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Evaluation of
PIRÈD
the
Umbrella Management
Unit of the Democracy
Enhancement Project

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Executive Summary

USAID/Haiti has requested an evaluation of the Umbrella Management Unit (UMU) of its Democracy Enhancement Project (DEP) as implemented by the America's Development Foundation and its two sub-contractors, DATEX Inc. and World Learning, Inc. The UMU is known as PIRÈD in Haiti. The DEP was conceived in the aftermath of the 1990 election which brought to power President Aristide riding on a wave of support from Haitian popular movements. The DEP sought to strengthen five primary Haitian institutions of democracy and governance, the National Assembly, political parties, the electoral commission, civil society and local government. The UMU was responsible for providing sub-grants and institutional development technical assistance to Haitian NGOs working in civic education, the media, human rights and democratic debate and to support the strengthening of local government units. Other institutional arrangements were provided for the remaining aspects of the DEP.

The military coup of September 1991 radically altered the conditions under which the project was to operate and rendered most of the planned DEP activities impossible or untimely. However, USAID/Haiti and PIRÈD have continued to honour the project agreement and have attempted to follow its provisions throughout the tumultuous period of the de-facto government and the eventual return of President Aristide in October 1994.

For many reasons which are discussed more fully in the text, the project was very controversial throughout most of its life. The controversy was fueled in part because: PIRÈD adopted a civic action/political reform agenda as opposed to the civic education/institutional development strategy originally envisioned; several of the Haitian organizations chosen by PIRÈD to receive assistance were from the newly emerging popular movements; project staff became increasingly involved in refugee work; and there were numerous communication gaps between PIRÈD, USAID/Haiti and the inter-agency committee that was set-up to supervise project activities. Opinions differ as to what the project could have or should have done, which partners it should have chosen and how engaged it should have become.

Having reviewed the circumstances under which the project operated and the details of its action, this evaluation has found that, while the project has not achieved the numerical objectives which were originally intended and while there are weaknesses which have led to difficult relationship with USAID/Haiti, it has performed remarkably well under the circumstances and has in some ways exceeded the requirements of its Cooperative Agreement.

Through the sub-grants that were made with Haitian civil society organizations the project has touched on each of the expected areas of support and the activities of the sub-grantees have resulted in the production of civic education materials, airing of TV and radio public service announcements, legal education campaigns, training of paralegals and setting-up of a network of free legal-assistance offices, establishment of volunteer prison monitoring and advocacy pressure groups, legal publications, the strengthening of four organizations and project planning technical assistance to about twenty.

While the project was prohibited from working in the local government area until late in 1994, seminal exploratory work on approaches to, the status of, and background for enabling legislation for local government development was performed. The first phase of a local government training program touching 107 units in 26 communes was also completed in early 1995.

In addition to its primary obligations with respect to civil society and local government support, PIRÈD undertook a large number of other activities related to its "Democracy Advisor" and facilitation role. These have included conferences, seminars, contacts with and visits of the Martin Luther King Centre, briefings and information to many international organizations and journalists, technical assistance to others in institutional development training, facilitation of human rights round-tables, facilitation of USAID/Haiti brainstorming sessions, refugee assistance work, technical assistance to USAID/Haiti on the basic education strategy review and for facilitating grassroots input into the National Environmental Action Program, and assistance in developing a plan for the 1995 elections.

Beyond these examples of punctual assistance, which in and by themselves do not justify a project of this size, it is the consistency of the project's strategy, its determination to keep operating under difficult conditions, the cutting-edge work done in many areas and the collective impact of the project's actions which are significant. Among other things, PIRÈD has:

- performed sophisticated analyses of the democratization process in Haiti, perceived the importance of the emerging popular movement in that process and the necessity to establish bridgeheads to it, and positioned itself and USAID/Haiti well to start developing meaningful relations with newly enfranchised members of Haitian society, the participation of which is essential to further efforts at democratization.*
- provided a safe-haven for the continued expression of democratic aspirations under extremely repressive conditions*
- given the Haitian people who experienced it an unusually humane face of US involvement in Haiti, demonstrated US resolve and commitment, and increased their respect for and willingness to work with a formidable partner of whom many are still suspicious*
- produced high quality reference and training materials in institutional development and basic civic education which position the DEP well to accomplish the work initially intended, now that the conditions are more appropriate to achieve it*
- provided seminal new thinking and approaches for the process of decentralization and local government development as well as an embryonic think tank which can now be tapped for large scale implementation*

While this assessment appears to deviate from the perceptions initially communicated to the evaluators, the evaluation has found that a number of factors have contributed to clouding the project's performance. These include: the lack of formal redefinition of project objectives which left room for varying personal interpretations; the absence of a general framework on civil sector support under different conditions for properly assessing the level of engagement of

the project; the opening to new sectors of society which affects the traditional balance of power, made many uneasy, and resulted in both veiled and explicit attempts at discrediting the project through the circulation of rumors and misinformation; micro-management by a committee responding to different signals and pressures; the personality of, and intentions ascribed to, the Chief of Party; the lack of attention paid to details and the nature and speed of communication with USAID; and the impossibility of building a proper public image and advertising the project's intent under the coup conditions.

The lessons to be learned from this experience include: growing understanding of the constraints and opportunities presented by ever changing political conditions that in effect suggest a different paradigm in political development, in this case, that civic action/political reform may have a greater impact in a democratization strategy than a civic education/institutional development strategy under coup conditions or in a pre-transition state; the realization that the emergence of new political centers calls for a reassessment of traditional partners and that the associated resistance to such change will manifest itself in many different ways; the need for political analysis and clarity and unity of purpose; and the need to supplement local government development programs with concrete local action. They also include the recognition that Haiti offers tremendous potential for good work in the field of democracy and that much further creative independent thinking will be required in the years ahead.

Recommendations for the implementation of the amended project include the public recognition of the important work performed by PIRÈD and its partners, provision of some minimal bridge funding until the new institutional arrangements are in place, the need for a flexible granting mechanism to complement the contractual arrangements envisioned in the amended project which would continue the innovative work that was done by PIRÈD and facilitate the integration of all actors in the amended project into a coherent whole, formal linkage of local government work with small project funding mechanisms, strengthening the democracy unit's capability to perform political analysis, limitation of the role of committees to information exchange and policy review, systematic and conscious efforts at filtering and clarification of information, and specific training in communications and in the political and cultural sensitivities of Haiti for USAID/Haiti staff.

With the accomplishments of the past year behind it and many new possibilities ahead of it, Haiti is at a critical stage of its development. USAID/Haiti, and particularly its HRD office, hold a particular responsibility in helping the people of Haiti make use of this rare confluence of circumstances and break out of the vicious circles of oppression and poverty in which they have been trapped ever since they arose, nearly two centuries ago, in a historic expression of popular will, to break away from the shackles of slavery, take charge of their destiny and restore a sense of dignity and human honor. It is in the context of such a partnership in the search of innovative and effective solutions for democracy and development that the current strategy of USAID/Haiti can best be defined. This search will require a new sensitivity and a willingness and the courage to experiment beyond the normal confines of project management.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background on the Project

Following the 1990 elections in Haiti which brought President Aristide to power, USAID/Haiti undertook a four-year Democracy Enhancement Project (DEP) (DEP, No. 521-0236-A- 00-1112-00) designed to strengthen five primary Haitian institutions of democracy and governance: the National Assembly, political parties, the electoral commission, civil society and local government. The project was authorized on May 31, 1991 for a four year period with a budget of \$11.0 million in development assistance (DA) funds and \$13.45 million in local currency and was structured to work through U.S. private and voluntary organizations (PVOs). An important component of the project was the Umbrella Management Unit (UMU) which was to provide sub-grants and institutional development technical assistance (TA) to Haitians NGOs working in civic education, the media, human rights and democratic debate and to support the strengthening of local government units.

The UMU was implemented through a Cooperative Agreement (CA) with a competitively-selected grantee, the America's Development Foundation (ADF) together with its two sub-contractors, DATEX, Inc. and The Experiment in International Living, now called World Learning, Inc. The UMU is known in Haiti under its Creole acronym PIREĐ (for *Projet Intégré pour le RENforcement de la Démocratie en Haiti*) and will be referred to as such in the remainder of this document.

Other components of the project were to be undertaken by a combination of grants and buy-ins with organizations such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the Consortium for Legislative Development (CLD), and the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD).

The military coup of September 1991 radically altered the conditions under which the project was to be implemented and rendered most of the planned DEP activities impossible or untimely. However, both USAID/Haiti and ADF have continued to honour the project agreement and have attempted to follow its provisions, throughout the tumultuous period of the de-facto government and the return of President Aristide. Now that the president and constitutional government have been restored, there is renewed hope that the objectives anticipated in the original project can be realized. An amendment to the project which increases total DA funding by \$18 million to \$29.1 million and extends it by four years to May 31, 1999 has been designed and recently authorized. The amendment calls for a second generation of competitively bid institutional arrangements for project implementation.

USAID/Haiti has requested an evaluation of the UMU (PIREĐ) as implemented by ADF and its sub-contractors so that lessons learned from it can inform the design of the next generation of institutional arrangements called for in the amended project.

1.2. Purpose and Methodology of the Evaluation

Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation, as stated in the Scope of Work (see Appendix A), is to determine:

1. The extent to which the project's goal, purposes and outputs have been accomplished,
2. Whether the original design was sufficiently flexible to permit significant project accomplishments despite the many changes in Haiti since 1991;
3. If the project leadership moved with appropriate speed and adaptability to deal as well as possible with the changed circumstances;
4. Whether the project sub-grantees were selected, monitored, assisted and controlled as well as possible;
5. What the most helpful lessons to be learned are from the project to date.

Methodology

Given the scope of work and the circumstances under which the project operated, while the fulfillment of contractual obligations was examined, **the major emphasis of the evaluation is not on a precise measuring of project achievements or the effectiveness of sub-grantees, but on extracting useful lessons from the unique experience which the last four years represented for USAID/Haiti as it attempted to formulate and implement its newly conceived democracy support activities.** The assessment of project "success" or achievement of "objectives" could not be made with reference to the original numerical objectives or even a revised strategy. Rather it was placed in the larger context of the space and options available to the project and of the value of the overall set of actions undertaken by the project in the light of these conditions.

