


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HAITI

Incentives to Improve Basic Education (IBE)
Projet Bilateral d'Education (PROBED)

MIDTERM EVALUATION

June 1989



**IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY
OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS**

Florida State University
Howard University
Institute for International Research
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United States Agency for International Development
Bureau for Science and Technology
Office of Education
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive Summary

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Purpose of Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation is to review and assess the congruence of implementation efforts, progress and achievements of the IIBE project with the project design outlined in the project paper and to determine project viability. The results of this evaluation will be used by IIBE to make midterm improvements in project management and operations, by IIBE and AID to better manage the transition to grant funding, and by AID to assess the readiness of the prospective grantee to absorb and manage project funds.

2. Summary of Project Description

Working with the Catholic Church and major Protestant Churches, the IIBE project seeks to stimulate and support improvement in educational quality and efficiency in private primary schools serving rural and disadvantaged urban areas. Although the numerically dominant force in primary education, the fragmented private sector had no institution sufficiently representative to serve as a grantee. While a counterpart institution was forming, Florida State University (FSU) has implemented the project through a Mission buy-in to the Improving the Efficiency of Educational Systems (IEES) Project.

3. Implementation History

Informal meetings in 1985 and more formal exchanges in 1986 led to the formation of an organizational structure capable of planning and implementing projects and acting as conduit for foreign donor funds. The major Protestant groups formed the *Fédération des écoles protestantes d'haiti* (1986), and the *Commission épiscopale des écoles catholiques* emerged on the Catholic side (1986). The two organizations have recently (1989) formed an umbrella group, the *Fondation haïtienne de l'enseignement privé* (FONHEP). EOP institutional development objectives have thus been largely surpassed even though the project is only at midpoint.

Beginning in September 1986, PROBEd (French acronym for IIBE) has supplied school services to three cohorts of schools (86/7: 24 schools; 87/8: 95 schools; 88/9: 76 schools). Very few schools have dropped out and the selection of the fourth and last cohort (89/90) is currently underway.

Public sector support could not be realized to any significant degree. Neither GOH school support resources nor Ministry collaboration in the R&D component have materialized. Following the November 1987 events, any potential or real collaboration with MEN was stopped, along with all other USAID/GOH assistance. Nevertheless, informal contacts have remained open and PROBEd collaborates in the Ministry's *Commission mixte* preparing the Fifth World Bank Education Project. PROBEd has also been instrumental in channeling \$1.27 million in World Bank salary supplements to private sector teachers for the 87/8 and 88/9 years and is expected to play a similar role in subsequent years.

4. Major Findings

4.1 Achievement of Objectives

PROBEd has surpassed many of its midterm objectives. EOP output objectives have been reached in the following proportions:

Institutional Development

Stimulate representative Haitian school organizations	100%
Strengthen MEN's capacity in accreditation, examination, evaluation, and applied research	(dropped)

School Services

Provide services to between 10% and 20% of private schools in depressed areas	60%
Reach 60,000 students	70%
Train 1,800 teachers and directors	65%

Research and Development

Inventories and comparative evaluation of educational innovations	5%
Learning systems using distance teaching and modular instruction (starting Year 3)	5%
Text production systems	0%
Preprimary programs	75%
Strategies for local educational financing	(postponed)

The project is well on track in most areas and ahead of schedule in the critical development of organizational structures. Only the R&D component is lagging behind, but has recently started to pick up speed. A minor design flaw — waiting until Year 3 before installing significant capacity in curricular development — is partly responsible for this slow start in R&D. Another reason was the political necessity to begin school service implementation before the R&D systems were in place.

This project is highly original and differs from other attempts to improve Haitian primary education in the following ways:

- unusually thorough preparation (Sector Assessment; participation of particularly experienced individuals);
- rapid assumption of management responsibility by Haitians;
- participatory management system;
- midpoint transformation from contract to grant structure;
- contractual links between project and beneficiaries;
- selective and noncritical links with the public sector.

4.2 Areas in Need of Improvement

Staffing. The analytical, administrative, organizational, and motivational characteristics of the lay sector representatives are not on par with either of the Protestant or Catholic sectors. Some of the clerical

staff are not operating at maximum productivity. The project is vulnerable to mishaps (e.g., resignations) since only a single person is trained for each function.

Administration. The computerized integrated management system is not yet fully operational at a time when administrative and financial accounting for the past year have to be done and orders for next year need to be received, analyzed, and processed.

R&D. Policy-oriented research has not yet reached the volume and maturity needed to make a real dent in routine operations, midterm corrections, and evaluating the impact of particular activities and components.

5. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Institutional Development

General conclusion. Institutional development at PROBEd has been most successful, surpassing project paper objectives and opening the way to the changeover from contract to grant structure. The following recommendations address the situation which has arisen (1) as a consequence of this success and (2) because of the termination of collaboration with the Ministry.

Recommendation 1. Continue to assess the training needs of PROBEd, CEEC, FEPH, and FONHEP formally and periodically. Budgetary allocations should be sufficient to train all personnel to be able to act as substitutes in key functions in time of need.

Recommendation 2. Ongoing examination of the functions of individuals and units should be continued in a more formalized manner, as an institutional capacity analysis. At this organizational crossroads, such a collective enterprise will help to redefine roles and relationships and modify institutional capacity where needed.

Recommendation 3. Allocate the necessary resources to facilitate in-depth work on the independent sector, initially focusing on (1) estimation of its size, characteristics, needs and potential; (2) an inventory and analysis of organizations already representing parts of this sector; (3) organizations already serving the needs of independent schools; as well as (4) the elaboration of a policy aimed at bringing-in a credible independent sector representative as a full-fledged member of FONHEP.

5.2 School Service Delivery

General conclusion. School service delivery has been effective, on time and on target. The methodology has undergone several adjustments and corrections and is now fully appropriate considering both local capacities and donors' administrative and accounting needs. One surprising trend is yet to be fully understood: the great uniformity of menu choices by very dissimilar schools.

Recommendation 4. Accelerate the installation of a simple but integrated computerized management system providing for data input and analysis in a user-friendly way. Three more staff should be trained to have computer skills at least comparable to those of the school services section.

Recommendation 5. Impose and control limits on student density, class size and maybe other variables potentially critical to pedagogical success. Accelerate corrective actions based on monitors' reports.

Recommendation 6. Adhere scrupulously to the letter of performance contracts, avoiding any semblance of character imposed by central authorities.

5.3 Research and Development

General conclusion. Large quantities of data are being accumulated and analytical effort has recently been increased. In general during the first years, R&D appears to have taken second place to the more im-

mediate concerns of service implementation. Once a clear research focus has been decided upon, significant research results can be expected in several areas.

Recommendation 7. Schedule information seminars on the PEP research for both PROBEd and other organizations. Make sure that feedback can be integrated into the design of future preschool activities.

Recommendation 8. Define a clear research focus and objectives, use existing data more widely, amplify routine data collection, coordinate analytical work, and make the most of existing qualitative data.

Recommendation 9. Resources should be allocated to continue and accelerate policy-oriented research as a part of regular project activities. In order to assure the necessary volume, significance and continuity of the R&D effort, one person or section should be made specifically responsible for it and the R&D component should have a specific place on the organizational chart and the budget.

5.4 Coordination With Other Donors

General conclusion. PROBEd's low profile — which is politically appropriate — and single donor financing have resulted in a low level of coordination with other agencies. This is bound to change as PROBEd becomes just one of FONHEP's projects. While diversification of funding is desirable, the Foundation as well as CEEC and FEPH would do well to preserve their autonomy by rejecting base financing from donors whose principal activities involve governmental agencies. Such donors have so far shown little understanding of what makes PROBEd work.

Recommendation 10. While striving for rapid diversification of funding sources, limit contributions by multilateral donors to specific items such as teacher salary support, classroom construction, and research. Under no circumstances should FONHEP trade its autonomy for budgetary support.

Recommendation 11. Continue to keep a low profile while at the same time instituting regular formal and informal exchanges in order to ensure complementarity of action with other organizations.

Recommendation 12. Limit coordination of activities to those donors and organizations which share the project's objectives and respect its autonomy completely.

5.5 Program Management

General conclusion. The project has succeeded in maximizing the advantages of creating new structures and initiating new initiatives. Excellent human and organizational resources have been mobilized without overburdening PROBEd by their past allegiances and liabilities. However, with the current organizational transformation and the impending increase in complexity, scale, scope and cost of activities, renewed attention will have to be paid to management issues.

Recommendation 13. Negotiations to specify in detail the roles and responsibilities of FONHEP and FSU should continue, resulting in a document specifying exact chains of command regarding key functions, such as deciding how money should be spent, authorizing/approving expenditures, accounting for expenditures, assigning and supervising technical staff, and organizing and implementing activities.

Recommendation 14. Agreements reached should be illustrated on a hierarchical project organigram. If a single organigram cannot accurately show all relationships, then a series could be developed (e.g., one showing staff supervision and reporting responsibilities, another showing financial responsibilities, etc.). However, a single comprehensive chart is preferable.

Recommendation 15. A gradual transition from the consensus orientation to a more vertical structure of decisionmaking is desirable and represents a more viable option for the future. It should be feasible now as a result of the trust developed between the various partners in the past three years.

Recommendation 16. Efforts to improve and document management systems and procedures should continue.

Recommendation 17. As far as the transition to FONHEP is concerned, continuing attention should be paid to developing a detailed, accurate organigram and to specifying in writing explicit roles, responsibilities, authorities, and tasks of each individual and organization involved in FONHEP.

5.6 Summary Recommendation and Rationale

In a most general way this evaluation team recommends (1) to continue funding PROBED at levels agreed to in the project paper and the proposed amendment, (2) to carry out the proposed rearrangement of the organizational structure and the transfer of authority to FONHEP, and (3) to initiate planning of both an extension of USAID support to PROBED and FONHEP and to other projects with similar objectives but more limited in geographic scope.

Justifications for such a favorable recommendation include the following:

- The project has stuck to its original goals and reached many of its objectives.
- The project has reached and surpassed its institutional development objectives ahead of schedule.
- Project design has proven to be appropriate to Haitian social and political realities.
- The overall level of competence of individuals associated with the project on staff and administrative council, as well as at FSU and AID, is excellent.
- Beyond its own immediate activities, PROBED has already started to act as a model for providing school support, to stimulate foreign donor interest and, to promote a dialogue between churches as well as the public and private sectors which would have been unthinkable only a few years ago.



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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Summary of Goals

"The program goal of the IIBE Project is to promote Haitian economic development and popular participation in development activities by strengthening of the country's human resource base." (Project Paper, p. 23). Within this general program the project has the dual purpose of improving the quality of private primary schools and of serving as a catalyst for efforts within Haitian private primary education to organize itself and to take charge of attempts to improve the quality of schools.

The project is original in at least two respects. First, it does not define its goal as expanding access to schools to populations currently deprived of such access. Instead, the focus is on improving quality and internal efficiency. The project is also original in going against the grain of institution-building projects worldwide which have most often confused "institution" with government or state institution. The major organizational thrust of this project aims at private sector institutions.

1.2 Summary of Strategy

The general strategy of the project consists of a number of elements logically linked with each other.

1. By focusing on private schools PROBED excludes the option of working with and through the state's existing administrative hierarchy. Therefore, a way had to be found to address and influence a large number of individual schools. It was decided to enter into a large number of individual contracts between the project and beneficiary schools. (A small number of contracts with entire private school systems such as the Methodist system, had originally been contemplated.)
2. The heterogeneity of private education precludes the application of standardized technical solutions. Each school should receive a type of support adapted to its particular conditions.
3. In order to decrease dependency of schools upon continued outside help, support is explicitly limited to a very few years and actually decreases after the second year.

Detailed strategies for the major project components include the following:

School support is provided to a sample of Protestant, Catholic, and lay ("independent") schools operating in both rural and depressed urban areas. Schools are selected according to a set of predefined criteria, linked to the project by contract, and offered a dozen possible support items. There are provisions for production of most of the resources offered within Haiti, for evaluation and monitoring their use and, for the gradual transfer of all resource supply and monitoring tasks from PROBED's Technical Services Center to Sectoral Service Centers representing the Catholic, Protestant, and (maybe) lay sectors.

Research and Development is to be achieved in the following manner. Initially the project is to inventory and study the innovations and experiments carried out previously and concurrently in private schools in Haiti, with a special focus on low-cost distance learning systems, low-cost text production systems, pre-primary programs and local educational financing. Some of the R&D effort was to be carried out in close collaboration with the National Pedagogical Institute (IPN) and two of its *Centres d'appui pédagogique régionaux* (CAPRs).

Organization building efforts of the project are aimed at strengthening a Catholic and a Protestant "embryonic representative body." These national religious bodies, the *Commission épiscopale des écoles catholiques* (CEEC) and the *Fédération des écoles protestantes d'haiti* (FEPH) are represented in the PROBED organization by two Sectoral Service Centers. These Centers have the principle function of representing the schools within a sector and administering project-supplied resources for educational

improvement. The organizational support for the lay schools was initially seen as a responsibility to be handled in the Ministry of Education (MEN) with project support.

Public sector reinforcement was originally intended by strengthening MEN's school inspection facilities, by providing resources for shared R&D studies and by lending technical support to develop evaluation and examination systems.

1.3 Context Issues

Three major contextual issues should be kept in mind when analyzing the design and the evolution of PROBED. The first of these is political. PROBED has evolved in the midst of the most severe and prolonged political crisis since the U.S. occupation. Given the current distribution of forces it is unlikely that the project will ever know peaceful times. Haiti is characterized not only by a "soft state" but a generalized weakness and scarcity of institutions in all sectors of the social structure. From such political instability and institutional weakness, the Catholic Church has emerged as the relatively strongest nongovernmental institution of national scope. It has been a decisive player in bringing down the Duvalier dictatorship. Harnessing the human resources and organizational potential of the Catholic Church has become an obvious strategy for scores of development projects.

The majority of primary schools in Haiti are private schools. The private sector has recently increased its share of both schools and enrollments. According to the 1988 MEN statistics, 68% of primary enrollments are in private schools. More recent World Bank team estimates put the private sector proportions at 82% of primary schools and 72% of enrollments. The two most obvious causes of this trend are the weakness of the public sector and the tendency of new Protestant missions to combine their religious activities with school construction and educational activities (as they have been required to do by law since the mid 1970s).

The avalanche of foreign aid which has descended on Haiti over the last fifteen years has been curtailed somewhat for the time being following the aborted 1987 election. But in the educational sector, aid has continued almost unabatedly. Numerous bilateral and multilateral projects have hardly been cut at all, and the massive decentralized infusion of essentially North American funds into the Protestant missions might even have increased.

1.4 Project Rationale: Focus and Limitations

The rationale of PROBED's aid strategy is straightforward if not always explicit in the Project Paper. Rather than just transferring resources, the project directs its effort in such a way that autonomous national institutions can emerge and grow. Thus strengthening the private sector should in turn stimulate the Ministry and make the public sector more active and competitive. As a consequence, efficiency improvements will have to be made in private schools if they want to preserve their market share. Both sectors will thus end up stronger and more efficient, and the client population will benefit on both sides. Although some of this argument may be hope or speculation, the basic rationale has turned out to be sound.

The project strategy also has its limitations. Since the major organizational thrust is aimed at churches, lay schools and especially lay schools whose pedagogical mission is overshadowed by a commercial vocation, will by necessity play a lesser role in both structuring and receiving support. Besides, the major religious organizations, CEEC and FEPH, are still very young and fragile. Overburdening them with budgets and tasks too large for their own good might imperil precisely those of their qualities which PROBED needs most; namely, the high levels of motivation and loyalty of their personnel. These latter

qualities are harder to locate in the lay sector — a fact which is sometimes evoked to justify a slow and prudent approach to that sector.

By its very design **PROBED** thus cannot be enlarged and multiplied at will; in order to be effective, the project must stay relatively small. The price for growing too fast, too large, and too permanent would be to be exposed to all the dangers menacing large, conventional development projects; so far this has been avoided.

2. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Project Goal and Purpose

The main problem to be addressed through PROBED is the low quality of basic primary education in Haiti. The basic rationale underlying IIBE's institutional development strategy is that the systematic improvement in the efficiency and quality of Haiti's system of basic education cannot be attained unless an institutional framework to ensure supervision, guidance, pedagogical and financial support, and facilitation of research and development is built up.

The IIBE strategic objective is therefore twofold:

1. enabling the three principal subdivisions of Haitian private primary education to organize structures for coordinating educational improvement efforts and for building a constituency for sustainability (i.e., funding) beyond PROBED;
2. strengthening the Ministry of Education's capacity to perform the systemwide and essentially public functions of accreditation, examination, evaluation, and applied research needed to support the development of education.

The first strategic objective requires that the associations in the private education sector, established jointly by the groups involved in private primary education, take increased responsibility for:

- managing the project's private school support activities;
- obtaining the adherence and participation of a wide spectrum of private schools and representing them within the subsector in question as well as at the national level; and
- generating self-financing from resources provided by constituent systems and schools.

Due to the political turmoil over the past years, the resulting cutoff of U.S. aid to the GOH, and the MEN's apparent lack of institutional capacity to organize itself and fulfill its constitutional responsibilities, the second strategic objective has been abandoned for the time being.

Up until this point in time PROBED has been very successful in implementing the project. The institutional development component has proceeded at a much faster rate than expected and has gone farther than originally anticipated.

2.2 Project Implementation

(For an institutional chart and a description of roles and relationships, see Annex 1.)

2.2.1 First Stage: 1985/86

Target: The emergence of PROBED and two private sector education associations.

Implementation:

- | | |
|---------------|--|
| June 24, 1985 | USAID meets with representatives of the Protestant Federation of Mission Schools, representing 1,171 schools and 26 organizations. |
| Jan. 15, 1986 | Joint Protestant/Catholic meeting of leaders of Haitian private education. Continued collaboration resulting in the Project Paper. |
| Sept. 1986 | Start of project implementation. |

A **Commission of Catholic Schools (CEEC)** is formed by the *Conference episcopale d'haiti (CEH)* which acquired its legal personality on January 28, 1986. In February 1989, the Commission is renamed to become one of Catholic Education, inspired by the Convention signed in 1880 between the Vatican and the Haitian State proclaiming education and the Catholic Church to be inseparable.

The CEEC is probably the first major central unit to link the private educational sector to a foreign donor. Its role is to be a partner in project implementation and its main function is to coordinate development efforts of Catholic schools and promote cost-effective structures. In fact, this effort is facilitated by existing, coherent structures in the Catholic sector, in particular by its dioceses.

A **Federation of Protestant Schools (FEPH)** was formed and incorporated in May 1986 to coordinate a very independent and unorganized Protestant educational sector. Like the CEEC, its principal mission is to be a partner in project implementation, to regroup all schools that belong to Protestant missions and promote their educational and financial development. Unlike Catholic churches, each mission or church pays annual dues of \$125 per delegate. The number of delegates to the General Assembly is proportionate to the number of schools that each institution member operates. Since the creation of FEPH, membership has increased considerably and the dues constitute a regular source of income.

Both the CEEC and FEPH owe their existence to PROBED's initiative. With this, the institutional development goal of the project is nearly achieved.

2.2.2 1986/87 – Project Year 1

Target: Institutional development, progressive devolution of responsibilities to the subsectors, and implementation of the procedures, processes and infrastructure required to manage subsequent project activities. Identification of first pilot cohort of 24 schools.

Implementation:

A **Technical Service Center (TSC)** and two **Sectoral Service Centers (SSCs)**, which are the operational arms of the CEEC and FEPH, are established and assigned functions to project implementation. The TSC, under the oversight of FSU, coordinates the work of the SSCs as well as the technical assistance provided by FSU. The **Project Administrative Council**, composed of representatives of the CEEC and FEPH, sets policy guidelines and makes decisions regarding programmatic and budgetary planning that are respected by both the donor and the contractor. A curriculum policy for the project is formulated and a performance contract for the schools drafted. The Director of the TSC arrives in July 1987.

The main administrative and technical responsibilities of the SSCs involve supervision of private school improvement effort. This includes (1) selection of participating schools; (2) delivery of material and services to participating schools; (3) supervision and monitoring of participating schools; (4) evaluation of school performance and collection of background data; and (5) active participation in TSC research and development activities.

The cooperative arrangement between the three major parties has avoided a simple hierarchy of authority. Only in the case of FSU is authority clearly assigned in limited areas. In spite of some resulting duplication of effort and waste of resources, one might consider the operation of the project an unusual but mostly successful example of team leadership.

