

EVALUATION OF U.S. PRIVATE  
VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS  
WORKING IN TAJIKISTAN THROUGH  
USAID GRANT AGREEMENTS

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

<b>AKF</b>	Aga Khan Foundation U.S.A.
<b>CAAEF</b>	Central-Asian American Enterprise Fund
<b>CADA</b>	Central Asia Development Agency
<b>CBO</b>	community-based organization
<b>DACA</b>	Data Collection and Analysis Unit (SCF)
<b>DHA</b>	UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EURONAIID</b>	European Community Food Aid NGO
<b>FAO</b>	UN Food and Agricultural Organization
<b>FAP</b>	<u>Feldsher Accoucheur Point</u> (local health post)
<b>FFW</b>	Food for Work
<b>FSU</b>	Former Soviet Union
<b>GBAO</b>	Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous <u>Oblast</u>
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GGL</b>	Group Guaranteed Lending Program (SCF)
<b>GOT</b>	Government of Tajikistan
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>IFRC</b>	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>INGO</b>	International Non-Governmental Organization
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee
<b><u>kolkhoz</u></b>	collective farm
<b>LNGO</b>	Local Non-Governmental Organization
<b>mt</b>	metric ton
<b>MCI</b>	Mercy Corps International
<b>MOH</b>	Ministry of Health
<b>MSF</b>	<u>Medecins Sans Frontieres</u>
<b>NET</b>	NIS Education and Training Program
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>NIS</b>	Newly Independent States
<b>NOVIB</b>	Netherlands NGO administering aid programs
<b><u>oblast</u></b>	region
<b>ODA</b>	Overseas Development Agency (UK)
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>PRDP</b>	Pamir Relief and Development Program
<b>PSF</b>	<u>Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres</u>
<b>PVO</b>	Private Voluntary Organization

<b>QIP</b>	Quick Impact Project
<b>RI</b>	Relief International
<b>RNG</b>	Royal Netherlands Government
<b>RSR</b>	Republican Subordination Region (Tajikistan)
<b>SCF</b>	Save the Children Federation
<b>SED</b>	small enterprise development
<b>SOW</b>	Scope of Work
<b>SUB</b>	district hospital
<b>SVA</b>	physician-attended health center
<b>TA</b>	technical assistance
<b>TACIS</b>	(EU) Technical Assistance to Commonwealth of Independent States
<b>TADP</b>	Tajikistan Agricultural Development Project
<b>TELAP</b>	Tajikistan Emergency Logistics Assistance Program
<b>TNA</b>	Tajikistan Nutrition Assessment
<b>TOT</b>	training of trainers
<b>TVGAP</b>	Tajikistan Vulnerable Group Assistance Project
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNMOT</b>	United Nations Military Observer Mission in Tajikistan
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USAID/CAR</b>	Central Asian Republics Regional USAID Mission
<b>USDA</b>	United States Department of Agriculture
<b>VHC</b>	Village-Based Health Committee
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Program
<b>WLI</b>	World Learning, Inc.

## MAP OF TAJIKISTAN

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **BACKGROUND**

Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, irreconcilable political, regional, ethnic, and religious differences plunged Tajikistan into a civil war, resulting in the deaths of 50,000 people and displacement of another 530,000 to 665,000. In addition, tens of thousands of homes, schools, and health posts were destroyed while the per capita Gross Domestic Product dropped from \$1,100 in 1991 to an estimated \$400 in 1995.

### **PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION (PVO) PROGRAM OBJECTIVES**

The PVOs' program objectives have been to ameliorate the immediate impact of the human suffering and economic damage flowing from the civil war and at the same time to lay a foundation for long-term economic and democratic political development.

### **PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION**

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess a) the performance of five U.S. PVOs in Tajikistan in carrying out their United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded activities; b) the impact of those programs; c) the management capabilities of the organizations; d) their ability to leverage USAID resources with those of other donors; e) the capability of and interest in extending their range of activities into the development sphere; and f) their approach to the development of local development institutions.

In addition, the evaluation team was requested to prepare a set of criteria for USAID/CAR's use in conducting an informal solicitation of proposals from PVOs for future program activities. These criteria have been included as Annex L.

### **PROGRAM EVALUATION**

In reviewing the USAID PVO Program in Tajikistan as a whole, it is clear that it has contributed significantly to the rehabilitation of pockets of Tajikistan. The five U.S. PVOs funded under the auspices of this program started work in Tajikistan at a time when relief needs due both to the effects of the civil war and the collapse of the former Soviet Union (FSU) were paramount. Collectively, these organizations have begun to address a range of pressing needs—such as water and sanitation, health, food, housing, income, and capacity building. They have also worked with a variety of vulnerable groups—Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returning refugees, and women and children. With a few exceptions, their work has concentrated on one geographic region, Khatlon oblast. The PVO Program has served to give the Tajik people an appreciation that the rest of the world, including the United States, is aware of their plight and is willing to help.

While none of the five PVOs was able to assess the actual impact of its activities on higher-level objectives (such as improved health status) given the absence of baseline data, the output data are nonetheless impressive. Several examples follow:

- # Aga Khan Foundation (AKF): 221,000 people fed and 21,000 clothed.
- # CARE/US (CARE): 250,000 people fed plus a substantial number benefited from medicines distributed.
- # International Rescue Committee (IRC): 40,000 people gained access to potable water and latrines.
- # Relief International (RI): deteriorated health services restored for 260,000 people.
- # Save the Children Federation (SCF): 27,000 housing reconstruction workers fed; 62,000 returned refugees and IDPs provided with shelter; 71,000 school children are being fed.

The five U.S. PVOs funded by USAID vary in size, orientation, sectoral focus, and technical capabilities. In addition, their management capabilities vary. Of the five organizations, it is only RI that has had some notable management problems that require redress. The other PVOs appear to have management systems, procedures, and styles that meet their current programming needs. (The evaluation team was unable to visit AKF field sites and based its judgments on information received from AKF in Dushanbe and Washington, DC).

USAID management was judged to be satisfactory but in need of increased attention to the PVOs and their programs and objectives.

It is clear from the financial tables on pages x, xi, and xii that USAID resources have in fact been leveraged by the PVOs evaluated. The United States government (USG) has provided assistance to Tajikistan through a range of organizations in addition to USAID. It is much more difficult to assess the degree to which USG assistance overall has succeeded in leveraging other resources.

The PVOs examined in this evaluation all have the capability of extending their programs into the development sphere; in fact, most of them have already largely begun the transition.

Local non-governmental organizations (LNGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) represent a potentially important development force in Tajikistan, especially if Tajikistan is to embrace a self-help strategy. These organizations are young and could benefit greatly from training and technical assistance. Most of the PVOs evaluated have either begun or have plans to work with LNGOs and/or CBOs.

## **LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Lessons Learned**

- # U.S. PVOs were an effective means for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the emergency period following the 1992-1993 civil war in Tajikistan. However, in such countries, which are far-distant and suffer from damaged or weak infrastructure and systems, the initiation and implementation of assistance must be recognized as difficult and costly. Social and economic conditions in Tajikistan indicate that substantial levels of assistance, both humanitarian and developmental, will continue to be needed.
  
- # Given the nature of and the relatively short time line usually envisioned for humanitarian assistance, objectives should not be too ambitiously stated in terms of goals and objectives, e.g., improved health status. More realistically, the primary focus of such assistance should be the provision of outputs such as homes reconstructed, number of needy beneficiaries fed, number of wells and latrines installed. As the transition to longer-term development takes place, implementing agencies and donors can then give increased attention to longer-term efforts to reach higher-level goals and the establishment of baseline data so that impact, such as improved health status, can be more accurately measured. The need to work toward the development phase was absent in the original grant agreements and in subsequent implementation supervision by USAID.
  
- # By more actively involving indigenous groups, whether LNGOs or CBOs, in their operations from the beginning, AKF and SCF have improved the likelihood of achieving sustainability. USAID did not focus adequately on the potential for building sustainability through involvement of LNGOs and CBOs.
  
- # The local NGO community appears to have substantial potential as an emerging self-help force and therefore should be approached through the development of both CBOs and LNGOs. Training and technical assistance are critical in building the capacity of the LNGO/CBO sector.
  
- # The lack of complete grant documentation and of progress reports to field representatives makes it extremely difficult to monitor effectively the implementation and progress of assistance efforts.

### **Recommendations**

- # Given USAID's strategy for assistance to Tajikistan, which includes a projected phase-out by 2000 as well as the likelihood of serious budgetary constraints, future program priority should be given to PVO activities that

- Improve or increase human productivity, e.g., LNGO and CBO capacities, health status, small enterprise development, small-scale agricultural production. Such an approach would help the Tajik people identify and address their own problems, especially as over the foreseeable future limited government and inadequate private donor resources will be available. To a great extent, USAID should look to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the relevant United Nations (UN) agencies to meet any major continuing need for humanitarian assistance, thus enabling USAID to focus on longer-term development priorities.
- Are sustainable by local communities following the departure of PVOs.
- Recognize the need for geographic dispersion to other areas of need, subject to funding availability and coordination with complementary activities of other donors.

# With respect to improving the overall management of PVO activities;

- The roles of the involved offices in USAID/CAR and the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe should be specifically defined and the PVO community informed accordingly.
- All essential PVO documentation, such as grant agreements, should be submitted by USAID/Washington to USAID/CAR and the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe. In addition, USAID should encourage PVO home offices to provide field representatives with essential documentation.
- The USAID/CAR should continue its commendable efforts to clarify further the procedures involved in the review of PVO proposals and in modifying the criteria against which proposals will be judged. Final actions should be completed as soon as possible and relevant information provided to interested members of the PVO community.
- Assuming the continuation of the transition toward support for longer-term development activities, USAID proposal criteria should include a requirement for the presentation of adequate baseline data, including that related to gender, to permit the adequate measurement of an activity's impact over time. Proposals should identify opportunities for partnerships or collaborations with other foreign PVOs for the purpose of achieving greater efficiency and outreach. Finally, proposals should address involvement of LNGOs and CBOs as a means of ensuring sustainability.

## STRATEGIC PLANNING

In establishing sectoral priorities, USAID should consider the effects of PVO proposals on human productivity: how will projected activities affect the ability of the Tajik people to advance their well-being and standard of living? USAID will need to identify a) key sectors, b) the capabilities and interests of the PVOs, and c) the plans of other donor organizations.

The major contributors to the advancement of human productivity are health, formal education and enterprise development, all of which fall within USAID's traditional areas of interest. In this case, the U.S. PVOs have largely ruled out formal education as both too broad for their limited resources and too sensitive *vis à vis* the Government of Tajikistan (GOT). All of the PVOs, however, have expressed an interest in health and enterprise development/job creation.

Two new donors are soon to put into operation major programs that could have a significant bearing on the U.S. PVOs. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) plans to implement a four- to five-year \$20 million project under which U.S. PVOs will, in theory, be able to tender on community development projects. However, clarification of both the UNDP's conception of "community development" and its willingness—or reluctance—to work through PVOs will be important determinants of the degree to which the UNDP program may affect USAID activities in enterprise development. The World Bank is considering setting up a \$10 million two-year grant-making mechanism for projects focusing on employment generation; in this case, PVOs clearly could play a major role in both designing and implementing projects.

USAID thus has an opportunity to ensure that essential needs that cannot otherwise be met will become the focus of a dynamic USAID/PVO program.

### TOTAL<sup>1</sup> FUNDING OF PVOs EVALUATED AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1995

#### Funding by PVO (including dollar value of commodities provided)

PVO	Amount
Aga Khan Foundation U.S.A. (AKF)	\$38,656,170
CARE/US (CARE)	\$11,657,132
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	\$1,009,976
Relief International (RI)	\$3,194,593
Save the Children U.S. (SCF)	\$13,828,025
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$68,345,896</b>

<sup>1</sup> USG and other donors.

**Funding by Donor (including dollar value of commodities provided)**

<b>Donor</b>	<b>Humanitarian Programs</b>	<b>Humanitarian Funding</b>	<b>Development Programs</b>	<b>Development Funding</b>	<b>Total Funding</b>
USAID <sup>1</sup>	7	\$3,153,813	6	\$2,574,598	\$5,728,411
USDA	10	\$34,451,439	4	\$11,689,765	\$46,141,204
UNHCR/ UNDP	2	\$238,752	4	\$1,121,301	\$1,360,053
UNICEF	2	\$245,000	2	\$26,100	\$271,100
WFP <sup>2</sup>	— <sup>2</sup>	— <sup>2</sup>	1	\$15,000	\$15,000
Soros Foundation	1	\$244,874	1	\$50,000	\$294,874
Europe	7	\$12,150,000	1	\$237,960	\$12,387,960
State Dept.	1	\$45,582	2	\$390,000	\$435,582
DOD	1	\$500,000	—	—	\$500,000
PVO Funds	3	\$662,840	3	\$673,952	\$1,336,792
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>\$51,592,300</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>\$16,778,676</b>	<b>\$68,470,976</b>

<sup>1</sup> \$9.55 million in additional USAID resources for Tajikistan were channeled through international agencies and NGOs.

<sup>2</sup> WFP also made direct distribution to over 450,000 beneficiaries of humanitarian food supplies financed by USAID and other donors.

### USAID Program Budget for Tajikistan

Project	Through December 1994	Through September 1995 <sup>1</sup>	Total
Special Initiatives <sup>2</sup>	\$18,074,547	\$4,900,000	\$22,974,547
Environment	\$464,054	—	\$464,054
Health Care	\$2,068,880	\$533,000	\$2,601,880
Private Sector	\$1,995	—	\$1,995
Democratic Reform	\$457,160	\$850,000	\$1,307,160
Economic Restructuring	—	\$250,000	\$250,000
Exchanges and Training	\$2,867,886	\$1,650,000	\$4,517,886
Interagency Transfers	\$393,225	\$1,030,000	\$1,423,225
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$24,327,747<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>\$9,213,000</b>	<b>\$33,540,747</b>

<sup>1</sup> Estimates provided by USAID/Washington.

<sup>2</sup> The “special initiatives” line item has funded most PVO activities and provided funding to international organizations such as WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Excludes notional figure of \$7 million provided to the Central-Asian American Enterprise Fund (CAAEF) and available for programming in Tajikistan; grants to the Eurasian Foundation for possible use in Tajikistan are also excluded.

## **I. BACKGROUND**

Of all the Central Asian Republics, Tajikistan has had the least success in coping with the shocks resulting from the collapse of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Following removal of the tight political controls imposed by Moscow, irreconcilable political, regional, ethnic, and religious differences plunged Tajikistan into a bitter civil war in 1992-1993. The war resulted in the deaths of 50,000 people and the displacement of an estimated 530,000 to 665,000. The number of refugees who fled Tajikistan at that time for other countries was estimated by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) at between 290,000 and 355,000, including between 60,000 and 100,000 departing for Afghanistan; 150,000 for Russia; and 80,000 to 105,000 for the other Central Asian Republics. Most of the remainder became Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), of whom 100,000 to 130,000 went to the capital, Dushanbe, and another 140,000 to 180,000 to areas farther from the fighting, such as Gorno-Badakhshan, Garm, and Leninabad. Added to the loss of life and population displacement, tens of thousands of buildings (particularly homes), schools, and health posts were destroyed while per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped from \$1,100 in 1991 to an estimated \$400 in 1995.

Compounding the war's devastation, Tajikistan's economy, which had been based primarily on aluminum exports and cotton monoculture, was heavily reliant on the continued smooth functioning of the FSU system of economic cross-dependency among its various republics. As a result, Tajikistan was also hard hit by the changes in its trade regime.

In the aftermath of these events, three primary challenges face both the Government of Tajikistan (GOT) and the donor community: security; the risk that total economic collapse might occur before economic reform and donor efforts are able to take meaningful effect; and the need to move effectively into a development mode to improve the chances for economic recovery in the medium to long term.

### **A. Security**

While armed opposition groups and factionalism among “government” forces continue to pose considerable risks in the east and south, negotiations with the principal opposition continue. The people as a whole appear tired of war and disorder. Therefore, while localized conflicts may at times hinder operations, donor efforts should be able to continue without major disruption . . . unless economic collapse triggers large-scale renewed conflict.

The U.S. PVOs are members of the UN security network. If this network closes, alternative arrangements would be needed for communications, travel advisories, and evacuation plans.

### **B. Economic Collapse**

The farm sector is operating even though the industrial sector is largely shut down. Yet, migration, remittances, and new regional trade contacts are creating new economic opportunities. While the

U.S. Embassy/USAID and the Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) have expressed cautious optimism about the economy's future, the equally knowledgeable World Food Program (WFP) Country Director foresees food shortages that could attain the "riot" level and a continued erosion of what little purchasing power now exists. Given the limited time available to the team to address these complex questions, the most we can do is to identify and acknowledge the risk of such collapse as one factor in weighing the programmatic options to be presented.

### **C. Development**

While all of the organizations consulted—from PVOs to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)—agree on the general desirability of moving at least some assistance programs into a more development-oriented posture, they also recognize that between 650,000 and 800,000 people (12 to 15 percent of the population) fall into a vulnerable group: women, children, pensioners, handicapped, and the like. The "social safety net" of the FSU, which once took care of these people, no longer exists, nor does the GOT command the resources to recreate it. The non-CIS donor community, working to a considerable degree through PVOs, must be considered their primary recourse.

Differences of opinion therefore pertain as to the balance between relief requirements and the development imperative. Additional differences of opinion surrounding the ability of PVOs to serve as effective agents of development have arisen between the U.S. Embassy/USAID, which has confidence in the developmental capacities and interests of the U.S. PVOs, and the UNDP, which appears more skeptical. Another aspect of the discussion concerns the optimum regional balance to be struck in carrying out future development programs. Exploration of these matters is among the primary considerations of this evaluation.

## **II. PVO PROGRAM OBJECTIVES**

The basic purposes of the USAID-supported PVO Program in Tajikistan to date have been to ameliorate the immediate impact of the human suffering and economic damage flowing from the civil war and the collapse of the unsustainable FSU social safety net and, at the same time, to lay a foundation for long-term economic development. A number of other multilateral and bilateral public and private donors have participated with USAID in this program.

The most significant characteristics of the U.S. PVO Program, other than the delivery of short-term relief, have been its efforts to build a bridge between relief and longer-term development, e.g., Food for Work (FFW) housing rehabilitation; Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) for economic recovery; the manufacture of soap for both health and small enterprise development (SED) purposes; and the creation of Local Non-Governmental Organizations (LNGOs) to aid Tajik self-help activities.

The suggested direction of future USAID PVO programming are discussed in the Recommendations Section of this evaluation.

### **III. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION**

The purpose of the current evaluation is to assess the performance of five U.S. PVOs in Tajikistan in carrying out their USAID-funded activities; the impact of those programs; the management capabilities of the organizations; their ability to leverage USAID resources with those of other donors; and their interest in extending their range of activities into the development sphere. (Detailed discussions of these matters as they pertain to individual PVOs are presented in Annexes E through I; the main text of the evaluation deals more summarily with individual programs and in greater depth with overall program performance, impact, management, and development orientation.)

It is expected that the findings of this evaluation will be used to help determine the programming for a range of assistance programs in Tajikistan by a number of donor agencies, the nature and scope of such programs, and their implementing agencies. In light of the potential 1996-2000 USAID, UNDP, and World Bank resource inputs and those of the other donors and the relatively limited number of potential in-country implementing agencies, the capabilities and interests of the evaluated PVOs will be an important factor in determining Tajikistan's absorptive capacity.