A great deal of time and effort was dedicated to obtaining as clear and accurate an understanding as possible of the circumstances under which the project operated and of the individual events both in Haiti and abroad which affected the project. Given the sensitive nature of the project and the diversity of opinions held by major actors, particular care was also taken by the evaluators to clarify fundamental issues related to the implementation of such projects and to separate the idiosyncrasies related to the specific circumstances and personalities involved from the more generic lessons to be learned.

The evaluation was conducted by a two-person team from April 10 to April 29, 1995. The methodology included review of a large number of project documents, in-depth interviews with project staff, interviews with USAID and US Embassy personnel, interviews with other

¹ Hereafter "project" refers to PIRÈD, the Umbrella Management Unit (UMU) as implemented by the ADF and its partners, not the overall DEP.

international agencies, interviews and visits to sub-grantees and other participants in the project, interviews with selected Government officials and other Haitian observers. A list of people contacted is attached in Appendix B.

1.3. Structure of the Report

The original intent of the project and its basic assumptions, the main objectives of the cooperative agreement with ADF, the evolution of the political situation and project activities and the revised project strategy are summarized in Section II. This is followed by an overview of project achievements in Section III. Conclusions on the overall performance of the project and factors which have affected perceptions of this performance are discussed in Section IV. The major lessons learned from this exercise are summarized in Section V and a set of specific actionable recommendations for the implementation of the amended project are formulated in section VI.

An attempt is made at relating each section to major evaluation issues raised in the scope of work. The issues most closely associated to a given section are identified at the beginning of the section. While all issues are addressed in the document in one form or the other, not all are explicitly identified in this way.

II. EVOLUTION OF THE PROJECT

2.1. Project Intent, Design and Assumptions

In 1989, USAID/Haiti undertook a Political Needs Assessment (Zak and Smucker) in preparation for developing a strategic project to enhance democratic governance in Haiti. In addition to what it termed the "president as strongman" phenomenon, the assessment summarizes several other persistent historical features of the Haitian political system: 1) a state of chronic crisis in succession to power; 2) the army as supreme arbiter of political destiny; 3) intolerance of opposition; 4) a state in which the key functions are extracting wealth and extending patronage; 5) feeble development of government institutions, and 6) the absence of personal security.

During this time, USAID/Washington had also begun enhancing its own thinking and programming in the Democracy and Governance (DG) area by advancing basic guidelines for supporting and maintaining democratic political liberalization efforts throughout the world (USAID Democracy and Governance Guidelines, 1991). The guidelines, not only benefitted from a review of USAID practical experience in DG programming but also profited from the findings of a comparative analysis of 26 countries conducted by Larry Diamond and Seymour Lipset on Democratic development (1987). Their findings, the USAID Guidelines, along with the Democratic Needs Assessment were important components that helped form the foundation for the design of USAID/Haiti's Democracy Enhancement Project. A more Haiti-specific analysis conducted by the DEP project designers and informed by the events which occurred during and around the 1990/91 democratic elections (which resulted in the election of Jean Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic leader whose support came from Haitian popular movements) combined to articulate the goals of the 4 year project Democracy Enhancement Project.

The stated goal of the DEP was to "contribute to the development of a constitutional, stable, and open democratic society in Haiti", and its purpose was to "expand and strengthen constitutional and autonomous private institutions which facilitate broad-based participation in democratic decision-making and respect for the Constitution."

There were three critical assumptions made concerning project feasibility and three end-of-project goals asserted as indicators of project success. The indicators were: first, that the constitutional structures at the national and local/regional levels would be functioning; secondly, that political parties would function within the framework of democratic political competition; and lastly, that there would be increased numbers and types of independent sector institutions promoting citizens rights and responsibilities.

In order for these indicators/goals to be met, USAID/Haiti held out three critical assumptions: 1) that a democratically elected government would endure; 2) that the US Government (USG) would have access to the Government of Haiti (GOH) and 3) that, at the very least, all components of the DEP would be operational.

As indicated earlier, the project had five components which were to be implemented through different institutional arrangements. The civil society component (with the exception of

organized labour) and the local government component were to be implemented through a competitively bid Cooperative Agreement with ADF. This grantee was also to play the role of the Umbrella Management Unit for the whole project and fulfill the role of Democracy Advisor which was given to the Chief of Party (COP).

The Cooperative Agreement was signed on August 30, 1991 for a period of four years. The objective of the UMU, as stated in the CA was to:

"support effective and sustainable programs which enhance democratic values; promote pluralism and broad-based participation in the expression of opinions in Haiti through promoting free and independent media; access to justice; debate on democratic issues; civic education; decentralization and linkage between civil society groups and local government officials".

The two main outputs of the CA were stated as follows:

- The capabilities of 10-15 independent sector organizations will be strengthened to support effective and sustainable programs which enhance democratic values and pluralism in Haiti, through promoting free and independent media, access to justice, debate on democratic issues, and civic education
- At least 350 local government bodies will have improved organizational and individual skills in planning, resource generation and allocation, and constituent participation.

The UMU was expected to manage sub-grants to the selected independent sector organizations, support 2-3 Haitian organizations to undertake the training program for local government, provide institutional development support to its sub-grantees as well as to a broader range of independent sector organizations, maintain close contact with Haitian and international independent sector organizations working for democratic development in Haiti as well as with the other component of the DEP project, organize round-tables and conferences in consultation with USAID/Haiti, and provide advice and assistance to the U.S. Mission on the evolution of its democracy initiative.

No specific indicators were attached to all these "other" activities, nor were specific indicators provided for the expected levels of "strengthening", "institutional development" or "capacity" of local government to be achieved.

The project was to be staffed by 3 expatriates (COP, Institutional Development Specialist and Financial Management Specialist), assisted by Haitian professional and support staff.

Total funding for the UMU was to be \$6,499,141 split into \$3,863,782 for the UMU and \$2,635,359 for sub-grants. It was expected that an additional \$7.75 million would be available for independent sector and (mostly) local government sub-grants from GOH-owned local currency funds so that the sub-grants' share of the total budget was expected to rise to about 73%.

2.2. Evolution of the Political Situation and Project Activities

Project activities were inextricably intertwined with the evolution of the political situation. It is difficult to fully understand the evolution and significance of the achievements of the project without reference to specific political events and the constraints and opportunities presented by the evolution of these events. Figure 1 attempts to illustrate major project actions in each one of its areas of responsibility in the context of political events and of its interaction with USAID. Highlights are summarized below.


Project key personnel were fielded on September 26, 1991, 4 days before the military coup d'état which brought to power the "de-facto government", sent President Aristide on a prolonged exile and completely altered the conditions under which the project was to operate and which had been identified as critical assumptions for the realization of project objectives: 1) with the exception of PIRÈD, the other major components of the DEP were virtually not operational during the 4 year Life of Project (LOP); 2) from late 1991 until September of 1994, there were functionally two GOHs, i.e. the de-facto government of the Coup and the democratically elected government in exile; and 3), the principal assumption of the project, i.e. that the democratically elected government would endure, was rendered void by the September 1991 coup.

In the weeks following the coup of 1991, USAID assistance in the DG area was suspended. Project personnel were evacuated in October 1991 and the project was not authorized to restart until March 25 1992, on a limited basis which, in accordance with US policy, prohibited work on the local government component. Although all agreed that the project could not be implemented as originally planned, the DEP program goals or the CA with ADF were not formally amended. As expressed to the evaluators by numerous interviewees, including both USAID/Haiti personnel and PIRÈD staff, there was an operating assumption that a "negotiated resolution" to the current state was imminent and that the project would resume its full planned activities. In the interim, PIRÈD moved to operationalize the civil society component of the CA by developing a set of strategy documents and proposals for USAID/Haiti approval. The local government component of the CA was postponed until conditions permitted its implementation.

Throughout 1992 and up to the "Governor's Island" accord of July 1993, the political situation in Haiti moved between periods of extreme insecurity and violence to one of measured optimism and a lessening of political repression by the de-facto government, with various levels of human rights violations and with severe curtailment of civil liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly. During this period, PIRÈD and USAID/Haiti, having abridged DG priorities, provided assistance/grants that reflected a moving away from the original "consolidating" of the putative democratic gains realized during the democratic transition period prior to the coup to supporting the "restoration of democracy". This subtle shift was precipitated by the recognition of the pre-transition-like conditions that were evident in Haiti during 1992/93 and coincided with USG negotiation efforts aimed at restoring those gains.

In July of 1993, PIRÈD submitted to USAID/Haiti a revised strategy for the project in light of the activities of the project up to that time and the conditions that prevailed at the time. The strategy reviewed the main factors that have directly affected the implementation of the

Figure 1
Main Political Events and Project Activities



project in the post-coup period, and while it recognized that the overall DEP objectives were conceived broadly enough not to require revision, it proposed some necessary strategic, programmatic and tactical adjustments to the project's action.

In the civil society sector, the strategy sought to prioritize its support to a privileged segment of civil society which it termed the "democracy" sector, in order to preserve and re-establish some of the basic conditions necessary for an advancement of the process following political resolution of the crisis. It proposed to limit the number of core sub-grants to 5 and complement them by a number of more modest shorter-term sub-grants. It also proposed a supplementary strategy of "punctual" interventions designed to support the return of constitutional democracy, mitigate the negative impacts of the coup, position the UMU to ensure access to a broad spectrum of Haiti's democratic forces in the post-crisis period, promote a climate of tolerance and non-violence during the transition, support the revival of democratic debate and monitor and report on the progress in the transition from military to civilian democratic control.

In the local government sector, while direct action was still postponed until authorized, the strategy called for assisting local government units to organize themselves into associations, the design and implementation of a basic course in public administration, the establishment of a semi-autonomous multidisciplinary consultative unit for decentralization issues and the establishment of a small-project grant program to support viable local government efforts and give substance to training. The last two elements were rejected by the project committee and the strategy was revised and toned down.