2.2.3 1987/88 – Project Year 2

Target: Development of management capacity needed to provide services to schools. Pursuit of long-range institutionalization goal. Selection of the second cohort of schools.

Implementation:

New subcontracts are signed by the FEPH and the CEEC whereby the two SSCs take management responsibility of an increasing share of school support funds. The FEPH and the CEEC decide to make their collaboration permanent and begin the process of forming a **private primary education consortium**. It is hoped that such an arrangement would formalize their de facto authority in the implementation of the project as well as their legal status vis-à-vis the Ministry of Education and other potential donors, in order to gain a more significant voice in national educational planning and to broaden their financial resource base.

The rapidity with which the Catholic and Protestant sectors have organized themselves and have been officially recognized as the legitimate representatives of approximately 65% of private sector primary education in Haiti has clearly been a major achievement.

The CEEC has already received a 3-year grant from the French Government to assist it in institutional reinforcement. The Government of Haiti/World Bank allocates nearly \$1.27 million over the next two years for salary supplements to private sector teachers, learning materials, and administrative support. The possibility of other donors giving financial assistance to Haitian institutions during the life of the project had been considered so remote that no mention of this can be found in the Project Paper.

Finally, the fact that project implementation has not been damaged by the termination of the public sector portion is another sign of the strength and adaptive capacity of both PROBEd and the sector associations.

2.2.4 1988/89 – Project Year 3

Target: Major extension in project coverage. Review and design of the institutional development strategy 1988/89 - 91/92. Selection of third cohort of schools including a first cohort of 33 independent (lay sector) schools.

Implementation:

The Administrative Council approves institutional development plans by each sector through increased budgetary allocations, training support and activities. Work on the statute of the foundation continues simultaneously and leads to the incorporation (9/5/1988) of FONHEP, the **Haitian Private Education Foundation** (officially recognized in 1989).

Following these events, a revised project implementation plan will be executed as of July 1989 to the end of the project under a contractual agreement between USAID and FONHEP. FSU will continue to provide technical assistance as AID's designated grant manager via an extension of the IIBE buy-in. This arrangement requires internal adjustments of budgets, activities, roles and responsibilities in the light of the new contractual situation, a process which is already underway.

The institutional development approach so far has focused on strengthening central structures, in part because little was included in the original budget for the purpose of building and decentralizing institutional capacity. The associations are only now attempting to broaden and reinforce their local support base by more closely identifying the needs of rural schools in their subsectors, enlisting new membership and determining the most appropriate roles and working relationships between the CEEC and FEPH central and regional offices.

Both CEEC and FEPH owe their existence in part to the availability of foreign funds and will continue to be dependent on foreign sources. What is striking in the context of Haitian education, however, is not such dependence as such, but the good use which has been made of the foreign funds. Someone should one

day take the time to calculate how much money has been spent by foreign donors to create new Haitian organizations. Per head of constituency served by PROBEd would look good.

2.2.5 Critical Inputs

A close look at project implementation suggests that the strength of the institutional development approach lies in its very flexibility or suppleness. It emphasizes the human element and ideas, and de-emphasizes method and procedures per se. What makes this project significant is the high level of motivation of personnel, the ability to actively enlist and involve a constituency in pursuit of a common goal. The close collaboration of Haitian educators has been essential to support project design as well as project implementation thus far, and it offers concrete evidence of the potentialities in the institutional domain.

Aside from the participants, another important element appears to have been the social soundness analysis. Its influence is clearly felt in the project methodology and in the general private sector orientation of the project. One has to realize that there was considerable risk involved in setting up a project that simultaneously tries to emphasize accountability by the use of contracts on the one hand and Ministry collaboration on the other hand. Many things might have gone wrong in this project and a few have indeed gone wrong. The critical reasons of the success are probably to be found in two elements:

1. New organizations were created, but not by newcomers to organization. Several significant organizations in both the Catholic and Protestant sectors predated CEEC and FEPH. Their collective experience could be used without PROBEd having to accept the organizational liabilities linked to their history. All Project Administrative Council (PAC) members had participated in these older organizations.
2. Instead of the usual "implement first -- organize later" procedure typical of many projects institutional development was recognized by the parents of PROBEd as an element of pivotal importance. (It is well known that there were several fathers, mothers and physicians involved in the birth of PROBEd, but only one midwife; she gets a special, appreciative nod here.)

2.3 Issues in Institutional Development

2.3.1 Improvements in Level of Staff Training and Competence

All technical staff interviewed agree that they have learned considerably on the job and through FSU's technical assistance efforts. Given that project operation is rather participatory in nature and the chain of command is unclear, the loose coping system requires management practices that are closer to art than science. The model requires patience and flexibility on the part of the directors. It leaves some autonomy for all staff, which means that they have to learn by doing. But it also means some duplication of effort and occasionally less than optimal use of resources.

To a great extent this appears to have been the modus vivendi of the institutional development strategy: learn by trial and error. However, with the increasing responsibilities that the devolution of responsibility model requires, the establishment of a management information system, and the changing of the guard when FONHEP assumes its functions as of July 1989, more systematic training of staff both at the central and regional level will become desirable. The project leadership appears well aware of that and has in fact scheduled TA help on precisely this point for the Summer of 1989.

2.3.2 Organizational Strength

Strength exists only relative to some standard. In the case of PROBEd the standard is given by the obstacles on the path towards reaching organizational objectives. PROBEd and the sector associations are virtually certain to reach their objectives and can thus be considered strong enough for the task at hand. However, the future is uncertain and it would be useful to have some kind of objective indicator of organizational strength. We propose the following criteria: (1) competence and motivation of key personnel, (2) size of membership, (3) budget diversity, (4) administrative efficiency, and (5) scope and structural penetration (for want of a better term). How would PROBEd and its three partners (CEEC, FEPH and FONHEP) measure up?

1. Nothing needs to be added concerning competence and motivation of key personnel; they are excellent. This is not to say that they are necessarily flawless but that they have behaved like true professionals, solving problems whenever necessary rather than looking for culprits elsewhere.
2. Size, in terms of project schools, is small and will stay small. However, the CEEC and FEPH have extended their reach to, and to some extent even control over, an increasing number of schools and could in the foreseeable future manage to have some influence over close to half of Haiti's primary schools. There is phenomenal potential here in the sense that there are large numbers of directors, teachers, and parents who have a stake in what happens with and to these organizations.
3. The organizations are still relying almost exclusively on a single budgetary source which leaves them vulnerable to policy changes at donor's headquarters. However, diversification is already setting in. Both sectors have received some external financing and have ways of obtaining at least some local financing as well. FONHEP should rapidly become quite diversified in terms of funding.
4. Administrative efficiency has not always been optimal and receives almost continued attention at PAC meetings. Decisionmaking at the directors' level has sometimes been slower than the coordination and TA team would have wanted it to be, and some aspects of school delivery appear to have worked in spite of, not because of, the project's administrative shell. But in the end all efficiency questions boil down to the one: did it work? The answer is: yes, it did.
5. The structural penetration of an organization refers to the extent and quality of its linkages with the social structure of which it is a part. Penetration grows with age, the extended networks of the members, institutional recognition and interconnectedness and the like. It is essential for the efficient functioning of the organization in times of difficulty. The larger the scope of operation, the greater the need for deep social penetration. PROBEd has a large scope both in terms of geography (spanning most of the Haitian territory) and in terms of activity (performing most of the functions one would normally associate with a Ministry). However, structural penetration is not yet fully commensurate with the scope of operation; one could hardly expect it to be after so few years. The low profile has resulted in low institutional recognition by the public and other organizations, and interconnectedness still lacks depth in the sense that most other organizations would go on as before, should PROBEd cease to exist. Even the extended networks of members of the PAC, considerable as they are, do not seem to penetrate deeply into the seats of political power.

In summary we come to the conclusion that PROBEd and its partners are already surprisingly strong organizations and are growing into a position of more secure strength. There is no reason to believe that their growth would come to a halt soon.

2.4 Impact Assessment

2.4.1 Impact on the Beneficiaries: The Catholic and Protestant Churches and the Independent Sector

The project, as represented mainly by the Protestant and Catholic sectoral organizations it supports, has allowed those organizations to work together on a global, human level, outside of their normal religious activities. This unprecedented collaborative effort in educational development would not have happened without PROBEd. For leaders and teachers to have succeeded in working together is a good thing for the education system as a whole.

Project improvements in the quality of education (i.e., teaching practices and curriculum materials) are likely to be sustained, given that Catholic and Protestant schools account for a large majority of private primary education enrollment. The churches can therefore be expected to continue to play the most important role in mediating the effort to improve the quality of schools and in assisting the SSCs with their tasks after AID financing ends.

Internally, at the church level, PROBEd made evident the need for restructuring, for developing institutional capacities to continue project benefits, and for extending the churches' own resource base in order to become more efficient in pursuing their public education mission.

The independent sector has not yet been able to organize itself and become a full fledged member of FONHEP. The coordinator of the ISSC does not yet represent any "independent" central unit but rather is under the oversight of the Technical Service Center.

2.4.2 Impact on the Functioning of Private Schools and the Quality of Education

One to three years is too short a time to assess the impact on student learning achievement (see chapter on R&D). However, based on informal observations the following can be said: the training provided to directors and teachers, and the resources and services made available by the project to individual primary schools and their student and parent communities happen at a time when the Haitian people are becoming more aware of their situation. In a country like Haiti, with 80% illiteracy and no democratic tradition, this change in awareness may be a major milestone toward improving the quality of education.

Through PROBEd, many parents have become more aware of how children learn, of the role of the teacher and the parents in the learning process, of appropriate cognitive level materials and curriculum, of the optimum physical organization of classroom space when this is in short supply, of learning extended into the community, of sharing ideas and goals, of asking questions, answering their own and each others, of self-evaluation techniques, of using various methods of teaching and of managing large classes with different age and knowledge levels.

This list could go on and on. What is important to the clientele is that more students are able to come to school, that more of them have books, and that some schools now have all six grades where only three existed before. In short, there are many signs that the conditions for learning are improving, and we have observed at least some signs that this is being appreciated by the schools' clientele.

However, more teachers need to be trained, particularly as trained ones leave for better paid teaching positions and what remains is a teaching staff of uneven quality. Teacher training is also crucial to prepare the student for the transition from preprimary to primary education so as not to lose any student achievement gains. The curriculum needs to be more systematically applied and linked to local conditions as well as research. Consequently, monitors need more comprehensive training that covers pedagogical and administrative evaluation techniques. And many more school buildings are needed with better lighting to

accommodate children so that they can learn, concentrate, and move about a little more freely. Most of these needs are dependent upon institutional development of the SSCs, their constituent systems and schools, and their capacity to respond to these needs.

2.4.3 The Impact of PROBEd on the Ministry of Education

In comparison with the important role the private sector plays in primary education, the MEN has contributed very little to the financial, pedagogical, or administrative development of the private education sector. To some extent, PROBEd has taken over the MEN's public functions of supervision, inspection, and guidance through its performance contract arrangement and curriculum program. One might even say that the project is contributing to gains in public services by accepting and extending the Reform and by providing basic primary education which is considered by most people to be a public good.

2.5 Conclusions and Recommendations

Institutional development has been more successful and has received more analytical attention than any other component of PROBEd. Three major organizations have been established and their structures defined. We have found them already to be surprisingly strong, penetrating the Haitian social structure to an increasing extent and showing the promise of influencing, if not fully representing, better than half of Haiti's private primary schools.

Successful as they are, these organizations need to be reinforced at this interim stage of project implementation. Roles, functions, and relationships relevant to reaching project objectives need to be clarified in view of the transition to FONHEP. Much of this work is part of advance planning and has been included in two recent institutional development reports (Fass, 1988, April; Stafford and Desroches, 1988, July). However, some of this work cannot really be achieved ahead of time and some of the new relationships will have to emerge as the three organizations grow in volume, scope, personnel, funding, and visibility.

It cannot be assumed that all PROBEd personnel currently have levels of training adequate for assuming their new functions. A formal assessment of training needs will rapidly become a necessity. Some training programs have already been scheduled for Year 4 in response to this need but more will be called for to satisfy the second portion of the following recommendation and make the project less vulnerable, especially to temporary changes in personnel.

Recommendation 1. Continue to assess the training needs of PROBEd, CEEC, FEPH, and FONHEP formally and periodically. Budgetary allocations should be sufficient to train all personnel to be able to act as substitutes in key functions as needed.

PROBEd has so far been able to count on a high level of motivation among the key staff members. This has protected the organization from potentially negative effects of diffused authority structures, uneven qualifications, and work roles which were not always clearly defined. As the organization grows older and more complex, a full-blown institutional capacity analysis appears desirable. Policies, roles, work organization, the use of resources and, interinstitutional relationships should all be defined with utmost clarity if organizational efficiency is to be maximized. Such a review should be achieved through a series of meetings among all staff involved. PROBEd has actually recognized the need for such review and reflection and the PAC appears to undertake it regularly. Yet there are no formal, written records of this. If there were personnel changes, the newcomers would find it difficult to sort out the limits of roles and responsibilities.

Institutional capacity analysis and training needs assessment are exercises in self-analysis of an organization. They would continue to be conducted in a practical manner — although somewhat more formally — and ideally should be enjoyable events for everyone involved. It will be impossible to reach ef-

efficiency goals and improve the mode of operation without at the same time maintaining and increasing levels of individual motivation. In this latter respect the recommendation, therefore, aims at making the project stronger precisely in an area where it is already strong, but will be challenged by the transition lying ahead.

Recommendation 2. Ongoing examination of the functions of individuals and units should be continued in a more formalized manner, as an institutional capacity analysis. At this organizational crossroads such a collective enterprise will help to redefine roles and relationships and modify institutional capacity where needed.

In one respect the institutional development efforts of PROBEd have not yet met with success. Compared to the church sectors, lay sector schools have not been well served. According to 1989 estimates by a World Bank team, over 2,300 (37.8%) of Haiti's schools belong to the lay sector, 116 fall into the categories of *école communale*, and 493 are *écoles communautaires*. So far there have been no systematic attempts to document the specific needs of these schools, their social and geographic concentrations, their enrollments and their fledgling attempts to organize themselves. Given the magnitude of the problem it is understandable that PROBEd has limited its organizational efforts almost exclusively to the religious sectors. However, it is high time now to proceed to an in-depth analysis of the needs, potential, and organizational options of the "independent" sector. Not only is PROBEd obliged, by the spirit if perhaps not the letter of the project paper, to work with the independent sector schools, but a moral argument can be made as well: If PROBEd won't help those schools, who will?

Recommendation 3. The project should allocate the necessary resources to facilitate in-depth work on the independent sector, initially focusing on (1) estimation of its size, characteristics, needs and potential, (2) an inventory and analysis of organizations already representing parts of this sector, (3) organizations already serving the needs of independent schools, and (4) the elaboration of a policy aimed at bringing a credible independent sector representative into FONHEP as a full-fledged member.

3. DELIVERY OF SCHOOL SERVICES

3.1 Types and Purpose of School Services

PROBED provides two types of services to participating schools. Under the general rubric of instructional support we find (using project paper numbering): (1) inservice training for directors, (2) improved instructional materials, (3) inservice teacher training, (5) school supplies, (7) instructional aids, and (8) a preprimary program. Under the heading of economic assistance, the project provides what most private sector schools could normally be expected to provide themselves if they had both the resources and the inclination to do so, namely, (6) school equipment, (10) school construction and renovation, (9) school feeding programs, and funds for (12) administrative overhead. No salaries as such are provided to directors and teachers although the (4) incentive grants might be interpreted by some as salaries. One final item completes the original list of services offered, namely, (11) seed money for income-generating activities.

Given the great variability of primary education in Haiti, PROBED adopted from the outset a flexible approach to the provision of services. Responding to school needs as stated in writing by directors, the project's services can vary widely in type and volume among participating schools over the duration of their participation. At the heart of the project's service delivery is the performance contract, an instrument designed to facilitate both planning and accountability. Given the amount of attention the performance contract receives both in the project paper and in the routine interactions between project and schools, it will be important to ascertain whether it has fulfilled the expectations originally placed upon it. The idea to enforce a performance contract is novel in Haitian education, to say the least. Should it turn out to function well, it might deserve much wider application.

An evaluation concerned with the provision of school services should not limit itself to description alone. One should also ask why the delivery of services has been possible at all. There is no reason why resources provided by a foreign donor should ever benefit the intended recipients rather than being intercepted or "helped along" from the intended destination to a different end user. Whether funds will be put to good use at the intended destination depends principally upon administrative controls regulating the distribution and the motivations of personnel involved in the distribution. Both of these topics are dealt with in the chapters concerning institutional analysis and administrative procedures. For the moment, let us turn to a description of what has been achieved in school service delivery so far.

3.2 Implementation Levels

What follows is a list of output targets for the delivery of schools services outlined in the project paper. We start by comparing these original targets with achievements reported in the semiannual portfolio reviews (SAPRs), especially with the "cumulative to date" column of the most recent SAPR. Implementation levels will then be analyzed in two ways: first, by looking at the level and structure of expenditures, and second, by assessing the numbers of schools and students benefiting from such expenditures. The impact of the project's activities will be dealt with separately at the end of this section.

1. **"Directors of participating private primary schools trained in improved school administration practices."**

Target: "up to 300" directors trained

To date: 187 directors trained.
292 school committee members trained.

Comment: While the project paper takes community relations seriously, especially in the social soundness analysis and in the "small projects" item on the performance contract menu, no mention is made of training school committee members. This is an important addition to the training of directors and teachers, allowing both a better understanding of pedagogical modernization in the community and an efficient feedback of community reactions to the new ideas and practices.

- 2. "Full set of reformed instructional materials furnished to all participating schools requesting this aid."**

Target: "up to 300" schools equipped with materials

To date: 187 schools equipped.

Comment: The project is basically on track, making modern instructional materials available where desired. But this activity has not evolved in the way foreseen in the project paper. That document talked about "textbooks to be kept by the school and rented at nominal fees to students or loaned against a security deposit." The rental scheme appears not to have worked out and the use of textbooks was clearly far from generalized in those schools visited during the evaluation. The project paper also foresaw a situation where directors would "choose among four or five approved series of textbooks" including a set of Reform materials prepared by IPN. In fact, PROBEd's openness towards many diverse educational ideologies and traditions has outweighed, so far at least, the urge to reach consensus on a small number of high quality, coordinated sets of instructional materials. Some reports talk of "chaos" which might be too strong a word, especially considering the fact that many schools, such as the Methodist ones, have access to coherent packages worked out by their governing bodies. An added complication is caused by the fact that IPN has only recently completed its set of materials and that these materials have not been well received by the public. The whole question is certain to receive more attention in future months and years.

- 3. "Teachers of participating private primary schools trained in improved instructional and classroom management methods."**

Target: "up to 1,200" teachers trained

To date: all 1,279 primary and preprimary teachers trained.

Comment: Inservice training of teaching personnel *stage* or *recyclage* has become a major industry in Haiti over the last few years. IPN alone has carried out well over 100,000 persons/*stage*, each ranging between one day and three months. According to administrators, professors, and participants alike, much of what is going on at these *stages* is of dubious pedagogical value and the principal motivation for participating appears to reside in the per diem payments which, in the public sector, can be considerable. PROBEd seems to have been able to avoid the aura of materially profiting and academically faking it which surrounds some of the training industry. It pays comparatively low per diems and has instituted methods of participant selection (100% of teaching staff) and control (via the performance contract and monthly monitoring) designed to ensure that participants will actually carry out what they are trained — and paid — to practice. The project is on target, but will have to face the challenge of reinforcing and upgrading the new methods, especially if a limitation to "four or five" sets of textbooks forces many teachers to switch to instructional materials they are not very familiar with.

- 4. "Essential school equipment (blackboards, student desks, teacher desks, etc.) provided to all participating schools requesting this aid."**

Target: No advance estimates given.

To date: 118 schools of 1st and 2nd cohorts have received all equipment requested. 61 of 76 3rd cohort schools had received their orders by the last SAPR.

Comment: The project is on target and the supplies are generally of very good quality. Some criticisms have been voiced concerning the high cost of PROBEd standard furniture, but savings on this item would probably put timely delivery and quality standards at risk.

Most of the equipment appears to be put to good use and the monitoring system has allowed the rapid identification and correction of cases where directors failed in their contractual obligations. Preschool furniture is the only item which is still too novel to be easily put to good use. I have seen tables used appropriately in one school, misused in another one, and stacked away unused in two more. This item seems to be a vulnerable one. The preschool tables are usable only in conjunction with locally supplied low chairs. These chairs are in strong and constant demand throughout Haiti. Other than pencils they are just about the only item in PROBEd schools which is useful outside of their confines. Nothing short of iron chains and bars will ever keep such an item inside a school for long.

