which sometimes delayed responses beyond their usefulness. It should be noted that Foundation reports indicate that the response time, on average, is quite quick. According to university staff, the unit has initiated some 12 substantive studies by March 1992, although the team has not yet seen them.

There have been administrative problems between the DPR and the University staff, each of which reports separately to its own authorities. The University has been edged out of some management, and some say the situation has improved. The university feels it has deteriorated and will become increasingly bureaucratic. Because of budget constraints, in the present fiscal year only \$40,000 has been allocated, providing university staff with a limit of 5 hours consulting a week (before it was virtually unlimited), and that whole budget is funded by the Foundation. Without Foundation support, the university part of the program would collapse, and whatever analysis that is done would disappear. Staff could, for example, look up statistics, but not evaluate them, nor do they have sufficient knowledge to use foreign sources.

The delicacy of the programs with the DPR was reflected in the administrative arrangements that were designed to keep the Foundation (and USAID) at a distance from the program. Thus the University of Indonesia (IU) was contracted to provide advisors to the research service. One observer noted that questions had been raised about the propriety of any foreign support (questions of influencing policy, and tapping into the DPR's computers, etc.),

²⁷ Probably because they have little civilian experience, and are more technically oriented. Most requests seem to have come from Committee 1--Foreign Policy and Security.

and said that USAID direct funding would have been even more unacceptable.

The program with the DPR has been adversely affected by a number of factors, the first of which is the nature and role of the DPR itself, discussed above. The second is, ironically, the personal relationship (which was very close and effective) of the Foundation with the previous DPR speaker, who allowed the program to begin. When he was replaced after the election, a new set of personalized relationships had to be developed with the new speaker, and this slowed progress. One early project manager within the DPR had delayed grant implementation, and was eventually replaced. This points to an essential dilemma and tension in programming in Indonesia: the need for the close personal relationships for project success (because of the personalization of power) but the requirement to institutionalize change and thus move beyond such relationships. It should be noted here that when the changeover in the DPR leadership took place, all grant activities ceased as the new leadership conducted an internal evaluation of the program for about three months in the fall of 1992. Apparently satisfied with the results, activities once again commenced, with increases in levels of internal support, including staff positions. The foreign (American) advisor who visited the program has indicated that there will be little effectiveness of that program in the foreseeable future. The most urgent needs, according to an observer is to assure legal status for the unit, and then to designate a management head within it.

3. Conclusions

Some aspects of work with the DPR have been functionally successful--they have in large part accomplished bureaucratically what was set out to achieve. Substantively, however, the team regards this aspect of the project as productively neutral--it accomplished some tasks the significance of which have yet to be demonstrated.

If, as the team has indicated, the DPR is handpicked by the executive branch and subject to executive veto, then there is an apparent tension between the goal of strengthening the DPR and encouraging democracy, at least at this stage in its incarnation. The team recognized this inconsistency, but feels that even within its current confines the DPR could be a more effective voice, even at present.

The team concludes that work with the DPR is potentially important, but cannot be judged within the temporal confines of the usual project. If immediate results are expected in project purposes, such as the DPR 'originating new legislation on its own initiative' (taken from the logical framework of the Foundation's proposal), then the project could not be deemed to have succeeded. The DPR will in the medium term be unlikely to lead in policy discussions or affect change in any major manner. Yet at some point

it is likely to play a far greater role than it does today. The issue, then, is should, or could, the intellectual and administrative infrastructure be established now, with an eye on the future so that elements will be in place when needed, or is this impossible? Over what period might this happen, if happen it does?

The answers seem mixed: the administrative structure can be put in place (e.g., staff positions in a reference service, a presidential decree and legal status, etc.), but it is virtually impossible to attract and keep intelligent, vigorous, and ambitious staff in positions for which they see no real or important roles for themselves or their work in the foreseeable future.²⁸ Training staff overseas for eventual DPR employment (thus keeping them abroad for what may be a sterile few years) is an alternative (if their English capacities could be raised), but there could be no guarantee that they would stay long or be effectively used on their return. Thus, work with the DPR is controversial, with many looking to its inherent potential, and others feeling that funds supplied now are wasted.

If the administrative sustainability is in place, the intellectual elements essential to its effective use are not, and this is unlikely to change. If one were to prognosticate on when the DPR might assume a more active (one hesitates to write equal--perhaps less subservient would be a better term) relationship with the executive branch, then the minimum period that seems most likely at this point is in approximately four or five years, when the succession issue may again surface and when the newly elected DPR may begin to assume a more proactive role. One pessimistic observer, however, believed it would be in his children's lifetime.

If present programming is in part a kind of 'holding operation' awaiting more propitious times, this implies that one possible purpose for Foundation continuing support might be the entre' to affect more substantively progress later. This may be true, but it does not necessarily logically follow. A 'holding operation' does, however, imply rather modest levels of funding in the interim period. But such modest levels have to be significant enough to allow for sustainability and effectiveness; at present, the University of Indonesia team effort is in jeopardy, and quality may collapse, according to the university team. There are funds for only five hours of consulting a week for each team member--an inconsequential amount.

The Foundation might also consider approaching the Fulbright Commission or the Humphrey Fellowship program to see whether any training scholarships might be made available that could help build capacity.

²⁸ Those who are there are said to want to stay because most see it as their entry point into government.

The present model for a research unit is only one among many; the U.S. is most familiar with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. But other models exist--government, quasi-government, private, academic, etc. Other models, attached to but bureaucratically separate from the DPR might be considered: a type of Rand Corporation, Brookings Institution, Korean Development Institute are a few that come to mind. If the bureaucratic milieu is not hospitable, or if one faction tries to exert influence over the unit, then the Foundation might do well to study alternative administrative mechanisms to accomplish the same goals outside of the bureaucratic problems of the DPR.

The team in this short period and without much further focus on this issue cannot make specific recommendations for action. It seems evident that a proper study of operations and alternatives would be a wise investment, employing unbiased Indonesians (and perhaps an expatriate) all of whom might be charged with examining options within an acceptable cultural context, and perhaps in a collaborative relationship with the DPR. A visit to various research organizations might be arranged for the Secretary General and key fraksi members as part of such a study. The team, in any case, recommends such a study be undertaken.

Although there have been changes in its activism over the past several years, the DPR still has a long road to travel before it reaches its constitutional relationship with the executive branch and performs as a legislature might in a more pluralistic state.

D. Law and Legal Programming

1. The Setting

The Asia Foundation allocated \$719,000 in both grant phases for four categories of legal programming (incorporating the original six areas in its 1989 proposal to USAID). These are [1] the development of a computerized CD-ROM legal data retrieval system; [2] judicial training in civil and criminal law, administered by the Supreme Court; [3] the development of legal education and training, under a variety of auspices; and [4] enhancement of NGO public advocacy capabilities.

The issue of law is perhaps the most complex of all the programming fields within the 'democracy objective' under review. Law as a component of the democratic experience (in contrast to law in commercial or international venues) and as usually used in foreign aid programming is a concept so vague and yet so based on a continuous, western tradition that its meaning in each of the major cultural groups in Asia is likely to be quite diverse and different from the concepts to which the donors are accustomed. As one writer indicated:

Where in the west the legal tradition was a linear, incremental progression within a continuous cultural context, in Asia as a whole and in individual states the changes were sudden, stark, and often alien. The judicial systems, then, were seen by some not only as hostile, but as tools by those with power to maintain authority.²⁹

To clarify what is in essence an imprecise term with multiple, culturally biased connotations, and its/their relationship to democracy, it may be helpful to distinguish what is called a 'legal system' from a 'legal culture.'³⁰ A 'legal system' is "how men get things done in society, how they manage their conflicts, what kinds of roles they rely on for assistance, how these roles are related systemically, and what resources of authority they have." 'Legal culture,' on the other hand, deals with legal values, both procedural and substantive, which "consists of fundamental assumptions about the distribution and uses of resources in society, social right and wrong..."

Lev reminds us of "...the frequent confusion of legal process with democratic politics and civil rights, because of the prestige of American and English examples--and ignores the extent to which social functions may be served by more than one kind of institution."³¹

As an evaluative hypothesis, we may reasonably postulate that foreign assistance in the legal field may affect a 'legal system,' but it is unlikely to change the primordial 'legal culture.' But the intimate relationship between democracy and law lies in the concepts associated with legal culture--less with legal systems or process. Simply to improve court administration (i.e., 'legal systems'), for example, in an authoritarian state could make repression more effective. Thus the dilemma: legal culture is related to the concepts, distribution, and uses of power, which are the determining elements in consideration of democracy. Yet these are just the factors that legal programming cannot readily address.

Rather than law (the 'rule of law') leading to political reform in many non-Western societies, law is likely to follow politics. Expressed differently, the forces that affect politics and

²⁹ David I. Steinberg, "Administration of Justice: Asia Report." Development Associates (for AID/PPC/CDIE), March 1, 1992.

³⁰ The concept and quotations are from Daniel S. Lev, "Judicial Institutions and Legal Culture in Indonesia," in Claire Holt, ed., Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. His argument is quite complex and cannot be addressed in detail here. This discussion does not do justice to his position, but is perhaps a beginning in distinguishing what may be actionable in the legal field.

³¹. Ibid.

power are reflected in law³²--law as norm rather than law as leader or reformer. Thus legal reform programming may be an important avenue to improve a legal system, but it is unlikely to have much effect on the core values on which democracy is based.

The judicial process in Indonesia is that of the civil law, not the common law of England and the United States. The former does not rely on legal precedent, each case being decided on the basis of the original statute. Common law, however, is strongly wedded to precedent. In addition, no court except the Supreme Court need publish the reasons for a decision. Thus the value of case books and related materials is much diminished in Indonesian society. The judiciary is not, and has not been, independent in Indonesia, and was never so regarded under the constitution of 1945. The budgets for the courts are determined by the executive branch; judges are civil servants without either stature or self esteem, according to one informant. Thus, there are few legal checks and balances. That very concept is inherent in the confrontational system at the heart of American society; it is anathema in many social systems, including that in Java, that go to extraordinary lengths to avoid confrontation.

An important shift has taken place in the legal field. Under Sukarno's Old Order, most regulations were authorized by law; there were few presidential decrees. Under Suharto's New Order, however, there are ten times the number of presidential decrees and instructions than there have been laws. There is also no requirement that 'regulations' must be published and available to the public. The power of the executive is thus apparent, with important implications for the present role of the DPR, and role of law diminished.

That does not mean that law is unimportant. Indeed:

The legal system itself is considered the area most in need of urgent reform. The World Bank's annual country report described Indonesia's legal structure as falling 'far short' of a 'well-functioning legal system that is an important prerequisite if the shift towards a less governmental-regulated environment for the private sector is to be successful.' Ironically, legal reform was a major aim of the New Order when it came to power...The fact that the Dutch laws were designed by the colonial authorities to enhance administrative power and control has perpetuated their usefulness. Use of Dutch precedents has by all accounts increased under the New Order.³³

³² See David I. Steinberg, "Law, Development, and Korean Society." The Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1971.

³³ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis Indonesian Politics Under Suharto. Order, Development and Pressure for Change. London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 48-49.

2. Findings

Foundation programming covers a broad spectrum of activities and organizations (see Appendix 2 for a complete list), but may be grouped into several categories: increasing access to legal information, legal training and education, and public advocacy and dispute settlement projects among NGOs.

Within the category, there have been some important successes and one major administrative issue. That issue was, in fact, the work with the BPHN, the National Law Development Agency of the Ministry of Justice. A group of some 400 staff, of whom half a lawyers, they are charged with legal planning, legal development (they do 'academic drafts' of some legislation), and legal dissemination.

Almost \$85,000 was spent to put laws, regulations, and other official materials on CD-ROM with the BPHN, in order to make the full corpus of laws and regulations available both to the public and the bureaucracy. The proceeds from the sale of these CD-ROMS were to support future inclusions. The Foundation provided computers and related equipment, training funds, some consultants, and funds for developing an Indonesian spell-checker.

According to the BPHN, the computers, training, and spell-checker were successful. The equipment is still in use. The consultants were not successful, however, and it was unclear to the staff of the BPHN for whom the consultant's worked, because they claim never to have seen any of their reports.

Whatever the facts, it is evident that the first expatriate consultant on CD-ROM failed, and for this the Foundation must take responsibility. In the course of the project, the priorities of the Ministry changed: from dissemination of laws through CD-ROM to national computer links between the BPHN and provincial agencies and to the DPR.

