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MEMORANDUM

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FROM: Carol Grigsby, Acting Director, AFR/WA *RTT for*

SUBJECT: R2a Review - Guinea-Bissau

The first portion of the R4, the Results Report/Review, was due in Washington on March 1, 1996. This submission documents actual results of operating units through FY/CY 1995 (or whatever period for which performance data and other information on results are available) and outlines expected progress for the R4 period.

A review meeting for the subject R2a has been scheduled for Friday, March 22, 1996 at 10:00 am - 11:00 am in Rm 6941 NS. The purpose of the review meeting is to present the R2a and discuss concerns surrounding it. Centers and offices are invited to attend the meeting and contribute to the discussions.

Comments related to this R2 may be submitted to William James, a/CDO Guinea-Bissau, before the meeting. Information on the review meeting can be obtained from William "Bill" James, at (202 647 5235).

Attachment: R2a - Guinea-Bissau

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1995 Results Report USAID/Bissau

I. Factors Affecting Program Performance

A. Overview

For Guinea-Bissau 1995 was an important transition year. Following successful multi-party democratic elections in 1994, 1995 opened with a newly-elected, multi-party legislature and a newly-elected executive branch. This new government's first year was characterized by its inexperience and uncertainties about how this newly democratic system was to work. All three branches of government undertook significant efforts to broaden participation of civil society in their activities.

Executive branch ministries such as agriculture, fisheries and commerce held workshops, conferences and seminars, regionally and in Bissau, to solicit input on constraints identification and priorities, possible policy reform, and new statutes and regulations. The judicial branch also invited civil society participation in reviewing its administrative structures and investigating ways to simplify and decentralize its non-court functions related to the private sector, such as the Notary and Registry functions. To improve the interface between traditional and modern law and to increase access to the legal system, small claims courts were established in rural communities throughout the country. The need for and the decision to establish sector courts/small claims courts were reached after consulting with a variety of civil society organizations and communities themselves. The judicial system depended on communities' assistance in locating and often rehabilitating physical space in order to become functional.

The legislative branch held widely-attended "town meetings" to solicit citizen and intermediate organizations input on laws to be presented for deliberation. Less successful were efforts to establish coordination mechanisms between the three branches and within the executive branch, with the result that coordination in 1995 was primarily ad hoc. Nonetheless, the executive branch responded to strongly expressed legislative and political opposition party concerns about the poorly functioning executive branch with a restructuring of the cabinet.

During 1995 many exciting activities brought positive and solid results economically and in improved governance, as will be discussed later. At the macroeconomic level, however, the story was more mixed. While meeting IMF/World Bank adjustment targets, the inexperience of the new government was evident in their weak management of the economy, inhibiting the country's performance. Two external shocks related to the prices of rice and sugar, staples for the majority of Guineans, aggravated the situation,

sending inflation back over 50% after the 1994 low of 15%. Yet, despite the mixed Government of Guinea-Bissau's (GOGB) performance, the economy itself performed very well. (See Goal discussion below and Annex A for goal level indicators table,)

B. Progress Toward Program Goal

USAID/Bissau's Goal is market-oriented economic growth that is broad-based and sustainable. As can be seen in the indicators' table, Guinea-Bissau is on target for achieving market-oriented and broad-based economic growth. Although GDP growth was less than in 1994, it was still an acceptable 3.5%. Increased agricultural production, sales and exports increased household incomes in at least 42% of rural families, 42% of all farm families selling cashews. Cashew producers' income (42% of all farm families) increased by 184% over their 1992 income. Overall, producer income from agricultural production increased by 13% (this excludes data from the unmeasured sales and exports with neighboring countries).

The growth in public markets and the participation of merchants, traders, and other entrepreneurs in those markets (see Strategic Objective indicators table) indicated the continued broadening of economic activity. Not a specific indicator, the growth in membership of the National Associations of Agricultural Producers, Small Merchants and Traders, and Women with Economic Activities, among others, also show a broadening of participation in the economy:

- * from 1993 to 1994, membership grew by 95%
- * from 1994 to 1995, it grew by 135%.

Sustainability, as represented by the indicators for balance of payment and budget deficits, remained problematic. While the GOGB met its IMF/WB targets, the actual size of both deficits are unsustainable, especially in a period of declining donor resources. Because of the increasing importance of GOGB economic management to achieving the Mission's Goal, USAID/Bissau plans a more active dialogue with the GOGB than in the past. This dialogue will involve direct discussions with the GOGB, discussions and coordination with the GOGB's national partners, and coordination with other donors.

II. Progress Toward Achieving the Strategic Objective

A. Summary Table (See Annex B for indicator table.)

In addition to measuring the absolute numbers indicated for the targets, in several instances USAID/Bissau has expanded the measurements of some indicators to include an index. We have

found that this facilitates analysis and appreciation of the trends represented by the absolute numbers. In some cases, where the target has been established only for the final year of the program, an index provides a clearer method of objectively monitoring performance in the interim.

B. Data Analysis

1. Strategic Objective

The Mission's Strategic Objective (SO) is private sector trade and investment (T&I) increased in critical growth sub-sectors (CGS) through improved governance. Exuberant performance against the indicators for achievement of the Strategic Objective has characterized 1995 as well as the Program's overall performance. For four of the six indicators (see Annex B), the targets have already been surpassed, some by more than double; we anticipate another will be reached next year (two years early); and the last is on schedule.

What does this performance mean? First, the private sector is thriving in the liberalized market economy, especially in recent years. Second, USAID has selected particularly robust indicators which are highly responsive in the short term, possibly in the medium and long term. Third, given the very low base from which Guinea-Bissau has started, the Mission may have underestimated the potential response, although 25% growth rates are not insignificant targets.

An important question, however, is whether the picture that is described by Guinea-Bissau's performance is complete and accurate. All of the indicators originally chosen by the Mission are economic in character. Despite the very important "through improved governance" element of the SO, there are no indicators to measure performance in governance. Yet, the sustainability of the economic performance is highly dependent on improved governance. The analysis of Goal level performance has already indicated that sustainability remains problematic. Improving the implementation and monitoring of those elements of the program that most directly address sustainability is a high priority for the Mission in the remaining period of the Program. To do so, however, USAID needs to establish SO-level indicators for improved governance which reflect the Program's desired results. See Part III--Special Concerns or Issues--for a more complete description of what the Mission is proposing to do about indicators in general.