In October 1993 with the collapse of the Governor's Island Accord and the "Harlan County" incident, which emboldened the de-facto Government and its para-military FRAPH organization, PIRÈD DG activities evolved once again to include more targeted activities that sought to assist in keeping democratic principles and democrats alive and fully "restoring" the legitimately elected government of Haiti. Through a portion of 1993 and all of 1994, PIRÈD became increasingly engaged in both direct refugee and human rights assistance as the pace of repression and human rights abuses accelerated, and participated actively in all US efforts at open dialogue, the protection of human rights and preparation of the transition and planning for the post-resolution electoral process. Project funding was increased by \$1 million in July 1994 to allow it to implement the Human Rights Fund, a program of direct assistance to victims of human rights abuses. PIRÈD remained active in all these areas up to an immediately following the long-awaited resolution of the crisis with the deployment of the multi-national force in September of 1994 and the return of Aristide in October of 1994.

A revised local government strategy was prepared in January 1994 and reviewed over the following months, and led to the development of local government training materials towards the end of the year and an implementation of Phase I in January 1995. Because of reduced funding for the DEP project, the strategy was implemented with a reduced target of 22 communes and their associated communal sections, about a third of the original objective.

In May 1994, 7 concepts papers for the smaller projects called for in the revised civil society strategy were submitted to the project committee for approval. Five of them were approved, but only two of them were operationalized in late 1994 and early 1995 because of shortages of funds and the impending termination of the project.

The project has been very controversial, with a wide range of opinions about its action and its effectiveness both within and without USAID/Haiti, and USAID/Haiti expressed to ADF concerns about the nature of communication between PIREĐ and USAID/Haiti, about the management of the project and about the impact of the project staff's personal involvement in refugee work on the other project activities. ADF was intimated as early as July 1994 that the Cooperative Agreement would be terminated as initially planned, on June 30, 1995 and that no extensions would be considered. In December 1994, due to funding shortages in the DEP project, PIREĐ was further informed of a reduction of about \$1 million in anticipated funding and that therefore, not all authorized or obligated funding would be received. PIREĐ has informed its sub-grantees about the termination of their agreements and is in the process of closing down its operations. Expected project expenditures to the end of project as compared to project budgets are summarized in Table 1.

New requests for proposals under the amended project are currently being issued for a new generation of institutional arrangements to implement the project.

Table 1
Projected Project Expenditures to the End of Project

| Expenditure Category | Original Budget | Amended Budget (for HR Fund) | Projected Expenditures |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Operating Costs | | | |
| for the UMU | 3,863,782 | 3,863,782 | |
| for HR FUND | | 150,000 | |
| TOTAL operating | 3,863,782 | 4,013,782 | 3,709,637 |
| Assistance Levels | | | |
| for Civil Society | 2,635,359 | 2,635,359 | 1,504,316 |
| for Local Government | | | 491,409 |
| for the HR FUND | | 850,000 | 835,834 |
| TOTAL Assistance | 2,635,359 | 3,485,359 | 2,831,559 |
| | | | |
| TOTAL | 6,499,141 | 7,499,141 | 6,541,196 |

Funding shortfall: \$ 957,945

III. PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS

This section addresses the questions:

- to what extent were project objectives achieved?
- what else was achieved?
- to what extent did the project work with the Haitian and international sector community to promote democratic development in Haiti?
- whether the sub-grantees were selected, monitored, assisted and controlled as well as possible
- to what extent did project management adhere to the criteria for sub-grant making in the Cooperative Agreement

Project achievements will be reviewed here in terms of civil society, local government, institutional development, grant management and other activities. For each area, we review both activities undertaken by the project and their outcomes. Conclusions on the overall performance of PIRÈD are derived in the next section.

3.1 Civil Society

PIRÈD's mandate was to support civil society development "through sub-grants to 10-15 Haitian independent sector organizations and training for a larger segment of these organizations," with particular emphasis on: a free and independent media, open public forum, access to justice, and civic education. Certain organizations had already been identified in the project paper and were expected to be recipients of sub-grants.

Although prior to the coup, Haiti enjoyed a large and vibrant community of NGOs capable of receiving assistance and accomplishing the goals of the project, the increasing repression of the coup forced many to suspend or forgo undertaking any activities that might be deemed "too political." As a result, PIRÈD adopted a flexible strategy that, while consistent with the aspirations of the DEP, attempted to adapt programming to the vagaries of the political situation and conditions on the ground. Although a decision not to advertise was made early in the project, over a 100 requests for assistance were reviewed (see list in Appendix C), most of which did not fall in the scope of the project or failed to meet the established criteria. The review process resulted in proposal development with 21 potential grantees, out of which 3 core sub-grants and 3 complementary sub-grants were made to independent sector organizations, in addition to institutional development and technical assistance to others. The organizations that received support from PIRÈD tended to have a more "civic action" orientation rather than the traditional civil society enhancement/civic education envisioned in the original CA. This shift properly reflected and responded to the changed conditions.

The evolution of sub-grants and technical assistance to civil society organizations is reviewed below.

The DEP project paper had foreseen continued support to organizations with which USAID had had previous experience such as the Human Resources Development Centre (CDRH), the Haitian Institute for Research and Development (IHRED), Celebration 2004, the Haitian Centre for Human Rights (CHADEL) and the Association of Haitian Journalists (AJH). Other potential grantees such as CHAMID, Amicale des Juristes and the Centre Petion Bolivar (CPB) had also been identified in the project paper as candidates for sub-grants.

By mutual agreement with USAID/Haiti, it was decided early on that open notification and full public competition for sub-grants would be ill-advised and that sub-grant proposals would be channeled through informal networks. It was also decided that PIRÈD's work in civil society need not be limited to medium or long term grants but could also include other assistance instruments such as purchase orders, contracts and travel orders.

PIRÈD's first priority was to provide previous democracy grantees with bridge funding to allow continuation of activities and a chance to develop more complex and meaningful proposals. The principal of CHADEL had joined the de-facto government and could not longer be funded and it was also not possible to work with the AJH. The first three sub-grant proposals were submitted to the project committee for approval in July 1992. Two of them, a \$50,000 three-months sub-grant for CDRH and a \$30,000 six-months sub-grant for Celebration 2004 were approved. A \$135,000 six-months grant for IHRED was not approved, initially on a technical concern related to working with local government, and later because of the support of its principal for the de-facto government. The CDRH sub-grant was to allow it assess the status of its civic education network and formulate a medium-to-long term institutional development strategy. This revealed an absence of institutional vision and capacity and no further grants were made to CDRH. Celebration 2004 did not pass its pre-audit assessment, and became too closely associated with the de-facto government to qualify for funding under the project's operating guidelines.

In seeking new sub-grantees, PIRÈD faced the difficult situation that most potential sub-grantees had either become coup-supporters or were identified with the de-facto government, did not wish to be associated with US funding or preferred not to be involved in activities which were considered too "political" or too "dangerous" under the circumstances.

While much proposal development work was done with a number of potential sub-grantees, in the end, longer-term, core sub-grants were awarded to only 3 organizations as summarized below:

- **L'Amicale des Juristes:** core sub-grant for pro-bono legal assistance to rural poor and an outreach program to train communities in basic legal principles, resulting in the training of 31,000 people in basic legal issues, establishing a network of 10 legal assistance offices (of which 8 were funded under the project), providing assistance in 4,600 legal cases, training 140 third-year law students, the publication of a wide range of legal technical materials and the establishment of a 1,000 volume law library.

Support included a 10 months pilot phase followed by a longer 22 months sub-grant for a total authorized funding of \$679,705.

- **Foundation for Development and Democracy (FONDEM):** core sub-grant for mass media and field level campaign promoting non-violence, human rights, and democratic principles, resulting in the development and wide dissemination of calendars, development of civic education materials and the development and airing of radio spots. Support included purchase orders for two civic education calendars and an 18 months sub-grant with an authorized budget of \$190,000.
- **Ecumenical Center for Human Rights (CEDH):** core sub-grant for human rights monitoring and prisoner support program, resulting in the establishment of 13 active volunteers prison associations who demonstrated remarkable commitment in times of crisis and managed to obtain admittance into the prisons from the de-facto government. Support included a two-year sub-grant (to be released in phases) for a total funding of \$300,000.

In addition to these three core sub-grants, PIRÈD submitted to the project committee in May 1994 proposals for 7 complementary sub-grants that were intended to round off the civil society portfolio. Of these, 5 were approved and to date, it was only possible to implement 2, as follows:

- **Petion-Bolivar Centre (CPB):** small sub-grant (\$30,510) for the development of a poster competition for children on human rights issues and support for CPB publications
- **Savanette Rural Workers Association (STAS):** small sub-grant (\$9,200) for training outreach animators for civic education. The sub-grant agreement was signed in April 1995.

One of PIRÈD's most interesting activities was the work they undertook with the **National Platform of Popular Organizations (PLANOP)** an association representing over 150 member popular organizations. While this group did not receive a sub-grant, they received a large amount of consultation and technical assistance in strategic planning, project planning, budgeting, and financial management, and purchase orders resulting in the development of materials on the role of non-partisan popular organizations, of a complete set of lively and gripping educational posters on human rights, and of educational radio spots. But beyond the specific outputs, it is the sensitive and non-directive work performed by PIRÈD with PLANOP, and their resulting increase in confidence, capacity and articulation of their action, and beginning of linkage with funding agencies and participation in democratic fore which constitutes the valuable outcome of this process and merits to be continued and reproduced with other grass-roots organizations with democratic aspirations.

Finally, PIRÈD also undertook other "punctual" activities such as support to the Haitian Press Agency to publish annual compilations of newsworthy events.

Two issues were raised during the course of the evaluation about PIRÈD's civil society work: one is about the number of grants made; the other is whether the types of organizations supported, or purposes of the sub-grants made, were consistent with DEP goals.

