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**DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES PROJECT:
(656-0227)**

MID-TERM EVALUATION

June 1995

Submitted by:

Management Systems International

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Subject: Contract No. AEP-5451-I-00-2049-00, DO #23

To whom this concerns,

Please find enclosed two copies of the "Democratic Initiatives Project: (656-0227), Mid-Term Evaluation", Contract #AEP-5451-I-00-2049-00, Delivery Order #23, dated June 1995.

We thank you for the opportunity of evaluating this project and will be happy to provide our services in the future.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Adrian Fredrick', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Adrian Fredrick
Database Manager
M.S.I.

Enclosures: Two Mid-Term Evaluation Reports

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PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA SHEET

1. **COUNTRY:** MOZAMBIQUE
2. **PROJECT TITLE:** DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES PROJECT
3. **PROJECT NUMBER:** 656-0227
4. **PROJECT DATES:**
 - a. **First Project Agreement:** September 27, 1991
 - b. **Final Obligation Date:** March 27, 1995
 - c. **Most Recent PACD:** December 31, 1996
5. **PROJECT FUNDING:**
 - a. **AID Bilateral Funding:** \$ 22,300,000
 - b. **Other Major Donors:** None
 - c. **Host Country CP Funds:** None

TOTAL \$ 22,300,000
6. **MODE OF IMPLEMENTATION:** Direct Mission Management with Grants, CAs and Contracts
7. **PROJECT DESIGNERS:** USAID/Mozambique
8. **RESPONSIBLE MISSIONS OFFICIALS:**
 - a. **Mission Director(s):** Roger Carlson (Current)
Julius Schlotthauer (Former)
 - b. **Project Officers(s):** Laura Slobey (Current)
Charles North (Former)
9. **PREVIOUS EVALUATION(s):** None

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAI	African American Institute
AREAF	Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund
CA	Cooperative Agreement
CACD	Cooperative Agreement Completion Date
CDIE	Center for Development Information and Evaluation (USAID/PPC)
CNE	National Elections Commission
CPSP	Country Program Strategic Plan
DANDIA	Danish International Development Agency
D/G	Democracy and Governance
DIP	Democratic Initiatives Project
D/TA	Decentralization/Traditional Authority
'E' Team	Inter-Agency Coordinating Group
EOPS	End of Project Status
FRELIMO	Mozambican Liberation Front
FY	Fiscal Year
G/DG	Global Bureau Center for Democracy and Governance
GDO	General Development Office(r)
GPA	General Peace Agreement
GRM	Government of the Republic of Mozambique
HRD	Human Resource Development
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IOM	International Migrations Organization
IRI	International Republican Institute
LOP	Life of Project
MAE	Ministry of State Administration
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Development Assistance Agency
PACD	Project Assistance Agreement Date
PP	Project Paper
PSC	Personal Services Contractor
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
REDSO/ESA	Regional Economic Development Support Office/East & Southern Africa
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
RFA	Request for Applications
RFP	Request for Proposals
SIDA	Swedish Development Agency
SO	Strategic Objective
STAE	Technical Secretariat for Elections Administration
SUNY	State University of New York
TA	Technical Assistance

UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
U.S. United States
USG United States Government
USAID United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OVERVIEW

Evaluations tend to focus on the problems encountered during project implementation while neglecting to note their accomplishments ... both large and small. For this reason the evaluation team wants to acknowledge up-front what many before us have also concluded:¹ that the Democratic Initiatives Project, serving as a focal point for overall USG assistance to Mozambique's first multiparty elections, was a smashing success. DIP, as a critical element in our overall foreign policy and development assistance programs in Mozambique was a principal reason for the country's successful transition to constitutional democracy. Equally important, it has provided one of the first opportunities in the post-cold war era for the United States to put into practice its belief in and commitment to democratic values and the principles of good governance. For these reasons alone, the Project is considered a success. Any additional benefits derived through the achievement of other Project component objectives can and should be considered a bonus. We say this without conditions or qualification.

The purpose for now casting a more critical eye on the Project -- by examining the performance of key actors and the degree to which the Project has or has not attained stated objectives -- is to increase USAID's future capacity to better support the Mozambican democratization process. We believe that the problems encountered as well as the accomplishments achieved to date by the Project offer useful insights and important lessons, not only for USAID/Mozambique, but for the Agency as a whole, as it grapples with issues of policy, strategy and the appropriate donor role in partner country democratic development.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

The Democratic Initiatives Project is composed of four principal components: (i) Electoral Assistance; (ii) Judicial System Strengthening; (iii) Civil Society Support; and (iv) Decentralization and Traditional Authority Analysis and Strengthening. In addition to the financial resources made available by USAID/Mozambique for the implementation of each of these components were the important management inputs provided by both the Mission and its implementing partners.

A. Overall Project-Level Status Relative to Project Inputs

¹ The most recent review of the Democratic Initiatives Project was undertaken late last year by the General Accounting Office in its multi-country assessment of USG-funded democracy programs. The DIP evaluation team was briefed by a member of the GAO team prior its departure for Mozambique. Among the soon to be published results of their study was the conclusion that the success of the DIP, as well as the entire USG effort in Mozambique -- itself a model among all countries reviewed -- was due to the extraordinary collaboration displayed among the concerned USG agencies.

As of March 31, 1995, a total of \$22,300,000 had been authorized in LOP funding of which \$19,100,000 had been obligated; \$17,687,262 earmarked; \$17,123,402 committed; \$14,386,119 in accrued expenditures; and \$4,713,881 in the pipeline. Of total LOP authorized funding to date:

- Roughly 64 percent (or \$14,156,454) has been earmarked for (and expended on) the electoral assistance Project component;
- Roughly 11 percent (or \$2,785,000 comprised of the AAI CA and NGO Sector budget) has been earmarked for the Decentralization/Traditional Authority (6%) and the Civil Society Strengthening (5%) Project components. As was noted previously, it was not clear to the team the purpose of the \$525,000 budgeted for the NGO Sector budget line item.
- Roughly 8 percent (or \$1,435,508) has been earmarked for Project Management (6.5%) and Audits and Evaluations (1.5%);
- Roughly 17 percent (or \$3,962,738) of authorized LOP funding remains unearmarked (total unearmarked TA, Training, Commodity and NGO budget line items) and thus available for new Project funding.

Total USAID LOP financial inputs (including funds allocated to TA, Training, Project Management, NGO Sector, and Audits & Evaluations budget categories) are adequate to ensure attainment of the overall Project purpose by the PACD.

- To date, sufficient funding has been earmarked to permit attainment of each of the outputs/objectives established for the individual Project components except strengthening judicial independence;
- Sufficient funding remains to cover all planned and anticipated Project management, while those necessary to cover audit and evaluation costs through the PACD may not be sufficient if a major external audit of the project takes place.

B. Achievement of Project-Level Outputs and EOPS Relative to Project Component Status

A total of seven institutional grants (UNDP, CARE, International Migrations Organization, African American Institute) and Cooperative Agreements (National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, International Foundation for Electoral Systems) were awarded under the electoral assistance component of the DIP; one CA was issued covering both the Civil Society and Decentralization/ Traditional Authority (D/TA) components (AAI); and one contract was entered into for the legal sector assessment under the Judicial Strengthening component (Chechi and Company). In addition, USAID directly procured both commodities and individual

consultant services to support related electoral activities identified during the year leading up to elections.

- A total of \$16,560,633² was awarded to the six U.S. and international NGOs, UNDP, and one for-profit firm responsible for managing the nine activities funded by the Project between late 1991 and mid-1994. Individual awards ranged from \$105,206 (IFES) to \$9,157,000 (UNDP). Funds were assessed and deemed to be adequate for the activities proposed and, in a number of cases, were considered to be overly generous;
- All awards under the Electoral Assistance component, except for those made to NDI and IRI were completed as of March 31, 1995, with these two Cas scheduled to expire on July 31, 1995 and August 31, 1995, respectively. The CA to AAI is currently scheduled to expire on July 29, 1996. Deliverables detailed in the contract made to Chechi and Company were completed in October 1992 (although the actual completion date was 12/31/94).

Of the four Project components, i.e., electoral assistance, judicial/legal system strengthening, civil society support, and decentralization, the percentage of planned outputs and EOPS achieved to date are as follows:

- Elections component outputs are nearly 100 percent completed; EOPS were fully achieved with the holding of the October 1994 multi-party elections and voting by some 87 percent of registered voters; mid-term sustainability of the electoral process, is however, in doubt;
- Judicial sector strengthening component outputs are 0 percent completed and are unlikely to be, although the legal sector assessment, an initial output under the original PP was completed; EOPS have not been achieved and are unlikely to be completed by the PACD of 12/31/96;
- Decentralization/Traditional Authority component outputs are less than 10 percent completed and are unlikely to be completed the by the Cooperative Agreement Completion Date (CACD) or PACD; EOPS, as defined in PP Amendment 1, are being achieved, but not as a result of project activities;
- Civil society component outputs are under 10 percent complete and are unlikely to be completed by either the CACD or the PACD; EOPS are being achieved but not as a result of Project activities.

² This figure represents total commitments through 3/31/95 and is comprised of the technical assistance and NGO Sector budget categories.

C. DIP Management Performance

A major USAID/Mozambique input contributing to overall project progress and achievement was and is DIP management and the resources devoted it. The findings related to DIP project management are viewed in both a narrow sense, i.e., that of the DIP project management team, and in the more inclusive sense which encompasses other Mission offices and the larger Inter-Agency Elections Coordinating Group or "E" Team.

- The team assessed the use of fixed-wing aircraft -- a particular source of disagreement and tension between the Mission and USAID/Washington -- as a necessary and critical element of electoral support ... both to ensure that required voting materials were delivered to the more remote polling stations in this vast country; but equally important, to ensure that left-over materials, and specifically voter registration lists and cards, were retrieved and returned to the STAE in Maputo. This latter undertaking is considered by the team to have been a critical link in the sustainability of future electoral efforts.
- Following the signing of the October 1992 General Peace Accords and in the run-up to the October 1994 National elections, DIP Project Management was essentially incorporated into the larger USG Inter-Agency Coordinating Group through its participation on the "E" Team.
- The "E" Team, in addition to its information sharing, strategy development and coordination, and problem solving functions related to USG support to the electoral process, became the decision-making body responsible for overall direction of the Project and the selection and approval of DIP-financed grantees and cooperators; functions it continues to undertake as of this evaluation.
- The smooth functioning, shared purpose and collaborative nature of the "E" Team was a principal reason for the overall success of USG support for the Mozambican elections, and therefore a significant reason for their success; and stands out as a model for inter-agency collaboration in the achievement of American foreign policy objectives and the delivery of U.S. foreign assistance.
- While DIP Project Management in the inclusive sense noted above has performed admirably in relation to the electoral assistance component of the Project, it has necessarily had to sacrifice a degree of oversight and management for other Project components. Although not the principal reason for the slow progress of these other project component activities, it nonetheless was a contributory factor.
- Problems were encountered in the Mission-wide review and E-team approval of several Project proposals submitted by U.S. NGOs, and the contracting of grantees and Cooperative Agreement Recipients leading to the delay of Project activities and engendering some ill-will between the concerned parties. Many of these problems can be attributed to: (i) mistakes made in the "heat of battle" as one informant termed the last

year prior to elections; (ii) the normal delays associated with USAID contracting; and (iii) the general understaffing of the USAID Mission in general and DIP in particular. However, a number these problems were technical and structural in nature and should be revised.

D. Implementing Partner Performance

- In general, all recipients of project funding under the **Electoral Assistance** component achieved the objectives established for their individual awards and thus contributed to the successful achievement of Project level election objectives including outputs and EOPS. The management, effectiveness and efficiency of the Awardees in the execution of their awards was, however, uneven.
- No activities were undertaken in **Judicial Strengthening** component except the initial legal sector assessment undertaken by Chechi & Company in early 1992 as one of several sectoral studies and assessments called for in the original PP. The changed situation resulting from the signing of the Peace Accords in October 1992 and the subsequent revisions to the PP which expanded DIP's mandate into the operational arena, also led to a more defined set of outputs and EOPS related to the strengthening of Mozambican judicial independence.

Both the **Traditional Authority Support** and **NGO Strengthening** components and corresponding activities were folded into a CA awarded to the African American Institute.

- Both AAI activities were seriously behind schedule as of 3/31/95. Many of the reasons, however, have little to do with AAI's management of the Project and include: (i) the delay in receiving initial CA funding; (ii) the frenzy of election fever which essentially precluded consideration of any other activity, USAID-financed or not, from mid-1994 through the end of the year ... in short, the first six months of CA activities; and (iii) the delays encountered in receiving GRM approval of the D/TA Project Manager and later, her subsequent illness. It should also be noted that both of these activities were ambitious, if not technically complex undertakings, working with some of least developed and understood organizational actors in the country, i.e., indigenous NGOs and traditional authorities.
- On the other hand, the team questions the strategy and approach initially conceived for the civil society strengthening component which included: (i) an intensive program of both tailor-made and generic capacity building with a large number of NGOs at the provincial level and below; and (ii) a reliance on more developed indigenous and international NGOs to provide targeted technical assistance and training to weaker subnational NGOs. Consideration must be given to whether the organizational eligibility and activity selection criteria as well as the proposal format developed by a South African NGO TA team were too sophisticated and complex for the majority of Mozambican

NGOs. This is particularly true given the relatively small grants which are intended to be provided under the CA.

PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

A. General Conclusions and Their Implications

It is important to keep in mind that the DIP was one of several components in USAID/Mozambique's Transition Program whose goal was a: **"Successful War-to-Peace Transition."** DIP thus contributed to the Program's second strategic objective: **"Successful Implementation of the Peace Process"** and specifically: **"Support for [multiparty] Elections."** While the Transition Program contributed to laying the foundation for long-term development, and has concerned itself at times with such developmental issues as sustainability, its objectives were essentially non-developmental ... avoiding famine and death, ensuring successful implementation of the peace process, and facilitating the reintegration of the population into stable and productive social and economic activities. In short, it fell somewhere along the murky continuum of relief to development.

DIP's virtually exclusive focus on elections has been entirely appropriate and essential within the context of the Transition Program strategy. The point to be made, however, is that the 1994 elections, as important as they were, should be considered as just one of several transition objectives successfully negotiated. Like the larger Transition Program to which it contributes, DIP has been involved in laying a developmental foundation, or as the revised DIP purpose states: **to support Mozambican initiatives to establish the foundation for a stable democratic society."** The true importance of the elections, therefore, is not because they represent the sudden advent of a democratic Mozambique, but rather, because they mark the dramatic end of a brutal war while providing the preconditions for a durable peace.

First time elections, particularly those which follow protracted wars, may indicate that a transition has taken place, but not necessarily the desired result of a sustainable democratic transition. In this regard, the oft quoted "one election does not a democracy make" raises two important questions for DIP in particular and for the Mission's democracy and governance program in general. If one successful election does not, in fact, make a democracy, then how many elections -- and the donor assistance required to support them -- does it take ... one more at the subnational level; a second round of national elections? Given the scheduled 1996 Municipal elections, this question has particular relevance to the Mission and the extent to which it will use remaining DIP resources to support them.

Secondly, the question can equally be asked as to the opportunity cost of supporting additional election activities as opposed to investments in other areas which may yield longer-term contributions to laying democratic foundations, or even to begin the process of democratic consolidation. The Mission's macro-political analysis of democracy and governance in Mozambique undertaken as part of its recently submitted CPSP makes a major conclusion in this regard. It notes that Mozambique's long history of the consolidation of political power in the executive branch has effectively excluded not only other state institutions (e.g., the legislature and judiciary) from participation in national governance matters, but more importantly, civil society and local government as well. While multi-party elections have led to the installation of

a democratically-elected president and independent deputies in the National Assembly, there is little doubt that the historical power asymmetries which define much of the past four hundred years are still much in practice and particularly in relation to civil society and local government. The question then is whether and how much the Mission should invest in up-coming Municipal elections vis-a-vis support to civil society and local government on the one hand and between assistance for the National Assembly and judiciary vis-a-vis civil society and local government on the other.

The slow progress of the other three DIP project components noted in the Findings section is considered by the team to be neither critical nor particularly unusual within the larger framework of the Transition Program. In general, it is our conclusion that the concern by both Mozambicans and donors for holding successful elections so dominated the Mozambican landscape that all other activities were relegated to secondary status at best and were most likely considered an unnecessary distraction at worst. In particular, it is our opinion that the judicial strengthening component as well as that supporting NGO or civil society strengthening suffered from the fact that their objectives were -- if it can be so termed -- far too developmental for the situation in which they were designed and implemented. Attempts to build the capacity of democratic institutions in a pre-democratic setting, especially one marked by instability and insecurity, were fraught from the beginning with problems over which neither USAID nor its partners had control. In hindsight, it would not be inaccurate for us to state that the three non-elections related EOPS and the activities designed to lead to their achievement were inappropriate to the project context and inconsistent with the non-developmental objectives of DIP. It is only now with the elections safely behind the Mission and its Mozambican governmental and NGO partners that these other more developmental project components have a realistic chance of being successfully implemented.

In summary, we believe the DIP was a smashing success because of the importance that the elections had in the transition from war to peace in Mozambique and the considerable role that the Mission had in making them successful. It was the achievement of peace that was the single most important initiative in establishing the foundation for a stable democratic society to which DIP has contributed. If the project had accomplished nothing else in its first three years, it would still be considered in our opinion to have been a success. The issue now is what can be realistically undertaken by the project during the remainder of the Transition Program to prepare for the commencement of USAID's first true "developmental" country program and the consolidation of democracy and good governance.

B. The Nature and Structure of DIP Project Management

The convergence of American foreign policy and development assistance objectives around Mozambican elections and the Democratic Initiatives Project has been a principal reason for the effectiveness and successful attainment of overall USG objectives in Mozambique. The extraordinary degree of collaboration and coordination within USAID, between it and other USG agencies, as well as with other donors and the GRM, is primarily due to the short-term focus on a limited range of objectives related to the 1994 elections. The "E" Team in its role as inter-

agency policy making and problem solving body has as well served as the primary management body for the DIP. As we noted earlier, elections are a transition event. They can also be considered a political event, both for the country undergoing them and for their donor partners.

With the successful conclusion of the elections, USAID must begin the process of reorienting the DIP to longer-term, more developmental objectives centering on support of the Mozambican democratic consolidation process. As USAID will soon have a newly approved country program strategy which, among other objectives, supports this consolidation process, the previous overlap of political and developmental interests will naturally begin to diverge. This is not to suggest that USAID's development assistance objectives have suddenly become inconsistent with larger U.S. foreign policy concerns. Rather, they have become strategic and long-term and focus on what USAID does best: conceive of and deliver development assistance, whether political, economic or social.

These changed circumstances have a number of immediate implications for DIP's future management. The first concerns the composition of the project management team and its place within the larger Mission management structure. The second implication concerns the role and function of DIP within inter-agency collaboration and coordination and the involvement of these other partners in future DIP management. The following discussion provides our recommendations concerning these two issues.

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

Of the numerous recommendations, suggestions and considerations put forth by the team in the Recommendations section, there were a limited number which we believe are of particular importance and that can and should be acted on by the Mission in the near future. They include:

A. Project Level Actions

- It is recommended that the PACD be extended at least an additional six months and preferably one year to permit the Mission to: (i) undertake a strategic review and planning exercise in order to determine the types of future DIP activities to be supported; (ii) ensure existing activities are completed; (iii) allow newly funded activities adequate time for completion; and (iv) provide adequate time to close out the project and undertake a final evaluation.
- We recommend that previously submitted unsolicited proposals not be acted upon until the completion of the strategic planning exercise. We further recommend that one or more RFPs/RFAs be let to solicit proposals for the management of activities identified through the strategic planning exercise, and believe this to be a better option for the Mission than trying to work with the proposers of unsolicited proposals.

- In line with the proposed and likely approval of a D/G Strategic Objective under the Mission's recently submitted CPSP, we recommend the creation of a new Democracy and Governance Office.
- Consistent with the developmental thrust of the soon to be approved CPSP and as originally proposed in the Project Paper, we recommend that the current position of Project Manager be changed to that of D/G Advisor.
- We recommend that the E-Team or similar inter-agency body continue its role as overall policy-making and coordinating body for DIP, but that it no longer be involved in strictly implementation matters related to project management, particularly related to the review and approval of project proposals.
- Within USAID it is recommended that a DIP Project Committee be established with representation from each Mission office with responsibilities for internal coordination of project activities and serving as the review committee for new proposal submissions.

B. Project Component Actions

- The Team sees no compelling reason to continue the **Judicial Independence Strengthening Component** and recommends that it be dropped. Such an action would require a revision of the Project Logical Framework and an amendment to the Project Paper.

F electoral Assistance Component

- We recommend that the Mission provide additional assistance to the newly created STAE to: (i) safeguard voter registration lists including the creation of a computerized data base; and (ii) conserve and safeguard unused voter cards, civic and voter education materials, and other documentation developed by CNE and STAE.
- We recommend that: (i) all recipients of Project assistance complete final reports, preferably a final evaluation of their respective activities; and (ii) the Mission undertake a limited assessment of the 1994 elections to identify gaps in either information or analysis and undertake relevant additional research, if required, leading to a comprehensive set of lessons learned and recommendations for use in the up-coming 1996 elections.
- Utilizing lessons learned from the study of the 1994 elections, we recommend that USAID should commission an assessment of local government elections needs, preferably in collaboration with other concerned donors, that would serve as the basis for USAID's support of the 1996 elections.

Decentralization and NGO Strengthening Components

- It is recommended that the AAI Cooperative Agreement -- through which the Decentralization and NGO Strengthening Components are being managed -- be extended an additional six months beyond the current PACD of 12/31/96.
- The Team strongly recommends that AAI revise the strategy of its **civil society project** by undertaking a two-pronged approach to NGO strengthening, including: (i) an intensive package of capacity building assistance to a limited number of organizations in priority USAID geographic areas; and (ii) the creation of a "micro grant fund" for rapid and responsive funding of a much larger number of newly emerging NGOs that have a good idea and the voluntary spirit to carry it out.
- It is recommended that all concerned parties working on the Decentralization and Traditional Authority Study project meet shortly after the arrival of the new DIP D/G advisor for the purpose of reviewing project status and to decide upon modifications to project objectives and implementation due to the delays experienced to date. Specifically, a new workplan should be developed with specific time-frames and indicators to be used in monitoring project performance and impact against stated objectives and planned activities.

C. Laying the Ground-work for DIP II

- The Team recommends that a major assessment and series of studies and research be undertaken to identify topics and develop a preliminary curricula outline in civic education that respond to needs perceived by Mozambican citizens.
- In the formal educational system, we recommend that the Mission begin discussions with the concerned GRM ministries concerning possible DIP support of the development of a civic education curriculum for secondary schools, an area of need and where no other donor has expressed an intention of support.
- We strongly suggest that the Mission begin identifying U.S. and African regional organizations working in the democracy and governance field as a means for increasing competition and broadening the base of potential new partners in DIP II.

LESSONS LEARNED

The Democratic Initiatives Project demonstrates a number of lessons which should not only benefit USAID/Mozambique in the future, but any Mission engaged in democratic development. Mozambique is a country that has successfully negotiated the transition from war to peace and did so with significant support from the donor community of which USAID has been a major contributor. Given the number of aborted African transitions and failed "state building" exercises that took place during the same two year period as the Mozambican transition, its tremendous

success is all the more noteworthy and merits close examination to determine what distinguished the this experience from others. The following discussion presents our analysis of what worked and what did not, and the lessons they offer for those who believe in a viable democratic Africa.