Procurement of all supplies is through Haitian suppliers and preference is given to equipment produced in Haiti. Decentralized procurement is well under way although at this time most of the profits and jobs connected with this item are still located in Port-au-Prince.

5. "Renovation and/or supplemental construction of adequate physical facilities for participating schools requiring this aid on a matching grant and/or local labor contribution basis."

Target: No advance estimate given.

To date: 32 primary school renovations completed, 24 preschool classrooms renovated, many more renovation requests evaluated.

Comment: Demand for this "big ticket" item is as great as the objective need in most private sector schools. This is a bottomless pit area which is best approached with prudence and clear financial ceilings. The PROBEd practice of selecting schools for renovation appears to have followed project paper guidelines without, however, being able to solve the space problem at most PROBEd schools. There is, of course, no easy answer to this space problem. However, PROBEd does have some leverage and might use it to get classroom density down to pedagogically acceptable levels.

Decentralization of construction and renovation activities should be receiving more attention now that the first few examples have been successfully completed. For a development project to buy cement blocks for Dos Palais in Port-au-Prince is an absurdity.

6. "Performance incentive grants furnished to school directors and teachers who completed training and served competently for at least two subsequent years."

Target: No advance estimate given.

To date: Payments at six month intervals, following decision by the relevant administrative body. Payments appear to have been made to all but 30 teachers and directors of the participating schools, at the following dates:

12/86	110 payments
6/87	107 payments
12/87	637 payments
6/88	618 payments
12/88	1,101 payments

Comments: To transform the medium-term performance rewards into *primes* was a fateful decision. It has to be stated emphatically here that the Haitian notion of *prime* is NOT equivalent to "performance incentive grant." (I have not heard any Haitian, project staff or other, refer to the *prime* as *prime de performance*.) A *prime* is a salary supplement handed out in a non-discriminatory fashion by most of the big employers in Haiti, including the public service, at more or less regular intervals. A *prime* can occasionally fail to materialize not because an individual employee was not up to his task but because an employer is either short of cash or wants to teach everyone a lesson. Furthermore, *primes* have in recent years become a regular part of the income of many people even remotely connected with the operations of foreign donors. PROBEd reports speak of the controversy aroused by the administration of performance grants based on individual merit. Nobody doubts that teachers need and deserve better salaries, but by giving in at the outset, PROBEd never achieved the academic and pedagogical performance leverage which had originally been hoped for. It is evident that a move back to the original intention and definition of this item on the menu would come only at a considerable cost. PROBEd cannot afford to lose the goodwill and honest participation of its teachers and directors in a protracted struggle over a reward scheme many of them feel — I heard it from a teacher, a monitor, and a bishop — is abusive (in the sense of being discriminating and inequitable — rich foreigners taking advantage of the desperate economic situation of Haitian teachers). To tie rewards to merit rather than status and loyalty is not as alien a concept in Haiti as it might appear after the frustrating *prime* controversy. But the merit MUST be symbolically recognized by a promotion if it is to have public legitimacy.

7. "Preprimary education programs established in private primary schools that qualify for this aid."

Target: No advance estimate given.

To date: 97 preprimary programs in operation.

Comment: The project paper is most careful and persuasive in stating the case for including a preprimary program in a project aimed at primary level schools; no other item receives as much discussion. Many of the *enfantine* and *préscolaire* classes in Haiti function as little more than feeding or day-care programs but some valid models are also available. PROBEd decided to experiment with variations of CARE's CINEC program before choosing one model following an evaluation. The project seems well on track.

8. "School feeding programs established in participating schools not already endowed with this resource."

Target: No advance estimates given.

To date: 75 schools with feeding programs.

Comment: The international evidence is overwhelming and confirmed by the Haitian experience — school feeding programs are a necessity. Why have only 40% of PROBEd schools been included in feeding programs at a time when U.S. Government food aid alone feeds more than one half of Haitian primary school students every day? Project documents provide only a partial answer by phrasing the problem as one of getting schools accepted by food distribution agencies. Indeed, some low-standard schools may not qualify just as many do not qualify for PROBEd participation. But some private sector schools clearly do not need to bother with feeding programs. Demand for their services and profits of the operation are sufficient without this added attraction.

A concerned observer's gut reaction would be to require all PROBEd schools to implement feeding programs since PROBEd by definition focuses on low-income populations. The administrative complication would certainly be compensated by the proven positive effects of school feeding programs.

The effectiveness of the school feeding programs deserves a detailed follow-up as part of the R&D activities of the project. Problems observed in the field include the following:

- a. Some schools have run out of food because it proved impossible to refuse food to children enrolled after the PROBEd enrollment rates had been set; some schools increased enrollment by up to 70% while the project agreed to finance no more than a 5% increase.
- b. Many schools reported great difficulties in collecting a small contribution from parents to pay for the food preparation costs not funded by the project such as personnel, charcoal, vegetables, meat and spices. Economically irrational since the contribution constitutes no more than a tiny fraction of the value of the meals, such opposition is understandable, when both CARE's national programs of free meals and the presence of numerous projects, including PROBEd, providing services without any financial contribution by beneficiaries are considered.
- c. Some schools have resorted to handing out bulgur wheat rations to parents rather than preparing meals at school, thus undermining the project's attempt to upgrade specifically the nutritional status of children enrolled in PROBEd schools.

9. "Income-generating activities developed in schools where surrounding community has taken necessary initiative."

Target: No advance estimate given.

To date: After initial attempts the Project Administrative Council decided to eliminate this activity from the current phase of the project, with the objective of freeing funds for institutional development activities.

Comment: Reports on this item are conflicting. According to some, a few income-generating small projects were started but the experience was disappointing. While parent committees responsible for this activity were formed in at least 117 schools (according to the SAPRs), the project also initiated a survey of such projects attempted throughout Haiti. Based on the results, this activity was abandoned. It has not been formally evaluated and reported on but the decision was certainly a sensible one. It is hard to estimate its impact on the community organization part of PROBEd but it cannot have been very significant. Grass roots community organization is neither a goal nor a strategy of this project. As long as service delivery is realized anyway, little more than perfunctory participation could have been expected.

As far as the potential economic benefit of small projects is concerned, the hopes of the project paper team can hardly be considered realistic. At best, the economic benefit from the small projects would have been negligible. At worst, the capital would just have disappeared due to theft or neglect. As an answer to the problem of recurrent costs in improved schools, this item never stood a chance.

It is worth noting the dilemma of the Project Administrative Council in this matter. Pushing institutional development ahead was both legitimate and ultimately very successful. The decision was reached in a collective and responsible way. Yet for some outsiders and participants, other aspects of this decision turned out to be at least as significant, namely, that the menu ("the promise") was being tampered with, and that powerful people in Port-au-Prince could make unilateral decisions. This evaluation team thinks that given the circumstances and the opportunity the PAC probably made the right decision. But comments made to the team as well as written in monitors' reports, show that in the eyes of some people a measure of trust has been lost. Whatever the grand opportunities of the future, the PAC would do well to stick to the letter of the performance contract.

trust has been lost. Whatever the grand opportunities of the future, the PAC would do well to stick to the letter of the performance contract.

10. "Technical Services Center functional and ready to undertake new activities in R&D."

Target: Center fully operational by Year 2.

To date: Center fully operational.

Comment: The TSC is the nerve center of PROBES. It has more personnel (20) than any one of the three sectors — who have 8.5, 14, and 14.5, respectively, in the independent, Catholic, and Protestant sectors. Some of this concentration of human resources pertains more to administrative charts than to everyday reality since some of the personnel on the TSC budget appear to be on "permanent loan" to the sectors. Nevertheless, the TSC does have more space, more functions, a larger administrative budget and more administrative punch than the sectors. What is most original in PROBES organization is that this high-powered unit has no executive power beyond its own limits. Does this make it inefficient? The *Bilan d'activités* (1988) suggests that the best measure of the efficient functioning of the TSC is the successful delivery of school services. However, the authority over these services, the school selection, the delivery schedules, the measurement of impact, the monitoring of the schools, etc., lies with the sectors. Employees responsible for these activities are sector employees.

How can such a system work? The answer to this question must be found in the institutional analysis chapter of this report. However, there can be little doubt that the system has worked quite well indeed. The delivery of school services has been a success. Most quantitative and qualitative targets have either been reached or are within reach, and where changes have been made, they were the result of reasonable decisions made collectively.

3.3 Estimation of Impact

Ideally a midterm evaluation should be able to provide some preliminary measurement of project impact; in practice this has almost never been possible. Time constraints in the evaluation process never allow any collection of quantitative data and few projects have ever been able to establish during their first years a baseline data collection that would satisfy minimum methodological requirements in the social sciences. PROBES is no different in this respect. More will be said about this in the next chapter.

This evaluation can do no more than to estimate project impact in very general terms and in a few selected areas. Various reasons can be given for this unfortunate state of affairs. First, since the project has always operated in the midst of political uncertainty and, occasionally, turmoil, the practical difficulties of carrying out baseline studies and tests have been very considerable. Second, a staffing problem in the evaluation section of the TSC, combined with the initial failure of a computerized system of processing orders and inventories, made the analysis of routine data for impact assessment almost impossible. Finally, the reliable quantitative measurement of impact must be prepared over several years. PROBES is still relatively young and experimental in this respect, and the evaluation section has only recently finalized instruments, completed training and adopted procedures which will facilitate impact measurement in the future.

Preliminary impact estimation is feasible in the context of this evaluation in the following areas: teacher revenues, school budgets, and teacher training. This excludes the most important output objectives such as student learning as well as what, in the final analysis, PROBES is all about — social and economic development. But it is already much better than nothing and we could not hope for much more at midterm. There is reason to believe that very shortly the project will in fact be able to measure its impact in various fields much more precisely (see the next chapter).

Teacher Revenues

Unweighted median salaries reported in the *Bilan* and presumably covering the 1987/88 year are \$44 or \$396 per year with a minimum of \$136 per year. The PROBEd performance grant of \$900 per teacher is not indexed, and it is stretched over three years. This practice departs from the original intentions and is still not fully understood since we have heard three different versions from three administrators. The performance grant amounts to a de facto salary increase of 75.8% for a teacher at the median level and 220.1% for those at the low end of the range. Whatever the income situation of the individual teacher — most teachers' household incomes exceed their salaries — it is evident that PROBEd has effected, for a limited period of time, enormous salary improvements. Taking the much lower average qualifications and salary levels into account, the effect of these grants has been just as considerable as the 1987 raises in the public sector. The long-term effects are, of course, hardly comparable since PROBEd schools typically have no pension plans and are not guaranteed any long-term support.

This is not the place to justify project activities but it is nonetheless important to place PROBEd's impact on teacher revenues in context. In the first place, the project's intent upon altering the behavior of underpaid teachers can hardly do without offering tangible economic benefits. As one comment on a preliminary version of this report has stated quite correctly, adopting PROBEd's procedures and assignments carries a significant opportunity cost for many teachers. Income from other economic activities may thus be lost and have to be replaced. One may draw this even further by pointing out that those "other economic activities" are often carried out in a much larger time frame than a three year salary supplement. To lose clients, access to land, business partners and the like must be compensated either by longer-term income possibilities at least comparable to those forfeited, or by spectacular short-term benefits such as the ones handed out by PROBEd.

School Budgets

Estimating PROBEd schools' total annual budgets is hardly feasible at this time; the project does not collect this kind of data. Nevertheless we can conclude that the impact of PROBEd support is very major, even for some of the better-off schools. This conclusion is based on the following observations:

- Despite significant shortcomings in the research reported in the *Bilan d'activités* (e.g., the contradictions of median salaries in table and text, p. 24; the unfortunate collapsing of categories on p. 23; the large number of missing data, etc.), we can get at least some ballpark figure on the recurrent costs of a model school (in the statistical sense of "mode"). Such a school might have 205 students, 7 teachers, 6 classrooms, and a monthly revenue from fees of \$160 (after discounting for 10% of fees never paid). According to table VIII the payroll would be \$320 while according to the text it would be \$140. Monthly upkeep of buildings and equipment might add another \$30 while director's salary increment and other costs might be around \$50.

These are necessarily rather crude approximations. The point is that the annual budget of such an average school is unlikely to exceed \$3,600 if the school is subsidized in one of the CEEC or FEPH networks, and is more likely on the order of \$2,500 (or less) in the case of a lay sector school.

Comparing to this the \$25 per student and year (\$5,125) PROBEd would spend on this school we realize the enormous impact of project participation.

- There cannot be many teachers in Haiti who have never been to a *recyclage* but in many cases these have had little to do with school budgets and have not been administratively, financially and pedagogically linked with the normal operation of the school. In PROBED, schools directors have the resources to make inservice teacher training part of the overall budget and the normal operation of the school. Moreover, the free monitoring and the *prime* make such training a coherent package of motivation, behavior and control, and all this under the ostensible authority of a director who normally would never have the means to train his teachers.

All this is to say that the PROBED impact on school budgets goes far beyond the purely financial aspects and extends to the planning which should be an integral part of any budgetary process. School budgets become something qualitatively different under the PROBED influence.

- Finally, PROBED participation also bestows a status upon schools which, in the case of entrepreneurial directors, can be transformed into hard cash. The reputation of being a "good" school, one recognized by powerful agencies and visited by foreigners, constitutes a valuable asset. This can then be converted into increased student numbers or fees — or both. An example of such conversion was observed during the evaluation and is described in the annex about the independent sector.

Teacher Training

Both casual observation and monitors' reports suggest that the level of professional expertise and the pedagogical practices of PROBED teachers are improving. For example, the following table comparing pretest and posttest results of the 1987 and 1988 training sessions shows an average improvement of success rates of 39.6% in 1987 and 23.7% in 1988. The decrease of 15.9% in the improvement should in itself be seen as an improvement. It is most likely due to improved testing and reporting procedures; the 1988 results appear much more credible than the 1987 results.

TABLE 1

Tests of Teachers: Unweighted Mean Success Rates in Pretests and Posttests at 1987 and 1988 Training Sessions by Discipline and Groups

1987	GROUP I			GROUP II			GROUP III		
	PRE	POST	DIFF	PRE	POST	DIFF	PRE	POST	DIFF
MATH	7.1	64.5	57.4	6.6	76.3	69.7	19.8	86.5	66.7
FRAN	21.3	69.1	47.8	54.0	88.3	34.3	93.6	95.4	1.8
CREO	27.1	63.3	36.2	30.7	56.4	25.8	34.6	62.6	28.0
PEDA	50.5	86.2	35.7	32.6	68.8	36.2	51.8	87.7	35.9
AVERAGE	26.5	70.8	44.3	31.0	72.5	41.5	50.0	83.1	33.1
1988	GROUP I			GROUP II			GROUP III		
	PRE	POST	DIFF	PRE	POST	DIFF	PRE	POST	DIFF
MATH	13.0	54.8	41.8	19.4	67.6	48.2	28.8	51.0	22.2
FRAN	46.7	62.8	16.1	69.4	84.7	15.3	63.4	81.7	18.3
CREO	41.8	46.4	4.6	54.1	61.8	7.7	71.9	77.1	5.2
PEDA	24.5	62.8	38.3	35.3	77.6	42.3	60.8	85.6	24.8
AVERAGE	31.5	56.7	25.2	44.6	72.9	28.4	56.2	73.9	17.6
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1987 AND 1988 MEAN SUCCESS RATES									
	TOTAL 1987			TOTAL 1988			DIFFERENCE		
	PRE	POST	DIFF	PRE	POST	DIFF	PRE	POST	DIFF
MATH	11.2	75.8	64.6	20.4	57.8	37.4	9.2	-18.0	-27.2
FRAN	56.3	64.3	28.0	59.8	76.4	16.6	3.5	-7.9	-11.4
CREO	30.8	60.8	30.0	55.9	61.8	5.8	25.1	1.0	-24.2
PEDA	45.0	80.9	35.9	40.2	75.3	35.1	-4.8	-5.6	-0.8
AVERAGE	35.8	75.4	39.6	44.1	67.8	23.7	8.3	-7.6	-15.9

NOTE: Numbers vary between years, groups, and tests. Results were included only when both pretest and posttest had been taken. 1988 averages differ from those in the 1987 report, presumably because the latter had been weighted.

The project has not yet reported how these improvements in teacher competence are translated into student results but some relevant data should become available soon. There can be little doubt that the impact of teacher training is positive and significant as such, unless it is cut short by other variables. There is, however, also a negative impact of some importance. Teachers with improved qualifications have better career prospects and several PROBED teachers have been able to find higher-paying jobs, sometimes even in the public school system. While the positive side of this effect should not be forgotten — PROBED has succeeded in supplying teachers of improved qualifications to Haitian education in general — the immediate impact on project implementation is rather negative. Losing the best teachers year after year would leave PROBED schools with a negative selection — those who cannot find better jobs. Besides, PROBED's mission is to help disadvantaged schools, not to supply teachers for schools already better off. The conclusion of this section, therefore, is that as time goes on and PROBED trains more teachers, a very major effort should be made to find a longer-term solution to the teacher salary problem. If this means continuing the *prime* as a salary supplement, then the focus of this effort would be an agency such as AID (via subsequent projects). If the solution is to upgrade teachers sufficiently to make them eligible for the MEN payroll, the focus should be the World Bank and its Education Sector Loans (or budget support grants). But more imaginative solutions might be called for, such as a controlled and more lucrative "occupational multiplicity" policy under which teachers would act as (paid) health officials, project monitors, and the like.

This report will not concern itself with the more general questions of project impact but future evaluations of a larger PROBED II operation might well have to do this. Some of the relevant points are discussed in the chapter on "crosscutting issues of this report."

3.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Model

This analysis will limit itself to the model of school service delivery as a whole. Weaknesses of particular parts and units are discussed in other sections of this report. The term "model" refers to the complex of assumptions, strategy, administrative structure, and inputs which make up school service delivery at PROBED and distinguish it from efforts made by other organizations. Reduced to its most compact expression, the PROBED model contains the following elements:

Assumptions: (1) Upgrading human resources by formal primary education will accelerate national economic development. (2) Channeling school services to private schools in rural and disadvantaged urban areas will improve the quality of education for an increasing number of children. (3) Church organizations are capable, efficient and willing instruments for converting donor resources into educational results. (4) The government will tolerate interference by national agencies who, with strong outside support, compete on its own turf.

Strategy: Announcing clear selection criteria, the project excludes the best and the worst of the schools, tying inefficient but deserving schools by contract to larger institutions and the PROBED organization. The contract guarantees that certain resources will be delivered in such a way as to effect improvements in pedagogy and learning, a process which is closely monitored and evaluated by PROBED with the help of technical assistance. The contract is reciprocal: PROBED will provide the resources and the schools will put them to their intended uses.

Administrative Structure: Simple but standardized administrative practices are put on paper, communicated during training sessions and reinforced through an unending flow of paper between schools and the central organization. Administrative responsibility and authority is rapidly bestowed upon national organizations and structured in an increasingly decentralized way.

Inputs: The inputs enumerated in the previous sections of this chapter are not completely standardized and allow the project to focus on particular needs as stated by school directors. Given an enormous curricular flexibility, pedagogical results will thus vary widely between the schools. PROBED expects better and more durable results from such a flexible definition of both inputs and expected outputs.

This complex of assumptions, strategy, administration and inputs makes up the PROBED model. It obviously defies a simple three-line summary description. The critical question is whether it is working. If successful delivery of school services is the test, the answer can only be affirmative. Let us organize the discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this model according to three criteria: coherence, efficiency, and replicability.

The package of services designed in the project paper and offered to school directors is coherent almost without a flaw. The only alien element in the package of upgrading human resources and improving the conditions of teaching and learning, is the "small projects" item which promptly fell by the wayside. Although part of a laudable community participation ideology and of equally laudable concerns about the long-term recurrent costs resulting from project participation, this item was probably doomed from the start. It suffered from totally unrealistic expectations concerning potential return on capital, the difficulties of protecting collective resources, and the dynamics of promoting strong and lasting community organization in Haiti. At least a dozen AID/Haiti reports written over the last few years by several social scientists could have warned the authors of the project paper that this was not the way to go. It is the strength of PROBED's generally flexible approach that program adjustment could be made collectively and with a minimum of undesirable consequences. As it stands now, the school services model is coherent even if for each individual school it must appear to be less than complete.