Arguably, while the activities of PIRÈD did serve to promote pluralism, broad-base participation, free and independent media, access to justice, civic education, etc., they fell short of numerical goals of the CA. Rather, the choices represented more strategic and tactical assistance than the institutional capacity building originally envisioned. The output of the project should not be seen only in terms of the sub-grants made. A large amount of work went into identifying and assisting organizations develop proposals. That many of them did not make it to the final stage or, when submitted, were not approved, does not negate the valuable work done with them and their resulting increased capacity in project planning and proposal development.

As for the choices made, it is our assessment that the assistance provided and the level of engagement of PIRÈD exceeded the scope of work of their CA and was more consistent with a political reform agenda that aggressively reacted to the political restraints imposed by the coup. Was this appropriate? A recent study by USAID/CDIE on civil society maintains that there is a logic to the type of assistance and organizations chosen and that donor assistance should be consistent not only with the political environment but also with the demands of political reform. The actions undertaken by PIRÈD are consistent with this analysis of how to proceed with a political reform agenda under the conditions that prevailed at the time.

3.2. Local Government

The local government component of the CA called for PIRÈD to provide assistance to "at least 350 local government bodies ... to improve organizational and individual skills in planning, resource generation and allocation, and constituent participation." As previously mentioned, direct local government support was prohibited until conditions permitted. However, a well thought-out strategy for local government development was prepared and grant support was provided for the development of "Les Collectivités Territoriales," a seminal institutional and prospective analysis of the Haitian local government structure and a second follow-on publication (with recommendations) on the pragmatic implications of that structure. The *Collectivités Territoriales* has had a wide circulation--over 2,000 copies distributed--throughout the NGO/Civil Society community and was an integral part of the training materials provided to local government specialists for the USAID/OTI-IOM local government project. The team involved in these studies constitutes an embryonic think tank on the issues facing local government and merit continued support and an expansion of their role.

An important consideration concerning the local government initiative is that critical to the implementation of a local government initiative in Haiti (prior to and after the coup) is the passage of enabling legislation at the national level that articulates the constitutional duties, responsibilities, autonomy, and authority of local elected officials/government units. Though the Parliament has considered such legislation, at this writing the enabling legislation is still pending.

In the spring of 1994 the local government component was approved by USAID/Haiti at considerably less ambitious numerical levels. Instead of providing capacity building and training for 350 government bodies, the approved program strategically selected 107 local units in 26 communes and focussed training and civic education on both the demand -- civil society actors along with potential candidates for (near) future political office -- and on the supply side -- current elected officials of local government.

One innovation of the training which was based on the data collected from the Collectivités Territoriales was the emphasis on providing "a minimal level of functionality" to both elected officials, community organizations, and potential candidates, in effect hedging their bets for maximum "real impact." The training was done through a Haitian consulting firm. 50 trainers were trained and they in turn trained 760 people. The training program is found to be very useful by current government authorities and is being considered for large scale implementation by the Prime Minister's decentralization unit.

Additionally, support and technical assistance was provided for the formation of a national federation of municipal officials, 9 department level regional associations, and the first ever Mayor's Conference bringing together Haiti's elected officials at the communal level.

3.3. Institutional Development

PIRÈD's institutional development strategy started with the development of a set of appropriate indicators of institutional strength and the identification of common weakness of the Haitian independent sector institutions. Creole materials which respond to these weakness and are appropriate for the Haitian context were then adapted from various sources, tested and refined.

Two modes of institutional development were initially envisioned: one intensive, working with selected sub-grantees over an extended period of time, and the other, a generic group training intended for a larger set of civil society organizations. Because of the fear of association under coup conditions, it was not possible to implement the generic training.

PIRÈD worked closely with its sub-grantees and more in-depth with FONDEM and PLANOP. The methodology and materials were developed and tested in collaboration with these two organizations. PIRÈD's approach to institutional development incorporates principles of adult learning, fosters the empowerment of participating organization and is aimed, by eliciting the genuine commitment of the participants, at reinforcing independence and self-reliance, and thus promoting the sustainability and replication of the learning that takes place. The indicators of institutional strength are useful for all NGOs funded by USAID/Haiti projects. The reference and training materials are excellent and represent a great asset for institutional development in Creole in Haiti. Those who participated benefited greatly and the approach helped bolster their confidence. Additional materials and session plans on communications, team work, management issues, monitoring and evaluation have also been developed. A training of trainers process is still pending.

On the financial side, the approach was also to work with individual sub-grantees, assist them to understand basic financial management concepts and adopt simple but effective accounting and reporting procedures. A simple financial management manual in French was prepared which is also useful for a wide range of Haitian organizations.

Four organizations were able to clarify their mission and structure and improved their financial monitoring and reporting capabilities. Fifteen organizations improved their project planning and proposal development skills through the assistance provide by PIRÈD.

The major beneficiaries of institutional development efforts are often the people involved in the process. Many of these people have now moved on the assume higher responsibilities and are attempting to apply these skills in new spheres of activity. (see Appendix D, for the current positions of some PIRÈD participants).

Financial sustainability, although a major focus of the initial project paper, was not a major or specific consideration under the circumstances. It must however be noted that a decision not to continue funding CDRH was made early in the project, when an institutional needs assessment revealed that it was lacking a sense of mission and not likely to survive for its own purposes (independently of a USAID-derived mandate); Celebration 2004 was not funded because it did not meet the pre-audit criteria; PIRÈD resisted the temptation to fund PLANOP which was not ready to receive funds and encouraged them to learn about financial responsibility by using funds generated by a small purchase order; CEDH has shown the beginning of an ability to tap other funding sources; and Amicale des Juristes, while it has been obliged to reduce its level of activity substantially in the absence of funding, relies on the strength of its highly committed volunteer labour and will, without funding, continue to exist as an institution, albeit at lower levels, so that the concern for sustainability was present in PIRÈD's dealing with its sub-grantees and other partners.

PIRÈD staff mentioned difficulty in pinning down the charismatic leaders of the some of their sub-grantees which made the institutional development process difficult to apply to them. Under the circumstances, Amicale des Juristes and CEDH could have benefitted from a more aggressive approach from PIRÈD and PIRÈD could have done a better job of strengthening basic administrative systems and procedures and monitoring systems in all grantees.

3.4. Sub-Grant Management

The UMU was supposed to develop project funding criteria and a format for sub-grants, call for proposals, help acceptable proposals to be developed to the point where they could be submitted to the project committee and then work with the sub-grantee to ensure compliance with objectives and agreement requirements.

Acceptable format for sub-grants and criteria for project selection were developed and approved by USAID/Haiti. A decision was made jointly with USAID/Haiti early in the project to avoid open notification given the circumstances. When the workload increased, an internal

project committee was set-up in PIRÈD to review all applications. These were all systematically summarized and classified (see list in Appendix C). Over 20 organizations were assisted to develop proposals. Sub-grant proposals submitted to the committee for approval were all well documented and scored according to the established criteria. The files for the sub-grants that were made are all complete and include the original proposal, the final version that was submitted to the committee, signed agreements and amendments, correspondence, progress and financial reports and samples of publications or other project outputs.

Obtaining reports from sub-grantees was often a difficult problem because many were understaffed or their charismatic leaders had other priorities. PIRÈD's own reports to USAID/Haiti, while all complete and informative were also often late. Amendments to proposals and other sub-grant related business were often delayed because of other priority actions. USAID/Haiti's perception of PIRÈD's inability to submit reports or other required paperwork on time and take care of important house-keeping issues (such as a long delay in submitting CEDH's proposal for a second phase of funding), and generally respond in a timely fashion to USAID concerns about the management of the project have contributed largely to a souring of relations between USAID/Haiti and PIRÈD.

The core sub-grantees have been audited and evaluated. They have passed their audits although the auditors had some reservations about their internal decision-making structures. This is again often due to a lack of personnel.

The grant management system put in place by PIRÈD is effective, in compliance with the requirements of the CA and up to industry standards.

3.5. Other Activities

In addition to its primary obligations with respect to civil society and local government support, PIRÈD undertook a large number of other activities related to its "Democracy Advisor" and facilitation role. These have included conferences, seminars, contacts with and visits of the Martin Luther King Centre, briefings and information to many international organizations and journalists, technical assistance to AIFLD on institutional development training, facilitation of human rights round-tables, facilitation of USAID/Haiti brainstorming sessions, refugee assistance work, technical assistance to USAID/Haiti on the basic education strategy review and for facilitating grassroots input into the environment program, and assistance in developing a plan for the 1995 elections.

The refugee assistance work, which started as the personal commitment of the COP and other PIRÈD staff to assist members of civil society groups which were coming under increasing pressure from the de-facto authorities, quickly overwhelmed the project. Nonetheless, the project was able to assist 1,150 refugees to negotiate the in-country processing system and positioned PIRÈD well to facilitate the human rights round-tables, contribute to, and later implement, the Human Rights Fund. PIRÈD's implementation of the Human Rights Fund is outside the scope of this evaluation and will not be reviewed here.

The time, energy and resources of the project allocated to refugee work was questioned (in terms of its impact on the "normal" activities of the project). However, all Haitian and other observers interviewed agree that this personal and project commitment provided a new, much more humane, picture of US involvement in Haiti. As a matter of fact, in the eyes of many not well informed about the project's objectives, this is the single greatest achievement of PIRÈD.

While USAID has helped fund a large number of humanitarian, health, educational, business and agricultural activities in Haiti, and while these activities have been implemented by dedicated people, effective and very much appreciated by Haitians, there is a large sector of the popular movement which has traditionally been influenced by an anti-US rhetoric and had a very suspicious view of US intentions in Haiti. While many individuals and groups have helped protect members of Haitian society during the most difficult times, the public stance courageously taken by PIRÈD, which was clearly seen as US funded institution, has had a significant impact in changing many people's attitudes about US involvement in Haiti. It has of course not stopped groups in the extreme right and left from accusing PIRÈD of a variety of evil intentions, each to suit its purposes. A high level of commitment and engagement necessarily creates reactions.

Members of various groups interviewed have also indicated to the evaluators that the PIRÈD building was a safe-haven, "under the protection of the US Government", where they were able to meet and continue the democratic debate with less fear of being apprehended.