In addition, the evaluation team was requested to prepare a set of criteria for USAID/CAR's use in conducting an informal solicitation of proposals from PVOs for future program activities. These criteria have been included as Annex L.

## IV. USAID PROGRAM CONTEXT

### A. Summary of USAID Program Budget

#### USAID Program Budget for Tajikistan

Project	Through December 1994	Through September 1995 <sup>1</sup>	Total
Special Initiatives <sup>2</sup>	\$18,074,547	\$4,900,000	\$22,974,547
Environment	\$464,054	—	\$464,054
Health Care	\$2,068,880	\$533,000	\$2,601,880
Private Sector	\$1,995	—	\$1,995
Democratic Reform	\$457,160	\$850,000	\$1,307,160
Economic Restructuring	—	\$250,000	\$250,000
Exchanges and Training	\$2,867,886	\$1,650,000	\$4,517,886
Interagency Transfers	\$393,225	\$1,030,000	\$1,423,225
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>\$24,327,747<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>\$9,213,000</b>	<b>\$33,540,747</b>

<sup>1</sup> Estimates provided by USAID/Washington.

<sup>2</sup> The “special initiatives” line item has funded most PVO activities and provided funding to international organizations such as WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Excludes notional figure of \$7 million provided to the Central-Asian American Enterprise Fund (CAAEF) and available for programming in Tajikistan; grants to the Eurasian Foundation for possible use in Tajikistan are also excluded.

### B. Discussion

The \$5.73 million in direct USAID support to date for the five U.S. PVOs evaluated (see Section V, page 7) is a vital part of the USAID effort in Tajikistan, but it is far from the only one. International organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (\$1 million), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (\$100,000), International Organization for Migration (IOM) (\$736,000), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (\$3.4 million), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (\$714,000), and World Food Program (WFP) (\$3.8 million) have channeled significant resources totaling \$9.55 million. When added to the \$5.73 million granted directly to U.S. PVOs, the total \$15.28 million in USAID funding for governmental and non-governmental organizations constitutes almost half of the overall \$33.54 million USAID program budget for Tajikistan.

Moreover, the Tajikistan Country Strategy section of the USAID Strategy for Central Asia, approved on July 8, 1994, recognizes Tajikistan's need for both "emergency assistance as a special area of attention" and assistance "designed where possible to help shape and direct the programming patterns that could emerge in a more stable and reforming environment." Thus, the potential for transition to development is important to both USAID and the individual PVOs in terms of the substantive nature of the programs to be undertaken and the management and procedural capacities of the institutions involved. The most recent World Bank and UNDP-supported "Technical Cooperation Program, 1996-1998" document issued in December 1995 confirmed the validity of USAID's approach.

In keeping with the Country Strategy's mandate, USAID is making efforts to move toward a more cohesive PVO program with greater emphasis on long-term development rather than on strictly short-term humanitarian relief. These efforts are reflected in the draft criteria established by USAID/CAR for evaluation of 1996 PVO proposals. The criteria explicitly acknowledge the continuing transition from humanitarian relief to longer-term development and emphasize the importance of strengthening the capacity of the Tajik people to address their own problems.

(Annex D presents a more detailed discussion of the USAID program.)

## V. FUNDING FOR THE PVOs EVALUATED

### Funding by PVO<sup>1</sup> (including dollar value of commodities provided)

<b>PVO</b>	<b>Amount</b>
Aga Khan Foundation U.S.A. (AKF)	\$38,656,170
CARE/US (CARE)	\$11,657,132
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	\$1,009,976
Relief International (RI)	\$3,194,593
Save the Children U.S. (SCF)	\$13,828,025
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$68,345,896</b>

<sup>1</sup> USG and other donors.

**Funding by Donor (including dollar value of commodities provided)**

<b>Donor</b>	<b>Humanitarian Programs</b>	<b>Development Programs</b>	<b>Humanitarian Funding</b>	<b>Development Funding</b>	<b>Total Funding</b>
USAID	7	6	\$3,153,813	\$2,574,598	\$5,728,411
USDA	10	4	\$34,451,439	\$11,689,765	\$46,141,204
UNHCR/ UNDP	2	4	\$238,752	\$1,121,301	\$1,360,053
UNICEF	2	2	\$245,000	\$26,100	\$271,100
WFP <sup>1</sup>	— <sup>1</sup>	1	— <sup>1</sup>	\$15,000	\$15,000
SOROS	1	1	\$244,874	\$50,000	\$294,874
Europe <sup>2</sup>	7	1	\$12,150,000	\$237,960	\$12,387,960
State Dept.	1	2	\$45,582	\$390,000	\$435,582
DOD	1	—	\$500,000	—	\$500,000
PVO Funds <sup>3</sup>	3	3	\$662,840	\$673,952	\$1,336,792
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>\$51,592,300</b>	<b>\$16,778,676</b>	<b>\$68,470,976</b>

<sup>1</sup> WFP also made direct distribution to over 450,000 beneficiaries of humanitarian food supplies financed by USAID and other donors.

<sup>2</sup> European Union organizations plus individual governments and NGOs.

<sup>3</sup> Funds directly assigned by PVOs to programs; PVO indirect administrative costs cannot be determined from data available, but are substantial.

## VI. PROGRAM EVALUATION

### A. Overview of the Individual PVO Programs Evaluated

Because of major disparities in the programs of the individual U.S. PVOs—ranging in size from \$1 million to \$38 million and in composition from humanitarian to developmental—the general evaluation of the USAID PVO Program must necessarily include considerable evaluation of specific PVO programs. The one commonality running through virtually all of the PVO operations is that their headquarters have not established sufficiently clear lines of communication with the field offices. The evaluation team learned about this shortcoming when it had to await its return to the United States to obtain important operational information that should have been available at the PVOs' Dushanbe offices. (The same problem applies to USAID.)

Annexes E through I provide lengthy discussions of the five U.S. PVO programs, including details of funding, management, impact achieved, leveraging of resources, transition to development, development of local NGOs, conflict resolution, and coordination among themselves and with other donors.

(In addition, a brief description of the program of Mercy Corps International (MCI), which is not otherwise treated in this evaluation, has been inserted as Annex K for information purposes.)

#### 1. Aga Khan Foundation (AKF)

**Total Funding \$38,656,170**  
**USAID Funding \$2,247,000**

In late 1992, in response to emergency food, clothing, fuel, and medical needs, AKF initiated a program of humanitarian assistance in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBO). The region had absorbed 60,000 to 80,000 IDPs from the civil war, increasing its population by 50 percent. Over the next three years, AKF's humanitarian programs received over \$36 million from several donors, including USAID and USDA, and reached an estimated 221,000 beneficiaries, most of the area's population. In addition to meeting immediate humanitarian needs, AKF received over \$2 million in assistance to begin organizing communities and providing infrastructure for longer-term social and economic development.

Among the AKF initiatives was the Pamir Relief and Development Program (PRDP), a local non-governmental organization (LNGO). AKF received \$600,000 as a subgrantee of World Learning, Inc. (WLI), from a USAID grant to WLI. The funds were used to strengthen the private voluntary sector and to initiate medium-term development activities in the Pamirs. Of long-term importance, the U.S. Department of State and USAID provided AKF with \$790,000 (supplemented by \$300,000 in AKF funds) to support completion of the Pamir I hydroelectric plant to provide essential electricity and to help alleviate deforestation (wood is the main alternative source of energy). AKF has informed the evaluation team that, as a result of a highly favorable mid-term assessment, it intends to continue its development activities in Gorno-Badakhshan, with emphasis on addressing agricultural productivity through PRDP.

While some of AKF's direct management functions, such as financial reporting, are confusingly divided among Gorno-Badakhshan, Dushanbe, Geneva, and Washington, its demonstrated ability to work effectively in the field through PRDP has contributed to sound management and the potential of sustainability for both its humanitarian and development activities.

## **2. CARE/US (CARE)**

**Total Funding \$11,657,132**  
**USAID Funding \$105,911**

Initiated in 1994, CARE's Tajikistan operations have concentrated in the following areas of traditional interest: a) an \$11 million feeding program entitled Tajikistan Vulnerable Group Assistance Project (TVGAP) funded by USDA for 250,000 beneficiaries, primarily in Dushanbe and war-ravaged Khatlon Oblast; and b) the delivery of emergency medical supplies to a substantial additional number of people under its Tajikistan Emergency Logistics Assistance Program (TELAP), supported by \$57,000 in USAID funds. Subsequently, USAID provided CARE with \$49,000 to conduct a food security assessment, entitled the Tajikistan Nutrition Assessment (TNA), in selected parts of Tajikistan. CARE generally handled its activities through its own staff rather than relying on local intermediaries. CARE/Atlanta has indicated to the evaluation team that it is interested in expanding its range of activities into long-term development and that its \$1 million Tajikistan Agricultural Development Project (TADP), which will work to a greater degree through indigenous institutions, is under active consideration for funding by the EU. In addition, CARE has developed some preliminary ideas for submission to USAID/CAR when 1996 PVO proposals are solicited.

The management of CARE/Dushanbe has proven itself highly capable of implementing humanitarian programs. In fact, CARE/Atlanta has indicated a willingness to reinforce the management function for the more difficult task of managing institutional development aspects of development programs in the event of a future award.

## **3. International Rescue Committee (IRC)**

**Total Funding \$1,009,176**  
**USAID Funding \$650,000**

In fall 1994 and at the request of UNHCR, IRC assumed implementation responsibility for a water and sanitation program initiated by Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)/Belgium. Subsequently, IRC received a USAID grant of \$250,000 in support of the effort. In 1995, IRC obtained an additional \$400,000 from USAID to continue its assistance in improving health and hygiene at local schools, health facilities, and selected villages in Khatlon Province, with emphasis on work already underway to provide potable water sources and latrines for an estimated 40,000 beneficiaries. Aside from training a number of maintenance workers and making some unsuccessful attempts to impart health education, IRC did little to tie these efforts to broader community development in those areas that received assistance. As a result, USAID may have missed an opportunity to encourage sustainability.

An IRC developmental activity, originally funded at \$330,000 by UNHCR, involved so-called Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) focused on Small Enterprise Development (SED) activities in poultry raising and soap and shoe production. Based on successful projects observed by the evaluation team such

as soap, oil seed, and poultry production, these and related activities were considered to be sound and well-thought out efforts. The UNDP has decided to continue its support for IRC's SED activities.

As with most other PVOs evaluated, IRC/Dushanbe's management has been handicapped by inadequate information flow to the field. Nonetheless, the presence of a strong Country Director has enabled IRC to avoid major problems to date. Continued management attention will be needed to monitor and implement the program in accordance with grant agreements.

#### **4. Relief International (RI)**

**Total Funding \$3,194,593**  
**USAID Funding \$1,250,000**

RI currently has a \$1.25 million Cooperative Agreement with USAID to implement an Emergency Health Response project to provide medicines and medical supplies, together with training of personnel, to rural primary care health clinics known as Feldsher Accoucher Points (FAPs) and to carry out maternal health and child survival campaigns in Khatlon Oblast and the Garm Valley. Training of trainers (TOT) has been emphasized at all levels of the rural health system. The project's problems lie primarily with the GOT, which is unable or unwilling to provide the funding to pay its health care workers. RI's strategy was to strengthen GOT health delivery; however, the strategy now needs to be reconsidered.

The number and scope of RI's non-USAID activities, including health projects financed by Soros, UNHCR, UNICEF, the Royal Netherlands Government (RNG), the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), point to RI's ability to attract a range of financing in the health sector, which is where its primary technical expertise clearly lies. In the area of Small Enterprise Development (SED), some have considered RI's activities less than successful.

RI/Tajikistan management has not been adequate in the past. The Tajikistan program was micromanaged from RI's Los Angeles headquarters, with frequent turnover in the Country Director position. It remains to be seen if the recently arrived (November 1995) Country Director will be able to remedy the local organization's problems.

#### **5. Save the Children Federation (SCF)**

**Total Funding \$13,828,025**  
**USAID Funding \$875,500**

SCF began its Tajikistan operations in May 1994 with a Food for Work (FFW) housing project piggybacked onto an ongoing UNHCR activity and jointly funded by USDA, USAID, and UNHCR. To date, 12,255 houses have been completed, with 5,800 more under contract and another 10,000 awaiting funding. The program, which works through locally managed work brigades, has already produced almost 60,000 beneficiaries, although the eventual total should more than double that number. A related activity, for which USAID funding of \$500,000 has been requested, would provide plastic sheeting for greenhouses.

With funding from USDA, UNHCR, RNG, and Soros, SCF also has underway a FFW school reconstruction program, a school feeding program for 34,615 girls and 36,854 boys, a Group Guaranteed Lending (GGL) Program with over 300 members (based on the Grameen Bank model), a Data Collection and Analysis (DACA) unit to provide current economic information, and capacity-building activities to assist local NGO development. In addition, SCF conducted a Food Needs Assessment in the most heavily war-affected areas of Tajikistan during summer 1995.

USAID has approved a \$313,000 SCF project to assist the Tajik village health care system by establishing Village-Based Health Committees (VHCs), strengthening FAPs, and providing training and technical assistance to Ministry of Health (MOH) personnel. SCF is also seeking SED funding for local income-generation activities to help ensure financial support for this more self-reliant health care system.

SCF's strong management capability ensures that its Tajikistan program will continue to function effectively and attract donor support.

## **B. Impact Achieved by the Program**

The overall impact of the USAID PVO Program in Tajikistan has been greater than the sum of its parts. In conjunction with the admirable efforts of UNHCR, WFP, USDA, and several European assistance agencies, the program has given the Tajik people an appreciation that the rest of the world, including the United States, is aware of their plight and is willing to help. Equally important, the self-help lessons applied through the direct hands-on efforts of the U.S. PVOs have played a major grass-roots-level role in assisting the Tajiks to move forward in their attempts to make the difficult transition from an authoritarian political system and centrally directed economy to a more pluralistic political system and free-enterprise market economy.

Because of the various types of assistance provided, the determination of beneficiary impact cannot be reduced to a single universal figure. Similarly, in view of multiple donor contributions to many of the initiatives and the leveraging nature of USAID inputs, attribution of particular results to individual donors is not feasible. Nonetheless, the evaluation team was able to determine the number of people receiving aid from each of the PVOs and thus developed a general picture of benefits conferred.

**AKF.** The AKF program has provided 221,000 inhabitants of and refugees in Gorno-Badakhshan with adequate minimum rations for crucial preharvest periods and gave 21,000 children the clothing and shoes essential for the region's frigid winters. AKF's program to develop PRDP to work in agricultural production and marketing and its continued funding of the Pamir I hydroelectric power project are laying the groundwork for additional benefits to flow in the future.

**CARE.** CARE has fed 250,000 people in vulnerable groups. It also distributed 20 metric tons of medicines provided under the USAID-funded TELAP programs. The USAID-funded Nutrition

Assessment executed by CARE has provided baseline data for the design of future food security programs.

**IRC.** IRC provided 40,000 people with access to potable water and latrines under the Water and Sanitation project. The pilot Small Enterprise Development (SED) program, which has assisted approximately 100 entrepreneurs, will be more widely replicated.

**RI.** With the virtual collapse of the GOT health care system, RI has played a vital role in restoring health services for 260,000 people, constituting 39 percent of the population of Khatlon oblast.

**SCF.** Save the Children's FFW housing reconstruction program has provided food for 27,000 brigade workers and shelter for 62,000 returned refugees and IDPs; WFP estimates the program will have a total 139,000 beneficiaries at its conclusion. More than 71,000 school children (with virtually even gender distribution) are being fed. Some 75,000 people in the region will be served by the USAID-funded health project just getting underway. The rapidly growing Group Guaranteed Lending (GGL) Program has already made almost 100 SED loans without default. And SCF's economic data collection and capacity-building activities, which provide market prices reporting to the emerging local business community, will help the transition to a market system.

### **C. USAID Management System and Effectiveness**

Under the management structure in place for assistance to Tajikistan and as is the case generally with all NIS programs, responsibilities are centralized in Washington, D.C., where the U.S. Department of State makes final decisions with respect to regional Mission funding allocations, and USAID/Washington officials serve as Project Officers for grants awarded to U.S. PVOs.

In the case of the Central Asian Republics, the structure is complicated by the involvement of the USAID/Central Asian Republics office (USAID/CAR), which operates from Almaty and seeks to serve five highly individual and often difficult-to-reach countries. The responsibilities of USAID/CAR are to represent USAID in the five Central Asian states, to provide country-specific knowledge and advice, to shape program direction and future program strategy, and to provide technical and program input for activities proposed for USAID funding in the region. Within USAID/CAR, responsibility for monitoring PVO activities rests with the Office of Program and Project Support. In May 1994, the office's senior Program Officer was assigned to spend approximately one week every two months in Dushanbe to monitor USAID activities and to serve as a liaison to the U.S. PVOs and the donor community there. Previously, regular USAID/CAR field monitoring of PVO activities was not possible, though members of the USAID/CAR staff on occasion visited PVO sites and discussed ongoing activities.

It was not until mid-April 1995, however, with the arrival in Dushanbe of the USAID/CAR Country Representative, that USAID/CAR was in a position to provide continuous and more in-depth program monitoring. Some months later, a U.S. Personal Services Contractor (PSC) arrived and was

assigned to the USAID/CAR Office of Social Transition, the office responsible for monitoring PVO activities in Tajikistan.

Officials of the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe have also maintained close contact with the program. Embassy staff, including the Ambassador, DCM, and POL/ECON Officer, frequently consult with PVOs in Dushanbe and make many site visits, the reports of which represent additional monitoring tools and useful sources of information.

The PVO proposal review process has advanced from ad hoc response to a more coherent approach. In the case of new PVO proposals, USAID/CAR has established review procedures and criteria that were first used for proposals submitted for the FY95 funding cycle. The review cycle calls for specific review criteria against which PVO proposals are simultaneously assessed and requires a meeting of concerned Embassy and USAID officials. (A Washington representative was invited to participate in the FY95 review process but was unable to attend.) Participants in the review process convey their recommendations to Washington for action on individual funding levels and modifications. USAID/Washington offices use the input from the field, consult with individual PVO headquarters, and prepare PIO/Ts providing funding and instructions to the USAID/Washington Grant Officer. The Grant Officer then finalizes grants to the individual PVOs concerned.

According to USAID field officers, the procedures reflect a transition from FY93, when PVO proposals were of an emergency nature in response to the war and devastation in Tajikistan. Similarly, in FY94, most funding was targeted to continuing the PVOs' emergency assistance programs.

With respect to the grants and cooperative agreements for PVO activities in Tajikistan, USAID Washington, USAID/CAR, or the PVO offices in Dushanbe provided the evaluation team with some of the documents listed in Annex C. However, several key grants and amendments were unavailable to the grantees and the USAID/CAR Country Representative's Office in Dushanbe as well as to USAID/CAR. The lack of such documents, including, in many cases copies of financial and program performance reports, has been a major constraint to both monitoring and evaluation. (See Annex J for suggestions on improved grant reporting.) Of particular importance, information on overall financial support for the various programs was not available anywhere in the field and had to be obtained from the PVOs' headquarters upon the evaluation team's return.