- Elections, particularly first time elections, dominate the concerns, agendas and energies of all parties concerned. To expect that other activities, especially those with more developmental objectives, will receive the attention that they deserve is unrealistic. In the case of DIP, the slow progress of project components other than those concerned with electoral assistance, is understandable. Future designs should be less ambitious as to what can be accomplished in such circumstances.
- First time elections in countries emerging from war are much more a benchmark of a transition from war to peace than they are a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. It should be realized that for a considerable period of time following transition elections that donor assistance will be primarily contributing to the consolidation of peace and not the consolidation of democracy and improved governance. In short, assistance designed to attain developmental objectives in the domain of democracy and governance is unlikely to lead to the full achievement of these objectives.
- In transition situations, there is likely to be a convergence of foreign policy and development assistance objectives leading to achievement of both. As economic and political stabilization are achieved there will necessarily be a divergence between the two as the longer-term and strategic nature of development assistance begins to conflict with the shorter-term and tactical needs of foreign policy. This should not be interpreted as a difference between foreign policy and development assistance objectives at the policy level, but rather in the day-to-day implementation of the latter and the operational decisions that are required.
- Decisions to utilize an intermediary to channel and manage development assistance on behalf of USAID to one or more implementing agents should be based primarily on programmatic needs and not the administrative ease that they may afford overstretched bureaucracies. This is a lesson learned from numerous USAID-financed "umbrella" projects.
- Democratic development in general and democracy and governance programs in particular are risky undertakings and must be based on the assumption that failure is as likely an outcome as success. As the case of Mozambique points out, however, the benefits of the undertaking are worth the inherent risks.

I INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Chapter I provides the evaluation purpose, scope and methodology as well as the overall structure of the report in Part A. In Part B a summary of the project background and context are presented and an up-dating of Democratic Initiatives Project design parameters.

A. Evaluation Scope and Methodology

1. Evaluation Purpose and Objectives

This mid-term evaluation is the first external review conducted of DIP implementation. The evaluation is both retrospective and future-directed as portrayed by its two-fold purpose: (i) to provide USAID and other concerned USG agencies, as well as the project's several Mozambican government and non-governmental partners, with an assessment of DIP's progress to date in terms of stated project objectives; and (ii) to offer recommendations for the future programmatic direction of the project as it moves towards its scheduled conclusion. As stated in the contract scope of work (see Annex A), specific evaluation objectives include:

- Review the appropriateness, timeliness and quality of project inputs. Assess the validity of design assumptions, eligible activities and impact indicators. Provide a descriptive analysis of project status relative to the inputs provided.
- Review project outputs and evaluate progress made towards their achievement. Assess the extent to which end of project status was achieved for: (a) free and fair elections; (b) participation by the majority of the electorate in these elections; (c) active participation by traditional authorities in local level decision-making; (d) increased number of Mozambican NGOs active in areas where the project has worked; (e) implementation of regular in-country training for judges at provincial and district levels; and (f) application of the new commercial code.
- Provide a detailed explanation of those areas where project outputs have been exceeded, or are not likely to achieve targets over the life of the project.
- Given the Project's concentration on the electoral process, the emphasis of the evaluation should be on the DIP's electoral assistance component. Special difficulties in implementation have included: (a) the necessity of securing funding to employ aircraft in conducting registration and other pre-election activities; and (b) the need to develop and finance important components of the electoral process such as the training and deploying of political party monitors, delegados de lista, in a very short time as no other donor funding was available for this activity.
- Review the project purpose and assess the extent to which project inputs and outputs are, or are not, leading to the achievement of the purpose by the project assistance completion date (PACD).

- Make recommendations for the next phase of project implementation.

2. Evaluation Approach and Methodology

The field portion of the evaluation took place between April 18, and May 5, 1995. The two-person evaluation team of a democracy and governance specialist and elections expert was joined at various points by an officer from the Global Bureau's Democracy and Governance Center (G/DG) and the REDSO/EA Democracy and Governance Advisor. The team spent the first two weeks in a review of core project documents (see Annex B) and in interviews with key project stakeholders (Annex C) including concerned USAID/Mozambique, U.S. Embassy and USIS officers; GRM officials in the Ministry of State Administration, the National Elections Commission, and the Commission's technical arm (STAE); U.S. and international NGO grantees as well as a number of indigenous NGOs; and several of the major donors which supported the electoral process. While the team was generally successful in meeting key project participants, attempts to interview a cross-section of Mozambican political party representatives were impeded due to the holding of a critical session of Parliament to pass the country's first budget under a democratic system. We believe their time was better spent in such pursuits with little impact on the overall outcome of this evaluation.

The team prepared a preliminary evaluation report prior to its departure and held a debriefing for USAID/Mozambique as well as other members of the USG Inter-Agency Coordinating Group on the elections (the 'E' Team) based on the principal findings, conclusions and recommendations found in the report. A draft final report was prepared by team in the U.S., sent to the Mission for comment, and revised and finalized accordingly.

The evaluation team has paid considerably more attention to the electoral assistance component of the DIP than to other planned activities. This is justified in terms of the overall time and funding expended by the Mission on this important activity. However, we have taken sufficient time to both review the three other components which represent three of the five end of project status (EOPS), and attend to the equally important task of reflecting on and making recommendations for future DIP directions and activities.

3. Evaluation Structure and Contents

The remainder of this report is divided into evaluation findings (Part II) and a consolidated conclusions and recommendations section (Part III). Rather than provide detailed individual analyses of each project component (and their numerous sub-components) in the report's main body, we have undertaken this SOW requirement and appended it in Annex 2. Principal findings have been extracted from this annex and are presented in Section II. B, while corresponding conclusions and recommendations are found in chapter III. Before moving into our findings, a brief overview and background section is presented to provide the context and design parameters of DIP.

B. The Democratic Initiatives Project

Section 1 provides a summary of the historical context within which the DIP eventually came to be designed and implemented. In section 2 a review of the design parameters and their evolution over the course of the project is presented.

1. Project Background and Context

In September 1991 when the Democratic Initiatives Project was first authorized, Mozambique was about to enter its 16th year of civil war. It was a war of particular virulence and brutality with non-combatants the primary targets and victims. Although peace negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO had been underway for nearly a year by this point, it was far from clear that they would actually lead to a cessation of hostilities, let alone an enduring peace. A year later in October 1992, in the midst of one of the worst droughts to hit Southern Africa in a century, the impossible happened: the two sides signed General Peace Accords (GPA) in Rome ending one of Africa's longest running civil wars. Peace and the relative security that came with it provided the impetus for some 1.6 million refugees in surrounding asylum countries, an additional 3.7 million internally displaced, and nearly 100,000 demobilized soldiers and their families, to begin the arduous trek back to their ancestral lands and the beginning of a long process of national reconstruction and reconciliation.

Mozambicans had virtually no experience with either democratic pluralism or multiparty politics until the holding of national presidential and legislative elections in October 1994. Nearly 500 years of Portuguese colonialism ending in 1975 were immediately followed by 16 years of post-independence FRELIMO one-party rule. In both periods, political power was essentially centralized in the hands of a few strong state institutions and particularly those of the executive branch. Not only was there little role for society in the formulation or execution of public policy, but so too were the legislative and judicial branches effectively excluded from any independent decision making role in national governance matters. And likewise, local government and traditional authorities became either direct extensions of the executive branch or were coopted and undermined by FRELIMO's party structure which extended down to the lowest levels of economic and social life.

By the early 1980s the impact of FRELIMO rule and its Marxist-Leninist policies was clear. Politically, FRELIMO had alienated core constituencies both within and outside of the party ultimately leading to the formation of RENAMO -- although not without the initial prodding and support of the Rhodesian and later, South African governments -- and the start of civil war. Economically, the legacy of a centralized command economy and the escalating costs of maintaining a large military capability brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy, while forcing the largely farming population to retreat into subsistence agriculture. And finally, given the fact that nearly one-third of all Mozambicans were in the status of either external refugee or internally displaced, with two-thirds of the population living in absolute poverty, and nearly everyone else in some way brutalized and scarred by the war, the country's social fabric was as close to the breaking point as anywhere in the world.

It was this combination of political, economic and social failures, plus a large dose of pragmatism that led FRELIMO, as early as its fourth party congress in 1983, to begin the process of political liberalization. Government actions culminated in the formal break with Marxism - Leninism in 1989, and the passage of a new constitution in 1990 providing for multi-party politics and eventual elections. It also accounted for FRELIMO's decision to reach an accommodation with Western donor countries, including the adoption of economic stabilization and structural adjustment programs in return for emergency relief and development assistance. The recently held and successful multiparty elections and the installation of the country's first democratically elected government marked an historical turning point in Mozambique's transition from totalitarian to democratic rule.

2. Updating Project Design

Since the approval of the DIP project paper and signing of the Project Grant Agreement in September 1991, there have been three PP amendments and five Grant Agreement amendments. Because they so thoroughly changed the initial design parameters including purpose, EOPS, LOP funding and PACD, this section provides a brief overview and updating of project design parameters.

a) *The Project Paper (PP)*

DIP was authorized through a bilateral Project Grant Agreement with the Government of the Republic of Mozambique (GRM) in September 1991, with Life of Project (LOP) funding in the amount of \$4,000,000, and a Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) of December 31, 1993. The project was conceived of and designed to support the Mission's fiscal year (FY) 1990 - 1992 Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP) which pursued a combination of policy reform and developmental objectives in three principal areas: (i) assuring food security; (ii) increasing the role of the private sector in the economy; and (iii) facilitating improved governance. DIP's stated purpose within the framework of the latter objective was:

to facilitate increased Mozambican understanding of strategic options and related implementation requirements for democratic initiatives in the three core areas of multiparty elections, the institutionalization of an independent judiciary, and the decentralization of government.

The PP identified three principal project components, i.e., multiparty elections, institutionalization of an independent judiciary, and decentralization. A fourth area: "enhancing the non-governmental base for democracy," was noted in the PP as a target for possible support but the emphasis was primarily on facilitating the creation of an enabling environment for NGOs rather than on the provision of specific assistance, given the weakness of Mozambican civil society and the lack of established organizations. Due to the uncertain nature of Mozambican political development at the time of DIP design, activities in each of the three core components were limited to the conduct of sector-wide analyses and studies as a means of providing the Mission's government counterparts with strategic options as well as implementation plans and budgets in

the three key areas of democratic development identified during DIP design. The project was designed with maximum flexibility in mind with individual components viewed as both discrete activities with their own objectives as well as elements contributing to the larger project purpose.

b) *Amendment Number 1*

As noted above, October 1992 marked the end of open hostilities between FRELIMO and RENAMO with the signing of the General Peace Accords. It also ushered in a changed developmental as well as political context, to a significant degree bringing a convergence of objectives to the two domains. The Mission reviewed these new circumstances and subsequently developed a new interim country program strategy, **War-to-Peace Transition Program**, for the period FY 1993 - FY 1995. Three new program objectives were formulated -- (i) avoid drought-related and war-related famine and death; (ii) contribute to the successful implementation of the peace process; and (iii) contribute to reintegration of populations into stable and productive social and economic activities -- which addressed the new program goal of **Successful War-to-Peace Transition**. To support the second program objective, the Mission designed a new activity to support military demobilization and redesigned the DIP to support, among other activities, the multiparty elections called for in the GPA.

On September 3, 1993, DIP was amended for the first time in order to: (i) increase LOP funding from \$4.0 million to \$17.0 million; (ii) extend the PACD from 12/31/94 to 12/31/96; and amend the project purpose to reflect the new objectives of the Transition Program. Specifically, the new DIP purpose was revised as follows:

to support Mozambican initiatives to establish a foundation for a stable democratic society.

While the initial intent of the project was to provide the GRM and other Mozambican actors with strategic options related to the development of democratic institutions, the principal purpose for revising DIP was to provide USAID with the capacity to directly support the implementation of key Mozambican initiatives, primarily that of electoral assistance. The amendment does, however, acknowledge that elections alone will not ensure the growth and sustainability of democracy. The strengthening of civil society, the decentralization of government, and the promotion of a rule of law are critical factors required to ensure that democratic processes do not stop with the elections. While the amendment recognizes that such objectives can only be achieved in the long-term, it states that actions must be started now to set the stage for the post-electoral period.

The redesigned DIP essentially maintained the same three project component areas detailed in the PP, but moved them from the primarily analytic and advisory to the operational with activities designed to support the wider set of objectives called for in the Transition Program. In addition, support for civil society which had been a potential rather active area of project assistance under the PP was up-graded to reflect the need to begin laying the foundation for a strong non-state

sector in the post-electoral period. Conditions or EOPS developed to indicate achievement of the newly formulated project purpose were revised and are presented in Section 2, below.

In summary, the principal purpose of amending the DIP was to permit the Mission to engage in direct support of the peace process in general and elections in particular. Secondly, it provided the Mission with the operational capacity to support the laying of a foundation for improved democratic governance in several complementary areas important to the post-transition period.

c) Amendment Number 2

Amendment number 2 to the PP was signed on September 9, 1994. Its purpose was two-fold: First, it increased life of project funding by an additional \$2.1 million to a total of \$19.1 million; and secondly, in conjunction with Grant Agreement Amendment Number 4, it permitted USAID/Mozambique "to issue direct contracts and assistance instruments without first obtaining GRM concurrence for each action." The reason for the increase in the DIP LOP budget was to fill funding gaps identified in the last two months prior to the holding of elections. This included additional funding for fixed wing aircraft and items not previously identified in the GRM's election budget, such as training and logistical support for political party monitors and international election observers. The rationale for seeking the right to enter into contracts and/or Cooperative Agreements (CA) and grants without GRM approval was to be able to respond rapidly to newly emerging and critical electoral needs in the immediate run-up to elections. Previous delays in the funding of project activities resulting from contracting difficulties made such a requirement particularly necessary at this late juncture.

d) Amendment Number 3

The third and final DIP amendment was signed on February 2, 1995 with the primary purpose of increasing LOP funding by an additional \$3.2 million to a total of \$22.3 million. The increased funding made available through this amendment was to permit completion and consolidation of on-going component activities and to provide additional funding for two new activities. In terms of on-going activities these additional funds would:

- (i) ensure that critical documentation (e.g., voter registration rolls and unused ballots) were safely returned and stored in the capital and to create computerized data bases thus starting the institutionalization of key electoral processes and contributing to system sustainability;
- (ii) continue support to the decentralization process; and,
- (iii) provide additional support for strengthening civil society through small grants and training for NGOs, media and political parties.

The two supplementary activities which were to be supported by this amendment included: (i) additional funding to strengthen the newly elected National Assembly such as technical assistance

and training for new Deputies and to improve the quality of their support staff; and (ii) to provide preliminary analytic capability to the Mission and some operational support to the GRM for the scheduled 1996 Municipal elections mandated by the recently passed Municipal Code.

II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

Chapter II provides findings at the overall project level (Part A) as well as that of the individual project components or what are also referred to as subprojects (Part B). These components or subprojects cover the four principal areas, i.e., electoral assistance, legal sector/judicial strengthening, decentralization/traditional authority, and NGO support, specified in PP Amendment Number 1 as targets of DIP assistance. It should be noted that most of these components have more than one activities designed to achieve project level outputs and EOPS. Part C, provides a summary of principal findings.

A. Reviewing and Assessing Project-Level Status

The first three sections of Part A, present findings related to project level inputs, outputs, and EOPS. The final section provides a review of USAID/Mozambique project management, considered to be a major input factor determining the achievement of overall project objectives. The section begins with an identification and review of the inputs made available for Project implementation. Section 2 reviews the Project Management structure established to allocate and manage the use of dedicated resources.

1. Specifying and Assessing Project Inputs

In this section, a review of USAID-provided inputs is undertaken as the initial step in addressing a **principal evaluation objective**: determining the appropriateness, timeliness and quality of Project inputs. The Project Paper specifies six sets of Project inputs: (i) technical assistance (TA), (ii) USAID project management, (iii) training, (iv) project-level evaluations and audit, (v) commodities, and (vi) NGO sector assistance. The PP and its three subsequent amendments provide, in accompanying financial plans, the level of funding and, in some cases, the corresponding units and level of resources committed. It should be noted that the PP Logframe includes neither Government of Mozambique nor grantee contributions as Project inputs as is customary in similar design documents. The following table traces the evolution of project inputs through the financial plans contained in the Project Paper and relevant Project Amendments.

TABLE 1: PROJECT INPUTS AS EXPRESSED BY FINANCIAL PLANS

Financial Plan	Project Paper	Amendment #1	Amendment #2	Amendment ³ #3	Total Input Category
Technical Assistance	\$ 1,850,834	\$ 13,607,000	\$ 15,700,000	\$ 19,369,552	\$ 19,369,552
Training	\$ 461,166	\$ 200,000	\$ 200,000	\$ 600,000	\$ 600,000
Commodities	\$ 195,000	\$ 0	\$ 0	\$ 100,000	\$ 100,000
NGO Sector	\$ 300,000	\$ 1,900,000	\$ 1,900,000	\$ 525,000	\$ 525,000
Project Management	\$ 993,348	\$ 1,093,000	\$ 1,093,000	\$ 1,435,448	\$ 1,435,448
Audit & Evaluation	\$ 200,000	\$ 200,000	\$ 200,000	\$ 270,000	\$ 270,000
Total LOP Funding	\$ 4,000,000	\$ 17,000,000	\$ 19,100,000	\$ 22,300,000	\$ 22,300,000

Total LOP funding has increased by over five and one-half times between the approval and authorization of the Project Paper in September 1991, and the signing of the third amendment in February 1995. Table 2 below, provides figures by Project input category for the financial status of the project through March 31, 1995. While the total authorized LOP budget was \$22,300,000, the amount actually obligated as of this date was \$19,100,000. As noted below, it is the authorized amount which is used in determining the status of project inputs, and thus the basis for our subsequent recommendations.

TABLE 2: FINANCIAL STATUS REPORT BY PROJECT INPUT CATEGORY⁴

	OBLIGATIONS TO DATE	EARMARKS TO DATE	COMMITMENTS TO DATE	EXPENDITURES TO DATE	PIPELINE TO DATE
PROJECT ELEMENT					
Technical Assistance	\$ 17,081,652	\$ 16,486,754	\$ 16,425,122	\$ 13,863,451	\$ 3,218,201
Training	\$ 200,000	\$ 0	\$ 0	\$ 0	\$ 200,000
Commodities	\$ 0	\$ 0	\$ 0	\$ 0	\$ 0
NGO Sector	\$ 525,000	\$ 145,000	\$ 142,000	\$ 75,000	\$ 450,000
Project Management	\$ 1,093,000	\$ 935,508	\$ 556,280	\$ 447,668	\$ 645,680
Audit & Evaluation	\$ 200,000	\$ 120,000	\$ 0	\$ 0	\$ 200,000
Total Project	\$ 19,100,000	\$ 17,687,262	\$ 17,123,402	\$ 14,386,119	\$ 4,713,881

³ The financial plan used for PP Amendment Number 3 corresponds to Amendment Number 5 to the Project Grant Agreement signed with the GRM. There was no Financial Plan for PP Amendment Number 3.

⁴ The figures used in this table come from USAID/Mozambique's quarterly "Summary Project Financial Report," covering the period 1/1/95 through of 3/31/95 and dated April 4, 1995.

The following four sections provide the status of USAID financial inputs through March 31, 1995. As noted above, total funds **authorized** through this period are \$22,300,000, while \$19,100,000 were actually obligated. As the actual obligation of the remaining \$3,200,000 is expected to take place by the time this evaluation is completed, we use the authorized figure as shown in Table I above, in order to provide the Mission with a true picture of financial inputs and particularly whether funding is adequate or not for planned activities through the PACD.

a) Technical Assistance and NGO Sector

The TA and NGO sector budget items represent the funds made available for financing each of the project's four components and numerous individual activities. It needs to be pointed out that the NGO Sector budget line item of \$525,000 does not have any clearly defined purpose as far as the team can discern. It has been used to fund both a CARE grant (\$117,000) related to the electoral assistance component and the procurement of photographic equipment (\$25,000) for a private media concern (Savana). Actual grants for Mozambican NGO strengthening are covered under the African American Institute (AAI) Cooperative Agreement (CA). Of the total \$17,606,652 obligated for these two line items, \$16,631,750 have been earmarked leaving \$974,902 available for new subproject funding. However, taking the figure of \$19,369,552 **authorized** through PP Amendment Number 3 for the TA line item and \$525,000 for the NGO Sector line item, total funding unearmarked and available for new subproject funding increases to **\$3,262,798**.

b) Training

A total of \$600,000 was authorized and obligated through PP Amendment Number 3 for the training line item. This was an increase of \$400,000 from PP Amendment Number 2 to PP Amendment Number 3. No earmarks have been made to date and it is unclear whether there will be any given the lack of clarity as to what this line item was to be used for. In essence, there remains an additional **\$600,000** authorized and obligated but unearmarked for new subproject funding. This may soon change, however, with the Mission's recently communicated intention to fund USIS training programs.

c) Commodities

Total funding under the Commodity's line item increased from zero under PP Amendment Number 2, to \$100,000 under PP Amendment Number 3. There have been no earmarks made to date, thus leaving a the full amount of **\$100,000** available for commodities, or new subproject funding depending on the needs identified during the remainder of the project. It is assumed that commodities pertain to those necessary for subproject use rather than project-level objectives.

d) Project Management

Total Project Management funding increased from \$993,348 under the PP to \$1,435,448 under PP Amendment Number 3. Total earmarks through 3/31/95 amounted to \$935,508 leaving an unearmarked balance of roughly \$500,000 through the current PACD. Project management costs primarily include salary and benefits for the DIP long-term technical assistance team of Project Manager, assistant Project manager, and secretary, as well as necessary equipment for the project management team and some short-term TA which was brought in at various points to support project management prior to the elections. As most fixed assets (e.g., project manager furniture and appliances, project management team equipment) were purchased as of 3/31/95, remaining costs through the PACD should be limited to normal salary and related benefits for the three person project management team.

e) Audits and Evaluations

A total of \$270,000 has been obligated under PP Amendment Number 3 for audits and evaluations. Total earmarks through 3/31/95 amounted to \$120,000 which ostensibly pertain to costs associated with this mid-term evaluation. Funds remaining under this budget item amount, therefore, to \$130,000 which will be required to cover final evaluation costs and perhaps an outside audit.

Finally, it should be noted that a "contingency" budget line item has been shown since the initial Project Paper, but no actual funds have been authorized or obligated to it. It is the teams understanding that no future funding is likely to be allocated to this line item.

2. Specifying and Assessing Project Outputs

Amendment Number 1 to the Project Paper specifies four Project-level outputs. Each of these outputs correspond closely to the five EOPS presented in the following section, with the first output contributing to the first two EOPS. The four outputs are discussed in turn below.

a) Conditions for Free and Fair Elections Created

As provided in greater detail in Part B.2 below, the first project-level output was completely achieved through the several activities financed under the electoral assistance project component. Specifically, the following indicators signify that the outputs, as detailed in the PP Amendment Number 1 Logical Framework (logframe), were achieved:

- | | | |
|-------|--|----------------|
| (i) | 52,400 election officers trained | 100% Completed |
| (ii) | Electorate's understanding of the electoral process improved | 100% Completed |
| (iii) | 4,000 hours of fix-winged aircraft services provided | 100% Completed |

In addition to the conduct and completion of a preliminary study and analysis of electoral needs as called for under the original PP in early 1992 by the International Foundation for Electoral

Support (IFES), several complementary activities were designed and undertaken following the approval of Amendment Number 1 -- and, for the most part, completed prior to elections -- to ensure the achievement of this project-level output, including: (i) the provision of TA by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) on comparative electoral legislation to Mozambican Political parties debating the country's draft electoral law (100% completed); (ii) the provision by NDI of voter training, voter education materials for radio broadcast, focus group voter opinion research data, and TA to NGOs working on voter education campaigns (94% completed); and (iii) through the combined efforts of IRI, IOM and CARE, 32,000 political party pollwatchers sponsored, trained and deployed to over 7,000 voting locations (100% completed).