The CD-ROM aspect of the project was stopped when it became apparent that it could not be accomplished within the project time limits, but there were some positive side effects (equipment, training, etc.) Perhaps it was the right technology too early, or perhaps with an institution incapable of managing the subproject in a timely manner because the Minister changed priorities in the middle. It was poorly managed both by the BPHN and the Foundation in terms of its ability to operate within time constraints set by the USAID grant. The Foundation terminated its assistance and reallocated its funds with USAID concurrence. Data has continued to be processed, however, under funds provided by USAID through their ELIPS (Economic Law Improvement and Procurement Systems)

project.³⁴ It has been about a year since the Foundation cut off funds for non-performance, and it has had no official contact with the BPHN on this project since that time. These seems little doubt that the CD-ROM approach to data collection, retrieval, and dissemination was intellectually correct if Indonesia is to progress in legal systems, even if it may have been premature.

One success was the Konsortium Ilmu Hukum, the legal group that has reformed the legal curriculum at the undergraduate level, which turns out some 13,000 graduates in law annually. The plan is to make that level of legal education more professional. In February 1993, the Minister of Education signed the decree authorizing the changes, to be introduced over four semesters. The head of the Konsortium indicated that some additional funds would be necessary to prepare new course materials. A basic objective is also to change the teaching methods of the law professors.

The Foundation has been providing support to NGOs for a category of legal programming on dispute settlement. This important area has received far greater attention worldwide in the past decade or so, and can be an effective wedding to traditional and modern law. In Thailand and Korea, modern courts are often seen as modern means to encourage traditional dispute settlement to take place.

Mention should be made of the Indonesian Center for Environmental Law and the Indonesian Forum for the Environment. Both are NGOs, but the former is a new organization formed from the latter and the Legal Aid Foundation. Both organizations are largely dependent on foreign sources of support, which have been quite diverse, and both seem engaged in activities that are important and may be influential in the society. The Indonesian Center was only recently formed, and the efficacy of its programs cannot yet be judged. These groups have good working relationships with the Ministry of the Environment, and have been asked to help draft legislation on environmental dispute settlement (note: not by the DPR, but by the executive branch). These organizations are vulnerable because they are in large part funded from foreign sources, and they need to seek local sources of support for their core activities to ensure sustainability.

All of these rather specific efforts do not necessarily mean that legal system programming might not eventually affect the legal culture. As one observer indicated, work in the field of human rights and broad-based advocacy groups can raise the level of understanding, interest, and hope in changing the basic legal culture--social norms. Changes in the judiciary in terms of status

³⁴ One eminent observer felt that the ELIPS project should have been undertaken under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice, not the Ministry of Finance, in spite of some problems of working with the former Justice Minister.

and functions could move the process forward. When the 'legal culture' seems threatened, the government steps in to limit change. It has prevented foreign organizations from assisting the Legal Aid Foundation, a group deemed by the state to be too critical and political. Whatever progress may be made, the process will be slow and frustrating. That does not mean it should be abandoned.

3. Conclusions

Law is a field worthy of continuing effort. The Foundation's record indicates the problems of programming in that arena, but that progress is possible. Work in the field of law has, in a sense, been oversold as directly affecting the democratic process due to the Western natural preoccupation with the 'rule of law.' At least here (and no doubt in other societies), this relationship between legal programming and democracy has not yet proven to be effective in any reasonable period. It is unlikely to be so in the foreseeable future. Law would seem to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for societal change, or perhaps one in parallel with such reformations.

Government attitudes toward law may be exceedingly difficult to change. The Foundation has paid attention to the private and professional legal field, i.e., lawyers associations, etc. Although bar groups are fragmented, the Foundation should continuously explore where opportunities for reform exist, and consider programming there. Attention may also be paid to paralegal activities, including the role of 'legal brokers' who seem to be the initial link between the people and the state and legal processes.

This vagueness and these limitations should not prevent or discourage programming in this area, but it should encourage caution both in expectations and attributing changes to foreign-supported projects. Changes will take place, but their extent and timing will likely be indigenously determined.

E. Press Programming

1. The Setting

A vigorous press is one critical element in political pluralism. If evidence were needed, the pervasive means by which the media have been controlled in totalitarian societies is proof of its perceived and potential power to liberate. As intellectuals, the press staff perform functions far beyond their reportorial or editorial positions. They have been the leaders in many societies.

The press has a long and distinguished record in Indonesia, dating to the colonial period and the rise of nationalism, to which it contributed. Under the Suharto government, the press has been both vigorous and constrained. In the 1970s, a number of newspapers were closed permanently, and later in that era some were tem-

porarily shut. Self-censorship is pervasive, and there are subjects about which the press are well informed but which are taboo as journalistic topics. These include matters that could incite ethnic or regional dissention, subvert state solidarity, succession issues (in the past), direct criticism of the head of state, or the personal activities of various of the leaders and their families. The state registers and licenses the press, which means that it approves its leadership, and its influence is pervasive.³⁵ If some articles appear that are critical, they are in print because the government (or some element thereof--it is not always monolithic on such matters) has allowed them. Some of the press' reluctance to engage in controversy no doubt stems from a traditional avoidance of confrontation, especially evident in Javanese society, but one should not be under any illusions about state control when it so desires.

The press, however, is essentially an urban, and limited, phenomenon. Total circulation is about 14 million, a 10 percent drop from last year, perhaps because of the expansion of television. Some 85 percent of circulation is said to be in Java, with Jakarta most important. The provincial press does not usually report extensively on local news, thus limiting its influence in those areas (but it may be safer for it not to do so).

At the same time, there is an increasing openness in other areas. The government no longer crudely censors the foreign press, and the ubiquitous, legal presence of television dish antennae in urban areas indicates that a variety of international views are instantly available to a wide population. Legal NGOs communicate with their international associates through high-speed modems. Higher educational standards point to greater literacy and increased interest in the press (although a number of Indonesian intellectuals remarked that this was not a 'reading society'), although the recent increases in television stations has somewhat undercut the job market for print journalists.

The Dr. Soetomo Press Institute, named for a famous nationalist educator and editor of the colonial era, was established in 1989 as an independent, private training facility for post-graduate and in-service journalism education of both longer and shorter term. Although journalism is taught as part of mass communications programs at the University of Indonesia and some other schools, these are more theoretical curricula. Although the Institute was founded under the aegis of the Press Council (a state-controlled entity chaired by the Minister of Information), it is autonomous of the government. It is unique in the press field in Indonesia.

³⁵ In some societies (e.g., Malaysia), the press must re-register periodically, thus giving the state a powerful, continuous weapon. In Indonesia, the press registers once, but registration may be withdrawn.

It enrolls some 16 students (limited because of the availability of computer terminals, which are assigned to each student) for each long-term (40 weeks) course, and so far about 50 have graduated. (See Appendix 3 for data on the training programs.) Short term courses are also taught. The early classes had an admission ratio of about 15 to one, but because the market has eroded for the print media, the ratio has dropped to about 3 to one. Employment in the print media is either stagnant or dropping, while that in the electronic media has risen.

The Institute, originally started under a fund from the Dr. Soetomo Press Foundation, is funded by tuition (waived in the case of needy students), media payments when graduates are hired or when staff are released to take short courses, and by foundations. Most prominent among them has been The Asia Foundation, which has provided over 50 percent of the Institute's budget since it was established.

2. Findings

Foundation support to the Institute under the two grants has totalled \$415,100, and an additional \$90,000 has been provided to other institutions for general seminars, research, and publications on the role and development of the press. There have been six categories of support: [1] an American journalism consultant; [2] faculty development study tours; [3] student scholarships; [4] assistance to the library and documentation center; [5] short courses for professional journalists; and [6] assistance to the Reporter magazine.

Over half of the funds to the Institute have been for an American professor of journalism, who from all reports has been successful but who left for the holidays shortly before the evaluation started and could not be interviewed. His reports of 1991 and 1993 were, however, helpful in understanding the internal dynamics of the Institute. His tenure at the Institute is now over. His was an acerbic, but overall productive, relationship with the director.

The Institute would like to expand its teaching to include the electronic media, but the costs of basic equipment are high, and additional foreign teachers would be necessary. There are now no funds available for these innovations, but the opportunities in radio and television are expanding as stations increase.

The greatest needs of the Institute, according to its Director, are for full scholarships (travel, per diem, tuition) for members of the provincial press, who generally cannot afford to attend. He would also like to institute intern programs for Indonesian press members with the Malaysian-speaking press in Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei, and ensure continued contact with the international press and organizations as a whole.

If the problem with the DPR research service was sustainability without credibility, here it is credibility without sustainability. The essential question connected with the Institute, which seems widely regarded as important in the journalism field, is just this. Local, major funding is lacking, because, we understand, the local media is under heavy pressure from the government to provide funding for quasi-governmental press organizations. To preserve the independence of the Institute, the Director has requested the major local press groups to approach the Indonesian conglomerates on its behalf (to insulate the Institute from reporting pressures), but to date nothing has happened. The Asia Foundation has solicited the Freedom Forum for a challenge grant to set up an endowment for the Institute, which has perhaps paid insufficient attention to seeking local sources of support until now. That proposal, the evaluation team understands, is still pending.

Without additional support from either local or foreign sources, the Institute's program would be cut back to in-service, short-term training which essentially would have to pay for itself. The present director will be leaving for a diplomatic assignment, and the new director will need to pay far more attention to this issue. The present director, known for his independence, is rather mercurial; the new director will need to provide broad management skills and to improve the internal operations by acquiring mid-level administrative support.

LP3 Yogja and LP3ES also conduct training for a variety of the provincial press in that city and elsewhere of both in-service and a general nature. The former's instruction is not simply devoted to press matters per se, but also provided instruction in social concerns as well.

3. Conclusions

There is widespread support for this portion of the grant, which is more centered and less administratively complex than that with the DPR or in law. This may be because a single, major institution is involved, the private nature of the enterprise, the practicality of the grant, the perceived, immediate need by both students and employers, or any and all of the above.

Any institute will not change the nature of press regulation or the political process that controls it. A person interviewed indicated that in the short term the Institute's work would not affect democracy or press freedom. Over the longer term (5-10 years), there is some hope in building human resources, even if some will drop out of the press field. (There are some press people in the DPR.) But this investment in human resources is, according to the World Bank's study The East Asian Miracle (1993), one of the soundest that can be made and an important lesson from that experience. One observer indicated that there is likely a high level of frustration among students, who are taught about the role of a free


press but find it impossible to practice it.

The team concludes that support should continue, but that the Institute must understand that its future, and eventual local credibility, will come from non-profit support from the Indonesian community, and it is to that end that considerable staff time should be directed. Foreign grantors might consider providing funds to improve local fundraising.

The team cautions against relying on the English-language press in Jakarta as an indicator of the degree of openness or repression in the society.

F. Survey Programming

1. The Setting



Public opinion polling in Indonesia is in its infancy. It has been conducted in a sporadic manner by some of the media, but on issues that were considered safe, and on which there was little follow up. In the project proposal, The Asia Foundation indicated, as an assumption, that the government was "amenable to having public opinion expressed through polling, as long as the surveys are directed towards non-controversial public policy issues." There were few in Indonesia trained in scientifically designing and interpreting such surveys.

In a strongly hierarchical society such as Indonesia (Java), it is highly unlikely that either superiors or subordinates feel comfortable in receiving or providing views that are considered controversial by their superiors at any particular time. One cannot, we were told on several occasions, in Indonesia disagree directly with the President. Thus, it could prove very useful to have a mechanism established that would impersonally provide feedback on important issues, even if in its early stages the state might wish to keep the results of such surveys private.³⁶

2. Findings

The LP3ES organization, an old, established NGO funded from between 10-20 indigenous and foreign donors at any one time, reports that the grants has gone well. The training was completed, and the foreign advisor was beneficial in discussing the issues with the staff in Jakarta. The team was informed that the statistical aspects of polling were not as important as the general theory and usefulness of the work, as Indonesia has strong statis-

³⁶ A Politburo member of the former Burma Socialist Programme Party told one author that the failure of that party was largely due to lack of an effective feedback mechanism from the populace. This may be an inherent problem in hierarchical, authoritarian systems.

tical capabilities.