The model is also efficient by any development project's standard. Most services are delivered on time and put to good use. While it is true that there have been start-up difficulties both in the processing of orders and in the capacity of small, poor and inefficient schools to absorb the ideas and goods of a modern service distribution system, what is typical of the PROBED model is the relatively rapid identification and correction of problems at all levels. There are, of course, some school systems in Haiti which deliver services much more efficiently than PROBED, but those share with this project neither the social level and geographic dispersion of the clientele nor the low level of resources available for distribution. The PROBED model is efficient thanks to its socially appropriate design and the high level of competency and motivation of the individuals making up PROBED.

Is PROBED the answer to the tremendous problems faced by primary education in Haiti? Maybe, for a good part of it. If so, is the PROBED model of service delivery replicable? The answer can be no more than a most cautious yes. The strategy and administrative structure are certainly robust enough to allow transfer into different locations and social environments. However, an institution is only as efficient as key individuals want it to be. While there are capable and well motivated individuals operating in many areas of Haiti — especially in such centers of rural mobilization as Papaye, Plaisance, Jérémie, and Laborde — it is difficult to imagine them without the support of their respective institutions. These institutions in Haiti are almost invariably churches or the social-action branches of churches. A replication of PROBED would almost inevitably have to be done in the context of such church structures. A second PROBED of small size, national scope, and identical orientation would compete with PROBED for the same extremely limited human resources, organizational capacities and official tolerance. A replication of the existing project, while theoretically possible because the model is a good one, may well be neither feasible nor desirable.

There are no major weaknesses or design flaws apparent in the project's service delivery model. This is not to say that all resources flow smoothly or that there is no room for improving procedures for processing orders, keeping stock and monitoring beneficiary schools. No doubt the administrative analysis presented

elsewhere in this report will reveal several weak spots and recommend procedural changes. But the most significant finding is that services are indeed being delivered, that implementation is pretty much on schedule and that the staff of the TSC have been able to solve problems and adapt to new situations. A case in point is the computerized ordering system which was unsuccessfully tried in Year 2. For a few agonizing days there must have been a sense of impending disaster around the Behrman building. But, in fact, the staff proved capable of reverting to the old manual system of processing orders, and almost all schools received their orders on time. The project appears ready now to use computerized ordering procedures, and the learning experience has certainly been as fruitful as it has been memorable.

3.5 Comparison with Service Delivery in the Public Sector

If school service delivery was efficient in the public sector there would be no need for PROBEd. In fact, the public sector agency charged with much of the work PROBEd ends up doing in the private sector has never managed to become efficient. Its products have been broadly rejected (books), laughed about (Reform curriculum teachers), sabotaged by persons paid to put them to use (training sessions and Creole teaching), stolen (materials and salary supplements), and diverted to personal use (vehicles). Many of the beneficiary schools have simply been destroyed. This is not the place to evaluate the performance of IPN (see Chiappano, 1988; Locher et al., 1987). However, it might be worthwhile to reflect briefly about the contrast between school service delivery in the public sector and in the PROBEd structure.

The basis for service delivery in PROBEd is a contract recently renamed into *accord de réciprocité*. School directors know what to expect and what they have to deliver in exchange. It is true that this relationship between donor and recipient has not always been an easy one. There have been mix-ups in orders and delivery, some changes in the contract and in budgets imposed by the Project Administrative Council which have not been universally well received, and monitoring has not always been as regular and intense as originally hoped for. But basically the contractual approach has proven a valid one, and the contract has been respected by all partners. PROBEd is small and the *responsables* of beneficiary schools can communicate with the staff and get action if needed.

In the public sector, schools also have a right to expect services, but delivery is irregular and does not appear to bind the recipient to any particular performance. While it is true that most of the National Schools are incomparably much better funded and equipped, it is also true that their number is small, access is de facto very limited and a cost/benefit analysis turns out highly critical (IEES, 1987, March, vol. 1).

The relationship between donor and recipient in most PROBEd schools is governed, if not completely dominated, by the relationships, loyalties and commitments of their respective religious organizations. These schools profit from a capital of goodwill and motivation money simply cannot buy. While it is true that monitor reports also occasionally reveal evidence of "assisted beneficiary" mentality contrary to project intentions there is much more evidence of teachers and directors going the extra distance to ensure that PROBEd's services can actually do some good. As stated above, there is no reason why newly accessible resources would ever be put to good use. PROBEd's personnel and beneficiaries work within a timeless agenda and often a larger calling, and it is this social and mental complex, not organizational charts, delivery schedules and money, which explains why things work. The contrast with the public sector is very marked indeed.

Finally, there is an attempt in PROBEd to assure community involvement in the affairs of the school. Together with the institutional and geographic decentralization, this should help to make schools less vulnerable to fluctuations in donor support, political change in Port-au-Prince and the operation of parasites of all kinds. Where communities have a say, there is little place in the long-run for sinecures, neglect of duty

and misappropriation of resources. There is still a long way to go in this respect but, at least PROBES is by design and conviction moving in the right direction. In the public sector everything is hierarchical and centralized and, therefore, equally vulnerable.

There are also similarities in service delivery in the two sectors. In some respects the problems are the same – thousands of adults and tens of thousands of children have to be organized, nurtured, helped along. Goods have to be delivered in thousands of different combinations and quantities. Problems of low status and low pay and the necessity to earn extra income cut into the capacity and willingness of teachers to "deliver the goods." School materials are "alien" in the sense that few children are exposed to much written material outside of school. And at all levels of society there are agents waiting to prey on those who control resources without having corresponding levels of power. Facing these conditions, Haitian educators have tried and failed in many attempts to make schools better. What the cumulative experience teaches us is that a flexible, decentralized approach has better chances of succeeding than a centralized, hierarchical one; and that bureaucratic mechanisms to sanction and control behavior are expensive and inefficient compared to the motivation and control produced in religious communities. (This analysis might well be put to a test when reliable performance results from the independent sector are available.)

4. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

4.1 Goals and Purposes

Research in the context of PROBEd is applied research or, more specifically, "operations research." Its orientation is practical and its focus is ultimately identical with that of the project. As the project paper states: "Research and development concerning new learning systems and funding strategies to overcome these constraints (of insufficient outside funds) and make more efficient use of available local resources is needed if Haitian primary education is to fulfill its promise" (p. 52). In the first place, the paper proposes to carry out inventories of both "experiments and trials already conducted in the field in Haiti by educators from both the public and the private sectors" and of "strategies tried out in other Third World countries" using new educational technologies. Besides these inventories, formative evaluation activities are proposed – a type of research which uses the eye-opening qualities of empirical research to improve the motivation and efficiency of project staff involved in it.

More specifically, research is to focus on (1) the use of educational radio and the like, (2) text production systems, (3) preprimary programs, and (4) cost recovery strategies. Nowhere else than in the R&D section is the term "low-cost" used so constantly and insistently. The originators of the project were apparently aware of the wasteful practices and high recurrent costs of some high-tech attempts to circumnavigate what are the real obstacles to educational efficiency. But it does surprise the reader to find such insistent emphasis on "low cost" as a justification for having an R&D component in a project.

PROBEd's modest R&D schedule is designed to lead to a "major effort aimed at developing an instructional technology to make Haitian primary education more cost-effective." This effort is to be carried out, starting in Years 3 and 4 of the project, in collaboration with other private sector institutions and the Ministry, using outside funding. Close to 19% of the project's total budget is to be spent on R&D.

4.2 Implementation Levels

It is fair to say that R&D so far has received much less attention than either school support or private sector organization. The effort involved in getting the institutional and service components going, despite frequently disruptive political events, must have left little energy for an R&D component which appeared less critical. For example, it took well over a year to correct a staffing problem (the TSC R&D person), a delay which would hardly have been tolerated in school services if the results had been as minimal as they were in R&D up to that time. Besides, the Ministry was to play a major role in R&D in a double capacity: as provider of personnel and funds as well as full-fledged collaborator in the research enterprise. Some might consider this aspect of the R&D component an expression of naïveté, but a careful reading of the Project Paper allows different interpretations. Whatever the original intentions, public sector collaboration in R&D turned out to be an opportunity – which was missed – rather than a design flaw. The de-obligation of funds targeted at the MEN following the events of November 1987 has done no immediate damage to the two major components of the project. It might even have been a godsend.

The following is a brief review of R&D targets and current implementation levels.

1. "Operational data base on private schools and their teachers developed."

Target: Operational data collection system in place.

To date: Information base in place.

Comment: The project keeps good files and has amassed a considerable amount of information on beneficiary schools. Much of it is collected by means of a number of Creole questionnaires which have been refined over the years. Monitors' comments provide important detail for qualitative analysis of particular issues, e.g., the discussions surrounding the *prime*.

However, there is still some way to go. For example, the itemized payments per school, cohort and year have not yet been entered into the data base, not even for the second cohort. Such a simple question as how many schools have been given furniture so far — and what type and quantity of furniture — cannot be answered quickly and efficiently. It is thus impossible, at this point, to weigh the impact of specific items and expenditures upon performance outcomes. Essential data appear to be missing. The project does not seem to know which of the schools are licensed by the Ministry, a piece of information which, according to Fass's recent book (1988: 251), is absolutely critical in explaining the attractiveness of some schools. Other data are incomplete (e.g., we can find out how many benches a school has received from the project but we do not know what proportion of the children are seated comfortably).

Besides the school services data, there is a much larger data base currently being readied for the research/evaluation section. There are data on school and teacher characteristics, administrative procedures and quality of education indicators from the first year on, and student performance data from the second year on. Some of this data is currently in the process of being analyzed.

To summarize, while a data base is operational and useful in the school services component it cannot, at this time, provide many of the answers which are needed to make sensible corrections to project strategies and to achieve some of the cost savings which the project's authors were so concerned with. And while a larger and better data base has been assembled for evaluation and R&D purposes, it has not yet been put to much good use for either understanding project operations or measuring project success. No analysis so far appears to have made simultaneous use of both data sources.

2. "Evaluation of existing instructional and organizational innovations in private primary schools completed, including assessment of feasibility of preprimary education."

Target: Implementation plan and data collection instruments completed and tested.
Evaluation continued.

To date: Plans and instruments in place; evaluation in progress.

Comment: The project attempts to make directors and teachers into more informed participants in educational innovation. Among other things we have found them to read reviews such as *Edikate/ l'educateur* and the project's own *Timoun lakay*. A proposal for a new *Bulletin pedagogique* is currently under review. Training sessions and regular contact with monitors will, in the long-run, have similar effects.

To this evaluator, the evaluation of the PEP component is clearly the best-conceived and most promising of all of PROBEd's evaluation activities. The consultant looking at the methodological side of the experiment has given excellent advice and the monitoring of the PEP schools is done so carefully that a wealth of rich data will allow informed judgments even in the event of possible statistical insignificance. The "assessment of feasibility of preprimary education" will thus be an informed one.

It is to be hoped that the monitoring and evaluation at other levels of schooling will soon be carried out in an equally competent and useful fashion. The problems of incomplete data collection and impractical data storage can be solved soon. However, two basic problems will remain for the time being. First, there is the inadequacy of the baseline data collection which includes no data on teacher competence, student performance and the like at the before stage to be compared to the same variables after project influence. Second, there is the virtual absence of control groups (the good hearts of the PAC wrecked the one for

PEP, and PROBES only got a small control group documented for the small fourth cohort of schools). The progress effected by project activities during the first two years will thus hardly be measured against any clear standard outside of the project's influence. (In all fairness one has to admit that projects rarely fulfill these requirements of "clean" statistical designs.) For subsequent years the summative evaluation will be easier; internal validity of the data should not be a problem. From Year Four on, external validity will be improved as well, and the results should lend themselves to interpretation without any ambiguity.

Another positive sign in R&D is the recent *Rapport d'évaluation* of the Summer 1988 training session (PROBED, 1989). This report is so complete and the applied research portions are so well done that one gets the feeling that after the neglect and mishaps of the first two years the project is on the way to building up the R&D capacity hoped for at the beginning.

Whether the project has really evaluated in any depth the most significant "existing instructional and organizational innovations in (Haitian) primary schools" is hard to say. Several staff appear knowledgeable about some experiments and if the Reform (implemented by the MEN and IPN) can still be called an experiment, PROBES is well served in having a former head of evaluation at IPN on its current staff. But there is no record of a systematic, comparative study having been carried out, no written report of such a study and apparently not even a burning interest in carrying out such a study. Many organizations have experimented, over the past three decades, with textbooks, teacher training, furniture, school renovation and the like, but PROBES so far has no way of systematically assessing the relative costs, merits, determinants and pedagogical benefits of these efforts in various Haitian contexts. One might well argue that such a study should really be carried out by some other agency or specialized research team. It could have made an interesting chapter in the Education Sector Study. Be this as it may, PROBES would profit from a detailed analysis of what became of other attempts to improve the quality of schooling in Haiti.

3. "Selected existing innovations disseminated to all participating schools."

Target: Curricula specialist to prepare implementation plan.

To date: Implementation plan being prepared by curricula specialist.

Comment: PROBES has the necessary personnel in place to carry out and monitor curricular innovations. Besides, several members of the Administrative Council and the staff have been personally involved in curricular innovation over many years. Another positive sign is that the project did not hand over the extremely sensitive curriculum questions to some doctrinaire UNESCO experts. So far in Haiti the advice given by such specialists has regularly failed the tests of political feasibility and/or social acceptability. PROBES's approach to allow curricular flexibility, especially in the beginning, is a sound one.

The "curricular chaos" deplored by some project reports was no doubt a condition *sine qua non* of successful organization of the private sector. Much admirable work had been done by several member churches over many years, and to move too quickly towards a single curriculum or a small set of coherent plans might have scared away some member churches and marginalized PROBES from the outset. Nevertheless, one gets the impression from visiting schools and from looking at PROBES's data base that the project would do well to strengthen the efforts to put more coherence into the curriculum in beneficiary schools. As a first step a much more complete information system would allow the project to know which manuals are being used under what conditions. Some books may cover less material but be more appropriate under conditions of extremely large class sizes. Some books may safely be used at various age levels while others aim at a narrow range of ages and psychological maturity. The project is on track in limiting itself to the distribution of only "selected" innovations but it has yet to complete procedures which allow

it to analyze in some depth how effective such innovations have been under given, if not controlled, conditions.

4. "Evaluation of feasibility and adaptability of radio education and programmed teaching/learning to Haitian private primary schools completed and project proposal prepared."

Target: Review and select for adaptation possible instructional materials for use in project schools.

To date: No written record of such investigation available.
(Scheduled by Project Paper for Year 4.)

Comment: Radio education is the low-budget variety of distance teaching and is as such theoretically attractive to both donors and implementing agencies. However, the start-up costs are usually very high and it cannot be taken for granted that such programs will be more cost-effective in a country short of studios, transmitters, and trained personnel. IPN's *radio éducative* has been a costly flop despite the relatively high quality of some of its broadcasts. PROBES appears to be only at the beginning of the necessary evaluation and experimentation which would, if successful, justify a major effort. There appears to be little specific expertise among the project staff but some of the participating church organizations have broadcast educational programs, in a wider sense, for several years.

A different form of distance teaching might fare better at PROBES. The curriculum section is presently elaborating a distance teaching project using modular units to be distributed by the monitors. So far it is aimed at only one group of teachers — those whose extremely low qualifications practically preclude their successful participation in the regular summer training sessions. The outcome of this effort remains to be seen but it could conceivably be extended to all teachers if appropriate modules could be prepared. The problem of addressing such special attention at only some teachers in a given school should not be underestimated, but it can be overcome.

4.3 Strengthening Research and Development

4.3.1 Clarifying Research Objectives

School service delivery at PROBES is already quite well organized and getting better during the current year. It lends itself to operations research for two reasons. First, there is the relative ease of documentation. School directors are willing collaborators, the monitoring network is in place, and the data base of the TSC is useful, although incomplete, given staff training levels; it is also getting better and more user-friendly. Second, the administrative payoff and training effect of operations research are almost immediate. However, research results are only as good as the questions asked. Unless limited and clear research objectives are specified, even a great mass of expensive data will remain quite useless. There is ample room for improvement at PROBES in this respect; the payoff for asking the right questions will be significant.

PROBES has recently put a considerable effort into the elaboration of a *Plan global d'évaluation* (1989, 15 March) which is an excellent inventory of just about all the variables and methodological questions one may want to consider. It has been followed by a critical review (Madhère, 1989), again a document written with care and precision. However, neither of these two papers can be a substitute for a missing research focus. The evaluation plan is too vast and ambitious, and the variable lists derived from it are taxing the project staff as much as they are satisfying the expert consultants. It appears to this evaluator that this is not the time for encyclopedic efforts but for concentration on a few topics of immediate relevance to project implementation. This is not a plea for superficial research but for limitation and concentration.

Consider the following hypotheses as examples of opportunities for operations research. Results of such research can later be translated into "pedagogical benefits at lower cost." Some of them can be tested with little extra effort by using existing data; others may require an extra effort at both the data collection and analysis stages. It goes without saying that appropriate control variables should be introduced in every one of the tests proposed here. It is equally evident that all of the following 11 hypotheses should immediately be discarded if a more convincing way is found to focus and push ahead with research.

Examples concerning school and curriculum:

Hypothesis 1: "The availability of (free) books is the single most important determinant of cognitive results."

Op. res. test: Compare results by schools, classes and individuals according to textbook availability.

Comment: While setting up this test, prepare a panel study (longitudinal test) and compare results with international evidence.

Hypothesis 2: "Initial alphabetization in Creole will lead to better mastery of French by the end of the primary school cycle."

Op. res. test: Document the curricular history of a sample of students and classes. Compare results of end-of-cycle tests, using at least three control variables known to affect cognitive outcomes: rural/urban milieu, school category (especially *congréganiste*/others) and public/private sector.

Comment: IPN may have comparative material available. The 1987 World Bank study allows only a partial comparison since the documentation of control variables was too limited. International evidence on vernacular alphabetization is available.

Hypothesis 3: "Independently of class sizes, school size affects learning positively."

Op. res. test: Compare student achievement in standard tests, having documented both class and school characteristics.

Comment: This test should only be carried out with a large sample, involving at least 100 schools. It is hardly worth the cost in itself but should be coordinated with other system-wide tests.

Hypothesis 4: "Student performance in rural schools will always be lower than in urban schools."

Op. res. test: Code schools according to rurality of location and clientele. Use this variable in large-scale end-of-cycle test.

Comment: All IPN tests up to 1986 as well as the 1987 study have shown this hypothesis to be true. Why it is true is not well understood. This test should be large-scale and include several other variables influencing cognitive results.

Examples concerning class characteristics:

Hypothesis 5: "Classroom density beyond a certain level will cancel out the positive effects of PROBED's innovations."

Op. res. test: Document classroom density as well as all the PROBED innovations for those classes routinely subjected to cognitive tests. Sample size will probably allow only one-by-one testing of the variables.

- Comment:** Results may directly lead to policy guidelines on classroom size and density.
- Hypothesis 6:** "Class size is an independent determinant of student performance."
- Op. res. test:** Document class size both during the testing and during the rest of the school year.
- Comment:** Intuition tells us that teacher skill may well cancel disadvantages related to large class size.
- Hypothesis 7:** "Age homogeneity of a class has a positive effect on learning."
- Op. res. test:** Use range or standard deviation of the age variable; compare with cognitive results.
- Comment:** The effect of age homogeneity will frequently be confounded by other variables because a homogeneous class will often be found in an *école congréganiste* or a school using the Reform curriculum. It may be that the test is not feasible within the context of PROBES. But if feasible, it could lead to immediate consequences on admissions policy.
- Hypothesis 8:** "Time spent learning is a more important predictor of cognitive results than time spent in school."
- Op. res. test:** Closely observe a sample of classes over a period of several weeks. Measure both time in school and the total of interruptions for breaks of all kinds. Compare the results of before and after tests.
- Comment:** This observation and testing could be carried out as part of the professional training of teachers. Student teachers or other observers could keep track and be involved in the testing. Such involvement may have an effect upon their own training and make them more effective teachers.
- Examples concerning teacher characteristics:**
- Hypothesis 9:** "Years of teaching experience is a more important determinant of student performance than teacher's level of knowledge."
- Op. res. test:** Compare teacher characteristics with student performance.
- Comment:** Traditionally there is a great deal of teacher resistance against any direct comparison of the knowledge and performance of individual teachers and their classes. Such research needs to be very well prepared and treated confidentially.
- Hypothesis 10:** "Teachers' level of training is a stronger predictor of student performance than their credentials and certification."
- Op. res. test:** Same as in the previous hypothesis.
- Comment:** Same problem of tact and confidentiality as in the previous hypothesis.
- Hypothesis 11:** "Retraining teachers in *stages* is an effective way of upgrading their professional competence and classroom results."
- Op. res. test:** Document for all teachers the number of days of *stages* they have attended at PROBES and elsewhere. Use performance at summer training pretests as well as monitor's evaluation of observed in-class performance as dependent variables.

