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EVALUATION OF

GRANT NO CCS-0007-G-00-2078-00

WITH THE

ATLANTIC COUNCIL

FOR

DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM INITIATIVES IN THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES (Project 110-0007)

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Submitted to

Agency for International Development
Bureau for Europe and Newly Independent States

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CONTENTS

ACRONYMS	1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
1 PURPOSE AND METHOD OF THE EVALUATION	3
2 THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT	5
3 FINDINGS	9
4 MANAGEMENT	18
5 CONCLUSIONS	22
6 RECOMMENDATIONS	25
APPENDIX A LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED	27
APPENDIX B REFERENCES	28

ACRONYMS

A I D	Agency for International Development
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
GAO	General Accounting Office
IMEMO	Institute of World Economy and International Organizations
MPS	Members of Parliament
MSI	Management Systems International
NATO	National Alliance Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Atlantic Council of the United States is a non-profit public policy center that addresses the advancement of U S global interests among the Atlantic and Pacific communities It signed a two-year grant agreement with A I D in September 1992 for $626 500 The mission of the Council is to identify challenges and opportunities illuminate choices, and foster informed public debate about American foreign, security, and international economic policies The purpose of the Grant is to familiarize civilian and military leaders from the NIS with the budgetary and defense policy mechanisms which the civilian executive and legislative authorities in democratic governments utilize for oversight of national armed forces

The environment for changes in civilian-military relations in the Russian Federation and Ukraine is presently not verv conducive to short- to medium-term change The military in both countries remain firmly in control of their spheres of operation and few parliamentary in-roads have been made to exert greater civilian control

The intended inputs were technical assistance personnel trainers, consultants panelists, experts, plus the back-up of an informal network, administrative staff, and the timely delivery of training materials By the end of January 1994 the Council had implemented two seminars The first, from 12-13 June 1993 involved a 2-day seminar in Russia on the U S Defense Budget Process for 38 Russian participants The second program was a week-long seminar for eight participants from Ukraine on Defense Budgeting and Intelligence Oversight held in Washington DC from 17-24 July 1993

The Council's program has suffered delays from the outset and at the time of the evaluation, it has fallen far short of fulfilling its planned activities Both seminars fell short of their original goals The budget seminar was to have been followed by a second iteration of the seminar in Ukraine This did not occur because the Ukrainians were not ready for such a seminar The second seminar was to have a large number of Russian participants However, poor planning, the lack of a Russian-based Council staff person to process potential participants tight time lines, and an underestimation of Russian political sensitivities prevented any Russians from participating

To date the follow-up evaluation of the participants has not been completed The impact of the program so far is unknown, and must be considered to be relatively minor Anecdotally, however, the Council was able to report examples of a few participants in Council programs that were making a policy impact

Despite contacts in both countries, especially in Russia, the Council has not succeeded in establishing even a modest local network of organizations on whose effective cooperation it can count This means that it has not achieved the necessary sources of information, or perspectives, nor has it identified a set of institutions from which to select potential participants It has not managed to mount any consultancies, or to bring any trainees to the U S for the training of trainers exercises Both of these points indicate a lack of meaningful contacts and requests for its assistance

The Council does have significant contacts in the U S and lists among its U S participants a number of high-ranking and well respected experts in the field, who participate at no cost to the project This expertise has been used well for the seminars that have been conducted

Civilian-military relations is an important area of concern And while the DPI project was designed to test the waters in a number of areas, civilian-military relations do not appear to be a fruitful one for A I D to continue Changes in these relationships do not appear to be immediate priorities for either the Russian Federation or Ukraine A small grant to one grantee is unlikely to produce any significant results in the foreseeable future Given the broad range of democratic initiatives in which A I D is involved, it is now appropriate to concentrate efforts in areas that have greater potential for change and partnerships within the NIS Given the distinct absence of any experience for A I D in this area, a better home might be found for this program in the Department of State or Defense

1 PURPOSE AND METHOD OF THE EVALUATION

A Background and Purpose of the Evaluation

This evaluation was conducted by Management Systems International (MSI) under IQC No AEP-0085-I-10-3001-00, Delivery Order No 10 It is the first evaluation of a major sectoral component of assistance from the Agency for International Development (A I D) to the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union It pertains to a portion of A I D 's Democratic Pluralism Initiatives (DPI) Project, No 110-0007, which was authorized on 10 April 1992 Funding for the DPI Project has been increased twice, and it has been extended the project through 31 December 1996

