

A POSITION PAPER ON
THE ORGANIZATIONAL POSITIONING OF TRIBAL AREAS DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

by

Robert LaPorte, Jr., Ph.D.
Contract Number 391-0471-0-00-0536-00

Submitted to:

Rural Development Division
Office of Agriculture and Rural Development
United States Agency for International Development
Mission to Pakistan

January 31, 1990

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I Executive Summary and Recommendations	1
II Problem Statement	2
III Background	3
IV Project Description	8
V Implementation Plan	19
VI Administrative, Political, Social and Economic Analyses of Institution Building	21
VII Detailed Institution Building Plan for TADP	25
 Annexes	
A Scope of Work	
B Daily Log	
C Documents Consulted	
D Organizational Charts of Special Development Unit, P & D, GONWFP, FATA Section, P & D, GONWFP and Special Development Plan Section, P & D, GONWFP	

After careful examination of all identified options for an institutional "home" for the Tribal Areas Development Project in the Government of the North West Frontier Province (GONWFP), the recommendation is to place it in the Special Development Unit (SDU) of the NWFP Planning and Development Department. This recommendation is made with reservations. USAID should have discussions with and secure agreement from the GONWFP on the following issues:

- (1) that there is consensus among its line departments that SDU should be the home for TADP;
- (2) that the GONWFP encourages the SDU to pursue its Charter of Functions of September 1984;
- (3) that each officer appointed as Director General of SDU:
(i) serve for at least two years; (ii) has the experience and status necessary to exercise the "clout" that the P&D Department has over the line departments in NWFP; and
(iii) has the potential and willingness to take the steps necessary to create and maintain a "planned management" or "development management" work climate in the SDU; and
- (4) the staff recruited for the SDU and the PMU/TADP be "trainable" and have the potential to interact effectively with the project directors, researchers, contractors, and the donors involved in the various area development projects.

II

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Simply stated, the problem posed to the consultant was to find a potentially effective organizational "home" in the Government of the North West Frontier Province (GONWFP) for the Tribal Area Development Project (TADP).¹ With USAID assistance during the first three years of TADP, this "home" must be able to plan, identify, design, manage, monitor, inspect and evaluate subprojects in several sectors in selective and receptive tribal areas in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Related to the issue of locating a home, among other tasks,² the consultant was to "analyze issues relating to:"

- o The quality and capacity of GONWFP to plan and manage an area development project, TADP, in FATA;
- o An examination of various TADP project management options, and the recommended course of action for the Mission to follow leading to an ownership of the Project by the GOP;
- o The re-orientation of the GOP counterparts leading to rational decision making for planning and implementing Project objective[s] at the end of, say, a three year period. The consultant will determine the various mile stones over the three year period, beginning with a mile stone, which has political/administrative agenda for Projection selection, to the final mile stone, at the end of three years, when project selection would be based on rational decision making and a functioning project home within the folds of the Government. Some planning, implementation and decision making methodologies now being pursued include: use of socio-economic profiles for each Tribal Agency, regional planning methodology and "participatory workshops" over a 24-36 month period attended by the various stake holders (Planning and Development, USAID, the line agencies and the Political Agents). The consultant will integrate the planning and decision making interventions by the Rural Development Division of the Mission into his/her Position Paper recommendations and analyses." (See Annex A, Scope of Work, p. 4.)

¹In discussion with USAID officials in Islamabad, it appeared that the "home" should/could also serve the needs of projects sponsored by other donors.

²See Annex A, Scope of Work, pp. 4-6 for a complete listing of tasks.

As background to this consulting assignment, it is useful to review the recent history of TADP.

TADP, 1982-85

This is not the first time that an organizational "home" in the GONWFP surfaced as an issue for TADP. During the first evaluation of TADP, the evaluation team concluded that one of its weaknesses was the absence of a home:

At present, TADP has no single home within the GOP or the GONWFP. There is no single GOP project manager. Because its subprojects are located in several tribal agencies and frontier regions and implemented by either FATA/DC or the NWFP Communications & Works (C&W) and Local Government and Rural Development (LG&RD) departments, there are several project managers but none who have a vested interest in ensuring that the problems these subprojects have faced (or may encounter in the future) are dealt with in a systematic, expeditious fashion. Consequently, a degree of confusion characterizes the efforts of TADP in the design and implementation of the subprojects it supports. (Interim Evaluation of the Tribal Areas Development Project, Pakistan, May 1986 [field work was completed in November 1985], p. 9.)

The evaluation team recommended, in part, that:

- o USAID should integrate TADP into the Planning and Development (P&D) Department, NWFP, through two linkages: an SDU, which handles daily execution of project activities, and a Project Coordination and Review Board (PCRB), which serves as a commitment generator, policy decision maker, and implementation bottleneck breaker. This recommendation is welcomed by the NWFP.
- o TADP, through the SDU and PCRB, must acquire the active participation of the political agents for each agency in which subprojects will take place. This is to ensure that subprojects identified will be in areas less likely to dissolve into chaos when construction begins, and to obtain a political commitment to use the full powers of the political agent's office to bring them to successful conclusion.
- o TADP should undertake systematic planning for subproject activities by establishing and supporting a revised Research and Evaluation Unit working directly in the P&D Department, as one component of the SDU. This unit

should respond to TADP/P&D planning requirements and collect information on broad categories of existing human, natural, and developed resources of each tribal agency likely to have subprojects; it should then carry out detailed analyses of likely implementation difficulties, serving as early warning of TADP/GOP actions to be required. This unit should be staffed with an expatriate planner/developer, senior Pakistanis, and computer technology, to assist the P&D Department with its information management and planning responsibilities. (Interim Evaluation of the Tribal Areas Development Project, p. xiii.)

At the time these recommendations were made, there was a difficult set of "actors" occupying the development stage in the NWFP. The SDU had been recently created and its Director General was Ejaz Rahim who had previously served as Secretary, P&D, GONWFP, and currently serves as Commissioner, Peshawar Division. Ejaz Qureshi was Secretary, P&D, GONWFP, and also serving as acting Additional Chief Secretary (Development). Qureshi encouraged the TADP Evaluation Team to make the above recommendations. Other officials of the GONWFP who had contact with TADP seemed to support the concept of an organizational home. The GONWFP, therefore, was encouraging a reorganization of TADP which would include developing an organizational home and placing it in the P&D Department.

TADP, 1986-88

Although improvements were made in the management of TADP from 1985 to 1988, the issue of an institutional "home" and generating a sense of investment and participation on the part of the GONWFP in TADP was largely ignored.

In spring 1988, USAID/Islamabad considered assisting the P&D Department, GONWFP, to improve its project monitoring capacity and assist in developing an computer-based information system that would help to alleviate the delays created by having to manipulate data manually. (See "Project Monitoring" file, USAID/Peshawar.) For reasons unknown to the consultant, this assistance was not rendered. (According to the Field Representative of UNFDAC, some of this work will be undertaken shortly for SDU supported by a technical advisor from UNFDAC. SDU already has some of the hardware and software in place to support this effort.)

In late 1988, the Second Evaluation of the Tribal Areas Development Project was undertaken. The Team stated:

If the future of TADP calls for the creation of planning and field research capacity, as well as development activities beyond infrastructure, in particular, if the option of Focused Development is a serious consideration for present TADP and TADP Amendment, there is good reason to integrate TADP into

an operational unit of the Planning and Development Department [of GONWFP]. This can be done immediately, with preparation for TADP to be integrated into a reorganized and re-staffed Special Development Unit, with support for technical assistance, staff development commodities and operating expenses for a newly-created Planning, Research, and Evaluation Division. (Second Evaluation: Tribal Areas Development Project; Pakistan, p. 161.)

Building on this evaluation and its own internal decision making, USAID is now considering what to do regarding what remains in TADP and to plan for TADP Amendment. Hence, RDD/ARD Peshawar developed the Concepts Paper.