While it is always difficult to specify and attribute the exact contribution that USAID inputs -- or the input of any donor for than matter -- have made to a desired outcome or condition, there is little doubt that, in the case of electoral assistance, USAID support was both significant and critical. This includes interventions that were made directly by USAID/Mozambique officers or by the individual activities financed by the Mission under the electoral assistance component. The finding that conditions for a free and fair election were created is evidenced through the reports and announcements of international donors and NGOs, as well as political party monitors and the National Elections Commission. While many incidents of elections anomalies and irregularities were reported, they were, for the most part, investigated and dealt with immediately with little impact on the veracity of final election outcome.

b) An Independent Judiciary Strengthened

The only DIP-financed activity related to this project-level output was the conduct of a legal sector study undertaken by Checchi and Company and completed in mid-1992 as part of the set of preliminary studies and assessments called for under the original DIP PP (100% completed). However, none of the following four measurable indicators signifying attainment of this project output were either started or completed:

- (i) Commercial code revised;
- (ii) Family law research conducted;
- (iii) 50 judges trained; and,
- (iv) Other judiciary staff trained.

In short, as of 3/31/95 activities designed to achieve this output had not commenced, with no apparent plans or planning undertaken that would lead to output achievement by the scheduled PACD.

c) *The Role of Traditional Authorities Clarified*

The following two indicators signifying attainment of this project-level output fall under the broader category of decentralization, the initial project component specified in the PP. The issuance of a policy paper itself has not changed from that specified in the PP, while the in-country training of political party officers was added after preparation of PP Amendment 1.

- (i) An official policy paper on the role of traditional authorities issued resulting from the administration of a research program on the relationship of traditional authorities to local government structures; and,
- (ii) Provision of an in-country training program on decentralization methodologies to GRM and political opposition representatives.

For a number of reasons discussed in more detail in B.2 below and in Annex 2, this Project output is less than 10% completed. It is one of two project outputs and EOPS whose achievement was to be attained through the Cooperative Agreement made to African American Institute. The overall finding related to this component/output is that it is significantly behind schedule, and has only shown movement since the beginning of this current year.

d) *Public Understanding of Civil(c) Rights and Responsibilities Increased and Selected Organizations Strengthened*

The evaluation team took this output to mean an increased understanding of civic rather than civil rights and obligations. Of the following two indicators signifying attainment of this project-level output, the team has assessed that less than 10% of the corresponding activities were completed by the end of March 1995:

- (i) Public's understanding improved; and,
- (ii) Sub-grantees' activities promoting the role of civil society.

Attainment of this output was to be completed through activities financed in the CA to AAI. As detailed in B.2 below and Annex 2, the specific activities intended to lead to the attainment of this output are seriously behind schedule.

3. Specifying and Assessing End of Project Status

The following conditions or end of project status (EOPS) were specified in Amendment Number 1 to the Project Paper indicating achievement of DIP project purpose:

- (i) Free and fair elections implemented;
- (ii) Majority of the electorate participates in national legislative and presidential elections;

- (iii) District level judges are applying new commercial code; regular in-country training for district and provincial level Ministry of Justice officials has been institutionalized.
- (iv) Traditional authorities play an active role in local level decision making; and,
- (v) An increase in the number of Mozambican NGOs and community associations in Project activity areas.

EOPS numbers 1 and 2 were both fully achieved with the holding of national presidential and legislative elections. As noted in the previous section on Project-level outputs, no activities have been undertaken related to the strengthening of an independent judiciary and thus no progress has been made towards the achievement of EOPS number 3. Activities related to attaining project outputs (i) clarifying of the role of traditional authorities and (ii) increasing public understanding civic rights and selected organizations strengthened, have commenced through AAI's CA but actual progress has been very slow to date. Therefore the last two EOPS are seriously behind scheduled.

4. Assessing DIP Project Management and External Relations

A major USAID/Mozambique input contributing to overall project progress and achievement was and is DIP management and the resources devoted it. The findings related to DIP project management are viewed in both a narrow sense, i.e., that of the DIP project management team, and in the more inclusive sense which encompasses other Mission offices and the larger Inter-Agency Elections Coordinating Group or "E" Team. This section also looks at relations between USAID project management and other actors involved in support of the Mozambican democratic transition.

a) *DIP Project Management*

The following discussion presents the principal findings concerning DIP project management and its functioning:

DIP Project Management has been defined to include: (i) the Project Management Team composed of three Personal Services Contractors (PSCs), i.e., Project Manager (U.S. Hire), Secretary (local hire), and an assistant Project Manager (Third Country National), all coming on board at various points between January 1992 and December 1993; (ii) a Direct Hire Project Officer initially coming from the Program Office and later reassigned to the General Development Office (GDO); and (iii) a short-term PSC (U.S. Hire on temporary transfer from Project Development Office) for roughly three months just prior to elections. During the last year prior to the October 1994 elections, the DIP Project Management Team was increasingly supported by staff in virtually all other Mission Offices including Senior Management.

- The DIP Project Management Team was severely understaffed throughout most of the period under review including critical periods in the run-up to elections. It was, however,

universally praised -- by Mission colleagues, concerned Mozambicans and donors, and PVO Partners -- for its hard work, dedication, and collaborative spirit;

- The major contribution which USAID assistance made to the holding of successful Mozambican elections was thus the result of an extraordinary Mission-wide effort which included the full commitment and prudent leadership of Senior Management; the selfless and competent work of numerous individuals in each Mission Office, often under extreme pressure; and the exceptional character, skills and devotion to Mozambique and Mozambicans of the DIP Project Manager.

Following the signing of the October 1992 General Peace Accords and in the run-up to the October 1994 National elections, DIP Project Management was essentially incorporated into the larger USG Inter-Agency Coordinating Group through its participation on the "E" Team.

- The "E" Team, in addition to its information sharing, strategy development and coordination, and problem solving functions related to USG support to the electoral process, became the decision-making body responsible for overall direction of the Project and the selection and approval of DIP-financed grantees and cooperators;
- The smooth functioning, shared purpose and collaborative nature of the "E" Team was a principal reason for the overall success of USG support for the Mozambican elections, and therefore a significant reason for their success; and stand out as a model for inter-agency collaboration in the achievement of American foreign policy objectives and the delivery of U.S. foreign assistance; and,
- It appeared to the Evaluators that the "E" Team still undertakes the same functions vis-a-vis DIP Project Management in the post-electoral era as it did during the previous two years of the Project.

While DIP Project Management in the inclusive sense noted above has performed admirably in relation to the electoral assistance component of the Project, it has necessarily had to sacrifice a degree of oversight and management for other Project components. Although not the principal reason for the slow progress of these other project component activities, it nonetheless was a contributory factor. As noted by a number of Mission staff, there has also likely been adverse impact on the progress of other projects within the Mission's portfolio, the result of staff participation in election-related activities as well as the imperatives which any first-time election generates in the wider country context.

- Little progress has been made in the execution of the AAI Cooperative Agreement which encompasses two of the four Project components and accounts for two of the five Project EOPS. While much of the delay experienced by this Project component was due to causes over which neither USAID nor AAI had control, the team believes there has been a lack of DIP follow-up related to actions discussed and agreed upon by both parties to

address identified constraints. The Team does, however, acknowledge that frequent meetings were held between DIP management and the AAI Country Representative.

- There has apparently been little discussion or any decision made concerning the future of the Judicial Independence component of the Project;
- While there have been sporadic discussions and a general idea of the types activities to be funded during the remainder of the Project, it does not appear to have been undertaken in a strategic or coherent manner. Instead decisions appear to have been made on a case-by-case and ad-hoc basis rather than in relation to current Project objectives;
- The "interregnum" between the departure of the former Project Manager and the arrival of the new one has aggravated these lacunae, and led to some initial confusion concerning jurisdiction between Offices with responsibilities for the management of project activities. This has now apparently been resolved to the satisfaction of the concerned offices.

Problems were encountered in the Mission-wide review and E-team approval of several Project proposals submitted by U.S. NGOs, and the contracting of grantees and Cooperative Agreement Recipients leading to the delay of Project activities and engendering some ill-will between the concerned parties. Many of these problems can be attributed to: (i) mistakes made in the "heat of battle" as one informant termed the last year prior to elections; (ii) the normal delays associated with USAID contracting; and (iii) the general understaffing of the USAID Mission in general and DIP in particular. However, a number these problems were technical and structural in nature and can or should be revised.

- While the "E" Team was indispensable for charting overall direction and strategy for the USG electoral support effort, it was at times overly cumbersome in its role as the DIP Project review and approval committee;
- Except for the grant made to the United Nations Electoral Trust Fund and a contract made to Chechi & Company for the legal sector assessment, all Project activities funded to date by DIP were the result of unsolicited proposals. This contrasts to the PP which anticipated a competitive award process which, it is believed, would have lessened some of the problems noted above;
- Similar problems may be encountered in a new set of unsolicited proposals being submitted by U.S. NGOs which could be compounded by the lack of a clear Project strategy for activities to be undertaken through the PACD;
- At the same time, at least three Project proposals submitted by U.S. and international NGOs, and ultimately critical to the success of the entire electoral process, were handled quickly and in close collaboration with Project partners, demonstrating the flexibility and responsiveness that was intended in the Project's design.

b) USAID Relations with Its Partners

In general, and throughout the period leading up to elections, USAID/Mozambique's relations with the GRM, Mozambican political parties, other donors, and NGO grantees and cooperators was exceptional demonstrating professionalism, even-handedness, collaboration and flexibility. Within the larger USG electoral effort:

- USAID officers remained fully engaged with their government counterparts encouraging, cajoling, and, when necessary, remaining firm on previously made commitments which, in a number of cases, were responsible for keeping the elections on track;
- USAID participation and leadership in the "Aid for Democracy Group" contributed to the forging of common donor positions vis-a-vis the GRM on a range of contentious elections issues; and the identification, coordination and "division of labor," including financing, of key electoral needs;
- USAID's relations with its NGO grant recipients has not been without its share of tensions, indicative of disagreements over approach and strategy; differences in perspective related to constituencies served; and the frictions that have traditionally marked the PVO - USAID relationship. In spite of these tensions and unique to the Mozambique context, ways were found to overcome problems which ultimately led to an unusual degree of partnership.

Relations between USAID and its government and donor counterparts have begun to lose some of the strength and sense of common purpose exhibited during the period between the signing of the Peace Accords and the successful completion of elections. This is considered neither particularly unusual nor necessarily detrimental to future collaborative efforts. The elections were far more than a benchmark in the transition from a one-party state to a multiparty democracy. They signified the transition from a brutal 16 year civil war to a new era of peace and national reconstruction. In this new context, the objectives are long-term, strategic and developmental as opposed to those related to the elections which were short-term, tactical and immediate. Each of the partners involved in this new setting should and will have varying views as to how best to attain longer term, more developmental objectives.

B. Reviewing and Assessing Project Component Status

As previously discussed, the Democratic Initiatives Project is comprised of four principal components, each with at least one activity contributing to the achievement of project level outputs and EOPS. In Part B, a review and assessment of the status of each component is undertaken as an principal step in evaluating the overall progress made towards the achievement of project objectives. As the vast majority of USAID resources have gone towards financing project component activities, this assessment will as well provide findings and thus contribute to conclusions concerning the impact and effectiveness of project level inputs. Section 1 specifies, in summary form, the principal activities comprising each component, the implementing

agency, LOP budget, PACD and current status. Sections 2 through 4, provide the principal findings by component in terms of **Awardee Performance Relative to Project Component Status**. Each of these sections are a summary of and extracted from the detailed descriptions found in Annex 2. The concluding Section 5, looks specifically at the performance of Awardees in terms of several management requirements including reporting, monitoring and evaluation.

1. Specifying Project Components

Table 3 below, summarizes basic data related to each of the four project components and the activities that make them up:

TABLE 3: PROFILE OF PROJECT-FINANCED COMPONENTS AND ACTIVITIES

COMPONENT/ACTIVITY RECIPIENT	GRANT/CA #	GRANT/CA LOP FUNDING	START - END (PACD) DATES LENGTH OF GRANT/CA	STATUS
1. Electoral Assistance	3 Grants/4 Cas	Total: \$14,156,454	09/27/91-06/30/95 = 45 MOs	99% Completed
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)	CA-A-00-1089-00	\$ 105,206	09/27/91-12/31/93 = 27 Mos	100% Completed
International Organization for Migrations (IOM)	G-656-0227-3-40014 G-656-0227-3-40018	\$ 2,192,700	09/19/94-12/15/94 = 03 Mos	100% Completed
International Republican Institute (IRI)	CA-G-00-4031-00	\$ 480,000	07/29/94-08/15/95 = 13 Mos	95% Completed
CARE International	G-656-0227-3-0047	\$ 117,000	09/19/94-11/10/94 = 02 Mos	100% Completed
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)	G-656-0227-3-4025	\$ 9,157,000	04/29/94-04/28/95 = 12 Mos	100% Completed
National Democratic Institute (NDI)	CA-A-00-4001-00	\$ 1,920,000	12/07/93-07/39/95 = 18 Mos	95% Completed
African American Institute (AREAF)	AREAF CA Buy-in	\$ 184,000	09/01/94-11/01/94 = 02 Mos	100% Completed
2. Judicial Strengthening	1 Contract	Total: \$144,179	09/27/91-03/31/95 = 12 Mos	0% Completed
Checchi & Company	Contract I-00-2006-02	\$ 144,179	09/27/91-09/30/92 = 09 Mos	100% Completed
3. Decentralization/ Traditional Authority	1 CA Subcomponent	Total: \$864,245 + \$500,000 Admin	08/01/94-08/29/96 = 25 Mos	<10% Completed
African American Institute	CA A-00-4929-00	\$ 1,364,245	08/01/94-08/29/96 = 25 Mos	<10% Completed
4. NGO Democratic Development	1 CA Subcomponent	Total: \$559,922 + \$334,833 Admin	08/01/94-08/29/96 = 25 Mos	<10% Completed
African American Institute	CA A-00-4929-00	\$ 894,755	08/01/94-08/29/96 = 25 MO	<10% Completed
TOTALS	3 GRANTS; 5 Cas; & 1 Contract	\$16,560,633 in Commitments	Completed in: FY 92 = 1; FY 94 = 3; FY 95 = 5; FY 96 = 2	Obligated : 85% Authorized: 73%

The following discussion presents the principal findings related to overall awards made to implementing agents since the commencement of project activities:

A total of seven institutional grants (UNDP, CARE, IOM, AAI) and Cas (NDI, IRI, IFES) were awarded under the electoral assistance component of the DIP; one CA was issued covering both the Civil Society and Decentralization/Traditional Authority (D/TA) components (AAI); and one contract was entered into for the legal sector assessment under the Judicial Strengthening component (Chechi and Company). In addition, USAID directly procured both commodities and individual consultant services to support related electoral activities identified during the year leading up to elections.

- A total of \$16,560,633⁵ was awarded to the six U.S. and international NGOs, UNDP, and one for-profit firm responsible for managing the nine activities funded by the Project between late 1991 and mid-1994. Individual awards ranged from \$105,206 (IFES) to \$9,157,000 (UNDP). Funds were assessed and deemed to be adequate for the activities proposed and, in a number of cases, were considered to be overly generous;
- All awards under the Electoral Assistance component, except for those made to NDI and IRI were completed as of March 31, 1995, with these two Cas scheduled to expire on July 31, 1995 and August 31, 1995, respectively. The CA to AAI is currently scheduled to expire on July 29, 1996. Deliverables detailed in the contract made to Chechi and Company were completed in October 1992 (although the actual completion date was 12/31/94).

2. Assessing Electoral Assistance Support & Awardee Performance

In general, all recipients of project funding under the Electoral Assistance Project component achieved the objectives established for their individual awards and thus contributed to the successful achievement of Project level election objectives including outputs and EOPS. The management, effectiveness and efficiency of the Awardees in the execution of their awards was, however, uneven.

- CARE, IOM and IRI were widely praised for their management of activities related to the training and administrative/logistic support of political party election monitors. The impact of this set of interventions was considered by many within government, among donors, and by USAID to have been critical to the success of the elections. It should be noted that the timeframe and objectives of these three awards were limited and focussed which, it is believed, contributed to their success. Finally, reference is made to some tensions which arose between USAID and IRI's local representative over the lack of information provided to USAID and promises made by IRI to election officials that had financial implications not budgeted for under this component activity. On the other hand, the materials produced by IRI were considered to be some of the most effective and utilized of all donor inputs.

⁵ This figure represents total commitments through 3/31/95 and is comprised of the technical assistance and NGO Sector budget categories.

- IFES undertook an assessment of electoral needs in early 1992 which was one of several studies called for under the original Project Paper. It is the team's evaluation that this study was not particularly useful -- either to USAID or the GRM -- primarily the result of an unresponsive team which did not fully respond to the terms of reference specified in their CA. Specifically, the assessment was to provide USAID and the GRM with a recommended package of electoral interventions with corresponding budgets. The draft report submitted by IFES was found to be unacceptable in this regard. By the time a final report was submitted -- itself only marginally better than the draft -- the GRM had requested UNDP to undertake the work.
- While USAID provided a block grant to the UN Electoral Trust Fund, it did earmark these funds to three specific activities: (i) training of election officials; (ii) production of civic and voter education materials and training of trainers; and (iii) funding of fixed-wing aircraft. Some 42,000 election officials working under the CNE were trained and effectively administered elections in some 7,000 sites ("tables") throughout the country. Voter and civic education materials produced by UNDP were considered of generally good quality and 1,600 trainers were trained in two different sessions. While no figures were found for the number of people receiving voter education from UNDP trainers, the intention was that it would be undertaken on a country-wide basis. Of particular note was the use of theater and role playing with villagers as an educational technique which was considered both innovative and effective.

Finally, the team assessed the use of fixed-wing aircraft -- a particular source of disagreement and tension between the Mission and USAID/Washington -- as a necessary and critical element of electoral support ... both to ensure that required voting materials were delivered to the more remote polling stations in this vast country; but equally important, to ensure that left-over materials, and specifically voter registration lists and cards, were retrieved and returned to the STAE in Maputo. This latter undertaking is considered by the team to have been a critical link in the sustainability of future electoral efforts.

- NDI has managed one of the longest (20 months), and among U.S. NGO Awardees, the largest awards (\$1.9 million) under the Electoral Assistance component. NDI's execution of its civic education activities suffered from problems in obtaining approval of its unsolicited proposal which took nearly a year to gain USAID approval, and engendered significant ill-will between the two parties; and initial tensions with UN technical assistance personnel working under the STAE. While NDI was able to overcome these problems over time, and successfully implemented its voter and civic education program, the team believes that a number of these problems were self-induced, the result of the manner in which it made its entry into Mozambique -- initially by-passing USAID and dealing directly with the Embassy -- embodied by an approach which was considered by key actors in CNE/STAE, UNDP, and USAID to be less than sensitive and collaborative.

NDI's program of civic education included the development and production of civic and voter education materials and the training of some 200 trainers through a "cascading" strategy, training Mozambicans from the national to district levels. In general the program was competently executed and the training methodology employed was considered to be particularly effective. NDI estimated that over 1.7 million eligible voters were reached by its trainers. Civic education materials produced under this Project sub-component were deemed generally good by USAID and STAE, and particularly the radio plays produced and aired throughout the country. The single exception in this regard, were a number of posters that were deemed inappropriate to the local context.

- One of most effective activities -- although not necessarily critical to the elections was the technical and logistics services, including interpreting services at the CNE press center -- was provided by AAI through the African Regional Electoral Assistance Program (AREAF). With a relatively modest amount of funding, this single intervention was mentioned by a wide range of informants as a most useful collateral intervention.

3. Assessing Judicial Strengthening and Awardee Performance

No activities have been undertaken in this Project component except the initial legal sector assessment undertaken by Chechi & Company in early 1992 as one of several sectoral studies and assessments called for in the original PP. The changed situation resulting from the signing of the Peace Accords in October 1992 and the subsequent revisions to the PP which expanded DIP's mandate into the operational arena, also led to a more defined set of outputs and EOPS related to the strengthening of Mozambican judicial independence.

- The Chechi legal sector assessment while thorough and extensive in scope was considered by a number of key GRM officials to contain an anti-Lusophone bias, somewhat condescending in tone, and did not stress the differences between Roman Law and the Napoleonic Code. It was the GRM's view that consultants familiar with this particular legal system were needed to accurately assess the sector.
- The logic underlying USAID's involvement in the legal or justice sector was to closely coordinate its activities with other donors already operating in this area including the World Bank, DANIDA, and Portuguese technical assistance. Later, SIDA and more recently UNDP have indicated their interest in providing assistance to the sector.
- If in fact the activities called for under this Project component -- i.e., (i) revision of the Commercial Code; (ii) conducting research into the area of Family Law; (iii) the training of 50 judges; and (iv) training of other judiciary staff -- are still necessary, which is by no means clear to the team, then the question must be asked if USAID is the best placed donor to undertake them. If it is, then it must be asked whether they could just as easily be undertaken through other USAID Projects (e.g., Private Sector Support for the Commercial Code and Primary Health Care for Family Law research).

4. Assessing Traditional Authority Support and NGO Strengthening

Both of these DIP components and corresponding activities were folded into a CA awarded to the African American Institute. This was another proposal which seemed to languish in USAID's review and approval process, taking at least a year to negotiate and then several additional months to receive funding. Having established its Mozambican office in 1987 with a respected Mozambican as Country Representative, AAI was both knowledgeable of the local situation and had established a good previous working relationship with the USAID Mission. The AAI CA was both the longest (2 years) and largest (\$2.26 million) of all the awards made by USAID through the Project except for that issued to the UNDP.

- Both AAI activities are seriously behind schedule. Many of the reasons, however, have little to do with AAI's management of the Project and include: (i) the delay in receiving initial CA funding; (ii) the frenzy of election fever which essentially precluded consideration of any other activity, USAID-financed or not, from mid-1994 through the end of the year ... in short, the first six months of CA activities; and (iii) the delays encountered in receiving GRM approval of the D/TA Project Manager and later, her subsequent illness. It should also be noted that both of these activities were ambitious, if not technically complex undertakings, working with some of least developed and understood organizational actors in the country, i.e., indigenous NGOs and traditional authorities.

On the other hand, the team questions the strategy and approach initially conceived for the civil society strengthening component which included: (i) an intensive program of both tailor-made and generic capacity building with a large number of NGOs at the provincial level and below; and (ii) a reliance on more developed indigenous and international NGOs to provide targeted technical assistance and training to weaker subnational NGOs. Consideration must be given to whether the organizational eligibility and activity selection criteria as well as the proposal format developed by a South African NGO TA team are too sophisticated and complex for the majority of Mozambican NGOs. This is particularly true given the relatively small grants which are intended to be provided under the CA.

While we believe the "Management Principles Manual" which has been developed by the TA team, and which will serve as the basis for NGO capacity building interventions is thorough and appears to be of high quality, it is unlikely that it will be able to be implemented in full given the time remaining in the Project.

5. Awardee Reporting and Monitoring and Evaluation

Finally, the quality of reporting by Awardees, both financial and progress, to USAID was mixed, lacking in a number of cases both basic informational requirements and objective analysis. The timeliness of Awardee reporting, as stipulated in individual contracts, Cas or grant agreements was also problematic for most of these organizations. It was unclear from our discussions with

either USAID or individual Awardees how well the latter actually monitored their own awards, and evaluated -- at least, a final evaluation -- them.

- It can be stated that the three awards made during the last stages of the electoral process were too short and undertaken during difficult times to merit the preparation of regular reports stipulated in the individual agreements. We do, however, acknowledge the effort made by CARE to both monitor its activities and report to USAID on them in a timely manner. There has not yet been any final accounting for the funds used by most completed awards, nor the evaluation of completed activities, except for IRI, some six months following the elections. The same goes for the UNDP grant and this grantees failure to submit required reports. In the non-election related activities, mention is made of the significant effort of AAI in its reporting on CA activities. We would only note that its reporting period does not conform to either that of USAID or conventional accounting or audit periods.
- The same problems related to reporting noted above are equally valid for the monitoring of a number of Awardee grants and Cas. While the reasons for a lack of monitoring is understandable for the three awards of short duration, they do not pertain to the two larger Cas made to NDI and AAI. While each of their initial proposals contain discussions of intended monitoring and evaluation plans, they do not deal with the practicalities of monitoring country-wide activities with available personnel covered by the CAs. In the case of AAI, this is not yet a problem as it has yet to make any grants or commence capacity building activities with NGOs. With NDI, however, we are unable to determine how well their civic education trainers were supervised and monitored during the CA. The particular concern that we have in this regard is the accuracy of data collected and reported on by the 200 NDI trainers related to the number of villages they worked in and the number of individuals that were trained.
- The one evaluation of award activities that we did review, i.e., the NDI CA, was of poor quality both ignoring major problems encountered during the project and even omitting important accomplishments which, in fact, demonstrated significant impact of the activities. It would also have been useful to USAID/Mozambique to have such information for its own reporting to USAID/Washington.
- While a number of organizations did undertake evaluations of elections activities, they were either of discrete components (e.g., voter education) or were more forward looking than retrospective and analytic (e.g., UNDP).