The DPI Project was designed to help build political, legal and social institutions critical to the success of democratic and economic reform in the NIS in the wake of the collapse of communism and the Soviet economic system In its early phase, the Project funded Grants and Cooperative Agreements for U S -based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to provide technical assistance, training, and some equipment Grants and Cooperative Agreements are both nstruments to transfer funds to provide assistance to the recipient in carrying out a program A Cooperative Agreement is a relationship in which substantial involvement is anticipated between A I D and the recipient during the performance of the proposed activity This report refers to the recipient organizations generically as "grantees "

The DPI Project has five sub-sector components rule of law, independent media, political process governance and public administration, and civil society The civil society component is intended to enable citizens to participate actively and effectively in the political and economic life of their countries, to check governmental powers and encourage responsiveness, and to provide services not provided by the government The Cooperative Agreement between A I D and the Atlantic Council is one element of this component of the DPI Project

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to assess the extent to which the grants are meeting the objectives of their agreements fitting with the general guiding principles of democratic reform and able to adjust to the new strategic priorities, being implemented in an effective and efficient manner; and having an impact on the people, organizations and countries of the NIS

B Method

In December 1993, A I D contracted with Management Systems International (MSI) to conduct field evaluations of the activities of seven DPI Project grantees and desk studies of the activities of two grantees

The evaluations were conducted by a team of six management consultants David Read Barker (Team Leader), Cynthia Clapp-Wincek, David Hirschmann, James S Holtaway, Sally J Patterson, and Alan Lessik Four members of the team (Barker, Holtaway, Patterson, and Lessik) divided responsibility for the seven field studies, with three evaluators each taking lead responsibility for two studies and one evaluator taking responsibility for one field study and the

synthesis report The other two members of the team (Hirschmann and Clapp-Wincek) were each assigned lead responsibility for one desk study

The professional backgrounds of the evaluators are development management, cultural anthropology, political science, and political organizing and opinion research All four of the field evaluators had previous professional experience in Russia, three of them had worked in Russia within the previous 6 months

A team planning meeting of the A I D project managers the evaluators, and representatives of the Atlantic Council and other grantees was held on 4 January 1994 The participants agreed to support the evaluation as a collaborative, candid, constructive, and creative process The evaluators then interviewed A I D and Atlantic Council officials in their offices in Washington, D C Extensive documentation was gathered and reviewed by the team

The evaluators visited the Russian Federation from 20-29 January, at which time the team broke into two sub-teams, one of which visited Ukraine from 29 January to 5 February and one of which visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan from 29 January to 5 February

As one of the desk studies the evaluation of the Atlantic Council was based on

- A review of documents (the Grant Agreement, quarterly reports, A I D policy statements on democracy and assistance to Russia),
- Discussions with AC staff in Washington,
- Interviews with A I D /W and USAID/Moscow staff, and
- Review of participant evaluation forms

When the field team returned then two desk-study evaluators met with them to exchange notes, and follow-up interviews were held with Grantees and A I D officials

The team interviewed 10 people, who are listed in Appendix A, and reviewed a number of documents, which are listed in Appendix B

2 THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

A Purpose and Description of the Program

The Atlantic Council of the United States is a non-profit, public policy center that addresses the advancement of U S global interests among the Atlantic and Pacific communities Its stated mission is to identify challenges and opportunities, illuminate choices, and foster informed public debate about American foreign, security, and international economic policies Its numerous programs include an examination of new relationships within Europe and between Europe and North America as they affect the security and prosperity of the U S , and assistance in the democratic transformation of the New Independent States (NIS) and an examination of their relations with the U S

Under the latter program, the Council implements a number of "sub-programs" which include the future of Russian-American Relations in a Pluralistic World, a Working Group on Ukraine, United States-Russian Dialogue, Institution Building in Civil-Military Relations, and Democracy and Governance Before engaging in this work in Russia and Ukraine, the Council had carried out successful undertakings of a similar nature in Central and Eastern Europe