The SO indicators were chosen to give a broad view of the economic situation. These indicators, however, do not provide a full picture of the range between exuberance and stodginess encompassed by the critical growth sub-sectors contributing toward achieving the SO. These sub-sectors comprise 65% of the

domestic economy and over 90% of total employment. These critical growth sub-sectors (CGS) are: rice, cashew nuts, fruits, vegetables, forestry and forest products, fisheries, general commerce and general services. For each, USAID is monitoring and providing assistance, at the Sub-Program Outcome level, to improve performance in six additional areas: production, processing, domestic marketing, export marketing, and product-specific commerce and services. To better monitor performance in each of these CGS and areas, the Mission has developed the CGS matrix. (See Annex C for matrix). Analysis of performance in each of the CGSs is important to better understand both the overall performance at the SO level and the synergy of the four Program Outcomes in contributing to that performance.

RICE--Production continued its slow climb in 1994, while overall productivity increased slightly. These slight increases masked the uneven production and productivity among the three production systems. Productivity increases were all in the 3%-4% range, while the biggest gains were due to increased hectareage under production ranging from increases of 12%-14% for rainfed and freshwater paddy, respectively, and a loss of 6% in area cultivated under the saltwater paddy system. Most importantly, 1994 appears to mark the first year since 1988 that productivity has not been negative. It is too soon to determine if the gains were flukes or a response to investment. Over the 1988-1993 period productivity declines ranged from a high of 39% under the saltwater paddy system to a more modest 3% under fresh water alluvial cultivation. Most of the productivity loss was directly attributable to the degeneration of seed stock once the GOGB's small farmer credit program expired (it provided improved seeds and other inputs) and government downsizing resulted in the decimation of the agricultural extension and research system.

Several factors may have stimulated increased productivity in 1994. One, a major decline in rice imports in 1993 may have provided incentives to improve productivity. Two, in 1994 the almost rigid rice-cashew barter system began to crumble, as middlemen purchased cashew nuts with cash rather than imported rice. Three, improved infrastructure may have increased access to markets. Data from 1995 and later will be needed to determine if there is a positive trend and its probable causes.

CASHEW--Production, marketing, and exports continued to be the economic high spots for Guinea-Bissau in 1995. Although not as spectacular as 1994, production remained very high. Combined with higher exports and higher producer prices, the production resulted in significant increases in rural household income. The indexed producer income (see Goal indicator table) for 1995 is 284 compared to the base year of 1992. Of special interest to USAID, the majority of cashew nut harvesters and sellers to traders are women. In addition to the income they earn from the sale of the nuts, women are also the major manufacturers and vendors of cashew wine (and juice), a highly lucrative endeavor (\$10/day compared to \$7.73 for sale of the nuts).

Despite the importance of raw nut exports to producer income and Guinea-Bissau's revenues, there are still a number of opportunities to multiply the benefits of the cashew nut trade. One, a number of high quality, low technology nut processing techniques exist which can increase household income another 31%. Two, increased competition can both spread the economic multiplier effect and increase producer prices. Three, improved services within the industry can increase efficiency, reduce margins, increase profit all along the chain, and increase revenue for the country. Policy incentives as well as technology dissemination are already on the Mission and its partners' agendas.

FRUITS—The economically important fruits in Guinea-Bissau are mangos, bananas, citrus and pineapple. In 1995 fruit production continued to diversify and expand, particularly mangos. USAID/Bissau's 1995 efforts focussed on mangos, a crop important to both the country's nutritional status, export revenue, and trader and producer income. While production was 14.5% greater than 1992 and 12.9% greater than 1994, the producer price was 260% greater than 1992. The formal marketing system sold slightly more production domestically than it exported, although exports were 18% higher (in volume) than 1994 and 23% higher than 1992. The value of exports was 74% higher than in 1992 and 15.6% higher than in 1994. The number of attendees at grafting and other technology training has been steadily increasing, although still largely consisting of small-sized farmers going into production for the first time. Increased domestic marketing of all fruits benefitted women merchants, who sell the majority of fruits domestically. Continued growth and value added to all participants in the marketing chain will depend on improved harvesting, handling, storage, and shipping.

HORTICULTURE—Vegetable production and marketing are almost exclusively practiced by women for Bissau. In direct response to economic liberalization (removal of price controls and access restrictions) in the late 1980s, vegetable producers increased their cultivated land and production, with annual increases in hectareage of 53%, 30% and 55%, for 1987, 1988 and 1989, respectively. More significantly, production increased over those same years by 51%, 31% and 117%, respectively. Since 1992, increases have been more modest. Recovery from a drought in 1991 resulted in an increase in production of 81% over 1991, but growth since then has been a much more modest 2% per year. The biggest obstacle to continued growth in production and producer income is market development. The vegetables being produced are largely European, with a limited market in Bissau without an education campaign. Guinea-Bissau does possess some comparative advantages for export to Europe, but much work needs to be done on storage, handling, market timing, and shipping. Regional markets offer greater immediate potential, but need additional development, especially transport and marketing networks.

FORESTRY—Guinea-Bissau has valuable forests and forestry resources. However, at this time no ecologically sound, sustainable and rational forest management plan has been developed or adopted by the country. As a result, the forest is disappearing at an alarming rate. In 1996, USAID/Bissau will undertake a forest and biodiversity assessment as a first step in identifying an ecologically sound action plan that is acceptable to USAID's development partners. Unfortunately, one of the major causes of deforestation is the demand for fuelwood and poles for housing by Guinea-Bissau's Sahelian neighbors, where prices for Guinea-Bissau's charcoal are three to five times higher than in the Bissau market. Solutions to this problem are beyond Guinea-Bissau's ability to address by itself. Neighbors will also have to address their fuelwood and construction problems before Guinea-Bissau will have real control of its forest resources.

FISHERIES—Between 1990 and 1994 statistics showed a pattern indicating overfishing and declining harvests in the industrial zone. GOGB revenue from licenses concurrently decreased from \$20 million in 1990 to \$11.3 million in 1994, although this was still almost 44% of the country's foreign exchange earnings. Based on research and technical assistance financed by USAID, in 1995 the Ministry of Fisheries undertook two major efforts to improve the ecological balance while safeguarding the importance of fisheries receipts in the country's current account balance and the GOGB's budget. First, the Ministry renegotiated a new, two-year fisheries agreement with the European Union which significantly increased license fees while introducing catch quotas and reporting requirements. Second, the Ministry developed a comprehensive Management Plan and began implementing measures such as catch limits for all species; a new licensing structure which provides incentives to firms which more directly provide benefits to Guinea-Bissau in the form of employment, on-shore processing and sales, use of port facilities, etc.; incentives for private national investment; and a licensing structure based on preserving the halieutic resources.

