

*FINAL REPORT*

**Mid-Term Project Evaluation**

**USAID/JAMAICA - DEVELOPMENT OF  
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS**  
(USAID Project No. 532-0173)

*March 1996*

*Submitted to:*

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Program Officer  
USAID/Jamaica

Gary E. Lewis, Director  
Office of Natural Resources and  
Agricultural Development  
USAID/Jamaica

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Note: This evaluation report was completed by Management Systems International and does not necessarily represent the views and opinions of the United States Agency for International Development.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

BJCMNP	Blue and John Crow Mountain National Park
BREPA	Black River Environmental Protection Association
CDC	Conservation Data Center
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DEMO	Development of Environmental Management Organizations
EAI	Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EFJ	Environmental Foundation of Jamaica
EPP	Environmental Protection Plan
EU	European Union
FSCD	Forestry and Soil Conservation Department
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GOJ	Government of Jamaica
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
JANEAP	Jamaica National Environmental Action Plan
JCDT	Jamaica Conservation and Development Trust
JEF	Jamaica Environmental Fund
JNPI	Jamaica National Parks Institute
LAC	Local Advisory Committee
LEMC	Local Environmental Management Committees
MBMP	Montego Bay Marine Park
MBMPT	Montego Bay Marine Park Trust
NCRPS	Negril Coral Reef Preservation Society
NEPT	Negril Environmental Protection Trust
NEST	National Environmental Societies Trust
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRCA	Natural Resources Conservation Authority
NRCD	Natural Resources Conservation Division (replaced by NRCA)
NRM	Natural Resources Management
ONRAD	USAID/Jamaica's Office of Natural Resources and Agricultural Development
PACD	Project Assistance Completion Data
PARC	Protected Area Resource Conservation Project
PCC	Project Coordinating Committee
PEPA	Portland Environmental Protection Association
PIL	Project Implementation Letter
PIOJ	Planning Institute of Jamaica
PIOJ/PMU	PIOJ Park Management Unit
PMU	Project Management Unit (NRCA)
PP	Project Paper
PPS	Project Paper Supplement

PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
SITE	Strategic Interventions in the Environment
SOW	Scope of Work
STEPT	Saint Jamaes Environmental Protection Trust
TEPA	Trelawny Environmental Protection Association
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
TSS	Technical Support Services (DEMO institutional contractor)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UWI	University of the West Indies
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

## PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA SHEET

1. **Country:** Jamaica
2. **Project Title:** Development of Environmental Management Organizations Project (DEMO)
3. **Project Number:** 532-0173
4. **Project Dates:**
  - a. **Date of Authorization:** DEMO, September 24, 1992; PARC II PPS, October 4, 1993; EIA September 14, 1995.
  - b. **Final Obligation Date:** FY -- (planned/actual)
  - c. **Current Project Assistance Completion Date:** September 30, 1997
5. **Project Funding:**
  - a. **AID Approved Bilateral Grant Funding:** Total = \$11.65 million (PARC II = \$3.4 million, EIA = \$.5 million)
  - b. **Other Major Donors:** None
  - c. **Host Country Counterpart Funds:** US\$3.075 million; NGO contribution of US\$3.540 million
  - d. **Total Funding:** US\$18.265 million
6. **Mode of Implementation:** DEMO is implemented by an institutional contractor -- Technical Support Services (TSS) -- along with the Jamaican Natural Resources Conservation Authority (NRCA). The PARC II component has been implemented by Planning Institute of Jamaica's Park Management Unit (PIOJ/PMU).
7. **Project Designers:** DEMO, USAID/Jamaica staff; PARC II, Island Resources Foundation (IRF).
8. **Responsible Mission Officials:**
  - a. **Mission Director(s):** Robert Queener (1992-94), Carole Tyson (1994-current)
  - b. **Project Officer(s):** Stephen Reeve, Jane Ellis (PARC II Component)



9. **Previous Evaluations: None**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The state of Jamaica's environment, which is critical to the country's overall well being, is degenerating at a rapid rate. Preserving and improving Jamaica's environment is of utmost economic importance to the country, especially since a significant portion of Jamaica's foreign exchange is generated from tourism. A sense of urgency is now required to ensure that Jamaica's environmental degradation can be mitigated, that watersheds and coastal zones can be protected from further degradation, and that the country's most important scenic and biologically diverse endowments can be preserved. A determined effort by the Jamaican public and private sectors to address environmental concerns is being supported by USAID/Jamaica's Development of Environmental Management Organizations (DEMO) Project.

The USAID/Jamaica DEMO Project was authorized in September 1992, for the purpose of strengthening public and private organizations "to manage Jamaica's most economically important natural resources." The project's original emphasis included assistance to:

- ! build the capacity of the Jamaican Government's Natural Resources Conservation Authority;
- ! strengthen Jamaican environmental NGOs; and
- ! design and test public-private community-based environmental management activities in four economically and geographically diverse sites: Montego Bay and Negril during the project's first two years, and in the Black River watershed and the Kingston Bay coastal area during the project's final two years.

In October 1993, the PARC II Project Paper Supplement to the DEMO Project (hereafter referred to as the PARC II component) was created to develop a sustainable national park system. This was to be done by privatizing management and raising funds to support parks, strengthening the Jamaican Government's park policy making and enforcement capabilities, and expanding the park system beyond the two national parks that were in existence at the project's inception -- the Blue and John Crow Mountains National Park and the Montego Bay Marine Park. (Both of these parks were created under the USAID PARC I Project.)

The five-year DEMO project, excluding the PARC II component, is managed by Technical Support Services (TSS) -- an institutional contractor. The institutional contractor's work began in March 1994, following a prolonged contract bidding and negotiation process. In the interim, USAID/Jamaica provided some assistance to the NRCA through the USAID/Washington Environmental Policy and Training Project (EPAT). (EPAT "pre-implementation" activities, which have focussed on the development of pollution regulations, are not covered by this evaluation.) The TSS contract is scheduled to run through April 1998.

The \$3.4 million PARC II component has been managed by the Planning Institute of Jamaica's Park Management Unit (PIOJ/PMU). The Park Management Unit was designed to be the institutional core of PARC II, with responsibility for managing workplan approval, technical support, and funding disbursements to the project's other implementing organizations. PARC II components included: capitalization of the Jamaica National Parks Trust Fund; creation of an independent Jamaica National Parks Institute; oversight of a system to generate information on biological diversity in Jamaica; and management oversight of the country's two national parks and creation of two new parks.

As this evaluation was begun, USAID was concerned that the PARC II component was not proceeding according to plan. This situation was characterized by:

- ! a strained relationship between USAID and the PIOJ's Park Management Unit, including an inability to reach agreement on basic project implementation issues; and
- ! a changing environmental dynamic in Jamaica that called into question the validity of the design of the PARC II component.

For these reasons, the project evaluation team was asked to concentrate efforts on identifying ways to get the PARC II component back on track.

### **THE DEMO Project: Overall Performance**

Overall, the DEMO Project (excluding PARC II) is making good progress and can be expected to achieve its principal objectives and project purpose. Foremost, these objectives include providing assistance to the Natural Resources Conservation Authority to enable it to assume a leadership role in safeguarding Jamaica's environment -- in some cases to be undertaken through policy and regulatory development and enforcement and, in other cases, to be pursued through participatory planning approaches involving a wide range of affected stakeholders. The USAID/DEMO Project's principal accomplishments to date are highlighted below. The project has:

- ! **Assisted the NRCA to develop into an institution able to assume responsibility for the formulation of policies and regulations necessary to guide and oversee the stewardship of Jamaica's environment.** This work has included developing guidelines for conducting environmental impact assessments, completing a "State of the Environment Report," installing a computer information system, and assisting the NRCA to develop its own accounting system. Provisions for regulatory enforcement are being developed and will be fully enacted once they are adopted as law -- a process that is well underway.
- ! **Assisted the NRCA to develop a "National System of Protected Areas Plan."** This includes a proposed national policy for creating and managing protected areas, which is in the process of being adopted as official government policy. The NRCA's protected areas

policy paper is expected to be approved by the Cabinet in mid-1996. The protected area establishment procedure proposed in the NRCA's policy document has been successfully tested in Negril (through USAID/DEMO activities), enjoys widespread support by local government and NGOs, and is soon to be applied by the NRCA in the Black River watershed and the Kingston Bay area.

- ! **Provided technical assistance and training that has strengthened the institutional management capabilities of a wide range of Jamaican environmental NGOs.** This assistance has principally been undertaken through USAID/DEMO's support to the National Environmental Societies Trust (NEST), a Jamaican NGO membership organization that was established in 1989. NEST's purpose has been to provide technical assistance to NGOs to enable them to develop project design and management skills so they can access grants from the Environmental Foundation of Jamaica. As a result of assistance received from NEST, about a dozen NGOs have been awarded grants from the Environmental Foundation of Jamaica and are currently implementing community-based environmental improvement projects.

Overall, the evaluation team is confident that the DEMO Project (with the exception of the PARC II component) is proceeding as expected and will likely achieve its principal objectives by the project's completion.

### **The PARC II Component: Overall Performance**

The PARC II Project was to build on the momentum of the PARC I Project but has not performed as per design expectations. Under the PARC II Project:

- ! new parks have not been created although two were envisioned;
- ! there are no revenue generation programs in operation at the two existing parks, as were called for under the project agreement;
- ! the JCDDT capital campaign to increase the Jamaican National Parks Trust Fund, to have been largely funded by USAID, was never undertaken;
- ! the Jamaican National Parks Institute, which was to have helped finance and oversee the management of national parks, was never created; and
- ! the Conservation Data Center has played no meaningful role in supporting protected area management in Jamaica.

In summary, the PARC II component did not proceed as expected and has accomplished little of consequence. In retrospect, the component's design turned out to be unrealistic. In particular, project

design projections concerning the JCDT's ability to raise funds to support a park financing system proved to be overly optimistic while, at the same time, the Government of Jamaica never clearly and decisively acted to create the JNPI. Instead of offering direct support for the creation of the JNPI, the NRCA (for a variety of understandable reasons) actively pursued a more decentralized approach to the creation and management of a park and protected area system (with assistance from DEMO's SITE component).

### **The PARC II Project: General Recommendations**

In the view of the evaluation team, the objectives of the PARC II component are still valid and can be achieved over the coming few years. To achieve the component's objectives, however, fundamental implementation and management adjustments will be necessary. In particular, activity should now be concentrated on: strengthening the NRCA's ability to establish, implement and enforce parks and protected area policy; strengthening the park management capabilities of NGOs that are expected to receive NRCA delegation of authority to manage parks and protected areas; and revisiting and/or redesigning the strategy of how to ensure financing will be available to support protected area management in Jamaica.

Future funding needs for the protected area system will be considerable and should come from a variety of sources, including local revenue generation, private sector participation, local endowment funds, bilateral and multilateral funding agencies, and a permanent cash flow source (such as a tourist departure tax). Each protected area and its management entity will require a different mix of these funding sources.

### **Specific Recommendations to Improve the DEMO/PARC II Component**

- ! Shift PARC II management responsibilities from the PIOJ/PMU to the NRCA and NGOs (MBMPT and the JCDT).
- ! USAID should provide direct grant support to the JCDT and the Montego Bay Marine Park Trust (MBMPT) to improve their park management and revenue generation skills.
- ! Prepare the NRCA to take a lead role in the management of parks and protected areas.

This evaluation was conducted by a five-person team from Management Systems International during November and December of 1995. The report is organized into three chapters as follows:

- ! Chapter 1 - findings on NRCA institutional strengthening, assistance to Jamaican environmental NGOs (NEST), the strategic interventions in the environment (SITE), and TSS and USAID management;
- ! Chapter 2 - findings on the PARC II component of the DEMO Project; and

! Chapter 3 - key findings, conclusions and recommendations.

## **Section 1: THE USAID-FUNDED DEMO PROJECT (other than the PARC II Component)**

### **I. Project Background**

#### **A. DEMO Project Design**

The DEMO Project was conceived as a continuation of a USAID long-term commitment to assist Jamaica in the management of its natural resources. The Project was designed to strengthen the capacity of the Jamaican Government's Natural Resources Conservation Authority (NRCA), strengthen Jamaican environmental NGOs, and design and test public-private community-based environmental management activities in four economically and geographically diverse sites. Additionally, DEMO was expected to complement the grant program activities of the Environmental Foundation of Jamaica (EFJ) by strengthening the technical and administrative abilities of participating organizations and improving their ability to use EFJ funds effectively.

The goal of DEMO is to "promote stable, sustainable, and broad-based economic growth." The primary indicator of the goal is: environmental conditions cease to deteriorate, while economic growth occurs, in areas which have both important natural resources and potential for economic use, especially tourism. The Project purpose is "to strengthen the capability of public and private environmental organizations to manage Jamaica's most economically important natural resources."

#### **B. Intended Project Impact**

The DEMO Project was designed to achieve the following two higher-level impacts: 1) strengthened lead environmental institutions (principally the NRCA and Jamaican environmental NGOs) so they will continue to improve environmental management during and beyond the life of the project; and 2) measurable environmental and economic benefits. The following end-of-project-status indicators were established to measure the achievement of project success by the Project Activity Completion Date (10/31/97):

- ! The NRCA will be providing substantive leadership on priority natural resource management policy and regulatory issues, especially in support of national economic growth;
- ! The NRCA will be receiving revenues from user fees, penalties and other sources equal to at least 25% of its operating costs;
- ! The National Environmental Societies Trust (NEST) will be financially self-sufficient;
- ! The NRCA and NEST will be mobilized and deploying resources more effectively for environmental management, drawing on a growing environmental network from NGOs and

the informal sector, to community leaders and business people, to government agencies and donors;

- ! At least ten technically and financially viable Jamaican NGOs will be engaged in environmental mitigation, including areas directly related to key issues of national economic growth (e.g. tourism);
- ! DEMO Strategic Interventions in the Environment (SITE) activities will be demonstrating the application of practical techniques to solve on-the-ground problems in such areas as waste management, watershed restoration, and reef protection;
- ! Local Environmental Management Committees (LEMCs) will have obtained experience and organizational development sufficient to become technically and financially sustainable over the long term and to provide direction and coordination for local environmental improvements; and
- ! Public and private awareness of, and dialogue on, priority natural resource management issues in support of economic growth will be considered routine.

## **II. Project Implementation Performance**

### **A. The Natural Resources Conservation Authority (NRCA)**

After passage of the National Resources Conservation Act in late 1990, the NRCA was founded in June 1991 as the primary agency for national environmental resource management in Jamaica. NRCA's mandate assumes responsibility for managing "the physical environment of Jamaica in order to ensure the conservation, protection and sustainable use of the natural resources." Specific NRCA responsibilities include: i) articulation, coordination, and implementation of a national environmental policy; ii) establishment of a regulatory, monitoring and enforcement program; and iii) coordination with external agencies on environmental programs, including NGOs and private sector entities. The NRCA's mandate includes managing a protected area system for Jamaica.

NRCA has a ten-member Board of Directors which has been in absentia since September following the expiration of their terms and pending re-nomination and approval of members by the Minister of Environment and Housing. The Board, under the NRCA Act, has powers to approve and issue permits and licenses as well as ensure environmental compliance.

#### **A.1. NRCA's Accomplishments to Date under DEMO**



DEMO expected project outputs, as put forward in USAID's Project Paper, are listed below along with a synopsis of progress to date.

- ! A participatory approach to national planning that involves stakeholders early in the process and gains their commitment to national environmental objectives.

**Status: Excellent Progress** - The policy paper developed by the NRCA for creating and managing protected areas is a major achievement that provides clear guidance as to how Jamaica can develop and manage new protected areas. The process has been successfully tested in Negril, enjoys widespread support, and will soon be applied in the Black River watershed and the Kingston Bay area.

- ! Program direction from NRCA based on inputs from its Board and the key players who can influence the success of its programs.

**Status: Uncertain** - The NRCA Board of Directors is currently in absentia. Thus its composition and priorities are uncertain.