According to the Grant Agreement, "The purpose of the Grant is to familiarize civilian and military leaders from the NIS with the budgetary and defense policy mechanisms which the civilian executive and legislative authorities in democratic governments utilize for oversight of national armed forces "

In terms used in the Council's proposal, "The principal long-term objective of the program is to encourage the integration of Russian and Ukrainian military establishments into society, opening them up to greater supervision from, and closer working relationships with, the democratically elected civilian leadership of the executive and legislative branches of government and with the press and public at large This process requires pursuit of the immediate goals of this program the illustration to new civilian leaders of European and American mechanisms for oversight of the armed forces, the design of appropriate mechanisms of civilian oversight of the military, the training of staff of these mechanisms, and eventually the design of appropriate programs of military education about those mechanisms "

B Country Context and Issues, and the Need for Adaptation

Within two months of the signing of the Grant Agreement in September 1993, the Council saw a need to alter the program in a major way The operating environment in the United States, Russia and Ukraine had changed. At home, a new Administration was elected and signaled its intent to develop new policy initiatives for the NIS

Overseas, changed political circumstances in Russia required considerably more caution in setting up civil-military programs than had been anticipated, while increased antagonism to western assistance among some parties made it a more sensitive undertaking The need for cuts in defense spending rendered the process of enhanced civilian control more complex for local

leaders In addition, one of the anticipated key players -- the Russian Security Council -- stopped operations In Ukraine, the overall political situation appeared more promising at the time, although defense management remained in the hands of the military

Two ongoing obstacles have continued to delay progress throughout the 16 months of the program First, neither the Ukrainian nor the Russian Defense Ministries have come under civilian control The military has remained reluctant to accept this change and political leaders have not seen it as advantageous to press the process too far Second, the parliaments and their defense committees have proved very difficult to communicate with largely because they have no staff support Originally, the Council thought that it had a reasonably good chance of dealing with a civilian-led Ministry of Defense in Russia This did not turn out to be the case

At the time of the evaluation, the Council was awaiting the formation of the Parliamentary Committees in Russia and the election of a Parliament in Ukraine Given the outcome of the Russian elections, there is concern that the Parliamentary Defense Committee may be hostile to the President or that the Parliamentary Defense Committee will be composed of members or ex-members of the military, whom do not evidence strong commitment to civilian oversight Both of these concerns suggest the ned for sensitivity over strengthening parliamentary oversight prematurely

C Program Budget and Financial Management

The Council's headquarters are in Washington, D C To implement its Program, the Council has a full time Director devoting two-thirds time to this project and a Deputy Director who devotes 100% of her time They share the support staff, intern support, and office equipment available to the rest of the Council

Table 1 Grant Budget

Russian National Security Council Training	$ 39 200
Institution Building - Briefings	169,000
Institution Building - Training Programs	134 400
Administrative Costs	173,350
Indirect Costs	110,550
TOTAL	$ 626,500

As of the end of December 1994, the Council had spent $146,000, about one-quarter of its budget

3 FINDINGS

A Inputs, Activities, and Delivery Mechanisms

The intended inputs were technical assistance personnel trainers, consultants, panelists, experts, with back-up of an informal network administrative staff, and the timely delivery of training materials Quantities were not expressed in the Grant Agreement, but based on the two activities carried out--three trainers were needed for one 2-day training exercise in Russia, and approximately 15 to 20 panelists for a week-long seminar in the U S --one might estimate (very roughly) that in order to fulfill the program as envisioned, inputs over the two years might have amounted to between 20 and 30 trainers visiting Russia and Ukraine, 60 and 100 panelists and presenters in the U S , and 15 to 25 consultants, plus all the accompanying background material translated where necessary into Russian

Table 2 Summary of Inputs

	Estimate of Planned Inputs	Number Achieved by 1 February 1994
Trainers	20-30	4
Panelists	60-100	25
Consultants	10-20	0

By the end of January 1994, the Council used four technical assistance personnel abroad, and about 25 panelists at home At the time of the evaluation, two additional seminars were planned for March 1994 However, these recently have been postponed