Although all U.S. PVOs in Dushanbe were appreciative of Embassy and USAID/CAR support, especially that of USAID/CAR's Office of Program and Project Support, several of their representatives expressed the need for USAID to clarify and differentiate the roles and responsibilities of the various offices involved in PVO matters within USAID/CAR and the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe. Although the USAID Country Representative has visited several field sites, PVO representatives cited insufficient field monitoring by USAID officials and called for closer contact with PVO representatives and their programs. Most expressed satisfaction with the management provided by the USAID/Washington Project Officers involved with their grants, though

such officers were able to visit the field only rarely. Virtually all the PVO representatives believed they could look to the Embassy and the Ambassador for support and assistance when needed.

## **D. Program Coordination Mechanisms and Effectiveness**

### **1. With International Donors**

Until recently, the principal donor coordination mechanism in Tajikistan has been meetings cochaired by the UNDP and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (who is also the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator for Assistance). Participants at the meetings include members of the various United Nations organizations operating in the country and representatives from diplomatic missions and PVOs.

In discussions with officials of the U.S. Embassy, other UN agencies, and representatives of the PVO community, the effectiveness of the coordination achieved through this forum and the leadership provided by UNHCR earned high praise. However, with the departure of DHA and phasing down of UNHCR operations in Tajikistan, the sole responsibility for chairmanship passed to UNDP. Accordingly, a number of PVOs expressed concern that the effectiveness of the forum may decline due in part to widespread perceptions that the UNDP is less interested in working with the international PVO community.

### **2. With GOT Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

As the reconciliation process unfolds and normalization evolves, PVOs will inevitably need to respond to a broader legal and regulatory environment as it affects international PVOs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has publicly stated its interest in playing a facilitating role, thereby providing an opportunity to enter into dialogue and be more forthcoming about ongoing projects and activities.

The evaluation team met with the Chief of the Department of International Organizations and International Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss registration procedures and other matters related to U.S. PVOs. It appears that the ministry is making a strong effort to accommodate current and new NGOs, both international and local. The ministry is trying to simplify the procedures required of NGOs, by, among other things, assisting with logistical matters and the establishment of relations with local government officials.

International NGOs (INGOs) registering with the ministry must present three documents as follows: 1) bylaws or a charter; 2) a statement of the organization's proposed goals, objectives, and activities in Tajikistan; and 3) a written mandate from headquarters for the organization's senior official posted in Tajikistan. If the documents are submitted with a requesting cover letter, registration can be completed in as little as one hour. Information relevant to the INGO is entered into a database and is followed by issuance of an identification number. The INGO then receives many of the services of the diplomatic corps (e.g., registration of vehicles, expedited customs clearance).

The chief further stated that registration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs constitutes the only legal requirement for an INGO to operate in Tajikistan.

LNGOs, whether affiliates of an INGO or purely local, are not required to register with the ministry. Nonetheless, the ministry would like the LNGOs to register and would offer them the full range of services comparable to those rendered to INGOs.

The evaluation team has different impressions as to the nature and degree of cooperation between the U.S. PVOs and the ministry and the reasons why such cooperation may not have been totally satisfactory in the past. In the team's opinion, the most important consideration is mutual recognition of an underlying interest in working together more closely and the commitment of all parties to make a renewed effort to do so.

### **3. With GOT Ministry of Justice**

The evaluation team also met with the Director of the Office of Private Organizations of the Ministry of Justice to discuss registration procedures and other matters related to both international and local NGOs. The director expressed the desire of his ministry to be as helpful as possible in dealing with NGOs while still fulfilling the ministry's responsibilities to ensure that all such organizations obey the laws of Tajikistan.

The ministry divides private sector entities into the two following groups: 1) “public” or “social” (i.e., nonprofit) organizations and 2) “private” (i.e., for-profit) enterprises. The evaluation team’s meeting dealt primarily with the first group, which is further divided into the following: a) local, within a particular area; b) covering the entire country; and c) international. The differences in procedures for the various categories are relatively minor, involving some additional documentation and slightly higher fees for the latter two. The director stated that registration would be automatic and would be completed within 30 days, if an NGO satisfied the documentary requirements.

The director detailed the obligations of the ministry to oversee the activities of the NGOs to ensure that they did not go beyond their stated purposes or violate the laws of Tajikistan. A nonregistered organization could be prosecuted, or a registered organization could have its registration revoked for perceived violations of law or “antisocial” behavior. The tone of the presentation was distinctly authoritarian.

The director further stated that formal registration with the Ministry of Justice was obligatory for INGOs as well as for LNGOs and that INGOS need only inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of their presence.

As was the case with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the evaluation team came away with different views of the degree of cooperation accorded by the Ministry of Justice. Again, it is the team's opinion that the most important consideration is the recognition of mutual interest in working together more closely and the desirability of all parties to make a renewed effort to do so.

#### **4. With Other Governmental Institutions**

In the evaluation team's discussions with PVO representatives, the representatives indicated that they are able to work closely with local government officials in the design and implementation of their programs and, in some cases, even involve officials in the design work leading up to proposal submission.

In all cases, the PVOs had entered into either country agreements or ministerial agreements at the central government level. However, coordination with central government ministries and other agencies was not regular, in part due to the lack of resources available through the central government. In one case of regular, ongoing coordination, the PVO believed that frequent contact and the PVO's invitation of central government officials to visit work sites helped raise the profile of the activity, thereby generating not only favorable public relations but also providing protection from "mafia"-types who might be inclined to try to muscle in.

#### **5. Among PVOs**

With respect to coordination among PVOs, the evaluation team learned that the PVO community organizes coordination meetings on a collegial basis as required and that sector and subsector working groups have been established to permit effective coordination within sectors. From the team's observations, it appears that such coordination takes place on a regular basis, thus avoiding potential duplication of effort. Beyond this, the relationships among the U.S. PVOs appear to be collaborative and productive.

#### **E. Potential for Transition to Development**

The PVOs examined in this evaluation all have the capability of extending their programs into the development sphere; in fact, with the active encouragement of the U.S. Embassy, USAID, and the donor community, most have already begun the transition. Within the larger picture, however, certain details deserve further examination.

**AKF**, within the regional context to which it is committed, has engaged in a wide range of activities, from earlier involvement with humanitarian assistance such as food relief to more recent development activities such as agricultural production and marketing and the provision of hydroelectric power for energy generation and deforestation mitigation. As the September 1995 evaluation of activities in Gorno-Badakhshan makes clear, AKF's integrated and sustainable approach to regional development deserves commendation and further support. It should be recognized, however, that this approach has and will continue to require a significant level of financial and technical resources.

**CARE** in Tajikistan continues to see itself primarily as a humanitarian institution. Yet, CARE/USA headquarters recognizes the need to move toward development. The effect of CARE's self-image on the CARE/Tajikistan program ties in with the magnitude of the country's vulnerable groups and

the question of what other resources and implementing agencies are available to deal with such populations *vis à vis* the challenges of development. Depending on Tajikistan's financial and institutional resources, CARE could address either humanitarian or development needs.

**IRC/Dushanbe** has entered enthusiastically and effectively into its development programs, and its personnel in Tajikistan wish to continue along that course. Reports suggest, however, that factions within the central IRC organization would prefer a narrower focus on the many refugees and displaced persons in other parts of the world in keeping with the organization's original mission. Moreover, it presently appears (with the exception of minor close-out activities in its water and sanitation program) that IRC wishes to continue only with its SED program—and with non-USAID funding. The IRC response to the solicitation of interest in FY 1996 USAID programming should resolve these issues.

**RI** has demonstrated both an interest in and the capability to improve Tajikistan's health status by working within the existing government-operated rural health structure. Initially RI's health project focused on emergency delivery of medicines. Subsequently, the PVO shifted its emphasis to longer-term development issues—strengthening the capacity of the rural health structure itself. While the latter focus is a necessary one, Tajikistan's internal budgetary deficits are undermining RI's work within the government health structure. Consequently, community involvement in addressing own-health needs should be considered part of any future programming.

**SCF** has moved into a primarily development mode that involves a variety of both programs and donors. Its primary emphasis is on completing the FFW housing program until all shelter-related destruction has been repaired. When SCF's other development programs are combined with its demonstrated management capability, it is clear that any development program in Tajikistan can count on SCF as a potential major player.

## **F. Potential for Synergy**

There is potential for synergy to achieve greater impact through partnerships and collaborations in future programming of the five programs. The USAID Country Representative has encouraged the PVOs to explore joint arrangements with regard to administrative services as a cost-saving measure. With the SCF's strong management record in Tajikistan contrasted with the management difficulties experienced by RI, cooperation between SCF and RI would make a great deal of sense in the health area—if the two are able to agree on a common program of community self-help to compensate for inadequate GOT support for the sector, which has undermined RI's program effectiveness. If IRC's health and sanitation efforts continue, SCF and IRC could also collaborate, with SCF putting its community development expertise to work to ensure greater program sustainability. Likewise CARE could readily tap into its worldwide management expertise for both its own expansion into development and to assist one of the smaller PVOs with valid programmatic ideas but limited management expertise. And, with Small Enterprise Development (SED) one of the most critical elements of any future development program, all the PVOs pool their collective experience. Only

AKF, with its subregional focus and self-integrated approach, would appear well suited to go it alone.

### **G. Ability to Leverage Resources**

The fact that the PVOs have leveraged USAID resources is clear from the financial tables set out in Section V. Only in the case of IRC has a PVO depended on direct USAID inputs for more than half of its funds, although a portion of the remaining IRC funding (from UNHCR and UNICEF) was probably (no data breakout was available to the team) an indirect contribution from the USG. At the other end of the spectrum, CARE has obtained less than 1 percent of its direct Tajikistan program funding directly from USAID—and none of it indirectly, as USDA was CARE’s only other donor.

Overall *causation* is impossible to determine with precision from the material available to the evaluation team: What portion of the \$54.8 million in other donor funding would—or would not—have been provided in the absence of USAID’s \$13.6 million (\$5.7 million directly to the PVOs plus \$7.9 million through UNHCR, WFP, and UNICEF)? In any event, several of the cases examined by the team pointed to direct causal effects. For example, \$670,000 in AKF funding for two activities depended on the provision of \$1 million in USAID funding. USAID required \$200,000 in nonfederal funds as an SCF contribution to the \$313,000 in USAID funds for SCF’s health project. USAID provided \$560,000 in administrative support to the USDA/ UNHCR/SCF \$12.3 million FFW project. Finally, it is important to recall that the federal government’s 22 CFR 226.23 sets out a minimum 25 percent cost sharing requirement for USAID funding.

The question of the ability of the USG as a whole to leverage resources is complicated by the federal government’s many contributions to a wide range of institutions, extending from the World Bank through the various UN agencies to U.S. and international PVOs. Even within the USG, major direct contributions to the Tajikistan program have come from USDA, the U.S. Department of State Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration, and USAID. The larger question of how USG contributions to PVOs might stimulate contributions from other entities that would otherwise not be forthcoming is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

In a narrower sense, however, the leveraging capabilities of the individual U.S. PVOs constitute the leveraging of resources by the United States as a nation. The \$12.4 million in European contributions were, at the least, influenced by USG leadership. Moreover, with the actual UNDP and expected World Bank entries into Tajikistan development programs, portions of which are expected to be implemented by U.S. PVOs, USG support of these PVOs will entitle the federal government to claim a share of the credit for the extension and expansion of PVO efforts. From a programmatic standpoint, USAID can increase its leverage by directing support to PVOs that have evidenced the ability to gain the confidence of other donor agencies operating or planning to operate in Tajikistan, thus creating a multiplier effect. All five PVOs evaluated have demonstrated their leveraging ability in the past.

## **H. Potential for Developing Local NGOs**

The concept of an NGO is new to Tajikistan. Before the break up of the Soviet Union, organizations that appeared to resemble NGOs, such as the Scouts and children's organizations, existed (and continue to exist). When examined more closely, however, it is clear that these are parastatal organizations created and controlled by the government.

Over the last few years local NGOs (LNGOs) have begun to emerge in Tajikistan. Some 200 LNGOs are now officially registered at the Ministry of Justice. However, no more than 50 of the LNGOs are committed, even on paper, to relief and development activities. USAID/CAR has also reported a relatively large number of environmentally oriented NGOs in Tajikistan.

Many of the LNGOs came into existence in response to funding opportunities provided by the donor community in Tajikistan. The U.S. PVOs seeking to initiate LNGO capacity-building efforts find that many of the organizations have little sense of their mission or how to go about their work. Moreover, they tend to have limited ability to represent their constituencies effectively.

Informal community-based organizations (CBOs) or associations, such as farmers' associations, women's loan groups, and water user groups, are increasing in number. Most of these CBOs are emerging as a direct result of contact with and/or involvement in PVO field programs.

The evaluation identified no local NGO service or resource organizations. The absence of such organizations is not surprising since NGO service or resource organizations tend to emerge only in the presence of a vibrant NGO sector to which the organizations can provide useful resources or services.

In the international field, however, both the USAID-funded Counterpart Foundation and the partially USAID-funded International Organization for Migration (IOM) address the need for NGO service or resource organizations.

- # The Counterpart Consortium, which will soon set up an office in Dushanbe, has identified NGO strengthening as a programming objective. It will set up a USAID-funded program in Tajikistan designed specifically to meet this objective through training and the provision of small-scale project grants. Drawing on the lessons it learned elsewhere in the FSU, Counterpart is specifically charged with promoting and advancing LNGO development across Central Asia.
  
- # IOM, which is an intergovernmental organization, has been training GOT officials on how to facilitate and conduct workshops and training courses. GOT officials have formed an LNGO-type service organization while maintaining their jobs in government. The development of a full-fledged service organization at this time would be opportune. It could provide needed services (coordination, technical assistance, training, evaluation, etc.) in a wide range of areas to a growing number of LNGOs and CBOs as the sector matures.

Ample foreign assistance funds appear currently available for LNGOs in Tajikistan. Sources include USAID funding made available through Counterpart; the American Legal Consortium, which has provided several small grants; the U.S. NGO ISAR, which has an active program with environmental NGOs in the former Soviet Union; and the Eurasia Foundation (see Annex D).

In addition, the LIEN project of the European Union's Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) provides grants of up to \$200,000 for projects submitted by a local NGO in partnership with a European NGO. The UNDP's soon-to-be-implemented program also emphasizes capacity building for local organizations to enable them to avail themselves of UNDP funds for community projects.

The development of the Tajik NGO sector will, however, require more than access to funds. The LNGOs require technical assistance to tap the available funds, use them efficiently, and respond to the needs of their constituents. In short, technical assistance is needed in areas ranging from organizational development and management to sectoral and community development skills.

The degree to which international NGOs regard strengthening local NGOs as part of their mandate varies. Most of the PVOs evaluated by the team were, however, are either already working with local NGOs/CBOs or plan to do so. The shift seems to run in tandem with the shift from relief to development.

- # **AKF.** The work of AKF provides a model for building LNGO capacity. AKF began the development aspect of its program by creating the Pamir Relief and Development Program (PRDP), an LNGO that has played a key role to date in making the Gorno-Badakhshan development program sustainable. A September 1995 evaluation gave PRDP high marks.
  
- # **SCF.** Another major player in the field, SCF has consistently used community groups as the functional leaders of its various programs in both humanitarian and development areas. Its village-based Health Committees (VHCs) being formed for its USAID-funded health project promise to perform well. In addition, the Group Guaranteed Lending (GGL) program has established women's savings and loan groups, the initial focus of which is loans for SED income generation but whose group cohesion and sense of purpose can be tapped to take on other community development issues.

SCF has recently received a small grant from UNHCR for capacity building of local NGOs. SCF is still in the early stages of the grant but plans to work in tandem with Counterpart to train NGOs. As part of the initiative, SCF will also establish an NGO resource and advisory center for local NGOs and CBOs.

- # **IRC.** Although IRC has not yet worked with NGOs or CBOs in its water program, the organizations have helped train village groups to maintain and repair their own water pumps.

- # **RI.** While RI's health strategy focused exclusively on strengthening the GOT rural health system and as such precluded work with local NGOs, RI has begun to work with community-based women's groups in its SED project.
- # **CARE.** CARE is expected to receive EU funding to work with the Dekhan Farmers Association, which it views as similar to an LNGO.

## **I. Potential for Conflict Resolution**

Only in one case has a PVO specifically articulated its intent to aid in conflict resolution. To its credit, SCF has dedication to the art of conflict resolution and has been among its leading practitioners. SCF's requirement of nondiscriminatory participation in all sponsored activities has transformed project activities into vehicles for learning tolerance and conflict resolution strategies.

While other PVOs have not specifically articulated the linkage between project activities and conflict resolution, the design of their activities and the mechanisms for implementation contribute to building a sense of community among participating villages, villagers, and ethnic groups. For example, most PVOs involve local communities in the identification of problems and seek local input into the design of activities. Further, during program implementation, PVOs seek community feedback through frequent visits, consultations, and working sessions. The benefits of village-level activities are monitored to ensure that all factions and ethnic groups within a community enjoy equal access to program activities, thereby helping to foster cohesiveness among local populations. Where activities require direct village involvement, such as in the maintenance of water handpumps, training has been routinely provided to permit basic repairs to become a responsibility of the entire local community. As a result of such involvement, rural populations have gained a direct stake in the investments made in their communities. This stake plays an important role in encouraging diverse groups within local communities to seek peaceful resolution of any conflicts that might arise. Finally, the recent memory of conflict and destruction of property appears to have motivated most of those in the war-afflicted areas to forgo the inclination to use violent means to achieve their ends in local disputes.

## **J. Addressing Gender Issues**

The evaluation team believes that the role of women deserves greater attention to improve the quality and targeting of assistance provided in Tajikistan. While many PVO activities observed by the team included a role, sometimes a key role, for women, the impact of these activities on women and the efforts to include women directly in important roles, e.g., managers of SED efforts, demand greater attention. In reviewing information available with respect to project activities, little gender-disaggregated data were in evidence. As PVO programs continue the transition to development, proposals should be expected to contain gender baseline data or, at a minimum, include plans to collect the needed information early in an activity's implementation. In addition, PVO proposals should be required to include an analysis of the role of women in the activity for which funding is sought. Similarly, performance reports should note the impact of the activity on women.

## **VII. STRATEGIC PLANNING**

### **A. General Considerations**

With the continuing transition of donor activities in Tajikistan toward development and the expectation that in times of relative peace and stability humanitarian programs are likely to be limited to vulnerable groups, it is important to consider which sectors of society and the economy should receive priority attention, and from which institution. It is the team's observation that USAID, in establishing sectoral programming priorities, should consider the potential effects of any proposals it receives on the issue of human productivity: How will prospective activities affect the ability of the Tajik people to advance their well-being and standard of living? Under this concept, USAID needs to decide a) what it considers the key sectors leading to the enhancement of human productivity and the degree of specificity required in the goals of PVO programs eligible for funding; b) the capabilities and interests of the proposing PVOs; and c) the plans of other donor organizations with a significant involvement in Tajikistan.

### **B. Sectoral Outlook**

Under the conditions prevailing in Tajikistan at present, the evaluation team believes that the major contributors to the advancement of human productivity are health, education, and enterprise development. The first two are necessary conditions for people's ability to work productively. Yet, both have suffered from the ravages of the civil war and the economic dislocation that has reduced the ability of the government to continue providing essential services. GOT payment of salaries for both medical and educational personnel has diminished almost to the vanishing point while the provision of essential supplies and maintenance of facilities has likewise suffered. As for enterprise development, it is hardly surprising that a society so recently ruled by the precepts of socialism should need massive assistance to make the transition to a free economy, with its requirement for individual initiative coupled with the special needs of a market system.

