

**EVALUATION OF THE
HAITI COMMUNAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAM**

**Funded by
the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives
and Implemented by
the International Organization for Migration**



Bas-Vaudreuil Road Project
Croix des Bouquets

April 1996

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AOJ	USAID/Haiti Administration of Justice Project
ARD	Associates in Rural Development, a USAID contractor for the DEP Project
BHR	Bureau for Humanitarian Response, USAID/Washington
CAC	Community Improvement Committee (French acronym)
CASEC	Conseil d'Administration des Sections Communales, three member elected body that governs each of Haiti's 535 Communal Sections, when formed.
CGP	Communal Governance Program
DEP	Democracy Enhancement Project, a USAID/Haiti local government development project
FADH	Force Armée d'Haiti
FAES	Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Social, an IDB program that funds small projects throughout Haiti
FRAPH	Front de la Resistance Armee du Peuple Haitian
FY	Fiscal Year
GOH	Government of Haiti
HABITAT	An office of the United Nations active in municipal development
HNP	Haitian National Police
ICP	In-country Refugee Processing Program
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPSF	Interim Police and Security Force
JOBS	Jobs Creation Program, funded initially by USAID through various Private Voluntary Organization's (PVO's); the World Bank picked up the program in September 1995
LAC	Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, USAID/Washington
MNF	U.S.-led Multi-National Force that deployed in Haiti from September, 1994 through March 31, 1995, at which time it handed off to UNMIH
MSI	Management Systems International, Inc., Washington, D.C.
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID/Washington
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID/Washington
PADF	Pan American Development Foundation
PRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Department of State
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization, an NGO that meets the standards for negotiation with USAID
UBRD	Union du Bloque Raquet pour le Developpement, an NGO in Jacmel
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti (Peacekeeping Force)
UNV	United Nations Volunteer

USAID United States Agency for International Development. When used as "USAID" this acronym refers corporately to the entire agency. When individual units are intended, the acronym used will be more finite, e.g., USAID/Haiti, OTI.

USG United States Government


BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA

1. Country: Haiti
2. Project Title: Haiti Assistance Project: International Organization for Migration (IOM)
3. Project Number: 968-4028
4. Project Dates:
 - a. Project Agreement: September 22, 1994
 - b. Final Obligation Date: FY 1996
 - c. Most recent Project Assistance Completion Date: March 31, 1996¹
5. Project Funding:
 - a. USAID bilateral funding (IDA grant: project plus estimated operating costs for Communal Governance Program) US\$11 million
 - b. Other (Local, Military, UNV) ²
6. Mode of Implementation: AID Grant Agreement with the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
7. Project Designers: USAID/BHR/Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)
8. Responsible USAID Officials:
 - a. USAID/BHR/OTI: Frederick Barton, Director
 - b. USAID/Haiti: Lawrence Crandall, Mission Director
9. Previous Evaluations: None

¹The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) is in the process of extending this project to December 31, 1996.

²For each micro-project, Haitian community organizations supplied in-kind contributions, especially volunteer labor. Also, in numerous instances, U.S. and UN military contingents provided cash, materials, transport or technical support. U.S. Special Forces teams were authorized to spend up to \$1,000 to complement CGP projects in their areas. The United Nations provided 15 international and Haitian UN Volunteers (UNVs) as field officers for this project, as well.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview

The United States government is addressing humanitarian, political and economic development considerations as part of its civilian preparations to help restore a democratic form of government of Haiti. The U.S. Agency for International Development's newly established Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) is playing a central role in this effort. In September 1994, OTI launched the Communal Governance Program (CGP), along with a companion project to demobilize and retrain Haitian military and police. Both activities are being implemented through a grant agreement with the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

CGP was authorized to provide rapid, time-limited and visible assistance to help restore democratically elected government and encourage Haitians to move from an environment of intimidation towards a process of popular participation. The program is utilizing a decentralized implementation process in order to be responsive to local populations, especially in rural areas. Its participatory approach to community discussions helps citizens and their elected officials determine priorities and make decisions on how to better their lives. To provide tangible benefits in such an impoverished country, CGP is funding and managing numerous micro-projects and activities.

Management Systems International (MSI) was contracted to evaluate CGP. It assembled a four-member team with extensive United States Agency for International Development (USAID) experience in managing and evaluating projects as well as on-the-ground experience in Haiti. During the team's January - February 1996 visit, it collaborated with three Haitian social scientists, IOM's evaluation chief, and two USAID staff members to conduct the evaluation which employed a multi-disciplinary approach and extensive field interviews.

Evaluation Findings

Democratization

While the restoration of a democratically elected government was brought about primarily by the arrival of foreign troops as part of a larger diplomatic effort, CGP contributed to the democratization process by quickly moving into a new political space and providing badly needed material resources to enable local organizations to begin improving their communities. **CGP empowered local organizations to address development problems in very concrete ways.**

CGP is providing a means for Haitians to express themselves freely both with one another and with their local representatives. This is resulting in local officials being more responsive to their constituents in determining priorities and the allocation of program funds. CGP is also serving to facilitate the decentralization of government by working directly with local community groups and locally elected officials. Aided by IOM's effective management, CGP has injected transparency and accountability into programs and transactions involving the use of community resources. Despite some initial and well justified skepticism, CGP has started an important process to rebuild confidence in local government and lay the foundation for other democratization activities by USAID and other donors.

Outreach

OTI and IOM are achieving the remarkable feat of providing highly valued project assistance to all regions of Haiti and to 113 of the country's 133 communes or counties. CGP has engaged more than 2,000 community groups representing some 50,000 Haitians throughout the country. Although earlier USAID projects had achieved similar geographical spread, CGP has been unusual in the variety of projects which it has funded and the speed with which it has moved. The goals of rapid action and high visibility are being fully achieved by the project.

Beneficiaries

Popular reaction to CGP micro-projects, particularly Phase I activities (schools, roads, water) is highly positive. CGP is uniformly praised for a) the rapidity with which it responds to proposals; b) absence of hidden personal or political criteria in micro-project approval; and c) its full compliance with its part of all agreements. The micro-projects selected also benefit women and men equally, with children as major beneficiaries of CGP activities. The evaluation team did note, however, a limited skewing of micro-project locations in some urban versus rural sites and along roads or accessible tracks. This was viewed as unintended and more related to practical management and time considerations. While there had been concern about the possibility of disproportionate use of resources based on political or other factors, no evidence was found to show such use.

Collaboration with Multinational Forces

A key ingredient in this project is the close cooperation with the U.S. and other foreign military. From the initial planning stages in Washington, D.C. to the on-the-ground operational period, OTI and IOM worked to coordinate their efforts with the military. This collaboration, which was greatly facilitated by the rapid and successful completion of the military's primary mission, is resulting in both the military and civilian counterparts benefitting from sharing expertise and complementing one another's efforts. CGP is especially profiting from the security umbrella as well as the greater logistical and transportation resources of the military.

Management

Following some preliminary uncertainty about project design and objectives and problems with hiring and training field staff, IOM developed a well organized management structure, involving micro-project approval procedures, administrative guidelines, documentation mechanisms and an impressive data base for all activities. OTI/IOM quickly mobilized international and Haitian staff to open field offices nationwide and initiate operations swiftly.

Transition

Because of the inherently short-term nature of OTI activities, CGP will now terminate at the end of 1996. Another extension is not being planned. The challenge for USAID is to build on the CGP successes and facilitate the transition of certain functions to other USAID, Haitian and/or donor activities. For example, the Communal Improvement Committees are a temporary mechanism set

up under the CGP to involve local officials in decisions about the use of funds. Once elections take place for local assemblies, these committees may disband. The experience with such local representative groups, however, should not be lost and should be included in the planning and implementation of future bilateral USAID and international agency projects. Particularly when there is an extension of Phase II of this program, the added experience gained by these committees in preparing acceptable proposals for funding by Haitian or other donors is a valuable resource for the further development of local government.

Lessons Learned

- USAID is to be commended for making the needed adjustments to respond rapidly in Haiti. Its interventions would probably not be feasible for a more typical in-country Mission or where there is no resident Mission.
- Although OTI should be encouraged to integrate more of its operations with other parts of USAID (and they with OTI), including the in-country Mission, it deserves particular recognition for the success of this project.
- The "notwithstanding" authority in the use of its special funding gives OTI an important advantage in speed and flexibility which should be used elsewhere to deliver development assistance. In exercising this prerogative, however, OTI should vigorously strive to incorporate into its program more of the sound development criteria and management practices of some of USAID's traditional operations.
- The feasibility and utility of military and civilian cooperation in assistance activities was well demonstrated. The military provided transportation and other logistic support to OTI/IOM projects. The security offered to civilian counterparts by the mere presence of military in the region was vitally important. Such assistance may be essential in similar circumstances before development activities can really get underway and have an impact. U.S. Special Forces and Civil Affairs units were helped by the financial resources and on-the-ground knowledge provided by the USAID/IOM staff. Such linkages can and should be pursued in other settings where both civilian and military personnel are present.
- The well received switch from an emphasis on civic education to one based on small projects contains a generic lesson. Democratization efforts staged in an impoverished setting such as Haiti are effectively pursued through concrete and adequately funded activities yielding tangible benefits.
- Under conditions of institutional chaos, CGP also demonstrates that it is both possible and desirable for USAID assistance programs to design delivery systems that provide external resources to local communities without passing through the normal channels of the host government. Particularly where local government is either weak or non-existent as in Haiti, a multifaceted approach involving both Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and government as well as continued management of the funds by USAID, serves as a very useful check on the deficiencies of governmental structures while providing real benefits to the people.

Conclusion

The evaluation team judges CGP to be a very successful project in terms of meeting overall U.S. goals and objectives in a most difficult political and economic situation. The effort has enhanced U.S. and multilateral efforts to bring about a political transition in the country while providing real benefits to the Haitian people. On the whole, the managerial achievements of the CGP far outweigh its problems. The evaluation team concludes that both the in-country USAID/OTI coordinator as well as the IOM management and field staff involved in the implementation of the program performed with overall excellence. USAID, and OTI especially, now need to build upon this performance both in Haiti and in comparable national political transitions in other parts of the world.

I. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMUNAL GOVERNANCE PROJECT

This report presents the results of an evaluation of the Communal Governance Program (CGP) in Haiti. The project was originally funded in Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 by USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR), Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) as part of the U.S.-led multinational effort to restore democratically elected government to Haiti. The project was obligated and administered largely through a grant agreement with the Geneva-based International Organization for Migration (IOM). Coupled with a companion project for Haitian military demobilization and reintegration, the overall grant was first committed in the amount of \$6.9 million and thus far totals \$20.9 million over three fiscal years (about \$11 million of which is attributable to CGP project and operating costs). At the time the evaluation was conducted, CGP was scheduled to terminate on March 31, 1996. Subsequently OTI informed the evaluation team that the project and grant to IOM will be extended until December 31, 1996.

This evaluation is the first formal assessment of CGP, although there have been a series of internal audits and more informal reviews throughout the life of the project. It is also the first evaluation of a major OTI activity, which was set up to lead USAID's efforts in dealing with political emergencies like Haiti's and, in certain cases, bridge the gap between emergency assistance and longer-term development programs.

A. Project Objectives

CGP was authorized to—

- Provide rapid, time-limited and visible assistance to the Haitian people as part of the process of restoring democratically elected government.
- Be an intrinsic part of the overall effort led by the U.S. Government and involving the United Nations and other bilateral and multilateral participants in military, diplomatic, economic and humanitarian activities.
- Provide flexible and decentralized assistance responsive to the interests of Haitians at the local level, especially in rural areas.
- Emphasize the process of working with local community organizations and officials to determine priorities and make decisions in a participatory manner.
- Fund and manage numerous micro-projects and activities to provide tangible benefits to poor Haitians during a time of political transition.

In financing CGP, USAID, and more specifically OTI, was contributing to the following goals—

- Facilitating the restoration of effective governance at all levels of Haitian society.

- Helping the Haitian people move from a society of intimidation toward an atmosphere of popular participation.
- Promoting greater decentralization of government as a first step towards improved political, economic and social development.

The specific actions envisioned by OTI included—

- Helping elected officials develop conditions so that they could participate more effectively in community dialogue.
- Assisting citizens in creating locales to assembly for community discussions.
- Fostering the reemergence of Haitian NGOs.
- Establishing local credit associations.
- Facilitating the dissemination of health, education and other public information.
- Establishing a data base of Haitian community needs, resources and priorities.
- Recruiting and training staff to carry out the above activities.

B. Evaluation Objectives

As stated in the scope of work, the objective of this evaluation was to determine if CGP as administered by IOM fulfilled the broad program goals as originally stated by OTI, while simultaneously meeting the more narrow objectives of delivering urgently needed services and infrastructure restoration to Haitian communities. More specifically, the evaluation includes—

- A qualitative assessment of the effectiveness of CGP in achieving the overall goals of facilitating the return of democratic rule, reducing the atmosphere of intimidation, and promoting decentralization and popular participation in governance.
- An evaluation of the performance of IOM in undertaking CGP, including its management of personnel and other resources.
- A determination of appropriate next steps for CGP.
- A presentation of relevant policy lessons as to whether, and under what conditions, a flexible, community targeted intervention such as CGP can and should serve as part of a rapid-response assistance strategy to other countries in political transition.

II. BACKGROUND³

A. Office of Transition Initiatives

OTI was created in 1994 as part of USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Response "to bring fast, direct and overt political development assistance to the acute needs of priority nations emerging from political, economic and/or social distress." Its mission is to support self-governance efforts that move countries from crisis to fundamental social-political stability. Programs are intended to respond to political emergencies and bridge the gap in certain cases between emergency assistance efforts, usually managed by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and longer-term development programs administered by resident Missions. OTI's operations emphasize speed and flexibility using the "notwithstanding" authorities of its special appropriations.

In September 1994, OTI signed a grant agreement with the International Organization for Migration and shortly thereafter launched a nationwide community self-help effort, known as the Communal Governance Program to demonstrate quick response and tangible benefits immediately following the restoration of Haiti's democratically elected government. OTI initiated with IOM at the same time a demobilization and reintegration program for former members of the Haitian military and police.

B. International Organization for Migration

IOM was established in Brussels in 1951 and named the "Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration." Its primary function was to arrange for and manage the migration and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons in Europe. The U.S. was a co-founder of the organization, which was entrusted with: 1) inter-country and institutional arrangements for the transfer of migrants and refugees; 2) assisting the movement and settlement of migrant refugees; and 3) cooperation among governments and international organizations in the field of migration.