B Outputs

The original proposal had no specific targets for outputs Again, one could estimate (based on the records of the events that were organized) that the target might have been between 50 and 80 people briefed, 130 to 160 people trained in-country, 2 to 5 trained on longer term programs in the U S , and technical advice on law and mechanisms of oversight given to 15 to 25 people

Although it is not mentioned explicitly, the quality of those trained, briefed, and advised is as important as quantity Quality would include such attributes as relevant experience, capacity to benefit from the activity, location in (or relationship to) any of the main policy influencing hierarchies, and level of seniority of participants and therefore capacity (or potential capacity in the near future) to influence military-civil policy and practice In the process, some key legislative enactments relating to civilian oversight of the military would have been passed, and some civilian, governmental, and nongovernmental agencies would be strengthened.

By the end of January 1994 the Council had implemented two programs The first 12-13 June 1993, involved a 2-day seminar in Russia on the U S Defense Budget Process for 38 Russian participants The Director of the Program was co-chair with Sergei Rogov, a senior officer in two Russian foreign policy institutions, who also assisted with most of the local arrangements Also participating were Stanley Resor former Secretary of the Army and a Council Officer; Neal Curtin Director of Planning and Reporting, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office (GAO), and Steven Kosiak Senior Budget Analyst Defense Budget Project In addition to presentations and discussions, a number of relevant documents, including GAO reports, Annual Reports of the Secretary of Defense, and Congressional Budget Office reports were distributed to participants, and left with Mr Rogov's center

The second program was a week-long seminar for eight participants from Ukraine on Defense Budgeting and Intelligence Oversight was held in Washington, DC from 17-24 July 1993 Participants attended briefings on the roles played by the Pentagon, Congressional Research Service, General Accounting Office, House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence, the Office of Management and Budget, and the National Defense University Atlantic Council Co-Chair, General Andrew Goodpaster and Council Board member, Frank Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense and Stanley Resor also met with the group In addition to the full briefing agenda, program participants maintained a full social schedule These social occasions provided important opportunities for informal and frank discussions by participants This program involved approximately 25 to 30 panelists at occasions such as lunches, receptions, and informal gatherings

All of the panelists were highly qualified and experienced professionals and evidenced the capacity of the Council to mobilize this level of personnel It is not clear how familiar panelists are with Ukrainian circumstances or their degree of sensitivity to Ukrainian cultural/ political/situational circumstances Only one session was expressly devoted to Ukrainian issues, but it is undoubtedly true that much of the question and answer periods would have related to issues specific to Ukraine The Council has considerable contacts with foreign service experience or policy experience with military and security concerns which might serve to facilitate inter-cultural communication The Council does stress, as part of its operating style, that it is sensitive to local political suspicion about western influence "We emphasize that we are not in a teaching role, but are there to exchange experiences Also we do not advise about policy, but about methodology, and we provide explanations of our experiences and what worked and what failed "

The following up seminar to the budget seminar was not held in Ukraine Purportedly, because the Ukranians were not ready for such a seminar No Russians participated in the U S training This was attributed to poor planning, a tight timeframe, the lack of a Russian based Council staff person and a lack of sensitivity with regard to including Ukranians and Russians in the same seminar

There was no evaluation by participants of the first seminar Evaluations of sessions by the participants in the second seminar were very positive averaging well over 4 for all presentations on a 1 to 5 scale The lowest was 4 11 and the highest 4 78 Comments by the participants were generally very positive, although a number of practical suggestions (none of them major) were made for improvement The responses made one significant point all the participants believed

that this kind of training was needed bv the Parliament and about half thought it was needed by the Office of the President

Table 3 Summary of Outputs

	Estimate of Outputs	Number Achieved by 1 February 1994
Participants in the U S	40-80	8
Trainees in country/region	130-160	38
Trained in U S	2-5	0
Receiving Consulting advice	15-25	0

At the time of the evaluation, the Council had advanced plans and grantor agreement to conduct two further programs One was planned for this spring, near Moscow, for about 20 to 25 members of the Russian NSC and the newly-elected Russian Parliament The second undertaking, scheduled to take place from 2-4 April 1994 in Ukraine, was intended for 30 to 35 defense journalists from Russia, Ukraine Kazakhstan, and Belarus Both of these sessions have been rescheduled for later dates