The polling to be conducted will in the first phase concentrate on social issues, such as the environment and poverty, and then move to press problems, and later into politics as the skills are built and acceptance is gained. The first phase is said to be completed.

As a follow-on to this grant, USAID in October 1993 provided LP3ES with a two-year grant of \$200,000 to conduct polling and seminars related to it, as well as to support its library on democracy issues. The standard rate of overhead on such grants in Indonesia is 15 percent

3. Conclusions

This grant was a small, useful, and to date successful effort to begin the professional approach to polling. Its effectiveness in the field has yet to be demonstrated, but the fact that USAID has provided a sizeable grant directly to the organization indicates the level of its confidence.

G. Project Management

1. The Asia Foundation

a. Findings

The Asia Foundation management of the project has been sensitive but has been hampered by a lack of senior staff, staff turnover, and the installation of a new computerized accounting system that is still yet to be completely functional. Although the Foundation is decentralized to the country level in program management, it is not so decentralized in financial management. Cumulative records on accomplishments (as contrasted with those included in each semi-annual report to USAID) have been lacking. Such records would have been useful here, but we understand they are available in the Foundation's headquarters.

An interim evaluation was mandated, but never undertaken, we understand because of shifts in staff in both the Foundation and USAID. In cases of the cessation of a project element (CD-ROM computerization of laws), the Foundation management has not followed up to determine what has happened to the considerable investment in activities, in this case machine readable entries into the data base, over a year ago, even though another USAID project is now assisting that effort.

USAID conducted an audit of the first stage of the project and

two other USAID-assisted projects as well.³⁷ Covering only expenditures in Indonesia, and not conceptual issues, it concluded that the Foundation's statements:

present fairly the receipts and expenditures of the three grants it had with USAID/Indonesia. No material internal control weaknesses were noted and the organization complied, in all material respects, with applicable laws, regulations, and agreement terms.

The team found that USAID initially gave the Foundation considerable latitude within subproject categories to reallocate funds on the basis of need and after consultation with USAID. This freedom was reflected in the original proposal by the absence of quantifiable 'output' indicators in the logical framework.³⁸ Yet this latitude was eroded as the project wore on, and the flexibility that had been initially apparent seemed to evaporate.

The Foundation office had a representative and two assistant representatives in the earlier period of the grant; it will in a few months have one of each. It lacks an experienced senior Indonesian program advisor, a position most Foundation offices have had. It is thus seriously understaffed at the conceptual/managerial level. As the Foundation moves into fields that are more technical and in which the level of Indonesian competence is high, it becomes necessary for the office to reflect such competencies if it is to operate at a peer level with the Indonesian community. This need is evident in exploring new areas of programming. Some such qualified staff are available in the local community, and in some fields, such as law, they have been employed as consultants.

b. Conclusions

The provision of a management unit in the Foundation seemed prudent from both USAID and Foundation vantage points because of the complexity of the process and the number of grants from USAID to the Foundation generally, and the number of sub-activities under these projects.

Although the administrative management of the unit will no doubt improve as the new computer system is in place, and through a San Francisco-supplied financial specialist in Jakarta on temporary assignment, the programmatic management issues take on a different dimension. When the Foundation received major local funding from USAID, (at various times about half its program budget), its

³⁷ Drs. Hadi Sutanto & Rekan, the Price Waterhouse affiliate in Indonesia. Audit Report No. 5-497-92-15-N, April 24, 1992.

³⁸ A major problem of 'democracy' programming is the measuring of progress through 'quantifiable indicators' at project purpose, or even output level. As A.I.D. adjusts to this objective, the stress on quantification will need re-examination.

staff remained relatively constant, but it has since dropped. The top program, substantive management that is required for the Foundation's activities as a whole seems stretched too thin, and this could cause the Foundation serious trouble in the future.

When making grants of this nature, which in essence are umbrella projects each containing a multitude of smaller grants, USAID should resist the temptation to micromanage the details, as long as the grantee (the Foundation) keeps the appropriate project officer informed. Foundation staff commented on the supportive attitudes of some of the USAID contract officers. The Foundation's files indicate that it was scrupulous in reporting as required to USAID, although the Foundation indicated that receiving reports from some subgrantees was sometimes more difficult; financial reports were easier to obtain than narrative analyses (in Bahasa Indonesia or English). If the Foundation were chosen because of its demonstrated competence (which was apparent) and because such an organization insulated USAID from detailed oversight, commitments, and involvement of its own staff, then it would follow that erosion of those principles was in the interests of none of the parties.

The Foundation has, however, lost in local (foreign) credibility even as it has gained in assets. The Foundation's program in part has anticipated A.I.D.'s new priorities; in a sense it has been ahead of the U.S. government's programmatic curve. It has been highly successful in its funding. Although the close association between USAID and the Foundation is in some sense a testament to the Foundation's perspicacity, it also could skew the Foundation's program if the Foundation were to be too responsive to shorter term U.S. interests, in contrast to Indonesian needs for which the Foundation had capacity to assist.

The Asia Foundation needs to have a high, constant level of analytical capacity, both Indonesian and expatriate, and not necessarily as either career or full time employees. The Foundation might wish to discuss this issue with USAID.

2. USAID

a. Findings

The management of this set of projects with The Asia Foundation has been strongly influenced by the changing administrative patterns of operations, staffing, approval, and funding within USAID.

Operational responsibility for funding rests within the office of Voluntary and Humanitarian Programs, which is in the process of transformation into the Office of Community and Civic Programs, with changing staff as well. Funding for the initial stage of the project came from the PVO Co-Financing II Project, an umbrella

category over which the Mission has discretionary authority. This project was designed to provide support to a variety of foreign and indigenous private organizations, which in effect bid for financing from a rather modest pot.

This project was succeeded by the Strengthening Institutional Development (SID) Project, which currently has an annual budget of approximately \$5 million. The project directly focuses on democracy issues, as well as other priorities, and helps to induce pluralism through enhancing PVO activities in a variety of fields. Project proposals are reviewed on an annual cycle with perhaps 50-60 applicant organizations requesting an aggregate of perhaps \$60 million from this small fund. The competition for resources is thus fierce, and the fact that The Asia Foundation annually may receive some 15 percent of the total funds available has created considerable enmity, both internally in USAID in the past and among the PVO community.

The internal USAID approval process has further exacerbated these issues. The process has changed over time, and is in its third iteration. The small staff, very often understrength, was plagued by reviewing all proposals on an annual basis, and making a first cut for selection, winnowing down the proposals to about a dozen. This involved a minimum of some 500-600 pages of material for review (concept papers of some 10 pages each), an onerous task for those with other responsibilities. The review was often done on the basis of the technical quality of the proposal, with internal advocates by sector or discipline pushing their particular interests. To simplify the process, the review group was broken up into disciplinary fields, reporting to the Deputy Director. Later the overarching committee was reconstituted. The front office within USAID makes the final determination on grant approvals, and often in the past overrode the committee for policy reasons. This former split between policy and technical considerations was deleterious both to the review process and to sound working relationships. The result was a natural feeling of frustration on the part of the reviewing staff. In the early stages of this project, there were severe animosities against the Foundation by office managers and staff, because they felt their budgetary authority and program autonomy were destroyed. These staff have all been rotated from USAID, and the situation is much improved with new and larger staff support.

This frustration is particularly acute in relation to The Asia Foundation. The Foundation regularly applies for, and receives, a large percentage of the available funds, whatever the committee may decide. Thus there is "a tremendous amount of resentment about the Foundation," according to one observer. Some feel that the Foundation, because of its effective lobbying capacities in Indonesia and its personnel, have an 'inside track' for the limited funds available. The Foundation also has a cycle of presentation that enables them to come up with proposals in a timely manner. Some staff have

complained that it is a waste of time to review Foundation proposals and indeed to monitor project effectiveness since they will be approved in some form in any case. Some substantive issues are thus ignored--issues that are important to project effectiveness; one such issue was the present and future role of the DPR.

Because of staffing constraints, the plethora of proposals to be reviewed and monitored, and some of these attitudes (held by some previous USAID staff), there was minimal dialogue between the institutions on grant substance, and little effective monitoring until quite recently when a new project officer took over responsibility. Such dialogue that existed in the past (it is now changed for the better) was not with the technical office, but with others in the Mission. The Foundation has provided semiannual reports in a timely manner, but these reports are rarely discussed or reviewed. The Foundation appropriately does not provide the actual reports from subgrantees, but summarizes them in its reports to USAID. USAID staff did occasionally visit some of the Foundation's subgrantees in the field, and in a couple of cases found that the subgrantee organization had no knowledge that the funds had originated with USAID, but from a different and new project. The team does not believe that this is common, but conversations indicated that the issue of attribution of funds was not considered, except in the case of the DPR where it was intentionally downplayed. It is significant, perhaps, that the term 'evaluation' was not used in the team's planned meeting with the Speaker of the DPR.

Both organizations in their relations with each other operate with a substantial level of 'trust' between them, as one person indicated. This is necessary because of the bureaucratic incapacities of both organizations to interact substantively with each other. Because of staff changes in The Asia Foundation, a scheduled, mandated interim evaluation was never done, and USAID did not itself realize that it was needed.

USAID, to alleviate its administrative burden, has created these umbrella projects, but in fact the bureaucratic process internally in USAID (and in other missions as well--this is a common problem not unique to Jakarta) negates the original concept of more simple administration. In addition, the need for the grantee to seek informal approval from USAID for many of its operational activities (contract personnel, salaries, allowances, etc.) also undercuts the independence that USAID had sought to provide the PVOs in the first place.

b. Conclusions

Quite beyond the control of the responsible USAID staff, the management of this series of grants has not been as effective in enabling USAID to learn from the programming, nor has it been sufficient from the Foundation's experience (see above section). Although all administrative requirements seem to have been met by

all parties (except the interim evaluation), this type of project, which is directed at the core of the political process and political change in Indonesia, apparently could have used frank and continuous dialogue on substance.

USAID is locked into a yearly cycle of review that creates more work for staff and less substantive review of proposals that inherently are long range if they are to be effective. A biannual or triennial review for some projects would clearly seem to be administratively desirable and substantively appropriate.

This evaluation was delayed, and a new grant agreement to continue the projects already signed before analysis of the previous activities was undertaken. It would have been more prudent to provide bridge funding (if required) and await the evaluation before making major, continuing commitments. This issue is not new, and is reflected in many instances of new project design being completed before the old project is evaluated. The fiscal year is often the culprit.

The evaluation team has reviewed some Foundation proposals (not yet funded) and is impressed with their salience to the development process in Indonesia. Yet if these are funded from the SID account (and the team did not review these concepts with budgets in mind), then the problems of the Foundation will continue and indeed be exacerbated. The team recommends that if the democracy issue is indeed salient to the Mission in terms of its strategy (and not a peripheral program tacked on to satisfy some in Washington), then some of the Foundation's activities (and democracy as a major concern) should be financed outside of the SID project as individual line items in the Mission's Congressional presentation.

III ON DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AID

As we have distinguished between 'legal systems' and 'legal cultures' above as providing guidelines for realistic expectations of what might be accomplished in law related to democracy, we may make a similar distinction when we discuss democracy as a whole. Here it might be useful to distinguish between 'political liberalization' and 'democratization.'³⁹

³⁹ The issue, and a number of other vital points, is discussed in Bruce Koppel, "The Prospects for Democratization in Southeast Asia: Local Perspectives and International Roles." This is a summary of a multi-country study carried out under East-West Center auspices, and included as a paper at the American Council on Asian and Pacific Affairs conference on Southeast Asia, December 2-3, 1993 in Washington, D.C. The Asia Foundation, through its Center for Asian Pacific Affairs (CAPA), uses 'liberalization' and 'consolidation' as stages in the democratization process. (See David J. Timberman, "Global Democratization: Meeting the Challenges of the 1990s." CAPA Report # 3, October 1991. The Koppel

Political liberalization refers to those aspects of a society where reforms directly improve some aspect of governance or popular involvement. Improvement in the civil service, electoral reforms, deregulation of the press or NGOs, greater access to state information, and other types of progressive actions are definable activities about which foreign aid donors could effectively be concerned. These are what has been called elements of 'good governance.' The institutionalization of such reforms may not necessarily threaten existing regimes or primordial societal values. Indeed, regimes could see such actions as in their own interests, such as increasing their political legitimacy. Foreign aid organizations have continued to program in such fields under a variety of sectoral designations.

