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**IMPACT OF GREATER HORN OF AFRICA INITIATIVE
ELEMENTS ON USAID/KENYA STRATEGIC PLAN**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The consulting team was asked to comment on USAID's draft strategic plan for Kenya for the period 1996-2000 in light of issues deriving from the President's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI), with particular emphasis upon the potential for civil conflict, and food insecurity, and the interrelationship between developments in Kenya and those in neighboring countries. Kenya's role is central to the Greater Horn area, with a comparatively strong economy and a history of stability that is unusual in the region. Yet recent trends, particularly the intercommunal clashes of 1991-94 instigated in connection with the 1992 general elections, have shown genuine potential for civil unrest.

In addition to reviewing substantial documentation, the consultants spoke in Nairobi with at least two dozen Kenyans from NGOs and many walks of life, with expatriates associated with NGO and development issues, and with both US and national staff within the USAID Mission. Based on this information, they have concluded that there is significant potential for instability in Kenya, given serious tensions over land tenure and use, growing economic inequality, rising population, the short-term instability associated with the early stages of a democratization process, and the easy availability of modern weapons throughout the region.

The team spent considerable time analyzing the etiology and effects of the 1991-94 Rift Valley clashes in relation to these elements and concluded that they were unmistakably the product of a calculated political strategy, rather than of "ancient tribal hatreds", as some had attempted to portray them. This represents a disturbing new development in Kenyan society. Tensions certainly do exist with respect to the sense various ethnic groups have about their share of the national pie they have received vs. what they feel is their due; the clashes have demonstrated how easily such feelings can be exploited for partisan political ends. Resentment that could lead to conflict is also found among the pastoralists groups which occupy a significant proportion of Kenya's territory, including many of its border areas and areas surrounding the economically important game parks; among groups in the coastal regions; and among urban groups, where issues of social inequality and lack of services have become particularly acute.

The team finds much of the Mission's proposed 1996-2000 strategic plan in the areas of Democracy and Governance (D&G), Agriculture/Business/Environment, and Health and Population reflects strategies appropriate to enhancing stability and prosperity in this important country, with continued support to Kenya's effective programs aimed at slowing population growth being of particular importance for the future. But the team also has recommended that the Strategic Plan be modified to sharpen the D&G focus on the 1997 elections, to better define the focus of its civil society support activities, and to make conflict prevention and mitigation a cross-cutting theme for all the Mission's work. The Mission needs to institute accountability for conflict prevention impact assessment in all of its programs to avoid situations in which project resources might actually make matters worse (e.g., where land tenure or usage patterns are in dispute in agriculture project areas). Wording reflecting several of these recommendations was suggested for use in the Strategic Plan, and the Mission has incorporated most of this into its working draft.

One of the Mission's great strengths is its extensive and long-standing network of PVO/NGO connections. NGOs are at the forefront of civil society efforts to respond to the threat of conflict in Kenya, displaying remarkable creativity and initiative, and there seems to be real promise for low-

key efforts by the Mission to expand its support to their endeavors. It is therefore suggested that a modest program of support to NGO efforts in grass-roots conflict prevention and related policy research (e.g., on land tenure issues), drawing upon existing D&G and other resources, be located within the D&G office.

With respect to broader GHAI issues, the team recommends that food security and related issues (e.g., terms of trade for pastoralists, instability and population movements in neighboring countries, market manipulations) continue to be an important focus of Mission monitoring and attention, even in the absence of a regular PL-480 program; that greater effort be made to deal at a policy level with the particular strains within the pastoralist areas of the country (a cross-cutting Greater-Horn theme); and that the Mission's conflict prevention and mitigation efforts be better integrated with the existing network of efforts by regional and national NGOs working on similar issues throughout the GHAI area (with specific suggestions being made with regard to possible contacts).

It is generally agreed that, while Kenya is by no means as threatened by violent internal conflict as some of its GHAI neighbors, the possibility of such conflict is sufficient to merit genuine concern, especially in view of Kenya's key economic, political and logistical importance to the GHAI region. The potential for constructive response is substantial enough to warrant the integration of this theme into the Mission's strategy. A series of low-cost initiatives, to be undertaken through NGOs and in coordination with other donors and integrated with similar efforts under way in other countries of the GHAI area, could offer real promise as a substantial contribution to Kenya and the region as a whole.

INTRODUCTION

This report, submitted by Willet Weeks and Crawford Young, is based upon a two-week mission to Kenya, from January 21 to February 3, 1996. The consultant team, organized by Associates for Rural Development, Inc. (ARD) in association with Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), at the request of USAID, interviewed approximately two dozen Kenyans (listed in the report Annex 2), several expatriates from the NGO community, members of the USAID/Kenya Mission, and Embassy staff. The team expresses its warmest gratitude to the USAID/Kenya Mission for its excellent logistical support in facilitating arrangements for these interviews. As well, Thomas Wolf, Director of the Kalamazoo College Kenya Program and long-time Kenya resident, greatly assisted our efforts, drawing upon his extensive network of contacts.

The task assigned to the team was "to assist the Mission in reviewing its draft Country Strategy through the GHAI lens and crisis prevention." The team was asked to appraise possible sources of instability within Kenya, the potential for violent conflict, and possible responses to it within the overall USAID/Kenya strategic plan. The team has proposed a number of specific changes and additions to the Mission Strategic Plan within the framework of our mandate. This report offers our overall conclusions and recommendations.

Our report benefits from the extended analysis of the balance sheet on democratization in Kenya supplied by the assessment report concerning D&G in Kenya, written by Gary Hansen, Jennifer Widner, and Judith Geist.¹ A valuable overall framework for our inquiry is provided by the study on preventing violent conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa by Creative Associates International.² We also consulted a range of documentary materials from NGOs, international organizations, and human rights groups, as well as the recent academic literature concerning democracy, ethnic clashes, and other issues pertinent to our mission.

The short period available to the team for this study made impractical any interviewing or observation outside the Nairobi area. Thus we were unable to verify on the ground any of the judgements we draw from the evidence noted above. On issues where conflicting testimony is encountered (for example, the proportion of persons displaced by Rift Valley ethnic clashes who have been able to return to their farms), we are unable to offer firm conclusions.

One can imagine a wide range of conceivable sources of instability and conflict in Kenya. The report will not endeavor to provide exhaustive treatment of the subject, but focus upon those sources which seem to us most salient, based upon actual events in Kenya, the Greater Horn of Africa, and for that matter the continent (and the world) as a whole in recent years. The conflicts which most easily escalate into violence are those defined by communal identities, although the root causes may lie in inequalities of resource access, class difference, power struggles among political élites, or other factors. In recommendations which we offer, we do not assume a policy *tabula rasa*, but rather accept as givens the basic parameters of the GHAI, and the primary sectors of activity identified in the draft 1996-2000 Strategic Plan.

POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY

In this section, we examine some overall factors of possible instability: land conflicts, population pressure, social inequality, tensions of democratization, and influx of modern weapons. We then turn more specifically to the issue of ethnic conflict, which appears to us likely to define the contours of violence if it occurs, although not necessarily to "cause" disorder. Although there are other conceivable sources of instability, the most consequential factors seem to us to be subsumed within these categories. In the focus upon sources of possible instability, we should stress from the outset that we do not suggest that serious instability or episodes of violent conflict are the most likely scenario. In classifying the ten countries in the Greater Horn, the Creative Associates document lists Kenya in a middle category of "medium potential for conflict" (along with Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti); we find this a reasonable assessment.³ Instability and violence are much more than a remote incubus; on balance, we believe that near-to-medium term disorder is a possibility, though not a likelihood.

Land assumes a singular intensity as a basic resource and political issue in Kenya. It figures far more centrally in the language of political conflict than in most African states; one of our respondents mused that only Zimbabwe and perhaps South Africa compared in the saliency of the land question. Several explanations may be advanced for the crucial importance of land as the pivot of political conflict.

Certainly the land question originates in the colonial era, with the choice early in the century to develop Kenya (and finance its administration and the East African Railway) through promotion of white agricultural settlement. Large tracts of the best land in Kenya (roughly a quarter of the arable) were alienated in the early colonial decades to white settlers, particularly in the central highlands and the Rift Valley. The cultivating populations displaced, especially Kikuyu, were crowded into reserves, or lived precariously as farm laborers, tenants, or squatters. The pastoralists whose grazing lands were confiscated, Maasai and some Kalenjin groups, were also pushed back into less desirable zones. When anti-colonial struggle took form, land grievances were central to the idiom of protest, and the ethnic community most affected by the privileged and protected status of the "white highlands", the Kikuyu, played the leading role. The 1952-1956 "Mau" uprising, carried out by a "Land Freedom Army" drawn from the most marginalized Kikuyu rural strata, required the use of British Army troops to repress, the sole instance in the postwar annals of British African decolonization where metropolitan troops were deployed.

A formula for resolving the land crisis was the key to the power transfer accord bringing Kenyan independence in 1963. In essence, this provided for a market-value buyout of a significant faction of the white farm sector, and its transfer to Kenyans in small and medium holdings. Over time, a substantial fraction of the remaining former white farms passed into

Kenyan hands through market mechanisms, often in very large holdings. By far the largest beneficiaries were Kikuyu (and closely related Embu and Meru), for several reasons:

- (1) a significant portion of the white-owned lands lay in Kikuyu zones;
- (2) most of those then resident on these lands as squatters, tenants, or laborers, were Kikuyu;
- (3) already in the 1950s, when the first land schemes began, Kikuyu were best positioned with some economic resources and entrepreneurial skills to acquire the land;
- (4) the independence settlement resulted in the accession to power of Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, whose patrimonial management of the emerging political system provided opportunities for politically prominent or wealthy Kikuyu to acquire land on easy terms; and,
- (5) Kenyatta remained in power until his 1978 death, providing an extended period, during which time the greater fraction of the white farms passed into African hands, for Kikuyu to enjoy some advantages in land acquisition.