GENERAL COMMERCE—As indicated in the 1994 Assessment of Program Impact, the marketing structure of Guinea-Bissau is changing. In 1995, the restructuring process appears to have accelerated. The number of registered commercial firms more than doubled over the 1992 numbers and increased by 65% over the 1994 levels. In addition, membership in the National Business Associations increased by 135% over the size of membership in 1994 and by more than 14 times the 1992. The number of merchants in public markets (with permanent structures) and *feiras* (spontaneous markets without permanent structures) increased by 16% annually. This growth in competition, together with economic reforms and road improvements, stimulated a drastic decline in the entrepot system and an expansion of the multivalent system. (The entrepot system is a centralized, merchant-based marketing system which characterized the colonial economy. The multivalent system is a decentralized, itinerant trader-based system.)

The shift from the entrepot system to a multivalent system is being driven by: a) reduction on import restrictions, resulting in the loss of the monopoly on consumer goods previously enjoyed by the merchant participants of the entrepot system and permitting producers and other intermediaries to directly import goods; b) the flexibility of small traders to access goods from a variety of suppliers or to alter their geographic area of action; c) the lack of experience with free markets that is hindering the ability of licensed, formal sector merchants to acquire basic market information; and d) the price inflexibility imposed on the entrepot (licensed) merchants by their fixed-price longer-term contracts, licensing fees and informal transfers. Fueling the growth underlying the shift is the increased incomes of rural producers which in turn has increased the demand for both imported consumer goods, while the increase in locally produced goods has further favored the multivalent system. During this shift intermediate organizational structures are arising which are different blends of the two systems. The bottom line is that economic liberalization and policy incentives are increasing the concerns about efficiency, value and cost-effectiveness.

GENERAL SERVICES—Transport infrastructure, especially roads, and transport enjoyed tremendous growth. Between 1990 and 1994, the asphalted road system in Guinea-Bissau grew from 396 km to 619 km. Roughly 28% of the road network of 2,636 km is paved, 18% is laterite and the rest is dirt, providing a density of 73 km of road for every 1000 km². This is in addition to the riverain network, which is declining in importance. As a result, both the number and size of trucks carrying people and goods increased tremendously. Between 1992 and 1995, the number of trucks carrying people increased by 54%. Other support services remain problematic: the financial sector is extremely weak; the communication grid is small (about 10% private customers, with the rest public sector and diplomatic corps); the storage system is inadequate (especially for cold storage for exports); the energy grid is limited, highly erratic, and very expensive; and the market information system is still largely word of mouth.

C. Contribution of USAID Activities

USAID/Bissau's Country Program Strategy is designed to be highly participative. Three of the four Program Outcomes (PO) are governance-related and implicitly and explicitly participative and consultative. Even the fourth PO, which deals with more direct support to the private sector is designed to be participative. Much of the Program's success is directly due to the participative nature of implementation. Intrinsic to that character, however, is a more deliberative pace of achieving results. Because most of the intermediate results are at the PO or Sub-Program Output level, we have chosen to discuss performance at the PO level. Most of the indicators originally chosen for the PO level and below are input, process or output indicators. In terms of meaningful analysis of the impact or achievement of results, the indicators are not particularly useful. The implications of this and what USAID/Bissau intends to do about it are contained in Section III. For this Results Report the analysis will focus on what we do know about our

progress in achieving results and intermediate results.

1. Program Outcome 1

"Technical/analytical base for planning T&I policy, legal and regulatory reform and for providing direct T&I support to the private sector improved in the critical growth sub-sectors."

a) Summary Table

See Annex D for Program Outcome 1 and its associated Sub-Program Outcome indicators.

b) Data Analysis

In practical terms, the Mission and its major contractor for implementing the Program have considered the constraints research, analysis of research findings, identification of needed policy changes, and recommendations for both the types of policy and legal/regulatory changes and action plans to make and implement these changes as the parameters of this Program Outcome. Between 1992 and 1994 constraints research was initiated in almost all of the critical growth sub-sectors. From

Policy Change

One of the principal recommendations of the regional workshops was to decentralize the licensing and registration to regional Ministry of Commerce offices. The executive decree which resulted from the recommendation allowed legalization of imports and exports outside of Bissau. In apparent reaction, registered commercial firms as of June 1995 increased by 65% over the number of registered firms in 1994. When compared to the 22% average increase in registered firms between 1991-1994, this increase is particularly striking. Although data does not yet exist to confirm what proportion of these firms are outside Bissau, 1992 data showed that 52% of retailers and 22% of exporters and importers were outside of Bissau.

(Source: Ministry of Commerce, 1995)

the very beginning of the research process, the Program established its *modus operandi* as highly participative, including private and public sector participation at each stage of the research to action plan continuum. In 1995 the results of the emphasis on increased transparency, broad participation by partners, customers and stakeholders, and the iterative review process could begin to be seen.

Based on the USAID-financed and facilitated workshops and conferences which brought together representatives from the National Association of Small Merchants and Traders, the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Women with Economic Activities, and the Ministries of Commerce, Finance, and Justice, a number

of policy recommendations were presented to the Minister of Commerce. Some of these measures were within his immediate competency to act upon. For example, in 1995 the Ministry of Commerce began to implement some of the decentralization recommendations (see box). Other recommendations required action by the Council of Ministers and currently are under consideration.

The same iterative consultative process was followed in the fisheries sector over the 1993 and 1994 period. In 1995 as a result of this process of USAID-facilitated consultation with customers, partners and stakeholders, the Ministry of Fisheries took a major step to improve the biodiversity and ecological balance while safeguarding the importance of fisheries receipts to the country. See page 5 discussion of fisheries matrix cell for explanation of what happened. Other countries with current fisheries agreements have been advised of the new catch quotas, as well as the incentive package the Ministry began implementing in late 1995. This new licensing structure provides incentives to increased investment in Guinea-Bissau. It is too early to see any results.

c) Expected Progress in 1997 and 1998

Through an annual customer and partner consultative process, USAID's constraints analysis and priorities for each of the critical growth sub-sectors is confirmed. By 1997, USAID expects that the policy reforms already identified in the Fisheries, Cashews and General Commerce will be approved by the appropriate authorities and implementation begun. Efforts are underway so that by the end of 1996, an agricultural sector framework highly supportive of private trade and investment, particularly in the rice, cashew, fruit and vegetable sub-sectors, will be approved. An action plan for increased investment in rice will be approved and implementation begun in 1997, with many of the necessary laws, statutes and regulations for stimulating investment drafted in 1997 and 1998. With more than 70% of the population working in agriculture, and rice the main food crop, by 1998 USAID expects to see measurable increases in household income which can be attributed to increased rice production, processing and marketing.

A new "organic" (basic) Land Law, whose formulation through a broadly participative process has been USAID-assisted will be approved by the Assembly in 1996. Besides the new land law, one of the most important activities undertaken in 1996, a Tropical Forestry and Biodiversity assessment, will be completed. USAID and its partners' challenge for 1997 and 1998 will be to generate a forestry sector framework and a management plan which protect these valuable resources yet are supportive of its sustainable investment and use. By 1998, investments in forest products (e.g., lumber rather than logs, carpentry, honey, medicinal and

food plants) will begin to improve rural families incomes, as well as urban and suburban incomes. These increases in income are not expected to be measurable until after 1998.