### **C. PVO Capabilities and Interests**

Each of the PVOs studied in the evaluation has its own areas of interest and expertise, particularly where social services are concerned. It is highly problematical for the PVOs to address the formal education sector. Aside from fringe activities, such as SCF's spot programs of school construction and feeding and some limited aspects of AKF's integrated development programs in GBAO, the PVOs see the education sector as both too large for their limited resources and too sensitive from the perspective of GOT's desire to control all the intellectual aspects of education.

Except for CARE (and to a degree IRC, which has directed previous inputs to physical development in water and sanitation), the PVOs have demonstrated a desire to participate in the health sector. The main differences in expressions of interest in future health sector programming are IRC's general uncertainty and RI's original assumption that it could work through the GOT while AKF and SCF are committed to working through local organizations (PRDP for AKF and the VHCs for SCF). A

limiting factor regarding AKF is its desire to retain a Gorno-Badakhshan regional focus and the assistance already provided under the FVA/PVO Competitive Grants Program.

In the area of enterprise development/job creation, all PVOs have demonstrated interest and indicated a desire to continue along this course in the future. Since enterprise development/job creation is also the sector in which the United States has both the greatest interest and the highest level of expertise, it would seem to provide a natural synergy for USAID/PVO programming. Strong USAID leadership will be helpful in focusing the attention of all agencies operating in Tajikistan on the importance of enterprise development/job creation in the country's economic development.

#### **D. Potential Other Donor Interventions**

In conjunction with the U.S. PVO community many bilateral and multilateral donors have played a role to a degree in supporting development efforts in Tajikistan. Two additional funding sources-- the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank-- are soon to put into operations programs that could have significant bearing on the U.S. PVO community.

Working through four regional offices, UNDP plans to implement a \$20 million project over a four-to five-year period. Under this program, U.S. PVOs will be able to tender on a competitive basis for community development projects ranging from \$5,000 to \$60,000. However, both the expressed attitude of the UNDP/Tajikistan leadership and the perceptions of a number of PVOs have led the evaluation team to develop the impression that the UNDP may be reluctant to work with the international PVO community. Clarification of both the UNDP's conception of community development and its willingness or reluctance to work through PVOs will be important determinants of the degree to which the UNDP program may affect USAID activity in enterprise development. In any event, careful coordination will remain necessary.

The World Bank is considering a grant-making mechanism for projects that focus on employment generation. If authorized, the program would bring a total of \$10 million over two years into Tajikistan. The World Bank representative looked favorably on PVOs playing a major role in both designing and implementing the bank's projects in Tajikistan. Given the close relationship between enterprise development and employment generation, the potential for synergy between the USAID/PVO program and that of the World Bank is clear.

#### **E. USAID's Role**

As set forth in the Recommendations section, USAID has the opportunity to play a balancing role in ensuring that Tajikistan's essential needs, which cannot be met by the GOT and are not being met by UNDP, the World Bank, or other donor institutions, will become the focus of a dynamic USAID/PVO program.

## **VIII. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. Lessons Learned**

- # U.S. PVOs provided an effective channel for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the emergency period following the 1992-1993 civil war in Tajikistan. However, in such countries, which are far-distant and suffer from damaged or weak infrastructure and systems, the initiation and implementation of assistance can be difficult and costly. Social and economic conditions in Tajikistan indicate that substantial levels of assistance, both humanitarian and developmental, will continue to be needed.
  
- # In light of the nature of short-lived emergency humanitarian assistance, PVOs should not set forth overly ambitious goals and objectives, e.g., improved health status. More realistically, humanitarian assistance should focus primarily on such outputs as reconstructed homes, the number of needy beneficiaries fed, and the number of wells and latrines installed. As the transition to longer-term development takes place, implementing agencies and donors can then devote increased attention to longer-term efforts to reach higher-level goals. Implementing agencies need to collect baseline data so that impact, such as improved health status, can be accurately measured. Given the nature of the assistance, the goal of working toward development was absent in the original grant agreements and thus in subsequent implementation supervision by USAID.
  
- # By actively involving indigenous groups, whether LNGOs or CBOs, in their operations from the outset, AKF and SCF improved the likelihood of achieving sustainability. USAID did not focus adequately on the potential for building sustainability through the involvement of LNGOs and CBOs.
  
- # The local NGO community appears to hold substantial potential as an emerging self-help force and should be approached through the development of both CBOs and LNGOs. Training and technical assistance are critical in building the capacity of the LNGO/CBO sector.
  
- # The lack of complete grant documentation makes it difficult to monitor effectively the implementation and progress of assistance efforts.

### **B. Recommendations**

- # Given USAID's strategy for assistance to Tajikistan, which includes a projected phase-out by 2000 as well as the likelihood of serious federal government budgetary constraints, future program priority should be given to PVO activities that
  - Improve or increase human productivity, e.g., LNGO and CBO capacities, health status, small enterprise development, small-scale agricultural production. Such an

approach would help the Tajik people identify and address their problems. Such an approach is important, given that government and private donor resources over the foreseeable future will be inadequate to solve the range of identified problems. To a great extent, USAID should look to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the relevant United Nations (UN) agencies to meet any major continuing need for humanitarian assistance, thus enabling USAID to focus on longer-term development priorities.

- Are sustainable by local communities and people following the involvement of PVOs.
- Recognize the need for geographic dispersion to other areas of need, subject to funding availability and coordination with the complementary activities of other donors.

# With respect to improving the overall management of PVO activities;

- The roles of the involved offices in USAID/CAR and the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe should be specifically defined and the PVO community informed accordingly.
- All essential PVO documentation should be submitted by USAID/Washington, USAID/CAR, and the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe. In addition, USAID should encourage PVO home offices to provide field representatives with essential documentation.
- USAID/CAR should continue its commendable efforts to clarify further the procedures involved in the review of PVO proposals and in modifying the criteria against which proposals will be judged. Final actions should be completed as soon as possible and relevant information provided to interested members of the PVO community.
- Assuming the continuation of the transition toward support for longer-term development activities, USAID proposed evaluation criteria should include a requirement for the presentation of adequate baseline data, including gender-related data to permit the accurate measurement of an activity's impact over time. Proposals should identify opportunities for partnerships or collaborations with other foreign PVOs for the purpose of achieving greater efficiency and outreach. Finally, proposals should address the involvement of LNGOs and CBOs as a means of ensuring sustainability.

**ANNEX A**

**FINANCIAL SUMMARIES**

**Aga Khan Foundation U.S.A. (AKF) Tajikistan Funding**

<b>Donor</b>	<b>Amount</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Dates</b>
USDA 1993	\$4,203,478 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1993-1994
USDA 1993	\$286,849	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1993-1994
USDA 1994	\$6,651,930 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1994-1995
USDA 1994	\$389,341	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1994-1995
USDA 1995	\$10,700,000 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1995-1996
USDA 1995	\$668,620	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1995-1996
State Department	\$275,000	Pamir I Hydroelectric Plant	1993-1995
State Department	\$115,000	Pamir I Hydroelectric Plant	1995-1997
USAID 1993	\$1,025,000	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1993-1994
USAID 1993 (and WLI)	\$600,000	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding LNGO Development	1993-Sept. 1996
AKF Funds	\$368,952	Match USAID/WLI Grant	1993-Sept. 1996
USAID 1994	\$522,000	Gorno-Badakhshan Health	1994-1997
USAID 1995	\$300,000	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1995-1996
USAID 1995	\$400,000	Pamir I Hydroelectric Plant	1995-1997
AKF Funds	\$300,000	Match State/USAID Pamir 1995	1995-1997
EuronAid	\$2,100,000	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1993
NOVIB	\$750,000 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1993
European Community Humanitarian Office	\$1,800,000 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1993
Swiss DDA	— <sup>2</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1993-1995
UNHCR/AKFC	— <sup>2</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1994-1995

EC	\$3,600,000 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1994-1995
ODA	\$3,600,000 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1994-1995
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$38,656,170</b>		

<sup>1</sup> Dollar value of food provided (if non-US purchase, \$750/mt CIF assumed).

<sup>2</sup> Various commodities for which dollar value cannot be determined.

### CARE/US (CARE) Tajikistan Funding

Donor	Amount	Activity	Dates
USDA	\$6,258,739 <sup>1</sup>	Vulnerable Group Feeding	Aug. 1994-June 1995
USDA	\$581,400	Vulnerable Group Feeding	Aug. 1994-June 1995
USDA	\$4,164,909 <sup>1</sup>	Vulnerable Group Feeding	June 1995-July 1996
USDA	\$546,173	Vulnerable Group Feeding	June 1995-July 1996
USAID	\$18,088	Distribution of Medicines	Feb. 1, 1994-April 15, 1994
USAID	\$38,725	Distribution of Medicines	April 21, 1994-June 21, 1994
USAID	\$49,098	Nutrition Assessment	May 1994-June 1994
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$11,657,132</b>		

<sup>1</sup> Dollar value of food provided.

### International Rescue Committee (IRC) Tajikistan Funding

Donor	Amount	Activity	Dates
UNICEF	\$21,000	School Water and Sanitation	June 1, 1995-Jan. 31, 1996
UNHCR	\$250,000	Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)	April 1, 1995-Dec. 31, 1995
UNHCR	\$83,876	QIPs for Soap Production	Dec. 1, 1994-Open
IRC	\$5,000	Unrestricted Assistance	Jan. 1, 1995-Dec. 31, 1995
USAID	\$650,000	Water Rehabilitation and Education	Aug. 1, 1994-Dec. 31, 1995
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$1,009,976</b>		

**Relief International (RI) Tajikistan Funding**

<b>Donor</b>	<b>Amount</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Dates</b>
Soros Foundation	\$244,874	Emergency Health Assistance	April 14, 1994-July 15, 1994
UNICEF	\$5,100	Health Data Collection	Aug. 1, 1994-Oct. 31, 1994
UNICEF	\$45,000 <sup>1</sup>	Pharmaceuticals	Aug. 1, 1994-Oct. 31, 1994
UNHCR	\$27,625	Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)	Oct. 1, 1994-Dec. 31, 1994
UNHCR	\$238,572	Urban Refugee Assistance	Jan. 1, 1995-Dec. 31, 1995
Direct Relief International	\$55,210 <sup>1</sup>	Donation of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies	July 21, 1994
Direct Relief International	\$446,688 <sup>1</sup>	Donation of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies	Dec. 1, 1994
Direct Relief International	\$160,942	Donation of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies	Sept. 14, 1995
USAID	\$1,000,000	Humanitarian Health Assistance	Sept. 8, 1994-July 7, 1995
USAID	\$250,000	Humanitarian Health Assistance	July 8, 1995-Feb. 7, 1996
State Department	\$45,582	Distribution of Department of Defense Medical Supplies	March 1, 1995-June 30, 1995
Department of Defense	\$500,000 <sup>1</sup>	Medical Supplies	April 4, 1995
NOVIB	\$300,000	Procurement of Medicines	July 8, 1995-Feb. 7, 1996
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$3,194,593</b>		

<sup>1</sup> Dollar value of medical commodities provided.

### Save the Children U.S. (SCF) Tajikistan Funding

<b>Donor</b>	<b>Amount</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Dates</b>
USDA 1994	\$1,282,119	Food for Work Reconstruction	Aug. 5, 1994-Dec. 31, 1995
USDA 1995	\$1,179,938	Food for Work Reconstruction	May 12, 1995-Dec. 31, 1996
USDA 1994-1995	\$9,227,708 <sub>1,2</sub>	Food for Work Reconstruction	May 12, 1995-Dec. 31, 1996
WFP	\$15,000 <sup>3</sup>	Food for Work Reconstruction	Aug. 1, 1995-Dec. 31, 1995
USAID	\$562,300	Food for Work Reconstruction	Aug. 5, 1994-April 30, 1996
USAID	\$313,200	Health	Sept. 21, 1995-Sept. 21, 1996
Soros Foundation	\$50,000	Group Guaranteed Lending	Open
UNICEF	\$200,000 <sup>1</sup>	Pharmaceuticals In-Kind	July 1, 1995-July 1, 1997
UNHCR/UNDP	\$759,800	Construction Materials, Etc.	May 1, 1995-March 31, 1996
RNG	\$237,960	School Reconstruction	July 31, 1995-Sept. 30, 1996
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$13,828,025</b>		

<sup>1</sup> Dollar value of commodities provided.

<sup>2</sup> Annualized commodity value breakdown not available.

<sup>3</sup> Cash plus 1,000 mt wheat (not given dollar value since WFP retained title).

#### Totals by PVO (including dollar value of commodities provided)

<b>PVO</b>	<b>Amount</b>
Aga Khan Foundation U.S.A.	\$38,656,170
CARE/US	\$11,657,132
International Rescue Committee	\$1,009,976
Relief International	\$3,194,593
Save the Children Federation U.S.	\$13,828,025
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$68,345,896</b>

**Totals by Donor (including dollar value of commodities provided)**

<b>Donor</b>	<b>Humanitarian Programs</b>	<b>Development Programs</b>	<b>Humanitarian Funding</b>	<b>Development Funding</b>	<b>Total Funding</b>
USAID <sup>1</sup>	7	6	\$3,153,813	\$2,574,598	\$5,728,411
USDA	10	4	\$34,451,439	\$11,689,765	\$46,141,204
UNHCR/ UNDP	2	4	\$238,752	\$1,121,301	\$1,360,053
UNICEF	2	2	\$245,000	\$26,100	\$271,100
WFP <sup>2</sup>	— <sup>2</sup>	1	— <sup>2</sup>	\$15,000	\$15,000
Soros Foundation	1	1	\$244,874	\$50,000	\$294,874
Europe <sup>3</sup>	7	1	\$12,150,000	\$237,960	\$12,387,960
State Department	1	2	\$45,582	\$390,000	\$435,582
Department of Defense	1	—	\$500,000	—	\$500,000
PVO Funds <sup>4</sup>	3	3	\$662,840	\$673,952	\$1,336,792
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>\$51,692,300</b>	<b>\$16,778,676</b>	<b>\$68,470,976</b>

<sup>1</sup> \$9.55 million in additional USAID resources was channeled through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (\$1 million); International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (\$100,000); International Organization for Migration (IOM) (\$736,000); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (\$3.4 million); United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (\$714,000); and World Food Program (WFP) (\$3.8 million).

<sup>2</sup> WFP also made direct distribution to over 450,000 beneficiaries of humanitarian food supplies financed by USAID and other donors.

<sup>3</sup> European Union organizations plus individual governments and NGOs.

<sup>4</sup> Funds directly assigned by PVOs to programs; PVO indirect administrative costs cannot be determined from data available, but were believed to be substantial.

**ANNEX B**

**SCOPE OF WORK (SOW)**

[SCOPE OF WORK PASTED INTO DOCUMENT HERE]











## ANNEX C

### EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

#### A. TEAM COMPOSITION

BHM International, Inc., was selected to carry out the evaluation and recruited the following team members:

John M. Miller  
Jane I. Yudelman  
Paul N. Wenger (Team Leader)

#### B. GENERAL EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

Given the tight scheduling required by the six-person-week level of effort in Dushanbe established in the Scope of Work and the number and variety of activities to be assessed, documentation to be reviewed, and interviews to be conducted, the team undertook a schedule of 1) becoming familiar with program documents; 2) meeting with USAID officers with program responsibilities and with U.S. Embassy officials with knowledge of the country; 3) interviewing PVO personnel, whether presently USAID-funded or potentially eligible, and government and UN officials; and 4) carrying out field evaluations of major representative activities. The team used the last few days in Almaty primarily for report writing and meetings with USAID staff to discuss findings and recommendations and to produce a draft report for completion in Washington before receipt of USAID comments.

Due to the number of PVOs and activities to be assessed, the evaluation team divided the initial write-up of PVO and program activities and distributed primary responsibility for each to individual team members. The final evaluation of each PVO and the more general aspects of the overall evaluation and lessons learned and recommendations are, however, a joint product of the team.

#### C. LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

##### 1. United States Government

Department of State and USAID/Washington

Mark Nichols, Project Officer, USAID/ENI/EHA

Teresa Ward, Director, USAID/ENI/Central Asian Republics (CAR)

Linsey Howard, Department of State/INR

William Jackson, Department of State/CAR Desk Officer

Delphia Dirks, USAID/ENI/CAR

Lois Godiksen, USAID/ENI/CAR

Tom McKay, Department of State/S/NIS

Christine Sheckler, Democracy Project Officer, USAID/Washington

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

James Butterworth, NIS Advisor

USAID/Central Asian Republics (USAID/CAR)

Patricia Buckles, Acting Mission Director

Edward Birgells, Project Development Officer

Jonathan Addleton, Program Officer

Marilynn Schmidt, Director, Office of Social Transition

Robert Alexander, Health and Humanitarian Assistant, Office of Social Transition

U.S. Embassy, Dushanbe

Ambassador Grant Smith

Brad Hanson, Deputy Chief of Mission

Martha Patterson, Economic/Commercial Officer

**2. Government of Tajikistan**

Erkin Kosimov, Chief of the Department of International Organizations and International Law,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Israil Nazaralievich Shoev, Chief of the Office of Non-Governmental Organizations of the Ministry  
of Justice and Director of the Office of Private Organizations of the Ministry of Justice (and two  
deputies)

**3. United Nations Agencies**

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Pierre-François Pirlot, Chief of Mission and DHA Humanitarian Coordinator

Amin Awad, Senior Programme Officer

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Bogdan Lisovich, Deputy Resident Representative

Basil Comnas, Senior Programme Advisor

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Johan Fagerskiold, Resident Project Officer

World Bank

Michael Mills, Principal Human Resources Economist, Europe and Central Asia Department III

World Food Program (WFP)

Trevor Martin, Country Director

**4. Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs)**

Aga Khan Foundation (AKF)

Hakim N. Feerasta, Chief Executive Officer, Dushanbe

Patricia Scheid, AKF/Washington

CARE/US (CARE)

M.D.L. Narayan, Country Administrator

K.T. Srinivasan, Program Advisor

James Stewart, Logistics Manager

Nuriddinon Farrunh, Team Leader

Deborah Clark, CARE/Atlanta

International Rescue Committee (IRC)

Rob Andrew, Country Director

Gina De Campo, Financial Manager

William Farrell, Small Business Advisor

IRC field staff and SED participants

Relief International (RI)

Akram Eltom, Country Director

Margaret Bishop, SED Coordinator

Faiza Janmohamed, Health Services Coordinator

RI field staff

FAP staff

FAP attendees

SED women's group

Save the Children Federation/US (SCF)

Robert Reid, Field Office Director

Bharat Devkota, Assistant Field Office Director/Programs

Pamela Husain, Coprogram Director, Kurgan-Tyube

S.M. Husain, Coprogram Director, Kurgan-Tyube

Group Guaranteed Lending Program group

Work Brigade group

Robert Kaufman, SCF/Westport, CT

International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Goulsara Pulatova, Senior Program Assistant

Mercy Corps International (MCI)

James D. Hinton, Country Director  
Beverly Hinton, Administration/Finance Manager  
Thomas E. Hensleigh, Country Director, MCI/Kazakhstan  
Dale Jones, MCI/Portland, OR

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- Monthly Summary Reports (January-October 1995)
- Water Pump Installation Summary (November 1994-November 1995)
- Small Enterprise Development (SED) Program Summary
- IRC Tajikistan Organizational Chart

Letter from Clement J. Bucker, Grant Office, USAID to Maha Muna, IRC. Subject: Grant No. CCN-0001-G-00-4107-00. August 30, 1994.

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PIO/T, May 1995, requesting amendment of Grant No. CCN-0001-G-00-4107-00 (see above).

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## ANNEX D

### USAID PROGRAM IN TAJIKISTAN

#### A. SUMMARY OF USAID PROGRAM BUDGET

##### USAID Program Budget for Tajikistan

Project	Through December 1994	Through September 1995 <sup>1</sup>	Total
Special Initiatives <sup>2</sup>	\$18,074,547	\$4,900,000	\$22,974,547
Environment	\$464,054	—	\$464,054
Health Care	\$2,068,880	\$533,000	\$2,601,880
Private Sector	\$1,995	—	\$1,995
Democratic Reform	\$457,160	\$850,000	\$1,307,160
Economic Restructuring	—	\$250,000	\$250,000
Exchanges and Training	\$2,867,886	\$1,650,000	\$4,517,886
Interagency Transfers	\$393,225	\$1,030,000	\$1,423,225
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$24,327,747<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>\$9,213,000</b>	<b>\$33,540,747</b>

<sup>1</sup> Estimates provided by USAID/Washington.

<sup>2</sup> The “special initiatives” line item has funded most PVO activities and provided funding to international organizations such as WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Excludes notional figure of \$7 million provided to Central-Asian American Enterprise Fund (CAAEF) and available for programming in Tajikistan; grants to Eurasian Foundation for possible use in Tajikistan are also excluded.

#### B. DISCUSSION

Though an important part of the USAID effort in Tajikistan, direct USAID funding for the U.S. PVOs evaluated by the team is not the only assistance being delivered to the former Soviet state. Some \$9.55 million has been channeled from international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (\$1 million); the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (\$100,000); the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (\$736,000); the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (\$3.4 million); the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (\$714,000); and the World Food Program (WFP) (\$3.8 million).

Moreover, the USAID Strategy for Central Asia, as approved on July 8, 1994, recognizes Tajikistan's need for both "emergency assistance as a special area of attention" and assistance "designed where possible to help shape and direct the programming patterns that could emerge in a more stable and reforming environment." Thus, the potential for transition to development is important for USAID and the individual PVOs in terms of both the substantive nature of the programs to be delivered and the management and procedural capacities of the participating institutions .

In keeping with the strategy's mandate, USAID is making efforts to move from short-term humanitarian relief to a more cohesive PVO program that emphasizes long-term development. These efforts are reflected in the criteria established by USAID/CAR for the evaluation of 1996 PVO proposals. The criteria explicitly acknowledge the continuing transition from humanitarian relief assistance to longer-term development and emphasize the importance of strengthening the capacity of the Tajik people to address their own problems.

Under the management structure in place for assistance to Tajikistan, as is the case generally throughout the NIS programs, responsibilities are centralized in Washington, D.C. The Department of State makes final decisions with respect to funding allocations, and USAID/Washington representatives serve as Project Officers for grants awarded to U.S. PVOs. In the case of the Central Asian Republics, the structure is further complicated by the USAID/ Central Asian Republics office (USAID/CAR) operating from Almaty. The office seeks to serve five highly individual and often difficult-to-reach countries. Within USAID/CAR, responsibility for monitoring PVO activities has recently shifted to the Office of Social Transition, with the continuing active involvement of the Office of Program and Project Support.

The responsibility of USAID/CAR is to represent USAID in the five Central Asian NIS countries, provide country-specific knowledge and advice, shape program direction and future program strategy, and provide technical and program input for activities proposed for USAID funding in the region. The arrival in Dushanbe of the USAID/CAR Country Representative in mid-April 1995 put USAID/CAR in an especially solid position to increase its input into program design and monitoring activities for Tajikistan. Previously, regular USAID/CAR field monitoring of PVO activities was not possible, though members of the USAID/CAR staff did on occasion take field trips, visit PVO sites, and discuss ongoing activities as well as possible future proposals.

In conjunction with the U.S. PVO community, other bilateral and multilateral donors have to a degree also played a role in supporting development efforts in Tajikistan. Two additional funding forces--the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank--are soon to put into operation programs that could have significant bearing on the U.S. PVO community.

Working through four regional offices, UNDP plans to implement a \$20 million project over a four-to five-year period. Under this program, U.S. PVOs will be able to tender on a competitive basis for community development projects ranging from \$5,000 to \$60,000.

The World Bank is examining the feasibility of setting up a grant-making mechanism for projects that promote employment generation. If authorized, the project is expected to be functioning within the next six to nine months and will bring a total of \$10 million over two years into Tajikistan.

These two forces will have considerable bearing on the U.S. PVO community. USAID should factor the programs into its own future funding for U.S. PVOs.

In addition to working with the U.S. PVOs and the international organizations cited above, USAID has supported a number of other programs addressing long-term development concerns, including

- # Tajik Participation in the Newly Independent States (NIS) Education and Training (NET) Program. The program enables Tajik officials and private citizens to visit the United States for short-term Russian-language-taught training courses, especially in key areas such as economic restructuring.
- # A follow-on NET program designed to help maintain contact between Tajiks and American counterparts as well as among Tajik returnees.
- # A number of activities in the areas of democratization, elections, and local NGO development.
- # Short-term technical assistance (TA) in economic restructuring.
- # A medical partnership linking the Boulder Colorado Community Hospital with two similar institutions in Dushanbe.
- # Participation in a regional family planning initiative, women's health programs, and epidemiological activities.
- # Short-term work related to legal and democratization issues.
- # Participation in a regional farmer-to-farmer program in the area around Khojent, an area unserved by USAID programs.
- # Participation in the Central-Asian American Enterprise Fund.

Moreover, a number of other USAID-funded groups, though not a part of the PVO effort under the Special Initiatives project, have made important contributions to the Local Non-Governmental Organization (LNGO) sector in Tajikistan. These include

- # ISAR, which is a U.S. PVO operating throughout the Former Soviet Union (FSU). It specializes in environmental issues and has provided 17 small grants totaling \$26,000 to

local organizations. Projects range from supporting environmental awareness among school children to providing emergency food and heat to animals in the Dushanbe Zoo.

- # The American Legal Consortium helped support a major conference on LNGO development in Dushanbe in summer 1995 and has provided seven grants totaling \$120,000. Examples include the support of seminars on conflict resolution, civic education, and information dissemination.
- # The Counterpart Consortium, charged with promoting LNGO development across Central Asia, is setting up an office in Dushanbe. It has provided a grant to one local organization and anticipates further work, including LNGO training and development.
- # Eurasia Foundation, operating throughout the FSU, has thus far provided four grants totaling \$28,000 to local groups, including educational institutions. For example, it supported a two-day workshop on business development in Khojent and supports introduction of e-mail communication at the university in Dushanbe.

## ANNEX E

### PVO PROGRAM DESCRIPTION--AGA KHAN FOUNDATION U.S.A. (AKF)

#### AKF Tajikistan Funding

Donor	Amount	Activity	Dates
USDA 1993	\$4,203,478 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1993-1994
USDA 1993	\$286,849	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1993-1994
USDA 1994	\$6,651,930 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1994-1995
USDA 1994	\$389,341	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1994-1995
USDA 1995	\$10,700,000 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1995-1996
USDA 1995	\$668,620	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1995-1996
State Department	\$275,000	Pamir I Hydroelectric Plant	1993-1995
State Department	\$115,000	Pamir I Hydroelectric Plant	1995-1997
USAID 1993	\$1,025,000	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding	1993-1994
USAID 1993 (as WLI sub-grantee)	\$600,000	Gorno-Badakhshan Feeding LNGO Development	1993-Sept. 1996
AKF	\$368,952	Match USAID/WLI Grant	1993-Sept. 1996
USAID 1994	\$522,000	Gorno-Badakhshan Health	1994-1997
USAID 1995	\$300,000	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1995-1996
USAID 1995	\$400,000	Pamir I Hydroelectric Plant	1995-1997
AKF	\$300,000	Match State/USAID Pamir 1995	1995-1997
EuronAid	\$2,100,000	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1993
NOVIB	\$750,000 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1993
European Community Humanitarian Office	\$1,800,000 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1993
Swiss DDA	— <sup>2</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1993-1995
UNHCR/AKFC	— <sup>2</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1994-1995
EC	\$3,600,000 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1994-1995

ODA	\$3,600,000 <sup>1</sup>	Gorno-Badakhshan Humanitarian	1994-1995
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$38,656,170</b>		

<sup>1</sup> Dollar value of food provided (if non-U.S. purchase, \$750/mt CIF assumed).

<sup>2</sup> Various commodities for which dollar value cannot be determined.

## A. BACKGROUND

The Aga Khan Foundation was established in 1967 as a private, nonsectarian, not-for-profit organization. Worldwide, AKF administers up to \$50 million in development programs annually. It concentrates its funding in the lower-income countries of Africa and Asia, with an emphasis on health, education, and rural development. While it frequently works in areas where large numbers of its own Ismaili sect live, AKF always carries out its programs without any discrimination among beneficiaries.

## B. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

In late 1992, AKF became involved in humanitarian assistance to the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) in response to the region's emergency food, fuel, and medical needs. The region, which had absorbed an influx of a USAID-estimated 60,000 to 80,000 largely non-Ismaili IDPs over and above its original predominantly Ismaili population of 170,000. The objectives of the AKF program were to a) enable vulnerable groups to survive the coming months; b) prevent, to the extent possible, the destruction of local resources, particularly trees and livestock; and c) expand the capacity of local people to organize themselves for development activities. Funded by over \$21 million in food and cash from USDA and \$1.8 million from USAID (to support food and fuel procurement as well as related transportation and administration in addition to medical supplies), the program fed, clothed, and provided health benefits to 221,000 people, close to the entire expanded population, on a completely nondiscriminatory basis. The initial phase of the emergency effort was due to terminate in September 1993, but a continuation of the serious economic and food security needs required program extensions through 1995. Over the three years to date, AKF's humanitarian programs have received over \$36 million from a large number of donors, including USAID and USDA.

In addition to its immediate humanitarian impact, the initial AKF program succeeded in setting the stage for beginning to organize communities for longer-term social and economic development. Clearly a leader in the field of strengthening local NGOs, AKF responded to its mandate and began the development aspect of its program by creating an LNGO in 1992. The Pamir Relief and Development Program (PRDP) has played a key role to date in making the Gorno-Badakhshan development program sustainable. The program received high marks in its September 1995 evaluation. PRDP monitors and assists in the implementation of relief and development activities in Gorno-Badakhshan and is patterned after AKF's Rural Support Programme in northern Pakistan.

Subsequently, AKF submitted another proposal to USAID in the amount of \$400,000 for development activities in Gorno-Badakhshan, including support for the Pamir I hydroelectric power plant, which had already received \$390,000 from the U.S. Department of State. USAID was awarded the requested grant in September 1995. AKF, in turn, has contributed \$300,000 of its own funds for Pamir I as counterpart to the State/USAID funding.

In addition to the USAID assistance noted above, AKF received, through a USAID grant to World Learning, Inc. (WLI), a \$600,000 awarded in 1993 for a two-year pilot development program in Gorno-Badakhshan. AKF contributed \$368,952 of its own funds to the program which is aimed at strengthening the private voluntary sector and initiating medium-term development activities in health, education, and agriculture. In addition, the Tajikistan portion of a centrally funded FVA/PVC Competitive Grants Program has to date totaled \$522,000 and focuses on AKF health programs in Gorno-Badakhshan.

AKF is currently working in Tajikistan under an Agreement of Cooperation signed between the country's president and the Aga Khan during the latter's visit in May 1995. AKF has informed the evaluation team that, as a result of a highly favorable mid-term assessment, it intends to continue its development activities in Gorno-Badakhshan, with emphasis on addressing agricultural productivity through PRDP. It hopes to replicate its success with a similar program in Pakistan.

It should be noted that, due to weather and logistical constraints, the evaluation team was unable to visit Gorno-Badakhshan to verify directly the activities and reported accomplishments of AKF; therefore, all statements concerning AKF's program are based on documentary analysis plus interviews with its Tajikistan chief executive officer, its Washington representative, and other knowledgeable sources.

### **C. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND EFFECTIVENESS**

AKF employs one expatriate and a few local support staff in its office in Dushanbe. Its program is decentralized, with most responsibilities the province of the PRDP. Two long-term foreign advisers—an agricultural development specialist and an institutional development adviser—provide assistance to PRDP. In addition, several short-term advisers have provided assistance as needed. PRDP has a staff of approximately 85, about 30 of whom are employed in support positions.

The evaluation team was unable to obtain either financial or other reports from AKF's office for the 1993 grant. The team learned that all accounting and financial reporting was performed in AKF's Geneva office, although the financial data set out above were, in fact, obtained from the AKF Washington office after the team's return. Nevertheless, while some of AKF's direct management functions can be seen as confusingly divided among Gorno-Badakhshan, Dushanbe, Geneva, and Washington, the organization's demonstrated ability to work effectively in the field through PRDP has contributed to sound management and the potential sustainability of both its humanitarian and development activities.

To add to the management challenge, neither the USAID/CAR Country Representative's Office in Dushanbe nor USAID/CAR in Almaty had copies of the Program Performance Plans and Reports called for in the grant. According to the grant, AKF was to submit the following: a) Project Implementation Plan, b) Quarterly Reports, c) Special Reports, and d) a Final Report. These submissions were sent only to USAID Washington and were not required to be distributed in the field, although information copies of financial reports were to be submitted to the Regional Controller and the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe. (The shortcomings of USAID management are discussed elsewhere.)

#### **D. IMPACT ACHIEVED**

In 1993, the economic and food situation in Gorno-Badakhshan was deteriorating. In responding to the emergency, AKF looked to PRDP as the implementing agency and as a means to mobilize the community. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, Gorno-Badakhshan received 90 percent of its food requirements from the Soviet Union. As a result, even though Soviet imports ceased, a Soviet-era distribution system remained in place within Gorno-Badakhshan and could be used. In the case of food required in response to the 1993 emergency, food was shipped to Osh, Kyrgyzstan, and then forwarded by truck to Gorno-Badakhshan, where a Humanitarian Assistance Committee had already prepared distribution plans. Radio broadcasts informed the beneficiaries of when, where, and what food commodities would be available. Emergency assistance was provided equitably to all beneficiaries based on lists of family names and numbers maintained at the village level. Use of the village structure minimized overhead and reportedly kept the loss rate at less than 1 percent. During 1993, AKF reported distribution of over 10,000 mt of food and of other commodities such as tea and washing powder. In 1994, about 13,700 mt of food commodities were delivered, and, as of early December 1995, 18,000 mt. The number of feeding beneficiaries is given as 221,000, with 21,000 children also provided with shoes and clothing.

#### **E. LEVERAGING RESOURCES**

AKF clearly has the ability to leverage additional assistance resources, as demonstrated in the above financial table (USAID provided less than 10 percent of the AKF Tajikistan budget directly or indirectly).

## F. TRANSITION TO DEVELOPMENT

AKF is undertaking development activities in association with its Agricultural Reform Program, which is operated by PRDP in conjunction with the WLI grant. The immediate objective of the program is food self-sufficiency. Gorno-Badakhshan requires about 30,000 mt wheat per year but currently produces only about 5,000 mt. Indicative of the region's capacity to produce, wheat production in 1963 totaled 16,000 mt, dropping to 3,000 mt in 1993 due to a number of factors, including a shift in land use from food to fodder, and the inability to obtain inputs due to the economic collapse of both the FSU and Tajikistan.

After discussions with the government, AKF was able to make land allocations to individuals with the right of private management. In conjunction with the introduction of improved seeds, yields of potatoes and wheat increased by 88 percent and 18 percent, respectively, over the past harvest. The September harvest of spring wheat showed increased yields from the previous year from about 700 pounds per hectare to 2.5 tons per hectare. In repayment for improved seeds provided by AKF, farmers are required to provide two kilos of seed for every one received. AKF hopes that with continued food production increases, the food crisis in Gorno-Badakhshan will come to an end in five to seven years.

An independent evaluation of AKF development activities in Gorno-Badakhshan, with emphasis on the WLI/PRDP program, was conducted in mid-1995 by the respected Dr. Raymond Fort. He concludes that

"By nearly any objective standard or comparison of results with similar efforts elsewhere, the performance of PRDP has been outstanding. Given the short two-year period of PRDP operation, it is best to balance enthusiasm with measured optimism for the difficult periods to come; even so, PRDP's performance to date is impressive . . . ."

As a result of the success reflected in Dr. Fort's evaluation, AKF looks to move increasingly into development activities, including such areas as livestock, seed production, revival of industry, and continued efforts in education and health--all underpinned by community participation based on the regional development approach evidenced to date in Gorno-Badakhshan. Although much of AKF's assistance today is provided to all, the organization looks to the day soon when those who are able to do so will pay for benefits received. AKF believes that by building on the country's infrastructure and high literacy rate (95 percent), Gorno-Badakhshan will be able to move rapidly to a revival of its economy.

Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, Gorno-Badakhshan depended on diesel-generated electric power. Subsequently, faced with serious fuel shortages, people increasingly turned to the forests for fuel, degrading the environment as a result. The Pamir I hydroelectric facility was under construction at the time of the breakup and needed only a relatively small investment of about \$700,000 for completion, thereby not only helping to preserve forest resources but also providing power for

manufacturing and commercial activities and resultant employment opportunities. USAID has recently invested in the power facility under the Special Initiatives Project.

In addition, AKF plans to upgrade Khorog State University into a “regional center of excellence,” focusing on a limited number of disciplines. Furthermore, AKF looks to improve English-language teaching at four or five universities across Tajikistan at a future date.

## **G. DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL NGOS**

As the above discussions indicate, AKF is actively involved in supporting the development of the local NGO PRDP. Community participation and empowerment are keystones of AKF's approach and the basis on which it envisions phasing out its presence over time. In the case of Gorno-Badakhshan, PRDP is the development vehicle. It must be conceded that AKF's approach is resource-rich, which may limit replication of its effects in situations where similar inputs are not available.

## **H. CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

No specific information is available to indicate to what extent USAID-funded support to AKF has contributed directly to conflict resolution. Nonetheless, AKF assured the team that all emergency and development assistance provided to Gorno-Badakhshan has been equitably distributed among all ethnic and religious groups, including IDPs, despite the fact that the region's resident population is predominately Ismaili. To the extent that such assistance has contributed to reducing stresses within and among communities and averting crises, it can be argued that the potential for peaceful conflict resolution has been indirectly enhanced.

Moreover, AKF's assistance in helping Gorno-Badakhshan absorb large numbers of non-Ismaili IDPs without incurring economic disaster certainly played a major role avoiding the ethnic conflict that might well have resulted.

## **I. FINDINGS**

- # AKF's focus on community participation, including support for the development of the local NGO PRDP, contributed significantly to the success of its efforts thus far in Gorno-Badakhshan.

## **J. RECOMMENDATIONS**

- # AKF's focus from the outset on the development of a local implementing NGO has contributed to the sustainability of its efforts. AKF should be held up to other PVOs as an example to be emulated.

- # Given that AKF has been successful in obtaining a high level of resources from other donors and that its community development approach is resource rich, USAID should assess closely any further assistance to AKF to ensure that such assistance supports USAID's priorities and leverages significant additional support from other sources.
  
- # To permit more effective monitoring of ongoing USAID-funded AKF activities in Tajikistan, copies of AKF grants and reports should be routinely provided to USAID offices in Almaty and Dushanbe.

## ANNEX F

### PVO PROGRAM DESCRIPTION--CARE/US (CARE)

#### CARE Tajikistan Funding

Donor	Amount	Activity	Dates
USDA	\$6,258,739 <sup>1</sup>	Vulnerable Group Feeding	Aug. 1994-June 1995
USDA	\$581,400	Vulnerable Group Feeding	Aug. 1994-June 1995
USDA	\$4,164,909 <sup>1</sup>	Vulnerable Group Feeding	June 1995-July 1996
USDA	\$546,173	Vulnerable Group Feeding	June 1995-July 1996
USAID	\$18,088	Distribution of Medicines	Feb. 1, 1994-April 15, 1994
USAID	\$38,725	Distribution of Medicines	April 21, 1994-June 21, 1994
USAID	\$49,098	Nutrition Assessment	May 1994-June 1994
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$11,657,132</b>		

<sup>1</sup> Dollar value of food provided.

#### A. BACKGROUND

CARE has been working in relief and development worldwide for 50 years and currently operates programs in more than 35 countries. The focus of its work for many years has been food delivery and nutrition programs. More recently, through monetization of commodities and other funds, CARE has become involved in agriculture, agroforestry, health, SED, population, and water; headquarters has expressed an interest in moving more intensively into development, an area in which funding is available. Most recently, CARE has been building its capacity to work with partners—government, PVOs, LNGOs, businesses, or community-based organizations.

CARE Tajikistan began operation in 1994, fulfilling roles for which it was well suited and that were much needed: delivery of emergency medical supplies with USAID funds and a major vulnerable-group feeding program with USDA support.

#### B. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The two grants that CARE Tajikistan received from USAID terminated in June 1994, although CARE's USDA-funded feeding activities continued. Given that the focus of this evaluation is on USAID-funded activities, the team did not spend as much time with CARE as with the other PVOs. Further, the focus of the discussions with CARE suggested consideration of future directions and relief vis à vis development.

**CARE and USAID.** CARE's work in Tajikistan began in 1994 with its Tajikistan Emergency Logistics Assistance Program (TELAP). Under this program, CARE provided coordinated administrative, logistical, and commodity management support services to the U.S. government in the receipt, storage, and distribution of approximately 20 mt of emergency medicines and medical supplies to recipient health care centers in Tajikistan. The one-month project was extended by two months under the title of TELAP II. After the two-month period drew to a close, CARE received an additional amendment to conduct a food security assessment, entitled the Tajikistan Nutrition Assessment (TNA), in selected parts of Tajikistan. The initial grant to CARE for TELAP totaled \$18,088; the subsequent extension totaled \$38,725. In addition, USAID provided CARE with \$49,098 to conduct the TNA.

### **C. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND EFFECTIVENESS**

CARE Tajikistan's staff consists of 38 nationals and three expatriates. The organization has made a concerted effort to decentralize its management structure. Believing strongly in building the capacity of its national staff, CARE has provided staff with ongoing training in areas of need.

Project development begins at CARE's Tajikistan office. Concept papers are sent to its NIS regional office in Tbilisi, where project proposals are finalized and sent to CARE headquarters for approval. The process ensures that a high degree of technical knowledge is brought to bear on the development of CARE's programs. Similarly, technical support is readily available during project implementation.

In addition, CARE Tajikistan's success in its USDA-funded vulnerable-group feeding programs reinforces CARE's worldwide reputation for commodity delivery management. USDA officials have also noted that CARE has done a good job in delivering food to needy persons in Tajikistan.

### **D. IMPACT ACHIEVED**

TELAP concluded in June 1994. By all accounts, the program appears to have succeeded. CARE has a strong history of monitoring and distributing food to beneficiaries and demonstrated its expertise in TELAP. The TNA nutrition assessment was also completed in June 1994. It focused on Dushanbe and its environs and the regional cities of Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab.

**Dushanbe and Environs.** The TNA report highlighted the need for CARE to focus a significant portion of its USDA-funded food commodity distribution program in the periurban areas of Dushanbe to mitigate the areas' food shortages. In addition, it called for CARE to address longer-term development needs by introducing alternative employment opportunities such as Food for Work programs and small joint business ventures.

**Kurgan-Tyube.** The findings of the TNA suggested that CARE should focus on food distribution only at the times of greatest need. The TNA recognized that Kurgan-Tyube is an agriculturally rich area with the potential to produce either sufficient food to meet its own needs or sufficient cash crops (e.g., cotton) to purchase food internationally. In addition, food distribution should focus on

households in greatest need, that is, those whose homes were destroyed and have not yet been repaired. In addressing longer-term development needs, the report called for CARE to a) implement projects to increase household crop production by making seeds, fertilizer, tools, and fuel available, with community input as to the types and variety of crops to be promoted; b) investigate projects for increasing the sale and marketing of crops; and c) explore business partnership projects for processing cotton and cloth within the collective farms (kolkhozes).

**Kulyab.** The TNA report recommended targeted food distribution to mitigate immediate and impending food shortages. It also endorsed the type of development projects recommended for Kurgan-Tyube, but with greater emphasis on pumped potable water systems and irrigation.

Overall nutritional data (June 1994) indicated that while there is no acute malnutrition in the three regions, moderate malnourishment is a problem, implying that the population has a low margin of reserve and is unlikely to withstand any significant deterioration in food availability. USAID therefore recommended that agencies work together to establish and maintain a reliable system for monitoring nutritional levels in different districts.

CARE states that it has used the nutrition data and analysis in all its food programming and reports. Some of the recommendations were obviously reflected in the recent development of several new proposals, for example, the proposal to work with the Dekhan Farmers Associations. As such, the TNA has provided valuable insights for CARE's future direction in the three geographic regions.

Nonetheless, it is surprising that it has taken CARE a year and a half to adopt the longer-term development recommendations. Furthermore, with little concrete data available to the PVO community in 1994, CARE could have more actively used the information to promote development activities with other PVOs. In particular, it could have spearheaded a movement to undertake a nutritional assessment of children under five years of age.

In sum, while the results of the TNA have not been exploited to their fullest, they have helped to guide CARE, if somewhat slowly, in its transition from relief to development.

## **E. LEVERAGING RESOURCES**

With the exception of medical inputs from Project HOPE, CARE has to date received its resources almost exclusively from the USG (USAID and USDA). However, as it expands its outreach into development, CARE hopes to enter a new funding phase. It has a reasonable expectation of EU funding on the order of \$600,000 for the food security program discussed below. At the same time, CARE/Germany has expressed an interest in helping to fund CARE/US in its development activities.

## **F. TRANSITION TO DEVELOPMENT**

While CARE still sees itself as primarily directed toward food delivery to vulnerable groups, it has accepted the importance of moving into development-oriented programs as well. CARE recently

completed a proposal to address issues of household food security. The one-year project would provide assistance to approximately 53,000 people who grow, receive, trade, or otherwise benefit from local wheat production through private and kolkhoz farming. CARE believes that with assistance to private enterprises in cooperation with the Dekhan Farmers Associations throughout Tajikistan, grains can be milled locally. CARE believes that community-based milling enterprises will a) further develop the independence and decentralization of agricultural support activities and b) enhance the capacity of local communities to make greater use of land, labor, and limited resources.

The CARE/Dushanbe staff is excited by the move toward development but wants to approach the transition from relief to development slowly and cautiously.

### **G. DEVELOPMENT OF LNGOs**

CARE has not worked to date with any LNGOs in Tajikistan. It is, however, proposing to work with the Dekhan Farmers Associations in the near future by providing training and agriculture inputs. CARE views the associations as indigenous organizations somewhat similar to NGOs.

### **H. CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

CARE does not specify conflict resolution in its programming objectives. It does, however, view its role as crucial to avoiding if not resolving conflict in that it provides needed food commodities that help reduce the potential for civil unrest. Moreover, in distributing food, CARE staff has on occasion ignored orders from various militias to stop deliveries in certain areas, thereby putting staff members at risk.

### **I. FINDINGS**

- # CARE has been deficient in building sustainability into its programs by relying solely on its own institutional capabilities.
- # CARE has, however, demonstrated the ability to deliver food and medical supplies and provide the necessary logistical support for food distribution to vulnerable groups.
- # CARE/Tajikistan has been slow to move toward development, but CARE/Atlanta plans to accelerate the process.

### **J. RECOMMENDATIONS**

- # Future USAID funding for CARE in Tajikistan should emphasize greater attention to building sustainability into CARE programs.

# Given the massive needs of vulnerable groups in Tajikistan and CARE's expertise in the field, CARE should still be considered a leading candidate for any USAID humanitarian PVO programming.



## ANNEX G

### PVO PROGRAM DESCRIPTION--INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC)

#### IRC Tajikistan Funding

Donor	Amount	Activity	Dates
UNICEF	\$21,000	School Water and Sanitation	June 1, 1995-Jan. 31, 1996
UNHCR	\$250,000	Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)	April 1, 1995-Dec. 31, 1995
UNHCR	\$83,876	QIPs for Soap Production	Dec. 1, 1994-Open
IRC	\$5,000	Unrestricted Assistance	Jan. 1, 1995-Dec. 31, 1995
USAID	\$650,000	Water Rehabilitation and Education	Aug. 1, 1994-Dec. 31, 1995
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$1,009,976</b>		

#### A. BACKGROUND

IRC was founded in 1933 at the request of Albert Einstein to assist anti-Nazi opponents of Hitler. Since then, IRC has become the leading American nonsectarian, voluntary organization serving refugees worldwide.

From the beginning, IRC's mission has been to help the victims of racial, religious, and ethnic persecution and people uprooted by violence to survive and rebuild their lives. In addition, IRC's work has evolved to include assistance to displaced people within their own borders and to refugees during repatriation.

#### B. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

In early 1994, with the encouragement of USAID, IRC sent a team to Tajikistan to assess the feasibility of establishing a country presence to assist with humanitarian needs resulting from the 1992 civil war. In fall 1994 at the request of UNHCR, IRC assumed implementation responsibility for a water and sanitation program instituted by Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)/Belgium. The program focused on the areas most severely affected by the war. Subsequently, IRC submitted a proposal to USAID to provide administrative support in conjunction with a continuation of UNHCR-funded activities in water and sanitation. USAID was a source of some of the UNHCR funding initially provided to IRC. USAID subsequently awarded a grant of \$250,000 to IRC to cover administrative support of the effort from August 1, 1994 through July 30, 1995.

In FY95, IRC submitted another proposal to USAID to continue delivering assistance in improving health and hygiene at local schools, health facilities, and in selected villages in Khatlon Province.

The proposed activity emphasized potable water sources and built on earlier work underway. The proposal requested \$650,000 and an extension of IRC activity through December 1995, with both a revision of the current budget and additional funding for new activities. USAID approved the proposal in late FY95, but with additional funding limited to \$400,000.

Project activities funded by USAID include 1) installation of shallow and deep well hand pumps, 2) limited rehabilitation and repair of existing water distribution networks, 3) maintenance and repair of existing submersible and surface pumping systems, 4) construction and rehabilitation of latrines, and 5) technical training in maintenance and repair of water pump systems.

IRC apparently missed the opportunity to focus on a possible use of the various interventions as tools for community development. The evaluation team believes the omission is attributable to IRC's focus on the humanitarian aspects of the program.

IRC intends to request a no-cost extension in FY96 with a shift in emphasis from installation and repair of equipment to maintenance training for village teams and villagers who were beneficiaries of earlier water assistance. At this point, IRC does not anticipate any further extension of assistance and looks to an enhanced emphasis on ongoing efforts in small enterprise development, with coverage to be expanded to areas such as the Garm Valley and perhaps Kulyab. In part, IRC recognizes that longer-term solutions are required to address the availability of potable water to the majority of the population and that the GOT does not currently consider the delivery of water a priority.

### **C. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND EFFECTIVENESS**

During discussions with the evaluation team, other PVO and UN representatives commended IRC's programs and capabilities. Current IRC/Tajikistan staff consists of four expatriates, including the IRC Director, a Financial Manager, a Field Assistant and a Small Business Adviser. In addition, IRC employs 70 Tajiks. During a field trip to IRC activities, the evaluation team was impressed with the quality of all IRC field staff.

The following comments are based on a review of the original grant before its 1995 amendment. Neither IRC's field office nor USAID/CAR had a copy of the amendment. Since the evaluation team was unable to review the amendment, we have assumed that the reporting requirements remained unchanged from the original grant.

With respect to USAID reporting requirements, as directed in the Grant Agreement, IRC/New York must submit copies of all financial reports and the Final Report of Project to USAID/Washington. There is no requirement that IRC/New York also submit the reports to USAID/CAR or the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe. Further, the grant says nothing about the distribution of a key monitoring device: Program Performance Reports. In addition, two of the items requested in the Program Performance Reports for USAID/Washington seem to have little relevance to the grant, i.e., status of transportation and distribution summary. Moreover, there is no specific

requirement that the grantee report on progress toward achievement of the grant's objectives. Additional comment on these reporting requirements are included in the USAID Management Section of the main evaluation as well as in Annexes D and J.

According to IRC/Dushanbe, IRC/New York does not routinely provide its field office with copies of progress reports submitted to USAID/Washington. IRC/New York does, however, provide an internal Post-Transaction List to the field, which includes home office charges to the grant. IRC/Dushanbe finds the list useful in calculating total costs incurred under the grant. Though required progress reports were unavailable for the evaluation team's review, the team was provided with monthly summary progress reports covering both water and sanitation and small enterprise development activities for the January-October 1995 period as well as with a water pump installation summary report.

The former reports summarize installations, repairs, and rehabilitation and training and workshop activities as well as problems and corrective actions taken during the concerned month. In addition to USAID, IRC provides copies of this report to relevant UN agencies, the U.S. Embassy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus informing interested audiences of its activities.

The latter installation report covers pump installation activities for the periods November 1, 1994, through June 30, 1995, during which time USAID provided administrative funding support to IRC, and July 1, 1995, through November 30, 1995, during which time USAID fully funded installation activities.

#### **D. IMPACT ACHIEVED**

During phases one and two (through the end of November 1995), IRC saw the installation of 2,151 and repair of 531 shallow well handpumps and the installation of 22 and repair of two deep-well handpumps. In addition, IRC is maintaining 22 electric pumps originally installed by MSF, eight of which have had to be replaced over the past 18 months principally because of continuous use. Also, 63 latrines have been installed or rehabilitated.

According to the IRC field office, the installations have resulted in the provision of potable water and improved sanitation facilities to about 40,000 beneficiaries. No information is available, however, on the facilities impact on improving the health and hygiene of the targeted populations—the purpose of the grant.

The Progress Performance requirements of the grant do not appear to request that IRC report on progress toward attainment of the program's purpose. The evaluation team heard anecdotal evidence, however, while visiting an orphanage housing 600 boys. The institution's director indicated that although a new hand pump had been installed only a few weeks earlier, he had already seen a decline in water-related illnesses among the boys.

As a further result of IRC's efforts, approximately 105 villagers have been trained and organized into village teams to maintain water facilities. Such training is expected to be a primary focus of the IRC grant extension request.

Despite its positive record, IRC encountered problems that have decreased the potential impact of USAID investments. For example, with the collapse of piped water systems installed during the Soviet period, villagers came to rely on irrigation canals for drinking water, even though canal water was contaminated and posed a serious health threat. When presented with the option of potable water drawn from either a handpump or the nearest canal, many villagers have continued to choose the latter despite the health education that has accompanied IRC's installation of pumps. To address the problem, IRC brought in two public health specialists. Their efforts were frustrated, however, by members of the target communities and health officials who believed that the population was already knowledgeable about safe water practices and therefore found the education efforts "insulting."

IRC estimates that the use of handpumps during the spring, summer, and fall, when canals are full, is about 60 percent, increasing to 90 percent in the winter when the canals are dry. It appears that villagers would prefer the ease of obtaining polluted water to the effort involved in operating a handpump for clean water.

In addition to the water problem, IRC had earlier encountered a relatively high rate of repairs among handpumps manufactured locally and had to deal with the manufacturer to improve quality. While judged a moderate problem as long as IRC is on the scene to assist with repairs, the repair issue could, following IRC's exit, become a serious challenge to continued pump operation. This is one factor influencing IRC's interest in delivering enhanced training over the last phase of the program in 1996.

Another potential problem involves groundwater contamination in a number of shallow well sites. IRC reported that 30 to 40 water samples have shown higher-than-acceptable levels of nitrates and salt. If determined necessary and with the approval of the Tajikistan Ministry of Health, IRC would cap contaminated wells.

## **E. LEVERAGING RESOURCES**

IRC received startup funding from the Soros Foundation to cover the January-May 1994 period, thus enabling IRC to enjoy some leeway in obtaining more significant funding support from UNHCR and USAID. In the second phase of the program, USAID provided funds for both the program and its administrative components. During the course of the program, IRC was able to obtain approximately \$21,000 in United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) funding, including 12 India Mark II deep-well hand pumps and 50 shallow-well hand pumps in conjunction with the hand pump and latrine components, thus supplementing USAID funding. IRC looks to UNICEF to follow up with necessary public health education.

## **F. TRANSITION TO DEVELOPMENT**

With some encouragement from IRC/New York, USAID/CAR, and U.S. Embassy officials, IRC/Dushanbe has evidenced interest in development activities. Since 1994, IRC has been supporting, with UNHCR funding (a portion of which is from USAID), small enterprise development (SED) activities associated with soap and cottonseed oil production, poultry farms, and shoe production. These activities are designed to provide needed products to the population and to introduce commercial practices and the profit motive to enterprising individuals, with a longer-term view of privatizing operations wherever feasible.

During a field trip with IRC representatives, the evaluation team visited a soap and oil production operation and a poultry farm that had received IRC support. Both were impressive and represented IRC's ability to train managers to apply sound and basic production and business systems. With the phaseout of many UNHCR operations in Tajikistan, IRC looks to UNDP for continued support of these and other SED initiatives. While in Dushanbe, the evaluation team learned that UNHCR has decided to provide bridge funding until July 1996 to ensure no hiatus during the shift of responsibilities to UNDP.

IRC/Dushanbe has entered enthusiastically and effectively into its development programs, and all its personnel in Tajikistan clearly wish to continue along that course. However, factions within the central IRC organization reportedly would prefer to retain IRC's traditionally narrower focus upon the many refugees and displaced persons in other parts of the world. The IRC response to any FY 1996 USAID programming solicitation should resolve this issue.

## **G. DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL NGOS**

One component of IRC's program includes the establishment of local village teams to provide well maintenance services after IRC's involvement comes to an end. In addition, at the end of its involvement in water and sanitation, IRC intends to assist its local well installation and maintenance and latrine rehabilitation staff to form a local non-governmental organization. Although not currently or directly funded by USAID, IRC is also developing an impressive cadre of private business and manufacturing talent under its SED programs.

## **H. CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

Although no direct evidence is available to suggest that IRC activities were expressly targeted to conflict resolution, it is clear that the provision of improved water and sanitation facilities throughout areas affected by the war has enhanced the social investment in individual communities. As a result, the affected populations have gained a sense of community ownership and pride, elements that can play a positive role in the desire to seek peaceful conflict resolution.

## **I. FINDINGS**

- # The USAID-funded water and sanitation programs gave inadequate consideration to community development to ensure program sustainability.
- # Cultural practices, such as drawing canal water rather than using a hand pump to draw potable water, can be difficult to overcome; therefore, special attention needs to be given to such issues during the design and implementation of activities.
- # IRC/Dushanbe, with encouragement from USAID and other donors, has made the transition from relief to development in its SED effort; however, there is uncertainty as to whether IRC headquarters may wish to return to its original refugee-aid orientation.

## **J. RECOMMENDATIONS**

- # USAID itself should pay increased attention to the sustainability of projects through greater community involvement and should insist that its grantees do likewise.
- # Subject to the above noted recommendation, IRC should be considered a valid candidate for USAID funding if it chooses to seek the same.
- # To permit adequate monitoring of grant activities, additional attention needs to be given to Progress Performance Reports (and, perhaps, an Annual Implementation Plan). Measuring achievement of an activity's purpose should be a necessary element of reporting.
- # All reports submitted by IRC/New York to USAID/Washington should be provided to the IRC Country Director; USAID/Washington should likewise provide such reports to USAID/CAR and the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe.
- # As IRC continues its movement into development activities, it should make a concerted effort to establish baseline data.

**ANNEX H**

**PVO PROGRAM DESCRIPTION--RELIEF INTERNATIONAL (RI)**

**RI Tajikistan Funding**

<b>Donor</b>	<b>Amount</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Dates</b>
Soros Foundation	\$244,874	Emergency Health Assistance	April 14, 1994-July 15, 1994
UNICEF	\$5,100	Health Data Collection	Aug. 1, 1994-Oct. 31, 1994
UNICEF	\$45,000 <sup>1</sup>	Pharmaceuticals	Aug. 1, 1994-Oct. 31, 1994
UNHCR	\$27,625	Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)	Oct. 1, 1994-Dec. 31, 1994
UNHCR	\$238,572	Urban Refugee Assistance	Jan. 1, 1995-Dec. 31, 1995
Direct Relief International	\$55,210 <sup>1</sup>	Donation of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies	July 21, 1994
Direct Relief International	\$446,688 <sup>1</sup>	Donation of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies	Dec. 1, 1994
Direct Relief International	\$160,942	Donation of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies	Sept. 14, 1995
USAID	\$1,000,000	Humanitarian Health Assistance	Sept. 8, 1994-July 7, 1995
USAID	\$250,000	Humanitarian Health Assistance	July 8, 1995-Feb. 7, 1996
State Department	\$45,582	Distribution of Department of Defense Medical Supplies	March 1, 1995-June 30, 1995
Department of Defense	\$500,000 <sup>1</sup>	Medical Supplies	April 4, 1995
NOVIB	\$300,000	Procurement of Medicines	July 8, 1995-Feb. 7, 1996
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$3,194,593</b>		

<sup>1</sup> Dollar value of medical commodities provided.

## A. BACKGROUND

Relief International (RI) was established at the beginning of this decade. The private, nonprofit, and nonsectarian humanitarian organization provides assistance to victims of natural and manmade disasters. Currently, RI maintains country field offices in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Russia. RI's programs focus on the direct provision of emergency and rehabilitative assistance to the most vulnerable groups. Its multisectoral activities include health, sanitation, relief distribution, shelter, income generation, and education.

## B. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

**History.** RI began its operations in Tajikistan in April 1994 with funding from the Soros Foundation, UNICEF, UNHCR, and other private sources. RI used the funds to address the emergency medical needs of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and other groups affected by the civil war and floods of 1992-1993. To this end, RI deployed a team of mobile health clinics to provide primary and emergency health care services to the people of Khatlon Oblast, a region widely considered as most severely affected by the combined impacts of civil war, economic decline, and floods.

In September 1994, USAID awarded RI \$1 million through a Cooperative Agreement to continue its activities in Khatlon Oblast for the following ten months. Under the newly funded project entitled Emergency Health Response, RI added a feature to its previous activities: strengthening the capacity of the health system to address basic primary care problems. RI's strategy now includes the provision of medicines and medical supplies together with training the personnel (medical assistants and midwives) of rural health clinics, the Feldsher Accoucher Points (FAPs); and public health promotion and health campaigns focusing on maternal health and child survival.

RI has since submitted another proposal to USAID entitled Humanitarian Health Assistance. USAID funded the request at \$250,000 as an extension of RI's previous Cooperative Agreement. The funding has allowed RI to continue its work in Khatlon as well as to expand its activities into the Garm Valley, an area severely affected by the fighting between government and opposition forces. The extension officially ended on February 7, 1996. RI, however, intends to seek a cost extension.

In the latter part of 1994, RI received funds from UNHCR for a Quick Impact Project (QIP) to promote the production of locally manufactured goods (winter wear) for use in humanitarian aid distribution. In early 1995, RI again received funding to build on its previous QIP and to introduce small enterprise development (SED) activities in the Khatlon region. The funding amounted to approximately \$130,000. UNHCR further funded a small program to address the needs of Afghan refugees resident in Tajikistan. Both UNHCR-funded projects were due to conclude December 31, 1995.

**USAID-Funded Project Description.** Specific to the USAID-funded Cooperative Agreement, RI's project set forth the following objectives initially for the Khatlon Oblast in southwestern Tajikistan and subsequently in the Garm Valley:

- # to reduce mortality and morbidity through curative and preventive health care and child spacing;
- # to reduce the incidence of communicable diseases (i.e., diarrheal diseases, acute respiratory infections, and skin diseases); and
- # to reduce women's reproductive problems.

RI attempts to meet these objectives by

- # improving the institutional capacity of the rural health care system through participatory training of health workers in selected FAPs, physician-attended health centers (SVAs), and district hospitals (SUBs);
- # providing health education through public health awareness campaigns;
- # providing primary health care, including maternal and child care activities; and
- # providing basic pharmaceuticals.

RI's activities consist of basic health care services and distribution of medicines through mobile health clinics; the distribution of medical supplies to FAPs; training of FAP, SVA, and SUB staff; and conducting maternal and child health education campaigns.

RI has approached capacity building through the training of trainers (TOT) at all levels at which they work. The TOT has focused on a) the rational use of essential drugs to treat simple illnesses such as diarrhea, worms, anemia, simple skin infections, and muscle pain; b) diagnosis and treatment of basic health problems; c) case management; and d) skills in carrying out health education campaigns. In addition, the FAP level has been emphasizing training in breastfeeding and weaning practices. Further, training in growth monitoring has been introduced into the training curriculum in Garm. Finally, SUB staff has been trained specifically in the Expanded Program in Immunization (EPI).

**Project Strategy Issues.** Conceptually, RI's health strategy is sound. It attempts to strengthen the rural health system that has been serving the population of Tajikistan for years. In particular, it has focused on strengthening FAPs, which are the linchpin of the rural health system. FAPs are the structure closest to the community. They undertake community outreach and provide the necessary referrals without which patients are denied treatment at SVAs and SUBs.

Nonetheless, the project environment in which RI works is challenging. At the beginning of the project, FAPs were facing problems related to the lack of medicines and delayed, if any, salary payments to staff. Through coordination with the MOH, RI identified selected FAPs with which to work. With training and distribution of medicines, RI encouraged most of the selected FAPs to remain functioning, but on a more abbreviated schedule than before. Currently, more and more of the FAP staff are not reporting to FAPs since they have not been paid for months and facilities are falling into disrepair. Furthermore, RI has been distributing internationally acquired medicines to the health centers. While the distribution of medicines has definitely served its place, it begs the question of what happens when RI ends its involvement—especially since the MOH has no funds for needed supplies. In addition, no medicine is produced on the local market.

While RI's strategy seemed to be feasible in its early stages, it is now succumbing to the impacts of larger economic pressures affecting the country as a whole. Therefore the project as currently configured faces severe structural limitations that must be addressed. Moreover, these limitations will need to be factored into the design of any further health program.

### **C. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND EFFECTIVENESS**

**General Information.** RI's staff consists of 30 Tajiks and six expatriates. Staff are "semi-autonomous," which means that upper-management staff report to the Country Director on day-to-day issues and seek technical input directly from RI headquarters.

The Country Director is newly arrived in Dushanbe and is filling a position that has remained vacant for some time. The RI technical staff seems dedicated and appears technically competent.

RI prepares field progress and financial reports and submits them to headquarters for consolidation and presentation to the donors. RI field staff does not have any further substantive inputs after the reports reach headquarters. Field offices do, however, receive final copies of the reports for their files. Unlike the other PVOs, RI did have a copy of its funding agreement with USAID.

While influenced by field inputs, program direction is ultimately the province of headquarters staff. RI's move toward SED stems from a decision made at headquarters.

**Assessment of Management Capabilities.** A look at RI's management as a whole suggests some serious problems. RI has a difficult relationship with UNDP (see below), which represents a source of development funding in Tajikistan.

The primary symptom of RI's management problems is the turnover in the Country Director position, which remained open for some time and was filled only a few months ago. The current Country Director, however, appears knowledgeable, demonstrates a strong background in public health issues and programming, and is experienced in the management of health programs in the region with Save the Children. Nonetheless, his management skills at RI still need to be proven. Beyond this, RI headquarters has been the target of criticism and has had difficulty recruiting some of its technical

staff. For example, RI's Health Coordinator was running the SED project for several months before the permanent SED coordinator joined the organization through the intervention of UNHCR. Other such examples exist.

Added to these problems is the fact that RI's staff is growing anxious about RI's future in Tajikistan. Staff members are therefore beginning to seek employment elsewhere.

**Financial Management Issues.** While in Dushanbe, the team heard comments and criticisms from the UNDP about RI's budgeting of program costs versus support costs. RI reportedly spent \$4 on support for every \$1 it spent on program costs. With this in mind, the team examined the budgets of RI's USAID-funded activities and found that the criticism did not hold. Looking at RI's health project budget as extended (\$1,250,000), the program costs represented about 79 percent of the budget and the support costs about 21 percent.

The criticism did, however, appear warranted during a recent review of a \$84,000 SED proposal submitted to UNDP for funding under the QIP program. The RI staff explained that the project would be training-intensive at the outset. A multiyear budget would have reflected decreasing training inputs, thus lowering support costs. Given the grant's planned short duration, there is no way to confirm or deny the explanation.

**Management of the Cooperative Agreement Issues.** USAID has funded RI through a Cooperative Agreement managed by USAID/Washington in consultation with technical offices as needed for review, the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe, USAID/CAR, and, more recently, the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe for field input.

RI is the sole PVO in the evaluation to have executed a Cooperative Agreement with USAID; the others largely received grants. Although never confirmed, the team assumes that the arrangement reflects the fact that RI still has not completed its registration with USAID. It became clear that despite the closer USAID management intended in the arrangement, RI's project was treated as if it were a grant.

The reporting system and channels set up by USAID to monitor this and other PVO projects appears unnecessarily convoluted and confusing. PVOs such as RI submit their financial and performance progress reports to their headquarters, yet discussion and feedback take place between the headquarters staff and USAID/Washington.

The system does not favor a quick response should the situation in Tajikistan worsen, as some have predicted, and PVOs such as RI need to revert to programming emergency and humanitarian aid.

## **D. IMPACT ACHIEVED**

RI has set out some highly ambitious health objectives for a project of short duration. To date, it is impossible to indicate the project's impact on the health objectives. RI has neither baseline data nor a monitoring and evaluating system in place to record and measure impact.

Discussions with RI staff revealed that they had been too involved in the relief side of their activities to think about measuring impact. Furthermore, on review of the Cooperative Agreement, it appears that USAID did not specify any measurement of impact as part of the agreement.

As with the other PVOs, RI must develop a system for the measurement of impact in order to manage and direct its health activities properly and show the extent to which it is succeeding in affecting the health of the target population. The team also recommends that USAID become better attuned to the need for the measurement of impact as part of its agreement with RI and other PVO grantees, especially as grantees move from relief to development activities.

RI, however, does have a system for measuring outputs. In Khatlon and the Garm Valley combined, RI provided TOT to 538 people and worked with 193 out of 358 health facilities. Through this intervention, RI estimates to have reached a population of 260,282. Using the Ministry of Health (MOH) estimates of population figures in the two regions, RI's program has covered roughly 39.2 percent of the population. These figures appear to be substantial, but again they say little about impact on health.

## **E. LEVERAGING RESOURCES**

RI has managed to leverage significant support for its health activities from a considerable range of donors. Specifically, it has received funds and/or in-kind contributions from the Soros Foundation, UNICEF, UNHCR, the Dutch government, USAID, and Direct Relief International.

## **F. TRANSITION TO DEVELOPMENT**

RI's initial activities in Tajikistan responded to an emergency and, as such, necessarily took the form of a relief effort. With the signing of the agreement with USAID, RI was planning to implement a project that combined both relief and longer-term development activities. The former included the distribution of medical supplies and the provision of medical services to needy populations via mobile health clinics; the latter planned to develop the capacity of the staff of the rural health system through training so that personnel could better serve the medical needs of the rural population.

At the outset of the USAID project, RI focused on the direct provision of medicines and health care rather than on building the capacity of the health care system. One RI document reports that RI targeted 70 percent of its efforts to direct services and 30 percent to the longer-term objective of capacity building. This same report indicates, however, that within roughly eight months RI had

reversed this ratio, with the greater portion of activities geared to strengthening the rural health structure.

Discussions with RI staff seem to bear out the shift in focus. Initially, RI deployed a team of mobile clinics used for 80 to 90 percent of its emergency medical distributions. With the revitalization of FAPs with staff from the MOH and with drugs and training inputs from RI, RI began and continues to focus on the capacity-building component; the number of mobile clinics was trimmed to the two currently in operation.

RI built into its original proposal a combination of emergency aid and activities to address some of Tajikistan's longer-term development concerns. It appears that RI has lived up to its plan and has shifted from a largely relief-driven program to a program that combines relief and development.

### **G. DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL NGOS**

By definition, RI's present approach in its USAID-funded health activities seems to leave little room for working with LNGOs. Instead, RI has chosen to work with local government structures.

### **H. CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

While RI has not directly addressed conflict resolution in the present project, it has emphasized the need to avoid ethnic discrimination in its activities. Services provided by the mobile clinics, although initially intended to serve the needs of IDPs, have been available to all. In addition, FAPs are encouraged to provide services to all who seek assistance. RI staff monitors service delivery on visits to individual FAPs.

### **I. A SPECIAL PROBLEM: RI AND UNDP**

A special problem has surfaced concerning relations between RI and UNDP. UNDP visited one of RI's SED project sites in October 1995 and formed some unfavorable opinions about the project. UNDP shared these opinions liberally among the development community, particularly with the evaluation team and in writing with USAID and the U.S. Embassy, though not with RI as had been promised. The team believes that UNDP's actions show a severe lack of professional courtesy and diplomacy in dealing with RI.

Even though USAID did not fund RI's SED project, the team felt that it was important to visit the project to make its own assessment of RI's capabilities in this area, particularly given that RI had expressed an interest in moving in the direction of SED over the next years. The team was favorably impressed by what it saw: women were beginning to reap the benefits of their business training, RI material inputs, and the income-generating activities that they identified themselves. However, conversations with their donor, UNHCR, indicated that RI's SED project was slow to start. While implementation is proceeding more smoothly now, it is still not of the quality of IRC's work, particularly with respect to business training. Therefore, UNHCR, with UNDP support, has decided

to hand RI's SED activities over to IRC at the end of the grant. UNHCR further suggested that RI should concentrate on its area of strength: health.

It therefore appears that some of UNDP's criticisms of RI's problems (quality of business training, the ratio of support to programming costs) in the SED program were borne out by UNHCR while others were addressed to the satisfaction of the team after the field visit. This aside, the team observed that the way in which UNDP handled its concerns about RI's SED project lacked professionalism.

## **J. FINDINGS**

- # RI has proven that it can mobilize its emergency/relief health services rapidly. It has also demonstrated rapid response to requested services, such as the treatment of communitywide scabies and the need for diphtheria immunizations under the auspices of UNICEF's diphtheria campaign.
- # RI's work in the health sector appears soundly formulated and executed. However, larger economic issues are undermining the organization's efforts to work within the government health structure. Any current and future efforts in this sector will need to address economic issues. With the deterioration of rural health, community involvement in addressing local health needs should be considered a part of future programming.

## **K. RECOMMENDATIONS**

- # RI would serve itself and its donors well to begin a system of baseline data collection and measurement of impact in future development projects.
- # RI seems to be struggling with its identity in Tajikistan at present. Should it survive its funding crises, RI should clarify its vision and identity as reflected in a unified approach to programming. The team believes that this identity should build on RI's current in-country programming capacity in health.
- # USAID should consider whether any health program in Tajikistan at present is sustainable in the absence of greater community involvement and should require grantees in the sector to address this issue.
- # RI has had considerable experience to tap in the health sector in Tajikistan. However, in order to be seriously considered for funding, RI will need to indicate that it has resolved its management problems and developed a strategy that addresses the concerns raised about its current health strategy.



## ANNEX I

### PVO PROGRAM DESCRIPTION--SAVE THE CHILDREN FEDERATION (SCF)

#### SCF Tajikistan Funding

Donor	Amount	Activity	Dates
USDA 1994	\$1,282,119	Food for Work Reconstruction	Aug. 5, 1994-Dec. 31, 1995
USDA 1995	\$1,179,938	Food for Work Reconstruction	May 12, 1995-Dec. 31, 1996
USDA 1994-1995	\$9,227,708 <sub>1,2</sub>	Food for Work Reconstruction	May 12, 1995-Dec. 31, 1996
WFP	\$15,000 <sup>3</sup>	Food for Work Reconstruction	Aug. 1, 1995-Dec. 31, 1995
USAID	\$562,300	Food for Work Reconstruction	Aug. 5, 1994-April 30, 1996
USAID	\$313,200	Health	Sept. 21, 1995-Sept. 21, 1996
Soros Foundation	\$50,000	Group Guaranteed Lending	Open
UNICEF	\$200,000 <sup>1</sup>	Pharmaceuticals In-Kind	July 1, 1995-July 1, 1997
UNHCR/UNDP	\$759,800	Construction Materials, Etc.	May 1, 1995-March 31, 1996
RNG	\$237,960	School Reconstruction	July 31, 1995-Sept. 30, 1996
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$13,828,025</b>		

<sup>1</sup> Dollar value of commodities provided.

<sup>2</sup> Annualized commodity value breakdown not available.

<sup>3</sup> Cash plus 1,000 mt wheat (not given dollar value since WFP retained title).

#### A. BACKGROUND

Save the Children Federation (SCF) is a nonprofit, nonsectarian organization operating in 38 countries and nine states in the United States. SCF was originally established to provide disaster and refugee relief but has since evolved into a development organization with programs in agriculture, education, small-scale enterprise and credit, population, health, and nutrition. To build sustainable programs for administration primarily by local professionals, SCF operations are directed from the field, with technical and administrative support provided by the home office.

## **B. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION**

SCF began program operations in Tajikistan in May 1994 by taking over, at UNHCR's request, a housing project that built on an ongoing activity. The project, which fell within the purview of SCF experience and interest, was funded jointly by a 1994 USDA grant and received USAID administrative support and UNHCR's continued provision of roofing materials. The mud brick structures are not believed to pose a major earthquake risk despite their weight. An appropriate technology study verifying this general observation but proposing some detail changes to improve safety further, reduce costs, and maximize the use of local materials is due to be released shortly.

The purpose of the activity was to implement a Food for Work (FFW) program to assist with reconstruction of damaged houses and kitchens/outbuildings and to clean up rubble and irrigation ditches. By August 1994, a headquarters office in Dushanbe and two field offices had gone into operation, with 80 local staff hired. By November, when winter brought the reconstruction program to a temporary halt, 8,000 houses and 4,000 kitchens/outbuildings had been rebuilt, with work started on the less urgent cleaning activities. As a result, 18,000 brigade workers received several months of food, and over 40,000 family members obtained shelter before Tajikistan's harsh winter, a precondition to their engaging in any income-producing activity. These accomplishments came despite such exogenous problems as shortages of building materials, late arrival of USDA food, ethnic tensions, and security problems.

In spring 1995, the FFW work program resumed, and over 4,000 additional houses and 2,500 kitchens/outbuildings were rebuilt for a grand total of 12,255 houses and 6,646 kitchens/outbuildings to date. Follow-on grants from USDA and the World Food Program (WFP) have enabled SCF to contract for an additional 5,800 houses and 2,900 kitchens/outbuildings for the upcoming construction cycle. SCF has requests outstanding at USDA for 8,000 mt food and \$2,360,000 in administrative costs and at USAID for \$15,146,000 for housing reconstruction materials, plastic sheeting, and administrative costs to finish the 10,000 estimated additional houses required to complete the recovery process.

A related activity, whose production potential was demonstrated to the evaluation team during a field trip, will be the provision of plastic sheeting for greenhouses to permit year-round production of the fruit crops for which Tajikistan is famous. USAID funding of \$500,000 for this purpose is included in the \$15 million request (above).

SCF has already begun a 15-month FFW school reconstruction program with \$328,000 in funding provided by the government of the Netherlands. Basic data are being collected to demonstrate the number of schools and extent of need.

Using funding from USDA, UNHCR, and the Soros Foundation, the overall SCF Tajikistan program has also extended its range of activities to include

- # a recently begun school feeding program for 34,615 girls and 36,854 boys in grades one through four. Noteworthy are the virtual equality between the genders and the quality of the food, which the evaluation team sampled and enjoyed;
- # a Group Guaranteed Lending (GGL) program based on the Grameen Bank model, operating for several months with more than 300 members without default and lending over 350,000 Tajik Roubles (approximately the equivalent of \$1,500, although purchasing power impact is greater than the dollar amount would suggest);
- # a Data Collection and Analysis (DACA) unit to meet an urgent need among PVOs and donors alike for accurate and current information on such subjects as market prices for food and other necessities;
- # a capacity-building activity to assist LNGO staff development in the area of project management, business management, and training to enable LNGOs to operate without the need for an International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) partner. One facet of the activity is the setting up of an NGO Resource Center to provide learning materials on NGO capacity building and institutional development; and
- # several development-oriented one-time activities such as a computer training session, a sanitation workshop, and an economic survey.

Finally, USAID approved in September 1995 a \$313,000 grant (to be matched by \$200,000 in non-federal funds) for a SCF health project. The project goal is to provide models for the regeneration of the Tajik village health system and to achieve a sustainable reduction in maternal, infant, and under-age-five morbidity and mortality by

- # establishing Village-Based Health Committees (VHCs) and organizing associated self-financing village pharmacies;
- # strengthening FAPs' curative capabilities and roles as trainers of health protective behavior; and
- # providing training and TA to MOH clinical and managerial personnel.

The project is notable for both the LNGO aspects of the VHCs and the long-term sustainability ensured by community involvement. Understandably, it is too early to evaluate the project.

SCF will also seek funding to promote small-scale enterprise development (SED) in the project areas to ensure that the beneficiaries have the financial wherewithal to support the health care system.

The similarities between the SCF health program and that of RI (discussed in Annex H), combined with both the management strength of SCF relative to that of RI and the qualifications demonstrated by RI in its health program, make the possibility of cooperation between the two organizations worth considering.

### **C. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND EFFECTIVENESS**

The skills SCF has developed in its 60+ years of operation have been well applied in the administration of the projects evaluated. Included in the management structure is the concept of local participation through village meetings, group problem solving, and the involvement of communities' human resources in the design, implementation, and monitoring of project activities. It was clear to the evaluation team that the people of the villages visited by the team supported the activities and their management systems.

An important though easily overlooked measure of management capability is the ability to start up promptly and operate effectively in an exacting environment. SCF has passed that test well in an extremely difficult situation: Tajikistan's landlocked condition, its institutional weaknesses, and the stresses placed on all activities by both the civil war and the dislocations flowing from the demise of the Soviet Union have created a long and shallow learning curve for many organizations seeking to function there. SCF, to its credit, has been able to meet the challenges of the situation and attain operational effectiveness quickly.

Moreover, SCF's multiple activities have been carried out at a reasonable cost. The direct administrative costs for managing a \$8.7 million portfolio (all activities of which will be completed within a two-year period) have run at an annual level of \$1 million. The amount is well within the range deemed acceptable, especially considering the difficulties of operating in Tajikistan. Equally valid is SCF's 25.2 percent indirect cost ratio.

(An organization chart of SCF Tajikistan is attached at the end of this annex.)

### **D. IMPACT ACHIEVED**

The most immediate and important impact of the SCF Tajikistan program has been to provide 62,000 returned refugees and IDPs with the housing essential for Tajikistan's harsh climate. Another critical element has been feeding (or providing the opportunity to monetize commodities) of more than 27,000 brigade workers for periods of several months as they worked on reconstruction and cleaning efforts. The WFP estimates that when the SCF housing and cleanup efforts have been completed, they will have reached 139,000 beneficiaries through the provision of shelter and periods of feeding.

With respect to the relief/development continuum, it should be noted that the long-term direct benefit impact is limited to shelter recipients. Outside brigade workers will have to seek other sources of

food once the SCF project concludes. It could be argued, however, that an indirect long-term development impact would flow from brigade members' experience in working together as a team.

A thorough evaluation of the impact of the school feeding program would require before-and-after studies of student attendance and achievement. Provision should be made for gathering baseline data at the beginning to permit such an evaluation after the program has been in operation for, say, two years. Logically, however, it appears likely that delivery of a meal providing most of the day's nutritional requirements would both encourage attendance and raise achievement levels.

The Group Guaranteed Lending program is too new for impact evaluation, but its zero default rate and the enthusiastic reports of participants in the meeting attended by the team strongly indicate that the program will produce substantial benefits in entrepreneurial development over the long term. Again, baseline data should begin to be gathered for an eventual, more detailed evaluation.

In a similar vein, while DACA and the various capacity-building activities carried out by SCF have produced a number of documents and workshops and laid the groundwork for important steps toward development, the activities have not yet gone past the "output" level to produce actual development results; thus, they are not readily subject to impact evaluation at this time. It also appears that DACA outputs are not always as complete and timely as they could be, indicating the need for continued attention to the operation of the activity.

## **E. LEVERAGING RESOURCES**

SCF has shown considerable ability to obtain and function with financial resources from a wide variety of donor organizations. In fact, USAID, with \$875,000 (or about 7 percent) in direct contributions to SCF's \$13.8 million program, is only one of six donor agencies contributing to the overall SCF program in Tajikistan (the others are USDA, UNHCR/UNDP/UNICEF, WFP, the government of the Netherlands (RNG), and the Soros Foundation). While it could be correctly said that USDA funding is a U. S. government resource and that USAID is a major contributor to WFP provision of food and UNHCR/UNICEF/UNDP supplies of other commodities, the maximum \$960,000 that can be attributed to indirect USAID funding is still less than 10 percent of total SCF funding.

Finally, both the Netherlands and Soros contributions, though relatively small, are totally non-USG.

## **F. TRANSITION TO DEVELOPMENT**

In the broadest sense, while the FFW element of the massive SCF housing reconstruction program might be considered relief, the shelter aspect has clearly been developmental. It is difficult for people to work efficiently if they have no place to live.

School feeding and health move a step closer to the traditional concept of development in that they provide people with the capability of working more effectively over the short term in the case of health and over the longer run in the case of educational benefits flowing from school feeding.

Given that almost any form of meaningful economic activity requires both appropriate information and trained personnel, direct development benefits flow from the various capacity-building and data collection activities. Most direct among all ongoing SCF activities are the GGL programs, which provide the capital essential for micro-enterprise development. In addition, the SED programs proposed in conjunction with the USAID-approved health project can be expected to promote a level of development above that required simply to pay for health care.

## **G. DEVELOPMENT OF LNGOs**

It is not only reasonable but essential to define LNGOs in the broadest sense to include all community-based organizations (CBOs) that function outside the government. Different societies have different forms of social organization, and any definition that limits LNGOs to formal groups (e.g., the Red Cross) would miss the dynamic of local self-help through the medium of non-governmental associations of whatever form.

By that definition, all the SCF programs (with the exception of school feeding, which works through the government school system) have been specifically designed to play an important role in developing LNGOs.

- # The work brigades that carry out reconstruction and cleanup activities are locally formed and managed groups with the forward-looking potential to continue meeting community needs through jointly undertaken labor.
- # The GGL groups are perfect examples of self-help institutions developed at the grass-roots level and dedicated to the principles of community responsibility for mutual benefit.
- # Training in general business skills, such as bookkeeping and inventory management, which are essential in the transition to a market economy, are the focus of capacity-building activities undertaken by SCF.

## **H. CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

In the documentation furnished to the evaluation team, SCF has emphasized its dedication to conflict resolution and has been among the leading practitioners of the art. Not only does SCF require nondiscriminatory participation in all its activities, it consciously uses the activities to demonstrate the building blocks of tolerance and conflict resolution/avoidance.

## **I. ADDRESSING GENDER ISSUES**

Of particular interest is SCF's sensitivity to gender issues. The Organization encourages the full and active participation of the village women. This is, of course, a practical necessity in communities where many of the young, healthy men are either dead or absent, but a necessity still far from obvious in a traditional Muslim culture. Many of the best brigade workers in the FFW house reconstruction activity were women and their work gained the full respect of their male coworkers, enough so that several women became brigade leaders.

The gender issue assumed special importance in the organization and operation of the GGL. The evaluation team had the opportunity to observe the dynamic leadership among women during a GGL meeting (the leader of that particular GGL group was also a reconstruction brigade leader).

## **J. FINDINGS**

- # SCF's reliance on community groups as the backbone of its programs has built sustainability into SCF programs.
- # SCF's willingness and ability to undertake an FFW project with a development goal demonstrates an additional dimension of FFW that often remains unrealized.
- # The fact that SCF agreed to operate only in fields where it had worldwide experience, experienced staff, and proven methodologies has enabled it to avoid costly errors.
- # SCF's provision of adequate management for its Tajikistan operation has enabled it to operate effectively even in a difficult environment and has earned the organization the respect of such potential sources of future funding as UNDP and the World Bank.
- # Because of the wide range of its efforts (FFW, school feeding, health, lending programs, capacity building, community development), SCF could overextend itself.

## **K. RECOMMENDATIONS**

- # Based on its record of performance in the short run and the promotion of sustainability in the long run, SCF should be considered a leading candidate for additional USAID funding.
- # As the move toward development accelerates, more attention must be paid to adding baseline data for subsequent evaluation.
- # SCF would do well to collaborate with RI as the latter has substantial health sector experience.

[TAJIKISTAN ORGANIZATIONAL CHART PASTED INTO DOCUMENT HERE]

## ANNEX J

### SUGGESTED GRANT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Following is a possible model for reporting on program planning and performance to be used for PVO grants for Tajikistan. USAID/CAR may wish to consider the need for monthly reporting as is required in at least one grant. Such frequent reporting is often excessive and unnecessary for the effective monitoring of a grant.

#### A. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

No later than 30 days from the effective date of the grant, the grantee shall prepare and submit to the USAID/Washington Project Officer, USAID/CAR, and the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe a program implementation plan that will include critical path indicators for the full term of the grant. As necessary but no less frequently than annually, the implementation plan will be updated.

#### B. QUARTERLY REPORTS

The grantee shall submit (x) copies of quarterly program progress reports not to exceed 20 pages to the USAID/Washington Project Officer, USAID/CAR, and the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe. In addition, two copies shall be submitted to USAID, PPC/CDIE/DI, Washington, D.C. 20523-1802. The reports shall be submitted within 30 days following the end of the reporting period and shall briefly present the following information:

- # A comparison of the actual accomplishments with the targets set forth in the implementation plan to include the status of completion of outputs and progress toward the achievement of the program's purpose. Outputs and progress should, to the extent possible, be quantified. In addition to output data, the report should include, where feasible, the unit costs of outputs.
- # Where targets are ahead of or behind schedule, the reasons should be included. Where behind schedule, the grantee should indicate what actions, when, and by whom are necessary to place the effort back on schedule.
- # Other pertinent information should include staffing and key changes made or anticipated as well as an overview of funding availabilities and expenditures. Where appropriate, an analysis and explanation of any projected cost overrun or high unit costs should be included.

### **C. SPECIAL REPORTS**

Between the required program performance reporting dates, events may occur that have significant impact on the program. In such instances, the grantee shall inform the USAID/Washington Project Officer, USAID/CAR, and the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe as soon as possible after the following conditions are known:

- # Problems, delays, or adverse conditions that will affect the ability to attain program purposes and objectives, cause serious delays in the schedule contained in the program implementation plan, or preclude attainment of major outputs by the established time periods. The report shall be accompanied by a statement of action(s) proposed or taken and any USAID assistance needed to resolve the problem encountered.
- # Favorable developments or events that enable schedules in the program implementation plan to be met sooner than anticipated or more outputs to be produced than originally projected.
- # If any performance review conducted by the grantee discloses the need for a change in the budget estimates in accordance with the criteria established in the standard provision of this grant entitled "Revision of Grant Budget," the grantee shall submit a request for budget revision to the Grant Officer, the USAID/Washington Project Officer, USAID/CAR, and the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe.

### **D. FINAL REPORT**

Within 90 days following the estimated completion date of the grant, the grantee shall submit (x) copies of a final report to the USAID/Washington Project Officer, USAID/CAR, and the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe. In addition, two copies shall be submitted to USAID/PPC/CDIE/DI, Washington, D.C. 20523-1802. This report will cover the entire period of the grant and include a description of the context within which the activity was carried out and a summary of program activities over the life of the grant, with special attention given to the degree of attainment of the program's purpose(s) or objectives as well as a summary of inputs used and outputs attained. Impact on beneficiaries should be clearly stated. In addition, lessons learned as a result of the program should be fully described. Any recommendations for consideration in carrying out similar activities in the future should also be included.

## ANNEX K

### MERCY CORPS INTERNATIONAL (MCI)

One of the principal U.S. PVOs operating in Tajikistan is Mercy Corps International (MCI), with a staff of two expatriates and 18 local employees. The team was not tasked to evaluate MCI, which has received no USAID funding to date in Tajikistan. However, in view of an expressed interest in participating in future programming, coupled with MCI's qualifications for an expansion of activities, this brief annex is included in the evaluation.

It should be noted that although Mercy Corps is a Christian institution, it does not engage in proselytizing.

MCI has been working to build the capacity of LNGOs by providing them with small grants to help set up offices and pay overhead. MCI also provides guidance to these organizations when needed, especially in proposal writing, an area where most LNGOs lack expertise. MCI has been able to take on this activity as a result of its ability to monetize some of the food commodities received from USDA. MCI reports it has completed 169 such projects through the monetization of \$1.1 million worth of USDA butter oil. MCI has distinguished between for-profit private enterprises, which receive credits repayable by donations to nonprofit institutions, and humanitarian organizations, which receive direct grants. It feels that Tajikistan evidences considerable entrepreneurial spirit.

MCI has also engaged in Food for Work (FFW) projects for cleaning irrigation ditches and storm drains.

In addition, MCI has just submitted a proposal to TACIS in conjunction with a women's organization to provide counseling on women's health, rape, and suicide. In the proposal, the women's organization is the lead organization, with MCI's role that of adviser and monitor.

MCI has also provided seeds, tractors, and fuel to support a group of handicapped persons providing food for 4,000. Subsequently, the government donated ten hectares of land to the farm. The handicapped group, with MCI, has submitted a proposal to TACIS for additional equipment, greenhouses, and the establishment of health care services for invalids.

## ANNEX L

### RECOMMENDED PVO PROPOSAL CRITERIA

#### A. CRITERIA

As a result of USAID's experience with the review of U.S. PVO proposals in 1995 and the recent evaluation of U.S. PVOs in Tajikistan, USAID has established the following criteria for evaluating funding proposals by U.S. PVOs for FY96. These criteria have been established to ensure that all qualified U.S. PVOs with the capability of working under Tajikistan's difficult conditions have the opportunity to compete for USAID resources.

Among the major bases of these criteria is the expectation of a continuing transition from relief assistance to longer-term development. It is accompanied by the need to strengthen the capacity of the Tajik people to address their own problems: a process described as "Developing Human Productivity."

The following are the criteria against which proposals will be assessed:

#### 1. Ability to Work Effectively in Central Asia (20 points)

- # Demonstrates ability to begin programs expeditiously and work effectively under difficult conditions;
- # Demonstrates effective relationships with central and local levels of government, other PVOs, and the donor community; and
- # Maintains an office with full administrative capability in the Former Soviet Union (FSU).

#### 2. Overall Quality of the Program (20 points)

- # Conceptually sound and does not duplicate other PVO or donor efforts;
- # Responds to identified needs;
- # Contains data against which progress and impact can be measured; and
- # Adequately details and justifies its proposed budget.

### **3. Capacity Building (20 points)**

- # One of the most important products that can be left behind following the end of U.S. assistance is enhanced institutional capacity of local entities (i.e., NGOs, CBOs, small businesses, cooperatives).
- # Proposals shall address capacity building of such local entities.

### **4. Geographic Distribution (15 points)**

- # USAID is seeking a broad geographic distribution of activities into areas of most serious need.

### **5. Ability to Leverage Other Donor Assistance (15 points)**

- # Proposal specifically indicates the magnitude of other (non-USAID) funds that will support the activities.

### **6. Gender Issues (10 points)**

- # Adequate discussion of the role of women in proposals is expected.
- # Where appropriate, plans must be included for the collection of gender-disaggregated data to assist in measuring impact.

## **B. PROPOSAL SUBMISSION**

Proposals must be submitted to USAID in Dushanbe by -----, 1996, in order to be considered for funding in the current fiscal year.

It is expected that individual proposals will not exceed \$300,000 and in most cases will be for less.

## **C. REVIEW PROCESS**

Representatives from USAID/CAR, the USAID/CAR Country Representative in Dushanbe, and officials of the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe, with the participation of USAID/Washington, will meet within 30 days of proposal submission to review each proposal. The results of the meeting will be forwarded to USAID/Washington for final funding consideration, the preparation of necessary program documentation, and the award of grants.

Recommendations to USAID/Washington will be made within five working days of the review meeting.

USAID/Washington will have 15 working days to prepare the documentation on proposals selected for final award.

The appropriate PVO representatives will be informed of the decisions within ten working days thereafter.