- ! Annual action plans that coordinate the contributions of other participants and build on inputs from the public and private sector.

**Status: Good Initial Progress** - The 1995 NRCA Annual Plan is a good first start as a management tool. NRCA partners, however, have not embraced the document as reflective of their own planning and management and needs (including NEST and SITE). Although the Annual Plan meets all project criteria, and fulfills USAID requirements, it is viewed by NRCA partners as a document developed by Technical Support Services (TSS), for TSS, and not one that is used as a management tool by DEMO project collaborators. Nevertheless, the Annual Plan document has contributed to a significantly improved NRCA Project Coordination Committee (PCC) Operational Budget review and approval process. This new process includes the review and approval of the DEMO Protected Area Resource Conservation (PARC II) component, which will facilitate project disbursements for parks and protected areas.

- ! Agreement among all concerned parties on the proper role of the GOJ and the non-governmental groups in relationship to national environmental management.

**Status: Substantial Progress** - The NRCA has clearly defined a parks and protected area planning and management process, has identified several NGOs which will be granted authority to manage national parks and protected areas, and has productive working relationships with a wide range of Jamaican NGOs.

- ! The establishment of an environmental information system to serve as a framework for environmental quality standards and to guide natural resource use decision-making.

**Status: Partial Accomplishment** - A State of the Environment Report has been completed, but the Country Environmental Profile and Cataloguing the technical library to form the basis of a management information system have not been completed as yet. Connection with SITE's information base at the local level is not apparent.

! The development and agreement to use Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for public and private projects.

**Status: Partial Accomplishment** - There appears to be agreement on the use of EIAs for public and private sector projects, but it is not clear as to what stage of EIA development NRCA involvement becomes imperative. Considerable progress has been made on policies and standards needed to begin to address issues in the development of EIAs.

! The establishment of key environmental regulations, standards, and guidelines, including realistic provisions for their enforcement, while pursuing non-regulatory approaches for voluntary compliance.

**Status: Solid Progress** - NRCA has done a commendable job with the establishment of key environmental regulations, standards, and guidelines. Provisions for enforcement are being developed, but they have only been tested in a few instances. SITE and NEST activities are also designed to pursue non-regulatory approaches to voluntary compliance.

! A planning and budgeting capability within NRCA that will enable it to attract other donors, secure additional revenues and design bankable projects, permitting NRCA to effectively function with reduced dependence on annual GOJ budget allowances.

**Status: Solid Progress** - The NRCA accounting system is about to be certified by USAID for the direct management of project funds. In addition, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is planning on funding a major multi-year institutional strengthening project with the NRCA. NRCA is also pursuing the issue of retention of fine or fee income and the possibility of a special levy that would be directed to help finance the Authority.

## **A.2. NRCA's Structure and Staffing**

**Findings:** Initial recruitment and staffing of the NRCA -- primarily from Ministry of Agriculture personnel -- was not built around a close examination of the requirements of key technical and managerial positions. In addition to the organizational structure and staffing needs of NRCA's mid-level management, and its newly expanded role in the Parks and Protected Areas unit, several NRCA staff commented on the need to improve technical and managerial skills within key NRCA project units. Although NRCA personnel have improved their skills through on-the-job experience, technical skill deficiencies are evident within NRCA and must be addressed if it is to fully perform its role as the lead regulatory and supervisory body for natural resource management in Jamaica.

A training plan for the DEMO project will soon be completed, with initial training activities expected to begin by mid 1996. In its current state, the plan provides only a generalized listing of available training programs. The training plan does not appear to be integrated into the larger organizational development scheme, for example clarification of functions, structure and the priority skills that will be needed for NRCA to achieve its mission are not rationally examined.

### **A.3. NRCA Management of the USAID/DEMO Project**

**Findings:** The DEMO Project design envisioned a four-person Project Management Unit (PMU) that would respond directly to the overall needs of the project. NRCA initially established the PMU with two professionals, and a full time mid-level manager has recently been added. However, the concept of a completely separate PMU does not appear to be as effective as originally envisioned. It is now apparent that DEMO management responsibilities are widespread, and that other outside program resources which complement the activities of DEMO (e.g. GOJ and CIDA), require the management and supervision of the PMU as well as other NRCA division unit managers.

Over the first half of the project, the USAID technical assistance contractor -- TSS -- has taken the lead in driving the technical and managerial direction of the project, as is often the case during the start-up phase of new projects. For its part, the NRCA has recently assigned a mid-level manager to assume full-time responsibilities for NRCA's implementation of DEMO, including planning, and decision-making coordination. This is a good starting point for enabling the NRCA to transition into leading and managing DEMO's overall planning and implementation effort.

### **A.4. NRCA Parks and Protected Area Division**

**Findings:** Given current and projected financial limitations of NRCA, the Authority has focussed its protected area management approach on policy development, regulation and enforcement. By necessity, NRCA's strategy for implementing a protected area system is focussed on delegating this authority to those local institutions, both public and private, that manifest an interest and capability to manage a protected area under NRCA's policies and its regulatory authority. This approach to protected area management is relatively new in the conservation world, and is still in the experimental stage. Both good and bad experiences exist. Four major factors have emerged from those experiences as requirements for project success:

- ! the delegating authority must develop clear and effective policies and guidelines regarding protected area management and funding, as well as the process and mechanisms by which authority is delegated;
  
- ! significant training in all aspects of protected area management will be needed for the implementing institutions;

- ! clear management goals and guidelines must exist for each protected area, usually established via a management plan implementation process/schedule; and
- ! effective project oversight must be carried out by the delegating authority, which also requires well-trained personnel.

The NRCA, with assistance from the DEMO project, has developed a Green Paper describing the elements of a protected area system, which represents an excellent description of the present state of policy regarding this issue ( a precursor draft was prepared by the JCDT). Although a strong beginning, many implementation details remain to be worked out.

**Key Finding/NRCA:** The NRCA with DEMO/TSS assistance, is off to a good start in its effort to become a more skilled and effective organization. In particular, environmental participatory planning processes, development of environmental regulations, and internal management structures have achieved significant progress since project start-up. At this point, however, NRCA seems to be overly reliant on its USAID-funded technical assistance contractor for programming and managing technical activities and developing NRCA products.

## **B. The Strategic Interventions in the Environment Component (SITE)**

As per the Project Paper, the SITE component was to "... focus field activities in four selected areas of environmental concern. The SITE activities will facilitate GOJ-NGO-private sector collaboration on actual resource management and enable the lead government agency, NRCA, to work with GOJ land and resource managers to resolve critical problems; define management responsibilities; develop model programs for data collection and management, planning, resource conservation, environmental controls, regulations and enforcement; and apply knowledge gained from these activities to formulate national policies and standards." The principal activities undertaken through the SITE process have been development of integrated environmental management plans through a participatory process involving NRCA, local government and local NGOs (Environmental Protection Plans - EPPs); and funding of several small NGO community development activities that were identified through the EPP process.

It was expected that SITE work would be undertaken in Negril and Montego Bay over the project's first two years, and that work in an additional two sites would be undertaken during the project's final two years -- now expected to be Black River and the Kingston Bay coastal area. The following is a synopsis of SITE activity undertaken to date.

### **Negril SITE Activities**

The focus of the DEMO/SITE activity has been the development of the Negril Environmental Protection Plan. The activity has been successful at developing and carrying out an integrated approach to environmental planning through the preparation of an Environmental Protection Plan

(EPP). This process has brought together a wide range of stakeholders and been responsible for a harmonization of diverse interests. The plan provides a clear path for how to proceed to protect the Negril watershed and clearly defines the roles of a broad range of institutions, as well as sets up a planning and implementation process. The process itself will be managed by the NRCA in collaboration with local government and NGOs, including the Local Environmental Management Committee -- which is the Negril Environmental Protection Trust (NEPT).<sup>1</sup> The process that has been used to develop the Negril EPP provides a model for how the NRCA can cooperate with other communities and municipalities to produce environmental and protected area plans, and represents DEMO's most important accomplishment in Negril.

Other DEMO activity in Negril has focussed on supporting the implementation of a series of small-scale community projects to improve the area's environmental conditions. Small-scale community projects undertaken in Negril have included construction of a low-cost demonstration toilet, a teacher internship project, Negril area beach access signage, and a fisherman's work area relocation initiative. Several of these activities, however, have run into management and implementation difficulties. For example, the demonstration toilet, whose user base is unclear, and which is inefficiently managed through a series of subcontracts between Kingston, Montego Bay and Negril, appears to be based on a concept unsuccessfully tested a few years earlier in Montego Bay. Management difficulties with other small-scale DEMO projects in Negril have concerned cost-overruns, inadequate quality, and lack of intended impact.

### **Montego Bay SITE Activities**

In late 1994, a DEMO workshop was held in Montego Bay to explain the proposed DEMO SITE activities and discuss initial plans targeted for NGOs in the area. Two organizations were identified as possible beneficiaries of SITE resources: the GMRC (Greater Montego Bay Redevelopment Company), and STEPT (St. James Environmental Trust). STEPT is a relatively new organization that represents 30 community organizations in the St. James Parish but does not have any professional staff. Prior to the '94 workshop, project funds were used to support the study and completion of an environmental development plan for Montego Bay. The GMRC also provided support for the longer-term environmental development plan for Montego Bay.

In early 1994 it was apparent that neither the GMRC nor STEPT was able to clearly define their programs, potential roles in SITE activities, or coordinate an allocation of responsibilities in using project resources. In the end, the selection of an LEMC, and clarification of roles to be undertaken between the GMRC, STEPT and others was not resolved. Thus, although several DEMO-supported meetings were held, DEMO has not yet implemented any SITE activities in Montego Bay.

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<sup>1</sup> NEPT, following a series of false starts with hired or almost-hired Executive Directors, now consists of a volunteer Board of Directors and two USAID-funded personnel (a secretary and a driver). USAID, through the DEMO project, has also provided NEPT with a project vehicle, office equipment and supplies, and has developed accounting manuals which can be used by NEPT if and when they hire staff to manage projects and finances.

**Key Finding/SITE:** The DEMO/NRCA work in Negril to develop a protected area plan has been successful in harmonizing the interests of a diverse group of resource users/stakeholders. The process used in Negril provides a model for how NRCA can interact with NGOs, local government and the private sector to develop and manage environmental protected areas in Jamaica.

### **C. National Environmental Societies Trust (NEST)**

Component Two of the DEMO Project Paper provided support for the National Environmental Societies Trust Fund. NEST is a membership organization of Jamaican NGOs that was established in 1989. Its purpose is largely to provide technical assistance to NGOs so that they are able to develop project design and management skills to enable them to access grants from the Environmental Foundation of Jamaica (EFJ). USAID and the EFJ are the main financial supporters of NEST.

As per the PP..."strong and effective NGOs will provide a critically important foundation to the development of national environmental action in Jamaica. The DEMO Project will assist the national NGO umbrella organization -- NEST -- to implement NGO training and technical assistance programs in order to enable NGOs and community-based groups to develop and sustain their environmental management missions. Under this component, the project will accomplish the following:

- ! A strong and clearly defined role for NEST based on input from Board and membership;
- ! The establishment of a NEST membership services delivery system that includes focussed and germane training programs and a range of technical outreach services that expand NGO's capacities to become self-sustaining;
- ! Annual NEST action plans that coordinate the contributions of other participants;
- ! A capacity within NEST to undertake ad hoc policy analysis and engage the GOJ and private groups in environmental policy dialogue;
- ! A financial planning and management capability within NEST that will enable it to attract other donors, secure additional revenues, design bankable projects, and establish continuity of financing recurrent expenditures;
- ! An environmental network of NGOs, community-based groups, community and business leaders, government agencies and donors exchanging ideas, information and resources;
- ! Participation of at least 100 representatives of NGOs and community-based groups in training programs designed to enhance their abilities to sustain environmental management activities; and

- ! At least ten technically and financially viable NGOs will be engaged in environmental mitigation and education, including areas directly related to key issues of national economic growth (e.g., tourism).

When the DEMO project began, it was envisioned that USAID would provide assistance to NEST to hire an executive director and to provide support for the organization to carry-out various training, technical assistance and networking activities. Prior to the DEMO involvement with NEST, the organization had no executive director (they did have a program officer), and was not a particularly active organization.

It wasn't until approximately twelve months after USAID entered into the TSS technical assistance contract that the NEST board approved and hired an executive director. This position was filled in March 1995 and has set the stage for NEST to be able to proceed with activities as intended by USAID.

NEST's current staffing includes an Executive Director (USAID funded), a program officer (position vacant since October 1995), two technical officers (one in Kingston funded by EFJ, and one in Trelawny funded by USAID), an administrative officer (vacant but was scheduled to be filled in January 1996), a resource information officer (to be paid by EFJ), a proposed training officer (funding not secured) and a part-time accountant. NEST has received technical assistance from USAID to establish an accounting system and it is felt that once the administrative officer is hired then NEST can begin the process of becoming certified to manage USAID funds. Currently all funds spent by NEST are managed and tracked by TSS, with activity approval being handled by the PCC.

**Findings:** NEST activities supported by USAID include:

- ! managing an NGO project proposal writing workshop in Kingston, Port Antonio and Trelawny.
- ! managing a strategic planning workshop for NGO leaders (half-day sessions over a two week period); and, as a follow-on, planning to select five NGOs that were involved in the strategic planning workshop to provide them with technical assistance to develop organizational strategies;
- ! holding quarterly membership meetings that now focus on specific issues of interest to the NGO community, e.g., the most recent quarterly meeting focused on the impact of the GOJ decision to lift kerosene subsidies and the effect this would have on deforestation;
- ! and, sponsoring an Annual General Meeting (Montego Bay, December 1995) to develop an action agenda for the coming year and discuss issues of interest to the NGO community.

The evaluation team was able to speak with five NGOs who had participated in NEST NGO training activities over the past four months, and all found the training to have been helpful, practical and well run. In fact, a number of NGOs that have participated in NEST project design workshops have

since had proposals funded by EFJ and are currently implementing community-based natural resources management projects.

**Key Finding/NEST:** Although it took longer than expected for NEST to assume its intended role under DEMO, the organization is now active in providing project planning, strategic planning and proposal development assistance to a large number of Jamaican environmental NGOs. NEST's Executive Director is highly regarded within the NGO community and the NGOs that have participated in NEST training have considered the training to have been well-run and useful.

#### **D. The Technical Support Services (TSS) Institutional Contract**

The technical, financial and administrative services of an institutional contractor were a key part of the DEMO Project design for assisting the NRCA PMU in carrying out planning and day-to-day operations within the three components of the project. The contractor was to provide the services of a long-term environmental management expert, and a number of short-term local and international experts who would be called upon to supplement the skill base of the NRCA PMU in specialized areas. In addition, the institutional contractor would consolidate and be responsible for most of the project's procurement and expenditure functions.

The long-term technical advisor, together with the various short-term consultants, would be responsible for providing technical support to the PMU under the DEMO Project. The Technical Advisor and the NRCA PMU Manager were responsible for drafting project plans and strategies for technical assistance and training to NRCA, NEST, NGOs, and LEMCs. In the performance of these functions, the Technical Advisor and the PMU Manager were to work closely with the NRCA Director in order to assure that plans reflect and support the overall objectives of the NRCA.

An integral part of the Technical Assistance Contractor's terms of reference was the adherence to a system of self-monitoring of basic data needed to track and measure implementation progress. TSS and the PMU were to furnish both USAID and the NRCA Project Managers with quarterly and annual project reports. These reports are required for specific tracking of (a) financial flows via quarterly and annual summaries, (b) key contractual tasks via quarterly and annual summaries, and (c) key impact data in annual summaries. In addition, all short-term contractors retained by the project are required to furnish the same reporting information provided by the long-term personnel, but in an abbreviated form.

TSS and the PMU Manager were to jointly prepare an annual status report for NRCA PCC review at the time of the annual workplan exercise. The proposed process of routine reporting and development and use of the annual Workplan exercise was not envisioned to be overly complex. The major objective of this information was not detail, but rather to surface the priority issues for efficient management review. The performance of TSS was to be evaluated every six months against expected outputs described in the Workplan.