Democratization, on the other hand, involves more fundamental issues. Such questions as the concepts of power, hierarchy, individualism, confrontation, and social norms all affect democratization, and would be affected by that process. They thus become more difficult to change.

The fundamental dilemma of democratization in Southeast Asia (recognizing the diversity of cultures within this region) may be conceptualized through two competing schools of thought. The first would state that a political system, to be authentic and accepted, "has to reflect and be consistent with the deeper cultural themes of that society," leading to the conclusion that "Western liberal democracy, in both its minimalist and maximalist forms, is inappropriate."⁴⁰ ~~This 'consensual' model plays down individual rights in favor of the group and social unity (however defined). It was articulated at the UN regional human rights meeting in Bangkok in the spring of 1992. It can, and has been, used as an argument to prevent change. With variations, it seems the Indonesian state position.~~

The opposite model is 'ethical universalism,' which would assert that whatever institutional form it might take in any particular state, democracy has core values and is a concern within the region. Although the A.I.D. 'Asia Democracy Program Strategy'⁴¹ discusses 'indigenous democratic goals,' and denies it would enforce any particular model on any state, the governing concepts are clearly in the American image and would fall more in the ethical universalism school than in the consensual model.

Central to the concepts of both democratization and liberalization are inchoate concepts of power. When we turn to the

distinction seems more useful in the Indonesian context.

⁴⁰. Ibid.

⁴¹ Reprinted January 1993, but some three years old.

literature on Indonesia on issues of power, Anderson's article is salient.⁴² In those traditional societies where power is highly personalized and considered finite, then sharing, delegating, compromising, decentralizing, or diminishing one's own power is considered inappropriate. In societies that are highly hierarchical, such as that of Java, and where confrontation is avoided wherever possible, many of the institutional elements that make up democratization become difficult. Information is considered an attribute of power; thus open communications is eschewed if possible. Checks and balances of an overt and confrontational nature are said to be inappropriate.

Thus democratization becomes difficult, but it is important to add, not impossible over time. The development of institutions supportive of the democratic process of change, whether through indigenous efforts or assisted by foreign aid, is one critical element of encouraging forward motion, which this team believes will essentially be indigenously determined. Foreign assistance can, however, speed the processes of reform, encourage change, and assist political liberalization. Balances of power among administrative units, legislatures, and various levels of a judiciary are, at least in the Western experience from which democracy sprang, both relevant and important. They are not, however, sufficient either as a single programmatic concept or as an analytical base to bring about the democratic millennium in Indonesia.

In a state as highly nationalistic as Indonesia (a number of those interviewed said that it was a shame or inappropriate to have to accept foreign funds for support to the DPR, even though they approved of the project), overtly 'pushing' democracy could well have negative reverberations unless deftly handled. Many Indonesians with whom the team talked wanted foreign pressures and support for reform, but those managing bilateral or private aid agencies must recognize the delicacy of the balance.

Pluralism in the form of a civil society are steps in the democratization process, and insurances foreign aid organizations can assist in the process of developing plural centers of power through strengthening NGOs, professional associations, the private sector, and regional interests (within national unity). These forces may at some time assist in the process that will allow democratization to proceed. External information and exposure to world trends contribute to that process as well as they destroy a monopoly on information, and thus power.

It can strongly support the process of political liberalization and pluralism, and programs toward that end. It cautions, however, against claims of programmatic success in democratization

⁴² B. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Claire Holt, *op. cit.*, 1972.

in the Indonesian context.

IV NON-GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMMING

A leitmotif running through both programming in the overall field of promoting democracy and in a variety of other areas is the stress given to the role of the non-profit organization (NGOs). This has been a strong Congressional concern, as well as an A.I.D. priority.

These projects under review reflect that concern. Funded first from the PVO-Co-Financing II project, and then from the SID project, the projects both exhibited that interest by, first, the grant to the foreign NGO, and then the subgrants from it to indigenous private groups. A major proportion of funds expended under these grants have been to private, professional, or advocacy NGOs.


We support the view that the NGO community has a potentially important role in the formation of civil societies. We also believe that the process of democratization, in which pluralistic centers of power are important, is materially furthered by the support of groups that contribute to that pluralism. To this end, A.I.D. missions often program with such groups to achieve specific targets of reform. Indeed, we believe that the concentration on project purposes with such organizations is only part of the objective. In fact, the medium of support may be the message.⁴³

It could be argued that the growth of these organizations, especially when critical governmental groups are impervious to reform, may be the most effective, albeit long term, method for assisting the process of pluralism. As we have argued above, the growth of pluralism in Asia may be a more accurate description of the processes now underway in liberalizing societies, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. If democracy requires fundamental shifts in attitudes toward power and authority, then pluralism may be the first important step toward in that process.

Pluralism may be fostered by the growth of the NGO community, as well as by other potential centers of influence, such as the business community, religious groups, womens' organizations, professional associations, etc. Very often located in urban areas (even as they may work in the countryside), they reflect the relative autonomy of these environments.

NGOs in Indonesia are subject to strict regulation. They are

⁴³ See David I. Steinberg, "The Administration of Justice in Asia. A Conceptual and Project Survey." Development Associates, for AID/CDIE, November 8, 1992.



registered, but not licensed (the latter involves the approval of the leadership by the state, the press is both registered and licensed). There are about 4,000 NGOs (non-profit groups) in Indonesia,⁴⁴ some of which are indirectly political in nature, or a means by which to avoid government financial scrutiny. There are three types: primary NGOs, established by people at the grass roots to deal with local problems; secondary, established by elites as advocacy groups; and tertiary, liaison groups for advocacy NGOs in the same field. The government exerts control, especially in local areas, and all must receive approval to accept foreign assistance (except when the total foreign aid program has been approved in advance by the government, or when funds are provided by a group without a local office), and to hold seminars and conferences. NGOs often hold such meetings in 'five-star hotels' because it then becomes the responsibility of the hotel to get approval as part of its business venture. NGOs in Indonesia are more severely constrained than in many other states in the region. At least one NGO has been prevented from receiving foreign aid, and one NGO staff member jailed because the state felt threatened.

When NGOs obtain approval from the government to accept foreign assistance, some donors and recipients differ in tactics. If a project mentions 'democracy,' then approval may have to be sought from the Cabinet Secretariat, which normally will not grant it. Avoidance of that term but with the same content, and submission to any sympathetic element of the bureaucracy (even in a different field) may win approval. Some donors have their own avenues for approval, such as a sympathetic member of the bureaucracy. The packaging of such requests seems important, although the contents rarely change. In a sense, then, donors (and local recipients) are packaging their activities for two differing audiences--donor headquarters or the Indonesian bureaucracy, the former to make them more 'democracy' relevant, the latter to make them less obviously so. The projects and their impacts remain constant, however.

The issue for A.I.D. as a whole is the general practice of relegating of NGO activity to separate, small, discrete umbrella projects, which are often seen by USAID managements as peripheral to their main interests. If democracy (or preferably pluralism, in the view of this team) is to be built into the A.I.D agenda, it should be done directly as part of the mainstream program

⁴⁴ Djisman Simandjuntak and Amir Santoso, "Problems and Prospects for Transition and Democratization in Indonesia." Unpublished paper, 1993.

V FUTURE PROGRAMMING AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The future, planned direction of USAID's efforts are contained in the 'Strategy Update' of October 1992. Part of its program calls for 'increased rights and good governance' as a strategic objective, and 'more informed legislative policy-making,' 'improved legal system and judicial capacity,' 'improved capacity of the press/media,' and improved capacity of labor organizations and NGOs that responsibly advocate' change. In this charge, The Asia Foundation figures prominently, and in effect, the elements in the grants currently evaluated are specifically included for emphasis.

The USAID's direction is clear, and the Mission specifies as evidence that 'The Jakarta Message' of the Non-Aligned Group meeting in Jakarta in September 1992 called for the 'universal validity' of human rights as a supporting position for its efforts ~~and the likelihood of progress~~. That meeting, however, also emphasized that economic rights were also a factor, and that the stability required for economic progress would come first. Thus there are differing interpretations of that message. For the Mission, it clearly indicated progress; for these writers it will be human rights business as usual in Indonesia--which means the slack season.⁴⁵

Future programming in the broad area of furthering the democratization process in Indonesia, and in the fields of law, legislature, and the press may be divided into recommendations for USAID and The Asia Foundation separately, and then individually in each of these sectors.


In a sense, the immediate direction is already in place both for USAID and the Foundation. USAID has already provided a grant to the Foundation to continue some of these activities, at least some of which are related institutionally and programmatically to what has gone on before, and the Foundation has proposed new directions in eastern Indonesia in a concept paper that could be important. It would have been better, however, to await the results of this evaluation before proceeding, but the team recognizes that

⁴⁵ The relevant text of the 'Jakarta Message' is as follows:

18. We reaffirm that basic rights and fundamental freedom are of universal validity. We welcome the growing trend toward democracy and commit ourselves to cooperate in the protection of human rights. We believe that economic and social progress facilitate the achievement of these objectives. No country, however, should use its power to dictate its concept of democracy and human rights or to impose conditionalities on others. In the promotion and protection of these rights and freedoms, we emphasize the inter-relatedness of the various categories, call for balanced relationship between individual and community rights, uphold the competence and responsibilities of national governments in their implementation.


the exigencies of the fiscal year and grantee requirements often subvert the logical progression of programming.

Our analysis, as preliminary and cursory as it has had to be, points out the dangers of expecting both too much from programming in the area of democracy in Indonesia, and anticipating clear, causal relationships between projects supported and whatever changes may eventually take place. USAID and The Asia Foundation should resist pressures to 'sell' projects because of desirable but unrealistic, anticipated results, and then to attribute whatever positive changes may take place to foreign support. This is not to deny the usefulness of a variety of projects, but rather to expect them to accomplish too much. The team recognizes the pressures on field offices to provide the positive data on which headquarters operate; insofar as possible they should be consciously resisted.



If the Foundation were to be supported in any of these endeavors, it would also take the Foundation out of competition with smaller NGOs, and thus reduce the latter's antipathy toward the Foundation.

Both organizations would do well to keep the limitations of foreign influence on political change in mind. Some of the severest critics of the government have remarked that they would not want to see assistance stopped because of human rights problems; they would rather see more conditionality related to that issue. Such conditionality could logically be built into discrete democracy-related projects with clear, limited, but important objectives. As we have noted, the government has denied the possibility of conditionality, at least in its overt form, but project conditionality is often acceptable while policy conditionality in democracy/human rights areas may be more problematic.


The team believes that USAID and the Foundation should continue to work in the fields of the legislature, law, and the press, . The DPR activity should be a 'holding operation,' where the Foundation and USAID retain credibility of interest so that at some future date, when conditions are more propitious, they might play a greater role. Whatever path is pursued with the DPR, a study of the research service potential and administrative arrangements is clearly called for. Work with the provincial legislatures may be appropriate in building human resources, but it is unlikely to have

any impact over the next half-decade on fundamental issues in the distribution of power in the provinces, as the provincial administrations are fearful of deviating from central policies. The law needs reform in a variety of ways, but do not expect these efforts directly to affect in the near term the 'legal culture,' discussed above. The press continues to need support, but expanded activities should consider work in the electronic media--both radio and television, with the understanding that the state controls these programming areas. Support to NGOs remains a vital element in the foreign aid process in this area.

[REDACTED]

Foreign aid organizations in sensitive fields, such as those related to democracy, should realize that if they educate and expose to international stimuli a new generation of talent, they may do more for Indonesia when internal events allow them to come into their own. We should remember that the 'Berkeley mafia' were trained before conditions here allowed them to be gainfully employed. This was also true for technocrats in Korea under Syngman Rhee.

A.I.D. has concluded overall that its long-term participant training programs worldwide have been successful. They are, however, expensive. Except for a few key people in a selective group of disciplines, thought should be given to local training programs (with foreign consultants where needed), and gearing the successful completion of such training to career, prestige, or financial rewards. The model may be USAID's own Ministry of Trade project. This is especially true in law, where the U.S. common law system is not applicable in Indonesia. There is a need, according to some with whom the team spoke, for training in Dutch law to revise those archaic laws still used here. Local press training is an example of effective local human resource development.