C. A Summary of Principal Findings

Section C provides a summary review of principal evaluations findings at both the overall project and component levels.

1. Overall Project-Level Status Relative to Project Inputs

- As of 3/31/95 a total of \$22,300,000 had been authorized in LOP funding of which \$19,100,000 had been obligated; \$17,687,262 earmarked; \$17,123,402 committed; \$14,386,119 in accrued expenditures; and \$4,713,881 in the pipeline.
- Of total LOP authorized funding to date:
 - Roughly 64 percent (or \$14,156,454) has been earmarked for (and expended on) the electoral assistance Project component;
 - Roughly 11 percent (or \$2,785,000 comprised of the AAI CA and NGO Sector budget) has been earmarked for the Decentralization/Traditional Authority (6%) and the Civil Society Strengthening (5%) Project components. As was noted previously, it was not clear to the team the purpose of the \$525,000 budgeted for the NGO Sector budget line item.
 - Roughly 8 percent (or \$1,435,508) has been earmarked for Project Management (6.5%) and Audits and Evaluations (1.5%);
 - Roughly 17 percent (or \$3,962,738) of authorized LOP funding remains unearmarked (total unearmarked TA, Training, Commodity and NGO budget line items) and thus available for new Project funding.
- Total USAID LOP financial inputs (including funds allocated to TA, Training, Project Management, NGO Sector, and Audits & Evaluations budget categories) are adequate to ensure attainment of the overall Project purpose by the PACD.
 - To date, sufficient funding has been earmarked to permit attainment of each of the outputs/objectives established for the individual Project components except strengthening judicial independence;
 - Sufficient funding remains to cover all planned and anticipated Project management, while those necessary to cover audit and evaluation costs through the PACD may not be sufficient if a major external audit of the project takes place.

2. Achievement of Project-Level Outputs and EOPS Relative to Project Component Status

- Of the four Project components, i.e., electoral assistance, judicial/legal system strengthening, civil society support, and decentralization, the percentage of planned outputs and EOPS achieved to date are as follows:

- Elections component outputs are nearly 100 percent completed; EOPS were fully achieved with the holding of the October 1994 multi-party elections and voting by some 87 percent of registered voters; mid-term sustainability of the electoral process, is however, in doubt;
- Judicial sector strengthening component outputs are 0 percent completed and are unlikely to be, although the legal sector assessment, an initial output under the original PP was completed; EOPS have not been achieved and are unlikely to be completed by the PACD of 12/31/96;
- Decentralization/Traditional Authority component outputs are less than 10 percent completed and are unlikely to be completed the by the Cooperative Agreement Completion Date (CACD) or PACD; EOPS, as defined in PP Amendment 1, are being achieved, but not as a result of project activities;
- Civil society component outputs are under 10 percent complete and are unlikely to be completed by either the CACD or the PACD; EOPS are being achieved but not as a result of Project activities.

III. EVALUATIONS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While evaluations often provide separate sections for conclusions and recommendations, the evaluation team has decided to consolidate them into one section for a number of reasons. First, in Annex 2 we have undertaken a major analysis of each of the four project components which includes a presentation of principal findings, conclusions and recommendations. As we did in Part II on Evaluation Findings, we believe that the reader is better served here by a summary of conclusions and recommendations and, if more in-depth understanding is required, can turn to this annex for our analyses. And secondly, given the multiple components and numerous activities financed by the project, it was felt that greater coherence and clarity could be achieved by an immediate rendering of recommendations following the conclusions upon which they were based. We believe the report thus flows more smoothly and provides the readers with a better means to evaluate the team's logic that has led to the recommendations proffered.

This chapter starts with a number of basic conclusions that the team has observed through its assessment of project activities as part of this evaluation exercise. The remainder of this conclusions and recommendations section is divided into three principal sections which correspond to what we deem are the principal set of issues which the Mission needs to address during the remainder of the project: (i) the nature and structure of DIP Project Management in the inclusive sense referred to in this report; (ii) steps to improve the current execution of component activities vis-a-vis stated Project-level objectives; and (iii) reorienting Project direction and objectives through the PACD. The concluding section provides "lessons learned."

A. General Conclusions and Their Implications

It is important to keep in mind that the DIP was one of several components in USAID/Mozambique's Transition Program whose goal was a: **"Successful War-to-Peace Transition."** DIP thus contributed to the Program's second strategic objective: **"Successful Implementation of the Peace Process"** and specifically: **"Support for [multiparty] Elections."** While the Transition Program contributed to laying the foundation for long-term development, and has concerned itself at times with such developmental issues as sustainability, its objectives were essentially non-developmental ... avoiding famine and death, ensuring successful implementation of the peace process, and facilitating the reintegration of the population into stable and productive social and economic activities. In short, it fell somewhere along the murky continuum of relief to development.

DIP's virtually exclusive focus on elections has been entirely appropriate and essential within the context of the Transition Program strategy. The point to be made, however, is that the 1994 elections, as important as they were, should be considered as just one of several transition objectives successfully negotiated. Like the larger Transition Program to which it contributes, DIP has been involved in laying a developmental foundation, or as the revised DIP purpose states: **to support Mozambican initiatives to establish the foundation for a stable democratic society."** The true importance of the elections, therefore, is not because they represent the

sudden advent of a democratic Mozambique, but rather, because they mark the dramatic end of a brutal war while providing the preconditions for a durable peace.

First time elections, particularly those which follow protracted wars, may indicate that a transition has taken place, but not necessarily the desired result of a sustainable democratic transition. In this regard, the oft quoted "one election does not a democracy make" raises two important questions for DIP in particular and for the Mission's democracy and governance program in general. If one successful election does not, in fact, make a democracy, then how many elections -- and the donor assistance required to support them -- does it take ... one more at the subnational level; a second round of national elections? Given the scheduled 1996 Municipal elections, this question has particular relevance to the Mission and the extent to which it will use remaining DIP resources to support them.

Secondly, the question can equally be asked as to the cost-benefit of supporting additional election activities as opposed to investments in other areas which may yield longer-term contributions to laying democratic foundations, or even to begin the process of democratic consolidation. The Mission's macro-political analysis of democracy and governance in Mozambique undertaken as part of its recently submitted CPSP makes a major conclusion in this regard. It notes that Mozambique's long history of the consolidation of political power in the executive branch has effectively excluded not only other state institutions (e.g., the legislature and judiciary) from participation in national governance matters, but more importantly, civil society and local government as well. While multi-party elections have led to the installation of a democratically-elected president and independent deputies in the National Assembly, there is little doubt that the historical power asymmetries previously noted are still much in practice and particularly in relation to civil society and local government. The question then is whether and how much the Mission should invest in up-coming Municipal elections vis-a-vis support to civil society and local government on the one hand and between assistance for the National Assembly and judiciary vis-a-vis civil society and local government on the other.

The slow progress of the other three DIP project components noted in the Evaluation Findings section is considered by the team to be neither critical nor particularly unusual within the larger framework of the Transition Program. In general, it is our conclusion that the concern by both Mozambicans and donors for holding successful elections so dominated the Mozambican landscape that all other activities were relegated to secondary status at best and were most likely considered an unnecessary distraction at worst. In particular, it is our opinion that the judicial strengthening component as well as that supporting NGO or civil society strengthening suffered from the fact that their objectives were -- if it can be so termed -- far too developmental for the situation in which they were designed and implemented. Attempts to build the capacity of democratic institutions in a pre-democratic setting, especially one marked by instability and insecurity, were fraught from the beginning with problems over which neither USAID nor its partners had control. In hindsight, it would not be inaccurate for us to state that the three non-elections related EOPS and the activities designed to lead to their achievement were inappropriate to the project context and inconsistent with the non-developmental objectives of DIP. It is only now with the elections safely behind the Mission and its Mozambican governmental and NGO

partners that these other more developmental project components have a realistic chance of being successfully implemented.

In summary, we believe the DIP was a smashing success because of the importance that the elections had in the transition from war to peace in Mozambique and the considerable role that the Mission had in making them successful. It was the achievement of peace that was the single most important initiative in establishing the foundation for a stable democratic society to which DIP has contributed. If the project had accomplished nothing else in its first three years, it would still be considered in our opinion to have been a success. The issue now is what can be realistically undertaken by the project during the remainder of the Transition Program to prepare for the commencement of USAID's first true "developmental" country program and the consolidation of democracy and good governance.

B. The Nature and Structure of DIP Project Management

The convergence of American foreign policy and development assistance objectives around Mozambican elections and the Democratic Initiatives Project has been a principal reason for the effectiveness and successful attainment of overall USG objectives in Mozambique. The extraordinary degree of collaboration and coordination within USAID, between it and other USG agencies, as well as with other donors and the GRM, is primarily due to the short-term focus on a limited range of objectives related to the 1994 elections. The "E" Team in its role an inter-agency policy making and problem solving body has as well served as the primary management body for the DIP. As we noted earlier, elections are a transition event. They can also be considered a political event, both for the country undergoing them and for their donor partners.

With the successful conclusion of the elections, USAID must begin the process of reorienting the DIP to longer-term, more developmental objectives centering on support of the Mozambican democratic consolidation process. As USAID will soon have a newly approved country program strategy which, among other objectives, supports this consolidation process, the previous overlap of political and developmental interests will naturally begin to diverge. This is not to suggest that USAID's development assistance objectives have suddenly become inconsistent with larger U.S. foreign policy concerns. Rather, they have become strategic and long-term and focus on what USAID does best: conceive of and deliver development assistance whether political, economic or social.

These changed circumstances have a number of immediate implications for DIP's future management. The first concerns the composition of the project management team and its place within the larger Mission management structure. The second implication concerns the role and function of DIP within inter-agency collaboration and coordination and the involvement of these other partners in future DIP management. The following discussion provides our conclusions and recommendations concerning these two issues.

1. Internal USAID Structure and Responsibilities

As the Mission prepares to implement a new country program strategy, we recommend that a new Democracy and Governance office be created. This would be consistent with the fact that the new CPSP contains a discrete D/G strategic objective (SO) and the fact that these discussions were already underway within the Mission concerning restructuring around these SOs. The benefits to such an action are two-fold and mutually reinforcing:

- It raises D/G to an equivalent status with other Mission offices which would have the effect of clearly delineating the lines of authority and management responsibilities between DIP and these other offices, a major problem which has faced the Project for nearly eighteen months.
- Consideration could also be given to moving the land-tenure project from the Agriculture Office to the new D/G office as this activity has direct bearing on a range of D/G issues from civic education, to conflict resolution, to decentralization including local government and Traditional Authority strengthening.

We would suggest that the position of Project Manager be changed to D/G advisor as initially called for in the DIP Project Paper and which would be consistent with the new developmental thrust of the Mozambique program and the actual duties that this person would be expected to carry out. We believe this recommendation should be carried out regardless as to whether or not a new D/G office is created. Furthermore, we note that the original reasons given for cutting out the "advisor" position appear in retrospect to have been wrong as the previous DIP Project Manager ended up spending the majority of his time providing advisory services to the full U.S. country team. As the Mission moves into a new era of development assistance, its D/G Advisor will be providing counsel to obtain development assistance objectives and not dispensing political advice related to the attainment of American foreign policy objectives. The 1994 elections mark the Mission's transition from a political to developmental role.

- The current assistant Project Manager has ably demonstrated her competence in most areas associated with project management, and with oversight from an experienced direct-hire project officer and additional training, should be able to assume full responsibilities for the wider range of project management tasks required in DIP.
- In the event that a new D/G office is created, it may be appropriate as well to make the office head directly responsible to the D/Director as initially recommended in the DIP project paper which would help to lessen problem arising in the event that a less experienced direct hire is appointed as head of the D/G office.

2. Inter-Agency Collaboration and Involvement in DIP Management

Regardless of the significant changes which have taken place since the elections, there continues to be an important need for an inter-agency forum such as the "E" Team to coordinate overall policy in support of Mozambican democratic consolidation and to share information among colleagues about the evolving democratic process. We do not, however, feel that there is any

longer a need for inter-agency operational involvement in strictly implementation matters related to DIP project management, including the review and approval of project proposals.

- We recommend that the "E" Team or similar body meet on a monthly basis, at most, and deal with issues of general policy coordination and the sharing of relevant information. The D/G advisor as a member of this inter-agency body would be expected -- like any other member -- to provide a report on the status DIP progress, including the status of individual Project-financed activities; and a description and status of new proposals submitted for Project funding.
- Within USAID it is suggested that a DIP Project Committee be established with representation from each Mission office, similar in concept to the several "task forces" which have successfully operated at various times over the past three years of the Transition Program. The Project Committee would be responsible for coordinating DIP activities within the Mission and serving as the review committee for new proposal submissions. Committee recommendations could be forwarded to the Director for final approval, or for streamlining purposes, above an established threshold.

C. Required Actions Related to Current Activities

Viewing the DIP within the Mission's "War-to-Peace" Transition Program, and as the principal means through which USG support was provided to multiparty elections, the team regards the project a major success. This overall conclusion is tempered by two basic concerns: (i) electoral sustainability and (ii) the appropriateness and relevance of specific project activities financed to date. The first concern is addressed in Part C, below. The second concern, the relevance of project financed activities within the Transition Program strategy, is addressed in the discussion of the team's recommendations as to what steps should be taken to either ensure attainment of project component objectives as currently defined; or alternative solutions that would ensure the achievement of Project-level objectives. Each of the project components are discussed in turn below.

1. Strengthening Judicial Independence

As noted under Part II, Evaluation Findings, the only activity undertaken to date under this project component has been the conduct of a "Legal Sector Assessment," an output under the original PP. The four project level outputs and corresponding EOPS stipulated in the first PP Amendment have not been achieved, nor have activities been undertaken or planned for that might conceivably lead to their achievement. While the requirements of the October 1994 elections rightly dominated the Mission's thoughts and consumed the energies of DIP management for the better part of period under evaluation, we conclude that this component, in particular, was not seen as particularly important or relevant to the achievement of either Project objectives or, more importantly, the Transition Program.

The team sees no compelling reason to continue the Judicial Independence Strengthening Component of the Project and recommends that it be dropped. It is not an area in which USAID has a comparative advantage vis-a-vis other donors of which there are many currently operating in the sector. If there are specific activities -- such as the development of a commercial code or conducting research on family law -- which the Mission feels it necessary to continue pursuing, then we believe that they can be undertaken within the context of other projects in the Mission's portfolio. **Such an action would require a revision of the Project log-frame and possibly an amendment to the PP.**

2. Electoral Assistance Sustainability

While the Electoral Assistance component has essentially achieved its stated outputs and EOPS, we believe that a number of important actions need to be taken that can contribute to ensuring the mid-term sustainability of the overall electoral process and prepare for up-coming local elections. Our recommendations are two-fold:

- To first ensure that all recipients of Project assistance complete final reports, preferably an evaluation of their activities. Our concern is that this has not been done in all cases, and for those that have, the results have been disappointing and ultimately of little use in providing lessons learned and recommendations for the conduct and support of future elections.
- To undertake a limited assessment of the 1994 elections in general and the impact and effectiveness of USAID's role in particular through a review of existing evaluations and studies. Its orientation would be both retrospective and future directed. It would identify any remaining information and analytic gaps and undertake limited research leading to a comprehensive set of lessons learned and recommendations for the up-coming 1996 elections. This might be an excellent activity for the new DIP D/G Advisor to start her tenure with utilizing consultant support as required.

3. Support for Decentralization and NGO Strengthening

The AAI Cooperative Agreement, through which the remaining two Project components are being managed, needs to be extended to the current PACD; and most likely for at least an additional six months beyond this point. AAI should undertake a full review of its two projects and their current status and prepare a new and detailed workplan laying out a revised timeframe for the completion of each subproject and any additional requirements including resources that may be needed. It is suggested that this exercise be undertaken in conjunction with concerned home office personnel and in close collaboration with the DIP Project Management team.

- We take particular note of AAI's intended partnership with SUNY/Albany in a newly submitted electoral assistance proposal. We believe AAI's participation in this proposed activity would be detrimental to the execution of its two current projects which are already seriously behind schedule and which thoroughly engage, or should engage, AAI's

Country Representative and the organization's limited infrastructure in Mozambique. One could question as well SUNY's own capacity to undertake activities in Mozambique and its knowledge of local conditions if it finds it necessary to join with AAI in the execution of its proposed activity.

- We also feel that the Mission's use of AAI, and AAI's own agreement to act as an intermediary channeling and managing USAID assistance to multiple recipients undertaking diverse and complex activities has been a contributory factor in the slow progress made to date in these two components. While these two components appear to be closely related at a conceptual level, in practice and in terms of substance, they have proven to be significantly different leading to both management and technical problems. Lessons learned in the management of USAID-financed umbrella projects in other countries, as well as in Mozambique itself, have shown that such projects are extremely management intensive, particularly if they involve a grants element as does NGO strengthening component. While we believe that AAI has now built the requisite capacity to manage these two components, there is no indication as far as we can determine -- other than its presence in Mozambique -- that it initially had either the technical or management skills to ensure successful implementation of these components.

a) *Civil Society Strengthening*

It is strongly recommended that AAI revise its NGO project to undertake a two-pronged strategy: first, to target a concentrated and long-term package of grant and technical assistance to, at most, two or three NGOs which have demonstrated some capacity for project implementation in each of four selected provinces; and secondly, to establish a "micro grant fund" for rapid and responsive financing to a much larger number of newly emerging NGOs and voluntary associations that have a good idea and the voluntary spirit to carry it out. Undertaking the second prong of this strategy will require that USAID recognize that there is a significant risk of failure likely for several of the activities financed. The team considers the risk reasonable, given both the small amounts of funding involved and the potential benefits to be gained. Specifically, we recommend:

- That AAI target NGOs in no more than four provinces, including those which will fall under USAID's new country program strategy, for financial grant and capacity building assistance. Consideration should also be given to funding NGOs based in Maputo but with on-going programs in these four provinces. The definition of NGOs needs to be conceptually expanded from the current emphasis on developmental NGOs to include a wider range of non-state or civil society actors including professional and business associations, peasant or farmer federations, and (pre)cooperatives and credit unions.
- A revised training and technical assistance plan should be prepared for submission with the new workplan that reflects and is consistent with this new strategy. This should include a review, and where necessary, a modification of the Management Principles Manual currently in draft; the organizational eligibility and activity selection criteria

developed for the small grant fund; and the proposal format for grant applications, particularly as it would pertain to a new micro-grant fund.

- An alternative strategy/solution to working through established international NGOs as a means for capacity building assistance for weaker indigenous NGOs needs to be seriously considered. It is hoped, however, that these international NGOs could assist in the identification of local NGOs and community groups for the Micro-grant fund, and perhaps help them to develop proposals for AAI funding, and in the eventual monitoring grant activities. This model would provide USAID with useful experience for the up-coming design of its new PVO/NGO program which intends to seriously support indigenous NGO strengthening.

b) Decentralization and Traditional Authority Study

It is strongly recommended that a meeting be arranged shortly after the arrival of the new DIP D/G advisor with the participation of the AAI Country Representative and D/TA Project Manager, and concerned officials of the Ministry of State Administration and someone from the newly mandated STAE, if an officer has been appointed. The purpose of this meeting would be to review the status of project activities and make decisions concerning any modifications that may be deemed appropriate given the delays experienced to date. It would also provide an opportunity for USAID to gauge Ministry interest in the project and discuss potential needs in the area of decentralization, local government and traditional authorities.

D. Future Directions and Activities

In section D we provide a set of conclusions and recommendations based on future DIP requirements at both the overall project and component levels, including individual activities already underway and those which we believe merit future consideration.

1. Project Level Changes

It is recommended that the PACD be extended at least an additional six months and preferably one year. It is our assessment that adequate funding remains to support the additional Project Management costs associated with an extension of this length; and that the nearly \$4.0 million in unearmarked Project funds which remain requires both careful analysis to make effective use of it and the time carry-out the new activities decided upon. Specifically, this would: (i) ensure that existing activities are completed as intended; (ii) provide the Mission with a short "time-out" to reflect on what additional activities it wants to support between now and scheduled elections in late 1996; (iii) give the new DIP D/G Advisor/Project Manager time to participate in this reflection exercise and definition of future Project directions, thereby gaining a measure of ownership over the Project; (iv) permit new start-ups financed with remaining funds adequate time to achieve their objectives; and (v) finally, provide adequate time to close out the Project and undertake a final evaluation.

- We recommend that those unsolicited proposals received from the Mission to date be held in abeyance for the time being until the completion of the strategic review and planning exercise, and the new DIP Project Manager arrives and has settled into her job. We see no reason why the organizations which have submitted these proposals should not understand the reasoning behind the Missions decision to delay action on their review.
- Once the suggested strategic review and planning exercise has been completed by the Mission and new activities have been identified, we recommend that one or more RFPs/RFAs be let to solicit proposals for their management and implementation. This will not only increase competition and bring in more specialized organizations, but will increase the likelihood that what USAID needs, it will get. Certainly, the previous assumption that unsolicited proposals would be the quickest means to fund activities was not borne out by the project's experience to date.

2. Project Components

The team sees new activities to be undertaken during the remainder of DIP as falling into three areas: (i) those which contribute to the further consolidation of achievements reached through the electoral assistance component, including a major focus on election system sustainability; (ii) assessing the needs and budget requirements of the 1996 elections, including defining USAID's assistance role and commencing implementation of those activities that are agreed upon as consistent with our interests and capabilities; and (iii) activities which are able to prepare the groundwork for the start-up of DIP II, with its emphasis on longer-term, developmental objectives and, specifically, those program outputs related to the new D/G SO proposed in the CPSP. As regards these three areas we would propose the following:

a) *Consolidating Electoral System Achievements*

The team was specifically tasked with addressing the evaluation question: "assess the degree to which the medium term sustainability of the electoral process has been achieved" given the significant resources provided by the Mission through DIP. It is our conclusion, reflecting that of the Mission itself, most other donors and the GRM, that the Mozambique electoral process is only marginally more sustainable, in financial terms, than it was prior to the holding of the country's first multiparty elections in October 1994. While the up-coming Municipal elections are not anticipated to cost anywhere near the approximately \$65.0 million spent on the previously held national elections -- particularly if they are staggered over a number of years as proposed by the GRM and a number donors -- there is little likelihood that the government will be able to cover more than fifty percent of the costs associated with these new elections. On the other hand, as a result of these first ever elections, the country has a much increased human resource base -- both a voting citizenry and election officials and institutions -- familiar with the mechanics, if not the purpose, of the electoral process. It also has developed material resources, many of which still remain from the national elections, which can be reused or easily modified for use in future elections. It is to these latter material resources under the responsibility of the

STAE that we recommend DIP assistance be provided. Specifically we recommend assistance to the newly created STAE to:

- (i) safeguard voter registration lists collected and returned to Maputo after the national elections, including the creation of a computerized data base; and
- (ii) conserve and safeguard unused voter cards, civic and voter education materials, and other documentation from both CNE and STAE related to the last elections and of potential use in future ones.

b) Preparing for the 1996 Local Government Elections

The Mission's decision to support the 1996 Municipal elections through DIP has already been made. We agree with this decision in general, but do not think that all remaining DIP resources should go to supporting these elections as noted above and expanded upon below. We recommend that USAID in coordination with other donors engage the GRM in a policy dialogue concerning electoral reforms and other related issues. Specifically:

- It is our conclusion that the rationale for holding local elections should be based on and tied to the GRM's decentralization program. As such, USAID should remain engaged in discussions with the Ministry of State Administration concerning new enabling legislation required to further define the Municipal Code. We feel this recommendation is consistent with the view that the holding of elections -- particularly the first several following the transition -- contribute only marginally to the consolidation of democratic institutions and processes as well as practice and values. By tying electoral support to decentralization USAID will therefore be supporting an increased opportunity for local government to participate in national-level policy making and governance reform.
- That local elections be undertaken on a rolling basis over period of four to five years with the first set of elections (one-quarter to one-fifth of all districts) in 1996 to be conducted in those rural and urban districts where the likelihood of true contestation exists. These districts would be those in which RENAMO either won a majority or attained a significant percentage of the vote.
- That the GRM give consideration to permitting civic organizations, in addition to political parties, designate members as election monitors. As only the former have the right to participate in elections as monitors, such an action would require changes in a new electoral code.
- That the new electoral code should include provisions for an independent electoral commission with representation from the national to district levels and ensure its financial autonomy from the state.