Comment: Using years of formal training and/or degrees obtained and years of experience as control variables, this test should lead to programmatic conclusions concerning the retraining sessions.

Ideally PROBED should have a much stronger research section. Several of the research tasks enumerated in the project paper have hardly been addressed and the inventories of pedagogical innovation alone will require several person-months if they are to be good enough to help project planning. The Project Paper remains vague on specifics but very persuasive on the general need for research. As a matter of fact, some observers consider the whole of PROBED an experiment, a piece of research in itself. The project would do well to elaborate now a much more specific research agenda for the short- and medium-terms, to explore which research topics are best handled in collaboration with other projects and institutions, to establish a much more complete data bank and to make sure that research remains an integral part of all project activities.

4.3.2 Project-Specific Rationale

Testing such hypotheses as the ones sketched out above is important for any project operating in the field of Haitian primary education. It will have payoffs anywhere. But there are specific characteristics which distinguish PROBED from other projects and it will be important to subject these elements to systematic tests as well. For example, the criteria of admission (high vs. low scores on the admissions test), the church affiliation (lay sector vs. church affiliation), the service flexibility (complete vs. partial equipment), the voluntary character of school feeding programs (available vs. not available), etc., should all have measurable outcomes.

PROBED has had very good results with the preparation and implementation of the formative evaluation culminating in the *Bilan d'activités* for the first two years. There could be such an event every six or twelve months. Since much information is accumulating, especially in the school services and PEP divisions, the stage is all set for the collective analysis and discussion which carries much weight in sustaining a high level of motivation among the staff. Now that the first products have come out it will also be possible to assure a much more rapid feedback to all persons involved. What has just happened with the *Avril 1989* report, published in June and concerning the training and tests held a year earlier should not be repeated.

4.3.3 Research Strategy

This is a propitious moment for strengthening R&D at PROBED. The three sections most directly involved (evaluation, curriculum and PEP) are all headed by individuals of exceptional competence. The organization of routine data collection and input at the school services section is currently being upgraded. The monitors have been on the job long enough to be familiar with data collection techniques in schools. Finally, research activities at the MEN are now producing at least some results of direct relevance to PROBED. A research strategy, given current budgetary constraints, might contain the following elements:

1. Formulate research questions relevant to reaching project objectives and assessing progress toward reaching the major project goals. Using existing data from the PEP, school services and evaluation sections, constitute two integrated data bases – one on classes and one on individual students. Answer the research questions in order of priority and analyze the policy implications suggested by the results.
2. Amplify routine data collection to include more information on schools (license by the MEN, distance from competing schools, fee structure), classes (Reform curriculum, teacher characteristics, use of supporting materials, availability of books, size, density and seating arrangements, noise and lighting conditions, general appropriateness of physical environment), and a sample of students

(school career, ownership and use of manuals). The latter is the most difficult and costly type of data and may be left to a special research effort slated for outside funding.

3. **Coordinate analytical work** on project data with what is underway elsewhere. This involves **standardizing concepts** (e.g., the *Bilan* (1988: 23) should supply the *taux d'encadrement*, not a recoded "ratio," to make comparison with other Haitian data possible) and **procedures** (e.g., why can't PROBEd use the same school ID's and geographic codes as the MEN?). It also involves making the most of possible **matching** of data sets (e.g., with the *1988 Enquête exhaustive* at the MEN) and of **comparison** of evaluation results (e.g., at IPN). Wherever possible, evaluation and testing instruments should be identical in whole or in part with those used in the major research teams such as IPN, in order to facilitate comparative assessments of the impact of different inputs, curricula, and other variables.
4. **Increase the value of quantitative data collection** by making the most of existing **qualitative data**. The bulk of monitors' reports is never coded and hardly taken into consideration for other than administrative purposes. This qualitative data is invaluable for understanding the quantitative trends found in the numbers. This may be the point to correct a misunderstanding I encountered on several occasions. Qualitative data is gathered slowly by perceptive, trained observers in a non-standardized fashion. It is not what urban interviewers put into forms for IHSI.

Various other elements could be added to this strategy. However, they should neither add much to the research budget nor distract from the operational focus of the research. Anything more expensive and/or more academic should be funded separately.

Let me summarize once more what this chapter is all about. I have found that PROBEd's research intentions and research potential have so far not been fully developed. There is great potential, especially in TA resources, as has become evident once more in the well-reasoned comments received on the draft version of this report. But the volume, depth and usefulness for policy purposes of research at PROBEd has so far not been impressive. Much data is being collected in many different forms. But a surprising proportion of this data has been neither coded, nor keypunched, nor analyzed — nor even read and verified in some cases, I am told.

There was as much reason for concern about research during PROBEd's first three years as there is now reason to be satisfied that things are taking shape. The project was in danger of losing (1) the stimulating effect which research involvement can have on project implementors, (2) the chance to refine research focus and instruments, (3) most of the training effect for local staff, and (4) any relevance for in-course corrections of project methodology. I am assured the danger has now passed at least for some of these four points. And I am convinced the material is already there for several stimulating reports and discussions.

5. FINANCIAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

5.1 Scope and Limitations

This component of the evaluation took place in Port-au-Prince and focuses solely on financial, administrative, and program management of the PROBLED office. All staff interviewed were extremely cooperative and willing to share thoughts about the past and the future. Requests for documents were answered promptly.

There are four factors that limit the scope and depth of this component:

1. The Project Paper has no specific, explicit management objectives against which to measure performance, though some are implied in the institutional development area and/or appear in various work plans developed during implementation. Therefore, the standards used in this evaluation are generally accepted management principles, as well as AID regulations and administrative requirements.
2. Since the PROBLED office does not have information about the overall FSU contract, such as the contract document itself, questions of overall FSU prime contractor performance (e.g., reporting, accounting system, documentation of rationale for budget reallocation) could not be answered.
3. The short time frame did not permit visits to FEPH and CEEC headquarters. Thus, information gained about their independent (non-PROBLED) financial, administrative, and program management capabilities is anecdotal only.
4. The current TSC Director is quite new to the organization and therefore unable to provide historical data. While quick to locate requested documents and offer suggestions as to others that might be reviewed, he could not be expected to bring all important records of the past to the consultant's attention. For these reasons, descriptions of past management policies and practices may be incomplete.

5.2 Management at PROBLED

This project involves creating entirely new structures, initiating new activities, and linking the new structures within a new project. Starting from the ground up has both advantages and disadvantages. These are generally opposite sides of the same coin.

For example, one advantage is that there is no history of past organizational structure or practices that require change; thus, no strategies to minimize ever-present resistance to change are needed. The related disadvantage is that there is nothing on which to build; all structures, systems, and procedures must be established from scratch.

Another advantage is that an entirely new structure assembles a new staff untainted by prior "office politics." The related disadvantage is that it takes time for these staff to become comfortable with one another and develop the capacity to work together. This challenge is compounded here by staff affiliations with three separate and independent organizations (FEPH, CEEC, and FSU) with no prior institutional relationships.

The third advantage is that the creation of new organizations allows the development of fresh structures and systems that respond directly to newly established organizational goals. In this project, the simultaneous development of the two new organizations, FEPH and CEEC, further allows for sharing of experiences and the development of joint solutions to common problems. The disadvantage is that demands for program development and for organization/management development compete for staff time, and the former normally wins out. This is especially true in service-oriented NGOs often staffed by technical ex-

perts whose only management training has been on-the-job. Thus, the attention paid to management issues is often insufficient.

PROBED has succeeded in maximizing the advantages and minimizing the disadvantages. This project and its participating organizations have elected two kinds of management structures and styles, neither of which is traditional. First, at the top managerial level, there is a nonhierarchical, "loose" structure that relies on consensus-oriented management. In fact, there is no organization chart, and it is not possible to draw one in a conventional sense. The one suggested in the Project Paper was never implemented, nor was the one shown in the PROBED personnel manual. All the participants agree that the project is managed at the top level jointly by the sector directors and the TSC director, and that policy is established by the Project Advisory Committee, which also includes USAID. Second, at the technical levels, the style is "matrix management," where teams representing the various organizations work together on the unit's technical tasks. Although the TSC member is generally regarded as the team leader, the team members technically report to the senior sector manager and, in the two religious sectors, are members of the FEPH and CEEC staffs.

From a theoretical standpoint, this is probably one of the weakest and most risky approaches to a complex project like PROBED, yet it has been extremely successful. This is the result of unusual staff commitment, a shared capacity for understanding and compromise, and a rarely-found degree of patience among all the organizations involved, including USAID and FSU. Without these assets, PROBED would have been unable to function and meet its programmatic objectives.

The potential risks and weaknesses lie in the following:

- Lines of authority and accountability are unclear (except vertically within the sectors and between top management and the PAC).
- There is no single management authority resident in the organization.
- There is no generally accepted mechanism for decisionmaking in the event the consensus process fails.
- Management is a very time-consuming process, since key staff are involved in discussing many issues that, in other settings, are within the purview of a single director or delegated to a technical manager.

These risks and weaknesses have apparently had no adverse effects on PROBED. One can only speculate as to the reasons, but the following are likely. First, no one has felt a need for clear lines of management authority and responsibility or for a single point of senior management. In fact, it is unlikely that they would have been accepted by FEPH and CEEC. Second, the consensus process has always worked. Third, although participants recognize that time spent on joint resolution of management and policy questions reduces the time available for technical and program issues, they have wanted to be part of these decisions and would not have willingly ceded the necessary authority.

Cumbersome as it may be, the combination of consensus-oriented and matrix management styles has worked very well in PROBED. Indeed, given the uniqueness of the project design, it is unlikely that any other approach would have worked at all. "Management" should exist only to support programs, not simply for its own sake. In this case, the management approach selected by PROBED participants has contributed to, not detracted from, achievement of programmatic objectives. In addition, despite some early problems with procedures and timeliness common to virtually all projects, the approach enabled PROBED to meet AID's administrative requirements.

The establishment of FONHEP, under a direct grantee relationship with USAID, the consequent realignment of roles, responsibilities, and relationships, and the entry of three new key players (the FON-

HEP Executive Director, the new TSC Director, and the new USAID Project Officer) calls for an altered style in the future. The draft organigram for FONHEP correctly reflects a more hierarchical arrangement, with the Sector Directors reporting to the FONHEP Executive Director (see annex 1). However, it still begs the question of the hierarchical and functional/authoritative relationships between FONHEP and FSU, and the new agreement will require careful and detailed definition of tasks and responsibilities for the two organizations. As indicated by Simon Fass in his November 1, 1988, proposed strategy (pg. 9), this is no easy task given FSU's responsibilities to meet its own contractual obligations when its ability to do so requires FONHEP's cooperation in carrying out the required activities.

Recommendation: Negotiations to specify in detail the roles and responsibilities of FONHEP and FSU should continue, resulting in a document specifying exact chains of command regarding key functions, such as deciding how money should be spent, authorizing/approving expenditures, accounting for expenditures, assigning and supervising technical staff, and organizing and implementing activities.

Recommendation: Agreements reached should be illustrated on a hierarchical project organigram. If a single organigram cannot accurately show all relationships, then a series could be developed (e.g., one showing staff supervision and reporting responsibilities, another showing financial responsibilities, etc.). However, a single comprehensive chart is preferable.

5.3 Definition of Management Structure

This question can be posed in two ways: (1) Is the structure well-defined in the minds of those who use it (staff and advisors)?; and (2) Is it immediately clear and well-defined to an outsider (a new staff member or consultant or an external analyst)? As indicated above, the answer to the first question is yes. Those involved in PROBED know how its management works and accept the organizational style. The answer to the second is no, as explained below.

By definition, a well-defined management structure has the following characteristics:

- There are clear, vertical lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability.
- The structure and its associated systems and procedures facilitate work.
- The structure places responsibility and authority for all tasks at the right level and in the right place.
- There is no redundancy, and no tasks are left undone.
- The structure promotes efficiency.
- The structure is appropriate to prevailing cultural and other organizational norms.
- The structure takes advantage of the talents of staff, and each staff member holds a position appropriate to his or her qualifications.

Most well-functioning projects and organizations demonstrate these characteristics.

The unusual structure of PROBED departs from these norms in several ways:

- As indicated in 1.2, top management is tripartite and nonhierarchical, and lines of authority and responsibility at this level are not clear. In pragmatic terms, there are no such lines. At technical levels, the "matrix" system also lacks clear lines, with sector participants reporting organizationally to the sectoral manager but working in most cases under the technical direction of the TSC team leader. Again it must be pointed out that although this approach is potentially weak, it works at PROBED.

The same can be said with regard to accountability. It is vertical only within the sectors and within TSC/FSU. Moreover, the accountability within the sectors relates more to the independence of the

sectoral organizations than to actual operations. For example, while a sectoral technical staff member works on a daily basis with the TSC Team Leader and other sectoral colleagues, his or her performance is evaluated formally by the Sector Director. Nevertheless, the system works at PROBED.

- The structure and its associated systems and procedures do facilitate work, as indicated by the project's achievements. However, work might be facilitated more efficiently (see below) by a different approach.
- Given the general absence of vertical lines, it is hard to judge whether authority and responsibility are well located since it is often unclear exactly where they reside. However, from a functional perspective, some task realignment might make organizational sense. For example, School Administration staff have a separate accounting system for detailed tracking of school supplies expenditures and spend a lot of time maintaining it. Transfer of some of the basic accounting functions to the accounting unit might make better use of overall staff time.
- With regard to redundancy, there may be some because, as indicated above, so many people are involved in decisionmaking. One strategy to limit this potential is to delegate responsibility downward for drafting a decision, and then to review this decision efficiently at a higher level. As for tasks left undone, the structure does account for all activities. However, too little attention has been paid in the past to codification of basic procedures. This is now being remedied by the TSC Director.

It should be noted that, like most organizations of this type, PROBED's staffing is thin. Combined with the lack of codification in some areas, this means that the organization is adversely affected by staff turnover. To minimize this effect, increased attention should be paid to in-house training (perhaps 4-6 hours per month), first within the units and then across units. This will promote the institutional memory required for smooth continuation of operations in the event of turnover.

- The current structure does not promote efficiency, although it must be recognized that the project has exceeded its programmatic objectives in many respects. Greater efficiency can be gained from gradually delegating downward, developing clearer scopes of work for each staff member, and clarifying roles and responsibilities of each organization. Other strategies include reviewing and possibly realigning functional tasks, as suggested in the school administration accounting example presented above.
- The current structure is apparently appropriate to the norms of the local participants and has met the initial organizational interests of the sectors. Under FONHEP, these interests will be realigned, and structural operations must be realigned accordingly.
- The talents and appropriateness of each staff member could not be assessed during this brief evaluation, and documents available in the personnel files are incomplete. It does appear, however, that there are more management assets within the organization than are currently being used. One example is the Administrative Assistant, who has an excellent background in general office management and could carry out more responsibility for administrative operations. The new TSC Director is aware of this potential and plans to make use of it. Another is the TSC warehouse/logistics supervisor, who has designed materials management systems from scratch and has innovative ideas about how to streamline operations and increase accountability in the future.

5.4 Decisionmaking Process

The decisionmaking process, a consensus-oriented approach, is defined and viable in the minds of those who use it. Nobody is excluded from decisions that concern him or her. However, the consensus approach often means that some people are involved in discussing issues that do not require their attention (e.g., a sector director participating in determining how best to use the driver pool efficiently), call for expertise they do not have (e.g., technical staff involved in defining financial documentation requirements), or

do not take maximum advantage of their expertise (e.g., involving technical experts in general administrative decisions instead of channeling their efforts towards technical questions). Most important, it consumes a tremendous amount of time. While a certain amount of work must be done "by committee" in a complex project like PROBED, other decisions – or at least the development of options for consideration – can be delegated downward or horizontally to one member of the senior management team. For example, the positions and ideas of the three senior managers on a given issue could be presented in a group meeting, as they are now. Then one of the managers could be charged with drafting a solution for presentation first to the management group and then to the advisory group. In addition to saving time, this would enhance the analytic and negotiation skills of participating staff.

Recommendation: A gradual transition from the consensus orientation to a more vertical structure is desirable and represents a more viable option for the future. It should be feasible now as a result of the trust developed between the various partners in the past three years.

5.5 Documentation and Use of Management Systems and Procedures

The documentation of management procedures prior to the arrival of the new TSC Director was incomplete. The new Director is currently revising and expanding existing documents, and has submitted them to sector representatives on the PAC for review. The drafts show great improvement. The new procedures manual covers personnel policies and procedures, petty cash, vehicle use, procurement, document management, filing systems, security and key policies, equipment inventory and repair procedures, office supply inventory, stocking, and distribution, work planning and monitoring, travel and per diem regulations, and general accounting procedures. A detailed accounting/financial manual will also be developed for use by accounting staff. When all of these manuals are final, PROBED's management operations will be fully documented.

While official documentation has not been up to par in the past, two factors deserve attention. First, the Project Coordinator has supplemented the manuals with numerous memos to the TSC Director concerning management operations. These memos were not filed all together and were not readily available for review by the evaluator. According to staff reports, they were sometimes distributed by the Director to relevant staff, sometimes rewritten by the Director and then distributed, and sometimes communicated verbally. The point is that additional documentation besides the operations manual did exist, and FSU responded well to the need for more detailed written procedures. Second, despite the lack of centralized, organized documentation, key basic procedures were generally followed. For example, it appears that purchases were made correctly, and detailed leave records were maintained by the Administrative Assistant.

5.6 Effectiveness of Basic Management Systems and Procedures

A brief review was conducted of the following key management operations:

- budgeting
- planning
- personnel
- accounting/finance
- office stocking, inventory, and supply
- field stocking, inventory, and supply
- equipment inventory and maintenance
- filing
- automation

Generally speaking, the rudiments of most operations are in place, though they are not as well documented as they should be. In the event of staff turnover, new employees would have insufficient reference materials. Therefore, all operations should be carefully and fully codified. Also, there are some opportunities for improvement that would facilitate operations. It is important to emphasize that, where systems and operations are currently below par, staff are aware of problems, committed to resolving them quickly, and actively engaged in developing sensible approaches.

The following findings merit attention:

Budgeting

The budget process involves (1) drafting of home office, TSC, and independent sector budgets by FSU/Tallahassee, with the latter two based on input from TSC staff, (2) drafting of Catholic and Protestant sector budgets by sector directors, using FSU categories and guidelines, (3) compilation and presentation of the total project budget by the Project Coordinator, (4) joint review and revision of the total budget by the Budget Committee, and (5) preparation of the revised budget by the Project Coordinator. The last two steps are iterative, in that budget revisions are made as needed throughout the year in response to changing requirements.

Although there were some implementation problems early on, this process now works well. Most important, TSC and sector managers believe that it is fair. They do not complain about inadequate funding, and state that when they request additional funds or reallocation of funds, these requests are granted when they are justifiable.

The Project Coordinator maintains copies of all drafts in a budget notebook. These documents are provided to TSC and the sectors as well, although it is unclear exactly where they have been kept within TSC. For example, the TSC accountant says he does not have a copy of the budget showing a line item for major items purchased in the U.S. and supplied by FSU, so that he does not know when PROBED orders exceed the line item. In contrast, the sector directors say they have current sector budgets and are able to manage their funds accordingly. Attention to document distribution can easily resolve the problems within TSC. Document management is now covered in the newly drafted revision to the operations manual.

Planning

Comprehensive annual work plans are developed collaboratively, integrating the plans of each sector and unit, and the overall project plan is displayed in all the relevant offices. In addition, detailed plans are developed for specific events, such as training. All plans are monitored. In summary, the planning process is effective.

Personnel

The Administrative Assistant has established an organized set of personnel files in a locked cabinet. There are separate sections for TSC and the sectors. Many of these files, even those of TSC staff, lack basic documentation, such as position descriptions, resumes, and performance evaluation forms, although the Administrative Assistant has requested them. Given the explicit requirements in the new draft procedures manual and the commitment of the TSC Director to completing the files, these problems can be rectified easily. Organization of staff under the FONHEP umbrella will further facilitate this process.

Leave records, time sheets, salary payment receipts, and other personnel administration documents are well organized and managed. For TSC and top management positions, recruitment procedures have been followed. However, one of the sector directors indicated that, in the event a position becomes available in

the sector, candidates would be selected from resumes already on file at the sector organization, without further advertisement.