TSS is also responsible for procuring a range of commodities associated with project implementation including computers, vehicles and other equipment. In addition, an inventory control system was



required by TSS, with the approval of USAID, to identify and track all commodity purchases under the contract with a unit value of \$500 or more. A semi-annual inventory report was to be prepared by TSS and submitted to USAID. The contractor was also required to procure or provide all training activities associated with project implementation, including short-term overseas and local training, local workshops, and overseas field visits.

**Findings:** A detailed list of all products/activities completed by TSS under the DEMO Project is presented as Annex E. This list compares actual versus planned accomplishments by TSS. Also, since TSS' main task under DEMO was to assist with the institutional strengthening of the NRCA, their performance, in part, can also be judged by the degree that NRCA has benefited from technical and managerial assistance provided by TSS. Section C.1. - NRCA's Accomplishments to Date under DEMO (beginning on page 3) discusses the issues of NRCA institutional strengthening. In addition, a list of planned versus actual expenditures by TSS is presented in Annex D.

**Key Finding/TSS:** After initial delays and difficulties, particularly regarding the management of the DEMO Annual Workplan, TSS is on-track in meeting the deliverables and terms of its contract with USAID/Jamaica. Although the requirements of the workplanning process are being met, an increasing emphasis on the process could help to make the exercise more meaningful for the NRCA DEMO partners, including NEST and SITE implementors.

## **Section 2: THE PARC II COMPONENT OF THE DEMO PROJECT**

### **I. Background**

#### **A. The Component's Design and Intended Accomplishments**

The PARC II component of the DEMO Project was initiated in October 1993 and is scheduled to run through September 1998. The component has an authorized funding level of US\$3.4 million.<sup>2</sup> The USAID PARC II component was created to achieve the following three broad objectives:

1. to develop a sustainable park system by privatizing management and raising funds to support parks;
2. strengthen the Government of Jamaica's (GOJ) Natural Resources Conservation Authority's (NRCA) park policy making and enforcement capabilities; and
3. expand the park system to protect other critical areas.

The primary activities under the PARC II component were to have been:

-- limited support to the parks established under the USAID PARC I Project to ensure their sustainability, the Blue and John Crow Mountain National Park (BJCMNP) and the Montego Bay Marine Park (MBMP);

-- assistance to open two new national parks by the end of the project -- Black River and Cockpit Country -- and to build up the cadre of national park professionals, achieving economies of scale in training and management;

-- assistance to the NRCA in the strengthening of its protected areas division to enable it to establish policies and regulations for national parks;

-- assistance to the JCDT to create a Jamaican National Parks Institute (JNPI) to consolidate the management, leadership, training and fundraising for the national parks and protected areas system;

-- continued capitalization of the Jamaican National Parks Trust Fund (JNPTF), principally through additional Debt-for-Nature swaps, targeted donor solicitation, support from the Jamaican business community, and annual contributions from the Government of Jamaica (GOJ);

-- assistance to carry out buffer zone management activities involving local community participation; and

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<sup>2</sup> The evaluation team was not able to get adequate information on the status of expenditures by the PIOJ/PMU in order to analyze overall PARC II expenditures or expenditures by component.

-- assistance to provide environmental data collection and monitoring activities in adjacent protected areas.

The following institutional responsibilities were to be undertaken in order to achieve the PARC II component's objectives:

**The Planning Institute of Jamaica/Park Management Unit (PIOJ/PMU):** was the principal implementor of USAID's PARC II component and received direct funding from USAID. The role of the PIOJ/PMU was to oversee the management of the BJCMNP and the MBMP; take the lead in the development of the JNPI; and supervise the activities of the CDC. The PARC II PMU was designed to evolve into a newly created Jamaican National Parks Institute (JNPI) which, within the first six months of the project, was to take over the day to day operation of the country's national parks.

**The Jamaica National Parks Trust Fund (JNPTF):** was created through a Debt-for-Nature swap under the PARC I Project and was to be the parks and protected areas financing support system for Jamaica. The JNPTF did not receive direct support from USAID under the DEMO Project.

**The Jamaican Conservation and Development Trust (JCDT):** as developer and custodian of the National Parks Trust Fund (capitalized at approximately J\$16 million under PARC I), JCDT was expected to ensure Fund growth sufficient to eventually contribute to the costs of running all parks under development at the end of the PARC II component. This was to be accomplished through a sustained capital campaign directed at the Jamaican business community, international foundations and other donors, and by the generation of income through local park services.

**The Natural Resources Conservation Authority (NRCA):** the NRCA is responsible for policy development, planning, and management oversight of the system of Jamaican national parks and protected areas. This includes formulating policy guidelines, planning protected area systems, and helping to develop and approve operational plans to manage parks and protected areas. The PARC II component was to provide modest assistance to the NRCA's Protected Areas Division to enable it to carry out its mandate.

**The Conservation Data Center (CDC):** Under the supervision of the PIOJ/PMU, and with funding support from USAID, the Center was to be a collector and generator of information on biological diversity in Jamaica. It was envisioned that this service would support the management of the BJCMNP and the MBMP and, after two years of USAID support, would largely be able to cover its operational costs by collecting fees for its services.

**The Government of Jamaica's Ministry of Finance:** Under DEMO/PARC II, the Jamaican government stated its intention to make an annual contribution to the JNPTF of J\$5 million.

## **B. Jamaica's Changing Environmental Dynamic**

Since the PARC II component was designed, the environmental dynamic in Jamaica has changed. This change has been characterized by:

- the emergence of several NGOs interested in managing parks and protected areas within their area of geographic operation (e.g., the MBMPT, NEPT, PEPA and the SCCF);
- increasing consensus for decentralized local NGO management of parks and protected areas, which is the underpinning of the NRCA's policy paper on the development of a parks and protected area system for Jamaica;
- less funds than expected being available from the JNPTF to support NGO park management activities; and
- an emerging desire by NGOs to establish local trust funds, such as the MBMPT.

With USAID support, and since the time the PARC II component was designed, the GOJ and NRCA have developed a policy of minimal centralized authority, with protected area management to be in the hands of local organizations, either public (local government), private (NGOs), or public-private partnerships; this in response to insufficient public sector budgets, increased local interest, and NRCA's expressed desire to obtain a wider base of political support for protected areas.

The NRCA decentralized approach to protected area management appears to have overtaken the centralized approach pursued by the PIOJ/PMU under the PARC II component. The differences in the two approaches are evident in the designs of the PARC II component and the SITE component of the DEMO project. On the one hand, PARC II envisioned the two existing national parks as being managed by a newly created JNPI (Jamaican National Park Institute), albeit with local community organizations/NGOs participating on Local Area Committees to provide input into management decisions. The DEMO Project Paper envisioned, through the SITE component, a strengthened local NGO capacity for dealing with local environmental issues, and although it does not explicitly state that management of protected areas is one of these options, this is in practice what has happened in Negril and Montego Bay, and what is expected to happen in Black River. Over the course of the PARC II component, the NRCA increased its support for a decentralized approach to protected areas management, whereas the PIOJ/PMU held tightly to the original PARC II design which called for the creation of a central entity to oversee park management in Jamaica. This entity was to be the JNPI, an amalgamation of a reincarnated PIOJ/PMU operating with strong support from the JCDDT. The JCDDT support was to be financed, in part, through the increased capitalization of the JNPTF.

Aside from the NRCA and local NGOs playing a more prominent than expected role in protected area management, strained relationships between USAID and the main institutions involved in the implementation of the PARC II component have also impeded progress. USAID and the PIOJ/PMU were never able to reach agreement on fundamental project implementation issues and this resulted in disbursement and implementation delays. The institutional ambiguity of PARC II also contributed

to its lack of productivity. Multiple organizations were involved in the PARC II component, but roles, responsibilities and accountability for achieving results were often unclear.

The particular status and accomplishments of the PARC II component are presented in the remainder of this section.

## **II. The Role and Performance of USAID PARC II Implementors**

### **A. The Planning Institute of Jamaica/Park Management Unit**

The Park Management Unit (PMU) was designed to be the institutional core of PARC II, with coordination, work plan approval, technical support, and funding disbursement roles to the other project components (BJCMNP, MBMP, JCDT, and the CDC). Institutional location of PARC II PMU in PIOJ is due to historical reasons, in part because PARC I was located there, since at that time it seemed the best location. It is, however, generally agreed that the PARC II-PMU should be located elsewhere, since the PIOJ is in charge of coordination of foreign assistance programs, and normally does not assume extended project management responsibilities.

As per the PARC II design, the PMU was to take on day to day management of the two existing national parks, but support was to be phased out after one year at the Montego Bay Marine Park and after two years at Blue and John Crow Mountains National Park. As local management capacity evolved and financial sustainability plans were prepared, these Parks were to be overseen by the JNPI and managed with input provided by Local Advisory Committees.

In part due to the inability of the PMU and USAID to reach agreement on workplan and financial sustainability plan requirements, there have been significant delays in USAID's disbursement of PARC II funds to the PIOJ/PMU. The workplan for January through June 1995 was approved later than expected and consequently extended through the end of the year. There are differences of opinion as to why USAID and the PIOJ/PMU were unable to reach agreement on basic planning and implementation issues. To a large degree, these differences centered around the following issues:

- ! uncertain PMU commitment to support approved local initiatives, especially the assistance to be directed to the MBMPT to enable its assumption of park management responsibilities;
- ! lack of PMU clarity in workplans with regard to such matters as the role and activities of the CDC and overseeing the capital campaign to be conducted by the JCDT; and
- ! absence of participation and oversight by the NRCA in decisions taken by the PMU, such as the hiring of the BJCMNP Manager.

By design, the PIOJ/PMU (through the Project Management Committee) was to act as a project activity approval mechanism and was to incorporate a range of institutions as part of its approval process. In practice, however, the PMU, largely in isolation and without much NRCA participation, approved its own workplan and then looked to USAID for final clearance. This put USAID in the awkward position of having to be the organization to critically review, and often disapprove, PMU decisions and workplans. USAID's role as sole enforcer of project regulations and activities contributed to the difficult relationship that developed between the PIOJ/PMU and USAID. Within the past few months the DEMO PCC -- including USAID and the NRCA -- decided that the PIOJ/PMU workplanning process had not functioned well, and made a decision that the PCC would become the project approval mechanism for all PARC II activities.

**Key Finding:** The PIOJ/PMU's main responsibilities under the DEMO PARC II component were to: oversee the management of the two national parks and develop revenue generating activities in both parks to increase their ability to be self sufficient; oversee the work of JCDT to increase the capitalization of the JNPTF; manage and ensure the sustainability of the CDC; and be the management unit responsible for liaising with USAID concerning overall PARC II expenditures, workplanning and activity implementation. None of the accomplishments that were to have been achieved by the PIOJ/PMU were realized, and the unit was unable to effectively reach agreement with USAID on basic project planning and implementation issues.

### **A.1. The Jamaica National Parks Institute**

The PARC II component design envisioned an early creation of the JNPI, which would then manage the two existing national parks and create the next two. The JNPI was to manage and administer national parks and account for and disburse PARC II component funds. A central management support entity was deemed important for the long term development of national parks in Jamaica. JCDT was to hire core staff for the new institute and was expected to take the lead on fundraising to further capitalize the JNPTF. A long-term cooperative agreement with JCDT was envisioned to implement PARC II, once the transition was made from the PIOJ/PMU to the JNPI (estimated to take one year from PARC II inception on 10/93).

A key assumption under the PARC II component was that the JCDT could raise enough funds to be able to meaningfully contribute to the operational costs of two new parks, as well as provide for the institute's own costs and those of the two existing parks (i.e. BJCMNP and the MBMP). In part, the JNPI was never created because adequate private sector funds were not raised that were required to cover the institute's operating costs and necessary to sustain the JNPI beyond the terms of the USAID PARC II component. But just as important, the NRCA never proactively took steps to bring about the institute's creation -- in fact, with USAID/DEMO assistance, the NRCA was pursuing a decentralized approach to protected area creation; one in which the NRCA itself would directly delegate park and protected area management to NGOs, rather than having park management overseen by the JNPI. Complicating the matter of JNPI's creation was a lack of clarity and agreement regarding the institute's size, structure and functions and a seeming inflexibility on the part of the PIOJ/PMU to consider implementation scenarios other than those put forward in the USAID Project Paper design. [**Of note:** the USAID DEMO Project contained a Condition Precedent that stated no funding or commitment of any PARC II components would be made after 9/30/94 unless "JNPI is legally established, staffed and operational, and has been delegated authority from NRCA to manage the Blue and John Crow Mountains and Montego Bay National Parks."]

Annex F contains a presentation of responsibilities that could be undertaken by a JNPI-like institution and also examines the conditions that would need to be in place before it would make sense to create such an institution.

**Key Finding:** The JNPI, which was to have been created after six months of PARC II component implementation, was never created and is not likely to be created during the life of the DEMO Project.

## A.2. Conservation Data Center

The CDC, located at the University of the West Indies, is part of a Nature Conservancy network of more than 60 CDCs throughout the Western Hemisphere, and enters data in the TNC-developed Biological Conservation Database format. In PARC II, the CDC was supposed to conduct and manage environmental baseline studies and monitoring related to the management of the two existing national parks, and of the new ones that would come on-line. Its original mandate was to establish a data base concerning Jamaica's biodiversity, especially rare and endangered species, and specifically to focus on the management needs of the first two national parks.

The Project Paper recommends that the CDC receive support to develop a business plan and strategy in order to sustain itself beyond the end of the project. Funding for the CDC was contingent upon development of this plan (as stated in the USAID-GOJ Project Agreement). As of yet no progress has been made in this regard. Until a redefined role for the CDC happens, a business strategy would be premature.

There does not seem to be much interest in Jamaica for supporting the CDC with its present information collection capabilities outside of the University of the West Indies, where significant support is uncertain.<sup>3</sup> The NRCA seems interested in assuming the management of the CDC but, at the current time, does not have the funds necessary to support its operation. More staff, effective leadership, a clarified role and relevant institutional home are needed to rejuvenate the CDC; however funding will probably continue to be a problem. In addition, expectations of the CDC with regard to its financial sustainability are probably exaggerated, no matter what its role.

**Key Finding:** The CDC has played no meaningful role in the implementation of the USAID DEMO Project.

## B. The Jamaica National Parks Trust Fund (JNPTF)

The JNPTF was established as a trust fund in January 1991 under the USAID-funded PARC I Project. The Fund provides grants to the JCDT to provide operational support to the BJCMNP and for JCDT to sub-grant funds to the MBMP. At the time the fund was created it was envisioned that the JNPTF would be a significant source of funding to be complemented by local funding sources, for a national park financing system implemented by the JNPI and, where appropriate, local-level NGOs.

The JNPTF is overseen by a seven person Board of Trustees. Its Trustees include three JCDT representatives, and one member from each of the following four organizations: the Private Sector

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<sup>3</sup> An effective protected area system requires the information that the CDC should be able to provide. The CDC's present mapping capability, however, is insufficient as data can only be located on maps with scales of 1:50,000. Therefore, the CDC's capability to aid park management in the two existing parks is limited and probably inadequate.



Organization of Jamaica, the Natural Resource Conservation Authority, the Planning Institute of Jamaica and the University of the West Indies/Jamaica.

As per the USAID PARC II Project Paper Supplement "as the park system expands, it will be necessary to expand the endowment of this fund to cover additional expenses. It was never intended that the JNPTF be the sole source of revenue for national parks. Revenue from local park specific sources such as user fees, concessions, and merchandising would need to be developed to support individual parks. This was expected to be easier in thriving tourist destinations such as Montego Bay and Negril, and more difficult in terrestrial parks....This component will contain modestly phased down support for JCDT to build up the trust fund that ultimately is intended to support all costs for the completed system of National Parks after PARC II."

The Fund was initially capitalized at a level of US\$437,000 using funds leveraged through a debt-for-nature swap. There were no expenses in the Fund's first year. March 1993 was when the Fund began paying the salaries of National Park staff.

### **Findings:**

- ! To date, the JCDT has been the only direct recipient of JNPTF disbursements. In turn, the JCDT sub-grants Trust Fund allocations to the MBMP. The arrangement whereby JCDT would itself manage Trust Fund disbursements to other NGOs came about because at the time the Trust Fund was established the JCDT was probably the only environmental NGO in Jamaica capable of doing so.
- ! The Fund was capitalized through two debt swaps, under the USAID PARC I Project, at a level of \$547,000. As of September 1995, the Fund was valued at approximately US\$930,000. The overwhelming majority of the capitalization of the Trust Fund since its inception has been gained from interest earned from financial investments, primarily guaranteed government securities (similar to Treasury Bills). The JNPTF pays no brokerage fees to its investment managers but allows the fund managers to retain some portion of profits earned.
- ! As per the JCDT 1994 Annual Report, in 1994 the JNPTF disbursed a total of J\$4,563,607 to the JCDT: approximately 50% was used to run BJCMNP, 30% was allocated for the management of the MBMP, and the remainder of the disbursement was retained by the JCDT, in part as a management fee.
- ! USAID's PARC II PPS estimated that the JNPTF needed to be endowed at a level of J\$100 million by 1997, and J\$180 million by 2002. As of September 1995, the trust fund's total assets were worth J\$32.5 million.
- ! The Jamaican Government's contribution to the Trust Fund, expected to be five million Jamaican dollars annually, was zero in 1994 and three million in 1995.

- ! The near and longer term relationship between the JNPTF and the MBMPT (with funds being channeled through the JCDT) is unclear. The MBMPT believes it has a legitimate claim to some portion of the JNPTF reserves as it is expected to receive government delegation to manage one of Jamaica's two national parks, however, it is unclear how much money it will be granted, over what period of time it will continue to receive financial support, and what process will be used to make these decisions.
- ! There is discomfort among the Jamaican NGO community at large with the uncertainty as to how current and future trust disbursements will be allocated. On the other hand, the JNPTF is not sufficiently capitalized to be able to provide grants to any organizations other than the MBMP and the JCDT and, therefore, is understandably reluctant to expand the number of NGOs that it includes as Trust Fund sub-beneficiaries (or managing partners).
- ! Although the main role of the JCDT under the PARC II component was to secure capital contributions for the JNPTF endowment, it does not have private sector commercial representation on its board. For some time, PCC members have felt that adding private sector representation could lead to a more successful and aggressive fundraising strategy. This informal suggestion has yet to be acted on and seems to have become an additional source of friction between USAID and the JCDT/JNPTF. (During the evaluation team's visit to Jamaica, the JNPTF Board approved two additional board seats but has not yet indicated how those seats will be filled.)

**Key Finding:** The JNPTF has grown as a result of interest earned from well-managed capital investments, however, the Fund has not been able to secure any significant level of new capital contributions. In addition, the JNPTF grant disbursement regime is unclear and the process lacks transparency.

### C. Jamaican Conservation and Development Trust (JCDT)

In terms of the specific role of JCDT in PARC II, the project design envisioned the following:

- ! Modest project support for JCDT -- gradually phasing down -- with emphasis on building up the trust fund that ultimately is intended to support all recurring costs for the completed system of National Parks after the PARC II.
- ! JCDT continuing its national environmental education programs, monitoring programs, development of buffer zone initiatives, local NGO support to contribute to national parks, and the revision of the National Parks Systems Plan.

The JCDT's most important task under the USAID PARC II component was to substantially increase the capitalization of the JNPTF endowment. In fact, the success of this activity formed the underpinning of two of the three broad goals of the PARC II component: to develop a sustainable park system by privatizing management, and raising funds to support parks; and expanding the park system to protect other critical areas.

Under the original PARC II agreement, USAID was to provide funds to JCDT, through its agreement with the PIOJ/PMU, to fund a capital campaign manager. The purpose of this position was to raise funding to increase the JNPTF endowment's ability to support the management of national parks. Subsequent to an agreement between USAID, the PIOJ/PMU, and the JCDT to hire a JCDT capital campaign manager, USAID project officers learned that the Agency's regulations did permit funding of direct solicitation activities. USAID did try and reach a compromise agreement with JCDT but the issue was never able to be resolved to both parties satisfaction. Consequently, US\$300,000+ of USAID funds to support the JCDT capital campaign were never spent.

**Key Finding:** The JCDT has been unsuccessful in adding any significant new capital to the Jamaica National Parks Trust Fund, as was its principal responsibility under the PARC II component of the DEMO Project.

#### **D. Natural Resources Conservation Authority (NRCA)**

**Key Finding:** The NRCA did not play a significant role in the management and implementation of the DEMO PARC II component. [The NRCA's role in protected area policy and management has been discussed under Section I of this report.]

### **III. Management of the National Parks**

As per the PARC II component Paper design, the main outputs for the two existing parks were to have been:

- ! management and financial sustainability of the BJCMNP and the MBMP;
- ! NGO support for each new park in place; and
- ! income-generating capability in place for national parks including user fees, concessions and licenses to contribute to the cost of park management.

Throughout the project, the parks have been directly managed by the PIOJ/PMU. This has occurred because the JNPI was never created and the NRCA, to date, has not yet granted the JCDT and the MBMPT the authority to manage the two parks. It is now expected, however, that the NRCA will delegate management of the MBMP to the Montego Bay Trust, and will delegate the management of the BJCMNP to the JCDT.

**Findings:** A discussion of the management of the two parks is contained in Annex G: Park Management.

**Key Finding:** As a result of the PIOJ/PMU's management of the PARC II component, there have not been any significant improvements in the management of either the BJCMNP or the MBMP under the DEMO Project. And, as of December 1995, there were no income generating programs operational in either park. (Under its own initiative, however, the MBMP has proceeded to develop its own multi-year plans for implementing income generation activities.)

## Section 3: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### I. The DEMO Project: (on all components expect PARC II)

The DEMO Project has now completed two and a half years of activity that has focused on strengthening the capability of public and private environmental organizations to manage and provide policy and regulatory oversight of Jamaica's most economically important natural resources. In spite of a slow start-up, all mid-term objectives have been met and considerable project momentum has led the evaluation team to conclude that the project has a good prospect of achieving its principal objectives and project purpose.

#### A. The Natural Resources Conservation Authority

**Key Finding:** The NRCA, with DEMO/TSS assistance, is off to a good start in its program to becoming a more skilled and effective organization. In particular, the NRCA has realized steady progress in: developing and implementing participatory environmental planning processes; developing environmental regulations; and creating and strengthening internal management. At this point, however, NRCA seems to be heavily reliant on its USAID-funded technical assistance contractor for programming and managing technical activities and developing NRCA products.

##### A.1. NRCA Project Management

**Conclusion:** NRCA has frequently been more of a participant than a leader in the management of DEMO-funded activities, particularly in regard to the DEMO/SITE work undertaken in Negril.

**Recommendation:** In all instances of technical assistance and training activities funded under the project, NRCA should ensure that one or more key management or technical personnel are an integral part of the planning and design -- and in certain instances the implementation -- process carried out with TSS assistance. During the second half of the project, TSS's role should be more focused on facilitating the NRCA's leadership and management of project objectives, and less on being the lead managing entity.

##### A.2. Structure and Staffing

**Conclusions:** A stronger overall mid-level managerial capacity within NRCA is needed to assume responsibility for the project tasks currently being carried out and overseen by TSS. To help ensure the longer-term effectiveness and institutional sustainability of the NRCA, a better understanding of the organization's required functions and skills is needed.

**Recommendation:** Carry out an NRCA organizational analysis to define position and department functions, and form a basis for identifying the skills that need to be upgraded or added in order for the Authority to effectively carry out its mandate. Such an analysis should be based on an overall assessment of organizational, division and department mandates and structure. A multi-year NRCA staffing and training plan should be developed based on an institutional analysis that identifies long-term personnel needs of the NRCA.

### **A.3. NRCA's Project Management Unit**

**Conclusions:** The NRCA/DEMO PMU should be an integral part of the overall NRCA organizational structure. This management structure should permeate the organization and be fully justified on its own merits and overall program functions, as opposed to being a separate DEMO project management unit that will be dissolved once the project is completed.

**Recommendations:** Consider integrating the DEMO/PMU into a "Program Coordination Office" that would have a coordination, planning and management role for the overall NRCA. Functions could include program budgeting, strategic planning/objective setting, performance monitoring and analysis, and overall planning for all NRCA inputs, including GOJ budget allocations, DEMO and CIDA resources. As such, the office would require a focus on management and planning skills, rather than being primarily technical in orientation. The current NRCA Policy, Corporate Planning and Project Management Unit could play such a role, but currently does not appear to be actively undertaking these suggested functions.

To be effective, the DEMO PMU should meet on a regular basis -- perhaps through sub-committees that could be formed around the project's/NRCA's important functional areas.

### **A.4. NRCA's Park and Protected Area Management Capability**

**Key Finding:** The NRCA has successfully played a lead role in the development of a national-level parks and protected area policy for Jamaica. Under the PARC II component, however, it was the PIOJ/PMU, not the NRCA, that was responsible for the management of Jamaica's national parks.

**Conclusion:** The NRCA is not adequately staffed or skilled to effectively undertake its new responsibilities of policy, regulatory and administration supervision of a Jamaican system of parks and protected areas.

**Recommendations:** USAID should increase assistance to build up the NRCA's capacity to develop overall park and protected areas policies and regulations, and to assume management oversight of NGOs expected to be granted delegation of authority to manage parks and protected areas. This will be necessary in order that the NRCA can begin to exercise a strong leadership role in the continued evolution of parks and protected areas management in Jamaica.

To help the NRCA to develop this capability, USAID should consider providing financing to support the following positions:

- ! an experienced branch/division director, to oversee the management and planning of an NRCA Parks and Protect Areas Division.

- ! a park financing specialist, to assist in the identification and implementation of revenue producing plans to ensure that NGOs have resources adequate to manage necessary park operations.
- ! a park management specialist, to assist NGOs to develop park and protected area management plans and to monitor NGO compliance.

As the executor of agreements to delegate parks and protected areas management to NGOs, the NRCA should take the lead on developing a system whereby profitable parks will be able to cross-subsidize the development of future parks and protected areas.

## **B. The DEMO SITE Component**

**Key Finding:** The DEMO/NRCA work in Negril to develop a protected area plan has been successful in harmonizing the interests of a diverse group of resource users/stakeholders, and provides a model for public-private NGO collaboration that can be used throughout Jamaica.

### **Conclusions:**

- ! The DEMO/SITE activity has achieved impressive success in developing and carrying out an integrated approach to *environmental planning* through the preparation of an Environmental Protection Plan (EPP). In Negril, this process has brought together a wide range of stakeholders and has been responsible for a harmonization of diverse interests. The *planning process* used in Negril will form the basis of an approach for Jamaica to proceed to establish and manage additional parks and protected areas.
- ! It is unrealistic to expect that the DEMO/SITE process can be initiated and completed within a two year time frame, as was called for in the Project Paper.
- ! Several of the small-scale community environmental activities implemented in Negril have been plagued by management difficulties and results have sometimes fallen short of expectations.

### **Recommendations: SITE**

- ! The DEMO Project should continue to provide support to the NRCA to undertake the integrated and participatory environmental planning process based on the process that was used in Negril. Now that an environmental protected area development process has been designed and tested, it will be necessary for the NRCA to take ownership of the process and play a lead role in its implementation as work is begun in new areas.
- ! It is recommended that USAID support for DEMO/SITE activity be continued in Negril, (see caveat below), revisited in Montego Bay, and begun in two new areas.

- ! Until the NEPT organization or some other entity is prepared to hire an Executive Director, and someone resident in Negril is designated as being accountable for the expenditure and tracking of project funds, it is suggested that no further technical assistance projects be carried out in Negril.
  
- ! Experience to date, although limited, would indicate that small-scale community development projects should not be implemented without the management oversight of a local organization. Criteria should be developed by the PCC to indicate the institutional requirements that are necessary for successful management of DEMO-funded community-based small-scale activities. Criteria, for example, could include: the managing organization has a clear mandate and organizational mission; the organization has clear objectives; and the organization has staff on-board who have some history of successfully managing small-scale projects within their communities.

### **C. The National Environmental Society Trust Component of DEMO**

**Key Finding:** Although it took longer than expected for NEST to assume its intended role under DEMO, the organization is now active in providing project planning, strategic planning and proposal development assistance to a large number of Jamaican environmental NGOs. NEST's Executive Director is highly regarded within the NGO community and the NGOs that have participated in NEST training have considered the training to have been well-run and useful.

#### **Conclusions:**

- ! NEST is currently providing services that appear to be making a contribution to strengthening Jamaican environmental NGOs. These services include providing environmental NGOs project design and proposal writing skills that several have since used to successfully access grant funding from the Environmental Foundation of Jamaica.
  
- ! This NEST training approach is designed and carried out to ensure that training has a practical orientation and will be able to realize a spread effect.
  
- ! In principle, the evaluation team is supportive of USAID's effort and workplanning requirement that NEST develop a business/sustainability plan. However, at this point in time, effort might be best concentrated on ensuring that NEST is able to deliver a reasonable amount of high quality technical assistance for the remainder of the project. Although USAID would like to see NEST become financially self-sustaining by the end of the DEMO project, USAID should keep in mind that if NEST does well in delivering training and technical assistance to environmental NGOs, the benefits of the assistance provided will have been relevant and helpful whether or not NEST continues to exist. NEST does not have enough staff to concentrate on both revenue generation and delivery of technical assistance -- and probably will need to establish a solid reputation for being a capable technical assistance organization before it can realistically be expected to attract significant funding beyond that now received from EFJ and USAID.



## **Recommendation: NEST**

NEST is a going concern and should be financially supported by USAID to provide NGO strengthening assistance throughout the life of the DEMO project. USAID's principal concern should be to ensure that NEST continues to fulfill this role.

- ! Further staffing of NEST, particularly the administrative/accountant position, should be encouraged and financially supported by USAID. This will enable NEST to receive direct grants from TSS. The organization will then be able to manage its own finances and increase its decision-making and implementation efficiency. This will also provide NEST experience that the organization will require if it is to become financially self-sustaining.
- ! If USAID wishes NEST to become self-financing by the end of the DEMO Project, then USAID should support the hiring of an additional senior staff member who could take the lead in the design and delivery of technical assistance. This would enable NEST's Executive Director to concentrate energy on fundraising and sustainability issues rather than having to be the principal manager of NEST's outreach and training services.

### **D. The TSS Institutional Contract**

#### **D.1. TSS Project Management**

**Key Finding:** After initial delays and difficulties, particularly regarding the management of the DEMO Annual Workplan, TSS is on-track in meeting the deliverables and terms of its contract with USAID/Jamaica. Although the requirements of the workplanning process are being met, an increasing emphasis on the process could help to make the exercise more meaningful for the NRCA DEMO partners, including NEST and SITE implementors.

**Conclusion:** TSS has done a credible job during the first 18 months of the Technical Assistance Contract. The accomplishments noted in Annex E have fully complied with the contractor's scope of work, despite initial implementation complications with regard to the development of annual work plans and the processing of payments and vouchers. These early difficulties have now been resolved.

**Recommendation:** No major changes are suggested.

#### **D.2. TSS Financial Capacity**

**Conclusions:** TSS has not been able to consistently and routinely meet its payment obligations to USAID/DEMO project implementors. This has caused considerable aggravation among many of the DEMO project implementing entities, which to date has not been fully resolved.

TSS has recently secured bank credit to facilitate up-front payment requirements and improve the firm's carrying capacity of project expenditures. It is expected that this action, plus a specialized process of vouchering and payment of funds recently proposed and instituted by the

USAID/Controller's Office, may serve to resolve past difficulties experienced by TSS in payment liquidity.

**Recommendation:** If the above described financial capacity of TSS remains an issue, it should be fully addressed by the USAID contracting office with assistance from the AADC Washington Audit Office as required, as recommended by the RCO for USAID/Jamaica.

#### **E. USAID Management of DEMO**

USAID has been responsive and diligent in its project management of DEMO, despite initial delays in the start-up of the PCC and the contracting of TSS. Good working relationships have been established, and close coordination on all project planning and decision-making takes place. On the PARC II component, daily project implementation matters often seemed to have been addressed through an excessive use of Project Implementation Letters, which should be greatly curtailed over the remaining two years of the project given the consolidation of the annual plan process, and the transference of the PIOJ/PMU to the NRCA.

In light of the changes recommended in this evaluation, it is suggested that USAID:

1. Consolidate project management to one Project Officer responsible for all DEMO activities.
2. Review the DEMO logical framework so that its objectives and indicators adequately reflect the changes that will be implemented as a result of this evaluation. In particular, emphasis should be given to indicators that allow USAID to meaningfully track progress in the following two areas: the institutional strengthening of the NRCA; and progress towards creating a financially viable Jamaican parks and protected area system.
3. Extend the PACD for six months to March 31, 1998, and review the TSS's contract for proposed modification, with emphasis on utilizing short-term specialized technical assistance as needed in lieu of the need for a long-term technical advisor beyond the current PACD - as a way of transferring ownership of the project to the NRCA and being able to support that transfer with up to six months of targeted technical assistance.

## II. The PARC II Component of DEMO

Although PARC II's objectives were exceedingly ambitious and perhaps unrealistic, the overall lack of progress has nonetheless been a disappointment to all involved. A presentation of the project's principal objectives along with a snapshot of progress to date follows.

1. To develop a sustainable park system by privatizing management, and raising funds to support parks. **Not Achieved.**

There has not been any significant progress made by the PARC II component in establishing a viable and sustainable park system. The JNPI, which was to have been the managing entity of a financially sustainable national park system has not been created. In addition, the JCDT has been unsuccessful in its efforts to significantly expand the capital endowment of the JNPTF which, in part, was to fund the JNPI. However, the MBMP, under its own initiative, has created its own trust fund and is beginning to assume responsibility for its own long-term financial needs -- although this effort is in its infancy.

2. Strengthening NRCA's park policy making and enforcement capabilities. **Not Achieved (under the PARC II component).**

The NRCA has made important advances in its ability to create and manage a national parks and protected area system, most notably a national policy framework has been developed and is well along in the process of becoming national policy. However, the NRCA's achievements in this area have come primarily as a result of its association with DEMO components other than PARC II.

3. Expanding the park system to protect other critical areas. **Not Achieved.**

The PARC II component called for the creation of two new national parks -- the Cockpit Country and Black River -- once the financial viability of the country's existing two parks could be assured. As discussed under item one, the financial viability of Jamaica's existing two parks has not improved or been assured under the PARC II component, and thus no new parks have been created. There is an initial effort to establish a protected areas management plan for the Black River watershed but it is the NRCA, with DEMO/SITE assistance, that appears poised to take this initiative. The PARC II component did little, if anything, to advance progress on the creation of a park or protected area in Cockpit Country.

In summary, the PARC II component did not proceed as expected and has accomplished little of consequence. The PARC II component's design was based on the establishment of the JNPI as the central institution that would have been responsible for the management and expansion of a national park system. In retrospect, however, the component's design turned out to be unrealistic. In particular, project design assumptions concerning the JCDT's ability to raise funds to support the system proved to be overly optimistic while, at the same time, the Government of Jamaica never clearly and decisively acted to create the JNPI. Instead of offering direct support for the creation of the JNPI, the NRCA actively pursued a more decentralized approach to the creation and management of a park and protected area system (with assistance from DEMO's SITE component).

One of USAID's Conditions Precedent under the PARC II component called for the legal establishment of the JNPI by September 30, 1994. Although this condition was not met, and was a basis for the achievement of the component's objectives, USAID (with the concurrence of the Government of Jamaica) decided to extend the CP due date until September 1995, and continued to manage the project as designed. As of December 1995, this Condition Precedent had still not been met. Since late 1994, it has been evident to many of those involved in the management of the PARC II component that the component's design was out of sync with its implementation environment. (In fact, the PARC II component's design was contentious within USAID even before implementation was begun.)

**Overall Recommendation:** In the view of the evaluation team, the objectives of the PARC II component are still valid and can be achieved over the coming few years. To achieve the component's objectives, however, fundamental implementation and management adjustments will be necessary. In particular, activity should now be concentrated on: strengthening the NRCA's ability to establish, implement and enforce parks and protected area policy; strengthening the park management capabilities of NGOs that are expected to receive NRCA delegation of authority to manage parks and protected areas; and revisiting and/or redesigning the strategy of how to ensure adequate trust funds will be available to support protected area management in Jamaica.

Future funding needs for the protected area system - both at the local and national (Jamaica National Parks and Protected Area Service) levels - will be considerable and should come from a variety of sources, including local revenue generation, private sector support, local endowment funds, bilateral and multilateral funding agencies, and a permanent cash flow source such as a departure tax on tourists. Each protected area and its management entity will require a different mix of these funding sources. A suggested list of fundraising activities was developed by the evaluation team and has been included as Annex H.

#### **A. The Planning Institute of Jamaica/Park Management Unit**

**Key Finding:** The PIOJ/PMU's main responsibilities under the DEMO PARC II component were to: oversee the management of the two national parks and develop revenue generating activities in both parks to increase their ability to be self sufficient; oversee the work of JCDDT to increase the capitalization of the JNPTF; manage and ensure the sustainability of the CDC; and be the management unit responsible for liaising with USAID concerning overall PARC II expenditures, workplanning and activity implementation. None of the accomplishments that were have been to achieved by the PIOJ/PMU were realized, and the unit was unable to effectively reach agreement with USAID on basic project planning and implementation issues.

**Conclusion:** The PIOJ/PMU, as the entity responsible for the management of the DEMO PARC II component, did not function effectively and produced little of consequence.

**Recommendation:** As of March 31, 1996, all funding to the PIOJ/PMU should be discontinued.

## B. The Jamaica National Parks Trust Fund

**Key Finding:** The JNPTF has grown through solid investment management decisions, however, the Fund has not been able to secure any significant level of new capital contributions. In addition, the JNPTF grant disbursement regime is unclear and the process lacks transparency.

**Conclusions:** The JNPTF has three main responsibilities -- fundraising (capitalization of the trust fund); grant disbursement and management oversight; and investment management (to increase the value of current capital reserves). Performance to date is presented below:

Fundraising - The JNPTF's efforts at attracting new capital contributions have not met with the level of success envisioned in the USAID PARC II PPS. (USAID's inability to fully fund a JCDT capital campaign manager, as called for in the PARC II component design, and approved through the USAID-PIOJ/PMU workplan process, contributed to, but was not the sole cause of the JCDT's lack of success in capitalizing the JNPTF; lack of success can be equally attributed to the JCDT's lack of success and initiative.)

Grant Disbursement and Management Oversight - The rules governing JNPTF disbursements are not clear and transparent. (The JCDT, which holds a plurality of seats on the JNPTF's board, is in the unusual position of being both the principal institution influencing trust fund disbursements, while at the same time is the trust fund's only direct grantee to date. This arrangement is perceived by some in the environmental community to be a conflict of interest.)

Investment Management - The JNPTF endowment has realized impressive growth as a result of investment contracts bid-out by the JNPTF Board of Trustees and managed by several investment firms. Interest earned on these investments has been largely responsible for the endowment fund growing from US\$437,000 in April 1992 to nearly US\$600,000 by September 1995.

### **Recommendations:**

**Fundraising: In order to be able to contribute to the development of an effective national parks and protected area financing system in Jamaica, the JNPTF needs to find a way to further capitalize its trust fund. This issue requires the priority attention of USAID, the JCDT and the JNPTF Board.**

The addition of dynamic private sector representation on the JNPTF's Board could help to provide a more entrepreneurial orientation towards fund raising. Other possibilities to consider would include using some portion of funds to hire, on a contract basis, a firm that specializes in fundraising, or to collaborate with a US NGO having expertise in this area.

Grant Disbursement and Management Oversight: It is suggested that the JNPTF Board of Trustees, in consultation with the NRCA, undertake a series of reforms to revise and clarify its mission, its organizational structure and its management and operating procedures. It is also suggested that NRCA provide assistance to clarify the relationship between the JNPTF and the MBMPT. USAID,

however, provides no direct funding support to the JNPTF and, as such, has no authority to directly affect the decisions of the Fund's Board of Trustees.

USAID could help this suggested strategy revisitation process by clearly articulating the actions that it deems to be necessary in order for the JNPTF to regain the full confidence of USAID -- and this has not been done to date. If the JNPTF Board is interested in undertaking basic reforms to its management of the Fund, then USAID should consider supporting this effort. (It is worth keeping in mind that the JNPTF Board was established with TNC support, was acceptable to USAID at the time of its creation, and has a successful three year track record of managing endowment investments.) If the JNPTF decides not to undertake reforms then USAID project support to the JCDT should be limited to activities directly related to improving its management of the BJCMNP, and USAID should explore an alternative approach to supporting the development of a national parks and protected area financing support system. Under such a scenario, the JNPTF would (insofar as USAID strategy would be concerned) assume a role that would likely be limited to funding the management of the BJCMNP.

Investment Management: The investment management track record of the JCDT, on behalf of the JNPTF, has been positive and therefore no changes are recommended.

IF USAID is not able to gain confidence that the JNPTF will be able to fulfill its intended role as a central financing mechanism for a national parks and protected area system then other options should be explored. For example, USAID may wish to consider having EFJ act as an investment manager for local trust fund accounts. The advantage of such a system would be that local trust funds could conceivably get a better rate of return by contributing their funds to a larger investment pool, and they would have a transparent and reputable way to manage investments -- which could be attractive to potential contributors. This is only one of several scenarios that could prove to be a worthwhile alternative to relying exclusively on the JNPTF/JCDT as the sole mechanism for ensuring financial sustainability of Jamaica's parks and protected areas.

### **C. The Jamaica Conservation and Development Trust**

**Key Finding:** The JCDT has been unsuccessful in adding any significant new capital to the Jamaica National Parks Trust Fund, as was its principal responsibility under the DEMO Project.

**Conclusion:** The strong role of JCDT as envisioned by the Project Paper has not developed and has greatly impeded project progress. The lack of capitalization of the JNPTF has meant that two of the three DEMO PARC II objectives could not be achieved (to develop a sustainable park system by privatizing management, and raising funds to support parks; and expanding the park system to protect other critical areas).

Both USAID and the JCDT have offered plausible but differing opinions on the reasons why the USAID funds to support a capital campaign were never spent, and both agree that more could have been done by JCDT. Regardless of the actual reason, the inability of USAID and the JCDT to reach

agreement and move forward in the implementation of a capital campaign seriously undermined the entire concept of the DEMO PARC II component.

**Recommendation:** Due to the lack of measurable progress under the PARC II component, as of March 31, 1996, USAID should discontinue its current package of support to the JCDT. It is recommended that the JCDT should now be expected to cover all park ranger and park management costs from its JNPTF interest draw-downs. (Adequate funds appear to be available to JCDT from the JNPTF to maintain the current level of park ranger operations in the BJCMNP). And, since there is no near-term prospect for the JNPTF to be capitalized as was envisioned in the project's design, it is now necessary that USAID revisit, and perhaps radically alter, the strategy it has pursued under the PARC II component for creating a park and protected area financing *system* in Jamaica.

USAID, however, should consider providing the JCDT additional support that is product-oriented and performance-based in order to enable the JCDT to effectively manage the BJCMNP. Such support could include helping to upgrade the NGO's park management skills, producing tangible income-generating opportunities (e.g., cabin restoration), or supporting specific steps that would enable the JCDT to increase the capitalization of the JNPTF. A "new beginnings" attitude should set the context for these discussions. The preceding recommendation assumes that USAID and the JCDT can reach agreement on the types of activities that USAID is willing and able to support. Over the coming months, however, if the two organizations cannot reach such an agreement, then no further USAID funding should be provided to the JCDT.

#### **D. The Jamaica National Parks Institute**

**Key Finding:** The JNPI, which was to have been created after six months of PARC II component implementation, was never created and is not likely to be created during the life of the DEMO Project.

**Conclusion/Recommendation:** Since two years of effort to create the JNPI were unsuccessful, and significant funds toward this end have already been expended, USAID should no longer provide funding to create the JNPI or a JNPI-like institution.

The institutional context, policy development and funding necessary for the successful creation of the JNPI was not present at the beginning of the PARC II component, and, in the judgement of the evaluators, is not yet present. The conditions that will be necessary to create such an institute would include: the availability of significant private sector financing (to come from the JNPTF through JCDT); delegation from the NRCA; and a stronger GOJ/NRCA capability to set policy, execute planning, and undertake enforcement. A discussion on the role of a JNPI-like institution is discussed in Annex F.

#### **E. The Conservation Data Center**

**Key Finding:** The CDC was unsuccessful in making any progress towards reducing its reliance on USAID funding, and did not provide any information to the national parks that resulted in their being better managed.

**Conclusion:** The CDC has played no meaningful role in the implementation of the USAID DEMO Project. In addition, the CDC does not appear to have been held accountable for its performance and there does not currently appear to be any significant demand for its services.

**Recommendation:** USAID should discontinue the financial support it currently provides to the CDC.

Biodiversity information needed to support the development of additional protected areas, such as the Black River watershed, should be obtained on a contract basis. If CDC continues to exist after March 31, 1996, they could conceivably be one of organizations/companies requested to respond to such a solicitation request -- which could be issued by the NRCA. USAID should consider supporting such contracts on a case by case basis depending on needs. In the meantime, a decision needs to be made as to where the CDC information collected and funded under the PARC II component should be transferred.

## **F. Park Management**

**Key Findings:** As a result of the PIOJ/PMU's management of the PARC II component, there have not been any significant improvements in the management of either the BJCMNP or the MBMP under the DEMO Project. And, as of December 1995, there were no income generating programs operational in either park.

**Conclusion:** A lack of technical expertise in most fields of protected area management is evident, both within NRCA and in the NGO community, many of whom are managing protected areas (or plan to). While training of NGOs involved with the DEMO project is being carried out, most of this is geared to institutional strengthening, including NRCA; very little training has focussed on the technical aspects of achieving effective park management. NRCA staff are also not being trained to supervise park management projects and to carry out the technical aspects of their planning and regulatory functions.

### **Recommendations:**

- ! It is essential that technical assistance, external or local, be obtained to address some of the critical issues of this project. The training plan in development through DEMO should be reviewed to ensure that appropriate consideration is given to strengthening the technical capability of both NRCA and local NGOs to manage protected areas. Consideration should also be given to providing practical experience in revenue generation application to a specific protected area situation, which, in addition to providing practical experience, can also serve as a model or guideline for other protected areas. Training in protected area management of both NGOs involved in protected area management, and NRCA's National Parks and Protected Area Management Unit should be given a high priority.



! USAID should support the further development of the two NGOs currently expected to receive delegation of authority from the NRCA to manage the BJCMNP and the MBMP -- the JCDT and the MBMPT -- and should try and do so through providing direct grant assistance.

- With regard to support for the JCDT, this issue has been discussed under the section 3 JCDT conclusions and recommendations.

- With regard to the MBMPT, USAID should provide a one-time direct grant to support the near-term management and development of the park, as well as to cover technical assistance to increase the park's ability to carry out its job. The MBMP now has a capable staff in place, a functioning and effective Board of Trustees, and, given its limited resources, has made good progress in its effort to protect the park's resources through a process of cooperation with a wide range of local stakeholders. In the interest of enabling the MBMPT to adequately solidify its recent gains, and to ensure continued progress in protecting the park's resource base over the near term, USAID's direct grant should be used to help offset the MBMPT's next two years of operation.

### **III. Priority USAID Management Actions**

The following are suggested priority actions to be undertaken by USAID/Jamaica as a result of this evaluation.

#### **Shift PARC II Management Responsibilities from the PIOJ/PMU to the NRCA and NGOs (MBMPT and the JCDT):**

1. Initiate a meeting between the USAID Mission Director and the Director General of the PIOJ to discuss the transition of the PARC II component to the NRCA. Aside from reaching a general understanding on issues regarding the project's future implementation, decisions will need to be made regarding the timely transfer of project-purchased commodities, particularly vehicles and computers.

#### **Ensure the National Parks are Properly Managed:**

2. Enter into a discussion with the MBMP/MBMPT to determine the next two years of the park's operational needs. USAID will need to initiate detailed discussions with the Marine Park to define the park's operational requirements and to fashion a USAID-funded grant agreement to ensure that the park can successfully transition into an independently financed and managed entity. Based on the evaluation team's findings, the prospect for the MBMP's near and long term success seems promising, but will require some USAID support over the next two years.
3. Negotiate a grant agreement with the JCDT to ensure that it will be capable of sustainably and properly managing the BJCMNP. It should be assumed that the primary funding to support park ranger operations will come from draw-downs from the interest earned by the JNPTF (and this may negatively affect the level of funding that the JNPTF is able to provide to support the management of the MBMP). However, the JCDT is likely to need technical assistance in park management and fundraising, and could also benefit from USAID support to develop specific capital projects -- such as the refurbishment of overnight cabins in the park that are currently in a state of decay. USAID should also initiate discussions to take a fresh look at ways to further capitalize the JNPTF. One idea would be to make funds available, through the JCDT, on a matching basis -- particularly if the match comes from a private sector source.

#### **Prepare the NRCA to be able to take a Lead Role in the Management of Parks and Protected Areas:**

4. USAID should enter into discussions with the NRCA to determine what support will be necessary to enable the NRCA to take a lead role in the development of a Jamaican parks and protected area financing and management system. At a minimum, the NRCA will need to upgrade its park and protected areas unit into a

branch or a division (so that it can classify the director's position at a salary level that will attract the professional talent needed for the job). USAID staff support should be considered for a branch/division director, a park management specialist (to design/write delegation of authority agreements, to monitor compliance with agreements, to oversee community involvement in protected area management, and to play a lead role in integrated and participatory protected area planning), and possibly support a protected area finance specialist (to develop government regulations governing NGO fee collection and retention, to develop a dedicated government tax to support natural resources conservation, to develop a system that will ensure resource sharing between protected areas, and to research, develop and disseminate revenue generation options/strategies). In addition, some level of operational support will be needed, including vehicles and an operational budget.

In addition, a longer-term organizational development plan should be undertaken for the NRCA to clarify issues concerning structure, functions and needed skills. A multi-year training plan should result from, rather than precede, such an exercise.

## **ANNEX A: Scope of Work**

## **ANNEX B: List of Persons Interviewed**

### USAID/Kingston

Stephen Reeve, Project Officer - DEMO

Jane Ellis, Project Officer - PARC

### PIOJ/PMU

David Lee, PMU Manager

Robert Carr, Assistant Manager

Gregory Silveria, Accountant

### PIOJ

Mearle Henry

### NEST

Maureen Rowe, Executive Director

### Montego Bay Marine Park

Brian Duncan, Executive Director

Sandra Blake-Butler, Operations Manager

Malden Miller, Marine Scientist

Charles McKenzie, Ranger Manager

### Montego Bay Marine Park Trust (MBMP/T)

Patrick O'Callaghan, Board Member

Bill Taylor, Board Member

Kirk Taylor, Board Member

### Jamaica National Park Trust Fund

Ripton MacPherson, Board Member

Michael White

Blossom O'Meally-Nelson

### Jamaica Conservation and Development Trust

David Smith, Executive Director

### South Coast Conservation Foundation (SCCF)

Peter Espeut, Executive Director  
Harvey Webb III, Assistant Director

National Resources Conservation Agency (NRCA)

Franklin MacDonald, Executive Director  
Learie Miller, Deputy Executive Director

Construction Resource and Development Centre

Stephen Hodges, Executive Director

Duncan and Duncan Ltd.

Christine Duncan, Managing Director

Environmental Foundation of Jamaica

Terrence Thomas, Executive Director

Technical Support Services (TSS)

Alison Massa, Chief of Party  
Conrad Ornstein, Director  
Al Massony, TSS/Washington  
Royce Laneir, TSS/Washington, President

## **ANNEX C: Evaluation Team and Methodology**

A five person team from Management Systems International conducted the evaluation of the DEMO Project.

David Callihan, Co-Team Leader/Institutional Development Specialist  
Michael Lofstrom, Co-Team Leader, Natural Resources Management Specialist  
Alan Moore, Parks and Protected Area Specialist  
Bevon Morrison, Environmental Management Specialist  
Wilbur LaPage, Finance Specialist

The full evaluation team spent three weeks in Jamaica during November 1995 concentrating its effort on an analysis of the PARC II component of DEMO. In December 1995 Callihan, Lofstrom and Morrison spent an additional two weeks in Jamaica completing analysis of the PARC II Component as well as reviewing the NRCA, NEST and SITE components of DEMO.

The team reviewed relevant files and reports, visited all of the organizations involved in the implementation of the DEMO Project, and conducted field visits to the Blue and John Crow Mountain National Park, the Montego Bay Marine Park and the Negril SITE activity. A list of persons contacted appears as Annex B.

**ANNEX D: Financial Analysis of USAID/DEMO Project**

**A. DEMO Component Financial Analysis as of 10/31/95**

<b>Project Component</b>	<b>PP Illustrative Budget</b>	<b>Actual Expenditures 10/31/95</b>	<b>% Actual Expenditure vs. PP Budget</b>
<b>NRCA</b>			
Tech. Assistance TAC Distribution Pre-TAC Expense (1)	1,280,000	312,083 323,725 261,698	63%
Training	404,000	65,097	16%
Commodities	283,000	189,951 (2)	65%
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>\$1,967,000</b>	<b>\$1,152,554</b>	<b>59%</b>
<b>NGO/NEST</b>			
Tech. Assistance TAC Distribution Pre-TAC Expense	550,000	41,776 28,685 98,864	31%
Training	408,000	13,719	3%
Commodities	49,000	19,381	40%
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>\$1,007,000</b>	<b>\$ 202,425</b>	<b>20%</b>
<b>SITE</b>			
Tech. Assistance TAC Distribution Pre-TAC Expense	470,000	247,105 191,747 296,592	177%
Training	-	4,159	
Commodities (3)	1,714,000	87,160	5%
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>\$2,184,000</b>	<b>\$ 826,763</b>	<b>39%</b>
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>\$5,158,000 (4)</b>	<b>\$2,181,742</b>	<b>42%</b>



Notes:

- (1) Pre-TAC project activities are defined as those project-funded activities occurring before the institutional contractor was in place, or from November, 1992, to May, 1994. The TAC services did not become operational until the institutional contract was signed and the first six-month work plan was approved.
- (2) Actual expenditures for commodities does not include recent procurements for laboratory equipment, computer hardware and software, and portable radios, which total \$46,254.
- (3) The DEMO Project Paper did not clearly define commodities for SITE activities. Consideration should be given to allocating a portion of the commodity line item to technical assistance. More technical assistance will be needed for the future SITE activity in Black River and elsewhere.
- (4) The DEMO budget total only includes the original Project Paper estimates for the components of NRCA; NGO/NEST; and SITE.

Findings:

! The DEMO project components (i.e. NRCA, NEST/NGOs, SITE) were officially started in October, 1992, however, a relatively slow start-up period prevented operations from starting for about 6 months. The PCC required more time than anticipated in filling positions and formalizing procedures. The first PCC meeting took place on April 21, 1993. Thus, the period of time for DEMO project operations to date has been approximately 2 and 1/2 years. In terms of the PACD (10/31/97), the DEMO project is approximately 2/3rds complete.

! With respect to the three DEMO components under the direction of the NRCA with support from the TAC -- although each component is now experiencing stronger performance, there has been some degree of divergence from the original PP budget line items contained in the illustrative financial plan. The following are summary financial assessments of each of the three DEMO components:

1) **NRCA.** The NRCA component is currently running below budget expectations in the area of training (as of 10/31/95). While technical assistance (including TAC and pre-TAC funding) and commodities appear to be on track and in accordance with the PP implementation plan (disbursements of 63% and 65% respectively vs. the original budget), the training category is just 16% of the original budget estimate as of 10/31/95. This may be attributable in part to applying certain training activities to the technical assistance category, thus reducing the disbursement total for training. Nevertheless, **the project has approximately two years remaining to utilize the balance of training funds, estimated to be \$339,000.** (A PACD extension of six months or more would facilitate the full utilization of training funds for the NRCA component.)

2) **NGO/NEST.** For the NGO/NEST component there is only a limited amount of disbursement for direct training activities. As of 10/31/95, approximately 3% of this line item had been disbursed. Also behind schedule for disbursements -- although to a lesser extent -- is the technical assistance

category, showing 31% expended from the original PP budget estimate. This is attributable to the slow start-up for the NGO/NEST component given the absence of a full time Executive Director until May, 1995. Expenditures for commodities under the NGO/NEST component as a percentage of the original budget are 40%. **Much has been accomplished in the last quarter (October-December, 1995) under the NGO/NEST component in terms of training (training workshops, membership meetings and effective operational planning).** These and future activities will significantly improve the progress and rate of budget disbursements for training and technical assistance under NGO/NEST.

3) **SITE.** The two SITE activities undertaken to date (i.e. Montego Bay and Negril) have utilized a much greater percentage of the SITE component technical assistance funds than was envisioned in the PP design and budget. **As of 10/31/95, these two sites had utilized more than 175% of the total technical assistance budget line item in the PP budget (which included funding for an expected four sites over the LOP).** This figure includes the distribution for both TAC and pre-TAC technical assistance services in addressing the needs of Negril and Montego Bay. On the other hand, commodity expenditures for SITE activities have only amounted to 5% of the original PP budget estimate as of 10/31/95. It appears to be warranted that the commodities line item should be modified to allow a portion of technical assistance to be charged against commodity expenditures. This is important given the greater need for technical assistance services than commodities as experienced under the SITE activities in Negril, and to some extent Montego Bay during the first two years of implementation.

### **Conclusions:**

! NRCA training and institutional strengthening activities will be more fully utilized over the next 1-2 years of the project. **This will occur at a faster rate given the transition of PARC II policy and other functions to the NRCA from the PIOJ/PMU.** It is anticipated that the proposed strengthening of the NRCA Parks and Protected Areas Unit (i.e. 2-3 new positions) as well as other management entities within NRCA, will greatly enhance the accomplishment of DEMO project objectives.

! NGO/NEST is now progressing at a much faster pace after a year of organization building. Only limited NGO training and educational activities have taken place as of 10/31/95. **It is expected that NEST will provide more intensive assistance to NGO leaders and other local level representatives, as witnessed during the last quarter of 1995.** This is viewed by the evaluation consultants as a stronger approach to bringing about training and awareness benefits/multipliers as a result of NEST initiatives with NGOs. Closer linkages are anticipated between NEST and NRCA staff members through NEST assistance to local level groups for environmental compliance and protection activities that directly complement the policy work of the NRCA.

! SITE activities will move into Kingston and Black River next year, which will significantly speed the rate of disbursement of funds for technical assistance and training activities within these sites. However, the projected amount of commodity support for these and other sites should be modified to better meet the emerging need for technical assistance and training at the new SITE locations. **It is not anticipated that any additional project support will be provided to NEPT project**

**activities in Negril until such time as a solid organizational structure is in place (e.g. Executive Director, and a certified accounting system in place).** At this time, it may be more appropriate for NEPT to seek funding for SITE project activities through the EFJ grant mechanism.

**Recommendations:**

! Increase the rate and amount of training activities for NRCA technical and managerial staff. New positions for the Parks and Protected Areas Unit (i.e. Unit Director, Park Management Specialist, and Park Sustainability expertise), as well as a stronger NRCA PMU and staff management role, should enable the development and use of training programs that will institutionally strengthen key functional areas in NRCA.

! Increase the rate of NEST expenditures for training activities. Although this is already taking place, it should be improved based on the new Trelawny regional office and a stronger institutional framework fostered by the NEST Executive Director.

! SITE project activities in Negril with the NEPT organization (including expectations for additional technical assistance) **should not be funded** until NEPT has made a full commitment to project objectives by hiring an Executive Director and establishing a certified accounting system, with a qualified person responsible for financial accountability and control.

! Project management should seek to redefine the SITE commodity budget line item so that a portion of technical assistance can be charged against commodities. Technical assistance has been utilized more than anticipated in the original DEMO project design. Additional needs for technical assistance will be particularly important when the project undertakes new SITE activities in Black River and Kingston, planned for 1996.

**B. DEMO PARC II Component Financial Analysis as of 10/31/95**

**PARC II COMPONENT FINANCIAL ANALYSIS AS OF 9/30/95**  
**(In \$US)**

The following is a summary analysis, by line item section of the PARC II component PP Budget vs. the actual and estimated component expenditures from 1/1/94 to 9/30/95. Although the actual expenditures for the most recent nine month period from 1/1/95 to 9/30/95 are accurate and reflect the actual totals of financial statements of the PIOJ/PMU, the amounts recorded during the first year of project implementation

(i.e. 1/1/94 to 12/31/94) are based on several sources of financial information, whose accuracy has not been verified.

In order to determine a complete and accurate review of all financial statements for the PARC II component, an outside audit should be performed. It was not possible to obtain full and accurate information needed for a detailed analysis of all financial aspects of the PARC II component. Nevertheless, the following analysis presents pertinent financial information, with a summary analysis on the progress of financial disbursements for this component through September 30, 1995.

<u>PARC II Component</u> <u>PP Budget</u>	<u>Personnel</u> <u>Salaries,</u> <u>Park</u> <u>Staff</u>	<u>Porgrams</u> <u>Operations</u>	<u>Constructio</u> <u>n and</u> <u>Commoditi</u> <u>es</u>	<u>1.</u> <u>Total</u> <u>Original</u> <u>PARC II</u> <u>PP Budget</u>	<u>2.</u> <u>Actual</u> <u>Expenditure</u> <u>s</u> <u>1/1/95-</u> <u>9/30/95</u>	<u>3.</u> <u>Estimated</u> <u>Expenditur</u> <u>es</u> <u>1/1/94-</u> <u>12/31/94</u>	<u>4.</u> <u>Total Actual</u> <u>and Estimated</u> <u>Expenditures</u> <u>1/1/94-9/30/95</u>
<b><u>Section 1. Existing Parks</u></b>	87,000	91,000	191,000	<b>369,000</b>	157,666	183,673	<b>341,339</b>
<b>Montego Bay</b>	28,000	30,000	47,000	<b>105,000</b>	65,680	74,710	<b>140,390</b>
<b>Blue &amp; John Crowe Mts.</b>	59,000	61,000	144,000	<b>264,000</b>	91,986	108,963	<b>200,949</b>
<b><u>Section 2. New Parks</u></b>	268,000	132,000	360,000	<b>760,000</b>	-	-	-
<b>Cockpit Country</b>	138,000	66,000	180,000	<b>384,000</b>	-	-	-
<b>Black River Morass</b>	130,000	66,000	180,000	<b>376,000</b>	-	-	-
<b><u>Section 3. National Park</u></b> <b><u>Policy Oversight</u></b>	140,000	25,000	71,000	<b>236,000</b>	4,750	34,768	<b>39,518</b>
<b><u>Section 4. JCDT National</u></b> <b><u>Park Sustainability</u></b>	217,000	274,000	45,000	<b>536,000</b>	107,788	77,954	<b>185,742</b>
<b><u>Section 5. CDC Data</u></b> <b><u>Collection and Monitoring</u></b>	148,000	25,000	36,000	<b>209,000</b>	61,690	42,077	<b>103,767</b>
<b><u>Section 6. JNPI (PIOJ/PMU)</u></b>	295,000	437,000	51,000	<b>783,000</b>	155,785	125,335	<b>281,120</b>

<b><u>Section 7. Evaluation and Audit/PSC</u></b>	293,000	84,000	-	<b>377,000</b>	115,000	-	<b>115,000</b>
<b><u>Section 8. Contingency and Inflation</u></b>	-	-	130,000	<b>130,000</b>		-	-
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>\$ 1,448,000</b>	<b>\$ 1,068,000</b>	<b>\$ 884,000</b>	<b>\$ 3,400,000</b>	<b>\$ 602,679</b>	<b>\$ 463,807</b>	<b>\$ 1,066,486</b>

## **Explanation of Columns designated under headings 1., 2., 3., and 4.**

**No. 1.** The original PARC II PP Budget which totals \$3.4 million in USAID funds, from the component's inception of approximately 1/1/94 to the estimated PACD of 10/31/97.

**No. 2.** Reflects the Actual Expenditures for the most recent nine month period from 1/1/95 to 9/30/95, based on financial documentation received from the PIOJ/PMU, as verified by their Accountant.

**No. 3.** Reflects the Estimated Expenditures for calendar year 1994 (1/1/94 to 12/31/94). This column is an estimate of component disbursements for this period based on several sources of information, including the PIOJ/PMU. This information was not verified and is presented as a best estimate given several sources of information. It is expected that a more thorough financial analysis can be made on the basis of an outside audit.

**No. 4.** Reflects the Total Actual and Estimated PARC II expenditures from 1/1/94 to 9/30/95. This total amount coincides with the total amount of PARC II obligation of funds as of 9/30/95 (\$1,066,486), as verified by USAID/Jamaica financial information.

The following is a summary financial analysis of the PARC II component expenditures per PP Budget line item.

**Section 1. Existing Parks.** Line item expenditures indicate that 92.5% of these funds are disbursed.

**Section 2. New Parks.** No line item expenditures made for new parks for Cockpit Country or Black River Morass.

**Section 3. National Park Policy and Oversight.** A limited amount of line item funds have been spent by NRCA (approx. 17%). This should be greatly improved during the second half of the project based on the transference of PARC II activities and responsibilities to the NRCA.

**Section 4. JCDT National Park Sustainability.** Only 34.6% expended due to complications in regard to the capital development campaign. Approximately \$350,000 remains under this line item. (This estimated amount should be verified in a subsequent project audit).

**Section 5. CDC Data Collection and Monitoring.** Approximately 50% expended, although a full analysis of this line item was not possible.

**Section 6. JNPI (PIOJ/PMU).** Approximately 36% of the JNPI line has been disbursed for costs incurred by the PIOJ/PMU. The JNPI was not established during the accounting period.

**Sections 7 & 8. Evaluation and Audit/PSC, and Contingency and Inflation.** A limited amount of Section 7 has been spent (30.5%), with none of the contingency and inflation line item expended to date.



## **ANNEX E: Summary of TSS Products/Activities Carried Out Under the DEMO Project**

The following is a summary of the DEMO/TAC Products carried out from the start of the TSS contract (5/94) through the end of the most recent reporting period (10/95), by TSS personnel and in conjunction with the corresponding Project implementation entities. The accomplishment of these products is in accordance with the contractors scope of work, and reflects the achievement of key performance benchmarks to date.

### **1. Project Administration, Management and Planning**

! 1994 DEMO Work Program Plan -- first step toward developing a planning capacity among DEMO participants, and served as a comprehensive management guide for the DEMO work period.

! 1995 DEMO Work Program Plan -- a Work Program Plan document detailing objectives, key issues, constraints and opportunities; time lines for completion of activities, and six-month and one year budget estimates for NRCA, NEST, NEPT and PARC II.

! DEMO Training Implementation Plan -- consolidates training needs assessments conducted with the environmental community in Jamaica. Document includes an array of appropriate training opportunities, and a schedule and process for delivering training.

The Annual Performance Report issued by TSS is an accurate indication of project activities and progress to date. The Semi-annual and Annual Operating Plans are now being developed in an appropriate and timely way, and the inventory control plan is well documented and distributed regularly.

This budget review and approval system will be streamlined further through the delegation of Park management authority of the Blue and John Crow Mts. National Park and the Montego Bay Marine Park to their respective management entities. The proposed Project grant assistance made directly to the park management organizations will alleviate the need for the PCC to review and approve their budgets every six months.

The three meetings established by the PCC for review and approval of the participating organization's respective budgets are an effective means of dealing with the complexity of having six individual budgets to approve every six months. In addition, the consolidation and transference of PARC II policy and other functions into the NRCA Parks and Protected Areas Unit will help to simplify overall project reviews and tracking and monitoring of project performance.

### **2. Policy and Public Information**

! Draft Green Paper: Towards a National System of Protected Areas for Jamaica. Document was approved by the NRCA Board and is now ready for presentation to the Minister and the public. The System Plan presents a policy framework for a national system of protected areas.

The policy document inter alia defines six national goals for Jamaica's protected areas; establishes policies for funding mechanisms, fundraising strategies, delegation of management authority procedures, and summarizes the legal framework and proposes a two-year implementation program. The next step for the eventual legislation of this document is to obtain public comment and input into the finalization of policies and procedures for protected areas.

! State of the Environment Report -- document covers the present state of the economy relative to the country's natural resources, summarizes institutional roles and programs, and indicates priorities and strategies of NRCA.

### 3. SITE/NEGRIL

! **Negril Environmental Protection Plan** - A collaborative effort among the NRCA, NEPT, NGIALPA, and Negril community groups culminating in a detailed protection plan and framework for managing a Negril protected area. This is the first time in Jamaica that such an effort has been undertaken to provide a management framework for delegating management authority for a protected area by the NRCA to a local organization. The next step is the approval of a White Paper, with legislation expected by mid 1996.

! **Negril Environmental Protection Plan Community Meeting Discussion Guides** - As part of the public awareness and review process for the draft Negril Environmental Protection Plan, discussion booklets were developed to guide the community dialogue process between NEPT and the local communities included in the protected area. Broad awareness of the proposed protected area plan was achieved as a result of public fora and the project-funded booklets. In addition, a map of the protected area identifies areas of national significance and provides a directory of contacts for institutions collaborating in the management of the protected area.

! **Other Products and Results of Projects Accomplished in Negril include:**

- **NEPT Staffing Plan** and procedures for staffing an institution capable of managing the Negril protected area;
- **NEPT Fundraising and Capital Campaign Strategy**, to assist in raising funds necessary for NEPT to fulfill its objective to manage a Negril protected area following delegation of authority by NRCA;
- **Negril Environmental Awareness Survey**;
- **NEPT Accounting System Development Plan and Manuals**;
- **Negril Beach Access Signage** -- posting of signs awaits approval of the Parish Council and the NEPT Board;
- **Teacher Internship Project Design** -- activities included environmental awareness and conservation programs for teachers and students from 12 area schools, and focused on coral reef issues, presentation of water and energy conservation strategies, and an environmental forum which brought together 46 students and 12 teachers in a module for exploration of local environmental issues.

! **Negril Area Water Quality Monitoring Plan** - research by Dr. Tom Goreau to develop a draft strategy for a coordinated water quality monitoring plan for the Negril area.

**! Mangrove Restoration Proposal** - A draft proposal for solving the problems of erosion and sediment and nutrient loading in coastal waters as a result of removal of coastal vegetation, especially mangrove forests.

#### **4. NEST/NGOs**

**! NEST Executive Director** - Definition of Terms of Reference, Selection Criteria and Advertisement, Executive Director hired in March, 1995.

**! Terms of Reference for NEST Library Catalogue System** - Established terms of reference and contracted with a local librarian to catalogue the NEST library.

**! Terms of Reference for the NEST Brochure Preparation**

**! Terms of Reference for NGO Strategic Planning Workshops** - Definition of training materials needed for the training of trainers workshops, and seminars for NGOs in the development of strategic plans.

#### **5. NRCA**

**! NRCA Management Information System Statement of Work** - Scope of Work established for linking and coordination of NRCA's business information systems. The intent is to establish a plan for developing and implementing an integrated system of information for research and management decision-making.

**! Coastal Zone Management Issues**

The following is a listing of the key policy documents, guidelines and reports accomplished by NRCA with assistance from the TAC:

- Coastal Reconnaissance Study and Issues Report
- Draft Beach Access Policy
- Draft Mangrove and Wetlands Protection Guidelines
- Draft Mariculture Guidelines

**! Public Education, Information, and Outreach Division Brochure Design** -- following on an IDB public education initiative, mockups of brochure designs for the Public Education Division and Watersheds Division were developed to support a series of NRCA information brochures.

## **Training Activities**

! Workshop on Revenue Generation for Protected Areas -- NEPT Chairman attended five-day workshop in Dutch Antilles on a range of mechanisms for financing protected areas as practiced in the Caribbean.

! Environmental Economics and Policy Analysis -- Learie Miller attended five-week training course at the HIID (Harvard University, Boston) in skills training for analyzing, quantifying, and valuing the environmental impacts of policies and projects. Key topics included instruments for sustainable development and financing mechanisms for environmental investments in the public and private sectors.

! NRCA Staff Computer Training.

! Environmental Site Assessment -- 13-day study tour for Dr. Mearle Barrett, exposure to experts and material on site assessment techniques in the U.S. Seminars included introduction to site assessment, framework for analysis, international financing sources, multilateral banks/NGO information needs, community relations/public participation techniques, historical analysis techniques, regulatory analysis, remediation techniques, analytical methods, overview of U.S. environmental site assessment regulations, enforcement, and compliance.

! Solid Waste Management Seminar -- five-day seminar for 40 individuals from central and local government to review management options for meeting Jamaica's solid waste requirements.

! Proposal Writing Training Course -- EFJ funded with NEST assistance

## **ANNEX F: Conditions Favorable to the Creation of the JNPI (or a JNPI-like organization)**

The Jamaican National Protected Areas Service should come into existence when:

- NRCA is sufficiently strengthened as an institution;
- consensus has been achieved among the various players concerning the structure and role of the Service; and
- when funding is available.

The future activities of the National Parks and Protected Areas Service should include:

- Training of local NGO staff and rangers in all aspects of protected area management, particularly general administration and tourism management.
- Provision of technical support; e.g. guidance in preparing and carrying out management and work (operational) plans; tourism management techniques.
- Liaison (problem solving) between local managing organizations and NRCA and other government agencies whose policies or actions are affecting protected area management. This institution should be the first contact for policy and legal clarifications before NRCA becomes directly involved.
- Reception and dissemination of technical information of all sorts related to the protected area system. It is envisioned that the CDC, with an expanded role, would take on this role.
- Preparation of information for the general public concerning the system as a whole.
- And, provide interim management of protected areas when local capabilities are not in place or are unable to achieve basic performance objectives.

It should be a fairly small organization whose role should be oriented primarily towards facilitating the work of local NGOs and other protected area management organizations, providing technical assistance and assuring that this group of protected areas effectively functions as a system.

## **ANNEX G: Park Management**

During PARC I, The Nature Conservancy (TNC) played an important role as a provider of technical assistance. Although PARC II envisioned technical assistance from a PVO/NGO in a variety of fields (assistance with the establishment of a protected area system, definition of a role for the CDC, further capitalization of the Trust Fund, income generation techniques, etc.) none has been requested to date. In some fields, notably the protected area system plan, the NRCA has taken the initiative. The NRCA, with DEMO assistance, is also in the process of developing guideline documents on other topics related to protected area development, including management plans, local advisory committees, and feasibility studies.

### **A. The Blue and John Crow Mountain National Park**

The BJCMNP is considered to be a park which will be managed by JCDT; no delegation of authority has been given by NRCA to do so, although a Letter of Intent is in the process of being prepared as an initial step in this process. At present, the park is managed through the PMU. Although lack of NRCA Delegation of Authority is sometimes used to justify the lack of some management activity, it does appear to be a constraint with regard to securing private sector funding. However, it does not seem to have limited some other activities, since law enforcement with the help of the local police does occur.

The Management Plan for BJCMNP represents a good beginning for planning the park. However it is distinctly not user-friendly, uneven in its coverage of the relevant topics and not at all operational, even though its second volume is labelled as such. It also lacks a zoning scheme which effectively identifies different types of use, especially those critical areas which should receive maximum protection. The maps are of a scale which is of little use for management purposes. Overall Park management goals are not identified.

There are three Local Advisory Committees (LACs) established in different areas of the Park. Reportedly, some are functioning well, and some are not. They seem to contain a broad representation of community interests, and have acted as local watchdogs for detecting illegal activity in the Park. Monthly meetings are carried out between park authorities and some of the LACs, especially in the Hollywell sector where the LAC seems best organized.

The role of the LACs in some cases seems to be evolving from an advisory/sounding board function to that of actually taking charge of some park activities, especially those involving revenue generation for the local community. At Hollywell, the LAC is interested, and has evidently received some commitment from the BJCMNP to manage a recreation area containing cabins, camping sites and a picnic area. A sign at the entrance to this site indicates that the visitor is entering *Hollywell National Park* administered by the local LAC.

The JCDT has been charged with planning and carrying out the development of a revenue generating trail at Hollywell, the Park's most heavily visited site. The proposed administration of this mechanism seemed somewhat cumbersome. Other possibilities for charging fees at

Hollywell have been discussed, but nothing has been decided. Entrance "permits" are proposed to be sold by local "private agents" such as The Gap, a restaurant near the Park, thus freeing park personnel for other duties. From discussions with park and PMU staff, it would seem that some technical assistance concerning trail selection, routing, and construction would be useful.

The park rangers encountered by the evaluation team in the BJCMNP were new to the job, (one a trainee and the other had been a ranger for 5 months) and seemed dedicated and enthusiastic about their work. The Park manager's position has been vacant for some time and at present is filled on an interim basis by the Chief Ranger. The last manager reportedly quit due to frustration with the bureaucratic difficulties of obtaining funding and getting things done. Personnel are selected after nationwide advertising for vacancies, and most staff were not from the local area. There was an expressed desire not to hire local people as rangers because of potential conflicts of interest concerning law enforcement and the local population. Some training has taken place.

Rangers interviewed seemed familiar with the resource protection issues and the critical points of concern around the park's boundary. However, patrolling of those locations and others appeared to be sporadic, and rangers relied primarily upon sympathetic local residents for information regarding infractions. Roving motorized patrols lasting a few days are being scheduled in order to improve regulation enforcement.

PMU management of the BJCMNP has maintained the status quo achieved under PARC I, but does not appear to have advanced significantly during PARC II. Training of park staff has continued, but due to high staff turnover, effectiveness of park management does not appear to have increased. There have been reported disagreements between BJCMNP staff and PMU supervisors, which have led to high turnover rates. It is unclear if enforcement rates have increased over the years. The PIOJ/PMU has conducted several enforcement training events which have had wide participation from several natural resource management agencies.

[Of Note: The Park is being considered for "Park in Peril" status by The Nature Conservancy. Funds made available for this purpose must be supplemented by the USAID Mission. Two distinct projects are being discussed for funding: development of a revenue generating visitor center/recreational area at Hollywell; and the establishment of a biological corridor from the eastern end of the Park to the coast. The latter would be carried out under the auspices of PEPA, an environmental NGO located in Port Antonio. Funding will likely not cover both projects, therefore a choice must be made.]

## **B. The Montego Bay Marine Park**

The Montego Bay Marine Park was established on paper as early as 1974 and gained official designation as a national park in 1991. The Marine Park encompasses an area offshore from the city of Montego Bay extending 9 km from the international airport east to just beyond the Great River. Montego Bay is Jamaica's most visited tourist destination and currently processes about

800,000 tourists annually through its airport and receives about 300,000 annual visitors via cruise ships.

A majority of the park's operational costs, including commodity procurement and the salary of the Park manager, have largely been provided by USAID, but have been directly administered by the PIOJ/PMU. In addition, the National Parks Trust Fund, managed by the JCDT, has provided salaries for four park rangers, one marine scientist and a few administrative staff. A modest level of private sector funding has been raised by the MBMP Trust's Board.

Under the original design of the USAID PARC II component, it was envisioned that the MBMP would be supported by the Jamaica National Trust Fund and managed by the to-be-created Jamaica National Institute of Parks -- which itself was to be the result of spinning the PMU staff out of the PIOJ into an institution that would be largely controlled by the JCDT. However, as discussed earlier, the JNPI was never created. And, the MBMP has since gone on to form its own trust fund (the MBMPT). It is now intended that the delegation of authority from the NRCA to manage the MBMP will be given directly to the MBMPT, rather than to the JNPI as was envisioned in the PARC II component Paper.

In Montego Bay, it is now expected that the MBMPT will be given delegation of authority from the NRCA to manage the park (and the MBMPT received a NRCA letter of intent to delegate authority during the time of this evaluation). To a large degree, this situation, different than originally envisioned, was the outcome of the MBMPT becoming more assertive as a result of its dissatisfaction with its relationship with the PIOJ/PMU. With regard to the BJCMNP, the PMU still maintains responsibility for management of the park, but the NRCA has stated its intent to delegate management authority to the JCDT. Currently, operational funds for both parks are supported by USAID, with funding channeled through the PIOJ/PMU, and by interest earned from the JNPTF, which is administered by the JCDT. USAID funding to the PIOJ has not been authorized beyond March 31, 1996 -- at which time the JNPTF is likely to be expected to increasingly cover the operational costs of managing the park.

The following section presents findings on the operation of the PARC Relationship between the Montego Bay Marine Park and the JCDT, the National Park Trust Fund and the PIOJ/PMU:

#### Park Management: Findings

- ! As of mid-November 1995, the MBMP had not received from the NRCA concerning the Agency's intention to delegate it authority to manage the national park. This may have limited the park's ability to raise private sector funding, particularly from Montego Bay's tourism operators. There has been a perception among potential private sector park supporters in Montego Bay, and shared among the MBMP's Board of Directors, that without official delegation of authority there could be no guarantee that funds raised for the park's management could be retained exclusively for use in Montego Bay. In addition, the lack of delegation of authority has meant that the MBMP does not have the credibility to promote itself as the official park management body designated by the GOJ to manage the park over the longer term.



- ! There is widespread support from Montego Bay's private sector to contribute and raise funds to cover the park's current and future operations. The Board of Directors, primarily composed of successful Montego Bay entrepreneurs, seems intent on implementing several activities designed to raise funds that will cover the park's operational costs and will contribute to capitalization of the Trust's endowment. The endowment will then fund the needs of the park over the longer term. These ideas include developing a MBMP visitors center, expanding concessions within the park, and offering a mix of educational and entertainment fee-based services, e.g. an aquarium, guided tours, and leasing marina space to glass bottom boat operators are some of the ideas under consideration. Several concrete actions have been taken, or are underway, by the MBMPT to begin implementing long-term revenue generation activities. These activities have included visiting a marine management project in the Bahamas, commissioning a prefeasibility study to determine financing and revenue generation options, and getting a verbal agreement from the UDC to cede Fletcher's Beach to the MBMP as a permanent home for its headquarters. In the meantime Montego Bay's business community seems willing to fund a portion of the costs of operating the park, including providing the Park manager's salary, until such time that revenue generation facilities can become operational. However, the MBMP directors expect the National Trust Fund to continue to cover the salaries of the park rangers over the foreseeable future.
- ! The MBMP has not been provided a clear operational budget by PIOJ/PMU, the organization responsible for funding and approving all of the Park's procurement. All procurement requests must be approved in advance by the PMU and, in turn, all requests to the PMU for over \$160 have to be approved by USAID. The number of management layers, and bureaucratic delays throughout the system, have meant that even the simplest of procurements have become bogged down in excessive delays. For example requests for rangers uniforms (embroidered T-shirts) have been in process for six months and the MBMP has still not been given authority by the PIOJ/PMU to execute a purchase.
- ! There is a widespread perception by those involved with the management of the MBMP that a disproportionate amount of funds administered by the PIOJ/PMU and the JCDT were spent in Kingston and didn't filter down to the operational level. In addition, the MBMPT was uncomfortable with the lack of rules regarding disbursement of National Park Trust Funds by the JCDT, and with their lack of involvement in the decision making process. For example, the MBMP has no representation on the National Trust's Board of Directors. One board member commented, "There is a strong perception that all environmental funds are going through, and remaining with, Kingston organizations. These organization's boards are all interrelated and all Kingston-based."
- ! There is no project bank account in Montego Bay that has been set-up for the MBMP to manage the operational budget it receives from the PIOJ/PMU. All expenses and approvals must go through the PMU in Kingston and, due to administrative delays, the MBMP, on a monthly basis, incurs out-of-pocket expenses in its procurement of goods and services allowed for under the agreement with the PIOJ/PMU.

- ! The MBMPT is in the process of having KPMG Peat Marwick certify that its financial system meets USAID financial review standards. In addition, the MBMPT recently received a favorable audit of its finance and accounting system by Deloitte and Touche.
- ! The MBMPT believes it is entitled to some portion of the National Park Trust Fund as was specified in the original design of the USAID PARC II component, however, the portion of funds that should be allocated to the MBMPT has been, and remains, unclear. In addition, the decision rules for allocating the Funds between the BJCMNP and MBMP are unclear.
- ! The MBMP's Local Advisory Committee, which includes a wide array of diverse stakeholder groups such as fisherman cooperatives, dive operators and hoteliers, is an active and influential participant in the planning and implementation process employed by the MBMP. Local NGOs spoken with were able to confirm that the MBMP pursues a truly participatory process in its management planning, and it was clear from discussions with MBMPT Board members that they are committed to continuing this approach.

#### Park Operations: Findings

- ! There are currently three park rangers and one ranger supervisor employed by the MBMP. The MBMP also employs a marine scientist, responsible for monitoring environmental conditions and working with fishing communities to introduce improved fishing practices, e.g. increase the gauge of the wire used in fish traps. The rangers work 40 hour weeks, primarily conducting both day and night patrols. Because of the limited number of rangers, there are frequently periods when no rangers are on patrol.
- ! Two boats, originally procured under the PARC I Project, were inappropriate for patrol purposes because the boats were too large, the engines too powerful, the equipment could not be easily serviced in Montego Bay, and the boats had too much draft to be able to travel over shallow-water reefs. The MBMP has proposed to sell one of the boats and use the money to buy two inflatable patrol boats that will be more appropriate for use by the rangers -- the approval for this action, although all think it is a good idea, has been outstanding for six months.
- ! The Park's Head Ranger defined the park's priority needs as: equipping wardens, conducting and increasing ranger patrols, conducting environmental awareness activities, and expanding the area under protected areas status.
- ! There is some anecdotal evidence from dive operators and fisherman that the number and size of fish within the park have been modestly increasing over the past year. However, the MBMP marine scientist has not yet been able to confirm such increases through his monitoring efforts. Monitoring efforts to date have been sporadic but the park currently has a plan to expand biophysical monitoring within the park, including training local dive operators as volunteer fish census monitors.

## **ANNEX H: Revenue Generation in a National Park System**

A number of the necessary preconditions to a self-sustaining park system are partially in place: strong support within the government; willingness to pay seems to exist among visitors and tour operators; a clearly innovative attitude among park employees and NGOs, and a number good to outstanding revenue generation opportunities. However, several priority actions remain to be addressed.

### **A. Priority Actions for Establishing Revenue Generation Programs at Individual Parks**

**Assure Revenue Retention within the Park System:** The basic incentive to raise funding for parks is a guarantee that those revenues will in fact be dedicated to parks. This is particularly true for private sector contributions and NGO efforts, however it has been proven to be just as important when government employees are the collection agents. The issue in this case is one of authorizing other than government employees to collect and retain income from the users of public lands. Authority to initiate park revenue programs appears to lie with the advisory board created by para. 27(8)(d) of the NRCA Act of 1992 and para. 34(9)(d) of the NRCA Act of 1993. However, guidelines for implementation are lacking (addressed below).

**Develop a Comprehensive Package of Fees and Charges:** Initiation of user fees awaits a set of guidelines or fee ranges for such activities as park entrance, day visits, camping, and cabin use. It is understood that a consultant (Dennis Parchment) is currently working on this package for implementation in 1996.

**Develop a Strong Budget Management Focus:** Recognition of the park budget as the primary management and planning tool needs to be strengthened by the use of budget formulation guidelines, regular and accurate budget advisories on balances, and solid budget oversight.

**Adopt Approved Money Handling Practices:** Handling money in unsecured locations and in a highly decentralized system requires clearly enunciated procedures, including numbered series of tickets and permits (kept in a secure place, and signed for), a daily cash report in which cash and ticket sales are reconciled, plus a bank account into which a weekly deposit is made using random bank run times and other reasonable security measures. Arrangements for a reasonable petty cash fund is essential along with instructions for its accountability.

**Write, Monitor, and Audit Performance Agreements:** The ability of the delegating authority to write contracts with NGOs for the purpose of park management and revenue generation clearly extends to developing a shared statement of expectations and indicators of performance. That agreement should have a regular schedule of reports on the performance indicators, a financial and program audit component, and a renewal clause based on performance.

**Develop Profit Centers in Parks:** Revenue generation cannot happen in the absence of opportunities for visitors to spend. Not only are most park visitors willing to support their parks,

but they frequently expect to be able to buy necessities such as film, food, and gifts, and will contribute donations, join NGOs memberships, and pay heavy markups on quality merchandise such as are found in visitor centers and museum shops. Profit centers in parks have an educational role and are often designed around a combination of free services (such as a film or video) combined with the opportunity to spend.

**B. Specific policies and guidelines needed to encourage NGO and private sector involvement in park sustainability**

**Complex "organizations" need top level attention:** The partnership between the GOJ and NGOs to manage Jamaica's National Parks can best be described as a complex organization. It is an experiment in national park management which "cannot afford to fail"; and is, therefore, a very good investment by GOJ in terms of strengthening NRCA capabilities to work effectively as NGO supporters. A full time, high level "deputy director" of parks and protected area working full time on issues of sustainability and support would not be an unreasonable expectation.

**Solid Respect for What Each Party Can Do:** There appears to have been some thought that a strong NGO sector means a weak central government role in parks. Experience, to date, certainly should have demonstrated the need for strength in both sectors is nothing less than Jamaican environment deserves. A clear definition of roles, along with an understanding that each needs the other to be fully effective needs to be reinforced.

**Organizational (& personal) Agendas take a "Back Seat":** Key to developing that necessary level of mutual respect, is the ability to set aside personal and organizational agendas for the good of the park and the system of protected areas. Often times volunteers and NGOs have very specific, localized interests: a river, mountain, reef, visitor center, or trail. It is not uncommon to forget that it is these resources, not the organizations and personal agendas, that need protection. ("Means" have a way of becoming "ends" in complex organizations!)

**Willingness to Engage in an Experimental Approach:** Given the experimental nature of the Jamaican national park system, it would be logical to expect a provisional approach to such things as revenue generation, i.e. provisional delegation of authority, interim rules, and temporary fee policies. In such a setting, the freedom to make mistakes should be understood, as the system perfects its processes and practices. This is probably less a question boldness, than it is one of all parties working together with a sense of good will and urgency.

**Shared Definitions, Targets, Information:** Given a high level of attention to sustainability within NRCA, it should be relatively easy to establish common ground on how all parties see sustainability becoming the operational ethic of Jamaica's national parks. Fundamental to achieving this level of shared expectations, is the sharing of information about self-funding successes elsewhere. The planned sustainability symposium is a major step in this direction. Hopefully, there will be a number of follow-up actions beyond the symposium, perhaps including implementation orders and a regular publication such as "Sustainability Notes".

**A Success Attitude ("can do" = "no problem"):** A strategy for success, based on creating early self-funding accomplishments to build on (and challenge) is certainly possible with the two national parks already designated. (Montego Bay's income potential seems assured; and the development opportunities at Blue and John Crow Mountains National Park are in the "world class" category). That kind of success strategizing can be extended to such high potential sites as Black River and Port Royal to maintain momentum. But it must also extend to the micro level in terms of securing co-sponsors for such things as park signing projects, brochures, mountain biking enterprises, small visitor centers, etc.

**Cost Control, Cost Control, Cost Control:** Sustainability, of parks and park systems, is inevitably a moving target as the parks and the system grows. However, self-funding is achievable within those levels of growth only with a strong cost-containment ethic. Competitive bidding, solid specifications, good supervision, careful accounting, detailed reporting, and regular auditing are important tools for building a cost control ethic. However, in the absence of a belief that "there is always a better way" to do each task, these tools lose a lot of their effectiveness.

### **C. Alternative Funding Sources for Jamaican National Parks**

An Outline of Park Revenue Possibilities - Sources most appropriate for system (government) use:

General appropriations (direct and indirect)

Special appropriations (one time, emergencies planning, capital development, storm clean-up, etc.)

Dedicated funds (direct and indirect)

Sale of assets/extractives

Lease of park images/exclusives/settings

Lease, land, long-term for development

Lotteries

Impact fees

Fines

Licenses

Application fees

Inter-governmental partnerships

Other

Sources most appropriate for local (NGO) use:

Entrance fees

Activity fees

Service fees (parking, etc.)

Special events

Trust funds

Rentals (existing campsites, cabins, etc.)

Leases, short term (events, etc)

Corporate partnerships

Merchandising/food/gifts/lodging

Other

#### **D. National Park System Economic Sustainability Action Plan (sample)**

**Purpose:** This plan identifies the necessary actions, products, lead persons or agencies, and target completion dates which will collectively move the Jamaican national park system toward a position of economic sustainability. While economically focused, THE GOAL OF LONG TERM ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY RECOGNIZES THAT A FUNCTIONING SYSTEM IS THE BEST GUARANTEE FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE SYSTEM'S UNITS. SIMILARLY, EACH UNIT'S BIOLOGIC INTEGRITY HELPS TO GUARANTEE THE SYSTEM'S SUSTAINABILITY.

NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS:

The prerequisites of park system sustainability are:

- (1) a clear definition of terms and a widespread endorsement of the concept,
- (2) written policy guidelines for the roles of all players,
- (3) written legal authority for NGOs to collect monies from the users of public lands, including limits and liabilities,
- (4) approved fees and charges for all uses and services,

- (5) accepted accounting, reporting, and auditing practices,
- (6) achievable sustainability targets;
- (7) a cost-control ethic,
- (8) an experimental approach, and
- (9) an appreciation of the fact that sustainability will result from an attitude as much as from a plan.

**Action Plan:** In order to achieve these preconditions, and to demonstrate commitment to the goals of economic sustainability, the following actions and assignments are proposed:

Action:	Product:	Lead:	Completion:
Establish fee schedule for all park activities	Letter of authorization with attach's. (schedule, discounts, differentials, commissions,etc.)	NRCA	4/1/96
Review current park rules and regulations for reasonableness and consistency with fee schedule	Amended Gazetted park rules	Consult	6/1/96
Initiate process for a departure surtax for parks	Dedicated fund for Park Authority	NCRA	6/1/97
Create policies for fee collection practices, money handling procedures, costs of collection guidelines.	Fee collection manual	Consult	4/1/96

Create policies and guidelines for merchandise quality appropriateness, pricing, catalogue sales, approvals.	Merchandising manual for all cooperators	Consult	6/1/96
Create cost control guidelines	Policy manual supplement	Consult	6/1/96
Develop national (regional?) economic sustainability conference	Conference	NRCA	3/1/97
Create "gift" catalogue of park system needs	Donor brochure of fundable projects	NRCA	3/1/96
Networking for sustainability	Local and international computerized help net	Consult	9/1/96
Performance contract training	Staff capability for writing and supervising performance contracts (with consultants and cooperators)	Consult	6/1/96