2. Program Outcome 2

"Policy, legal and regulatory environment for increased private T&I in the CGS improved"

a) Summary Table

See Annex E for Program Outcome 2 and its associated Sub-Program Outcome indicators. See Section III for a discussion of the Mission's issues and concerns with the indicators and targets.

b) Data Analysis

In practice, this Program Outcome has been defined as the formulation of or amendment to statutes, laws and/or regulations

Study Tour

In 1995, USAID financed a study tour to the United States and Brazil for Guinean legislators representing all five political parties with elected representatives in the National Assembly. The study tour's objectives were a) to acquaint the Deputies with alternative legislative structures and operations, and b) to focus on legislative structures and relationships with trade and investment constituents. Perhaps one of the most positive results which came from the trip was the establishment of a common understanding among these leaders of the five political parties of how different parties can work together in a legislature. Since their return, noticeably improved operational relations between the different parties have helped forge a better understanding of their joint and separate roles, and a more collegial atmosphere.

which Program Outcome 1 activities have identified as necessary to achieve results at the SO level. USAID assistance is being provided to both the executive branch and the legislative branch. Prior to 1995 the current democratic multi-party National Assembly didn't exist, so most of USAID's assistance was provided to the executive branch, which drafted all laws, statutes and regulations.

Since the beginning of 1995, USAID/Bissau has shifted most of its attention and assistance to the nascent Assembly which lacked: i) knowledge and experience in drafting laws, ii)

operating structures, systems and procedures, iii) qualified and trained support staff, iv) a physical home, v) space for public hearings and commission meetings, and vi) basic office equipment. In 1995 USAID was able to help the Assembly identify and

negotiate temporary headquarters. With very modest working space, and minimal USAID-provided office equipment, the Assembly was able to turn its attention to becoming operational. A positive intermediate result has been the increased access to the Deputies and participation on working commissions by the public, increasing transparency and accountability.

In 1995 USAID's executive branch assistance for legal and regulatory reform was directed to the Ministries of Fisheries and Commerce. The results of that assistance has already been discussed under Program Outcome 1.

c) Expected Progress in 1997 and 1998

In 1995 the Assembly's Land Law working group recommenced the process of developing and passing a new land law. Because of the increasing politicalization of this fundamental and essential legal foundation for development (and increased trade and investment) during the election campaign period, the process was suspended until after the 1994 elections. USAID will assist the Assembly's working group to resurrect the consultative process which it sponsored during the 1993/94 process.

In 1997 and 1998 subsequent laws to deal with complementary issues (e.g., protected areas) will be drafted and approved after a similar broad consultative process. This process will actually extend beyond 1998. With secure tenure, increased investments in tree crops (e.g., cashews, mangos, citrus) will have a significant, measurable spread effect--from producer income to national accounts. The transparency of the process will reinforce public confidence in the legislative process, further strengthening its independence and ability to fulfill its role as a "checks and balance" to the executive.

The results of USAID's 1995 and 1996 investments in training support personnel in recording legislative meetings and hearings, in drafting trade and investment legislation, and in establishing an operational structure will begin to be seen in 1997. Timely publication of hearing, debates, and legislation will strengthen good governance and investor confidence. While USAID/Bissau does not yet know how it will measure these (see Section III), some measurable progress is expected by 1998. The sustainability of that progress will not be clear until later. Continued USAID assistance to this important but nascent institution will be necessary.

3. Program Outcome 3

"Adjudication of T&I legal and regulatory conflict improved"

a) Summary Tables

The Mission's current indicators are provided in Annex F. Please note that these indicators lack targets and are largely process (at the project implementation level), input or output level indicators. See Section III for a discussion of what USAID/Bissau proposes to do to remedy the situation.

b) Data Analysis

As with the prior Program Outcomes, this section will discuss the results of USAID's activities in this Program Outcome based on actual implementation parameters and available alternative data. Although this PO envisions providing assistance to both the judicial branch and the executive branch (where it has administrative adjudication responsibilities), in 1995 the Program's attention was largely devoted to helping create an independent judiciary and public confidence in that branch.

USAID's assistance to the judiciary in 1995 was to the Ministry of Justice and the Court system. In keeping with the Program's Strategic Objective, the context of all assistance was trade and investment. Training, for example, was always focussed on commercial law, although the processes and skills were more broadly applicable. In the case of the small claims courts (see box), training of the judges and court reporters frequently used modern commercial law to examine the potential interface of modern and traditional law. Of the 671 civil cases which were brought to the small claims courts in 1995, 71.8% dealt with conflicts related to commercial law and economic concerns (trade and investment).

Small Claims Courts

In order to function as an independent judiciary, the court system must be accessible to and recognized as credible by the population it purports to serve. In 1995 USAID assisted the Court system to create and establish small claims courts. By October 1995 the first 22 courts had received 1009 cases and resolved 68.7% of them. In comparison, between 1991 and 1992, the whole court system received 1,580 cases of which only 176 (11%) were resolved.

These courts are intended to approach justice through a consensus approach which applies modern law practice but tries at the same time to conform to traditional law. The success of this approach is clearly seen in the resolution of case load to date. Of the civil cases (70% of the total number of cases), 91% are resolved through consensus. Even in criminal cases, 56% are decided by consensus. The credibility, timeliness and importance to the rural population of these small claims court is clearly seen in the tremendous growth in caseload and in the degree to which consensus is successfully obtained.

1995 also saw the USAID-assisted establishment of the "*Tribunais de Contas*" (Accounts Courts), which provide many of the audit functions provided in the United States by Inspector Generals and the GAO. Based on

the Portuguese and Brazilian models, these "Tribunais de Contas" are not yet independent. Although both models provide some level of independence, the actual degree of independence will depend on which model Guinea-Bissau finally chooses.

USAID-financed consultants provided research, analysis and advisory assistance to the process of consolidating the independence of the judiciary. In 1995 both the Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court (the court system is independent of the Ministry of Justice) began, with USAID assistance, a consultative process with their partners and stakeholders to determine responsive, cost-effective administrative structures. Included in the process has been an examination of management structures and systems, including evaluation and appointment of judges. Although the "organic" magistrates law which clearly establishes the independence from the executive branch, as required by the constitution, was passed in 1995, the results and impact of these changes will not be measurable for several years. Intermediate results need to be identified and indicators selected which will provide progress benchmarks.

c) Expected Progress in 1997 and 1998

In 1996 USAID is helping the judicial system identify ways to streamline adjudication of the commercial code. One such effort, identified by the system's customers (business associations and individual private sector customers), requested an examination of the Notary and Registry system. A series of amendments to law and regulations will be identified in 1996 for implementation beginning most likely in 1997. As a result, USAID expects to see a significant increase in "informal" sector use of the Notary and Registry services. In 1996 and 1997 the remaining 12 small claims courts will be installed and training of the judges in the modern commercial code will be continued. Training for the sector representatives of the attorney general's office within the small claims courts will begin in 1997. Also in 1997, restructuring of the rest of the court system will begin, including systems to expedite processing of caseloads which cannot be settled at lower court levels and independent systems for monitoring and regulating performance of magistrates and judges.