Accounting/Finance

After early problems experienced by most AID-funded projects with regard to backup documentation and adaptation to reporting formats, these operations are relatively smooth. TSC and sector accountants are able to track and record expenditures correctly and provide regular cash flow summaries to TSC and sector managers. The TSC accountant is currently preparing for the switch to FONHEP grantee status and has begun training sector accountants in new procedures required.

At present, the TSC accountant maintains a manual ledger in addition to a computerized recording system because of "bugs" in the latter (see "Automation" below). This is inefficient, and the computer program should be corrected as soon as possible. However, additional programming may be required to meet the grantee recording requirements of FONHEP, as the current system manages on a cash rather than accrual basis.

Office Stocking, Inventory, and Supply

These operations are managed by the Administrative Assistant. Major items are ordered through FSU about every six months using a standard requisition form, and smaller items are purchased locally. Receipt of materials is checked against orders and appropriately recorded.

There have been few instances of stock outages, but when they have occurred, it has been necessary to purchase some items locally at a higher price. The Administrative Assistant proposes to install a cardex system to record and track inventory so that reorders are timely. This kind of a system should avoid outages in the future.

Field Stocking, Inventory, and Supply

The school administration unit has developed procedures to document the needs of each participating school (as well as monitors), compare requests with schools budgets, and ensure that school personnel complete the forms correctly. This is a very time-consuming process, but it works. The major problem is that the computer system that should compile the orders apparently does not work well (see "Automation" below). This is a serious problem that needs to be fully investigated and solved quickly.

With regard to getting materials to the field, the combined efforts of school administration and warehouse/logistics personnel have resulted in progressively greater controls and more efficient receipt and distribution systems. The warehouse operation is secure and well-controlled. There have been virtually no losses, and few incorrect shipments. The use of PROBES vehicles and drivers will make the distribution process easier to manage. Future plans call for using the computer-generated order form to track receipts as well. This will simplify the jobs of both monitors and school administrators.

Equipment Inventory and Maintenance

The inventory is complete, and maintenance is secured as needed. It may be advisable in the future to develop regular maintenance contracts on major equipment (e.g., air conditioners, computers, typewriters), if this is cost-effective locally, and to establish regular maintenance regimens for the vehicles. The latter is currently under investigation by the warehouse/logistics supervisor.

Filing

The Executive Secretary maintains orderly centralized files, alphabetically by subject. Similar files are maintained by the sector directors. The prior TSC Director also maintained his own set of files. Apparently some documents with broad project application (such as memos from the Project Coordinator about operating systems and procedures) were stored in this file, without copies to the central file. Other key documents, such as subcontract agreements, exist only in sector files. Thus, the central file is incomplete, despite the efforts of the Executive Secretary to collect and organize critical project information. The new draft procedures manual proposes an excellent solution to these problems, and the new TSC Director is currently reviewing and relocating materials in the old Director's file.

Automation

As indicated above, two key systems do not work well. One is the accounting system, which apparently cannot correctly record petty cash transactions or the apportionment of a single check to two expense categories (e.g., writing a check for \$800 to a consultant and recording that \$600 was for fee and \$200 for travel expenses). The second is the ordering system, a DBase application designed for the school administration unit. The source of the problem is unclear, but system breakdowns for two consecutive years have created crisis situations. Both of these systems should be reviewed and corrected immediately.

The school administration unit also proposes to link the ordering system to its own accounting system through Enable or a similar application. The concept is a good one. However, this move should be deferred until (1) the ordering system is fully operational, and (2) a decision is made about exactly where the basic accounting function will reside in the future.

Recommendation: Efforts to improve and document management systems and procedures should continue.

5.7 Compliance With AID Management Procedures and Regulations

As indicated above, there were some early problems with compliance, such as providing sufficient back-up expense data, but these have been solved. PROBEd provides FSU regularly with full accounting reports, and the process is now satisfactory. Other major systems, such as procurement, hiring, travel, and materials management are also consistent with AID standards. Project staff are aware of compliance issues, constantly developing ways to tighten systems and procedures, and paying increased attention to documenting internal procedures. There are no serious outstanding compliance issues, which speaks well for the introduction of FONHEP as an independent grantee.

5.8 Reporting

The subcontracts require quarterly reports from the sector organizations to FSU. The Project Coordinator has provided a report format, with headings, and these reports are generally timely. In addition, the accounting unit submits monthly expenditure reports to FSU, including sector expenses, and reports directly to USAID on the use of PL-480 funds. There are no significant problems in the reporting area.

5.9 Management/Operational Plans for Transfer to FONHEP

A great deal of thought has gone into the design of FONHEP and plans for transfer. As indicated above, a number of matters need further clarification, such as the precise role and responsibilities of FSU vis-à-vis Foundation staff and the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of staff members. It is essential

that these issues be resolved and documented as soon as possible. For example, as grant manager, does FSU determine how funds are going to be spent (given its responsibility for fulfilling its own contractual obligations), or does it offer advice on the consistency of spending plans with AID regulations? As another example, precisely what is the "advisory" role of TSC members? At the moment, three are technical team leaders, working collaboratively with, but also providing direction to, local staff.

In addition, systems and procedures should be reviewed to assess their appropriateness to the new structure and make any revisions that may be necessary. For example, if FEPH and CEEC staff are "seconded" to the Foundation, then there is the question of who evaluates their job performance. In similar cases involving seconding (such as Partners for International Education and Training, an AID-funded joint venture), performance evaluation is conducted by the job (Foundation) supervisor rather than the organizational (sector organization) supervisor.

The excellent spirit of collaboration and cooperation that characterizes PROBEd should be carried over to FONHEP. However, the new organization as well as the realignment of responsibilities to the donor requires new modes of operation. These modes must be carefully thought out and documented so that all participants understand exactly what the chain of command is and how it is supposed to work.

Recommendation: Continuing attention should be paid to developing a detailed, accurate organizationigram and to specifying in writing explicit roles, responsibilities, authorities, and tasks of each individual and organization involved in FONHEP.

6 . CONTEXTUAL AND CROSSCUTTING ISSUES

6.1 Sustainability

The sustainability issue can be addressed in two ways:

- (1) are project activities sustainable solely with local resources after termination of a specific project?
- (2) are project objectives realistic and can they be reached after project termination?

The first question is more appropriate for projects aiming at altering the resource base, promoting agricultural modernization and the like. For PROBEd, the answer is no. The second question can be answered affirmatively.

Sustainability of PROBEd activities in the short-term can be considered nearly certain. Barring political upheaval and change so general as to be inconceivable at this time, PROBEd, FONHEP, CEEC, and FEPH will not only be able to exist but even to expand their activities over the next three years. The financing is either in place or virtually assured to be forthcoming and there are no liabilities from the past which could have a truly destructive effect in the future.

PROBEd's human resources have also proved considerably resilient and adaptable. For example, the Project Administrative Council oversaw the incorporation of two sector associations, and the Foundation participated in workplan and budget developments and helped design the institutional development plans. Such a Council will not be easily shaken by the kind of adversity which is unfortunately part of everyday reality in Haiti.

Long-term financial sustainability is an entirely different matter. PROBEd activities — even excluding the TA part — are far too expensive for Haitian school systems to finance. Even at the school level, the recurrent costs of project involvement and continuation of project policies are far greater than what either parents or school systems would be able to finance out of local contributions. Much of Haitian primary education, and especially its improvement, will in the foreseeable future have to be financed by foreign sources, be it by charities, bilateral aid, multilateral grants and loans or the remittances of Haitians abroad.

To give just one example, all recent analysis has shown that lasting improvements in the educational sector cannot be achieved without lasting improvements in the status of teachers. Teachers' salaries alone should presently be raised — conditional upon training and performance — to at least \$200 (on average) if the private sector wants to both retain its better teachers and make full-time teaching a real option for the others. This would mean a minimal monthly payroll of \$4.4 million (or \$3 million more than the current estimated payroll of the 22,000 private sector teachers), no more than a quarter of which could be financed by school fees at their current levels. Whether or not the MEN will eventually put a part or all of these teachers on its payroll is irrelevant; either the MEN, the Churches, FONHEP, or someone else will have to finance the shortfall from foreign sources.

We can thus conclude that although PROBEd activities are indeed sustainable, they are not self-sustainable in the sense of reliance upon local sources of local funds. Given Haitian political realities, long-term dependency upon outside financing is unavoidable if lasting improvements in basic education are to be achieved.

6.2 Social and Political Environment

Political instability is likely to persist in Haiti for several years to come. This might make life for project staff and participants more difficult, but it will not threaten the project as such. PROBES has more than just survived under very difficult conditions, and will continue to do so.

One significant change to be monitored carefully is the apparent willingness of the MEN and the World Bank to include the private sector in the fifth and subsequent education loans. This might conceivably expose the project to the kind of pressures and complacent tolerance of inefficiency which critics have frequently associated with the public sector and its foreign benefactors. It will be one of the great challenges for FONHEP to pull in resources under these conditions without having to pay the price many will be expecting from it.

6.3 Community and Democratic Development

The AID Mission Strategy Paper considers democratic development basically a Haitian responsibility. We believe, however, that PROBES has assisted in many ways a democratic transition which can be observed in classrooms and local communities.

There is a change in teacher and student behavior. Teachers manage classes differently; they help children to speak, think, and reflect. Authority roles are changing; teachers go on strike. People traveling through communities seem to experience a slow movement from the culture of silence and repression to the liberty of association and free expression. Groups and committees are forming associations, not only the parent committees promoted by PROBES. The latter, where they exist, assemble at schools to discuss with teachers and directors alike the issues concerning their children's education, as well as the parental obligation to help children learn, and to feed and care for them.

At the primary and preprimary class level and where there is physical space, the teacher works with children in groups or as a class. Communication is reciprocal. We are told that teacher training is essential for preserving preprimary gains in learning as children advance through the next class levels. Clearly, for those who have spoken with and listened to some Haitians, there have been moves toward a democratic transition. The "hidden agenda image" people once had of PROBES has apparently given way to more trust. Some of Haiti's disenfranchised masses are slowly gaining trust — and a voice — and PROBES plays a small but significant role in this process.

6.4 Development Issues

According to the project paper, national economic development is the ultimate objective of all educational development efforts. Since the project concentrates its activities on the schools of the poor, we can assume that the "economic development" hoped for will be one which is shared by all social classes. This brings up some questions for which there may be no good answers at this time but which are worth considering anyway. The first two of these questions concern problems of social stratification familiar to any student of Haitian society.

- By upgrading teacher incomes, the project leaves schools with increased operational budgets and thus the need to increase fees once project support has stopped. Since the project supports the schools of the disadvantaged, it is precisely the lowest stratum of Haitian society which might thus have to pay more for education. Is this not a form of regressive taxation? Should foreign aid promote it?

- PROBED's selection of schools by necessity excludes the worst, i.e., those where parents do not get any academic results despite paying fees amounting to a large proportion of their disposable incomes (as the Sector Assessment of 1987 documented most convincingly). PROBED schools are one notch above such *écoles borlette*. Will PROBED's effect be to increase the distance separating the worst schools from the others? Will this marginalize the clientele of the worst schools even more, blocking its chances for upward mobility of even the intergenerational type?

One answer to this kind of question would be that the determinants of social stratification are so powerful that one small project cannot hope to change them. In order to be successful a project will have to "accept social reality" and try to do the best within it. This may well be true but notice the subtle shift in focus. Instead of individual advancement leading to socioeconomic development the focus here is on project success. Who needs projects if they don't result in tangible benefits for the target population or worse, if they worsen the plight of the poor?

Another point frequently raised by professionals connected with UNESCO, the World Bank and bilateral aid agencies is the following:

- By being involved in curriculum and materials development, teacher training, testing, school construction and all those other activities currently neglected by the Ministry of Education, will PROBED help to **undermine and frustrate even further the progressive elements of legitimate governmental institutions**, precluding any chance of ever leading the country out of the current institutional morass?

Again there is no easy answer. Even the most critical observer of the Haitian state will agree that at least one day there ought to be government agencies rendering services in an efficient and cost-effective manner. But how to get there? PROBED's detractors maintain that the project diverts resources which would be better spent by nurturing the fragile growth of incipient decency in the Ministry. In the project's defense, one can say that to set a good example will be more effective than to waste money where the absorptive capacity is weak. This observer happens to favor the latter position but is forced to admit that this is not a simple black-or-white problem.

Finally, there is the issue of the rapid growth of a "parasitic" city—a primary city growing at the expense of an increasingly impoverished hinterland.

- Most of PROBED's operational budget is spent in Port-au-Prince or on commodities routed through Port-au-Prince. (The project's rule about having at least 50% of its resources go to schools does not alter this.) How much more employment does this urban bias create in the capital city? How much more rural-urban migration will be caused by millions of dollars injected into the economy of the capital city? **Is it desirable to increase the primacy of Port-au-Prince and hence its power to extract scarce resources from a disadvantaged hinterland?**

This problem affects, of course, all development projects to some extent. Once the Jeeps and professional salaries, the gasoline and the Coca Colas, the cement and the nails, the radio batteries and the cooking oil, the pants and the blouses, the soap and the bicycles and the machetes and the pencils and the paint are all added up, very little in the consumption made possible by foreign donor largesse does not in some way fuel the urban economy. Is this a necessary concomitant of development? Is it unavoidable, essential, or even desirable? Economists might be able to prove this thesis right or wrong. I would expect that every million dollars spent in Haiti on a Haitian development project will add, after accounting for imports, about \$700,000 to the Port-au-Prince economy and finance the rural-urban migration of several hundred of the 50,000 new migrants received annually by the capital city.

Hopefully, the PROBEd students-turned-migrants will stand a better chance than most of finding employment in the urban economy.

7. LINKS WITH MISSION STRATEGY

Based upon the Haiti Action Plan Review (May 1988), the USAID/Haiti strategic objective is keyed on four core areas: (1) Child Survival/Population; (2) Agriculture/Natural Resources; (3) Private Sector Job Creation; and (4) Basic Education.

The main problems to be addressed are low standards of living for most Haitians and low quality of standards of basic primary education. USAID's overall program strategy promotes:

- assistance directly benefiting the people, i.e., through PVOs and NGOs;
- human resources development activities, including women in development;
- development of the private sector, i.e., employment through private sector growth;
- significant policy dialogue on a wide range of issues, i.e., GOH commitment to development, a more attractive investment climate and higher foreign assistance levels;
- targets of opportunity in democracy;
- sustainability and cost-effectiveness of projects in the near and long-term.

The mission's human resources development activities, of which PROBES represents a major part, complement and support its overall development strategy. In fact, PROBES does more than that. Assisting Haiti in developing its human resources potential and strengthening its private institutional capacities, it has indirectly benefited the public sector, an effect not in line with official strategy at the present time. AID is, however, involved in contingency planning for public sector assistance and possible phased resumption of aid to the GOH, and PROBES functions as one of the channels through which communication can flow in either direction.

Given the limited absorptive and implementation capacity of the MEN, PROBES, through emphasizing institution-building, has actually provided the MEN with access to the private sector at a level unheard of before. The project has served as a catalyst for GOH/World Bank teacher subsidies and fulfilled MEN supervision and guidance functions through its own performance contracting system.

Moreover, while AID development strategy favors project-level activities, most often managed by foreign experts, PROBES supports the growth of indigenous organizations. It devotes most of its efforts and a large share of its budgets to training and school support services at the grass roots levels, thus directly benefiting people and emphasizing private sector training and growth.

Similarly, PROBES has created well-paid equal opportunity jobs and its employment policy is to favor indigenous over expatriate staff. PROBES thus promotes Haitian management capacities, while other development projects frequently rely much more heavily upon foreign experts to manage foreign development assistance. For the time being, most of these jobs are located in Port-au-Prince. However, with the decentralization of sectoral offices to various regions, there is some prospect that some of these jobs will be moved to provincial cities, thus counteracting the ever-present dangers of urban dominance.

In regard to policy dialogue, difficult to pursue in the midsts of political turmoil, the existence of Catholic and Protestant education institutions has protected the Mission's project from negative political fallout from the U.S. aid cutoff. Indeed, possible political complications stemming from a free-standing private sector education project have been averted thus far by the uninterrupted, informal dialogue on policy issues of common concern between representatives of the CEEC and FEPH, and the MEN.

However, even though private/public sector relations have never been better, according to the MEN, the private sector has not yet been able to assure its active participation in policy and technical level discussions in the preparation of the Fifth Education Project, to be financed by the World Bank. Although there are representatives of the private education sector in the National Commission for the Preparation of Education Project V, the GOH/MEN apparently lacks the political will and administrative strength to decide what form this private-public sector relationship might take.

Another item high on the USAID Mission strategy is the promotion of "opportunity in democracy." PROBEd is not in any way concerned with political issues as such, but is indirectly making a contribution outlined in the previous chapter. Besides, if organizational poverty was a critical element making the previous dictatorship survive, then building up indigenous organizations is in itself a factor preventing its recurrence.

Promoting basic literacy, local autonomy, and pluralistic institutions is to establish the foundations of democracy. Only time will tell how much of a contribution PROBEd has been able to make in this respect.

But giving a voice to the silent masses is only one aspect of democracy and only part of the stated objective of USAID Mission strategy. A necessary compliment is to be found in the emphasis upon **appropriate indigenous development**. The temptation is always there to "go high-tech" and "solve" problems in a rapid, competent and "efficient" manner, and PROBEd has not always resisted that temptation. The project paper reflected dreams of educational radio, the school services section has been trucking cement blocks from Port-au-Prince to Dos Palais, and the evaluation section has papers talking of statistical procedures even the high-powered consultants cannot agree upon. All these are examples of "jumping the gun," of technological shortcuts open to the elite, which are ridiculous in the best of cases but have the potential of harming social and democratic progress. Luckily, most of PROBEd's efforts are not at all of this kind. Quite to the contrary, the diversification, decentralization, and collective leadership promoted by the project are the best protection against the arrogance of locally inappropriate "efficiency."

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PROBED is in many ways an excellent project. Its underlying assumptions and basic rationale have turned out to be correct. Among the project's greatest qualities we find an ability to deflect potential conflict, overcome internal difficulties and start producing tangible results at an impressive pace.

The project has reached an important crossroads with the emergence of three indigenous institutions ready to accept major financial and administrative responsibilities. But while this is in itself a significant achievement, prospects are not at all certain — especially for the umbrella organization FONHEP. The following will be determinants of FONHEP's potential for success.

1. A clear delineation of internal roles and functions.
2. Having all systems, procedures, and staff in place before operations begin.
3. Operating on a level compatible with the CEEC and FEPH as well as a representative of the lay sector.
4. Avoidance of undue delays in providing services or in receiving its own donor funding.
5. Putting in place a system allowing a continuous monitoring of performance, impact and conformity with the umbrella's objectives.

(For an elaborate discussion of some such points see Checchi, 1988.)

Most of the recommendations in the following sections concern PROBED, not the Foundation. But they should also be understood as attempts to increase the probability of the nascent Foundation's being successful.

8.1 Institutional Development

Institutional development has been more successful and has received more analytical attention than any of the other components of PROBED. Three major organizations have been established and their structures defined. We have found them already to be surprisingly strong, penetrating the Haitian social structure to an increasing extent and showing the promise of influencing, if not representing, better than half of Haiti's private primary schools.

Successful as they are, these organizations need to be reinforced at this interim stage of project implementation. Roles, functions and relationships relevant to reaching project objectives need to be clarified in view of the transition to FONHEP. Much of this work is part of advance planning and has been included in two recent institutional development reports (Fass, 1988, April; Stafford and Desroches, 1988, July). However, some of this work cannot really be achieved ahead of time and some of the new relationships will have to emerge as the three organizations grow in volume, scope, personnel, funding, and visibility.

It cannot be assumed that all PROBED personnel currently have levels of training adequate for assuming their new functions. A formal assessment of training needs will rapidly become a necessity. Some training programs have already been scheduled for Year 4 in response to this need but more will be called for to satisfy the second portion of the following recommendation and make the project less vulnerable, especially to temporary changes in personnel.

Recommendation 1: Continue to assess the training needs of PROBED, CEEC, FEPH, and FONHEP formally and periodically. Budgetary allocations should be sufficient to train all personnel to be able to act as substitutes in key functions in time of need.

PROBED has so far been able to count on a high level of motivation among the key staff members. This has protected the organization from potentially negative effects of diffused authority structures, uneven qualifications, and work roles which were not always clearly defined. As the organization grows older and more complex, a full-blown institutional capacity analysis appears desirable. Policies, roles, work organization, the use of resources and, interinstitutional relationships should all be defined with utmost clarity if organizational efficiency is to be maximized. Such a review should be achieved in a series of meetings among all staff involved. PROBED has actually recognized the need for such review and reflection, and the PAC appears to undertake it regularly. Yet there are no formal, written records of this, and if there were personnel changes, the newcomers would find it difficult to sort out the limits of roles and responsibilities.

