

A.I.D. EVALUATION SUMMARY - PART I

PD-ABM-176

IDENTIFICATION DATA

<p>A. Reporting A.I.D. Unit: USAID/NICARAGUA</p> <p>Evaluation Number: 95/1</p>	<p>B. Was Evaluation Scheduled in Current FY Annual Evaluation Plan? Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Slipped <input type="checkbox"/> Ad Hoc <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Evaluation Plan Submission Date: FY: 95 Q:2</p>	<p>C. Evaluation Timing</p> <p>Interim <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Final <input type="checkbox"/> Ex Post <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/></p>
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D. Activity or Activities Evaluated (List the following information for project(s) or program(s); if not applicable list title and date of the evaluation report.)

Project No.	Project/Program Title	First PROAG or Equivalent (FY)	Most Recent PACD (mo/yr)	Planned LOP Cost (000)	Amount Obligated to date (000)
524-0316	Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI)	1991	12/97	18,000	18,000

ACTIONS*

<p>E. Action Decisions Approved by Mission Director - Actions Required:</p> <p>* See Attachment "A"</p>	<p>Name of Officer Responsible for Action</p>	<p>Date to be Completed</p>
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APPROVALS

F. Date of Mission Review of Evaluation: May 10, 1995

G. Approvals of Evaluation Summary and Action Decisions:

	Project Officer or Program Officer	Evaluation Officer	Representative of Borrower/Grantee	Mission Director
Name (Typed)	Todd Amani	Paul Greenough		George Carner
Signature	<i>[Signature]</i> for Todd Amani	<i>[Signature]</i>		<i>[Signature]</i>
Date	August 15 1995	8/15/95		8/16/95

ABSTRACT

H. Evaluation Abstract: The project is designed to promote a functioning democratic system of government in Nicaragua which will accommodate change through peaceful means, allow citizens to participate in the decisions that affect their lives, and protect basic rights and freedoms associated with economic progress. The project is being implemented by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), Center for Democracy (CFD), Consortium for Legislative Development (CLD), America's Development Foundation (ADF), Florida International University (FIU), United Nations Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD). The methodology used for this interim evaluation consisted of review of project documentation and interviews with persons involved in the design, monitoring, implementation, and evaluation of SDI Project-funded activities. The basic purpose for performing the evaluation was to examine the management and implementation of activities under the SDI project and to identify its problems, strengths, and weaknesses.

The major findings and conclusions are:

- * The lack of a USAID-generated assessment and analytical framework led to client-driven design.
- * The evolving Nicaraguan context led to altered SDI tactics.
- * Local institutions not sufficiently well developed to meet the rigorous U.S. requirements for receiving direct support.
- * In the various activities supported by the SDI Project there is little evidence of local participation and transparency in the process of government. Over time this is likely to lead to increasingly diminished returns as the country's democratic culture grows stronger. It is therefore important that participation and transparency be seen not only as project outcomes, but also as basic to the modus-operandi of USAID/Nicaragua and its partners.
- * Significant absence of systematic monitoring of the SDI Project on the part of USAID. Lack of user-friendly management tools in many instances to allow for a collaborative relationship to develop between USAID/Nicaragua and the entities responsible for project implementation. Additional USAID staff needed to improve project management.
- * Potential synergy through greater interchange should be realized.
- * Local NGOs critical to project success need vital organizational skills to improve their functioning.
- * Gender analysis techniques needed to strengthen project success.

COSTS

I. Evaluation Costs

Name	1. Evaluation Team Affiliation	Contract Number OR TDY Person Days	Contract Cost OR TDY Cost (U.S. \$)	Source of Funds
Lawrence C. Heilman Joan Goodin Jennie Lincoln Mitchell Seligson		524-0316	\$150,000	Project
2. Mission/Office Professional Staff Person-Days (estimate): N/A		3. Borrower/Grantee Professional Staff Person-Days (Estimate): N/A		

SUMMARY

J. Summary of Evaluation Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations (Try not to exceed three (3) pages)

Address the following items:

- Purpose of Evaluation and methodology used
- Purpose of activity(ies) evaluated
- Findings and conclusions (relate to questions)
- Principal Recommendations
- Lessons Learned

Mission or Office:

USAID/Nicaragua

Date This Summary Prepared:

August 15, 1995

Title and Date of Full Evaluation Report:

Evaluation of Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI)

The Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI) Project was undertaken in an environment charged with political conflict. As a development project in the democracy and governance (D&G) area, it represented a fresh approach to addressing the unique and deep-seated societal problems present in Nicaragua. There were no precedents to draw upon as USAID/Nicaragua moved to fashion this intervention in the context of a U.S. foreign policy establishment that wanted resources transferred immediately but was unable to put the bureaucratic mechanisms in place to allow the expeditious flow of resources.

The purpose of the interim evaluation was to determine whether the project was proceeding as planned to achieve its intended outputs and what changes may be required to achieve implementation. This was to be done in terms of project management structures designed to guide the implementation of each activity and each activity's progress to date as a means to identify SDI Project problems, strengths, and weaknesses.

In order to assess the effectiveness and impact of the project, the evaluation team examined implementation plans and compared them to actual progress, reviewed project documentation and interviewed persons involved in the design, monitoring, and implementation of SDI Project-funded activities.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

For the human rights activity implemented by America's Development Foundation (ADF), the financial management and computerized data systems of the Asociación Nicaraguense Pro Derechos Humanos (ANPDH) and the Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos (CPDH) were greatly improved. However, overall institutional capacity remains weak for these two organizations. ADF provided no significant assistance for the diversification of funding sources nor was ADF technical assistance of the highest quality. A two-pronged funding strategy, providing individual support for CPDH and ANPDH plus support for jointly-sponsored activities in the area of human rights education, is recommended. Other recommendations call for carefully-framed objectives, specialized technical assistance, and the diversification of funding sources.

The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) has been successful in promoting civic education at the secondary school level. Important to this success is the fact that significant input from a broad cross-section of Nicaraguan social and political thinkers provided the basis for a consensus document on the fundamental principles of a curriculum guide for teaching civic education. USAID/Nicaragua should continue to support this project and encourage a strategic planning process with the objective of clarifying the relationship between the Ministry of Education and the Center for Education for Democracy.

For the labor activity being promoted by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the major objective identified was the organic consolidation of five labor confederations into a single central body, the Congreso Permanente de Trabajadores (CPT). However, as the UNO political party coalition began to fall apart, so too did the fate of the CPT. It is recommended that in the future USAID/Nicaragua concentrate on labor education for individual union members, moving beyond support for specific organizations. It is also recommended that, in designing a new labor education initiative, a transparent, participatory process be employed, and that USAID/Nicaragua make a comprehensive assessment of the type and quality of offerings already available.

The National Assembly has been supported by the Center for Democracy (CFD) whose most significant contributions were the installation of an electronic voting board and a plenary sound system. The speed and transparency in the voting process provided by the electronic voting board has contributed to the efficiency of the plenary sessions. However, numerous obstacles and delays, not the least of which was a 15 month hiatus during which program implementation was restricted by USAID/Nicaragua, have resulted in no delivery

determine priority areas and take into consideration other aid projects now under development for the Assembly before designing a next phase of USAID/Nicaragua assistance for the Assembly.

Journalism training implemented by Florida International University (FIU) has clearly contributed to the development of a professional and independent Nicaraguan press. Before consideration is given to providing additional funding beyond the present amount programmed in the cooperative agreement, the objective of the FIU undertaking in the journalism sector should be more tightly focused, particularly through the upcoming election period, to afford this activity the opportunity to demonstrate results that clearly contribute in a cost-efficient way to reducing polarization in the Nicaraguan society.

Regarding the **Civil-Military relations** activity implemented by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), in 1994, a new military law was passed by the National Assembly. In February 1995, a transition to a new commander of the armed forces took place in accordance with that law. The cultivation of this transition was assisted directly by the private consultations and the public seminars orchestrated by NDI. USAID/Nicaragua should explore additional vehicles to support a civil-military dialogue. In the process of developing a new dimension of the civil-military activity, a role for NDI should also be considered given the excellent performance that it has demonstrated to date.

In the case of **Conciencia**, the return on investment for this program is high. Conciencia is building a grassroots network that should be utilized in civic education programming for the 1996 elections.

The International Republican Institute (IRI) that has supported **Grupo FUNDEMOS** has been successful in convening a number of conferences on relevant issues and is developing training activities for young participants in many political parties. However the team concluded that while FUNDEMOS has significant potential to meet its objectives, IRI has not provided adequate technical assistance to FUNDEMOS to support its organizational development.

OVER ARCHING ISSUES

An important by-product of the activity evaluations was the distillation of over arching issues. These issues take the form of recommendations designed to promote new system, procedures, and a rapid-response capacity to more effectively meet the demands suggested by the Nicaraguan experience in other countries; recommendations related to forward planning for the next phase of the SDI Project; and finally recommendations concerned with project management arrangements.

The **lack of USAID-generated assessment and analytical framework** to anchor project design had immediate consequences. It meant that U.S. D&G organizations (AFT, AIFLD, IRI, NDI, CFD) drove the design and activity selection process, despite having only rudimentary initial plans. In the absence of rigorous analysis against which to check the feasibility of the interventions being proposed, USAID/Nicaragua was forced into a reactive mode. USAID/Washington should consider requiring that, prior to initiating any significant D&G project activity, USAID field missions ensure that a serious assessment has been made of the problem and an analytical framework is developed to guide the selection of activities to address the problem. USAID/Washington should also consider making this requirement clear to development practitioners promoting specific D&G approaches without regard to geographic location or the local conditions.

As part of its re-engineering initiative, **USAID should consider changing the registration, external audit, and other requirements** for delivering support directly to indigenous organizations. This is particularly important for D&G projects, since strengthening local capacity is often an essential output for meeting the project purpose. As a basis for such USAID policy changes, a careful analysis should be made of the U.S. vs. local trade-offs faced by USAID/Nicaragua and other missions in similar political environments. It may be, for instance, that audit requirements should be altered by increasing the amount granted to a local group before an external audit is required. A substitute might be to require USAID field missions to make provisions in agreements with indigenous organizations for local technical assistance to ensure that financial accounting and reporting systems meet standards deemed satisfactory by USAID.

es supported by the SDI Project there is little evidence of either. Overtime this is likely to lead to increasingly diminished returns as the country's democratic culture grows stronger. It is therefore important that participation and transparency be seen not only as project outcomes, but also as basic to the modus operandi of USAID/Nicaragua and its partners. For any new and follow-on project activities, USAID/Nicaragua should re-fashion its arrangements with U.S. cooperators and grantees to ensure the greatest possible degree of Nicaraguan participation in the project design process and transparency in the funding arrangements that are forged for delivering U.S. resources.

Access to modern organizational development (OD) techniques for the performance of key organizational tasks by NGOs would contribute significantly to their prospects for eventual self-reliance and long-term sustainability. This would also help to develop the fabric of solid citizen organizations needed to strengthen civil society, and to increase the number of indigenous NGOs eligible to receive funding directly from USAID and other sources. Thus, USAID/Nicaragua's dependency on U.S. PVOs and contractors as intermediary agencies would decrease. Since a healthy NGO sector is a bulwark of civil society, and because Nicaraguan NGOs are extremely weak, USAID/Nicaragua should insist that technical assistance packages aimed at building their capacity include not only substantive skills, but also those needed for the effective performance of the basic tasks that undergird the organization itself. Such skills should also be included in labor education programs since unions, too, seek to organize groups at the local, regional, and national levels. To accomplish this, qualified OD practitioners with international experience should be identified and engaged, either directly by USAID/Nicaragua or by grantees and cooperators.

There has been a significant absence of **systematic monitoring** of the SDI Project on the part of USAID/Nicaragua. This is exacerbated by the lack of user-friendly management tools in many instances to allow for a collaborative relationship to develop between USAID/Nicaragua and the entities responsible for project implementation. The monitoring process should have the following components: workplans, monitoring and evaluation plans, quarterly reporting, and periodic and formal review meetings.

ATTACHMENTS

K. Attachments (List attachments submitted with this Evaluation Summary; always attach a copy of the full report.)

The full evaluation report is attached: *Evaluation of Strengthening Democratic Institutions.*

COMMENTS

L. Comments by Mission and Borrower/Grantee on Full Report

ATTACHMENT "A"

E. Action Decisions Approved by Mission Director - Actions Required	Name of Officer Responsible	Date to be Completed
<p>1.- <u>Better Informed Project Decisions</u> All future program activities funded under the SDI Amendment will avoid analytical gaps through the incorporation of a rational decision process which will include: 1) insurance that activities are fully supportive of Mission strategic objectives; b) analysis of the findings and recommendations of the SDI project evaluation; c) analysis of Mission surveys and focus groups; d) Mission experience; and e) discussions with key project counterparts.</p>	Gary Russell	Ongoing
<p>2.- <u>Determining Mode of Project Support</u> In designing components of the SDI amendment which will require the services of an institutional contractor, the Mission will assess the benefits of using expatriate residents versus U.S.-based grantees to implement project components on a case-by-case basis.</p>	Gary Russell	05/96
<p>3.- <u>Local Involvement in Project Design</u> The Mission will ensure greater degree of Nicaraguan participation and transparency through the direct involvement of Nicaraguans in the design of SDI project components.</p>	Gary Russell	Ongoing
<p>4.- <u>Gender Analysis</u> USAID/Nicaragua will make available gender analysis training and technical assistance to all the organizations participating in the SDI Project Amendment.</p>	Gary Russell	Ongoing
<p>5.- <u>Improved Project Monitoring</u> In order to allow for a collaborative relationship to develop between the Mission and the entities responsible for project implementation, USAID/Nicaragua will ensure the improvement of the monitoring process through the establishment of a systematic process that includes workplans, monitoring and evaluation plans, quarterly reporting, and periodic and formal review meetings.</p>	Gary Russell	Ongoing
<p>6.- <u>Support of Center for Education on Democracy (CED)</u> USAID/Nicaragua has approved a new grant to the CED through the American Federation of Teachers for continued civic education in Nicaragua secondary schools, as well as the establishment of school based student governments. This grant will cover the period Oct. 1, 1995-Sep. 30, 1996.</p>	Gary Russell	Grant signed by 09/95
<p>7.- <u>Expanding CED's Role</u> Given the success of the CED in training teachers in a new civic education curriculum, the SDI/C is working with the CED to identify additional opportunities for the organization to reach beyond the public school system.</p>	Gary Russell	Ongoing

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E. Action Decisions Approved by Mission Director - Actions Required:	Name of Officer Responsible	Date to be Completed
<p><u>8.- Preserving Curriculum Materials</u> USAID/Nicaragua will work with AFT and CED staff to develop a system for preserving and archiving school-based civic education materials to prolong their useful life, thereby reducing replacement costs.</p>	Gary Russell	12/95
<p><u>9.- Institutionalizing Program Resources</u> All education materials produced and collected by the CED will be organized and shared with the Ministry of Education (MED).</p>	Gary Russell	Ongoing
<p><u>10.- Greater Coordination Between CED and MED</u> The SDI/C will work with the CED and the USAID/ Nicaragua's basic education project team to explore opportunities for CED to assist in the development of a primary education civic education curriculum.</p>	Gary Russell	Ongoing
<p><u>11.- Political Party Training</u> A grant to IRI/FUNDEMOS providing funds for the training of members of all political parties which adhere to democratic principles has been approved. The grant is for 16 months, beginning Oct. 1, 1995.</p>	Gary Russell	Grant signed by 09/95
<p><u>12.- Organizational Development Assistance to NGOs</u> The services of an institutional contractor will be procured to provide organizational development assistance to all NGOs funded under the SDI amendment.</p>	Gary Russell	Institutional Contractor in place by 02/96
<p><u>13.- Diversification of Funding Sources</u> The Mission will require as part of the grant agreement that each human rights grantee submit a sustainability plan before the end of the agreement.</p>	Gary Russell	Ongoing
<p><u>14.- Strengthening Journalism Sector</u> The Mission plans to begin a second phase of assistance to strengthen the Nicaraguan journalism sector under the SDI amendment.</p>	Gary Russell	Second phase of USAID/N assistance to begin by 12/95
<p><u>15.- Continued Support to National Assembly</u> USAID/Nicaragua will continue to support the Legislative Assembly under the SDI amendment. The provider of technical assistance will be determined through a Mission managed competitive procurement. The terms of reference will be developed in full consultation with the leadership of the Assembly.</p>	Gary Russell	Institutional Contractor in place by 05/96

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15N 97097

**Evaluation of
Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI)
USAID/Nicaragua
534-0316-C-00-5010 -**

Volume I

April 1995

Submitted to:

USAID/Nicaragua



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ACRONYMS

ADF	America's Development Foundation
AFT	American Federation of Teachers
AIFLD	American Institute for Free Labor Development
ANPDH	Asociación Nicaraguense Pro Derechos Humanos
AOJ	Administration of Justice
CED	Center on Education for Democracy
CENIDH	Centro Nicaraguenses de Derechos Humanos
CPDH	Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos
CFD	Center for Democracy
CIAV/OAS	Comisión Internacional de Apoyo y Verificación/Organization of American States
CIPE	Center for International Private Enterprise
CLD	Consortium for Legislative Development
CPDH	Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos
CPT	Congress Permanente de Trabajadores
DI	Democratic Initiatives
DH	Direct Hire
EPS	Ejercito Popular Sandinista
FIU	Florida International University
FSLN	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional
FUNDE	Nicaraguan Development Foundation
ILANUD	Latin American Institute for the prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders
INDE	Nicaraguan Development Institute
IRI	International Republican Institute
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
MED	Ministry of Education
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding

OD	Organizational Development
PSC	Personal Services Contractor
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
SDI	Strengthening Democratic Institutions
UNO	Union of National Opposition
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	US Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI) Project was undertaken in an environment charged with political conflict. As a development project in the democracy and governance (D&G) area, it represented a fresh approach to addressing the unique and deep-seated societal problems present in Nicaragua. There were no precedents to draw upon as USAID/Nicaragua moved to fashion this intervention in the context of a U.S. foreign policy establishment that wanted resources transferred immediately but was unable to put the bureaucratic mechanisms in place to allow for the expeditious flow of resources.

A project did get up and running, and the findings and conclusions of the evaluation Team identify a number of SDI Project-funded activities that significantly contribute to bringing the country together as a nation. However, the team also identified some shortcomings in the manner in which business in this project was transacted. With the perfect vision that comes in the aftermath of tumultuous events, weaknesses in the design and implementation processes have been pinpointed. This does not reflect negatively on the development professionals held accountable for transacting USAID business in the D&G arena.

Those individuals who were engaged in the direct administration of the SDI Project did an energetic and intelligent job. Constraints stemming from lack of sufficient human resources to administer the project and the complexity of the D&G phenomenon itself contributed to the shortcomings noted. From this experience, a number of "lessons learned" have emerged that hopefully can be applied by both public and private sector institutions engaged in this type of activity in other parts of the developing world.

SDI Project Activities

The following is a brief description of the major conclusions reached for the more significant activities evaluated:

For the **human rights** activity implemented by America's Development foundation (ADF), the financial management and computerized data systems of the Asociación Nicaraguense Pro Derechos Humanos (ANPDH) and the Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos (CPDH) were greatly improved. However, overall institutional capacity remains weak for these two organizations. ADF provided no significant assistance for the diversification of funding sources nor was ADF technical assistance of the highest quality. A two-pronged funding strategy, providing individual support for CPDH and ANPDH plus support for jointly-sponsored activities in the area of human rights education, is recommended. To accomplish this, a number of funding options are mentioned for exploration by USAID/Nicaragua. Other recommendations call for carefully-framed objectives, specialized technical assistance, and the diversification of funding sources.

The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) has been successful in promoting **civic education at the secondary school level**. Important to this success is the fact that significant input from a broad cross-section of Nicaraguan social and political thinkers provided the basis for a consensus document on the fundamental principles of a curriculum guide for teaching civic education. USAID/Nicaragua should continue to support this project and encourage a strategic planning process with the objective of clarifying the relationship between the Ministry of Education and the Center for Education for Democracy.

For the **labor** activity being promoted by the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the major objective identified was the organic consolidation of five labor confederations into a single central body, the Congreso Permanente de Trabajadores (CPT). However, as the UNO political party coalition began to fall apart, so too did the fate of the CPT. It is recommended that in the future USAID/Nicaragua concentrate on labor education for individual union members, moving beyond support for specific organizations. It is also recommended that, in designing a new labor education initiative, a transparent, participatory process be employed, and that USAID/Nicaragua make a comprehensive assessment of the type and quality of offerings already available.

The **National Assembly** has been supported by the Center for Democracy (CFD) whose most significant contributions were the installation of an electronic voting board and a plenary sound system. The speed and transparency in the voting process provided by the electronic voting board has contributed to the efficiency of the plenary sessions. However, numerous obstacles and delays, not the least of which was a 15 month hiatus during which program implementation was restricted by USAID/Nicaragua, have resulted in no delivery to date of the management information system. USAID/Nicaragua should consult with the Junta Directiva to determine priority areas and take into consideration other aid projects now under development for the Assembly before designing a next phase of USAID/Nicaragua assistance for the Assembly.

Journalism training implemented by Florida International University (FIU) has clearly contributed to the development of a professional and independent Nicaraguan press. Before consideration is given to providing additional funding beyond the present amount programmed in the cooperative agreement, the objective of the FIU undertaking in the journalism sector should be more tightly focused, particularly through the upcoming election period, to afford this activity the opportunity to demonstrate results that clearly contribute in a cost-efficient way to reducing polarization in the Nicaraguan society.

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In the case of **Conciencia**, the return on investment for this program is high. **Conciencia** is building a grassroots network that should be utilized in civic education programming for the 1996 elections.

The International Republican Institute (IRI) that has supported **Grupo FUNDEMOS** has been successful in convening a number of conferences on relevant issues and is developing training activities for young participants in many political parties. However the team concluded that while FUNDEMOS has significant potential to meet its objectives, IRI has not provided adequate technical assistance to FUNDEMOS to support its organizational development.

Overarching Issues

An important by-product of the activity evaluations was the distillation of overarching issues. These issues take the form of recommendations designed to promote new systems, procedures, and a rapid-response capacity to more effectively meet the demands suggested by the Nicaraguan experience in other countries; recommendations related to forward planning for the next phase of the SDI Project; and finally recommendations concerned with project management arrangements.

The **lack of a USAID-generated assessment and analytical framework** to anchor project design had immediate consequences. It meant that **U.S. D&G organizations (AFT, AIFLD, IRI, NDI, CFD) drove the design and activity-selection process**, despite having only rudimentary initial plans. In the absence of rigorous analysis against which to check the feasibility of the interventions being proposed, USAID/Nicaragua was forced into a reactive mode. USAID/Washington should consider requiring that, prior to initiating any significant D&G project activity, USAID field missions ensure that a serious assessment has been made of the problem and an analytical framework is developed to guide the selection of activities to address the problem. USAID/Washington should also consider making this requirement clear to development practitioners promoting specific D&G approaches without regard to geographic location or the local conditions.

As part of its re-engineering initiative, **USAID should consider changing the registration, external audit, and other requirements** for delivering support directly to indigenous organizations. This is particularly important for D&G projects, since strengthening local capacity is often an essential output for meeting the project purpose. As a basis for such USAID policy changes, a careful analysis should be made of the U.S. vs. local trade-offs faced by USAID/Nicaragua and other Missions in similar political environments. It may be, for instance, that audit requirements should be altered by increasing the amount granted to a local group before an external audit is required. A substitute might be to require USAID field missions to make provisions in agreements with indigenous organizations for local technical assistance to ensure that financial accounting and reporting systems meet standards deemed satisfactory by USAID.

Two of the hallmarks of a society where the rights and responsibilities of its citizens are to have primacy are **local participation and transparency** in the processes of government. In the various activities supported by the SDI Project there is little evidence of either. Over time

this is likely to lead to increasingly diminished returns as the country's democratic culture grows stronger. It is therefore important that participation and transparency be seen not only as project outcomes, but also as basic to the modus operandi of USAID/Nicaragua and its partners. For any new and follow-on project activities, USAID/Nicaragua should re-fashion its arrangements with U.S. cooperators and grantees to ensure the greatest possible degree of Nicaraguan participation in the project design process and transparency in the funding arrangements that are forged for delivering U.S. resources.

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There has been a significant absence of **systematic monitoring** of the SDI Project on the part of USAID/Nicaragua. This is exacerbated by the lack of user-friendly management tools in many instances to allow for a collaborative relationship to develop between USAID/Nicaragua and the entities responsible for project implementation. The monitoring process should have the following components: workplans, monitoring and evaluation plans, quarterly reporting, and periodic and formal review meetings.

SUMMARY OF PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following is a list of the major recommendations discussed in the order of their priority as determined by the evaluation team. Three factors were considered in determining priority:

- the degree to which the recommendation addressed a priority implementation problem;
- the funding priority of the activity;
- the priority of the activity from a Country Team perspective.

Only the most important recommendations for each activity are discussed below. A complete list of the recommendations is found in Annex B.

1. **Human rights** activity implemented by **ADF**.

Two-Pronged Funding Strategy: For the next stage of the SDI Project, in order to further strengthen CPDH and ANPDH, while continuing to promote coordination among all human rights groups, USAID/Nicaragua should carefully explore all funding options. These include the following:

Direct support to CPDH and ANPDH with funds divided into two categories:

- **Individual Support** - operational funding for specific high-priority activities by each organization in the areas of human rights promotion and defense; and
- **Support for jointly-sponsored CPDH/ANPDH activities** in the field of human rights education - these would seek to include all human rights groups and to build on the progress achieved in Phase III of the current project.

Smaller grants to CPDH and ANPDH, plus a grant to a third organization for the joint efforts described above as proposed by those two organizations or by any other human rights group.

Creation of an in-country management/monitoring unit for all human rights activities outside of USAID/Nicaragua, which would probably involve a U.S. or other foreign entity. This entity would seek and provide assistance to any human rights NGO wishing to propose appropriate activities, promote coordinated action, provide close monitoring of the activities supported, identify and respond to the technical assistance and

training needs of human rights groups, and serve as liaison between the human rights community and USAID/Nicaragua.

Continuing the present mode of using a U.S. PVO to channel funds to the human rights community. This is seen as a last resort to be considered only if the Mission is not able to dedicate the necessary staff time or funds to any other option.

Carefully-Framed Objectives: Assuming any of the above options are chosen, it is incumbent on USAID/Nicaragua to identify clear and detailed human rights objectives.

Specialized Technical Assistance: A clear understanding between USAID/Nicaragua and the grantees should also be reached regarding technical assistance needs.

2. Civic Education being promoted by AFT.

Role of USAID/Nicaragua-Funded Civic Education Textbooks: Near the very end of the evaluation process, the evaluation team learned of the existence of the Civic Education textbooks for the public school system that had been provided by USAID/Nicaragua prior to the initiation of this activity. The team is unable to reach informed conclusions regarding the utility of these textbooks in connection with the process in which the AFT activity is currently engaged. It is critical that USAID/Nicaragua, in conjunction with AFT and MED, review the appropriateness of these textbooks.

Continued Support for the CED: The cooperative agreement which supports the CED expires March 31, 1995. If the cooperative agreement is not renewed, it is unlikely that the progress in teacher training would be continued and a valuable resource could be lost. Therefore, USAID/Nicaragua should continue to support this project. As a part of the process of developing a new cooperative agreement a strategic planning process should be undertaken to clarify the role of the CED as it relates to the MED. Extending the program to include the primary level should be considered. A new MOU between the MED and the CED should continue to focus on the basic tasks of:

- Continue the process of refining the civic education curriculum.
- Continue training of civic education teachers at the secondary level.
- Distribute more widely materials that have been developed or are being revised.

Expanded Role of the CED: The present activities could become just one component of a broader effort to support civic education. Additional CED

outreach activities could be developed that reach beyond the public school system. USAID/Nicaragua should continue to support this project and encourage a strategic planning process to address the relationship between the MED and the CED.

3. **Labor activity being promoted by AIFLD.**

Emphasis on Labor Education: To maximize current opportunities for depolarization, and for helping to build an independent, democratic labor movement, USAID/Nicaragua should adopt a more inclusive approach by moving away from support for specific organizations to a program of labor education open to all union members who wish to participate. The overall objective of such support would be to develop new cadres of labor leaders who understand the role of the union movement in a free and democratic society, and are capable of fairly and effectively representing workers' rights in relevant public and private fora.

Topics would include such offerings as the role of labor in a free and democratic society, labor law, the legislative process, economics, privatization, labor-management relations, collective bargaining, conflict resolution, leadership, and organizational development. Courses could be supplemented with action research by students on certain key sectors or national issues of interest to the labor movement.

Assessment of Current Offerings & Funding Modalities: Given the reported existence of various national and foreign labor education efforts in Nicaragua, and the lack of relevant information, before undertaking any further effort in this area, USAID/Nicaragua should make a comprehensive assessment of the type and quality of offerings currently available in order to explore whatever opportunities there may be for collaboration as a way to maximize the investment of USG funds.

4. **The Legislative Assembly being supported by CFD.**

LAN/MIS Installation with Specialized Legislative Programming: USAID/Nicaragua should take measures to ensure the installation of the local area network, the statutory retrieval system, and the bill status system and provide appropriate training necessary for these systems to become operational.

Staff training: In the time remaining, staff training and development should be given a high priority. Training courses under the direction of Dra. Myriam Jarquin de Medina, the CFD local coordinator, should be aggressively pursued to meet the objectives of this project.

Next Steps with the Assembly: USAID/Nicaragua should consult with the Junta Directiva to determine priority areas and take into consideration other aid projects

now under development for the Assembly before designing a next phase of USAID/Nicaragua assistance for the Assembly.

5. **Journalism training implemented by FIU.**

The FIU Project and Transition to the Election: Given the scarcity of resources available for D&G activities to be promoted by USAID/Nicaragua, the enormity of the problem in the journalistic sector, and the role that the FIU project could play in the period leading to the next presidential election, consideration should be given to tightening the focus of the FIU activity. One possibility is to reduce the amount of courses being given. The number of desired outputs identified in the Objective Tree which was taken directly from the Cooperative Agreement may be excessive and could be considered too scattered.

6. **Civil-Military relations implemented by NDI.**

Continued Support for Civil-Military Dialogue: USAID/Nicaragua in the context of the Country Team should explore additional vehicles to support a civil-military dialogue. The next steps in the civil-military dialogue should have a higher participation of Nicaraguans in both design and implementation. For example, a series of focused seminars on specific topics could also be utilized to produce a set of issue papers written by Nicaraguans on civil-military relations. In the process of developing a new dimension of the civil-military activity, a role for NDI should also be considered given the excellent performance that it has demonstrated to date.

7. **CID/Gallup Study and Its Uses to Measure Performance of SDI Project**

Task to Analyze the Data: A political scientist with experience in analyzing public opinion data on democratic values in Latin America should be engaged to analyze the data. The tasks to be performed:

- Creation of working computer files of both the mass public national sample as well as the specialized groups.
- Examination of subsets of the sample, both mass public and special groups, that are of particular programmatic interest to USAID/Nicaragua. For example, it would be wise to examine the value structure of teachers since they are carrying out civic education in the schools. Similarly, it would be wise to examine the values of journalists since USAID/Nicaragua supports Florida International University focused on up-grading their skills.

8. **SDI Project needs to be empirically based instead of being driven solely by client needs.**

Analytical Gaps to Be Filled Prior to Allocation of New Funds for SDI Activities: In the case of follow-on activities funded by the SDI Project, it is

critical that analytical gaps be filled as a critical part of building the analytical framework prior to agreeing to specific activities to be supported and the levels of funding necessary to get the job done. This especially the case for new labor and National Assembly activities.

9. **Special Challenges that should be addressed in the next phase of the SDI Project process.**

Local Participation and Transparency: To the greatest extent possible, USAID/Nicaragua should refashion each of its funding arrangements in this next phase of the SDI Project to insure Nicaraguan participation in the implementation process and transparency in the arrangements that are forged for delivering U.S. resources.

Promoting Synergy: To capitalize on the potential for information-sharing and cooperation among and within the various components of the SDI project, and thus take advantage of the synergy implicit in the project design, USAID/Nicaragua should consider convening periodic meetings with involved implementing agencies. Such sessions should be used to convey to grantees and cooperators USAID/Nicaragua's commitment to collaborative efforts in seeking to achieve project objectives, calling on them to help explore those opportunities and to actively pursue them.

Empowering Indigenous NGOs: Since a healthy NGO sector is a bulwark of civil society, and because Nicaraguan NGOs are extremely weak, USAID/Nicaragua should insist that technical assistance packages aimed at building NGOs include not only substantive skills, but also those needed for the effective performance of the basic tasks that undergird the organization itself. Such skills should also be included in labor education programs since unions, too, seek to organize groups at the local, regional and national level. To accomplish this, qualified organizational development (OD) practitioners with international experience should be identified and engaged, either directly by USAID/Nicaragua or by grantees and cooperators.

Gender Analysis Methodologies: To ensure that gender-based differences are taken into account in the design, implementation and evaluation of SDI-sponsored activities, USAID/Nicaragua should consider providing gender analysis training and technical assistance for all participating organizations. Such training should serve to more sharply define objectives and indicators to measure project outreach in terms of the participation of and benefit to both men and women.

Donor Coordination: To help facilitate the process of post-war reconciliation within Nicaraguan society and to provide a model for such behavior, USAID/Nicaragua should explore current ideology-based donor preferences with the U.S. Country Team in order to identify ways in which such sharply segmented resource allocation practices might be ameliorated. Once in process, such

coordinated efforts among donors should be made known by USAID/Nicaragua to all SDI grantees and cooperators.

10. **USAID/Nicaragua's project management arrangements.**

Additional Staff for the D&G Portfolio: The evaluation team has been informed that the intention of USAID/Nicaragua management is to create a DI Office and staff it with two DHs and a number of PSCs. This appears appropriate given the additions to the D&G portfolio of an AOJ Project and a Municipal Development Project, the substantial on-going analytical work required of the DI staff, and the need to conduct a first-hand systematic review of the input mobilization process.

Need for Systematic Monitoring: There has been a significant absence of systematic monitoring of the SDI Project on the part of USAID/Nicaragua. This is exacerbated by the lack of user-friendly management tools in many instances to allow for a collaborative relationship to develop between USAID/Nicaragua and the entities responsible for project implementation. The monitoring process should have the following components:

- Workplan
- Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
- Quarterly Reporting
- Periodic and Formal Review Meetings

11. **NED's project arrangements.**

Lack of Systematic Monitoring on the Part of NED: There has not been systematic monitoring by NED. There is a need for user-friendly management tools to allow for a collaborative relationship to develop between NED and the grantees responsible for project implementation. The monitoring process should have the same components as those listed in 10 above.

Prompt Review of Proposals Developed/Received by NED Field Office: As reported by the chief of the NED field office, there are in excess of 40 proposals awaiting review by NED. These proposals should be reviewed as soon as possible to determine which are the best candidates to be funded with the available SDI Project funds.

What Happens After NED?: However, if it is determined that NED is not a candidate to perform the role in the future that they are presently performing, there are at least three options to be considered.

Option #1: USAID/Nicaragua could identify another U.S. organization that can perform the functions explicit in the recommendations offered immediately above.

Option #2: USAID/Nicaragua could identify or develop a Nicaraguan organization that can perform the functions explicit in the recommendations offered above. One such candidate could be the Center for Education for Democracy that is presently implementing the civic education project.

Option #3: USAID/Nicaragua could administer a grant program working directly with groups such as IRI, NDI, and AFT.

12. **Conciencia.**

Civic Education Support Continued In the Transition to the 1996 Election: The return on investment for this program is high. Conciencia is building a grassroots network that should be utilized in civic education programming for the 1996 elections.

13. **FUNDEMOS supported by IRI.**

IRI to Provide FUNDEMOS TA on Training Methods: IRI should undertake immediately the training of the FUNDEMOS staff to ensure quality training design and implementation in political party development. Training materials must be developed and distributed to participants.

14. **INDE supported by ADF.**

Shrinking Funds and SDI Priorities: Given the magnitude of expected budget cuts, USAID/Nicaragua may wish to give careful consideration to the priorities it sets for future funding. Before allocating additional support for this project, once the current NED grant expires (September 1995), USAID/Nicaragua and NED should explore the following possibilities:

- INDE has enjoyed USG support for quite a number of years and, though willing to sponsor this civic education initiative, does not contribute to the effort. USAID/Nicaragua could require that an increasing amount of counterpart funds from INDE and/or FUNDE be contributed if the project is to continue. This could help ensure the institutionalization and longer term sustainability of these efforts.
- Another NED component, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is providing support and technical assistance to COSEP, of which INDE is a key affiliate. It may be more appropriate for USAID/Nicaragua to dedicate scarce SDI resources to other priority areas, leaving civic education in the business sector to NED/CIPE.

FOREWORD

Purpose of Evaluation

To paraphrase from the Scope of Work (See Annex C) the purpose of this evaluation was to analyze the activities funded by the SDI Project. This is to be done in terms of project management structures designed to guide the implementation of each activity and each activity's progress to date as a means to identify SDI Project problems, strengths, and weaknesses so as to:

- Recommend actions designed to improve the on-going implementation of SDI Project-funded activities;
- Provide guidance which will serve to assist USAID/Nicaragua in extending and/or modifying some ongoing activities to be funded in an amendment to the SDI Project; and
- Explore and assess possibilities for new or expanded activities under an amendment to the project.

Methodology

The process for evaluating the various project activities was essentially concerned with analyzing project documentation which is cited in Annex D and interviewing persons identified in Annex E involved in the design, monitoring, and implementation of SDI Project-funded activities.

In addition to the key questions identified in the Scope of Work that were used to guide the interviews conducted by evaluation team members, the team reviewed each activity in terms of:

- The management of the activity;
- Input/output mobilization of the activity;
- Progress towards achievement of the activity's objective.

An abbreviated logical framework was prepared for each activity to assist the team members in assessing project performance. A fuller discussion of the methodology is found in Annex E.

Report Organization

Chapter I contains a summary description of each of the activity evaluations. The complete evaluations are located in Annex A, Volume II. Chapter II is a synthesis of the major

Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations which were distilled from the individual activity evaluations. Chapter III discusses SDI Project funding opportunities.

Team Composition

Joan M. Goodin, an MSI Senior Associate since 1993, has over 25 years experience in management positions in the U.S. and international trade union movements, the U.S. Congress, and various PVOs. She has worked with public and private organizations in the U.S., Europe, Asia and Africa, as well as in every country of Latin America, having lived in Peru for five years. Ms. Goodin was responsible for reviewing activities in the human rights and labor sectors.

Lawrence C. Heilman has been a Director of MSI since 1989. Previous to this, he served with USAID as a Foreign Service Officer for 20 years planning, implementing, and evaluating development programs in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. His particular interests are in planning and managing rural development projects, nutrition improvement and disaster recovery activities, and measurement issues relating to D&G interventions. He has a Ph.D. with an emphasis on Latin American institutional history. Dr. Heilman was the evaluation team leader.

Jennie K. Lincoln is the Special Assistant for International Projects at the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta, Georgia. She teaches Latin American Politics, U.S. Foreign Policy and other international relations courses. From 1989-91, she was the Associate Director of the Latin American and Caribbean Program at the Carter Center of Emory University. From 1984-86 she was a Fulbright Professor in Costa Rica. Dr. Lincoln reviewed political party, the National Assembly, civic education, and civil-military activities.

Mitchell A. Seligson is Daniel H. Wallace Professor of Political Science and Research Professor, University Center for International Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. Formerly, he was Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at Pittsburgh. He served in Central America in the Peace Corps in the 1960s, and since that time has been conducting research on the region. He has published more than ten books and monographs and over 75 professional articles and has held grants from Fulbright, Ford, Rockefeller, Danforth, and the Social Science Research Council. Dr. Seligson addressed measurement issues.

Acknowledgements

The Evaluation Team wishes to thank members of the U.S. Mission to Nicaragua, the many grantees and cooperators funded by the SDI Project, and the multitude of Nicaraguans in the public and private sectors that contributed to the rich dialogue that characterized the evaluation process. Doors were always open and conversations both formal and informal were frank and candid, allowing for an honest exploration of the basic issues explicit in the task of the evaluation. USAID/Nicaragua was generous in their hospitality, easing the weight of the more contentious issues.

CHAPTER I

SUMMARY OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES EVALUATED

This chapter provides a summary of the most important Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations of each of the SDI Project-funded activities evaluated. Complete activity evaluations are found in Volume II, Annex A.

I. National Endowment for Democracy (NED) Grants

A: Civic Education - Mujeres Nicaraguenses, "Conciencia" - Resources in Action

Conciencia is a nonprofit, non-partisan woman's organization that supports civic education and promotes grassroots political participation. In July 1992, NED awarded a grant for \$44,000 to Delphi International, and subsequent grants to Resources in Action totalling \$150,000 for 1993 and 1994, to provide support to Conciencia. Conciencia's objectives are:

- To enhance public knowledge and understanding of the rights and responsibilities of citizens, especially women, in a democratic society; and
- To promote active political participation, especially among women, at the grassroots and national level.

Conciencia has been successful in developing training materials and carrying its programs through and beyond Managua into the rural countryside. It also carries civic education messages through its weekly radio broadcasts. The return on investment for this program is high. Conciencia is building a grassroots network that should be utilized in civic education programming for the 1996 elections.

B: Civic Education in the Public Education System - American Federation of Teachers (AFT)

In April 1992, AFT undertook a three-year collaborative effort with the Ministry of Education (MED) of Nicaragua to support the Center for Education for Democracy. A grant from NED to the AFT for \$1,420,108 provided the funding. The objectives of this project included:

- The development of a curriculum framework for democratic education at the secondary school level;
- The training of approximately 20 master high school teachers who would be responsible for developing classroom activities and conducting in-service training in the field; and
- The development of civic education curricula and reference materials.

This activity has been successful in achieving the objectives described immediately above. The activity addresses the most important concepts and values concerning democracy. Important to this success is the fact that significant input from a broad cross-section of Nicaraguan social and political thinkers provided the basis for a consensus document on the fundamental principles of a curriculum guide for teaching civic education.

C: Civil-Military Relations - National Democratic Institute (NDI)

NDI received a grant from NED for \$276,294 for the period from June 1992 to December 1994 to undertake activities in the area of civil-military relations. NDI developed a program premised on the belief that "agreement on issues concerning national defense and internal security must be the result of broad social and political consensus." To that end, NDI's objectives in Nicaragua included:

- Promoting civilian oversight and experience in security affairs; and
- Familiarizing Nicaraguan military officers with the nonpolitical role of armed forces in a democratic society.

NDI conducted private consultations that cultivated the ground to prepare for public conferences on civil-military relations in Nicaragua with participation at the highest level of both political leaders and military officers. Both the private consultations and the public conferences included participation by retired members of the armed forces of a variety of countries: Chile, Argentina, Spain and the United States.

In 1994, a new military law was passed by the National Assembly. In February 1995, a transition to a new commander of the armed forces took place in accordance with that law. The cultivation of this transition was assisted directly by the private consultations and the public seminars of the NDI civil-military program.

D: Civic Education - The Nicaraguan Development Institute (INDE) - America's Development Foundation (ADF)

NED provided grants totalling \$165,000 to ADF for civic education activities carried out by the Nicaraguan Development Institute (INDE), an NGO made up of private businesses and individual entrepreneurs. After working with its chapters in various parts of the country, INDE decided to concentrate on Matagalpa and Leon as pilot sites for promoting interaction between the business and other sectors to increase participation in municipal affairs. At the same time, INDE initiated efforts to democratize its own internal election procedures through secret ballots and a minimum of two candidates for each position.

Given the magnitude of expected budget cuts, it is recommended that once the current grant expires in September 1995, NED and USAID/Nicaragua carefully consider SDI priorities and explore such options as requiring an increasing amount of counterpart funds from INDE, which has not yet institutionalized this initiative.

E: Promotion of Strengthened Political Parties - Grupo FUNDEMOS - International Republican Institute (IRI)

Grupo FUNDEMOS is a local non-governmental organization supported by a three-year sub-grant for \$367,812 from IRI which received a total of \$579,994 from NED for this activity. It was created to provide a forum that could bring together diverse opinions concerning contemporary issues in a public debate, and to promote political party training and development. Grupo FUNDEMOS has been successful in convening a number of conferences on relevant issues and is developing training activities for young participants in many political parties. This evaluation concluded that while FUNDEMOS has significant potential to meet its objectives, IRI has not provided adequate technical assistance to FUNDEMOS to support its organizational development.

F: Promotion of a Credible, Professional, and Independent Media - Canal 8

The equipment purchased with the NED grants totalling \$133,675 has been used to enhance the programming capacity of Canal 8. All the equipment that was to be provided by the grants is in place, being fully utilized, and the final financial accounting has been fully rendered. Canal 8 is a good option for providing independently produced and balanced news. This activity is a success story.

Though the chief executive officer of Canal 8 will probably be requesting additional funds to enhance his programming capacity, this activity should not be awarded additional support from USAID/Nicaragua which has other higher priorities. However, this decision should be made in the context of the U.S. Government's requirements for funding activities that support a free, fair, and peaceful election in 1996.

G: Promotion of a Credible, Professional, and Independent Media - Radio Dario

There is every indication that this activity has successfully achieved the objectives of:

- Becoming a national, independent radio station which is broadcasting beyond the departmental area; and
- Increasing programming promoting free discussion, consensus building, and the advancement of democratic ideas.

Radio Dario has achieved the objectives as identified in the grant agreements. Though the station has further requests for equipment that would provide it FM capacity, an expenditure of funds for this activity is not seen as having a priority.

2. Cooperative Agreements

H: Human Rights - America's Development Foundation (ADF)

ADF was awarded a \$2,218,969 Cooperative Agreement to strengthen two human rights organizations (the Asociación Nicaraguense Pro Derechos Humanos; ANPDH, and the Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos; CPDH), to facilitate coordination among all human rights

groups, and to increase their capacity to use the media. Training of trainers from these groups was also to be provided. However, while the financial management and computerized data systems of the two organizations were greatly improved, their overall institutional capacity remains extremely weak. Moreover, the sustainability of the two groups was not heightened, as ADF provided no significant assistance for the diversification of funding sources or USAID registration. Nor was overall ADF technical assistance of the highest quality.

A two-pronged funding strategy, providing individual support for CPDH and ANPDH plus support for jointly-sponsored activities in the area of human rights education is recommended. Also, it is recommended that USAID/Nicaragua explore all funding options for channeling support to the human rights community. Other recommendations call for carefully-framed objectives, specialized technical assistance, and the diversification of funding sources.

I: Journalism Training - Florida International University (FIU)

The FIU activity has clearly contributed to the development of a professional and independent Nicaraguan press. However, before consideration is given to providing additional funding beyond the present amount programmed in the Cooperative Agreement, the objective of the FIU undertaking in the journalism sector should be more tightly focused, particularly through the upcoming election period, to afford this activity the opportunity to demonstrate results that clearly contribute in a cost-efficient way to reducing polarization in the Nicaraguan society.

J: Labor Sector - American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)

SDI support for the development of a strong democratic and independent trade union movement has been channeled through a \$3,186,231 Cooperative Agreement with AIFLD. The major objective identified was the organic consolidation of five labor confederations into a single central body, the Congreso Permanente de Trabajadores (CPT). This was to help "level the playing field" between democratic and Sandinista labor organizations. However, as the UNO political party coalition began to fall apart after the 1990 elections, so too did the fate of the CPT. Thus, it was never consolidated into a central body which, in turn, made it impractical to achieve the other four outputs or the project purpose.

Meanwhile, the country's economic crisis and high unemployment have had devastating results for both democratic and Sandinista unions. The overall importance of the labor sector on the national scene is seen to have declined sharply in the last two years. This has produced evidence of increasing de-polarization within the sector, as all labor groups struggle for survival.

To promote further de-polarization and strengthen the independent labor sector it is recommended that future USAID/Nicaragua investments concentrate on labor education for individual union members, rather than support for specific organizations. It is also recommended that to design this next phase of SDI support for labor, the USAID/Nicaragua undertake a transparent and participatory process to obtain input from the Nicaraguan labor sector.

K: The Legislative Assembly - Center for Democracy (CFD)

CFD, in cooperation with the State University of New York/Albany (SUNY/Albany) and Florida International University (FIU), formed the Consortium for Legislative Development (CLD) and entered into a cooperative agreement to implement the Regional Legislative Development Project. Modification No. 5 to that cooperative agreement provided \$1,599,625 for a Buy-In from USAID/Nicaragua to pursue legislative development projects in Nicaragua for three years. The Buy-In provided for: short-term and long-term training of staff; training and orientation programs for legislators and staff; the development and installation of an information system that would include a statutory retrieval system and a bill status system; the acquisition of legislative publications and reference materials; and, the acquisition of additional commodities including an electronic voting/attendance system and audio and recording equipment for the Assembly plenary.

Installation of the electronic voting board and plenary sound system were completed and well received. The speed and transparency in the voting process provided by the electronic voting board has contributed to the efficiency of the plenary sessions. However, numerous obstacles and delays, not the least of which was a 15 month hiatus during which program implementation was restricted by USAID/Nicaragua, have resulted in no delivery to date of the management information system.

In the time remaining on this project, staff training and development should be given a high priority. The implementation of training activities should be aggressively pursued to meet the objectives of this project. It is also important that USAID/Nicaragua take corrective measures to ensure the installation of the local area network, the statutory retrieval system, and the bill status system and that appropriate training necessary for these systems to become operational is provided. USAID/Nicaragua should consult with the Junta Directiva to determine priority areas and take into consideration other aid projects now under development for the Assembly before designing a next phase of USAID/Nicaragua assistance for the Assembly.