The establishment and cultivating of institutional relationships is seen as an additional output of these activities In Russia, the Council has strengthened previously established relations with IMEMO (the Institute of World Economy and International Organizations) and the Institute of the USA and Canada It has also established contacts with Sergei Rogov, President of the Center for National Security and International Affairs and Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada a defense and security consultant who worked closely with the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense In terms of getting its work done, this particular contact has been the most useful for the Council He collaborated in setting up the June Budget Seminar by selecting the Russian participants and making logistical arrangements, and is assisting with the proposed seminar for Russian NSC and Parliamentary members

In Ukraine, the Council established contact with a colonel in the Defense Ministry who was responsible for addressing the issues of concern to the AC and seeking U S assistance The Council also established contacts in the Defense Commission of the Rada, and with four institutes which appeared willing to assist the Council in carrying out its proposed functions the Ukraine Institute of World Economy and International Relations the Institute of Global and Regional Security Studies, the U S -Ukraine Foundation's Parliamentary support operation, and a new economic reform center which was being established by the Former Deputy Prime Minister Volodymyr Lanovoi None of these contacts, however, appear to have provided practical help in program implementation

An indirect output might also be considered to be the building of informal contacts through a couple of exploratory visits and through meetings held at the Council with prominent visitors

brought to the U S by other organizations such as the Department of Defense and Global Outlook For example, the Council organized briefings in November 1992 for Alesei Tsarev, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense of the Russian Supreme Soviet's Committee on Security Issues, and Evgeni Volk, a consultant to the Committee

Cost Effectiveness

The Council had spent $56,000 at the end of the first activity and $129,000 at the end of the second The start-up expenses for administration and exploratory visits, etc , means that on the average, it cost about $50,000 for each event (in one case a 2-day program for 38 people in Russia, and the other a week-long program in Washington for eight people) This is not the type of program where it makes sense to cost this out per participant because quality is as important as quantity, or more so Further, different types of programs have different purposes in mind, and may be seen as complementing one another rather than providing alternative modes of operating

The cost varies significantly with the location of the seminars It is significantly less expensive to offer these programs in-country rather than in the U S In addition, increasing the number of participants at a seminar or following up a seminar overseas with another in another location would increase the numbers of participants while maintaining costs The Council planned to do both of these things but neither has happened

C Impact

The principal long-term objective of the program was to encourage the integration of Russian and Ukrainian military establishments into society, opening them up to greater supervision from, and closer working relationships with, the democratically elected civilian leadership of the executive and legislative branches of government and with the press and the public at large This goal could be achieved only if the armed forces and their military leaders were educated to be respectful of the democratic process and responsive to the civilian chain of command

Clearly within a period of fifteen months, achievement of any impact based on these objectives is unlikely since it is dependent on factors beyond the manageable interest of the Council

The earliest signs of impact would be evidenced by a number of people who had benefitted from training, briefings, exposure, technical advice, etc , who had managed to apply what they had learned in some concrete manner towards achieving the purposes of the program For example, parliamentarians asking questions or having an input on the budget, or urging new legislation or supervisory mechanisms, members of a national security council playing a liaison and policy role, parliamentary committees or civilian members of the executive branch being involved in military policy making, evidence of enhanced expertise and effectiveness in think tanks or academic institutions, contributions by such think tanks to policy analysis and debate and oversight, and/or better press investigation and coverage of the military, including debates about the military and its role

In the medium term, one might anticipate institutional changes reflected in more effective parliamentary committees, a more open detailed and substantive debate about the defense budget, national security councils playing a more effective policy and liaison role, and the appointment of civilians to the senior posts of the defense ministries

To date, the follow-up evaluation of the participants has not been completed and therefore there is little evidence of even short-term impacts Since the whole program was delayed, the first activities were organized in June and July 1993, only about 6 months before this evaluation commenced The follow-up questionnaires used by the Council are in the final stages of preparation and have not been mailed yet

Anecdotally however, the Council was able to report some examples that participants in Council programs were making a policy impact An MP in Ukraine at the time of the training, Mr Kostenko, is now a Minister of the Environment and a major participant in the nuclear weapons negotiations Another participant, V Lernish, the Chairman of the Defense Commission of the Ukrainian Parliament, met with the highest levels of the U S military and security establishment during his visit to Washington It is believed that these meetings have strengthened his resolve to work towards the same ends as those of this program There are also a few examples of people who at the time of training, were indistinguishable from their colleagues but who have risen to higher and more strategic positions

Some other participants in Council activities are reported to have assisted in the drafting of important legislation extending civilian control over the military in Russia (The Council acknowledges that the military has been effectively ignoring such legislation, and that these laws may well be overturned during the next session of Parliament.)