All of the above and similar activities were not explicitly planned and are difficult to measure. Their collective impact, however, was extremely effective in demonstrating US commitment and resolve, facilitating policy formulation and an open dialogue between the US mission and Haitian organizations, documenting human rights abuses, and helping to maintain the rule of law and non-violence in public view throughout the difficult transition period. Taken all together these activities represent perhaps the greatest contribution of the project and are a great credit to PIRÈD staff.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

This section addresses the questions:

- how well did the project perform overall
- whether the original design was sufficiently flexible to permit significant project accomplishments despite the many changes in Haiti since 1991
- if the project leadership moved with appropriate speed and adaptability to deal as well as possible with the changed circumstances
- how did the overall project management arrangement work

4.1. Project Achievements

In the light of all of the observations in the previous sections and the circumstances under which it operated, the project performed remarkably well. While the stated project outputs were not accomplished as planned in the Cooperative Agreement - and it was clear when conditions changed that they could not be -- many aspects of the revised strategy were implemented and the project can be credited with significant achievements.

The most significant achievements of the project are not so much in terms of the specific objectives of the CA or of the outputs outlined in the previous section, but more in terms of the inroads, innovation and cutting edge work performed by the project. Among other things, PIRÈD has:

- performed sophisticated analyses of the democratization process in Haiti, perceived the importance of the emerging popular movement in that process and the necessity to establish bridgeheads to it, and positioned itself and USAID/Haiti well to start developing meaningful relations with newly enfranchised members of Haitian society, the participation of which is essential to further efforts at democratization.
- provided a safe-haven for the continued expression of democratic aspirations under extremely repressive conditions
- given the Haitian people who experienced it an unusually humane face of US involvement in Haiti, demonstrated US resolve and commitment, and increased their respect for and willingness to work with a formidable partner of whom many are still suspicious
- produced high quality reference and training materials in institutional development and basic civic education which position the DEP well to accomplish the work initially intended, now that the conditions are more appropriate to achieve it

- provided seminal new thinking and approaches for the process of decentralization and local government development as well as an embryonic think tank which can now be tapped for large scale implementation

The performance of the project was, however, clouded by a number of factors which affected perceptions of it and resulted in a large number of negative statements about its actions and achievements.

These factors have to do with the choice of partners and level of engagement of the project, lack of proper redefinition of project objectives and the resulting differing sets of priorities for the major actors in the process, the project's public image, and communication and perception problems, and they have, taken together, had a significant impact on forming perceptions. The main factors identified in the course of the evaluation are briefly discussed below.

4.2 Factors Affecting Perceptions of Project Achievements

Choice of Partners and Level of Engagement of the Project

Many at USAID/Haiti and elsewhere were uneasy about the level of engagement of PIRÈD and its choice of partners. The project was accused of being a CIA operation, a "Lavalas" partner, too "political", too one-sided or too partisan, of supporting selected political parties, of dismantling the popular sector, of undertaking the COP's own personal hidden agenda, of neglecting more "appropriate" and neutral partners, etc., with radically varying perceptions depending on the function, interests, political position or class of the person interviewed.

Much of the unease had to do with different levels of assessment of the impact of the election of President Aristide and the rise of the popular movement, and the confusion brought about by the coup about a possible resolution. In addition to the imminent "negotiated resolution" expectation, there were two other factors that (in retrospect) appear relevant and contributed to USAID/Haiti thinking both prior to and immediately after the Coup.

The first factor involves the complicated governing issues brought on by the outcome of President Aristide's election i.e. while President Aristide won 67 percent of the vote, Lavalas (the "party" that Aristide ran under) only won a minimal number of seats in the newly elected parliament, thereby assuring a divided government and leaving room for much uncertainty and ambiguity about the new state of affairs.

Secondly, while, as is the case in all DG activities, support was to be provided to pro-democracy organizations and individuals, and while the role and implications of "popular movements" may have been subject of ongoing debate during the 1990/91 period, neither the DEP Project Paper nor the CA with PIRÈD explicitly addressed the issue, thus leaving interpretations of their importance subject to debate and personal choices.

These two factors are critical elements that greatly contributed to both redefining the political spectrum and energizing the political climate in Haiti and seemed proper subject for consideration in implementing a Democracy Program.

The US mission's traditional partners in Haiti have always been in what was perceived at the "center". However this was the center of only the visible tip of the Haitian iceberg. The election of Aristide and the rise of the popular movement exposed the so far hidden part of the iceberg thus challenging the definition of what constitutes the "center". PIRÈD focussed its energies on developing relationships with what it perceived to be the new "center", while many sectors of Haitian society did not appear ready and willing to accept this expanded notion. There is always a resistance to accept such profound changes in the established order and routines, and most of the comments we heard, positive and negative, had to do with varying degrees of recognition and comfort with, and commitment to, the reality of this emerging new trend. It is therefore natural that many were uneasy about the project's choices and actions and that attempts have been made to discredit the project, its partners and its action or minimize its achievements.

Lack of Formal Redefinition of Project Objectives

The DEP project was designed with a built-in flexibility to respond to the changing social, institutional and political context for democracy-enhancing activities. Annual implementation reviews were supposed to be held over the life of the project to "permit USAID/Haiti to assess the need for adjustments in emphasis, financing and implementation arrangements for project components". These reviews were to form the basis for "an anticipated annual adjustment in the project's implementation plan, budget and life-of-project targets" (PP, p.3)

The strategy driving the project emphasized "flexibility, activism, and immediacy" (p.4). Even under the assumed positive environment, it anticipated "changes both in focus and in resource levels", that "some actors may move faster than others and that other actors may become more important" and that "some of the initially identified may merit less assistance than initially planned". The process was expected to require "sensitivity on the part of all concerned" and the challenge was foreseen to be on selecting those partners "that can have the most impact on Haiti's fledgling democratic pluralism and that have the most chance of maintaining that impact over time". (p.35)

The project was designed with all this flexibility in mind and called for a dynamic formal updating of objectives and strategy, even under "normal" circumstances. However, because of the ever-changing political situation and conditions, long-term evacuations, etc., the formal updating of project goals and activities did not occur. While the revised strategy proposed by PIRÈD was an attempt at such redefinition, it was not called for in their terms of reference and did not constitute a formal agreement to amend objectives and strategies. This has resulted in differing understandings and expectations about what was to be done and what was important, and contributed to exacerbating tensions between USAID/Haiti and PIRÈD staff and clouding the nature of project achievements.

Project Management Arrangements

The DEP project paper called for a management structure which included an inter-agency committee to be chaired by the Ambassador, a USAID/Haiti project committee with representation by USIS and the US Embassy Political Section, the Chief of the Human Resources and Democracy Office, project coordinators, and the COP/Democracy Advisor (PP, p55). The project committee's primary role was "to assure that the project maintains an activist stance with regard to Haiti's democratic development, and that it stays flexible and responsive to changes in the environment". The Committee was also responsible for approving sub-grants and for a "careful review" of annual design adjustments, which would be "formalized through Action Memoranda signed by the Director". It was to be conscious of the political sensitivities, approach its work with all the organizations with subtlety and turn down support to those that become "too obviously political". The project paper also recognized the paradox that "democratization implies politicization" and that it would be "extremely difficult for AID to maintain the fine balance between "promoting democratic values and attitudes and having those values and attitudes used in a partisan manner" (PP, p.63)

The sensitive nature of the project, the fact that it was the only active "democracy" component at a time when restoration of democracy was the issue of the day, and the fact that so many different parties, operating from different assumptions and subject to various kinds of pressures, were involved in the detailed decision-making process about the project, further complicated agreement on, and clarification of, project objectives. Under such a crisis situation, with so many interests at play, the command structure of the project became unclear and PIRÉD's role, authority and freedom of action in the overall mission strategy was not properly defined. Conflicts of perception which were not resolved within this complex management structure led to hardening of positions, created an ever-widening gap between PIRÉD, USAID/Haiti and the inter-agency committee, and led to increasing isolation of PIRÉD. This has negatively affected the collaboration between the various partners, the reporting and other formal relationships between USAID/Haiti and the project and eventually, the chances for the project to have a significant impact immediately following the resolution of the crisis.

Perceptions, Communication and Public Image

The already complicated situations described above were further exacerbated by, on the one hand, differences in communication and leadership styles, lateness of reports, and length and complexity of analyses and documents submitted by PIRÉD to USAID/Haiti, and on the other, as mentioned earlier, by various interest groups' conscious and unconscious reactions and assumptions, which generated a large amount of written and verbal conflicting information, gossip, and misinformation. The fact that the project was not advertised publicly also contributed to a large measure to creating suspicions, letting imaginations run loose and clouding the nature of the project and its achievements. The opinions of people interviewed differed greatly and the differences were largely due to the nature of the information available to the observers, many personal, often unarticulated assumptions and values, and the different weights assigned to the significance of various events.

4.3 Overall Assessment of Pired's Performance

In the light of the above discussion, the following conclusions can be formulated about the strengths and weakness of PIRÈD's performance in implementing the objectives of the project.

Strengths

- **The Democracy Advisor role was fulfilled very well:** even in the absence of a clear policy statement from USAID/Haiti about the nature of democracy work in civil society under differing circumstances, the environment was read well and project activities were consistent with what is now emerging as a framework for such action; thoughtful and informed analyses and proposals were formulated to guide project activities and the mission's work in general.
- **PIRÈD showed a commitment to quality:** as reflected in the attention and care taken to develop materials, the procurement plan and the careful and thoughtful approaches to institutional development and local governance.
- **PIRÈD management showed flexibility and adaptability in light of the changed circumstances and navigated the troubled waters well:** PIRÈD management was able to maintain a clear vision consistent with the overall intent and philosophical orientation of the DEP project throughout the entire turbulent period. Several well-articulated revised strategies taking into account these objectives and the constantly evolving circumstances were prepared and implemented. A number of meaningful activities, not explicitly anticipated in the project, were undertaken which ultimately contributed to US efforts at restoring democracy in Haiti.
- **PIRÈD management and project team showed courage, commitment and determination in pursuing a dangerous course of action:** this contributed greatly in presenting a humane face of US involvement and demonstrated effectively personal and US commitment to democracy.