L: Judicial Training - ILANUD

The institutionalization of capacity at the Judicial School in terms of curriculum development and the provision of instruction has been successful. There is nothing to suggest that ILANUD's future efforts in close cooperation with the Judicial School over the course of 1995 will not be equally successful.

However, short of a follow-up evaluation to determine if the third objective which calls for judicial personnel "that have taken the training are more effective in performing their duties," it will be impossible to determine the degree of impact of the training. Nevertheless, the \$380,349 programmed appears to be a sound investment. Eventually, this activity should be evaluated in the context of USAID/Nicaragua's comprehensive AOJ Project.

CHAPTER II

OVERARCHING ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN INDIVIDUAL EVALUATIONS

Introduction

The foci of this evaluation are the array of activities that comprise the SDI Project. An understanding of the specific Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations that resulted from those individual evaluations is critical to an accurate and comprehensive appreciation of USAID's effort to support Nicaragua's budding democracy through the SDI Project. The individual evaluations are included in Volume II of this report and should be consulted first as the essential building blocks that undergird and validate the remainder of this chapter.

An important by-product of the activity evaluations was the distillation of overarching themes or issues. These overarching issues are presented in this chapter. The format for this chapter is the project cycle. Thus, Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations related to initial project design issues lead to those concerned with subsequent implementation. Next are recommendations related to forward planning for the next phase of the SDI Project. The final portion of this chapter deals with project management arrangements.

The Evaluation Team has also attempted to draw Recommendations that can contribute to that aspect of the re-engineering of USAID that is concerned with developing new systems, procedures, and rapid-response capacity to more effectively meet the demands suggested by the Nicaraguan experience. Though the problems of Nicaragua are unique, many of the systems and procedures that could have been applied to better meet the challenges faced by that country do not have to be unique to the Nicaraguan experience.

1. Lack of USAID Assessment Led to Client-Driven Design

Findings

An important element which influenced the design of the SDI Project was the presence in Nicaragua of a broad array of U.S. D&G practitioners that had been working during the election process. These included CFD, AIFLD, AFT, IRI and NDI. All were anxious to get on immediately with the job at hand, even though most had only a general sense of what the nature of their future contribution should be. With this as the decision-making backdrop, it may well have appeared to make good common sense to go with the D&G entrepreneurs that were aching for a piece of the action and had the political muscle to demand participation.

USAID/Nicaragua determined that the Nicaraguan circumstance dictated an abbreviated design approach. No assessment was undertaken, and as a consequence, no analytical framework was developed to guide the selection of activities for helping Nicaragua build its democracy. The Project Paper represented a minimalist approach for addressing design requirements. The prescription it promotes is a shopping list of activities based on the most superficial analysis.

Another consequence of this approach was that USAID/Nicaragua was forced to employ a tactic during the implementation phase commonly referred to as "rolling design." This calls for corrections along the way as a clearer perception of the problem and how to address it emerges. Here, a premium is placed on "action research" and mid-course corrections to "get it right." Clearly, this is a labor-intensive approach for both project managers and implementors. A number of factors, not the least of which was a scarcity of human resources within USAID/Nicaragua, rendered it impractical for USAID/Nicaragua to dedicate the time necessary for adequately monitoring this type of rolling design.

Conclusions

Under normal circumstances, a critical first step in USAID's project design process is to execute an assessment of the development sector in which the investment is to be made. In this assessment, the problem is identified and a strategy for the selection of a project or series of projects to address it is articulated. In the Nicaragua case, there appears to have been ample time for such an assessment after the election of President Chamorro and before the SDI Project Paper was actually developed. Certainly, it must have occurred to USAID/Washington decision-makers by as early as mid-1990 that there would be major resource allocations made to address the problems in Nicaragua that would require the programming of D&G activities.

There appears to have been ample time to have undertaken an assessment of the democracy and governance circumstances in Nicaragua after the election of President Chamorro and before the SDI Project Paper was actually developed. It certainly must have occurred to USAID/Washington decision makers by as early as mid-1990 that there would be major resource allocations made to address the problems in Nicaragua that would require programming D&G activities.

Another factor to be considered is that throughout the post-election period, a U.S. Embassy Political and Economic Sections must have been present and mandated to provide reporting on the body politic of Nicaragua. If the individuals doing this reporting had but slightly altered their optic to the requirement of developing the information required for a D&G assessment, it is conceivable that their reporting could have helped lay the foundation on which the SDI Project could have been more firmly grounded.

Again this conclusion is easily reached with hindsight. When reviewing the period following the election, it is important to recollect that USAID had never mounted a successful D&G assessment anywhere in the world. The Latin American and Caribbean Bureau had executed a number of AOJ assessments. However these assessments had not been able to bridge with project selection and design processes for a variety of substantive reasons. No tested methodology existed for guiding an assessment had Nicaragua chosen to undertake one.

The lack of a USAID-generated assessment and analytical framework to anchor project design had immediate consequences. It meant that U.S. D&G organizations (AFT, AIFLD, IRI, NDI, CFD) drove the design and activity-selection process, despite having only rudimentary initial plans. In the absence of rigorous analysis against which to check the feasibility of the interventions being proposed, USAID/Nicaragua was forced into a reactive mode. This resulted

in the approval of activities that in many instances provided only scanty details for guiding their implementation.

The problem that emerged in the application of a rolling design approach was that in a number of cases insufficient action research was undertaken by implementors as a basis for the on-going corrections needed to assure a satisfactory level of performance. For instance, AIFLD's work with labor organizations and ADF's work with human rights groups have suffered from a lack of timely, periodic analysis as those very fluid sectors evolved over time.

Recommendations

1. ***Assessment Should Be Required Before Committing Significant D&G Resources:*** USAID/Washington should require that, prior to initiating any significant D&G project activity, USAID field missions ensure that a serious assessment has been made of the problem and an analytical framework is developed to guide the selection of activities to address the problem. USAID/Washington should also make this requirement clear to development practitioners promoting specific D&G approaches without regard to geographic location or the local conditions.

This is particularly important in post-election political environments, such as Nicaragua in 1990 or Haiti in 1994. In such cases, it is critical that the analytical tasks required for designing a D&G program be initiated as soon as possible. In such cases of post-crisis transition, USAID should make it a first priority to dispatch a team to initiate the analysis on which a D&G program can be built. Embassy Political and Economic Sections should be called upon for assistance in accomplishing this. In USAID's re-engineering effort, it would appear that the Office of Transition Initiatives would play a critical role in these situations.

2. ***Analytical Gaps to Be Filled Prior to Allocation of New Funds for SDI Activities:*** For any follow-on activities to be funded by the SDI Project, USAID/Nicaragua should fill existing gaps in the analytical framework which should be a critical element for the approval of specific activities and funding levels. This is particularly important in the case of new efforts involving labor and the National Assembly.

2. The Evolving Nicaraguan Context Led to Altered SDI Tactics

Findings

In examining project implementation and the impact of SDI Project-funded activities, one must consider the evolving political context in which they were being pursued. It is a context continually impacted by U.S. Government policy interests which directly influence the mode of project implementation.

The problems identified in the Project Paper related to the historical antecedents of "authoritarianism, political polarization and fragmentation, injustice, and militarism." To address

this legacy, the stated project purpose was "to strengthen democratic institutions and the values and attitudes that nurture them."

Initially, this was interpreted as strengthening a series of institutions that could compete with Sandinista organizations. This was driven by the political consideration that it was critical "to level the playing field," particularly in the human rights, media, and labor sectors. However, over the last two years, the concern for addressing polarization in the society has resulted in an implementation mode that encourages broad participation in the institutions supported by USAID/Nicaragua. This has been particularly evident in the activities promoting civic education in the secondary schools, those targeting human rights, support for training in the judicial and media sectors, and civil/military initiatives.

Conclusions

The tactic of supporting institutions that stood in opposition to Sandinista organizations was not particularly successful in terms of building sustainable institutions. Cases in point are the labor and human rights sectors. However, the Mission's efforts to promote broad participation seems to have already contributed significantly to meeting the stated project purpose. The best examples are ILANUD's work with the judicial school, FIU's media training activities, and the civil/military activity led by NDI.

This is not to say that the original implementation tactic was incorrect given the Nicaraguan circumstance as understood at the time. But it must be recognized that this tactic did not further the accomplishment of the project purpose to as high a degree as the present tactic. The lesson to be learned is that there are no templates for political development. Only careful and continuous assessment of the local situation can be the basis for fashioning tactics that result in successful program implementation. The importance of a Country Team effort in this regard cannot be underestimated.

Recommendation

1. ***Problem of Polarization Is Key to the Project Purpose:***
USAID/Nicaragua should maintain its focus on providing assistance to attack the deep-seated problem of polarization. Only by balancing resources that address institutional and attitudinal problems associated with the historical legacy of division and conflict will a sound civil society emerge.
3. **Difficulties Prevented Direct Support to Local Institutions**

Findings

One of the stiffest challenges faced by USAID/Nicaragua in 1991 was to identify the indigenous institutions that could play central roles in strengthening democracy. In every instance USAID/Nicaragua determined that local D&G institutions were not sufficiently well developed to meet the rigorous U.S. requirements for receiving direct support, particularly with

regard to the proper management of grant funds. In addition, Mission managers did not feel that USAID/Nicaragua had sufficient staff resources to adequately manage grants made directly to Nicaraguan institutions. As an alternative, grants and cooperative agreements with U.S. institutions were chosen as channels of support to Nicaraguan institutions in the D&G arena.

With ILANUD in Costa Rica as the only exception, all SDI Project funds went to U.S.-based intermediaries, including five cooperative agreements and one grant to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). No public or private Nicaraguan entity was signatory to these original agreements.

Another reason for choosing cooperative agreement and grant mechanisms was to put some space between the Nicaraguan institutions with which the cooperators would be working and the U.S. Government. Also, with the NED grant agreement, USAID/Nicaragua hoped to reduce its management burden by having the Endowment assume many of the monitoring responsibilities for NED grantees and their Nicaraguan sub-grantees.

Labor, human rights, and the National Assembly were areas that USAID/Nicaragua was anxious to support. However, the nature of the problems to be addressed and the specific terms of support for these areas could not be well defined in 1991. Therefore, USAID/Nicaragua found a collaborative, rolling design approach to project implementation to be an attractive alternative. Nevertheless, as explained earlier this approach by definition makes great demands on USAID managers because of its labor-intensive monitoring requirements.

In a number of cases, such as AIFLD, ADF, and CFD, the lack of a close, collaborative relationship with USAID/Nicaragua and its lack of sufficient staff contributed to diminished performance. This less-than-superior performance must be viewed in light of the relatively high cost of doing business with these three organizations.

One of the principal reasons for selecting certain U.S.-based organizations was because of their capacity to provide technical assistance to their Nicaraguan counterparts, thus strengthening the institutional capacity of the latter - a major project output. In the three cases mentioned, the U.S. organizations were not particularly effective in delivering the desired technical assistance or in strengthening local counterparts.

The two most successful cooperators in this regard -- FIU and ILANUD -- succeeded for many of the same reasons. Both institutions benefitted from having conducted careful assessments of the problems they sought to address. Both built iterative planning approaches and feedback mechanisms into the implementation process. Therefore, as their products were delivered they were able to constantly refine those products, bringing them ever-closer to optimal quality. It must also be noted that both of these cooperative agreements came much later in the game after the dust had settled and the U.S. Government was moving from a "leveling the playing field" tactic to one aimed at reducing polarization by training opposing populations in common forums.

Only in the cases of NED, AIFLD and FIU have there been expatriate, residential project managers. In all other cases, those responsible for U.S. grantee activities have been based in the

United States. With regard to FIU, the U.S. activity manager who resides in Nicaragua has successfully implemented the rolling design concept, involving local groups in an on-going process of action research and project adjustment. As discussed in the individual project evaluations, those responsible for NED and AIFLD activities have not been particularly effective. As a consequence, it is impossible to draw any hard and fast lessons regarding this issue.

As will be discussed later in the chapter on NED management arrangements, the selection of the Endowment to monitor the USAID/Nicaragua grantees and sub-grantees did not result in the level of monitoring that USAID/Nicaragua had in mind. As a result, many opportunities were lost to improve the performance of grantees and sub-grantees in the course of implementing NED-funded activities.

Conclusions

The selection of certain U.S.-based cooperators and grantees did not necessarily result in the more efficacious expenditure of USAID funds, given the relatively high cost of doing business with those organizations and the quality of the results produced. Cases in point are AIFLD, IRI, ADF, and CFD. If one combines the overhead rate of certain of these institutions with the relatively high cost of the technical assistance they delivered, which in fact was only marginally successful, one must pause to ask what would have happened and how great would have been the loss of funds if USAID/Nicaragua had dealt directly with local counterpart institutions instead of relying on U.S. intermediaries.

Judging from the USAID/Nicaragua experience, the comparative advantages of residential vs. U.S.-based activity managers is a complex question. On one hand, costs must be weighed against the importance of the outputs to be pursued and the availability of local expertise. Other factors, which vary widely from one U.S. organization to another, relate to the internal workings of the U.S. organizations themselves - i.e., the level of authority and responsibility they are willing to assign to their on-site representatives. The only firm conclusion that can be reached from the Nicaragua case is that, while the fluidity of the situation requires close on-site attention, the wisdom of having an expatriate residential manager must be decided on the merits of the case. Factors to be considered include:

- the nature of the particular activity to be implemented;
- the condition of the local group(s) targeted for participation; and
- the internal modus operandi of the U.S. intermediary.

In accordance with USAID's current policy of developing projects in a collaborative, participatory, and transparent manner, it seems essential that consideration be given to working directly with Nicaraguan counterpart organizations. In the end, this is a question of balancing the level of risk USAID is willing to take to put that policy into practice with the possibility of achieving superior results vis-a-vis the SDI Project purpose. It is also an issue related to the degree of human resources that USAID is able to invest for monitoring progress and managing for results. At the very least, it would be important to bring the Nicaraguan institutions that are

going to be affected by proposed D&G activities into the project design process in concrete ways as early as possible.

Recommendations

1. ***Re-engineering of Requirements for Supporting Local Counterparts Needed:*** As part of its re-engineering initiative, USAID/Washington should consider changing the registration, external audit, and other requirements for delivering support directly to indigenous organizations. This is particularly important for D&G projects, since strengthening local capacity is often an essential output for meeting the project purpose. As a basis for such USAID policy changes, a careful analysis should be made of the U.S. vs. local trade-offs faced by USAID/Nicaragua and other Missions in similar political environments. It may be, for instance, that audit requirements should be altered by increasing the amount granted to a local group before an external audit is required. A substitute might be to require USAID field missions to make provisions in agreements with indigenous organizations for local technical assistance to ensure that financial accounting and reporting systems meet standards deemed satisfactory by USAID. Other criteria might involve such factors as the leadership capacity or membership strength of the local group.

2. ***Checklist of Items to Be Considered to Determine Expatriate vs. U.S.-Based Managers:*** Given the complexity of the cost-benefit factors involved in deciding whether to support expatriate residents or U.S.-based grantee representatives, USAID/Nicaragua should consider the following items:
 - Level of local involvement needed to achieve project outputs and purpose;
 - Intensity of on-site project monitoring/revision anticipated;
 - Availability and organizational capacity of appropriate indigenous institutions;
 - Availability of local technical expertise to provide needed assistance to strengthen indigenous grantees;
 - Track record and internal modus operandi of U.S. grantee institution. Does it have experience with resident managers? Will it transfer decision-making authority equal to level of responsibility? Will it provide necessary administrative/technical backup and general support when needed?;
 - Level of relevant technical expertise available within the U.S. organization as opposed to the recruitment of outside consultants;
 - Costs for expatriate residents compared with salary, consultant, travel and opportunity costs for U.S.-based representative.

4. USAID/Nicaragua D&G Efforts Synonymous with Country Team Goals

Findings

As head of the Country Team, the U.S. Ambassador leads the Inter-Agency Democratic Initiatives (DI) Committee that meets frequently and is the focal point for developing overall U.S. policy in this arena. It is within this policy that USAID/Nicaragua has formulated its D&G activities. Over a period of three months (November '94 - January '95), the DI Committee conducted an intensive review of D&G policy in order to harmonize and prioritize all efforts. That there is one Country Team policy which reflects U.S. priorities is documented in State cable 12356, "U.S. Mission Democracy Objectives and Funding Priorities."

The SDI Project goes to the heart of the U.S. Government objective of promoting the democratic process in Nicaragua. While USAID/Nicaragua has the primary management responsibility for SDI Project implementation, to better ensure success support from various other components of the Country Team is needed. For example, information developed by the Political Section may make the difference between success or failure of the Center for Democracy's National Assembly activity or in the justice sector where USAID/Nicaragua has a major intervention addressing judicial reform. Also, the Country Team's Labor Reporting Officer can make a contribution with regard to the AIFLD project, while the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) can help support the FIU media project. This type of coordination will be especially important since many SDI-supported organizations will be intimately involved in the upcoming electoral process, which is also a priority of the Country Team.

Conclusions

In this new era when USAID D&G objectives are synonymous with the priorities of the USG Country Team, and where the mobilization of financial and personnel resources to achieve those objectives involves various components of the Country Team, coordination to insure the proper utilization of all USG resources is essential. This is particularly the case given the heroic nature of the D&G objectives compared with the modest resources allocated to achieve them, thus placing a premium on maximizing their impact.

At the same time, USAID/Nicaragua's SDI activities will contribute importantly to the 1996 election process. Whether planned or unplanned, local organizations engaged in implementing SDI activities will certainly become involved in the upcoming campaign. Moreover, since USAID/Nicaragua is currently engaged in determining the activities supported under the next phase of the SDI Project, it will become increasingly important to monitor SDI activities carefully and to continue Country Team coordination.

5. Local Participation and Transparency Rather Than Client Preferences Should Determine Project Activities

Findings

Because U.S.-based clients drove the original project process, there was but modest local participation in the design phase and little transparency in the implementation of a number of project activities. This has tended to increase the lack of trust and sense of suspicion on the in Nicaraguan side. Examples of this were found in the activities undertaken in the labor sector by AIFLD and in CFD's efforts to strengthen the legislature.

The lack of participation and transparency was exacerbated by the fact that appropriate indigenous institutions capable of administering resources in accordance with U.S. Government standards were virtually non-existent. Additionally, in most instances sub-grantees have not been informed of the amount of funds that is being administered by the U.S.-based grantee, nor do they have a sense of the grantee's responsibilities to the project or to them.

Conclusions

Two of the hallmarks of a society where the rights and responsibilities of its citizens are to have primacy are local participation and transparency in the processes of government. In the various activities supported by the SDI Project there is little evidence of either. Over time this is likely to lead to increasingly diminished returns as the country's democratic culture grows stronger. It is therefore important that participation and transparency be seen not only as project outcomes, but also as basic to the modus operandi of USAID/Nicaragua and its partners.

Recommendation

1. ***Incorporate Local Participation and Transparency into Future Design Efforts:*** For any new and follow-on project activities, USAID/Nicaragua should re-fashion its arrangements with U.S. cooperators and grantees to ensure the greatest possible degree of Nicaraguan participation in the project design process and transparency in the funding arrangements that are forged for delivering U.S. resources.

6. Potential Synergy Through Greater Interchange Should be Realized

Findings

While implementing agencies in any field are often slow to seek out their peers in other sectors (even within the same project), in Nicaragua this tendency is exacerbated by the general lack of trust engendered by the recent war and other unfortunate lessons from the past. However, the synergy that might be derived from such contact could be a particularly potent force in achieving the goals of the SDI Project. This is because the ultimate success of many of these activities depends on public awareness or advocacy to achieve the desired legislative, regulatory or institutional improvements. For the most part, SDI project managers and implementors have

not capitalized on the opportunities for synergy inherent in the very design of the project. The following are examples of missed opportunities.

- USAID/Nicaragua could be an important catalyst, but to date has not used its good offices as major donor to engage all project implementors in a meaningful dialogue about how their various activities could benefit from cooperative efforts, nor indeed simply to share basic information.
- While NED-sponsored projects include several civic education activities (AFT, INDE, Conciencia), each of which could benefit from the work of the other, NED has not facilitated meaningful and continuous contact among them.
- While the final phase of the human rights project directed ADF to bring CPDH and ANPDH together in a collaborative effort, that initiative could have been taken much earlier. Moreover, USAID/Nicaragua could have stimulated interaction between those human rights groups and other relevant SDI players, such as trade unionists (CPT), and civic and political education grantees (AFT, INDE, Conciencia, FUNDEMOS) - all of whom express a desire to address human rights issues in some way.

The lack of transparency and local participation in the design and implementation of a number of the activities funded by the SDI Project has also mitigated against the building of synergy among and within the various sectors.

Conclusions

The adoption by USAID/Nicaragua and by project grantees and sub-grantees of a synergistic approach to the design, implementation and evaluation of project activities would maximize prospects for overall project success. Such an approach would involve the promotion of communication and cooperation among and within the various project components, and would be strengthened by transparent and participatory procedures.

Recommendation

1. ***Promote Synergy Through Regular Meetings with Implementing Agencies:*** To capitalize on the potential for information-sharing and cooperation among and within the various components of the SDI Project, and thus realize the potential synergy implicit in the project design, USAID/Nicaragua should consider convening periodic meetings with implementing agencies. Such sessions should be used to convey to grantees and cooperators USAID/Nicaragua's commitment to collaborative efforts in seeking to achieve project objectives, calling on them to help explore those opportunities within and between project components and to actively pursue them.

7. **Local NGOs Critical to Project Success Need Vital Organizational Skills to Improve Their Functioning**

Findings

While all the NGOs studied are clearly committed to and knowledgeable about the substantive fields in which they work, there appears to be a universal lack of vital organizational development (OD) skills to undergird their efforts. These skills include: strategic planning; project design, monitoring and evaluation; internal communications, processes and governance; membership/volunteer development and management; conflict resolution; and, human and financial resource development. It is also evident that U.S. intermediaries have not provided for the transfer of those skills to their Nicaraguan partners. This is a particularly serious gap for NGOs that seek as part of their objectives to facilitate the organization of community groups in different parts of the country. While modern OD techniques appear to be virtually unknown in Nicaragua, they could contribute significantly to project success and to the long-term sustainability of participating NGOs.

Eventually, this would also help to increase the number of NGOs capable of effectively managing USAID/Nicaragua support, thus opening new indigenous funding and management options, rather than continuing to depend so heavily on U.S. PVOs.

Conclusions

Access to modern OD techniques for the performance of key organizational tasks by NGOs would contribute significantly to their prospects for eventual self-reliance and long-term sustainability. This would also help to develop the fabric of solid citizen organizations needed to strengthen civil society, and to increase the number of indigenous NGOs eligible to receive funding directly from USAID and other sources. Thus, USAID/Nicaragua's dependency on U.S. PVOs and contractors as intermediary agencies would decrease.

Recommendation

1. ***Empower Indigenous NGOs by Providing OD Technical Assistance:*** Since a healthy NGO sector is a bulwark of civil society, and because Nicaraguan NGOs are extremely weak, USAID/Nicaragua should insist that technical assistance packages aimed at building their capacity include not only substantive skills, but also those needed for the effective performance of the basic tasks that undergird the organization itself. Such skills should also be included in labor education programs since unions, too, seek to organize groups at the local, regional and national level. To accomplish this, qualified organizational development (OD) practitioners with international experience should be identified and engaged, either directly by USAID/Nicaragua or by grantees and cooperators.

8. Gender Analysis Techniques Needed to Strengthen Project Success

Findings

Due to the differing roles of men and women in Nicaraguan society, there are gender-based differences in the way both participate in and benefit from D&G projects. Except for Conciencia, a woman-based NED-supported organization providing civic education to grassroots community groups, it appears that SDI Project grantees and sub-grantees have not applied gender-analysis tools in the design process, or taken these differences sufficiently into account in project implementation. It also appears that there is a general lack of knowledge of and experience with the gender-analysis techniques promoted by USAID. This could be detrimental to project success, particularly in the area of human rights (where it was reported that family violence and other types of abuse against women are an "unexplored issue"), as well as in labor education programs, and private and public civic education.

The failure to build gender-analysis into the formulation of strategies designed to promote participation in the upcoming election process could also result in low female voter turn-out.

While few project implementors have disaggregated the data they collect by gender (i.e., on project participants and beneficiaries), upon inquiry most stated that this could be easily done.

Conclusions

The incorporation of gender analysis techniques would strengthen project design, implementation and evaluation. The disaggregation by gender of the data regularly collected by project implementors could help establish a baseline against which to measure progress and for incorporating appropriate revisions in on-going workplans. Attention to gender-based differences will be particularly important in the upcoming election process.

Recommendation

1. ***Employ Gender Analysis Methodologies:*** To ensure that gender-based differences are taken into account in the design, implementation, and evaluation of future SDI Project-sponsored activities, USAID/Nicaragua should consider providing gender analysis training and technical assistance for all participating organizations. Such training should serve to more sharply define objectives and indicators to measure project outreach in terms of the participation of and benefit to both men and women. It is quite possible that the USAID/LAC Gender Adviser or Women in Development Office could help support such training and provide follow-on technical assistance. At a minimum, USAID/Nicaragua should insist that all data collected by project implementors be disaggregated and reported by gender.

9. Donors Could be Models for De-Polarization

Findings

Because of the segmentation of Nicaraguan society which resulted from the war and the politicization of both public and private institutions, foreign donors have tended to choose the particular ideology they wish to support. Thus, they are seen by many to be "taking sides" and contributing to the very polarization they say should be overcome. As a result, NGOs still categorize one another in accordance with their funding sources. For example, it was reported by some NGOs that, because they receive funding from USAID and are seen as U.S. clients, Scandinavian and other West European donors that favor FSLN-related groups will not "touch them."

Reconciliation among the various post-war factions will be needed for SDI project objectives to be fully achieved. A number of people interviewed felt strongly that the donor community could become a role model for such reconciliation.

Conclusions

Efforts to moderate ideology-based preferences and harmonize interests within the donor community could serve as an important model for de-polarization among client groups.

Recommendation

1. **Improve Donor Coordination:** To help facilitate the process of post-war reconciliation within Nicaraguan society and to provide a model for such behavior, USAID/Nicaragua should explore current ideology-based donor preferences with other donors in order to identify ways in which such sharply segmented resource allocation practices might be moderated. Once in process, such coordinated efforts among donors should be made known by USAID/Nicaragua to all SDI Project grantees and cooperators.

10. CID/Gallup Study and its Uses to Measure Performance of the SDI Project

Findings

As will be discussed in the specific activity evaluations located in Annex A, there has been a significant absence of systematic monitoring of the SDI Project on the part of USAID/Nicaragua. This is reflected in the lack of precision in identifying activity objectives and their indicators particularly as these objectives relate to the SDI Project purpose and to the current D&G Strategic Objective. It was initially anticipated that the CID/Gallup work would be the first step in putting a measurement system in place that could be used to measure SDI Project performance. An evaluation of the CID/Gallup work suggests that its utility as a measurement system for SDI Project performance has serious limitations. In the meantime USAID/Nicaragua is in the process of redefining its D&G Strategic Objective and recasting the objectives and indicators that will underpin the Strategic Objective.

As discussed in Part E of this Annex G, "Evaluation of the Utility of the CID/Gallup Study of Democratic Values in Nicaragua" by Mitchell Seligson, the work to date by CID/Gallup, funded by USAID/Nicaragua has the potential of serving as a credible baseline against which to identify changes in Nicaraguan attitudes regarding democracy and governance. However, the USAID/Nicaragua investment in the survey must be followed with additional analysis before data generated by CID/Gallup can serve as a useful analytical tool. The experience to date with CID/Gallup strongly suggests that they are not the appropriate entity to take this next step crucial to turning this empirical process into a useful analytical tool.

Conclusions

Data gathered periodically to measure changes in attitudes should also be used to supplement USAID/Nicaragua's efforts to search for relationships between U.S. Government-funded programs promoting democracy and better governance in Nicaragua and the impact of this assistance. It is a long reach from a project that supports procedural changes designed to bring efficiencies into the court room or an education project that is creating a civics curriculum for a secondary school system to a Strategic Objective concerned with promoting greater confidence in democratic institutions, processes, and values. However, the proposed measurement system could help to fill this lacunae.

Recommendation

1. ***Task to Analyze the Data:*** A political scientist with experience in analyzing public opinion data on democratic values in Latin America should be engaged to analyze the data. The tasks to be performed:
 - Creation of working computer files of both the mass public national sample as well as the specialized groups.
 - Examination of subsets of the sample, both mass public and special groups, that are of particular programmatic interest to USAID/Nicaragua. For example, it would be wise to examine the value structure of teachers since they are carrying out civic education in the schools. Similarly, it would be wise to examine the values of journalists since USAID/Nicaragua supports Florida International University focused on up-grading their skills.

11. USAID/Nicaragua's Project Management Arrangements

Introduction

This section addresses the key questions from the scope of work related to understanding whether the project management arrangements developed by USAID/Nicaragua are contributing to the efficacious management of the SDI Project. Answers related to specific activities funded by the SDI Project, when warranted, are to be found in the individual activity discussions.

Question: Are project management arrangements working effectively to assure that project activities are implemented on time, are of high quality, and contributing to project objectives? Is there sufficient USAID staff involvement with counterparts to adequately monitor project activities, develop mutual understanding about project goals and mechanisms, build consensus and develop a sense of ownership among counterparts and participants, undertake mid-course modifications as necessary, and provide substantive input on key decisions and activities?

Findings

The Project Paper called for "two personal services contract (PSC) employees with experience in democratization activities" to be hired to manage the SDI Project. Throughout most of the period of project implementation, there has been one PSC employee located in the General Development Office (GDO) responsible for monitoring the SDI Project. Though in May of 1994, a U.S. Direct Hire (DH) was assigned to the DI area, the unexpected departure in August of the PSC effectively meant that only one person has been managing the portfolio. During this entire period, the Chief of GDO has directly supervised the USAID/Nicaragua employee responsible for monitoring the SDI Project.

In addition to being responsible for monitoring this project, both the former PSC and presently the DH have been responsible for SDI Project administration and for leading the design process for all new D&G proposals.

USAID/Washington guidance reinforced by USAID/Nicaragua directives calls for the systematic monitoring of USAID/Nicaragua project-funded activities. This monitoring process should involve USAID/Nicaragua project management in:

- Making frequent site visits to gather first-hand impressions of the status of project implementation;
- Undertaking systematic reviews of time-phased workplans;
- Undertaking systematic reviews of financial and project status reports to ensure they are accurate, timely, and responsive to the reporting requirement stated in the original agreement;
- Developing and implementing a monitoring and evaluation plan that identifies objectives and indicators for these objectives; and
- Dealing with problems that are identified in the monitoring process in an expeditious manner.

Though many of the activities funded by the SDI Project have workplans, it does not appear that USAID/Nicaragua project management systematically reviews them during the course of project implementation to determine if the mobilizing of inputs or the accomplishment of

outputs is on schedule. Additionally, there is no evidence that workplans have been revised to reflect the changed status in the schedule for activity input mobilization.

There is little evidence that monitoring and evaluation plans have been developed for the individual activities. As a consequence there are numerous cases where there is inadequate consensus between USAID/Nicaragua and the implementing entities as to the objectives being pursued and the indicators for gauging project performance.

As a general rule, most project implementors are reporting in a timely fashion. The usefulness of particular reports ranges from excellent (i.e., ILANUD and AFT) to unsatisfactory (i.e., ADF). However, the lack of a systematic and formal USAID/Nicaragua review system which involves the implementing entities makes it difficult to discern whether the reporting is being used as a management tool for identifying problems and taking the steps necessary to assure appropriate mid-course corrections.

An often-repeated sentiment by the USAID project manager was that he has been primarily fighting fires and has had little time for systematically monitoring project performance. There is very little time for field visits which are critical to monitoring the mobilization of inputs.

Conclusions

The foregoing findings should not be interpreted as implying that SDI activities are not being successfully implemented. The conclusion drawn from those observations is that the project has been understaffed from the beginning and continues to be understaffed. This may reflect past USAID/Nicaragua management's lack of understanding of the labor-intensive nature of the SDI Project. When it was initiated there was little appreciation of the complexity of these activities and the amount of time that would be required to adequately administer them.

The lack of adequate person power to administer and monitor the project has directly contributed to the lone personnel resource having to respond to an endless series of problems that have emerged in the course of implementing a very complex development undertaking. There has been little time for site visits to systematically review the status or quality of the input mobilization process. Nor has there been adequate time to undertake the analysis critical to the successful implementation of a rolling design process which is the nature of the SDI Project.

The Semi-Annual Report prepared by USAID/Nicaragua for Washington consumption is not an adequate tool for the project manager to review project status with counterparts and implementing entities. This is particularly the case if the idea for the report is to identify implementation problems and take appropriate actions in a timely fashion.

Recommendations

1. ***Need for Additional Staff for the D&G Portfolio:*** USAID/Nicaragua should assign additional personnel to the D&G portfolio. This is particularly important, given that AOJ and Municipal Development projects are to be added, and in view of on-going analytical requirements and the need for first-hand project monitoring. At this writing, the

evaluation team understands that the intention of USAID/Nicaragua management is to create a DI Office and staff it with two DHs and a number of PSCs. We fully support such an initiative, and recommend that this be done at the earliest possible date.

2. ***Need for Systematic Monitoring:*** There has been a significant absence of systematic monitoring of the SDI Project on the part of USAID/Nicaragua. This is exacerbated by the lack of user-friendly management tools in many instances to allow for a collaborative relationship to develop between project management and the entities responsible for project implementation. USAID/Nicaragua should therefore initiate a systematic monitoring process which includes the following components:

- ***Workplan:*** Time-phased workplans approved and reviewed periodically by USAID/Nicaragua.
- ***Monitoring and Evaluation Plan:*** Monitoring and Evaluation Plans should be prepared for each activity that clearly identify objectives and indicators. The use of logical framework methodology would be appropriate for identifying objectives, their indicators, and the means of verification.
- ***Quarterly Reporting:*** Quarterly reporting with the following format:
 - Activities and accomplishments for the last three months. (Where the activities have varied from the workplan in terms of the nature or timing of the activity, this should be noted in the quarterly report. It may be appropriate to update the workplan at this juncture depending on the nature and magnitude of the change);
 - Projected activities for the next six months;
 - Project implementation problems;
 - Status of resolution of the problems identified in the last quarterly report.
- ***Periodic and Formal Review Meetings:*** In order to improve SDI Project oversight, consideration should be given to establishing periodic and formal review meetings (quarterly or semi-annual). The workplan and the quarterly reports would be the basic instruments to be used in the review. The agenda for the meeting could follow the format of the quarterly report.

12. National Endowment for Democracy Project Monitoring Arrangements

Introduction

This section treats the key questions related to understanding whether the project management arrangements developed by NED are contributing to the efficacious management

of the NED component of the SDI Project. Answers related to specific activities within the NED grant funded by the SDI Project, when warranted, are to be found in the individual activity discussions.

Attachment I to the Grant Agreement states that "NED will have the sole responsibility for the implementation of the project activities" funded by this agreement. This specifies that NED "shall monitor the progress of its sub-grants and ensure that time schedules are being met according to their workplans, which will include specific milestones upon which progress can be gauged each project year." NED is further directed to establish a local office to be responsible for "assisting with coordination of activities, identifying potential grantees, and monitoring fiscal and program performance."

The NED monitoring process as outlined for in the grant agreement with USAID/Nicaragua calls for:

- Making frequent site visits for first-hand observation of the status of sub-grantee activities;
- Approving time-phased workplans prepared by sub-grantees;
- Reviewing financial and project status reports by sub-grantees that are accurate, timely, and responsive to the reporting requirement stated in the original agreement;
- Reviewing monitoring and evaluation plans that identify objectives and indicators for those objectives for each sub-grantee;
- Managing a systematic review of sub-grantee financial and project status reports in conjunction with workplans and project monitoring and evaluation plans; and
- Dealing with problems identified in the monitoring of the implementation process in an expeditious manner.

Findings

Project Identification and Approval

All sub-grants made by NED were approved by the NED Board which meets periodically in Washington, D.C. NED's approval process though a rigorous one represents a throw-back in the USAID experience to when projects were approved by USAID/Washington. In effect, a NED Board in Washington D.C., which is composed of illustrious persons with deep knowledge of the processes of democracy and governance in general, is called upon to approve modest sub-grants for activities a culture and a country away.

The NED/Managua Office was directed to identify potential grantees, and the record suggests that the Office Director has been successful in generating over 40 proposals from

indigenous organizations that are potential candidates for NED funding. Some of these proposals reach back to the summer of 1992. To date none have resulted in NED grants funded through the USAID agreement.

Workplan Preparation

Sub-grantees are required to submit annual workplans to NED/Washington for review. In all cases studied, this requirement was met. Except for an occasional reference in the NED/Washington Semi-Annual Reporting to USAID/Nicaragua, there is little in the record to suggest that the workplan was used by NED/Washington, NED/Nicaragua, or by USAID/Nicaragua as a management tool to track implementation and adjust the workplan when circumstances so dictated.

Project Status Reporting

The Semi-Annual Report prepared by NED/Washington and submitted to USAID/Nicaragua arrives approximately three months after the end of the reporting period. It provides a narrative synthesis with an emphasis on the status of input mobilization. Only occasionally are there references to problems that affect project implementation.

Financial Reporting

NED/Washington has complied with all financial reporting requirements. However, the reports have little utility to USAID/Nicaragua project management in terms of providing them with timely financial data that will help to understand the status of activity or input mobilization.

Monitoring and Evaluation Plans

There is little evidence that NED has encouraged sub-grantees to develop monitoring and evaluation plans. As a consequence, in many cases objectives are not sharply delineated and indicators have not been identified.

The NED/Managua Field Office

The Director of the NED/Managua Office has sustained contact with the sub-grantees. He has a comprehensive knowledge of the democracy and governance situation in Nicaragua and applies it to better understand the status of NED grantees.

He reports frequently and informally to USAID/Nicaragua his perceptions regarding the status of grantee activity. He communicates frequently with NED/Washington, and on a monthly basis submits a written report on activity status. He also submits a monthly financial report to NED/Washington.

Though the Director of the NED/Managua Office has on occasion facilitated coordination, cooperation, and exchanges among grantees, this facilitation function has not been pursued on a steady or sustained basis.

Conclusions

NED, as it presently administers the USAID grant, plays a benign or passive monitoring role. The Director of the NED/Managua office, though extremely knowledgeable of the NED program in Nicaragua, is constrained by a lack of authority from playing a more aggressive monitoring role with regard to specific grantee activities. This is particularly the case with the larger grantees that look to their home offices in the U.S. and on to the NED/Washington Office as being in their chain of responsibility. To a number of the grantees, the NED/Managua office is a layer of bureaucracy that can provide occasional logistical support or serve as a mail drop for reports to their home offices in the U.S., but it is not perceived as an office that has a proactive monitoring role to perform.

The Semi-Annual Status Report prepared by NED/Washington is not adequate to meet the needs of USAID/Nicaragua project management in reviewing project status with counterparts and implementors. This is particularly the case if the idea for the report is to identify implementation problems on a timely basis and take corrective actions.

The foregoing description of findings should not be interpreted as implying that activities are not being successfully implemented. The conclusion drawn from these observations is that the way in which NED interprets its project development and monitoring functions is at variance with what USAID/Nicaragua anticipated when funds were granted to NED.

This difference in how USAID and NED perceive the monitoring requirement reflects distinct differences in the cultures of the two organizations. NED is a Washington-based organization. It has a charter that dictates that all projects be approved by a board that meets in Washington. It normally does not get involved in longer term institution-building activities such as the AFT work aimed at developing and institutionalizing civic education in Nicaragua's secondary school system. It lightly monitors the activities that it funds, making an occasional site visit and relying heavily on the reporting specified in grant agreements.

In contrast, USAID/Nicaragua is a field organization. It supports making project selection decisions in the field. It is in the business of institution-building over the longer term. It is mandated to monitor closely the activities that it funds. It is these differences that underscore the problems that each side has in trying to strike a balance with regard to the monitoring process as a tool for facilitating the implementation of the activities funded through the USAID-NED agreement.

Recommendations

In the course of this evaluation, the evaluation team was informed that NED wished to discontinue its relationship with USAID/Nicaragua as soon as feasible. For the reasons discussed above, NED is uncomfortable with this relationship; neither party finds it totally satisfactory. However, should NED and USAID/Nicaragua find common ground, the following recommendations should be considered:

1. ***Need for systematic monitoring by NED:*** The absence of systematic monitoring by NED is exacerbated by the lack of user-friendly management tools to allow for a collaborative relationship to develop between it and the grantees and sub-grantees responsible for project implementation. For that reason, NED should adopt a system that includes the following elements:

- ***Monitoring and Evaluation Plans:*** M&E Plans with clear objectives and indicators should be prepared for each activity. The use of logical framework methodology would be appropriate for identifying objectives, indicators, and means of verification.

- ***Quarterly Reporting Through NED/Managua to USAID/Nicaragua:*** Consideration should be given to establishing a system of direct quarterly reports. This reporting should go to the NED/Managua office which, in turn, would pass it directly on to USAID/Nicaragua. The following format is recommended:

- Activities and accomplishments for the last three months. (Where the activities have varied from the workplan in terms of the nature or timing of the activity, this should be noted in the quarterly report. It may be appropriate to update the workplan at this juncture, depending on the nature and magnitude of the change.)
- Projected activities for the next six months.
- Project implementation problems.
- Status of resolution of problems identified in the last quarterly report.

- ***Quarterly Review Meetings:*** To improve SDI Project oversight, consideration should be given to establishing a quarterly review system in which the Director of the NED Managua office meets with each grantee and their Nicaraguan counterparts to review the quarterly status report recommended immediately above.

The workplan and the quarterly report would be the basic instruments to be used in the review. The agenda for the meeting could follow the format of the quarterly report. The focus of the meeting would be to explore whether activities are on track in relation to planned timelines.

2. ***Need for Prompt Review by NED of Proposals Received by Its Managua Office:*** As reported by the head of the NED Managua office, there are in excess of 40 proposals awaiting review by NED. These proposals should be reviewed as soon as possible to determine the best candidates to be funded with remaining SDI Project monies.

3. ***After NED - Alternative Management Arrangements:*** If it is determined that in future NED will no longer perform the functions that it is presently performing, there are at least three options that USAID/Nicaragua should consider.

Option #1: USAID/Nicaragua identifies another U.S. organization that can perform the functions previously assigned to NED.

Option #2: USAID/Nicaragua identifies or develops a Nicaraguan organization that can perform the functions outlined. One such candidate could be the Center of Education for Democracy that is presently implementing the public school civic education project. Clearly, the selection of a Nicaraguan entity to undertake these functions would require a considerable investment in institution-building by USAID/Nicaragua. It is even possible that if a Nicaraguan institution were selected, a U.S. entity would be needed to provide the required technical assistance.

Option #3: USAID/Nicaragua administers a grant program working directly with grantees such as IRI, NDI, AFT, and so forth.

CHAPTER III

SDI PROJECT FUNDING OPPORTUNITIES

Background

One of the dictates of the Scope of Work for this evaluation was to provide recommendations regarding the funding of activities for the next phase of the SDI Project. This mid-term evaluation highlights the need for careful analysis prior to making financial commitments, given the complexity of the activities to be undertaken. Though there are a number of areas to be considered for future funding, few could actually be supported without careful analysis on the part of USAID/Nicaragua as to the problem to be addressed and the identification of concrete outputs and purposes that could be feasibly achieved.

The following recommendations should be seen as informed opinions based on a snapshot of the complex set of activities operating within a context marked by multiple problems. We have made no effort to coordinate the recommendations in this section with the funding levels available. In formulating these recommendations, uppermost in our mind were the following factors:

- USAID/Nicaragua priorities;
- U.S. Mission priorities;
- Performance of the activities evaluated; and
- Nicaragua's needs as expressed by the Nicaraguans with whom we conversed in the course of the evaluation.

Funding Options

Based on our review of SDI Project activities, the following options are presented in order of their priority:

1. **Human Rights:** Future work to be undertaken in the human rights field will probably require a major expenditure if past experience is any indication of the cost of building institutional capacity. This is a high priority activity.
2. **Political Party Formation and Voter Outreach:** As the '96 elections approach, certainly the work that could be undertaken by FUNDEMOS and Conciencia should be assigned high priorities.
3. **Civic Education in the Public School System:** Both in terms of long-range and nearer term objectives related to the strengthening of civil society, support for civic education in the public school system is a high priority. Clearly, supporting

improved civic education instruction in secondary schools in this transition to the '96 elections is a smart decision. The magnitude of USAID/Nicaragua's support should be decided in the context of the questions posed in the section dealing with this activity.

4. **Media Training:** FIU could continue offering training opportunities with an emphasis on the role of media in a free and fair election during the transition to the '96 election process. This should not be an expensive item.
5. **Civil-Military Relations:** An excellent job has been done to date by NDI. However, there are additional activities that should be supported in this area. Again, this should not be a big ticket item.
6. **National Assembly:** The work performed by CFD has barely scratched the surface with regard to assisting the National Assembly to become a more effective institution. Aspects of a modern legislature that could be addressed in the next phase include: the development of constituent services; the strengthening of the MIS to bring information to legislators that can help them frame new legislation in light of the prevailing conditions; the installation of an oversight capacity; and, the formulation of a budget analysis mechanism. This could be an expensive undertaking.
7. **Labor Sector:** An education program designed to enhance the capacity of union members should be supported. It could be designed to be in the \$300,000 range per year, depending on available funds and the scale deemed appropriate by the Country Team.
8. **Judicial School:** Though it appears that the new Administration of Justice Project addresses most of the problems in this area, there may be additional training requirements that would be appropriate to support at the Judicial School. Sustained training for jurors can result in delivering important D&G messages to the grassroots. Again, this would not involve a major expenditure. This is put at the end of the list because it is anticipated that additional USAID/Nicaragua expenditures will not be necessary to sustain training in this area. However, should other funds not be available, then USAID/N should support training at the Judicial school on a priority basis.

Obviously, future funding possibilities should not be confined to the above list. For example, during the course of this evaluation the team learned that the NED/Managua Office has received over 40 proposals that should be reviewed by USAID/Nicaragua to determine the potential they may hold for supporting SDI Project objectives.

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Volume II
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Volume II

**ANNEX A
STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS (SDI) PROJECT
ACTIVITY EVALUATIONS**

The complete evaluations of the activities reviewed are listed below. They are divided into groups: those funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) through the USAID/Nicaragua SDI Project and those funded directly by USAID/Nicaragua through cooperative agreements.

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ANNEX A

PART A: NED - CIVIC EDUCATION - MUJERES NICARAGUENSES, CONCIENCIA - RESOURCES IN ACTION

BACKGROUND

In the context of Nicaragua's transition to democracy following the 1990 elections, citizens were faced with political polarization inhibiting efforts toward political and social reconciliation. At the same time, the country was also suffering a severe economic crisis. The new era, nevertheless, offered an opportunity for citizens to mobilize and exert their rights by demanding political accountability of the country's leadership.

Mujeres Nicaraguenses "Conciencia" is a nonprofit, nonpartisan women's organization that supports civic education and promotes grassroots political participation. In July 1992, NED entered into Grant Agreement 92-111.0 with Delphi International Group to support Conciencia. Effective dates for this grant were July 1, 1992-June 30, 1993 for an obligated amount of \$44,000. In September 1993, NED continued its support for Conciencia by entering into Grant Agreement No. 93-165.1 with a different group, Resources in Action. The grant covered the period July 1, 1993-June 30, 1994 with \$70,000 obligated. NED renewed this support under Grant Agreement No. 94-139.0 for the period July 1, 1994-June 30, 1995 with an obligated amount of \$80,000.

FINDINGS

Project Activities

Conciencia operates on a modest budget, with a high degree of voluntary assistance to support civic education activities through group meetings, radio broadcasts and the distribution of printed materials. While Conciencia opens its activities to all citizens, it targets grassroots communities whose access to information and government services is minimal. Conciencia seeks to raise the awareness of individuals about their rights and responsibilities as citizens. Activities are also conducted to educate community leaders in the principles of democracy, in order that they may become multipliers and transmitters of these principles. Most of the group activities which take the form of meetings and workshops take place on Saturday and Sunday. Reports indicate an average attendance average of 30 per meeting. An average multiplier of ten is anticipated for each individual contact. However, an event observed during this evaluation was attended by approximately 80 women and a number of children.

Members of Conciencia gather groups in a community to discuss themes of democracy that have relevance to their lives. Where appropriate, written materials from Conciencia are distributed. An example of a very basic principle that is part of the Conciencia civic

education message concerns the need for each mother to register the birth of a child. The lesson imparted covers the following:

- How does one register the birth of a child?
- What is a birth certificate?
- Where does one register a child?
- Who registers the child? What if the mother is unmarried?
- What does a person need a birth certificate for?
- What are the negative consequences of not having a birth certificate?

Other lessons address higher levels of sophistication concerning participation in a democratic system. But Conciencia begins with the very basic building blocks of an individual's identity, rights, and responsibilities in a democracy. The organization promotes participation and teaches individuals what benefits a democracy may have to offer.

Conciencia presents weekly radio programs via different radio stations that discuss contemporary problems in a democracy.