An interesting indirect result of its programs has been a request to the Council from the Chinese for a seminar on civil-military relations

D Grantee Future Directions

The possibility of training defense journalists was not a central part of the initial program, but it is seen as possibly a very useful addition/replacement for other programs

Although members of the Council hope the political situation will improve in both countries, they do not have cause for optimism It was acknowledged that this program requires a long term undertaking, possibly involving generational change They also believe that the turnover of personnel which it has experienced in these two countries will continue, and therefore that there will continue to be delays requiring prolonged effort in order to provide programs

Within 5 years, the Council hopes it will have achieved some level of acceptance among Russian and Ukrainian leaders of the need for civilian supervision of the military and the development of some civilian expertise in defense and military policy and budgeting But it is thought that it will take a longer time to get strong civilian institutions to carry this out effectively, and even longer to get the Russians beyond the mind set that they are encircled and endangered, and for the top echelons of the Russian military to build up respect for civilian officials and politicians

At least one senior member of the Council was more optimistic about Ukraine than about Russia, arguing that there may be some advantage to lack of a national government in Ukraine since 1922 They are 'very thin in institutions of national government and therefore more receptive to advice from the west Their leadership wants to associate with the west and in particular the U S Since the Ukrainians are still in the process of forming a national army, it might prove relatively easier to work for a civilian Defense Ministry and to create a better relationship between the government and the military

The Council is awaiting developments in the two new parliaments, and hoping that the forthcoming seminar will provide it with some better sense of how to work with the Russian Parliament It notes, with concern, that the general trend appears to be towards strong presidential systems and weak parliamentary systems, which creates a new strategic dilemma for its program whether to support weak and turbulent parliaments, which the military seems capable of resisting, or to bolster the oversight capacity of increasingly powerful and potentially autocratic executives

4 MANAGEMENT

A Grant Management

Management by Atlantic Council

The Atlantic Council is a small organization attempting a very large mission It primarily relies on the extensive contacts and experience of its Director and the Board of Directors However, due to illness, the Director has not been able to take as active a role as is needed

The required six month Work Plan with specific objectives for each program component and a strategy for measuring impact was not very detailed initially, nor has it been updated on a regular basis As of January 1994, three quarterly reports had been received, that is one less than required The reports provide brief and clear information on activities carried out, and explanations of changes in circumstances The chief weakness in the reports is the lack of substantive discussion of progress towards achieving program purpose and objectives

According to the Council and A I D , there have been delays in communication and responses In general, though, these comments have been accompanied by a mutual understanding of the novelty and complexity of the situation, the heavy work load of new personnel, and practical early problems such as unstable fax lines The Council has not established a strong relationship with A I D Mission staff in the two countries, partly because its program is small, and therefore does not warrant a permanent presence in country or even regular visits Further, civil-military relations is an area of expertise in which there is a very limited amount of experience in A I D or embassies Even in embassies in which there is considerable expertise about military, security, intelligence and arms issues, the narrower focus on civil-military relations and questions relating to defense budgeting is relatively new to their work

The grantee has experienced some problems with a few of the requirements, such as country clearance visa procedures, insurance requirements, and requirement for physicals The Council also asks whether such a small program should have the same reporting requirements as larger programs Some of the reporting requirements appear duplicative The grantee feels that A I D 's decisions have sometimes taken too long, for example, with the proposed journalists' training programs Given that windows of opportunity open and shut unexpectedly, the grantee's opinion is that could respond far more quickly than A I D procedures will allow

Management by AID

Similarly, A I D believes that, on a number of occasions, the Council has been slow to respond to its needs They expressed concern that the Council had thus far appeared unable to adapt quickly enough to changing circumstances in the two countries Further, the question was raised as to whether the Council had sufficient information and local contacts to make the necessary adjustments to its program But in the main, A I D felt that the Council has generally kept A I D informed, clarified the causes of delay, and explained its intentions The reporting is considered good for a small program