TADP, 1989-Present

The April 1989 Concepts Paper³ stated, in part, "TADP-II implementation modality will invoke the following strategic concepts:"

- o Undertake an "Expanded TADP Option." This includes funding infrastructure projects and line agency activities with stronger institutional strengthening and sub-projects scattered widely across FATAs.
- o At the same time, efforts will be aimed at a "Focused Development Option," concentrating on selective and receptive tribal agencies in which many line agencies will contribute to the development of a defined area. A combination of the "expanded" and "focused" development options stems from the late 1988 evaluation recommendations.
- o A major project implementation weakness identified by the evaluation team and also recognized by the senior government planners in the NWFP is that project activities are being planned and implemented largely based on USAID initiatives and personnel. Project Management for TADP will be shifted to the GOP.⁴ In fact, efforts are underway to take corrective measures

³See Concepts Paper: Tribal Areas Development Project (TADP) II, RDD/ARD Peshawar, Second Draft, March 27, 1989, pp. 4-6 for a discussion of all the strategic concepts. Unlike 1986 when USAID decided not to seek a home for TADP in GONWFP, USAID in 1990 is now pursuing a home for TADP in the GONWFP. On the GONWFP side, the situation remains the same as in 1986--that is, the GONWFP is willing to provide a home for TADP-II in the P&D Department.

⁴My underscore.

during the bridging period. GONWFP has been requested to create a "home" for the TADP and the positioning of a full time Government Project Director. The institution building steps are:

a) Creating a "home" within the Government. The Special Development Unit (SDU), an UNFDAC supported arm of the Provincial Planning and Development (P&D) Department overseeing area development projects in areas growing opium/poppies, was recommended by the evaluation team to be the "home" for TADP. This recommendation was supported by the Provincial Government. Steps will be taken to support this institution building including the possible transfer of TADP funded professionals into the SDU. SDU strengthening will become a major R&D/ARD activity as SDU is also the home for the USAID funded NWFADP.

b) Locating the TADP Project Director into the SDU with a Project Management Unit (PMU) consisting of a small staff to oversee and coordinate TADP implementation through the various line agencies working in the tribal areas.

Using existing TADP funds, TADP is providing a service to itself and the P&D Department of GONWFP by developing socio-economic profiles of the four southern tribal agencies. Kurram and South Waziristan have been virtually completed. North Waziristan and Orakzai will be completed in the near future. This leaves Khyber, Mohmand and Bajaur Agencies to be profiled. These profiles form an important information source and can be a base for decisions regarding project planning, identification, design, and placement and by generating baseline data, provide a departure point for project evaluation.

On the Government of the North West Frontier Province side of the equation, the P&D Department is about to engage in a reorganization exercise assisted by two Dutch technical advisors to improve P&D's effectiveness. This effort will not necessarily include SDU but it may affect the unit. The Special Development Unit, on the other hand, has gone through almost three years of inaction and apathy due to the absence of capable and interested leadership. The new Director General, a forester by training and inclination, has only been in office since January 7, 1990, and is attempting to develop a ten year plan for his unit.

On the other donors' side, those consulted (in this case, only UNFDAC and the Narcotics Affairs Unit [NAU] of the U.S. Department of State) are dissatisfied with SDU's performance or, to put it more bluntly, lack of performance. According to individuals interviewed by the consultant, this lack of performance is due to understaffing of SDU, the low quality of its existing personnel,

and lack of leadership due to frequent changes in the director generalship of SDU. UNFDAC headquarters "is not favorably disposed" to extend its support of SDU after 30 June 1990 despite a request from its Field Representative in Islamabad. The Field Advisor for UNFDAC and the Senior Technical Advisor to SDU by UNFDAC are having SDU prepare a "long horizon plan" whose purpose is to force the Unit to indicate what it plans to do over the next several years, how and when the recurring costs of SDU will be absorbed by the GONWFP, and to recruit "trainable" employees who might serve as counterparts for technical advisors if UNFDAC decides to continue its relationship with SDU.

Reference has already been made to the Scope of Work for this consulting assignment. For the most part, what will be discussed below will follow the issues/questions raised in that document. Before addressing the issues/questions, a few comments on the sources of information that served as the basis for the analyses and conclusions might be useful.

Information Sources and Methodology Used

Information Sources

Basically two sources of information were used: (1) the documents made available by USAID/Islamabad and USAID/Peshawar, the documents collected from units in the Planning and Development Department, GONWFP (SDU, FATA Section, and SDP Section), and documents from UNFDAC (see Annexes C and D); and (2) the responses from a series of interviews and discussions with GOP, GONWFP, USAID, U.S. Department of State, and UNFDAC officials. (See Annex D for the list of individuals interviewed.)

Methodology

In addition to the documents review, a total of twelve unstructured interviews were conducted. Input was also received from an additional fourteen individuals. (See Annex B, "Daily Log," for a listing of all the individuals that the consultant contacted.) An attempt was made to cross check the information received from the interview respondents by having three senior USAID Foreign Service Nationals: read the interviews; tap their considerable expertise and experience gained from dealing with the individuals interviewed, the GOP, the GONWFP, the tribal areas, and the TADP over time; and indicate if the information received, in their opinion, was accurate and reliable. The consultant was able to compare the information received from the interviews with information gathered through interviews with GOP and GONWFP officials on similar topics in February 1982. This provided a time frame, albeit crude and not detailed, which started before TADP was initiated and ended with the present.

The Quality and Capacity of GONWFP to Plan and Manage an Area Development Project, TADP, in FATA

The thesis that civil servants are good crisis managers but poor planners seems to apply in the case of the officers contacted in the GONWFP. They often find themselves reacting to problems rather than anticipating and planning for them. Crisis management, therefore, seems to be the most important influence on government operations in both the settled and the tribal areas of the NWFP.

Planning Capacity

None of the agencies (line and staff) surveyed in this assignment engaged in rational short or long term planning. P&D Department which has "planning" in its name does not plan. It serves as a budgeting, programming and liaison unit for the GONWFP and the GOP and donor agencies. From the mid 1970s to the early 1980s, the Regional Development Plan Section of P&D, assisted by the Germans, was involved in planning for the Chashma Right Bank Canal Colonization Program. The Regional Development Plan Section of P&D Department was subsequently abolished.

The FATA Section in P&D does not plan. It is responsible for the Annual Development Programme for FATA but this is merely assembling the requests from the agencies for development projects. Likewise, the Special Development Plan Section of P&D deals with the donor aided projects in the NWFP but it does not plan them. Finally, personnel of the Special Development Unit of P&D do not plan. The only plans that have been developed in SDU have been the work of expatriate advisors. It does some liaison work between the donors and the tribal agencies, some minor monitoring, but it does not plan.

The line agencies in the NWFP (C&W, Agriculture, Education, LG&RD) and the federal line agency mandated to work in FATA, the FATA/DC, do not plan. They may design projects but they basically use set plans developed overtime for small scale construction (buildings) or minor water and irrigation projects.

Project Management Capacity

Regarding management capacity in area development schemes, the establishment of the project management units for the donor assisted projects in the tribal agencies and the Northern Areas may be the first time in at least recent years that the GONWFP was involved, albeit in a minor capacity, in project management. C&W and FATA/DC supervise construction projects but this is only one aspect of project management. The capacity for area development management in the government agencies of the NWFP is limited.

TADP Project Management Options and the Potential for Government Ownership

Organizations Examined

Three staff and five line agencies were targeted for analysis. The possible "homes" examined for TADP included the:

- o Special Development Unit of the P&D Department, GONWFP;
- o FATA Section of the P&D Department, GONWFP;
- o Special Development Programme Section of the P&D Department, GONWFP;
- o Communications and Works Department of GONWFP;
- o Food, Agriculture, Livestock and Co-operation Department of GONWFP;
- o Education Department of GONWFP;
- o Local Government and Rural Development Department of the GONWFP; and
- o Federally Administered Tribal Agencies Development Corporation of the Government of Pakistan (under SAFRON).