Weaknesses

- **Communication with and responsiveness to USAID/Haiti were not effective:** communication with USAID/Haiti failed to overcome the differing senses of priority, communication styles and perceptions about the nature of the work to be done and important project achievements; while documents submitted to USAID/Haiti were well-written and complete, they often came late and resulted in increasing frustration at the USAID level.
- **Project responsibilities were too heavily loaded on the chief of party and the project was too often associated only with the chief of party and perceptions of him by others:** the double role of chief of party and democracy advisor in an extremely difficult situation required the chief of party to personally undertake a large amount of work. He was ably assisted by the institutional development specialist, financial specialist and project coordinator and project committee, but more delegation

of responsibilities would have helped relieve the load and change perceptions of the project.

- **Insufficient attention was paid to public image and public relations in light of the high visibility PIRÈD had during the coup:** the decision, jointly taken with USAID/Haiti, to keep a low profile for the project has contributed to forming many erroneous opinions about the project, most often associated with assumptions about the personal agenda of the chief of party. More informal attention could have been given to combatting these perceptions. This would have been a worthwhile investment, since perceptions weighed so heavily in the balance.
- **Institutional development efforts could have been more extensive and directive:** while the institutional development approach adopted by the project is excellent and merits to be further developed and implemented, it is intended for institutional development under "normal" circumstances. In times of crisis and given the inappropriate environment for a blossoming of the sub-grantees, a more involved and direct approach to helping the sub-grantees achieve their objectives and structure their work would have been appropriate.

V. LESSONS LEARNED

The evaluation scope of work calls for an emphasis on lessons learned. Many lessons can be derived from the observations of the previous sections. The main lessons learned are highlighted here for ease of reference, even though this implies some repetition. They are classified into lessons learned about democracy work in general, democracy work in Haiti, project management arrangements and communication as it affects perceptions and decision-making.

5.1. About Democracy Work in General

The transition to a democracy, while far from being a linear process, can be characterized by four generic stages: pre-transition, early transition, late transition and consolidation. Each stage is characterized by a given set of conditions and, as a result, the forms of action required to support the process vary from stage to stage.

In retrospect, it is now apparent that the mix of actions foreseen in the DEP project were not clearly related to a systematic analysis related to the stage at which Haitian society was, and some of them assumed a far too advanced stage of democratic transition, calling for institutional development, financial self-sufficiency, civic education, and local government capacity building. The events of the last four years, as well as the current situation, demonstrate clearly how fragile that early transition can be. The September 1991 coup reversed the process and brought Haiti back to a stage of pre-transition and repression. It now appears with more clarity that in times of crisis or pre-transition, civic action with a political reform agenda has potentially more impact than generic civic education and that a focus on direct action by civil society organizations may be more appropriate than focussing on non-directive institutional development. Supporting such a process requires clarity of purpose, commitment and unity of thought among the major interveners.

The transition to democracy in many societies often involves shifting the balance of power away from traditional elites to a majority which has often been excluded from the equation. Such a shift also requires USAID to reassess its traditional partners and learn to work with sectors of society which are less organized, less experienced and less able and ready to use USAID funds. New sensitivities and new approaches are required to address this imperative effectively.

5.2. About The Haitian Scene

The lessons learned about democracy in general touched upon above are derived partly from the Haitian experience and are, of course, applicable to Haiti. In particular, with the election of President Aristide and the work done by PIRE^D, it is clear that the popular movement is emerging as a new partner in the development and the democratization processes. Now that tentative links have been established with this sector, USAID/Haiti should expand this work and continue helping the democratic sector mature. We have observed some very encouraging signs of

maturation in the course of our interviews: the rhetoric has considerably mellowed; members of the popular movement are talking about opening to other sectors of society and development of new partnerships; there is evidence of thoughtful analysis of situations, commitment to non-violence, desire to learn effective management skills, more moderate tones. All of these signs are very promising. However, much more patient, careful and sensitive nurturing is going to be required before many of these groups can emerge as significant partners of USAID/Haiti.

Our limited contact and observations of aspirations at the local level demonstrate clearly that general civic education or civic education in the context of local government training cannot at this time be dissociated from concrete local action. Because of the absence of any experience of local government, decentralized or not, the need for local government must be created and perceived and emerge from action at the local level. Local government development work should therefore be linked clearly and simply to small project funding mechanisms, as originally proposed in the local government strategy suggested by PIRÉD. It is only in the context of such action that local communities will start understanding the need, mechanisms and principles for local governance and the necessity for acquiring a certain set of skills.

Another set of observations which has emerged from the various interviews conducted relates to the appropriateness of various structures and proposed "democratization" processes in the Haitian context. Haiti has a rich history, a tremendous human resource base and a particularly favourable context for defining a new form of democracy or governance suited to its circumstances. It also has severe constraints. Care should therefore be exercised in implanting without close scrutiny imported conceptions and assumptions. For example, the concepts of left and right, may not be as appropriate as "haves" and "have-nots" or "included" and "excluded" from the circuits of power and benefits; generic civic education about democratic rights and responsibilities is not sufficient and should build on more fundamental forms of basic education in terms of responsibility, cooperation and human values.

Haiti is at the cutting edge of democracy work for USAID and the opportunity to develop and test new approaches with far-reaching implications for other countries exist. There is room for creative experimental work and USAID/Haiti should spearhead this process and allow for such creativity in the implementation of its democracy program.

5.3. About Project Management Arrangements

As mentioned earlier, the project management structure proposed for the DEP was complex and too many decision-making responsibilities were given to the project committee, which ended up micro-managing the project and slowed the decision-making process considerably. In the crisis situation in which the project operated, the participation of a large number of actors with different agendas and the absence of a clear command structure contributed to some of the polarizations that occurred. While committees are necessary for coordination of project activities, they can be cumbersome and slow down project pace when they are given detailed approval and project management duties. They are better suited for communication, information exchange and policy review.

The Democracy Advisor function is extensive enough that it should be separated from the grant/contract management role in the selected institutional arrangements. It is also unlikely that individuals possessing the qualities required by this function will also have the qualities required for project and sub-grant management. USAID/Haiti should ensure that in the new institutional arrangements for the amended DEP, the role of democracy advisor is properly fulfilled and that as political analysis is given as much emphasis as institutional analysis.

Contracts appear better suited to implement well-defined strategies with specific outputs. It is likely that contractors for the amended project will focus on grant management and large scale implementation of well-defined activities. The kind of independent creative thinking such as that performed by PIRÈD is perhaps easier to perform within the more flexible context offered by Grants or Cooperative Agreements. A balanced mixture of granting mechanisms therefore appears more effective in meeting the overall purposes of the DEP than reliance only on contracts.

5.4. About Communication

Much of this evaluation has been about perceptions and how they are formed. We have seen that perceptions are formed subtly and that great attention must be paid to the sources and nature of information received.

There is a great tendency for "zin" or gossip in Haiti. While much of it unconscious, it is nevertheless often tailored to achieve various personal or class purposes. Communication in Haiti is never direct and frank. It is made of allusions and innuendos, and is caught up in many complex beliefs, sensitivities and emotions. These two factors, a tendency for manipulation of information and complex methods of communications, must be carefully taken into account, especially in the democracy sector. Clear, candid and frank communication of impressions and perceptions among US personnel is absolutely essential in an attempt to counteract the negative impacts of these processes. Clear signals must also be sent by USAID/Haiti to avoid erroneous perceptions based on years of suspicion about US intent.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

This section addresses the issues:

- what needs to change
- what should be done differently
- how can institutional contracts be developed that have maximum flexibility/adaptability to respond to Haiti's political vicissitudes

The lessons learned listed in the previous section all include implicit recommendations which should find their way into the design and implementation of all democracy enhancement projects. We have limited ourselves here to extracting a few more urgent actionable recommendations to help inform the decision-making process regarding the implementation of the amended project.

The recommendations fall under three categories: those that are intended to ensure a smooth transition to the new set of contracts, those that relate to building on the achievements of the current project and the design of the amended project, and those that relate to USAID internal project management arrangements and processes.

6.1 To Ensure A Smooth Transition Into The Amended Project

Public Recognition of Pired Achievements

There is a perception among PIRÈD grantees and other observers that USAID/Haiti has "terminated" PIRÈD because "they did not like what it did" or "they were not serious in supporting popular movements", etc... It is important to clarify these erroneous perceptions and some discouragement in the ranks, and show continued USAID support for this type of work by:

- recognizing publicly the services rendered by PIRÈD and the quality of their work, commitment and sacrifices
- recognizing publicly the services rendered by PIRÈD sub-grantees and other partners who often carried on their activities at great personal risk, who kept the lamp of democracy burning throughout all the difficult periods and who have been forgotten in the confusion that followed the deployment of military forces. This could be done at a reception or similar format.
- explaining clearly the nature of the amended project, the new institutional arrangements and ways in which the current partners will be able to continue their relationship with USAID/Haiti in strengthening democracy in Haiti

Bridge Funding

Since it is not likely that the new institutional contractors will be able to operate until September 1995, temporary bridge funding should be considered for at least two sub-grantees

who are likely to be funded under the new arrangement and would unnecessarily suffer and lose resources in the interim. These are Amicale des Juristes and CEDH. Interim funding for both of these two sub-grantees might amount to \$50,000 to \$55,000 over a three month period.

6.2 To Reinforce the Design of the Amended Project

Continued Support to Creative and Facilitation Work

In light of the high-quality and innovative work which was done in institutional development, local government and in working with the popular sector, the fact that the amended project will be implemented through three separate institutional contracts which will present fewer opportunities for integration and that currently proposed institutional contracts will have to focus on large scale implementation efforts and grant management concerns, we strongly recommend that a mechanism be found to continue supporting this developmental work so that the three institutional contracts that are currently proposed will continue benefiting from the creativity, experimentation and cross-fertilization required for this field. More specifically, such a mechanism, possibly a Cooperative Agreement, could include the following activities:

- continue to develop and test the local government training program to the point that the modules can be implemented on a large scale by the local government institutional contractor
- continue working with PLANOP and STAS and other similar popular organizations at a low level of financial input to allow them to grow to the point where they are able to become recipients of sub-grants under the civil society contract
- finalize the institutional development training materials and training of trainers process and provide technical assistance to the contractors in its implementation
- continue assisting the regional and national associations of local government to articulate their action
- facilitate cross-fertilization of ideas and actions of the major players and Haitian partners

Such a grant would act as the Research and Development component of the overall Democracy Enhancement Project, assume the role of external Democracy Advisor and assume a facilitation and cross fertilization role. If this crucial role were to be built into the project, then the other contracts could proceed as planned, with slight modifications in their scopes of work to avoid duplication of functions .