[REDACTED]

A second programming theme for the future could be information. In many states where traditional concepts of authority are still prominent, knowledge is viewed as power, and is not easily shared. Making more readily available laws for the specialist, information of the public through the media, transparency in government, and accountability (an element in the A.I.D. strategy) all contribute to preconditions for pluralism and further the process of democratization.

The rural sector of the society is at present most retractable to pluralistic change. But if the term 'democracy' can be avoided, there may well be programming avenues in the NGO community, womens organizations, as well as in the environment, that could be supportive of longer term developments. The Foundation has explored issues in the eastern islands, the poorest area of the country.

Abri should not be ignored, as it is likely to be important in

are some subprojects, such as with the DPR, where clearly the Foundation is the better choice. This is probably true also in certain provincial work. ~~to have a number of direct grants to support the work of intellectuals and elites in urban areas beyond the boundaries of the~~ This can be accomplished through some direct grants. If this does not occur, than USAID's capacity to absorb the political lessons from such relationships will be severely diminished. The team recommends that both avenues be pursued, but that the administrative capacities of both organizations need refurbishing before either will fulfill their potential.

VI SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

This series of interrelated projects are directed toward important ends central to the future of Indonesia as a major economic force in the region, and to the wellbeing of its citizenry. They are focused on the democratization of Indonesia by providing assistance to improve the fields of legislative action, law, the press, and public opinion polling. All are considered cardinal to democratization.

This evaluation concluded that the relevance of these sectors to project goals was quite real, but that there was considerable hyperbole in what could reasonably be expected to be accomplished within the parameters of the projects and the time of their operation. There are some modest signals of greater openness in the society. Central, personalized control, however, with the primary object of stability within a state that continues to manage all aspects of the political process is evident. ~~the~~ ~~of short or medium term project success in democratization are~~ Thus the hypotheses on which the grants were made concerning the importance of the fields were accurate; the expectations of change were unrealistic.

The evaluation noted the importance of the subprojects undertaken, and recommended continuing programming in all of these fields. Yet it stated that more realistic targets should be set, and conceptually this could be assisted through considering the distinction between 'legal process' and 'legal culture,' and between 'political liberalization' and democratization. Each of the former may be assisted with achievable results, while the latter elements may be impervious to change through foreign assistance over the foreseeable future, and rather more subject to more glacial attitudinal shifts toward which efforts should be directed.

~~The team recommends that both USAID and the Foundation, separately or together, continue to address these issues through~~ ~~these on both human resource development and access to information as these two elements are likely to contribute to long-term~~

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The evaluation recognizes the difficulties inherent in working in the field of democratization, and commends both USAID and the Foundation for its efforts. It suggests certain administrative reforms listed above.

VII LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons learned are those generic issues that transcend the project, and even the society. Among those that may be drawn from this evaluation are:

1. Projects that are justified by objectives involving broad, societal change--such as democracy--should be carefully couched to present realistic goals and avoid hyperbole. Such fundamental changes are usually indigenously determined, even though foreign assistance may speed the process.
2. Projects promoting democracy and law are important elements of societal change, but are more likely to affect institutions than fundamental values, on which democracy and 'rule of law' are based.
3. Projects directed toward core societal issues can rarely be accomplished within short bureaucratic project life.
4. If A.I.D. continues to program in democracy-related fields, some of these projects should be part of core Mission programming, and not relegated to PVO co-financing efforts.
5. Such umbrella projects may not diminish the bureaucratic Mission overload that they were designed to alleviate. Conscious efforts must be made to keep oversight simple after approvals have been given.
6. USAIDs, under financial pressures, should reduce NGO competition for grants by more carefully defining fields, and reviewing

their internal review processes, which should be both integrated and transparent.

7. NGO recipients of USAID grants should ensure that they have the administrative capacity to monitor closely the conceptual aspects of such grants, as well as the financial/administrative ones.

8. The role of NGOs is an important component of foreign assistance, and should be reviewed carefully for their future effectiveness.

9. Human resource development may be a critical element in planning for the future.

10. The personalization of power, common in many traditional societies, creates special problems for the institutionalization of reforms, and the problem needs to be directly recognized and considered in such societies.

APPENDIX 1

SCOPE OF WORK

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN INDONESIA

SCOPE OF WORK FOR FINAL EVALUATION
OF THREE ASIA FOUNDATION-ADMINISTERED PROJECTS

CONTACT PERSON:

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The Asia Foundation
Jl. Darmawangsa Raya 50
Kebayoran Baru
Jakarta 12160
Tel: 739-5533, 739-1860

EVALUATION TEAM LEADER:

Under discussion; LLPD-II grant agreement requires an external evaluation "to be carried out by an expatriate consultant and a USAID staff member"

I. OBJECTIVE

The objective of this evaluation is to examine two umbrella projects and one focussed project intended to strengthen democratic institutions in Indonesia. The projects were designed to focus on activities in support of legal and judicial systems development, legislative development, and professionalization of the media (through the umbrella projects); and the institutionalization of the capacity to perform public opinion polling by a specified Indonesian non-governmental organization. The three projects were funded through grants from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to The Asia Foundation (TAF), and were carried out over the period April 1990 through September 1993.

The evaluation should provide analyses of the soundness of the conceptualization and design of the three projects, project management (on the part of both USAID and TAF), and progress made toward strengthening democratic institutions during the period of the projects. It should, as well, evaluate the choice, management, activity results, and contribution to overall progress of the various activities undertaken through subgrantees under the umbrella projects and through the focussed project. Finally, the evaluation should make recommendations to USAID and TAF on how best to follow up on activities already undertaken and on the design and management of future programming to strengthen democratic institutions in Indonesia.

X

II. BACKGROUND

A. PROJECT HISTORY

In September 1989, as a result of discussions between USAID and TAF, the Foundation submitted a multi-year proposal for activities in support of legislative, legal and press development. The proposal led to the signing of a grant agreement "Strengthening Legislative, Legal and Press Institutions in Indonesia" (LLPD-I) on March 28, 1990. Whereas the proposal requested \$3 million for activities occurring over a three-year period, the grant agreement obligated \$1.2 million for an 18-month period with the remaining financing subject to examination through another design and proposal process before the grant could be extended. While several possible sources of funds were considered, the grant was ultimately funded through USAID/Jakarta's PVO Co-Financing II project. A no-cost one-year extension (from September 30, 1991 to September 30, 1992) was made as LLPD-I neared its original expiration date to ensure stability of funding for several long-running grant activities.

At the same time, TAF presented a new proposal for the remainder of the original grant period: \$1.7 million for activities covering the 18-month period from October 1991 through March 1993. To facilitate administration, USAID made a separate grant agreement for these additional activities. "Strengthening Legislative, Legal and Press Institutions in Indonesia--Phase II" (LLPD-II) was signed on August 30, 1991. The major portion of the grant was funded from USAID/Jakarta's Strengthening Democratic Institutions umbrella project, with a portion funded from AID/Washington's Asia Democracy Program. For thirteen months, LLPD-I and LLPD-II ran concurrently. LLPD-I ended on schedule at the end of September 1992. Also in September 1992, LLPD-II's original expiration date was extended at no cost (to September 30, 1993) to accommodate program delays resulting from restrictions on activities accompanying the Indonesian elections and from turnover in Asia Foundation staff.

In August 1992, TAF successfully competed for AID/Washington Asia Democracy Program funds to manage a program to institutionalize the capability of a leading NGO (the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information, LP3ES) to conduct public opinion polling. The grant agreement, for \$55,892, covers a one-year period from October 1992 through September 1993.

B. PROJECTS

LLPD-I and II were designed to support democratic institution building activities in three areas: legislative development, legal development, and professionalization of the press. In each of

these areas, one organization was chosen as the focus of activities, with related or supporting activities carried out through other organizations.

Legislative development focussed on the Indonesian National Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or DPR), with special efforts made to institutionalize an information and research service capacity within the DPR. Most activities were undertaken directly with the DPR, following consultation with the Speaker and with liaison provided by the Secretary General's office. Activities at the DPR have included observation tours and training programs for DPR members and staff, English-language training for members and staff, a workshop/seminar series for members on topical subjects, publication of two periodicals providing information about the DPR, and the creation and institutionalization of an internal independent information gathering and processing research service (Pusat Penelitian dan Pelayanan Informasi, or P3I). Related activities in support of legislative development have included training programs for provincial level parliaments (DPRDs), a conference on the general election of 1992, research on the history of Indonesia's legislature, and training for journalists on legislative reporting.

Legal institution-building activities were more broadly based than the other two development areas in LLPD. While the National Law Development Agency (Badan Pembangunan Hukum Nasional, or BPHN) of the Department of Justice and its project to produce a complete collection of Indonesia's laws and regulations in electronic media format (CD-ROM) was scheduled to receive a substantial portion of the budget, many other activities were undertaken with other subgrantee organizations. These included components intended to strengthen the judiciary (Supreme Court), strengthen the capacity for formal legal education (National Association of Law Deans, University of Indonesia Faculty of Law), strengthen the capacity for continuing legal education (Center for Legal Studies, University of Indonesia Faculty of Law), and enhance the public advocacy capabilities of NGOs (Indonesian Institute for Legal Aid for Women and Families, Dana Mitra Law Foundation, Indonesian Environmental Forum, SEJATI Foundation, and Indonesian Consumers Foundation, among others). When it became apparent that the CD-ROM project at BPHN could not be completed within the life of the LLPD projects, the budgeted funds were redirected toward completing a microfiche collection of Indonesia laws and regulations (Legal Documentation Center of the University of Indonesia), improving computerized access to court decisions (Supreme Court), and toward additional activities improving access to information about Indonesian law.

Press development concentrated on the private Dr. Soetomo Press Institute and the institutionalization of its School of Journalism. Activities there included providing an American consultant/instructor, student scholarships, faculty training programs,

support for production of Reporter (bimonthly magazine for journalists), and development of a library and documentation center. A second institution, the Yogya Institute for Research, Education and Publication (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerbitan Yogya, or LP3 Yogya) was a subsidiary focus for press institution building. Activities with LP3 Yogya included upgrading a computerized laboratory for training journalists, an analysis of Indonesian press content, developing curricula for training editors, and a training program for provincial editors.

The LP3ES public opinion polling capacity project was a targeted activity occurring over one year. Elements of the project were a short practical training program at a U.S. university, an observation trip to the Philippines and Korea to visit organizations which regularly carry out public opinion polls, and the application of these activities in carrying out public opinion polling in Indonesia.

III. PROGRESS TO DATE

Given the nature of the three projects, progress to date is best captured through the semi-annual narrative reports provided by TAF to USAID. These documents will be provided to the evaluation team as background material prior to the start of the evaluation.

IV. ACTIVITIES TO BE EVALUATED

- | | |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| A. Grant No. | AID 497-0336-G-SS-0041 |
| Activity Title | Strengthening Legislative, Legal and Press Development Institutions in Indonesia |
| Total Grant | \$ 1,203,725 |
| Life of the Project | 28 March 1990 to 30 September 1992 |
| Project Location | Jakarta and throughout Indonesia |
| B. Grant No. | AID 497-0364-G-SS-1089 |
| Activity Title | Strengthening Legislative, Legal and Press Development Institutions in Indonesia--Phase II |
| Total Grant | \$ 1,781,126 |
| Life of the Project | 28 August 1991 to 30 September 1993 |
| Project Location | Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and throughout Indonesia |
| C. Grant No. | AID 497-0364-G-SS-2091 |
| Activity Title | Institutionalizing the Capability of a Leading Indonesian NGO to Conduct |

Total Grant	Public Opinion Polls
Life of the Project	\$ 55,264
Project Location	1 October 1992 to 30 September 1993
	Jakarta

V. STATEMENT OF WORK

A. SCOPE

The evaluation should at minimum provide written responses to the following questions:

1. Project design

- **Conceptualization:** What is democratic institution building and how can democratic concepts be operationalized within the Indonesian context? To what extent has the conceptualization underlying these projects been appropriate and adequate to the circumstances?
- **Design:** How did the conceptualization translate into the design of the grants?

2. Organizations and activities

- **Choice of subgrantee organizations:** Were subgrantee organizations well chosen? Did the respective project activities suit each organization? Were these activities feasible in terms of results?
- **Implementation of activities by subgrantees:** Did the activities advance the subgrantees' institutional and/or organizational capacities? In what ways did they succeed or not in accomplishing this? Have the resulting activities contributed to the achievement of project objectives?