The organization has extended its geographic reach beyond Europe. In 1987, the IOM Council changed its name to the "International Organization for Migration" in recognition of its expanded mandate. IOM is governed by a council of representatives from member states. Sixty states participate in the organization's activities as members and 40 more participate as observers. The Republic of Haiti joined IOM as a member state in 1995.

IOM carries out complex, multi-agency emergency programs characterized by: 1) the mass movement of people, 2) major reintegration efforts for uprooted populations, and 3) measures to prevent migration flows and stabilize populations. Recently IOM has played a major role in efforts linked to peace-keeping operations and humanitarian emergencies (e.g. Gulf crisis and in Afghanistan and Kurdistan). These operations require at the outset prompt action. In later stages, longer-term efforts are required to achieve reconstruction and rehabilitation objectives (e.g., Mozambique, Liberia and Angola).

³For information about Haiti's recent history and the U.S. policy towards the country, see Annexes B and C.

1. IOM Programs in Haiti

IOM became active in Haiti in October 1992 with the implementation of the In-Country Refugee Processing Program (ICP). The program was funded by the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) in the U.S. Department of State. Its purpose was to process Haitians seeking refugee status in the U.S. Since the program's inception, more than 100,000 Haitians have been considered for refugee status and approximately 5,690 were settled in the U.S. The ICP officially concluded on May 31, 1995.

With the return of constitutionally elected government in the fall of 1994, the Government of Haiti (GOH) faced many critical problems. Among these were the need to demobilize the military forces and provide for mass participation in the democratic process. To meet these objectives, IOM's Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the Communal Governance Program were established. The later is the subject of this evaluation.

IOM's OTI-financed demobilization program offers intensive six-month vocational training courses to former Haitian soldiers. The courses provide ex-soldiers with technical skills and new attitudes toward productivity so they can participate in their country's socio-economic development. After graduation, participants attend seminars that cover aspects of searching for a job. Of the 5,482 registered ex-soldiers, 3,032 completed vocational training and 1,810 were receiving training as of March 1996.

2. Choice of IOM to Carry Out the Communal Governance Program

Several factors contributed to the choice of IOM to implement CGP rather than one of the NGOs with long track records in Haiti and USAID projects. To reduce USAID's management burden, the Mission in Haiti and OTI wanted a single implementing agency willing and able to do both community development *and* demobilization. The Haiti-based NGOs were certainly eager to do the former, but few were willing to do the latter. IOM was responsive to USAID's preference for one entity to handle both. USAID/Haiti was impressed by IOM's work with migration in the country, and OTI management liked the quality of IOM's work elsewhere in the world, particularly in Mozambique. The use of an international organization, rather than an American NGO, also was considered important to give an international character to the sensitive demobilization and communal governance activities to be undertaken.

III. DESCRIPTION OF THE COMMUNAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAM

A. Phase I (November 1994 - September 1995)⁴

The general goal of CGP is to provide a rapid response over a short period to buy time for the initiation of major reforms. CGP is not intended to replace development strategies implemented by other international and bilateral government agencies. The program is based on the need for urgent action to—

- Provide concrete results to complement peace-keeping operations;
- Reinforce civic action efforts of the U.S. and foreign military;
- Encourage a climate of reconciliation; and
- Increase confidence in public authorities, both locally and nationally.

The implementation process began in late 1994 with the establishment of six field offices and was later expanded to 13 in early 1995. This was followed by the training of international and national staff. CGP then sponsored a broad outreach campaign, involving meetings with community representatives and local officials, and radio announcements and advertisements placed in the local media to encourage community members to submit project ideas.

Originally OTI/IOM had planned for CGP to work closely with local governments as soon as local elections took place. As the elections were progressively delayed, however, a decision was made to bypass most government channels in areas where “legitimate” mayors did not exist. In those areas, project approval and implementation were entered into via direct contact with individual urban and rural citizens groups. In areas where popular mayors remained, consultation was generally useful and positive. In general, however, the Phase I approach was characterized more by direct contacts between IOM staff and recipient community organizations, without the intermediary role of local representatives.

⁴In this document “Phase I” of the CGP refers to that stage of project activities in which the emphasis was on micro-projects with few linkages to elected authorities because new elections had not yet taken place. “Phase II” refers to the program’s current operation in which a community’s access to USAID/IOM project resources is contingent on prior review and approval of their priorities and proposals by a commune-wide council created with OTI/IOM encouragement. Participants include municipal authorities (*majistra*), rural elected authorities (Conseil d’Administration des Sections Communales [CASECs]), and one elected representative (*mam*) from each rural section.


B. Phase II (October 1995 -)

In June 1995, the program was extended for an additional six-month period through March 1996. Another extension through December, 1996, is now pending. IOM operations focused on 24 city councils which are coordinated by six regional offices (versus 13 in Phase I).

CGP's objectives are also evolving. While individual community groups are not neglected, the focus of program activities attempted a shift to elected representatives and local administrators. In each commune where the program is operational, a Community Improvement Council (CAC in its French acronym) has been created. Each CAC consists of locally elected officials, mayors and officials of communal sections (CASECs) as well as community leaders from NGOs and the community at-large. This body is a citizens action committee that meets regularly within communities to discuss needs and priorities.

1. Assistance Process (Phase II)

The following IOM diagram describes the democratic process set up by OTI/IOM under Phase II of CGP as opposed to the more direct relationship between IOM staff and recipient community organizations more common under Phase I.



2. Beneficiaries and Distribution of Micro-Projects

CGP has engaged more than 2,000 community groups representing some 50,000 Haitians throughout the country in more than 1,900 micro-projects. They range from the rehabilitation and construction of community schools, roads, markets, canals and bridges to the organization and implementation of public health, literacy, sanitation, reforestation, and civic education activities. Table I shows the categories and number of micro-projects. (See the map exhibit for a more graphic representation of distribution and types of CGP activities).

Table I: Categories of Micro-Projects

	MICRO-PROJECTS	NUMBER	CGP FUNDS (gourdes) (15 Haitian gourdes=US\$1.00)
1.	Schools	559	24,853.894
2.	Roads/Bridges	345	10,149.731
3.	Sanitation	323	7,774.839
4.	Water Supply	148	4,295.551
5.	Agriculture	98	2,450.559
6.	Public Administration	87	3,370.573
7.	Conservation/Environment	62	2,736.837
8.	Commerce	56	2,736.837
9.	Health	53	1,278.694
10.	Recreation	37	1,113.585
11.	Justice	31	839.908
12.	Electrification	25	1,246.671
13.	Government	1	8.756

No specific economic sectors (i.e., agriculture, health, education) were singled out for CGP intervention. The program is following a mixed, local-demand driven approach. Micro-projects were selected to meet one or more of the following criteria:

- Repair and rehabilitation of dilapidated infrastructures, with preference given to rural and low income areas;
- Resumption of basic education, health and sanitary services;
- Activities to reverse environmental degradation and improve living conditions (including rehabilitation following Hurricane Gordon);
- Initiatives that were local in nature, manageable without heavy reliance on outside expertise and which could be substantially completed in five months or less;
- Short term assistance to facilitate the functioning and role of locally elected officials;
- Broadest possible outreach.

3. Training

Because the concept of communal governance is a relatively new one for many community members, training programs have been developed by OTI/IOM for both IOM staff and Haitian beneficiaries to—

- Create dialogue between government officials and community groups;
- Strengthen local government's responsiveness to community concerns through dialogue and, wherever possible, through project implementation; and
- Reinforce citizens' understanding of their role in community improvement.

Training sessions focus on both technical aspects of project development as well as conceptual matters regarding participatory practices. A wide variety of topics are treated, including negotiation skills, setting priorities and project management. Training also addresses the basic concepts of community development such as community-based decision making. The training provided under Phase II is reinforcing the links between community groups and local government developments.

IV. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

A. General Description

The overall goal of CGP is to enhance democratic processes in Haiti. Specific project activities are a means to that broad end. While certainly mindful of management issues, therefore, the evaluation team focused less on the technical or administrative dimensions of CGP projects and more on the generic question of the manner in which activities contribute to democratization.

Following orientations by U.S. Government personnel both in Washington and Haiti, the team focused on: 1) design of interview guides and topics, 2) field research, 3) interviews, and 4) data analysis.

To ensure coverage of the scope of work and comparability of information, standard interview guides were developed. For each region, two types of questions were posed: generic questions about the functioning of IOM's regional field offices and the mayors' offices and specific questions about individual micro-projects. Topics in the regional interview guide included: IOM team composition, Haitian and UN staff, program start-up, relationship with other organizations, foreign military presence, project selection criteria, micro-project support, the shift from Phase I to Phase II, and project phase out. Topics in the micro-project interview guide included: source of project idea, nature of community groups, government involvement, community contribution, participatory processes, technical support, sustainability, contributions by other organizations, opinions about Phase I versus Phase II, and attitudes toward IOM, quality of life, government, security, freedom of expression, voting, and migration.

The interview strategy also allowed individuals and groups to express their preferences on different modes of channeling developmental aid, compare the OTI/IOM program to other assistance interventions with which they have been involved or familiar, and similar general questions.

To maximize coverage in Haiti, the evaluation team split up into six subgroups, including three trained Haitian social scientists for the benefit of team members not fluent in Creole. Two criteria guided the team's choice of regions: (1) some had to have a currently active IOM offices and others had to be regions where IOM had closed its office; and (2) some had to be considered successful regions and others had to be seen as problem regions by IOM.

The lengths of interviews varied. At both the regional and micro-project level, they lasted between 45 minutes and two hours, depending on the depth of the questioning and the enthusiasm of the groups interviewed. Enthusiasm tended to be high. Group interviews were held with between two and five people; on occasion numerous observers (400 in one instance!) were present.

Regional level interviews were carried out in eight mayors' districts (*mairies*), and micro-project interviews were conducted for 98 activities or micro-projects in 15 communes. Because groups interviewed (without counting passive observers) involved *at least* two individuals, the number of people interviewed amounted to *at the very least* 200 people. Efforts were made to include women and approximately 50 women actively participated in the interview process.

The team reviewed a substantial number of micro-projects of the following types: 1) Phase I and Phase II; 2) successful and unsuccessful; 3) community based and municipal government infrastructure; and 4) projects carried out by and for women. Micro-projects studied were determined in approximately equal measure by: 1) IOM staff, 2) MSI consultants, and 3) chance encounters. The following table shows the micro-projects reviewed by phase and location.

Table II: Micro-Projects Reviewed

Location	Phase I	Phase II	Total
San Marc, Petite Riviere, Verette, Dessalines	8	7	15
Fort Liberte, Derac, Ouanamimthe	9	2	11
Jacmel	12	2	14
Petit Goave, Gran Goave, Miraguan	13	7	20
Gonaives, Port de Paix	3	2	5
Hinche, Thomassique, Pignon	23	4	27
Mirebalai	4		4
Thomazeau		2	2
Total	72	26	98

Analysis of information collected through the more than 100 interviews began in Haiti and continued in Washington. It consisted primarily of summing up information horizontally across interview guide items or item clusters. Based on this factual data, conclusions were drawn and recommendations made.

B. Concepts and Indicators for Evaluation of Democratization

1. Evolution of the Democracy Concept within the CGP

In the weeks preceding the arrival of the Multi-National force in Haiti, OTI viewed CGP principally as a high-visibility, rapid-result, short-term civilian counterpart to what was then feared to be a potentially violent military invasion. But the intellectual architects of the program within USAID, and more specifically within OTI, intended from the outset to go beyond these short-term objectives into developmentally sustainable outputs for long-term democracy building.

The term democratization in its strictest definition refers to a change toward a political system based on electoral procedures. In its broader developmental use, however, the term is also used to refer to a more generic switch toward social processes involving participatory behaviors and attitudes. These factors meant that the evaluation team would have to examine the specific activities of CGP less from the perspective of their technical soundness or their income generating potential than from their contribution to the process of democratization. Guided by these considerations and by the

requirement in the evaluation scope of work concerning the primacy of qualitative assessments of these hard-to-measure linkages, the evaluation team decided on several democratization indicators applicable to the specific situation in which CGP functioned.

In searching for indicators, the team had the advantage of a great deal of prior USAID thinking on these matters. Representative indicators which appear in USAID's "Democratic Initiatives" documents include—

- ▶ Facilitating the return of democratic rule
- ▶ Promoting decentralization and popular participation in governance
- ▶ Promoting more transparent and accountable government institutions
- ▶ Increasing development of politically active civil society
- ▶ Participation
- ▶ Competition
- ▶ Accountability
- ▶ Transparency
- ▶ Predictability
- ▶ Equity
- ▶ Accessibility
- ▶ Empowerment
- ▶ Reducing the atmosphere of intimidation and fear
- ▶ Strengthening the rule of law and increasing respect for human rights.
- ▶ Promoting free and fair elections

The vast majority of these indicators were considered by the evaluation team to be relevant to CGP, particularly those referring to broad participatory processes as opposed to formal electoral and legal processes.

2. Democratization as Studied during this Evaluation

The first section of evaluation findings presents a qualitative analysis of CGP impact on indicators of democratization based on interviews with hundreds of Haitians who participated in 98 CGP micro-projects. In the analysis, an attempt was made to answer questions of the following types:

- Is there evidence that CGP succeeded in motivating people actively to engage in local decision making and problem solving processes that entailed joint action, if not by entire communities, at least by groups above the level of individual domestic units?
- Is there evidence that, as a result of CGP funded activities, an "aggregation of interests" has taken place — i.e., people who had formerly not worked together are now collaborating on activities?
- Is there evidence that CGP activities have had any reconciliatory effect — i.e., that former antagonists are now collaborating on joint activities?

- Is there evidence that CGP succeeded in enabling local elected officials to carry out their duties in ways that might not have occurred if the program had not been in existence?
- Is there evidence that the CGP succeeded in creating a higher level of interaction between local citizens and their elected officials with the former making more open demands on the latter and the latter being more responsive to the former?