Institutional capacity analysis and training needs assessment are exercises in self-analysis of an organization. They should continue to be conducted in a practical manner – although somewhat more formally – and ideally should be enjoyable events for everyone involved. It will be impossible to reach efficiency goals and improve the mode of operation without at the same time maintaining and increasing levels of individual motivation. In this latter respect the recommendation, therefore, aims at making the project stronger precisely in an area where it is already strong, but will be challenged by the transition lying ahead.

Recommendation 2: Ongoing examination of the functions of individuals and units should be continued in a more formalized manner, as an institutional capacity analysis. At this organizational crossroads, such a collective enterprise will help to redefine roles and relationships and modify institutional capacity where needed.

In one respect the institutional development efforts of PROBED have not yet met with success. Compared to the church sectors, lay sector schools have not been well served. According to 1989 estimates by a World Bank team, over 2,300 (37.8%) of Haiti's schools belong to the lay sector, 116 fall into categories of *école communale*, and 493 are *écoles communautaires*. So far there have been no systematic attempts to document the specific needs of these schools, their social and geographic concentrations, their enrollments and their fledgling attempts to organize themselves. Given the magnitude of the problem it is understandable that PROBED has limited its organizational efforts almost exclusively to the religious sectors. However, it is high time now to proceed to an in-depth analysis of the needs, potential, and organizational options of the "independent" sector. Not only is PROBED obliged, by the spirit if perhaps not the letter of the project paper, to work with the independent sector schools, a moral argument can be made just as well: If PROBED won't help these schools, who will?

Recommendation 3: The project should allocate the necessary resources to facilitate in-depth work on the independent sector, initially focusing on (1) estimation of its size, characteristics, needs and potential, (2) an inventory and analysis of organizations already representing parts of this sector, (3) organizations already serving the needs of independent schools, and (4) the elaboration of a policy aimed at bringing a credible independent sector representative as a full-fledged member into FONHEP.

8.2 School Service Delivery

PROBED is on target in terms of the quantity of school services delivered. While the project is not expected to reach the 300 schools originally planned for, the average school size turns out to be larger than expected and the number of students benefiting will surpass the expectations (60,000) of the project paper. Only one of the items originally offered to school directors has had to be dropped (the small, income-generating projects). This decision was well-prepared and made at the appropriate level.

Based on our contacts with PROBEd staff, teachers, directors and school *responsables*, we would judge the quality of school services as good. However, a valid assessment of the quality of services would have to be much more detailed and would require more time. One of the critical items on the service menu is the summer training session. The quality of this session is clearly improving, judging from a comparison of project reports, test results and progress in staffing of the evaluation and curriculum sections. The computerized management systems installation is still something of a weak spot but this problem is currently being addressed. There is not yet a truly integrated system in place for ordering, keeping stock, and providing the data necessary for the R&D section. There is also not enough depth in staffing and staff skills to make efficient use of the present two-system setup (LOTUS and DBase). As a consequence, quality improvements in service delivery are difficult to document and even more difficult to measure.

Recommendation 4: The project should accelerate the installation of a simple but integrated computerized management system providing for data input and analysis in a user-friendly way. Three more staff should be trained to have computer skills at least comparable to those of the school services section.

The appropriateness of the school service delivery model in the Haitian context is beyond any doubt. It allows for much administrative flexibility and a rapid adaptation to varying local needs because the contract avoids a standardized package of services. PROBEd's monitoring system, both in terms of human resources and administrative procedures, appears vastly superior to what can be observed in the public sector. Nevertheless, the project is not yet very strong in evaluating the appropriateness of item-choices made by directors and in taking corrective action where necessary. The effectiveness of the services has not yet been systematically measured and will remain unknown for some time to come. There are some indications that some beneficiaries consider the project as a very conventional resource. (Foreign donors give away goods for free and respond to pressures for more free goods.) On the other hand, there are also signs that decentralization, incipient community control, informal controls through church structures, and the performance contract, all have a beneficial influence upon effectiveness. We have not found in this project any sign of the waste and irresponsibility unfortunately typical of so many development projects.

Despite effective service delivery, the intended impact of PROBEd's help to schools can be undermined by variables currently beyond project control. The evaluation has identified one such variable — the density of students in classrooms — but there may be others playing a similarly nefarious role. There are also signs that the follow-through by monitoring staff concerning the use of furniture, books, and other supplies could be improved, among other things by increasing the monitors' pedagogical competence.

Recommendation 5: Impose and control limits on student density, class size, and maybe other variables potentially critical to pedagogical success. Accelerate corrective actions based on monitors' reports.

Since the performance contract is the heart of the relationship between the project and beneficiary schools, compliance with the contract must be taken very seriously. This applies to both contractual partners. PROBEd has been perceived as responsible for some delays, for inappropriate handling of the performance incentive grants, and for defaulting on some of its obligations (in the sense of unilaterally changing some of "the promise" included in early version of the contract). Schools have been known to lack compliance with contract items yet have escaped sanctioning. While on the whole the use of the performance contract has been a success, and procedures for carrying out contractual obligations have been improved, it will be important in the future to adhere to every letter of the contract quite scrupulously. Amendments, renegotiations and budget rollbacks must be avoided. This takes on a particular importance now since the credibility of the new organizational structure, both in the eyes of the beneficiaries and of the

donor organization, will depend very much on preserving an image of honesty and efficiency. The performance contract has the potential of providing such an image and of maintaining credibility on all sides, provided its form and content are easily comprehensible and culturally appropriate.

Recommendation 6: The project should adhere scrupulously to the letter of performance contracts, avoiding any semblance of changes imposed by central authorities.

8.3 Research and Development

The project has adopted a research sequence apparently at odds with what was proposed in the project paper. Data collection and project implementation were pushed ahead without first analyzing the experience of other organizations working in educational innovation and modernization. Inventories have not been assembled of either Haitian or international experience, and project staff do not appear universally convinced of the importance of analyzing other peoples' successes and failures before pushing ahead the implementation of one's own project. The political imperative of putting organizational structures and school services on the map as soon as possible may explain some of this. But besides the TA personnel, we have found little awareness of the dramatic possibilities in policy-oriented, comparative and applied research to improve project design, procedures and staff motivation.

The quality and usefulness of research currently under way is generally good and now growing rapidly even though the volume of analysis is not yet large enough by far. The fact that the public sector R&D component has fallen by the wayside should be interpreted as a positive development, but it has also resulted in reducing the overall volume of resources allocated to research. The most intense – and lavishly funded – research effort at the project is PEP; this research is well designed and will prove to be useful in the design of a much enlarged preschool component. The model character of this research should be made evident to all PROBEd staff as well as to other projects.

Recommendation 7: Schedule information seminars on the PEP research for both PROBEd and other organizations. Make sure that feedback can be integrated into the design of future preschool activities.

R&D at PROBEd could now be picking up volume and significance. Some human resources and information systems are in place or currently being put into place. However, there is a need to define the focus of R&D more clearly and to generally increase the level, quantity and thoroughness of analytical work being done. This is the time to constitute a real research agenda, including priority questions to be answered as well as the methodologies and means needed to find answers. The project will greatly profit from subjecting its own procedures and impact to continued critical analysis.

Recommendation 8: The project should define a clear research focus and objectives, use existing data more widely, amplify routine data collection, coordinate analytical work and make the most of existing qualitative data.

R&D must be given a firm place in an organization's hierarchy if it is to produce significant results. Practically speaking this means personnel, offices, equipment and a place on the organization's administrative charts and budgets. It can hardly surprise the observer to find PROBEd wanting on the research side since for a long time there simply has not been any strong advocate of policy-oriented research on the permanent staff. Even the evaluation section cannot fulfill such a role completely since it is too much preoccupied with its immediate functions of testing, helping out in the monitoring and training activities and the like.

There are basically two options for organizing a strong applied research component. The first one would be to set up a real research office with all that is implied (personnel, machines and high-powered technical assistance including permanent expatriate staff). This model has been tried at IPN/UNESCO and has not been very successful in producing significant results at the time when they are needed. An arcane and isolated research division tends to remain true to itself. It also tends to be very expensive.

The second option — the one to be strengthened at PROBEd — is to structure applied research as an integral part of regular project activities. This needs no more than one or two part-time researchers (maybe technical assistance) who make sure that concise research objectives are defined in discussions with all key staff, that the specific data are actually assembled and available in usable form, that analysis is carried out on time and, that results are fed back into the operational activities by means of discussions, reports, and workshops. All of this has been done to some extent since Year 3 and some of it can be expected to produce concrete results soon. This model produces policy-oriented research in constant exchange with regular project activities. The size of such an operation should ideally be proportional to the scope of project activities and the volume of budgets and personnel involved in these activities.

Recommendation 9: Resources should be allocated to continue and accelerate policy-oriented research as a part of regular project activities. In order to assure the necessary volume, significance and continuity of the R&D effort, one person or section should be made specifically responsible for it and the R&D component should have a specific place on the organizational chart and the budget.

8.4 Coordination With Other Donors

PROBEd has so far been limited to a single donor and consequently has enjoyed only limited autonomy. This situation is bound to change as FONHEP takes over many of PROBEd's responsibilities. As for the founding members of FONHEP, CEEC, and FEPH, they will no doubt soon have diversified funding. Their constituent churches have operated on multiple funding sources for decades. Such diversification is legitimate, even necessary, but it is not entirely without problems. Donor organizations operate according to their own agendas and interests. Their previous experiences, ideologies and procedures, will not always coincide with FONHEP's. Most importantly, there could be such an asymmetry of size — especially in the case of multilateral donor organizations — that FONHEP might well drown in a sea of regulations, procedural requirements, visiting administrators and experts and other niceties inevitably attached to a major transfer of funds. Moreover, if the principal involvement of such donors is with the public sector, any co-financing of FONHEP's base budget might create intolerable amounts of jealousy and conflict.

Recommendation 10: While striving for rapid diversification of funding sources, the Foundation should limit contributions by multilateral donors to specific items such as teacher salary support, classroom construction, and research. Under no circumstances should FONHEP trade its autonomy for budget support.

So far PROBEd has not explicitly coordinated project implementation with the activities of other donors. As activities grow in scope and volume such coordination will rapidly become unavoidable. It is most important in the following areas: (1) selection of sites of concentrated activity; (2) methodology, especially pertaining to the use of incentive payments and community participation; and (3) staffing choices (e.g., to avoid interorganizational competition for scarce personnel). Complementarity rather than competition in project activities is, of course, one of the objectives of such coordination. Another one is to increase contact and communications with potential donors in view of diversification of funding. PROBEd has

acted wisely in maintaining a very low profile and in limiting contacts largely to the individual level. For FONHEP it will be imperative to move to a higher level of coordination.

Recommendation 11: FONHEP should continue to keep a low profile while at the same time instituting regular formal and informal exchanges in order to ensure complementarity of action with other organizations.

There are limits to coordination with other organizations. The administrative burden of such efforts can be so formidable that regular project implementation is jeopardized. There is also a tacit acceptance of public sector norms and authority when multilateral donor funds reach FONHEP via public sector channels. There is, finally, a need to avoid "contaminated" organizations whose interest and image are simply incompatible with FONHEP.

Recommendation 12: The project should limit coordination of its activities to those donors and organizations which share its objectives and respect its autonomy completely.

8.5 Program Management

The project has succeeded in maximizing the advantages of creating new structures and initiating new initiatives. Excellent human and organizational resources have been mobilized without overburdening PROBED by their past allegiances and liabilities. However, with the current organizational transformation and the impending increase in complexity, scale, scope and cost of activities, renewed attention will have to be paid to management issues.

Recommendation 13: Negotiations to specify in detail the roles and responsibilities of FONHEP and FSU should continue, resulting in a document specifying exact chains of command regarding key functions, such as deciding how money should be spent, authorizing/approving expenditures, accounting for expenditures, assigning and supervising technical staff, and organizing and implementing activities.

Recommendation 14: Agreements reached should be illustrated on a hierarchical project organigram. If a single organigram cannot accurately show all relationships, then a series could be developed (e.g., one showing staff supervision and reporting responsibilities, another showing financial responsibilities, etc.). However, a single comprehensive chart is preferable.

Recommendation 15: A gradual transition from the consensus orientation to a more vertical structure of decisionmaking is desirable and represents a more viable option for the future. It should be feasible now as a result of the trust developed between the various partners in the past three years.

Recommendation 16: Efforts to improve and document management systems and procedures should continue.

Recommendation 17: As far as the transition to FONHEP is concerned, continuing attention should be paid to developing a detailed, accurate organigram and to specifying in writing explicit roles, responsibilities, authorities, and tasks of each individual and organization involved in FONHEP.

8.6 Summary Recommendation and Rationale

In a most general way this evaluation team recommends (1) to continue funding PROBED at levels agreed to in the project paper and the proposed amendment, (2) to carry out the proposed rearrangement of the organizational structure and the transfer of authority to FONHEP, and (3) to initiate planning of

both an extension of USAID support to PROBEd and FONHEP and other projects with similar objectives but geographically more limited scope.

Justifications for such a favorable recommendation include the following:

- The project is on track, has stuck to its original goals, reached many of its objectives, and has been most efficient and cost-effective compared to public sector attempts in the same field.
- The project has reached and surpassed its institutional development objectives ahead of schedule. The emergence of FONHEP and its constituent member organizations is one of the most promising events in recent Haitian educational history.
- Project design has proven to be appropriate to Haitian social and political realities. Far from floundering in political turmoil, the project has probably grown stronger under adverse conditions.
- The indigenous character of the organizations doing most of the project's work is essential for long-term sustainability.
- The project has pilot characteristics and is right now moving into a new phase of great promise and of equally considerable risk. To stop now would deprive everyone of learning from a significant experiment.
- Compared to other projects active in Haitian education the overall level of competence of most members of project staff and the administrative council (and one might well add, the human resources mobilized over the years by USAID/Haiti and FSU) is nothing short of spectacular. Project success so far is due not to organizational charts or level of funding but principally to the qualities of the individuals involved.
- The project has a diversified structure which will soon be paralleled by administrative and geographic decentralization and diversification of funding. The risks associated with the presence of powerful foreign donors and a significant concentration of material resources can thus be reduced to a relatively low level.
- The project's goals are important and ambitious without being unrealistic. Beyond its own immediate activities, PROBEd has already started to act as a model for providing school support, to stimulate foreign donor interest and, to provoke a dialogue between churches as well as the public and private sectors which would have been unthinkable only a few years ago.



ANNEXES

ANNEXES

- 1 **Institutional Chart, Roles and Relationships**
- 2 **Note Concerning the Independent Sector**
- 3 **Geographic Distribution of Project Activities**
- 4 **Educational Statistics for Haiti, by Sector**
- 5 **Evaluation Scope of Work**
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ANNEX 1

Institutional Chart, Roles and Relationships

INSTITUTIONAL CHART, ROLES, AND RELATIONSHIPS

First IIBE Project Phase 1986 to 1989:

1. The USAID/Haiti Mission, Human Resource Development Office, has primary oversight and monitoring responsibility for the IIBE project, in conjunction with USAID/Washington.

2. The Project Administrative Council (PAC), composed of representatives of the CEEC and FEPH, has an advisory role to the project in terms of setting policy guidelines and de facto authority over project implementation, such as programmatic, budgetary and resource allocation planning in close collaboration with FSU/TSC.

3. Florida State University (FSU) serves as AID/contractor and grant manager through an IIBE buy-in, to implement the project and provide technical and managerial assistance to the CEEC and FEPH, via its operational arm, the Technical Service Center (TSC), over which it has oversight.

School support activities are implemented through FSU subcontracts with the two indigenous organizations (7) — the *Commission episcopale de l'education catholique* (CEEC) and the *Federation des ecoles protestantes* (FEPH) which represent their respective school systems. FSU/TSC is responsible for transferring skills to the CEEC and FEPH through on-the-job and formal training that will enable them to take full responsibility for the school support and internal institutional development activities of the project and to serve as viable and permanent service organizations to the private education sector.

4. The Technical Service Center (TSC) coordinates all technical assistance provided by the contractors and supervises the following units: administrative staff; three technical teams: (1) School Administration, (2) Curriculum/Pedagogy, (3) Evaluation/Monitoring; the Preprimary Education Program (PEP); and the Independent Sectoral Service Center (ISSC).

The TSC has a functional, joint leadership relationship with the two other Sectoral Service Centers (SSCs) of the FEPH and CEEC. The whole relationship has been described as a loose coping system.

5. The Independent SSC has a coordinator under the immediate supervision of the TSC. The ISSC has three technical teams with a reduced staff and six field monitors to supervise and coordinate all schools of the sector. There are 33 schools in the third cohort and another group of independent schools planned in the fourth cohort.

6. The International Research Institute (IIR) assists FSU for the preprimary education component and represents FSU for the CARE subcontract.

7. The FEPH (legally incorporated in May 1986) and the CEEC (incorporated in January 1986) have a contractual relationship with FSU/USAID to implement school support activities of the project. Both are the central coordination unit for their respective constituent school systems and have an operational arm (8) within PROBES, the FEPH/SSC, and the CEEC/SSC.

Both the FEPH and CEEC have subcontracts with UPEF/GOH for monitoring salary supplements for teachers and school supplies, as well as with PROBES for implementing the internal institutional development plans of the two sectors.

The central office in PAP will have a staff of four: a coordinator, an administrative assistant, an accountant, and a monitor.


8. The Sectoral Service Centers (SSCs/FEPH and CEEC) belong to their respective central unit and have a functional partnership relationship with the TSC. They direct, supervise and coordinate all schools of the sector and are responsible for diversifying the system's resource basis, including the establishment of parent associations.

9. and 11. Both SSCs have a director's office and supervise three technical teams: (1) School Administration, (2) Curriculum/Pedagogy, and (3) Evaluation/Monitoring. As of June 1989, the SSCs have 10 field monitors each to carry out the review process and performance contracting activities. In the context of PROBEd, the various technical teams coordinate their work and cooperate in planning new projects.


10. Implementing the sectoral institutional development plans, FEPH will establish 3 regional offices (by June 1989) in the North, South, and Artibonite regions so that there are four with PAP. These offices will coordinate the work of the FEPH in their respective districts and provide decentralized services, training teachers and directors. They will have direct contact with the Protestant schools, missions, and churches in order to diversify and broaden their resource base. Two more offices are planned in Port de Paix and Hinche.

The CEEC will organize 4 diocese offices and renovate 4 others in Jérémie, Cayes, Jacmel, PAP, Hinche, Gonaïves, Cap-Haïtien, and Port-de-Paix. Under the auspices of the bishop of the diocese, the office is responsible for the provision of services to all Catholic schools, coordination of educational activities of the diocese, and implementation of CEEC central policy. Each office will have a staff of three: a director, an administrative assistant, and a monitor.

**IIBE—INCENTIVES FOR IMPROVING BASIC EDUCATION PROJECT (PROBED)
1986-1989**



PROJET D'ORGANIGRAMME FONHEP/CST/PROBED
23 MAI 1989



ANNEX 2

**Note Concerning the Independent
Sector**

NOTE CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR

1. Attempts at Analysis

To our knowledge there has never been, outside PROBED, any attempt to study the lay sector of Haitian private primary education as such. At the project we were shown two reports, the first one a study of the sector and the second one a proposal for its organization. They are not among the most convincing of the project's documents. The topic is, of course, more difficult to study than either of the religious sectors each of which has received frequent, though fragmented and incomplete, attention for more than a decade.

The neglect of the lay sector by both religious and governmental authorities has led to major problems of documentation. The best overall data base of "all" schools in Haitian history (the MEN *Enquete exhaustive des écoles de la republique d'haiti - 1988*) undercounted close to 1,500 schools, many hundreds of them lay schools. A glimpse at that data is contained in annex 4 of this report.

2. Organization of the Independent Sector

The preliminary report on this topic to the PAC has not yet been acted upon. It proposes to take PROBED's independent sector schools as a basis for starting a representative organization of this sector. It appears to this observer that the chances of success of such an enterprise are not very good. There will, of course, always be school directors eager to get an office, a Jeep, and a secretary but that will be about it. What made the other sector associations work so well is precisely that they were not put together in this way.