3. Grant Administration

- **USAID's management of TAF:** Was USAID supportive of TAF's programming and management needs with these projects? Was the USAID level of management appropriate for the projects? Was USAID responsive to proposed programming changes and adjustments throughout the life of the projects?
- **TAF's management of subgrantees:** Were the grants adequately managed in terms of the subgrant structure and number? Was the subgrant structure and number appropriate for the achievement of project goals?

- Level of funding: Did the level of funding match the absorptive capacity in this sector? Did the level of funding match the time period established for grant implementation?

4. Results and Sustainability

- Did the subgrantee project designs lead to effective implementation? Specifically:
 - Were institutions built?
 - Were capacities of organizations established or enhanced?
 - Were processes to further democratization established?
 - Did the institutions/activities contribute to increased political democratization within the Indonesian context?

5. Follow on/Future

- To what extent are the activities carried out under these programs likely to sustain themselves in the future?
- How can ongoing subgrantee relationships be restructured to better achieve project goals?
- What new activities might be undertaken by USAID and/or TAF to further project goals?

B. METHOD

The evaluation team should examine the original TAF grant proposals and the original USAID Grant Agreements for all three grants, as well as all amendments made since the inception of each grant. TAF will make available the correspondence files with USAID for each grant, in order that the evaluators may track the decision-making, budget realignments, and other management issues. In addition, the evaluators should examine carefully and critically appraise the semi-annual narrative reports provided by TAF to USAID each April and October, as they provide the best chronological history of the grants. TAF will provide the evaluators with a listing of all subgrants made under LLPD-I and II, and will make available any of the subgrant files at the request of the evaluators. The evaluators will conduct interviews and site visits with major subgrantees, including the DPR, BPHN, Dr. Soetomo Press Institute, LP3ES, LP3 Yogya (if time and budget allow) and a selection of others; TAF will act as liaison with the subgrantees to arrange

these visits.

C. TIME FRAME

The evaluation should take place over a four to five week period, beginning approximately October 1, 1993.

1. Composition of Team

The team should consist of two individuals: one experienced with democratic institutions in Asia, and the second knowledgeable about contemporary Indonesian political organization, institutions, and events. TAF is currently exploring the availability of a number of individuals, and hopes to submit a list of possible evaluators in the near future.

2. Logistics

TAF will provide space for the evaluation team in its office in Kebayoran Baru. One computer will be made available to the evaluators in the office. Transportation, communication and other miscellaneous costs will be provided through the evaluation budget (forthcoming).

D. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The evaluation team will provide a verbal progress report to TAF on or about day 15 of the evaluation. Prior to leaving Indonesia, the evaluation team will debrief the appropriate USAID and TAF staff on their findings and recommendations, and will present a detailed draft report on the findings and recommendations. The final report will be completed immediately following the evaluation, and will be submitted before the evaluation team disbands.

The evaluation report will consist of an executive summary and full report stating the objectives of the grants; purpose of the evaluation; evaluation methodology; findings of the evaluation team; conclusions; recommendations for future action; and lessons learned generally about the design, implementation and results of such democratic institution building grants.

LLPD Phase I and Phase II Project List

AUTH'D AMOUNT	PROJECT AND GRANT NUMBER	INSTITUTION:ACTIVITY TITLE	TOTAL PAYMENTS
	10-021-ID-1088	WALHI: Environ mediation activities	5,426.00
	10-021-ID-1107	YLKI: Regional consumer conf in Hong Kong (2 participants)	4,282.00
	10-021-ID-1146	Dana Mitra Hukum Fndn (support for legal aid): Institutional support	5,842.00
	10-021-ID-X005	Kowani: Environ and agrarian law workshop	2,242.00
	10-021-ID-X011	WALHI: Asian environ law conf (1 participant)	881.00
	10-021-ID-X036	WALHI: 2d E-LAW meeting and observation tour	3,683.00
	10-021-ID-X037	(2 participants)	3,419.00
192,000.00 Phase II	10-021-ID-X065	LKPSM: Monthly seminar series	5,575.00
	10-021-ID-X066	YLKI: Instl advocacy trng/young consumers ed	16,566.00
	10-021-ID-X068	PUSKOWAN: Informal business trng	3,503.00
	10-012-10-02801	WIM: Environmental Mediation for Sumut	36,070.00
	10-012-10-02601	LP3ES: Research Studies and Seminars	27,269.00
	10-012-10-03702	SEJATI: Instl support and legal research programs	35,400.00
	10-012-10-01702	ICFEL: Instl support and policy study	6,877.00
	10-012-10-04602	YLKI: Staff development and internship prog	23,863.00
	10-012-10-04201	YDMH: Workshop on alternative dispute res	7,718.00
228,500.00		SUBTOTAL	206,599.76
3,500.00 Phase II Only		Informal Sector Programming (none)	
3,500.00		SUB TOTAL	0.00
760,800.00		TOTALS FOR LEGAL DEVELOPMENT	634,824.14

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LLPD Phase I and Phase II Project List

AUTH'D AMOUNT	PROJECT AND GRANT NUMBER	INSTITUTION:ACTIVITY TITLE	TOTAL PAYMENTS
196,000.00	Phase II	Legal Education and Training	
9,000.00	Phase I	(Devel of Teaching Staff at Univ Law Faculties) ID-020-ID-0165 As-Syafi'iyah Islamic Univ: Ph.D. Fellowship in Constitutional Law	2,063.00
		ID-020-ID-1026 UI: Law Reform Strategies & Econ Develop Workshop (3 participants)	6,428.00
	Phase II	ID-020-ID-X019 UI:Trng in legal research techniques & methodology	1,811.00
		ID-020-ID-X080 UI:Staff development & training	5,229.00
34,500.00	Phase I	(Legal Curriculum Development) ID-020-ID-1057 UI: Development of model law curriculum	9,026.00
		ID-020-ID-1077 Konsortium Ilmu Hukum: Conf on curriculum reform	10,276.00
		ID-020-ID-X022 UI: Develop of intermed model law curriculum	10,620.00
	Phase II	ID-020-ID-X076 Konsortium Ilmu Hukum: Conf on curriculum reform	20,585.00
		ID-206-ID-X083 Konsortium Ilmu Hukum:Reforming legal curricula	71,207.00
		10-014-10-01602 Konsortium Ilmu Hukum:Law Deans Conference	18,427.00
33,000.00	Phase I	(Continuing Legal Ed and Legal Publications) ID-020-ID-1029 CLS: Book on commercial law	2,665.00
	Phase II	ID-020-ID-X014 CLS: Commercial law book series	27,613.00
		10-014-10-04108 UI:Legal Data Center, Depok	48,394.00
272,500.00		SUB TOTAL	155,672.00
		Enhancement/NGO Public Advocacy Capabilities	
36,500.00	Phase I	ID-021-ID-1003 YLKI: Regl W'shop for Young Consumer Leaders (1 participant)	1,009.00
		ID-021-ID-1010 WALHI: SPIDR (dispute resolution) conference	5,509.59
		ID-021-ID-1018 and observation tour (3 participants)	5,209.58
		ID-021-ID-1019	5,009.59
		ID-021-ID-1079 WALHI: Observation tour to Korea (1 participant)	1,246.00

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APPENDIX 2

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

LLPD Phase I and Phase II Project List

AUTH'D AMOUNT	PROJECT AND GRANT NUMBER	INSTITUTION:ACTIVITY TITLE	TOTAL PAYMENTS
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT			
Development of Full-Text Computerized Legal Research System (CD-ROM)			
61,500.00 Phase I	ID-018-ID-1044	BPHN: Purchase of computers and supplies	44,388.95
	ID-018-SF-1165	Audit of data for CD-ROM (Aspen Systems/Martin)	10,930.58
Phase II	ID-018-ID-X015	BPHN:Computer programming training course	2,189.00
	ID-018-ID-X042	BPHN:Typing training program	2,019.00
	ID-018-ID-X053	BPHN:Computer training program and software	12,785.00
	ID-018-ID-X087	Computer consultancy:spell checker	10,607.00
61,500.00	SUB TOTAL		84,938.53
Available and Accessible Legal Information			
154,000.00 Phase II Only	10-014-10-04106	UI/FH: Development of institutional capacity	18,633.00
	10-014-10-03903	Supreme Court: Computer assm't, maint, trng	40,786.00
	10-014-10-03906	Supreme Court: Purchase of computers	6,719.00
	10-014-10-04107	UI/PDH: Microfiching and computer indexing	63,546.00
154,000.00	SUB TOTAL		129,684.00
Judicial Training in Civil and Commercial Law			
15,500.00 Phase I	ID-019-ID-0149	Visiting Scholar at Berkeley (Siahaan)	17,643.14
25,300.00 Phase II	ID-019-ID-X079	Visiting Scholar at Berkeley (Saragih)	21,888.10
	ID-019-ID-X096	Nat'l Assn of Women Judges Conf (Notowidagdo)	3,849.61
	10-019-10-03901	Supreme Court:Judicial Training Materials	14,549.00
40,800.00	SUBTOTAL		57,929.85

APPENDIX 3

DR. SOETOMO PRESS INSTITUTE

LLPD Phase I and Phase II Project List

AUTH'D AMOUNT	PROJECT AND GRANT NUMBER	INSTITUTION:ACTIVITY TITLE	TOTAL PAYMENTS
PRESS DEVELOPMENT			
Dr. Soetomo Press Institute			
315,000.00 Phase I	ID-022-ID-0102	American journalism consultant	213,943.69
	ID-022-ID-0116	Institutional support for Press Institute and School of Journalism	129,117.00
170,250.00 Phase II	ID-022-ID-X092	American journalism consultant	57,303.54
	ID-022-ID-X038	Institutional Support for Press Institute and School of Journalism	96,550.00
	ID-022-ID-X021	Berkeley Journalism Fellowship (1 participant)	20,346.86
	ID-022-ID-X039	International media conference & observation	4,899.84
	ID-022-ID-X040	tour (2 participants)	5,316.84
485,250.00	SUB TOTAL		527,477.77
Seminars, Research and Publications on the Role and Development of the Press			
25,000.00 Phase I	ID-023-ID-1017	ID Mass Comm Assn: W'shop on mass comm curricula	6,438.00
	ID-023-ID-1045	LP3Yogya: Background study, seminar & curric devel for desk editor training	7,195.00
	ID-023-ID-X010	LP3Yogya: Computer equip for newswriting lab	10,278.00
20,000.00 Phase II	ID-023-ID-X072	LP3Yogya: Survey on inclination of media content	15,735.00
45,000.00	SUB TOTAL		39,646.00
Support for Journalism Training at LP3 Yogya			
20,000.00 Phase II Only	10-007-10-02501	LP3Y: Intensive provincial editors training program	16,321.00
20,000.00	SUB TOTAL		16,321.00
550,250.00	TOTALS FOR PRESS DEVELOPMENT		583,444.77

GRADUATE COURSE PARTICIPANTS

PSJ GROUP 3: Apr 92 - Feb 93

1. Ahmad Muntaha
2. Aloysius Widiyatmaka
3. Bambang Wahyuwahono
4. Barry Sihotang
5. Fairus Husaini
6. Gunawan Effendie
7. Iis Suryawati
8. Ilham Abadi
9. Innocentius Christianto
10. Kr. Riyanto
11. Marthen Selamat Susanto
12. *Mochamad Sabar*
13. Muji Karmini
14. Priyanto
15. Salman Hadi
16. Sukoto

Interned
at:

Began career
at: [currently available information]

PersDa Gramedia
Kompas
Kompas
Suara Pembaruan
Tempo
Bisnis Indonesia
Bisnis Indonesia
Editor
Jakarta Post
Suara Pembaruan
PersDa Gramedia

Tempo
Pikiran Rakyat
Bisnis Indonesia
PersDa Gramedia

Kompas
Kompas
Tempo stringer

Jakarta Post
Kompas
Suara Pembaruan

PSJ GROUP 4: Sep 92 - Sep 93

1. *Ahmad Nuril Hidayat*
2. Antonius Doni Dihen
3. Bob Permadi
4. Budiman
5. Ganjar Nugraha
6. *Irhamsah*
7. Lily Glorida I.S.Nababan
8. *Nasihin*
9. *Prasetyo*
10. *Ririën Ekoyanantiasih*
11. Roberto B.H.L Toruan
12. Roy Tumpal Pakpahan
13. Sumedi Tjahja Purnama
14. Triyanto Rusbiantoro