Small Project Fund

The linkage of local government development with a small project assistance fund, as initially proposed by PIRÈD in their revised local government strategy, has been incorporated in the design of the amended project. The current initiatives in this area undertaken by IOM and Planning Assistance are made within the context job creation and the rapid transition to normalcy

after the military intervention. In the implementation of the local government component of the amended DEP project, great care will have to be taken to clearly and systematically relate such small projects to local government development and integrate them in the training process envisaged for local government. The institutional development approaches developed by PIRÈD in the context of its work with civil society could usefully be adapted to building the capacity of local government units. The issues of governance that arise from the implementation of these projects, and not only issues related to project management capability, should be central to the learning and technical assistance process that accompany the implementation of these projects, and should be fed back to the larger policy debate via the associations of local government units. As mentioned in the lessons learned section, the need for, and functions, form and legislative requirements of, local government will naturally arise as local action begins to take shape. The relationship of these projects to the overall purpose of the DEP makes them different from traditional community development projects and will require careful monitoring and direction.

6.3 About Project Management, Coordination, Communication and Perceptions

Role of Committees

The need for coordination and cooperation among the various agencies involved is crucial in this democracy work. While such coordination can be achieved through committees, it is important that committees limit themselves to overall information exchange and policy and coordination issues and avoid the tendency to micro-manage projects.

Democracy Advisor

The amended project already calls for a much strengthened democracy unit within USAID/Haiti. This is a development in the right direction. Strengthening democracy is now for USAID one of the main strategic prerequisites for sustainable development and it is rapidly formulating its own theory and technology of intervention, in much the same way as USAID has acquired experience in the other sectoral fields of development over the years. The capacity to perform sophisticated political analysis in the context of such a USAID democracy development strategy is therefore essential. This may be a separate exercise from the more general political analysis performed at the mission level, which takes into account many other larger concerns of foreign policy. This capacity could be resident within USAID/Haiti or purchased through a Cooperative Agreement as suggested above, but as experience has shown, it should be separated from the function of grant management, since it is fairly rare to find individuals who will show equal strength in both of these functions.

Information and Communication

Since information and perceptions are so crucial in this area and since information manipulation for various personal, class or political interest is so pervasive, a conscious systematic effort to verify information sources by explicitly eliciting opinions and views from various sectors and attempting to understand the underlying motives of various actors is required. We

recommend workshops on communication processes in Haiti and historical and current political analysis seminars for US personnel involved in the democracy sector. Specific conscious efforts should also be made at the mission level to exchange information and perceptions frankly and openly so that conclusions are not derived from a set of unspoken assumptions. In particular, the activities, directions and operating assumptions of the democracy projects should be explained clearly to all USAID personnel and to the public in general,

It is hoped that the above few recommendations and the more general lessons learned touched upon in the previous section will contribute to the successful implementation of the amended DEP. As mentioned earlier, Haiti stands at a crucial turning point in its history. The actions undertaken by PIREL, the stand taken by the US Government in support of democracy, the successful and peaceful military intervention which restored constitutional order, the unique and innovative package of measures rapidly taken in support of the transition process and the new partnerships that are developing, all represent a new paradigm of opportunity, which, if it is energetically and sensitively pursued is potentially rich in rewards and may be highly significant in advancing the search for solutions to development and democracy worldwide.

USAID/Haiti, and particularly its HRD office, hold a particular responsibility in helping the people of Haiti make use of this rare confluence of circumstances and break out of the vicious circles of oppression and poverty in which they have been trapped ever since they arose, nearly two centuries ago, in a historic expression of popular will, to break away from the shackles of slavery, take charge of their destiny and restore a sense of dignity and human honor. It is in the context of such a partnership in the search of innovative and effective solutions for democracy and development that the current strategy of USAID/Haiti can best be defined. This search will require a new sensitivity and a willingness and the courage to experiment beyond the normal confines of project management.

APPENDIX A
Evaluation Scope of Work

ATTACHMENT I

Evaluation of DEP Project: UMU America's Development Foundation (ADF)

I. Introduction

USAID/Haiti proposes to contract for the services of two people to carry out an evaluation of this project for a period of three weeks each. The Democracy Enhancement Project (DEP, No. 521-0236-A-00-1112-00) is administered through a Cooperative Agreement (CA). The Umbrella Management Unit (UMU) for this project is America's Development Foundation, together with its two subcontractors, DATEX, Inc. and The Experiment in International Living (now called World Learning, Inc.).

II. Background

The project was signed on May 31, 1991. The PACD is June 30, 1995. Taking into account the significant changes that have occurred in Haiti since the project was initiated, the intention of this evaluation is to determine:

a. The extent to which the project's goal, purposes and outputs have been accomplished;

b. Whether the original design was sufficiently flexible to permit significant project accomplishments despite the many changes in Haiti since 1991;

c. If the project leadership moved with appropriate speed and adaptability to deal as well as possible with the changed circumstances;

d. Whether the project subgrantees were selected, monitored, assisted and controlled as well as possible;

e. What the most helpful lessons to be learned are from the project to date.

III. Discussion

Haiti has been through many tumultuous and unforeseen changes over the past four years. Many assumptions made in the original project design have undoubtedly been modified since its inception in 1991. Particularly in the democracy and governance field, there have been many important deviations between the situations foreseen and those that actually occurred.

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However, both USAID and ADF, the grantee, have continued to honor the project agreement and have tried to follow its provisions, up to and including the present time. Furthermore, after the PACD (June 30, 1995) and under a different configuration, USAID plans to continue funding many of the components in the DEP project. As a result, an analysis of this project will be of significant value in the final design and implementation of the amended democracy project, which should be contracted for later this year.

The evaluation should stress lessons learned. Conclusions from the lessons learned should be highlighted in an executive summary in the final evaluation report. These conclusions should help USAID better design and implement the next generation of institutional support to local government and civil society. For example:

What needs to change?

What should be done differently?

How can an institutional contract be developed that has maximum flexibility/adaptability to respond to Haiti's political vicissitudes?

The evaluators should make specific, actionable recommendations in response to lessons learned. Anecdotal documentation or data that does not inform USAID on choices or options for the next generation of support should be deemphasized.

While giving highest priority to the "lessons learned" from this project, the evaluators should also address the following:

A. Whether and to what extent the "UMU Component Objectives" in the project were fulfilled, i.e.:

1. Strengthening the capabilities of 10 - 15 independent sector organizations to "enhance democratic values and pluralism in Haiti, through promoting free and independent media, access to justice, debate on democratic issues, and civic education";

2. Providing better organizational and individual skills "to a minimum of 350 local government bodies in planning resource generation and allocation, and constituent participation". (Note: This project element was to be accomplished via sub-grants to two or three Haitian independent sector organizations, and by activities to link local government and civil society interest groups. (IHRED and CDRH were mentioned in the agreement);

-3-

3. Developing independent sector organizations, stressing their sustainability (i.e., operating without USAID funds), and training more such groups "which practice democratic values and promote civilian participation in the democratic process".

B. In implementing project objectives, to what extent did project management adhere to the criteria for sub-grant making in the Cooperative Agreement, i.e., grant format, evaluation criteria, open notification procedures, balanced proposal reviews, project committee consideration, encouraging viable proposals, evaluating and auditing sub-grants, and responsive and timely reporting?

C. To what degree did the project "work with the Haitian and international sector community" to promote democratic development in Haiti?

D. Were the three long-term key project staff members and the short-term staff recruited and assigned in accordance with the CA?

IV. Work Plan

The contract to evaluate this project will be implemented by two evaluators. The evaluators will report to the Chief of the Human Resources Development Office (HRDO) in USAID/Haiti.

The evaluators will begin their work in Haiti on/about April 10, 1995. They will submit an outline for the format of their final report to HRD by COB April 12, 1995. On or before April 26 (COB), the principal evaluator will submit a draft Final Report to HRD. Upon its acceptance by the HRD Chief, the principal evaluator will submit five (5) copies of the completed Final Report to the HRD Chief. All work will be completed three weeks after the contract starts.

V. Budget

A budget for the evaluation is attached. Compensation will be provided only for the work actually performed, and in accordance with The Standard Provisions (attached).

(NOTE: The UMU component of the DEP project known as the "Human Rights Fund" was an additional element added in mid-1994. It was funded separately and had a different goal and objectives. The HRF will not be included in the present evaluation).