Training Materials and Publications

Conciencia has developed training materials and produced 90 packets covering the following themes:

- Geographic data on Nicaragua
- Environment
- Municipality
- Power of the Government
- Democracy
- Rights and Responsibilities of Nicaraguans
- Political Process
- Leadership
- Communication

Conciencia has also published six pamphlets to reinforce its civic education program (5000 each) on:

- Geography of Nicaragua
- Environment
- The Family
- Communication
- Leadership
- Democracy

Quarterly, Conciencia publishes a Boletin Informativo which includes reports on previous activities, news of upcoming activities and general civic education type articles such as, "What is a Constitution?" or "What Are One's Rights as an Individual?"

Project Management

In 1994, Conciencia counted 18 chapters nationwide, including six in Managua and twelve outside the capital. According to the Final Evaluation Report for the grant period of July 1993-June 1994, Conciencia consolidated its basic structure, as well as its administrative and technical components in July 1993 at a meeting of delegates from the departments of Managua, Masaya and Granada. Elections for new officers were held, with the new board of directors and executive committee taking office immediately. Conciencia then contracted a full-time executive director and an executive secretary to oversee the management and operations of the organization. Conciencia also has the support of an Advisory Board of distinguished Nicaraguan citizens.

Organizational assistance has been provided to Conciencia by Resources in Action in the form of training and consultation with Conciencia's personnel, board members and regional coordinators. Resources in Action has also facilitated communication between Conciencia and other organizations in an effort to develop a network and collaborate with other organizations.

In attempting to assess how many people have been reached by Conciencia's programs, the month of September 1994 was chosen at random for review. Reporting indicated that a series of seminars had been carried out over four week-ends covering the following topics: Personal National Identity, The Political Constitution, Democracy, the Family and Daily Life, and Evaluation. Each of the seminars attended by 34 participants who were district and municipal coordinators or community representatives who could in turn serve a multipliers in their communities. During the same month, short workshops were implemented in 15 zones with a total of 606 participants.

CONCLUSIONS

While aggregate numbers are not compiled, it is reasonable to suggest that Conciencia is reaching a significant number of targets through primary group contact, secondary multiplication, radio programs, and publications. The program is successful in meeting its objectives and demonstrates organizational development and growth.

RECOMMENDATION

1. ***Civic Education Support Continued In the Transition to the 1996 Election:*** The return on investment for this program is high. Conciencia is building a grassroots network that should be utilized in civic education programming for the 1996 elections.

**Elements of a Logical Framework for
Mujeres Nicaraguenses "Conciencia"**

GOAL: To enhance public knowledge and understanding of the rights and responsibilities of citizens, especially women, in a democratic society.

PURPOSE: To promote active political participation, especially among women, at the grassroots and national levels.

OUTPUTS:

1. Heightened awareness within civil society, particularly among women, about civil rights, responsibilities, and opportunities.
2. Increased civic participation, especially at the grassroots level, and especially by women.

INPUTS:

1. Publication of informational bulletins.
2. Radio Programs concerning civic information and women's participation in civil society broadcast by several radio stations.
3. Local and regional meetings, seminars and workshops on topics concerning the democratic process, constitutional rights, the function of local government in a democracy, and community action.

(Note: This abbreviated Logical Framework was prepared by the Evaluation Team to identify the objectives of the activity. It was against these objectives that the Evaluation Team gauged the accomplishments of the activity.)

PART B: NED - CIVIC EDUCATION IN THE PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM - AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (AFT)

BACKGROUND

One of USAID/Nicaragua's highest priorities in support of the newly elected government of President Violeta Chamorro in 1990 was assistance for education. Under the Sandinista government of the previous ten years, curriculum was developed with a concentration of revolutionary ideological content. In the early literacy campaign in 1980, for example, the first lesson taught the vowels: A E I O U - from the words "la revolucion." In 1991 USAID/Nicaragua provided funding for the purchase of text books for grades K through 12 which included civic education text books.

USAID/Nicaragua and NED requested that the Educational Foundation of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) submit a proposal to train teachers in civic education in a effort to promote democratic values and methods in the public school system. This resulted in a three-year collaborative effort with the Ministry of Education (MED) supported by grants from NED to AFT totalling \$1,520,108.

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the MED and the AFT in the first quarter of 1992 included the following objectives:

- Development of a K-12 Education for Democracy curriculum that would meet the approval of a citizens' commission.
- Preparation of a secondary level textbook on the development and practice of democracy with teacher's lesson plans and activities for all grade levels.
- Training of 24 teachers to serve as Education for Democracy trainers.
- Organization of in-service teacher training programs utilizing this corps of Nicaraguan teachers who would be trained during the course of the project.

The MOU was amended in April 1992 and required the MED release with pay 20 secondary school teachers to work with the Education for Democracy Project for approximately two years. The AFT agreed to support the publication of materials related to the project.

FINDINGS

Secondary Education Target

This project was redesigned to focus principally on secondary education instead of the original K-12 plan. It was further agreed that the project would not include the development of civic education textbooks. The basic education program, supported by the Academy for Educational Development (AED), included a component for civic education in the primary grades.

Consensus Building

A critical aspect of the civic education activity was the creation of the Center for Education on Democracy (CED) outside of the MED. The CED has served as the interface between the MED and the general public. It has been within CED that the civic education activity has been implemented.

One of the first tasks of the civic education project was the development of the Marco Curricular de Educacion Para la Democracia (Curriculum Framework for Education for Democracy). The document was produced by the CED as the result of a broad cross-section of educators, politicians, and citizens meeting, deliberating, and reaching consensus as to what democracy is and how it should be taught in Nicaragua in public and private educational forums. This document is serving its intended purpose as the framework for the civic education curriculum at the secondary level.

Master Teacher Training and Methodology

From an original group of 26 teachers, 21 are expected to complete two years of training through the CED in March 1995. Ten of these teachers are women. Salary support for release time for these teachers has been provided by the MED as a counterpart contribution to the project. The teachers are guaranteed a position to return to upon completion of the training. They will be responsible for the implementation of the civic education program and for training additional teachers in methodologies which emphasize participatory activities in the classroom.

In-service Training

The CED set an objective of providing introductory training on democracy to every high school civics teacher in the country in the form of four-day seminars. According to an interim report on the Education for Democracy Project prepared by consultant Gary Bloom in December 1994, approximately 88% of those teachers received this training, along with a high percentage of administrators and MED officials who attended the workshops. Ninety-three percent of the participants rated the training as good or excellent in the post-seminar evaluation. AFT has reported that a total of 3,745 civics and social studies teachers have been trained by CED master teachers in a 87 seminars since 1993.

Curriculum Materials

The CED has produced basic documents for the new civics curriculum, as well as a number of supporting educational materials. Among the principal materials developed are:

- The Marco Curricular de Educacion Para la Democracia (Curriculum Framework for Education for Democracy).
- The Modulo de Aprendizaje (Learning Module) provides a teacher's guide for utilizing the Curriculum Framework. It was produced primarily for the training conducted by the program during the first quarter of 1994.
- The Guia Didactica (Manual) provides a teaching methodology guide and is a critical element in the training seminars. It includes specific classroom activities for active, participatory methods in the classroom.
- The Programa de Formacion Civica y Social (I y IV Ano) (Civic and Social Education Program) are the principal documents which provide objectives, activities, and evaluation strategies for civic education in the first and fourth years of high school.

Identified in the Bloom evaluation and echoed in interviews in this evaluation were the concerns about the availability of usable materials for the classroom. Bloom notes:

"By putting materials into the hands of the Nicaraguan civics teachers, [the] CED has had a major influence on teaching in the country. There is such a severe poverty of materials in Nicaragua that these materials have been received with not only interest and enthusiasm, but with thirst. Teachers consistently speak of the need for still more support materials and student texts. Observations in Nicaragua's civics classrooms made it clear that students have access to virtually no print material in support of the program."

Even so, it should be noted that the materials produced are used principally by the teachers. This means that the teachers are responsible for developing many of the lesson plans and classroom activities themselves. The guides are written at a level that requires higher educational training than many of the teachers themselves have. Beyond getting these materials into the hands of the teachers, impact of the program may not yet be determined. Bloom's observation that "both trainers and teachers have had difficulty in conceptualizing and implementing evaluation of this program" were echoed in interviews for this evaluation.

Additional materials have been produced to support classroom activities which are more "user friendly" and are of a very practical nature, such as:

- Algunos Conceptos Elementales de: Politica Publica, Grupos de Influencia, Partidos Politicos, Ideologias, Gobiernos Constitucionales y No Constitucionales - a booklet that characterizes different aspects of political

participation and includes a profile of contemporary political parties in Nicaragua.

- Guías Para el Uso del Periodico como Material Didactico - a pamphlet which provides curriculum instruction and activities for utilizing the newspaper as a teaching tool.

Multiplier Effect

The CED has been successful in creating a cadre of master teachers who in turn provide training within the Nicaraguan educational system. The group represents a variety of social and political positions and has fostered a working association that sets an example of cooperation among diverse elements within a democracy. This group has become a cohesive support group in itself which may provide the backbone for a network of civics education teachers throughout the country.

A second multiplier effect should be noted. Project reporting indicates numerous invitations and opportunities for both the CED instructors and the master teachers to participate in conferences or to offer specialized training sessions for groups beyond the MED. For example, the Nicaraguan Peace Scholarship Program, managed by Georgetown University, asked for training on values, human relations, decision-making, self-esteem, and personal planning for 47 scholarship recipients prior to their departure to the U.S. "The general idea was a course that reinforces the students' roots and commitment to Nicaragua thus encouraging the return of scholars to the country to contribute to the democratic development of the society after finishing their studies."

First National Congress of Civic Educators of Nicaragua

The CED organized a two-day meeting that brought together 800 participants including 550 teachers from throughout the country. The purpose of the meeting was to disseminate and study the Education for Democracy Curriculum Framework and to "give needed prestige to civics and civics teachers, usually held in low esteem among educators and students." Nobel Prize Winner and former president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, was the keynote speaker. The Congress provided a valuable opportunity for civics teachers to exchange ideas about the democracy curriculum and appropriate teaching methods.

Women in Development

In the public education system of Nicaragua, it is estimated that 80% of the teachers are women. Ten of the twenty-one master teachers being trained in the Education for Democracy Project are women. Female members of the staff include the advisor for curriculum development and a secretary. Also, the AFT advisor to the project is a woman. The values and principles being incorporated into the civic education curriculum that is being developed supports clearly the importance of equal participation in democracy of both men and women.

No Coordination with Basic Education Project

There has been no coordination between this civic education project and the larger AED basic education project which is also supported by USAID/Nicaragua. Making reference to the managers of the basic education project, the U.S. coordinator from AFT commented, "We know who they are, and they know who we are."

CED Staff/Management

The CED staff includes a director, two instructors, a curriculum development specialist and three support staff who operate the Center and manage the project components. The staff, which includes two women, is small and very dedicated to the project. The Center is located in a facility provided by the MED and is of an adequate size to accommodate the training of the master teachers and to offer space for somewhat larger seminars. The staff has also been successful in seeking in-kind contributions and donations of materials, services and rent-free space for activities. For example, in support of a national democracy week painting, poetry, letter writing, song and civic project competition, funds were collected from 29 businesses and organizations along with a substantial contribution from UNICEF.

Project Management

Given the project's management structure, it was not surprising to learn that USAID/Nicaragua is not well informed in a timely manner about plans and activities. NED awarded a grant to the AFT. AFT negotiated a MOU with the MED to establish the CED. AFT, therefore, communicates directly with the Ministry of Education.

AFT has the overall responsibility for managing the grant from NED. A U.S. coordinator from the AFT, therefore, is contracted to oversee the project. The coordinator operates out of Washington, D.C. but has been on site in Nicaragua for approximately 9-10 weeks of each year of the grant, providing both substantive and organizational guidance for the project. AFT receives no overhead for this project which represents a significant in-kind contribution to the project. Office space and equipment for the U.S. coordinator, administrative assistance and financial management are covered by AFT. In addition, the AFT has been successful in recruiting educators and curriculum specialists in the U.S. to provide technical assistance on a travel-expense basis only.

The AFT presented annual workplans to NED which were developed in conjunction with the Nicaraguan director of the CED. The workplans for the three years during which the project has been in effect do represent the development of specific activities that address the purpose of the project. It is evident that as the project unfolded, however, original planning had to be modified. Nevertheless, these modifications have been carried out within the overall guidelines of the project purpose. Feedback and input from project participants have been utilized to improve and enhance the project.

Quarterly reporting is submitted by AFT to NED. This reporting identifies accomplishments toward project objectives and activities that have evolved as the project has

developed. NED forwards a synthesis of all its projects including the AFT reports to USAID/Nicaragua. USAID/Nicaragua receives this reporting from NED long after it has moved up the communication chain from the CED to AFT to NED. While AFT is following proper reporting procedures, the information ultimately received by USAID/Nicaragua is not timely and often lacks important details.

Project Costs

Though outputs are not identified in AFT's projected budgets and the expenditures reported to NED, the documented achievement of outputs strongly indicates that AFT has spent the grant funds allocated to it on the most important activities. AFT estimated that the cost of each output was:

Education for Democracy framework:	\$ 195,577
Development of a master teacher multiplier corps:	272,916
In-service teacher training:	393,452
Development of an 8-12 secondary level Education for Democracy curriculum:	144,784
Reference text for democracy for civics and social studies teachers:	258,369
Civic Education Conference:	103,701
"Democracy Week" student contests:	73,225
TOTAL	\$1,442,024

These estimated costs by output reinforce the sense that project expenditures have effectively focused on activity priorities. In sum, a review of the financial documentation provided by AFT against accomplishments/outputs indicates USAID/Nicaragua's return for its investment has been highly satisfactory.

CONCLUSIONS

The revised project workplan called for the accomplishment of the following outputs:

- Development of 8-12 curriculum frameworks for democratic civic education.
- Development of 8-12 actual curricula for democratic civic education.
- Training of twenty-eight master high school teachers responsible for developing model classroom activities for teaching democratic ideas and practices based on the curriculum framework.
- Conducting of in-service training in the field by trained master teachers.

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- Development of "Education for Democracy" civics materials including a reference book for secondary teachers on the history, ideas and practice of democracy and a handbook on democratic teaching techniques with complementary teaching materials for classroom use

Significant progress has been made for each of the outputs described immediately above. The project has the potential of reaching the secondary school population throughout the country with civic education messages. The importance of this population must not be underestimated given the fact that most of these students will be able to participate in the 1996 national elections. There is a potential for the project to reach into the Nicaraguan society beyond the formal education system.

This project benefits significantly from the input received from the AFT. AFT's contributions have allowed the project to operate at a high return on investment for USAID/Nicaragua given the substantial in-kind support from the AFT Educational Foundation.

The role that the cross-section of educators, politicians, and citizens played in developing a strategic framework for civic education in Nicaragua in the medium of the CED set the tone for an exemplary participatory process that has characterized this project from its inception. The very nature of efficacious programming of D&G activities requires consensus building using a participatory approach.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ***Role of USAID/Nicaragua-Funded Civic Education Textbooks:*** Near the very end of the evaluation process, the Evaluation Team learned of the existence of the civic education textbooks for the public school system that had been provided by USAID/Nicaragua prior to the initiation of this activity. The team is unable to reach informed conclusions regarding the utility of these textbooks in connection with the process in which the AFT activity is currently engaged. It is critical that USAID/Nicaragua, in conjunction with AFT and MED, review the appropriateness of these textbooks with regard to the following options:
 - These text books should continue being used as the official text for civic education in the public school system of Nicaragua.
 - It should be recommended that these textbooks be discontinued.
 - AFT should enhance the curriculum development and teacher training processes to take into consideration the fact that these textbooks are out there in the schools and are being utilized.
 - AFT should significantly curtail its plans, recognizing that there is a satisfactory textbook presently available, and recognizing the special effort in

which AFT is currently engaged is a fringe benefit that Nicaragua can ill afford.

After reviewing this issue, USAID/Nicaragua should consider the Recommendations listed immediately below. (Note: This review should include the paper, "Evaluacion de Programmas de Estudio de Ciencias Sociales - Enfasis en los Programas de Formacion Civica de Secundaria" prepared by Lic. Ana Maria Soto and Lic. Alvaro Hernandez A., July, 1993.)

2. ***Continued Support for the CED:*** The cooperative agreement which supports the CED expires March 31, 1995. If the cooperative agreement is not renewed, it is unlikely that the progress in teacher training would be continued and a valuable resource could be lost. Therefore, USAID/Nicaragua should continue to support this project. As a part of the process of developing a new cooperative agreement a strategic planning process should be undertaken to clarify the role of the CED as it relates to the MED. Extending the program to include the primary level should be considered. A new MOU between the MED and the CED should continue to focus on the basic tasks of:
 - Continue the process of refining the civic education curriculum.
 - Continue training of civic education teachers at the secondary level.
 - Distribute more widely materials that have been developed or are being revised.
3. ***Expanded Role of the CED:*** The present activities could become just one component of a broader effort to support civic education. Additional CED outreach activities could be developed that reach beyond the public school system.
4. ***Curriculum Materials:*** Provisions to preserve and archive materials distributed to the schools should be facilitated. For example, a binder system or library box/container system to accompany materials distributed to the teachers should be developed to prevent loss of these educational materials.
5. ***Program Resources/Library/Archive:*** Educational materials and resources collected by the CED should be organized, maintained and made accessible for consultation by the MED and by teachers in the field.
6. ***Coordination with USAID/Nicaragua's Basic Education Project and CED Efforts in Primary Education:*** Personnel directing the Basic Education Project supported by USAID/Nicaragua should be in constant communication with CED personnel leading the Education for Democracy Project.
7. ***AFT Resident Advisor:*** Depending on the magnitude of USAID/Nicaragua's follow-on investment in public civic education, consideration should be given to having AFT

— provide a full-time resident advisor that has the appropriate professional background to guide this activity.

**Elements of a Logical Framework for the
Civic Education - AFT/Center for Education for Democracy (CED)**

PURPOSE: To develop and implement a civic education component of the formal education curriculum in Nicaragua in grades 8 through 12.

- OUTPUTS:**
1. 8-12 curriculum frameworks for democratic civic education developed.
 2. 8-12 actual curricula for democratic civic education developed.
 3. Twenty master high school teachers trained and responsible for developing model classroom activities for teaching democratic ideas and practices based on the curriculum framework.
 4. In-service training conducted in the field by trained master teachers.
 5. "Education for Democracy" civics materials including a civics reference book for secondary teachers on the history, ideas and practice of democracy and a handbook on democratic teaching techniques with complementary teaching materials for classroom use developed.

- INPUTS:**
1. The establishment of the Center for Education for Democracy with a project director and staff to train master teachers and develop the actual curriculum.
 2. Technical assistance from AFT and outside consultants in curriculum development.
 3. The development of a panel of distinguished Nicaraguan representing a political and social cross-section of the country to oversee and arrive at a consensus concerning the Education for Democracy Curriculum Framework.

(Note: This abbreviated Logical Framework was prepared by the Evaluation Team to identify the objectives of the activity. It was against these objectives that the Evaluation Team gauged the accomplishments of the activity.)

PART C: NED - CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS - NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (NDI)

BACKGROUND

When President Violeta Chamorro was inaugurated on April 25, 1990, she announced that General Humberto Ortega would remain as Chief of the Ejercito Popular Sandinista (EPS) for an indefinite period of time. While this announcement may have quieted discomfort within the armed forces concerning the new president, the civilian population in Nicaragua including many political leaders were alarmed and dismayed. It appeared that control of the military would escape the newly elected civilian government with General Ortega in charge.

NDI had a record of supporting democratic initiatives in Nicaragua that pre-dated the 1990 elections. With the agreement of many political influentials in Nicaragua, NDI developed a civil-military relations program premised on the belief that "agreement on issues concerning national defense and internal security must be the result of a broad social and political consensus."

NED awarded grants to NDI totaling \$276,294 for the period June, 1992 through December, 1994 to undertake the following activities:

- to promote civilian oversight and experience in security affairs;
- to familiarize Nicaraguan military officers with the nonpolitical role of armed forces in a democratic society; and
- to train civilian political leaders on security issues, stressing the important distinction between internal security and national defense and the supremacy of civilian authorities over the armed forces.

FINDINGS

Project Activities

In November 1992, NDI came to Nicaragua to undertake an initial evaluation of civil-military relations since the 1990 transition. The NDI delegation included Colonel Prudencio Garcia of Spain; Jose Manuel Ugarte, an adviser to the Argentine Congress; and Richard Millett, a professor of history and Central American affairs from the United States. The delegation met with General Ortega and his advisors; members of the Economic and Defense Committees of the National Assembly; President Chamorro; Minister of the Presidency, Antonio Lacayo; and other civilian notables. A report was issued and widely distributed throughout Nicaragua and the United States that concluded that "despite blunt rhetoric over the role of the military in Nicaragua, the roots of consensus were beginning to emerge."

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In May 1993, NDI sponsored a forum in Nicaragua to present its report on civil-military relations. The forum was attended by approximately 100 participants, including 20 military officers. The forum was also broadcast on television and radio. Again, the forum was attended by the principal decision-makers concerned with civil-military relations in Nicaragua including: Antonio Lacayo, Minister of the Presidency; General Humberto Ortega, Chief of the EPS; party leaders from the National Assembly; and leaders of other civilian organizations. General Ortega used the forum to announce that he would retire from his position as Chief of the Armed Forces in accordance with a new military law passed by the National Assembly and that he would agree to an institutionalization of a Ministry of Defense.

The next major activity promoted by NDI was a seminar in Managua on August 4-5, 1993 on "The New Role of the Armed Forces in Nicaragua." The program built on prior civil-military activities in Nicaragua by further expanding the range and level of participation. More than 90 people participated representing several levels of the command of the armed forces, numerous political parties, the National Assembly, the former Nicaraguan Resistance (Contras), and non-governmental organizations.

Four international civil-military relations experts participated in the program providing Nicaraguans with information on the role of the armed forces in other democratic societies: Juan Rial, noted History Professor from Uruguay; Gabriel Marcella, Professor of Third World Studies at the U.S. Army War College and former political-military advisor to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command; Luis Tibiletti, advisor to the Chairman of the Argentine Congressional Defense Committee and editor of Regional Strategic Security, a magazine on South American military affairs; and Erik Kjonnerod, former U.S. military officer and current professor at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. The program was broadcast on radio and there was partial coverage by television and the print media. The forum produced points of consensus and the following recommendations:

- Communication should be improved between civilian and military officials through similar seminar/workshop activities.
- Greater subordination of the military to civilian control should be guaranteed.
- Professionalization of the armed forces should continue to progress under adequate civilian control.
- Re-entry of military officers into civilian life should be insured.
- An adequate military budget should be established to cover the costs of the armed forces.
- Basic defense regulations dictating the function and organization of the armed forces should be developed through open public debate and discussion.

In November 1993, NDI received a direct request from Minister of the Presidency, Antonio Lacayo, for assistance in drafting military legislation. NDI consulted with the Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Assembly and in February 1994 fielded a survey team to Managua to determine appropriate next steps in the program.

As a result of that survey mission, NDI organized a civil-military seminar in conjunction with the National Assembly of Nicaragua on April 25-27, 1994. According to the June 1994 Quarterly report, "More than 250 people from various sectors of Nicaraguan society attended panels and workshops on topics such as the function of a ministry of defense, the role of the legislature in defense issues and the channels of communication between the armed forces and the civilian government. Participants in the two-day event included representatives of the executive, the National Assembly, political parties, the diplomatic community, the armed forces and nongovernmental organizations." NDI also sponsored the participation of five Haitian parliamentarians as observers.

The international panelists brought in for the seminar included: retired General Guilherme Belchior Vieira, former Director of the Superior Military Institute of Portugal; retired Colonel Julio Busquets, former Vice President of the Defense Commission of the Spanish Parliament; Horacio Jaunarena, Vice President of the Defense Commission of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and former Defense Minister of Argentina; retired U.S. Major General Bernard Lofke, former President of the Inter-American Defense Board; Patricio Rojas, former Defense Minister of Chile; and Jose Manuel Ugarte, advisor to the Argentine Congress on defense and security issues.

The seminar was well attended by the highest government officials and received extensive coverage in the press. Headlines of principal newspapers heralded, "Agreement EPS-Government" as Gen. Ortega and Min. of the Presidency Antonio Lacayo used the seminar as a platform to announce agreement concerning the Ley de Organizacion Militar (Military Organization Law).

Women in Development

The very nature of civil-military relations in Latin America does not portend well for female participation. There are no high ranking female military officers in Nicaragua. Civilians included in the private consultations and public conferences in this project did not include significant participation by women.

Project Management

NDI manages this project from Washington, D.C. Since the principal project activities include seminars and conferences, it has been possible to arrange these at a distance. NDI's modus operandi includes extensive consultation with all sectors in Nicaragua, as well as with USAID/Nicaragua and the U.S. Embassy concerning activities which are often of a sensitive, political nature.

All international participants and consultants in NDI's seminars and conferences participate without remuneration. Only travel expenses are covered. NDI has established a remarkable track record for attracting notable participants who donate their time.

A review of the documentation of this project suggests the following observations: while NDI's workplans are very general in nature, the quarterly reports and follow-up activity reports are quite detailed. There is a clear correlation between the workplans and subsequent activities with modifications incorporated only in response to USAID/Nicaragua's requests or the changing political context in which the project must operate.

Follow-up to project activities in terms of publications is good. NDI publishes and distributes widely reports on conferences in both English and Spanish. The continuity of the project suffers, however, from time lags in communication between the principal players in civil-military relations and the project coordinators. The flurry of activity prior to a major event and the event itself provokes attention to both the topic and the project. However, in between the seminars and conferences, many Nicaraguan participants commented that they did not know what was being planned.

CONCLUSIONS

NDI's program on Civil-Military Relations in Nicaragua has been successful in bringing together the highest level civilian and military leaders to discuss the nature of civil-military relations in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan participants interviewed for this evaluation commented repeatedly that the exposure to the experiences of other militaries and governments undergoing democratic transitions such as Spain, Argentina and Chile provided valuable insights to the problems at hand in Nicaragua.

NDI's seminars and conferences offered a "non-threatening" forum for both civilians and military to discuss openly these delicate issues. Both civilian leaders and the highest military commander utilized these fora to express in public changes in positions which previously had been intransigent.

In 1994, a new military law was passed by the National Assembly. In 1995, a transition to a new commander of the armed forces is to take place in accordance with that law. The cultivation of this transition was assisted directly by the private consultations and the public seminars of the NDI civil-military program.

RECOMMENDATION

1. ***Continued Support for Civil-Military Dialogue:*** USAID/Nicaragua in the context of the Country Team should explore additional vehicles to support a civil-military dialogue beyond conferences which convene civilians and military for only brief moments in time. Also, the next steps in the civil-military dialogue should have a higher degree of participation by Nicaraguans in both design and implementation. For

example, a series of focused seminars on specific topics could also be utilized to produce a set of issue papers written by Nicaraguans on civil-military relations. In the process of developing a new dimension of this activity, a further role for NDI should be considered given the excellent performance that it has demonstrated to date.

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Elements of a Logical Framework for the Civil-Military Relations Activity

- PURPOSE:** To promote civilian oversight in security affairs.
- Indicator: Civilian control over military established by law.
- OUTPUTS:**
1. Number and quality of hearings held by Defense Committee of National Assembly increased.
 2. Ability of the National Assembly to acquire information from the military improved.
 3. National Assembly's role in developing military budget increased.
 4. Nicaraguan military officers familiarized with the nonpolitical role of armed forces in a democratic society.
 5. Civilians in government familiarized with the nonpolitical role of armed forces in a democratic society.
- INPUTS:**
1. International consultants convened to work in private with civilians and military in Nicaragua concerning civil-military issues.
 2. International conference on civil-military relations in Managua, co-sponsored by the National Assembly's Defense Committee.
 3. A series of one-day fora in four regions of the country to enable military officers, politicians and other private citizens to discuss the role of the military in a democratic Nicaragua.
 4. Training of civilian political leaders on security issues, stressing the important distinction between internal security and national defense and the supremacy of civilian authorities over the armed forces.

(Note: This abbreviated Logical Framework was prepared by the Evaluation Team to identify the objectives of the activity. It was against these objectives that the Evaluation Team gauged the accomplishments of the activity.)

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PART D: NED - CIVIC EDUCATION - THE NICARAGUAN DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (INDE) - AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION

BACKGROUND

As part of the civic education component of USAID/Nicaragua's SDI project, between July of 1992 and September of 1994, two consecutive grants totalling \$165,000 were given to the America's Development Foundation (ADF, a U.S. PVO) for civic education activities undertaken by the Nicaraguan Development Institute (INDE).

The overall goal of these activities was: "To encourage Nicaraguan private sector organizations to become more active in the country's public life, to foster popular understanding of democratic values and processes, and to promote greater civic participation by an informed and responsible citizenry."

During the course of the two ADF grants, NED became convinced that INDE had "graduated" and was able to manage a third grant directly, without a U.S. intermediary. Thus, INDE itself was given a further grant by NED for the period from October 1994 through September 1995. It is the ADF/INDE grants that are the subject of this evaluation.

Initially, INDE activities were billed as "INDE/FUNDE," and were to be carried out in conjunction with and the participation of FUNDE (the Nicaraguan Development Foundation), a sister organization. However, as the project evolved increasing emphasis was placed on activities involving only INDE. While INDE was founded in 1963, and FUNDE was not created until 1969, the latter has become the larger of the two. The INDE Coordinator of this project noted that: "During the war INDE and FUNDE had to work together; now they are separate again." While the relationship appears to be close, the two groups increasingly pursue their own objectives. INDE's relate more to policy issues, while FUNDE is concerned with economic development, generating investments, etc. Despite that, the project coordinator believes that "there is greater interest in democracy among coops than among businesses."

FINDINGS

About INDE

Both INDE and FUNDE are dedicated to private sector interests. INDE's members are businesses of all sizes, as well as individual entrepreneurs, while FUNDE is an organization made up of cooperatives, both agricultural and commercial.

INDE members are grouped in chapters in different parts of the country. Each chapter has its own pesonaria juridica, sponsors its own programs, and operates as a totally independent entity. Monthly membership dues run from 20 Cordobas for individuals to a maximum of 500 Cordobas for businesses. However, in Managua, some businesses voluntarily pay more. Dues from the Managua chapter go to INDE headquarters, and are the

financial mainstay of the organization. All other chapters retain 100% of the dues collected, and pay no fee for services even when INDE-central is requested to provide them technical assistance. Reportedly, collaboration among all chapters only occurs in relation to national problems. It was also reported that the head office in Managua is not responsible for inter-chapter communication. However, with funds from GTZ of Germany, one person from the Managua office travels around the country visiting chapters. The organization does publish a monthly newsletter called INDEsarrollo, which is sent to chapters. Also, special materials have been published for workshops and seminars.

Currently, INDE has six chapters, located in Matagalpa, Jinotega, Leon, Granada, Chinandega, and Ocotal. Esteli and Nueva Segovia are to establish chapters soon. Membership data are not gender-disaggregated. With regard to the participation of women on the boards of these chapters, which generally include from seven to ten people, the following (verbal) information was provided: Leon = 2; Chinandega = 1; Managua = 3; Matagalpa = 0; Jinotega = 4; Granada = 0.

INDE is an important chamber within the Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada (COSEP), an entity made up of chambers of commerce, which appears to be vocal in certain policy matters such as the formulation of the Labor Code recently adopted.

While INDE finances a variety of programs, it does not contribute to this project. The democracy/civic education initiative is funded solely by this NED/USAID support.

Evolution of Project Activities

A review of the record shows a clear evolution in terms of the location and nature of INDE's activities and objectives. And here it should be noted that, from the beginning, INDE has produced clear work plans, and has used Logical Framework methodology to shape and track activities. ADF technical assistance included planning, activity-charting and the formulation of Logical Frameworks. The project coordinator says that "the logframe completely changed our vision."

During the first year of project execution, INDE worked in the departments of Matagalpa, Boaco, Granada, Leon, Chinandega, Masaya and Managua. The program consisted of forums, workshops, and seminars on democracy and civic themes, dozens of which were held in the places mentioned. The purpose of those events, broadly stated, was to provide civic education in the fundamentals of democracy (e.g., the separation of powers, citizens' rights and duties, tolerance for differing opinions, etc.) and to provide training in leadership skills, organizational management, fund-raising, and the like in order to strengthen entities associated with INDE and FUNDE. Specific topics included such themes as the democratic management of cooperatives, the role of the armed forces in the public life of the country, human rights, the importance of the secret ballot, the selection of appropriate candidates for public and private office, the dangers associated with nepotism and the persistence of authoritarian habits in the management of private and public institutions. The courses also sought to stimulate interest in the strengthening of voluntary associations.

As recorded, the lessons drawn from those experiences included the need to work with formal organizations rather than with informal groups, to avoid an overly academic approach to training, and to employ participatory methodologies.

To support these training activities, INDE also produced a series of special publications and didactic materials on democracy, leadership, team building, and so forth.

From project initiation, INDE has also been very committed to raising public awareness concerning civic topics through the mass media, including radio and television but particularly through the press. The strategy adopted was to write frequent letters to the editors of the various newspapers. This has paid off handsomely, especially at La Prensa and La Tribuna (where the project coordinator works as a design technician at night). Coverage is also sought for special panel or round table discussions on topics of the day. (We can personally attest to this, since the panel discussion on electoral systems we attended on January 26 was covered with large articles in both those newspapers - even though only about 30 people attended.) Since INDE is seen as a very conservative organization, it is generally not covered by a number of other local papers.

Later, the geographic scope of project activities was reduced in order to facilitate closer monitoring and follow-up. It was clear that the broad-brush approach, which is felt to have been necessary at the outset, had not led to long-lasting results and was no longer the most appropriate way to pursue project objectives. Moreover, it was decided that it was necessary to train trainers (multiplicadores), in order to better ensure lasting impact. This group was selected from on-going seminars, and following the training was expected to continue the learning process within their own communities and with members of INDE chapters. The net result of this approach appears to be that a minimum number of those trained as multipliers are still active in project activities. However, some have provided subsequent in-kind support. Such is the case with Juan Toruno of Radio Dario, another SDI grantee, in Leon (now one of the two key cities in the project), who covers all INDE events on his station.

Objectives for the 1993/1994 NED grant specifically include "youth and women" as "key sectors of the population" if a widespread understanding of democracy is to be increased. However, there is no evidence that any specific project activities were ever designed to meet that objective. Nor are project participant data desegregated by gender. The project coordinator indicated that "women don't participate much in Managua, but more so in other places." As an example, he noted that "women play an important role in the economy in Leon," mentioning the Market Women's Association there as a very active group. He did not indicate that INDE had made efforts to work with those female entrepreneurs. The coordinator also stated that "women don't have access to credit: Nicaragua is machista." While he reported that it is not illegal for women to be given credit, the banks prefer not to do so, and for that reason additional requirements are imposed on female loan applicants.

The Final Phase

By October 1993, it was clear that INDE needed to revise the project's ambitious objectives and operations. Therefore, ADF contracted a consultant to facilitate an eight-day workshop at INDE for that purpose. At that point, it was decided that two chapters - Matagalpa (UNO) and Leon (FSLN) would serve as pilot sites where most project activities would be concentrated. The following new objectives were chosen, and accomplishments to date are shown:

- To increase chapter membership in Matagalpa and Leon by no less than 10 members per year. Result: The project coordinator reports that this has been accomplished, though membership varies: some come in, some leave.
- To foster democratic procedures within INDE and its affiliated cooperatives in Matagalpa and Leon. Result: Following a long process of consultation and education, the project has succeeded not only in changing election procedures in the two cities targeted, but also within the organization as a whole. Voting procedures now require there be at least two candidates for every position (usually there are about four), and voting be done by secret ballot. It has been agreed by the leadership that, at the March 1995 INDE Assembly, the organization's statutes will be officially amended to reflect this change. Prior to this, Board members were chosen as a slate and they decided who the officers would be. In essence, this represents a revolution in the way INDE operates. FUNDE, however, has resisted such a move. Nor has INDE been able to interest COSEP in democratizing its election procedures.

In a related but unexpected development, the taxi coop in Chinandega (FSLN members) asked INDE about "the democracy story." After learning what was going on in the organization, coop members decided that they, too, would democratize their procedures. They now have annual assemblies, and elect officials by secret ballot.

- To enable INDE chapters to better serve the interests of their communities, promoting relations between the business sector and other population groups and interesting all citizens in developing a proactive presence and holding elected officials, especially at the local level, accountable and responsive to their concerns. Result: Here again, Matagalpa and Leon were used as pilot sites. Beginning with the persons who had been trained as multipliers, a refresher course was provided. For Matagalpa and Leon plans were developed to meet this objective. Result: All but one person in Matagalpa have ceased to participate as multipliers. Though they remain supportive of INDE in general, the project coordinator reports they are basically "unmotivated." Leon, however, is another story. There the group of active participants has grown to 147 people, one of whom serves voluntarily as liaison to INDE headquarters in Managua. (He came to the office during this interview process, and also attended the January 26 panel discussion in Managua.) The INDE manual.

"Democracy" is used to ensure that everyone in the group transmits the same message.

- To increase citizen presence at local government council meetings (Cabildos Municipales) in Matagalpa and Leon. This includes both INDE chapter board members and individual members of affiliated entities. This is to strengthen INDE's position to serve as a legitimate and effective link between civil society and government. Result: In Matagalpa, the Mayor (who had been president of the INDE chapter there) promoted this participation and dialogue. In Leon, the Mayor (FSLN), building on the groundwork laid by INDE, obtained resources from the Spanish Technical Cooperation Fund for a community-wide civic education project called Leon, Siglo 21. While the project coordinator feels that INDE could have done this if they had been given the money, he is pleased that the effort is indeed going forward.

Another initiative that INDE had in mind was to stimulate relations between disarmed persons and business people. However, that was not pursued since, as the project coordinator affirmed, "INDE is not seen as a valid interlocutor."

Project Management

In late 1992, with the departure of the Project Director, a successor was named and the project staff was re-vamped. The secretary position was eliminated, with remaining staff members being responsible for their own secretarial work. And the title of Project Director was also eliminated, with duties re-assigned among the three coordinators (Program, Administrative, and Logistics), who are supported by two technical specialists. Also, to avoid paying such a large percentage of the budget in taxes to the government, salaries were reduced and an amount equivalent to the reduction was provided as reimbursement for expenses. Thus, the project budget was re-configured to reflect these changes.

Throughout the entire period under study, ADF maintained close relations with INDE, visiting frequently and providing technical assistance as needed. On a scale of one to ten, the project coordinator rates the overall quality of ADF technical assistance as "eight and a half." During ADF's last visit the INDE project coordinator was disappointed when he was given to understand that ADF was no longer interested in working with this project, suggesting that they apply to NED directly. Meanwhile, NED reports great difficulty in getting an appropriate proposal from ADF, noting that drafts were too vague and ambitious. Finally, on meeting with INDE in person, and realizing that the organization was in fact very clear about what it wanted to do, NED/W decided on the direct grant approach. The project coordinator now reports that the new ADF representative has indicated their interest in working on another project with INDE once the NED grant expires.

Meanwhile, the NED/Managua Office Director has also maintained a close relationship with INDE, providing assistance whenever possible. He has also served as liaison with USAID/Nicaragua, with which the INDE coordinator has had infrequent and superficial contact. He reports that no one from USAID/Nicaragua has ever visited the project office.

INDE project documents, as well as narrative and financial reports, appear to be in excellent order, with progress roughly related to the indicators identified in the logframe.

CONCLUSIONS

By virtue of these activities, INDE has strengthened substantially its capacity to provide civic education to its members and their communities. It has successfully provided training, didactic materials and community-based models for use by its members in the business sector, and has encouraged them to become more active in the country's public life - the main goal of the project.

While INDE as an institution officially supports and has benefitted from this project, it is not contributing any of its own financial resources to the effort. Therefore, it is fair to wonder about the degree to which civic education has been institutionalized as an on-going organizational priority.

INDE's own internal procedures, such as the election process, have been democratized through this project. However, that is not true of FUNDE.

Through a rolling-design approach, the project was revised in a timely manner, allowing it take advantage of lessons learned and to keep pace with changing circumstances through the formulation of new strategies. However, some new priorities, such as activities targeting youth and women, as well as human rights, were not addressed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ***Shrinking Funds & SDI Priorities:*** Given the magnitude of expected budget cuts, USAID/Nicaragua will want to give careful consideration to the priorities it sets for future funding. Before allocating additional support for this project, once the current NED grant expires (September 1995), USAID/Nicaragua and NED should seriously explore the following options:
 - INDE has enjoyed USG support for quite a number of years and, though willing to sponsor this civic education initiative, does not contribute to the effort. USAID/Nicaragua could require that an increasing amount of counterpart funds from INDE and/or FUNDE be contributed if the project is to continue. This could help ensure the institutionalization and longer term sustainability of these efforts.
 - Another NED component, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is providing support and technical assistance to COSEP, of which INDE is a key affiliate. It may be more appropriate for USAID/Nicaragua to dedicate scarce SDI resources to other priority areas, leaving civic education in the business sector to NED/CIPE.

2. ***Credit and Other Special Problems of Business Women:*** Should USAID/Nicaragua or NED decide that INDE is to receive an additional grant, and even during the remainder of the current grant, INDE should be asked to investigate the special problems of Nicaraguan business women and devise activities aimed at advocating solutions at local and national levels. This process could be initiated by calling all female INDE chapter members (or board members) together to identify priorities and participate in the planning process. Since the INDE project coordinator sees women as being "easier to come together and reach agreement," and "making much greater efforts to negotiate," this could be a highly positive new learning strategy for strengthening the entire institution.

**Elements of a Logical Framework for
the Nicaraguan Development Institute (INDE)**

PURPOSE: To spark a cultural transformation in Nicaragua that will both ease the consolidation of democratic rule and make possible a resumption of economic growth and social progress.

- OUTPUTS:**
1. Widespread understanding and intellectual advocacy of democracy promoted by supporting and enhancing the role of key sectors of the population such as youth, women, and the business and professional communities.
 2. Initiatives enhanced of private sector organizations grouped under the institutional framework of INDE and its program affiliate FUNDE in their efforts to promote democratic leadership, consistent with the Nicaraguan transition process launched after the outcome of the 1990 elections.
 3. The nonviolent and democratic participation of citizens in solving problems at the local and national levels promoted by encouraging the exercise of their constitutional rights and cultivating an open and tolerant environment.
 4. INDE/FUNDE programs strengthened institutionally by expanding their geographical reach and the number of participants.

INPUTS: Regional forums on topics related to above outputs, with participants coming from cooperatives and from trade, business, and professional organizations.

Regional workshops to help FUNDE member cooperatives develop skills needed to act as effective interest groups.

Production of multi-media educational and promotional materials, including 3,000 manuals on leadership and organization development.

Workshops for FUNDE cooperatives and INDE national chapters, tailored to the specific needs of each group.

Lectures on topics related to the economic component of democratic development for FUNDE cooperatives and INDE national chapters.

Special programs for women and youth.

(Note: This abbreviated Logical Framework was prepared by the Evaluation Team to identify the objectives of the activity.)

**PART E: NED - PROMOTION OF STRENGTHENED POLITICAL PARTIES -
GRUPO FUNDEMOS - INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE
(IRI)**

BACKGROUND

In June 1991, the International Republic Institute (IRI) submitted a three-year proposal to NED for the purpose of supporting political party development in Nicaragua. IRI proposed a series of seminars to be carried out in conjunction with democratic parties and leaders to promote party training, public policy development, and democratic education. A longer term objective was to develop an indigenous institute for political education in Nicaragua to serve as an administrative base.

With FY1990 reprogrammed USAID funds, IRI had created Grupo FUNDEMOS, a private, non-profit, multi-partisan organization in Nicaragua to serve as the host country vehicle for IRI-supported political party development seminars and other activities. Thus, Grupo FUNDEMOS was founded in July 1991 "to foster Nicaragua's democratic transition by providing civic education to Nicaraguan citizens and strengthening democratic political parties."

In May 1992, Grupo FUNDEMOS received a sub-grant from IRI as part of the grant from NED. The grant period extended from June 1, 1992 to February 28, 1993. This grant was renewed in 1993 and 1994 and now has a closing date of June 30, 1995. Grant awards from NED to IRI, and IRI to Grupo FUNDEMOS are as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>NED Award to IRI</u>	<u>IRI Award to Grupo</u>
3/1/92-2/28/93	\$180,000	\$122,400
4/1/93-3/31/94	195,112	117,000
7/1/94-6/30/95	204,872	128,412
Total:	\$579,994	\$367,812
Total retained by IRI:	\$212,172	

FINDINGS

Grupo FUNDEMOS Program Activities

Grupo FUNDEMOS has actively provided an opportunity for persons with opposing viewpoints to discuss in an open forum controversial topics within the political arena. The activities have been organized as debates, conferences, seminars or workshops on topics related to both current political issues and longer-term political development concerns.

Grupo FUNDEMOS has developed an invitation list which includes representatives from all political parties, the government and other civic organizations. Many of its activities are announced in the media as an open invitation to anyone interested. Both men and women participate in these activities, but gender participation has not been documented.

FUNDEMOS's extensive list of activities is impressive in terms of numbers of activities and numbers of participants. Documents reviewed include a calendar replete with meetings, seminars and debates on topics, just to name a few, such as:

- Retention of Foreign Aid - The Implications
- Challenges of the Transition to Democracy
- Community Development: Procedures and Programs
- National Unity and the Atlantic Coast
- William Walker: the Predestined [new book presentation]
- Basic Principles of Municipal Administration
- What is Happening in Czechoslovakia?
- Exploring a National Consensus
- Democracy, Political Morality, and a Market Economy
- Corruption, Transparency and the Democratic Transition

The documentation demonstrates a cross-section of participation across the political spectrum from the far right to the middle most of the time, and to the almost-far-left some of the time. It appears, however, that the emphasis on reaching numbers and targets across the spectrum outweighs the attention spent on preparing for events and providing reports afterward. To its credit, FUNDEMOS has organized events outside Managua, and has attempted to gain recognition throughout the country. Requests for events or support for activities are received from different political parties.

Many participants interviewed suggested that the events held by FUNDEMOS were interesting and relevant. Initial concern about the origins of FUNDEMOS as having been rooted in the UNO coalition have been mitigated by the expansion of the Junta Directiva and the appointment of a new executive director.

Comments by all interviewed were favorable about the respectful manner in which debates on controversial topics were held. A telling response to a question about the value of organizations such as FUNDEMOS in the Nicaraguan political arena came from Sergio Ramirez, former Vice President of Nicaragua under the Sandinista government and current leader of the Ramirista faction of the FSLN, who might be expected to comment negatively. Instead, he stated that activities at FUNDEMOS, "teach us to be civil to one another and respectful in our disagreement."

Political Party Training

FUNDEMOS is organizing training seminars for young political party leaders and others. To date, the operative word for these activities is: seminar, not training. Even, the label seminar is a misnomer; "meeting" might be a more appropriate characterization.

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The modus operandi for these activities identified as political party training is for a group to sit and listen to someone talk for hours on end with the ultimate hope for at least a question/answer session. Recognizing that the "talking head" at the front of the room is a common method of teaching in Latin America, it does not appear that IRI has provided training methodologies for the FUNDEMOS staff. The staff on its own, and in consultation with political analysts and professors, is developing a training module. This has not yet been completed.

Dissemination of Information

FUNDEMOS has a relatively small budget for publications and has issued the first Boletin Informativo. The bulletin includes information about past activities and a descriptions of the components of the program for the coming year: programs on political party training and development, monthly debates and a monthly television program that is being developed.

Women in Development

The powers that be in FUNDEMOS are women. The executive director is a woman; and the two IRI program officers overseeing this activity are women. However, there are no women on the Board of Directors of FUNDEMOS. Women participate actively in FUNDEMOS events, but gender-segregated data has not been collected. The programming of events has not focused on topics of special interest to women; a topic such as the reform of the Family Law would be an appropriate for FUNDEMOS programming.

Workplans and Reporting

Neither the workplans nor the reporting on this project offer sufficient information to allow meaningful monitoring or evaluation of this activity. Grupo FUNDEMOS workplans are passed on by IRI to NED and USAID without any additional input. Nor is there any indication of additional review or input by USAID/Nicaragua.

Similarly, quarterly reports by IRI are based on monthly reports from FUNDEMOS which include the number of activities held, the nature of the activities and the number of participants. Very little, if any, qualitative comment concerning progress toward objectives, problems encountered, or other such details is included.

CONCLUSIONS

Grupo FUNDEMOS is a local non-governmental organization that is capable of convening and organizing activities that support political party development. The energy of the new executive director, Violeta Granera de Sandino, and the dedication of the small staff and volunteers is most evident. However, the project suffers from lack of organizational focus and an insufficient training methodology which would improve its ability to achieve its objectives in a more efficacious and thorough manner.

Grupo FUNDEMOS offers an important potential for political party development in Nicaragua. However, the present methods under which it is operating are not likely to achieve significant gains toward that end. IRI has not provided enough guidance or technical assistance to allow FUNDEMOS to become the effective organization that it might be.

It appears that Grupo FUNDEMOS has been so busy trying to mobilize people interested in politics to provide impressive head-counts for IRI that it has focused on quantitative as opposed to qualitative variables. Clearly, it is important to the objectives of this project to convene a large cross-section of the Nicaraguan political sector. However, to measure success in terms of how many events are held, how many people attend, and whether or not the Sandinistas are represented undermines the higher purpose of this project: to encourage participation in a democratic system of government through political parties.