Kompas
Jawa Pos
Suara Pembaruan
Pikiran Rakyat

Kompas

Jakarta Post
Suara Pembaruan
RCTI or Suara Pembaruan
Kompas

[italics: did not complete curriculum]

PSJ-ENGLISH First term only [3 MONTHS] (contract)

Jakarta Post:
Drs. Erie Noer Bawono
Drs. Handono Tedja Mertadiwangsa
Drs. K. Basrie
Pandaya
Dra. Santi W.E. Soekanto
Tri Hafiningsih

Indonesian Observer:
Nazrollah Abdulmalik

TVRI English:
Agung Prawoto

PILOT PROJECT
Group SP: Jun 89 - Jan 90
Suara Pembaruan cadets

1. Sri Wahyu Dramastuti
2. Syah Sabur
3. Miko Napitupulu
4. Syahfrul Mardhy
5. R.G.Windrarto
6. Agus Baharudin
7. Sri Rejeki Listyorini
8. Edwin Karuwal
9. Charles P.Manurung
10. Erry Yulia Siahaan
11. Sabar Subekti
12. Bidramnanta
13. Eny Damayati
14. Nelson Simanjuntak
15. Kristanto Hartadi

GRADUATE COURSE PARTICIPANTS

Interned
at:

Began career
at:[currently available information]

<i>Suara Pembaruan</i>	<i>Suara Pembaruan</i>

PSJ GROUP 1: Sep 90 - Sep 91

1. Ahmad Sulthon
2. Arief Pujiyanto
3. *Daruyasa Asihwardji*
4. Erafzon Saptiyulda AS
5. Euis Komariah S.
6. Fathuddin
7. Frits Pangemanan
8. Lenah Susianty
9. Mulyo Sunyoto
10. Retno Kustiati
11. Salomo Simanungkalit
12. Samsudin Berlian
13. *Sayadi*
14. Sri Raharti H.
15. Susilawati Suryana

<i>Kompas</i>	<i>Kompas</i>
<i>Kompas</i>	<i>Antara</i>
<i>Jakarta Post</i>	
<i>Berita Buana</i>	<i>Antara</i>
<i>Jakarta Post</i>	<i>Jakarta Post</i>
<i>Jakarta Post</i>	
<i>Jakarta Post</i>	<i>Jakarta Post</i>
<i>Tempo</i>	<i>Jakarta Post</i>
<i>Surabaya Post</i>	<i>Antara</i>
<i>Kompas</i>	<i>Forum Keadilan</i>
<i>Kompas</i>	<i>Kompas</i>
<i>Jakarta Post</i>	<i>Jakarta Post</i>
<i>Tempo</i>	<i>Forum Keadilan</i>
<i>Tempo</i>	<i>Tempo</i>

PSJ GROUP 2: Sep 91 - Sep 92

1. Agus Priyanto
2. A. M. Dwiatmanta
3. Ari Satriyo Wibowo
4. Beny Tusriyoso
5. Bonifasius Mba Balu
6. Bdyke Irwan Noya
7. Endang Pramugari
8. Heri Wardoyo
9. Ibrahim
10. Karsono
11. Setiawan
12. *Sulistiasih*
13. Titus Tri Wibowo
14. Tiurma Mercy Sion
15. Yoyok Gandung Priyana
16. Yurnilawati

<i>Bisnis Indonesia</i>	<i>Eksekutif</i>
<i>Jakarta Post</i>	<i>Jakarta Post</i>
<i>Kompas</i>	<i>Swasembada</i>
<i>Kompas</i>	<i>TPI</i>
<i>Kompas</i>	
<i>Kompas</i>	
<i>Bisnis Indonesia</i>	
<i>Tempo</i>	<i>Forum Keadilan</i>
<i>Tempo</i>	<i>TPI</i>
<i>Pikiran Rakyat</i>	<i>Keluarga</i>
<i>Suara Pembaruan</i>	<i>Neraca</i>
<i>Bisnis Indonesia</i>	
<i>Suara Pembaruan</i>	<i>Kompas</i>
<i>Tempo</i>	
<i>Jakarta Post</i>	<i>TPI</i>

The Postgraduate Studies in Journalism (PSJ) program offers university graduates in any discipline a year of fulltime professional journalism education in four 10-week terms totalling 56 credit-hours (16, 16, 8, 16).

FIRST TERM**PSJ-510 Indonesian Language for Journalists (3 cr.)**

Course modules focus on writing and reading skills. The writing module includes: intensive review of grammar and usage; variety and uses of different writing styles and approaches; emphasis on clear, precise, dynamic use of language. The reading module uses contemporary techniques to develop faster reading with better comprehension and retention.

PSJ-511 Newswriting (5 cr.) Introduction to news principles and values; organizing and writing techniques; different forms of news media writing; basic news gathering principles. Emphasis on lab exercises, constant practice, detailed feedback, individual coaching, rewrite, and group review.

PSJ-515 Indonesian Press History (2 cr.) Introduction to the origins, development and historical role of news in Indonesia and the world. Development of the Malay and provincial language press in the National Awakening period. The role of a fighting press in the Dutch and Japanese colonial periods, during the revolution, and since independence. The evolution of the concept of a free and responsible press within the framework of the constitution and Pancasila. Major figures in Indonesian press history. Lectures and discussion, assigned reading, and guest speakers.

PSJ-516 Introduction to News Media (3 cr.) Introduction to the contemporary nature and methods of print and electronic news media in Indonesia and the world; the news process and information flow; Indonesian news media economics, organization and operations; legal, social, professional and political factors in the operation of free and responsible news media within the framework of the Indonesian constitution and Pancasila. Lectures, discussion, assigned reading, guest speakers, field trips and projects.

PSJ-517 Topics-in-Journalism I. (1 cr.) [Instruction in English.] Variable content, with current subject specified in course schedule. Examines a different aspect of journalism each term; familiarization with major international English-language news media; special personal attention to improving individual English language written and oral skills. Generally taught by visiting journalist or specialist attached to the institute.

PSJ-519 Seminar I: Ideas & Culture (2 cr.) Reading and discussion. Group analysis of important literature, both Indonesian and world. Top editors, reporters, writers and others invited as guest discussion leaders on a work of their choice, read by students in advance. Emphasis on habitual systematic reading, with personal analysis and critique of significant or challenging ideas.

SECOND TERM

PSJ-521 Reporting (3 cr.) News gathering and advanced writing; interviewing; observation; verification; analysis of material; covering beats; generating enterprising ideas; cultivating and using oral and written sources; maintaining professional attitudes and relationships in public and in the newsroom; preparation for PSJ-534 Field Internship. Emphasis on current news, with a variety of supervised group and individual field assignments, including individual interviews, press conferences, speeches, panel discussions, printed sources, and personal observation. Assigned reading, lecture and discussion, individual coaching and feedback.

PSJ-522 Editing (5 cr.) Editing and revising news copy; checking for accuracy of fact and form; writing headlines; designing and laying out pages; basics of typography; cropping and sizing photographs; professional responsibility of editors; editorial organization, work-flow patterns and trends in newspapers and magazines. Laboratory application and practice of principles studied, with assigned reading, lectures and discussion.

PSJ-525 Indonesian Media System and Laws (3 cr.)

Thorough study of national press laws, regulations, administrative policies and codes in the framework of the Indonesian constitution and Pancasila; the concept of a free and responsible press in Indonesia; the nature and effect of contemporary interpretations and enforcement practices; comparative review of other major press theories, systems, laws and regulations in the region and the world; constitutional, criminal, civil and corporate law as it relates to libel, slander, violation of personal freedoms, copyright, censorship, labor-management relations. Assigned reading, lectures and discussion, case-studies.

PSJ-527 Topics-in-Journalism II (1 cr.)

[Instruction in English.] Variable content, with current subject specified in course schedule. Examines a different aspect of journalism each term; familiarization with major professional, trade and academic journals in communication; reading, writing and discussion in English; increased emphasis and personal attention to individual English writing skills. Generally taught by visiting journalist or specialist attached to the institute.

PSJ-529 Seminar II: Journalistic Ethics and Professionalism (2 cr.)

Examination and discussion of major questions of ethics, professionalism and taste involving journalists, those they deal with, and their publics: the content and application of ethics codes in Indonesia and elsewhere; newsroom policies; personal responsibility and integrity. Assigned reading, discussion, case analysis, argumentation, practice making hard decisions.

THIRD TERM (2-week + 8-week full-time intensives)

PSJ-531 Photojournalism (2 cr.) Introduction to basic principles and practices of news photography, including: cameras and film processing; news picture planning and coverage; composing effective news pictures; essentials of picture editing and layout for publication with consideration for professional ethics, taste, and the law; organizing supporting information, maintaining files, and preparing a portfolio. Photo exercises and field assignments, assigned reading, lectures and discussion, and demonstrations. Full-time intensive course prior to field internship.

PSJ-534 Internship (6 cr.) Application of skills in a professional work environment. Eight weeks or more full-time supervised work at a news organization under terms approved by the school; preparatory report on the organization's identity, character, history, structure, ownership, etc.; weekly typewritten intern reports summarizing and analyzing each week's experience, submitted with all original copy and clippings of any published work; a final closing report assessing the entire experience. A faculty coordinator, besides reviewing all reports, consults personally and privately with each job mentor and intern at the start, midway and end of the internship to discuss arrangements, performance strengths and weaknesses, placing a written summary of these discussions into each student's confidential record. At the end, the job mentor is expected to submit a final written evaluation of the student's performance by standards expected of any entry-level journalist, noting areas of strength and weakness, and areas needing further development. This evaluation is confidential between the mentor, the school and the student, and is placed in the student's file where it is available for inspection by the student.

FOURTH TERM

PSJ-541 Advanced Reporting (3 cr.) Systematic news coverage of organized society; study and practice of regular coverage of a significant public subject area or public office; organizing a beat; cultivating sources; searching the public record, archives and reference material; developing background and working files; covering and writing on-going stories, with follow-ups and related enterprise stories; analytical reporting; individual and team work. Emphasis on enterprise to develop ideas, reporting strategies and information beyond handouts and event-oriented reportage. Assigned reading, lecture and discussion, individual counseling.

PSJ-543 Feature Writing (3 cr.) Study and practice of timely and timeless features and enterprise stories that emphasize fine or lively writing and more detailed reporting. Attention to news features, personality profiles, special section and magazine articles, and the meaning of in-depth treatment. Emphasis on thorough reporting, rewriting and polishing of stories. Assigned reading, and group review and discussion of individual manuscripts before rewrite.

PSJ-544 Media Publication (3 cr.) Study of news planning, organization, editing, production, distribution and general management of a publication through hands-on experience organizing and producing a publication. Defining the mission; organizing an editorial staff; directing news and photo coverage; dealing with colleagues; weighing cost factors; editing, dummied and laying out the publication using desk-top equipment and methods. Emphasizes individual responsibility and initiative on a coordinated team. Assigned reading, field assignments, critiques and staff discussion.

PSJ-545 (a, b, c.) Contemporary Journalism (3 cr.) Variable content, defined in the course schedule. Devoted to advanced skills, specialized subjects or directed independent research. May be subdivided into elective options. [Instruction in Indonesian or English, depending upon instructor or materials.]

PSJ-547 Topics-in-Journalism (1 cr.) [Instruction in English.] Variable content, with current subject specified in course schedule. Examines a different aspect of journalism every term; reading, writing and discussion in English at an advanced level; special personal attention to polishing pronunciation and individual writing skills. Where appropriate, may be combined with PSJ-545. Generally taught by visiting journalist or specialist attached to the institute.

PSJ-549 Seminar III: Journalism & Society (3 cr.)

Advanced seminar on contemporary professional and news media issues, practices, and trends in Indonesia and the world; debate of matters raised by assigned reading and individual seminar papers; special attention to the journalist's social, professional, and personal values in the context of Indonesian society, the constitution and the Pancasila. Assigned reading, individual library and field research into approved self-selected topic, practice in critiquing, presenting and defending articles of information, analysis and opinion.

The medium of instruction is Bahasa Indonesia, but English is used in the 517/527/547 courses and with foreign visitors or news sources. Reading assignments are in both languages.