In addition, some time was spent with the Commissioner, Peshawar Division and the Political Agent, Mohmand Agency to investigate whether or not the tribal agencies themselves could individually or collectively serve as a home for TADP.

Analytical Framework

It is important to indicate at the outset that every attempt was made to examine and analyze the agencies indicated above as institutions and not be influenced by the incumbents holding positions in them. The GONWFP (as many public and private organizations, including USAID) reassigns its officers with some frequency. For example, since 1955, only one individual has served more than two years in the post of Commissioner, Peshawar Division. Since August 1982 when the Project Paper for TADP was signed by the USAID Mission Director, there have been three Secretaries of the Planning and Development Department, GONWFP--the average tenure in this post is about three years. Since 1984 when the Special Development Unit of P&D was established, there have been four Directors General (one only served two months) and long periods of time when the Secretary, P&D Department had to serve in this capacity because the government had not appointed a replacement.

Therefore, what USAID can count on is that the Secretary or Director General occupying the position today may be posted to another position tomorrow. Therefore, institutional needs and demands must be understood and the incumbent in the office has to be a secondary factor.

Analysis and Findings: The Line Agencies

At the outset of this assignment, the consultant adopted a "guilty until proven innocent" approach in analyzing the line agencies as potential homes for TADP. The reason was that if USAID's design bias for TADP Amendment is multi-sector, it did not make sense to place TADP's home in a single sector line agency.

All of the five line agencies analyzed, with one exception--the Local Government and Rural Development Department--are single sector agencies. It is true that C&W Department builds school buildings and basic health units as well as roads but the priority that C&W Department assigns is on large roads and the small buildings required for education or health receive low priority. The Food, Agriculture, Livestock and Co-operation Department (abbreviated to "Agriculture") does include more than agriculture in its portfolio but its principal thrust is in the agriculture sector. The Education Department focuses upon the education sector.

The FATA/DC is a federal/central government regional development authority (public enterprise) but its experience in regional development has been limited to irrigation projects and development of small industries (all of which have closed down) and minerals. In many ways, FATA/DC is an additional irrigation department (with an industries wing attached) for the NWFP that serves this purpose in the FATA.

Given the above analysis, the conclusion is that C&W, Agriculture, Education and FATA/DC are not logical homes for the TADP. This does not preclude USAID from "buying in" on projects that these agencies may be implementing in the FATA.

Analysis and Findings: The LG&RD Department

The above process of elimination of the other line agencies leads to a consideration of the Local Government and Rural Development Department. This department has had changes in its mission over the past several years.

During Bhutto's Integrated Rural Development Programme days (1972-77) and spilling over into the Zia period (up to 1979), LG&RD staffed the markazes which were organizations below the district level but were not part of district or subdistrict administration.

The markazes were supposed to plan and coordinate small scale regional development schemes in their command areas. The nation building departments (C&W, Education, Health, Agriculture, etc.) were responsible for project management and delivery of services to the command areas of the markazes. The NWFP was the leading province in the Integrated Rural Development Programme and established 35 functioning markazes, the most famous being Daudzai in Peshawar Division. A major problem that markaz officials had was getting the nation building departments to complete projects and deliver services. The "clout" of markaz leadership was limited if it existed at all. With the enactment of Local Bodies Scheme ordinances in all four provinces plus the GOP in 1979, Local Government and Rural Development departments in all four provinces took on a changed mandate and role. The mandate was to assist district councils in planning and implementing rural development schemes and staff the district councils with planners, managers, and technical personnel (engineers, etc.). Again, the NWFP was the leading province in development via local bodies and in 1982, the GONWFP decided to allocate more funds to its district councils for the construction of schools. The reason for this was simple--GONWFP's analysis of the performance of district councils in planning, locating and building schools was better than C&W Department's performance.

The LG&RD Department operates in the tribal agencies. However, the local political structure in the FATA is based on jirgas and maliks and not on district councils as in the settled areas. The administrative structure is also different in the FATA. The powers, duties and responsibilities of the Political Agents are different from the Deputy Commissioners in the settled areas of NWFP. These differences causes LG&RD to operate differently in FATA than in the settled areas. LG&RD personnel in the tribal areas are responsible to the Political Agents and not to LG&RD/Peshawar. LG&RD funds are used by the Political Agents to encourage the loyalty of the tribals and reward those who are loyal. LG&RD/Peshawar has little to say regarding the use of its funds in the FATA--an issue that has become an area of disagreement between LG&RD and the Political Agents.

In 1982, an analysis of management constraints in the NWFP and Balochistan⁵ led the team to conclude that the LG&RD Department in NWFP only received personnel that could not get posted in the other departments of the province. Its ranking among government units in NWFP as an organization of choice was only slightly higher than the Agriculture Department. This was a time period (1982) when the Zia government was allocating funds to district councils (through LG&RD) to try to foster a political leadership that would counterbalance those in opposition to General Zia. With the

⁵Report of the Management Constraints Team, Office of Program, USAID/Islamabad, March 15, 1982.

assembly elections in 1985 and those in 1988, funding for district councils decreased and so has the "clout" of LG&RD. In fact, LG&RD's "clout" among the other nation building departments appears to have declined even more than its low point in the 1970s.

Based on the above analysis, the conclusion is that the LG&RD Department should not be the home for TADP. This does not preclude a role for the department in its capacity as a line agency which works in the FATA.

Analysis and Findings: FATA Section and SDP Section

Both of these staff agencies are located in the Planning and Development Department of the GONWFP. Both are headed by Chiefs which are in BPS 18 grades. Each plays a separate and distinct role in the P&D Department.

FATA Section was established to perform the following functions:

- o preparation of the Annual Development Programme (ADP) for the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies;
- o processing of development projects in FATA;
- o preparation of Working Papers/Briefs for the Provincial Development Working Party, the Central Development Working Party, the Provincial Consultant Selection Committee, and departmental subcommittee meetings;
- o processing of Special Development Plan schemes in FATA for approval;
- o monitoring and evaluation of FATA ADP Projects by holding Quarterly Review Meetings;
- o coordination and liaison with SAFRON with regard to various departmental activities/demands pertaining to FATA;
- o coordination with political administration (i.e., the Political Agents) and line departments in implementing of Member of National Assembly/Senator Programme and Directives issued by the Governor of NWFP, the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of Pakistan from time to time; and

- o all routine matters.⁶

It is a federally funded and staffed section within the P&D Department and reports directly, from time to time, to the Governor of the NWFP. Hence, for all intents and purposes, it is a federal unit implanted into the GONWFP. Its positioning in the P&D Department gives it "clout" in its relations with line agencies and Political Agents. However, it was not designed to be a project management unit and the GONWFP does not want it to be involved in project management. The functions that it performs are necessary to development in FATA but if it were either merged with SDU and SDP Section, it might lose its objectivity and remoteness (which is an asset according to GONWFP officials) in the FATA development process.

FATA Section is not a suitable home for TADP. From the GONWFP side, the reasons for its unsuitability include: (1) it is a federal agency funded and staffed by the GOP; (2) it should remain distant from project management in FATA so that it can continue to be a check on development projects in FATA; (3) it is a budgeting and programming section with limited monitoring capacity through quarterly review meetings and, in performing these functions, it plays an important role in the development of FATA; and (4) to transform FATA Section into an implementation unit would make it both judge and an implementation unit--P&D sections should remain aloof from implementation and act more as judges.

The Special Development Plan Section basically performs the functions assigned to the FATA Section but for a different clientele. It is responsible for all donor aided projects. It prepares the ADP for donor assisted projects under the Special Development Plan for the NWFP settled areas and FATA. Its strengths and weakness are similar to FATA Section's with the exception that the SDP Section is a provincial unit within P&D Department. The GONWFP's reasons for not making it an implementation unit are similar to those for not making FATA Section an implementation unit plus the fact that P&D Department envisions the SDP Section becoming the Foreign Aid Section of the P&D similar to units in P&D departments in other provinces.