Technical assistance from IRI to FUNDEMOS was difficult to ascertain. In addition, neither the executive director nor members of the Junta Directiva were aware of what IRI's role should be, or could be, in helping them development their program.

FUNDEMOS has an organizational structure, a modest facility, and a staff dedicated to non-partisan principles which could be utilized in civic education activities for the 1996 election. However, the Recommendations identified below must first be addressed before a role can be identified for FUNDEMOS in the transition to the election of 1996.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ***IRI Should Provide FUNDEMOS TA on Training Methods:*** IRI should undertake immediately the training of the FUNDEMOS staff to ensure quality training design and implementation in political party development. Training materials should be developed and distributed to participants.
2. ***Follow-up and Published Reports on Activities:*** In addition to publication of a newsletter, training materials and activity reports should be prepared for a wider distribution.
3. ***Management and Follow-up:*** Grupo FUNDEMOS should focus more on the preparation for and follow-up to its events to ensure a higher level of quality of its activities. A reduction in the number of extraneous events will allow the FUNDEMOS staff more time to prepare, evaluate and report on its activities.
4. ***Women on FUNDEMOS Board:*** FUNDEMOS should add women to its Board of Directors so their deliberations reflect the views of both genders and the body is more representative of the overall population the organization is trying to reach.

Elements of a Logical Framework for FUNDEMOS

- PURPOSE:** To encourage participation through responsible political parties.
- OUTPUTS:**
1. Effectiveness of democratic political party organization in Nicaragua enhanced
 2. Open debate among a diverse spectrum of political, civic and governmental representatives achieved
- INPUTS:**
1. Organizational support and TA provided by IRI to Grupo FUNDEMOS to engage in the following activities:
 - Political ideology symposia with participation of international political experts
 - Methodological symposia and workshops on political party organization, recruitment, platform formation, etc.
 - Topical seminars on such issues as Constitutional Reform, Democratic Development, etc.

(Note: This abbreviated Logical Framework was prepared by the Evaluation Team to identify the objectives of the activity. It was against these objectives that the Evaluation Team gauged the accomplishments of the activity.)

PART F: NED - PROMOTION OF A CREDIBLE, PROFESSIONAL, AND INDEPENDENT MEDIA - CANAL 8

BACKGROUND

Because of the high degree of illiteracy in Nicaragua, electronic news casting is an important option. It is estimated that 89% of the urban population has access to radio and 87% has access TV. Most media enterprises in Nicaragua exist to promote their own political agendas. However, Canal 8 won support from NED for the purchase of critical technical equipment because of its declared independence from partisan pressures.

Anticipated outputs include:

1. Improved quality and increased quantity of the news casting.
2. Increased and improved public affairs programming.
3. Additional advertising revenue generated to help sustain new programming initiatives.

FINDINGS

Implementation

The equipment purchased with the NED grants of \$52,500 and \$81,175 is being used to enhance the programming capacity of Canal 8 as was its intended purpose. All the equipment that was to be provided by the grants is in place, being fully utilized, and the final financial accounting has been fully rendered.

Impact

There was definite progress achieved in terms of the three outputs identified in the Background section above. The equipment purchased with the grant funds is operational, and it is adding to the quality of the production effort at Canal 8.

Canal 8's station identifier proclaims its independence. The significance of this self-proclamation relates to the fact that other Nicaraguan television stations are identified closely with a political party or, as in the case of Channel 6, government owned. Canal 8 transmits the international news programs of TeleNoticias which operates out of Miami, Florida. Two programs which have garnered accolades for Canal 8 are "A Fondo" (In Depth) and "Por Que Nicaragua Nos Importa" (Why Nicaragua is Important to Us). Each offers public interest programming concerning political, social and economic issues. Using interview formats and viewer call-ins, government officials, political party leaders, intellectuals, and other leaders

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discuss timely topics of concern. The programs have been well received by viewers. Decision-makers and other influentials often seek an opportunity to appear on these programs.

CONCLUSION

This activity is a success story. Though the chief executive officer of Canal 8 will probably be requesting additional funds to enhance his programming capacity, Canal 8 should not be awarded additional support from USAID/Nicaragua which has other higher priorities. However, this decision should be made in the context of the U.S. Government's requirements for funding activities that support the objective of supporting a free, fair, and peaceful election in 1996.

Canal 8 is a good option for providing independently produced and balanced news. The equipment provided by the NED grants has served to support the development of this capacity.

Elements of a Logical Framework for Canal 8

- PURPOSE:** Foster greater diversity and freer flow of information via electronic news media.
- OUTPUTS:**
1. Improved quality and increased quantity of newscasting.
 2. Increased and improved public affairs programming.
 3. Additional advertising revenue generated.
- INPUTS:** Grants of \$52,500 and \$81,175 that were used to purchase equipment.

(Note: This abbreviated Logical Framework was prepared by the Evaluation Team to identify the objectives of the activity. It was against these objectives that the Evaluation Team gauged the accomplishments of the activity.)

PART G: NED - PROMOTION OF A CREDIBLE, PROFESSIONAL, AND INDEPENDENT MEDIA - RADIO DARIO

BACKGROUND

NED initially awarded a grant to Radio Dario through Delphi International in 1990 designed to provide support to promote independent media in Nicaragua. It was used to purchase equipment critical to allowing Radio Dario expand its operations country-wide. NED, using grant funds from the SDI Project, made two separate grants of \$50,000 and \$38,000 permitting Radio Dario to cover the hard currency costs for purchasing and replacing badly needed equipment critical to Radio Dario's operations and partial funding of the stations operating costs necessary to strengthen the station's financial viability and programming capacity.

FINDINGS

Implementation

The activity has been well managed and reporting has been abundant. All funds programmed and obligated, have been expended and accounted for. All equipment purchased with the grant funds has been installed and is presently operational.

Accomplishments

There is every indication that the activity has successfully achieved the purpose level objective as well as the outputs identified above. There is a constant flow of local leaders and public opinion makers covering the political spectrum that speak over Radio Dario. Just recently the Sandinista Mayor of Leon discussed local problems over Radio Dario as did elements of the local police force. The President of the National Assembly has also been on Radio Dario. A daily program, Point of View, is devoted to an hour plus of programming concerned with public issues of a civic nature. Each Sunday a special program concerned with civic affairs is aired.

Except for parts of the Atlantic Coast, Radio Dario has achieved national coverage. Financially this station is stronger because of its ability to attract a national audience.

Women In Development

Of the approximately 11 employees at the station, four are women including the Controller of the operation. Women leaders play a significant role in forums presented by Radio Dario as a part of its programming concerned with public, civic issues.

CONCLUSIONS

Radio Dario has achieved the objectives identified in the grant agreements. Though the station has further requests for equipment that would provide it FM capacity, an expenditure of funds for this activity is not seen as a priority.

Elements of a Logical Framework for Radio Dario

- GOAL:** To encourage and sustain a higher degree of independent public opinion and an informed citizenry by restoring Radio Dario to its previous programming level.
- PURPOSE:** Radio Dario becomes a national, independent radio station broadcasting beyond the departmental level.
- OUTPUTS:**
1. Radio Dario functioning and expanding its broadcasting range.
 2. Increased programming promoting free discussion, consensus building, and the advancement of democratic ideas.
 3. Radio Dario has achieved a greater degree of financial sustainability.
- INPUTS/ACTIVITIES:**
1. Hard currency costs for purchasing and replacing badly needed equipment critical to Radio Dario's operations.
 2. Partial funding of the stations operating costs necessary to strengthen the station's financial viability and programming capacity.

(Note: This abbreviated Logical Framework was prepared by the Evaluation Team to identify the objectives of the activity. It was against these objectives that the Evaluation Team gauged the accomplishments of the activity.)

PART II: HUMAN RIGHTS - AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION (ADF) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

Having included a human rights component in the SDI project, USAID/Nicaragua identified two independent, non-partisan Nicaraguan human rights groups (the Asociacion Nicaraguense Pro Derechos Humanos; ANPDH, and the Comision Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Nicaragua; CPDH) for support by way of sub-grants through a U.S. PVO, the America's Development Foundation (ADF). Thus, ADF was awarded a three-year Cooperative Agreement (C.A.) for this purpose. In addition to sub-grants, ADF was also to provide technical assistance to the two Nicaraguan NGOs. Specifically, the project's objective was to strengthen the institutional capacity of ANPDH and CPDH to promote human rights, and to investigate, report, denounce, and campaign against human rights abuses.

Project support has covered three distinct phases. Phase I provided bridge funding for the first five months during which ADF delivered core support and technical assistance to ANPDH and CPDH for the creation of the internal financial management systems and controls necessary to be certified to manage USAID-funded sub-grants, and for the development of detailed proposals and budgets for Phase II. That second phase consisted of institutional development and specific program activities, for which sub-grants included both administrative and program support. Meanwhile, ADF continued to provide technical assistance. Phase III began with a May 1994 project amendment which included new objectives, and was to give the two sub-grantees time to complete USAID NGO registration requirements so that USAID/Nicaragua could fund them directly in the future. Also, over that period sub-grantee support was gradually shifted away from administrative expenses to specific projects, while ADF technical assistance continued.

Overall View of ANPDH and CPDH

While CPDH was founded in Nicaragua in 1977, ANPDH was created overseas in 1986 by a group of Nicaraguan exiles, and did not move to Nicaragua until 1989.

The beliefs of the two organizations vis-a-vis human rights are virtually the same, but their individual priorities and the manner in which they pursue them, differ - mostly as a function of their particular organizational cultures. For example, CPDH has a large headquarters staff (18 persons) of fairly low-paid employees, while ANPDH has only half that number (9) of professionals in its Managua office who are paid roughly twice as much. Otherwise amenable, or indeed complementary, differences, and the ability of the two groups to work together have been hampered by resentments stemming from their origins, interpersonal and stylistic differences, and a conflicting sense of ownership of the very cause to which they are both committed.

CPDH: The Director, Lino Hernandez, is viewed as a "traditional leader" by those who have observed him over time. With close ties to the Catholic church, his positions on

the issues of the day tend to be extremely conservative, and his style of leadership is described by others as "verticalista." Thus, staff do not participate in the organization's overall planning or decision-making process, and inter-office communication is limited. In short, Lino Hernandez is CPDH.

The CPDH Board is comprised of 13 persons, one of whom is female. Board membership is static; while the term is four years, the same individuals are continually re-elected. There have been only two chairs since the organization began - a change caused by the death of the first. The Board meets once a month, while the Executive Committee, comprised of the President, Vice President, Secretary, and Treasurer, also meets monthly or whenever the need arises. Lino Hernandez (who is a member of the Board) and the CPDH Administrator, Luz Marina Gutierrez, are the only staff members who attend Board meetings.

This organization had established four regional offices (Carazo, Matagalpa, Leon, Juigalpa/Chontales) which employed a total of 11 persons. However, in response to the reduction of support received through the ADF sub-grant, in August 1994 Hernandez chose to close those offices while retaining all headquarters staff, publication functions, and other activities in Managua. Most interested parties, including ADF representatives, feel that this was a misguided decision, since it meant that communications from victims of human rights violations in the field have slowed to a trickle, and CPDH education efforts outside of Managua have been curtailed. Moreover, funds from Phase II of this project had been used to open two of those regional offices. CPDH has four departments: administration, communications, legal affairs, and education.

CPDH has one other important source of funds, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which has provided support for civic education courses, publications and so forth for some years now.

ANPDH: Before moving to Nicaragua, ANPDH had received a large amount of USG funding for human rights training for contra forces at camps in Honduras and Costa Rica. However, by the time this project was to begin, not all accounts had been squared. After its arrival in 1989 the organization was becoming an increasingly serious player on the Nicaraguan human rights scene. This lasted until June of 1994, when it was rocked by an internal "convulsion" which threatened to destroy it. We were told by all concerned that ADF played an important and highly positive role in averting a major, permanent disaster. That convulsion resulted in the departure of a number of staff members, including the Executive Director who, among other things, was accused of sexual harassment. It was at that point that Julio Cesar Saborio was asked to move up to the top post. Those difficulties set ANPDH back considerably. However, it appears that since taking over Saborio has been able to successfully re-constitute the organization, hiring back some departed staff, tightening up financial management and administrative systems, and facilitating internal planning and communication processes.

ANPDH has a regional office in Esteli, departmental offices in Matagalpa, Jinotega and Chontales, and local offices in Bluefields and Quilali. The total field staff consists of 12 full-time persons (including four women). In addition, ANPDH has facilitated the creation of

28 Comites Municipales de Derechos Humanos in Regions 5, 7, and 12, made up of volunteer collaborators. These are groups of citizens who come together at the municipal level to defend their communities against human rights violations, and to provide education on human rights values and principles. The nearest ANPDH office responds to requests for assistance from these Committees, and serves as liaison between them and Managua.

Another change that occurred as a result of the June 1994 convulsion was the complete re-structuring of the ANPDH Board which had been made up of paid staff representing the various departments - a fact that had caused considerable tension. Since then, a nine-member Board of outside professionals, also including a single female, has been established. The organization has four main departments: investigation, administration, computer operations & publications, and education.

ANPDH's sole source of support is the USAID/Nicaragua funding it receives through this project.

FINDINGS

Phase I (November 1991/March 1992)

The C.A. specified that during this period bridge funding was to be provided by ADF to the two local organizations in order to make them eligible for USAID sub-grants, and prepare activity-specific proposals for Phase II. As part of the support earmarked for ANPDH, ADF was authorized to reimburse that organization "up to \$30,392 for costs incurred from June 1991" to clear up fiscal discrepancies from the prior period.

Indeed, ADF did provide the required technical assistance for the installation in both organizations of financial accountability systems and computerized data bases for the recording and monitoring of human rights violations. Training was also provided for all staff members in the use of the new computers. In addition, an outside consultant was sent by ADF to work with each group to assess their internal needs, develop strategic plans, and formulate Phase II proposals, matrices (documents resembling Logical Frameworks), and budgets for Phase II.

Finally, ADF retained Price Waterhouse to perform organizational audits, resulting in that firm's certification of both groups as eligible for USAID-funded sub-grants.

Meanwhile, during this first phase, the two organizations carried on with their usual work of investigating and reporting human rights violations.

Phase II (March 1992/April 1994)

On February 26, 1992, ADF submitted to USAID/Nicaragua separate 24-month sub-grant proposals from ANPDH and CPDH for Phase II activities. It appears that ADF did not attempt to synthesize or harmonize these proposals in any way. The quality of these documents calls into question the thoroughness of the technical assistance provided by ADF

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in Phase I, as well as the quality controls employed at ADF headquarters. That is, they reveal a superficial strategic planning effort which led to "kitchen-sink" plans and voluminous documents titled matrix for the education activities included in the proposals, rather than solid overall project Logical Frameworks. In discussing that intervention with the two groups, they felt that the consultant's time had been too limited, but that his work had been helpful.

In essence, those Phase II proposals did not lay the groundwork for effective project monitoring and on-going evaluation. They contain far too many vague objectives at the output level (10 in the case of CPDH, and 12 for ANPDH which divided them into "Monitoring and protection of human rights," and "Education: promotion of human rights and democratic values"). Moreover, the indicators used tend to be general, with few containing quantitative measures and many with no means of verification. It is understandable that less-than-ideal proposals were forthcoming, given the situation in Nicaragua and the weakened condition of the two organizations. However, it does seem that since the two groups were obviously on the right track, an additional investment in technical assistance could have improved the planning process and the quality of these proposals considerably.

Also missing is a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system. That is, while the number and types of violations reported are registered, and newspaper clippings are provided by the two organizations with their quarterly reports, there is no provision for measuring the subsequent impact of the activities undertaken. It was reported by both organizations that the effort put into developing a matrix (pseudo-Logical Frameworks) for Phase II was done to fill a requirement. It was not clear to them that those documents are meant to be used as tools for on-going project revision, not merely filed away. In fact, many professional staff reported that they were not even aware that such a tool existed.

In Phase II, CPDH and ANPDH were each given funds to hire a project coordinator to oversee these activities. Apparently, because personnel was needed for other areas, the persons who, on paper, are to fill this role actually do not. At CPDH the person is head of the legal department and knows nothing of overall project activities, and at ANPDH the person is a lawyer who oversees one of the regions and is also in charge of education.

Organizational Training & Technical Assistance Workshops were carried with each sub-grantee during Phase II. From March 29 to April 2, 1993, ADF consultants facilitated a workshop with ANPDH technical personnel from headquarters and the field, along with selected volunteers, for the purpose of strengthening the organization's operational capacity. This was to be achieved through an increased understanding of the technical processes used to systematize data related to human rights violations, the consolidation of a data base that could be inter-related, and the training of personnel for the development of strategic analyses for the more efficient utilization of the data collected. During this workshop, ANPDH staff produced a series of recommendations that were to be implemented within the organization. Recommendations called for such actions as the development of work plans and an on-going planning system; the diversification of funding sources through research to identify other governmental and non-governmental donors in Latin America and internationally; additional staff training; the drafting of an organizational Procedures Manual; and others. On investigation, it appears that the organization has implemented almost none of those

recommendations. Again, this workshop seems to be recalled as a positive exercise and an interesting few days - a break from the real work of ANPDH.

A similar exercise was conducted by ADF consultants at CPDH from July 7 to 16, 1993, though it dealt more deeply with organizational rather than technical issues. At that time resistance to the switch from manual to automated data systems was discussed. The workshop report indicates that this "reflects the lack of clear reorganization of the work flow." It goes on to describe the work flow as converging at a central point with "each department receiving instructions from the executive level, but without linkages that open channels for horizontal communication." Indeed, as suggested earlier, that still appears to be the case. The report found that at the individual level, "computers are being used as glorified typewriters." Three specific workshop outputs are recorded in the report: 1) a participatory diagnosis, which identified the tensions created by the transition to a computerized mode of operations; 2) a new organization of the work flow was clearly laid out, and; 3) instruments necessary to respond to this new organization of the work were produced, including a case registration form, a press data bank, and processes to correlate information among departments, among others. A review of the status of the group's recommendations with the various departments revealed that very few of those actions have been pursued by management. Follow-on technical assistance was provided to CPDH by ADF in August, when a computer expert was retained to work on automation tasks with personnel in the areas of education, press, legal, filing systems, and publications.

It is clear from the record and from verbal reports that both organizations carried out important substantive work during Phase II, furthering the cause of human rights and the reconciliation of demobilized forces during a critical period in Nicaragua. This included the investigation, reporting and denouncing of human rights violations, and the education of local individuals and groups to recognize violations and take action on their own behalf.

However, except for the installation of automated financial management systems, plus the automation of data regarding human rights violations and improved publications, it is not apparent that the overall institutional capacity of either CPDH or ANPDH was significantly strengthened during this phase.

Phase III (May 1994/March 1995)

On March 31, 1994, ADF submitted a proposal for Phase III to USAID/Nicaragua. After considering the activities proposed, on May 13, 1994 USAID/Nicaragua officially informed ADF that it would approve a four-and-a-half month amendment "to support what it considers to be the most important activities noted in the description:"

- 1) increasing the capacity of the human rights organizations' use of media;
- 2) a coordination seminar for all human rights groups, and;
- 3) training of trainers for NGOs interested in human rights education, information gathering and/or advocacy.

In general, as reported to us by the former director of Barricada newspaper: "Each media outlet has its own human rights group, depending on their own ideological or political slant." He further explained that, since the press lacks the ability to carry out its own investigations, they don't know the local impact of human rights violations. Therefore, he maintains that, to cover this issue properly, what is needed is for human rights groups to collaborate at the local level and with national media.

Objectives re Coordination with Other Human Rights Groups & Training of Trainers

First it should be noted that, as a result of the 1993 Report of the Tripartite Commission [a body composed of the Verification Commission of Cardinal Obando Bravo, the Government of Nicaragua, and the OAS International Commission of Support & Verification (CIAV/OAS), which was created in 1992 to investigate human rights violations, since February 1994 CPDH and ANPDH have been working with CENIDH (the FSLN organization, and the only other specialized human rights group in the country) to develop some type of concrete joint action. This action became clear when the three were called together by the head of the new Police Academy and asked to prepare a training curriculum including human rights (i.e., prisoners' rights, role of the State, international conventions, etc.), and to give classes to new recruits. They agreed, and continue to work together on this initiative. More recently, the three organizations were summoned by the Minister of Foreign Relations, who asked for their assistance in monitoring human rights abuses at three border check points. Both ANPDH and CENIDH are participating in that effort.

In pursuit of this Phase III priority and with encouragement from ADF, CPDH and ANPDH began contacting other Nicaraguan organizations working in the human rights field. In addition to CENIDH, these groups have included: Catholic University, Central American University, University for Peace (UPAZ), IPADE, Evangelical Committee for Development Support (CEPAD), Cardinal's Commission for Verification, Pastoral Universitaria, and CIAV/OAS. With CPDH and ANPDH as the lead sponsors, ADF contracted various consultants to carry out a series of events which have been attended by some or all of the groups mentioned:

1. June 29, 1994 - a dialogue among human rights groups to begin the process of familiarization and the exchange of information on institutional objectives, the standards used for data collection and dissemination, efforts in the area of public awareness, and so forth.
2. July 28/29, 1994 - a "Consensus Seminar" to determine priority topics, discuss training strategies, communications, etc. Note: this was the first event attended by CENIDH, which is reported to have openly stated its discomfort with the process and the way the agenda was ignored in an effort to "force" an organic linkage of participating groups. CENIDH has refused to attend any further coordination sessions. Both CPDH and ANPDH feel that this Seminar was unproductive.

3. September 8/9, 1994 - Communications Seminar mentioned in previous section.
4. November 30/December 2, 1994 - an event titled Defensa Integral en Derechos Humanos, a training-of-trainers (TOT) workshop which was preceded by a survey of the institutional characteristics of participating organizations. There is no evidence that this event reaped the desired results; no core group of trainers was formed.
5. January 17/21, 1995 - a retreat at Selva Negra, Matagalpa, titled "Workshop on Prospects for Action by NGOs: Systematization of Information and the Effective Use of that Information in the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights." Two kinds of participants were targeted: those in charge of data collection and analysis, and persons "who work on various topics related to human rights, seeking to analyze, discuss and design a joint strategy that results in a culture of respect for human rights in Nicaraguan society." Participants were divided into two groups; one called "Action Strategies of Nicaraguan NGOs," and the other "Systematization of Human Rights Information." Based on-site observation, the latter group evaluated their part of the Workshop as "excellent," while the former (known as the "political group") made little forward progress, and was not as generous in its praise.
6. January 25, 1995 - an evaluation session (suggested at the Selva Negra workshop by Lino Hernandez) to review coordination efforts since the process began in June 1994. It is important to note that this half-day session was held at CEPAD, which also provided lunch. An important topic of discussion revolved around ADF's offer to sponsor a TOT for human rights educators (some two from each group). It was finally agreed that this should be held over three consecutive week-ends in late February or early March, since funds must be expended before the March 31 PACD.

According to all reports, this series of events has successfully "broken the ice" among the various participating organizations. Many participants were heard to marvel at the fact that "six months ago, we couldn't even sit down at the same table together." Another oft-heard expression was: "Hay voluntad." Indeed, all indications point to a will to continue this type of coordination.

However, there are three factors that will be important to take into account as the process goes forward:

- A. Neither CPDH nor ANPDH appear to fully recognize the importance of this initiative. Therefore, it is likely that unless pressed they will not assign it high priority. Meanwhile, it seems clear that a concerted effort leading to the creation of a true human rights movement will be required if indeed fundamental human rights are to be known and respected in Nicaragua. ANPDH and CPDH together have become the accepted leaders of this coordination breakthrough, which could become a force at the

local, national and international level. If they do not come to appreciate this fact and act on it, everyone will be the loser.

- B. The Nicaraguan component of the UPAZ program titled "Cultura de Paz y Democracia en America Central" (which is funded by Taiwan through the governmental Comision Mixta Centro America-Taiwan) appears to have the same type of coordination among human rights groups in mind. Some months ago, the director of the Nicaraguan component of that program, Otoniel Arguello, began convening meetings referred to as the Foro Pro Paz y Democracia, which includes the same groups as the ADF/CPDH/ANPDH initiative. While this has created confusion and a potential duplication of effort, this could become a positive development if handled tactfully; already it has aroused negative vibes within CPDH, ANPDH and other groups. It is felt that ADF, knowing USAID/Nicaragua's intention to fund CPDH and ANPDH directly, and aware of the Mission's interest in supporting further cooperative efforts, is cultivating UPAZ as an alternate mechanism through which to obtain funds for continued technical assistance to the Nicaraguan human rights community. Whether true or not, if not dealt with openly, such suspicions could severely retard further progress.
- C. Technical assistance is needed by all participating organizations in the area of organizational development (OD) which builds the capacity to perform the functions vital to any healthy NGO. OD techniques are based on proven adult-education principles, and cover such tasks as: strategic planning; participatory project design, implementation and evaluation; membership and volunteer recruitment; building boards and committees; internal communications and external visibility; conflict resolution; development of human and financial resources; and others. For this, OD experts (whether or not human rights professionals) are needed to provide on-going, periodic training and technical assistance, both for the organizations themselves, and to transfer to them the skills needed to facilitate the organization of solid community groups at the grassroots level. It is clear that Nicaraguan organizations (human rights or otherwise) have not yet had an opportunity to learn and use true OD techniques, and that the consultants brought in to date by ADF have included no qualified specialists in this field.

Current Technical Capacity

Thanks to a fortunate coincidence, two ADF-contracted Mexican consultants came to Managua during the course of this evaluation. One is a "documentalist;" an internationally-recognized technical expert in the field of human rights data bases, specialized software, and so forth. During her stay, she provided in-house technical assistance to CPDH and ANPDH. Thus, the comments included in this section are based on her observations, plus interviews with CPDH and ANPDH staff.

As part of Phase I, the ADF representative responsible for this project had purchased the computer equipment to be installed in Nicaragua. For reasons that no one was able to explain, he purchased Apple Macintosh computers for CPDH, though ANPDH was using IBM

equipment. This not only presents a serious obstacle to the mutual exchange of computerized information, but has also thwarted efforts to achieve uniformity in the vocabulary used and the manner in which computer records are stored in the two organizations. Moreover, it appears that nearly all of the software delivered by ADF is unlicensed, i.e., copied, and that the usual user manuals were not included.

At present, ANPDH's technical capacity is far superior to that of CPDH. As reported by the Mexican technical expert, CPDH's computer equipment would be the envy of any human rights organization; it is one of the most costly systems she had seen in such an NGO. However, its potential is grossly under-utilized by CPDH staff, who simply do not use their computers to full capacity. Some feel that this is due largely to a lack of management's commitment to the use of the new automated system. Indeed, we observed that some professional staff who have computers sitting on their desks still use typewriters for word-processing and even record data manually. Furthermore, CPDH does not have a experienced computer operator/technician on its staff. One piece of equipment that Hernandez seems to prize is the Gestetner Duplicator procured by ADF for improving CPDH's publications.

Meanwhile, computer equipment at ANPDH is old and outmoded, but is used to the maximum extent possible. As the Mexican consultant put it, "It would be impossible to get another drop out of those machines. Also, ANPDH has added an expert computer person to its staff. Everyone uses the system, and even communicate with one another via e-mail within the Managua office.

The bottom line is that the organization that has the excellent equipment doesn't take advantage of it (CPDH), while the other organization has old, outdated equipment and uses it to the max.

Sustainability

As already indicated, a comprehensive system for planning, monitoring and evaluating progress is still missing. But perhaps the most important gap in the institutional capacity of these organizations is their lack of fund-raising capability. This was to be addressed through ADF technical assistance in Phase II. Though in its first semi-annual report to USAID/Nicaragua (and in virtually all subsequent reports) ADF specifically mentions this as an area for technical assistance, there is little evidence that such assistance was seriously pursued.

As reported by an early USAID/Nicaragua project manager who was concerned about the need for sub-grantees to diversify their funding base, his first request to the ADF representative was for a written "sustainability plan," for which he provided a detailed outline. However, in spite of his repeated requests, that plan was never delivered. Inquiries at CPDH and ANPDH also reveal that almost no ADF technical assistance was provided for this purpose. The record shows that in February 1993 the ADF representative met with the CPDH CEO and other staff to discuss fund-raising alternatives. Though a "small program of activities" was outlined for March 1993, it does not appear that follow-up ever occurred. The

CPDH CEO remembers only having been given a foundation directory by the ADF representative for use in identifying potential funding sources.

The only additional funding received by ANPDH during the period was from the Canadian International Development Agency for two educational workshops - one for police and military personnel in Jinotega, and the other for training police, military, and prisoners in Bluefields.

Broadening the funding base is a critical and comprehensive organizational task. It requires more than just the names of potential sources; it requires planning, research, contacts, and the development of persuasive proposals. It is a science unto itself. The lack of experience and know-how within both CPDH and ANPDH is alarming in that it negatively affects their ability to become strong, self-reliant human rights organizations. This is particularly worrisome with regard to ANPDH, since USAID/Nicaragua continues to be its only source of support.

Women in Development

As indicated earlier, family violence and the other forms of abuse to which women are uniquely subjected have not been thoroughly explored or addressed by Nicaraguan human rights organizations. While there is an awareness of the need to do so, as yet there is no evidence that any targeted efforts to deal with these issues have been designed or undertaken.

Management

Throughout the life of this agreement, USAID/Nicaragua has closely monitored ADF activities and on various occasions has called on ADF to address the question of the sustainability of CPDH and ANPDH. Meanwhile, ADF has had serious problems in being responsive to the requirements identified in the Cooperative Agreement with regard to the development of management tools to facilitate the implementation of the project while strengthening communications with USAID/Nicaragua.

Despite constant prodding from USAID/Nicaragua, ADF has never been able to prepare a comprehensive workplan that is time-phased and that would communicate how it planned to mobilize inputs to produce outputs that would lead to the achievement of the project purpose as stated in the Cooperative Agreement. Reporting from ADF headquarters in Washington to USAID/Nicaragua has been timely and voluminous to the point of uselessness. As a consequence this reporting has not served anyone's purpose.

CONCLUSIONS

ADF Technical Assistance: The role played by ADF and the technical assistance it provided have not been of the highest quality. This is due to a number of factors, such as: a) insufficient staff assigned to field work (i.e., only one headquarters representative with virtually no backup), even though funds for additional personnel were included in the original

budget; b) no in-country presence, even as the political process evolved and made a local presence advisable; c) failure to carefully evaluate consultants, leading to repeat visits by persons considered unsatisfactory by client organizations, and; failure to comply with specific USAID/Nicaragua requests, including the design of sustainability plans and the USAID registration of the two sub-grantees.

Institutional Capacity: While the financial management and data base systems of CPDH and ANPDH were greatly improved over the course of this project, the overall institutional capacity of the two organizations remains extremely weak. Too little attention was paid to the vital internal tasks that can make or break an organization, including: the development of an on-going and truly strategic planning cycle employing participatory procedures to ensure that staff and clients alike feel that they "own" their organization; solid project design, monitoring and evaluation techniques; internal communications and staff development; development of boards, committees, and volunteer or membership bases, and; fund-raising strategies.

Relative Strengths: Of the two sub-grantees, ANPDH is considerably stronger on the technical level, while CPDH has developed greater capacity in the use of the mass media.

Priority Need: There is absolute consensus among individuals in and out of the this community that the most urgent human rights need at all levels of society is education. Activities related to human rights education also hold the greatest potential for the further unification of the human rights community.

Coordination and Cooperation: Thanks to the progress made in Phase III, there is excellent potential for greatly strengthening the budding process of coordination and cooperation among Nicaraguan human rights activists and organizations, and between them and the remainder of the NGO community. This potential could be maximized at the local municipal level through a well-planned process of human rights education linked to community development. It could also be a significant force at the national level in two ways:

- for the careful identification of key human rights messages to be delivered by all human rights groups through the media, along with specialized training for appropriate spokespersons from each organization to deliver those messages; and
- the formulation by consensus of regulatory and legislative proposals to be put forward nationally and internationally by each organization on behalf of the Nicaraguan human rights movement. A case in point is the legislation that will be required to develop criteria and procedures for the establishment and operation of an independent office of the constitutionally-mandated Human Rights Ombudsman. All organizations agree that this is extremely important; CPDH has developed a draft bill that, supposedly, will be shared as a basis for building consensus among participating groups as a follow-on to the January 25 evaluation session.

Need for OD Expertise: The process of consensus-building and cooperation between CPDH and ANPDH, and between them and other human rights groups could have been much smoother and more rapid had ADF contracted consultants with OD credentials and expertise, rather than concentrating on persons whose backgrounds are mainly human rights.

Relations with CIAV/OAS: The relationship between the various human rights organizations and CIAV/OAS is one of mutual cooperation and respect. All are extremely frustrated by the lack of action on recommendations by the Tripartite Commission, of which CIAV/OAS is a member. While President Chamorro has approved and forwarded these recommendations to the appropriate authorities, virtually no action has been taken.

Violations against Women: The special problems of women as victims of violence and sexual abuse are virtually unexplored by the three Nicaraguan human rights organizations. Except for occasional references in their regular publications, and a special study by CENIDH, these issues have not been integrated into the human rights agenda. Moreover, current documentation systems do not provide for gender-desegregated data.

Political Campaign: As the 1996 election process draws near, CPDH and ANPDH are already sounding the call for organizational ethics and neutrality. The other groups participating in the coordination initiative are aware of the dangers of partisan politics. Stepped up coordination efforts during this period will be key to avoiding those pitfalls, which could erase progress to date. CPDH, ANPDH and others need to make special efforts to bring CENIDH into the fold.

ADF Management: The lack of useful management tools has significantly reduced USAID/Nicaragua's capacity to systematically monitor the implementation of the ADF Cooperative Agreement.

Future Funding Options: In order to maintain support for CPDH and ANPDH, while continuing to press for coordinated efforts involving all human rights groups, in the next phase of the SDI Project USAID/Nicaragua will have to explore carefully all available funding options. These include such mechanism as: continuing to work through a U.S. intermediary; direct funding of the two organizations with the proviso that they continue to convene and work in concert with the broader human rights community (requiring labor-intensive management by USAID/Nicaragua); smaller grants to each of the two for their own activities, with a separate grant to a third party for joint or coordinated actions; the creation of an outside management unit for closely monitoring developments, promoting further coordinated actions, seeking and helping to shape appropriate proposals from all human rights groups, and acting as liaison with USAID/Nicaragua.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 1. Two-Pronged Funding Strategy:** For the next stage of the SDI Project, in order to further strengthen CPDH and ANPDH, while continuing to promote coordination

among all human rights groups, USAID/Nicaragua should carefully explore all funding options. These include the following:

- Direct support to CPDH and ANPDH with funds divided into two categories:
 - Individual Support - operational funding for specific high-priority activities by each organization in the areas of human rights promotion and defense, and;
 - Support for jointly-sponsored CPDH/ANPDH activities in the field of human rights education. These would seek to include all human rights groups and to build on the progress achieved in Phase III of the current project. Such educational activities would target both the local and national level and would aim to strengthen coordination among all human rights groups, improve public policy on human rights, and expand public awareness and respect for fundamental human rights as a critical element in a free and democratic society. For example:
 - Joint efforts to organize new community groups at the municipal level in selected strategic areas, along with the harmonization of groups where more than one exists in a given community;
 - The formulation by consensus and implementation by all participating human rights groups of a policy agenda aimed at the passage or revision of specific regulatory or legislative measures; and,
 - Based on the foregoing activities, the planning and execution by all participating human rights groups of a public awareness campaign to be carried out through the mass media.

This mode would require constant oversight and tight management by USAID/Nicaragua. Given the direct relationship that would result from grants given directly to CPDH and ANPDH by USAID/Nicaragua and the evolving nature of inter-organizational relations in the human rights community, frequent monitoring by USAID/Nicaragua and the incorporation of needed revisions in a rolling-design approach to the management of these grants would be required if this initiative is to succeed.

- Smaller grants to CPDH and ANPDH, plus a grant to a third organization for the joint efforts described above as proposed by those two organizations or by any other human rights group. This third grant would also include the provision of technical assistance to the human rights community at large.

Such a third grant to another Nicaraguan organization would probably be counterproductive, since it would generate resistance and friction between



USAID/Nicaragua and CPDH/ANPDH. This, in turn, might erase the progress to date in the area of group coordination.

- Creation of an in-country management/monitoring unit outside of USAID/Nicaragua for all human rights activities which would probably involve a U.S. or other foreign entity (for the reasons explained above). This entity would seek and provide assistance to any human rights NGO wishing to propose appropriate activities, promote coordinated action, provide close monitoring of the activities supported, identify and respond to the technical assistance and training needs of human rights groups, and serve as liaison between the human rights community and USAID/Nicaragua.

While lightening the management burden on USAID/Nicaragua and providing needed training, OD and other technical assistance, it is likely that this option would increase management costs, reducing the funds available for substantive work.

- Continuing the present mode of using a U.S. PVO to channel funds to the human rights community. This is seen as a last resort to be considered only if the Mission is not able to dedicate the necessary staff time or funds to any other option.

This would require that USAID/Nicaragua retain the services of a U.S. or regional institution, since the resistance and resentment that would result from the involvement of any other Nicaraguan organization would almost certainly be counterproductive in terms of meeting the project purpose. Given that there is no known appropriate U.S. entity with offices in Nicaragua, this would present an obstacle to the type of labor-intensive, hands-on approach required at this critical juncture in the development of a strong and healthy national human rights movement.

2. **Carefully-Framed Objectives:** Assuming any of above options are chosen, it is incumbent on USAID/Nicaragua to identify clear and detailed human rights objectives such as those mentioned above. These should then be discussed individually and jointly with ANPDH and CPDH, and with other human rights groups if the mechanism selected involves a third party. Specific requirements for individual and joint activities should be clearly articulated by USAID/Nicaragua and accepted by the two organizations as a condition of further funding. Once objectives are set, specific indicators should be included in any grant agreement, along with the means of verification, as a basis for measuring progress and revising project outputs and inputs as needed. It should also be made clear that all data collected are to be gender-disaggregated and used for forward planning.
3. **Specialized Technical Assistance:** A clear understanding between USAID/Nicaragua and the grantees should also be reached regarding technical assistance needs. As indicated, this could be paid for out of grantee funds, managed directly by

USAID/Nicaragua, or by a third-party entity. Particularly recommended is technical assistance in the following areas:

- On-going, periodic assistance by qualified organization development (OD) specialist(s) to strengthen the institutional capacity of grantee organizations, and to transfer OD techniques to the field staffs of all interested human rights groups involved in organizing community human rights groups.
- Continued assistance for the strengthening and harmonization of data bases, moving toward the eventual capacity to exchange human rights documentation

4. ***Diversification of Funding Sources:*** To move toward the future sustainability of ANPDH and CPDH, in any new agreement USAID/Nicaragua should push them to make the diversification of funding sources a priority organizational task. Written fund-raising plans with timelines and target amounts should be a condition of further support. The technical assistance called for in the previous recommendation should emphasize resource development and all types of potential support should be explored, including the establishment of long-term endowments.

5. ***Systematic Management:*** In any future activity, a systematic approach to management should be adhered to that would include the following components:

- **Monitoring and Evaluation Plan:** Objectives with their indicators and means of verification should be established in a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan.
- **Workplan:** A time-phased workplan, approved by USAID/Nicaragua, should be a precondition to the dispersing of funds.
- **Quarterly Reporting:** A quarterly reporting system with the following format:
 - Activities and accomplishments for the last three months.
 - Projected activities for the next six months.
 - Project implementation problems.
 - Status of resolution of problems identified in the last quarterly report.
- **Quarterly Review Meetings:** A quarterly review system in which the grantee(s), any sub-grantee(s), and the USAID project manager would review the status of project implementation. The workplan and the quarterly report would be the basic instruments to be used in the review.

Elements of a Logical Framework for Human Rights - ADF

- GOAL:** To assist in the development of a democratic society in which fundamental human rights are known and respected.
- PURPOSE:** Assist the ANPDH & CPDH to strengthen their capacities to promote human rights and to investigate, report, and denounce human rights abuses.
- OUTPUTS:** Mechanisms developed to strengthen the institutional capacity of ANPDH and CPDH to investigate, report, and campaign against human rights abuses, lawlessness, and corruption.
- INPUTS:**
1. ADF will conduct an in-depth study of ANPDH & CPDH re their staffing patterns, financial systems, methods of investigation, monitoring and reporting, educational activities, and publications.
 2. Sound organizational plan which will streamline their operations.
 3. ADF will set up financial accountability systems, computerized data bases for the recording and monitoring of human rights violations, and standardize the methods of investigation.
 4. ADF will assist the 2 groups in preparing lists of needed equipment, will seek out the most reliable suppliers, and will procure said equipment.
 5. For CPDH, ADF will assist in the initiation of 2 new regional offices - 1 on the Atlantic Coast and 1 in Juigalpa.
 6. ADF will review the curricula of the training courses, the promoters' training, the audiences of each group, and the frequency of the courses with a view to upgrading the content and scheduling of training courses if necessary.
 7. ADF will also give TA to the 2 groups with their publications, by making them more readable and appealing to a larger segment of the population.

(NOTE: This abbreviated Logical Framework was prepared by the Evaluation Team and used to gauge the accomplishments of this activity.)

PART I: JOURNALISM TRAINING - FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY (FIU) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

An assessment of the state of journalism in Nicaragua was undertaken by the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at Florida International University (FIU) in 1991. As a result, in August 1993, FIU sent a proposal to USAID/Nicaragua, which was the basis for a Cooperative Agreement between USAID/Nicaragua and FIU in December 1993. The agreement was designed "to support the development of a credible, professional, and independent press, willing and able to produce objective reporting despite the political, economic, and intellectual pressures to which they are subject, and in turn, contributing toward the strengthening of democratic values inside Nicaraguan society.

To accomplish this, the project envisaged an ambitious program of seminars, workshops, and training exercises which would included the following subjects:

- Writing for the print media
- Legislative reporting
- Crime/trial reporting
- Economic/business reporting
- Investigative reporting
- TV news production
- News editing and writing
- Radio reporting
- Role of the press in a developing democracy
- Campaign and election reporting
- Journalistic ethics

A detailed implementation plan with an illustrative time line was to be provided to USAID/Nicaragua within two weeks of signing the Cooperative Agreement, and a preliminary list of participants was to be provided to USAID/Nicaragua for each seminar two weeks in advance. Basic to the execution of the Cooperative Agreement was the anticipation that the FIU Team would work closely with USAID/Nicaragua throughout the period of implementation.

As of December 6, 1994, USAID/Nicaragua reported that \$233,000 had been committed to the FIU Journalism Training Project, and \$57,258 of expenditures were reported.

FINDINGS

Project Implementation

To date 401 participants have taken part in 1,398 days of training in 18 seminars given throughout the country with a total of 522 participants, 121 (23%) of whom were women. The top two priority topics, as identified by the journalists themselves, are writing and editing, and ethics. In the process of implementing the program and as it moved into areas outside of Managua, a participatory planning process evolved that has served to identify regional needs. As a consequence, the seminars have succeeded in addressing local requirements.

FIU/Nicaragua-USAID/Nicaragua Management Relationship

The record is replete since August of this past calendar year with reporting on the part of the FIU Project Coordinator describing in great detail their activities. The FIU Coordinator has been extremely forth-coming in sharing information regarding the journalism training program and the status of journalism in Nicaragua. USAID/Nicaragua personnel have visited training activities on several occasions. Preliminary lists of participants were provided to USAID/Nicaragua as required approximately two weeks before each seminar. In addition, USAID, USIS and FIU meet together often, generally on a monthly basis. The only shortcoming appears to be the lack of an implementation plan that identifies future project activities in a timeframe that would allow USAID/Nicaragua to systematically chart the status of project implementation in terms of mobilizing inputs for the execution of project-funded activities. Given the evolutionary nature of events in Nicaragua, a rolling design approach could have been employed.

Project Impact

As the program has evolved, the FIU Team has been increasingly successful in providing training that not only reflects the needs of local journalists as identified initially by FIU in their sector assessment but, in the process of training, these needs have been prioritized, refined and pinpointed by geographic region. Observation of training activities supports a finding that specific skills are being acquired and/or enhanced. It is therefore possible to say that there definitely has been an increase in the capacity of Nicaraguan journalists to produce objective reporting, thereby contributing toward strengthening democratic values in Nicaraguan society. Examples of project accomplishments which support that statement include:

- The creation of non-partisan journalists' organizations at the regional and national level. FIU personnel played a facilitating role in the creation of the Sindicato de Periodistas de Nicaragua, which includes members of both UPN (FSLN) and APN (UNO). Moreover, the association called Periodistas Unidas del Norte, which had been formed by UPN and a group in Costa Rica, helped FIU organize seminars in northern conflict zones. The FIU director is

convinced that Nicaraguan journalists are eager to act as professionals, and to "throw off polarity."

- The restructuring of the newsroom at La Prensa to free it from political influence and enable it to make the transition to full color and digital pagination technology. Here, too, FIU played a facilitation role.
- The fact that FIU has served as advisor to Barricada under both regimes, each representing a different ideology within the FSLN.
- The multiple technical advances achieved to further professionalize reporting tasks, including: the creation of computer modem networks in the interior of the country; the development of two independent television news operations on the Atlantic Coast; the inclusion of entrepreneurial skills in departmental seminars, and; the development of local instructor staff for rural seminars with specifically targeted goals and lower costs.

In short, the project can take credit for having facilitated the move by the journalism community as a whole towards a more professional posture. The training forum has become a medium for journalists of different ideologies and political persuasions to think of themselves as journalists first and partisans second. This, in turn, has contributed to overall depolarization.

However, as with most democratic initiatives, the formulation of objective indicators for measuring the degree of impact of FIU training is difficult. Above accomplishments, and particularly the fact that journalists have joined together in a desire to professionalize their work should lead to a decrease in politically-oriented newspaper articles and radio programs. At present, there is no mechanism for systematically monitoring that coverage.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite the lack of a formal project monitoring and evaluation system, the FIU activity has clearly contributed to the development of a professional and independent Nicaraguan press. However, before consideration is given to providing additional funding beyond the present amount programmed in the Cooperative Agreement, the objective of the FIU undertaking in the journalism sector must be more tightly focused, particularly through the upcoming election period, to afford this activity the opportunity to demonstrate results that clearly contribute in a cost-efficient way to reducing polarization in Nicaraguan society.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ***The FIU Project and Transition to the Election:*** Given the enormity of the problem in the journalistic sector and the positive role that the FIU project could play in the period leading to the next presidential election, an extension of this activity is

recommended. If further funding is provided consideration should be given to tightening the focus of the FIU activity. One possibility is to reduce the number of different courses presently being given. The number of desired outputs identified in the Abbreviated Logical Framework which was taken directly from the Cooperative Agreement may be excessive and could be considered too scattered.

No attention has been given to identifying a master project objective. If there is a follow-on phase for this activity, a Logical Framework should be developed that reflects a reasonable expectation with regards to what can be accomplished at the purpose level.

2. ***Implementation Plan Development and a Project Monitoring System:*** An implementation plan should be developed for the remaining period of project implementation. This plan should serve as the basic management tool shared with USAID/Nicaragua to track the status of project progress.
3. ***Quarterly Reporting:*** Consideration should be given to establishing a quarterly reporting system as required by the Cooperative Agreement.
4. ***Quarterly Review Meetings:*** Consideration should be given to establishing a quarterly review system in which the FIU Coordinator, a USIS representative, and the USAID/Nicaragua project manager would review status of the FIU Cooperative Agreement implementation. The workplan and the quarterly report would be the basic instruments to be used in the review. The agenda for the meeting could follow the format of the quarterly report. The focus of the meeting would be to determine if FIU project-funded activities are on track in relation to the timelines identified in the implementation plan.
5. ***Monitoring and Evaluation Plan:*** The following questions should be addressed if there is additional funding for journalism training activities. How is the impact of the project to be measured? Is a baseline established? Are participants pre-tested? Are samples of participants' writing reviewed? Is there a post-test? Is there a questionnaire filled out by participants after each workshop, seminar, or training activity that prompts the participants to discuss the quality of the training?

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Elements of a Logical framework for the FIU Media Activity

HIGHEST OBJECTIVE: An increase in the free flow of information

HIGHER OBJECTIVE: Increased human capacity to produce objective reporting contributing to strengthening democratic values in the Nicaraguan society

- OUTPUTS:**
1. Improved writing for the print media
 2. Improved legislative reporting
 3. Improved crime/trial reporting
 4. Improve economic/business reporting
 5. Improved investigative reporting
 6. Improved TV news production
 7. Improved news editing and writing
 8. Improved radio reporting
 9. Enhanced understanding on the part of the press of the role of the press in a developing democracy
 10. Improved campaign and election reporting
 11. Enhanced understanding on the part of the press of journalistic ethics

- INPUTS/ACTIVITIES:**
1. Seminars, workshops, training exercises
 2. Approved lists of participants for seminars, workshops, and training exercises

(Note: The elements for this activity were taken directly from the project documentation.)

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PART J: LABOR SECTOR - AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT (AIFLD) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

In spite of a seven year absence from the country (June 1983 to March 1990), for over 25 years AIFLD had provided support to the ORIT/ICFTU-affiliated Confederation de Unificacion Sindical (CUS), and through CUS to other democratically-oriented labor groups in Nicaragua. By late 1987, with AIFLD technical assistance, three other labor organizations representing various parts of the political spectrum, from Christian Democrats to Communists, joined CUS in an informal umbrella group called the Congreso Permanente de Trabajadores (CPT). Their common goal was to defeat Sandinismo and replace it with a democratically-elected government, an objective realized as a result of the February 1990 elections.