4. Program Outcome 4

"Ability of entrepreneurs to respond to improved policy, legal and regulatory environment improved"

a) Summary Table

See Annex G for the indicators table and Section III for a discussion of USAID/Bissau's concerns about the indicators and lack of targets.

b) Data Analysis

Although the indicators for this PO and its Sub-Program Outputs identified at the time of the Country Program Strategic Plan's approval are largely directed at measuring inputs, elements of two indicators are good intermediate results indicators for economic growth. Those two deal with the growth of registered formal sector enterprises. The number of firms registered is a problematic indicator insofar as there are a number of factors which can affect its reliability--such as how many of the registered firms are actually operational, whether there is real growth in aggregate economic value to the economy and household income or whether the new registrations reflect a displacement from one economic activity to another. Nonetheless, it can be used as a proxy for ease of registration and investor confidence. From those perspectives, Strategic Objective indicator 1 (Formal sector--number of commercial firms registered will have increased) is a good measure of the results of Program Outcome 4.

Underlying Sub-Program Outcome 4.1 and its indicator(s) is the assumption that strengthening private interest groups, which we have effectively made synonymous with business associations, and their ability to deliver services to their members will result in increased trade and investment. The Mission continues to believe in the validity of that assumption. However, instead of tracking the inputs (as identified by the current indicators), we are monitoring the growth in both membership in associations and membership which is registered, which we feel reflect a combination of member confidence in the business climate and the ability of the associations to provide services (e.g., training, marketing, market information, interlocution with the GOGB) which will facilitate members' growth. We have found that between 1994 and 1995 association membership grew by 135%, and the number of association members who were registered increased by 54% between 1994 and the baseline year of 1992. During this same period, the associations were involved in all aspects of the USAID-assisted policy and legal reforms identified earlier in this report and in prior Assessment of Program Impact reports.

Policy and Investment

In 1993 and 1994, USAID undertook a series of discussions on policy reform issues related to cashews, bringing together the formal private sector, the associations representing formal as well as informal sector economic actors and the GOGB. Two critical reforms involved reducing the export tax on cashew nuts and removing minimum tonnage restrictions on exports. In 1994, the cashew industry responded with a 96.5% increase in exports in 1995, almost exclusively raw nuts, and to India. In 1995, with USAID-assisted investments in household-level processing, members of AMAE began the first ever regional exports of processed cashew nuts. As a result of the strong African (trade fairs to Senegal, Guinea-Conakry, South Africa, and Cape Verde) interest in Guinea-Bissau's processed nuts, household level processing and sales of processed nuts is increasing. Once more, policy reform and direct USAID assistance to the private sector have increased domestic investment. Importantly, most of this added cashew investment has been by women.

In support of the services offered by the business associations to their members, in 1995 the Mission continued its assistance, through the National Agricultural Producers (ANAG) and National Association of Women with Economic Activities (AMAE), for expanding family unit cashew nut processing. Training in processing and marketing has been provided to over 200 individuals. In addition, the remaining dehusking units were sold. The results are just beginning to be seen. For example, one of the first beneficiaries of the activity participated in a USAID-funded, multi-association trade fair delegation to Senegal, which returned with export orders of more than 60 tons/month, a tremendous growth in the virtually nonexistent exports of processed nuts. As a result of USAID's Program providing the necessary

foundation for the immediate results, today there are several family processing units selling into the local market and small quantities for export. In addition, this first AMAE participants have already invested their profits in additional processing capacity. Similar results are being experienced by other households as they purchase the dehusking units and receive the associations' training. A direct response to the demand for the equipment necessary to meet the increased trade and investment opportunity, a local Guinean firm is now making and selling the dehusking units. With the possible increase in family income from processing an average of \$360 per year, interest in training has grown beyond the capacity of the original training center. Two additional training centers supported by AMAE and ANAG were opened in 1995. It is too soon, however, to measure the actual growth in sales and income.

Also in 1995, USAID-financed direct support to ANAG enabled the organization to develop the capacity to provide training (such as improved technology for mango production and pre- and post-harvest handling of mangos for export) and market information (for domestic sales and establishing minimum producer sales prices for cashew nuts) to its members. As a result, in 1995 producers were able to increase their income from sales of cashews by 15-20%.

Lessons Learned: Stronger civil society does not necessarily facilitate broad-based, sustainable economic growth

With USAID strengthening support, associations--10 thus far-- have been more actively representing their members interest *vis-a-vis* government policy. As acknowledged representatives for their members, the associations are recognized by the GOGB as partners in the reform dialogue. The Ministry of Commerce, for example, accepts their initiatives about and development and review of potential changes in regulations--a strong plus for improved governance and democracy. The Ministry of Justice is similarly open to the Bar Association.

On the other hand, the associations still define their role as "protective" of their members. In some cases this has resulted in their urging the GOGB to reimpose competition restrictions, a step the GOGB was not even considering, but to which the GOGB felt it must respond. USAID negotiations with the Ministry and other associations have limited the extent of the restrictions, but clearly education about free markets and the role competition plays in increasing the benefits to all participants along the market change is necessary if a stronger civil society is not to undo the gains of liberalization. Counterbalancing forces are needed within a civil society just as a strong civil society is needed counterbalance a strong government.

c) Expected Progress in 1997 and 1998

Over this period, USAID expects to focus its attention on increasing direct assistance to the private sector in the CGS of rice, fruits and vegetables, forestry products, general commerce and general services. Strengthening market information about domestic markets and regional trade as well as the European market is expected to result in increased trade and investment for these markets in these CGS. USAID also expects to be able to better document the impact of these results on rural household incomes as well as business income.

Combined with its policy work under Program Outcome 1, USAID further expects to see increased benefits accruing to association members linked to the fisheries sector, artisanal and industrial.

III. Status of the Management Contract

A. Strategic Objective Changes or Refinements

The Mission for the next annual report will make a minor refinement of the Goal Statement, mostly for ease of typing and to bring it more in line with Bureau standard language. We will change the Goal statement from "Market-Oriented economic growth that is broad-based and sustainable" to "Broad-based, market-oriented, sustainable economic growth."

At this time USAID/Bissau does not expect any substantive changes in the Strategic Objective. However, based on the discussion of the Mission's concerns described below, the Mission may be proposing changes to the program logframe, indicators and targets as a result of the Program evaluation which will be conducted in April or May 1996.

B. Special Concerns or Issues

The arrival of the new USAID Representative in October 1995 corresponded with the initiation of the Agency's re-engineering and the development of the master contract consortium's 1996 annual work plan (the Program is largely implemented by a master contract within a primary project). Trying to integrate the Agency's re-engineering precepts, the Mission's program and organization, and the master contract's annual work plan and processes, the USAID Representative noted several areas of potential discord. Among the areas of most concern were:

- while indicators at the Program (as well as Project and Contract) Goal level are well-defined, including the quantitative targets, a significantly different situation exists at other levels:
 - * indicators at the Sub-Program Outcome and contract output (and critical growth sub-sector matrix) nominally exist, but quantitative and/or qualitative targets for them mostly do not nor, when they do exist, is it clear that the indicators are measurable or achievable or measure the desired results; and
 - * indicators for governance, measurable or otherwise, are missing at the Strategic Objective level;
- a potentially significant difference ("through improved governance" was dropped in the contract) between the master

contract's primary objective (the program was designed to have one principal project which would largely coequal the Program) and the CPSP Strategic Objective statement exists;

- the use of the critical growth sub-sector matrix (see Annex C) as the basis for the development and implementation of the annual work plan appears to have focussed the Mission and contractor's attention on inputs and outputs rather than on impact (Strategic Objective) and results (Program and Sub-Program Outcomes)
 - * articulation at the Program Outcome and Sub-Program Outcome level do not clearly reflect the desired results in terms of measurable impact and results;
 - * impact and results indicators are generally weak at all levels;
- Although the CPSP period is half over, without established targets and indicators which clearly measure desired results, it is not clear what will/can be achieved in the time remaining, nor what is within the Mission and master contractor's manageable interest.

To resolve these issues, the Mission is undertaking a full Program evaluation in April/May 1996, followed by assistance from a PRISM/indicator team to revise indicators and establish targets and a monitoring, evaluation and reporting team to ensure that the performance monitoring program of the Mission and the master contractor are gathering the proper data. Mission reengineering efforts are underway to begin this process and are expected to both inform and be influenced by the planned customer surveys, the evaluation and the indicator and monitoring assistance. The Mission hopes to submit any proposed revisions to USAID/W in early September 1996. Implementation of the changes can then be built into the 1997 annual work plan (generated in October 1996).

C. Environmental Issues and Schedule

In October 1995 USAID/Bissau, its partners and its customers reviewed the status of each of the critical growth sub-sectors and identified the next generation of critical constraints. All participants cited, and the data available clearly showed, serious deforestation as a major problem. Section 117 of the FAA requires that before USAID does anything which might result in the loss of tropical forests, it must undertake a tropical forest assessment. USAID/Bissau has a draft scope of work submitted for a tropical forest and biodiversity assessment. Contracting is expected in March/April 1996, with a team arriving in April/May 1996. In relation to that, the Mission is also undertaking a programmatic environmental assessment to examine, among other

issues, the impact the program has had or may have as a result of its policy, legal and regulatory, and direct assistance to the private sector in the environmentally sensitive sectors of agriculture, fisheries and forestry. All of these evaluations and assessments will be integrated into any proposed revisions the Mission may submit to USAID/W for approval and concurrence.

Annex A
Goal Indicator Table

Performance Targets	Base-line 1992	1993	1994	1995	1998
Goal: Market-oriented economic growth that is broad-based and sustainable					
1. GDP Growth from 1992-1998 increases by at least 25% listed by \$value, % growth and index ¹		8.6%	6%	5.8%	4%
2. 60% of rural household incomes increase ^{a)}					
3. # of HH reporting money income increased >3% ^{b) 2}					
4. In each year 93-98, # of administratively determined prices does not increase and continue to reflect world prices ³	6	5	5	5	5
5. Current account deficit ↓ by >3% per year 93-98 ⁴	-68.5	-25.4	8.29	-6.98	-57.1
	na	-63%	-133%	184%	
6. Budget deficit ↓ by >3% per year 93-98 ⁵	-339.9	-310.1	-244.2		- 283.1
	na	-8.9%	-21.2%		

COMMENTS:

a) Baseline never done. World Bank was to have been the source of this data through an annual household survey. The project never came to fruition, thus surveys were never done. For this report, the Mission is using two proxys: cashew producer income and number of people traveling. About 42% of rural households sell cashews, making cashews a significant and measurable source of household income in rural areas. For the moment, we are setting the 1998 target to represent a 20% per year growth rate. Although problematic (other factors may distort the linkage) the other

¹ Source: IMF/WB and Ministry of Finance. 1992 and 1993 final numbers; 1994 and 1995 numbers estimated as of December 1995.

² Source: INE 1995

³ Source: USAID

⁴ Source: Central Bank and IMF/WB. In US\$ millions

⁵ Source: Ministry of Finance and IMF/WB. In billions of Guinean pesos (PG billion)

proxy indicator is increased numbers of people traveling by rural transport. The assumption is that the number of people traveling is function of available income. It also assumes that passenger capacity is not excess (which appears to be valid based on visual sightings). Although the original indicator had a 3% per year target, until we complete the program evaluation and indicator revision, we are proposing a 15% per year growth in daily passenger capacity from 1995 through 1998, holding the size of trucks constant, i.e., assuming growth will be through small trucks rather than buses.

Cashew Production	1992	1993	1994	1995	1998
Producer income in US\$	4,222	9,396	10,639	12,000	15,128
Producer income index	100	222.5	252	284	

Passengers on small trucks	1992	1993	1994	1995	1998
Number of small trucks	330	350	na	508	772
Average # of people/truck	25	27		27	27
Daily Truck Passenger Capacity	8,250	9,450		13,716	20,860
Passenger index	100	144.5		166.3	252.8

b) Again, this data was to have been available through a World Bank-financed household survey series. For this year's reporting, and until the program evaluation is completed and indicators revised, the Mission is using both the cashew production (see prior footnote) and total agriculture production as proxy indicators. Production figures are measured in millions of Guinean pesos at 1986 values. Source: INE 1995

Annex B
Strategic Objective Indicator Table

Performance Targets	Base-line 1992	1993	1994	1995	1998
Strategic Objective: Private sector trade and investment (T&I) increased in critical growth sub-sectors (CGS) through improved governance					
1. Formal sector--# of commercial firms registered ↑ by 25% over 1992 ^{c)}	2,096	2,407	2,988	4,935	2,649
	100	114.8	142.6	235.4	125
2. Semi-formal--# of applications for stalls at formal markets ↑ by 25% over 1992 ^{d)} ⁶	na	na	na	na	na
3. Informal sector--# of rural households reporting a) money income, b) part of production sold, and c) part of consumption purchased ↑ by 25% over 1992	na	na	na	na	na
4. Export earnings from cashews, wood and wood products, fish and fish products, fruits and vegetables increase by 25% over 1992 ^{e)} ⁷	6.54	18.92	30.02	23.71	8.18
	100	289.3	459	362.5	125
5. Productive (capital goods) input component of imports increased by 25% over 1992 ⁸	26.8	31	27	28.6	33.5
	100	115.7	100.6	106.6	125
6. # and/or value of foreign and domestic applications approved and implemented the CGS under new investment code ↑ >25% over 1992 ⁹	13	16	22		26
7. Private investment increased to around 5% of GDP ¹⁰	1.4	1.4	1.9	2.5	5

c) An individual can only register once, but can in turn register more than one firm. The number of persons registered showed a 53% increase between 1992 and 1994, an even greater increase than the 42% growth in the number of firms, indicating an impressive overall increase of people into the formal sector.

⁶ Source: Municipal Chamber of Commerce; Eve Crowley, 1994

⁷ Source: Central Bank, July 1995; França, October 1995 (Cashews).

⁸ Source: Central Bank Report: January-October 1995. Imports expressed in US\$million; second row is index.

⁹ Source: Ministry of Finance. Number of applications only data available.

¹⁰ Source: Ministry of Finance

d) Because of the gap between the number of applications for market stalls and the number of applications which actually are actually exercised, as well as the delays in getting the data processed, the Mission has considered other easier to measure indicators which measure the desired result--more trade and investment from the semiformal and informal business sectors. When examined in this context, the third indicator on the informal sector is trying to measure much the same result. One of the best measurable indicators we could find that seems to measure the results from both indicators is "Businesses in public markets throughout the country increased by 25% over 1992 figures. This indicator can also be a proxy for commercial buying and selling of both production and consumer goods, thus also indirectly indicating growth in household income. Source: Municipal Chamber of Commerce; Eve Crowley, 1994.

Semiformal/informal businesses in public markets througout the country increased by 25% over 1992	1992	1993	1994	1995	1998
Number of markets	30			65	
Index	100			216.7	
Number of merchants	14,500	16,400	18,500		18,125
Index	100	113.1	127.6		125

e) Value (first row) is expressed in US\$millions/fob; second row is an export earnings index. Cashews represented about 88% of exports in 1995; seafood exports did not include artisanal zone catches; fruits and vegetables remained minor and well below potential; wood products consisted almost exclusively of logs and sawn wood.

Areas of Economic Activity	CGS Products					
Production						
Processing						
Marketing/domestic						
Marketing/export						
Commerce/general						
Commerce/product specific						
Service/general						
Service/product specific						

Annex D
Program Outcome 1 Indicator Table

Performance Targets	Base-line 1992	1993	1994	1995	1998
Program Output 1: Technical/analytical base for planning T&I policy, legal and regulatory reform and for providing direct T&I support to the private sector improved in the critical growth sub-sectors					
1. Rice research and analytical base for T&I policy, legal and regulatory reform and for providing direct T&I support to the private sector completed by 1994				R; no AP ¹¹	
2. Cashews research and analytical base and action plan for T&I policy, legal and regulatory reform and for providing direct T&I support to the private sector completed by 1995			R	R; no AP	
3. Fruits research and analytical base and action plan for T&I policy, legal and regulatory reform and for providing direct T&I support to the private sector completed by 1996		R	R	R; no AP	
4. Vegetables research and analytical base and action plan for T&I policy, legal and regulatory reform and for providing direct T&I support to the private sector completed by 1996				R; no AP	
5. Forestry research and analytical base and action plan for T&I policy, legal and regulatory reform and for providing direct T&I support to the private sector completed by 1996				on-going ^{f)}	
6. Fisheries research and analytical base and action plan for T&I policy, legal and regulatory reform and for providing direct T&I support to the private sector completed by 1995		R	R	Mgt AP	
7. General commerce research and analytical base and action plan for T&I policy, legal and regulatory reform and for providing direct T&I support to the private sector completed by 1998		Part R ^{g)}			
8. Land Tenure research and analytical base and action plan for T&I policy, legal and regulatory reform and for providing direct T&I support to the private sector completed by 1993 ^{h)}		R	AP	AP	

¹¹ R=Research and Analysis; AP=action plan. Source: Project and USAID records

Performance Targets	Base-line 1992	1993	1994	1995	1998
9. Cross-Border Trade research and analytical base and action plan for T&I policy, legal and regulatory reform and for providing direct T&I support to the private sector completed by 1995		R ¹⁾			
10. Traditional Legal Systems research and analytical base and action plan for T&I policy, legal and regulatory reform and for providing direct T&I support to the private sector completed by 1998		R		AP; impl starte d	
Sub-Program Outcome 1.1.: Private/public sector commission(s) coordinate process of developing and executing research/analysis agenda	No targets	See main text			
1. Commission(s) for coordinating the process of developing and executing the research and analysis agenda established					
2. # and type of commission(s) meetings, by topic					
3. # and type of research/analysis work groups established, by topic					
4. # and type of work group meetings, by topic					
Sub-Program Outcome 1.2: Private interest groups and appropriate government units participate in processing of developing and executing research/analysis agenda					
1. # and type of private interest groups and appropriate government units participating in commission(s) work group meetings to develop and execute the research and analysis agenda, by topic					
2. # and type of private interest groups and appropriate government units participating in commission(s) in research and analysis, by topic					

COMMENTS:

f) USAID/Bissau has a programmatic environmental assessment and a tropical forest/biodiversity assessment planned for third quarter FY 96. This will update and integrate all of the various bits and pieces of forest related studies and research. The Mission hopes to be able to use the results to precipitate a sector framework and action plan through coordination with partners and customers.

g) Research on informal sector completed in 1994 (Crowley Report). Additional research and action plan needed.

h) Research began in 1991 and was completed by 1993. Action plan to develop new laws was formulated for 1994, but implementation was suspended for the 1994 elections. A revised action plan for legislation was developed in late 1995 for 1996 implementation.

i) Preliminary research was conducted in 1993. Additional research is being considered for 1996/97.