The reasons cited above form the basis for not recommending the SDP Section as the home for TADP.

Analysis and Findings: The Special Development Unit

The SDU was established in 1984:

⁶Function of FATA Development Section, FATA Section, P&D Department, GONWFP, no date.

. . .to design, administer, coordinate, monitor and evaluate area development projects funded under the Special Development and Enforcement Plan (SDEP), to eliminate opium poppy cultivation in NWFP. Since its founding, the SDU has added to its concern for areas presently growing poppies, those with the potential for poppy cultivation. In effect, the SDU has become P&D's oversight agency and institutional home for multiple-function, multiple-line department, area development projects.⁷

More specifically, the functions of the SDU are:

- (i) Planning, Formulating and Processing of poppy-substitution integrated development projects in NWFP and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA);
- (ii) Overall supervision, monitoring and evaluation of such projects during their implementation;
- (iii) Coordination inter-se amongst such projects;
- (iv) Coordination, on behalf of the Provincial Government, with Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) and other federal agencies responsible for, or related to, planning and implementation of poppy-related projects in NWFP and FATA;
- (v) Coordination, on behalf of the Planning and Development Department, with Administrative Secretaries and Heads of line departments and concerned agencies in NWFP both during formulation and implementation of such projects;
- (vi) Coordination in operational matters, on behalf of the Provincial Government, with various multilateral and bilateral donors assisting such projects in NWFP and FATA;
- (vii) Functioning as the secretariat for a Policy Committee on poppy-substitution integrated development projects to review, inter alia, the linkage between development and enforcement efforts; and

⁷Second Evaluation: Tribal Areas Development Project, Pakistan, p. 161.

- (viii) Formulation, management and implementation of integrated area development projects specifically assigned by the Provincial Government.⁸

It is headed by a grade 20 Director General who reports to the Additional Chief Secretary Planning and Development, NWFP.⁹ Both the Charter of Functions and the establishment of the Director General's office as a grade 20 level officer reporting to the Additional Chief Secretary Planning and Development, NWFP, a clearly defined mandate to plan and manage area development programs in both the settled and tribal areas of NWFP and access to the policy making levels in the GONWFP. With the "right person in the job" of DG, sufficient trained and competent staff, coupled with donor assistance to support its efforts, there was every reason to believe that all this unit needed was in place and it could become the vehicle for area development in the NWFP that both the province and the donors desired. However, after the first DG was transferred in 1986, the organization almost ceased to function. In late 1988, the Second Evaluation Team stated:

This organization. . . is not presently staffed or supported to be an effective institutional home for these [donor assisted area development] projects. . .¹⁰

In fact, what the Second Evaluation Team found was basically a "shell" of an organization. What went wrong and who was to blame? Given the time constraints on this consulting assignment, only five reasons might be suggested. They are:

- (1) the GONWFP did not replace the first DG with an officer with either the foresight or interest in area development--in fact, there were long periods of time when successive Secretaries of the P&D Department had to wear "two hats," one as Secretary, P&D and the other as DG, SDU;
- (2) the staff recruited had either finished their government careers or had just begun them;

⁸CHARTER OF FUNCTIONS of Special Development Unit (SDU) for Poppy-Substitution Projects in NWFP (Planning and Development Department), no date, circa September 1984. The underscoring was my idea.

⁹CHARTER OF FUNCTIONS of Special Development Unit (SDU) for Poppy-Substitution Projects in NWFP (Planning and Development Department).

¹⁰Second Evaluation: Tribal Areas Development Project, p. 161.

- (3) the technical assistance provided by the donors was either not appropriate or used by the SDU--it may have been both;
- (4) the donors did not exert enough pressure on the GONWFP to help ensure that better officers and staff were recruited to the SDU; and
- (5) the "crisis management" mode was typical of the SDU and was no different from any other government department at the federal or the provincial level and there have been no opportunities for SDU personnel to be exposed to a "planned management" mode.

The work load in P&D is considerable and to require the Secretary to serve in two positions at the same time is unreasonable to say the least. For some reason, the director generalship of SDU became a "roosting place" for high grade level officers to wait for more important and interesting (in their opinion) positions.

In many cases, the staff that was recruited were either retirees from government service who were not "trainable," or very junior officers with little or no experience working in area development projects or in government secretariats for that matter.

SDU did not effectively use either its donor provided equipment nor its technical advisors. Some of those interviewed in the course of this assignment also raised issues about the kind (i.e., the appropriateness) of technical assistance and technology provided by the donors.

In addition, it does not appear that the donors held the GONWFP's "feet to the fire" to secure leadership and potentially effective staff for this organization. The force of outside pressure can cause an otherwise reluctant government to take corrective action. This outside force did not materialize.

Finally, "crisis management" was practiced and the exposure to a "planned management" mode was limited if not at all.

Despite its poor performance since 1986, the conclusion reached from this analysis is that SDU is the only logical, potentially effective home for the TADP in the GONWFP. This conclusion is based on:

- (1) its mandate, the grade level of its Director General, and its access to the Additional Chief Secretary for Planning and Development still retains the potential institution building blocks required for a multi-sector area development project;

- (2) USAID's willingness to place conditions on its assistance through TADP to the NWFP for the further development of the FATA; and
- (3) the hope that USAID will learn from its experience in TADP and other projects in the NWFP and will make every effort to assist the SDU and its Project Management Unit (PMU) established expressly for TADP through technical assistance to reach its potential.

The implementation plan which follows focuses "on the 'handing over' process to be undertaken."¹¹

Two events are or will shortly be occurring which relate to the future of SDU and the organizational issues raised in this paper. Both have been mentioned above in passing. One is the long range planning exercise that UNFDAC is requiring that SDU complete. The consultant did not see the plan (it is not yet prepared) but from discussions with Yar Mohammad Khan (DG/SDU), Donald Davis (Senior Technical Advisor to SDU from UNFDAC) and Donald C. McIntosh (Field Advisor, UNFDAC), it is under way and whether or not UNFDAC will continue to fund the SDU will be influenced by the results of this effort. The other event is the planned reorganization of the P&D Department to be undertaken with the assistance of two Dutch technical advisors. The reorganization of P&D will not directly affect SDU but these efforts might be coordinated with what USAID decides it wants to do regarding SDU as a home for TADP. Therefore, it is recommended that both exercises be investigated by the Project Paper Team as it begins to design TADP Amendment and that the Project Paper Team's efforts be coordinated with those of the Dutch and the UNFDAC.

The first steps in implementing the recommendation of placing TADP in the SDU include:

- (1) thoroughly analyze SDU and see if the reasons for its poor performance (those suggested in Section IV) are valid and if there are other important reasons. These reasons appear to be problems. If the problems are diagnosed, then solutions can be offered and implemented. The solutions may be reached through technical assistance supported by existing funds in TADP;
- (2) develop a series of conditions on USAID's involvement with the SDU. These should include:
 - (a) that a consensus be developed among the provincial line departments that work in FATA that SDU should be the home for TADP;
 - (b) that the GONWFP reaffirm its commitment to support SDU and support the proposed PMU for TADP, and that the GONWFP will encourage the SDU to pursue its Charter of Functions of September 1984;

¹¹See Annex A, Scope of Work, p. 9.

- (c) that each officer appointed as Director General of SDU: (i) serve for a least two years; (ii) has the experience and status necessary to exercise the clout that the P&D Department has over the line departments in NWFP; and (iii) has the potential and willingness to take the steps necessary to create and maintain a "planned management" or "development management" work climate in the SDU; and (iv) the staff recruited for the SDU and the PMU/TADP be sufficient for the tasks at hand, "trainable," and have the potential to interact effectively with the project directors, researchers, contractors, and the donors involved in the various area development projects.