AIFLD had re-entered Nicaragua before USAID returned to the country, and in 1990 was awarded a one-year \$700,000 Cooperative Agreement (C.A.) to help strengthen the free and independent trade union movement. An evaluation of that program concluded that "the basic problem identified... is not one of execution but of project design, namely, the project had no clearly stated objective." (Lazar 1992.) After discussing two possible objectives for a follow-on C.A. - one short-term and one long-term - the evaluation recommended that "AID and the State Department should decide which objective is to prevail in this project." The USAID/Nicaragua DI Task Force discussed these options at some length, and recommended to USAID/W that the short-term option be chosen. However, USAID/W had apparently already decided to support the long-term objective: "building an independent, sustainable democratic labor movement in Nicaragua," which became the central focus of the new three-year C.A. under study here. The original period covered was October 1, 1991 to July 31, 1994, with a budget of \$2,839,974. The end date was later extended to March 31, 1995, and funds were increased by \$346,257 to a total LOP budget of \$3,186,231.

The Post-Election Phase (1991-1992)

Individuals involved in the early stages of this activity, in AIFLD as well as in USAID/Nicaragua and USAID/W, refer to this as a "political project." That is, the overriding goal was a political one: the survival of a visible democratic labor movement (i.e., the CPT) to counterbalance Sandinista labor and as a means to safeguard the fragile democratic process initiated by the 1990 elections. This was considered an urgent necessity, since Sandinista-backed strikes and other disruptive practices were being used in an attempt to gain control of the newly-elected Chamorro government. As one of the early AIFLD Country Program Directors (CPDs) put it: "The Sandinista movement used the unions to beat the government up." In the words of a former USAID/Nicaragua interviewee: "Training was very much secondary to just keeping the CPT afloat. It was considered a tremendous success just to maintain an anti-Sandinista presence; survival was the name of the game." In this situation, given the larger political goal, the programmatic technical procedures normally associated with the implementation of a cooperative agreement (such as the submission of work plans and timely revisions or on-going project monitoring and evaluation systems), were not

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pursued with the usual vigor by USAID/W or USAID/Nicaragua. This inattention to detail (or "benign neglect," as one person called it) was exacerbated by the lack of Mission staff available to manage the multi-faceted SDI program.

The Transition Phase (1992-present)

For the 1990 elections the CPT formally joined with the UNO coalition to defeat Sandinismo. It is interesting to note that some now consider that formal and visible alliance to have been a mistake, since it is seen to have led to a subsequent erosion of CPT's image as a non-partisan, independent trade union body. Furthermore, as UNO began to splinter, so too did the loyalties of the labor leaders involved in the CPT (differences that are increasingly pronounced as the 1996 elections approach). In any case, it is clear that the post-election period was marked by euphoria and a spurt of growth within CPT-related labor centrals.

Nevertheless, as the current AIFLD CPD has stated: "This initial impetus gradually bogged down in 1992 as the CPT had to confront certain realities." Two major circumstances are then cited: a) the "tacit alliance or agreement [of the Chamorro government] with the Sandinistas to share power." and: b) "the brutal economic crisis afflicting the nation plus all of the dislocations caused by structural readjustment and the... neo-liberal policies of the regime."

In support of the latter point, U.S. Embassy data show that real per capita GDP fell from \$430.4 in 1992 to \$414.4 in 1993, and \$410.1 by 1994. The Nicaraguan Finance Minister has now declared that current per capita income is what it was in 1945, and is equal to that of Haiti. Official U.S. data also reveal that the unemployment rate has risen from 17.8 percent in 1992, to 21.8 percent in 1993, and 23.5 percent by 1994. Labor leaders put the current unemployment/underemployment rate at over 70 percent. Meanwhile, the Labor Minister maintains that the real unemployment rate is in the range of 40 percent, excluding persons having some source of income, such as street vendors.

FINDINGS

The fact is that the unanimous opinion of all persons interviewed, from AIFLD to labor leaders, government officials and casual observers, is that the relative importance of the labor movement has declined sharply in the last two years. The current AIFLD CPD affirms that, in addition to the economic debacle: "The major reality that the components of the CPT had to confront was the weakness of their own internal structures." Membership figures for the period from 1991 to 1994 provided by four of the five CPT centrals themselves confirm that. (Only the CNMN, which was not created until 1991, has grown.) While there is general consensus that the overall deterioration of labor's clout is due in large measure to the economic crisis and consequent unemployment, many interviewees also maintain that "personalismo" or inter-central power struggles have been an important contributing factor. As one highly credible source stated: "They're [CPT leaders] fighting among themselves, instead of getting together to fight the employers in defense of the workers."

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Conditions for Cooperation Emerging from the Economic Crisis

Clearly, the impact of the economic crisis has been felt by all workers, regardless of their ideology or party stripe. The good news is that this, in turn, has created increasing pressure for cooperation among workers in the various sectors of the labor movement (Sandinista and otherwise), all of whom are up against the same problem. Convincing evidence of this is seen in the education sector, where ANDEN of the Central Sandinista de Trabajadores (CST) and the CNMN of the CPT have joined forces in a campaign to win higher salaries for all Nicaraguan teachers (a process supported and facilitated by AIFLD). Another example involves a campaign for wage increases by the three major labor groups in the health sector, including FETSALUD (CST) and FENITRAS (CGT-i/CPT). The labor leaders interviewed felt that such cross-cutting collaboration is occurring ever more frequently at the local union level. Indeed, during a visit to Leon we heard evidence of this. There, faced with the imminent privatization of the company, the two Telcor unions (one Sandinista, which represents the majority, and the other affiliated with CGT-i/CPT) have joined forces to fight for a fair deal for all the workers they represent.

Labor union women appear to be ahead of this curve. Female members of nine of the 11 labor centrals participate actively in the Nicaraguan committee affiliated with the Regional Committee of Trade Union Women of Central America & Caribbean, which was born out of an ILO initiative, financed initially by DANIDA. (Only CTN and CTN-a do not participate.) Through this Committee, a number of Nicaraguan union women have attended labor education training activities in Italy and Costa Rica, and every year the various National Coordinators meet in a regional seminar in a different country. In August 1994, that seminar was held in Managua with support from the Nicaraguan government. Two-year work plans for action at regional and national levels are formulated and reviewed at these annual events. The current Regional Coordinator is from the Dominican Republic, while the Vice Coordinator is the Secretary of Women's Affairs of CAUS/CPT.

Meanwhile, a different twist on labor collaboration across union lines concerns the situation at "la Fosforera." This involves the bitter dispute which erupted after the return of half of the company to its former owners, with the other half going to the workers. After a conflict over the workers' right to sell their shares to outsiders, the company was illegally and forcefully taken over by the CST-affiliated Sandinista union with the support of the union affiliated with CAUS, one of the CPT labor centrals. This was in opposition to a third company union, the CTN, which is considered by CAUS to be "patronalista," but which represents the majority of the workers. Needless to say, this has caused considerable tension within the CPT. The head of CAUS maintains that it only makes good sense to work with Sandinista unions in such a situation.

Overall, the general perception is that the barriers between Sandinista and democratic unions have begun to crumble, particularly at the local level, thus creating the conditions necessary for across-the-board collaboration. It was stressed by many that the effects of the pinata, which turned a number of former Sandinista labor leaders into employers, has accentuated the process of change within that sector. Thus, many predicted that these bottom-up processes will ultimately force greater cooperation at the top levels of the movement.

"The Cold War is over" was an oft-repeated phrase. This view was vigorously supported by a highly-placed member of the Sandinista party, who stated: "The unions have greatly distanced themselves from the party; they're becoming more and more depolitized." As a case in point, he pointed out that the Sandinista unions "didn't participate in the recent split within the Frente [FSLN]." This source felt strongly that, given the economic crisis and high unemployment, labor differences must be erased for everyone's sake, and that this could best be achieved by providing true labor leadership training for all.

In summary, the economic crisis appears to have created a rather perverse "window of opportunity" for broadening USAID and AIFLD support beyond the narrow confines of the CPT, thus helping to build a truly independent Nicaraguan labor movement. To quote one of the former AIFLD/N CPDs: "AIFLD should now work with all unions, not just the ones in the CPT."

CPT Procedures and Membership From 1991 to the Present

The Executive Committee of the CPT is comprised of the General Secretary and one other member of each of the five participating centrals for a total of 10 members, who are to meet every Monday. However, since 1993, due to internal ruptures, these meetings have become less and less frequent and, when held, are not usually attended by all members. Theoretically, the post of CPT General Secretary/coordinator along with committee chairs are to rotate every six months, at which time an assembly called the CPT ampliada (30 members from each central; a total of 150) is to take place. While this process is reported to have worked well at first, it too began to break down about two years ago. Thus, no rotation has occurred for over a year and a half, nor has an assembly been held during that period. Current plans are to hold an assembly on February 7 with 10 persons from each central, assuming AIFLD provides the necessary funds.

Over and above the centrals' individual budgets, AIFLD also pays for a one-hour radio program called Habla el CPT, which airs on Sunday mornings. The heads of the five CPT organizations take turns each week. When asked about the content of the program, the leaders responded that each decides what he wants to talk about when his turn comes. That is, there is no attempt to develop specific objectives or overall CPT messages, nor is there any process for measuring the impact of this activity, all of which renders any cost-benefit analysis virtually impossible. In the earlier period, AIFLD also sponsored a CPT newsletter in which each central had a page. But that was stopped some time ago, given its low priority and a constrained budget.

By way of context, it should be noted that at present Nicaragua has 11 labor centrals: five Sandinista (FNT), five democratic (CPT), and one independent. However, because the overwhelming majority of union members pay no dues and easily jump from one organization to another, no records or hard membership data are available. There is no evidence that CPT leaders even try to keep track of the number of local union affiliates or the unions they represent. They concern themselves much more with the number of affiliated federations, though that too appears to be a moving target. Needless to say, no gender-desegregated data are available either. Several centrals, especially those with large campesino segments,

reckoned that women represented around 10% of total membership, while CNMN (teachers) puts the figure at 80%

Meanwhile, data from the Ministry of Labor appear to be extremely suspect. It is generally felt that the Minister uses the official certification process as a political tool. Examples were given of labor bodies that, while retaining personaria juridica, after an assembly or congress, are refused certification by the Ministry because of lack of conformity concerning the newly-elected executive council. This is the case, with CNMN, CAUS, and CGT-i, all of the CPT, as well as with groups like the Sandinista teachers union, ANDEN (which together with CNMN has carried out successful protest marches and is planning to strike in March for higher teachers' pay). Thus, these organizations are not eligible to participate in collective bargaining, and must do so through member federations or other affiliates.

Indeed, official Labor Ministry figures appear to reflect an overly dismal membership decline during the period under study. As one person remarked: "This government is pro-worker, but not pro-labor." Data provided to the Evaluation Team by the Ministry of Labor on January 23, 1995 show:

	<u>1991</u>	<u>1994</u>
Number of unions registered	172	64
Total number of affiliates	10,004	3,097
Total number of federations	30	3
Total number of confederations	2	0

It should be noted that during our interviews with CPT leaders in mid-January, they agreed to immediately provide written membership data for the Evaluation Team, including the total number of affiliates, unions and federations they represent, disaggregated by gender if possible. This was to verify the figures presented verbally during those meetings. However, to date none of the five centrals has submitted such written information.

The following figures, showing a 32 percent decline in the number of affiliates in the five CPT centrals between 1991 and the present, were provided by AIFLD:

	<u>1991</u>	<u>Present</u>
CUS	41,435	35,000
CTN-a	11,389	7,000-8,000
CAUS	31,145	19,512
CGT-i	74,960	32,332
CNMN	<u>12,000</u>	<u>14,000</u>
Total Membership	160,429	108,844

Status of Major Project Outputs/Objectives

If, in fact, the single criterion used to judge the success of this project is the survival of the CPT as a democratic alternative to Sandinista labor, then it may be said to have succeeded. However, if the consolidation, sustainability and effectiveness over time of the CPT as an independent, democratic labor central are used as measures of success (as is stated in the C.A.), one would have to conclude that the project has fallen woefully short of the mark.

None of the CPT leaders interviewed indicated that they had participated in the design of this project, believing that it was AIFLD that had chosen the five project outputs/objectives. Several also expressed strong disagreement with the lack of transparency surrounding project implementation, stating that they have never been told the full details or known the amount of budget support that AIFLD gives to each group. One leader suggested that AIFLD should have clearly stated the desired outcome and let them decide how to best accomplish it. In essence, this is definitely seen as an AIFLD project; there is no sense of ownership by the implementing labor organizations.

As enshrined in the current C.A., the **first project objective** was the conversion of the informal, umbrella CPT into an official labor central. That is, after taking the "necessary steps... to secure agreement of the rank-and-file membership," the five organizations were to "affiliate to a democratic central labor body." The remaining four project outputs were closely linked to, and designed to flow from, the first. (See Logical Framework at the end of this section.)

The indicator included in the Agreement for this first objective specifies:

"By March 1994, the CUS, CTN(a), CGT(i), CAUS, the independent FSMN [which later became CNMN], and other qualified independent unions will have formed a labor body offering its member unions effective technical and legal services through a centralized agency."

In fact, this did not happen, nor do any of the interested parties believe it will happen, at least until after the 1996 elections; many do not believe it will happen at all. The AIFLD CPD is among the latter group; he has indicated that it may be better to move beyond the CPT and launch an entirely new effort after the elections are over.

Objective number two calls for stronger "independent unions and worker cooperatives in the urban and rural sectors." Indicators set aggregate growth targets for CPT-member organizations "that nearly double the total number of workers enrolled in affiliated trade unions and rural worker organizations by the end of FY 1994," and an increased "aggregate CPT membership from 165,000 to over 250,000." As shown above, the current total membership figure is around 109,000, representing a 32 percent decline since 1991. There is no evidence that these targets were ever revised as project implementation went forward and developments on the national scene evolved.

Inputs originally planned for the accomplishment of the first objective included financial support for a CPT coordinator, central staff, administration of a joint education program, publications, and necessary physical facilities.

However, in 1993 when the leaders of the five centrals were taken by the AIFLD CPD to see potential CPT office space which he had selected, they balked. Aware that some \$400,000 was to be used for a CPT coordinator and other staff, office rent, furniture, and monthly expenses, the leaders opposed such an expenditure because that would reduce the funds available for their own organizations. They declared that this was not the time to set up a separate operation, and that they needed the money themselves. Thus, they called for a re-direction of the resources earmarked for the CPT. Apparently, AIFLD then allocated a larger share of program funds than originally planned to each of the five centrals. Those funds are divided into two types of support: 1) organization/administrative, and; 2) labor education. Only funds for joint activities were reserved for the CPT. Those expenditures have included two seminars (one on privatization and one on agrarian issues), CPT congresses, and the organization of an agrarian workers' union which was to be part of the CPT.

It should be noted that there is no project amendment or other evidence, either in USAID or AIFLD files, showing that funds were ever officially re-allocated. Moreover, the three-year work plan called for in the C.A. was never submitted by AIFLD to USAID, nor was this substantive change (which also affected other outputs) noted as a project revision in subsequent AIFLD semi-annual reports to USAID.

The allocation of funds to the five CPT organizations for the period from 1991 through 1994, as reported by AIFLD, is as follows:

	<u>Organ/Admin</u>	<u>Education</u>
CUS	\$ 455,928	\$ 107,610
CGT-i	83,942	23,428
CTN-a	63,029	21,002
CNMN	57,090	26,787
CAUS	<u>53,348</u>	<u>16,527</u>
Sub Totals	713,337	195,354
CPT	<u>395,161</u>	<u>1,851</u>
TOTALS	\$ 1,108,498	\$ 197,205

Based on these figures, some \$1,540,000 (over 54%) of the initial budget of \$2,839,974 went for AIFLD's own expenses and labor education programs. The November 1994 amendment to the C.A. extended the project to March 31, 1995, and increased LOP funding by \$346,257. In that same amendment, program costs were reduced from \$1,839,974 to \$1,222,585 (38%), while the remainder went to AIFLD (62%).

For the second objective, inputs included the designation by CPT organizations of 30 organizer/activists, who were to "work in concert with the CPT coordinator so as to avoid overlap, duplication and destructive competition." In addition, "education and community development programs" were also to be used to complement organizing campaigns.

Since for above-described reasons no CPT coordinator was ever hired, the desired centralized collaboration never occurred. Indeed, as explained earlier, post-election circumstances have led to increased duplication, destructive competition and divisions within the CPT.

Those divisions are exemplified by the following:

1. AIFLD support for the CTN-a was halted in October 1994 due to long-standing differences over the manner in which funds had been expended. Following an AIFLD audit, a "Bill of Collection" had been sent to CTN-a, and is still pending resolution. Since the General Secretary of CTN-a, Antonio Jarquin, was the CPT Coordinator when this problem began, no rotation of that post (which is to take place every six months among the five leaders) has occurred for over a year and a half. This means that AIFLD is no longer invited to CPT meetings (though it continues to finance CPT events), and that the other CPT leaders are caught in the middle. Some feel strongly that AIFLD should restore funding to CTN-a; others do not. In any case, the situation is extremely awkward, and has produced considerable internal tension.
2. Next in line for the CPT Coordinator post is Julio Paladino, head of CGT-i, who is exerting increasing pressure on the others to dislodge CTN-a. (This is now supposed to occur at a February 7 CPT meeting.) He is also pressing them to support him as the legitimate CGT-i General Secretary. Complicating an internal power struggle between Paladino and Nilo Salazar, the Ministry of Labor has officially certified the latter as the rightful occupant of the top post. Thus, other CPT leaders are again forced to take sides. Some, like Roberto Moreno of CAUS, feel strongly that the "official" General Secretary (i.e., Salazar) should be in the CPT, while others, including Jarquin, support Paladino, and still others attempt to stay neutral.
3. Meanwhile, there are indications that Carlos Huemby, the head of the other CTN (independent) would like to join the CPT if Jarquin of CTN-a were banished from the group. Some CPT leaders support that idea; some support Jarquin; others believe that both CTN and CTN-a should be members.
4. Disagreements caused by "certain political differences," as one leader put it have caused serious tensions. Such differences have arisen, for example, when one of the political parties split (with one CPT central going one way, and one going the other), or when the CPT has been asked by high-level government officials to support a particular initiative. This has led to heated arguments, with some members holding out for labor independence over even the appearance of political involvement.

In addition to such problems, there have been hotly-contested accusations of "pirating" among CPT-member unions. In essence, the organizing targets set by some unions, federations, and even confederations, are alleged to be other democratic labor organizations, rather than unorganized workers or Sandinista groups; this despite the Non-Pirating Agreement signed by CPT member organizations.

The third project objective was to significantly strengthen the institutional capabilities of CPT unions. In addition to enhanced labor education capacity (treated in the next section), a key indicator was increased member services by CPT unions in the areas of collective bargaining and the "procurement of development services needed by small farmers." Such procurement appears to relate to the small projects funded in rural areas as part of the Community Development Program, and is covered in a subsequent section of this report.

With regard to collective bargaining, while the economic situation has made this extremely difficult, at least one CPT central, CAUS, reported increased capacity to negotiate collective agreements. The CAUS General Secretary noted that in 1990 only about 10 percent of the affiliates had such agreements, and that this has since increased to some 80 percent. He also said that in 1993 AIFLD had provided important technical assistance in connection with the privatization of a shrimp company, for which a firm was retained to do a study. Likewise, AIFLD had provided legal assistance concerning the privatization of a shampoo/soap company. He then stressed the need for AIFLD to give higher priority to technical assistance (lawyers, economists, seminars) related to privatization. Additionally, this CPT leader reported other evidence of enhanced institutional capacity thanks to the funds provided by AIFLD through this project. Specifically, he mentioned model elections within CAUS (without a plancha, and with various candidates for each post), and the resources needed to get people out to deliver seminars at the departmental level.

Aside from the above, there is no evidence that the institutional capabilities of CPT unions to service affiliates has been significantly strengthened during the period of this cooperative agreement.

The Labor Education Program

AIFLD reports that since its program re-opened in July, 1990, it has sponsored a total of 1,327 courses for 30,419 male participants (73%) and 11,369 female participants (27%).

Labor education was included in two ways in the C.A. - once as an input to complement the CPT organizing campaign (**objective #2**), and again as an indicator for measuring the degree to which the institutional capabilities of CPT unions have been strengthened (**objective #3**). For the former, no quantitative measures were included in the agreement; the latter contemplated the creation within each CPT component of a "fully functioning education department" to focus on selected topics.

Regarding education as a complement to organizing efforts, the lack of detailed information on the particular objectives pursued or types and locations of the courses held by CPT organizations, makes it virtually impossible to measure success. This is exacerbated by

the absence of education needs assessments and strategies, or overall planning and evaluation systems to measure results and incorporate appropriate revisions. Neither AIFLD nor any of the CPT centrals have carried out these tasks. Therefore, the education program is comprised of a series of ad-hoc responses to requests from unions or federations, rather than a proactive initiative. It should be noted that, while AIFLD had developed a one-page evaluation form for seminars, only CUS reports the use of written evaluations.

All we can say with certainty is that, according to above budget figures provided by AIFLD, labor education accounted for less than 18 percent of the total amount allocated to CPT organizations. The AIFLD CPD reports that the Institute currently favors a reduction in the percentage allotted to administrative/organizing expenses with an increase in support for education.

There was consensus among the CPT leaders interviewed that the lack of planning capacity is exacerbated by the month-to-month approval process established by AIFLD for funding upcoming events. That is, once a month each CPT central must submit a financial report with receipts to AIFLD in order to get programs approved and funds for the following month. (This is also the case with administrative/organizing expenses.) Also mentioned as a complicating factor was the sense of inconsistency which grew out of the high turnover rate of AIFLD CPDs (of which there have now been four), with their different styles and expectations.

On the question of institutional capabilities, while each CPT central now has a Secretary of Education, it would be a stretch to call this a "fully functioning department." Moreover, judging from what they told us, most of these Secretaries see themselves more as part of the organizing team, dedicating only a portion of their time to labor education. Of the five CPT groups, CUS (with the lion's share of the education budget) appears to take this function most seriously. However, it too lacks a strategic approach and a comprehensive planning and evaluation scheme.

Several times during this interview process other Nicaraguan labor training programs, primarily university-based, were mentioned. For example, the head of CAUS reported that they had been offered and had accepted several half-becas (scholarships) from a Nicaraguan university for a three-year legal training course. Thus, CAUS pays 50 Cordobas per month for each of three members who are currently participating in that program. Due to the limited time available, it was not possible for the Evaluation Team to visit the programs mentioned nor to assess their content or quality.

As reported during a meeting with four of the five CPT-related women's affairs officers, labor education is an urgent need for women unionists. They maintain that "labor education for women is accepted, but not given any priority." That is, seminars for union women are considered by their respective leaders to be "special courses," and are not included in labor education budgets. Only when AIFLD agrees to provide additional funds do these centrals sponsor them. The women did not see the CPT as being interested in their problems, calling for their male colleagues to take trade union women's needs into account. In addition

to funding several seminars for union women, AIFLD has made it clear to CPT centrals that 30% of participants in all seminars should be women. So far, 27% of them are.

These CPT women felt strongly that an Instituto de Capacitacion y Formacion Sindical should be created to provide training for all unionists - not just CPT members. They noted that, while Sandinista labor has several such facilities, the training is "politicized; not true labor education." They felt an urgent need to "catch up" since, during the former regime, the Sandinistas had dedicated considerable resources to turning out well-disciplined labor cadres.

The creation of a labor training institute open to all unionists was also recommended by a number of the labor leaders interviewed. Some also felt it should have a research capacity, for example to develop economic and legislative analyses to support a "labor platform" to be formulated and backed by the trade union movement. This, it was said, would permit the labor movement to move from a reactive to a proactive posture vis-a-vis government or employer proposals and policies.

The Community Development Program

As an input to the agrarian union objective (**objective #4**), the community development program was designed to provide incentives to CPT union members (mostly farmers) in rural areas by funding small projects of up to \$2,000 each. These projects were aimed at "income generation and improved social and educational conditions." While \$100,000 was originally budgeted for this activity over two years, USAID/Nicaragua called a halt after the first year, thereby expending a total of \$50,000 for some 29 small projects. The indicator called for the execution of "at least 20 small projects." Therefore, the target was exceeded.

One reason for halting rural-based small projects related to output number four of the C.A., which called for the creation of an agrarian union and social services department within the CPT. In pursuit of this objective, the AIFLD CPD tried to draw together the campesino units of the various CPT organizations into a separate union called the Union of Nicaraguan Campesino Workers (UTCN), which was formed in 1992. AIFLD provided UTCN with technical assistance for the formation of campesino coops. As reported by several CPT leaders, since there was no CPT, the perception was that the AIFLD CPD wanted to head up this new organization himself. One commented: "He was going to finance UTCN separately. We complained. That took away our trust in CPT." In essence, the attempt to extract the campesino components from the CPT centrals met with enormous resistance (especially since campesinos represent the majority for some). The UTCN disappeared after about eight months, and was later resurrected by CUS which had no campesino component at the time. The CUS General Secretary maintains that the UTCN was "born in the bosom of the CPT, but because of jealousy there was no will to cooperate, so CUS took it on" - yet another burr under the CPT saddle.

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CPT's Role in Public Policy

The final project objective calls for CPT unions to have a voice in the "development and implementation of public policy by Nicaraguan government authorities when worker interests are directly affected." The indicator to be used for measuring success is that unions will have "the means to influence legislation, such as the labor code and administrative rule-making," especially the participation of CPT unions in the privatization of publicly owned assets. The input associated with this objective calls for the CPT coordinator to "represent affected unions as and when there arises a requirement for union intervention in any official proceeding," with special training or consultant services provided to give the coordinator the necessary legal and technical competence to operate effectively.

Since there is no CPT coordinator, this too is difficult to measure. That is, since efforts (much less representation) were never centralized, some CPT centrals have greater influence than others. For instance, Roberto Moreno, head of CAUS, is also President of the Labor Committee of the National Assembly. Obviously, he helped shape the Labor Code. However, there is no evidence of concerted lobbying efforts by the CPT regarding labor interests. Each central "does its own thing," as one CPT leader said. This also appears to be the case on the question of privatization, which remains a murky area, and for which most CPT centrals lack technical expertise. Greater fragmentation is anticipated as labor bodies are wooed by political parties and aspiring presidential candidates in anticipation of the 1996 elections.

As stated at the outset, the general opinion is that labor's clout has deteriorated significantly over the past couple of years. This appears to have led to a concomitant erosion of the CPT's role in the public policy arena. In a word, the effective participation of CPT centrals in the public policy process now appears minimal.

Women in Development

AIFLD has sought to ensure that at least 30% of those who participate in labor education events are women. However, no overall disaggregated participant data appear to be available. While each of the five CPT centrals has named a secretary of women's affairs, programs directed at female union members are not generally considered to be a priority. Training events aimed at union women are not included in the regular programming (or budget expenditures) of the five organizations. Those that have taken place were supported by AIFLD as separate items when specifically requested to do so. The important role that union women could play in helping to organize and consolidate a free and democratic labor movement does not appear to be fully appreciated by Nicaraguan trade union leaders.

Management of the Cooperative Agreement

As the words "Cooperative Agreement" imply, a close and sustained relationship throughout the life of this project is called for between USAID/Nicaragua and AIFLD in the basic project agreement. Such relationships are to begin in the planning phase and continue through all remaining phases.

Since the inception of this agreement, when project management was the responsibility of the Democratic Initiatives Office of the USAID/W Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, through CY1992 when project management was passed to USAID/Nicaragua, and up through the present, the USAID-AIFLD relationship has been a distant one. USAID/Nicaragua had no meaningful participation in the planning of the activities to be undertaken by AIFLD/N, seldom visited those activities, and infrequently met with AIFLD/N to review the status of project implementation.

Though the Cooperative Agreement calls for a three-year workplan with time-phased milestones to be prepared by AIFLD and submitted to the USAID Project Officer, there is no record that this was ever done. Currently there is no workplan in effect that could be used by either AIFLD/N or USAID/Nicaragua to assist in determining the status of input mobilization and output achievement.

The AIFLD CPD prepares monthly project status reports and financial reports which are sent to AIFLD/W. The former are also sent by the CPD to the U.S. Embassy Labor Officer, but not to USAID/Nicaragua. As a consequence, project status reporting does not serve to strengthen what should be a "cooperative" relationship between AIFLD/N and USAID/Nicaragua, nor does it facilitate USAID/Nicaragua's ability to carry out its assigned monitoring function.

Since project management responsibility was transferred to USAID/Nicaragua in CY1992, the semi-annual progress report required by the agreement is prepared and sent promptly to USAID/Nicaragua directly from AIFLD/N. However, due to the time elapsed, this reporting is not particularly useful as a USAID/Nicaragua management tool for tracking activities, reviewing problem areas, and anticipating future events. Furthermore, there is no record that USAID/Nicaragua has attempted to use the semi-annual status report as a management tool.

CONCLUSIONS

The main output to be produced by this project (i.e., the organic consolidation of participating organizations into the CPT as a central labor body) was not achieved, thus rendering it impractical to accomplish the remaining four outputs or the project purpose. Despite early and clear indications of resistance by Nicaraguan protagonists to the prime objective, and the fluidity of the environment, the project was never revised to keep pace with evolving realities.

Because this project was designed by AIFLD without the active participation of the Nicaraguan labor organizations to be involved in carrying it out, and because it has been managed in a non-transparent manner which most beneficiary labor centrals see as paternalistic, it has not significantly enhanced the institutional capacity of those centrals, nor has it contributed to their sustainability.

The labor education programs sponsored by AIFLD and by participating organizations are designed in an ad-hoc manner mostly for organizing purposes, and are not based on any overall needs assessment, comprehensive strategy, or on-going evaluation. Serious training of trainers has not occurred, nor have the methodologies employed kept pace with modern, adult-education techniques. While labor education is also provided by various Nicaraguan universities and regional institutions, no overall assessment of the type or quality of current offerings is available.

Most Nicaraguan labor organizations do not have the capacity for solid economic and legislative analysis or the other technical skills needed to play a positive and effective role in such key areas as labor-management relations and the formulation and implementation of public policy affecting workers.

In view of experience to date, the upcoming election process, and the need for depolarization, an entirely new approach to strengthening the democratic and independent labor movement in Nicaragua is needed. This will require moving beyond support for specific organizations to building the capacity of individuals to provide vision and democratic labor leadership in an ever-evolving environment.

There has not been systematic monitoring of the AIFLD Cooperative Agreement by USAID/Nicaragua, nor has the "cooperative" relationship between AIFLD/Nicaragua and USAID/Nicaragua developed as envisioned in that agreement. This situation is exacerbated by the lack of appropriate management tools.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ***Emphasis on Labor Education:*** To maximize current opportunities for depolarization, and for helping to build an independent, democratic labor movement, USAID/Nicaragua should adopt a more inclusive approach by moving away from support for specific organizations to a program of labor education open to all union members who wish to participate. The overall objective of such support would be to develop new cadres of labor leaders who understand the role of the union movement in a free and democratic society, and are capable of fairly and effectively representing workers' rights in relevant public and private fora.

Topics would include such offerings as the role of labor in a free and democratic society, labor law, the legislative process, economics, privatization, labor-management relations, collective bargaining, conflict resolution, leadership, and organizational development. Courses could be supplemented with action research by students on certain key sectors or national issues of interest to the labor movement.

2. ***Transparent, Participatory Design:*** In deciding the specific objectives and content of the labor education program to be supported, USAID/Nicaragua should consider the following factors:

- The specific objectives to be achieved through support for labor education should be clearly defined by USAID/Nicaragua in keeping with the overall goal of the SDI Project.
- Transparency and the participation of interested parties in the selection of priority subjects will be important to the success of this effort. Therefore, it would be advisable for USAID/Nicaragua to consult with a broad array of Nicaraguan labor leaders, including the five CPT centrals, with regard to the specific topics that they feel should be included in the labor education program, as well as the timing and duration of courses.
- Based on those consultations, together with input from any other parties deemed appropriate, USAID/Nicaragua should identify the components to be included in this activity for discussion with potential implementing agencies.

3. ***Assessment of Current Offerings & Funding Modalities:*** Given the reported existence of various national and foreign labor education efforts in Nicaragua, and the lack of relevant information, before undertaking any further effort in this area, USAID/Nicaragua should make a comprehensive assessment of the type and quality of offerings currently available in order to explore whatever opportunities there may be for collaboration as a way to maximize the investment of USG funds. The assessment should also include inquiries directed to experienced institutions in other countries of the region, as well as in the U.S. This information should then be used to inform decisions concerning the most appropriate manner in which to award and manage available funds. For example, it might be possible to establish a Nicaraguan labor education entity (similar to the AFT Center for Education for Democracy), to add specialized courses or internships to an existing program, or to have labor education added to an existing university curriculum. In any case, USAID/Nicaragua should take into consideration the desirability of moving toward the eventual nationalization and self-sustainability of whatever labor education activity it supports.

4. ***Workplan & Reporting Requirements:*** The recipient of any future award for the provision of labor education should be required to prepare a time-phased workplan which should be approved by USAID/Nicaragua. To facilitate timely monitoring, consideration should also be given to establishing a quarterly reporting system with the following format:

- Activities and accomplishments for the last three months. (Where the activities have varied from the workplan in terms of the nature or timing of the activity, this should be noted in the quarterly report. It may be appropriate to update the workplan at this juncture depending on the nature and magnitude of the change.)
- Projected activities for the next six months;
- Project implementation problems;

- Status of resolution of problems identified in the last quarterly report.

5. ***Quarterly Review Meetings:*** Consideration should be given to establishing a quarterly review process in which the implementing agency, the USAID/Nicaragua project manager, and the U.S. Embassy labor reporting officer review the status of project implementation. The workplan and the quarterly report would be the basic instruments to be used in the review. The agenda for the meeting could follow the format of the quarterly report. The major question to be answered at the meeting would be: Are activities on track in relation to planned timelines?

Elements of a Logical Framework for AIFLD

PURPOSE: A strong democratic and independent Nicaraguan trade union movement, equipped to represent the workers' interest and participate constructively in the rehabilitation and development of the nation.

OUTPUTS:

1. Democratic and independent labor organizations unified into a national confederation or association embracing urban/industrial unions in Nicaraguan cities and towns and agrarian unions and agricultural cooperatives in the countryside.

Indicators: By March 1994 the CUS, CTN(a), CGT(i), CAUS, the independent FSMN teachers federation, and other qualified independent unions will have formed a labor body offering its member unions effective technical and legal services through a centralized agency.

Inputs

- a. CAUS, CGT(i) and FSMN will legally constitute themselves as labor confederations, by fulfilling administrative requirements for obtaining personeria juridica, or legal status, from the Nicaraguan government.
 - b. The majority of confederations will undertake the necessary steps required by their own legal charters to secure the agreement of the rank-and-file membership to affiliate to a democratic central labor body.
 - c. Support will be provided for a coordinator, selected by CPT's constituent members, who with a small central staff will facilitate the integration of CPT members, present and future, into a single central labor body. Operationally, the coordinator will set up working committees, schedule and conduct meetings, organize and administer a joint education program, and establish a system of internal communications with newsletters or other regular publications.
2. To strengthen the organizing, administrative and service-delivery mechanisms of independent unions and worker cooperatives in the urban and rural sectors.

Indicators:

- Prior to the formal establishment of a single central labor body, growth targets set for each of the CPT member organizations aiming at an aggregate increase of 15% in overall CPT membership in year one of this program, with incremental rates of growth in years two and three that nearly double the total

number of workers enrolled in affiliated trade unions and rural worker organizations by the end of FY 1994.

- A CPT organizing campaign coordinated to raise the total number of CPT-affiliated unions from 622 (as of March 1991) to 950 by March 1994, and increase aggregate CPT membership from 165,000 to over 250,000.

Inputs

- a. 30 organizer/activists designated by CPT organizations will be supported, working in concert with the CPT coordinator so as to avoid overlap, duplication and destructive competition.
 - b. Education and community development programs will also be utilized in complementing organizing campaigns.
3. Institutional capabilities of CPT unions significantly strengthened.

Indicators:

- Each of the CPT component unions will have a fully functioning education department where programs will focus on organization, union structure, labor relations, leadership development, small farmer interests and the workers' role in privatization.
- CPT unions will give increased service to members in collective bargaining and the procurement of development services needed by small farmers.

Inputs

- a. Basic and intermediate trade union seminars held for local and regional CPT leaders. Scholarships offered both by the George Meany Labor Center in USA, and international programs such as those offered by the latin American arm of the International Confed. of Free Trade Unions, ORIT. Specially prepared literature and audio-visual aids will be developed to illustrate major themes.
 - b. AIFLD will assist CUS and other groups in maintaining small administrative and coordinating staffs and with some of their current office expenses.
4. An agrarian union and social services department within the single central union body is established.

Indicators:

- An agrarian union and social services department will be functional and by March 1994 will have:

- created a communications and assistance network for analyzing problems and determining CPT policies and priorities in the agrarian field.
 - studied agrarian and labor conditions, opening a dialogue with the government and private institutions involved in the countryside, and insuring a significant role for democratic labor in the development of national agrarian policies and programs.
 - lobbied the Nicaraguan government and its agencies for the rapid and efficient provision of needed services for small farmers.
 - facilitated democratic labor unity by promoting joint action among agrarian organizations and urban/industrial unions on common problems.
- Small farmer unions and cooperatives and organized groups in the informal sector will have received technical assistance.

Inputs

- a. AIFLD will assist the CPT in developing an appropriate staff for its agrarian union and social services department.
 - b. Consultants as well as technicians will be provided by the project, to carry out needs assessments and project development.
5. CPT unions given a voice in the development and implementation of public policy by Nicaraguan government authorities when worker interests are directly affected.

Indicators: In the field of economic and social policy, democratic and independent unions will have the means to influence legislation, such as revision of the labor code, and administrative rule-making which affects wages and working conditions. Special attention will be paid to labor's input in such sensitive areas as the government's stated plans to dispose of publicly owned assets that more productively and efficiently can be managed in the private sector. Affected CPT unions will have a voice in the "privatization" or other disposition of such properties and services.

Inputs: The CPT coordinator will represent affected unions as and when there arises a requirement for union intervention in any official proceeding. However, special training and/or consultant services will be made available to give the coordinator the necessary legal and technical competence to operate effectively in the complex fields of legislative/administrative mechanics.

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(NOTE: This abbreviated Logical Framework was prepared by the Evaluation Team to identify the objectives of the activity. It was against these objectives that the accomplishments of the activity were gauged.)

**PART K: THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY - CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT (CFD)**

BACKGROUND

As a result of the elections of February 1990, a new Legislative Assembly took office in April 1990 in Nicaragua with the majority being held by UNO (National Opposition Union - a coalition of 14 political parties). This marked one of the first steps in the transition toward a democratic government after a decade of political and governmental domination by the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN). UNO won 52 seats; the FSLN won 39 and the MUR, one. The UNO majority was confronted with organizing the governance of the Assembly, which provided the following challenges:

- a constitutional and statutory organizational structure for directing the Assembly's political and administrative functions with a legal framework for the conduct of the legislative process badly in need of reform;
- an existing FSLN administrative organization which, although legally susceptible to immediate change, could not pragmatically be changed over night.
- an infrastructure in serious disrepair that included insufficient office equipment, a malfunctioning telephone system, and cramped, non-airconditioned office space; and
- a number of new representatives who had never held political office.

In August 1990, the Center for Democracy (CFD) entered into a Cooperative Agreement with USAID/W to implement the Regional Legislative Development Project to strengthen legislatures in Latin America. The CFD entered into a partnership with Florida International University and the State University of New York/Albany to form the Consortium for Legislative Development (CLD) to undertake implementation of this project. Under the Regional Project, members of the Consortium drafted a Needs Assessment for Nicaragua that was submitted to USAID/Nicaragua on December 14, 1990.

Modification No. 5 to the above Cooperative Agreement provided \$1,599,625 for a Buy-In from USAID/Nicaragua to pursue legislative projects in Nicaragua for a three year period. The Buy-In included the following objectives:

- Development of the institutional set-up for the modernization of the National Assembly.
- Graduate study for four staff members at the State University of New York/Albany or Florida International University.
- Training and orientation programs for legislators and staff.

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- Collaborative research and external advisory support to improve institutional linkages between the legislature and other institutions in Central America to include the participation in professional conferences and associations.
- Development and installation of an information system that includes a statutory retrieval system and a bill status system.
- Acquisition of legislative publications and reference manuals, as well as microfilming equipment to record and preserve legislative records.
- Acquisition of additional commodities including an electronic voting/attendance system; improved plenary audio and recording equipment; and photo off-set printing, photocopying and desktop publishing equipment.

FINDINGS

Summary

A variety of impediments and delays to the implementation of this project - including the suspension of activities imposed by USAID for 15 months - required extensions for these activities. By November 1994, 62% of project funds had been expended. Commodities account for a large portion of this project including \$242,000 for the electronic voting board and sound system, and an even larger amount estimated for the LAN (local area network). A revised workplan that extended project activities through July 31, 1995, was submitted to USAID/Nicaragua on December 15, 1994, and subsequently approved.

The principal inputs to this project include:

- purchase and installation of an electronic voting system (achieved)
- purchase and installation of an audio system for the Assembly chamber (achieved)
- purchase and installation of an MIS with bill tracking and statutory retrieval systems (partially achieved)
- purchase of library reference materials including microfilm technology to preserve legislative records (in process)
- short and long term training of staff and legislators (partial completion)
- publication of materials (achieved)

Outputs expected:

- improved monitoring, tracking and recording of the legislative process (partially achieved)
- strengthened technical capacity on the part of both staff and legislators to research issues and draft legislative proposal (partial achievement)

Electronic Voting System/Audio System

The electronic voting system includes a very large "pizarra" (blackboard) which is installed on the wall of the chamber behind the seats of the Junta Directiva (leadership committee) and faces the membership. It is an ever present reminder of who is present and how each member has voted when his/her name is illuminated with the corresponding vote indicated by colored lights. The installation and operation of the "pizarra" has provided a rapid, transparent and verifiable counting process which has reduced significantly the time required to record votes accurately. Previously votes were recorded by counting hands held high. This method allowed legislators to change votes at will if a recount were called for any reason. Among all interviewed, legislators, staff and non-legislators in the government and political arena, strong support was voiced for this technical improvement. Similarly, the improved audio system was favorably reviewed.

Management Information System

The local area network (LAN) which is supposed to provide a bill tracking and statutory retrieval system has been procured and the contract for installation has been set. Installation of the system [3 servers + 43 microcomputers + 7 laser printers + 7 dot matrix printers] and staff training is estimated to take three months. Software to be installed on the local area network (LAN) includes only standard packages: Wordperfect, Lotus, and a local electronic mail system. No specialized software to manage legislative information is included as was called for in the original design of this project. The total cost of the LAN system to be installed is approximately \$277,000. According to Dr. Medina, the local project coordinator, the specialized software and technical assistance already defined under the project. The specialized software and technical assistance component was eliminated from the budget by agreement with USAID/Nicaragua and the National Assembly to accommodate the increased cost of the LAN. To manage a statutory retrieval system and bill tracking system would cost approximately \$150,000.

Thus, it appears that after more than three years, one of the principal pillars upon which the project was built, a management information system for the legislature, will be only partially implemented by the time the extension of this cooperative agreement expires in July 1995.

In addition, few legislators or staff are aware of the plan for this system. While several consecutive Junta Directivas have been apprised of the plan to install an MIS, information has not been disseminated to the members of the legislature about the project. Several legislators were surprised (and delighted) to learn that such a system would be forthcoming. Under the project, an index of laws and decrees was manually developed that would be stored in the LAN with the objective ultimately of having full-text retrieval capability. However, at this point, it appears that no statutory retrieval system nor bill status system will be installed without additional funds for software purchase, installation, and training.

Library Reference Materials and Microfilm Archive of the Legislative Record

Under the direction of Dr. Rhina Mayorga, Librarian, reference materials have been procured for the Assembly Library. Microfilm reading and recording equipment has been purchased and training is in the process for the technical staff. In addition, through a cooperative arrangement with the U.S. Library of Congress, the Assembly Library will exchange microfilm rolls to allow both to have a complete historical record. It is the intention of the Assembly to microfilm all existing copies of the Gazette and continue this practice in the future.

Short and Long Term Training

The design of the project and its early workplans did not include an overall training strategy. Rather, the project identified a critical need for the training of both staff and legislators and ad hoc measures were undertaken to meet these needs. The concept of training is not applied in a traditional sense, except in the case of long-term training which provided a two year graduate program for one person (Mayling Obregon) at Florida International University. [Note: a second two year program at the State University of New York/Albany (Daniel Centeno) was provided, but with Regional funds].

The graduate education programs at FIU and SUNY/Albany provided master's degree programs in public administration with a focus on legislative development. In addition, each student had the opportunity to intern in a State Legislature. Mayling Obregon had not been an employee of the Assembly. However, upon completion of this program, she was hired to help develop a Budget Oversight Unit within the Legal Advisors Section of the Assembly. [At the time of this writing, Daniel Centeno was awaiting appointment to the staff following his recent return from SUNY/Albany]. Both students evaluated overall experiences in these programs as favorable, and hope to apply newly acquired knowledge in positions with the legislative staff.

Most of the training activities identified in quarterly reports involve participation in seminars or orientation trips to the United States. Activities which were identified by the CFD as training include: study visits to the U.S. by legislators and staff; academic/intellectual seminars; and attendance in professional conferences and Associations.

One example of a short-term training exercise that went beyond the "sit and listen to panels talk"-type conferences was the training seminar on the preparation of action-oriented reports for legislators which was presented to several staff by Nina Serafino of the U.S. Congressional Research Service (July 1994). Staff members were responsible for researching and presenting public policy papers for subsequent review at a follow-up evaluation session. However, to date, no follow-up session has been scheduled due to an incomplete response from Assembly trainees.

Members of the Centro de Investigacion y Capacitacion in Costa Rica were contracted to undertake a needs assessment for the technical staff of the Assembly. The study produced recommendations for short-term training to be developed in Nicaragua. Staff of the Assembly that were targeted for the training did not agree with the short-term training format recommended. Therefore the training was not executed.

Technical Advisors for Legislative Commissions

In 1994, support for technical advisors was added to the workplan. A needs assessment was contracted and target commissions were identified to which technical advisors would be assigned. The plan called for four advisors. Three were identified and assigned. The CFD provided salary support for two advisors.

Publications

In response to needs identified by the Junta Directiva, the CFD paid for the publication of several important documents for the Assembly including:

- Constitutional Compendium (Volumes I and II)
- Who's Who in the National Assembly
- Newspaper print of Constitutional Reforms
- 1994 Annual Report

Management of CFD Cooperative Agreement

When Modification No. 5 to the CFD's Cooperative Agreement came into effect in January 1992, the Center was collaborating with Florida International University and the State University of New York/Albany in the Consortium for Legislative Development. This Buy-In was to be implemented by the Consortium. The CFD, however, was awarded this Cooperative Agreement, which made it the first among equals in the Consortium. Relations among the Consortium partners deteriorated to the point of dissolution of the Consortium in December 1992/January 1993. Intra-Consortium rivalries had contributed to delays in implementation of project activities while overhead costs and FIU/SUNY-Albany subcontractor costs were being charged to the project with little productivity to show for the time. Approximately \$300,000 was charged to the project for FIU and SUNY/Albany. With the exception of \$42,000 which corresponds to tuition/studies costs at the two universities, the documentation reviewed does not adequately explain how the \$300,000 was utilized.

While the Consortium was falling apart, the Legislative Assembly became embroiled in political infighting which caused some members to walk out. Assembly activities in 1993 became paralyzed prompting USAID/Nicaragua to call a halt to CLD activities with the exception of:

- Continued support for the graduate students in the U.S.

- Salary support for Dra. Myriam Jarquin de Medina to direct the development of the Assembly's legislative information system project.

This hiatus lasted until the new Assembly leadership was chosen in January 1994 and the Assembly returned to normal operation. USAID/Nicaragua then authorized CFD to continue with project activities. On March, 1994, Caleb McCarry, of the CFD, visited Nicaragua to reactivate the legislative development project. Subsequently a revised workplan was submitted to USAID/Nicaragua which included modifications to take into account the changed needs of the Assembly.

Workplans and Reporting

Project workplans have not been prepared, reviewed, and revised in a manner that is consistent with the administration of the project and which would allow a meaningful dialogue to be sustained between USAID/Nicaragua and CFD. The quarterly reporting requirement has been ignored, thus depriving USAID/Nicaragua of a realistic understanding of the status of input mobilization and the problems that represented impediments to implementation.

At the time of this evaluation, less than six months before the expiration of this cooperative agreement, the workplan does not include sufficient detail to indicate how short-term training may be developed or undertaken; nor is it specific with regard to the installation of the LAN and standardized/specialized software to implement principal components of this project.

CONCLUSIONS

In response to the extensive, critical needs of the National Assembly, CFD has provided useful commodities: the publication of several Assembly documents and the installation of the sound system and electronic voting board. The speed and transparency that the electronic voting board provides to the vote counting process is an important contribution to improving the efficiency of the Assembly.

It is also reasonable to expect that the MIS, when installed, would increase the technical capability of the staff and legislators to monitor, track and record the legislative process as indicated in the cooperative agreement and subsequent workplans. However, at this juncture it is impossible to analyze the impact of a system that is not yet installed and requires additional expenditures beyond the life of this cooperative agreement.