At the field level, the Council may have closer communication with the Embassy than with the Mission The Ambassador in Moscow has communicated positive interest in the program, and some of the Council's communication is carried on directly with him On one occasion, relating to the failed Russian participation in the July 1993 Washington seminar, there was sharp criticism of the Council emanating from the Embassy in Moscow The criticism indicated that the Council's actions showed a lack of appreciation of A I D procedural and time requirements, of concern for the quality of the Russian participants, and of an up-to-date understanding of the dynamics of Russian politics

The Council has learned that arranging conferences on these types of topics takes considerably more time than had been anticipated when the program commenced in late 1992 It has also learned the importance for staff and trainers to be aware of the political and cultural environment from which individual participants come (and presumably how different it might be from countries covered by their European experience) As one person said, "they may want to be 'good democrats' but the environment is very limiting " In particular, there has been a singular lack of civilians with whom to work It is not always clear how many of them are committed to reform as many participants have only very recently "switched boats" and their commitment to reform might be shallow

Other practical lessons on arrangements include Allow time for people to recover from trips, avoid overcrowding the schedule all interaction needs interpreters--including question and answer sessions and social occasions--allow plenty of time for question and answer sessions and for informal social engagements These latter events provide useful information and encourage frank exchanges They also, contribute to cost savings as private people, embassies, and other agencies share costs

Clearly, too, the Council considers its reliance on Mr Rogov to have been successful insofar as he has proved reliable in fulfilling his commitments The particular location he has selected outside of Moscow is suitable for keeping groups together and focused, and is comparatively economic compared to accommodations in Moscow The Council also feels it is necessary to have ready a number of different program offerings aimed at different groups of people so that it will be in a position to re-focus in times of setbacks, and take advantage of strategic openings

B Organizational and Institutional Factors

Monitoring and Evaluation

Evaluations are based on questionnaires given to participants, the first at the end of each program "while details of the meetings are freshly in mind," and the second, mailed 6 months later, intended to identify experiences which had proven most relevant to the work of the individual concerned

The proposal stated that the evaluation of the overall program would depend on the type of follow-on activities which the initial program generated However, no follow-on activities have occurred to date

In practice, the only evaluation exercise so far is the administration of a post-conference questionnaire after the July 1993 seminar in Washington An evaluation was not conducted at the budget seminar in Russia, and the Council was in the process of preparing the follow-up questionnaires (scheduled for 6 months after each event) at the time of evaluation Given that the issue of monitoring and evaluation were discussed seriously at the negotiating meeting, it is noteworthy that more was not being done to elicit the information required It was not clear that a system was put in place to systematically collect, record, and analyze results of the Council's undertakings

Coordination

There appeared to be close consultation and practical cooperation in the U S , most particularly in Washington, DC, with, among others, the Pentagon, Congressional Research Service, the General Accounting Office, the Department of Defense, the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Defense University, Global Outlook, the Rand Corporation, the U S Institute of Peace, the Center for War and Peace, the News Media at New York University, and Radio Free Europe

There is an informal coordination and policy network of these types of organizations in the U S This network of organizations, and the Council's capacity to call on its members for assistance in its programs, provides an obvious advantage to achieving A I D 's objectives in civil-military relations

In-country, the Council has a several-year-long relationship, certainly preceding this program, with established Russian institutes, IMEMO and the USA-Canada Institute, both of which are in a state of transformation as they can no longer survive on Government funding alone

Criteria of Selection

This is an issue that deserves consideration for a number of reasons First, if the impact of the program is dependent upon the quality of those who participate, the Council needs to make clear the criteria necessary to satisfy its definition of quality For example, in preparing for the next seminar in Russia, the Council said that it will require that half the participants be middle or senior level staff of the NSC and that the other half come from Defense and Finance Ministries and from Parliament provided they show interest in improving civilian control over the military

The Council is also interested in party balance It is not clear that Mr Rogov has been informed of this, but there is confidence that he is aware of this requirement. This indicates the second need for clarity on criteria of selection If responsibility for selection of participants is delegated, the Council needs to make its criteria explicit.