A much preferable option would be to build on part of the only existing lay school association, the *Association des écoles privées de Port-au-Prince* (ADEPP) which functioned previously as a school director's association but has been officially recognized under its new name since December 1988. The total membership is around 60 schools, including such high prestige institutions as:

Collaage Kayanou (Dir.: Guy Alexandre)

Nouveau College Bird (Dir.: Rosny Desroches)

Normaliens Reunis (Dir.: Emmanuel Buteau)

I have met with representatives of ADEPP on two occasions during the evaluation mission and have received their statutes and considerable material from them. Problems with building on this organization include its limitation to Port-au-Prince, the bourgeois character of many member schools, and the fact that many of the leading ones include the secondary level. But ADEPP could provide a nucleus and each of its participating members could, via some kind of *plan de parentage*, take responsibility for the guidance of a number of poorer lay schools.

3. Problems of Working With the Lay Sector

This sector has greater variation than any of the other sectors, ranging from the worst of the *écoles borlettes* to such excellent schools as Kayanou. The motivation of many directors is of course economic. Schools are for them a way to earn a living. (Is this really so radically different from some of the "religious" sector schools?) More importantly, these schools lack the formal and informal controls exercised by religious bodies.

The following example of one school visited may not be typical but it provides a vivid illustration of how PROBED support can (a) be translated into major profits and (b) thereby lose most of its intended pedagogical effectiveness.

Director M. of the C.P. school, one of the "independent" type in project terminology, has managed to have *Plan de parrainage* pay for his physical plant consisting of four standard classrooms. One of the classrooms is unfinished, consisting of cement floor and roof only. Capacity by planners' generous standards (40 students per classroom and teacher) would be approximately 160 students. The fees are \$2.40, 3.40 and 4.00 per month, dependent upon level, for nine months. Since the buildings are paid off we can assume these fees to cover the total cost of running the school, including all salaries and the owner/director's profits. Let us assume that class sizes are shrinking to one half between the lowest and the highest levels, that 10% of all potential fees are never received and, that salaries are 50% over the PROBES median.

Table 2.1

Profit Estimation for One School in the Independent Sector

Without PROBES	(enrollment: 321)		
	Income from fees:	872.60/month	
Salaries of 5 teachers	300		
Director's salary	200		
Other expenses (20%)	100		
	Profit:	272.60/month	2,453.40/year
Since PROBES	(enrollment: 540)		
	Income from fees:	1468.80/month	
Salaries of 7 teachers	420		
Director's salary	200		
Other expenses (20%)	124		
	Profit:	724.80/month	6,523.20/year
Increase in annual profit since PROBES:		<u>4,069.80</u>	

Increasing the annual profit by \$4,069.80 or 66% is clearly a major achievement. The key to the increased profitability of this school is evidently the 68% increase in enrollment due to the school's increased status, the staunch refusal of the Reform curriculum, the 6% annual population increase close to the capital city and, no doubt, the director's entrepreneurial talent. Notice that all this is calculated without taking PROBES's offer of \$25 per student into account, an offer which potentially adds another \$8,025 to the school's overall budget but very little to an honest director's profits.

Subdividing the classrooms and squeezing 68% more children into the same space, at up to six per bench, must have a negative effect on learning and hence on repetition and dropout rates. The magnitude of this negative effect will remain unknown but it will most probably cancel out any positive effect of PROBES's support.

As a final thought it may be useful to note the options of director M. — keeping in mind that in the absence of better data our estimates may well go wrong by a considerable margin in either direction. Had director M. chosen a teacher's career with the Ministry he would now be making approximately \$2400 per year. The rental value ("fermage") of the plot now occupied by the school would be another \$360 per year if he managed to rent it for construction of six one-family homes rather than agricultural use — which is unlikely. Counting the state pension as income equivalent at one third of salary value, the total annual revenue would be a maximum of \$3,560 — compared to an estimated \$8,323.20 he is currently earning in salary and

profits. Who can blame him for seeking to maximize the return for his qualifications, skills and connections to international donors?

4. Why Work With the Lay Sector?


This question is similar to the one frequently raised about working with private schools altogether. There are indeed many good arguments of principle against such work. But there is also a most powerful argument speaking for it: **Because it is there.** The lay sector is large and growing and on the whole does not provide good services to the paying clientele. The root cause for its existence is the absence of public school alternatives appropriate for and accessible to the impoverished clientele. As long as it is not feasible to eliminate this root cause, the lay sector deserves attention.

ANNEX 3


**Geographic Distribution of
Project Activities**

**ECOLES PROTESTANTES
& BUREAUX REGIONAUX**

- ⊙ Bureaux organisés
- Bureaux Futurs
- Ecoles 1^{re} Cohorte
- " 2^e "
- " 3^e "
- " 4^e "
- + " laissés en chemin




- 101 ECOLES PRESBYTERALES
(CATHOLIC)
- ① 8 BUREAUX DIOCESAINS



ECOLES INDEPENDENTES

(825 ENREGISTREES)

⊠ 3^e cohorte
⊙ 4^e cohorte



ANNEX 4

**Educational Statistics for Haiti,
By Sector**

(TABLEAU 4)

NOMBRES D'ECOLES, ELEVES ET INSTITUTEURS EN 1988
 SELON LE MILIEU ET LE SECTEUR,
 D'APRES L'ENQUETE EXHAUSTIVE DU MEN

	ECOLES		ELEVES			INSTITUTEURS		
	NOMBRE	%	NOMBRE	MOY	%	NOMBRE	MOY	%
URBAIN PUBLIC	434	24	138,068	318.12	34	3,702	8.530	32
PRIVE	1,383	76	270,428	195.53	66	8,044	5.816	68
RURAL PUBLIC	543	19	105,436	194.17	29	2,584	4.758	25
PRIVE	2,370	81	258,048	108.88	71	7,788	3.286	75
TOTAL PUBLIC	977	21	243,504	249.23	32	6,286	6.4335	28
PRIVE	3,753	79	528,476	140.81	68	15,831	4.2183	72
TOTAL	4,730	100	771,980	163.20	100	22,117	4.6758	100

SOURCE: CALCULS BASES SUR L'ENQUETE EXHAUSTIVE DU MEN

(TABLEAU 5)

ESTIMATION DU NOMBRE D'ECOLES PRIMAIRES
ET DES EFFECTIFS
SELON LE SECTEUR ET LA CATEGORIE

DONNEES DE L'ENQUETE EXHAUSTIVE DU MENJS (1988)

	LAIQUE	CONGREG	PRESBYT	MISSION	COMMUN	COM.TRE	TOTAL
PUBLIC	878	100	1				979
PRIVE	1,085	128	500	1,782	89	197	3,781

EFFECTIF MOYEN

PUBLIC	232	402	34				249
PRIVE	148	328	123	133	112	106	141

EFFECTIF TOTAL

PUBLIC	203,696	40,200	34				243,930
PRIVE	160,580	41,984	61,500	237,006	9,968	20,882	531,920

FACTEURS DE CORRECTION

PUBLIC	1.1	1.3	0				
PRIVE	1.3	1.35	1.35	1.3	1.3	2.5	

NOMBRE ESTIME D'ECOLES EN 1988

PUBLIC	966	130					1,096
PRIVE	1,411	173	675	2,317	116	493	5,183
TOTAL	2,376	303	675	2,317	116	493	6,279

ESTIMATION DES EFFECTIFS

PUBLIC	224,066	52,260					276,326
PRIVE	208,754	56,678	83,025	308,108	12,958	52,205	721,729
TOTAL	432,820	108,938	83,025	308,108	12,958	52,205	998,054

SECTEUR CATHOLIQUE

DIOCESE*	NOMBRE D'ECOLES	%	NOMBRE D'ELEVES	%	NOMBRE DE PROF.	%
CAP-HAITIEN	181	20.0	35,190	17.5	962	16.7
PORT-DE-PAIX	83	9.2	15,001	7.4	473	8.2
HINCHE	70	7.7	13,538	6.7	450	7.8
JEREMIE	130	14.4	29,377	14.6	771	13.4
CAYES	132	14.6	28,762	14.3	887	15.4
PORT-AU-PRINCE	211	23.3	60,900	30.2	1,666	28.9
GONAIVES	98	10.8	18,732	9.3	551	9.6
TOTAL	905	100.0	201,500	100.0	5,760	100.0

* A noter que ces données comprennent les écoles presbytérales, les écoles congréganistes et les écoles semi-congréganistes (une partie des professeurs de ces écoles émergeant au budget du MEN).

STATISTIQUES COMPILEES SUR DES ECOLES DES MISSIONS MEMBRES
DE LA FEPH APRES L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DU 9/9/88

DEPARTEMENT	ECOLES			ELEVES			PROFESSEURS			
	DILEGUES	PRIM.	SEC.	PROF.	PRIM.	SEC.	PROF.	PRIM.	SEC.	PROF.
OUEST	74	1,707	37	54	246,793	7,930	3,510	6518	387	81
CENTRE	10	147	3	7	22,079	153	365	498	15	7
ARTIBONITE	11	72	3	3	9,164	450	50	283	22	6
NORD	13	324	28	28	38,601	4,380	2,540	1,541	224	104
NORD OUEST	2	31	1	1	4,690	—	20	122	—	2
SUD	9	292	7	9	38,728	1,656	932	1,503	98	26
SUD EST	1	10	—	—	936	—	—	39	—	—
GRAND ANSE	4	20	1	1	4,403	112	75	82	3	2
TOTAL	124	2,603	80	103	365,394	14,681	7,492	10,586	749	228

ANNEX 5

Evaluation Scope of Work

SCOPE OF WORK IIBE EVALUATION – JUNE 1989

1. Summary

USAID/Haiti is preparing a mid-term evaluation of the Incentives to Improve Basic Education (IIBE) Project (521-0190), an education project managed by the Mission's Office of Private Voluntary Development and implemented through a buy-in to AID's Improving the Efficiency of Education Systems (IEES) Project, managed by the Office of Education/Bureau of Science and Technology. The prime contractor for implementation is Florida State University with subcontracts with local organizations – *Commission Episcopale des écoles catholiques*, *federation des écoles protestantes d'haiti*, and CARE/Haiti.

A three-person team is required to carry out the evaluation as per the scope of work outlined below. The Mission has asked Florida State University to propose (subject to AID approval) and field an evaluation team to conduct the evaluation over a three-week period beginning around May 25, 1989.

2. Scope of Work – IIBE Evaluation

I. Purpose

The purpose of this evaluation is to review and assess the congruence of implementation efforts and progress-achievements of the IIBE Project with the project design outlined in the Project Paper and to determine project viability. The results of this evaluation will be used by IIBE to make midterm improvements in project management and operations, by IIBE and AID to better manage the transition to grant funding and by AID to assess the readiness of the prospective grantee to absorb and manage project funds.

The evaluation will focus on the following issues:

1. Financial, administrative, and program management of the Project (contractor and subcontractors/prospective grantee);
2. Delivery of school services and support to private primary schools;
3. Attainment of institutional development objectives;
4. Research and development activities (primarily focusing on the preprimary experimental program and project evaluation and monitoring systems).
5. Technical Assistance provided by the contractor to the local subcontractor organizations.

II. Background Information

(to be prepared)

III. Statement of Work

A. The evaluation will examine the various project components detailed below with the goal of answering the following overarching questions:

- What has been achieved to date? Are these outputs congruent with inputs and the Project Paper?
- To what extent is the Project's purpose being achieved?
- Is the Project design and methodology congruent with the Project's purpose? In so far as it has been modified, are the changes responsive to the Project's purpose?

- What has been the Project's impact to date?
- How is the Project received by the outside community (i.e., beyond the organizations immediately involved in the Project)?

B. More specifically the evaluation will respond to the following questions:

1. Financial, administrative, and program management:

- Is a well-defined management structure in place?
- Is the decisionmaking process defined and viable?
- Are management systems and procedures documented and followed?
- Has the management structure provided adequate support for project operations?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the present management structure?
- Have AID procedures and regulations been incorporated into management practices and followed at contract level? At subcontract level?
- Are reports, work plans, budgets, etc., produced regularly and used?
- How responsive and/or transferable will the present management systems be to the restructured project (i.e., for use by grantee)?
- Have subcontractors/local organizations adopted and mastered basic management practice?
- What steps — additional technical assistance, training, reforms — will aid system improvement?

2. Delivery of school services

- Are the school support services identified in the Project Paper being provided?
- Is the present delivery system effective (i.e., responsive to school requests, timely delivery, etc.)?
- What are the recipients' perceptions of the services offered and delivered?
- What reforms are needed to improve service delivery?
- Is the Project adhering to the prescribed model and methodology? In cases where adjustments are made, what are the most common type of modifications, why are they made?
- Is the model and methodology (including adjustments) viable?
- Do interim indicators show school quality improvements?
- What appears to be the strengths and weaknesses of the model at this interim point in project implementation?

3. Institutional development:

- Have the institutional capacity building steps called for in the Project Paper been followed?
- To what extent have the Project Paper goals been achieved?
- What has been the impact of this activity to date?
- Has an institutional development strategy been developed?
- Is the institutional development strategy responding to 1) the local organizations' needs, and 2) the project objectives?
- Is devolution of responsibility to the local organizations taking place?

- Have the local organizations developed the capacity to accept increased operational responsibility?
- Has the strategy for responsibility transfer been adequately planned?
- What is the representational effectiveness of the local organizations?
- What are the prospects for future sustainability? To generate financial resources? To attract donor support?

4. Research and Development:

Preprimary Experimental Program (PEP) -

- Is the experiment being implemented as called for in the Project Paper?
- Based on current design and operations, will the activity result in the development of model(s) appropriate to the local context?
- Is the activity congruent with overall Project objectives?
- Does it contribute to current school support efforts? Is it integrated into the Project?
- Are appropriate research strategies and techniques being followed?

Other R&D activities -

- Is the R&D strategy outlined in the Project Paper appropriate to Project goals and operations?
- How is it being implemented?
- What are the R&D activities to date?
- Have other R&D activities been planned for?
- Will these activities aid the improvement of school quality? Can they be applied to non-project schools?

Evaluation Systems -

- Are data collection and monitoring systems in place and functioning?
- Is data appropriate to Project needs being collected?
- Are these systems operating effectively?
- Are formative and summative evaluation systems designed and in use?
- Are these systems comprehensive? Do they address both Project needs and research needs?
- Are local staff involved in the evaluation efforts?
- Is evaluation being treated as an integral part of Project operations?
- Are appropriate skills being transferred?

5. Technical Assistance:

- Has the technical assistance required by the Project Paper been provided?
- Does the PP staffing plan meet Project needs?
- Is the current personnel qualified to provide the assistance necessary?
- Is the current staffing pattern adequate?
- Has the contractor's approach resulted in knowledge transfer and capacity building of local staff?

- What special problems have been encountered?
- Has the contractor undertaken appropriate adjustments and been responsive to evolving Project needs?
- Has the technical assistance established productive relationships with counterpart staff?

IV. Schedule of Work

A. Each evaluation team member will be provided with basic Project documentation (Project Paper, contracts, salient reports) prior to departure to Port-au-Prince and authorized to spend up to two-days reviewing the material at his home base.

B. Within three days of arrival in Port au Prince the evaluation team will present a detailed workplan to the Mission CTO and FSU representative. This will include a description of evaluation methodology, individual work assignments, field visit schedule, interview/meeting schedule, list of survey instruments to be used, and data requirements. The workplan will be finalized in a meeting with CTO, FSU representative and evaluation team.

C. The team will be expected to confer regularly with Mission CTO and FSU representative to coordinate support activities, corroborate findings, etc. A progress meeting will be held at least once a week.

D. At the end of the second week, the team will present a draft outline of the report and present preliminary findings and recommendations at a meeting with Mission and appropriate Project personnel.

E. At the end of the third week, a draft report will be presented to AID and IIBE to review prior to preparing revised finalized version.

F. The final report will be drafted by designated team leader and presented directly to Mission CTO with copy to FSU. This report will be presented no later than two weeks following receipt of review reactions, corrections, etc.

V. Logistical Support and Level-of-Effort

Office space, secretarial services (limited) and transport will be provided by IIBE and AID as part of this evaluation effort. Team members are expected to prepare and enter preliminary drafts on the computer. IIBE will make available a computer for data entry, analysis, and word processing needs. Anticipated specialized program software needs must be arranged for in advance of arrival in-country.

Translation services, if required, will be purchased as a part of this evaluation. A five-day work week is authorized.

VI. Evaluation Team Composition

A three-person team is required for this evaluation effort. These persons will be recruited by FSU and subject to AID approval. At least two team members should have French language capabilities at the fs 3+ level. The person in charge of field surveys will preferably have Creole speaking ability as well. The team will combine expertise in the areas of basic education, institutional development, and project evaluation and research with knowledge of Haiti and AID regulations. All members should have experience in program evaluation.

The Mission CTO, FSU representative, and IIBE personnel will take a collaborative and active role in the evaluation.

The team members will spend 15 work days (three weeks) in-country, preceded by a two-day preparatory period at home base. The designated team leader will be authorized to spend an additional 5 days preparing the final report, either in-country or at home base.

VII. Reports

The team will be responsible for submitting the following documents according to the schedule cited below:

<u>Document</u>	<u>Schedule</u>
a. Work Plan	COB day 3
b. Draft Outline/Preliminary Findings	COB day 10
c. First Draft Final Report	COB day 15
d. Final Report and Executive Summary	10 days following receipt of comments

The final report will be submitted to AID in ten copies in English. An executive summary, highlighting observations and recommendations, will be prepared by the team leader for translation by FSU into French. The report will be presented according to the AID format for evaluation reports, and will include the following chapters:

1. Executive Summary
2. Project Identification Data Sheet
3. Table of Contents
4. Body of Report
5. Appendices

The body of the report will include discussion of (1) the purpose and study questions of the evaluation, (2) a summary of the economic, political, and social context of the project, (3) the evaluation approach and methodology selected, (4) the evidence/findings of the evaluation, (5) the conclusions drawn from the findings, and (6) the recommendations based on findings and conclusions. The report should also include a list of recommendations made in other consultants' reports, a statement as to whether or not the recommendation was heeded and the results thereof. The body of the report should not exceed 50 pages.

ANNEX 6

List of Persons Interviewed

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED AND INSTITUTIONS VISITED

Most of these individuals were interviewed formally in their offices. In some cases the questioning was more limited in both time and substance. Names of teachers, directors, and *responsables* of the schools visited are omitted.

PROBED

Jean MOISSET
Tony REEKMANS
Maud FONTUS (SSC, Protestant)
Delille ANTOINE (SSC, Catholic)
Eddy JOSEPH (SSC, Independent)
Antoine LEVY
Aline BORY-ADAMS
Vania BERROUET
Evelyne VERDIER (PEP)
Georges MERISIER
Michel FAVARD
Jackie GAILLARD
Serge MARTINEAU
Alice SIMON
Margareth ADAM
Jean-Claude HUDICOURT

PROJECT ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

Père Hubert CONSTANT
Frère Hubert LEDEIT
Rosny DESROCHES
Pasteur Pauris JEAN-BAPTISTE
Père Yves JOCELYN
Père Yvan MUSEAU

USAID/FSU

Dana FISCHER
Daniel CESAR
Karen TIETJEN
John MC LANAHAN
Tony CRESSWELL
Peter EASTON
Simon FASS

UNESCO/PNUD

Frantz LOFFICIAL

MEN

Untel JEAN-NOEL (Planification)
Patrick AMBOISE (Statistique)
Hugues MATADOR (Informatique)

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Msgr. LAROCHE (Bishop of Hinche)
Richard CHALLANDES (Swiss Aid Agency)
Annie LAPORTE (CIDA)
Daniel MILBIN (IHSI)
Yves DECADY (IHSI)

SCHOOLS VISITED

Charlemagne Peralte, Croix-des-Bouquets
Solidarite Chretienne, PAP
Notre Dame de la Mer, Aquin
Notre Dame du Mt Carmel
Ste. Cetherine, Bouzi
Immaculee Conception, Cavaillon
Evangelique Bethanie, Cavaillon
Methodiste de Dory, Dory
Emmanuel Par la Foi, Mirebalais
Soeur Lucie Cecile, Mirebalais
Marie Educatrice, Dopalais
Methodiste Wesleyenne, Thomonde
Nouvelle Ecole Haitienne, Hinche
Ecole Normale, Hinche-Papaye
Ste. Therese, Hinche-Papaye
Maman Bon Dieu, Los Palis

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography contains works consulted during the evaluation, even though many of them are not necessarily quoted in the text.

Several of PROBED's internal documents have been omitted from this list because either they had not been officially sanctioned as final drafts at the time of the evaluation or their exact titles were not available at the time of writing of the final draft of this report. My apologies to both authors and readers for this mishap.

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