Despite the hiatus in project activity during 1993, there is insufficient explanation to account for the fact that by February 1995, bids for the procurement of the LAN system were still being reviewed with cost estimates that would preclude the purchase/installation of software to manage the statutory retrieval and bill tracking systems. Those items were among the highest priorities identified in 1991, specified by technical analysis in 1992, and were nowhere near installation in the Assembly by February 1995. A factor which may have contributed to this situation is the lack of a systematic monitoring of the CFD Cooperative

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Agreement on the part of USAID/Nicaragua. This situation is exacerbated by the lack of management tools to allow for a collaborative relationship to develop between USAID/Nicaragua and CFD.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **LAN/MIS Installation with Specialized Legislative Programming:** USAID/Nicaragua should take measures to ensure the installation of the local area network, the statutory retrieval system, and the bill status system and provide appropriate training necessary for these systems to become operational.
2. **Staff training:** In the time remaining, staff training and development should be given a high priority. Training courses under the direction of Dra. Myriam Jarquin de Medina, the CFD local coordinator, should be aggressively pursued to meet the objectives of this project.
3. **Next Steps with the Assembly:** USAID/Nicaragua should consult with the Junta Directiva to determine priority areas and take into consideration other aid projects now under development for the Assembly before designing a next phase of USAID/Nicaragua assistance for the Assembly.
4. **Management Tools for Project Administration:**
 - **Workplan:** Submit a revised workplan that carries the project through the end of the timeframe with proposed activities to be approved by USAID/Nicaragua.
 - **Quarterly Reporting:** Quarterly Reporting should be re-established with the following format:
 - Activities and accomplishments for the last three months.
 - Projected activities for the next six months.
 - Project implementation problems.
 - Status of resolution of problems identified in the last quarterly report.

Elements of a Logical Framework for the Legislative Assembly Activity

PURPOSE: Improve transparency, efficiency, and accountability in the legislative process

OUTPUTS:

1. Improved monitoring, tracking, and recording of the legislative process
2. Strengthened technical capacity on the part of both staff and legislators to research issues and draft legislative proposals
3. Improved monitoring, tracking, and recording of the legislative process in the National Assembly

INPUTS:

1. Technical assistance provided through CFD
2. Short and long term training of staff and legislators
3. Commodity assistance:
 - installed electronic voting system
 - installed audio system for the Assembly chamber
 - installed MIS with bill tracking and statutory retrieval systems
 - library reference materials including microfilm technology to preserve legislative records
 - publication of materials

(Note: This abbreviated Logical Framework was prepared by the Evaluation Team to identify the objectives of the activity. It was against these objectives that the Evaluation Team gauged the accomplishments of the activity.)

As of the end of January, 1994, \$380,349 had been committed to the Strengthening of the Judicial School of the Supreme Court of Nicaragua Project, and an expenditure of \$202,349 was reported by ILANUD as of October 10, 1994.

FINDINGS

USAID/Nicaragua and ILANUD Management

All documentation prepared by USAID/Nicaragua and ILANUD including the initial assessment documentation, the project identification documents, the workplan, and the reports concerning the status of project implementation strongly indicates that the Strengthening of the Judicial School of the Supreme Court of Nicaragua Project has been implemented by ILANUD in an excellent fashion.

Assessment of Progress

The objectives to be achieved identified in the project documentation are:

1. Judicial School possesses basic instructional packages covering basic civil, criminal, and labor court procedures/systems dealt with by judges, public prosecutors, and support staff.
2. The Judicial School will have trained personnel that can design, execute, and evaluate AOJ in-service training programs for clerks of the court, local judges, district judges, and public prosecutors.
3. Judicial personnel that have taken the training are more effective in performing their duties.

Ample progress has been made with regard to objectives 1 and 2 identified immediately above. Basic courses were developed with ILANUD assistance and given by Nicaraguans from the judicial sector to personnel throughout the country. A review of the materials prepared by the Judicial School in conjunction with ILANUD demonstrates that participants were provided with instruction in the basic skills relevant to their judicial responsibilities. It is reported that ILANUD made great progress in promoting a participatory style of training, using Nicaraguan cases developed by ILANUD working with the Judicial School. It was the case study, specific to problems of administering justice in Nicaragua, that became the medium for instruction. The fact that Nicaraguans were the instructors cum facilitators in this training was key to the success of the training. Significant by-products of this training effort are manuals outlining the judicial procedures that are basic to administration of justice in Nicaragua.

After each training course, the participants filled out an evaluation form that provided each participant the opportunity to comment on the training. This information was analyzed by the Curriculum Coordinator and the Academic Coordinator at the school in conjunction

PART L: JUDICIAL TRAINING - ILANUD COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

BACKGROUND

When the SDI Project was developed, the judicial system was controlled by the Sandinistas, though some non-Sandinistas were being appointed as judges during the period after the 1990 election. Judicial sector personnel were deeply suspicious about having the U.S. Government work in that sector. This dictated a go-slow approach, for it was extremely difficult to discuss the problem with the major players in this sector -- the Sandinistas.

In the Action Plan for FY-1993 and FY-1994 prepared in December, 1991, USAID/Nicaragua proposed to fund a project that would promote legal and regulatory reform by establishing property rights, projecting industry and trade, and fostering new regulations which encourage and protect private sector investment. Though the Latin and Caribbean Bureau (LAC) was anxious to support an Administration of Justice (AOJ) intervention, LAC recommended an AOJ intervention as a part of the SDI Project concerned with reform of the entire institutional judicial fabric would be more appropriate.

However, USAID/Nicaragua realized no models or precedents existed for guiding a judicial reform in Nicaragua. An AOJ Sector Assessment had been done by FIU in conjunction with the United Nations Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD) which provided an overview of the functioning of the justice sector, but it lacked detailed analysis, critical to selecting appropriate activities to address the problems in the sector. USAID/Nicaragua brought in William Davis, representing the National Center for State Courts, to assist in reviewing the situation in the justice sector. He recommended a major restructuring of the sector including the revision of the legal codes and the strengthening of the judicial training capacity.

Judicial training as a first step in the context of judicial reform was determined to be the priority. It was decided that the whole range of judicial reform activities required to restructure the sector represented too complex an undertaking to be pursued in the immediate future. Therefore, it was decided to start with a training activity targeted on personnel working in the judicial sector. There was consensus in the judicial community that a high priority was to professionalize the judicial corps, and judicial sector personnel throughout the system professed a strong desire to receive training. In 1992 ILANUD, with funding from the Regional Program for the Strengthening the Administration of Justice funded by USAID, initiated a program concerned with restructuring the operations and administration of judicial training in Nicaragua. The Judicial School was created in 1993.

Because of the work undertaken by ILANUD and the receptivity to ILANUD by the Nicaraguan judicial sector, it was decided by USAID/Nicaragua that ILANUD was the most likely entity to implement the Strengthening of the Judicial School of the Supreme Court of Nicaragua Project. It took approximately nine months to develop this activity with ILANUD with USAID/Nicaragua working with both Sandinistas and non-Sandinistas.

**Elements of a Logical Framework for the
Strengthening of the Judicial School of the Supreme Court**

PURPOSE: (NOTE: The purpose to be expressed here should be identical with the purpose identified in the AOJ Project.)

SUB-PURPOSE: Judicial personnel that have taken the training are more effective in performing their duties.

MASTER OUTPUT: Enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of the Judicial School.

SUBORDINATE OUTPUTS:

1. Judicial School possesses basic instructional packages covering basic civil, criminal, and labor court procedures/systems dealt with by judges, public prosecutors, and support staff.
2. The Judicial School has trained personnel that can design, execute, and evaluate AOJ in-service training programs for clerks of the court, local judges, district judges, and public prosecutors.

- INPUTS:**
1. Basic training modules for clerks of the court, local judges, district judges, and public prosecutors in basic civil, criminal, and labor court procedures/systems designed and executed.
 2. National and regional seminars to address short term issues that affect the day-to-day workings of the Judiciary and the Attorney General's Office designed and executed.
 3. Scholarships and study tours for key staff members of the Judiciary and Attorney General's Office.
 4. Equipment and training materials

(Note: This abbreviated Logical Framework was prepared by the Evaluation Team to identify the objectives of the activity. It was against these objectives that the Evaluation Team gauged the accomplishments of the activity.)

with ILANUD. When appropriate, courses were modified to incorporate participant feedback.

Women in Development

Of the 2,766 District Judges, Municipal Judges, jurors, and court administrative personnel that were trained, 1,118 were women. A significant number of women were trained in each of the categories. It appears that there are ample opportunities for women in the AOJ field.

CONCLUSIONS

The institutionalization of capacity at the Judicial School in terms of curriculum development and the provision of instruction has been successful. There is nothing to suggest that the future efforts of ILANUD working in close cooperation with the Judicial School over the course of 1995 will not be equally successful.

However, short of a follow-up evaluation of the third objective that judicial personnel "that have taken the training are more effective in performing their duties", it will be impossible to determine the degree of impact of the training. Nevertheless, the \$380,349 programmed appears to be a sound investment. Eventually, this activity should be evaluated in the context of USAID/Nicaragua's comprehensive AOJ Project.

The training of jurors, making them mindful of their responsibilities, serves not only to strengthen the court process, but it can also have the effect of reaching a broad audience at the grassroots level with D&G messages concerned with the rights and responsibilities of the Nicaraguan citizen.

3. DIFFICULTIES PREVENTED DIRECT SUPPORT TO LOCAL INSTITUTIONS

1. ***Re-engineering of Requirements for Supporting Local Counterparts Needed:*** As part of its re-engineering initiative, USAID/Washington should consider changing the registration, external audit, and other requirements for delivering support directly to indigenous organizations. This is particularly important for D&G projects, since strengthening local capacity is often an essential output for meeting the project purpose. As a basis for such USAID policy changes, a careful analysis should be made of the U.S. vs. local trade-offs faced by USAID/Nicaragua and other Missions in similar political environments. It may be, for instance, that audit requirements should be altered by increasing the amount granted to a local group before an external audit is required. A substitute might be to require USAID field missions to make provisions in agreements with indigenous organizations for local technical assistance to ensure that financial accounting and reporting systems meet standards deemed satisfactory by USAID. Other criteria might involve such factors as the leadership capacity or membership strength of the local group.

2. ***Checklist of Items to Be Considered to Determine Expatriate vs. U.S.-Based Managers:*** Given the complexity of the cost-benefit factors involved in deciding whether to support expatriate residents or U.S.-based grantee representatives, USAID/Nicaragua should consider the following items:

- Level of local involvement needed to achieve project outputs and purpose;
- Intensity of on-site project monitoring/revision anticipated;
- Availability and organizational capacity of appropriate indigenous institutions;
- Availability of local technical expertise to provide needed assistance to strengthen indigenous grantees;
- Track record and internal modus operandi of U.S. grantee institution. Does it have experience with resident managers? Will it transfer decision-making authority equal to level of responsibility? Will it provide necessary administrative/technical backup and general support when needed?;
- Level of relevant technical expertise available within the U.S. organization as opposed to the recruitment of outside consultants;
- Costs for expatriate residents compared with salary, consultant, travel and opportunity costs for U.S.-based representative.

ANNEX B

CHECKLIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

All Recommendations are listed in the order they appear in Volumes I - II.

VOLUME I; Chapter II, Overarching Issues Identified in Individual Evaluations

1. LACK OF USAID ASSESSMENT LED TO CLIENT-DRIVEN DESIGN

1. ***Assessment Should Be Required Before Committing Significant D&G Resources:*** USAID/Washington should require that, prior to initiating any significant D&G project activity, USAID field missions ensure that a serious assessment has been made of the problem and an analytical framework is developed to guide the selection of activities to address the problem. USAID/Washington should also make this requirement clear to development practitioners promoting specific D&G approaches without regard to geographic location or the local conditions.

This is particularly important in post-election political environments, such as Nicaragua in 1990 or Haiti in 1994. In such cases, it is critical that the analytical tasks required for designing a D&G program be initiated as soon as possible. In such cases of post-crisis transition, USAID should make it a first priority to dispatch a team to initiate the analysis on which a D&G program can be built. Embassy Political and Economic Sections should be called upon for assistance in accomplishing this. In USAID's re-engineering effort, it would appear that the Office of Transition Initiatives would play a critical role in these situations.

2. ***Analytical Gaps to Be Filled Prior to Allocation of New Funds for SDI Activities:*** For any follow-on activities to be funded by the SDI Project, USAID/Nicaragua should fill existing gaps in the analytical framework which should be a critical element for the approval of specific activities and funding levels. This is particularly important in the case of new efforts involving labor and the National Assembly.

2. THE EVOLVING NICARAGUAN CONTEXT LED TO ALTERED SDI TACTICS

1. ***Problem of Polarization Is Key to the Project Purpose:*** USAID/Nicaragua should maintain its focus on providing assistance to attack the deep-seated problem of polarization. Only by balancing resources that address institutional and attitudinal problems associated with the historical legacy of division and conflict will a sound civil society emerge.

should insist that all data collected by project implementors be disaggregated and reported by gender.

8. DONORS COULD BE MODELS FOR DE-POLARIZATION

1. **Improve Donor Coordination:** To help facilitate the process of post-war reconciliation within Nicaraguan society and to provide a model for such behavior, USAID/Nicaragua should explore current ideology-based donor preferences with other donors in order to identify ways in which such sharply segmented resource allocation practices might be moderated. Once in process, such coordinated efforts among donors should be made known by USAID/Nicaragua to all SDI Project grantees and cooperators.

9. USAID/NICARAGUA'S PROJECT MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

1. **Need for Additional Staff for the D&G Portfolio:** USAID/Nicaragua should assign additional personnel to the D&G portfolio. This is particularly important, given that AOJ and Municipal Development projects are to be added, and in view of on-going analytical requirements and the need for first-hand project monitoring. At this writing, the Evaluation Team understands that the intention of USAID/Nicaragua management is to create a DI Office and staff it with two DHs and a number of PSCs. We fully support such an initiative, and recommend that this be done at the earliest possible date.
2. **Need for Systematic Monitoring:** There has been a significant absence of systematic monitoring of the SDI Project on the part of USAID/Nicaragua. This is exacerbated by the lack of user-friendly management tools in many instances to allow for a collaborative relationship to develop between project management and the entities responsible for project implementation. USAID/Nicaragua should therefore initiate a systematic monitoring process which includes the following components:
 - **Workplan:** Time-phased workplans approved and reviewed periodically by USAID/Nicaragua.
 - **Monitoring and Evaluation Plan:** Monitoring and Evaluation Plans should be prepared for each activity that clearly identify objectives and indicators. The use of logical framework methodology would be appropriate for identifying objectives, their indicators, and the means of verification.
 - **Quarterly Reporting:** Quarterly reporting with the following format:
 - Activities and accomplishments for the last three months. (Where the activities have varied from the workplan in terms of the nature or timing of the activity, this should be noted in the quarterly report. It may be appropriate to update the workplan at this juncture depending on the nature and magnitude of the change);
 - Projected activities for the next six months;

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4. **LOCAL PARTICIPATION AND TRANSPARENCY RATHER THAN CLIENT PREFERENCES SHOULD DETERMINE PROJECT ACTIVITIES**

1. ***Incorporate Local Participation and Transparency into Future Design Efforts:*** For any new and follow-on project activities, USAID/Nicaragua should re-fashion its arrangements with U.S. cooperators and grantees to ensure the greatest possible degree of Nicaraguan participation in the project design process and transparency in the funding arrangements that are forged for delivering U.S. resources.

5. **POTENTIAL SYNERGY THROUGH GREATER INTERCHANGE SHOULD BE REALIZED**

1. ***Promote Synergy Through Regular Meetings with Implementing Agencies:*** To capitalize on the potential for information-sharing and cooperation among and within the various components of the SDI Project, and thus realize the potential synergy implicit in the project design, USAID/Nicaragua should consider convening periodic meetings with implementing agencies. Such sessions should be used to convey to grantees and cooperators USAID/Nicaragua's commitment to collaborative efforts in seeking to achieve project objectives, calling on them to help explore those opportunities within and between project components and to actively pursue them.

6. **LOCAL NGOS CRITICAL TO PROJECT SUCCESS NEED VITAL ORGANIZATIONAL SKILLS TO IMPROVE THEIR FUNCTIONING**

1. ***Empower Indigenous NGOs by Providing OD Technical Assistance:*** Since a healthy NGO sector is a bulwark of civil society, and because Nicaraguan NGOs are extremely weak, USAID/Nicaragua should insist that technical assistance packages aimed at building their capacity include not only substantive skills, but also those needed for the effective performance of the basic tasks that undergird the organization itself. Such skills should also be included in labor education programs since unions, too, seek to organize groups at the local, regional and national level. To accomplish this, qualified organizational development (OD) practitioners with international experience should be identified and engaged, either directly by USAID/Nicaragua or by grantees and cooperators.

7. **GENDER ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN PROJECT SUCCESS**

1. ***Employ Gender Analysis Methodologies:*** To ensure that gender-based differences are taken into account in the design, implementation, and evaluation of future SDI Project-sponsored activities, USAID/Nicaragua should consider providing gender analysis training and technical assistance for all participating organizations. Such training should serve to more sharply define objectives and indicators to measure project outreach in terms of the participation of and benefit to both men and women. It is quite possible that the USAID/LAC Gender Adviser or Women in Development Office could help support such training and provide follow-on technical assistance. At a minimum, USAID/Nicaragua

- **Quarterly Review Meetings:** To improve SDI Project oversight, consideration should be given to establishing a quarterly review system in which the Director of the NED Managua office meets with each grantee and their Nicaraguan counterparts to review the quarterly status report recommended immediately above.

The workplan and the quarterly report would be the basic instruments to be used in the review. The agenda for the meeting could follow the format of the quarterly report. The focus of the meeting would be to explore whether activities are on track in relation to planned timelines.

2. **Need for Prompt Review by NED of Proposals Received by Its Managua Office:** As reported by the head of the NED Managua office, there are in excess of 40 proposals awaiting review by NED. These proposals should be reviewed as soon as possible to determine the best candidates to be funded with remaining SDI Project monies.
3. **After NED - Alternative Management Arrangements:** If it is determined that in future NED will no longer perform the functions that it is presently performing, there are at least three options that USAID/Nicaragua should consider.

Option #1: USAID/Nicaragua identifies another U.S. organization that can perform the functions previously assigned to NED.

Option #2: USAID/Nicaragua identifies or develops a Nicaraguan organization that can perform the functions outlined. One such candidate could be the Center of Education for Democracy that is presently implementing the public school civic education project. Clearly, the selection of a Nicaraguan entity to undertake these functions would require a considerable investment in institution-building by USAID/Nicaragua. It is even possible that if a Nicaraguan institution were selected, a U.S. entity would be needed to provide the required technical assistance.

Option #3: USAID/Nicaragua administers a grant program working directly with grantees such as IRI, NDI, AFT, and so forth.

Volume II; Annex A, Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI) Project Activity Evaluations

PART A: NED - CIVIC EDUCATION - MUJERES NICARGUENSES, CONCIENCIA - RESOURCES IN ACTION

1. **Civic Education Support Continued In the Transition to the 1996 Election:** The return on investment for this program is high. Conciencia is building a grassroots network that should be utilized in civic education programming for the 1996 elections.

- Project implementation problems;
- Status of resolution of the problems identified in the last quarterly report.

- **Periodic and Formal Review Meetings:** In order to improve SDI Project oversight, consideration should be given to establishing periodic and formal review meetings (quarterly or semi-annual). The workplan and the quarterly reports would be the basic instruments to be used in the review. The agenda for the meeting could follow the format of the quarterly report.

10. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY PROJECT MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS

In the course of this evaluation, the Evaluation Team was informed that NED wished to discontinue its relationship with USAID/Nicaragua as soon as feasible. For the reasons discussed above, NED is uncomfortable with this relationship; neither party finds it totally satisfactory. However, should NED and USAID/Nicaragua find common ground, the following recommendations should be considered:

1. **Need for systematic monitoring by NED:** The absence of systematic monitoring by NED is exacerbated by the lack of user-friendly management tools to allow for a collaborative relationship to develop between it and the grantees and sub-grantees responsible for project implementation. For that reason, NED should adopt a system that includes the following elements:

- **Monitoring and Evaluation Plans:** M&E Plans with clear objectives and indicators should be prepared for each activity. The use of logical framework methodology would be appropriate for identifying objectives, indicators, and means of verification.

- **Quarterly Reporting Through NED/Managua to USAID/Nicaragua:** Consideration should be given to establishing a system of direct quarterly reports. This reporting should go to the NED/Managua office which, in turn, would pass it directly on to USAID/Nicaragua. The following format is recommended:

- Activities and accomplishments for the last three months. (Where the activities have varied from the workplan in terms of the nature or timing of the activity, this should be noted in the quarterly report. It may be appropriate to update the workplan at this juncture, depending on the nature and magnitude of the change.)
- Projected activities for the next six months.
- Project implementation problems.
- Status of resolution of problems identified in the last quarterly report.

3. **Expanded Role of the CED:** The present activities could become just one component of a broader effort to support civic education. Additional CED outreach activities could be developed that reach beyond the public school system.
4. **Curriculum Materials:** Provisions to preserve and archive materials distributed to the schools should be facilitated. For example, a binder system or library box/container system to accompany materials distributed to the teachers should be developed to prevent loss of these educational materials.
5. **Program Resources/Library/Archive:** Educational materials and resources collected by the CED should be organized, maintained and made accessible for consultation by the MED and by teachers in the field.
6. **Coordination with USAID/Nicaragua's Basic Education Project and CED Efforts in Primary Education:** Personnel directing the Basic Education Project supported by USAID/Nicaragua should be in constant communication with CED personnel leading the Education for Democracy Project.
7. **AFT Resident Advisor:** Depending on the magnitude of USAID/Nicaragua's follow-on investment in public civic education, consideration should be given to having AFT provide a full-time resident advisor that has the appropriate professional background to guide this activity.

PART C: NED - CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS - NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (NDI)

1. **Continued Support for Civil-Military Dialogue:** USAID/Nicaragua in the context of the Country Team should explore additional vehicles to support a civil-military dialogue beyond conferences which convene civilians and military for only brief moments in time. Also, the next steps in the civil-military dialogue should have a higher degree of participation by Nicaraguans in both design and implementation. For example, a series of focused seminars on specific topics could also be utilized to produce a set of issue papers written by Nicaraguans on civil-military relations. In the process of developing a new dimension of this activity, a further role for NDI should be considered given the excellent performance that it has demonstrated to date.

PART D: NED - CIVIC EDUCATION - THE NICARAGUAN DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (INDE) - AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION (ADF)

1. **Shrinking Funds & SDI Priorities:** Given the magnitude of expected budget cuts, USAID/Nicaragua will want to give careful consideration to the priorities it sets for future funding. Before allocating additional support for this project, once the current NED grant expires (September 1995), USAID/Nicaragua and NED should seriously explore the following options:

PART B: NED - CIVIC EDUCATION IN THE PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM - AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (AFT)

1. ***Role of USAID/Nicaragua-Funded Civic Education Textbooks:*** Near the very end of the evaluation process, the Evaluation Team learned of the existence of the civic education textbooks for the public school system that had been provided by USAID/Nicaragua prior to the initiation of this activity. The team is unable to reach informed conclusions regarding the utility of these textbooks in connection with the process in which the AFT activity is currently engaged. It is critical that USAID/Nicaragua, in conjunction with AFT and MED, review the appropriateness of these textbooks with regard to the following options:

- These text books should continue being used as the official text for civic education in the public school system of Nicaragua.
- It should be recommended that these textbooks be discontinued.
- AFT should enhance the curriculum development and teacher training processes to take into consideration the fact that these textbooks are out there in the schools and are being utilized.
- AFT should significantly curtail its plans, recognizing that there is a satisfactory textbook presently available, and recognizing the special effort in which AFT is currently engaged is a fringe benefit that Nicaragua can ill afford.

After reviewing this issue, USAID/Nicaragua should consider the Recommendations listed immediately below. (Note: This review should include the paper, "Evaluacion de Programmas de Estudio de Ciencias Sociales - Enfasis en los Programas de Formacion Civica de Secundaria" prepared by Lic. Ana Maria Soto and Lic. Alvaro Hernandez A., July, 1993.)

2. ***Continued Support for the CED:*** The cooperative agreement which supports the CED expires March 31, 1995. If the cooperative agreement is not renewed, it is unlikely that the progress in teacher training would be continued and a valuable resource could be lost. Therefore, USAID/Nicaragua should continue to support this project. As a part of the process of developing a new cooperative agreement a strategic planning process should be undertaken to clarify the role of the CED as it relates to the MED. Extending the program to include the primary level should be considered. A new MOU between the MED and the CED should continue to focus on the basic tasks of:

- Continue the process of refining the civic education curriculum.
- Continue training of civic education teachers at the secondary level.
- Distribute more widely materials that have been developed or are being revised.

**PART H: HUMAN RIGHTS - AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION (ADF)
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT**

1. Two-Pronged Funding Strategy: For the next stage of the SDI Project, in order to further strengthen CPDH and ANPDH, while continuing to promote coordination among all human rights groups, USAID/Nicaragua should carefully explore all funding options. These include the following:

- Direct support to CPDH and ANPDH with funds divided into two categories:
 - Individual Support - operational funding for specific high-priority activities by each organization in the areas of human rights promotion and defense, and;
 - Support for jointly-sponsored CPDH/ANPDH activities in the field of human rights education. These would seek to include all human rights groups and to build on the progress achieved in Phase III of the current project. Such educational activities would target both the local and national level and would aim to strengthen coordination among all human rights groups, improve public policy on human rights, and expand public awareness and respect for fundamental human rights as a critical element in a free and democratic society. For example:
 - Joint efforts to organize new community groups at the municipal level in selected strategic areas, along with the harmonization of groups where more than one exists in a given community;
 - The formulation by consensus and implementation by all participating human rights groups of a policy agenda aimed at the passage or revision of specific regulatory or legislative measures; and,
 - Based on the foregoing activities, the planning and execution by all participating human rights groups of a public awareness campaign to be carried out through the mass media.

This mode would require constant oversight and tight management by USAID/Nicaragua. Given the direct relationship that would result from grants given directly to CPDH and ANPDH by USAID/Nicaragua and the evolving nature of inter-organizational relations in the human rights community, frequent monitoring by USAID/Nicaragua and the incorporation of needed revisions in a rolling-design approach to the management of these grants would be required if this initiative is to succeed.

- ✳ ■ Smaller grants to CPDH and ANPDH, plus a grant to a third organization for the joint efforts described above as proposed by those two organizations or by any

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- INDE has enjoyed USG support for quite a number of years and, though willing to sponsor this civic education initiative, does not contribute to the effort. USAID/Nicaragua could require that an increasing amount of counterpart funds from INDE and/or FUNDE be contributed if the project is to continue. This could help ensure the institutionalization and longer term sustainability of these efforts.
 - Another NED component, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is providing support and technical assistance to COSEP, of which INDE is a key affiliate. It may be more appropriate for USAID/Nicaragua to dedicate scarce SDI resources to other priority areas, leaving civic education in the business sector to NED/CIPE.
2. ***Credit and Other Special Problems of Business Women:*** Should USAID/Nicaragua or NED decide that INDE is to receive an additional grant, and even during the remainder of the current grant, INDE should be asked to investigate the special problems of Nicaraguan business women and devise activities aimed at advocating solutions at local and national levels. This process could be initiated by calling all female INDE chapter members (or board members) together to identify priorities and participate in the planning process. Since the INDE project coordinator sees women as being "easier to come together and reach agreement," and "making much greater efforts to negotiate," this could be a highly positive new learning strategy for strengthening the entire institution.

PART E: NED - PROMOTION OF STRENGTHENED POLITICAL PARTIES - GRUPO FUNDEMOS - INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (IRI)

1. ***IRI Should Provide FUNDEMOS TA on Training Methods:*** IRI should undertake immediately the training of the FUNDEMOS staff to ensure quality training design and implementation in political party development. Training materials should be developed and distributed to participants.
2. ***Follow-up and Published Reports on Activities:*** In addition to publication of a newsletter, training materials and activity reports should be prepared for a wider distribution.
3. ***Management and Follow-up:*** Grupo FUNDEMOS should focus more on the preparation for and follow-up to its events to ensure a higher level of quality of its activities. A reduction in the number of extraneous events will allow the FUNDEMOS staff more time to prepare, evaluate and report on its activities.
4. ***Women on FUNDEMOS Board:*** FUNDEMOS should add women to its Board of Directors so their deliberations reflect the views of both genders and the body is more representative of the overall population the organization is trying to reach.

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made clear that all data collected are to be gender-disaggregated and used for forward planning.

3. **Specialized Technical Assistance:** A clear understanding between USAID/Nicaragua and the grantees should also be reached regarding technical assistance needs. As indicated, this could be paid for out of grantee funds, managed directly by USAID/Nicaragua, or by a third-party entity. Particularly recommended is technical assistance in the following areas:
 - On-going, periodic assistance by qualified organization development (OD) specialist(s) to strengthen the institutional capacity of grantee organizations, and to transfer OD techniques to the field staffs of all interested human rights groups involved in organizing community human rights groups.
 - Continued assistance for the strengthening and harmonization of data bases, moving toward the eventual capacity to exchange human rights documentation
4. **Diversification of Funding Sources:** To move toward the future sustainability of ANPDH and CPDH, in any new agreement USAID/Nicaragua should push them to make the diversification of funding sources a priority organizational task. Written fund-raising plans with timelines and target amounts should be a condition of further support. The technical assistance called for in the previous recommendation should emphasize resource development and all types of potential support should be explored, including the establishment of long-term endowments.
5. **Systematic Management:** In any future activity, a systematic approach to management should be adhered to that would include the following components:
 - **Monitoring and Evaluation Plan:** Objectives with their indicators and means of verification should be established in a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan.
 - **Workplan:** A time-phased workplan, approved by USAID/Nicaragua, should be a precondition to the dispersing of funds.
 - **Quarterly Reporting:** A quarterly reporting system with the following format:
 - Activities and accomplishments for the last three months.
 - Projected activities for the next six months.
 - Project implementation problems.
 - Status of resolution of problems identified in the last quarterly report.
 - **Quarterly Review Meetings:** A quarterly review system in which the grantee(s), any sub-grantee(s), and the USAID project manager would review the status of project implementation. The workplan and the quarterly report would be the basic instruments to be used in the review.

other human rights group. This third grant would also include the provision of technical assistance to the human rights community at large.

Such a third grant to another Nicaraguan organization would probably be counterproductive, since it would generate resistance and friction between USAID/Nicaragua and CPDH/ANPDH. This, in turn, might erase the progress to date in the area of group coordination.

- Creation of an in-country management/monitoring unit outside of USAID/Nicaragua for all human rights activities which would probably involve a U.S. or other foreign entity (for the reasons explained above). This entity would seek and provide assistance to any human rights NGO wishing to propose appropriate activities, promote coordinated action, provide close monitoring of the activities supported, identify and respond to the technical assistance and training needs of human rights groups, and serve as liaison between the human rights community and USAID/Nicaragua.

While lightening the management burden on USAID/Nicaragua and providing needed training, OD and other technical assistance, it is likely that this option would increase management costs, reducing the funds available for substantive work.

- Continuing the present mode of using a U.S. PVO to channel funds to the human rights community. This is seen as a last resort to be considered only if the Mission is not able to dedicate the necessary staff time or funds to any other option.

This would require that USAID/Nicaragua retain the services of a U.S. or regional institution, since the resistance and resentment that would result from the involvement of any other Nicaraguan organization would almost certainly be counterproductive in terms of meeting the project purpose. Given that there is no known appropriate U.S. entity with offices in Nicaragua, this would present an obstacle to the type of labor-intensive, hands-on approach required at this critical juncture in the development of a strong and healthy national human rights movement.

2. **Carefully-Framed Objectives:** Assuming any of above options are chosen, it is incumbent on USAID/Nicaragua to identify clear and detailed human rights objectives such as those mentioned above. These should then be discussed individually and jointly with ANPDH and CPDH, and with other human rights groups if the mechanism selected involves a third party. Specific requirements for individual and joint activities should be clearly articulated by USAID/Nicaragua and accepted by the two organizations as a condition of further funding. Once objectives are set, specific indicators should be included in any grant agreement, along with the means of verification, as a basis for measuring progress and revising project outputs and inputs as needed. It should also be

organizations to a program of labor education open to all union members who wish to participate. The overall objective of such support would be to develop new cadres of labor leaders who understand the role of the union movement in a free and democratic society, and are capable of fairly and effectively representing workers' rights in relevant public and private fora.

Topics would include such offerings as the role of labor in a free and democratic society, labor law, the legislative process, economics, privatization, labor-management relations, collective bargaining, conflict resolution, leadership, and organizational development. Courses could be supplemented with action research by students on certain key sectors or national issues of interest to the labor movement.

2. ***Transparent, Participatory Design:*** In deciding the specific objectives and content of the labor education program to be supported, USAID/Nicaragua should consider the following factors:

- The specific objectives to be achieved through support for labor education should be clearly defined by USAID/Nicaragua in keeping with the overall goal of the SDI Project.
- Transparency and the participation of interested parties in the selection of priority subjects will be important to the success of this effort. Therefore, it would be advisable for USAID/Nicaragua to consult with a broad array of Nicaraguan labor leaders, including the five CPT centrals, with regard to the specific topics that they feel should be included in the labor education program, as well as the timing and duration of courses.
- Based on those consultations, together with input from any other parties deemed appropriate, USAID/Nicaragua should identify the components to be included in this activity for discussion with potential implementing agencies.

3. ***Assessment of Current Offerings & Funding Modalities:*** Given the reported existence of various national and foreign labor education efforts in Nicaragua, and the lack of relevant information, before undertaking any further effort in this area, USAID/Nicaragua should make a comprehensive assessment of the type and quality of offerings currently available in order to explore whatever opportunities there may be for collaboration as a way to maximize the investment of USG funds. The assessment should also include inquiries directed to experienced institutions in other countries of the region, as well as in the U.S. This information should then be used to inform decisions concerning the most appropriate manner in which to award and manage available funds. For example, it might be possible to establish a Nicaraguan labor education entity (similar to the AFT Center for Education for Democracy), to add specialized courses or internships to an existing program, or to have labor education added to an existing university curriculum. In any case, USAID/Nicaragua should take into consideration the desirability of moving toward the eventual nationalization and self-sustainability of whatever labor education activity it supports.

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PART I: JOURNALISM TRAINING - FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY (FIU) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

1. ***The FIU Project and Transition to the Election:*** Given the enormity of the problem in the journalistic sector and the positive role that the FIU project could play in the period leading to the next presidential election, an extension of this activity is recommended. If further funding is provided consideration should be given to tightening the focus of the FIU activity. One possibility is to reduce the number of different courses presently being given. The number of desired outputs identified in the Abbreviated Logical Framework which was taken directly from the Cooperative Agreement may be excessive and could be considered too scattered.

No attention has been given to identifying a master project objective. If there is a follow-on phase for this activity, a Logical Framework should be developed that reflects a reasonable expectation with regards to what can be accomplished at the purpose level.

2. ***Implementation Plan Development and a Project Monitoring System:*** An implementation plan should be developed for the remaining period of project implementation. This plan should serve as the basic management tool shared with USAID/Nicaragua to track the status of project progress.
3. ***Quarterly Reporting:*** Consideration should be given to establishing a quarterly reporting system as required by the Cooperative Agreement.
4. ***Quarterly Review Meetings:*** Consideration should be given to establishing a quarterly review system in which the FIU Coordinator, a USIS representative, and the USAID/Nicaragua project manager would review status of the FIU Cooperative Agreement implementation. The workplan and the quarterly report would be the basic instruments to be used in the review. The agenda for the meeting could follow the format of the quarterly report. The focus of the meeting would be to determine if FIU project-funded activities are on track in relation to the timelines identified in the implementation plan.
5. ***Monitoring and Evaluation Plan:*** The following questions should be addressed if there is additional funding for journalism training activities. How is the impact of the project to be measured? Is a baseline established? Are participants pre-tested? Are samples of participants' writing reviewed? Is there a post-test? Is there a questionnaire filled out by participants after each workshop, seminar, or training activity that prompts the participants to discuss the quality of the training?

PART J: LABOR SECTOR - AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT (AIFLD) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

1. ***Emphasis on Labor Education:*** To maximize current opportunities for de-polarization, and for helping to build an independent, democratic labor movement, USAID/Nicaragua should adopt a more inclusive approach by moving away from support for specific

4. ***Management Tools for Project Administration:***

- **Workplan:** Submit a revised workplan that carries the project through the end of the timeframe with proposed activities to be approved by USAID/Nicaragua.
- **Quarterly Reporting:** Quarterly Reporting should be re-established with the following format:
 - Activities and accomplishments for the last three months.
 - Projected activities for the next six months.
 - Project implementation problems.
 - Status of resolution of problems identified in the last quarterly report.

4. **Workplan and Reporting Requirements:** The recipient of any future award for the provision of labor education should be required to prepare a time-phased workplan which should be approved by USAID/Nicaragua. To facilitate timely monitoring, consideration should also be given to establishing a quarterly reporting system with the following format:
 - Activities and accomplishments for the last three months. (Where the activities have varied from the workplan in terms of the nature or timing of the activity, this should be noted in the quarterly report. It may be appropriate to update the workplan at this juncture depending on the nature and magnitude of the change.)
 - Projected activities for the next six months;
 - Project implementation problems;
 - Status of resolution of problems identified in the last quarterly report.

5. **Quarterly Review Meetings:** Consideration should be given to establishing a quarterly review process in which the implementing agency, the USAID/Nicaragua project manager, and the U.S. Embassy labor reporting officer review the status of project implementation. The workplan and the quarterly report would be the basic instruments to be used in the review. The agenda for the meeting could follow the format of the quarterly report. The major question to be answered at the meeting would be: "Are the activities on track in relation to planned timelines?"

PART K: THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY - CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT (CFD)

1. **LAN/MIS Installation with Specialized Legislative Programming:** USAID/Nicaragua should take measures to ensure the installation of the local area network, the statutory retrieval system, and the bill status system and provide appropriate training necessary for these systems to become operational.

2. **Staff training:** In the time remaining, staff training and development should be given a high priority. Training courses under the direction of Dra. Myriam Jarquin de Medina, the CFD local coordinator, should be aggressively pursued to meet the objectives of this project.

3. **Next Steps with the Assembly:** USAID/Nicaragua should consult with the Junta Directiva to determine priority areas and take into consideration other aid projects now under development for the Assembly before designing a next phase of USAID/Nicaragua assistance for the Assembly.

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ANNEX C

ACTIVITY SCOPE OF WORK

I. ACTIVITY TO BE EVALUATED:

USAID/Nicaragua will evaluate activities that were part of the original Strengthening Democratic Institutions project which was authorized on June 17, 1991. The project has since been amended to extend its PACD from the original date of 6/30/95 to 12/31/97 in order to incorporate an administration of Justice component. The evaluation will focus on those activities that are currently being implemented and will emphasize those that are in the most advanced stages of implementation. New activities under the recently approved Administration of Justice component will not be a part of the evaluation except as related to initial activities financed by the project (e.g. judicial training) that are already underway and the implications of the design and negotiation process for implementation.

II. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION:

The purpose of this evaluation is to examine the management and implementation of activities under the Strengthening Democratic Institutions project and to identify its problems, strengths, and weaknesses in order to 1) take action to improve on-going implementation and 2) serve as a basis for a project amendment that would extend and/or modify some ongoing activities. The evaluation will also explore and assess possibilities for new or expanded activities under the amendment. In general, the evaluation should assist USAID/Nicaragua and other implementing entities in making decisions about on-going project activities, funding requirements, and possible modifications to existing project activities and timeframes.

To the extent possible, the evaluation should provide information on the impact of project activities. Since many activities have only been underway a short time and are designed to have longer-term impact, it may not be possible to assess impact at this time. Nonetheless, the Mission is interested in evaluating the degree to which project activities are contributing to overall Mission objectives in support of democracy.

III. BACKGROUND

USAID/Nicaragua supports a wide range of activities to promote democratic development in Nicaragua which are focused on the objective of increased consensus on democratic values. The program outputs associated with this objective are 1) wider promulgation and understanding of democratic values and 2) greater confidence in democratic institutions and processes. The primary project vehicle for this support has been the Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI) project, an umbrella project encompassing civic education, institutional support, human rights, democratic labor, and administration of justice activities.

The SDI project works to contribute to the development of a stable, enduring democratic system, protect human rights, promote justice, encourage participation, and facilitate higher levels of material and social well-being in Nicaragua by strengthening Nicaragua's democratic institutions and the values and attitudes that nurture them. One of the issues that was discussed at length in the design stage of the project was whether the best approach to achieve a greater consensus on democratic values was to promote those values directly through civic education, the media, etc; or rather to concentrate on improving the operations of the country's formal democratic institutions--such as the courts and the legislature--as a means of encouraging the adoption of those values. The Mission concluded that neither approach by itself would be adequate and decided to implement both approaches simultaneously. As a result, the project is distinct from many AID initiatives in other countries in its overriding emphasis on democratic values and political culture, by focusing efforts to strengthen institutions and organizations on those that are particularly critical to promoting and shaping democratic values (e.g. political parties, the press and human rights organizations) and attempting to influence value change directly. The project's four original primary components are: (A) promotion of democratic values; (B) private institutions of pluralism; (C) effective government; and (D) protection of human rights. In addition there is an active contingency fund which gives flexibility to meet emerging needs. The project was signed with the Nicaraguan government in 1991 with an initial completion date of 1995. The project was amended to add a fifth major component focused on Administration of Justice in 1994 and the completion date was extended to 1997 to cover the time period of that amendment. Initial activities originally expected to end in 1995 were not affected by the amendment.

Promotion of Democratic Values and Private Institutions of Pluralism

In early 1992, the Mission signed a \$5.0 million grant with the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to provide subgrants for funding activities which promote democratic values through 1) civic education programs both within the formal education system and through grassroots organizations, 2) the establishment of a media matching fund to support a free and competitive media, and 3) the strengthening of political parties and other grassroots organizations committed to pluralism. Activities supported by NED include:

- **Civic education** activities including a \$1.1 million project managed by the American Federation of Teachers working with the **Ministry of Education** to design a civics education curriculum and teacher's reference manual and to train a corps of master civics teachers. An \$80,000 grant to America's Development Foundation (ADF) to support the work of Instituto Nicaraguense de Desarrollo-Fundacion Nicaraguense de Desarrollo (INDEFUNDE), a grassroots civic organization sponsoring educational events on the theme of democracy and cooperatism, the principles of democracy, democratic leadership, etc. INDEFUNDE also **designs and produces** didactic materials which are used in seminars and forums. A grant to Delphi International in the amount of **\$80,000 supported the work of the Centro de Formación Juvenil (CEFOJ)**, a non-partisan, nonprofit organization of university students and youth. CEFOJ's

activities included workshops for high school and university students on such topics as opportunities for civic involvement, community service public works projects such as the construction of youth centers and sports facilities, and other informational seminars and meetings that promote the sense of community and cooperation. Another grant to Delphi International provides \$44,000 to fund the work of **CONCIENCIA**, a nonpartisan, nonprofit democratic women's association which works to enhance public knowledge and understanding of the rights and responsibilities of citizens in a democratic society. **CONCIENCIA's** program activities include sponsoring a weekly 15 minute radio program entitled "Women in Democracy," conducting seminars on topics such as the importance of registering births of children, and producing a book entitled Themes in Civic Education, which has been distributed to educators, government ministries, municipal offices, and the media.

- **Political forums and political party strengthening** activities are supported through a \$180,000 grant to the International Republican Institute (IRI) to fund the work of **Grupo FUNDEMOS**, a nonpartisan, nonprofit political think tank. **FUNDEMOS** is carrying-out an intensive program of forums, debates, and seminars on current political issues such as property disputes, the laws of regulating the military, the need for national consensus, and the issues involved in the transition to and consolidation of democracy. **FUNDEMOS** is actively involved in enhancing Nicaragua's political party system through an institutional strengthening program for political parties focusing on such topics as political leadership, presentation of party programs, recruiting, and fund raising.
- **Media matching grants to Radio Dario** (\$50,000) in León and Canal 8 (\$52,000) in Managua support a free, fair independent media through which social and political sectors can debate issues of political concern and which can offer Nicaraguans a peaceful vehicle for challenging those policies they oppose. This NED funding provides for enhanced civic education and public affairs programming.
- **Civil-military relations activities** have been financed through \$130,000 grant to the National Democratic Institute to carry-out a civil-military relations project. A technical team composed of NDI personnel and international experts in civil-military relations from Spain, Argentina, and the United States conducted in-depth interviews with relevant parties from the government, legislature, the military hierarchy, and civic organizations. A report summarizing their findings was subsequently published and two forums have been held. These events are significant because for the first time the major actors from diverse and relevant sectors sat together to discuss this highly sensitive issue.

Support for democratic labor unions is provided through a \$2.84 million cooperative agreement with the American Institute for Free Labor Development. AIFLD provides training, educational opportunities, and technical assistance to the members of five

independent union confederations which are affiliated with the Permanent Congress of Workers.

Journalism training is financed through a \$233,000 Cooperative Agreement with Florida International University to carry out various training activities in Nicaragua. This activity supports the development of a credible, professional, and independent press willing and able to produce objective reporting. The training consists of a series of local and regional seminars on such topics as the role of the press in a developing democracy, journalistic ethics, economic/business reporting, TV news production, investigating reporting, and news editing and writing.

Effective Governance

Legislative support has been provided under the SDI project to promote effective governance. Toward this end, the Mission has entered into a \$1.6 million cooperative agreement with the Consortium for Legislative Development (CLD). The CLD program provides for specific in-country and U.S. training and educational activities, procurement of commodities (including an electronic voting/sound system and a management information system), and technical assistance and institutional strengthening support to the **Nicaraguan National Assembly**.

Judicial training improvements have been financed through a one-year, \$380,000 cooperative agreement with the United Nations Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of the Offender (ILANUD) to provide support to the Nicaraguan Supreme Court's Judicial School for the training of district and local judges, prosecutors, and court clerks in their basic **functions and operations**, as well as for seminars for jury members, observational visits, and legal updating seminars for judges.

Protection of Human Rights

Support for human rights organizations is provided through a \$1.8 million Cooperative Agreement with America's Development Foundation to provide training, technical assistance, and salary support to the **Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights (ANPDH)** and the **Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH)**. This technical assistance includes the exposure of ANPDH and CPDH to the possibility of entering into a global human rights network and is oriented toward improving both the institutional and operational aspects of ANPDH and CPDH. Project activities in this area are expanding to fund programs that will involve all organizations working to promote human rights in Nicaragua. At the same time, direct operational support to the organizations is decreasing.

Administration of Justice

An amendment to the SDI Project recently added \$4.0 million for the improvement of the administration of justice in the areas of court administration, legal code reform, the strengthening of the prosecutorial functions of the Attorney General's Office and the

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introduction of alternative conflict resolution methods in schools and community centers. The specific subprojects in this amendment include:

Law reform efforts focusing on changing the principal legislative framework for the Nicaraguan justice system. Working with the Supreme Court, the activity will support the reform of the criminal procedure code, the criminal law code, the administrative law code, and the court organization law.

Prosecutorial and defense services will be improved through efforts to help the GON reorganize the Attorney General's Office and establish a Public Defender's Office. These efforts will deal with the issues that must be resolved to strengthen the role of prosecutors, to improve the operation of the criminal law system, and protect human rights by making available affordable public defender services to those accused of crimes.

Judicial administration improvements are focused on three primary areas. Judicial statistics will be improved by introducing the concept of a docket and docket control system, establishing a unique numbering system that will generate uniform statistical information for planning and verifying judicial activity, and establishing an index and retrieval system for judicial files. Assistance will be provided to develop a uniform records management system with procedures for completion of each required record including case intake registers and registers of final decisions, standards and systems developed at a national level on case storage and the use of technology (such as filing equipment and microfilm), destruction schedules, and guidelines for maintaining security both by limiting the threat of natural disaster and by controlling access to records. The project will also provide technical assistance for drafting an Administrative Procedures Manual that clearly states Court principles, procedures, and processes.

Judicial training activities will be focused on training to court personnel in the new legal codes and administrative procedures, and development of a legal ethics code.

Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms will be promoted by financing pilot mediation programs in the public school system as well as a pilot program of community mediation managed by a local NGO in selected communities. These efforts offer a means of reducing the caseload of judicial institutions and altering the cultural norms associated with conflict that often erupt into violence.

IV. STATEMENT OF WORK

A. Project Design

To evaluate issues of project design, the evaluation team will:

- Review the Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS), Action Plan, Program Performance Assessment System (PPAS) documentation, the project paper, and other project documents to determine the project's role

in overall Mission strategy and the underlying premises of the project design.

- Provide analysis of the project design based on experience and research in other settings, the current political and economic situation in Nicaragua, and the experience to date of the project.

This analysis must address whether the basic premise of the project and its approach to change in knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs via education and focused institutional strengthening is still valid, and if it is being correctly applied. The Mission requires the Contractor's views on 1) whether the major thrusts of the project--direct promotion of civil society and democratic values through civic education and strengthening key institutions are still appropriate and whether the balance and focus are correct, 2) whether possible additional or alternative approaches are being overlooked by the Mission and should be added, 3) whether the Project's strategic objectives, goal, and purpose are still appropriate and properly defined, 4) whether project activities are supporting the policy of "inclusiveness" by working with groups from across the political spectrum, and 5) what components should be added, modified, deleted, and/or continued.