Table III below summarizes non-traditional democratization indicators as related to CGP:

Table III: Selected Democratization Indicators

SCHOOL OF THOUGHT	CONCEPTS	POTENTIAL LINKAGES WITH OTI EVALUATION
Traditional political science (e.g. R. Dahl) view of democracy	Participation	Is participation of democratic groups and institutions encouraged/reinforced by OTI/IOM?
	Competition	Do individuals compete for leadership positions within CACs? Within community groups?
Development organizations (e.g. World Bank) view of "governance"	Accountability	Are the beneficiaries held accountable by: 1) other beneficiaries. 2) IOM?
	Transparency	Do beneficiaries understand why and how funding decisions are made and how priorities are set?
	Predictability	Is there a clear cause/effect relationship in local decisions?
Other democracy-oriented concepts	Equity	Do groups and institutions assure that benefits accrue to principal political, social, and economic groups equally?
	Accessibility	Do groups and institutions ensure that largest numbers of people have access to benefits? Do citizens have accessible forums in which to voice needs, priorities, concerns?
	Empowerment	Are groups/institutions continuing to carry out other developmental activities in a democratic manner?
	Decentralization. Deconcentration	Do beneficiaries feel they have more control over activities? Are local officials better able to act?

V. EVALUATION FINDINGS

A. Facilitating the Return to Democracy

The restoration of a democratically elected government, freedom of expression, and security from violence was made possible first and foremost by the arrival of foreign troops. CGP built upon the security brought by this military presence and was able to work in safety even in regions where there were no troops. Progress was further aided by the thousands of democratically structured grass-roots groups already in existence before CGP's arrival. CGP's democratization impact is principally the provision of material resources and decision making forums that strengthen pre-existing and newly created democratic groups and allow them to begin carrying out activities that were not possible before the foreign military presence because of both political restrictions and resource constraints.

CGP's contributions to the overall democratization process took different forms in each of the program's stages. The team's factual findings about these stages follow. Conclusions are presented in bold type.

During a preliminary stage, CGP sponsored civic education events (e.g., painting public buildings, re-establishing town parks) which brought people out to discuss political and developmental issues during the early months of President Aristide's return. Because they occurred at the end of a difficult three-year political period, the events were well attended in at least some regions visited by the team. Largely due to the need to show more tangible results, OTI/IOM shifted CGP after several months into a small project mode in which people themselves helped to decide on the projects and events in which the CGP funds should be invested. Virtually no more requests came in for civic education events and, after the first few months of the program, these activities (plus a few others in IOM's grant, e.g. credit associations) disappeared from the CGP repertoire.

CGP's early civic education activities came at a useful time and contributed to democratization by giving people an opportunity to publicly discuss formerly prohibited topics. Because more concrete results were needed, however, the ensuring shift in project design was a positive change to provide tangible benefits to poor Haitians while supporting democratic processes.

As the CGP strategy evolved, CGP operated principally through pre-existing rural and urban groups rather than through newly formed *ad hoc* groups. CGP resources financially empowered the groups to pursue the resolution of practical problems of high local priority, such as building or repairing schools, latrines and potable water systems.

Phase I projects contributed to democratization by permitting well-organized, pre-existing groups to begin problem solving activities after years of inaction due to repression and lack of resources. In putting emphasis on pre-existing groups rather than the formation of new groups, CGP took advantage of an important existing resource. The shift to a concrete, micro-project focus was in harmony with the perceived and real needs of the population.

Investment by CGP in Pre-Existing vs. New/Ad Hoc Organizations

	PRE-EXISTING	NEW/AD HOC	OTHER	TOTAL
PHASE I	57% Municipal 12%	26%	4%	42
PHASE II	53% Municipal 7%	33%	7%	15
TOTAL	56% Municipal 11%	28%	5%	57

Note: "OTHER" Usually means "pre-existing ad hoc," a group that was formed around the possibility of funding from a non-CGP source, that ended up getting CGP money.

After the parliamentary and local elections, CGP changed its approach in Phase II and began working more directly with local elected officials. These local government authorities (mayors and Conseil d'Administration des Sections Communales [CASECs]) are linked with representatives of community organizations in structures designed to strengthen accountability, transparency, and responsiveness in the distribution of OTI/IOM resources. At the time of the evaluation, the Phase II effort has been underway for only four months, but evidence suggests that the majority of local officials working with CGP have become more responsive to the needs of constituents. For example, the evaluators met with and heard about local officials meeting with community organization leaders and community members regularly, engaging in dialogue on local priorities in many cases for the first time, and implementing local development projects with CGP resources.

CGP's shift to a Phase II mode increased the level of democratic and open dialogue between elected officials and their constituents. Without this modification, such dialogue would have occurred less frequently or not at all in communities. The flexibility of CGP's approach allowed OTI/IOM to adjust to a fluid situation. Many conditions could have been foreseen, however, given the ample information available about Haiti and USAID's extensive experience there.

B. Reducing Intimidation

Haitians interviewed attributed the marked reduction of intimidation that has occurred since September 1994 to the Multinational Force and the later UN military presence. Several of those interviewed suggested that by participating in CGP, they put into practice their new freedom of expression and ability to organize. Citizens, for example, are able to meet in large groups for the first time in many years to discuss community needs and actions without fears of reprisal. Project participants' active involvement and often frank discussions in the meetings and other forums organized by the evaluation team reinforce this finding.

CGP contributed to reducing the atmosphere of intimidation by providing a channel within which the efforts of community development organizations could be tested and consolidated.

COMMON COMMENTS RELATED TO RECONCILIATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES MADE BY INTERVIEWEES
<p><u>Security</u> Total security, can sleep at night. Under Duvalier we couldn't even dream of this amount of security. Enough to resell. Under Cedras even more terror than under Duvalier.</p>
<p><u>Foreign Military</u> The presence of the foreign military gives the sensation of complete security. We do not want them to leave now because Haiti is not disarmed enough yet. After they leave there will be violence.</p>
<p><u>National Police</u> We have hope in the national police. They are proud and do their work well with the only problem being that they don't have weapons. We have no confidence in the national police. They aren't armed, they are young, not numerous, and from the same culture as they army, and will behave the same way.</p>
<p><u>CASEC vs. Chef de Section</u> The CASEC is better than the Chef de Section. He is elected, and his job is development rather than police function, and brutality, retaliation.</p>
<p><u>Freedom of Expression</u> We have so much freedom of expression we could resell it. We are free to meet and talk about anything we want. Under Duvalier we couldn't even have dreamt of such freedom, and not under Cedras either.</p>
<p><u>Elections</u> In 1990 the people wanted change so bad given their misery, and they had lived through the "macoutes". That is why they voted in such numbers. The low turn out in 1995 was because: no motivation campaign, Aristide did not express a preference, voting for Aristide did not improve their lives, no strong competition for Preval, they would rather have Aristide's lost three years back. Preval is not Aristide. Those who voted are directly involved in politics, or voted only to keep the "macoutes" out.</p>

CGP sponsored many municipal improvement projects that were done with little community participation and appear to fall outside the rubric of socio-economic development activities. Nonetheless the evaluation team sees them as compatible with CGP democracy enhancement goals. Painting all *casernes* and former military establishments UN blue and white instead of Force Armée d'Haiti (FADH) yellow, for example, was a low-cost but highly symbolic contribution heralding a new era. Similarly, improving physical prison conditions so that prisoners had at least basic rights also contributed to a new democratic image. Rehabilitated prisons and courthouses provide a psychological boost to beleaguered judicial and legal personnel, particularly in small towns. To many people in towns where prison and law enforcement personnel are located, rehabilitated prisons and police stations, together with the presence of the Interim Police and Security Force (IPSF), made real the abstract concept of public safety and protection from criminal elements.

The municipal improvement projects occurred at a key point in time and conveyed important symbolic messages that the atmosphere of intimidation experienced under dictatorship had truly ended.

At present, project beneficiaries are extremely nervous about the departure of the international military force and believe that the present stable and secure environment will not last beyond its departure. Many of those interviewed were concerned that sufficient disarmament has not taken place and a small but emphatic group of respondents fear that after United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) leaves, Haiti may experience civil war and chaos as well as an increase in common thievery.

C. Popular Participation and Decentralization

A core requirement for most CGP projects is community participation. CGP has the good fortune of working in an organizationally rich country. Pre-existing community organizations were encouraged to participate in CGP. For many groups interviewed, the completion of a successful water, school, or latrine project was often the first concrete activity that they had ever implemented as a group. There is a much higher level of involvement than normally anticipated as indicated by the high numbers of volunteer laborers. (See community contribution charts on pages 28-29).

The Haitian people fully supported CGP as evidenced by their active involvement. OTI/IOM's quick and responsive procedures encouraged this positive result.

While community participation was widely evident in most of the CGP projects, it was less apparent in the urban municipal projects noted above. City hall, courthouse and jail refurbishment programs, for example, were often accomplished under direct management and logistical support of the U.S. Special Forces with salaries paid from CGP funds. The embellishment of city halls, plazas and cemeteries was likewise done principally with salaried labor.

It probably would have not been productive to insist on heavy infusions of volunteer labor for urban infrastructure projects, which are an indirect benefit to members of individual households. Therefore, OTI/IOM acted correctly and pragmatically in not adhering to narrow definitions of community participation for projects such as jailhouse refurbishment.

In very broad terms, CGP promotes decentralization by deploying its own offices and its micro-project resources throughout the country. In doing this, it is following effective patterns established by many prior USAID projects and NGOs in Haiti, which have also funneled most of their resources to regional offices in a effort to break the monopoly of Port-au-Prince constituencies. In working directly with community organizations, the CGP supported a constituency for decentralized service delivery. The benefits of the restoration of democracy are shared throughout the country in 113 of Haiti's 133 communes. (See map exhibit at the beginning of this report.)

In terms of Haitian developmental history, CGP was among the better programs contributing directly to decentralization of service delivery and resource distribution. Its flexible authorities were generally used well.

1. CGP and the Government

Originally, CGP had planned to work closely with local governments as soon as local elections took place. As the elections were progressively delayed, however, a strategic decision was made to bypass formal government channels in areas where legitimate mayors did not exist. In those areas, project approval, implementation and contracts were more often directly carried out with individual urban and rural citizen groups. In areas where popular mayors remained, consultation was generally useful and positive.

After the June 1995 elections and the August to October, 1995 installation of newly elected mayors and CASECs, CGP began systematically to engage local officials and initiate activities toward the goal of strengthening local government units.

As explained by the OTI coordinator and IOM/Port-au-Prince staff, the shift into Phase II was undertaken for several important considerations. Newly elected local officials were to take office in August - October 1995, permitting CGP to more forcefully and systematically begin implementing one of its major, original mandates: support of locally elected officials as a vehicle for democratization. In addition, the OTI-funded CGP would eventually end, and to increase the likelihood of sustainability, a role for local government as a provider of resources and services needed to be encouraged.

The decision to change into a program mode (Phase II) that entailed more interaction with and support of representatives of Haitian local government was based on a series of compelling policy considerations that were considered of greater weight than the preference of most Phase I beneficiaries to continue relating directly to IOM. Despite initial concerns by some IOM field staff, the clear consensus among CGP staff now is that Phase II constitutes a conceptual and managerial improvement over Phase I.

Among the hundreds of Haitians who participated in group interviews during this evaluation, there was a widespread wait and see attitude regarding not only local government but also the parliament, central government, and national police.

There is an understandable mistrust by Haitians of their government apparatus that was at best mildly affected by electoral processes. The mistrust cannot be removed by brief assistance programs. The goal of CGP and other programs should be defined not as encouraging Haitians to trust their leaders, but as creating structures and procedures which permit people to monitor these leaders. The Phase II communal improvement process established under CGP is a good step in this direction.

Predictably, mayors generally supported increasing their say in the activities which were being funded — i.e., they favored a switch to Phase II. OTI/IOM understood that by working exclusively through mayors, they could not ensure participatory decision making. It designed a temporary structure (CAC), therefore, to guarantee a voice, not only to the mayors but also to elected or designated members of the rural population. The CAC structure is a temporary measure meant to function until local elections occur. These elections have been postponed and are now scheduled to take place later in 1996.

The communal improvement committee structure designed by OTI/IOM provides a system of checks and balances between rural and town constituencies and the desires of ordinary citizens and their elected or designated representatives. While the CACs have been in place only for a short time, they are functioning better in some communes than in others. Their future in a post-CGP environment, however, is uncertain.

Several CGP field staff members in favor of the switch towards collaboration with the local government nonetheless expressed concern over the manner in which it was accomplished and the relative difficulty of using the new mode. The timing of the change was governed by deadlines set in the Port-au-Prince office, rather than through case-by-case assessments of the capacities of individual communes to meet minimal performance criteria.

The decision to adjust from Phase I to Phase II must be understood in the light of: 1) the short life which CGP was believed to have; 2) the curtailing of the resources available; and 3) the delay in arrival of new mayors until October, 1995. The swiftness of the change, however, injected an air of urgency into complex organizational processes that are ordinarily done with more preparation and caution.

Despite Phase II pressures and problems, IOM staff succeeded in a feat that many would have thought not possible in such a short time frame. Agreements with mayors were signed, needs prioritized, communal committees formed and unprecedented dialogue occurred between the elected and their constituents. The result is numerous Phase II projects are now underway.

The jury is still out on the sustainability of the CAC committees, particularly in light of resource constraints and upcoming local elections to be held pursuant to communal and municipal assemblies. But USAID/OTI and IOM/Port-au-Prince and field staff have to be congratulated on their "can-do" ability to identify a mid-course modification, devise a plan, and establish an efficient delivery system to carry out the plan in record time.

D. Other Facets of Democracy and Governance

In addition to the explicit and ambitious goals set out for CGP, there are a number of other facets to democracy and governance that merit examination. They include accountability, transparency, equity, accessibility, empowerment, and reconciliation. Findings and conclusions in these areas are presented below.

1. Accountability: Reinforced

As with any community development effort, there were allegations that local leaders or elected government officials were using CGP funds for their own benefit. If so, these cases were certainly the exception rather than the rule. By using procedures such as dealing more in checks than in cash, requiring community contributions in advance of the delivery of CGP materials, setting specific deadlines for accomplishments and, if deadlines were missed, reprogramming funding, CGP field staff developed effective methods of ensuring accountability. Audit records support this overall finding.

Although there is wide variation across field offices, the vast majority of CGP projects reinforced the principle of accountability in the use of resources; both accountability to IOM for accomplishing results and accountability to members of the community for delivering agreed upon services and using funds responsibly.