Annex E
Program Outcome 2 Indicator Table

Performance Targets	Base-line 1992	1993	1994	1995	1998
Program Output 2: Policy, legal and regulatroy environment for increased private T&I in the CGS improved					
1. General private sector policies for increased private sector T&I as identified in PO 1 are (re)formulated begun by 1994 and ongoing			Fish Gen Comm	on- going	
2. CGS policies for increased private sector T&I as identified in PO 1 are (re)formulated begun by 1994 and ongoing				on- going	
3. Land tenure statutes for increased private sector T&I as identified in PO 1 are (re)formulated by 1994			suspended for election	re- start 11/95	
4. Commercial code policies (re)formulated by 1993			Conf/Sem/ Workshops	on- going	
5. Commercial code statutes (re)formulated by 1995			Workshops	Work- shops; Draft	
6. CGS-specific commercial code codes and statutes (re)formulated by 1995			on-going	See Part III	
7. Land tenure statutes and regulations as identified in PO 1 reviewed for consistency and (re)formulated as needed by 1995				restart 11/95	
8. (Re)formulated Land tenure statutes and regulations implemented by 1997				on- track	
9. Business registration statutes and regulations as identified in PO 1 reviewed for consistency and (re)formulated as needed by 1995			Workshops /conf	Work/ seminar	
10. (Re)formulated business registration statutes and regulations implemented by 1997				ongoing	

Performance Targets	Base-line 1992	1993	1994	1995	1998
11. Investment code statutes and regulations as identified in PO 1 reviewed for consistency and (re)formulated as needed by 1995				revised date 1996	
12. (Re)formulated investment code statutes and regulations implemented by 1997				revised date 1998	
13. Tax administration statutes and regulations as identified in PO 1 reviewed for consistency and (re)formulated as needed by 1995				revised date 1996	
14. (Re)formulated tax administration statutes and regulations implemented by 1997				revised date 1998	
15. CGS statutes and regulations as identified in PO 1 reviewed for consistency and (re)formulated as needed by 1996				ongoing	
16. (Re)formulated tax administration statutes and regulations implemented by (TBD)				TBD	
Sub-Program Outcome 2.1: Private/public sector commission(s) coordinate process of policy, legal and regulatory reform			No targets	See Part III	
1. Private/public sector commission(s) for coordinating the process of developing and executing the research and analysis agenda established					
2. # and type of private/public commission(s) meetings for coordinating the process of developing and executing the research and analysis agenda, by topic					
3. # and type of private/public commission(s) research/analysis work groups established, by topic					
4. # and type of private/public commission(s) work group meetings for coordinating the process of developing and executing the research and analysis agenda, by topic					

Performance Targets	Base-line 1992	1993	1994	1995	1998
Sub-Program Outcome 2.2: Private interest groups and appropriate governmental units participate in process of reviewing and (re)formulating policies, statutes and regulations			No Targets	See Part III	
1. # and type of private interest groups/appropriate government units participating in commission(s) working groups in reviewing and (re)formulating statutes and regulations of policies identified in PO 1 and 2, by topic					
2. # and type of groups/units participating in commission(s) work group(s) in review/(re)formulating statutes and regulations identified in PO 1 and PO 2, by topic					
3. # and type of private sector groups and appropriate government units endorsing the (re)formulated policies, statutes and regulations, by topic					
Sub-Program Outcome 2.3: Selected private groups represent their members' interests in policy, legal and regulatory fora			No targets	See Part III	
1. # of Chamber of Commerce members, by size and area of activity					
2. # and type of Chamber of Commerce surveys/analyses a) conducted and b) presented in policy, legal and regulatory fora					
3. # of INEP/TLI studies/analyses of traditional sector a) conducted and b) presented in policy, legal and regulatory fora					
4. # of policy/legal/regulatory outreach sessions to traditional populations executed, by type					

Performance Targets	Base- line 1992	1993	1994	1995	1998
Sub-Program Outcome 2.4: Ability of National Assembly to (re)formulate T&I legislation improved			See Part III	No targets	
1. T&I legislative committee structures and procedures developed					
2. # of legislators and support staff trained in T&I					
3. # of public hearings on T&I legislation held, by topic					
Sub-Program Outcome 2.5: Technical/analytical base for GELD T&I law review and drafting services improved			See Part III	No targets	
1. T&I laws collected/indexed/codified, by topic					
2. # of GELD staff and Law Faculty students trained in T&I					
3. # of T&I legal consistency reviews conducted, by topic					
Sub-Program Outcome 2.6: Implementation of T&I regulations improved			No targets	See Part III	
1. # and type of private interest groups/government units that favorably evaluate implementation of T&I regulations					

Annex F
 Program Outcome 3 Indicator Table

Performance Targets	Base- line 1992	1993	1994	1995	1998
Program Outcome 3: Adjudication of T&I legal and regulatory conflict improved				No Targets	
1. # and types of private sector interest groups and governmental units favorably evaluating adjudicatory performance of the a) court system and b) administrative tribunals					
2. # of T&I cases adjudicated by a) court system and b) administrative tribunals					
Sub-Program Outcome 3.1: Formal court system restructured and upgraded to facilitate fair and impartial adjudication of T&I legal conflict					
1. Plans for judicial (court) system functions, structures, and procedures developed and approved					
2. # and type of court officers, law adjudicators and support staff trained in T&I statutes and court procedures					
3. Judicial structures established and procedures implemented					
Sub-Program Outcome 3.2: Appropriate governmental units establish clear, transparent and efficient mechanisms for the administrative adjudication of T&I regulatory conflict					
1. # and type of administrative tribunals established to handle T&I conflict-resolution					
2. # and type of private interest groups having voting membership on each tribunal					

Sub-Program Outcome 3.3: Traditional law/systems recognized in T&I statutes/regulations and respected in court and administrative T&I rulings					
1. # and type of T&I a) statutes and b) regulations that make specific reference to traditional law/systems					
2. # and type of traditional interest groups favorably evaluating a) court system and b) administrative tribunal adjudicatory performance					
Sub-Program Outcome 3.4: Lawyers' expertise in T&I laws and regulations improved					
1. # of lawyers and law students trained by a) OAGB and b) Faculty of Law in T&I laws and regulations					

Annex G
 Program Outcome 4 Indicator Table

Performance Targets	Base- line 1992	1993	1994	1995	1998
Program Outcome 4: Ability of entrepreneurs to respond to improved policy, legal and regulatory environment improved					
1. #, size and type of new business entities and joint ventures established					
2. #, size and type of existing firms expanded and successful exports operating					
Sub-Program Outcome 4.1: Selected private interest groups provide CGS-related T&I support services directly to their members					
1. # and type of T&I a) training programs, b) research/market reports, and c) other publications provided entrepreneurs in the CGS via the Chamber of Commerce or other entities					
Sub-Program Outcome 4.2: Selected private interest groups and appropriate governmental units provide T&I promotional services in the CGS					
1. # and type of T&I a) promotional materials and b) T&I trade missions executed via Chamber of Commerce or Office for Investment Assistance					

Annex F
Program Outcome 3 Indicator Table

Performance Targets	Base- line 1992	1993	1994	1995	1998