B. Project Management

To address issues of project management, the Contractor shall:

- Carry out site visits and interview USAID project managers, personnel managing various grants or contracts, counterparts, subgrant recipients, and beneficiaries to determine the status of project implementation and to identify strengths and weaknesses in project management at various levels as well as specific management problems that should be addressed.
- Conduct interviews in both Grantee home and local offices to determine the adequacy of home office organization and support to field, as well as field office management.
- Review project documentation, contracts, grant agreements, accounting records, and workplans in relation to these assessments.
- If appropriate, provide recommendations for improving the management of project activities, addressing problem areas, and assuring appropriate oversight by USAID and propose alternative management arrangements for consideration as project activities are amended/extended.

Evaluation of management issues must address both at USAID's internal management of the project as well as the management of various activities by contractors and grantees. The key questions to be addressed are as follows:

USAID Management - Are project management arrangements working effectively to assure that project activities are implemented on time, are of high quality, and contributing to project objectives? Is there sufficient USAID staff involvement with counterparts to adequately monitor project activities, develop mutual understanding about project goals and mechanisms, build consensus and develop a sense of ownership among counterparts and participants, undertake mid-course modifications as necessary, and provide substantive input on key decisions and activities? How could project oversight be improved? Is there a working mechanism in place to assure that project activities are contributing to U.S. policy objectives, Mission strategic objectives, and program outputs?

Contractors/Grantees - Are contractors and grantees with project management responsibilities managing project activities effectively? Have they been responsive to USAID information needs and requests for specific actions? Are counterparts receiving the support they need from contractors and grantees? Are communication and coordination channels between USAID and beneficiary groups adequate? Are the grantees and contractors giving appropriate recognition to USAID assistance and, if not, what can be done to improve this? Do the additional levels of administration create additional work without facilitating implementation or contributing to project goals and do they limit the involvement of USAID project managers? Are there viable alternatives to the management arrangements currently in place that would improve project management?

NED - Is the NED subgrant system working effectively to support project objectives? What are the advantages and disadvantages of project implementation arrangements with NED? Does the NED mechanism of awarding subgrants impede the timely approval/implementation of important projects? Does NED provide adequate oversight of subgrants? Is NED providing technical assistance where necessary to assure that subgrantee programs are successful or is assistance limited to the administrative aspects of the grant? Is the timing, number and quality of the NED sub-grantee reports adequate? Is NED/Washington devoting sufficient attention to the Nicaragua portfolio? What is the relationship of the NED local staff to NED/Washington? Are AID managers sufficiently involved in the management of project activities financed through NED? Do the NED grantees and subgrantees feel that they get sufficient administrative assistance and technical support from the NED home and local offices?

AIFLD, ADF, CLD, ILANUD, FIU - Are contractors and grantees with direct project management responsibilities managing their activities effectively? Is their level of personnel and administration justified and contributing toward project objectives? Are activities on track in relation to planned timelines? Are funds accounted for appropriately? Are the institutions receiving assistance developing other sources of support and addressing issues of long-term

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sustainability? Are there specific management improvements that should be proposed if activities were to be extended through a project amendment?

C. Implementation and Impact

To address implementation issues and determine impact, the evaluation team will:

- Conduct site visits, field interviews, and reviews of project documentation and materials produced under various project components to determine progress being made toward objectives and identify problem areas.
- Recommend actions to address problem areas and propose other actions that would help accelerate progress toward project objectives.

The Contractor must address whether project activities are contributing significantly to overall project objectives by determining 1) whether the project is making adequate progress toward the outputs and objectives outlined in the project paper and 2) what problems have emerged have slowed implementation or prevented the achievement of planned outputs, and by identifying important areas of involvement necessary to reach project objectives that are not being addressed. The Contractor must specifically address the following project activities:

1. Civic Education

In order to analyze project civic education activities, the Contractor will:

- Review findings from USAID-financed focus group analysis and surveys as background to assessing civic education materials and programs financed under the program through site visits, field interviews, and analysis of civic education materials produced under the program.
- Analyze the effectiveness of on-going civic education efforts to determine what activities have been most effective and to identify the key elements of a successful civic education effort.
- Recommend changes to existing programs to improve the civic education effort and propose additional activities to expand the effectiveness and reach of the program.

In general, USAID wants to know whether the project's civic education activities are contributing significantly toward the better understanding of democracy and the development of democratic values in Nicaragua. The Contractor must address 1) whether the civic education materials developed by the project are addressing the most important concepts and values and are communicating them effectively, 2) whether the project is reaching a broad range of Nicaraguans with civic education messages, and

3) whether there are other means of civic education that could be used effectively (e.g. the media) to communicate certain messages or to reach a broader portion of the Nicaraguan public.

2. Interest Groups and Political Parties

In analyzing project activities involving interest groups and political parties, the Contractor shall:

- Meet with interest groups that have received project-funded assistance to develop an understanding of their overall program and the contribution of assistance under the project.
- Meet with political party leaders, staff, and members to develop an understanding of the substance of the assistance that they have received through project activities.
- Analyze the contribution of these programs to overall project goals and the effectiveness of project assistance in improving these programs' ability to contribute to project goals.
- Propose means of broadening the spectrum of groups that receive such assistance in line with USAID policy to work with groups that demonstrate a commitment to democratic principles and behavior.
- Recommend ways of improving the impact of this assistance.

The focus of analysis in this area is to be on whether project activities focused on interest groups and political parties are contributing significantly to overall project objectives. The Contractor must assess 1) whether the organizations chosen for assistance are likely to have a substantial impact on the process of democratization in Nicaragua 2) the degree to which the technical assistance and training are addressing the most important needs of these organizations and helping them to better perform their key functions in a democratic society, 3) whether these activities are reaching across the political spectrum and working to promote consensus and facilitating and promoting the use of democratic processes for decision-making and conflict resolution. 4) whether beneficiary organizations feel the assistance programs are responsive and flexible in meeting their evolving needs, and 5) the organizations' institutional strength - whether they have appropriate organizational structures to ensure necessary adaptations to changed circumstances and continued development, and to avoid conflict of interests.

3. Labor Unions

To analyze the AIFLD program with labor unions, the Contractor shall:

- Conduct site visits and field interviews with leaders and members of unions that have received AIFLD assistance, and review union records to determine the degree to which AIFLD assistance has contributed to strengthening the union and to assess the contribution of the AIFLD program to broader understanding among union members of those concepts of democracy most appropriate to union organization and labor issues.
- Conduct meetings and site visits with unions not currently associated with the AIFLD program to determine if AIFLD assistance to these unions would contribute to project objectives.
- Evaluate and recommend measures to enable the unions to become more self-sufficient.
- Evaluate the AIFLD methodology for strengthening unions and, as appropriate, recommend changes in AIFLD's approach to improve overall effectiveness.

The key questions related to AIFLD activities involve their contribution to overall project objectives and how the program might be modified to have greater impact. The Mission needs an independent analysis of AIFLD'S **accomplishments**. Therefore, the Contractor shall specifically address the following questions: Are AIFLD activities demonstrably strengthening the commitment to democratic principles among a broad sector of labor leadership and union members? Has AIFLD assistance increased the ability of unions to deliver concrete benefits to their members in terms of improved management/labor relations, higher salaries, better working conditions, job stability, etc.? Are there increased numbers of union members in unions receiving AIFLD assistance; what is the significance of greater numbers? To what extent is AIFLD addressing the needs of women in the labor movement? What training efforts have been carried out and what has been their impact? What has been the impact of AIFLD technical assistance? Is AIFLD addressing the issues of sustainability? What changes should be made now to assure that the project is successful?

The Contractor must also address issues related to a possible future program with AIFLD: Is the focus on "democratic labor unions" appropriate or would a program to "democratize" other unions contribute significantly to project objectives? Are AIFLD's efforts toward a more inclusive policy adequate and/or effective? Does AIFLD apply its definition of "democratic unions" evenly? Are AIFLD's monitoring and evaluation of its training events adequate?

4. Human Rights Support

To analyze the implementation and impact of support to human rights organizations, the Contractor will:

- Conduct site visits and field interviews, analyze survey and focus group findings, and review project documentation and materials to determine the institutional capabilities and effectiveness of the human rights organizations currently receiving USAID funding.
- Conduct site visits to organizations working to promote human rights that are not currently receiving USAID assistance to determine their capabilities and effectiveness.
- Identify current strengths and weaknesses in the various human rights organizations and the niche of each organization in the area of human rights promotion in Nicaragua.
- Recommend appropriate actions to assist all of these organizations in promoting human rights and contributing to project objectives, recognizing USAID's interest in programs and not direct operational support.
- Evaluate efforts to establish a human rights ombudsman and whether there are appropriate project activities that could support this effort.

The Contractor must focus primarily on whether the human rights organizations supported under the project are effectively promoting human rights in Nicaragua. The focus should be on whether the human rights organizations 1) have improved their performance as a result of project assistance, 2) are handling key aspects of their work such as verification and documentation competently, 3) have well-defined policies and priorities related to information gathering and use and on how to present their information effectively, 4) make adequate use of the media and other means to disseminate human rights information and issues, 5) have broadened their funding sources to improve their long-term sustainability. The Contractor is to identify areas that human rights organizations need to focus on to have greater impact.

Looking toward the future, USAID is interest in assessing 1) the degree of interest among human rights organizations in coordinating among themselves and working with other human rights organizations to more effectly monitor human rights, 2) measures being taken to change their image of partisanship, 3) potential alternative USAID mechanisms of support for human rights in Nicaragua that reduce the dependency of certain groups on USAID funding and work to broaden the spectrum of human rights groups receiving USAID support, such as ombudsman, etc.

Though USAID financial support for Comisión Internacional de Apoyo y Verificación (CIAV) human rights activities does not come from the SDI project, the Contractor must provide recommendations regarding the relationship of USAID support to project-funded human rights support under the project.

5. The Press

To analyze journalism support activities, the Contractor shall:

- Conduct site visits to recipients of media matching grants to verify the use of equipment purchased under the grants, observe its use, and interview those using the equipment to determine its contribution to news and public affairs broadcasting.
- Review focus group and survey material to determine attitudes, strengths and weaknesses of the news profession.
- Interview participants and trainers involved in the journalism training project, and visit a training activity if possible during the evaluation, to determine the effectiveness and appropriateness of the training.
- Recommend actions to improve press functions critical to democratic society.

The primary area of focus shall be on assessing the degree to which project activities in support of the press are helping to improve objectivity and coverage of news and public affairs. The Contractor shall determine whether equipment purchased under the matching grant program is being used for the purposes intended and assess whether it has had the desired impact. Analysis of the journalism training program shall focus on whether it is meeting the needs of journalists and contributing to project objectives and whether there are other activities or programs to promote a democratic professional press which USAID should be supporting.

6. Government Institutions

In assessing USAID support to selected government institutions, the Contractor shall:

- Conduct appropriate interviews and make site visits to the National Assembly and Judicial School to observe the results of USAID assistance and evaluate the contribution this assistance is making to project objectives.

Contractor should also follow these guidelines:

- A. Prior to departure for Nicaragua, members of the evaluation team must meet with officials in the U.S. with project responsibilities (such as NED staff and board members, AIFLD officials, ADF staff, etc.). The team may also want to meet with USAID staff involved in the initial design and implementation of the project who are now posted in Washington, and with USAID/W project officers in charge of the USAID/Nicaragua buyin for the Consortium for Legislative Development (CLD) National Assembly Project. The Contractor must also prepare a draft workplan for presentation to USAID/Nicaragua staff at the initial meeting after arrival in country.
- B. In Nicaragua, the evaluation team must hold an initial meeting with USAID project staff and the evaluation officer during their first week in country to clarify various aspects of the evaluation and to review the draft workplan for conducting the evaluation.
- C. The Contractor shall conduct interviews and field site visits, review documentation and project materials and carry out other tasks associated with completion of the statement of work. The Contractor is encouraged to seek out interviews and information from sources not directly associated with project activities that can help provide a different perspective on the project.
- D. The Contractor will provide debriefings to USAID staff and an evaluation report as outlined below. The evaluation report will provide findings, conclusions, and recommendations responsive to questions in the Statement of Work above. The analysis must be structured so that conclusions follow logically from findings and represent the Contractor's interpretation of facts gathered during the evaluation.

VI. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:

- A. **Workplan for Conducting the Evaluation** - The Contractor must prepare a preliminary workplan for presentation to USAID staff at the initial meeting upon arrival in country. A finalized workplan, including methodology and schedule of activities, must be provided within six days of arrival in country.
- B. **Mid-Way Briefing** - Approximately mid-way through the evaluation the team must provide a briefing to USAID staff on their progress and initial findings. This meeting must also identify any problems encountered in conducting the evaluation that should be addressed.
- C. **Draft Report and Debriefing** - Prior to departing from Nicaragua, the Contractor must submit a draft evaluation report and provide a debriefing for USAID staff that includes findings, conclusions, and recommendations. USAID will provide comments on the draft report within 10 work days.

D. Submittal of Final Report - The Contractor shall submit a final report incorporating Mission comments, responding to questions posed in the Statement of Work, and outlining findings, conclusions, and recommendations two weeks following receipt of comments on the draft report from USAID staff. The evaluation report must contain the following sections:

- **Executive Summary.** A summary of the overall evaluation that incorporates the main points of all other sections and highlights the major findings, conclusions, and recommendations. This section is also used as part of the Mission's Project Evaluation Summary that becomes part of an Agency-side evaluation database. The executive summary should not exceed three single-spaced pages.

- **Statement of Conclusions and Recommendations.** Conclusions should be short and succinct, with the topic identified by a short sub-heading related to the questions posed in the Statement of Work. Though this section may appear repetitious of elements of the Executive Summary, it is designed to facilitate USAID's formal review of the evaluation by grouping all the recommendations.

Recommendations must correspond to the conclusions; whenever possible, the recommendations should specify who, or what agency, should take the recommended actions:

- **Body of the Report.** The report is to include a description of the country context in which the project was developed and carried out, and provide the information (evidence and analysis) on which the conclusions and recommendations are based.

The analysis must be structured so that conclusions follow logically from findings and represent the Contractor's interpretation of facts gathered during the evaluation (in the same way that a medical diagnosis is based on symptoms). Recommendations (prescription) should follow from conclusions: Findings --> Conclusions --> Recommendations.

The general length of the body of the report should be no more than 30 pages; additional details and analysis should be placed in appendices.

- **Appendices.** These are to include at a minimum the following:

- The evaluation Scope of Work;

- The project Logical Framework, together with a brief summary of the current status/attainment of original or modified inputs and outputs (if these are not already indicated in the body of the report):

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- A description of the methodology used in the evaluation (e.g., the research approach or design, the types of indicators used to measure change of the direction/trend of impacts, how external factors were treated in the analysis). Evaluators may offer methodological recommendations for future evaluations;
- A bibliography of documents consulted.

Other appendices may include more details on special topics, and a list of agencies consulted.

Ten copies of the final evaluation report must be submitted along with a computer diskette with the report in Wordperfect 5.1/5.2 format and any accompanying tables or charts in either Wordperfect or Lotus 1-2-3 format.

- E. Evaluation Abstract** - The Contractor shall provide a brief abstract of the evaluation for use by USAID in disseminating information about the evaluation. This abstract shall be a further summary of the same information as the Executive Summary within the space limitations of one single-spaced page, preferably less.

ANNEX D

DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Documents are organized by activity or the organization that received funding from USAID (i.e., National Endowment for Democracy) and by the organization that produced, received, or used the document (i.e., USAID/Nicaragua). The vast majority of these documents have been returned to USAID/Nicaragua where at present they are being archived together.

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (NED)

- NED Proposal for Program to Promote Democracy and National Reconciliation in Nicaragua, SDI Project, August 1991 (revised 10/91).
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ANNEX E

PEOPLE CONTACTED

The people contacted are listed under the organization for which they work (i.e., U.S. Embassy), the development activities supported by USAID/Nicaragua's SDI Project (i.e., Conciencia), or by organizations not receiving funds from USAID/Nicaragua but working in the sector in which SDI activities are taking place (i.e. the Cardinal's Commission for Verification).

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (NED)

NED/Managua

- Victor Hugo Rojas, Office Director, Managua NED Office

NED/Washington

- Barbara Haig, Director of Programming
- Lillian Publilliones Nolan, Latin America Program Director

NED: CONCIENCIA

- Lillian Mejia de Colston, President
- Maria Justina Rivas Bravo, Program Coordinator
- Dora Esperanza Garcia de Berrios, Administrator
- Janet Ordonez Rojas, Training Coordinator
- Rosa Argentina Arancibiz Perez, Secretary
- Mayra Jarquin Lopez, Supervisor
- Maria Lissett Valle Bolanos, Public Relations

NED: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (AFT) - CENTER FOR EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

AFT/Washington

- David Dorn, Director, International Affairs Department
- Hortense Dicker, Project Coordinator, Education for Democracy Program/International

Ministry of Education

- Humberto Belli, Minister of Education

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- Aurora Gurdian, Vice Minister of Education
- Hortensia Rivas, former Vice Minister of Education

Center for Education for Democracy

- Salvador Stadthagen, Director
- Aura Lina Orlando Salazar, Curriculum Advisor
- Master Teachers in Training:
 - Erick Jose Briceno, Rio San Juan
 - Rosario Cruz, Esteli
 - Esperanza Moreno Benavidez, El Jicaro
 - Jose Arturo Gonzalez Jimenez
 - Maria Salvadora Bravo Chacon, Juigalpa
 - Cayetano Webb, Waspam Rio Coco
 - Digna Cerna, San Marcos
 - Rosa Lilian Rivera, San Rafael del Norte
 - Denis Aleman, Matagalpa

NED/NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE (NDI)

- Ken Wollack, President
- Santiago Canton, Program Officer/Latin America
- Happy Swann, Program Assistant

NED: INSTITUTO NICARAGUENSE DE DESARROLLO (INDE) - AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION (ADF)

- Fausto Carcabelos, Director
- Roger A. Cerda, General Manager, Chamber of Commerce of Nicaragua

NED: FUNDEMOS - INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (IRI)

International Republican Institute (IRI)

- Karen Harbert, Regional Program Director - Latin America & the Caribbean
- Maria DeCesare, Assistant Regional Program Director - Latin America & the Caribbean

FUNDEMOS

- Roberto Calderon, President
- Violeta Granera de Sandino, Executive Director
- Jose de Jesus Rojas, volunteer

- Jose Luis Velasquez, lecturer and advisor
- Jorge Luis Prendiz Bonilla, participant

NED: CHANNEL 8

- Carlos A. Briceno, President

NED: RADIO DARIO

- Juan Toruno Calderon, Owner, Radio Dario
- Juan Jose Toruno J., General Manager, Radio Dario
- Rosa Palachini, Controller

**HUMAN RIGHTS - COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH AMERICA'S
DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION (ADF)**

ADF/Washington

- Michael D. Miller, President
- Sergio Cambronero, former director of the ADF program in Nicaragua
- Patricia Prunier, Director of Training and Organizational Development
- Rocio Culebro, consultant
- Aida Maria Noval, cpsultant

Asociacion Nicaraguense Pro Derechos Humanos (ANPDH)

- Julio Cesar Saborio A., Executive Director
- Violeta Guevara, Region I Coordinator
- Rafael Rodriguez, Esteli Coordinator
- Fernando Larios, in charge of computer operations
- Ignacio Diaz Brenes, Education Coordinator

Comision Permanente de Derechos Humanos (CPDH)

- Lino Hernandez Trigueros, Director
- Ada Luz Trana M., Publications Coordinator
- Luz Marina Gutierrez, Coordinator for Administration
- Maria Dolores Anton, professional staff
- Eloisa Arana, head of Legal Department
- Manuel Arguello Mayorga, head of Education Department

Centro Nicaraguense de Derechos Humanos (CENIDH)

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- Vilma Nunez de Escorcia, Director
- Carmen Baltodano, professional staff

International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV/OAS)

- Santiago Murray, Director, OAS Program for Promotion of Democracy (former CIAV/OAS General Coordinator & Representative to the Nicaraguan Tripartite Commission)
- Sergio Caramagna, Coordinator General
- Raul Rosende, Responsable Nacional, Institutional Support Program
- Gulnara Garnkam, Social Projects Coordinator
- Sonia Nunez, professional staff

Cardinal's Commission for Verification

- Winston Betanco Barrera, Advisor
- Felipe Sanchez, Advisor

Universidad para la Paz

- Marvin Saballos Ramirez, Representative in Nicaragua
- Otoniel Arguello, National Coordinator, Regional Program on Culture and Democracy in Central America
- Mayra Mena, Assistant, Regional Program on Culture and Democracy in Central America

Comite Evangelico pro Ayuda al Desarrollo (CEPAD)

- Sebastian Castillo, Director, Human Rights Program
- Freddie Ordonez, President
- William Gutierrez, Director, Region III

Pastoral Universitaria

- Fatima Palacios, human rights program
- Lidiet Garcia, human rights program
- Claudia Medal, human rights program

IPADE

- Karolina Ramirez, human rights program

Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)

- Sergio J. Cuarezma Teran, Director, UCA/EEC Human Rights Program
- Manuel Arauz, Human Rights Program staff (graduate student)

- Manuel Arauz, human rights program

**JOURNALISM TRAINING - COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY (FIU)**

FIU/Managua

- Harold Moore, Chief of FIU activity in Managua

Ethics Seminar for Media Personnel, February 1-3, Managua

- John Virtue, Director of Publications of Latin American Journalism Program and Chief Instructor of Ethics Seminar

Participants

- Carlos Fernando Chamorro, former Director of Barricada Newspaper
- Ruth Largaespada, newspaper reporter formerly with Baricada
- Brenda Trejos, newspaper reporter formerly with Barricada
- Josefa Palacios, radio broadcasting
- Silvia Landeros, Director General of "Noticiero Enfoques"
- Esperanza Amaya, radio broadcasting
- Noel Huerta Palacios, freelance journalist
- Roger Solorzano, Secretary General of the Professional Journalists Union
- Focus group interview of participants during the Ethics Seminar for Media Personnel, February 1-3, 1995, Managua

**LABOR: COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR
FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT (AIFLD)**

AIFLD/Nicaragua

- Donald Ellenberger, former Country Program Director (CPD)
- Bernard Packer, CPD
- Selma Padron, former CPD

AIFLD/El Salvador

- Michael A. Donovan, Regional Director for Central America

AIFLD/Washington

- William Doherty, Executive Director
- Kevin F. Shaver, Director of Finance
- Jessie Friedman, Deputy Director

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Confederacion de Accion y Unidad Sindical (CAUS)

- Roberto Moreno Cajina, Secretary General
- Pio Santo Murillo, Director of Organization
- Olimpia Chamorro M., Director of Woman's Affairs

- Focus group interview of participants at the January 15, CAUS sponsored training "Seminario de Educacion en Pro-Derechos de los Trabajadores en la Zona Franca Industrial"

Central General de Trabajadores-Independientes (CGT-i)

- Julio Paladino Carballo, Secretary General
- Eleanor Joyner Laury, Director of Woman's Affairs
- Luis Carbajal, President of the Sindicato de Empleados y Trabajadores de Telcor

- Focus group of members of the Sindicato de Empleados y Trabajadores de Telcor during January 14 visit to Leon

Confederacion Nacional de Maestros Nicaraguenses (CNMN)

- Mario Casco Lanza, Secretary General
- Carmen Aguilar, Director of Women's Affairs

Confederacion de Trabajadores Nicaraguenses-Autentica(CTN-a)

- Antonio Jarquin, Secretary General
- Heriberto Rayo Ordonez, Deputy Secretary General
- Manuel Castillo Fletes, Director of Education
- Manuel Sanchez, Administrator

Confederacion de Unificacion Sindical (CUS)

- Jose Espinoza Navas, Secretary General
- Carlos Martinez S., Deputy Secretary General
- Jorge Morales Vallecillo, Director of Education and Cultural Affairs
- Guillermo Bone, Director of Finances
- Melania Armas de Chamorro, Director of Women's Affairs

- Focus group interview of participants during the January 15 CUS sponsored training "I Encuentro Nacional de Mujeres"

Labor Ministry

- Francisco Rosales, Minister

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NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY

Legislators

- Luis Humberto Guzman, President of the National Assembly, Union Democraata Cristians (UDC)
- Luis Sanchez Sancho, ONU
- Alfredo Cesar, UNO
- Jaime Bonilla, Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC)
- Maria Azucena Ferrey Echeverry, UDC
- William Ramirez, Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN)
- Reynaldo A. Tefel, FSLN
- Jose Leon Talavera, FSLN
- Maria Ramirez, FSLN/Ramirista
- Duilio Baltodano, Partido Accion Nacional (PAN)

National Assembly Staff

- Myriam Jarquin de Medina, CFD Project Director for Management Information System
- Rhina Mayorga, Librarian
- Julio Ramon Garcia Vilchez, Director/ Direccion General Asesoria Juridica
- Juan Manuel Espinoza, Executive Secretary
- Maria Elena Martinez, Director of Press and Public Relations
- Glenda Ramirez, Director of the Legislative Information System

Graduate Studies in U.S. supported by CFD

- Mayling Obregon, Florida International University
- Daniel Centeno, State University of New York/Albany

Center for Democracy

- Allen Weinstein, President and Chief Executive Officer
- Caleb McCarry, Vice-President, Director of the Americas Program
- Elizabeth Berke, Assistant Program Director, Americas Program
- Patricia Palmer, Vice-President, Chief Operating Officer, and Treasurer

JUDICIAL TRAINING: COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH THE INSTITUTO LATINAMERICANO DE NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LA PREVENCION DEL DELITO Y TRATAMIENTO DEL DELINCUENTE (ILANUD) FOR STRENGTHENING THE JUDICIAL SCHOOL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NICARAGUA PROJECT

- Joaquin Talavera Salinas, Director of the Judicial School
- Maria Amanada Ortado, formally office coordinator for ILANUD Project at Justice School
- Rosa Enez, Accountant in the ILANUD Project.
- Patricia Moreira Soza, Chief of Curriculum Methodology, Justice School
- Jairo Matez, Microfilm Project, Justice School

EJERCITO POPULAR SANDINISTA

- Lt. Col. Ricardo Wheelock, Director for Information

NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT

- Antonio Lacayo, Minister of the Presidency
- Alfonso Sandino, former advisor to Minister of Government
- Mariano Fiallos, President, Supreme Electoral Council

US EMBASSY, MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

- John Maisto, Ambassador
- Heather Hodges, Deputy Chief of Mission
- Frederick Becker, Political Counselor

United States Information Service

- Joseph McBride, Public Affairs Officer

USAID/NICARAGUA

- George Carner, Mission Director
- Mark Silverman, Deputy Mission Director
- Kevin Armstrong, Chief, General Development Office (GDO)
- Todd Amani, Democratic Initiatives (DI) Officer, GDO
- Lynn Vega, Program Coordinator, GDO
- Art Sist, former PSC coordinator of the DI Portfolio, GDO

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- Karen Hillard, General Development Officer, GDO
- Richard Monthieth, Technical Assistance in AIDS and Child Survival (TAACS) Advisor, GDO
- Richard Layton, Controller , Office of Finance (OFIN)
- Cesar Acosta, Chief Accountant, OFIN
- Lawrence Odle, Chief of Project Development and Implementation Office (PDIS)
- Roslyn Waters, Project Development Officer, PDIS
- Susan Merrill, Chief of the Program, Economics, and Private Sector Office (PEPS)
- Paul Greenough, Program Officer, PEPS
- Sara Espinoza, Development Assistant Specialist, PEPS
- Isa Zuniga, Information Specialist, PEPS
- Luis Ubeda, legal intern

USAID/WASHINGTON

- Liliana Ayalde, Deputy Director for Central America Office, Latin American and Caribbean Bureau

ANNEX F
METHODOLOGY

WORK SCHEDULE

The process or work schedule followed by the Evaluation Team to implement the evaluation was:

- PHASE I:** Team planning meeting: Heilman, Goodin, and Lincoln. (Nov. 21 & 22)
- PHASE II:** Field work in Nicaragua. Initiated the evaluation. The workplan was finalized and approved: Heilman, Goodin, and Lincoln. (November 27 - December 9)
- PHASE III:** Interview work in Washington, D.C.: Heilman, Goodin, Lincoln, and Seligson. (December 12 - January 10)
- PHASE IV:** Field work in Nicaragua. Finish the evaluation and prepare draft report: Heilman, Goodin, Lincoln, and Seligson. (January 11 - February 15)
- PHASE V:** USAID/Nicaragua reviews draft report and sends comments to MSI/Washington.
- PHASE VI:** MSI/Washington finalizes the report and sends final product to USAID/Nicaragua: Heilman and Goodin.

WORK RESPONSIBILITIES

- Lawrence C. Heilman - team leader, evaluation specialist, AOJ, media, labor, management issues, measurement issues
- Joan Goodin - human rights support, labor, media, PVO activity, civic education, gender
- Jennie Lincoln - political parties, National Assembly, civic education, civil-military
- Mitchell Seligson - measurement issues

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NOTES ON METHODOLOGY

The process for evaluating the various activities was essentially concerned with analyzing project documentation which is cited in Annex D "Documents Consulted" and interviewing persons identified in Annex E "Persons Contacted" involved in the design, monitoring, implementation, and evaluation of SDI Project-funded activities. Comments regarding the methodology for specific activities evaluated follow.

Civic Education - Mujeres Nicaraguenses, "Conciencia" - Resources in Action

One of the evaluators met in Washington, D.C. with a representative of Resources in Action and received documentation and recommendations for interviews from her. Additional documentation for this activity was obtained from USAID/Nicaragua. The evaluator visited the headquarters of Conciencia and met with the director, members of the staff and volunteer training in the Conciencia program. Another evaluator attended one of the weekly training programs held by Conciencia in Las Canoas in Tipitapa to observe activities first-hand. In addition, other groups and individuals who work in the area of civic education were consulted about knowledge and evaluation of Conciencia's activities.

Civic Education in the Public Education System - American Federation of Teachers (AFT)

After a review of the documents collected from the NED and USAID/Nicaragua, the evaluators met in Washington, D.C. with representatives from the AFT. Additional documents were received from AFT and USAID/Nicaragua. In Managua, the evaluators consulted with officials from the Ministry of Education (MED) including the Minister, Vice-Minister and the Director for Curriculum. Several visits were made to the Center for Education for Democracy in Managua. At the Center, the evaluators collected more documents, and interviewed the director, the curriculum advisor, instructors and 10 of the 21 teachers in training. In addition, the evaluators observed sessions of instruction with the teachers in training. However, given that Nicaraguan schools were in a vacation period during the evaluation, no field visits to observe the application of the teacher training in a classroom setting were possible. Additional civics education curriculum materials were purchased by the evaluators at a local bookstore. At no time during the evaluation had these materials been discussed with the evaluators by MED officials, CED staff, AFT staff, or USAID/Nicaragua personnel.

Civil-Military Relations - National Democratic Institute (NDI)

One team member met in Washington, D.C. with representatives from NDI and received documentation and suggestions for interviews from them. Additional documentation for this activity was obtained from USAID/Nicaragua. In Managua, the evaluator met with members of the Assembly, the Popular Sandinista Military (EPS), representatives of the CIAV/OAS, and Nicaraguan civilian politicians who participated in the civil-military project.

Civic Education - The Nicaraguan Development Institute (INDE) - America's Development Foundation (ADF)

Following the analysis of relevant project documents, in Washington interviews were carried out with the NED Program Director and the Director for Latin America, while in Managua the NED Nicaragua Director was interviewed. A telephone interview was also conducted with the representative of Delphi International who had monitored these activities during an earlier period. During a site visit to INDE and an off-site meeting, the Director of this SDI Project activity was interviewed. Also present for part of the site visit was the Logistics Coordinator and the volunteer liaison official between the project and INDE-Leon. An INDE-sponsored panel discussion on the Nicaraguan electoral system, held at the Olaf Palme building, was also attended. Additional documentation for this activity was obtained from USAID/Nicaragua.

Promotion of Strengthened Political Parties - Grupo FUNDEMOS - International Republican Institute (IRI)

The evaluation team met in Washington, D.C. with representatives from IRI and received documentation and suggestions for interviews in Nicaragua from them. Additional documentation for this activity was obtained from USAID/Nicaragua. One of the evaluators spent extensive time at FUNDEMOS interviewing the director and volunteer members of the staff. The evaluator also attended activities at FUNDEMOS, conducted a focus group interview, and consulted numerous members of a range of political parties about the activities at FUNDEMOS.

Promotion of a Credible, Professional, and Independent Media - Canal 8

The evaluation team met in Washington, D.C. with representatives from NED and received documentation for this activity. Additional documentation for this activity was obtained from USAID/Nicaragua. The documentation was reviewed by the evaluator. The team visited the Canal 8 station where the head of the station chief was interviewed and operations were observed. The evaluation team made it a point to watch Canal 8 news and public interest programs.

Promotion of a Credible, Professional, and Independent Media - Radio Dario

The evaluation team met in Washington, D.C. with representatives from NED and received documentation for this activity. Additional documentation for this activity was obtained from USAID/Nicaragua. The documentation was reviewed by the evaluator. The evaluator visited the Radio Dario station in Leon where the head of the station chief was interviewed and operations were observed.

Human Rights - America's Development Foundation (ADF)

The methodology here included documents collection and analysis and interviews in Washington, D.C. with the ADF president and two staff members, and the former head of

CIAV/OAS. Additional documentation for this activity was obtained from USAID/Nicaragua. In Managua, extensive in-house interviews were conducted at all levels of CPDH and ANPDH (including field staff), as well as with the Director and her assistant at CENIDH, the third Nicaraguan human rights organization (which is seen as linked to the FSLN). The former Deputy Director of ANPDH was also interviewed. Meetings were held at CIAV/OAS with the current coordinator and five staffers. While attending a retreat in Matagalpa sponsored by CPDH and ANPDH through ADF, interviews were also held with some 10 groups working in this field, including the Cardinal's Commission for Verification. This was followed by attendance at a planning session at CEPAD, which also involved the 10 groups. Subsequent discussions with the two Mexican consultants working with CPDH and ANPDH shed additional light on those organizations. Visits to two universities and to the Center for International Studies, along with conversations with a number of informed individuals, rounded out the information.

Journalism Training - Florida International University (FIU)

The documentation for the activity was obtained from USAID/Nicaragua. The head of the project was interviewed in Managua, and he provided additional documentation. In addition to analyzing the project documentation, a workshop on ethics and journalism conducted by FIU was attended by the evaluator. Several workshop participants were interviewed by the evaluator. The evaluator also held a focused group interview with workshop participants.

Labor Sector - American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)

In addition to the collection and careful review of pertinent project documents, to understand progress in the labor sector, an intensive series of interviews was carried out, starting with top AIFLD officials in Washington and Nicaragua, as well as two former AIFLD/Nicaragua CPDs and the Regional Director. Additional materials were collected for review from USAID/Nicaragua. In Managua, interviews included from three to eight representatives of each of the five Nicaraguan labor organizations that have participated in this project. In addition, a site visit was made to the Telcor union in Leon (which is facing the privatization of that company), and a focus group meeting was held with labor union women. Also, two AIFLD-sponsored labor education seminars were observed - one for union women, and one with workers from the Free Zone. Other interviews included the Minister of Labor and the Ministry's Director for International Labor Affairs, and a variety of local observers of the labor scene.

The Legislative Assembly - Center for Democracy (CFD)

Evaluators met in Washington, D.C. with representatives of the Center for Democracy and received from them documentation on the Assembly project and suggestions for interviews in the Assembly. Additional documentation for this activity was obtained from USAID/Nicaragua. One member of the evaluation team spent extensive time in the Assembly

interviewing members of different Junta Directivas that had worked with the CFD; the local representative for the CFD, Myriam Jarquin de Medina, legislators, and Assembly staff. Additional materials were collected for review from the Assembly staff.

Judicial Training - ILANUD

Documentation for the activity was obtained from USAID/Nicaragua. Additional documentation was obtained at the Judicial School site. The documentation, which was abundant, was thoroughly reviewed. The Director of the Judicial School was interviewed as was the former office coordinator for ILANUD, the Accountant for ILANUD, and the Chief of Curriculum Methodology. No classes were being taught during the period of the evaluation.

National Endowment for Democracy (NED)

The evaluation team visited NED Headquarters in Washington, D.C., received extensive documentation for the NED grant, and interviewed key staff at NED. The team also interviewed the head of the NED office in Managua, and he provided additional documentation.

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ANNEX G

A DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES

This annex is divided into five parts:

PART A:	A D&G Strategic Objective	1
PART B:	D&G Indicators for Objective Tree	3
PART C:	Rationale for D&G Strategic Objective	10
PART D:	CID/Gallup Study and Its Potential	13
PART E:	Evaluation of the Utility of the CID/Gallup Study of Democratic Values in Nicaragua	15

PART A: A D&G STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

USAID/Nicaragua is planning to redefine its Strategic Objective for the D&G area. The Evaluation Team has been asked to outline a D&G hierarchy of objectives and identify indicators for each objective in the hierarchy.

D&G OBJECTIVE TREE

Strategic Objective: A democratic society in which the rights and responsibilities of Nicaraguan citizens are promoted, respected, and protected.

Alternatives:

1. Strengthened democratic institutions, processes, and values on a selected basis.
2. A society in which the will of the people is promoted and respected and their rights and duties as citizens are defended.

Program Output 1: Strengthened public and private institutions concerned with the wider promulgation of democratic values

Sub-Program Output 1A: Increased effectiveness of the National Assembly

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- Sub-Program Output 1B: Increased efficiency of electoral machinery
- Sub-Program Output 1C: Human rights organizations strengthened
- Sub-Program Output 1D: Civic education programs strengthened
- Sub-Program Output 1E: Increased professionalism in the media community
- Sub-Program Output 1F: Strengthened indigenous NGOs promoting democratic processes and values
- Sub-Program Output 1G: Labor education program strengthened

- Program Output #2:** Increased transparency and effectiveness in public institutions
- Sub-Program Output 2A: Increased ability to plan, administer, and control public resources
- Sub-Program Output 2B: Reduction in waste, fraud, and abuse in public institutions

- Program Output #3:** Strengthened local government institutions
- Sub-Program Output 3A: Greater citizen participation in local government
- Sub-Program Output 3B: Municipal autonomy over finances and human resources

- Program Output #4:** Strengthen AOJ system
- Sub-Program Output 4A: Increased effectiveness of the court process
- Sub-Program Output 4B: Strengthened prosecutorial capacity
- Sub-Program Output 4C: Effective public defender program operational
- Sub-Program Output 4D: Increased public confidence in the AOJ system

(NOTE: Each of the Program Outputs is supported with a major USAID/Nicaragua investment.)

PART B: D&G INDICATORS FOR OBJECTIVE TREE

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: A democratic society in which the rights, and responsibilities of Nicaraguan citizens are promoted, respected, and protected.

Regardless of the wording finally decided upon for the Strategic Objective, certainly one candidate to be a proxy for indicating progress towards achievement of the Strategic Objective is the number of human rights violations. This indicator is recommended given the magnitude of resources being provided by USAID/Nicaragua for strengthening the administration of justice (AOJ) and human rights institutions and the fact that the highest priority for the U.S. Mission to Nicaragua in the D&G area is to protect human rights. There are also a number of other activities funded by USAID/Nicaragua that buttress AOJ and human rights activities in support of protecting human rights. The Embassy's annual human rights report could provide the means of verification for the number, type, and degree of human rights violations.

PROGRAM OUTPUT 1: Strengthened public and private institutions concerned with the wider promulgation of democratic values

The CID/Gallup data with the recommended analytical refinements would establish a baseline from which changes could be measured in terms of the degree to which attitudes and democratic values are promulgated. For example an examination of subsets of the value structure of teachers and journalists would provide an indication of the attitudes of these two groups that are involved in USAID/Nicaragua-funded D&G activity.

However, this would not absolve USAID/Nicaragua of the responsibility to measure performance with regards to the strengthening of institutions identified in the sub-program outputs identified below:

- Sub-Program Output 1A: Increased effectiveness of the National Assembly
- Sub-Program Output 1B: Increased efficiency of electoral machinery
- Sub-Program Output 1C: Human rights organizations strengthened
- Sub-Program Output 1D: Civic education programs strengthened
- Sub-Program Output 1E: Increased professionalism in the media community
- Sub-Program Output 1F: Strengthened indigenous NGOs promoting democratic processes and values
- Sub-Program Output 1G: Labor education program strengthened

PROGRAM OUTPUT #2: Increased transparency and effectiveness in public institutions

For Sub-Program Output 2A concerned with "increased ability to plan, administer, and control public resources," the indicators could be the number of systems actually installed and functioning institution by institution.

For Sub-Program Output 2B concerned with the "reduction in waste, fraud, and abuse in public institutions," indicators could be the number of disciplinary actions and criminal convictions.

However, should the Program Output be described to **"improve the effectiveness and strengthen the capacity of the executive branch to impose fiscal accountability in order to prevent waste, corruption, and fraud,"** a series of activities could be promoted described below that could have indicators identified below by activity.

Activity No. 1: Strengthening the regulatory framework for performing a government's budgeting, accounting, and auditing functions.

Indicators:

- Do the existing country laws and regulations facilitate, impede, or have no effect on progress in improving financial management?
- Do laws/regulations on financial management emphasize basic concepts, policies, and structures?

Activity No. 2: Upgrade the human resource capacity in the government's offices concerned with budgeting, auditing, and accounting.

Indicators:

- The numbers of educated and licensed CPA's are increasing within the public sector financial management area.
- The quality of financial management training.
- Does any government agency license accountants and auditors?

Activity No. 3: Improve the budgeting capacity of the government.

Indicators:

- Do the basic budget laws and regulations facilitate, impede, or have no important effect on reform/modernization in financial management?
- What is the role of the Central Budgeting Office?
- What percentage of public sector expenditures is covered or administered in the central government budget?
- What is the nature of earmarking in central government budgeting?

- Is the government's budgeting process linked into an integrated financial management system through common classifications relating to accounting and financial reporting?
- Does the Central Budget Office has the capability to control and evaluate budgetary execution in respect to both financial and physical performance?
- An adequate public sector financial statistics data base exists to permit performance analysis and evaluation.
- What degree of computerization in budgetary planning, analysis, and execution is performed by mainframe computer systems, by PC based systems?

Activity No. 4: Improve the accounting capacity of the government.

Indicators:

- Has the Central Accounting Office provided leadership in advancing an integrated financial management system?
- Has the Central Accounting Office provided an overall plan for implementing an integrated financial management system?
- Are there common charts of accounts classification linking accounting with budgeting and financial information data bases and reporting?
- What degree of centralization is there between the Central Accounting Office and ministries and autonomous agencies?
- Do the basic accounting laws and regulations facilitate reform/modernization in financial management?
- What degree of computerization of public accounting offices is performed by computer systems -- by PC based systems?

Activity No. 5: Improve the auditing and program capacity of the government.

Indicators:

- What is the degree of high level political support for auditing and program evaluation activities?
- Is there adequate funding for auditing and program evaluation activities?
- What is the focus of internal audit units?
- What is the focus of the supreme audit institution?

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- Is the auditing and program evaluation activity linked into an integrated financial management system?
- Are performance goals, objectives, targets, and related indicators established at program/project design stages to facilitate later evaluation during implementation?
- In carrying out external audits or program evaluations are international standards applied?
- How frequent are outside auditing firms contracted to carry external audits of government agencies or enterprises?

Activity No. 6: Improve the cash and debt management capacity of the government.
Indicators:

- What percentage of taxes are actually collected by tax authorities?
- What is the average delay of receipt of taxes when due as compared to other types of revenue when due?

Activity No. 7: Improve the contracting and contracting capacity of the government.
Indicators:

- Do existing procurement and contracting laws, regulations, and procedures facilitate the performance of these functions?
- What percentage of government contracts are awarded through competitive bidding procedures?
- How does the public perceive the performance of the government in executing the contracting process?

PROGRAM OUTPUT #3: Strengthened local government institutions

The following indicators are recommended to measure performance of the Strengthening Municipal Development Project.

1. Process for selecting local leaders. *Example:* All mayors are selected by direct election. The means of selection of local leaders is a critical element in measuring local government. Local leaders can be selected by direct election, indirect election, or appointment by central authority. Monitoring this process can communicate significant information on the strength of local governments.

2. Scheduling and holding of regular elections at the local level. *Example:* Elections for local officials were held in July, 1993. The scheduling and holding of elections is evident on its face. Use of this indicator becomes less relevant as a country consolidates its democratic practices.
3. Level of competition for leadership positions in local government. *Example:* 30% of local officials had competition in the selection process that granted them power. This indicator is intended to communicate information on the level of competition for leadership positions. Put another way, it communicates the level of control by a single party, personality, or a family exercises at a local level. This indicator could be adapted to monitoring competition in a specific community.
4. Responsiveness of local officials to public concerns. *Example:* 32% of the citizens surveyed rated the local government responsive to their problems. This indicator would communicate the linkage between the actions of the local government and the problems of the citizens. Another means of measuring this would be the number of public meetings held to discuss public issues and the number of people who attend those meetings.
5. Amounts and sources of revenues available for local programs. *Example:* \$15 million in revenues, of which 88% comes from local taxes, are available for local services.

This measure seeks to focus on the nature of the tax base and the revenues generated. It also provides information on the degree of dependence on central government. Another way of expressing this indicator would be by comparing per capita expenditures by rural, urban or regional/local governments.

6. Number and types of services provided by the local government. *Example:* Education, water, sanitation, and health services are provided by local government. This indicator is targeted at the nature, extent and areas in which citizens must rely on the various levels of government for services. In many instances citizens rely on the central government because local governments cannot or do not provide services. Permitting the private sector to provide services for basic needs such as electricity or water to local communities may also be an indication of success.
7. Percentage of population served by basic services provided by local government. *Example:* 92% of a city's population have access to water, sanitation, and electricity. The measure seeks to go beyond the services provided and determine the availability of those services. This indicator is also a means of addressing the adequacy of local financial and administrative capacities to respond to the demand for basic services -- water, sanitation, electricity.
8. Criteria used for determining priorities in service and resource allocation decisions. *Example:* Priorities are based upon political patronage. This measure seeks to identify the criteria used for service and resource allocation decisions. Such decisions could be

based upon local demand, publicly available needs tests, political pressure, patronage, or merit.

9. Improved institutional capabilities of local government. *Example:* Local government has specialized officers for budget control, revenue collection, and fiscal planning. This indicator is aimed at the institutional capabilities of the local government. Budgeting, revenue collection, and fiscal planning are all examples of desirable institutional capabilities. This measurement would be determined by an institutional analysis of the local government. This indicators could also measure the public confidence in the governments capabilities. Another means of looking at this would be to measure the percentage of officers who have received training for their specialization.

PROGRAM OUTPUT #4: Strengthen AOJ system

To measure the performance of an AOJ system, baseline data sets for indicators should be identified that gauge the efficiency of the management process as cases pass through the investigative, prosecutorial, and court room adjudication phases. Indicators that may be used to assess efficiency in the case management process are:

- Number of pending cases in criminal jurisdictions.
- Percent of court decisions (innocent, guilty, plea bargain) related to the total number of crimes investigated in criminal jurisdictions.
- Processing time for each discrete phase of cases from investigation through court decisions for criminal jurisdictions as well as total time for case processing.

These indicators are directly concerned with measuring the efficiency of the justice system for processing cases in criminal jurisdictions. Data sets for these indicators will have to be analyzed periodically to gauge their efficiency. These measures of efficiency are relative, not absolute. Thus, analysis of the data sets must be a continuous process. A critical aspect of this process is the establishment of an accurate baseline on a timely basis. Because of significant differences between jurisdictions, it is difficult to make comparisons within a country particularly if there is no agreement with regards to case processing time standards.

As such, these indicator data sets are the operations evaluation data that will be utilized by project management to strengthen the case management process. Each of these data sets should be collected by public entities in the justice sector periodically and on a sustained basis.

Output Measures for Court Administration: Additional indicators that measure progress in terms of the more effective administration of the court system at the output level of the SDIA/OJ Project are:

1. Establishment of a Court Administration Office: *Example:* "Supreme Court allocates four employees to establish planning office."
2. Establishment of Education and In-Service Training Programs for Judges: An intermediate measurement of this output could be courses offered and judges trained. *Example:* "Eight judicial training courses offered for new and continuing judges -- 250 judges trained."
3. Establishment of Training Programs for Non-Judicial Court Employees: *Example:* "Specialized training course for clerks offered; 400 clerks trained."
4. Establishment of Case Management and Tracking System: *Example:* "Six pilot case management and tracking systems being tested."
5. Establishment of a Modern System of Judicial Statistics and Records: *Example:* "Statistical analysis unit produces six annual studies of case loads, time for processing, and current status of cases."
6. Establishment of Unification of Documentation for all Laws, Decrees, Legal Codes and Procedures: *Example:* "Annual publication of unified code."
7. Strengthened Judicial Procedure/Establishment of a Bail and Pilot Pretrial Release Project: *Example:* "six courts testing new procedures for pretrial release of non-violent defendants."
8. Strengthened Judicial Procedure/Use of Oral Procedures: *Example:* "Six courts testing the use of oral procedures."
9. Strengthened Judicial Professionalization/Establishment of a Merit Selection Advisory Panel: *Example:* "All judicial appointments are reviewed by an independent board and rated on qualifications and background." A measure of movement toward professionalization is the use of merit selection criteria in the appointment of judicial officers. In addition to establishing the merit selection process, its implementation requires monitoring and measurement.
10. Strengthened Judicial Professionalization/Establishment of Professional Organizations For Judicial Officers: *Example:* "70% of judicial officers participate in association education and training activities." The establishment of professional associations and networks helps to strengthen the voice of the profession. It also brings together counterparts to represent the various classes of judicial employees in public debates and policy disputes.