The third reason derives from the need for non- or multi-partisanship in programs U S NGOs need to be multipartisan in their operations There is, of course, some difference in interpretation of this notion, and it may exclude assistance to actors judged to be inherently anti-democratic

It is clear that, given the difficulties experienced in managing the civil-military program, it would be unrealistic to expect the Council to have defined and implemented such a set of criteria It is also makes sense, in terms of the objectives of this program, that the Council has been primarily concerned with achieving an appropriate level of seniority and balance among the key security institutions As the Council moves to work with defense journalists and parliamentarians, and as it looks to widen its institutional connections, these criteria will become critical to the full achievement of its democratic undertaking

5 CONCLUSIONS

1 Given the international and political significance of Russia, the military power of both Russia and Ukraine, and the extremely uncertain and volatile political and economic environment of both the challenge of enhancing civil-military relations must continue to be addressed The Atlantic Council has the network of contacts and expertise to mount programs on civil-military relations

2 However, operating in such a volatile situation, this initiative must be considered the type of high risk program in which there is a strong chance of early failure The Council's program suffered delays from the outset It has fallen far short of fulfilling its planned activities At this stage, with about 9 months to go in its contract, it has spent about a quarter of the money available to it It has consequently "underproduced" on Russian and Ukrainian participants, trainees, and beneficiaries of its programs The impact of the program so far is unknown, and must be considered to be relatively minor

3 Despite contacts in both countries, especially in Russia, the Council has not succeeded in establishing even a modest local network of organizations It has not managed to mount any consultancies, or to bring any trainees to the U S for training of trainers exercises Both of these points indicate a lack of meaningful contacts and requests for its assistance

4 The Council has not developed adequate monitoring and evaluation systems for its program Even though it has mounted only two undertakings, the Council may have underestimated the importance to A I D of evaluation, and of developing systems aimed at measurement of performance and results The Council has not made explicit its definitions of success in its programs

6 RECOMMENDATIONS

1 While the area of civilian-military relations is an important one, it does not appear that A I D can mount a sufficiently effective program to achieve any impact The DPI project was designed to test the waters in a number of areas, however, civilian-military relations do not appear to be a fruitful one to continue Changes in these relationships do not appear to be immediate priorities for either the Russian Federation or Ukraine A small grant to one grantee is unlikely to produce any significant results in the foreseeable future And given the broad range of democratic initiatives in which A I D is involved, it is now appropriate to concentrate efforts in areas that have greater potential for change and partnerships within the NIS

This is not to say that civilian-military relations are not an important area in which to attempt to influence people and events in the NIS However, given the distinct absence of any experience for A I D in this area, a better home might be found for this program in the Department of State or Defence

2 If this program continues under the aegis of another branch of the US government, the Council needs to redouble its efforts to establish a better in-country presence in the NIS While its programs can count on very high levels of support from decision makers in the US, it needs to develop the same level of contacts in the NIS, in order to be successful Changes in the political landscape occur so unexpectedly and sometimes so dramatically that the Council needs some kind of on going monitoring and rapid information system in place in the two countries While Sergei Rogov in Russia has proved to be reliable and able to bring activities to closure, efforts need to be made to diversify institutional contacts and institution-building efforts

3 The program needs to be rendered explicit and measurable The Council needs to explain its inputs, outputs and what results might be feasible in each of the two countries These need to be made explicit in order to gain a more rigorous sense of the degree of divergence between intentions and achievements

APPENDIX A LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

David C Acheson	President, Atlantic Council of the U S
John A Baker	Director, Civil-Military Program, The Atlantic Council
Bryant George	A I D /EUR/NIS/DIHHR
Andrew J Goodpaster	Co-Chair, Atlantic Council of the U S
Jon Gunderson	Former Charge d'Affairs, American Embassy, Kiev
John Hardt	Congressional Research Service
Melissa K Henton	Deputy Director, Civil-Military Program, Atlantic Council of the U S
Kristin Loken	A I D /EUR/NIS/DIHHR
Alan Reed	USAID/Moscow
Stanley Resor	Member of the Atlantic Council Board
Jeff Simon	National Defense University

APPENDIX B. REFERENCES

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