Yet another factor was the early choice of Kenya, confirmed soon after independence, for individual titling of land. Whatever the economic efficiencies derived from individual land registration, the policy over time also sharpened conflicts over land, of several sorts:

- (1) sharp inequalities in the distribution of land; one recent estimate suggests that as many as 3.1 million new farms could be created if a three hectare ceiling were placed on land holdings;⁴
- (2) growing numbers of landless persons, with available land essentially all distributed;
- (3) land alienation to individuals and groups in zones where other communities believe they have ancestral claims; and,
- (4) as population densities and land pressures increased, particularly in the Central Province, flow of cultivators (mainly Kikuyu) onto lands utilized and claimed by pastoral populations, usually accompanied by acquisition of some form of real or apparent titling.

Finally, the aridity of the greater part of Kenya makes most of the land surface unsuitable for agriculture. All of northeast, north, and northwest Kenya is inhabited solely by pastoral populations only loosely integrated into the Kenyan polity. Intense conflict is developing all along the frontier between the pastoral and agricultural zones, semi-arid areas where marginal, high-risk, rain-fed agriculture is barely possible in some years. The acute land pressures in the rain-fed areas drive land-hungry populations to expand into these zones, and acquire ownership rights.

Thus land access, use and ownership are powerfully emotional issues. High inequalities of land ownership are a natural source of resentments. The pastoral-agricultural conflict is an ongoing source of isolated violence, and the 1991-1994 Rift Valley ethnic clashes showed how easily it could be politically exploited. The apparent belief in some highly placed political circles that the very communal security, even survival, of their ethnic group is at risk if control of the political summit changes also illustrates the singularly potent charge attaching to the land question.

A second major potential source of instability is the high degree of inequality. A conspicuous concentration of wealth lies in the hands of the top echelon of the political class, the more prosperous elements in the private sector (mostly Kikuyu and Asians, and a few remaining Europeans), and the expatriate community. The extraordinary scale of recent corruption scandals (for example, the Goldenberg affair, involving nearly a half-billion dollars) is suggestive of the degree to which political power can transubstantiate into economic accumulation. The emergence of a dynamic Kikuyu entrepreneurial class is in most respects an energizing force for development, but its affluence does contrast sharply with the poverty, violence and degradation of the Nairobi or Mombasa slums. The Asian racial minority, less than 0.5% of the population, controls a substantial segment of the economy, and stands out as a highly visible group, whose situation in the popular eye tends to be identified with the most affluent members of the category. And whites generally appear as a privileged category, whether citizens or expatriates.

Kenya thus appears to be no exception to an apparent global trend towards higher degrees of income inequality. However, this differentiation as yet does not translate into an organized politics of social class. Electoral competition in the early 1960s and in 1992 has for the most part followed ethno-regional rather than class lines, and radical populism remains a scattered and episodic element in political process. The tensions of extreme poverty are more readily apparent in the high insecurity in the major cities, and prevalence of property crimes and domestic violence. Property crime, of course, can be understood as reflective of class antagonism between the powerful and the powerless.

A third factor of potential instability is population growth. Kenya, which had only eight million people at the time of independence, now has 26 million. Although the unsustainable earlier growth rate of over 4% has dropped to less than 3% (in part as a result of effective family planning programs supported by USAID/Kenya), the expansion momentum built into the huge cohorts of young persons ensures that population pressures will intensify.

The translation between demographic statistics and potential social unrest occurs above all with the new generations. The World Bank estimates that a 7% growth rate (unlikely, based on recent performance) is necessary to absorb the young people entering the labor force. One major employer, the civil service (272,000), is under a structural adjustment mandate to shrink by 16,000 per year over a five year period. Especially in Central and Western Provinces, many rural youth will be unable to obtain land or countryside employment, and will continue to drift into the urban slums in pursuit of survival. In the rural areas as well, there are large numbers of adolescent males at loose ends, readily mobilized for anti-social activities, as shown by the ease and speed with which the Kalenjin "warriors" were recruited to assault, pillage and burn amongst the Rift Valley clash victim groups. The rapid appearance of similar groups when political

circumstance dictated or state authority dissolved in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia and Sierra Leone also merits note.

Fourthly, one needs to acknowledge that the democratization process itself can generate destabilizing tensions. Electoral competition formalizes and -- when democracy is consolidated -- civilizes the struggle for power. When multi-party competition is still unfamiliar to many citizens, when the contending parties do not offer discernibly different "societal projects", and when the stakes in control of the polity appear so high both to the political élites and their followings, the theatricalization of competition which an electoral process provides is likely to illuminate the cultural fault lines of civil society. And the regime itself, feeling directly threatened by this transition, may actively cultivate such fault lines in order to discredit pluralism so as to make its warnings about the perils of democracy a self-fulfilling prophecy. This by no means invalidates the postulate of the necessity of political liberalization. But one must recognize that a political learning process extending over time is doubtless required for the accompanying tensions to be manageable in civil form.

The 1991-1994 ethnic clashes clearly demonstrate the high costs of incivil political strategies: 1500 deaths, 300,000 or more people driven from their homes, high property loss. Although the government blamed the opposition, the churches, the media, and the "tribalism" inevitable with multi-party competition, most other sources place responsibility for instigating most of these clashes on the top echelons of the government; a parliamentary select committee in the then-KANU only National Assembly concluded that the clashes were orchestrated by key political figures close to President Daniel arap Moi (including Vice-President George Saitoti and Nicholas Biwott).⁵ Such strategies are inexcusable, and indeed may stimulate the opposition to reply in the same coin. The wisest preventive measures are fairness and equity of the rules of engagement; the D&G assessment team identifies a number of respects in which such basic codes are deficient in Kenya.⁶ But our point here is that major electoral events do raise the political temperature in an environment where cultural consciousness is high, making this necessary pathway to democracy pass through some possible moments of risk and tension.

Fifthly, serious potential risks lie in the large stocks of modern weapons which flowed into innumerable private channels when the huge armies of former Somali autocrat Siyaad Barre and the Derg dictatorship in Ethiopia dissolved in 1991. From various sources, we understand that the pastoral populations of northern Kenya along the Somali and Ethiopian frontiers are now well armed with automatic weapons. Apparently, most of the Northeast Province is virtually out of control, with government garrisons barricaded in a few small centers, and safe passage on the roads possible only in armed convoys.

Impossible to verify are the rumors encountered that an arms traffic now extends into the Rift Valley. The ethnic clashes would have taken a far higher toll had automatic weapons been available to the "warriors". Some suggest that some Kikuyu, Luo or Luhya settlers in affected Rift Valley areas may be arming themselves in anticipation of a possible repetition of the assaults. Parenthetically, one may observe that the weapons used by the "warriors" were cultural tools (pangas, burning hoes, arrows).

Finally, there is some destabilizing risk for Kenya in the now endemic civil strife in Somalia and Sudan. Some rough equilibrium appears to emerge in Somalia, though there is every reason to expect an extended period of statelessness, with various clan or warlord-based armed bands. The tragic civil war in Sudan continues with fluctuating degrees of intensity. In the latter case, one can imagine scenarios where Khartoum government military offensives of heightened intensity, or more serious strife among southern Sudanese groups, might suddenly produce a large refugee exodus into Kenya and Uganda. In both cases, the likely persistence of low-intensity warfare in itself poses some risks to Kenya. This threat is mitigated by the political geography; these frontiers are well removed from the core areas of Kenya, and large buffer areas of thinly populated pastoral areas provide important insulation.

We turn next to a consideration of the cultural diversity set of issues. Like all but a handful of African states (and most others in the contemporary world), Kenya is a culturally plural polity, composed of a diversity of ethnic groups, religious communities, and racial categories. Kenya is an artifact of the colonial partition; thus its diverse populations found themselves bonded only in shared subjugation to the colonial state, or (in the case of the Asian and European racial minorities) immigrants who prospered in its shelter.

The transition to independence came with astonishing speed from 1960 to 1963, from a political order in which rule was exercised through an autocratic racial hierarchy, with Europeans (whether government officials, settlers or others) at the top, Asians enjoying an intermediate commercial niche, and Africans concentrated in subaltern roles economically, socially, and politically. The political formula which emerged from 1963 until 1978 was based upon a loose-knit Kikuyu-centered machine, operating through a fairly fractionalized single party, with patrimonial networks of resource flows extending to most groups. The inner core, however, was clearly Kikuyu, and viewed as such by all politically conscious Kenyans.⁷ This period coincided with the epoch of the most vigorous post-independence economic expansion, which -- combined with the indisputable political skill of the late President Kenyatta -- ensured a long period of relative stability, and low levels of intensity to cultural cleavages.

Despite an unseemly succession scramble when during the last three years of Kenyatta's rule his health was visibly failing, the Kikuyu were unable to assure an ethnic succession. Power passed into the hands of then-Vice-President Moi, from the much smaller Kalenjin group (something over 10%). Particularly after the scare of a nearly-successful military coup in 1982, Moi reconfigured the commanding structures of the Kenyan state to ensure control by his Kalenjin group (really in the inner core his Tugen sub-group and the closely allied Marakwet and Keiyo). This is reflected in the key personnel in the military command, which clearly show that an "ethnic security map" determines who occupies the top posts.⁸

This system of political management was far more precarious than the Kenyatta formula, resting at its summit upon a much narrower base. The Kalenjin generally were a relatively marginalized congeries of peoples during colonial times, and therefore were far less equipped to play the dominant role which political accident thrust upon them. Thus during the 1980s, the insecurity felt by the regime led it to become increasingly repressive, triggering in turn by the mid-1980s growing criticism of Kenya for human rights abuses, and later in the decade the

internal pressures for democratization, which combined with donor insistence to produce the multi-party opening at the end of 1991.

Those at the top had some reason to fear retribution at the hands of the political opposition that emerged; a fear of the communal consequences of a shift in the ethnic balance of power permeated to lower societal levels as well, as the electoral struggle took shape. Since the flawed 1992 elections, many believe that the ethnic contours of power have further narrowed, and that the two largest ethnic communities (Kikuyu and Luo) have been substantially excluded from influence.

This capsule history indicates why Kenyan perceptions of politics are so strongly textured by ethnicity. To explore the calculus of stability within the context of identity politics, a few words are necessary to introduce ethnicity as political actor. Its complexity and fluidity are critical to grasp in assessing its political significance.

One can usefully conceive of ethnicity as having three faces. One dimension of the phenomenon touches upon inner elements of the cultural consciousness of the individual. This primordial aspect lies at the root of its potency in catalyzing fears and anxieties at moments of tension. In extreme circumstances (Rwanda, Bosnia), the ethnic "other" can be wholly demonized. This primordial sense of communal belonging often rests upon historical narratives, rarely literally true and often different from those of neighboring groups, which connect the sense of group identity to an ancestral collectivity.

But the political impact of ethnicity often comes from its instrumental invocation as a competitive weapon. It is this dimension of ethnicity which is clear in the Rift Valley ethnic clashes, which were unmistakably a product of a calculated political strategy, and in no sense reflected "ancient tribal hatreds". The ceaseless struggle for "fair shares" of the "national cake" reflects this instrumental aspect of ethnicity.

The third face of ethnicity lies in its ongoing process of change and evolution. The ethnonyms in Kenya (and elsewhere) in general use today are not identical with those current a century ago. Some (Luhya, Kalenjin) are mainly constructs of the colonial era. Others (the various groups emanating from the Luo diaspora) have perhaps more antiquity, but evolving boundaries and meanings over time. This socially constructed dimension of ethnicity helps explain its contingency and fluidity.

In short, ethnicity in contemporary Kenya is a malleable, multi-layered, and situational phenomenon. The larger categories commonly employed (Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin, Luhya) have multiple layerings. To decode the ethnic geography, one must reckon with the Kiambu dimension of Kenyatta as well as the Kikuyu; in the Moi era, the interplay of Tugen and "Kalenjin" needs to be noted. Tensions can rise and subside; in some clash areas, communities targeted by the violence have returned to their lands, and a perhaps still precarious comity with others seems restored.

In terms of possible sources of instability associated with the cultural diversity of the Kenyan citizenry, the complex Rift Valley situation clearly belongs at the head of the list. Prior

to colonial rule, most of the area was dominated by pastoral populations (Maasai, Kalenjin groups, Samburu, Turkana). During the colonial period, the most fertile and better watered areas were seized for white farms. Some Kikuyu, displaced by land alienation to white settlers, moved into Rift areas, some as squatters on white farms, others on unallocated land. The transfer of former white farms to Africans after independence led to many Kikuyu, and some Luo, Luhya, or Kisii acquiring land titles. The pastoral lands, classified as "trust lands", could through diverse procedures pass into the hands of incoming farm settlers, acquiring legal claims of varying solidity. There is thus a welter of land right conflicts, both between herders and cultivators, and amongst different pastoral groups.

The ethnic clashes were a complex series of localized violent episodes, sharing common patterns, but not forming a single, continuous event.⁹ In a number of areas, after the initial shock, impressive reconciliation efforts occurred which facilitated the return of those displaced. In others (Burnt Forest was frequently mentioned), tensions remain very high. By many accounts, the Rift Valley original populations, a number of whom had partially or wholly adopted an agricultural way of life, had coexisted harmoniously with the settler communities prior to the clashes. However, the possibility of renewed ethnic violence in this area remains significant for several reasons:

- (1) there remain innumerable conflicts over land rights, the validity of land documents held by some, the status of those farming without documentation, and the legality of some transfers of land rights from pastoral trust lands;
- (2) the memory of the clashes will fade only slowly, and the mutual fears may lead groups to arm themselves or engage in preemptive violence;
- (3) the underlying version of history held by the pastoralists, which portrays the land as belonging originally to them, means that a residual sense of grievance may remain, susceptible of activation in crisis circumstances; and,
- (4) the deepening land pressure in the adjoining highlands (Central Province, Mount Elgon, Nyanza), which will produce a continuing outflow of land-hungry persons into adjoining areas in the Rift Valley.

Although the Rift Valley set of issues is the most important and serious, there are a number of other ethnic factors which require briefer mention. Amongst the Kalenjin, a pronounced fear of political marginalization clearly operates. The Kalenjin label covers a number of sub-groups, employing closely related and for the most part mutually intelligible speech codes; the National Election Monitoring Unit report lists ten sub-groups: Kipsigis, Nandi, Nyangori, Keiyo, Tugen, Marakwet, Pokot (or Suk), Sabaot, Sebei (mostly Uganda), and Dorobo. The leaflets summoning "Kalenjin warriors" to attack Kikuyu or others expressed the fear that the multi-party elections were a scheme to oust them from their birthright.¹⁰ But "Kalenjin" is by no means a cohesive, mobilized block. Recent conflicts have pitted Kipsigis and Nandi against others. Many are no longer primarily pastoral. Within the group, some mutter that only Tugen and Marakwet have benefited from what others perceive as Kalenjin hegemony in politics.

The Maasai, although in everyday political conversation often identified as allies of the present regime, nurse important grievances. Their attachment to a pastoral way of life has been particularly resilient, in spite of a tendency in both Tanzania and Kenya to stigmatize them as "primitive". Their grazing lands have been particularly vulnerable to encroachment; the group ranches into which some sectors of Maasai land were organized provided an avenue for alienation of significant tracts to cultivators. Some of their critical water sources are at risk. Their location in proximity to core areas of Kenya make serious Maasai unrest a matter of concern.

The pastoral areas in the northern part of Kenya are less susceptible to competing settlement by cultivators, except in some areas of Samburu territory, and in irrigation areas of the Tana valley. As noted above, much of this area is administered only loosely if at all. This provides effective autonomy for the Somali, Boran, or Turkana groups, but means that only minimal services exist, which keep them in a state of relative marginalization. However, except for the possible corridor for arms flow from Somalia, Ethiopia, or Sudan, unrest in these areas does not affect central Kenya.

The political stance and perspectives of the two largest ethnic communities, the Kikuyu and Luo, weigh heavily in the political scene. Particularly since the 1992 elections, there is a feeling of marginalization and exclusion among both groups, although persons from these communities are represented in the government. Together, they account for well over one-third of the population. Both groups gave overwhelming support to opposition parties in the 1992 elections; in Central Province (Kikuyu), Moi won only 2%, 15% in Nyanza (mainly Luo), and 16% in Nairobi (Kikuyu predominant). As one local KANU agent observed plaintively to a Nation reporter during our stay, "selling KANU in certain areas is like marketing pork in Saudi Arabia."

The Kikuyu are particularly critical, numbering about 20%. But their sociological weight is much higher. Setting aside politically generated wealth within the inner circles of the Moi regime, Kikuyu by far eclipse all other ethnic groups in the size, resources, and entrepreneurial skill of their business class. Their physical location at the center of the country, their dominant presence in Nairobi, which although situated on what was Maasai grazing land prior to its colonial creation now is widely perceived as a Kikuyu zone, their fertile and productive land in Central Province, and the early access they enjoyed to mission schools combine to ensure their prominence in all aspects of national life. Their commercial talents and initiative have dispersed them to most corners of the country; in major towns, one usually encounters a significant number of Kikuyu enterprises. Acute land shortages in their historic homeland has resulted in Kikuyu agricultural expansion into surrounding areas, especially the Rift Valley. Particularly in the Kenyatta years, the political imperative of accommodating the forest fighters who carried out the Mau Mau insurrection meant encouragement of settlement of landless Kikuyu peasants in the Rift Valley and in scattered other locations.

The tensions between rich and poor Kikuyu run just under the surface. The Mau Mau insurrection was not only an anti-colonial revolt, but a Kikuyu civil war, pitting the most marginalized against those who had achieved some prosperity within the colonial order. The assassination of British protégé Chief Waruhiu in Nairobi in 1952 triggered the beginning of the uprising. Periodic voices arise within Kikuyuland expressing the social anger of the poor:

Bildad Kaggia, J.M. Kariuki, the novelist Ngugi wa Thiong'o; in diverse ways, they have been eliminated or marginalized.

Their success and drive for social ascension, along with recollections of their era of domination in Kenyan politics under Kenyatta, and earlier their leading role in the independence movement, make their relations with other Kenyan communities uneasy. Perceptions of "domination" easily arise, as does envy of what others see as their aggressive drive to prosperity. The Rift Valley ethnic clashes primarily targeted Kikuyu settlers. In a climate of escalated ethnic tensions, the Kikuyu urban immigrants outside Central Province could conceivably be vulnerable.

The Kikuyu question interfaces USAID policy in various ways. The democratization initiative is perceived by the regime as promoting the Kikuyu opposition. Kikuyu are particularly prominent in Kenyan NGO leadership; thus channeling aid through NGOs can be interpreted as ethnic (and opposition) favoritism. The microenterprise focus of the agriculture program is likely to advantage the ethnic community best situated to take advantage of these facilities.

The Luo zone of Nyanza Province is the other major stronghold of opposition sentiment. Although the nationalist coalition which spearheaded the conquest of independence in 1963 was a Luo-Kikuyu coalition (original KANU, versus the smaller groups then mostly aligned with the Kenya African Democratic Union, or KADU), the relations were uneasy. The most prominent Luo leader, Oginga Odinga, tried to form an opposition party (Kenya People's Union, or KPU) in 1966, but the party was banned in 1969. Moi interpreted the abortive military coup of August 1982 as Luo-inspired, and viewed political activity within the group with heightened suspicion thereafter.¹¹ The Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), which aspired at the beginning of the 1990s political opening to articulate a united opposition voice, split by election time into a predominantly Luo (FORD-Kenya) and a predominantly Kikuyu (FORD-Asili) wing.

The coastal areas present a complex ethnic scene. Difficult land issues arise because, in colonial times, the ten-mile coastal strip had a residual connection to the Sultan of Zanzibar, and different land alienation procedures existed. The major city, Mombasa, has a large immigrant population from central and western Kenya. There has been some land alienation to settler communities from outside the coast, a source of some resentment. Islam is dominant amongst some coastal communities, and present among most; thus there is some religious rivalry, and a feeling amongst many Muslims that they encounter discrimination. Coastal populations have never weighed heavily in national politics, and as a consequence have some feeling of exclusion. In the northern areas, spillover from the Somali crisis zone creates insecurity; road transport to Lamu, we were told, is periodically unsafe. There is no single ethnic issue on the coast which is likely to produce significant instability; there is some possibility that, from the amalgam of diversity questions, some conflict might occur.

The swelling urban centers, particularly Nairobi, are a possible locus of social disorder, which might weave together class disparities and communal conflict. During the 1990s, such episodes have occurred in a number of African cities (Dakar, Nouakchott, Brazzaville, Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, among others). Nairobi has experienced moments of fear and conflict on a smaller scale (in 1991, for example, or more recently when Luos fought with Nubians). Populations in the Nairobi slums live intermingled in social misery, with the opulence of the city center and the

spacious suburban quarters visible nearby. The Kenyan elite from all origins has a strong interest in averting urban violence which could escalate in unpredictable fashion. However, such urban conflicts, in African and American cities, can erupt suddenly, triggered by highly symbolic events (Rodney King), and wreak havoc before (literally) burning themselves out.

Race and religion, as lines of cleavage, play a lesser role. The primary racial issue involves the role of the Asian community, a significant fraction of which holds Kenyan citizenship. Kenyan Asians have never experienced the physical victimization that their Ugandan counterparts suffered under Idi Amin, or the economic losses felt by Tanzanian Asians at the peak of the socialist period. Since colonial times, in spite of their complex internal visions, they tend to be perceived by others as a single racial category. Their social insularity and control of important segments of the economy breeds resentment. Asian leadership since independence has tended to seek security through investment in support of incumbent authorities, but there is an inevitable uneasiness in the relationship. The permanent European community, greatly reduced in numbers since 1963, maintains a very low political profile. The 1995 emergence of Richard Leakey as head of a proposed (still unregistered) political party, Safina, is a bizarre departure from the norm, reportedly resented by other Europeans as attracting undue attention to their presence and continued disproportionate share of wealth and property.

On the religious side, save for the coastal areas and the north, Christian conversion over the past century has been extensive. Although the Anglican missions operated in most areas, there was a territorial division of labor amongst other Protestant missions, with a consequent overlap of region and denomination. For example, the African Inland Church (alias Mission) operated amongst the Kalenjin populations (and some Maasai and Kamba), and thus the church today is associated with Moi. African independent churches have a vigorous presence, especially in Kikuyuland. Protestant-Catholic rivalry is far less intense than in neighboring Uganda. Muslims are concentrated on the coast and the north (Somali and many Boran). The recent effort to launch a Muslim political party (IPK), whose registration was rejected on the grounds that ethnic, religious or racial parties are prohibited, suggests some rise in religio-political consciousness.

The importance of cultural identities in Kenyan politics should not be interpreted as antithetical to a deepening consciousness of citizenship within a Kenyan national context. Kenyan and ethnic identity operate at different levels; their relative importance is situationally determined. An ongoing struggle for relative shares in the "national cake" is the stuff of politics: not the only dimension, but a very visible one. But as the very metaphor suggests, the "cake" is "national", and component groups deserve a share because they are collective proprietors. The pastoral communities at the northern periphery of Kenya have been far less involved in national life than others, and have received much smaller servings of the "cake"; naturally, their sense of attachment to "Kenya" is much weaker than that of the central groups. Thus we see Kenya as a solidly established identity, in spite of the recently renewed debate about "majimboism" (regionalism).

In sum, we return to the overall judgement offered earlier. There are a number of possible dangers of instability in Kenya. Taken together, these provide ample reason for the

priority accorded to conflict avoidance and resolution in GHAI. But near term relative stability is the most likely scenario.

INSTABILITY AND ITS REGIONAL IMPACT

Any serious instability in Kenya would pose a major threat to the entire region. Since the intensification of conflict levels in the Greater Horn from 1983 on, Kenya has served as the central pivot for humanitarian responses. The relatively good infrastructure in Kenya, its central location, its communications links by air, sea and road, make it indispensable as a support base for the international community.

There is no end in sight for the lethal civil conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda or Burundi. International humanitarian interventions will continue to be necessary in the near and middle term. Thus access to Kenya as a base will be a critical requirement throughout the near and middle term future.

As we have stressed earlier in the report, instability in neighboring countries to the north has significant impacts upon Kenya. The large flow of modern weapons into the north and north-east makes administrative control of these regions all but impossible; such services as are available are supplied virtually only by NGOs. The challenge remains of lodging significant numbers of refugees; there is an ever-present possibility that their total might suddenly increase.

POTENTIAL OF INSTABILITY TO DISLOCATE DEMOCRATIZATION

The most obvious zone of instability is in the Rift Valley, still convalescent from the earlier wave of ethnic clashes. The populations concerned are highly sensitized to the possibility of violence, even where substantial inter-communal reconciliation has occurred, and where local leaders maintain that they were duped by political manipulators on the last occasion. Rift Valley leaders, particularly Kalenjin figures, raised the issue of "majimboism" during the 1992 elections. The subtext of this slogan implies that regional power would devolve exclusively upon the indigenous populations, who might then assert their rightful claims to these lands.¹²

The Rift Valley conflicts closely relate to the "Kalenjin" role at the summit of Kenyan politics, and the pervasive fear in their leading circles of losing their hold on the system. This psychosis underlies the risky strategy of fomenting ethnic clashes. As well, the diverse forms of harassment of opposition campaigns, manipulation of legislative obstacles, and huge financial outlays illustrate an absolute determination to retain power. This view has not changed, raising inevitable questions about what might transpire if the opposition can agree upon a single presidential candidate, and Moi appears likely to lose. The strong Kalenjin predominance within the security forces would at this point become an important question. The 1997 elections appear a critical moment of choice in this respect: assuring their integrity, managing the escalated communal tensions which are an ineluctable by-product, and ensuring respect for the results (if there is fair conduct).

Urban poverty and social inequalities rank next the roster of potential threats to democratization. The Nairobi situation is especially critical. The capital is an opposition

stronghold, although how this will be reflected will depend upon the eventual configuration of opposition forces. The civility of the electoral process will be an important element; if thuggery is prevalent, and the contending political forces incite youth militia to disrupt meetings of their competitors, then the possibility of violence is considerable.

The 1997 election in general is a critical step in the democratization process. If there are flagrant deviations from minimal standards of fairness and transparent malpractices, the consequences for the future of democracy will be very serious. Amongst many of those interviewed, there is considerable skepticism today regarding democratization. There was not strong confidence that the elections would be fair. The internal factional struggles amongst opposition groups, and within KANU, offer a disconcerting spectacle to the public at large, as does the evident ethnic underpinning of the parties. Skepticism is also widespread as to whether the array of opposition leaders would provide a different kind of leadership, beyond rearranging the ethnic balances in resource distribution. Expectations concerning the benefits from political liberalization seem much lower than in 1991, reflected in the forecasts by some observers of a relatively small turnout.

If the Kenyan public and the international community conclude that the elections are a "failure", the costs will be substantial. Renewed civil society demoralization and disengagement is likely internally, entailing a further loss of state legitimacy. Externally, significant donor withdrawal would be a likely consequence. In view of the degree of aid dependency, the economic impact of substantial loss of aid would be substantial.

The land question and the innumerable kinds of conflicts to which it may give rise merit a place on the list of possible threats to democratization. In theory, a liberalized political arena should provide the enabling environment for addressing and resolving through negotiation, mediation, and perhaps legislation the sources of some of the conflicts. In practice, the potential for violent conflict surrounding the multi-dimensional land issue examined earlier in the report in itself may constitute an obstacle in the path of democratization.

Widening social inequalities likewise offer both promise and peril for democratization. Although the economic feasibility of a radical populist alternative to the present set of market-oriented policies haltingly pursued by the government and insistently prescribed by the donor community is nil, the need for a political vehicle for the expression of the discontents of the marginalized is manifest. The emergence of some political structure which articulates social equity and distribution issues as well as macro-economic efficiency, and thereby provides a supplement to purely ethnic channels of expression, would undoubtedly enhance long-term democratization prospects. Successive opposition initiatives -- the KPU in the late 1960s, the Odinga-Anyona abortive venture in the 1980s, original FORD -- all began with such an aspiration, but in the end these were forced or fell into the familiar ethno-regional channels of Kenyan political competition.

The risk of escalating armaments amongst the civil population must figure on the list, and ranks next. The multiplication of youth militias with automatic weapons would create conditions of insecurity making democracy extremely difficult. Such conditions already exist in the north and northeast. Among other things, a political campaign is all but impossible; here one may

recollect the controversies over the seeming KANU sweep in Northeast Province in 1992 (72% for Moi), from which opposition parties were essentially barred as a security zone.

This list could be extended, but we will stop here. Although the Rift Valley situation clearly ranks first among the concerns listed, the rank order of the other, broad factors should not be read as implying a large difference in order of importance amongst them. What should be apparent from the roster of challenges to democratization is that the task of sustainable, institutionalized political liberalization is large, and the obstacles substantial.

LIMITS TO CONFLICT IN KENYA

The report has focused upon possible sources of conflict and threats to stability. The question may arise as to why, until the ethnic clashes from 1991 on, there had been so little destabilizing conflict in Kenya. Several factors may be advanced to resolve this conundrum.

For the first two post-independence decades, the Kenya state stood out in relative terms for its comparative strength and governing capacity. Diverse academic observers contributed positive, even admiring appraisals of its performance (Bienen, Leonard).¹³ Although corruption was certainly present, it reached a different order of magnitude in ordinary administrative transactions and the daily action of the regional administration in the 1980s and after.

Secondly, the KANU formula of governance until the 1980s was relatively loose-knit. Kenya was a one-party state, but a much less intolerant and autocratic one than Sékou Touré's Guinea, Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire, or perhaps even Tanzania.¹⁴ The "harambee" process of community involvement, the strong ties which many members of parliament had with their constituencies, the heated competition for party nomination at election time, and the modest degree of public debate occurring in Parliament all provided some political space for civil society.

Thirdly, Kenyan economic growth until the late 1970s was robust. The resources opened by Africanization of the state and reallocation of large blocs of settler lands provided avenues for social ascension for many. Valued basic services -- schools, clinics -- were expanding their reach rapidly.

These factors all play a diminished role today, as the competence and probity of the state eroded, Kenya became a much more closed system in the 1980s, and rapid growth ended in the 1980s. A fourth factor, of growing importance, is the emergence of a large African middle class, with a very wealthy upper layer, which has a high stake in political stability and good governance. The middle class includes members of virtually all ethnic communities, although not in equal proportions. Overall the Kikuyu are most visible, and -- as a collectivity -- perhaps have the most to lose from serious and sustained disorder. This serves as some brake on the aggressiveness of their opposition. Some of the wealth of the Asian community, at least arguably, is politically invested in ways which both protect the group and serve the ends of political stability.

Fifthly, the intensities of cultural cleavage are less than in some strife-torn countries. Ethnic consciousness is high, but this does not automatically and continuously carry a charge of intense animosity to the "other". The multiple layers of identity enter the picture as well; the interplay of communal consciousness in shaping social interactions is occurring at the sub-group and local level, as well as between the large ethnic blocks. The religious differences in Kenya have not provided major sources of tension, though some symptoms of growing Muslim resentment at perceived discrimination are palpable.

Finally, the international system -- in spite of the growing criticism to which Kenyan performance on political liberalization has been subject -- has played a stabilizing role. The high levels of foreign aid Kenya has received over the years are one measure. During the cold war years, the Kenyan government received significant security and diplomatic support from Western powers.

PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR USAID

1) 1996-2000 Strategic Plan

The team submitted a number of recommendations to USAID/Kenya concerning its draft 1996-2000 strategic plan. Many of these have been incorporated directly into the draft. In the sphere of D&G, and conflict resolution, the three primary recommendations were:

- (1) Sharpen the focus on the 1997 elections;
- (2) Better define the focus of the civil society support; and,
- (3) Incorporate conflict resolution and mitigation as a cross-cutting theme.

With respect to the 1997 elections, the team took as its point of departure the 1995 assessment team report on D&G. USAID/Kenya should find ways to signal its commitment to a free and fair 1997 election, conducted on a "level playing field", in the way its modest democracy/governance resources are allocated in the coming months, drawing upon the suggestions of the assessment team. Through the Embassy, and the donor community, the critical importance of fairly conducted elections for the future of development assistance programs needs to be clearly communicated.

Civil society, a term with a long and interesting intellectual history and multiple meanings,¹⁵ has come within the development assistance community to refer to the myriad organizations and associations that link citizens to the public realm, through direct interaction with government agencies, through political space within which public choice may be debated, and less directly through their aggregation by political parties in search of electoral majorities. The "demand-side" civil society-based strategy urged by the D&G assessment team, and adopted by the USAID/Kenya Mission, needs a clearer focus linked to other objectives; "civil society" as a whole is far too broad a target for the minimal resources of at best \$2 million per year which are available. One basis for focus is the political reform imperative; aid can target appropriate civil society bodies which can coordinate and sustain longer term effective demand for political, legal, and constitutional reform. We suggest conflict resolution as an additional focal point for the program. The latter in turn can in part reinforce an enhanced women's role, as a significant part

of the church group and NGO effort in this field involves women's organizations or female participants.

The third general recommendation is to incorporate a conflict resolution component as a cross-cutting theme throughout the program. Specific recommendations for doing this are put forward below. With particular respect to the D&G component, the team found impressive evidence of a substantial civil society capability in the conflict resolution area, which could be supported and further developed. In the wake of the ethnic clashes, the array of church-related and other civil society structures -- unusually dense in Kenya -- played a critical role in responding to the ensuing crisis. After the initial emergency relief phase, these bodies directed their energies to community reconciliation, and resettlement of clash victims on their lands.

The proposed 1996-2000 Strategic Plan represents the considered judgement of the Mission on development priorities that can be pursued within the resource levels likely to be available during that period, and it is certain that if its proposed strategies work as intended, they will have direct consequences in promoting greater prosperity and equity. It is certainly the case that further gains building on those already achieved in the health and population sector ought in themselves to have a positive influence: Kenya has achieved an impressive reduction in its overall rate of population growth, in part as a result of donor-supported family planning policies and projects, and the Strategic Plan's commitment to continuing this process has obvious potential for mitigating the progression of economic and social tensions in the coming decades.

The development of peaceful means for resolving inter-communal disputes over land rights and use is a critical issue for Kenya. Growing population densities place intensifying pressures on arable land; population control programs, no matter how well conceived, cannot by themselves relieve these pressures, especially since they cannot aim at flattening or reversing growth, merely slowing it. Even some of the Mission's existing efforts toward structural reform of the political system under the D&G sector may not go far enough in engaging pressing issues that have been exacerbated for political or other ends, or for addressing past neglect of the rights and aspirations of various component parts of Kenyan society. A low-cost, NGO-based effort by the Mission in the area of conflict management could substantially contribute to the ongoing remedial efforts within Kenyan civil society that have been mentioned above. Conflict management skills and knowledge acquired through such efforts could serve as a resource for preventing or containing rural ethnic conflict in Kenya, and for the region as a whole, thus serving the GHAI goals. The organizational capacity developed through such conflict management programs contribute as well, as noted above, to civil society strengthening, and to building women's participation.

A civil society conflict management program would seem all the more likely to achieve some modest but real successes because it would appear, based on the team's conversations, that Kenyans do not lack realism about where ultimate responsibility for promoting positive change lies: there is (compared to some of the other countries in the region) a noticeable lack of expectation that the international donor community can or should take direct responsibility for somehow managing political change -- some, indeed, express horror at the prospect that it might seek to do so. But these interlocutors do expect understanding and support for their own efforts to halt or contain the more overt pressures tending to promote violent confrontation and to

generalize human-rights violations within their society. USAID has already done much to support improvements in the overall levels of respect for legal and civil rights; there seems to be widespread appreciation for the progress of certain freedoms, particularly freedom of expression, that has been visible in recent years and that many interlocutors feel would not have occurred without sustained pressure from the donor community. Kenyans with whom the team has spoken have repeatedly emphasized that how the United States, and the international community generally, choose to deal with such issues carries great symbolic and practical implications for how they go about exercising their civic responsibility for effecting change within their society.

But recent developments and trends would indicate the possibility that much ground could be lost in the coming years should tensions once again spill over into open violence, especially if this occurred as a result of cynical manipulations such as those that precipitated the 1991-94 "clashes". Donors such as the United States thus have compelling reasons to add violent conflict to the civil-rights and other issues that have been the objects of their attentions, particularly in the broad field of D&G.

It is the team's conclusion that, for these reasons, the Mission should conceive of conflict early warning, prevention and resolution as a cross-cutting theme touching on all aspects of its work in Kenya. The "clashes" of 1991-94 are in themselves grounds for concern about the future stability of Kenya under its present system, especially when viewed from the perspective of what has occurred in recent years in neighboring countries and of the ensuing proliferation of modern weapons in the hands of individuals and groups throughout the region. USAID, with its inherent interest in seeing Kenya expand its traditional role as a prosperous island of stability in the Greater Horn of Africa, and consistent with AID's GHAI principles, should therefore seek out channels for monitoring potential conflicts and, where possible, for supporting established community-level efforts aimed at preventing or mitigating them. The specific etiology of the "clashes" would indicate that such efforts are best pursued outside USAID's relationship with the State and with Kenya's partisan political apparatus. Fortunately, many such efforts already are, as mentioned, under way and seem, in the aggregate, realistic and feasible; USAID is, furthermore, already well-positioned to support them -- it has, indeed, already been doing so in modest ways.

Kenya's civil society organizations have attained a richness and competence unusual in the subregion. In the team's brief visit to Nairobi, it met with a number of individuals representing groups actively working to effect political or social change outside the formal political process. Significantly, many of these are women's or woman-led groups. These groups appear to have in common a fundamental skepticism about that process's ability, at least in its present form, to support peaceful change. The fact that the 1991-94 "clashes" in Rift Valley, and to a lesser extent in Nyanza and Western Provinces, appear to have been incited by elements within the partisan political sector has hardened this skepticism. Many concerned individuals feel that, the State and the existing political parties having, at least in this case, discredited themselves as forces for constructive problem solving, the only effective means of bringing about reconciliation at the community level in conflict-prone areas lies with the efforts of individuals and groups operating outside their framework, though many of the wiser organizations realize that they must also work in dialogue with them.

More than their mere number, it is the variety of ostensibly non-partisan organizations engaged in civil society reconciliation and related efforts that is striking. The most numerous and in many ways the most active are those affiliated with Christian churches¹⁶ (e.g., the NCKK), but others (though no doubt in many cases reflecting the religious or moral values of their members) seem to be unaffiliated with any denomination. A number of the organizations interviewed are active in reconciliation efforts in the "clash" areas; others are engaged in addressing in one way or another social issues that could serve to precipitate or exacerbate potential future conflicts. (To take one example, USAID has supported, through its PVO Co-Financing mechanism, the Ogwedhi-Sigawa Development Project, in Migori, in its apparently successful efforts at reconciliation and conflict prevention between Kuria, Luo and Masai groups from 1990 onward. Conflict was, exceptionally, avoided in this area in the run-up to the 1992 elections.¹⁷)

In the time available, the team was of course been unable to develop a comprehensive roster of civil society organizations (a term which we interpret as including but not being limited to the conventionally-constituted national NGO's) or to assess with any authority the competence or effectiveness of the many organizations with which we did meet. Nor could we fully assess their leadership with respect to the purity of their motives or to their disinterestedness in pursuing their stated aims. It is of course characteristic of such organizations worldwide that there will be a wide range of competence, dedication, and disinterestedness between and within each of them, but it is their very diversity that, in Kenya, imparts to this sector its strength and promise as a vehicle for the pursuit of a conflict prevention and management strategy.

USAID/Kenya is well positioned to provide support to this sector by virtue of its long and distinguished history of working with NGOs, both indigenous and international¹⁸. Indeed, the current 5-year Strategic Plan provides that almost all of the Mission's project activities be conducted through grants to such organizations, a situation that is unusual in Africa outside the realm of failed States or of those with which the US entertains frankly hostile relations. (This in fact is apparently the cause of some controversy within the official American community, a matter which lies beyond the scope of this paper.)

A civil society/NGO-based USAID strategy for dealing with existing and potential civil conflicts in Kenya could thus be pursued through a set of existing relationships and administrative procedures, building on a relationship with NGOs that is already one of the Mission's great strengths. In pursuing such a strategy, however, it will be important for the Mission to bring greater coherence to its existing relationships with NGOs and perhaps to expand its range of NGO contacts. The Mission is presently involved in making grants to NGOs in the health/population and the agriculture/business/environment sectors, in the use (until FY95) of PL-480 food commodities, in D&G (through the Section 116(e) funding mechanism) and, through its long-standing PVO Co-Financing grants, in a range of development activities and in the strengthening of local NGO managerial capacity.

A further step should now be taken by the Mission if conflict prevention is indeed to become a cross-cutting theme: its NGO relationships need to be assessed strategically, so that a more comprehensive agency-by-agency understanding of each present and future partner's capacity and its standing within its own community can be assessed before decisions are made

about whether and how to support its proposed conflict prevention or reconciliation efforts. Fortunately, the staff who have been working with the Mission's various NGO projects seem to have developed substantial familiarity with Kenya's NGO sector, giving them a basis for any assessment of where capacity and commitment, sectoral and geographical expertise, or similar qualities lie. We understand from conversations with Mission staff that there is already a plan in place for consolidating the management of the Mission's PVO Co-Financing and 116(e) grants-making capacity under the D&G sector in FY96; this effort should be strengthened and expanded to include other sectors as well.

The involvement of the Mission's other sectors (Agriculture, Business and Environment, and Health and Population) in any conflict prevention strategy is essential, both because it is important for the Mission to encourage thinking about this issue among all its NGO partners and because there are obvious and direct relationships between such Mission priorities as "increased commercialization of smallholder agriculture" and the issues of land tenure and use that are, as discussed in the preceding sections, central to current and potential conflict within the society. It will be important to develop a Mission-wide conflict-prevention perspective and to institute accountability for some sort of conflict-prevention impact assessment before individual projects are implemented to avoid situations in which Mission resources might actually end up making matters worse (e.g., where land tenure or usage patterns are in dispute in agriculture project areas).

It is understood that resources for the development of such a theme are likely to be limited; the team has thus chosen to avoid proposing overly ambitious schemes or costly new initiatives. In this connection, it is urged that whatever resources are made available specifically for conflict monitoring and prevention be used to support ongoing national and regional initiatives, rather than to involve outside consultants and resource organizations. Skills and experience are rapidly being gained in community-level conflict prevention and resolution activities within Kenya and (see below) throughout the Greater Horn of Africa subregion. Promoting exchanges of experience and information within this paradigm will probably be far more cost effective than bringing in outside experts to help out with a sector in which techniques of proven efficacy are still in their infancy, though efforts by the NGO community to make use of existing resources within its own networks at the international level should be encouraged.

2) Procedural Recommendations

USAID should develop a modest set of NGO projects using existing D&G, PVO Co-Financing, resources, to support ongoing community-level initiatives aimed at anticipating and mitigating likely violent conflicts in Kenya.

The team makes the following specific recommendations for USAID consideration, recognizing that many are already being partly or fully implemented:

The Mission should establish conflict early warning, prevention and community-level reconciliation as a formal cross-cutting theme in which all sectors and all professional staff should become involved. Project development and review in all sectors should be specifically required to take possible impact on underlying community tensions into account, and opportunities should

be explicitly sought out to use USAID resources, alone and in association with those of other donors, to support prevention and reconciliation efforts. Individual grants for this purpose, and overall resource allocations to it, should be modest, though the possibility of expanding them in a period of rising tension should be kept open. The approach should be low-key, with relatively little publicity, to avoid unnecessary friction with the government and to avoid a deluge of proposals from NGOs whose commitment to work in this field might be induced by their discovery of a new funding vehicle.

The D&G office should be the focal point within the Mission for the development of this theme. Information-gathering and outside networking should specifically be included in the job description of the proposed D&G Advisor, and the office should take responsibility for the dissemination of conflict-related information to all Mission staff.

Activities in this area should build on USAID's existing contacts with Kenyan and international NGOs active in conflict early warning, prevention, and reconciliation at the community and national levels. Through appropriate networking with other donors and with the NGO/CSO community, the Mission should be able to expand its range of contacts in this area. Existing D&G and PVO Co-Financing grant resources should be made available to credible organizations to expand their capacity and activities in these spheres (as has already been done in at least a few instances). To the extent possible, a roster of organizations specifically involved in conflict-related activities should be maintained by the Mission in connection with the broader systematization of its NGO relationships, and should include assessments of individual NGO capacity and effectiveness. The objective here should not be to institute an ambitious new project area, but to develop, through support to a small number of carefully-screened NGO projects, expertise in conflict-related projects that can be documented and used in the future by USAID/Kenya and others in the GHAI region. This documented experience can then be drawn upon should circumstances warrant an expansion of USAID's (and other donors') conflict-related efforts.

An informal, ad-hoc panel on conflict prevention and mitigation should be established to advise the Mission. Given the nature of the underlying tensions described in the preceding sections of this report, it is essential that such a group be broadly representative, but it is the team's assessment that, given the remarkable levels of concern and thoughtfulness it has encountered in its contacts with Kenyans at all levels, such a panel could serve as a highly effective reality check for USAID's work in this area. Selection of members of this panel could be made a responsibility of the proposed D&G advisor, with the support of the Mission's highly qualified and perceptive professional Kenyan staff.

The development of an ambitious, autonomous early-warning capacity by the Mission would not appear to be warranted. A number of NGOs, individually and through such structures as the National Council on NGOs, are already monitoring and dealing with conditions at the community level. Regular contacts with these organizations and other donors should be adequate, though the D&G office should ensure that these are bringing in information from all

areas of Kenya and should seek out additional contacts for areas where existing NGO coverage appears inadequate. It is the team's impression, subject to verification by the Mission in the coming months, that plenty of information is already being gathered by the NGOs and the donors as a whole; the challenge for USAID will be to sort it out and verify its objectivity and accuracy.

Contingency plans for enlarging Mission conflict-related grants-making capacity should be expanded should it appear that tensions are increasing -- for example, in the run-up to the upcoming elections. The Mission, in consultation with other donors and its NGO counterparts, should develop plans for dealing with escalating levels of violence. The devastation caused by the 1991-94 clashes, whose effects are still being felt as of this writing, should provide adequate grounds for prompt and proactive recourse to emergency funding mechanisms through OFDA and others. The GHAI office should be involved in such contingency planning and asked for assistance in identifying resources to assure timely response. Even if actual conflict cannot be prevented (as the 1991-94 clashes almost certainly could not have been) by concerted donor and NGO effort, the presence of ongoing local project activity, combined with its quick expansion in the event of heightened tensions, may help strengthen community resilience in at least some instances and could in any case send a powerful signal to those fomenting troubles.

Contingency planning should include the likely need for effective humanitarian assistance should conditions worsen. While the present team's focus is not emergency response per se, it will be very important for the Mission to be mindful, in any future crisis, of the lessons that have been gathered, through GHAI and other mechanisms, with respect to the effects of humanitarian assistance on conflict and on community self-reliance. Though some life-saving activity clearly took place, there are suggestions in the available documentation on the international and NGO community's response to the 1991-94 crisis of inappropriate uses of food and other humanitarian assistance. The Mission could usefully serve as a channel for disseminating and promoting discussion within the Kenya-based NGO community and among other donors, including UN agencies, of relevant lessons learned. Inappropriate humanitarian responses, however well-intentioned, have in other emergency situations been shown to have devastating effects on conflict situations, by, for example, prolonging the conflict, inadvertently serving the purposes of those fomenting violence, or providing opportunities for banditry. In future situations where local conflict may lead to the need for emergency humanitarian response, one of Kenya's great strengths -- the extraordinary number of its NGOs -- could become a serious weakness, as uncoordinated and perhaps ill-considered interventions add to the inevitable confusion.

3) Additional Considerations

The following elements would need to be taken into account in implementing the approach proposed above:

The above discussion does not enumerate the nature of potential "conflicts". The previous sections of this report provide a non-exhaustive listing of potential areas in which future conflicts may develop in Kenya. Each set of conflicts will have its own causes and evolution,

and not all situations that lead to actual or potential violence will be the appropriate objects of involvement by NGOs or their respective donors, nor should USAID limit itself to matters containing clear and present threats of violence. Because the Strategic Plan has a 5-year time-frame, it is felt that it is inappropriate here to make a complete listing of a series of hypothetical developments. Given, once again, resource limitations, the Mission will need to make thoughtful judgments about where and how to use its resources. Much will depend on the capacity and responsiveness of its potential partners: under the approach outlined here, USAID would limit itself to supporting projects proposed by others. There will be strong, early pressure on the Mission to support activities in the "clash" areas of the Rift Valley, and some support to well-conceived programs in this area would certainly be appropriate. But attention will also need to be given to other areas (for example urban, pastoralist, coastal) where conflicts are thought to be possible.

Development of a conflict prevention and mitigation "theme" will put strains on the overall D&G program and personnel resources. There is no question that this is a serious concern which can only be partially addressed in a consultancy of this sort. We are aware that we are raising a problem of resources without proposing a solution. As mentioned, Kenya is not a country in which the likelihood of conflict is such as to require an all-out emergency program at this stage, though it is not impossible that the present situation could change dramatically in the five years of the Strategic Plan. It will be up to the Mission to determine how to implement a modest refocus so as to support a small number of carefully screened NGO projects, while monitoring developments through its contacts with other NGOs and its coordination activities with other donors.

The recommendations here do not address the issue of policy dialogue. The team's recommendation is that a modest level of activity in conflict prevention and mitigation be pursued through selected NGOs, which would be the Mission's principal channel of information about possible developing crises at the community level, and that this modest program be expanded significantly should the situation be perceived to be worsening in one or another region. How this is integrated with overall evolving Mission dialogue with the Government will have to be determined by those responsible for its management.

THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA INITIATIVE & KENYA: ADDITIONAL ISSUES

As the Strategic Plan points out, Kenya is an essential component of the GHAI system. It serves as an indispensable logistical base for humanitarian assistance to countries throughout the region, with ports, civil aviation resources, telecommunications, and financial services unavailable elsewhere. Conflicts among neighbors have significant spillover effects, including on occasion large refugee flows. Severe destabilization in Kenya would have repercussions throughout the region.

Kenya, along with Tanzania, has enjoyed a remarkable degree of stability throughout the post-colonial period. Though it has experienced recurring political crises and droughts and at

least a measure of civil strife, it has built up a prosperous, agriculturally-based economy, and, while the benefits of this are (increasingly) unevenly distributed (as described in previous sections of this report), Kenya is further along the road to sustainable prosperity than almost any of its neighbors, as attested by its recent "graduation" from "Least Developed" to "Developing" in the World Bank's nomenclature. Recent, if limited, measures of economic reform, some progress in some aspects of political reform, and the very real progress in population control cited in the Strategic Plan all add to Kenya's lustre. This Kenyan exception is worthy of note, and the fact that the nation's modern economy has become increasingly urban and inclusive, with a far higher percentage of middle-class or proto-middle-class stakeholders than among most of its neighbors, goes a long way toward explaining that Kenya has so far failed to succumb to civil wars and to the dramatic collapses of State authority that have afflicted most of its neighbors at one point or another during the last two decades.

Yet, as this report makes clear, it would be irresponsible to conclude that Kenya is exempt from serious potential problems, or that the factors which, in one combination or another, have at different times led the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, or Rwanda to the brink of collapse (and over it) need be of little concern in Kenya, or to conclude that the country is somehow immune to various other of the afflictions endemic to the Greater Horn. Indeed, conflicts within and among Kenya's immediate neighbors have some potential to contribute to instability here: refugee movements have occurred in recent years and may very well do so again; the huge quantities of modern weapons released onto the regional market by the collapse of the Ethiopian and Somali armies in 1990-91, augmented through ongoing, thriving arms bazaars in Somalia, have added new dimensions to traditional conflict within and among Somali, Oromo, Turkana, Samburu and other groups throughout Kenya's northern and eastern periphery; and both rural ethnic violence and urban criminality are far less easy to bring back under control once control has been lost. USAID has other channels through which to assess the Kenyan security apparatus's capacity to prevent or contain violence, but the 1991-94 clashes and the rising violent criminality in urban areas, along the coast, and along access routes to the economically-vital game parks are all cause for concern.

A number of the team's interlocutors expressed the view that intercommunal violence was of a sort that certain influential and wealthy elements within the society could turn on and off more or less at will, as they in fact are thought to have done in the 1991-94 case. Experience elsewhere would indicate that the "turning off" function is far more problematic than the initial incitement. In this, as in other respects, the team was at times unsettled by the assumption among some Kenyans and foreigners that, even though episodes of extreme intercommunal violence might occur (as some feel they may in the lead-up to the 1997 elections), "Kenya is not Somalia".

While the State may indeed be far more deeply enracinated in this society than in Somalia's, it is important to remember that large areas of the country are in fact closely linked to Somalia through ethnicity and pastoral movement, as others are to Ethiopia and the Sudan. It is certainly not hard to conceive of how these areas, which, as stated in earlier sections of this report, are to a large extent left to their own devices, could become enflamed by any combination

of further refugee movements, prolonged drought, and instability of the 1991-94-type in the agricultural highlands and/or the urban areas. Seen from a Greater Horn perspective, complacency of the "it can't happen here" sort that the team has noticed among some Kenyans or their foreign friends is disturbing.

The following are some comments on GHAI-related issues that the team feels the Mission should keep in mind:

1) Food Security

By all accounts, food security is not the clear and present concern that it must be to so many of its neighbors. Interviews and documents made available to the team confirm that, even though Kenya does not generally produce sufficient food crops to meet internal consumption needs, the overall prosperity of the commercial farming sector allows for any deficits to be met more or less automatically by commercial imports. It is further assumed that, in any period of reduced food output due to drought or instability (the 1991-94 events are seen, for example, as having had a significant impact on overall domestic maize production), increased demand for imports will also be met commercially.

Because of these considerations in a world in which there is ever-increasing competition for shrinking PL-480 resources, and because of disputes with the Government over the taxation of Title-II commodities programmed for local monetization by NGOs, Kenya will no longer have a PL-480 program in FY96-2000. Cooperating sponsors are consequently dismantling a good part of their food-management capacity, and WFP remains the only significant operator, providing, for example, US and other donor food supplies to the remaining Somali, Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees. (The team did not receive information on EU or other donor food assistance.)

The 1996-2000 USAID Strategic Plan does not refer directly to food security monitoring or to contingency planning for possible emergencies, whether localized or as a result of population movements. While the downsizing of PL-480 programs is doubtless a sound policy choice, the Mission, working with the highly capable regional FEWS unit, should nonetheless track matters of food security in the country very closely and should, in coordination with other donors, the NGOs, and the Government, regularly (at least quarterly and more often if circumstances warrant) continue to assess food-security issues (such as rainfall, food crop production, markets -- with special emphasis on the terms of trade of livestock for grain in pastoralist areas -- and population movements within Kenya and in neighboring countries). It is central to the GHAI process as the team understands it that even fast-breaking emergencies should not be allowed to overwhelm response capacity. Yet based on the available information, it appears to the team that there is at least a chance of this happening in Kenya in the next five years as a result of drought, conflict, refugee influxes, price-fixing and other forms of market manipulation (such as occur here even in times of relative prosperity), or, especially, of a synchronous onset of any combination of any of these.

Contingency planning of this sort is all the more important because it is only as a result of coordination and forward thinking that it is possible to respond effectively to food emergencies with programs that do not, as mentioned earlier, damage local capacity. Last-minute responses to fast-breaking food emergencies tend to come in the form of large-scale free relief distributions, arguably the most damaging and ill-conceived form of assistance available. Thoughtful contingency planning should allow for more appropriate and effective response in the event that outside support should one day be required on a large scale in one or more regions of Kenya.

2) Pastoralism as a Greater Horn of Africa Issue

Transhumant ("nomadic") pastoralism, involving the strategic exploitation of vast areas of arid territory not generally suited to agricultural production (even in cases where aleatory rain-fed crops are produced) is a common theme to much of the Greater Horn area. When combined with various forms of agro-pastoralism (often meaning the inefficient exploitation of marginal lands by former transhumant pastoralists who have been forced by circumstance to shift away from their primary economic base) and with the more intensive pastoralism practiced by groups in the more fertile rangelands of the Southern Sudan, the Great Lakes area and on into southern Africa, the economic and social importance of pastoralism in the area in general is huge. Kenya is no exception in this respect: like Ethiopia and Eritrea, probably 60% or more of the country's surface is exploited in this manner by perhaps 10-20% (in Eritrea more) of the population; most border areas are straddled by these groups, which tend to be more martial than are settled agriculturalists, given that the ability to protect and expand resources effectively is central to their survival. This latter phenomenon is not always thoroughly apprehended in assessments of "security" issues in the region.

Transhumant pastoralism is a highly effective ecological and economic adaptation and can bring wealth and prosperity to those who practice it; it also makes a major economic contribution to the countries in which it is practiced, though this is often submerged in the overall statistics (and may be invisible to them when livestock exports from border areas are handled outside the formal economy). Yet it can be seriously undermined by misguided or misinformed policies. As the system is little understood, rangeland that is vital to one or (more commonly) several groups' survival is seen by the authorities as "empty", and where competing land use strategies are possible (particularly where the development of large-scale irrigated agriculture is feasible, as it is generally is along the courses of rivers in arid areas) these are allowed to alienate what is usually vital dry-season pasturage, leading to severe stress on herds, overgrazing, and, in times of prolonged drought, the near-collapse of the entire system, with much death among both people and livestock.

This problem is made all the more acute in Kenya because of the highly confusing nature of the legal framework governing land tenure in all areas. While much rangeland is still classified as "trust lands" held by the State on behalf of one or another group (the system seems not to allow for formal recognition of the multi-group usage arrangements and stratified rights that are in fact the norm in many areas), the notion of "trust" rarely withstands pressure from

outside economic interests, and titles to specific plots (a notion fundamentally contradictory to the pastoralist system) are allowed to slice the rangeland system into bits and pieces in which grazing is often impeded or excluded. Given that pastoralists see recourse to violence as a legitimate response to stress, this process leads to conflict, either between pastoralists and the encroaching outsiders or, where the latter are protected by the State, among pastoralist groups for reduced resources. In Kenya, the fact that most of the large game parks also lie squarely within land that pastoralists have traditionally used (and that often contain vital water resources) further complicates the picture.

The GHAI provides for analysis of the causes of potential conflict and for dialogue with regional leadership about solutions that will avoid violence and humanitarian catastrophe. The pastoralist groups of the GHAI area have been at the center of many of the violent conflicts that have erupted in the past decade (indeed, the whole Somali crisis is in large part a direct consequence of the broader crisis of pastoralism in the traditional Somali rangelands, both within and adjoining the former Somali Republic), and they have been at the center of many of the humanitarian emergencies that have so preoccupied the international community.

Yet the Kenya USAID Strategic Plan makes virtually no mention of these people. Indeed, the agriculture/business/environment sector includes specific plans for smallholder farmers in areas surrounding game parks to be a target of privilege for its promotion of increased commercialization of agriculture, whereas most of the larger parks are in pastoralist areas. There is nothing unusual in this -- pastoralists, as, quite literally, moving targets are notoriously difficult to work with, and are generally left out of development plans. Yet there can be no peace or stability in the GHAI area without a concerted effort to integrate the pastoralist systems more rationally and explicitly into national and regional formal economies, and without efforts being made to come to terms with the specific challenges that have lately engendered so much starvation and warfare.

Given Kenya's relative prosperity and its much-noted centrality to the GHAI political and economic system, it is our strong recommendation that the Mission, working with other donors and the NGOs, find ways of helping to put pastoralist issues -- particularly the protection of traditional land-use rights -- at the center of Kenya's explicit national concerns. Rational responses on the part of Kenya to what are fundamentally soluble problems could set standards to be emulated throughout the region. While the team did not have the time or mandate to work on the local manifestations of these issues in any depth, we strongly urge the Mission to attempt to do so in the 1996-2000 period, using existing resources and its contacts both within Kenya and throughout the GHAI network, where there is strong interest in the matter.

3) Regional Conflict Management Efforts

The need to discover, support, and document innovative approaches to conflict prevention and mitigation at the community and national levels is common to all countries of the GHAI area. There is an obvious and compelling need for governments and civil society organizations to work

imaginatively on these issues and to share their experiences regionally. Political constraints may make it difficult for there to be much sharing of this at the State level -- Ethiopia, where much of the most innovative work of this sort is being done, might, for example, be seen through Kenyan eyes as somehow threateningly "majimboistic".

The GHAI network, as it is evolving, should allow for relatively non-threatening exchanges of experience and knowledge to take place within and between national and regional NGOs outside of the more prickly government-to-government framework; indeed, a great deal of the most significant peace and reconciliation work being done in the region is being done by NGOs able to serve as channels between hostile governments and between governments and various components of civil society, as well as insurgent groups. This is a fascinating development and one which is little understood outside the small circle of those directly involved.

USAID and other donors and NGOs in Kenya have a unique opportunity to participate in this process and to encourage its positive evolution. If the Mission implements the conflict-management recommendations outlined above, supporting what seem to be some very interesting and effective NGOs, the results should be discreetly documented and disseminated throughout the GHAI area. Similarly, it would greatly strengthen USAID's effectiveness in this area were it to establish relationships with some of the significant NGOs doing this kind of work in countries other than Kenya. Some of these are mentioned below, in "Annex 1: Suggested Resources".

The Addis Ababa-based Inter-Africa Group, in particular, has established something of a nexus for NGO efforts aimed at conflict resolution and for linking these to the OAU, to IGADD, and to the various regional governments. It would be in the Mission's interest to contact them and to work with the Kenyan NGO community on seminars, exchanges and other contacts. IAG already has extensive contact with the Kenyan NGO community and could also serve as a useful source of advice about how the Mission might most effectively go about supporting that community's efforts.

CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion, the team would stress the importance of Kenyan prosperity and stability for the entire Greater Horn of Africa. We close with the observation that the possibility of conflict is sufficient to merit genuine concern; the potential for constructive response is substantial enough to offer real hope for positive donor contribution. A series of modest but effective low-cost initiatives as suggested in this report could yield significant benefits for Kenya and for the region.

ENDNOTES

1. "Assessment/Strategy Democracy and Governance Kenya," Fourth Draft, 22 November 1995.
2. Creative Associates International, "Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Guide for Practitioners in the Greater Horn of Africa," draft report, 11 December 1995.
3. "Preventing Violent Conflicts," 67-68.
4. Diana Hunt, *The Impending Crisis in Kenya: The Case for Land Reform* (London: Gower, 1984), cited in John Githongo, "The Political Economy of Land," *Executive*, September 1995, 28.
5. "Multipartyism Betrayed in Kenya," *Human Rights Watch/Africa*, VI, 5 (July 1994), 3-4.
6. "Assessment/Strategy," 4-5.
7. For an excellent treatment of the recent political history of Kenya, see Jennifer A. Widner, *The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From "Harambee!" to "Nyayo!"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
8. Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980). For detail on the ethnic composition of the army command, see *Africa Confidential*, XXXVI, 9 (28 April 1995).
9. Diverse reports cover these clashes. National Electoral Monitoring Unit, "Courting Disaster: A Report on the Continuing Terror, Violence and Destruction in the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western Provinces of Kenya," 29 April 1993, summarizes findings of the Parliamentary Report, the National Council of Churches of Kenya report, and the Inter-Parties Task Force report.
10. "Courting Disaster," 4.
11. Widner, *The Rise of a Party-State*, 145-146.
12. Frank Holmquist and Michael Ford, "Kenya: State and Civil Society the First Year after the Election," *Africa Today*, Fall 1994, 12.
13. Henry Bienen, *Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); David Leonard, *African Success Stories: Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
14. This argument is developed in persuasive detail by Widner, *The Rise of a Party-State*; see especially her concluding comparative chapter, 198-232.
15. See various of the contributions in Naomi Chazan, John Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.), *Civil Society in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994).
16. The team did not have sufficient time or contacts to examine the presence or vitality of Islamic organizations. Interviewees insist, however, that such organizations exist in areas with significant Muslim populations and that they reflect much of the same diversity of religious vs. secular, of insularity vs. inclusiveness, as their Christian counterparts.
17. *Peace and Reconciliation: A Case study of the Ogwedhi-Sigawa Development Project*. Nairobi: Lutheran World Relief Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office, January 1996.
18. All references to NGOs here are both to national NGOs and to international NGO/PVOs unless otherwise qualified.

ANNEX 1: SOME SUGGESTED RESOURCES

The Mission already has a standing relationship with the Peace Network of the National Council on NGOs, which is attempting to develop documentation and rosters of projects.

P.O. Box 48278

Nairobi, Phone: 560877, Fax: 568445.

Contact is through Murtaza Jaffer, CEO

Considerable expertise and contacts, both regional and local, have been developed by:

The Nairobi Peace Institute, P.O. Box 14814, Nairobi

Phone: 441444

Contact: Dr. Hizkiyas Assefa.

The Kenya Pastoralist Forum is leading a large consortium of NGOs on research and advocacy, and is conducting what could be an important study of land-tenure issues in pastoralist areas.

Contact: Mr. Abdi Omar, Secretary

Nairobi Telephone: 603303

The Inter-Africa Group is an important regional NGO working on reconciliation issues at the community and regional levels.

Contact in Addis Abeba: Jallal Abdeltatif, Executive Director; Vanessa Saiers, NGO Coordinator

Telephone: (251-1)-518790; Fax: (251-1)-517554

UNICEF's Regional Advisor

Mr. Abdul Mohammed is also very involved in these issues.

Nairobi contact: Phone 621234

With respect to community-level management of conflict and negative consequences of humanitarian assistance, considerable documentation is being gathered by the: Local Capacities for Peace Project,

Collaborative for Development Action, Inc. (CDA)

26 Walker St., Cambridge, MA 02138

Phone(1-617)-661-6310; Fax: (1-617)-661-3085

Contact: Dr. Mary Anderson

ANNEX 2: LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED

USAID Staff:

George Jones, Mission Director

Nancy Gitau
Tom Hobgood
Victor Masbayi
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Lee Ann Ross
Carlton Terry

REDSO:

Bryan da Silva, Economist
Tina West, Democracy & Governance Advisor

U.S. Embassy:

Tim Foster, DCM
Linda Greenfield, First Secretary, Political Section (Refugee Coordinator)
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Formal contacts:

Thomas Wolf, Kalamazoo College
Ann Marie Rosenlund, Danish Embassy
Dr. Munyi Waiyaki, former Foreign Minister
Kisuke Ndiku, ActionAid/Kenya
John Abuya, ActionAid/Kenya
Nancy Baraza, Advocate, Bunyuro Professionals Group
Wayne Primeau, Canadian International Development Agency
Keith Disseldoan, Kenya Director, Christian Reformed World Relief Committee
Mwambi Mwasaru, Community Based Development Services
Tabitha Seii, Executive Director, Education Centre for Women in Democracy
Major John Seii (ret.), Education Centre for Women in Democracy
Patrick Onyango, Education Centre for Women in Democracy
John Githonga, Editor, Executive Magazine
Sigurd Hansen, Regional Representative for Eastern & Southern Africa, Lutheran World Relief
Abdi Umar, Kenya Pastoralist Forum
Hussein Sora, Advocate, Coordinator of land tenure project, Kenya Pastoralist Forum
Bernice Getata, Médecins Sans Frontières/France
Janet Jenner, Mennonite Central Committee

Amukowa Anangwe, Miradi Technoservices
Bethuel Kipligat, Nairobi Peace Initiative Group (former DG/Ministry of Foreign Affairs & former Kenya High Commissioner to Britain)
Hizqiyas Assefa, Nairobi Peace Institute
Ephraim Kiragu, Director, Christian Outreach Rural Development Services (CORDS), National Council of Churches of Kenya
Peter Gathuru, NCKK Emergency Desk Coordinator
Murtaza Jaffer, National Council of NGOs
Dr. Samuel Makinda, Senior Lecturer, Murdoch University, Perth, Australia
Atieno Mboya, OXFAM/UK
Fidel Mumina, United Nations Development Programme, Displaced Persons Project
Abdul Muhammad, Regional Advisor for Africa, UNICEF (formerly with InterAfrica Group, Addis Ababa)

Informal Contacts (do not wish to be identified by name):

Nairobi Luo clan chief
Taita electronics technician
Taita civil servant
Six former University students
Government official, self-described as "KANU stalwart"
Free-lance architect, entrepreneur (expatriate)