Utilizing the lessons learned from the 1994 elections, USAID should commission an assessment of local government election needs including: (i) available material and human resources and those which remain unmet; and (ii) identify, through the AID for Democracy Group, those areas in which other donors have intentions to offer electoral support. The draft findings and recommendations of this comprehensive assessment, including a corresponding budget would then be submitted to the GRM and other donors for their comments. The finalized assessment with both GRM and donor approval would then serve as the basis for the division of donor responsibilities and financing for the elections.

- Particular attention should be paid to the affordability and sustainability of the electoral process. Consideration could be given to introducing a new system of incentives for compensating election monitors from the political parties, and possibly civic organizations.
- The assessment should also review and recommend changes, where necessary, of all electoral procedures, and particularly those over which the political parties raised numerous objections, or which simply prevented election officials from carrying out their work.

3. Laying the Ground-work for DIP II

A major issue arising from the support of national elections which the team has identified is the confusion which exists between voter and civic education. The former was found to be effectively undertaken both the STAE and NGOs as it related simply to the mechanics of voting and could be easily imparted to the electorate in a relatively short time. Civic education on the other hand, is a more complicated and long-term endeavor which seeks to empower individuals in their ability to effect change through greater participation in national as well as community life. Democracy and improved governance are best learned in the context of local voluntary associations and local authorities where people come together to promote common interests and resolve shared problems. As such we recommend:

- In order to better understand the needs for traditional or informal civic education which is primarily aimed at the adult population, the team recommends that a major assessment and series of studies and research be undertaken to identify specific areas of need identified by the population. This would be followed by a national level workshop with international and regional specialist participation at which the results of the assessment would be presented. Workshop participants would finalize those areas deemed most appropriate for development and elaborate the contents of a series of modules including pedagogical approaches and learning techniques pertinent to specific target groups. Specific areas of focus should include: mediation and conflict resolution; policy analysis, formulation and lobbying; voluntarism in both traditional African society and as it has evolved in the West; the notion and role of civil society in a democracy.

- In the formal educational system we recommend that USAID promote the development of a new civic education curriculum in conjunction with concerned Mozambican institutions. We have interviewed other donors and found that none has an on-going program nor intends to undertake one in the future.

We strongly suggest that the Mission begin identifying U.S. and African regional organizations working in the democracy and governance field as a means for broadening the base of potential new partners for DIP II. This would both increase competition for future awards and lead to the identification of a new set of organization with greater specialization than those which participated in the primarily electoral assistance programs of DIP I. We suggest that the Mission contact the Global Bureau Democracy and Governance Center (G/DG) which has already undertaken such an exercise.

Finally, it is our recommendation that assistance to the National Assembly under DIP I not be made a priority within the set of recommendations noted above. We further express our opinion that under DIP II priority funding be given to civil society and local government strengthening. Parliamentary assistance is not an area in which either the United States or USAID have a comparative advantage and is thus best left to those European donors which do; and we might add, have already expressed a considerable intent to do so. Conversely, the United States has one of the strongest and most vibrant civil societies in the world as well as an unparalleled system of decentralized government with true devolution to local government. It is in these two areas that USAID has the greatest expertise and in which Mozambican democracy needs the greatest assistance.

E. Actionable Recommendations

Of the numerous recommendations, suggestions and considerations put forth by the team in this Conclusions and Recommendations section, there are limited number which we believe are of particular importance and that can and should be acted on by the Mission in the near future. They include:

1. Project Level Actions

Revising Project Design Parameters and Implementation Arrangements

- It is recommended that the PACD be extended at least an additional six months and preferably one year to permit the Mission to: (i) undertake a strategic review and planning exercise in order to determine the types of future DIP activities to be supported; (ii) ensure existing activities are completed; (iii) allow newly funded activities adequate time for completion; and (iv) provide adequate time to close out the project and undertake a final evaluation.
- We recommend that previously submitted unsolicited proposals not be acted upon until the completion of the strategic planning exercise. We further recommend that one or

RFPs/RFAs be let to solicit proposals for the management of activities identified through the strategic planning exercise and believe this to be a better option for the Mission than trying to work with the proposers of unsolicited proposals.

The Nature and Structure of DIP Management

- In line with the proposed and likely approval of a D/G Strategic Objective under the Mission's recently submitted CPSP, we recommend the creation of a new Democracy and Governance Office.
- Consistent with the developmental thrust of the soon to be approved CPSP and as originally proposed in the Project Paper, we recommend that the current position of Project Manager be changed to that of D/G Advisor.
- We recommend that the E-Team or similar inter-agency body continue its role as overall policy-making and coordinating body for DIP, but that it no longer be involved in strictly implementation matters related to project management, particularly related to the review and approval of project proposals.
- Within USAID it is recommended that a DIP Project Committee be established with representation from each Mission office with responsibilities for internal coordination of project activities and serving as the review committee for new proposal submissions.

2. Project Component Action:

Judicial Independence Component

- The Team sees no compelling reason to continue the Judicial Independence Strengthening Component and recommends that it be dropped. Such an action would require a revision of the Project Logical Framework and an amendment to the Project Paper.

Electoral Assistance Component

- We recommend that the Mission provide additional assistance to the newly created STAE to: (i) safeguard voter registration lists including the creation of a computerized data base; and (ii) conserve and safeguard unused voter cards, civic and voter education materials, and other documentation developed by CNE and STAE.
- We recommend that: (i) all recipients of Project assistance complete final reports, preferably a final evaluation of their respective activities; and (ii) the Mission undertake a limited assessment of the 1994 elections to identify gaps in either information or analysis and undertake relevant additional research, if required, leading to a comprehensive set of lessons learned and recommendations for use in the up-coming 1996 elections.

- Utilizing lessons learned from the study of the 1994 elections, we recommend that USAID should commission an assessment of local government elections needs, preferably in collaboration with other concerned donors, that would serve as the basis for USAID's support of the 1996 elections.

Decentralization and NGO Strengthening Components

- It is recommended that the AAI Cooperative Agreement -- through which the Decentralization and NGO Strengthening Components are being managed -- be extended an additional six months beyond the current PACD of 12/31/96.
- The Team strongly recommends that AAI revise the strategy of its **civil society project** by undertaking a two-pronged approach to NGO strengthening, including: (i) an intensive package of capacity building assistance to a limited number of organizations in priority USAID geographic areas; and (ii) the creation of a "micro grant fund" for rapid and responsive funding of a much larger number of newly emerging NGOs that have a good idea and the voluntary spirit to carry it out.
- It is recommended that all concerned parties working on the Decentralization and Traditional Authority Study project meet shortly after the arrival of the new DIP D/G advisor for the purpose of reviewing project status and to decide upon modifications to project objectives and implementation due to the delays experienced to date. Specifically, a new workplan should be developed with specific time-frames and indicators to be used in monitoring project performance and impact against stated objectives and planned activities.

3. Laying the Ground-work for DIP II

- The Team recommends that a major assessment and series of studies and research be undertaken to identify topics and develop a preliminary curricula outline in civic education that respond to needs perceived by Mozambican citizens.
- In the formal educational system, we recommend that the Mission begin discussions with the concerned GRM ministries concerning possible DIP support of the development of a civic education curriculum for secondary schools, an area of need and where no other donor has expressed an intention of support.
- We strongly suggest that the Mission begin identifying U.S. and African regional organizations working in the democracy and governance field as a means for increasing competition and broadening the base of potential new partners in DIP II.

F. Lessons Learned

The Democratic Initiatives Project demonstrates a number of lessons which should not only benefit USAID/Mozambique in the future, but any Mission engaged in democratic development. Mozambique is a country that has successfully negotiated the transition from war to peace and did so with significant support from the donor community of which USAID has been a major contributor. Given the number of aborted African transitions and failed "state building" exercises that took place during the same two year period as the Mozambican transition, its tremendous success is all the more noteworthy and merits close examination to determine what distinguished this experience from others. The following discussion presents our analysis of what worked and what did not, and the lessons they offer for those who believe in a viable democratic Africa.

- Elections, particularly first time elections, dominate the concerns, agendas and energies of all parties concerned. To expect that other activities, especially those with more developmental objectives, will receive the attention that they deserve is unrealistic. In the case of DIP, the slow progress of project components other than those concerned with electoral assistance, is understandable. Future designs should be less ambitious as to what can be accomplished in such circumstances.
- First time elections in countries emerging from war are much more a benchmark of a transition from war to peace than they are a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. It should be realized that for a considerable period of time following transition elections that donor assistance will be primarily contributing to the consolidation of peace and not the consolidation of democracy and improved governance. In short, assistance designed to attain developmental objectives in the domain of democracy and governance is unlikely to lead to the full achievement of these objectives.
- In transition situations, there is likely to be a convergence of foreign policy and development assistance objectives leading to achievement of both. As economic and political stabilization are achieved there will necessarily be a divergence between the two as the longer-term and strategic nature of development assistance begins to conflict with the shorter-term and tactical needs of foreign policy. This should not be interpreted as a difference between foreign policy and development assistance objectives at the policy level, but rather in the day-to-day implementation of the latter and the operational decisions that are required.
- Decisions to utilize an intermediary to channel and manage development assistance on behalf of USAID to one or more implementing agents should be based primarily on programmatic needs and not the administrative ease that they may afford overstretched bureaucracies. This is a lesson learned from numerous USAID-financed "umbrella" projects.
- Democratic development in general and democracy and governance programs in particular are risky undertakings and must be based on the assumption that failure is as likely an

outcome as success. As the case of Mozambique points out, however, the benefits of the undertaking are worth the inherent risks.

REPORT ANNEXES

**DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES PROJECT:
(656-0227)**

MID-TERM EVALUATION

ANNEX 1: DETAILED SCOPE OF WORK

DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES PROJECT:

(656-0227)

MID-TERM EVALUATION

ATTACHMENT I
SCOPE OF WORK

BACKGROUND

The Mozambique Democratic Initiatives Project (DIP) seeks to assist the country in establishing foundations for a stable democratic society. In its first two and one-half years, the project has concentrated on providing direct support for the holding of the country's first democratic multiparty elections. During the remaining life of the project, while continuing to provide targeted support for civic education and for the preparation of future municipal and national elections, emphasis will shift to other project objectives; specifically, (a) clarifying and strengthening the roles of traditional authorities, (b) providing training to address problems of implementing decentralization programs, and (c) providing small grants and capacity building technical assistance to national NGOs working to strengthen civil society in Mozambique.

While legal sector reform remains an option for possible DIP intervention, the need for project management to focus on the 1994 multiparty elections meant that only a review of the needs of Mozambique's legal sector so far has received project financing. The DIP plans to review the status of legal sector reform activities during FY 1995 and decide, in conjunction with the GRM and other sector donors, if legal sector reform will continue to be a priority area for intervention under the current project.

ARTICLE I **TITLE**

Mozambique Democratic Initiatives Project (656-0227): Midterm Evaluation

ARTICLE II **OBJECTIVES**

1. Review the appropriateness, timeliness and quality of project inputs. Assess the validity of design assumptions, eligible activities and impact indicators. Provide a descriptive analysis of project status relative to the inputs provided.

2. Review project outputs and evaluate progress made towards achieving outputs. Define end-of-project measurable indicators of progress include (a) free and fair elections conducted, (b) participation by the majority of the electorate in these elections, (c) active participation by traditional authorities in local-level decision making, (d) increased numbers of Mozambican NGOs active in areas where the project has worked, (e) implementation of regular in-country training for judges at provincial and district levels, and (f) application of the new commercial code at local levels.

Provide a detailed explanation of those areas where project outputs have been exceeded, or are not likely to achieve project targets over the life of project.

3. Given the Project's concentration on the electoral process, as described in Article II, the emphasis of the evaluation should be on the DIP's electoral assistance component. Special difficulties in implementation of the project have included (a) the necessity of securing funding to employing aircraft in conducting registration and other pre-election activities, and (b) the need to develop and finance important components of the electoral process such as the training and deploying of political party monitors, delegados de lista, in a very short time frame as no other donor funding was available for this activity.

4. Review the project purpose and assess the extent to which project inputs and outputs are, or are not, leading to the achievement of the purpose by the project assistance completion date (PACD).

5. Make recommendations for the next phase of project implementation.

ARTICLE III SCOPE OF WORK

A. General

The contractor selected for the mid-term DIP evaluation will perform an evaluation over a three-week period sometime within a three-month time frame between March and May 1995. The evaluation team will be composed of two full-time members, provided by the Contractor, with background and expertise consistent with the focus of this evaluation. The Contractor will appoint one member as team leader. A third team member may be provided by USAID as a resource person.

Two days of preparation and team building activities in Washington (2 days) is authorized, and it is recommended that the evaluation team meet with the former Democratic Initiatives Project Manager, J. Michael Turner (History Department, Hunter College-CUNY, tel. [212] 772-5480) in New York City (1 day), prior to its arrival in Mozambique.

The evaluation team will arrive and begin work in Mozambique on a date and at a time that has been concurred in by the Democratic Initiatives Project Manager or by the General Development Officer. The team will coordinate its work through the General Development Office within USAID. In carrying out its task, the team will review project

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documentation, and will meet with officers of USAID and the Government of the Republic of Mozambique (GRM), grant recipients, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations working in the political-development sector in Mozambique.

The evaluation team will present a complete draft report (15 copies) in English, and will provide oral briefings to USAID, representatives of the GRM and selected non-governmental organizations no later than the seventeenth working day of this assignment. USAID, representatives of the GRM and selected non-governmental organizations will provide the team with comments, verbal or written, within five working days following the oral presentation of the draft report. A draft Evaluation Summary (Form USAID 1330), is to be submitted to and accepted in fulfillment of the terms of the evaluation team's work by the Project Officer and the Mission Evaluation Officer no later than 30 calendar days after the comments and suggested modifications have been given to the evaluation team's leader.

B. Specific Requirements

To achieve the objectives of the evaluation, the team will address the following specific questions and topics:

1. Have the quality and quantity of USAID inputs been adequate to achieve project outputs at this time, and are sufficient resources available to fund planned and/or recommended activities during the remaining life of project?
2. Have the quality and quantity of United Nations Electoral Trust Fund and Non-Governmental Organization recipient outputs been adequate to achieve project outputs and end-of-project status (EOPS) by PACD?
3. Are the activities described in the Project Paper and the Project Paper Amendment being carried out? What has been the impact of these activities on project outputs and EOPS?
4. Has the project contributed significantly to creating conditions and workable sustainable mechanisms for the medium term institutionalization of a democratic electoral administrative process in Mozambique? If this institutionalization cannot be achieved in the medium term, what are the team's recommendations for achieving medium term sustainability for national institutions to administer democratic multiparty elections? Have DIP-financed NGO activities collaborated sufficiently with national institutions --both governmental and non-governmental-- to

provide technical assistance that would enable national institutions to assume greater responsibility for the administration of future elections?

5. The evaluation will assess the effectiveness of the project management structures proposed in the Project Paper, and the current administrative structures of the Project to review the proposals, make grants, and monitor grantee activities. The evaluation will review and make recommendations relative to the internal proposal review and grant-making process, identify administrative and management constraints, and make recommendations relative to improving project management and implementation. Particular attention should be focused on the role of the Inter-Agency Task Force ('E-Team') in the implementation and coordination of electoral assistance.

6. The evaluation will assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of the Project to support the priority intervention areas as identified in the Project Paper and Project Paper Amendment. Included are:

- a) Timely assistance provided to the GRM for administrative planning of the electoral process;
- b) Provision of direct assistance to the GRM for the holding of elections as proscribed in the 1992 Rome Peace Accord;
- c) Assistance to the GRM to expand research on traditional authority and the contemporary relationship of traditional leaders to local government structures within the context of a government national decentralization effort;
- d) Assistance to the GRM to provide in-country training and more medium-term training in the area of local government administration and decentralization;
- e) Assistance to develop the capacity of national NGOs and local groups in developing better public awareness of and strengthening civil society.

ARTICLE IV QUALIFICATIONS OF CONTRACT EVALUATION TEAM MEMBERS

All members of the Contractor's evaluation team should have extensive experience with political development and governance activities in developing transitional countries, and preferably with sectoral experience in sub-Saharan Africa. At least one team member must be fluent in Portuguese at the FSI-S/3-R/3 level. It would be helpful if the other evaluation team member also had language fluency preferably in Portuguese, or Spanish.

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The skills required for this evaluation are likely to be best represented in a two-person team:

1. Team-member #1 - Political Development NGO' experience, project impact specialist and some knowledge of USAID operations; USAID employment experience would be helpful.
2. Team-member #2 - Election Administration Specialist; a good knowledge of USAID operations and some knowledge of United Nations electoral operations would be helpful.

A staff person may be provided by USAID as a resource person to the team. The Contractor will not be responsible for any costs associated with this team member.

ARTICLE V REPORTS

The evaluation team shall provide a draft outline of the evaluation by the tenth working day of this assignment as part of an oral progress briefing to the USAID Mission.

The evaluation team shall provide a draft final report (15 copies) and make oral presentations (summary of findings, conclusions, recommendations) to USAID, appropriate officers of the GRM and representatives of selected non-governmental organizations. The draft report shall be submitted to and be accepted in partial fulfillment of the terms of reference by the Project Officer. Submission of the draft report will constitute 50% partial payment, whereas submission and acceptance of the final report will constitute full payment. Comments on the draft report will be submitted by all the reviewers to the evaluation team leader within five working days of the report's distribution. The final Evaluation Summary (Form USAID 1330) will be submitted to the Project Officer and the Mission Evaluation Officer no later than 30 calendar days after the comments and suggested modifications have been given to the evaluation team leader.

The USAID Project Officer is responsible for distribution of the final draft version of the evaluation within the Mission, to appropriate offices within the GRM and to selected representatives of the government and non-governmental organization community in Mozambique.

The final report will be produced with Wordperfect 5.1 word processing software. The Contractor will submit to USAID/Mozambique fifteen (15) bound copies and one (1) unbound copy of the final report. Three (3) bound copies should be dispatched by the Contractor via courier service to the following address:

Laura Slobey, General Development Officer
USAID/Mozambique
Rua Faria de Sousa, 107
MAPUTO, Mozambique

The remaining twelve (12) bound copies and one (1) unbound copy should be dispatched by the Contractor via U.S. Government diplomatic pouch to the following address:

Laura Slobey, General Development Officer
MAPUTO- Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20521-2330

A diskette of the final report and all supporting annexes is also to be submitted with the copies to be dispatched by diplomatic pouch.

ARTICLE VI RELATIONSHIPS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The team leader will be responsible for coordinating the work of the members of the evaluation team. The evaluation team will be responsible for conducting the evaluation and assuring that its objectives are met in accordance with the schedule provided in Article VIII below.

ARTICLE VII TERMS OF PERFORMANCE

The evaluation team will begin work no later than April 20, 1995 in Maputo, Mozambique. Work will continue uninterrupted (except for U.S. and Mozambican holidays) for a period of 18 working days for all members of the Contractor's team. All field work on the evaluation to be performed in Mozambique as described above is expected to be completed within 15 working days.

The evaluation team leader (or another team member if deemed appropriate) is allowed up to an additional 10 working days in total to incorporate comments on the draft report and to make any further modifications as may be required. Ten days of this additional time will be done in Mozambique, or at the Contractor's place of work, or at the team leader's place of choice, as long as USAID and Contractor are in agreement as to the suitability of the place to the accomplishment of the task. If the team leader is at his/her residence, per diem is not authorized.

ARTICLE VIII WORK DAYS ORDERED AND TIMING OF DELIVERABLES

A six day work week is authorized. Total days authorized:

Up to 3 days (1 in New York and 2 in Washington) - two team members;

Up to 2 travel days (international) - two team members;
Up to 18 working days (over a three week period) - two team members;

Up to 2 travel days (international) - two team members; and,

Up to 10 additional working days - one team member (team leader) to finalize the document and draft the USAID Evaluation Summary.

(Note: Sufficient time is to be allotted for printing and binding the final copies of the evaluation, and for dispatching the specified number of copies to USAID via either courier service or the diplomatic air pouch.)

ARTICLE IX MISCELLANEOUS

Duty Post: Mozambique

Language: Fluency in written and spoken English.
Knowledge of Portuguese by at least one of the team members is essential, and would be advantageous for the other team members in interviewing or in reviewing documentation.

Limited office space may be provided for the use of the evaluation team. (In the event that adequate space cannot be found within the Mission, Contractor is allowed to make arrangements for such space, such as leasing temporary quarters. Consequently, the Contractor should budget for office space.)

The Contractor is expected to provide all required secretarial assistance.

The Contractor is expected to arrange for all computer support (although printers at the USAID can be used, on a "time available", or "after hours" basis).

The Contractor is expected to provide for the evaluation team's transportation in and around Maputo.

Upon request of the Contractor, the Assistant Democratic Initiatives Project Manager (ADIP) will assist in making arrangements for car rental, hotel reservations, appointments with USAID, GRM and NGO representatives.

ANNEX 2: PROJECT COMPONENT ANALYSES

ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE SUPPORT

Electoral Assistance Support

1. Assessing Project Inputs

The original project paper (PP) specified inputs that would include technical assistance (analysis) and training/study tours, and c) commodities. In the amended project paper (PPI), the Electoral Assistance Component specified a number of inputs, including: a) technical assistance, b) training, c) project management and d) evaluation and audit.

a) Technical Assistance in the original PP was to include support for analytical studies of the electoral process. In the PPI technical assistance included support for air craft logistics, training of Mozambican election officers, and the design and production of civic education.

b) Training has been offered to both government and non-government actors. It includes workshops for journalists and study tours.

c) USAID Project Management included funds allocated for a person team: DIP Project Manager, Assistant Project Manager, and PSC Secretary. In addition, project management included a Direct Hire Project Officer and a short-term PSC of 3 months. As elections approached, other Mission Offices including Senior Management supported the DIP Project Management Team.

d) Evaluation and Audit: The project paper called for two evaluations to take place, one after the elections were held and the second to follow one year after the first evaluation. In the PPI the second evaluation was to take place prior to the PACD.

2. The Project Management Team (PMT)

The PP advised for long term management assistance obtained through 2 personal services contracts. One staff member would serve as the project manager, and the other would be the project advisor. A total of 72 person months of long-term TA was outlined in the original PP.

In the PPI, it was not viewed as necessary to have a project manager and a project advisor because of the recent arrival of two Political Officers at the Embassy. So, it was decided to hire one individual who had strengths in both areas. Soon, it was evident that the demands of the job were overwhelming for one individual, and an Assistant Project Manager and a Secretary were hired.

Functions and Responsibilities

The description of tasks provided in the PP placed primary day-to-day responsibility for the Project implementation with the PMT. Given the highly political nature of the project close collaboration with Mozambican counterparts was to occur.