2. Transparency: Upheld

Most project beneficiaries were able to explain why the decision was made to fund one micro-project over another and who was responsible for the decision. This provides evidence that the CGP achieved substantial transparency in its policies and decision making. Under Phase I, CGP worked more directly with the community to make each decision. Under Phase II, mayors, CASECs, and elected representatives of community organizations are more responsible for the decisions with CGP providing input and guidance. As discussed above, beneficiaries expressed concern over the transparency of decision making more under Phase II than under Phase I and generally preferred the ease, timeliness, and transparency of dealing directly with the IOM without the involvement of local government officials.

The clarity and openness of CGP operations generated a greater sense of confidence by most beneficiaries as to the absence of unstated personal or partisan criteria for access to project resources.

3. Equity: Performance Good but Mixed

During Phase I, the "first come, first served" nature of micro-project funding resulted in some unintended inequities in benefit distribution. This distribution pattern was noted in the following domains:

- In at least some communes, town inhabitants on the whole got a disproportionately higher percentage of projects than the majority of the population living in more remote areas.
- People on main roads received a much higher percentage of projects than those living in more remote sites.
- Protestant groups in several regions got a disproportionately higher percentage of CGP resources than majority Catholic groups.

CGP field staff were not unaware of these problems in the distribution of project resources. But because there was a rush to disburse funds in certain periods of Phase I, such less-than-optimal patterns of distribution were tolerated for the sake of project speed and management ease.

Correctness, speed and practicality were uppermost concerns for OTI/IOM managers. Even under crisis conditions, however, managers of assistance projects should be aware of the statistical prevalence of different sectors and their differential rates of response to project inputs. CGP certainly succeeded in getting out of Port-au-Prince and in some regions there

was a respectable number of projects that benefitted distant communities rarely affected by development programs. But skewing did sometimes occur.

4. Gender: Bias Not Evident

The evaluation looked at the gender issue both as it affects project beneficiaries and staff. The vast majority of projects funded by CGP unleashed benefit flows that went equally to men and women: schools, latrines, roads, water, and the like. When talking about the benefits of projects, people often referred to children as the prime beneficiaries. While in several categories of CGP staff there is equitable gender balance, there are clearly many more men among the senior Haitian staff.

IOM's projects benefitted men, women, and children. There was no evidence of bias in the choice of projects that would benefit one gender or age group more than another, except for perhaps a bias toward projects in which children are viewed (or were at least described by respondents) as the prime beneficiaries, such as schools and latrines. Concerning staff, it appears that more efforts could have been made to move women into senior Haitian positions, particularly if longer employment and training periods had been planned from the start.

5. Commune Wide versus Locality Specific Benefit Flows: a Balance

The activities recommended by project committees in Phase II tend to be more communal in character—public schools, markets, roads—than the projects of Phase I which tended to focus on the needs of smaller groups.

The CAC prioritization procedure (and the diminishing of budgetary resources) may make it more difficult for small groups to get approval for those highly valued projects that benefit individual hamlets or households (such as latrines and potable water systems) rather than communes at large. Because both types of projects are valuable, the ideal type of program would seem to be the mixed mode mentioned earlier in which the community granting mechanism of the CAC operates simultaneously with some variant of the more decentralized and agile granting mechanisms of CGP's Phase I activities.

6. Reconciliation: CGP Helps

Many CGP beneficiaries stated that the organizations to which they belong include people of diverse political views and that they have put aside such differences to resolve development problems (e.g., Union du Blocue Raquet pour le Developpement (UBRD), a very active NGO in Jacmel). There is the impression that when valued resources were present, people of varying political ideologies or religious convictions would work together. Nevertheless one can maintain a respectful skepticism about whether questions on this subject elicited frank and open responses. A number of micro-projects appeared to suffer from problems possibly rooted in political disputes. In the short time available, however, the evaluation team was not able to collect any data to show distortions of CGP investments based on political affiliations.

An important tool for village-level reconciliation will be resource flows that make it materially worthwhile for persons with differing views to work together. Nonetheless, there are clearly still

unresolved problems. The details of these problems could not be unearthed in the team's brief visits. While there is healthy concern by all, the evaluators found no evidence to show clear diversion of resources based on political or other affiliations.

Some Haitians who had been beneficiaries of the program under Phase I expressed concern that under Phase II, only organizations that share the same political views as the CASEC or mayors will receive funding for micro-projects. They preferred dealing with an apolitical foreign institution like IOM as the decision maker on whether micro-projects are funded. They were reluctant to enter into a mode in which decisions are even partly made by elected local officials, beholden to supporters. Only some individuals are beginning to struggle beyond Haiti's legacy of patron-client local governance.

The legacy of intergroup competition and suspicion of public institutions is still strong. If CGP has made a dent in that, it is a very small one. People's preference for dealing with foreigners rather than with fellow Haitians is viewed by many development workers as problematic and/or offensive. The underlying mind set has strong objective historical causes and is not likely to disappear in one generation. A modest start, however, has been made.

To avoid concerns over CGP's political neutrality and to prevent the involvement of staff in sensitive, conflict-ridden local dynamics, a pragmatic decision was made by OTI/IOM to avoid staff involvement in the parliamentary and local elections. There were some who felt that non-partisan support to fragile electoral processes was central to the democracy enhancement goals of the CGP. Yet a decision was made not to get involved in supporting elections through CGP projects.

OTI/IOM's practical decision to establish guidelines against involvement in electoral process was in retrospect justified. Although such involvement might make sense in other countries, the CGP strategy of pursuing democratization through material involvement in projects and strict non-partisan appearances has shown to be an effective approach for Haiti with its strong concrete needs and its resource of thousands of well-organized grassroots groups.

Comments on Phase I, Phase II, CACs, and the Mayor's Role

PHASE I INTERVIEWS	COMMENTS ON PHASE I- PHASE II, CAC	COMMENTS ON MAYOR'S ROLE
Phase II Is Better	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local government should be able to do small projects - Fully support Phase II and quality control - Phase II procedures are understood - CAC's role is important. During Phase I support was given to persons who did not represent community 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Better to involve the mayor - Recognize need to keep mayor informed
Other Comments	<p><u>PARTICIPATION</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Learned informally, not through IOM, but did not participate in process - A meeting, but understood nothing - Not aware of change - Not aware of change or what to do to get a new project <p><u>EFFICIENCY</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Phase I better because it is quicker, results sure - Fear that the process of going through the mayor will be long - Like working directly with IOM, the most effective quick method <p><u>OTHER</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Phase II not truly active - Proposed projects did not get funded - Doubtful on impact of Phase II due to limited funds - Disappointed that a Phase II project was turned down by CAC - Wait for results to judge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Know nothing about him - Does nothing - Zero - Barely functions - Mayor just elected - Has no budget - The mayor never comes around here - It's difficult to go see the mayor - The 'Mairie' has done nothing for the commune - Don't trust the mayor - Will lose confidence in CAC if mayor gives them no money - Doubts on local government - Only 25% of IOM money should go through them - Mayor elected by political party, susceptible to pressure to give money to supporters - There are very limited possibilities of interacting with the mayor's office - Only one mayor among the three magistrates has visited the commune - Nobody shows any respect for the mayor who is a member of the community - He does not show any interest in the welfare of the rural sections under his responsibility

Comments on Phase I, Phase II, CACs, and the Mayor's Role

PHASE II INTERVIEWS	COMMENTS ON PHASE I-PHASE II, CAC	COMMENTS ON MAYOR'S ROLE
Phase II is better	<p><u>TRANSPARENCY</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Now everyone knows what is happening - Now we know what's going on - Things more transparent now. <p><u>EGALITARIAN, DEMOCRATIC</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Under Phase I there could be deals with special groups - Through Phase II there is a certain equality, and chance for more localities - During Phase I, IOM never got to this side of the hill - Phase II more egalitarian, our voice has been heard, big change at the mayor's office - Phase II gets entire community involved - Under Phase II only genuine community reps will have access to funding - Phase I only helps individuals - Under Phase II democratic selection of project <p><u>CACs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CAC is a check on power of mayor's office - CACs are in touch with community - Excellent relations with CAC <p><u>OTHER</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Under Phase II proper technical supervision 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Big change at the mayor's office - Now we know what's going on - Excellent contacts with the mayor's office - The third mayor participated in the discussions
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Change happened because IOM was pressured by peasant groups - CAC is another "groupement" - Prefer that IOM manage money 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not aware there is a mayor - The mayor barely functions - The mayor has no budget and cannot do anything - So far the mayor's office has done very little - It is difficult to see the mayor.

E. Cooperation between USAID and the Military

Due to an initial heavy emphasis on civic education, there was little evidence in CGP of early USAID-military cooperation in the field. In November 1994, a USAID/Department of Defense (DoD) mission to Haiti resulted in better cooperation between CGP field officers and the military. For example, the DOD permitted the U.S. Special Forces A teams to spend up to \$1,000 to complement USAID resources on the development of special projects. After further plans were made to develop more concrete activities and with the arrival in Haiti of a longer term OTI coordinator very experienced in managing similar projects elsewhere, OTI/IOM shifted gears in early 1995 to work more in depth on specific community projects. Such activities lent themselves to better collaboration with the military and more efforts were made by all concerned to help foster this collaboration.

The actual collaboration in the field varied greatly, even with standing orders to do so, depending on the knowledge of the personnel involved, staff turnovers, and the inclination of the different organizations and individuals.

Where such USAID-military cooperation was actively pursued, it generally worked well and resulted in the accomplishment of common objectives. The military was better able to understand what was going on around it. By learning from those who sometimes preceded forces in a given region, it had a detailed working knowledge of the area. It was also able to find new and effective ways of providing assistance and limiting its involvement in activities which should be left to Haitian and other civilian organizations. Their concentration was on security and other essential functions. For their part, OTI/IOM were often able to gain access to technical and engineering resources not otherwise available and to receive logistical and transportation help to reach more of the population in remote locations. In addition, the very presence of the military obviously permitted OTI/IOM to operate in a much more secure environment.

When there was little or no USAID-military cooperation, it was usually due to one or more factors. There was often a major lack of knowledge on all sides about the roles and activities of other personnel on the scene. Better and more frequent briefings should be able to solve this problem. The frequent turnovers in personnel in all organizations hurt continuity of joint operations, especially where personal relationships were important to make things happen. Finally, there were sometimes significant cultural differences among military and civilian organizations and personnel, which did not always help closer cooperation and common actions.

Such local barriers notwithstanding, the collaboration between military and civilian personnel was one of the unique short-term features and successes of CGP.

Where practiced, USAID/military cooperation resulted in improved operations for all concerned.

F. Performance of IOM

The evaluation team was also asked to assess the work of the implementing organization, IOM.

1. Managerial Achievements: Excellent

Through CGP, IOM achieved the remarkable feat of providing highly valued projects to all regions of Haiti and to 113 out of the 133 communes during the 18 months of the grant agreement and amendments evaluated (four months of this were devoted to civic education and design, while 14 months were dedicated to actual project implementation). In its well organized documentation system, IOM reports having engaged more than 2,000 community groups representing well over 50,000 Haitians in community improvement projects. The highly varied nature of these micro-projects (bulletin boards versus school construction), and the different character of the groups engaged (soccer teams versus churches) render the evaluation team somewhat cautious in assessing fully the meaning of some of the figures presented in the monthly reports. But, there is absolutely no doubt that this program has had unprecedented success in mobilizing highly valued resources to tens of thousands of needy beneficiaries all over Haiti. (See tables and charts in Annex D).

The evaluation team's field visits left them impressed with the success IOM staff had in carrying out their mandate for rapid action affecting ordinary Haitians generally bypassed in development activities. While there were the inevitable start-up problems, especially in such a difficult environment, the operation is now running well and appears cost effective.

Popular reactions to CGP projects, particularly Phase I projects such as schools, water systems, latrines and the like, are highly positive. The expressions of praise which the evaluation team heard from Phase I project participants regarding IOM's management performance throughout the country were virtually unanimous and very convincing. Beneficiaries of CGP projects especially praised the following aspects of the program:

- *Rapidity of decision making.* Proposals were reviewed rapidly, sometimes on the same day, and positive or negative decisions were communicated immediately. This was, for most groups, both unprecedented and astounding.
- *Political impartiality.* The evaluators heard widespread expressions of cynicism concerning the hidden partisan dynamics that have governed local governmental responses to requests for aid. IOM staff, in contrast, were praised for their impartiality to the political (or other) antecedents of those proposing projects.
- *Compliance with agreements.* On several occasions the evaluators heard IOM praised for coming through on everything that it promised. On no occasion did the team hear from project participants that IOM failed to comply with its part of the agreement.

Among its beneficiaries, IOM has earned for itself a highly positive and uncontested management reputation.

CGP has a well-organized managerial structure emanating from Port-au-Prince. A long-term and experienced OTI project coordinator in Port-au-Prince works closely with USAID/Haiti and OTI management and IOM. From the IOM side, there is a chief of mission dealing with liaison with OTI and policy, management, and inter-agency coordination with UN bodies and other organizations. There is also a senior finance and administrative officer supervising administrative and budget matters, a national coordinator for the CGP supervising field program implementation, a field accounting coordinator who regularly visits field sites for administrative support and training, a staff training coordinator (as of the beginning of Phase II), a documentation officer responsible for press relations and the data base, plus requisite support staff.

**POINTS REGARDING CGP ON WHICH THERE IS CONSENSUS
AMONG RURAL HAITIANS INTERVIEWED**

Relation to Local Needs

- CGP satisfies immediate needs of the poor people.
- There is no one else here who helps us besides IOM.

Relation to Democracy

- IOM staff serve as a transition team to prepare for democracy.
- IOM prepares the ground for democracy.
- IOM presence linked to return of Aristide.

Relation to the Communities

- IOM/CGP is well installed in the community.
- IOM/CGP contract direct with the communities.
- People like to be consulted on their priorities.
- IOM/CGP never dictates to the community or local committee.
- IOM/CGP has close collaboration with local authorities, the 'mairie'.

Relation to the Military

- Separate from foreign military but collaborate with them.
- Foreign military takes care of security, IOM perceived to handle development and small projects.

General

- IOM respects contract and agreements.
- Competent staff.
- We want IOM to continue. Can you find a way so that IOM can continue?

Less than Consensus

- Some are aware, and some are not aware, of: 1) the source IOM funding, 2) the short duration of IOM in Haiti.
- If IOM were a running for president I would vote for them for president (only one comment).

CGP has a computerized data base system documenting its expenditures and activities. Each project, activity, or event is coded for commune, locality, type of activity, name of implementing group, community contribution, CGP budget contribution, dates of implementation and other variables. Evaluation team members were presented with precise and well organized information on all micro-projects.

With policy guidance from OTI, CGP has moved from a managerially "free" mode to one in which procedures are more carefully spelled out. With the input of the newly arrived OTI coordinator, administrative, financial and operational procedures were standardized and simplified by February 1995. A detailed field operations manual was prepared. This manual has been frequently updated, and monthly progress reports have been circulated. Earlier concerns have been resolved about IOM's apparent reluctance to provide sufficient information about USAID's role as the funding agency.

Several IOM offices exhibited significant creativity in assuring that groups with special needs participated in the project. Widespread benefits clearly accrued to children and adolescents, who are now safer and more comfortable learning in more than 500 schools that were renovated or constructed. In many cases, youth were involved in the implementation of school projects, especially in site cleaning and carrying materials, thus learning the value of volunteerism early in life. The team

also noted involvement of youth—including pre-schoolers in at least one case in Ouanamimthe—in a number of "public space" activities such as park clean-ups and beautification. This may indirectly promote civic pride and responsibility.

A second group needing basic attention was *prisoners*. Reports by human rights groups throughout the three-year crisis, and at the entry of the Multi-National Force (MNF), underscore the inhuman conditions in which prisoners were kept. There was severe overcrowding of antiquated facilities and the lack of segregation of sexes meant that women prisoners were subject to indiscriminate rape and sexual abuse. Frequent escapes also kept neighboring communities in fear. CGP's specific contribution to collaborative MNF/IOM/UN prison renovation, while not always easy to disaggregate, must be considered positive. The improved conditions assure male and female prisoners' basic human rights and also improve the safety of neighboring communities.

Finally, the special efforts of several regional IOM offices to include *physically challenged* youth and adults in projects must be lauded. For example, children from a school for the blind and deaf were active in constructing *gabion* baskets for a drainage ditch outside their school.

The program was unusually successful in terms of leeway given to field staff, and therefore, significant accomplishments were achieved in creatively addressing special needs groups.

COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTION: FORT LIBERTE REGION
<p>Rehabilitation of the Ouanamimthe Lycee: 70% of the school's 4,000 students contributed to the execution of the project. The painting was done by students of the two upper grades. Each student received a wage of 20 gourdes a day for a period of 15 days. The choice of participants was made during class. Nothing was done free. Parents with useful skills agreed to work for a reduced price.</p>
<p>The Romeo Fruit Tree Nursery near Fort Liberte: The president of the project committee put some of his land at the disposition of the project and contributed his labor. Two hundred to 300 rural people participated in the planning meeting to find project participants. From the meeting came the idea of a three day work "congress." One hundred to 150 men and women participated in the work "congress." The women went long distances in search of dried animal dung to serve as fertilizer. Unfortunately, some jealous people destroyed the nursery. They were against the "intermediary" on the project, the leader of local NGO, not against the nursery itself or the farmers who participated in it.</p>
<p>Filibert Tool Bank and Road Repair: Two days a week, local farmers have worked on the road. The number of farmers has varied between 70 and 400. Recently they stopped work so they could look for a source of "food for work." This is one of several instances where the "food for work" promoted by other projects such as the PAD/JOBS (Jobs Creation Program) project has competed with the "pure voluntarism" approach favored by the OTI/IOM project. (This area is so desperately barren and poor that it is difficult to begrudge the workers the desire to get some food in exchange for work instead of adhering to an idealized model of volunteerism).</p>
<p>Ferrier Road Canals: After a meeting of the whole community, a door-to-door collection approach was used to recruit money to pay for food for the road workers. Two hundred fifty people contributed money.</p>

COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTION: SAN MARC REGION
<u>Mireau School Reconstruction:</u> 300 people, or approximately 30% of the area's population, contributed work for free. Nine work foreman were paid with money from the local Albert Schweitzer hospital.
<u>Verette, 6th Communal Section, Road Improvement:</u> According to the project president, there are 37 work groups of 21 people each who work on the road two days a week. Two visitors to the project (which is very isolated) said they saw hundreds of people working. All three informants confirm that the community labor is truly volunteer. The community workers also contribute use of their own tools to build the road.
<u>Verette, Valley Forge Flood Control:</u> 25 people a day participated in transporting and assembling rocks and sand. Workers from the JOBS/PADF project contributed 3 days a week. "Gabion" (pilings) experts were paid out a fund collected and maintained by the project committee. Women prepared food and brought water.
<u>Coastal Erosion:</u> Before Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) got involved, 60-80 people per day worked on project. When PADF got involved there was conflict with IOM voluntary approach. A compromise resulted where people were paid with food every other day.
<u>Pierre Payen Flood Control:</u> Labor, rocks were brought from far away by UN to the river. Community constructed the pilings, 5 people on the "mason" committee, 42-60 people worked.
<u>Charette Dispensary Construction:</u> The Albert Schweitzer hospital trained the nurse, and contributed medicine. The mason gave voluntary labor. 50 people worked for free periodically over three months.

2. Staff Recruitment and Training: Mixed, But Now Better

Recruitment

Initial staff recruitment was done in a procedurally unusual fashion that reflected the special nature of CGP. IOM was contracted by OTI in a grant agreement as the CGP implementing agency. Under ordinary circumstances, the implementing agency has full responsibility for the recruitment and management of staff, subject to USAID's normal final approval. Partly because of the special nature of this transition initiative, however, OTI/Washington played a more active role in the recruitment of staff than is usually done, even by in-country USAID Missions in relation to grantees or contractors. For example, lists of names were generated often by OTI/Washington and sent to the IOM office in Haiti for review and agreement.

It was initially thought that CGP would last for only six months. Many of the earliest personnel contracts, however, were for only three months. The evaluators were told that this was done in order to place those hired on a probationary status and allow OTI/IOM management the option to reassess their performances after three months.

The original criteria for hiring expatriates, as reported to the evaluators, were to some degree problematic. This was in part because of the shifting assumptions about the nature and length of the entire program and of the activities which it was to undertake. Haiti and/or development experience plus fluency in Creole, or at least French, were valued from the outset. Several persons who had lived and worked in Haiti and who therefore met those requirements were hired. Some have stayed with the program throughout its life and have, by common consensus, been among the most effective IOM regional field managers.

Others, however, without project management or development experience were hired on the basis of their background in U.S. political campaigns, election monitoring, training or other fields not directly related to project management in a developing country. Especially after the program's shift toward an emphasis on projects, such personnel recruitment can be seen in retrospect as inadequate for the managerial skills required of CGP field teams. Some of those with marginal credentials eventually functioned well. Others did not; their inexperience in development and management led to administrative difficulties and unnecessary risks.

CGP benefitted from collaboration with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)/United Nations Volunteers (UNV) program. Seven UNVs were recruited in Phase I and sent to the field as junior team members. IOM subsequently requested and received three international and twelve national UNV positions.

The early assumption that political activists would perform better in this transition situation than those equipped with experiences in development and international program management has proven to be largely incorrect. Developing country, project management and language qualified individuals were better staff candidates.

The recruitment of Haitian staff was done via radio announcements and word-of-mouth, using criteria which were technically stricter and more germane to the tasks at hand. And the later assignment of Haitian UNV's to several communes was done following strict professional criteria. The incumbents of those positions struck the evaluators as having outstanding qualifications.

Often there were significant salary discrepancies among international staff hired by OTI, IOM and UNV. IOM regional field directors were at liberty not only to hire their own staff but also to set their salaries. At program start-up, there were no hiring guidelines regarding salary schedules, which caused management problems. The early program assumption that CGP could or should ignore bureaucratic precedents may have been partially at fault.

Training

The haste with which CGP was deployed, along with the periodic shifts of priorities in program objectives, complicated attempts to deliver consistently appropriate training for both IOM's international and Haitian staff and counterparts. IOM functioned for an entire year without a professional training coordinator. During this time, training was delivered on an *ad hoc* basis with no overall strategy or needs assessment to draw on until December 1995. With the appointment of a training coordinator in October 1995, the situation was finally improved.

The absence of a formal, integrated training component was a notable flaw, which could have been avoided with better planning in relating project content and duration to training needs. Despite this, IOM did an admirable job in preparing team leaders for their work in the field and eventually introduced better, more structured training.

Early training (October 1994) for the first group of eight team leaders consisted of a three-day orientation to get the teams up and running and out to the field quickly. Planners predicted that once established at their sites with local staff on board, they would be in a better position to assess

appropriate local training needs. Since many of these early hires had participated in the preliminary field assessment which allowed them to view the Haitian reality outside of Port-au-Prince, they had an advantage over the second group that came in three months later. Three months after their initial orientation, the first group was summoned back to Port-au-Prince for a three-day debriefing, giving them an opportunity to share lessons learned and, in effect, further their training.

Unlike the first group, the second one (which arrived in December 1994) was given a three-week orientation, which included topics of greater practicality and multiple day stays in the field. There were, however, no significant sessions on project design or management. At that time, emphasis had not formally shifted from civic education to micro-project development; thus better training in this area was not fully anticipated.

After October of 1995, with Phase II underway, field staff and counterparts required intensified training in community linkages, the organization and management of meetings, setting priorities, group facilitation, project identification and management, and accounting procedures. (Some of these topics had already been the focus of on-the-job training.) To date, more than 40 training sessions have been held. This on-going training takes place at regional IOM offices and mayors' districts, and attract anywhere from 15 to 50 participants. They are delivered by the IOM training coordinator with help from local staff and utilize a variety of adult learning techniques, including case studies, role plays, and group discussions.

While OTI/IOM training was weak early on, it did have the virtue of getting underway very quickly and did improve eventually. With the shift into Phase II, training has become more systematized and more relevant.

G. Other Issues and Concerns

While CGP is certainly judged to be an overall success, there were inevitably issues and concerns that arose as OTI and IOM rushed to implement the program.

1. Washington's Management Role: Particularly in the days before there was a long-term OTI representative in Haiti, OTI/Washington involvement in management was more intense than is ordinarily the case in overseas projects, despite the presence of an in-country USAID Mission. Many issues where OTI/Washington became involved concerned personnel. There was less than optimum integration of USAID/Haiti and OTI/IOM operations to maximize the use of resources. While USAID/Haiti was certainly very busy with numerous responsibilities and functioning with reduced staff, improved communications at various levels would have helped overall efforts, including CGP.

2. Degree of Project Design: CGP began with a general mandate to provide a rapid and flexible response in support of democratic processes. It had, however, no written plan or design at the outset to guide the pursuit of this mandate. As a result, there was a great deal of improvisation and periodic reordering of program priorities which could have been reduced with better planning.

Some written project designs to guide implementors (e.g., 5-10 page project plans rather than USAID's normally lengthy documents) may have helped. On a more positive note, OTI/IOM staff had a level of autonomy and flexibility in the disbursement of funds that is quite unusual in

development projects. This informal design approach allowed for rapid response to changing conditions. As an agency, USAID should seriously consider defining a limited number of operating guidelines and some basic procedures to be used in political transition programs, incorporating the generally successful OTI experience in Haiti.

3. Shifting time lines: IOM field staff were originally told the entire project would last only six months and some staff were hired on three-month contracts. This characteristic had several potentially deleterious effects (beyond those already mentioned). It reduced the pool of potential staff to those currently "in between jobs" and created an aura of job insecurity among many staff members who had to deal with the question of job hunting almost as soon as they began to gear up for CGP. With respect to program implementation, it produced an atmosphere of urgency and haste and a short-term orientation quite different from the orientation of staff in projects whose duration is several years. A longer project life of at least one year established at the outset would have led to a more stable perspective regarding personnel and program approaches.

4. The criterion of speed: The mandate to disburse program monies quickly before the end of the six-month life-of-project had the advantage of permitting IOM field staff to respond rapidly and generously to local community needs. The disadvantage of this was the emergence of pressures to produce many projects in a limited time period. Field team staff reported that during the height of Phase I, they felt pressure from the Port-au-Prince headquarters to maximize the number of projects in their regions. The Port-au-Prince office, although clearly interested in quality, seems to have inadvertently created the impression that individuals and field teams would be judged as much by the quantity of their projects as by the quality.

5. Geographic distribution of micro-projects: Within regions, the geographic distribution of micro-projects varied considerably, depending on whether the office gave cash and the transportation available to staff. In general, areas where cash was given had a greater geographic distribution of projects because IOM staff was not responsible for logistics (this created other concerns, however, about accountability and technical issues). In areas where the IOM office procured and transported materials, most projects tended to be in towns and along roads in order to facilitate access. A variation of this latter situation was where the IOM field staff was willing and able to enlist the help of foreign military units to transport materials to remote locations via helicopter.

6. Less participation in urban areas: Although there appeared to be more projects in cities and towns than in rural areas, IOM staff in Port-au-Prince and field offices expressed their belief that the project has generally been more successful in rural areas. When probed, the definition of "more successful" seemed to pertain to community participation at all levels—from project initiation to provision of volunteer labor to continuing maintenance of a new or improved facility. The team's sample was not large enough to provide any definitive conclusions in this regard, and found that coding the IOM database by "urban" or "rural" was too subjective to be useful. Given the fact the urban poor in Haiti—as in most countries—tend to be more politicized and frequently more volatile than their rural counterparts, the evaluation team made a special effort to ask "what works" in terms of fostering democratic development among the urban masses. The team was cautioned that urban problems and thus needs are often more complicated than those in rural areas. IOM staff underscored that there is less clearly defined communal "ownership" in urban areas and that urban populations tend to look more toward government to solve problems rather than work them out themselves.

7. Volunteerism: What does seem to work in both rural and urban areas, at least in the short term, are the "public spaces, public safety" types of projects—clean-ups and beautification, libraries, drainage, prisons improvements. These are all spheres where government and the people are clear that the public sector has responsibility. In a transition situation, however, the Haitian community seems willing to pitch in and help government with this responsibility. Stimulating community action in urban areas was more difficult than in rural areas and IOM management needed to plan accordingly, particularly when there were competing, income generating activities (e.g., JOBS Creation Program) in the area. Future programs may wish to adopt a strategy of starting with broad-based activities to build community confidence, while trying to identify non-political groups with which to work.

H. Future Institutional Arrangements

1. CGP and CACs as a Short-Term Mechanism

The Communal Improvement Councils (CACs) of Phase II were instituted as transitional devices to involve more local government officials, through a series of checks and balances, in decisions concerning the use of OTI/IOM's CGP resources. Although it is hoped that the participatory processes which they activated, particularly the dialogue between elected officials and their constituents concerning the disposition of available funds, will continue into the post-transition period, there is no built-in program assumption that the CACs themselves will necessarily survive as permanent organizational units in local government.

Toward the end of the evaluation, the team learned of OTI's plans to postpone the current program termination date of March 31, 1996 and to extend it through December, 1996.

This extension, when granted, could have several important positive consequences.

- **It will permit continuation of representative gatherings pending the emergence of elected local assemblies. Elections, recently postponed until later in 1996, are slated to put in place constitutionally mandated municipal assemblies which in some ways will resemble CACs. The continuation of CACs through this electoral process, particularly with funding to carry out some concrete activities, could perform the important role of providing a model on which these constitutionally mandated assemblies could base themselves.**
- **It will give the participating communes more experience in project management as they implement yet another round of Phase II projects.**
- **The extension will provide a continued infusion of badly needed resources for concrete activities into impoverished rural areas.**
- **CGP will have the time to finish Phase I projects whose terminations have been delayed.**
- **At least some of the CACs could undertake the task of attracting funding from other donors. The currently low state of proposal writing ability in the CACs would require**

flexibility and the willingness to assist in proposal formulation on the part of these other donors.

- **An extension will facilitate exploration of the nature of the hand-off between CGP and other USAID democracy enhancement programs as well as other donor programs.**

2. Long Term Potential of CACs

This topic was addressed in connection with another aspect of the evaluation's scope, namely facilitating the return to democracy. Here the subject is looked at in the context of another element of the evaluation, i.e., next steps for the CGP, especially now that the project is being extended.

There has been at least some discussion among IOM personnel of a potentially longer term role for CACs as formulators of action plans and searchers of financing from both the Government of Haiti and other donors. Democratic processes which do not deliver resources or services are of little value to rural dwellers. Thus, CACs' success depends largely on obtaining funds and support from the government and other donors. From this point of view, IOM's Phase II projects would be merely a prelude to that longer and important task of local government fund raising and project development.

The feasibility and desirability of any long-term CAC functioning is an open question. Clearly, the long term viability of CACs rests on two assumptions: 1) that the government will be willing and able to respond to well articulated requests for financial support; and 2) that the communes will be able, largely on their own and as a result of CGP and other inputs, to access external donors.

Both of the above assumptions are highly problematic and must be critically examined.

At the time of this evaluation, the mayors and their offices were reported to be without funding. They had been in office for four months and had yet to receive their first paychecks. They had no operational budget. The few taxes collected are returned to Port-au-Prince. Office furniture and supplies often consisted of excess U.S. property. Municipal buildings had sometimes been refurbished and painted with the financial and logistical support of foreign troops.

It is a questionable assumption to say that the Haitian Government, which fails to pay even the meager salaries of its mayors, will be responsive to a CGP-trained municipal citizens' committee requesting support for irrigation systems, roads, and other infrastructure and services unless and until other conditions change.

The CGP Phase II strategy envisions that CACs will approach foreign donors to solicit added funds. CGP projects are merely seed money to permit the execution of visible projects which help CACs to function and enhance their credibility in the eyes of external donors and constituents.

Thus far, many Communal Action Plans, while officially prepared by CACs, have in reality been prepared more by IOM field staff. Moreover, funding organizations generally prefer to create their own organizational systems, rather than adopt those created by predecessors. OTI made relatively little use of the institutional memory of USAID/Haiti. Similarly, the contractor for the follow-on local government components of the USAID/Haiti Democracy Enhancement Project (DEP), which is a

major candidate for CGP hand-off, indicates that it does not presently envision IOM's CAC system as part of its approach.

CGP will now continue through December 1996, and CGP has asked each of its field staff to form committees and generate communal action plans. There are several possible targets for proposals generated by the CACs. Major donor projects—FAES/ECHO—that provided small projects in rural areas were either slow to start-up (ECHO) and/or had more complicated approval processes (Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Social [FAES]). The larger donor efforts, however, are beginning to be implemented and the combined major donor resources directed at decentralized localities throughout Haiti should exceed US\$50 million in the next two to three years.

IOM field offices were open and responsive to working with international and indigenous NGOs, including those funded by USAID and those with independent funding. This collaboration leveraged more funds for projects than one agency alone could handle and in many cases introduced the community to other sources of funding that are likely to continue when OTI phases out.

During Phases I and II, CGP built and installed systems and infrastructures, focusing more on installation than on maintenance. Mechanisms for maintenance and repair of schools, pumps, roads, and the like were left without community management or resources, probably due to the initially anticipated short-term life expectancy of CGP.

In the process of generating a truly impressive number and variety of concrete sub-projects, schools, water systems and roads, CGP also put a large number of participatory decision making and collaborative processes in motion (e.g., CAC's, town meetings and IOM field procedures.).

Several generic Phase II elements of CGP may now be picked up by a variety of other funding sources in a longer term development mode. Given the array of donors and programs active in this sector, CGP's next steps should include consolidation of gains from IOM's transition effort so that others can move them into a sustainable development phase. This consolidation should include—

- **Finishing outstanding Phase I and Phase II micro-projects and helping to set up maintenance systems as appropriate so that local communities are left with continuing successes;**
- **Continuing to refine Communal Improvement Plans, where selected micro-projects are developed to a fundable proposal level, and other donors/NGOs/interested parties can move them forward; and**
- **Assuring that mayors are provided names of potential follow-on partners, descriptions of types of assistance provided, along with addresses and phone/fax numbers.**

3. CGP Phase Out

CGP's evolution is occurring at the same time that Haiti is completing critical steps to democracy including the transfer of the Presidency from Jean-Bertrand Aristide to René Préval and transfer of

United Nations' Peacekeeping to a much smaller Haitian National Police (HNP). Other assistance programs in local government development are also becoming more operational.

The Haitian Parliament is working on the enabling legislation for local governance which will include the provision for election of Communal, Departmental, and Inter-Departmental Assemblies. The positive experience gained by the CACs meshes with the constitutionally mandated procedures that will now be the subject of parliamentary discussion. CAC experiences may provide a basis for action in Communal Assemblies in particular.

It is very appropriate for the OTI funding of CGP to phase out, no later than the end of 1996, and for OTI to consolidate and build upon the successes of CGP. OTI can then take the lessons learned on to other critical transition countries.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Facilitating the Return to Democracy

1. CGP should continue to work on concrete activities and with the existing community organizations, via local representations, rather than seeking to direct scarce resources and energies for strictly civic education or to help in the creation of new groups.
2. CGP should continue to work in a democratic manner with local officials, but also allow for some direct dealings with community organizations, particularly if local officials fall back into the chronic stance of non-responsiveness of previous periods.
3. As CGP approaches its termination, experiences should be shared with USAID/Haiti, other donors and government authorities to assist in longer range planning for local government development in Haiti.
4. OTI/IOM should continue the mode of participatory discussions and activities, involving both citizens and local officials, so as to provide practice in and reinforcement of democratic processes.
5. While the opportune time for municipal improvement projects may have passed for the CGP, OTI/IOM should coordinate with USAID/Haiti to determine whether such activities would help other USAID projects (e.g., Administration of Justice [AOJ]) to further reduce intimidation. Otherwise, CGP should continue to focus on concrete community micro-projects.
6. OTI/IOM should continue to insist upon the full support of community groups and citizens in the planning and implementation of CGP micro-projects.
7. In the few cases where CGP might assist municipal activities (such as aid to other USAID projects), OTI/IOM should not necessarily insist on its usual requirement of community support or voluntary labor, particularly if there is not likely to be any concrete benefit to the people.
8. OTI/IOM should continue to focus CGP resources on rural areas and remote urban centers as a means of benefitting those people so long neglected by the leadership in Port-au-Prince.
9. OTI/IOM should continue to work with CAC's during the remainder of the extended CGP and provide their assessments to USAID/Haiti and its contracts.
10. USAID and the military should schedule more frequent exchanges of information both at headquarters and on-the-ground to assure proper planning, coordination and continued maximum use of resources.
11. USAID and the military should designate official points-of-contact in their respective organizations in Haiti and elsewhere to coordinate these joint efforts.

12. If the Canadian replacements for the U.S. military in the UN operation do not now plan to continue a civil affairs function, they should be encouraged to do so and to collaborate with OTI/IOM.

B. Performance of IOM

1. OTI/IOM should establish as many linkages as possible with other USAID and donor activities.
2. OTI/IOM need to further solidify its management and documentation to facilitate the approaching phase-out of this program, an orderly hand-off to others and any further assessments or determinations of added lessons learned for use elsewhere.
3. OTI/IOM need to continue with management improvements to cap off this successful program while also making known to the government and citizens that CGP is just one further example of U.S. support for both the restoration of democracy in Haiti and improved living conditions for the Haitian people.
4. To the maximum extent possible, OTI and IOM should use the tried and proven management methods of their respective organizations to save time, effort and money.
5. OTI/IOM should try to move qualified Haitian women into positions of greater responsibility among CGP project staff.
6. OTI/IOM should increasingly emphasize training of Haitian staff and counterparts as the CGP prepares to phase-out and as a means of assuring greater sustainability of the democratic processes and management practices so well demonstrated in CGP.

C. Next Steps

1. OTI should carefully stipulate the purposes of an extension of CGP and indicate the exact plans, conditions, and anticipated results of that extension in the amendment to the grant to IOM. In the context of the CGP extension, OTI/IOM also need to develop specific work plans to address the close-out of the project.
2. Particularly now that the CGP is to be extended to a total of two years, OTI/IOM should focus increasing efforts on maintenance of physical facilities as a matter of cost effectiveness as well as a further means of applying democratic processes.
3. As part of the CGP/IOM grant extension, OTI, in consultation with USAID/Haiti, should develop a realistic work plan with IOM regarding how CACs can better develop their capabilities to obtain resources from others.
4. OTI/IOM should keep an open mind about the future role of CACs and not commit to their continued existence as separate organizations. The impending elections for local assemblies may very well eliminate any further need for CACs, but that is a local decision. If CACs do not prove their worth in terms of obtaining and directing needed resources, there is little reason to

perpetuate them. Instead, OTI/IOM should focus on the functions and democratic processes provided by CACs and share the benefits of that experience with USAID/Haiti and other implementing agents.

5. IOM/OTI and USAID/Haiti need to share information and coordinate efforts regarding the funding of local government development projects so that operating assumptions and activities are as realistic as possible.
6. OTI/IOM should actively seek opportunities to disseminate CGP experiences so that others might carry these efforts forward.

VII. LESSONS LEARNED

Although some of Haiti's unique circumstances make it very difficult to apply procedures developed there to other transition situations, the OTI/IOM experience in Haiti has nonetheless yielded some generic lessons potentially useful in other transition situations. Some of the lessons are positive; others are more in the nature of changes that should be seriously considered and perhaps introduced if the program is repeated.

A. Delivery of Resources and Services

Democratization through resource flows. The CGP switch from a menu featuring civic education events to one grounded in the financing of tangible problem solving activities—water systems, roads, schools, latrines, and the like—was enthusiastically received by all stakeholders, particularly the beneficiaries themselves. A generic lesson is derived from this experience: democratization efforts staged in an impoverished setting are more effectively pursued through concrete and adequately funded activities yielding real benefits rather than through more abstract adult civic education seminars. It is simply unrealistic to promote democratic processes in theory when people's basic needs are not being fulfilled. Democratization programs in such settings will best pursue participatory process goals in the context of adequately funded and concrete material projects.

Non-governmental resource delivery systems. The CGP demonstrated once again in Haiti as elsewhere that, under conditions of institutional chaos, it is both possible and desirable for USAID assistance programs to design delivery systems that provide external resources to local communities without having to pass through the normal channels of the host government. Particularly where local government is either absent or weak, a multifaceted approach, involving both NGOs and government, serves as a very useful check on some of the deficiencies of governmental structure. This approach should not detract from the longer term goal of local government development.

Maintenance. Some of the concrete activities—roads, water systems—financed by a program such as this will have hefty maintenance requirements. In its emphasis on popular participation, CGP was properly insistent on the requirement of community contribution for the installation of these tangibles assets. Future efforts should also require an up-front strategy on the part of the beneficiary group for the maintenance of the structures being installed as a further exercise in democratic process and to protect the initial investment.

B. USAID/Military Cooperation

Security prerequisites for rapid start-up. In situations of major security problems, multinational military interventions can pave the way for civilian development activities that are both rapid and at least partly independent of daily military presence. In Haiti, all the lethal weaponry was on one side: that of the *de facto* regime and its civilian attaché and Front de la Resistance Armee du Peuple Haitian (FRAPH) armed surrogates. Unaccustomed to using their weapons against anyone but their own unarmed civilians, these forces quickly caved in with the arrival of the multi-national force, who were received as heroes by the unarmed population at large. Because of the receptivity by the population and their interest in concrete, material support, OTI/IOM was subsequently able to carry on its

civilian development activities with rapidity and physical safety, even without the daily presence of foreign troops in the targeted regions.

USAID civilian programs, however, may not have such latitude or success in situations of genuine civil or guerrilla warfare, where (unlike in Haiti) those wielding the weapons had been accustomed to confronting other armed groups rather than unarmed civilians. Where there are genuine combatants with willingness to confront the incoming troops and to take punitive measures against civilians collaborating with their development programs, a program such as CGP would not be able to be implemented with the security and rapidity that occurred in Haiti.

Military and civilian collaboration. **The feasibility and utility of military and civilian collaboration in assistance activities was well demonstrated in Haiti.** USAID brings critical development and management experience to a situation while the military provides resources, transport and security. The program in Haiti plus numerous other examples (Philippines, El Salvador, Vietnam) bears this out. In the specific case of Haiti, because there was no real combat after the arrival of the troops, the security function of the military cooperation with USAID was less urgent. OTI/IOM operated well in areas where there was no daily military presence. Likewise the popularity of the foreign military was such that the troops required no civilian development program to enhance their acceptability or security.

Nonetheless, the presence of a combined civilian and military presence permitted each group to more effectively reach the population. OTI/IOM activities were logistically facilitated by transportation and other support from the military. U.S. Special Forces and Civil Affairs activities were likewise helped by the financial resources and on-the-ground knowledge provided by the staff of CGP. Such linkages can and should be pursued in other settings. Because it is highly likely that there will be future emergencies involving USAID and military personnel, planning should begin early for close cooperation among these and other organizations to increase chances for success and maximize the use of resources.

Multinationalism of military cooperation. Even where the foreign military is not American, the advantages to USAID of the practice of collaboration with the military became clear. USAID programs cannot function effectively unless basic security concerns are resolved. Haitians, in fact, continue to feel strongly that the military presence should be prolonged as much as possible. The multinational character of this military presence may permit it to be extended longer than if it had been an all-American force subject to domestic political pressures for rapid withdrawal. It may be slightly more difficult to blend USAID and non-U.S. military procedures in civilian endeavors, but it can certainly be done.

C. Cooperation with Other Programs

Leadership role of the U.S. In line with the above observations, however, even in multinational undertakings, the U.S. will have to play a major leadership role in helping to solve basic problems. Other interested parties and donors should also be encouraged to share the burden, particularly in the real world of budgetary stringencies.

Multinationalism of funding. The sustainability of programs such as CGP would be heightened if the principle of multinationalism were also applied to the funding itself. With the narrowing of the USAID funding base, there was ambiguity as to who, if anybody, would carry on the activities of CGP after OTI funding runs out. In future activities of this type, USAID should consider taking more active measures to inform and, if possible, involve other donors in implementation during the project itself. This is particularly promising if the executing agency is one such as IOM, whose status as a Geneva-based international organization would encourage the participation by European donors. Such multilateral funding did occur in other civilian assistance programs (e.g., Mozambique).

Collaboration between USAID and other U.S. agencies. That part of the United States Government (USG) which has the preponderant expertise in working in such difficult developing country situations and managing complicated programs and substantial resources is USAID. One must quickly add, however, that these multifaceted political transitions require an array of skills and resources, necessitating the active involvement of many other government agencies. These include the Department of Defense and the U.S. military, Department of State, and others, depending on the particular circumstances and the issues involved.

Relation between OTI and other USAID programs. While USAID has generally distinguished itself in both emergency and development situations overseas, the heavy burden of many of its procedural regulations and pertinent laws do not always lend themselves to prompt and flexible assistance programs for nations in political transition. It is reasonable to assume that in the post-Cold War era, local "hot spots" such as Haiti will become a more common occurrence requiring a special form of U.S. aid. Therefore, USAID needs to adjust to this new reality. It is making a major effort to do so in the form of the newly created OTI which is mandated to lead the agency in this direction.

To maximize the use of resources within USAID and improve management, however, OTI should consider better integrating its operations with the other parts of the agency (and vice versa), including the resident overseas Missions. OTI's "notwithstanding" authority in the use of its special funding gives it an advantage in speed and flexibility which should be emulated elsewhere in USAID. But in exercising this mandate, OTI should strive to the maximum extent possible to incorporate into its program the sound development criteria and best management practices of the more traditional operations of USAID. Gender sensitivity in host country personnel recruitment, as well as accountability, strategic planning methods, and personnel administration are just a few of the USAID elements that strengthen OTI-funded projects without slowing down or impeding activities.

D. Management of CGP Resources and Personnel

Longer time lines. Although OTI indicates that its time line is normally up to two years, the actual experience in Haiti with the six-month agreements and amendments between USAID and IOM under which CGP worked showed the need for an upward revision from the beginning. Such programs must reasonably assume a longer period of operation (e.g., at least one year) to allow adequate planning and more effective management. Tranching funds and contracts in smaller portions, as occurred in Haiti, injects too much uncertainty and some inefficiency of resources into the program. Because of the short-term nature of OTI-funded activities *vis-a-vis* the long term democratization process itself, such programs should include plans for the transition to longer term projects.

Recruitment and managerial credentials. While the overriding goal may be support of a political process, inevitably the foundations will be built on the proper management of human and/or material resources. To ensure the latter, appropriately qualified and experienced management personnel must be recruited throughout all stages and areas of the effort to handle this administration effectively. The Haitian experience has demonstrated to USAID the utility of a project-oriented approach to democratization. The implementation of such an approach, however, presupposes managerial credentials that were not fully envisioned in the earliest OTI recruitment efforts. While the urgency associated with this and similar operations necessitates some compromises regarding staffing, future recruitment in similar situations should nevertheless seek to build on the lessons learned in this undertaking. Without effective management to guide an operation, democratic process goals will inevitably suffer.

Technical support strategies. CGP's shift from civic education to concrete projects created an unanticipated program need for solid technical and managerial expertise in the refurbishment of schools, roads, water systems and the like. The program made an early change and eventually provided for such support. Recognizing that democratization in other settings as well may be pursued through such material activities, future programs can anticipate the need for such technical and managerial backing from the outset.

ANNEX A: TOWARD A LOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSITION INITIATIVES

The CGP effort in Haiti belongs to the "first generation" of "transition initiatives" which bridge the gap between armed conflict and emergency assistance on the one hand and economic and social development programs on the other. In this section an attempt is made to formalize the CGP-OTI strategy and make it explicit, so that it can be repeated, built on, tested, and refined.

The first step toward development of a generalizable model for transition efforts is an examination of CGP-Haiti's and OTI's official objectives, listed below.

Official goals of the Communal Governance Project—

- Rapid visible results throughout the countryside;
- Decentralized, flexible implementation;
- Responsiveness to Haitians at the local level;
- Emphasis on process so that each project involved decision making by the participating community; and
- Implementation of public works projects.

Official OTI objectives are to—

- Facilitate the restoration of effective democratic rule;
- Promote greater decentralization of government as a first step toward greater development;
- Help the Haitian people move from a society of intimidation toward an atmosphere of popular participation.

An initial observation regarding the above lists of objectives is that there is a very general means-ends (or cause-effect) relationship between CGP and OTI objectives. Whereas the CGP list describes concrete, local level projects and processes, the OTI list describes country-wide democracy in almost rhetorical terms. The idea seems to be (although it is not spelled out) that the former, concrete, local-level CGP projects and processes are a **means** for achieving the overall decentralized, participatory democracy **ends** aspired to by OTI.


Two tools that USAID has used to design and evaluate projects and programs are: 1) the objective tree; and 2) the Logical Framework. Both tools, which are really part of a single analytical approach, make use of means-end (or cause-effect) analysis, identification of implicit assumptions, objective indicators for measuring results, and replacement of rhetoric and subjectivity by objectivity and logic.

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Objective Tree

Table A-1 shows a very general objective tree for transition efforts derived from the OTI/CGP experience in Haiti. Note that there is a general cause-effect (or means-ends) relationship among the categories of objectives going from the bottom of the diagram to the top.

Table A-1: A General Objective Tree for Transition Initiatives



In particular (reading from top to bottom), according to CGP reasoning:

- The means for achieving **strengthened decentralized democratic systems** throughout a country is **community level democratic processes, skills, and attitudes**:
- The means for achieving community level democratic processes, skills, and attitudes is a combination of:
 - 1) projects which satisfy community needs;
 - 2) municipal infrastructure projects; and
 - 3) participative identification of community needs.
- The mechanism which activates the whole objective tree is made up of:
 - 1) cooperation among community groups, local governments, military, other donors; which is the result of
 - 2) staffing and management; which cannot be achieved without
 - 3) financing.

A Logical Framework Structure for Transition Initiatives

Tables A-2 and A-3 show Logical Framework structures for aiding the design of future transition initiatives. In Table A-3, which shows a full Logical Framework structure, the objectives from the Objective Tree are ordered in one column to allow filling in of the Logical Framework boxes. Also, three columns are added and labeled "indicators, means of verification, and assumptions." The Logical Framework, when used correctly, is a powerful tool for the improved planning design, feasibility analysis, and evaluation of projects of all types.

Table A-2

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS
GOAL: Overall decentralized democratic system			
PURPOSE: Community level democratic processes			
OUTPUTS: - Community needs-oriented projects - Municipal government infrastructure - Participative identification of community needs			
INPUTS/ACTIVITIES - Cooperation - Management - Investment			

Table A-3 uses the Logical Framework structure to present a preliminary menu of objectives, possible success indicators, and issues to be analyzed and refined in the design and evaluation of future transition initiatives. In Table A-3, "objectives" and "indicators" are collapsed temporarily into one column, and the means of verification" column is not shown. Separation of objectives from indicators, and determination of "means of verification" probably occur on a case-by-case basis.

In the Assumptions column, on the right, are listed "external factor" outside the control of CGP, which affect the success and progress of CGP.

Table A-3

OBJECTIVES/INDICATORS	ASSUMPTIONS
<p>GOAL: OVERALL DECENTRALIZED DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Perceived legitimacy of local governments. 2. Decentralization 3. Government concern for regions outside capital 4. Municipal implementation projects/services 	
<p>PURPOSE: COMMUNITY LEVEL DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strengthening of existing, traditional groups 2. Emergence of new groups 3. People aggregate interests, collective action. 4. Women's participation 5. Labor and material contributions, voluntarism. 6. New resources found (donors, central government, local taxes, fee for service) <p>COMMUNITY LEVEL SKILLS, ATTITUDES</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Leadership, negotiation skills 2. Linkages to outside institutions 3. How to find new resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Previously distrustful parties together - Reconciliation - Intimidation reduction - People don't shoot each other - Less fear of violence - Reduced human rights abuses
<p>OUTPUTS: COMMUNITY NEEDS-ORIENTED PROJECTS</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. School projects 2. Communal projects (roads, water, electricity) 	
<p>OUTPUTS: MUNICIPAL, GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Visible results 2. Municipal structures 3. Locales for assembly, court houses, jails 4. Local tax-raising projects 	
<p>OUTPUTS: PARTICIPATIVE IDENTIFICATION OF COMMUNITY NEEDS</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Local communities engaged 2. Problems identified 3. Assessments, priorities, plans 	
<p>INPUTS: MANAGEMENT/COOPERATION</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rapid, decentralized investment and action 2. Collaboration with USAID, other donors, host government, military 3. Data base of community needs 4. Phase out/hand-over plan 5. Staff hiring, deployment 	<p>Demobilization of military, vocational training, absorption into society</p>
<p>INPUTS: INVESTMENT AND FINANCING</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Community-needs sub-project budget 2. Municipal infrastructure budget 3. Management budget 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cross threshold from security to survival - Hierarchy of needs

ANNEX B: RECENT HAITIAN HISTORY

Haiti has long been the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Gross Domestic Product per capita has fallen from US\$370 to about US\$225 in the past five years. Some 85 percent of the 1996 estimated population of seven million live in absolute poverty. Adult literacy is less than 25 percent, and only about 60 percent of the urban population and 25 percent of the rural population have access to safe water. Malnutrition and disease are widespread, with approximately 20 percent of children under five years of age suffering from chronic malnutrition. The infant mortality rate was 100 per 1,000 live births in 1994. Life expectancy at birth is about 55 years.

Haiti is the second oldest republic in the Western Hemisphere. It has had 21 constitutions and 42 chiefs of state in its 192 years of existence. From independence in 1804 until the U.S. Marine Occupation of 1915-1934, Haiti underwent 117 *coups*! After sustaining 27 years (1958 to early 1986) of repressive dictatorship under the Duvaliers (father and son), Haiti began what was thought to be a five-year crisis in succession to power that included two military governments (one of them twice), an attempt at national elections that was violently terminated by the military, an illegitimate "elected" civilian president, and an appointed provisional president who presided over the first credible democratic elections in the country's history in December 1990. When President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was sworn in on February 7, 1991, it was hoped that Haiti had finally made a break with its turbulent past.

This was not to be the case. On September 30, 1991, President Aristide's own Military Chief of Staff, Raoul Cedras, led a military *coup d'etat* financed by private business interests. President Aristide went into exile. The international community—acting through the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN)—condemned the *coup*, froze government assets and imposed a stiff trade embargo on the country.

In the three years following the *coup*, Haiti was ruled by a military regime that sought to legitimize itself through the installation of a series of illegal presidents and prime ministers. In the months prior to the US-led intervention of September 18, 1994, there were *two* nominal Senates, one loyal to the *de facto* regime and one to the elected President. The Chamber of Deputies was so divided it could not reach quorum. The Ministry of Justice was closed in October 1993, when reformist Minister Guy Malary was murdered. The executive branch of government was almost bankrupt, with civil service salaries largely in arrears. In short, the institutions necessary for governance and economic management at the most basic levels were virtually nonfunctional.

The military regime's respect for the human rights guaranteed by Haiti's 1987 Constitution was negligible and during the three-year crisis period, it increasingly met expressions of opposition with repression. In the first six months of 1994, the OAS International Civilian Mission recorded more than 2,000 cases of abuse before the regime ordered it to leave Haiti. These abuses generated an air of uncertainty and fear throughout the nation.

The international community condemned the regime and inflicted ever harsher economic sanctions to try to influence change. The sanctions had a serious impact. Inflation averaged

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averaged about 60 percent for much of 1993-1994, but in late August had moved into triple digits. Gasoline was US\$10 per gallon. The price of many basic goods was totally beyond the reach of most people. A large proportion of the Haitian population was considered marginal with key famine indicators such as severe malnutrition and low birth weight increasing.

The political crisis and its economic ramifications reinforced existing class stratification. The elite was able to buffer itself from some of the effects of the economic crisis by virtue of its wealth. Those who were sympathetic to principles of democracy were discouraged from speaking out by such events as the murders of their peers who did. Those who were unsympathetic became bullish in reaction to perceived inaction on the part of the international community. The elite-inspired formation of FRAPH—a neo-duvalierist organization committed to opposing the return of Aristide—was but one manifestation of the perception that the old guard would prevail.

The poor tried to leave the country, migrated internally, went into hiding and/or died. Most attempts at organized opposition were met by terror as exemplified by the mass murders in Rabôteau and burning in Gros Morne. Most members of opposition groups and individuals known to have supported Aristide rarely appeared in public. As of August 1994, the human rights community in Port-au-Prince believed that persons who had either been forced to migrate or go into hiding numbered in the hundreds of thousands.

The US-led MultiNational Force (MNF) intervention of some 20,000 troops on September 19, 1994 was followed by the re-opening of the legitimate Haitian Parliament on September 28 and the re-opening of Port-au-Prince City Hall on September 29. President Aristide returned on October 15 and with significant U.S. and international assistance, began to try to bring order out of chaos. His emphasis on the twin themes of institutional reconstruction and social reconciliation remain guiding principles today.

Since the re-establishment of the executive branch of government, Haiti's judicial and legislative branches have also started to rebuild. To begin to instill confidence in civilian-led law and order, the U.S. and international community have provided significant assistance to the judicial and penal systems and to creating a new Haitian National Police (HNP). Additionally, the U.S. and international community supported a series of constitutionally mandated elections which led to the installation of Haiti's 46th legislature and of 133 municipal and 535 communal section (CASEC) governments throughout the country. Although no one disputes the fragility of what has been built, it must be conceded that for the first time in many years Haiti has all of the institutions necessary for legitimate civilian governance.

Unfortunately, achievements of these institutions have not always met expectations. Since late 1994, Haiti has enjoyed a period of relative stability and security, but this is most often attributed to the presence of U.S. and international forces and not to the HNP or significant changes in social or political behaviors. The economy has continued to deteriorate, with devaluation and inflation creating conditions where even the middle class is finding it increasingly difficult to meet needs. Domestic and foreign investment has been negligible. While President Aristide maintained overwhelming popular support and the transition to President Préval has been peaceful, many Haitians are questioning when the benefits of democracy will appear. The new democratically elected administration of President Préval,

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representing the first peaceful transition of power in many years, faces the daunting task of stimulating economic growth. It will require the assistance of bilateral and multi-lateral donors for a number of years to come.

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ANNEX C: RECENT U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR HAITI

The principal U.S. Government policy objective for Haiti from October 1, 1991 until the return of President Aristide three years later was **the restoration of constitutional democratic government**. To achieve this, the U.S. worked on a number of levels both bilaterally and through the multilateral channels of the OAS and UN. Consistent with policies of the OAS and following the terms of relevant legislation and appropriations, the U.S. suspended all direct assistance to the country on October 2, 1991. On October 3, it blocked exports to the Haitian police and military. On October 4, President Bush signed an Executive Order to freeze the assets of the Haitian Government and to prohibit all financial transfers by any American citizen or company to the illegal government. On October 29, he signed a second Executive Order formalizing a comprehensive trade embargo on the country. It became effective November 5, 1991.

In May 1994, the U.S. and the international community tightened the sanctions considerably. Greater cooperation with the Dominican Republic prevented most overland contraband shipments from the Dominican Republic, thus, greatly reducing the availability of fuel. US-led diplomatic efforts cut off all financial transfers in excess of US\$50/ person/month and by the end of July 1994, terminated all commercial air transport into and out of the country. Haiti was effectively isolated from the community of nations.

The U.S. remained committed to the restoration of democracy as its foremost policy objective and to the return of President Aristide. In August 1994, the U.S. stationed a fleet of warships off the coast of Haiti to underscore President Clinton's message that he had not ruled out the use of force to achieve this objective. In addition, the UNs passed Security Council Resolution 940 (UNSCR 940), which provided international approbation for such an effort. UNSCR 940 broadened the scope of President Clinton's statements and provided for the deployment of a UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in *permissive or non-permissive* circumstances. Thus, in addition to its high anxiety over economic and political uncertainties in the domestic sphere, the Haitian population was living with the real possibility of an imminent military invasion by September 1994. Due to last minute diplomatic efforts, the military intervention was not a combative one. The arriving troops were able to quickly pacify the nation and concentrate on restoring basic governmental services and some economic functions.

To mitigate some of the negative effects of the crisis, USAID maintained a US\$40-60 million annual humanitarian assistance program in Haiti since shortly after the *coup*. This assistance program provided about three million poor Haitians with a basic "safety net" for the crisis. It was in the form of Public Law 480, Title II feeding programs, child survival and maternal/child health projects, and short-term jobs creation (JOBS). A small part of this program supported Haitian NGOs, including labor unions, in civic education and human rights through the Democracy Enhancement Project (DEP). In June 1994, the Human Rights Fund was initiated under DEP financing, which provided direct assistance to victims of political violence and abuse. The Fund provided assistance to 3,000 cases of abuse by the time it closed in November 1994.

USAID and the Military

Coupled with intensive diplomatic efforts, the intervention by the U.S. and other military forces was the single largest factor in bringing about the restoration of democratic institutions in Haiti. With the arrival of some 20,000 U.S. military personnel in September 1994, the nation was swiftly pacified and a number of steps were quickly taken to turn it on a course towards a democratic form of government. These steps involved more participatory forms of decision making as well as efforts to show to the Haitian people the tangible benefits of democratic processes. To help bring about this change, U.S. Special Forces, Civil Affairs and other military units provided limited governmental services and played some governmental roles (e.g. utilities, town meetings) to help lay the groundwork for the eventual transition of such functions to Haitian entities and foreign donors.

In the planning in Washington for the Haiti operation, it was anticipated that the U.S. military involvement in such civilian activities would be of limited duration. These functions were certainly viewed as being very important in the short term as a way of supporting the newly restored government and providing concrete benefits to poor Haitians as part of the restoration of democracy.

Addressing social and economic problems in a democratic fashion was understood as essential to get at some of the root causes of Haiti's chronic problems. There were, therefore, some initial agreements made in principle regarding how USAID and other civilian U.S. agencies would cooperate with the U.S. military in Haiti. In most cases, however, it appears that the details of such collaboration were left to be worked out on the ground after the onset of the operation. In USAID's case, it was decided that the agency would handle the demobilization of former military and police while also being responsible for local government projects in the rural areas. Although the former project was more politically visible and sensitive, the latter was seen as helping to fill the void between the immediate and emergency assistance provided by the military, USAID and others and the more traditional development programs of USAID and other donors. Through OTI, which had recently been set up to handle such programs, USAID worked out an agreement with the IOM to manage both the demobilization and CGP projects.

USAID initiated a significant recovery package for the post-resolution period which shifted program emphasis away from the more immediate provision of humanitarian assistance to a longer term sustainable development strategy. Although early development efforts, such as balance of payments transfers and elimination of arrears, were available immediately, many of the mechanisms to implement the sustainable development programs were delayed as the Haitian government assembled a staff. The overlay of a *transition program* to USAID plans in the context of Haitian political events was timely, complementary and necessary.

ANNEX D: SELECTED COMMUNAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAM EXHIBITS

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SUMMARY OF 1,923 COMMUNAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME (CGP) PROJECTS


As the Communal Governance Programme shifts its emphasis to helping elected officials work with communities on community improvement activities, the Programme is using the experience in community work it gained over the last year under the first phase of implementation. Under this first phase, over 1,800 improvement projects were initiated directly by community groups, with the assistance of the CGP. Under the current phase project design and implementation will be handled directly by the respective community improvement councils.

NUMBER & COST OF PROJECTS BY TYPE


PROJECT TYPE	New Construction			Rehabilitation/Repair/Completion			Clean Up			Total		
	Number of Projects	CGP Contribution (*)	Total cost (*)	Number of Projects	CGP Contribution (*)	Total cost (*)	Number of Projects	CGP Contribution (*)	Total cost (*)	Number of Projects	CGP Contribution (*)	Total cost (*)
Agriculture	42	1,122,342	5,278,338	65	1,485,247	6,497,328				107	2,607,589	11,775,666
Commerce	40	2,186,592	5,440,675	26	717,676	2,478,132	1	6,570	23,000	67	2,910,838	7,941,807
Education	245	11,136,765	22,531,374	363	13,558,159	32,927,392	1	3,400	9,700	609	24,698,324	55,468,466
Electrification	7	534,931	873,111	19	458,430	1,166,404				26	993,361	2,039,515
Environment/Conservation	15	628,529	1,392,132	44	1,633,784	7,013,501	4	32,609	60,144	63	2,294,922	8,465,777
Health	23	490,785	1,850,197	28	1,390,779	3,820,991	3	12,650	19,550	54	1,894,214	5,690,738
Justice	5	107,763	835,934	23	671,832	1,457,575				28	779,595	2,293,509
Public Administration	15	594,287	1,007,846	69	2,567,005	3,851,038				84	3,161,292	4,858,884
Recreation	12	500,998	865,349	23	477,550	1,989,021	1	0	2,000	36	978,548	2,856,370
Roads/Bridges	47	1,331,737	7,120,407	296	9,359,039	68,842,732	13	137,906	1,311,714	356	10,828,682	77,274,853
Sanitation	226	6,152,688	11,533,869	51	987,623	4,013,703	63	998,979	3,380,743	340	8,139,290	18,928,315
Water Supply	47	2,095,065	3,638,672	106	3,729,729	7,736,920				153	5,824,794	11,375,592
TOTAL	724	26,882,482	62,367,904	1113	37,036,853	141,794,737	86	1,192,114	4,806,851	1,923	65,111,449	208,969,492

(*) All costs in Haitian Gourdes

TOTAL BY PROJECT TYPE





TOTAL BY CATEGORY



Communal Governance Programme

Selected Programme and Haitian Social / Political Events




□ - Haitian Social/Political events
 □ - CGP events

* Canceled projects were deleted from our database

THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE ASSISTANCE "PROCESS"

CGP Field Teams are facilitating the establishment of productive, interdependent links between the Haitian people and their elected representatives at the local level by:



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ANNEX E: PEOPLE CONTACTED

USAID/Bureau for Humanitarian Response(BHR):

Frederick Barton, Director, Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI)
Johanna Mendelson Forman, Senior Advisor, OTI
James Dempsey, Director, Office of Program Planning and Evaluation (PPE)
Dina Esposito, PPE
Charles Brady, OTI Project Coordinator in Haiti
Thomas Stukel, OTI Project Coordinator in Haiti (*ad interim*)

USAID/Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC):

Mark L. Schneider, Assistant Administrator
Norma J. Parker, Deputy Assistant Administrator
Michael Morfitt, Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs (CAR)

USAID/HAITI:

Lawrence Crandall, Mission Director
Sarah Clark, Deputy Mission Director
Christopher Brown, Chief, Human Resources Division(HRD)
Carol Horning, Deputy, HRD
Rebecca Adams, PSC/Education, HRD
Yves Joseph, PSC/Education, HRD
Abdul Wahab, Chief, Economic Growth Division(EG)
Jean Claude Lucas, EG
Muriel Jolivert, EG
Danielle Wahab, Librarian

IOM/HAITI:

Lucca Dall'Oglio, Chief of Mission
Christophe Franzetti, Senior Finance/Administration Officer
David Costello, National Coordinator, CGP
Avis Gardere, Personnel/Administration Officer
Michael Barton, Documentation Officer
Sharon Bean, Staff Training Coordinator
Gabriel Ranieri, Field Accountant
Marco Tulio Boasso, Demobilization/Reintegration Team Leader
N. Piquion, Finance Officer
B. Mariano, Database Specialist
Matthew Huber, Field Team Leader
Neil Van Dine, Field Team Leader
Tanya Sisler, Field Team Leader
Maureen Achieng, Field Team Leader

Drew Kutschenreuter, Field Team Leader
Christopher Gascon, Field Team Leader
Reynald Blouin, Field Team Leader
Dumond Lyntz, Field Team Leader
Steve Siegler, IOM/OTI, Coordinator

OTHERS:

WASHINGTON, DC:

David C. Mitchell, Advisor on Policy and Missions, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
Colonel Dennis Barlow, Director, Policy and Plans, Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, DOD
Colonel Alan Thompson, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, USAF(DOD)
Ambassador James Dobbins, Special Haiti Coordinator, U.S. Department of State
Ambassador John Leonard, Haiti Working Group, U.S. Department of State
Richard Archi, Regional Director, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

HAITI:

Ambassador William Swing, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Daniel, Civil Affairs, UNMIH/Haiti
Robert Denizé, Office of the Prime Minister, Government of Haiti
Laura McPherson, Director, Caribbean Resources International
Louis Siegel, Associates in Rural Development (ARD) Chief of Party
Harlan Hobgod, ARD Consultant
Alain Maillard, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP/CNUEH-HABITAT
Pierre Duplex Jean-Baptiste, Lawyer, Gonaives
Mayor, Gonaives
Mary Nicolas, Deputy Mayor, Gonaives
Deputy Mayor, Saint Michel
Pierre Alex, Mayor, Fort Liberte
M. Calixte, Former Senator/ businessman, Fort Liberte
Mayor and Assistant Mayor, San Marc
Mayor and CAC, Petite Riviere Commune
Mayor and CAC, Verette Commune
Mayor, Mirebelais
Deputy Mayor, Petit Goaisc
Jackson Bellevue, First Deputy Mayor, Jacmel
Antoine Delbeau, Second Deputy Mayor, Jacmel
Gracilas Cintora, IDB

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ANNEX F: BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS

USAID/BHR/OFDA Fact Sheets 1, 2, and 3. "Haiti - Emergency". February 3, 1994, June 24, 1994, and September 1, 1994.

USAID/BHR/OTI. "Proposal for Haiti Assistance Project". September 15, 1994.

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LaVoy, Diane. USAID/PPC. Draft Design for Evaluation of the CGP. August 15, 1995

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Brady, Charles. USAID/IOM Status Fact Sheets. March 20 through November 16, 1995.

Republique d'Haiti. "Fonds d'Assistance Economique et Sociale". December 1995.

"Haitian Roulette". *National Journal*. December 9, 1995.

USAID/IOM Communal Governance/Demobilization and Reintegration Programme Monthly Reports.

ANNEX G: THE EVALUATION TEAM

This evaluation was carried out through an Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) work order by Management Systems International (MSI). Team members were:

- Dennis M. Chandler, Team Leader, a management and evaluation specialist, with extensive executive level experience with USAID both overseas and in Washington;
- Roger Popper, a social and management scientist, expert in project evaluation and institutional analysis;
- Gerald F. Murray, an Associate Professor of Anthropology, with more than twenty years of experience living and working in Haiti and Santo Domingo;
- Dorothy Leroux, a training and project management specialist, with extensive experience in the Francophone world.

In addition, actively collaborating in this evaluation were the following participants:

- Jose Pires, Chief of Evaluation, IOM/Geneva;
- David Eckerson, Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs, Latin American and Caribbean Bureau, USAID/Washington;
- Michelle W. Schimpp, Project Officer, Human Resources Division, USAID/Haiti;
- Harold Bony, Anthropologist, Haiti;
- Dupuis St. Anna Dumé, Anthropologist, Haiti;
- Francoise Vales, Psychologist, Haiti;
- A USAID provided contractor.