Dr. Soetomo Press Institute

Director : Dja'far H. Assegaff

**Programs: Education
Training
Seminars and Symposia**

Dr. Soetomo Press Institute programs are organized to provide education, training, seminars and symposia. They are organized as follows:

A. The Postgraduate Studies in Journalism (PSJ) Program

- B. Special programs for:**
1. professional preparation.
 2. seminars and symposia.

Special Facilities and Publications

- A specialised library of some 2,000 volumes in the field of journalism and the press, as well as subscriptions to national, regional and foreign newspapers and journals. The library is open both to the public and to journalism researchers.
- A 16-station computerized news lab, matching the number of graduate students accepted each cycle.
- Desktop equipment for such internal publications as Adinegoro, the monthly information letter on Institute activities.
- Reporter magazine, currently the only professional journal on journalism in Indonesia. Its six issues per year are subscribed to by journalists and the general public.

A. THE POSTGRADUATE STUDIES IN JOURNALISM (PSJ) PROGRAM

Calendar

The PSJ program of professional education at the Dr. Soetomo Press Institute (LPDS), provides 40 weeks of study across four 10-week terms.

It begins with intensive education in basics and skills for the first 22 weeks.

Then follow news media internships of at least eight weeks, applying skills in real-work environments, guided by cooperating senior editors.

The final 10 weeks are devoted to advanced courses and professional development.

Study hours are 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. daily, Monday through Saturday, except on official holidays. Instruction in the classroom and news lab is extended into covering news in the field.

Certificates of graduation are issued at the end of the program. Graduates are committed to working in the news media for at least two years.

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APPENDIX 4

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

APPENDIX 4

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

C.P.F. Luhulima is currently Senior Research Specialist at the Indonesian Institute of Science (L.I.P.I.), Senior Research Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies, as well as on advisory boards at the National Institute of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served as Director for Science and Technology in the ASEAN Secretariat, and set up the ASEAN Task Force on Energy Cooperation, and on Science and Technology Cooperation. He headed the German Department of the Faculty of Letters, University of Indonesia, and was a visiting lecturer at the Vancouver Community College, British Columbia, and at Eastern Washington University. He is the author of 11 books and over 25 articles. Mr. Luhulima was educated at the University of Indonesia, the Christian University of Indonesia, and the Wilhelmsuniversitaet, Muenster, Germany.

David I. Steinberg, Distinguished Professor of Korean Studies, Georgetown University, is the author of ten books and monographs and over sixty articles on Asian and development affairs. He was educated at Dartmouth College, Lingnan University (Canton, China), Harvard University, and the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London. He was President of the Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs, and a member of the Senior Foreign Service of A.I.D., Department of State, where he held various positions including Directors of the Office of Technical Support for Asia and then the Near East, and Philippines, Thailand, and Burma Affairs. He was a Representative of The Asia Foundation in Burma, Hong Kong, Korea, and Washington, D.C. He has been a consultant for the World Bank, the Rockefeller Foundation, The Asia Society, and has conducted many evaluations for A.I.D. throughout Asia.

Faculty Council

Dja'far H. Assegaff, Chairman

Chairman, Board of Ethics (Dewan Kehormatan), Indonesian Journalists' Association (PWI). Editor of *Warta Ekonomi* weekly business magazine. Senior lecturer in communication, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia. Former PWI secretary-general, deputy head of education, and head of foreign affairs. Permanent secretary to the Confederation of ASEAN Journalists. Past service as deputy managing director of the national newsagency Antara, editor of *Suara Karya* daily, deputy editor of *Indonesia Raya* daily, and of *Abadi* daily. 1963 University of Indonesia communication graduate (Sarjana) 1975 East-West Communication Institute Professional Fellow on Outer Space Communication Policy; 1972 Stanford University communication research internship; 1968 Southeast Asia Press Centre agricultural news reporting course; and National Defense Institute (Lemhannas), 11th regular course.

Andi Baso Mappatoto

Thirty years with the national news agency ANTARA, retiring as staff specialist, head of the Research and Training Bureau, and chairman of the board of directors at the Antara Institute of Journalism Training. 1975 M.A. in political science, University of Hawaii, East-West Center, Honolulu. 1967 communication graduate, School of Communication (Perguruan Tinggi Publisistik, now IISIP). Teaches concurrently at the Institute of Social and Political Sciences (IISIP), Jakarta.

Atmakusumah Astraatmadja

Past service as executive editor of *Indonesia Raya* daily, staff editor at PLA and Antara news agencies, broadcaster for Radio Australia in Melbourne and Deutsche Welle in Cologne, commentator at Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), and most recently, USIS information specialist in Jakarta. 1972-73 Press Foundation of Asia and UN Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning advanced study course in Bangkok on development journalism, 1971 Thomson Foundation Editorial Study Centre senior editors' course in Cardiff, Wales, 1970 Southeast Asia Press Centre business and development reporting seminar in Kuala Lumpur, 1957-61 studies at the School of Communication (now IISIP).

R. E. Stannard Jr.

Institute curriculum and planning adviser 1989-1993. University of Indonesia Fulbright professor of journalism 1977-78, and headed the mass communication unit while at the American University in Cairo 1984-86. Retired from Western Washington University (1969-91) as tenured associate professor and former journalism chairman. Ten years as UPI foreign correspondent 1959-1969 in Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan and the United Nations. Newspaper experience in Alaska, British Columbia and California. 1957 Cornell University M.A. in international relations, Southeast Asia Program fellow. 1953 University of Washington B.A. in Far Eastern Studies. Previous studies in mathematics at California Institute of Technology and physics at the University of Redlands.

Slamet Djabarudi

Chief copy editor and columnist at *Tempo* news magazine. 1992 Asia Foundation Fellow at the six-month Berkeley Journalism Program of the University of California Graduate School of Journalism. Followed one-week advanced copy-editing seminar at the Poynter Institute in St. Petersburg, Florida, and fortnight internships at the *Seattle Times* and *Time Magazine*. Former reporter at the *Indonesia Raya* and *Pelopor* Yogya newspapers. Studied at the IKIP Teachers' College, Yogyakarta.

Warief Djajanto

Former executive editor of the KNI News Service, Jakarta, and correspondent for DEPTI News Asia, Manila-based development news service. 1987 IISIP communication graduate. 1977-1978 Stanford University Professional Journalism Fellow followed by work program with The Associated Press, New York. 1975 Press Foundation of Asia 4th development journalism course in Manila. Workshops: 1990 press release writing team of the World Conference on Education for All, in Jomtien, Thailand, and 1983 journalist-consultant at workshop in Manila on reporting rural Asia, sponsored by the Press Foundation of Asia and Radio Nederland. Teaches concurrently at the Institute of Social and Political Sciences (IISIP), Jakarta.

Instructors

Abdullah Alamudi

Past service as: deputy editor of the *Bisnis Indonesia* business daily; staff editor at the daily *Jakarta Post* and *Tempo* weekly news magazine; correspondent for VOA, AFP, NHK and AP; assistant producer, BBC, London; executive editor, *Berita UNICEF* (UNICEF News); staff editor at the daily *Pedoman*. Currently USIS publication specialist. Studied economics at the University of Tasmania, Hobart, 1961-64, and at Hendon College for Further Education, London 1976-77.

Abdurachman Surjomihardjo

Senior Researcher, Center for Economic and Development Research, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI); lecturer, University of Indonesia Graduate School, National Resilience Studies program. 1988 University of Gadjah Mada PhD in history. 1961 University of Indonesia graduate in history.

Amir Daud

Past service as adviser for the Media Indonesia group, chief editor of *Bisnis Indonesia*, executive editor of the *Jakarta Post*, an editor at *Tempo* and *Pedoman*, correspondent for DPA and AP, All-India Radio Indonesia section, and daily *Waspada* in Medan.

Atmadji Sumarkidjo

Executive editor of the evening daily *Suara Pembaruan* and member of the board of writers of the military affairs journal *Teknologi dan Strategi Militer*. On the consultancy team to *Jayakarta* daily. Former undergraduate advisor, IISIP. Reported for the daily *Sinar Harapan* and was executive editor of TSM. Studied at the School of Communication (now IISIP), was 1988 Fulbright Fellow for Newsroom Management at the Foreign Press Center, Washington, D.C., and attended the 1983 Press Foundation of Asia development journalism course.

Goenawan Mohamad

Editor, *Tempo* and *Swasembada*; former editor, *Ekspres*. Studied psychology at University of Indonesia. 1992 Professor Teeuw Award in literature and journalism, at Leiden. 1992 Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, inaugural fellow of the Australia-Indonesia Institute. 1989 Harvard University Nieman Fellow.

Jakob Oetama

Chief executive and editor of *Kompas* daily and editor of the monthly magazine *Intisari*. President director of PT Gramedia publications. 1961 University of Gadjah Mada graduate in history, 1959 School of Communication graduate (Perguruan Tinggi Publisistik, now IISIP).

Masmimar Mangiang

Executive editor of the economics daily *Neraca*, and officer in charge of publications at the Padi dan Kapas (Rice and Cotton) Foundation. Past service as journalist with the *Kami* and *Pedoman* dailies, staff editor at *Radio Siaran Pendidikan Pemuda* (Youth Education Radio), and with *Tempo* news magazine. Also teaches at the University of Indonesia communication department. Studied at the University of Indonesia law faculty, and at the International Institute for Journalism in Berlin, 1976.

Parni Hadi

Deputy executive editor for editorial operations of the national newsagency Antara, served 1980-86 as its correspondent in Germany. Past service as executive editor of *Indonesia Magazine*, and correspondent for Hongkong-based *Asiaweek* magazine. Deputy secretary-general of the Indonesian Journalists' Association (PWI) and former secretary-general of the Organisation of Asia Pacific News Agencies (OANA). Studied English at the Teachers' College here, and took part in a science writing program in Germany in 1979-80.

Rumhardjono

Senior editor of *Kompas* daily. Past service: former staff editor at the *Merdeka* and the Indonesian Observer dailies. 1958-1964 studied Economics at Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung.

Syu'bah Asa

Has served as deputy editor of *Pelita* daily, executive editor of *Editor* news weekly, and a staff editor at *Tempo*.

T. Fatimah Satrijo

Concurrently instructor in the University of Indonesia School of Social and Political Sciences. 1971 University of Indonesia graduate in law. 1971 University of Indonesia degree in communication.

Admissions

Candidates for the Postgraduate Studies in Journalism (PSJ) program should have a tertiary degree (Sarjana, S1) in any academic discipline.

Applications must include a pass photo, a photocopy of the S1 degree, a university transcript, and a curriculum vitae, together with the entrance examination fee.

Written entrance examinations are administered to qualified applicants, covering Indonesian and English language skills, and general knowledge.

Submit applications by mail or deliver them directly to:

The Secretariat
Dr. Soetomo Press Institute
Press Council Building, 8th floor
Jalan Kebon Sirih 32-34
Jakarta 10110, Indonesia

Dates for applications, written entrance tests, and the start of instruction can be followed in announcements in the news media as registration nears.

Scholarships

Candidates who score well but are unable to pay the tuition may compete for a limited number of scholarships. The normal age limit for scholarship candidates is 27.

Candidates seeking scholarship assistance should say so in their letters of application, explaining the need in detail.

Educational Facilities and Methods

- * Small classes of 16 seats, for more intensive individual attention.
- * A 16-station computerized news laboratory.
- * Journalism skills courses in:
 - writing news and features
 - covering actual events
 - editing news
 - publishing the news
 - photojournalism
 - Indonesian for Journalists
- * Media-related courses on:
 - Indonesian media law & system
 - press history in Indonesia and the world
 - development of print and electronic media
 - contemporary journalism trends
- * Broadening perspective and vision in seminars and discussions on:
 - ethics and journalistic professionalism
 - media and society
 - ideas and culture, with exposure to works by Indonesian and world writers.
- * Several courses are conducted in English

B. SPECIAL PROGRAMS

1. Professional Training Programs

Among these are special educational packets designed in response to news media requests for training their own new reporters.

Also available are short-course packages, basic or advanced, in specific areas of interest to journalists. Typical examples would be training and exercises in legal aspects of the news, techniques of covering industry, and techniques of covering foreign affairs.

2. Seminars and Symposia

The Institute can arrange intensive discussion seminars and symposia both among journalists, and between journalists and non-press circles.

These programs may also be specially designed to engage news media executives in deep discussion and dialogue on particular editorial or management issues.

Dr. Soetomo Press Institute



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Jakarta