Output Measures for Prosecutorial Strengthening: An indicator regarding the strengthening of the prosecutorial component could be the utilization of work manuals on criminal case operations and investigative procedures for judges, prosecutors, and police. Another indicator could be that a prosecutorial task force is established combining investigative and prosecutorial functions.

Output Measures that Public Defenders Are Available: The right to legal counsel is widely recognized as an important aspect of access to justice. In Nicaragua most defendants have no opportunity to retain legal counsel. Such a program could use advanced level law students who receive credit for serving as legal advisors to the poor and indigent. An example of an indicator for this output could be "two pilot public defender projects operating in criminal courts."

PART C: RATIONALE FOR D&G STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

Strengthening of democratic institutions has been the principal focus of USAID efforts to contribute to democratic stability in the third World. Such efforts have included programs to strengthen legislatures, judiciaries, and electoral systems so as to help guarantee majority rule and minority rights. This is the very essence of a democratic system widely accepted since James Madison articulated those principals in The Federalist No. 10. In each country, the immediate goal of the effort has been to make institutions more efficient and at the same time more responsive to the citizenry. In many cases such efforts have achieved notable success; legislatures pass bills more efficiently, courts process cases more quickly, and election tribunals run cleaner, more representative elections.

Efficient, constitutionally legitimate institutions are, however, no guarantee that the wishes of the majority will be respected. Consider the sorry case of child labor legislation in the United States. In 1916, decades after similar legislation had been passed in Western Europe, the U.S. Congress passed the first child labor legislation in the history of the country by a vote of 337 to 46 in the House and 52 to 12 in the Senate. The Supreme Court, however, ruled the legislation unconstitutional by a vote of 8 to 1. A constitutional amendment was introduced with overwhelming support of the Congress and supported by a majority of the state legislatures, but it was not until 1942 that the Supreme court upheld child labor laws as constitutional. Thus for a decade a quintessential democratic institution, the U.S. Supreme Court, was able not only to thwart the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the elected national representatives and the wishes of the majority of elected state legislatures, but by all accounts the overwhelming wishes of the American public.

If democratic institutions offer no guarantee of democratic stability, what does? According to Robert Dahl's classic statement, it is the values of citizens that offer this guarantee:

"The extent of consensus on democratic norms, social training in the norms, consensus on policy alternatives, and political activity: the extent to which these and other conditions are present determines the viability of polyarchy (democracy) itself and

provides for minorities." (p. 135, Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, University of Chicago Press, 1956.)

Ample cross-national evidence exists in the academic literature that supports the proposition that belief in the legitimacy of democratic institutions, undergirded by a political culture steeped in democratic value, is a necessary (but obviously not sufficient) condition for democratic stability. On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that almost all Third World countries are regularly confronted by serious challenges to their stability.

In recent years, these challenges have increasingly come in the form of economic crises brought on either by flawed macro-economic policies or by external challenges. In other cases, domestic insurgency has caused many a regime to totter and in some instances fall. Mexico today faces both such challenges. Yet, not all regimes collapse; the ability of democratic regimes to survive the threat of break-down has been traced directly to the commitment of citizens and especially elites to democratic rules of the game.

A recent study of the wide scale breakdowns in the sixties and seventies in such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay shows how beliefs, preferences, and actions were central and far more important than institutions. (Youssef Cohn, Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy in Latin America, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) In contrast, another study has demonstrated that a deep commitment to the political system made it possible for Costa Rica to ride out in the early 1980s its most severe economic crisis of the century with no serious threat to stability. Institutions are, of course, not irrelevant, but themselves cannot insure democratic stability irrespective of their efficiency.

On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that the success of reforms designed to establish and strengthen democratic institutions can only succeed in an environment in which citizens develop support for those institutions. In Italy, for example, in 1970 new regional governments were created in a major experiment in decentralization. Those regional governments that succeeded were ones in which civic cultural values predominated. (Robert D. Putman, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press, 1993.)

In light of this evidence, it is unfortunate that more attention has not been placed in USAID programming on the shaping and measurement of democratic values. The emphasis has been heavily on the institutional side under the misguided assumption that "getting the institutions right" will ensure democratic stability. In fact, unless citizens believe that their legislatures pass fair laws, efficient court systems and legislatures will not promote stable democracy. Furthermore, unless citizens are committed to the principles of majority rule and minority rights, unless they are willing to tolerate the rights of those with whom they disagree, democratic stability will be ephemeral. In short, citizen support for key institutions coupled with widespread tolerance of opposition views and minorities, among both the mass public and key elite groups, are fundamental requisites for stable democracy.

However, it is for the above cited reasons that USAID/Nicaragua will sustain support for a Strategic Objective:

(The options are presented below.)

Strategic Objective: A democratic society in which the rights, and responsibilities of Nicaraguan citizens are promoted, respected, and protected.

Alternatives:

1. Strengthened democratic institutions, processes, and values on a selected basis.
2. A society in which the will of the people is promoted and respected and their rights and duties as citizens are defended.

Each of these Strategic Objectives suggests balanced support for key institutions concerned with governance and project activity designed to promote values critical to sustaining a civic culture.

Program Output #1, "Strengthened public and private institutions concerned with the wider promulgation of democratic values" targets populations in the public school system, labor organizations, in the media community, human rights organizations, and indigenous D&G PVOs that are concerned with encouraging the development of democratic values in the political arena. This program output also is concerned with strengthening the electoral machinery to provide access for citizens to fair, free, and open elections and the National Assembly that promulgates the will of the citizenry.

Each of the other three Program Outputs will have training components that promote values consistent with building the civil society. Training in the AOJ sector will stress the role of citizens in a society that promotes the rule of law. The Municipal Development Project will seek to involve citizens in grassroots activities basic to civil society. However, the emphasis in these other three program outputs will be to strengthen both national and local public institutions.

PART D: CID/GALLUP STUDY AND ITS POTENTIAL

FINDINGS

As discussed in Part E of this Annex, "Evaluation of the Utility of the CID/Gallup Study of Democratic Values in Nicaragua" by Mitchell Seligson, the work to date by CID/Gallup, funded by USAID/Nicaragua has the potential of serving as a credible baseline against which to identify changes in Nicaraguan attitudes regarding democracy and governance. However, the USAID/Nicaragua investment in the survey must be followed with additional analysis before data generated by CID/Gallup can serve as a useful analytical tool. The experience to date with CID/Gallup strongly suggests that they are not the appropriate

entity to take this next step crucial to turning this empirical process into a useful analytical tool.

CONCLUSIONS

No other country in Latin America has undergone such dramatic shifts in so short a period of time. Up until 1979, the country was ruled by what has been termed a "mafiaocracy" which was overthrown in a popular revolution and replaced by a quasi-authoritarian regime, which was in turn removed from power by an election that installed a competitive democracy. Little is clear, however, about the preferences in Nicaragua. There are no public opinion data on democratic values prior to the coming to power of the Sandinistas.

After ten years of Sandinista rule, however, limited survey evidence does exist that shows a widespread commitment to some democratic values. The evidence on support for institutions concerned with governance is less clear. The election that was lost by the Sandinistas was not won by the democratic forces in part because the UNO coalition did not exclusively represent those committed to democracy but instead those voting against the war. USAID/Nicaragua needs to know what Nicaraguans think about their system and the extent to which they support democratic values.

Data gathered periodically to measure changes in attitudes should also be used to supplement USAID/Nicaragua's efforts to search for relationships between U.S. Government-funded programs promoting democracy and better governance in Nicaragua and the impact of this assistance. It is a long reach from a project that supports procedural changes designed to bring efficiencies into the court room or an education project that is creating a civics curriculum for a secondary school system to a Strategic Objective concerned with promoting greater confidence in democratic institutions, processes, and values. However, the proposed measurement system could help to fill this lacunae.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the data should be provided to the Nicaraguans in order to engage them in a non-partisan dialogue as to the strengths and weaknesses of their systems of government and the civil society that they are pursuing.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ***Task to Analyze the Data:*** A political scientist with experience in analyzing public opinion data on democratic values in Latin America should be engaged to analyze the data. The tasks to be performed:
 - Creation of working computer files of both the mass public national sample as well as the specialized groups;

- Consideration should be given to expanding the sample to cover the Atlantic coastal region so as to capture the views of the citizens of this politically pivotal area; and
 - Examination of subsets of the sample, both mass public and special groups, that are of particular programmatic interest to USAID/Nicaragua. For example, it would be wise to examine the value structure of teachers since they are carrying out civic education in the schools. Similarly, it would be wise to examine the values of journalists since USAID/Nicaragua supports Florida International University focused on up-grading their skills.
2. **Nicaraguan's Access to Attitudinal Data:** The final product of the analysis should be tailored to be made available to Nicaraguans to enrich their dialogue concerned with democracy and governance in their country. A series of public fora could be held in which representatives from the academic community, the government, the opposition, and the private sector are invited to take a "look in the mirror" so that they may have an objective view of the strengths and weakness of Nicaraguan political culture.
 3. **Future Polling Efforts:** When the analysis is complete, plans should move forward to improve the questionnaire and re-apply it, perhaps after the 1996 elections to see if values have changed and if so in what direction.

PART E: EVALUATION OF THE UTILITY OF THE CID/GALLUP STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN NICARAGUA

Written by Mitchell Seligson

FINDINGS

Public Opinion and Democracy: A Theoretical Overview

The last three decades have witnessed an epoch-making and accelerating decline of authoritarianism and rise of democratic governments around the globe. First in Southern Europe and then in all of Latin America (except Cuba), dictatorial regimes were replaced by representative civilian governments. Still more dramatic has been the collapse of totalitarian rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Political scientists have been groping to explain these largely unpredicted historic changes.

The rise of fascism in Europe of the 1930s led social scientists to formulate theories that linked authoritarian culture to regime types (Adorno et al. 1950). The theory was that certain cultural traits of a nation's population favored the emergence of one or another form of government. Those theories became very popular in the 1960s as a result of the publication of the ground breaking work, The Civic Culture by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. The core of The Civic Culture argument was that the social and political beliefs of

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citizens explains the rise of democracy in countries like Britain and the United States, while also explaining the maintenance of authoritarian rule in countries like Mexico. In the years that followed, however, the upsurge in authoritarian regimes throughout the Third World made such theories less popular, and attention focused instead on the causes of democratic breakdown and the rise of military regimes. Even if the political culture paradigm had not faded because of real and perceived flaws, practical considerations brought much of the research in the field to a halt. In most of the Third World it became impossible to conduct attitudinal surveys either because they were prohibited by the regime, or because of the deep seated and quite realistic fears on the part of respondents that answering survey questions could jeopardize their own safety.

In recent years, with the emergence of democracy in most regions of the world, there has been a resurgence of interest in the impact of mass political culture on regime type. Studies of this genre range from the quasi-popular account of the Latin American cases by a former USAID official in Nicaragua, Larry Harrison (1985), to the scholarly study of Asia by Pye (1985). These studies, however, while highly suggestive, are not considered definitive because they rest their case on impressionistic evidence. Contemporary political science demands hard evidence, and so does USAID.

Such evidence was provided by Ronald Inglehart (1988; 1990), who, in his frequently cited study, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," argues forcefully and elegantly for the position that the beliefs of mass publics are a major determinant of regime type. Eschewing criticism of culture-based explanations of democracy, Inglehart employs a vast cross-national, longitudinal data base to demonstrate that:

Political culture is a crucial link between economic development and democracy. Although GNP per capita has a strong zero-order correlation with stable democracy, its effects are almost entirely due to its linkages with social structure and political culture, with the latter being the more important of the two. (Inglehart, 1988:1219)

Drawing on Almond and Verba's highly influential The Civic Culture (1963), Inglehart further states that:

I have established that certain societies are characterized relatively strongly by a durable set of orientations that roughly corresponds to the "civic culture" discussed by Almond and Verba and that this cultural pattern shows a strong empirical linkage with stable democracy even when I control for related aspects of social structure and economic development. (1988:1221)

Surveys conducted in many parts of the world have led others to the conclusion that there is indeed a link between political culture and regime type. In what is perhaps the most extensive review of the literature to date, Diamond and Linz (1989:10) concluded that there is "a strong reciprocal relationship between political culture and political system." That is, political culture and regime type influence each other such that democracy tends to build democratic values, while democratic values tend to strengthen democratic systems.

In this evaluation, we are particularly interested in the culturalist explanation of democracy in the context of Latin America, where many newly democratic regimes have appeared in recent years. There are a number of Latin American specialists who argue against the likelihood of the development of liberal, representative democracy in Latin America for cultural reasons quite similar to those that Inglehart cites. One early pessimist was one of the founders of Latin American political science, Frank Tannenbaum (1966: 144), who said, "The social and cultural matrix within which Latin America's leaders operate at present is such that effective and representative popular democracy is, with really few exceptions, not a feasible alternative." Writing in the 1970s, Glen Dealy (1974:73), sought to explain this pessimistic view by arguing that even when Latin Americans speak of democracy, they refer not to political pluralism, representation, and competing interests, but to "political monism or monistic democracy, that is, the centralization and control of potentially competing interests... an attempt to eliminate competition among groups."

The strongest, most prolific advocate of the view that democratic culture has a weak foundation in Latin America is Howard Wiarda¹ (1974b:269-70) who describes Latin America as:

Catholic, corporate, stratified, authoritarian, hierarchical, patrimonialist, and semifeudal to its core. Largely untouched by the great revolutionary movements... the Iberic and Latin American nations remained locked in this traditional pattern of values and institutions... [T]he hold of these traditional patterns and institutions has remained continuous, modified to be sure by the newer currents of modernity but not submerged and replaced by them.... By our own lights the Latin tradition may at times seem undemocratic and authoritarian (and we may as well acknowledge this), we must recognize also that democracy United States-style is probably ill-suited to the nations of Iberia and Latin America. (1974b:274)²

Even as late as the early 1980s when democracy was emerging throughout the region, respected analysts such as Fitzgibbon and Fernández (1981: 350) concluded that "the countries of Latin America are probably not developing along a democratic-participant cultural path."

More recent empirical evidence, however, has suggested that these earlier pessimistic views may be wrong. In a study of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, based on surveys conducted in the late 1980s, Seligson and Booth (1993; Booth and Seligson, 1994) found much higher levels of democratic beliefs among Nicaraguans than their politically authoritarian history would suggest. Moreover, in a recent study of political culture in Guatemala conducted for USAID, numerous findings show links between the nature of the Guatemalan political system and its political culture (Seligson and Jutkowitz, 1994). Although the direction of causality is

¹For further elaboration of this school see Morse (1974) and Newton (1974).

²Wiarda substantially sustains this vision of Latin American culture in a recent piece on the Dominican Republic (1989) (although he was somewhat less pessimistic about the longer-term prospects for democratization in that particular case) and in his book on the subject (Wiarda, 1990).

not completely clear, as has been demonstrated by a recent study by Seligson and Muller (1994), we are fairly confident at this juncture that at least some aspects of political culture and political system are linked.

The USAID Democratic Indicators Project in Nicaragua: Overview

The theoretical literature just reviewed is the backdrop against which the USAID project is being evaluated. According to the "USAID/Nicaragua Action Plan, FY95-FY96," dated March 1994, the first strategic objective of the Mission is building democracy. This strategic objective is first not only in numerical order, but in terms of total U.S. dollars committed to the effort. The two major program outputs are: 1) wider promulgation and understanding of democratic values, and 2) greater confidence in democratic institutions and processes. These objectives are to be achieved through a variety of programs, including municipal decentralization, basic education, electoral support, etc.

Two sorts of indicators are to be utilized in measuring the achievement of these goals. One indicator is a count of the number of union members and teachers trained under the program. The second, of direct relevance to this report, involves the attitudes of Nicaraguans. The remainder of this report will concentrate on the second indicator, but brief mention should be made of the first. In the view of this evaluator, the Mission should consider revising or dropping entirely an indicator that measures the number of individuals trained. As a former U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer, an indicator of that nature sounds to me much like the oft-scorned effort to measure Volunteer success by counting the number of latrines dug or cows artificially inseminated. Just as the principal goal of the Peace Corps is to change attitudes, the principal goal of the democracy project in Nicaragua is to increase citizen support for stable democracy. Union members and teachers can be trained, but unless they have internalized the values that presumably have been taught to them, democracy will not be strengthened in this country. For this reason it would seem like the Mission could consider following the strategy adopted by USAID/Guatemala for participants in its Peace Scholarship program and the Centro ESTNA (i.e., civil-military dialog). Both of those programs are designed to change attitudes, yet the limited evidence available to date does not suggest that this goal has been achieved. Perhaps it takes more than a short trip to the U.S., or participation in several months of seminars to change attitudes. Perhaps attitude change in adults is an unrealistic goal; if old "dogs" cannot be taught new "tricks," USAID should consider targeting the youth. To repeat, this report does not focus on the training programs, but does suggest a revision in thinking about indicators beyond these activities.

The great bulk of the indicators established by USAID/Nicaragua to measure achievement of the two strategic objectives are based on public opinion survey data. Specifically, the Mission has determined that it will utilize a 1994 survey of the mass public and certain special groups, along with baseline data from the University of Pittsburgh's Central American Public Opinion Project (see pp. 25-26 of FY95-96 Action Plan).

In order to obtain public opinion data for the indicators, USAID/Nicaragua contracted with CID/Gallup in San José Costa Rica. This firm is easily the best known of the polling firms in the Central American region, and the only one associated with the production of

frequent, periodic reports on the attitudes of Central Americans. It was an obvious choice for this project. The contract was finalized in September 1993, and a national public opinion poll was conducted in the second half of March 1994. In addition, during the first half of May 1994 a survey was conducted among seven sectors of Nicaraguan society.

The evaluation of the CID/Gallup study presented below is divided into three sections: 1) sample design, 2) questionnaire design and 3) data analysis.

Sample Design: The National Sample

Experts in sample design (know as "muestristas" in Central America) are like coaches of athletic teams: in basketball, taller is better, in football, bigger is better, and in samples, larger is better. In the proposal submitted by CID/Gallup ("Monitoring and Evaluating USAID/Nicaragua's Democratic Initiatives, March 1993, p. 7), a sample size of 1,200 was proposed. The actual survey conducted was nearly double that size, comprising 2,420 interviews. Nowhere in the documentation that I read for this evaluation is the expansion of the sample size explained or justified.

What does one gain with a larger sample? Why are national samples of the sort USAID commissioned in Nicaragua invariably smaller, between 1,000 and 1,200. Indeed, the standard sample size used by CID/Gallup in Nicaragua is 1,200. Larger samples reduce the size of the anticipated error produced by the sampling methodology. We normally want to know how close our results are compared to the results we would obtain if we interviewed every adult in the country. How close we come depends in part on the sample design and in part on the split in opinion on any given question. Normally, we assume a worst case scenario, one in which opinion is evenly split, 50/50. A little thought will show why this is the worst case. If we are interested in the opinions of all of the students of a given high school class that contains 10 students, and their opinions on a given issue were evenly split, five supporting one view and five supporting another, then if we selected any single student in the class to ask for his/her opinion, we would only guess right half of the time. On the other hand, if 90% of the students supported a given view, then if we selected any student at random and asked for their opinion, we should always guess that the student would support that view and we would be right nine out of ten times.

In the surveys in Nicaragua, opinion was sometimes split 50/50, but most of the time it was a much more uneven split, on the order of 60/40 or even 70/30. With a sample of 1,200, and a 50/50 split, the sample would produce results that 95 percent of the time are no more than 2.9% higher or 2.9% lower than the views of the entire adult Nicaraguan population, if we had the resources to interview them all. A sample of 2,400, on the other hand, would produce a sample error of about + or - 2.0%. In short, one would expect to improve one's prediction by less than 1% by increasing the sample from 1,200 to 2,400. In opinion splits that are greater than 50/50, the sampling error would be even lower.

In elections, a 2% error could make all the difference between winning and losing. It is for that reason that in close elections (a 50/50 split), pollsters tell us that the election is "too close to call." They are telling us that the true result is so close that it is within our

confidence interval. But in the field of democratic attitudes, in which there are no winners or losers, and in which there is no agreed upon absolute standard of measurement, improving a sample's predictive power by 1% is normally not a gain that would be worth the additional cost of gathering a larger sample. It is for this reason that one is left puzzled by the large sample size.

There is, however, one very important justification for a large sample, and that is when one wants to examine carefully important subsets of the population. For example, in Nicaragua, if one has a strong interest in young people who support the FSLN and who are poor, the number of respondents (i.e., "cases") in that cell of the sample would be far less than the overall sample of 2,400. Large samples can provide enough cases of specialized subsets of the population to make it possible to conduct a reasonable statistical analysis. When subsets become very small, however, it becomes increasingly difficult to establish statistically significant results, since statistical significance depends upon the number of cases in the cells being analyzed.³ Given the divided nature of Nicaraguan society, analysis of subsets of the population would be particularly useful for USAID and therefore the larger sample size could easily be justified. I suspect that this fact was what motivated someone to call for a larger sample, but no document states it.

In light of this conclusion, it is all the more surprising that the reports prepared by CID/Gallup do not make use of the increased precision made available to them by the large sample size. In their report on the national sample results (contained in "USAID/Nicaragua Democratic Initiatives Project, Phase Two," of April 1994, the analysis presented is almost entirely for the sample as a whole (i.e., univariate distributions), and only on occasion are two variables presented simultaneously (see especially Chapter VI on tolerance for bi-variate analyses). But even in those cases, the reader is only given percentages and not sample size. This prevents the analysts from telling the reader if the relationship reported is statistically significant. Without knowledge of statistical significance, one has no ability to refer to the substantive significance of the results.

The appendix to the national sample does provide breakdowns of the sample by residence, gender, age, education, house condition and religion. But here again, we are only given percentages and no measures of statistical significance.

The various reports do not present any breakdowns that would respond to specific Mission questions, such as the opinions of key subgroups (again, to pose an example, poor Sandinista youth versus middle class Sandinista youth). The sample is large enough to allow a considerable amount of analysis of support for democracy among the key subsets of the Nicaraguan population and one would hope that such analysis would be forthcoming.

Moving beyond the sample size is the question of the sample design. The documents presented by CID/Gallup refer to their use of their standard sampling frame. There is reference in some of the documents, however, to a sample frame provided to USAID from a

³It also depends upon the magnitude of the split in opinions; the wider the split, the easier it is to establish significance for any given number of cases.

demographic project (PROFAMILIA) supported by the Mission. It is not clear exactly what sample frame was utilized. It would be important to clarify the exact source of the sample frame because the Mission plans to replicate these surveys in future years, and if the sample design changes, the results of the survey could change because of that change rather than because of a shift in attitudes.

In countries with up-to-date population censuses, drawing national samples is a relatively easy affair. Nicaragua, however, has had no population census since 1971, although one has been planned for some time and, at last report, was about to get underway. In any event, without a census, and with no detail provided by CID/Gallup, it is impossible to know how the sample was drawn. Normally, one would use maps drawn for the census. Those maps may well be available now, but again, one cannot determine if they were used.

The problems of sample design in Nicaragua are especially acute because it has suffered over a decade of revolution and war, and population shifts probably have been extensive. In order for a sample to accurately reflect the population, the researcher has to have a good idea of the size and location of that population. In the absence of that information, what is the basis of the sample? Furthermore, how wide are the confidence intervals for the results? We just don't know from the documents presented.

One hint of the nature of the sample design emerges in one of the documents ("Muestras Para Estudio Iniciativas Democráticas, no date) in which it is stated that 100 sampling points (puntos muestrales) will be used. This seems like a rather small number, resulting in limited dispersion of the sample. In a similar national sample the author of this report is designing for El Salvador, 278 sampling points are being used, in a country far smaller geographically. Since there is no additional information on the sample, it is not possible to tell if this statement about the design was the one implemented or not.

Sample Design: Special Groups

One of the limitations of national cross-section samples like the one being discussed in this report, is that they often do not provide a large enough number of interviews among special segments of the population of direct interest to the researchers. USAID/Nicaragua resolved this problem by conducting a separate sample of a number of special groups: public servants, high school teachers, young people, journalists, leaders of public opinion, the military and police, officials of the judicial system and union members. Sample sizes ranged from 100 up to 300 for each group, for a total of 1,700 of these special group respondents. Interviewing the respondents of these special groups allows USAID to obtain a picture of the attitudes of each of these groups that presumably was not available in the national sample.

The special samples of the military and police, the judiciary, journalists and public opinion leaders seem well justified since the national sample was not likely to include sufficient number of cases in any of these categories. Less convincing was the motivation for the remaining special samples. Consider the case of the special sample of young people. Nicaragua, with its relatively high birth rate, has a young population. In the national sample, according to the CID/Gallup tabulations presented, 927 of the respondents were 24 years of

age or younger, comprising 38% of the sample. The additional 100 interviews of young people does not seem to add much to this data base.

One could also question the special sample of 300 public servants. According to the World Bank (World Development Report, 1993, p. 258), central government expenditures total 33.8% of the total GNP of Nicaragua. This must mean that a substantial proportion of the population work for the government. If the questionnaire had included a question on occupation (which it did not), then one would have been able to separate out public employees from other employed individuals, thus obviating the need for a special sample of public employees.⁴

It also is not clear why a special sample had to be drawn of union members. Here the figures are less clear and it may well be that the proportion of unionized employees in the population is so low that the national sample would not have produced an adequate sample size. However, no estimates of unionization are given in the documents, and the question was not asked in the national sample, so one cannot tell if a special subsample was needed or not.

The definition of the sample design for the political elite is not clear. In the initial documents, the group is defined as a political elite, but later as "opinion leaders." Yet, the sample document states that since the top leadership was interviewed by the in depth interviews [Phase I], they will not be interviewed in the special group survey. Such a decision would seem to have been an error, since it is precisely the attitudes of the top political elite that would have been of greatest interest.

Questionnaire design

The design of the questionnaire according to the various CID/Gallup interviews went through numerous stages. Phase One of the study involved conducting 25 focus groups. In addition, since it proved impossible to involve certain groups in focus groups (namely political leaders, judges, military and police officers, journalists, and university professors) an additional 80 in-depth one-on-one interviews were carried out by interviewers with advanced training.

Focus group work is an excellent way of developing and refining a survey instrument. CID/Gallup is to be commended for the extensive work they did in this design phase of the work. Moreover, since the focus groups were conducted by the top professionals in the CID/Gallup organization, each with many years of experience, a rich data base was established for the drafting of the national-level questionnaire.

The questionnaires that emerged from the focus groups were presented to USAID on October 8, 1993. This included one instrument for the national survey, and one for each of the special groups. Each of those instruments contained a common core of items identical in

⁴Although not the subject of this report, it is relevant to wonder why the Mission selected as its indicators of "increased role of the private sector in the economy" the number of firms divested. One would think that lowering the huge percent of GNP consumed by the government would be a more direct and relevant number.

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every way so that comparisons could be made among the groups (more on this point is developed in the section on data analysis).

Surprisingly, the questionnaire ultimately utilized by CID/Gallup bore almost no relationship to the drafts that emerged from the focus group. There is no documentation explaining the reason for the dramatic shift, but an examination of the draft questionnaires makes it obvious why they were jettisoned. The items developed do not tap into the basic values required by the USAID Strategic Objectives. One basic flaw in the instrument was the repeated use of the term "democracy," by which it was assumed that Nicaraguans have a common understanding of the term. In fact, there probably is no consensus on the use of the term in Nicaragua or anywhere else for that matter. It is for this reason that public opinion surveys on democracy usually make limited use of the term and instead present the respondent with a number of the features of democracy on which to comment.

Some illustrations from the original CID/Gallup questionnaire will drive home this point. In order to measure political tolerance, the respondent was given a list of groups (Sandinistas, Somozistas, etc.) and asked if each the group could help build Nicaraguan democracy. Since many people are unsure as to what democracy means and even more have very different definitions, an item like this is more likely to measure confusion in inter-personal definitions of democracy than it is of political tolerance. Another section of the questionnaire refers to the private sector, and asks if strengthening the private sector would strengthen democracy in Nicaragua. Here we have the questionnaire confusing the economic system (i.e., capitalism) with the political system (i.e., democracy).

A further difficulty with the original questionnaires is that they bore little or no relations to the items utilized by the study that was to have formed the baseline for the Mission's Strategic Objectives, namely, the University of Pittsburgh's Public Opinion Project. In order to compare the attitudes of Nicaraguans in the CID/Gallup survey to those interviewed by Pittsburgh, identical items would have had to have been utilized.

The revised questionnaire emerged in March, 1994. This instrument was derived largely from a draft instrument provided by Professor Edward N. Muller, Department of Political Science, University of Arizona.⁵ Not only is this instrument dramatically different from the CID/Gallup study, it is far more useful because it was based upon the University of Pittsburgh's Central American Public Opinion Project, which in turn was based on more than a decade of experimentation by Muller and the author of this report (Seligson) in Europe, Israel, the United States and Central America. The instrument also contains a number of items utilized by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (inter-personal trust) and an item developed by Ronald Inglehart, whose work on the link between political culture and democracy was cited in the introduction to this report. The Muller draft, had it been utilized as presented, would have allowed some direct comparisons with the Pittsburgh baseline in Nicaragua. More on this point follows below.

⁵The information in this section was provided by Karen R. Hilliard, and Todd Amani USAID/Nicaragua and Edward N. Muller.

Very little of the material developed in the CID/Gallup focus groups emerged in the revised questionnaire document. Oddly, however, the CID/Gallup report makes no mention of the intellectual (and indeed proprietary⁶) origins of the instrument eventually utilized, but instead makes it appear as if the questionnaire utilized grew out of the focus groups. Further confusion is added by the CID/Gallup Executive Summary (June, 1994, p. 11) in which reference is made to pre-tests conducted in Managua in early January, 1994. It is unclear, however, as to which version of the questionnaire was pre-tested, the original CID/Gallup instrument or the version sent by Muller. One document (an amendment to the contract with CID/Gallup, signed March 16, 1994) refers to a revised questionnaire prepared by USAID and faxed to CID/Gallup on January 21, 1994. Presumably the early January pre-tests were not done on the new version. CID/Gallup reports (p. 11 of their executive summary) that "after some modifications were made in the questionnaire, another pre-test was conducted between January 27 and January 29". Presumably those pretests were done on the revised instrument. Final pre-tests were performed in February, 1994 and produced the definitive version of the instrument employed during the period March 15-March 28, 1994.

The definitive instrument is a highly professional document. The questions are posed well and the response format utilized is appropriate for the environment in which the questionnaire was utilized. A number of interesting items were developed to attempt to measure the respondent's view of the legitimate role of the state in providing medical assistance, employment, etc.

While the instrument receives high marks for its overall quality, the alterations in the format made from the University of Pittsburgh survey reduces its utility in some important ways.⁷ Some of these are indicated below.

One of the key measures in any modern study of democratic political culture is tolerance. Because this item is so central to research in this area, the questions measuring tolerance have undergone countless refinements based on reliability and validity tests. A central issue in the academic literature on tolerance concerns the object of tolerance/intolerance. In some studies, the question would contain the object of intolerance, so that, for example, in the United States, people were often asked if they would be willing to let a communist run for office. Concerns were raised that in cases where an individual was him/her self a supporter of communists, the person could provide a tolerant response when in fact the individual might be intolerant toward the rights of others (Democrats or Republicans) to run for office. As a result of this concern, the "least-liked group" methodology was developed in which a list of groups is presented to the respondent and he/she selects the group on the list that he/she likes the least and then is asked about extending rights to that group (Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus, 1979).

⁶In a March 21, 1994 letter from Hilliard to Muller, it is stated that, "We will, of course, give you credit for your contribution in any document or article we write....We want to be very responsive about your rights to our original work...." Muller confirmed in a phone conversation on December 14, 1994, that the questionnaire provided was taken from a proprietary version sent to the U.S. National Science Foundation.

⁷Again, it is not clear to the writer who or when these alterations were made.

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The least-liked group method seemed to be ideal except that it is known to have one major flaw: many people refuse to select a group, and as a result, no measure of their tolerance is obtained. Fortunately, recent research (Gibson, 1992) shows that the traditional measures work just as well (i.e., are as reliable and valid) as the least-liked group method, and therefore in order not to lose data on those who do not select a group, the traditional method is preferred.

Unfortunately, the least-liked method was utilized in the CID/Gallup survey of Nicaragua. Respondents were asked to select from the following list: Evangelicals, Catholics, Union members, Sandinistas, Somocistas, Communists, Re-Contras, Re-Compas,⁸ and the Military. As a result, no tolerance information is available for a large segment of the population. A total of 31.4% of the respondents did not select a group from the list. On top of that, some 8-9% of the respondents did not give any answer to the specific tolerance items that followed. As a result, for 40% or more of the respondents we know nothing of their level of political tolerance. Particularly troubling about this result is that the pre-tests should have revealed the high non-response rate on these items and caused those designing the questionnaire to revise them. Compare 40% non-response rate in the CID/Gallup survey to the University of Pittsburgh study, which produced 3.3-3.5% non-response on the tolerance items. In short, on this key measure of democracy, the Mission will only be able to report on the views of 60% of Nicaraguans, while wondering about the views of those who did not respond.

Another key item in the survey, also directly linked to the Mission's strategic objectives, are those that measure support for the basic institutions of government. These items were drawn from the University of Pittsburgh study, but the response format was changed. Instead of using a 7-point scale, a 4-point scale was used. The revisions made in Nicaragua were done in an effort to simplify the questionnaire for the large number of illiterate respondents. Similar adjustments were made in the USAID study in Guatemala. In doing so, however, the four-point scale did not provide a middle point equivalent to position # 4 in the Pittsburgh study. As a result, it is difficult to compare the CID/Gallup results to the Pittsburgh results. As shall be pointed out below, this problem is carried over into the analysis of the data.

Data Analysis

The large sample design and the sophisticated questionnaire provides USAID/Nicaragua with a wealth of material to analyze for its strategic objectives requirements. It provides much more, however. The survey data could be put to many more uses than merely fulfilling the strategic objective exercise. As far as can be determined by the various reports produced by CID/Gallup, however, none of the richness of the data set has as yet been exploited. In many ways, USAID has harvested a ripe orange from the tree, sliced it and then failed to squeeze it. Some suggestions as to how the data set could be "squeezed" are made below.

⁸These last two groups are the rearmed Contra forces, i.e., those who fought against the Sandinistas and the rearmed Sandinistas forces.

First, however, reference needs to be made of the focus group/in-depth interviews. The reports provided by CID/Gallup on the in-depth interviews are exceptionally complete. Each interview was translated and transcribed, and the entire set was put together in a two volume report of nearly 500 pages in length. In addition, there is a "flash report" (dated October 13, 1994), which provides a summary of 68 of the interviews, and an 89 page summary of the focus group results (September, 1993 report).

While the material on the in-depth interviews is impressive, it seems to be addressing the wrong question. The purpose of this stage of the CID/Gallup study was to develop material for the questionnaire design. Yet, the "Analysis of In-Depth Interviews" (October, 1993) focuses exclusively on the opinions of those interviewed rather than the ways in which those opinions related to the questionnaires that had been drafted (and were later discarded as discussed above). The nearly 500 pages of transcription of the in-depth interviews is overkill; one cannot imagine busy USAID officials reading through a report like that. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine anyone reading through those pages in order to form a coherent image of the views of Nicaraguans. There is just too much detail. It is studies of this nature that demonstrate more clearly than anything why modern social science relies so heavily on quantified questionnaire in which the results can be summed up in a single percentage or coefficient.

Another illustration will make the point. In the CID/Gallup summary of the focus group work (September, 1993, p. 3), it is reported that, "regardless of political beliefs, [Nicaraguans] view the armed force as the one institution of the society which is dependable. The summary of the CID/Gallup focus groups also finds, "the police and the judiciary are scorned and viewed as corrupt" (p. 4). Yet, in the mass survey, the results strongly contradict these conclusions. In the series measuring trust in the basic institutions of the system, CID/Gallup found that 28% trusted the army, 32% the legal system, 33% the police and 35% the legislature.⁹ These figures demonstrate that even though the focus groups appear to have found the army as uniformly dependable, none of these key institutions including the army is trusted by anywhere near the majority of Nicaraguans, and the army is less trusted than some other major institutions. Indeed, the army is less trusted than the police and the judiciary, which the focus groups reported to be scorned. The focus group sample may well have produced the result reported by CID/Gallup, but the views of the focus group members do not square with the over 2,400 people interviewed in the mass sample.

A second massive compilation of data emerges from the Phase Three reports, i.e., the reports on the special groups interviewed as an expansion of the national sample. The reports are massive, totalling well over 500 pages, and contain a variable-by-variable analysis of each of the special groups. While an impressive amount of effort went into producing this documentation, its utility is restricted to those USAID officials who wish to examine the attitudes of the particular special group in isolation from comparisons with the general population or the other special groups. There could not be many of those people around. The real utility of this data is in comparing each of the special groups to one another, and to the general population. If differences are found, let us say between the military/police special

⁹These results sum up the positive end of the Gallup four-point scale on these items.

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sample and teachers, the question would then be to determine, first, if those differences are statistically significant and second, what factors determine those differences. Let us assume that the military/police are found to be less politically tolerant than teachers. Since cross-national studies have often found that tolerance is directly linked to education, is the difference between military/police and teachers a function of their careers or their level of education? We don't know this from the analysis presented by CID/Gallup. It should be noted that in some instances reference in the text (or more rarely in a table or figure) is made to the national sample, but in the great majority of cases this comparison was not made, and when it was, no effort was made to determine the significance and causes of any differences encountered.

A general observation to be made about both the reports of the national sample and the special interest groups is that the analysis is almost always univariate in nature. Presenting the results of a single variable measured against nothing else is rarely illuminating. One does not know if the reaction to those numbers should be, "my, my, how high," or "my, my, how low." Generally, the numbers only take on meaning when comparisons are introduced. One obvious set of comparisons would be among the special groups and the national sample, a point mentioned immediately above. Another point of comparison would be within the national sample, to contrast individuals by geographic regions, political preferences, gender and education, etc. The cross-tabulations in the appendixes of the report do some of this, but the implications are not discussed and tests of significance are not introduced. Moreover, we do not know if differences that emerge are a function of the variable being examined (e.g., education) or some other factor not presented in the appendix (e.g., media exposure).

The executive summary tries to pull a lot of this data together. In doing so, however, it runs into the problem just reviewed, namely the meaning of high and low. For example, the executive summary reports, "There is an elevated level of support of democratic norms..." (p. 23). In what sense is support "elevated." Is it high with respect to what it once was in Nicaragua, or what it is in other countries in Central America? A clear indication of the danger of reporting these figures in isolation becomes apparent in the analysis of another survey item. The respondents were asked if income inequality is a cause of political violence in the country. In Nicaragua 66% said "yes" to this question, but an almost identical item in the University of Pittsburgh survey of Central America found that for all six countries as a region, 77% said "yes." Nicaragua in comparative perspective becomes low, not high.

The executive summary also claims that there is "low interpersonal trust" in Nicaragua. It then goes on to state that, "this is of some concern, because the development of a democratic culture and strong support of the system requires in great measure interpersonal trust...." This conclusion seems unwarranted on both empirical and theoretical grounds. Empirically, on the item that measures interpersonal trust, 57.1% of Nicaraguans gave a low trust response, apparently justifying the conclusion in the executive summary. But for Central America as a whole in the University of Pittsburgh study, 76% of respondents were found to exhibit low interpersonal trust on this item. Theoretically, although Inglehart (1989) claimed that interpersonal trust is linked to stable democracy, in fact it has been shown by Muller and

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Seligson (1994) using data from Central America, as well as Europe, that no such connection exists.

In other cases, the executive summary misinterprets the meaning of the items in the survey. The summary reports that "satisfaction with life is low" (p. 24), but there are no items that directly measure life satisfaction (a standard set of items used in most surveys on democracy and included in the University of Pittsburgh study). As evidence for their assertion, the executive summary reports that "there is the perception of significant inequality in income distribution" (p. 24). First, this is not an indication of low life satisfaction but an evaluative statement about the perceived level of relative deprivation in Nicaragua. Second, an examination of the data contained in the statistical table provided by CID/Gallup reveals that 26% of the sample said that over the past ten years inequality has decreased, 30% said that the distribution has increased and 25% said it has not changed. Hence, the data do not suggest a strong sense of increasing relative deprivation, let alone life dissatisfaction.

One could go on examining the various claims of high versus low, but the point has already been made. There is limited utility in examining the frequency distributions unless they can be put in some sort of comparative perspective.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The central challenge that lies before USAID/Nicaragua in the development of indicators in the democracy field is the utilization of the excellent data set that has been developed as part of the base line exercise. The baseline data set provides nearly all of the information that the Mission would need to measure the population's understanding of key democratic concepts as well as the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Future analyses of public opinion will allow the Mission to compare changes in these key indicators of the political culture of democracy in Nicaragua.

Not only will the data set allow an examination of the attitudes of Nicaraguans as a whole, but it will also allow the examination of a wide variety of key subgroups within the population. These subgroups are available both within the national sample as well as the special samples that have been gathered.

Unfortunately, while the data set appears to be in very good shape, the reports written on that data set are less than illuminating. In some ways, CID/Gallup has given the Mission too much, and in other ways too little. On the too much side, the reports drafted are so voluminous that one cannot reasonably expect them to be absorbed by the Mission. On the too little side, there is too little data reduction and synthesis and too little comparative analysis of significant differences among key subgroups of the population.

Conversations with Ms. Karen Hilliard and Mr. Todd Amani at the Mission revealed that this perception is widely shared among those in the Mission who have been involved in the democratic indicators project. Currently, the Mission plan is to develop a working set of computer files drawn from the CID/Gallup surveys, to acquire the appropriate statistical

software, and then to conduct their own analysis of the data. While such interest is commendable, it may not be a realistic assessment of Mission capabilities. File construction and data analysis is a complex task, and only when qualified individuals are able to dedicate considerable amounts of time to the effort is anything of value likely to emerge from the effort. USAID officials lead hectic lives filled with attending seemingly endless meetings, reading and writing countless reports, and supervising dozens of projects and programs. Clear evidence of the inability of the Mission to find the time to exploit the utility of the data set in their possession is that by late December 1994, nine months after CID/Gallup presented the results of the national survey, the survey is no more than a mass of raw numbers on a computer diskette. File construction has not begun as doubts still remain regarding the coding scheme utilized by CID/Gallup. I have worked with the CID/Gallup data sets many times before and have noted that there are more surprises to come that will further slow the analysis of the data once the coding scheme is untangled.¹⁰ No effort thus far has been made to begin to prepare analysis files for the special groups, another major task, as there are seven special groups, each in their own file.

From all of the above, it is clear that in order to be able to reap any profit from investment made in developing a baseline data, a series of steps need to be taken:

The current data set:

1. A complete set of SPSS (or equivalent¹¹) files should be prepared, one for the national survey, and one for each of the seven special groups.
2. The eight files should be concatenated into a single file, with each subfile identified by a numeric code.
3. A careful review of the combined data set should begin before any analysis is attempted. Typically, CID/Gallup files contain numerous coding errors. Each error will have to be checked with the original questionnaire so as to determine the correct response.¹²

¹⁰Most important of these is that CID/Gallup typically restricts itself to single column variables. For those questions in which more than 10 responses are possible, letters are used. Since statistical programs can only normally operate on numbers not letters, these letters must be converted to numbers. Further problems emerge from this restriction to single column variables. For example, the age of the respondent is normally coded by Gallup by cohorts rather than by exact age in years. In regression analysis, the exact age is needed. In other cases, four variables have been used to code education (none, primary, secondary and superior). An index will have to be constructed combining those four variables in order to construct a single continuous variable for education.

¹¹SPSS is the most widely used computer package for the analysis of survey data. Other programs, such as SAS, would work equally well, however.

¹²Coding and data entry errors can be minimized through the use of a program such as SPSS/Data Entry II. Such programs can be designed to check for codes that are out of range (e.g. a response of 3 when only 1 and 2 are allowed), or illogical (pregnant males). Without the use of such a program, and absent verification of data entry, normally one can expect about 10% of the data to be wrong.

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4. At that point, an analysis of variance should be conducted on the eight files, in which global comparisons would be made among them. This analysis will quickly tell the Mission if there are, indeed, significant differences among each group. The analysis of variance would need to include post hoc tests, so that groups can be distinguished from each other, and also include co-variates as controls.
5. The Mission should develop its own set of questions to be asked of the data set. For example, it might want to know: Which groups are the most democratic? Which groups are the most anti-democratic? Are school teachers more or less democratic than the population as a whole? Are the military and police supporters of Nicaraguan democracy? If not, why not? Are there certain geographic regions that are more favorable to democracy than others? Is there hope that the young are more likely to support democracy than the old, or is democracy entirely a function of education.
6. An appropriate set of scales should be developed utilizing the various subsets of items in the survey. An attempt at doing so was contained in section VI of the executive summary, and that attempt should be polished and extended. Indeed, that is the one section of the entire set of CID/Gallup reports that contains any serious multivariate analysis.

Future waves of the survey:

1. It would be important to capture the levels of tolerance of the entire population. Future administrations of the survey should contain the standard tolerance series, but also continue to include the least-liked series, since that, too, provides valuable data.
2. Consideration should be given to dropping special subgroups that are already included in sufficient numbers in the main survey (especially the youth). At the same time, special interviews might be developed with other subsets of direct interest to the Mission.
3. The design of future waves should follow as closely as possible this first wave. That would imply that CID/Gallup should be given first consideration for conducting future waves. Different survey organizations might use different techniques and the result would be the emergence of differences in attitudes that are entirely an artifact of the survey organization rather than a change in attitudes themselves.
4. The analysis of the data from future waves is perhaps better assigned to those with a long track record in multivariate analysis of democracy surveys in Central America.

General recommendations for the current and future waves:

1. The indicators project itself, while conceived as an effort to monitor Mission progress in achieving its strategic objectives, could be utilized as another tool to help build democracy in Nicaragua. Nicaraguans need to know how other Nicaraguans think

about democracy. This implies the preparation of one or more reports designed for the Nicaraguan public and the translation of those reports into Spanish.

2. Public fora should be held examining the results of the surveys. These fora could be limited to selected elite groups, such as politicians, academics, senior military, etc. But they could also involve labor groups, teachers, campesinos, etc. The wider the discussion of democracy the better.
3. Comparison between the Nicaragua survey and those undertaken in other LAC Bureau countries should be made. Doing so might help improve the quality of all of those efforts.
4. The Mission should consider making the analysis of the democracy surveys an on-going component of their regular project planning and evaluation. The surveys could be used for much more than the annual strategic objectives exercise.

CONCLUSIONS

USAID/Nicaragua has developed a solid basis for its strategic indicators of democratic development with the CID/Gallup survey. It needs to build upon that basis in two ways. First, it needs to conduct a serious analysis of the data it now has in hand. Second, it needs to plan for revisions in future questionnaires, and the ongoing incorporation of analysis of the data into their various program initiatives.

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ANNEX H

PROJECT SUMMARY

The Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI) Project was undertaken in an environment charged with political conflict. As a development project in the democracy and governance (D&G) area, it represented a fresh approach to addressing the unique and deep-seated societal problems present in Nicaragua. There were no precedents to draw upon as USAID/Nicaragua moved to fashion this intervention under the duress of a U.S. foreign policy establishment that wanted resources transferred immediately but was unable to put the bureaucratic mechanisms in place to allow for the expeditious flow of resources.

A project did get up and running, and the Findings and Conclusions of the Evaluation Team identify a number of SDI Project-funded activities that significantly contribute to bringing the country together as a nation. However, the team identified shortcomings in the manner in which business in conjunction with this project was transacted. Constraints stemming from lack of sufficient human resources to administer the project and the complexity of the D&G phenomenon itself contributed to the shortcomings noted.

An important by-product of the activity evaluations was the distillation of overarching issues of which the most important are listed below:

- The lack of a USAID-generated assessment and analytical framework to anchor project design had immediate consequences. It meant that U.S. D&G organizations (AFT, AIFLD, IRI, NDI, CFD) drove the design and activity-selection process, despite having only rudimentary initial plans.
- As part of its re-engineering initiative, USAID should consider changing the registration, external audit, and other requirements for delivering support directly to indigenous organizations. This is particularly important for D&G projects, since strengthening local capacity is often an essential output for meeting the project purpose.
- As a basis for such USAID policy changes, a careful analysis should be made of the U.S. versus local trade-offs faced by USAID/Nicaragua and other Missions in similar political environments. It may be, for instance, that audit requirements should be altered by increasing the amount granted to a local group before an external audit is required.
- For any new and follow-on project activities, USAID/Nicaragua should re-fashion its arrangements with U.S. cooperators and grantees to ensure the greatest possible degree of Nicaraguan participation in the project design process and transparency in the funding arrangements that are forged for delivering U.S. resources.
- There has been a significant absence of systematic monitoring of the SDI Project on the part of USAID/Nicaragua. The monitoring process should include the following

components: workplans, monitoring and evaluation plans, quarterly reporting, and periodic and formal review meetings.

- Access to modern OD techniques for the performance of key organizational tasks by NGOs would contribute significantly to their prospects for eventual self-reliance and long-term sustainability. This would help to develop the fabric of solid citizen organizations needed to strengthen civil society.