APPENDIX B
List of People Contacted

| Name | Position |
|-------------------------|---|
| 50 members | PLANOP |
| Agr. Marc-Antoine Noel | UNDP, Consultant to CEP Former executive director CEP 1987, 1990 |
| Bobby Vaval | CEDH |
| Colin Granderson | Chief, OAS civil mission Haiti |
| Evans Paul | Mayor, PAP - FONDEM |
| Frantz Louis | USAID/Haiti, HPNO |
| Gabriel Verrette | USAID/Haiti, PCPS |
| Gail Spence | USAID/Haiti, PCPS |
| Jane Nandy | USAID/Haiti, HRD |
| Jean-Francois Roosevelt | Journalist |
| Jean-Robert Benoit | CEDH |
| Larry Crandall | Director, USAID/Haiti |
| Laura McPherson | Project Design Consultant |
| Leslie Voltaire | Chief of Staff, President Aristide |
| Lynn Gwen | Political Officer, US Embassy |
| Members | Prison Association of Petit-Goave |
| Micha Gaillard | HSI - Konakom - Parliamentary plan |
| Michele Oriol | Consultant Local Government |
| Nancy Charles | USAID/Haiti, HRD |
| Participants | Thomazeau local government training |
| Robert Denise | Decentralization Unit, PM's Office GOH |
| Staff | PIRED |
| Staff | Amicale regional office Croix-des-Bouquets |
| Stanley Lucas | Consultant to NDI, IRI |
| Vicky Huddleston | DCM US Embassy |

APPENDIX C

Summary of Civil Society Applications for Funding

LIST OF ASSOCIATIONS/ORGANIZATIONS
AND OTHER CONTACTS

DEBATS ET ECHANGES POLITIQUES (13)

CENTRE PÉTION-BOLIVAR
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY
COMMISSION PRÉSIDENTIELLE
CONFEDERATION NATIONALE DES ORGANISATIONS POPULAIRES DU
PAYS (CONAPOP)
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT GROUP
INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE ET DU
* DÉVELOPPEMENT (IHRED)
LIONEL DELATOUR (US POLICY INSTITUTE)
MARTIN LUTHER KING CENTER FOR NONVIOLENT SOCIAL CHANGE
MOUVMAN JÈN PATRIYÒT (MOJEP)
PLATE FORME DE CARREFOUR FEUILLES
PLATE FORME NATIONALE DES ORGANISATIONS POPULAIRES
WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA
RASANBLEMAN OGANIZASYON POU DEVLOPMAN SIDES

DROITS HUMAINS/LA JUSTICE (21)

ASSOCIATION POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DES DROITS HUMAINS (ADDHUM)
AMICALE DES JURISTES
CENTRE CANADIEN D'ÉTUDES ET DE COOPÉRATION
INTERNATIONALE (CECI)
CENTRE HAITIEN DE SERVICE SOCIAL (CHASS)
CENTRE LAFONTANT JOSEPH
CENTRE OECUMÉNIQUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
COMITÉ D'AVOCATS HAITIENS
COMMISSION DE DROITS HUMAINS - CHAMBRE DES DEPUTÉS
CONGRESSIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION
CONGRESSIONAL SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER
HAVA LEGAL ASSISTANCE
INTERAMERICAN FOUNDATION
KOMISYON JISTIS E PE
KOMITE ADÒK KONT VYOLANS SOU FANM
LE MONDE JURIDICO-SCIENTIFIQUE (MJS)
MEDICAL NET
MISSION CIVILE OEA/ONU
MOUVMAN PEYIZAN PAPAYE
NATIONAL COALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES/PAUP
PROGRAMME DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT (PNUD)
US CONSULATE/REPATRIATION PROGRAM

ÉDUCATION CIVIQUE (24)

ASSOCIATION DES JEUNES DE CARREFOUR FEUILLES
ASSOCIATION DES PAYSANS DE VALLUE
BODE NASYONAL
CÉLÉBRATION 2004
CENTRE CULTUREL D'INFORMATION DES COMBATTANTES DES
FEMMES RÉUNIES POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DU PAYS
CENTRE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT ET DES RESSOURCES HUMAINES
CENTRE DE RECHERCHE ET D'ÉDUCATION DÉMOCRATIQUE (CREDEM)
CHRISTIAN REFORMED WORLD RELIEF COMMITTEE (CRWRC)
FEDERATION INDEPENDANTE DE TRAVAILLEURS HAITIENS (FITH)
FONDATION JEAN FRANCOIS EXAVIER
FONDATION POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT ET LA DÉMOCRATIE
(FONDEM)
INSTITUTION MOBILE ÉDUCATION DÉMOCRATIQUE
INYON MILITAN PWOGRESIS AYISYEN (IMPA)
MAGISTRAT DE GROS MORNE (NORTHWEST)
MISSION HALLOUMANDJA D'HAITI
MOUVEMENT DES PAYSANS DE LIANCOURT (MPL)
MOUVEMENT NATIONAL DE DROITS CIVIQUES
MOUVEMENT POUR LA RECONSTRUCTION NATIONALE
MOUVEMENT D'UNITÉ DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ PAR L'INTÉGRATION
(MUCI)
OGANIZASYON DEVLOPMAN KOMINOTE KRETYEN AYISYEN (ODKKA)
ORGANISATION TROMPETTE DE LA LIBERTÉ DE PORT-AU-PRINCE
RADIO LAKANSYEL
RASSEMBLEMENT MOUVEMENT PAYSAN DU SUD-EST
SAVE THE CHILDREN

MEDIA (12)

AGENCE HAITIENNE DE PRESSE
ASSOCIATION DES TRAVAILLEURS DE PRESSE DE PORT-AU-PRINCE
ASSOCIATION DES JOURNALISTES HAITIENS
CENTRE D'ORIENTATION EDUCATIVE JOURNALISTIQUE ET DE
RECHERCHES RURALES (CEDEJERR)
CENTRE DE FORMATION DES JOURNALISTES
HAITI SOLIDARITÉ INTERNATIONALE (HSI)
LIBÈTE
MEDIA PERSPECTIVES
NOUVÈL POU NALE PI LWEN
RADIO EXPRESS DE JACMEL
RADIO SOLEIL
UNION NATIONALE DES JOURNALISTES D'INFORMATION
SPECIALISÉES

AUTRES (29)

ASSOCIATION POUR LA PRÉVENTION DE L'ALCOÛLISME ET DES
ACCOUTUMANCES CHIMIQUES (APAAC)
ASSOCIATION DES MEMBRES DE L'ÉCOLE BON SAMARITAIN

AUTRES (CONT'D)

ASSOCIATION DES JEUNES PROGRESSISTES DE PERNIER FATIMA

ASOSYASYON NEG SOLID TERYE ROUJ POU CHANJMAN

ASOSYASYON TI MACHAN RI TIMAS (ATMRT)

BASE DE L'UNITÉ

CENTRE DE PROMOTION RURALE ET D'ACTION SOCIALE

CENTRE HAITIEN POUR LA PROMOTION DE L'AGRICULTURE ET LA

PROTECTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT (CEHPAPE)

CENTRE POUR LA PROTECTION ET POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT

CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE ET D'INDUSTRIE D'HAITI

CONFEDERATION INDEPENDANTE DES SYNDICATS NATIONAUX

DÉPUTÉ DE MORON ET DE CHAMBELLAN

FONDATION HAITIENNE D'AIDE A LA FEMME (FHAF)

FONDATION HAITIENNE D'ENCADREMENT ET DE PROMOTION DES

ORGANISATIONS POPULAIRES ET SOCIAUX POUR LE

DÉVELOPPEMENT

* FRATERNITÉ DES TRAVAILLEURS NATIONALISTES POUR LE

DÉVELOPPEMENT D'HAITI

GROUPE AGE CHARISMATIQUE

INSTITUT NATIONAL POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA PROMOTION DE LA

COUTURE (INDEPCO)

INYON MILITAN PWOGRESIS AYISYEN (IMPA)

KOMITE TET ANSANM POU DEVLOPMAN

KOMITE KATYE BA VÉTY È (CAP HAITIEN)

KOMITE VIGILANS KONT MOVE JE (KOVIK MOJE)

MOUVEMENT DEMOCRATIQUE POUR LE PROGRES ET LA RECONCILIATION

NATIONALE (MDPR)

MOUVEMENT OEUVRES SOCIALES (MOS)

MOUVMAN PEYIZAN LENBE

MOUVMAN TI PEYIZAN RAVIN DE RÒCH (LIMBÉ)

MUTUELLE DE LA SOLIDARITÉ CHRETIENNE

PROMOTION CULTURELLE HAITI (PROKULA)

UNITÉ POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT ET POUR LE PROGRES (UFODEV)

UNIVERSITÉ QUISQUEYA

APPENDIX D

Current Positions of Some PIRÈD Participants

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES OF PIRED TRAINING AND TA

PLANOP

Gouraiqe René, Co-chair Human Rights Commission, member Comité de Gestion. Currently active in PLANOP and founding member of CEPROHDH.

Jean Claude St-Fleur, member general secretariat. Currently in the U.S. on political asylum.

Jean Gardy Théodore, Co-chair Public Relations Commission, member Technical Commission. Currently active in PLANOP and founding member of CEPROHDH.

Jean Ronald St-Cloud, Co-chair Information Commission. Left for France in July 1994.

Jean Augustin, Co-chair Public Relations Commission. Currently in the U.S. on political asylum.

Joël Leon, Co-chair Education Commission, member Organization Commission. Currently in the U.S. on political asylum.

Luckner Jabouin, member Organization Commission and Education Commission.

Patrice Laporte, Secrétaire Général. Currently in the U.S. on political asylum.

Paul Wilio, member general secretariat. Currently Director Fonds d'Assistance Social.

Pierre Marie Jacinthe, Co-chair Human Rights Commission. Currently active in PLANOP and secretary general of CEPROHDH.

Pierre Louis Pierre Frederique, member Comité de Gestion and Technical Commission. Currently in the U.S. on political asylum.

Pierre Mathias Jean Baptiste, Co-chair Information Commission, member Human Rights Commission. Currently in the U.S. on political asylum.

Serge Blaise, member Comité de Gestion. Currently in the U.S. on political asylum.

Théodore Saintilus, member Technical Commission and Public Relations Commission. Currently candidate for Plaisance.

Wilfred Desir, member general secretariat. Currently in the U.S. on political asylum.

Wilson Saintil, member Coordination. Currently active in leading his base popular organization.

Yves Exil, member Public Relations Commission. Currently in the U.S. on political asylum.

FONDEM

Enold Joseph, Treasurer of Conseil d'Administration. Currently Minister of Social Affairs

Jean Ariel Joseph, Vice President and member Conseil de Gestion. Currently Director of BUNEX the National Bureau of Exams.

Fritz Pérard, Coordinator and member Conseil de Gestion. Currently works in Prime Minister's Office.

Hernesson Duclervil

Yolly Edmond

Gabrielle Duroseau

Marc André, Conseil de Gestion.

St. Juste

Frantz Orélus, Conseil de Gestion

Donald

Antenor

Eddy Jeune, Accountant. Currently with Mayors' Office.