Responsibilities of PMT included:

- Drafting of terms of reference for all analyses under the project
- Review of project analyses jointly with Mozambican counterparts to review the findings and discuss their implications
- Review of action plans jointly with Mozambican counterparts so as to help determine what follow on donor assistance would be appropriate

Under the PPI, the responsibilities of the PMT included:

- Monitor the electoral process and electoral process activities financed by DIP
- Chair the USG inter-agency task force on elections in Mozambique (E-team)
- Meet regularly with grantee staff to review progress

In discussions with PMT staff, other concerned Mission officers, and Grantee personnel the following findings were noted:

- The DIP Project Management Team was severely understaffed throughout most of the period under review
- The PMT was praised for its hard work, dedication, and collaborative spirit
- USAID's contribution to the holding of successful elections was the result of an extraordinary Mission-wide effort which included Senior Management, individuals in Mission Offices, the DIP Project Manager, and Assistant Project Manager
- The DIP Project Manager was praised by the Government of Mozambique as well as by the Cooperative and Grant Agreement Awardees
- The PMT met regularly with some of the grant awardees and sporadically with others
- The gap in time between the departure of the DIP Project Manager in January and the arrival of his replacement (4 months later at the time in which this team evaluated the DIP) has been a set back to the accomplishments which occurred in the period leading up to the

elections. Lines of communication between USAID and the GRM have been broken; and slowed down the work of USAID's assistance to consolidating electoral support to the GRM

-There were problems encountered in the review and approval of several project proposals submitted by US NGOs, and the contracting of grantees and Cooperative Agreement Recipients, leading to the delay of project activities and engendering some misunderstandings between parties

Other Project Management Structures

In addition to the PMT, the PPI included several other structures and key participants that would be involved in the overall management of the Project.

a) Other USG offices

The E-Team

The E-Team began as a small consultative group formed by the DIP Project Manager, DIP Assistant Project Manager, the Program Officer, a USAID/Moz Economic Advisor, and one Cooperative Agreement Awardee expanded to include relevant personnel from USAID, the Embassy, and USIS.

-Initially the E-Team met to discuss the on-going electoral process, but as the elections approached and other USG personnel joined its activities, the E-Team became not just a structure to chart the overall direction and strategy of the USG electoral support effort, it also included review and approval of DIP projects

The project paper foresaw an important role being played by USIS and Embassy staff throughout the project, especially on broader policy matters and discussions with the Government.

-The DIP Project Manager helped to facilitate Embassy's relationship with the GRM

b) other USAID offices

Additional USG involvement included USAID/Washington, the Regional Contracts Officer (RCO), REDSO/ESA, Africa Bureau Democracy Task Force especially for working on issues pertaining to democracy in Mozambique.

The project proposal also called for extensive involvement from the USAID Director and Deputy Director. The Mission Director had the power to sign grants.

Relevant findings:

-REDSO/ESA provided technical assistance to the Project Management Team and the individual grantees

-The dependence on the RCO was a severe constraint to the timely awarding of grants and in some cases entailed long delays before individual electoral component projects could begin. In one case, the improper signature of the Assistant Mission Director was not discovered by a Visiting RCO and two cooperative agreements experienced a delay of about 3-4 months.

c) Short-term Technical Assistance

Given the need for a range of skills to implement the project technical assistance would be provided from diverse disciplines such as political science, public administration, law, anthropology, finance, and non-formal education.

-Short-term technical assistance was not used very much for the electoral component, with the exception of the Cooperative Agreement made with IFES.

The Aid-for-Democracy Group

A formal donors group that met weekly as elections approached to ascertain what the gaps in electoral needs were.

-USAID participation and leadership in the Aid for Democracy Group contributed to the forging of common donor positions vis-a-vis the GRM and contributed to identifying, coordinating, and dividing the tasks need to be done for a successful outcome of the elections

-In the post-election period, tensions have developed between the USG position and that of other donors. Each partner has begun to articulate different views on issues regarding future elections.

The Government of Mozambique

The PP intended for maximum participation and responsibility from the GRM in providing counterparts for the technical assistance personnel and for selecting individuals to participate in study tours. Also GRM agreement with the scopes of work and potential consultants would be obtain prior to contracting for required technical assistance. And GRM was to be responsible for briefing consultants and making documents available.

Relevant findings:

-USAID officers remained fully engaged with the GRM, developing close relationships which helped to keep the elections on track.

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--Relations between USAID and the GRM have begun to weaken since the departure of DIP Project Manager.

3. Summary of Findings

Project Inputs

-project inputs were more than sufficient to ensure the attainment of the overall project purpose by the PACD

-No direct grants or cooperative agreements were made to Mozambican NGOs in support of electoral activities

USAID Project Management

-USAID Project Management has performed exceptionally well in terms of participation and leadership activities towards the holding of Mozambique's first multiparty elections

--Inadequate time has been spent in monitoring some of the approved cooperative agreement activities

--USAID Project Management has been praised for its good working relations with the GRM, donors, Cooperative Agreement and Grant Awardees, Mozambican civic groups and associations, and international NGOS

--USAID Project Management has not adequately monitored the reporting by grant and CA recipients about their project component outputs and EOPS, the basis for determining Project level progress and achievements.

2. Assessing Electoral Assistance Support

Under the Electoral Assistance Support Component of DIP, there were a total of 7 institutional grants (UNDP, CARE International, IOM, AAI) and Cooperative Agreements awarded.

Breakdown of total awards for awardees:

IFES--\$114,096

International Organization for Migration--\$2,192,700

International Republican Institute--\$480,000

CARE International--\$117,000

United Nations Development Program--\$9,157,000

National Democratic Institute--\$1,920,254

African-American Institute--\$175,000

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-All awards under the Electoral Assistance component, except for those made to NDI and IRI were completed as of March 31,1995. The NDI Cooperative Agreement is scheduled to expire July 31, 1995 and that of IRI, on August 31, 1995. The IFES agreement was completed in October 1992 although the actual completion date was December 31,1994.

-Funds were assessed and deemed to be adequate for the activities proposed, and, in some cases, could be considered to be overly generous;

-In general, all awardees achieved the objectives established for their individual awards and thus contributed to the successful achievement of Project level election objectives including outputs and EOPS.

-The management, effectiveness and efficiency of the Awardees in the execution of their awards was uneven

Under the original Project Paper, the project outputs included under the Category of Elections:

-Strategic analyses;

-illustrative electoral models;

- illustrative action plan for dissemination of information.

Project Amendment I changed the original output objectives by specifying them more closely to the needs of the election. The new output objective concerning the Elections Category included:

-Conditions for free and fair elections created

Grants by Output Category

Only one cooperative agreement was signed in completion of project outputs under the original project paper, that with IFES. As events rapidly made the original PP obsolete, new project outputs were developed and shaped.

Six of the grants and cooperative agreements were classified as one of three Project-level output categories:

Category 1--70,000 election officers trained

Category 2--Electorate's understanding of the electoral process improved

Category 3--4000 hours of fixed-wing aircraft services provided

Category 1--70,000 election officers trained included the project component activities of UNDP, NDI, and IFES

Category 2--Electorate's understanding of the electoral process improved included the project component activities carried out by IRI, NDI, AAI, CARE International IOM, and UNDP

Category 3--4000 hours of fixed-wing aircraft services provided concerned only one grant awardee, UNDP

Individual Grants by Project Component Outputs

Category 1--70,000 election officers trained

The purpose of activities undertaken in this category comprises all or part of the outputs of grant awardees. The anticipated output objectives of these grants and agreements include:

- Training of up to 70,000 national registration and electoral officers to carry out the elections
- Building up the institutional capacity of registration and electoral officers to conduct future elections
- Develop election kits for use in voter training sessions to be used by government officers
- Mozambicans selected to participate in international election observer missions, election-related seminars and workshops
- Tours to familiarize Mozambican political leaders with democratic transitions in other countries
- Technical assistance provided to the CNE/STAE during the elections

The actual outputs from these grants reported to date include:

- Leaders selected and participate in international election observer missions to South African and Malawi
- Mozambican Leaders familiarized with democratic transitions in other countries
- 42,000 election officials, 1,600 civic education officers, and 9,600 census officers are trained for a total of 53,200 individuals
- 70,000 Mozambican citizens participate in the Elections Commissions at the Nations, Provincial, and District Levels

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-CNE/STAE are assisted in handling of press relations during the elections

Category 2--Electorate's understanding of the electoral process improved

The purpose of activities undertaken in this category comprises all or part of the outputs of grant awardees. The anticipated output objectives of these grants and agreements include:

-56 Core trainers familiarized with the IOM transport system by the end of the National Seminar;

-All Core Trainers requesting IOM assistance traveled to as many district capitals as possible from the respective provincial capitals in order to select and train the party monitors;

-IOM registration teams accompanied and facilitated the travel of the Core Trainers to the district capitals training sites;

-All Core Trainers received their training allowance by October 17, 1994;

-All Delegados de Lista registered by IOM for logistical assistance by October 17, 1994;

-All IOM registered Delegados de Lista who requested an advance on their monitor allowance received that advance prior to the elections;

-All IOM registered Delegados de Lista reach their voting tables before the start of the elections and were returned to their pick up point after the elections;

-All IOM registered Delegados de Lista who have proof of their participation in the elections, paid their monitoring allowances;

-Registration data on the Delegados de Lista provided after the elections.

Two pre-election individual party consultations held, each round lasting one week, with Frelimo, Renamo, and the other registered political parties;

-Two post-election individual party consultations held, each round lasting one week, with Frelimo, Renamo, and the other registered political parties;

-Dissemination of information on political parties and loyal opposition;

-A national ballot security and pollwatcher training program implemented prior to the October 1994 national elections

-Pollwatching and ballot security programs established and implemented by Renamo, Frelimo, and the other registered parties for the October 1994 national elections.

- Increased knowledge and confidence in the electoral process by the registered political parties, by increasing the likelihood of the acceptance of the results of the election by the political parties and their participation in the peaceful transition to a democratic government.
- One National Seminar on national poll monitor training completed by September 24, 1994 and up to 64 political party Core Trainers trained;
- Each political party attending the National Seminar initiates its own nationwide Delegados de Lista training program by October 1, 1994;
- Up to 12 national trainers deployed by CARE on a regional basis by October 1, 1994;
- CARE national trainers facilitate the training of up to 35,000 Delegados de Lista trained by the Core Trainers.
- Production and dissemination of civic education materials
- Completion of a survey of the broadcasting capacity of Radio Mozambique;
- Radio survey to serve as a baseline study to provide data on potential direct beneficiaries of the civic education program reached by Radio Mozambique is conducted;
- 30-35 Public opinion surveys conducted of 10 regionally dispersed groups carried out at 3 different stages of the electoral process. Focus group/public opinion surveys conducted in each province;
- Voter education materials designed and created, including election kits for voter education training activities;
- The creation and production of the "Free and Fair Elections" video in Portuguese and selected Mozambican national languages;
- Distribution of the "Free and Fair Elections" video to civic associations and other NGOs providing civic education training;
- "Train the Trainers" voter education workshops administered throughout Mozambique;
- Out of the participants to the introductory seminar, 15 Mozambicans recruited and trained to form the core of a national training team to conduct community education on democracy and elections in a minimum of 30 sites in all ten provinces and Maputo;
- The majority of voter education workshops administered in the rural areas;

-Public service announcements and current affairs discussion programs produced for radio broadcast;

-Production of a voter education radio talk shows, current affairs programs and a voter education radio play in Portuguese and in selected Mozambican national languages;

-The utility of television broadcasting for the production of television public service announcements in Portuguese and selected Mozambican national languages is investigated;

-The creation of a national coalition of civic associations and other non-governmental organizations to disseminate civic education awareness among the general public;

-Production of voter education activity update fact sheets used by civic associations, political parties, media and the donor community.

The actual outputs from these grants reported to date include:

--53 Core Trainers participated in the National Seminar for Core Trainers held in Maputo September 20-22, 1994

--For the most part, those CARE Core Trainers who needed transportation from the provincial capitals out to the district capitals to conduct training were transported by IOM vehicles.

--Core Trainers received their payment of \$200 in three installments corresponding to the number of weeks the pollwatcher training took place.

--IOM registered in 3 weeks time 32,758 Delegados de Lista and each one received a special travel card.

--Only 9,036 Delegados received an advance of 50,000

--All registered Delegados de Lista who presented themselves at the designated pick-up points were transported to their polling stations and back

--As of November 13, 1994 90% of the Delegados de Lista received their election subsidy of 200,000 meticaís

-Out of 32,758 Delegados trained, IOM documented 29,028 were present at polling stations during elections

-These Core Trainers conducted 262 provincial workshop and trained (under the supervision of the 12 CARE National Trainers) 17,517 Delegados

- CARE stationed 12 national trainers throughout Mozambique to facilitate the provincial workshops
- The political parties initiated their own Delegados training sessions
- CARE National Trainers directly facilitated the training of 17,517 Delegados de Lista.
- Two pre-election consultations were held with Renamo and Frelimo; the registered unarmed opposition parties received one consultation. The consultations address ballot security issues and the role of the majority and the opposition in a democracy
- Post-election consultations held only with Renamo, and the UD.
- Funds allocated to civic education paid for the deployment of a number of civic education units throughout the country. The teams conducted civic education activities using audio-visual productions and broadcasts, theater plays.
- NDI conducted 3 focus groups to ascertain attitudes about voting and democracy.
- The results of the focus groups photocopied and made available to the National Electoral Commission and USAID/Mozambique.
- Designed and produced a variety of civic education materials, including posters, stickers, tabloids, training manuals and tools, election kits, a video, a question and answer brochure, and election dictionary and a guide to the electoral process;
- Developed and used materials for media broadcasting (radio programs and public announcement spots) which encouraged the electorate to register and vote;
- NDI proposed for CNE consideration a theme and logo for the national civic education campaign that were accepted by the CNE.
- Election kits used in voter training sessions by diverse actors and organizations are developed. The kits provided participants with a simulated voting exercise which trained the electorate about the mechanics of voting in the elections.
- A short instructional video to be included with the simulated voting exercise is produced.
- A "Train the Trainers" voter education workshops for representatives of national civic associations, NGOs and political parties is held
- 15 Mozambicans hired to form the core of a national training team, the Voter Education Project Corps, to operate throughout Mozambique.

-The Voter Education Project Corps conducted local community education training on democracy and the elections;

-Survey of Radio Mozambique's broadcasting capacity is completed

-A radio campaign, using public service announcements and current affairs programs based upon the results of the national survey developed ;

Category 3--4000 hours of fixed-wing aircraft services provided

-3,600 hours of fixed-wing aircraft leased.

The actual outputs from these grants reported to date include:

-fixed-wing aircraft leased

3. Summary of Findings

Grantee Management and Planning

Quality of Grant and Cooperative Agreement Proposals

-The quality and the appropriateness of the grantee proposals varied. In general, proposals can be divided into two categories--those that were made over a short time frame and were limited and focused in their objectives. The other type was those for which a long period of negotiation between USAID and the Awardee allowed for some give and take to the final outcome of the proposal.

Effect of Grant Issuance Delays on Project Implementation

-Grants approved by the USAID Director as QIPs take up to 3 months from initial USAID/Awardee concept discussion to issuance of a grant. Larger grants, involved the approval of the Regional Contracts Office in Swaziland, take even longer, up to 6-months for final approval. Delays affected the implementation of a number of awards. In particular, excessive delays occurred when an invalid signature of the Deputy Director was not caught by a visiting Regional Contracts Officer and two awardees had their implementation dates pushed back. In one case, the project had to be compressed from 18 months to 9 months.

Baseline Surveys

Baseline data against which to measure progress toward meeting outputs and EOPS were requested of grant awardees. In some cases excellent baseline data were collected and in other cases, not.

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All awardees have collected some form of baseline information, but the quality and appropriateness varies greatly. For some of the awards, the duration of the grant was too short to demonstrate evidence of attainment of project purpose or goals. Most of the baseline data disaggregated for gender.

Appropriateness and Quality of Reporting to USAID

Awardees were asked to provide USAID with quarterly progress reports or weekly reports, technical reports, final report, and financial reports. Only CARE International submitted the weekly progress reports and a final evaluation report. NDI 3 quarterly reports covering the months from March-September 1994. UNDP has submitted a Electoral Process Trust Fund that did not comply with USAID procedures spelled out in the grant agreement. UNDP has also submitted a report assessing the electoral needs of Mozambique in the future. The report covers activities for the period from April through July, and provides qualitative data in narration form and no quantitative data. IRI has submitted one report, a close out report, which includes qualitative and quantitative data on its activities from August 5, 1994-August 5. AAI has submitted no report documenting the activities of its technical assistance team. IOM has submitted a final report with qualitative and quantitative data though it failed to document some of the problems in its logistical support activities. The IFES report did not meet USAID requirements as set by the terms of reference. A revision of the initial report also failed to correct the weakness of the initial report.

-Reporting on awardee activities was not uniform across the board. Some awardees took care to follow the required reporting procedures.

-Other awardees used a reporting format that was inconsistent with USAID's guidelines; the result are reports that contain no cumulative and quantifiable output and EOPS tables to allow tracking of progress over time.

-Some awardees have not submitted all of the reports required according to the details of the Cas or grant agreements negotiated.

-We noted among the best reports received were from CARE International, OIM, and IRI who collected much of the data stipulated by the contract agreement. NDI and UNDP failed to submit all reports required and/or failed to follow USAID procedures for writing the reports.

AAI submitted no report of the technical assistance team's activities.

Appropriateness and Quality of Internal Monitoring and Evaluation

-Several awardees carried out internal evaluations which USAID considered to be less than useful for a lack of honesty about the difficulties and problems encountered.

Staffing and Administration

-Some of the awardees suffered from staffing problems that affected achievement of grant objectives. The most serious problem has been incompetent and arrogant staff who become less than productive and actually detrimental to objective achievements.

-Some awardees have experienced conflict with Mozambican counterparts and this has hampered achievement of objectives in a timely manner.

-Some awardees were plagued by a lack of Mozambican professional staff to help

Awardee Contributions

-CARE, IOM, IRI made important contributions to the training and administrative/logistic support of political party election monitors. This set of interventions was viewed by many as critical to the success of the elections. The materials produced by IRI were considered to be some of the most effective and utilized of all donor inputs

-Less successful were the more ambitious civic education projects undertaken by UNDP and NDI, in part, because of the difficulty of adequately monitoring their impact. It was noted that the UNDP civic educational technique of theater and role playing resonated with the cultural expectations of Mozambicans and was considered effective. Also, effective were the voting simulation kits developed and produced by NDI used by a diverse group of community groups and political parties.

-The initial awardee, IFES, wrote an election assessment that was not very useful to the GRM or USAID because its report did not respond to the terms of reference specified in their CA. Their draft report was deemed unacceptable for it backed budgets for its recommendations for electoral interventions.

-The use of fixed-wing aircraft for the transportation of election officials and delivery of election materials to the provinces, for which good road transport was deemed inadequate, was judged by the team to be critical to the success of the elections. And more importantly, these aircraft were used to ensure that left-over materials and other documents such as voter registration lists and cards were retrieved and returned to STAE offices in Maputo. This provides a critical link in the sustainability of future electoral efforts.

Awardee Relations with USAID and GRM Institutions

Relations with USAID

-The majority of the awardees spoke highly of the USAID project manager. They found the project manager to be helpful and effective in providing useful feedback on their activities.

Tensions arose between USAID and NDI over the latter's tendency to deal directly with the Embassy, rather than USAID, even for small matters

Relations with GRM Institutions

-Awardee contacts with GRM institutions was mixed. Some worked quite well with CNE/STAE officials (IRI, CARE, OIM, AAI, and UNDP). NDI was viewed by CNE/STAE and UNDP as less than sensitive and collaborative, in the earlier stages. After a memo of understanding was signed between CNE and NDI (mediated by the DIP Project Manager) and the arrival of the Senior Resident Project Manager, the relations improved.

Relations with Mozambican Institutions

-There was some collaboration between awardees and Mozambican NGOs particularly in the training and distribution of voter education and civic education materials.

-Not enough attention was paid to building indigenous capacity, perhaps because awardees deemed there to be few professionally qualified Mozambican personnel. This raises the issue of sustainability of activities undertaken by awardees in future elections held in Mozambique.

Sustainability

Sustainability of Awardee Interventions

-The activities undertaken in support of electoral assistance provide Mozambicans with a limited capacity to reproduce or expand the results in future elections. Mozambicans learned how to conduct primarily a voter education campaign. They did not learn how to plan or implement a national campaign.

Sustainability of Donor Interventions

-The success of the elections was the result of a great bit of donor coordination and resources. It is not clear that donors will be willing to put similar levels of funding into future elections.

Sustainability of USAID Interventions

The successful outcome of the elections depended upon the efforts of some 32,000 pollwatchers who were paid the equivalent of one month's salary for 3 days of work. Will future pollwatchers be able to expect such a high salary. If USAID refuses to subsidize the pollwatchers, will other donors? Will the GRM?

Sustainability of Electorate Participation

-The overwhelming majority of the voting population voted in the first multiparty elections held in Mozambique. Voters turned out to vote for peace. Future elections will require equal percentages of voters for the sustainability of elections. What will motivate voters in future elections? The transition from voter education to civic education becomes critical for the sustainability of electorate participation in future elections.

Summary of Findings

The Electoral Assistance Component of the Project has successfully mobilized the efforts of 7 awardees to execute 4 institutional grants and 3 Cooperative Agreements. Grant and Cooperative Agreement activities were undertaken, and for the most part, successfully completed in all of the Project-level output categories specified in the Project Agreement. In a number of cases, the activities initiated by the awardees were unique, did not duplicate any other donor activities, and were viewed as being crucial to the success of the elections (IRI/CARE/IOM).

For the most part, the actual outputs of the various activities undertaken have matched or exceeded the anticipated output objectives in the grant agreements. In the few instances in which actual outputs failed to match the anticipated output objectives, it was due more to the lack of human or institutional capacity among Mozambican counterparts.

Evaluation Conclusions

Assessing Progress Towards Achievement of Project Objectives

The DIP Project was just one of several components in USAID/Mozambique's Transition Program whose goal was a: "Successful War-to-Peace Transition." DIP contributed to the Program's second strategic objective: "Successful Implementation of the Peace Process" and specifically to "Support for multiparty Elections." The indicator of the implementation of the peace process was the perception of a free and fair electoral process, including voter registration, campaigning, and elections.

Constraints to the War-to-Peace Transition.

A successful War-to-Peace Transition, the implementation of the peace process through a free and fair electoral process was by no means assured. There were many constraints to the success of the Transition Program. The many constraints included an adult literacy rate of only about 30%; the lack of experiences with formal election procedures, multiparty politics, and electoral choices; the lack of good communication and transportation networks outside of Maputo and the provincial capitals; Mozambique's political history; and attempts by various political parties to control citizen participation.

Despite these constraints, a successful election outcome was viewed as a sine qua non for laying a foundation for peace, security, and development in Mozambique. But as important as they were, they were just one of several transition objectives, that would support Mozambican initiatives to establish the foundation for a stable democratic society.

2. Attainment of Project Component Objectives Relative to Achievement of Project EOPS and Purpose

a. Electoral Assistance Support

The Project Paper and the Amended Project Paper specified project objectives an End of Project Status (EOPS) against which to assess actual progress towards the achievement of the Project purpose and goal.

1. Specifying the End of Project Status

a. Project Paper

The PP defined the Project purpose as: to facilitate increased Mozambican understanding of strategic options and implementation requirements for democratic initiatives in the areas of multiparty elections..." Quantifiable indicators (EOPS), and the means for measuring them were left to be determined by subjective judgment and analysis of Mozambique's progress toward democratization. However, USAID determined that monitoring of Mozambique's progress toward democratization would entail: 1) a consistent need to reassess whether proposed activities remain relevant; 2) reconfirmation of full Mozambican collaboration on project activities; 3) the extent to which the nature and timing of proposed activities are consistent with US foreign policy interests.

Attainment of this purpose would contribute to the achievement of the project goal of promoting viable democratic institutions and fostering democratic values in Mozambique. The project level outputs--completion of analyses and action plans would contribute to the project output of strategic analyses, illustrative electoral models, illustrative action plans for dissemination of information to GRM.

The project level outputs under the project proposal were never attained given the poor results obtained by the initial IFES elections assessment team. The report was unacceptable to USAID and the GRM. By the time the revised draft was submitted, the GRM turned to UNDP to undertake the electoral assistance activities. The project component activities did not contribute to the achievement of the original Project EOPS or the Project purpose.

In addition, the rapidly changing environment required USAID to amend its original goals, purpose, output, and activities. The amendment is discussed below.

b. Project Paper Amendment I

The amended project purpose (PPI) defined the project purpose as: support Mozambican initiatives to establish a foundation for a stable democratic society with measurable indicators (EOPS) being:

- 1.1) free and fair elections implemented and
- 1.2) the majority of the electorate participates in the election

Attainment of this purpose would contribute to the achievement of the project goal of stimulating long-term sustainable economic growth. The project level outputs--70,000 election officers trained, the electorate's understanding of electoral process improved, and 4,000 hours of fixed-wing aircraft leased would contribute to the project output of creating the conditions for free and fair elections.

Results of the Election--End of Project Status

1.1 Free and fair elections implemented

According to the 2,200 UN international observers, international observers, the 35,000 Mozambican political party monitors, and the hundreds of credentialed staff from the major donor agencies and Embassies who observed the elections, the multiparty elections were deemed as free and fair. The voting proceeded smoothly and orderly.

1.2 The majority of the electorate participates in the election

As elections approached all Mozambicans, including rural dwellers were aware and interested in the elections. Mozambicans were informed about the elections and intended to participate. For the voters, the elections would create the conditions for the stabilization of the peace process. Voting in the elections was a vote for peace.

Summary of Voter Participation

Estimated Eligible Voters	7,894,850 (Roughly 50%)
Register Voters	6,396,061 (About 81% of those eligible to vote)
Verified Register Voters	6,148,842 (96% of those registered)
Actual Voters	5,405,836 (88% of the verified registered voters)

The majority of eligible voters cast ballots, and the vast majority of those ballots were valid votes. These statistics point to free and fair participation of the majority of eligible voters.

Assessing Progress Made Towards Achievement of Project Level Outputs

For the Electoral Assistance Support Component, the Project Level Output included one output: conditions for free and fair elections created. The indicators of those conditions was to be demonstrated by 3 project category outputs:

1. 70,000 election officers trained
2. Electorate's understanding of electoral process improved
3. 4,000 hours of fixed wing aircraft services provided

It is also important to assess whether project component activities contributed to the achievement of those project component outputs and whether Project category outputs contributed to project level output achievement (See Tables below). The activities undertaken under the project components included:

1. Train election officers
2. Lease fixed-wing aircraft
3. Design, develop and produce non-partisan civic education materials
4. Assist Mozambican and international NGOs with their civic education programs

Category 1. 70,000 election officers Trained

It is possible to ascertain through the documents and interviews that 70,000 election officers were trained at the national, provincial, and local levels, though the quality of the training varied across the country. The training was to provide a critical mass of individuals capable of fulfilling their roles during the elections. The achievement of this project component output contributed to the achievement of the project level output, the creation of conditions for fair elections.

With the project level output achieved, we estimated that the EOPS for this Project was achieved; that is, free and fair elections were implemented.

Category 2. Electorate's understanding of electoral process improved

Activities promoted under the Project were to provide the population with voter and civic education in preparation for the elections and beyond. As far as voter education was made available to the vast majority of the population through a variety of sources--churches, government institutions and actors, Mozambican and international non-governmental organizations--a majority of the population were exposed to and did learn about voting procedures. Qualitative evidence offered by Mozambican and international NGOs as well as

the commentary of international election observers verifies that the population did gain an understanding of the voting process.

Limited quantifiable data for evidence of the increased understanding on the part of the electorate comes from the NDI focus groups which showed the population having absorbed knowledge about the process over time. For example, initially Mozambicans expressed anxiety over the secrecy of the ballot and the outcome for the losers of the election. However, one month prior to elections, voters felt more certain that the ballot was secret and that the losers of the election would not be punished. However, we could not ascertain the extent to which increased knowledge of the electoral process was limited to the participants of the focus groups or was, indeed, found throughout the entire population.

Based upon this qualitative and quantitative evidence, progress toward attainment of the EOPS (majority of the electorate participates in the election) to have been attained. Project activities did contribute to the attainment of Project Component Output Objectives.

3. 4,000 hours of fixed wing aircraft services provided

We were unable to verify the exact number of fixed-wing aircraft services provided, though the only UNDP Trust Fund Report obtained by the DIP Office mentions leasing of aircraft was undertaken. We placed greater emphasis on the impact of the aircraft services provided which exceeded output objectives. Not only were aircraft services provided as initially anticipated to transport documents and election personnel to the provinces, but an unanticipated benefit of the aircraft was that 6,000,000 registration forms and other election materials were brought to Maputo. This represents a future resource for future elections. The collection of registration materials for all who voted in the elections will enable any future CNE/STAE organization to avoid having to go through a registration process for those who registered. Only new voters will need to be registered.

The use of fixed-wing aircraft to ensure that all polling stations were fully staffed and had the requisite voting materials on the opening day of the polls has contributed to the attainment of the EOPS (free and fair elections implemented).

In addition, the project activities have contributed significantly to the attainment of Category III output objectives.

Grant Contributions Toward Project Output Objectives

In this section we attempt to directly and objectively assess the progress toward project-level output objectives by comparing the anticipated output objectives stated in quantitative terms as mentioned from the 7 grant and cooperative agreements with the actual outputs as reported to the USAID Mission subsequent to the signing of the agreements. Because not all reports have been submitted, there are some deficiencies in demonstrating strong quantitative stated

anticipated output objectives in some of the activities. The results are reported by project component activities.

1.1 Train election officers Activities

Planned versus Actual Outputs to Date in Election Officers Training

Output Indicator	Anticipated Outputs	Actual Outputs to Date
Voter registration agents trained	8000	9600 trained
Civic agents trained	Not specified	1600 trained
Election officers trained	60,000	42,500
Total Number of Agents Trained	up to 70,000	70,000
Leaders observe elections in neighboring countries	more than 4	4 reported

Of the activities conducted under the election officers training, the majority achieved and in some cases surpassed their expected outputs. All of the activities under this category were completed by the end of October 1994.

1.2. Lease fixed-wing aircraft

Planned versus Actual Outputs to Date in Fixed-wing Aircraft Leasing

Output Indicator	Anticipated Outputs	Actual Outputs to Date
Fixed-wing aircraft leased	3,600	Many hours leased

Because UNDP quarterly reports were not produced after July and the final report has not been written, we were unable to determine quantitatively what the actual outputs to date were. Qualitative data indicate that the fixed-wing aircraft proved to be a necessity and not a luxury to the overall achievement of the project component outputs as well as the project level outputs. Election materials as well as elections officials were transported to their polling stations in time for the opening of the elections. An added benefit of the aircraft leased their use in bringing important registration and voting materials back to Maputo for safekeeping. The grant to pay for UNDP leasing of the aircraft ended April 28, 1995.

1.3. Design, develop and produce non-partisan civic education materials.

Planned versus Actual Outputs to Date in Civic Education Materials

Output Indicator	Anticipated Outputs	Actual Outputs to Date
Posters produced	Not specified	150,000
Election Newspaper produced	Not specified	150,00 copies
Voter Registration comics	Not specified	250,000 copies
Radio "novela" programs produced and broadcast	Up to 60% of population is informed about civic education.	12 produced; No possibility of measuring impact
Radio programs for women produced and broadcast	Up to 60% of population is informed about civic education.	8 produced; No possibility of measuring impact
Pollwatchers book produced and distributed	32,000	35,000 produced; most are disseminated to pollwatchers
public opinion surveys	3 conducted with a total of 30 different locations	3 conducted with a total of 21 different locations
Election kits produced	4000	4000
Election video produced	Not specified	Not reported
Radio public service announcements produced and broadcast	Up to 60% of population is informed about civic education.	30 seconds each repeated 6 times a day; No possibility of measuring impact
Election activities radio program	Up to 60% of population is informed about civic education.	5 minutes 3 times on 3 days each week; No possibility of measuring impact
Television program produced and broadcast	Not specified	3-5 minutes 3 days each week
Question and answer television program broadcast	Not specified	3 minutes 3 days each week
Young people's television program broadcast	Not specified	10 minutes one day a week
Election's question and answer book produced	Not specified	Not reported
Election dictionary produced	Not specified	Not reported
Creation of election theme and logo	CNE acceptance of theme and logo	Theme: "There is a Place for Everyone" recorded and broadcast
Radio Mozambique broadcasting capacity undertaken	Provide baseline data on RM broadcasting capacity	Report written
Civic education theater groups created	Create local theater groups	Many theater groups created

The project component activities concerned with producing and disseminating civic education materials included the most activities. These activities encompassed a diverse range in the types of civic education materials produced and distributed for the Mozambican voter. Illiterate and literate voters could select from among print, electronic, and culturally-sensitive

theater productions to learn about voting and civic education. With few exceptions, the project component activities achieved their expected project component outputs. However with television and radio, we were unable to ascertain what the actual audience reach was. Television broadcasting does not go beyond Maputo and the provincial capitals and is not the best source for dissemination of voter education information. On the other hand, radio offers greater possibilities for reaching both urban and rural voters, but even with radio there are severe limits to its capacity to reach the majority of Mozambicans. While the survey of Radio Mozambique's estimated broadcasting capacity was thought to be 60% of the population, we felt these estimates were exaggerated given the lack of radios among a significant percentage of the population, the cost of batteries, the outdated equipment owned by RM, and the competition for Mozambican listeners from the more powerful radio broadcasting frequencies of neighboring countries, especially for Mozambicans living close to the territorial boundaries. The cooperative and grant agreements have ended with the exception of NDI (schedule to end July 31, 1995) and IRI (August 31, 1995).

1.4. Assist Mozambican and international NGOs with their civic education programs

Planned versus Actual Outputs in Assisting NGOs with Their Civic Education Programs

Output Indicator	Anticipated outputs	Actual Outputs to date
Political party Core Trainers trained	60 trained	53 trained
CARE National Trainers trained	12 trained	12 trained
Core Trainers transported to their training sites	53 transported	Trainers transported, but figures not reported
Party pollwatchers Trained	30,000 trained	35,000+ trained of which 17, 517 are trained directly by CARE National Trainers
NDI trainers trained	15 recruited	15 trained
NDI Voter Education Project Corps holds voter education training sessions	No: specified	8,939 training sessions held; 1,765,740 voters trained
Creation of a national coalition of civic associations	Coalition formed to disseminate civic education awareness among the public	Not achieved
Pre- and post election consultations with Frelimo, Renamo, and the opposition parties	2 Pre-election consultations; 2 post-election consultations	The 2 pre-election consultations for the two major parties were completed; only 1 post-election consultation has been achieved

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The fourth project component activity involved assistance to Mozambican and international NGOs with their civic education programs. For the most part, the project component activities contributed to the achievement of the anticipated project output objectives. The only activity not achieved was the creation of a national coalition of civic associations and other non-governmental organizations to disseminate civic awareness among the general public.

The general conclusion of the Evaluation Teams is that Grant and Cooperative Agreement Recipients have greatly contributed to the attainment of the Project Component output objectives as quantified by Project documents and interviews. However, the degree to which categories have attained their stated project level output objectives depends upon the available project documentation and our interviews with the recipients of grant and cooperative agreements. Where reports were lacking we attempted to fill in the data in the interviews and cross-reference the information through other methods.

In general, appropriate and quantifiable outputs and EOPS have been selected and make it possible for evaluators and project managers to measure the achievements of the grants and cooperative agreements. The gaps come from awardees using inappropriate formats to write up their reports or delays in the submission of reports. In one case, the cooperative agreement's project level activity cannot be quantifiable, and we were unable to determine its contribution to achieving project level output objectives.

Improving Project Monitoring

USAID should encourage the recipients to submit all reports as stipulated in the agreements. With the departure of many Mission and Embassy staff who were active in the Electoral Assistance component, there will be a dearth of institutional memory for the new DIP Project Manager and other in-coming staff. The new Project Manager will depend upon the submission of all grantee and CA reports due.

Assessing Progress Made Toward Achievement of Project Purpose

As a Result of USAID Project Inputs and Management

The inputs provided by the Mission to the needs of the initial project proposal were not satisfactory. With the project proposal amended the inputs provided by the Mission were much better than anticipated. The response of USAID to supporting Mozambican initiatives to establish a foundation for a stable democratic society were significant.

The Projects has had a significant impact on providing critical inputs the achievement of training election officials, improving Mozambican understanding of voting procedures, and of making timely distribution of election materials. In addition the Project has contributed to the Transition from War to Peace, and the Second Strategic Objective--the successful implementation of the peace process through the conclusion of a free and fair election.

Special Issues Related to the Electoral Assistance Component

a. Fixed-wing aircraft--The team evaluated this activity as critical to the overall success of the electoral process at all phases. The lack of good roads, especially in the provinces, necessitated the use of aircraft. This input was critical at all phases of the electoral process--during registration, voting, and in the post-voting phase. In addition, with local elections scheduled for next year, we evaluate the need for fixed-wing aircraft as not all roads will be repaired in time. Certainly, the holding of local elections will not require the same amount of aircraft hours leased as the 1994 election.

b. Financing of Political Party Monitor Training, Deployment, and Delegados de Lista. The acceptance of the peace process and democratic ideals depended especially upon the acceptance of the election outcome by the GRM and Renamo, more than it did for the average Mozambican. Whether the elections marked a point in the transition to peace required that the elections be viewed as free and fair to the main antagonists. To guarantee that elections be viewed as free and fair necessitated enough pollwatchers to cover all 7400 polling stations required a massive group of individuals, beyond the capabilities of the 2200 international election observers present for the elections.

Also, given that the Mozambican Constitution provides an opportunity for election monitoring only to political parties, a ballot security and monitoring program needed to mobilize a critical mass of political party members. Any pollwatching program that fell short on having diverse political parties present during the elections could be used as a pretext for the political leaders to cry voting foul. Pollwatching training and incentives to insure that the pollwatchers would indeed carry out their duties would enable polling stations to operate smoothly and orderly.

In addition, the production of manuals for the Delegados de Lista turned out to be important for empowering the Delegados to carry out their duties. The Delegados, well informed of their role, for the most part, added another layer of knowledgeable individuals who signaled to the electorate that the process was going to be free and fair. Delegados challenged and educated election officials who were not totally familiar with voting procedures. Delegados helped to reinforce the voting procedures for the electorate when it was their turn to vote. The Delegados made a distinct difference in the outcome of the elections.

2. Medium-Term Sustainability of Mozambican Electoral Process

The first national elections demonstrated that the majority of the population was eager to vote and had a reason to vote--for peace. One election does not predict the sustainability of the electoral process. It is by no means certain that voters who took time off from work, school, and family to stand in line for long hours will be willing to do so again and again and again. While the inputs and outputs contributed to the EOPS and Project Level Outputs, will this same level of inputs be available for the next elections?

Donor Sustainability--The elections were costly--\$63 million dollars--of which the USG financed one-seventh of that amount. Estimates of the costs of the municipal elections are \$16-20 million. Donor financing is expected to be lower; already donors are reducing their aid allocations to the GRM. While logistics will not cost as much next time (funding needs for registration will be lower), there will be a need for leasing fixed-wing aircraft.

Sustainability of the Electoral Process--The 1994 elections were a first step in what is to be a continuing process of regularly held, free and fair elections. There are some constraints to the electoral process. Financing is a problem. The GRM contributed only a small portion of the cost of the elections, about \$5 million dollars. But if the resources could be found, there are other constraints. The institutional capacity of the CNE/STAE, Mozambican NGOs, and political parties to design, plan, and execute elections and to mount a voter education program is weak. Certainly, institutional capacities were developed in this first round of elections, but technical assistance from the international community will be needed.

Sustainability of Voter Interest--Whether voters decide to participate in future elections must also be addressed. In 1994 voters had a reason to vote; they will need a reason to vote in future elections. There needs to be a distinction drawn between voter education which empowered voters to vote in the 1994 elections and civic education, concerned with empowering voters about the reason for voting in the next election. New and sustained civic education materials must be developed to encourage Mozambicans to stay involved with the new political process.

Civic vs. Voter Education--Voter education is appropriate for a transition to peace phase; civic education is appropriate to the transition to development phase. To maintain the confusion over the type of education needed risks jeopardizes the success of the first phase of the DIP project. It compromises the sustainability of citizenship participation and the implementation of free and fair elections. In short, Voter Education helped many Mozambicans understand the how and why of voting combined with the knowledge that the process would be free and fair with the presence of pollwatchers and international observers. These factors combined with the great desire of Mozambican people for peace motivated them to vote. And that ensured the attainment of Project EOPS, outputs and purpose. The majority of the electorate were informed about the political process and chose to participate in it. But voter education, alone, cannot guarantee the sustainability of the project level indicators in the future. It will not guarantee that:

- 1) the majority of the electorate will participate in the next election or
- 2) free and fair elections have been implemented (are sustainable) in future elections.

In fact, if voter education remains as the focus of USAID development efforts in the near and medium-term future, the end of project status already achieved will be jeopardize. Mozambicans will need a reason to vote in future elections; peace will no longer be the reason. New inducements and motivations have to be found, but internalized, not externalized

ones. The motivation for participation must be broadened and deepened within the Mozambicans themselves. In short, civic education must now become the focus of AID program and project activities. If not, without a "reason" to vote, the percentage of the electorate participating in future elections could decline, and this will threaten the implementation (sustainability) of free and fair elections. In the final analysis, if the project level output is not reinforced through a transition from voter to civic education, then the overall purpose of the project will fail and Mozambicans will be unable to create and sustain the initiatives to establish a foundation for a stable democratic society.

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**Electoral Assistance Provided under
Original Project Paper**

IFES

Cooperative Agreement No. PDC-0023-A-00-1089-00: To conduct an assessment of Mozambican electoral needs.

Cooperative Agreement Date: September 27, 1991

PACD: December 31, 1993

Purpose: To provide assistance to Mozambicans involved in the electoral planning process to conduct an election needs assessment and to provide specific recommendations based on the assessment.

LOP Budget: \$114,096

Breakdown:	Personnel	21,250
	Travel and Transportation	16,000
	Per Diem	11,925
	Miscellaneous	5000
	IFES G & A	24,921

Project Agreement Amendment No. 1 allocated an additional \$35,000 to cover additional work days.

Project Management:

Overall: 3 specialists in election needs assessments.

Reporting: After each review, the IFES teams will produce a report to include, the ability to conduct free and fair elections, recommendations for actions to be undertaken and the financial needs required to implement recommendations.

USAID Involvement:

Cooperative Activities:

1. Electoral Needs Assessment Evaluation

Objective: To undertake a review of the country's election planning capacity and additional needs for holding free and fair elections.

Outputs:

Assessment of procedures for registering election candidates and approving candidates to be placed on election ballots;

Assessment of the voter identification procedures and establishment and maintenance of voter registries;

Assessment of ballot design and security requirements;

Assessment of procedures for the distribution, collection, and security of ballots;

Assessment of criteria for the selection and location of polling stations;

Assessment of civic/voter education and motivation;

Assessment of training and materials required for election officials at the central and provincial levels;

Assessment of election commodities and equipment needs, including, detailed costs;

Assessment of the general role and function of election observers.

2. Study tours for Mozambican electoral officials

Objective: To provide technical assistance to Mozambicans about elections

Outputs: IFE staff and consultants to discuss and share information and materials with Mozambicans involved in the election

Overall Outputs

Assess Mozambican electoral needs

Provide technical assistance to help Mozambicans begin to plan for elections

Determine additional technical assistance and training needs

Impacts

Government of Mozambique develops a greater understanding of potential options and the personnel, financial, and logistical resources required for holding multiparty elections.

EOPS: Free and fair elections implemented.

**Mozambican Democratic Initiatives Project
Electoral Assistance Component
PP Amendment I**

International Organizations for Migration

Grant Agreement No. 656-0227-3-40014 and 656-0227-3-40018: To assist with the logistical support for the national election monitors for the October 1994 elections.

Grant Agreement Date: September 19, 1994

PACD: December 15, 1994

Purpose: To assist national election monitors to effectively monitor the October 1994 national elections. IOM will assist the national election monitors (Delegados de Lista) in the provision of logistical assistance to the political party Core Trainers during the training of the Delegados de Lista and to the Delegados de Lista during the voting period. The Delegados de Lista will determine the freeness and fairness of national elections. IOM will work closely with CARE, Incorporated (CARE) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) in the training of the Delegados de Lista.

LOP Budget: \$2,192,700

Breakdown:	Personnel	132,000
	Equipment and Supplies	53,000
	Travel and Transportation	824,700
	Other Direct Costs	1,167,000
	Indirect Costs	16,000

Project Management:

IOM-Maputo: Project Support Manager

Overall: IOM National Coordinator; 2 Assistant National Coordinators; 11 Provincial Coordinators

Reporting:

Weekly reports, with statistical information on the number of national election monitors trained, their party affiliation and voting table assignment, and a narrative of the activities

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undertaken and the difficulties encountered. Final report to contain the total number of monitors assisted during training, the total number of monitors transported during the elections and all payments made to the national election monitors. Financial report on the disbursements, advances received, and remaining cash on hand.

USAID Involvement: Review of Weekly Progress Reports by USAID Project Manager

Grant Activities:

A. Training and Registration

Objective:

To provide an operational structure for the registration and coordination of the Core Trainers, payment of the training allowances, transport from provincial capitals to the districts for the Core Trainers, and IOM registration of all Delegados de Lista. This structure is to facilitate the training of an adequate number of Delegados de Lista for the monitoring of the national elections.

Outputs:

- a. Participation in the National Seminar for Core Trainers to explain IOM's structure for the training and registration of the Core Trainers.
- b. Registration of 56 Core Trainers and the provision of a trainer escort for each Core Trainer.
- c. Transport assistance to the Core Trainers in the provincial capital areas.
- d. Payment of the training allowances to the Core Trainers.
- e. Registration of all Delegados de Lista trained by the Core Trainers and any other Delegados de Lista presented to IOM by the political parties or independent candidates.
- f. Payment of the monitoring allowances for up to 35,000 Delegados de Lista for the election monitoring.

2. Election Monitoring Support

Objective:

to ensure adequate means of transport for the Delegados de Lista before the voting and after the vote count is completed.

Outputs:

- a. Transport political party monitors to their polling stations in time for them to be at the voting table at the opening of the voting station on the first day of elections.
- b. Transport political party monitors back to their pick-up point following the elections.
- c. Payment of the monitoring allowing to Delegados de Lista who present themselves with the required proof that they performed their duties.
- d. Monitor the number of Delegados de Lista registered by IOM and the number present at the voting tables.

Overall Outputs

56 Core trainers familiarized with the IOM transport system by the end of the National Seminar;

All Core Trainers requesting IOM assistance traveled to as many district capitals as possible from the respective provincial capitals in order to select and train the party monitors;

IOM registration teams accompanied and facilitated the travel of the Core Trainers to the district capitals training sites;

All Core Trainers received their training allowance by October 17, 1994;

All Delegados de Lista registered by IOM for logistical assistance by October 17, 1994;

All IOM registered Delegados de Lista who requested an advance on their monitor allowance received that advance prior to the elections;

All IOM registered Delegados de Lista reach their voting tables before the start of the elections and were returned to their pick up point after the elections;

All IOM registered Delegados de Lista who have proof of their participation in the elections, paid their monitoring allowances;

Registration data on the Delegados de Lista provided after the elections.

Impacts

Degree to which the logistical system covered the essential needs of the national election monitors for election day monitoring

Degree to which assistance to the national monitoring of the elections was appropriate

EOPS: Free and Fair elections implemented.

1. A sufficient number of Delegados de Lista present at the voting tables during the October 1994 national elections to ensure that the freeness and fairness of the national elections is accepted by the political parties and Mozambican people.