Once these conditions are developed, open discussions with the GONWFP and secure its agreement to these conditions;

- (3) assist in the design of a Project Management Unit for TADP in SDU;
- (4) only propose the series of workshops discussed in the Scope of Work after USAID is satisfied that SDU and its PMU for TADP has in place a "trainable" staff; and
- (5) "hand over" management of TADP to the GONWFP only after USAID is convinced that SDU through the Project Management Unit for TADP can, in fact, manage the project.

VI ADMINISTRATIVE, POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSES OF INSTITUTION BUILDING

This section provides "administrative, political, social, and economic analyses of the institution building and 'handing over' processes."¹²

Administrative Analysis

There are two separate chains of command for both the development and law and order activities in the FATA. Sometimes these chains of command are "mixed" in the sense that subordinate officers working in the FATA report to both the GOP and the GONWFP. This stems from Pakistan's federal structure and it is important to understand this structure and its potential impact on the development process.

The Role of the Federal Government (GOP)
in Development of FATA

In the development process in FATA, the federal Ministry of State and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) plays a role through the Federally Administered Tribal Areas Development Corporation (FATA/DC). This role is limited to irrigations projects and small scale industrial and mineral development.

The FATA Section, which is located in the GONWFP's Planning and Development Department, is, in many respects, a federal unit funded by the GOP and officered and staff by GOP personnel. FATA Section, as indicated above, is involved in the preparation and monitoring of the FATA's Annual Development Programme.

The Governor, who is appointed by the President of Pakistan, also plays a role in the development process, if he so decides, by his command over the tribal military units (Mohmand Rifles, Kyber Rifles, etc.). For example, Brig. (Retd.) Gulistan Janjua, Governor of the NWFP, recently issued orders to all tribal military units to plant trees in the FATA.

The Political Agents of the FATA are also GOP officers and report to the Commissioner who reports to the Chief Secretary/NWFP who reports to the Governor. Their cooperation and support for development projects is very important. Some of these Political Agents are "development oriented" and have opened up previously inaccessible areas in the FATA through the promise of development projects (roads, tubewells, irrigation schemes, etc.).

¹²See Annex A, Scope of Work, p. 9.

The Role of the Provincial Government (GONWFP) in Development of FATA

Although the FATA is the responsibility of the GOP, the GONWFP plays a role in its development. All of the provincial line departments discussed in this report operate in the FATA. In fact, all of the provincial line departments operate in the FATA. But as the discussion of the LG&RD Department indicated, they operate differently in FATA than in the settled areas.

The P&D Department with its Special Development Unit and its Special Development Plan Section play a role in the development process of the FATA. In the past, SDU has worked in Bajaur and Mohmand agencies with the U.S. Department of State's Narcotics Affairs Unit. The SDP Section is responsible for all donor assisted projects that are in the Annual Development Programme of the NWFP and that includes those in the FATA.

As a consequence, coordination between GOP and GONWFP officials is very important to ensure that effective and efficient development takes place in those areas of FATA that want development. This administrative structure has to be taken into account in the strengthening of the SDU and the institutionalization of its PMU/TADP.

Law and Order in FATA

It is difficult, not to say hazardous to one's health, to undertake development activities under fire. The U.S. government has the Seabees for these undertakings. Therefore, law and order must prevail in areas where development projects are being implemented and the responsibility for law and order in FATA rests with the GOP. The January 30, 1990, bomb which exploded at the front door of the Political Agent's Rest House in Miran Shah, North Waziristan Agency, underscores the sometimes precarious position that USAID staff find themselves while working in the tribal agencies. The Political Agent is the officer responsible to the Commissioner whose Division his agency is in, and the GONWFP Home and Tribal Affairs Department.

The Political Agent has, at his command, his levies (tribals) and can use the tribal military unit (Mohmand Rifles, for example) to support the positions he takes with the tribals. The tribal military units are officered by Pakistan Army officers with the troops coming from tribes different from those where the unit is stationed. The officers report to the Frontier Corps and to their superior officers in the Pakistan Army. However, they are part of the federal Ministry of Interior in terms of budget and not the Pakistan Army. The use of force is often a last resort to secure the release of a kidnapped victim, a "lifted" automobile, or some other infraction committed on GOP property. The Political Agent

attempts to work through a jirga or through individual maliks whose good offices he can depend upon. Good working relations between the management responsible for development projects in FATA and the Political Agent is a necessity. Obviously, the law and order situation has to be taken into account in the planning and implementing activities of a PMU/TADP in the SDU.

Political Analysis

Politics influences almost all activities in the FATA. It is the politics of a tribal society that has maintained its distance and autonomy from the settled areas for centuries. When the British left in 1947, only 30 per cent of the tribal agencies were accessible to the new Government of Pakistan. Over the past forty years, another 40 per cent was opened up. Today, about 30 per cent still remains inaccessible.

In dealing with the tribals, the Political Agent is involved in the politics of the tribes. The Political Agent, furthermore, uses the resources at his command to reward the tribesmen for good behavior (i.e., not creating "mischief" especially on GOP territory) and to punish those who do. The reward system are cash payments, gifts of weapons and other durable goods, and development schemes. Politics, therefore, plays a much greater role in development than in the settled areas.

There may be some change in the politics of the FATA. In some areas, the malik system is weakening. New political actors are emerging. However, other than these general statements, the contractor did not surface details during his assignment.

The politics of the FATA should be taken into account in the institution building efforts of USAID vis-a-vis the SDU and its PMU/TADP.

Social Analysis

The social structure in the FATA revolves around the values of the tribesmen. It is not an open society but it is one that may be moving in that direction at the proverbial "snail's pace." As one interview respondent who had served as Political Agent/Bajaur indicated, "there are tribal areas and there are tribal areas." Not all tribal agencies are the same and not all areas within a particular tribal agency is the same. In recent years, Bajaur Agency has been opened up due to the efforts of the Political Agent and the promise and delivery of development products (roads, tubewells, etc.). As these areas open up, values will begin to change. At present, there is migration of tribesmen to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and the major cities of Pakistan (such as Karachi) in search of work. Upon return, these

tribesmen have often experienced changed attitudes as a result of their exposure to other societies.

The role of women remains quite confined although there are some changes. One interview respondent gave the example of a change in tribal attitudes towards women. In or around Parachinar in Kurrman Agency there is a higher secondary school for girls. This school has not been staffed because the GONWFP Department of Education has been unable to find women teachers who have the qualifications required for these teaching positions. According to the respondent, a group of the parents of the girls has petitioned the Political Agent/Kurram: for teachers for the schools and if qualified women cannot be provide, please send male teachers. If this is valid, it would be a remarkable change in attitude towards women. Traditionally, there has not been a premium placed on educating women.

The social structure and tribal values and attitudes must be taken into account in the planning and implementation activities of the PMU/TADP. The changes that are occurring in social structure and attitudes may provide opportunities for Women in Development projects planned and implemented by PMU/TADP.

In this regard, the socio-economic profiles of the tribal agencies that USAID is completing are essential to defining the problems and identifying the sectors and territorial areas where development interventions might have the highest probability for success. This effort is very commendable and should be continued.

Economic Analysis

In the FATA, there are demands for roads, electricity, irrigation, education, and other services. Considerable damage has been done to forest resources due to the settlement of Afghan refugees in FATA. The TADP could contribute to satisfying some of these demands and, hence, contribute to the economic development of FATA and

. . .accelerate the efforts of the Cooperating Country to integrate the Tribal Areas into the socio-economic mainstream of Pakistan and to improve the quality of life for tribal inhabitants.¹³

¹³Tribal Areas Development Project Paper, p. 1.

Steps Required Before Fielding the Project Paper
Amendment Team

- (1) As was discussed and proposed in Section V (Implementation Plan) consensus building among interested parties in the GONWFP and GOP should be developed. This might be accomplished through the good offices of the Chief Secretary, NWFP. Estimated time required: one day.
- (2) Negotiations should take place between USAID and GONWFP (and GOP?) over conditionalities USAID wishes to impose. Estimated time required: six weeks.

In terms of timing, February up to mid-March 1990 could be allotted for steps one and two.

Steps Following Consensus and Agreements with GONWFP

- (1) Fielding the Project Paper Amendment Team and completing the design. It is strongly recommended that one member of the team have skills/experience in organization design, management and institution building. Estimated time required: six weeks.
- (2) Fielding the technical advisors to assist the PMU/TADP in planning, identifying, implementing/managing, monitoring, inspecting, and evaluating area development projects. Would recommend a three person team: one to deal with planning and identifying functions, one for implementing/managing and monitoring functions, and one for the inspecting and evaluating functions. Would also recommend that the technical advisors collaborate in developing an on-going training section in the SDU that would train new personnel after the technical advisors have departed. Would also recommend that the team fully understand that they are not to perform the functions but teach counterparts how to perform the functions. Cannot definitely estimate time but may require a minimum of three to a maximum of six person years.

In terms of timing, mid-March to end of June 1990 for the completion of the work assigned to the Project Paper Amendment Team so that an approved and signed Project Amendment could be expected by Fall 1990. If work on identifying the technical assistance team begins in mid-March after successful negotiations with the GONWFP and is completed by Fall 1990, the team could be in place by Winter 1991. Completion of their work could be as early as December 1991, or as late as December 1993. A lot depends on the cooperation

provided by and the existing skills and experience of the personnel recruited for SDU and its PMU/TADP and the experience, skills and knowledge of the technical assistance team. Consequently, "handing over" TADP could take place as soon as December 1991 or as late as December 1993.

ANNEXES

Annex A

Scope of Work

STATEMENT OF WORK

A. Objectives:

The Mission will be building upon its development work in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan through a Project Amendment to its current \$ 45 million Tribal Areas Development Project 391-0471 (TADP). The proposed Project Amendment will lead to: (a) extension of PACD to September 1996, and (b) addition of \$ 15 million to the existing Project funding. The Project Amendment is expected to be made in the Summer/Fall, 1990. Therefore, the first two years of the proposed project amendment will include an overlap with TADP, which has its present PACD of September 1992.

The April 1989 Concepts Paper suggested a number of strategic concepts for designing and implementing a follow-on project. These are summarized below:

- Undertake an "Expanded TADP Option". This includes funding infrastructure projects and line agency activities with stronger institutional strengthening and sub-projects scattered widely across FATAs. For example, funding of construction projects would be through a Project Home and not directly through the line agency.
- At the same time efforts will be aimed at a "Focused Development Option" concentrating on selective and receptive tribal agencies in which many line agencies will contribute to the development of a defined area.
- The follow-on project will be implemented in opium/poppy free areas. However, this concept could change if TADP were to do follow-on work in poppy growing areas at a later stage. Infra-structure construction will be the major project intervention in the follow-on project. However, other development interventions will be pursued through "buying in" into line agency programs in the tribal areas.
- Project Management for the follow-on Project will be shifted to the GOP. GONWFP will be creating a home for TADP and the positioning of a full time Government Project Director. The institutions building steps are:

- i) Creating a "home" within the Government.
 - ii) Locating the TADP Project Director in the Special Development Unit (SDU) within the Planning and Development Department. The Project Director will oversee the Project Management Unit (PMU) consisting of a small staff to oversee and coordinate TADP implementation through the various line agencies working in the tribal areas.
- The follow-on project design team will emphasize the staffing of SDU and PMU relying mostly on local technical assistance.
 - The follow-on project will also focus on strengthening of line agencies working closely with the Project.
 - TADP will undertake a mapping exercise to identify resource base and bench-marks for decision making process for future project implementation.

A copy of the Concepts Paper is enclosed with the SOW, although some of the issues and time-frame have changed since the time that the Paper was written in April, 1989.

B. Background:

The TAD Project was designed to assist the GOP to integrate an isolated population living in tribal areas adjacent to the Afghan borders into the social and economic mainstream of the nation. The project has had two principal purposes:

- 1) The construction of infrastructure that promotes development in the Tribal Areas; and
- 2) Institutional strengthening of government line departments responsible for implementing projects in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Infrastructure development has included road improvement and construction; the construction of irrigation schemes; and small infrastructure development of the local government institutions. Institutional strengthening has included the creating of computer centers in four line departments

responsible for FATA. There has been only limited focus on agriculture, however; and sectors including forestry, animal husbandry, human resources development, health and education have not been addressed.

A December, 1988 evaluation acknowledges pre-stated constraints to development then existing in FATA, i.e.;

- 1) A system of administration whereby a Political Agent (PA) appointed by then Governor of NWFP acts as the judge and jury on virtually every matter of local concern, including development interventions.
- 2) Local politics involving power plays by PAs and tribal leaders (maliks) in attempts to satisfy both constituent and personal agendas. Since the average tenure for a PA is twenty months, projects which have been prioritized by one PA may be ignored by his successor.
- 3) Accessibility and safety, both of which are always questionable, but may present risks of sufficient magnitude to stop TADP work for indefinite periods.
- 4) Inter-tribal rivalry, which almost guarantees construction delays and work stoppages, since each stretch of road is under the jurisdiction of the tribe (hence, malik) living adjacent to it; and
- 5) Construction procedures which usually disallow competitive bidding in favor of contractor nomination by the PAs. These constraints inevitably cause delays as well as construction of sub-standard quality by tribal contractors who have inadequate skills for the job.

In spite of these constraints, TADP-I has made significant progress in the area of institutional strengthening and sub-project implementation, and the probability for ongoing success is great.

The December, 1988 evaluation presented a continuum of options for a follow-on project, including:

- 1) Transfer option, which would allow funding only for main highway construction that avoids local political issues and requires no TADP-I bridge;

- 2) Expanded TADP option, which funds infrastructure projects and those line department activities that directly utilize infrastructure with stronger institutional strengthening and support for sub-projects scattered throughout FATA; and
- 3) Focused development, which includes funding for initiatives concentrated within selected and receptive tribal agencies, in which many line departments contribute to the development of designated areas.

USAID/Peshawar TADP has selected a combination of the expanded TADP and focused development options, and is requesting the assistance of a consultant (specialist) in preparing a position paper which shall represent the Mission's recommendations for GOP ownership of the TADP.

C. Scope of Work:

An individual with demonstrated expertise in public administration with specific reference to Pakistan is required to prepare a study and report which will, inter alia, analyze issues relating to:

- The quality and capacity of GONWFP to plan and manage area development projects in the FATAs.
- An examination of various TADP project management systems, planning methodologies and personnel requirements, and the recommended course of action for the Mission to follow leading to the placement of project management in the GOP.
- The re-orientation and training of the GOP counterparts leading to rational decision making for planning and implementing project objective at the end of, say, a three year period. The consultant will determine the various intermediate objectives and "bench marks" over the three year period, beginning with a recommendation for a political/administrative agenda for project selection/approval, to the final mile stone, at the end of three years, when project selection would be based on rational decision making and a functioning program and project management system within the folds of the Government. Some planning, implementation and decision making methodologies now being pursued include: use of

socio economic profiles (data base) for each Tribal Agency, regional planning methodology and "participatory workshops" over a 24-36 month period attended by the various stake holders (Planning and Development, USAID, the line agencies and the Political Agents). The consultant will integrate the planning and decision making interventions by the Rural Development Division of the Mission into his/her Position Paper recommendations and analyses.