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International Republican Institute

Cooperative Agreement No. 656-0227-G-00-4031-00: To assist Mozambican political leaders to participate in the peaceful transition to a democratic form of government.

Cooperative Agreement Date: July 29, 1994

PACD: August 15, 1994

Purpose:

To assist Mozambican political party leadership to accept the results of the October 1994 national elections and to peacefully participate in the post-election transition to a democratic form of government.

LOP Budget: \$480,000

Breakdown:	Personnel	44,822
	Benefits/Allowances	21,380
	Consulting Fees	19,600
	Communications	16,500
	Travel and Per Diem	223,564
	Contractual Services	32,900
	Other Direct Costs	4,870
	Indirect Costs	116,364

Project Management:

IRI-Washington: Activity Expenditures and Accounting Records

Overall: IRI Program Office with assistance from the Assistant Program Officer

Reporting:

Work plans will be subject to review by the DIP Project Manager. Records on the number, location, and type of beneficiaries assisted and the number of training sessions held and will collect gender-disaggregated data for all baseline data, reports, and evaluations. Monthly Progress Reports, statistical information and the progress and obstacles made on consultations with political parties. Quarterly Financial Reports, expenditures using

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Agreement funds for each activity. Technical Reports, the result of technical assistance funded.

USAID Involvement: Consultations by USAID Project Manager, including approval of work plans and budget.

Cooperative Agreement Activities:

A. Political Party Consultations

Objective: To conduct pre- and post-election consultations with leaders of all registered political parties.

Outputs:

1. Two pre-election consultations with each political party on how to organize in a national assembly, the concept of a "loyal opposition," minority rights and representative government.
2. Two post-election consultations with each political party on how to maintain party organization in the post-election period, the relationship between a civil servant's government duties vs. their political party responsibilities and advocacy of public policy positions under consideration by the legislature.

B. Ballot Security and Pollwatcher Training

Objective: To conduct a national and regional ballot security and pollwatcher training program.

Outputs:

1. Political party members will be trained on the security of the ballot box and ballots before, during and after voting, including during transport and counting.
2. Political parties will be able to develop an individual ballot security and pollwatcher program including the recruitment of volunteers, filing of challenges and reporting of the results.

Overall Outputs

Two pre-election individual party consultations held, each round lasting one week, with Frelimo, Renamo, and the other registered political parties;

Two post-election individual party consultations held, each round lasting one week, with Frelimo, Renamo, and the other registered political parties;

Dissemination of information on political parties and loyal opposition;

A national ballot security and pollwatcher training program implemented prior to the October 1994 national elections

Pollwatching and ballot security programs established and implemented by Renamo, Frelimo, and the other registered parties for the October 1994 national elections.

Increased knowledge and confidence in the electoral process by the registered political parties, by increasing the likelihood of the acceptance of the results of the election by the political parties and their participation in the peaceful transition to a democratic government.

Impacts

Better understanding of democratic principles and multiparty political systems by the leadership of FRELIMO, RENAMO, and other political parties;

Assessment of the benefits of ballot security activities to the political parties and the electoral process;

Assessment of the benefits of the political party pollwatcher program

Assessment of the cost effectiveness of the ballot security and pollwatcher program activities;

Degree to which activities impacted on women in political parties

EOPS: Free and Fair elections implemented.

1. Election results are accepted by political parties.

CARE INTERNATIONAL

Grant Agreement No. 656-0227-G-00-4047: To assist with the training of national monitors for the October 1994 national elections.

Grant Agreement Date: September 19, 1994

PACD: November 10, 1994

Purpose: To support a national training program for the national election monitors (Delegados de Lista).

LOP Budget: \$117,000

Breakdown:	Personnel	47,000
	Equipment and Supplies	1,000
	Travel	33,000
	Other Direct Costs	28,000
	Indirect Costs	8,000

Project Management:

Overall: The CARE National Coordinator, the International Administrator, and 12 National Trainers.

Reporting: Weekly progress reports, to document weekly statistical information and the activities and difficulties encountered which will be subject to review by DIP Project Manager. A Final Report, to include the activities conducted and the accomplishments made and the problems encountered in attaining objectives. Financial report to be included with the Final Report. Records will include the number of political parties participating in the National Seminar, their expected base of operations and the expected number of Delegados de Lista they intend to train. The number of Core Trainers will be disaggregated by gender.

USAID Involvement:

Grant Activities:

1. National Seminar Training for Core Trainers

Objective: To train political party representatives as Core Trainers for ballot security and pollwatchers training program.

Outputs:

CARE will train 62 trainers, 14 from Frelimo, 14 from Renamo, and 2 each for the smaller opposition parties and independent candidates for national poll monitoring training at a National Seminar held in Maputo September 24, 1994.

The 62 participants will be the Core Trainers who will in turn train their own party's Delegados de Lista.

2. Facilitation of Regional Workshops

Objective: To facilitate regional workshops organized by the Core Trainers to train their party's Delegados de Lista.

Outputs:

The regional workshops will focus on the role and responsibilities of Delegados de Lista during the elections. Special emphasis will be given to voting security, how to handle voting irregularities and make complaints, counting of the ballots and the announcements of results.

CARE will station up to 12 national trainers throughout Mozambique to facilitate these workshops.

CARE trainers, serving as a regional resource, will facilitate the training of up to 35,000 Delegados de Lista by the Core Trainers.

Overall Outputs

One National Seminar on national poll monitor training completed by September 24, 1994 and up to 64 political party Core Trainers trained;

Each political party attending the National Seminar initiates its own nationwide Delegados de Lista training program by October 1, 1994;

Up to 12 national trainers deployed by CARE on a regional basis by October 1, 1994;

Care national trainers facilitate the training of up to 35,000 Delegados de Lista trained by the Core Trainers.

Impacts

Training covered essential information required by a Delegado de Lista to properly monitor the national elections.

Training resulted in a group of Delegados de Lista able to detect election irregularities and signal this in a proper manner

Delegados de Lista act as national monitors during the election and contribute towards the determination of a free and fair national election

EOPS: Free and Fair elections implemented

1. Delegados de Lista are capable of monitoring poll activities on election day.

United Nations Development Program

Grant Agreement No. 656-0227-G-00-4025-00: To support the UNDP Electoral Process Trust Fund for Mozambique.

Grant Agreement Date: April 29, 1994

PACD: April 28, 1995

Purpose: To provide support to Mozambique's Electoral Process through a program for the production and dissemination of civic education materials, training of election officers and fixed-wing aircraft logistical support.

LOP Budget: \$9,157,000

Breakdown:	Aircraft Lease	2,307,000
	Civic Education	1,605,000
	Training	4,111,456
	Equipment and Materials	885,000
	Administrative Costs	249,044

Project Management:

Overall: UNDP

Reporting:

In addition to the monthly donors meetings ("Aid-for Democracy Group"), UNDP will issue a Monthly Report on the status of progress on the electoral process. Periodic Progress Reports will also be submitted as well as a Technical and Financial Report. Annual report to include information on annual expenditures. A Terminal Project Performance and Evaluation Report will be submitted at a final evaluation meeting of UNDP, multilateral and bilateral donors and Mozambican counterparts.

USAID Involvement:

Grant Activities:

1. Civic Education Materials

Objective: To build up Mozambican institutional capacity to prepare and organize multiparty elections, a civic education campaign will be implemented.

Outputs:

The deployment of a number of civic education units throughout the country. The teams will conduct civic education activities using audio-visual productions and broadcasts, theater plays. Other initiatives include seminars and mobile civic education activities.

2. Election Officers Training

Objective: The training of up to 70,000 registration and election officers to build up Mozambican institutional capacity to prepare and organize multiparty elections.

Outputs:

Training up to 70,000 national registration and electoral officers to carry out the national multiparty elections.

Building up the institutional capacity of registration and electoral officers to conduct future elections.

3. Fixed-wing Aircraft Leased

Objective: The leasing of 3,600 hours of fixed-wing aircraft to prepare and organize for the multiparty elections.

Outputs:

To transport members of the CNE and its secretariat, the registration and electoral officials, and the technical assistance personnel.

To transport election-related materials to the provinces wherever the road conditions or distances pose obstacles to the conduct of free and fair elections.

Overall Outputs

Production and dissemination of civic education materials;

70,000 election officers trained;



3,600 hours of fixed-wing aircraft leased.

Impacts

Aid Mozambican election authorities to plan and implement election-related activities;

Mozambican institutional capacity is developed to prepare and organize multiparty elections;

Aid Mozambican authorities in meeting logistical needs for transportation and procurement;

Electorate informed of the voting process;

Mozambican electorate builds up trust in the electoral process.

EOPS:

1. Free and fair elections implemented.
2. Majority of electorate participates in the election.

National Democratic Institute

Cooperative Agreement No. 656-0227-A-00-4001-00: To conduct civic education activities.

Cooperative Agreement Date: December 7, 1993

PACD: July 30, 1994

Purpose: To conduct a civic education activity to support informed participation in the country's first multiparty elections. NDI will develop the program activities under the supervision of the National Electoral Commission, and in collaboration with other donor programs designed to provide the national electorate with civic education training.

LOP Budget: \$1,920,254

Breakdown:	Salaries	166,568
	Benefits	65,628
	Office Space and Utilities	27,250
	Equipment and Supplies	254,000
	Communication and Postage	80,000
	Travel and Per Diem	282,086
	Contractual Services	529,700
	Consultants' Fees and Expenses	52,530
	Other Direct Costs	42,500
	Cooperative Agreement	50,000
	Indirect Costs	369,992

Project Management:

NDI-Maputo: NDI Senior Resident Project Manager responsible for civic education and program activities; Resident Logistics Officer; Resident Administrative Field Officer; Radio Specialist Program Officer. NDI will work under the auspices of the National Electoral Commission (CNE).

NDI-Johannesburg: NDI Senior Associate in Charge of Southern African NDI Regional Office in Johannesburg

NDI-Washington: other management services to be provided by NDI headquarters staff and include:

Reporting:

Initial Detailed Plan to be submitted to DIP Project Manager. Quarterly Progress Reports to include statistical information and narrative on NDI activities as well as problems or delays in attaining objectives and goals. Survey report on the broadcasting capacity of Radio Mozambique and baseline information on number and type of civic education program direct beneficiaries. Financial Reports and Technical Reports will also be required. Baseline data will be gender disaggregated.

USAID Involvement:

Substantial involvement of USAID will include regular consultations with NDI; review of NDI plans and documents; review of the substantive provisions of subordinate contracts or sub-cooperative agreements; concurrence in the selection of long term NDI personnel resident in Mozambique; joint participation in the implementation and monitoring of NDI activities.

Cooperative Agreement Activities:

1. Public Opinion Survey/Focus Groups

Objective: To test the attitudes of voters towards the electoral process, the level of voter participation and voter responsiveness to the voter education campaign.

Outputs: To survey public opinion using quantitative (personal interviews) and qualitative (focus groups).

Make available to the National Electoral Commission and USAID/Mozambique the findings of the surveys.

2. Creation and Design of Voter Education Materials

Objective: To design a voter education campaign based on the findings of the focus group research, field experience and regular consultations with the CNE and Mozambican organizations.

Outputs:

The design and production of civic education materials will include posters, stickers, tabloids, training manuals and tools, election kits, a video, a question and answer brochure, and election dictionary and a guide to the electoral process;

Develop and use of materials for media broadcasting (radio programs and public announcement spots) to encourage the electorate to register and vote;

Propose for CNE consideration a theme and logo for the national civic education campaign;

Develop election kits for use in voter training sessions to be used by political parties, churches, schools, government offices, clinics, social action groups, community centers and development offices. The kits will provide participants with a simulated voting exercise.

Production of a short instructional video to be included with the simulated voting exercise.

3. Voter Education Workshops

Objective: To conduct "Train the Trainers" voter education workshops

Outputs:

Representative of national civic associations, NGOs and political parties are introduced to the voter education campaign and election kit materials at the "Train at the Trainers" voter education workshops;

A group of 15 Mozambicans to form the core of a national training team, the Voter Education Project Corps, to operate throughout Mozambique.

The Voter Education Project Corps will conduct local community education training on democracy and the elections;

Assist workshop participants to develop concrete plans for conducting voter education programs within their own organizations.

Produce for the CNE regular reports on the community-based education efforts to assist in the identification of potential problem areas to facilitate the overall election process.

4. Radio Campaign

Objective: To develop and produce a radio campaign to address campaign issues and to emphasize the importance of citizen participation.

Outputs:

A survey of Radio Mozambique's broadcasting capacity will be completed;

A radio campaign will be developed based upon the results of the national survey using public service announcements; the production and broadcasting of current affairs programs;

Monitoring of the public service announcements to ensure their non-partisanship and to measure the audience reached.

5. Study Tours for Political Leaders

Objective: To fund Mozambicans to participate in election seminars and workshops.

Outputs:

Mozambicans selected to participate in international election observer missions, election-related seminars and workshops.

Tours will help to familiarize Mozambican political leaders with democratic transitions in other countries.

Participants in the tours will write a report about their experiences as they relate to Mozambique.

6. National Non-Government Mozambican Coalition

Objective: To organize a national coalition of non-governmental organizations to broaden the population receiving voter education training and heighten general voter awareness.

Outputs:

The organization of a national coalition of non-governmental organizations to assist in organizing and conducting training programs and distributing education materials.

The promotion of broad democratic development agendas, including the promotion of cooperation among civic groups.

Overall Outputs

Completion of a survey of the broadcasting capacity of Radio Mozambique;

The radio survey to serve as a baseline study to provide data on potential direct beneficiaries of the civic education program reached by Radio Mozambique;

30-35 Public opinion surveys conducted of 10 regionally dispersed groups carried out at 3 different stages of the electoral process. Focus group/public opinion surveys conducted in each province;

Voter education materials designed and created, including election kits for voter education training activities;

The creation and production of the "Free and Fair Elections" video in Portuguese and selected Mozambican national languages;

Distribution of the "Free and Fair Elections" video to civic associations and other NGOs providing civic education training;

"Train the Trainers" voter education workshops administered throughout Mozambique;

Out of the participants of an introductory seminar, 15 Mozambicans recruited and trained to form the core of a national training team to conduct community education on democracy and elections in a minimum of 30 sites in all ten provinces and Maputo;

The majority of voter education workshops administered in the rural areas;

Public service announcements and current affairs discussion programs produced for radio broadcast;

Production of a voter education radio talk shows, current affairs programs and a voter education radio play in Portuguese and in selected Mozambican national languages;

Investigate the utility of television broadcasting for the production of television public service announcements in Portuguese and selected Mozambican national languages;

At least four Mozambican leaders sent on study tours to participate in international election observe missions and election-related seminars and workshops'

The creation of a national coalition of civic associations and other non-governmental organizations to disseminate civic education awareness among the general public;

Production of voter education activity update fact sheets to be used by civic associations, political parties, media and the donor community.

Impacts

NDI civic education program activities of benefit to electorate;

Civic education activities impact on the voting behavior of the national electorate;

Civic education activities are cost effective;

Electorate comprehends their role and participation in the holding of democratic elections and accountability of candidates to the electorate'

Civic education activities impact on rural poor and women.

EOPS: Majority of electorate participates in the election.

ANNEX 2: PROJECT COMPONENT ANALYSES

TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY & NGO STRENGTHENING

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AFRICAN AMERICAN INSTITUTE

CA No. 656-0227-A-00-4929-00: To Support Research on Decentralization and Traditional Authority: and Provide Training in Decentralization in Mozambique

CA Date: August 1, 1994

PACD: July 29, 1996

Purpose: To Support AAI's Decentralization and Traditional Authority and Democratic Development Projects

To support the production of research data and popular education materials on the relationship of local government structures to traditional authority; provide training for selected Government and opposition political party officials in the practice and methodology of administering decentralization programs; and provide grant funds and TA to national NGOs working to strengthen civil society in Moz.

LOP Budget: \$2,260,000

Breakdown:	Personnel	385,021
	Travel/Transport	459,132
	Equipment/Supplies	154,718
	Other Direct Costs	970,243
	Indirect Costs	290,886

Breakdown:	Decentralization & Traditional Authority	
(A)	TA Research	731,965
	Public Admin Training	132,280
	Sub-total	864,245
(B)	NGO Democratic Development	
	NGO TA	52,562
	NGO Training	87,360
	Small Grants Fund	400,000
	Evaluation	20,000
	Sub-total	559,922
(C)	AAI Administrative Budget	
		834,265
(D)	Rounding Off	1,568

Grand Total 2,260,000

Project Management:

AAI NY: Project Support Manager

Overall: AAI Program Representative; financial specialist; accountant/admin assistant

DTA: AAI Decentralization and Traditional Authority Project Manager; six students, and four officials (to be engaged as consultants and paid for by private donors) from MAE and specialists

Reporting: Annual Workplans and budgets which will be subject to quarterly reviews with USAID. Quarterly Technical Reports, identify benchmarks and progress in achieving program outputs; particularly using objectively verifiable indicators. Quarterly and annual fiscal reports, with expenditures reported per budget line item. Records on the number, location, gender, and type of beneficiaries assisted and will collect gender-disaggregated data for all baseline surveys.

USAID Involvement: Consultations by USAID Project Manager, including disbursement and monitoring of small grant fund.

DECENTRALIZATION & TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY PROJECT

Purpose: AAI will assist the MAE to undertake a comprehensive research project to determine the role of traditional authority in relation to local government structures within the context of a national decentralization program.

To permit further institutional change based on locally-derived models of power and hierarchy.

Sub-components:

A. (Continued) Applied Research (and analysis on traditional systems of power in various regions/cultures [leading to]) and Local Administration Reform.

Objective: to collect information that will be organized, disseminated and used to suggest administrative reform. Research activities will be organized, disseminated and used throughout the life of project, as additional information will be gathered from both the civic education activities and from work and discussion groups.

Outputs:

1. **Research:** Applied research on Traditional Authority (from other field/regions and groups in addition to those undertaken in pilot phase); work guidebooks will be

prepared to provide technicians with guidance gathering data; research will collect more in-depth information about basic elements and operation of micro-societies in the lineage territories; research program will produce reports and recommendations on a range of topics.

- * Data analysis for decision making
- * Documentation and information systems instituted
- * Clearing house on decentralization and traditional authority established
- * Research reports prepared, recommendations made, and criteria for action developed

2. **Local Administrative Reform:** research will provide information and recommendations for administrative reforms that would make government responsive to local needs priorities; will define the nature of institutional relations and communications channels between local governments and traditional powers.

- * Local participation in government
- * Review of administrative relationships between traditional authorities and provincial and central governments
- * Improved inter-institutional communications
- * Support for administrative change

B. **Civic and Administrative Education Materials (Preparation of educational materials on traditional authorities for Civic education and use by Administrative Officials)**

Objective: Produce and distribute materials that will educate and create dialogue at the local/district level and that can also support administrative training.

Outputs:

- * Popular brochures for civic education (approximately 20,000 brochures covering a minimum of 4 topics).
- * Didactic materials on/for administrative reform and MAE's training program produced (These materials, as analyzed and refined, will be included in the clearing house of information and made readily available to academic and training institutions).
- * Brochures/case studies/informational materials produced
- * Distribution of materials to target groups

C. **Consensus Building & Improved Governance Discussion Groups (design and organization of "work and discussion groups" at regional levels to focus public inquiry on traditional values, roles of citizenship and local governance and to foster nation-wide understanding of these issues).**

Objectives: The "Work and Discussion Groups" organized at the provincial level by culture and region, will begin the process of integration of local, traditional authorities into territorial administration and delegation of responsibilities for regional development. They will encourage dialogue and consensus on decentralization and traditional authority and power.

- Outputs:**
- * Wider understanding of traditional authority and power at local levels.
 - * Reinforcement of political and social elements that already acknowledge traditional authority.
 - * Encouragement of integration of local authority into regional development efforts.
 - * Local data for comparison of regional problems and solutions.
 - * Regional fora for dialogue on issues of traditional authority and decentralization
 - * 8 regional work and discussion groups will be coordinated by AAI technical team with local administration and a representative group of traditional authority, in cooperation with MAE.
 - * Preparation of edited reports for each work and discussion group
 - * National Work and Discussion Group will integrate information and models discussed at the regional/provincial/district levels.

D. Training in Local Administration

Objective: Training program for party leaders and staff of the MAE in broader aspects of public administration as relates to decentralization. To form or strengthen professional cadres who will develop and implement local government initiatives in the long term. For 15 to 20 persons in either Brazil or US.

Outputs: prepare an edited report with conclusions and recommendations of each of the eight "Work and Discussion Group" workshops.

Overall Outputs

Number of brochures/case studies/didactic guides produced; number of people and particularly important ones who received them;

Number of policy recommendations/reports produced;

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Number of work/discussion groups held;

Number of recommendations the MAE adopted and implemented;

Number of people who participated in civic education.

Impacts

Perceived changes in attitudes/knowledge of traditional authority and power

Degree to which the project included local authority in organizing project activities

Degree to which state authorities included local authority in decisions

Degree to which capacities are decentralized, perceived usefulness to research materials through changes and impact in different societal actors.

EOPS: Traditional authorities play an active role in local-level decision making

1. The research program will identify and explain new models for decentralized authority for MAE's consideration;
2. Didactic materials produced will educate the public at large as well as state and traditional authorities/administrators;
3. Work and discussion groups will provide data for analyses, include local and traditional authority in the reformulation process and promote consensus on steps to be taken.

NGO DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

- Components:(i) Local Technical Assistance & Training
- (ii) Workshops on Institutional Development
- (iii) NGO Small Grants Fund
- (iv) NGO Newsletter

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ANNEX 3: LIST OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES PROJECT:

(656-0227)

MID-TERM EVALUATION

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

African American Institute, "Democratic Development in Mozambique: Decentralization and Traditional Authorities and NGO Democratic Development," An Unsolicited Proposal, AAI, October, 1993, New York.

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USAID/Mozambique, "Grant Agreement 656-0227-G-00-4025-00," between USAID/Mozambique and United Nations Development Programme, Maputo.

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ANNEX 4: INDIVIDUALS & ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED

DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES PROJECT:

(656-0227)

MID-TERM EVALUATION

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INDIVIDUALS & ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED

U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

USAID/Mozambique

Roger Carlson	Mission Director
Jay Smith	Deputy Director
Cheryl McCarthy	Program Officer
Charles North	Deputy Program Officer
Laura Slobey	Supervisory General Development Officer
Gregg Wiitala	Supervisory Project Design & Management Officer
Scott Alan	Program Economist
Luisa Capelao	Policy Advisor
Vanesa Coelho	Assistant DIP Manager
Thomas Johnson	Program Development Officer
Alfredo Zucule	Financial Analyst

American Embassy

Ambassador Dennis Jett	American Ambassador to Mozambique
Mike McKinley	Deputy Chief of Mission
Suzy Pratt	Political Officer
Gary Grey	Political Officer

United States Information Service

David Ballard	Public Affairs Officer
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GRANTEES/CA RECIPIENTS

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African American Institute	Celia Diniz, Program Representative
African American Institute	Irae Baptista, D/TA Project Manager
International Migrations Organization	Mr. Rousselot
National Democratic Institute	Charlotte Cerf, Country Director
CARE International	Arnaldo Tembe, Training Director
CARE International	James Wesolosky, Short-term Consultant
United Nations Development Program	Bruno Soares, Technical Advisor

GOVERNMENT/POLITICAL PARTIES

National Elections Committee	Dr. Leonardo Simbine, Vice President
PCN	Lutero Simango

DONORS

European Union	Sven von Burgsdorf, Economist
Swedish Development Agency	Bosse Hammarstrom, Program Coordinator
Norwegian Development Agency	G. Boe, Ambassador
UNICEF	Gloria Fernandes, Project Officer

NGOs/OTHERS

FEF	Peter Haussler, Representative
AWEPA	Lucia Van den Bergh, Country Representative
LINK	Guy Mullins, Representative
Carry Manning	Independent Consultant
LTC	F. Nhantumbo, Researcher

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Kulima

D. Liuzzi, Coordinator

Christian Council of Mozambique

P. Cunica

CEA

A. Piadede

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