- The possible "homes" for TADP including: the UNFDAC funded Special Development Unit (SDU), the FATA-Section within the Planning and Development Department, the Special Development Plan Section of the Planning and Development Department, and other possible homes.
- Examining the role of SDU as a Project Management Unit for area development projects (poppy and non poppy projects) with the objectives of: a) giving greater administrative and political role than it currently has, b) strengthening planning capacity for poppy substitution among donors, implementing organization, and the Government of Pakistan; and c) improving technical and administrative management capacities.
- The preparation of Work Plans, Annual Development Plans, and other budgeting documents of the Government within the framework of the FATA socio economic profiles, the line agencies involved, the Project "home", and the USAID rules-of-business for funding the approved interventions.
- Participation of beneficiaries in project implementation and the sustainability of sub-projects after the TADP funding is over.
- Assistance in improving the GOP/GONWFP ability to collect, manage, plan and analyze data for rural development interventions and plan regional programs and development projects. The objective is that GOP/GONWFP operate without the level of "hands on" assistance USAID and other donors are providing through area development projects. ✓

To some extent this process has already begun in that socio-economic profiles for two Tribal Agencies are

almost ready. The profiles will become the basis for undertaking similar exercises for the other Tribal Agencies. Further, the Mission is in the process of introducing a planning process methodology by undertaking a regional planning workshop in February 1990. Training funded by TADP will support:

- 1) Data base management;
- 2) Planning process; and
- 3) Development project management.

The Mission will be introducing performance based budgets which will fund Agency level interventions developed with P&D and the Political Agents through the (TADP) planning process. The consultant's work is to assist USAID study the present organizational and staff set up in the GONWFP and make recommendations for USAID for where the Planning and Management (of area development projects) should be placed in the GONWFP organizational complex; how the management system will work; what skills, technology are lacking, what TA is required - how all this can be accomplished in three years through the proposed series of participatory workshops attended by the various stake holders, ultimately leading from USAID funding in the form of Project assistance to program support grants.

The work is to be conducted from January 21, 1990 for a period of three weeks. Mission requests AID/W to negotiate an IQC to acquire the services of an individual with demonstrated expertise in the analysis of public administrative systems and institution building as a component of development initiatives, with specific reference to Pakistan.

With the help of personnel from USAID's Rural Development Division office in Peshawar and the Office of Agriculture and Rural Development in Islamabad, the individual shall be responsible for preparing a comprehensive report analyzing issues, identifying options, and recommending decisions regarding the GOP ownership and management of the TADP, with the goal of providing structure/direction to the institution building process which shall result in GONWFP ownership of

TADP. The following assistance will be provided by USAID:

- 1) Project staff to identify and describe infrastructure activities occurring within the framework of TADP-I;
- 2) Project Systems Analysts who describe institution building strengthening activities, e.g., computer centers occurring within the Government line departments responsible for administering projects in FATA;
- 3) Several FSNs with backgrounds in agriculture, or engineering who know the area and speak the language, and who will accompany the consultant as necessary.

D. Qualifications and Required Tasks:

PhD. in Public Administration and extensive experience in analyzing development initiatives in South Asia with particular attention to infrastructure development and institution building among the minority/rural/tribal groups of Pakistan. Demonstrated familiarity with all aspects of Pakistan's governmental systems, at Federal, Provincial, Local, and Tribal level.

Demonstrated ability in understanding the interrelationship between various governments (Tribal, Local, Provincial, and Federal) with particular attention to development initiatives. Must be able to identify:

- Line departments which represent potential recipients for the TADP;
- Line departments that directly utilize and/or strengthen institutions;
- Line departments which have experience in institutionalizing a donor initiated project;
- Constraints to institutional development with particular focus on specific line agencies designated as potential program recipients;
- Interrelationship between the:
 - i) Process of implementing TADP institutionalization in GONWFP;

- ii) TADP planning process, including socioeconomic profiles; and
- iii) Annual work plan/budget procedures for funding TADP sub-projects. Ability to prepare a broad based analysis of GOP ownership of the TADP, including:
 - 1) Potential GOP Line Agency recipients of the TADP, including capabilities in incorporation of information based management systems, and with a specific in-depth analysis of the SDU (Special Development Unit) and/or other GOP/GONWFP institutional home for TADP as the potential recipient;
 - 2) Current evidence/past experience of GOP line agencies as program recipients;
 - 3) Methodology for handing over ownership of the TADP to the GOP;
 - 4) Time Frame required to complete the institution building and transition processes;
 - 5) Sustainability capacity of the GOP according to specific project components.

Tasks:

- o Review project related documents including: December 1988 Evaluation, Concepts Paper, AID Evaluation Summary, and other relevant documents on file;
- o Submit a schedule of production (work to be completed and corresponding date) to the Project Officer by the end of the third day in country;
- o Examine the institutionalization of TADP in terms of the interactions between: Line Agencies, Home for TADP, Regional Planning Methodology and Socio-economic Profiles, and the Work Plan/Budgeting

Processing.

- o Identify various government line agencies' strengths and weaknesses with specific reference to institution building capabilities and suitability as TADP "home";
- o Closely examine all options (line agencies) within the GONWFP for their potential as recipients of the TADP;
- o Conduct separate in-depth analysis of the SDU's potential as the recipient of the TADP, including: (a) The relationship between SDU's operational concept and its actual implementation; (b) Perception of the SDU by the donor community and the rest of the GONWFP and its line agencies; (c) SDU's information based management capabilities; (d) The role USAID might be able to assume in order to assist SDU to better implement its concept, and; (e) Perceived suitability of SDU as "home" for TADP; (f) If SDU is not recommended as "home" for TADP, then other options available in the order of preference with rationale for such a selection.
- o Prepare formal document analyzing all considerations regarding GONWFP as institutional "home" for the TADP.

The report shall include the following sections: (a) Summary and Recommendations; (b) Problem Statement; (c) Background; (d) Project Description; (e) Implementation Plan with focus on "handing over" process to be undertaken; (f) Administrative, political, social, and economic analyses of the institution building and "handing over" processes; and (g) Detailed institution building plan for TADP, with rationale.

E. Time Frame:

PIO/T # 391-0471-
Attachment-A
Page of Pages

An estimated three weeks will be required to prepare the report, beginning on or about January 21, 1990. At least 50% of the contractor's time in-country will be spent writing. The following timetable is envisaged: Week 1--Review of Documents, Interviews with USAID personnel, and Production of Work Plan; Week 2--Interviews with GOP personnel administratively involved or potentially involved with the TADP, draft preparation and review by USAID staff directly related to the TADP planning and implementation; Week 3--Validation of information gathered as necessary, preparation of final draft, and review by Mission/Project committee. The consultant shall stay until the final document is approved by the Mission.

Annex B

Daily Log

Annex B

Daily Log

<u>Day</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Activity</u>
Sat	1/20	<p>Arrived in Islamabad at 9:00 am. Met by Tariq Durrani (Program Officer, TADP, USAID/Peshawar). Held discussions regarding SOW until 11:30 am.</p> <p>From 11:30 am to 12:45 pm began reading "Concept Paper: Tribal Areas Development and Issues for -II," prepared by RDD/ARD Peshawar and began reviewing First Evaluation of completed in 1985. From 1:00 pm to 3:30 pm, met with Frank Pavich (Chief, Rural Development Division, Office of Agriculture and Rural Development, USAID/Islamabad) and Tariq Durrani to discuss SOW, schedule for the next two weeks, and the meeting scheduled for Sunday, January 21. Also met Ejaz Qureshi currently Pakistan's Consul-General in Montreal who had served as Additional Chief Secretary (Development) and Secretary, Planning and Development, NWFP). Briefly discussed SOW with him because of his long experience in the NWFP. Finished reading "Concept Paper: -II" and reviewed Interim Evaluation of .</p>
Sun	1/21	<p>Arrived at USAID Mission at 7:45 am. Met briefly with Stan Stanfield in Contracts to go over procedures. Met at 8:15 am) with Hans P. (Pat) Peterson (Chief, ARD, USAID/Islamabad), Gordon West (Chief, PDM, USAID/Islamabad), Richard Goldman (Deputy Chief, ARD, USAID/Islamabad), Michael Hauben (Project Design Officer, PDM), Mohammed Saleem (Rural Development, PDM) and Tariq Durrani. Discussed SOW. I pointed out that based on what I knew, the choices available for a project home are limited. There was consensus among the group regarding the management weaknesses in NWFP, particularly in agricultural extension. Participants raised following issues that I should examine:</p>

- o should TADP work in poppy growing areas if agreements are reached to stop cultivation of poppies?
- o how to increase community participation in development in the tribal areas;
- o would locating home for TADP in P & D increase centralization of development to the detriment of local development needs?;
- o all possible homes for TADP at the provincial level (P & D, line agencies) and FATA-DC (keeping in mind that USAID wants a government home for not only TADP but other projects in NWFP under USAID sponsorship and sponsorship of other donor agencies; and
- o would home in P & D have enough muscle to secure cooperation of Political Agents in implementing development projects in tribal areas?

The meeting ended around 9:00 am. Met briefly with Laurier Mailloux (Deputy Chief, PDM). Departed for Peshawar around 10:00 am. Arrived in Peshawar at 1:00 pm. Read Second Evaluation of (1988). Received copies of "Socio-Economic Profile of Kurram Agency" and "Socio-Economic Profile of South Waziristan Agency" (both in draft form and both prepared for the P & D Department of NWFP by Dr. Lynn Carter, USAID/Peshawar) and discussed them with Dr. Carter and the difficulties she has had in developing accurate maps and checking on conflicting data. She indicated that the Political Agent/Kurram Agency has used the profile as an encyclopedia. Checked into the hotel at 5:00 pm and Tariq arrived at 6:00 pm. We discussed his "Tribal Areas Development and Issues for -II" paper. Went to dinner at 7:00 pm. Returned to hotel at 8:00 pm and tried to reach by telephone Suleman Ghani (Secretary, P & D) and Ejaz Rahim (Commissioner, Peshawar Division) but was not successful.

Mon 1/22 Arrived at office at 8:30 am. Completed Police Registration forms and secured photos. Reached Suleman Ghani and scheduled appointment for 12:00 noon. Worked on daily log. Met with Suleman Ghani. Discussed SOW and issues relating to design of TADP Amendment. He indicated that P & D was not soliciting more business by indicating its availability as an institutional home for TADP. P & D through a reorganized Special Development Unit [SDU] could be the home if USAID decides to utilize a multi-sector approach to the development of the tribal areas. Suleman also arranged meetings for me with Secretary/Education, Secretary/ Agriculture, and Director-General/ Special Development Unit. He suggested that I also see Secretary/Construction & Works and Chairman of the Corporation and the Secretary, FATA/DC Meeting ended at 1:30 pm. Met with Mahmood Khan, Secretary/Education at 1:45 pm. Meeting lasted until 2:30 pm. Wrote up interviews, read file entitled "Planning and Monitoring Project for NWFP and read tribal agency profiles.

Tues 1/23 Met with Yar Mohammad Khan, Director-General, SDU, P & D at 9:00 am Met with Ejaz Rahim, Commissioner/ Peshawar at 10:30 am Met with Khalid Mansoor, Secretary/Agriculture at 12:30 pm. Met with Gerald M. Feirstein, Principal Officer, American Consulate/Peshawar, at 3:00 pm. Wrote up interviews. Had dinner at Suleman Ghani's residence, 7:30 pm.

Weds 1/24 Met at 9:45 am with Ali Begum, Chief, FATA Section, P & D and Ejaz Rahim. Had lunch at residence of Commissioner, Peshawar, 1:00 pm. Meeting at 3:00 pm with Faqir Piracha, Secretary, C&W. was cancelled after waiting one hour.

Wrote up interviews and read documents. Dinner at Tariq Durrani's residence.

Thurs 1/25 Met at 9:00 am with Col. Asadullah, Chairman, FATA-DC. Attended Commissioner's appellate court at 10:00 am at office of Commissioner, Peshawar. Sat in on a meeting that the Commissioner, Peshawar, held with Robert Traister, Acting Director, NAU, 11:00 am. Visited Mohmand Agency with Commissioner, Peshawar (balance of afternoon). Had dinner at 7:00 pm at residence of Robert Traister, Acting Director, NAU.

Fri 1/26 Wrote up interviews. Began work on report. Dinner meeting with Suleman Ghani at 7:30 pm was cancelled. He was called out of town.

Sat 1/27 Met at 9:30 am with Ali Begum. Met at 11:00 am with Azmat Hanif, Chief, Special Development Program Section, P & D. Meeting at 11:30 am with Mohammad Ihteshan Khan, Secretary, Local Government & Rural Development. Cancelled. Met at 12:00 with Faqir Piracha, Secretary, C&W. Debriefing of GONWFP at 1:00 pm. Lasted until 2:45 pm. Met at 3:00 pm with Amjad Khan, Chief, SDU, P&D. Met at 4:00 pm with Don Davis, UNFDAC at 4:00 pm. Meeting at 15:30 pm with M. Ihtesham Khan, Secretary LG&RDD, not possible. (Iftikhar) Dinner at 7:00 pm at residence of Dr. Lynn Carter, USAID consultant.

Sun 1/28 Departed for Islamabad at 7:30 am. Met at 1:00 pm with Donald McIntoch, Field Representative, UNFDAC. Wrote up last of interviews. Worked on report. Dinner with Zahid Noor.

Mon 1/29 Worked on report. Met with Frank Pavich at 10:00 am Met with Leon Hesser and George Metcalf at 11:00 am.

Tues 1/30 Worked on report. Tariq arrived from Peshawar at 10:30 am. Dinner at 7:00 pm with Judy and Hank Schumacher

Weds 1/31 Submitted draft to USAID Mission. Dinner at 7:00 pm at David Esch's.

Thurs 2/1 USAID Mission debriefing held at 2:00 pm. Worked on report revisions/additions. Dinner at 7:00 pm with Afaq Ahmed.

Fri 2/2 Depart for Karachi 7:00 pm.

Sat 2/3 Depart for U.S. on Pan Am 1067 at 3:00 am.

Annex C

Documents Consulted

CHARTER OF FUNCTIONS of Special Development Unit (SDU) for Poppy-Substitution Projects in NWFP (Planning and Development Department), no date, circa September 1984.

Concept Paper: Tribal Areas Development Project (TADP) II, RDD/ARD Peshawar, Second Draft, March 27, 1989.

"The Future of the Special Development Unit: Preliminary Notes for Discussion," Special Development Unit, P&D Department, GONWFP, December 1989, Restricted Circulation.

Interim Evaluation of the Tribal Areas Development Project, Pakistan, Development Alternatives, Inc., Washington, D.C., May 1986.

"Project Management Unit of Tribal Areas Development Projects, Phase II," PC-1, FATA Section, P&D Department, GONWFP, approved 8 October 1989.

Second Evaluation: Tribal Areas Development Project, Pakistan, Development Alternatives, Inc., Washington, D.C., December 1988.

"Socio-Economic Profile of Kurram Agency," prepared by Dr. Lynn Carter, USAID/Peshawar, Third Draft, 14 January 1990.


"Socio-Economic Profile of South Waziristan Agency," prepared by Dr. Lynn Carter and Shahzad Raza, USAID/Peshawar, Draft for Discussion, no date (circa early 1990).

Tribal Areas Development and Issues for TADP-II, prepared by Tariq Durrani, USAID/Peshawar, no date (circa 1989).

Annex D


Organizational Charts of Special Development Unit,
FATA Section, and Special Development Plan Unit
P & D Department, GONWFP

ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT UNIT, PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF NWFP




BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF FATA SECTION, P&D DEPTT.



BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

EXISTING ORGANIZATION CHART OF SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (SDP) SECTION



BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT