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FINAL EVALUATION

FINAL DRAFT

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ACRONYMS

| | |
|----------------|---|
| AID | Agency for International Development (U.S.) |
| AKRSP | Agha Khan Rural Support Program |
| BHU | Basic Health Unit |
| C&W | Communications and Works |
| DAPRC | Drug Abuse Prevention Resource Center |
| DHO | District health officer |
| D/PCL | Deputy Project Committee Leader |
| EPI | Expanded Program for Immunization |
| FAR | Fixed amount reimbursement |
| FATA | Federally Administered Tribal Area |
| FMT | Field Management Team |
| GAIE | Gadoon Amazai Industrial Estate |
| GARASP | Gadoon Amazai Rural Area Support Program |
| GOP | Government of Pakistan |
| HYV | High-yielding varieties |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| LHV | Lady health visitor |
| LOP | Life of project |
| MNA | Member of National Assembly |
| MPA | Member of Provincial Assembly |
| NARC | National Agricultural Research Center |
| NCD | Narcotics Control Division |
| NFE | Nonformal education |
| NGO | Nongovernmental organization |
| NWFP | Northwest Frontier Province |
| O/ARD | Office of Agriculture and Rural Development |
| OPF | Overseas Pakistani Foundation |
| ORS | Oral Rehydration Salts |
| PPACD | Project assistance completion date |
| PATA | Provincially Administered Tribal Area |
| PARD | Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Peshawar |
| PCU | Project Coordination Unit |
| PC-1 | Planning Commission-I (The basic planning document/instrument used for preparation of project) |
| PIL | Project Implementation Letter |
| PMU | Project Management Unit |
| RHC | Rural Health Center |
| SDA | Sarhad Development Authority |
| SDEP | Special Development and Enforcement Plan (of GOP) |
| SDU | Special Development Unit |
| SOW | Scope of Work |

| | |
|---------------|--|
| SRSC | Sarhad Rural Support Corporation |
| TIPAN | Transformation and Integration of the Provincial Agricultural Network Project |
| UNDCP | United Nations Drug Control Programme |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNFDAC | United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| TAT | Technical Assistance Team |
| TBA | Traditional Birth Attendant |
| VDC | Village Development Council |
| VDO | Village Development Organization |
| WAPDA | Water and Power Development Authority |

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Introduction and Project Background

This report is the final evaluation of the USAID-funded Northwest Frontier Area Development project (NWFADP) in Pakistan, project Number 391-0485. Chemonics International conducted the evaluation for USAID/Islamabad as a delivery order through its Rural and Regional Income Generation and Resources Management IQC (PDC-5451-I-00-1020-00). The delivery order was performed in collaboration with a subcontractor, Asianics Agro-Dev, from July-September 1993. This final evaluation follows two earlier evaluations of the Gadoon Amazai and Kala Dhaka projects, conducted in 1987 and 1990.

NWFADP comprised three separate projects. The Gadoon-Amazai project, the earliest and most lengthy of the three projects, started in 1983 and was USAID's first effort toward poppy eradication in Pakistan. The project's purpose was to change the Gadoon Amazai area economy from one based on poppy cultivation to a diversified agricultural and non-agricultural system with strong ties to the national economy. These ties, in turn, were to facilitate the Government of Pakistan's (GOP) enforcement efforts with regard to poppy cultivation and narcotics production.

Project strategy to achieve the above purpose comprised a two-pronged approach of direct poppy enforcement and elimination efforts combined with massive development interventions to provide area residents with replacement sources of income and basic needs. These interventions included infrastructure, agriculture, education (formal and nonformal), vocational training, and health.

The project began in September 1983 with \$20 million in funding to be used only in the Gadoon Amazai area, and was extended in December 1984 to include activities under the GOP's Special Development and Enforcement Plan (SDEP) for poppy-growing areas in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) through a \$10 million grant from the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control. This grant included funds for the Dir District Development project, which is covered separately in Section III of this evaluation. In September 1988, a second amendment of \$32 million extended the Gadoon Amazai project for another five years (through August 1993) and created a new project with similar purpose (and the same length) in the Kala Dhaka area, adjacent to Gadoon Amazai. The Kala Dhaka project is evaluated in Section II of this report.

Recently, the project assistance completion date (PACD) has been extended another 13 months, to September 1994, with the hope of strengthening and/or creating community-based village organizations and NGOs that can sustain project activities beyond project closeout.

Total USAID funding for the Gadoon Amazai project over the 10-year life of the project was more than \$38 million. The Kala Dhaka project, begun in 1990, was far more modest than the Gadoon project. Funding, although originally set at \$8 million, never exceeded \$4 million between 1990-1993.

The third project subsumed under NWFADP was the Dir District Development project administered by the U.N. Drug Control Program (UNDCP). Through NWFADP, USAID made a grant of \$10 million to UNDCP, \$2 million of which was used to fund the Special Development Unit (SDU) of the Provincial Planning Department. The remaining \$8 million was added to a project fund that totaled, with grants from other donors, \$14.6 million. (USAID later added another \$800,000 in funding to this project.) The USAID grant was made in two installments over the life of the project. Although the Dir project is continuing, USAID will not be funding further activities.

The three projects are located in parts of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province, two of which (Kala Dhaka and Dir) are administered as tribal areas. Villagers living in these areas have traditionally enjoyed autonomy from the state, and this difficult mountainous terrain has been a major source of raw opium and, consequently, a growing source of concern. However, while the objectives and strategies of the three projects were similar, each was implemented in differing settings with distinctive histories. Subsequently, each project had different emphases, resources, and management histories.

B. Evaluation Scope of Work and Methodology

B1. Team Composition

The evaluation team consisted of three expatriate members selected by Chemonics in the United States: James Keyser, team leader and anthropologist; Nek Buzdar, agricultural economist; and Pauline Milone, social scientist and women in development (WID) expert. Three other members of the team were recruited by Chemonics through its subcontract with Asianics Agro-Dev: Pervaiz Amir, agricultural economist; Zia Al-Jalaly, social scientist and WID expert; and Hassan Mehdi Naqvi, community development specialist. The team assembled July 19 at the USAID mission in Islamabad for several days of briefings, before establishing a base in Peshawar and commencing field trips to project areas.

B2. Scope of Work

A copy of the full scope of work for this evaluation is presented in Annex K. In short, the evaluation was tasked with assessing NWFADP achievements, with a special focus on the following areas:

- Continuation of enforcement and development activities.
- Sustainability of project investments and interventions including training, technology transfer, infrastructural and institutional development.

- Recommendations for a plan of action on how to continue development of community-based organizations and formation and governance of district-level NGOs.
- Socioeconomic impact on the people of the project areas.
- Recommendations and lessons learned for similar projects.

B3. Methodology

The evaluation team approached the assignment in three phases. In the first phase, the team gathered in Islamabad, where meetings were held with USAID officials and project managers. Detailed briefings were held on project achievements and milestones, and a list of project-related documents was provided. The team prepared an outline for the final report and an itinerary, and submitted these to USAID for comments.

The second phase comprised field work to obtain firsthand information on project accomplishments. The team also prepared a data guide to serve as an aid in field data collection. Secondary information was obtained from USAID/Peshawar, where the data guide was also shared with project staff. During the field work, interviews with project personnel, farmers, shopkeepers, and a spectrum of beneficiaries were held. The team also met with staff from the GOP's Project Management Unit and the newly formulated field management teams. During field work in the Gadoon Amazai area, two team members visited the Dir District project area and met with project staff. This meeting was followed by a briefing from the project manager, Adnan Bashir, who had previously managed the Gadoon Amazai project. The team later visited Dir to obtain information on project interventions. These initial trips to Gadoon Amazai were followed by several days in Peshawar for discussion and elaboration of field notes. Next, the team went to Mansehra where members covered the project area in groups of two.

Once more back in Peshawar the team began the third phase of the evaluation: the physical compilation and presentation of findings and conclusions. This process began with writing, talking to project personnel, and reading more project documentation. During this time two briefings were given to USAID/Peshawar staff on findings in the three project areas. These briefings were attended by all local USAID project managers. A seminar was also organized at the Pakistan Rural Academy to share experiences on NGO formation and seek guidance from professionals who had worked with NGOs in rural development projects in Pakistan. This information was then shared with project staff for preliminary reactions and comments. The third phase concluded with writing this report, circulating drafts for comment, and conducting briefings.

B4. Organization of the Evaluation

Following this Executive Summary, Sections I-III of this report present the findings and conclusions concerning the three NWFADP efforts: the Gadoon Amazai project, Kala Dhaka project, and Dir District Development project. Each of these sections includes background on the purpose and implementation procedures of these projects, as well as

assessments of project management and accountability. Section IV presents the recommendations and lessons learned for all three projects.

These main sections are followed by numerous annexes that present more specific background information, field data, and details of interviews with project personnel and beneficiaries. In addition, the annexes include the evaluation scope of work, a list of documents consulted and persons interviewed, and a schedule of evaluation team activities in Pakistan and Washington, D.C.

C. Findings and Conclusions

C1. Infrastructure

NWFADP infrastructure interventions have contributed to the economic and social well being of area residents targeted by the project. However, serious distributional and sustainability questions remain. Achievements include:

New and improved roads. Nearly \$5 million (12.5 percent of the project budget) was spent on road construction in Gadoon Amazai, including 19.6 km of surfaced road constructed or repaired at an average cost of \$51,000/km. Site-specific costs ranged widely, but both repairs and new construction are factored into this average, which is well above normal costs for road building in similarly mountainous terrain. In Kala Dhaka, the amount spent directly on completed tracks was around \$100,000, or \$10,000/km, a normal cost of building jeepable track in mountainous terrains. However, if the total amount spent is calculated against completed track, the per kilometer figure rises to nearly \$30,000—well above the normal range. Overall, project roads and jeepable tracks have contributed to increased integration of the area into the national economy. The Department of Public Works has assumed responsibility for maintenance of most of the roads in Gadoon Amazai.

School construction. More than 50 schools constructed or improved by the project are now fully staffed and operating in the Gadoon Amazai area; however, serious problems and questions exist concerning the completion and quality of school construction. The project planned construction of 157 schools, of which 103 (65 percent) were completed at the end of project. Of the 102 completed schools, 83 were new buildings; 13 of the construction projects involved the addition of a single room and 6 involved only repairs. Of the 157 schools worked on by the project, 112 were for boys and 45 were for girls.

The Department of Education has not taken over responsibility for operation and staffing of more than half of schools constructed, due to a shortage of funds and the problem of obtaining reliable teaching staff, particularly in some of the more remote locations. Coordination of construction efforts with the Department of Education to resolve siting and recurrent cost issues could have helped to avoid waste of construction funds and to increase the level of impact on targeted groups.

In Kala Dhaka, the project financed repairs for schools in Kotkai, Tuwara, and Nadrai. As in Gadoon Amazai, the technical assistance team found a strong demand for

education. It is, however, very difficult to recruit teachers who will live in the Kala Dhaka area. Some of those who have been hired stay in the towns of Oghi or Mansehra.

Electrification projects. Of the 35 electrification projects in Gadoon Amazai carried out under NWFADP, 31 were completed at a cost of \$670,000, and were handed over to the government's Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), which undertakes power generation and operation and maintenance of all electricity projects in Pakistan. Thus far, most villagers have been using electricity for household light purposes only. As people start using it for other purposes—e.g., to pump out irrigation water—more substantial benefits will be forthcoming. Poor families, which make up a majority of the population, find it difficult to afford the home installation fees and monthly charges.

Health. One basic health unit and two integrated rural health centers were completed. However, three other health units begun by the project were not completed, and the Department of Health did not have the resources to complete or staff the finished units. The impact of USAID-funded health interventions was minimal. There seemed to have been little coordination with the Department of Health in siting these centers, and the project failed to build on the existing structure of health care, thereby wasting resources and compromising sustainability. In some cases, improving existing facilities would have been more appropriate than building new and redundant facilities.

Improved and new irrigation. New or improved irrigation channels opened up 581 acres of additional irrigated land to cultivation in Gadoon Amazai. Project land leveling and terracing added more than 1,000 acres more of agricultural land, but whether this land is being used is questionable. In all, 322 irrigation channels, 5 tube wells, 215 dug wells, 13 test wells (to be converted into tube wells), and 116 water supply systems were completed in Gadoon Amazai for a total of \$4.5 million. In addition, 88 schemes were left incomplete; half of these were water supply systems. Improvements in irrigation channels will be sustained, since there are traditionally established systems of maintenance. Most newly constructed irrigation channels, however, already face problems of maintenance. Some new and improved channels have been abandoned, and others are in a state of disrepair.

In Kala Dhaka, changes in project implementation and funding led to no irrigation channels being completed at the time of the evaluation. Beneficiaries appreciated existing work and expressed their eagerness for construction to be completed. Water supply systems installed by the project have benefited a large number of villages and will likely be sustained, even though villagers do not use the water for drinking since it is too hot or cold depending on the season. Because most villages are close to the river, streams, and springs, the full use and benefits of project interventions have not yet been fully realized.

C2. Poppy Eradication and Agriculture

C2a. Poppy Eradication

The Gadoon Amazai project strategy can only be understood in light of the poppy eradication objectives of those who designed the project, and in light of the intervention of

troops in 1986 and 1987, involving 4,500 soldiers and more than a dozen deaths. The project had been shut down by these events and USAID had to "buy its way back in." In the end, GOP enforcement combined with project interventions in socioeconomic development have largely suppressed, for the time being, poppy production in Gadoon Amazai.

Given the project objectives after the enforcement measures of 1986-1987, logic dictated the funneling of project inputs to large landowners—the men with the most influence and in a position to request that their dependent families cease poppy cultivation. Project inputs were allocated according to land holdings, as reflected in official records, and powerful residents of the union councils defined projects that they presented to the government for funding.

Project interventions have had limited impact on poppy production in Kala Dhaka, where the project was aimed at preempting expansion of the low-level of cultivation that occurs in this region adjacent to Gadoon Amazai.

The UNDCP Dir District Development project has yet to make inroads to eliminating poppy production in the Dir Area, due its gradual approach to enforcement. As a result, remains a major poppy producing area.

Sustainability of eradication activities. The relative profitability of poppy growing to other pursuits in the NWFP remains an obstacle to sustainable eradication. In essence, the bottom line success of NWFADP rests on the fact that the elimination of poppy cultivation is not sustainable without the continued flow of large amounts of money into Gadoon Amazai and Kala Dhaka, and the ongoing threat of armed intervention against poppy growers.

C2b. Agriculture.

More than \$5 million was spent on agricultural inputs, mostly in the form of direct subsidies for fertilizer, seed, and fruit trees. In the initial project stages, and particularly following the events of 1986-1987, agricultural subsidies were an important part of the Gadoon Amazai effort. Application of fertilizer and improved seeds increased yields in Gadoon Amazai, but no demonstrations and experiments were established to determine whether profits from a given crop justified the expense of these inputs. A measurable portion of the fertilizer and seeds given to farmers was sold on the open market. All subsidies for fertilizer and seeds were stopped in 1992.

Acreage and yields of major crops like wheat and maize have increased, and newer cash crops like tobacco and rapeseed have been introduced. Increases in harvests of wheat and maize have also reduced the area's dependence on imported food. These advances should be sustained with continued input of high-yielding varieties, fertilizer, and know-how.

Although some fruit trees subsidized by the Gadoon Amazai project have begun to yield, some farmers planted trees merely to obtain a monthly payment from the project of Rs 750, supposedly to pay a watchman to guard the trees. When this subsidy was withdrawn,

interest in raising orchards decreased. Some farmers told the team that in the absence of the monthly payment, they would simply cut down the trees and plant other crops.

In Kala Dhaka, 21 percent of the project budget was spent to expand agriculture and forestry activities because it was felt that assistance in agriculture could provide preemptive incentives not to grow poppy. The design of the project gave due importance to agriculture, and a full-time position was budgeted as part of the contract. There was demonstrated impact of wheat, maize, and forestry noted in project trial, as well as successful social forestry interventions. A longer project life would have helped focus even more on those agroforestry practices that had a lasting impact. Project funding and procurement problems affected the start-up of field trials, and thus the agricultural component lagged behind in the initial stages of the project. New varieties of wheat, maize, and potato were introduced, and even though wheat and maize varieties were already well known to Kala Dhaka farmers, the high price of seed and fertilizer limited widespread adoption. On top of these expenses were prohibitive transportation costs.

Shift in economic base and integration into the national economy. The Gadoon-Amazai economy has shifted away from poppy growing (see above) to other agricultural enterprises and off-farm employment both locally and outside the project area, as residents have done for centuries. Urban migration has deprived some farm families of important part of their work force, and remittances earned by family members from outside the area are an important part of the NWFP economy.

C3. Vocational Training

No government groups other than Special Development Unit staff were strengthened by the Gadoon Amazai project. Failure to strengthen line agencies and encourage technology transfer was partly caused by the lack of accountability to AID social soundness guidelines on the part of Project Coordination Unit staff. Ignoring the line agencies will result in the long-term loss of investments made and a poor prognosis for sustainability.

C4. WID interventions

The WID component of the project established 30 nonformal education (NFE) centers for women. Operation of the centers indicated a demand for women's education and that cultural barriers did not prevent women's participation.

One line of training concerned health, under which activity centered on training three women health visitors and 35 *dais*, or traditional birth attendants. The project also sponsored the Expanded Program for Immunization, which has provided protection against common childhood diseases to about 2,000 infants and children under five years of age, and to another 5,000 women and girls. In addition, courses were offered at NFE centers on religious education and vocational skills such as sewing, cutting, and embroidery. Since 1986, 2,000 women have participated. The kitchen gardening program entailed provision of a kit of seeds, tools, fertilizers and pesticide sprays to local women. Okra, spinach, lemongrass, and

tomato were introduced for home consumption. There was no follow-up to this program, and the majority of the gardens have fallen into disuse.

At present, 11 NFE centers are being managed by the Gadoon Amazai field management team and will in principle be taken over by the nongovernmental organization to be created during the project extension to September 1994. Little analysis of the WID activities has been conducted. In general, the team found that the benefits of the WID program—as was the case with other interventions—tended to go to the well-to-do families.

The WID component of the Kala Dhaka project consisted of interventions in health, education, and income generation, including kitchen gardening, soap making, and a chicken raising program. Health interventions comprised training of 60 *dais* who were provided with a Save the Children midwifery kit. Training also covered personal hygiene, breast feeding and nutrition for mothers, weaning foods for babies, and preparation of oral rehydration solution. In addition, female mobile clinics were held in villages, during which a woman doctor examined 570 women and children. The woman social organizers played a major role in implementing this program.

Kitchen gardening training was initiated in 98 villages, and about 727 women participated. Vegetables such as tomatoes, onions, eggplant, and chilies have introduced, and are used for home consumption. Soap making was introduced as an income generation activity, and 38 women were trained and soap making equipment and supplies were provided. This program failed because essential ingredients such as caustic soda and sodium silicate were not locally available.

C5. Voluntary Organizations and NGOs

In spite of concerns in the 1990 evaluation and demand to implement a community-based approach, very little action has been taken in this regard. The strategy behind NGO and VO formation remains undefined, beyond the vague statement that the project seeks to organize groups of concerned individuals with professional experience and/or political influence to undertake development works on behalf of locally expressed priorities. More important, there has never been a coherent, focused, or consistent approach toward meeting the aspirations of Gadoon Amazai people in this effort.

USAID will not be able to finance operations as long as the Pressler Amendment is in effect, and other sources of money will have to be found. Fundraising and development is an enormous and thoroughly professionalized job for an NGO, and there is no recognition of this in the selection of board members or the content of the training. The lack of plans to integrate and develop linkages with local councils, local government, and district councils does not bode well. Project planning seems bent on creating new organizations rather than discovering ways to use the power of the existing system.

Finally, targeted beneficiaries do not have confidence that the NGO will help them. Villagers suspect the NGO is a continuation of the Gadoon Amazai and Kala Dhaka projects, which did not respect the needs and the priorities of residents as well as they might have.

Overall, NGOs and VOs observed lack productive functions, and thus they cannot be considered genuine organizations. The failure to involve any genuine village organization in NGO planning and activities is alienating villagers and is compromising the chances for sustainability.

C6. Project Design and Management

The 1990 evaluation pointed out deficiencies in project management, particularly high overheads and redundant hiring. The report also noted that supervision of work was insufficient in some of the line agencies. This report concurs. The PCU failed to engage the line agencies sufficiently in their work and did not build on existing structures to work with them. This is particularly true for the Public Health and Engineering Department and the Department of Education. As a result, there are redundant schools and health units in the project area—schools and health units that will be difficult to staff.

Gadoon Amazai beneficiary and equity issues. After the enforcement actions in 1986-1987, there were no clear guidelines under which groups would receive project assistance, but it was assumed the majority of benefits would go to the people who had to forego income from poppy growing. It was reasoned by project staff that the larger landowners, because they had dependent and tenant families, were in the best position to convince smallholders not to grow poppy. Thus, dug wells and improved irrigation channels were given more to these landowners; the more land an individual owned, the more project inputs he received.

Gadoon Amazai finances and project accountability. Save for some problems with execution and unfinished projects, the engineering work of the project was competent and conscientious. In addition, USAID's financial management of the project was sound. However, there was not accountability in social soundness. The 1990 evaluation signaled this problem and offered recommendations that were not heeded.

The USAID mission seems to have played a passive supervisory role. Even four or five years after the military incursion, after the excesses of the project and the consequences of the failure to follow social soundness requirements were known, and after the warnings and recommendations of the 1990 evaluation, business continued as usual. Similarly, the GOP did not take steps to protect the interests of the donor and or the beneficiaries. While PCU staff were vetted and appointed by the government, there was no intervention from the SDU and no active involvement from the Departments of Health or Education.

Kala Dhaka project management and design. Like Gadoon Amazai, the Kala Dhaka project was endowed with a technical assistance team and a Project Coordination Unit staffed by a civil servant appointed by the GOP. The failure to integrate the TAT structurally with the PCU, and USAID's choice to ignore the TAT, condemned the team to irrelevancy.

While there was much trouble and conflict in the execution of the project, these troubles were reported conscientiously and punctually to the USAID project manager in

Peshawar. It is clear that the appropriate and needed step of recognizing a serious design flaw and moving to institute remedies was not taken.

Kala Dhaka project financial accountability. The PCU never succeeded in hiring an accountant during its two years of operation and had chronic cash flow problems that were never solved. Ordinarily, since the PCU belonged to the GOP, the government might have been expected to give technical assistance; however, the attentions of the Special Development Unit were similarly elsewhere.

The symptoms of USAID's lack of interest in this project remain evident in the project site, the appointments and offices, the abortive attempts to establish activities in the project area, and the disappointment of participants. In spite of early and continued reporting of the problems from the TAT, USAID took no corrective action. Timely action on the part of USAID could have solved the problems. Instead they were ignored.

Dir District project management. The UNDCP Dir District Project strategy was similar to that of the other two projects in giving priority to opening up the area with infrastructural projects. The Dir Project, however, introduced the technical assistance of the social sciences into a Technical Support Unit (TSU) and gave the TSU an advisory role and veto power. The shift in emphasis to community based development was accompanied by bringing in the line agencies for executing projects, restricting the role of the PCU to a local counterpart of the TSU, and having the UNDCP exercise a strong custodial function in order to protect donors and beneficiaries. Despite a lack of substantive technical success, the Dir project was more efficiently managed than the Gadoon Amazai and Kala Dhaka projects.

D. Principal Recommendations

D1. Gadoon Amazai Project

D1a. Poppy Eradication and Agriculture

- Project advances concerning agricultural inputs and subsidies should be sustained with continued input of new technology (particularly high-yielding varieties), fertilizer, and know-how. An on-farm research unit should be established in Gadoon Amazai to regularly screen, demonstrate, and promote new technology.

D1b. Voluntary Organizations and NGOs

- The expertise of Sarhad Rural Support Corporation (SRSC) personnel who have been trained by USAID should be made available to SRSC and the as yet formed Gadoon Amazai NGO. Given the tentative nature of the Gadoon NGO, options concerning the use of SRSC in Gadoon Amazai be left open.

D2. Kala Dhaka Project

D2a. Voluntary Organizations and NGOs

- In Kala Dhaka it is too early to expand activities for the formation of an NGO without the experience of an effective NGO in the Gadoon Amazai area (see recommendation above).

D3. Dir Project

- Despite the lack of success in terms of poppy eradication, the evolution of the Dir District project has resulted in a management structure that should commend itself to USAID. The course of this project—and in particular its management—will be worthwhile following.

D4. General Recommendations

D4a. Women in Development

- The evidence of demand for education and the possibility of involving women should be a target of opportunity for the NGO to be created during the remaining project life. In addition, health care and training were in demand by project area women, and health-related activities should be a priority for future development efforts in Gadoon Amazai.
- Attempts should be made to save project-created nonformal education centers and their activities.
- For WID projects in general there is a need first to study the lives and work of women and determine what projects are likely to create or respond to demand. There must also be extensive follow-up analysis.

D4b. Voluntary Organizations and NGOs

- The 1990 evaluation of the Gadoon Amazai project and subsequent papers concerning the project and community-based interventions should provide enough guidance to USAID and the NGO board of directors. The priority should be a clear definition of purpose and elaboration of a strategy, and the selection of modest (i.e., doable) and well-defined objectives.
- The immediate and most urgent task is raising money. Through September 1994, project funds must be used to train local personnel in fundraising, development, and promotion. Personnel should be taught advertising, survey techniques, media presentations, cost estimation, and public relations. Successful examples of fundraising from other NGOs should be studied.

- Now that the board of directors is in place, an executive group should also be selected from the private sector to organize education and training adapted to the market in Pakistan. The business school faculties at the Universities of Lahore and Karachi can provide support, personnel, and courses, and short-term expatriates could also be brought in to advise.
- Project NGOs should be encouraged to influence line agencies and other GOP entities to staff completed health and education facilities, and to complete construction (and then staff) of those still being built. USAID should use its influence in this direction as well.
- Project NGOs could also be initially organized around completing outstanding subprojects that would be beneficial to surrounding communities. Provide the NGOs with specific purpose and tasks.

D4c. Project Management

- The evaluation team found very little trace of SDU activity in oversight or coordination in the project, reinforcing our recommendation that USAID take a custodial role in locally executed projects.
- Working with line agencies is necessary for building on an existing system, taking advantage of the capabilities and skills of the agencies, and improving the probabilities of sustainability.
- The donor must insist on structural measures to ensure that AID social soundness guidelines are honored. AID should take an active custodial role and insist on a strong bilateral monitoring and evaluation unit that can guarantee accountability.
- The Project Coordination Unit should have technical as well as monitoring and evaluation functions. To the extent that it also has executive or fiduciary responsibilities, accountability must be ensured through explicitly assigned oversight structures and entities.

SECTION I

GADOON AMAZAI PROJECT

SECTION I GADOON AMAZAI PROJECT

A. Introduction

A1. Project Purpose, Strategy, and Funding

The Gadoon Amazai project, the earliest and most lengthy of the three NWFADP efforts covered by this evaluation, started in 1983 and was USAID's first effort toward poppy eradication in Pakistan. The project's purpose was to change the Gadoon Amazai area economy from one based on poppy cultivation to a diversified agricultural and non-agricultural system with strong ties to the national economy. These ties, in turn, were to facilitate the Government of Pakistan's (GOP) enforcement efforts with regard to poppy cultivation and narcotics production.

Project strategy to achieve the above purpose comprised a two-pronged approach of direct poppy enforcement and elimination efforts, combined with massive development interventions to provide area residents with replacement sources of income and basic needs. These interventions included infrastructure, agriculture, education (formal and nonformal), vocational training, and health.

The project began in September 1983 with \$20 million in funding, to be used through August 1988. In September 1988, a second amendment of \$32 million extended the project for another five years (through August 1993) and created a new project with similar purpose (and the same length) in the Kala Dhaka area, adjacent to Gadoon Amazai. The Kala Dhaka project is evaluated in Section II of this report.

Recently, the project assistance completion date (PACD) was extended another 13 months, to September 1994, with the hope of strengthening and/or creating community-based village organizations and NGOs that can sustain project activities beyond closeout.

A2. Project Evolution

After the project had been in the field for three years, it was noted that the desired reduction in poppy cultivation had not taken place. The Gadoon Amazai area was still producing a large percentage of Pakistan's poppy crop—a result that did not surprise mission and GOP officials given the lack of strict enforcement measures that had been carried out up to that point. There was never any illusion that residents would forego poppy cultivation without the implementation of military-style actions. In March 1986, application of the enforcement side of the project strategy culminated in a paramilitary force some 4,500 strong entering the area at harvest time. Since the inhabitants of Gadoon Amazai were strongly and nearly universally opposed to poppy eradication efforts, and were well armed with automatic

weapons, the constabulary force had to be protected by armored personnel carriers, a mass of firepower, and helicopters.

The 4,500-person force secured accessible areas and protected hired laborers who scythed the poppy crop. Areas that were not accessible by armored vehicles were sprayed with defoliants from helicopters. This operation was assisted by the United States through the Narcotics Affairs Unit (NAU), the predecessor of the present Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS). In the demonstrations that followed these events, 14 Gadoon residents were shot and killed by constabulary troops.

It is necessary to be aware of these events to understand the nature of the USAID-funded efforts that followed. Although the Gadoon project was shut temporarily down as a result and access was denied to outsiders, USAID, still dedicated to interdicting poppy cultivation, bided its time and tried another approach to regaining access.

The next phase of the Gadoon Amazai project was more generously funded, partly in recognition of the fact that the 1986-1987 backlash against enforcement from Gadoon Amazai residents was to some extent caused by insufficient development works designed to soften the economic blow of poppy interdiction. Input from the technical assistance team (TAT) was effectively limited to engineering and project resources, and efforts were devoted to accelerated construction. Of the \$46 million spent on the project after 1984, 76 percent (\$35 million) was spent during 1988-1992. By far the largest share of the budget—about \$19 million—paid for various construction projects. In second place for project funds were staff salaries, benefits, and per diem. The Pakistani project coordination unit (PCU) at project headquarters in Topi, near the Tarbela dam, employed a staff of 430. Total personnel costs were \$7.7 million, and the amount claimed by the PCU goes up to 25 percent of the project budget when \$1.7 million for unit operation are added.

In addition to offices in Topi and vehicles, the PCU was provided with houses for employees, staff houses, and a guest house in nearby Tarbela where some project staff lived and where PCU staff could bring guests for conferences.

Throughout this second phase, the project operated on a "soft implementation" basis that sought to shift the lead operational role away from USAID and the departed TAT, and to forego social soundness considerations in an attempt to produce benefits as swiftly as possible for the now poppy-less Gadoon Amazai population.

B. Findings and Conclusions

B1. Infrastructure

Construction under the project fell into five categories: roads, schools, electrical power transmission lines, health facilities, and rural development schemes consisting mostly of irrigation channels, wells, and water supply systems.

As a result of this infrastructure development, the project area shows signs of increased integration into the national market economy. The extensive road system put in place now allows better and less expensive access to labor markets. This opportunity is relatively more class neutral than other project inputs that were allocated according to land ownership.

B1a. Roads

Some 94 million rupees (nearly \$5 million; an average life-of-project exchange rate of Rs20/\$1 is used in this evaluation), or 12.5 percent of the project budget was spent on road construction. In all, 19.6 km of surfaced road were constructed or repaired at an average cost of \$51,000/km. Site-specific costs ranged widely, but both repairs and new construction are factored into this average, which is well above normal costs for road building in similarly mountainous terrain.

Two surfaced road repair jobs were financed by the project: the Nagrai Charorai road (4.5 km) and sections of the Kabgani-Utla road. Separate costs for the Kabgani-Utla repairs were not given. Slightly more than 78 km of unsurfaced roads were built with project financing of about \$3 million, at an average cost of \$38,000/km.

Among project construction activities, roads are the most accessible to the widest range of beneficiaries, and the most likely to have long-term development impact. In every area in which evaluation team members traveled, project roads were being used by all classes of vehicles and other public and private conveyances. Moreover, there is clear evidence that project infrastructure has improved access to agricultural markets.

B1b. Schools

More than 50 schools constructed or improved by the project are now fully staffed and operating in the Gadoon Amazai area. Despite this accomplishment, however, serious problems and questions exist concerning the completion and quality of school construction (see discussion below). In addition, one of the most important achievements of the project was the opening of nonformal education (NFE) centers for women. Through its activities in this area, project staff found that there is a demand for education among women and that cultural barriers have not prevented these women from seeking education. (See section B4., below, for a full discussion of project impact on women in development.) This substantial demand for education from both sexes and the support given to education from the project show the way to other means of integrating Gadoon Amazai into the national economy, and present an opportunity for NGO activity.

The project planned the construction of 157 schools, of which 103 (65 percent), were completed at the end of project. Of the 102 completed schools, 83 were new buildings; 13 of the construction projects involved the addition of a single room and 6 involved only repairs. Of the 157 schools worked on by the project, 112 were for boys and 45 were for girls.

The PCU spent \$1.9 million on these 102 schools, for an average cost of \$18,600/school. This cost is higher if only the schools that are functioning are counted. The best estimates we were able to obtain were that 52 project-financed schools were functioning at the time of the evaluation.

Boys schools. Of the 112 schools for boys, 81 had been completed, 68 had been turned over to the Department of Education, and 49 were functioning, with total enrollment of 3,500 in 1991-1992. The 49 functioning schools comprised 30 primary schools, 11 middle schools, and 8 high schools. Annex D of this evaluation contains more figures on school construction (boys and girls) under the project.

Last year, the technical assistance branch of USAID's Peshawar mission undertook an inspection of construction projects throughout the Gadoon project area (Jehanzeb, et al., 1992). The inspection found that of the 47 boy's schools, completed at that time, 30 were in operation, but none of the primary schools had any latrine or sanitary facilities, only three had piped water, and five were judged to be in bad condition, with serious cracking and/or leaking. Nearly every primary school was judged to need additional work and repair. Overall, 19 of the buildings were judged adequate and 23 were judged to be in good condition.

The evaluation team was able to verify some of the inspection's findings. The team also visited local Department of Education offices in the project area and in Peshawar, but it was not possible at either office to determine how many boys schools had been staffed and/or were actually functioning. Officials declared that the department had issued a certificate of "no objection" for each school constructed, but no staffing commitments had been made.

Project officials at Topi and USAID employees managing the project were also unable to confirm how many schools built with USAID financing had actually been staffed and were functioning.

Girls schools. The present status of the 45 girls schools planned for construction under the project shows that less than half (22) have been completed. Eighteen of these have been handed over to the Northwest Frontier Province government. Of these 18, six are functioning, with total enrollment of 167.

Despite the above shortcomings, the education component of the project did have significant impact. It was demonstrated that a strong demand for education among women exists in Gadoon Amazai, and the establishment of NFE centers was an important step. The project recruited and paid women teachers to come and staff women's schools, and for the first time, women have gone through middle school and reached high school without leaving the area.

Beneficiaries. The intended beneficiaries of this project component were the school-aged Gadoon Amazai children of both sexes. The overwhelming portion of the project's allocation for education was devoted to construction, and as shown above, only a modest part of this investment actually affected the intended beneficiaries.

Sustainability. One of the most important results of project activities in education was bringing to light solid evidence of the demand for education. This demand exists for boys, girls, and adults of both sexes. Normally, when demand is present, probabilities for sustainability are high, as is the case for these activities.

Against this demand have to be weighed the relative poverty of the area and the lack of resources the Department of Education has at its disposal to take over and staff the schools. Many schools are already in need of maintenance, and it is unlikely that the department will assume control of all of them. In addition, untrained teachers and absenteeism remain major problems in this area.

Siting of schools. Money was available at the PCU office for school construction, and village project committees were formed and agreements made between the project committees and the PCU. Engineers and surveyors determined the site specifications and cost estimates and submitted them to USAID, which issued Project Committee Agreements.

As construction progressed, engineers inspected building progress, and when specifications were met, punctual payments were made to the project committee. Technically, the engineering work was correct, as were the financial transactions.

The land itself was usually donated by a village notable—the leader of a project committee. In addition to deriving some profit from the construction, the donator received the right to appoint a watchman (*chokidar*), a position paid for by the Department of Education. No arable land was donated for schools, only wasteland.

No consultations were held with the Department of Education concerning siting, and none of the ordinary concerns addressed in school mapping were considered. (What is basis of this statement?) As a result some schools were built on precipitous land far from settlements. It would be difficult for boys to get to these schools, and it is certain that girls will not attend, as concern over the safety of girls traveling to and from school is one of the principal reasons for not permitting them to attend. An authoritative source in USAID's Engineering Office who had worked with the project since its beginnings estimated that more than half of the schools constructed were on difficult to access sites.

In sum, technical requirements of sound engineering were consistently applied, and the formal requirements of financial accountability were followed. However there was ultimately a lack of social accountability to the beneficiaries and the donors.

B1c. Electricity

Of the 35 electrification projects in Gadoon Amazai carried out under NWFADP, 31 were completed at a cost of \$670,000. The allocation of electrification projects among union councils was:

| Union Council | Electrif. Projects | Villages Affected |
|----------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| Baitgali | 2 | 2 |
| Ganichatra | 13 | 13 |
| Gabasni | 6 | 6 |
| Nara | 6 | 6 |
| Nagrai | 4 | 25 |
| Total | 31 | 52 |

The average cost per project comes to \$33,500, and the average cost per village comes to \$12,900.

According to the June 1993 monthly status report by the USAID Office of Engineering, all Gadoon Amazai rural electrification schemes were completed and their systems were handed over to the government's Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). WAPDA undertakes power generation and operation and maintenance of all electricity projects in Pakistan.

Beneficiaries. During the evaluation team's field visits, minor complaints about the inaffordability of fees and charges for electric connections and meters were voiced by local residents. However, no major problems were observed. Project rural electrification efforts have already benefitted villagers, and there is every expectation that electricity use will increase in the immediate future. In some cases, electricity is used to pump underground water for irrigation.

Khan and Khan (1993) found the following:

- In 23 electrified villages in Nagrai, only 275 households were able to get electric meters and connections. The reason for low use was stated to be inaffordability of fees and charges.
- In Nara union council, six villages had been connected to the grid, and the five transformers are working satisfactorily.
- In Baitgali, one of the two electrification projects was operating, with 70 households benefitting.
- A total of six villages and 2,280 households were benefitting from the electrification projects in Gabasni union council.
- Thirteen villages and 790 households were benefitting from electrification projects in Ganichatra.

The tables below (Khan and Khan, 1993) show details on the use of electrification subprojects in the five assisted union councils.

Table I-1: Use of Electrification Projects

| Union Council | Subprojects | No. Visited | Transformers | Meters | Beneficiaries |
|---------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|
| Nagrai | 25 | 23 | 23 | 275 | 5468 |
| Ganichatra | 13 | 13 | 15 | 555 | 7900 |
| Gabasini | 6 | 6 | 6 | 123 | 2280 |
| Nara | 6 | 6 | 5 | 143 | 2600 |
| Baitgali | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 70 |
| Total | 52 | 50 | 51 | 1099 | 18318 |

Table I-2: Capacity and Use of Electrification Projects

| Union Council | Village | Transformers | Transformer Size | Meters |
|---------------|---------|--------------|------------------|--------|
| Nagrai | 13 | 13 | 25KVA | 51 |
| | 8 | 8 | 50KVA | 79 |
| | 2 | 2 | 100KVA | 145 |
| Gabasini | 2 | 2 | 50KVA | 103 |
| | 2 | 2 | 25KVA | 15 |
| Nara | 5 | 5 | 50KVA | 142 |
| Baitgali | 1 | 1 | 25KVA | 3 |

Sustainability. Thus far, most villagers have been using electricity for household light purposes only. As people start using it for other purposes—e.g., to pump out irrigation water—more substantial benefits will be forthcoming. WAPDA has the necessary expertise and manpower to operate and maintain the electrification subprojects efficiently. Subprojects have already been handed over to WAPDA for operation and maintenance, and no more involvement is planned by the project.

B1d. Health

Approximately \$1 million (2.7 percent of the Gadoon Amazai project budget) was spent on the construction of health facilities. One basic health center in Baitgali was completed at a cost of \$91,000, and two integrated rural health centers in Ganichatra were completed for \$104,000. At the close of the project, three other health units begun by the project had not yet been completed, and the Department of Health did not have the resources to complete or staff these units.

It appeared that the impact of USAID-funded health interventions was minimal. There seemed to have been little coordination with the Department of Health in siting these centers, and the project failed to build on the existing structure of health care, thereby wasting resources and compromising sustainability. In some cases, improving existing facilities would have been more appropriate than building new and redundant facilities. In general, demographics, bed capacity, human resources, and siting considerations were not adequately considered. For example, records do not show any sustained communication with the Department of Health concerning actions to guarantee that proposed health centers would be staffed.

B1e. Irrigation and Water Supply

Crop raising in Gadoon Amazai depends on both rainfall and irrigation. Adduction channels bringing water from natural springs and perennial streams have been used for centuries to water elaborate and extensive terraced fields. These irrigated terraces make up approximately 10 percent of all cultivated land, though they produce more than this percentage of the area's crops. They exist only in the higher-altitude areas and are found in five of the seven union councils: Nara, Gabasni, Ganichatra, Baitgali, and Nagrai. The remaining two union councils of Gandaf and Kabgani lay in an area of lowland, rainfed agriculture called the Gandaf-Malikabad Plains.

The Gadoon Amazai project design felt it was possible to develop irrigation systems in these two distinct areas by following two different approaches. In the hilly areas, it was decided simply to line and improve existing adduction channels.

For the Gandaf-Malikabad Plains it, was decided first to undertake an underground water resources survey through WAPDA. The survey revealed that sufficient underground water reserves existed, and that if they were exploited, most of the Gandaf-Malikabad Plains and foothills could be brought under irrigation. It was decided therefore to invest in surface or hand-dug wells and in tube wells to tap both shallow and deep underground aquifers.

Because many of the existing sources of drinking water in Gadoon were inadequate, inaccessible, and/or posed a significant danger to health, the project decided to construct safer and more accessible systems in as many villages as possible.

For a total investment of \$4.5 million, the project financed three kinds of irrigation construction: irrigation channel repair, dug wells, and tube wells, along with drinking water supply systems.

Table I-3: Costs for Irrigation and Water Supply Systems

| System | No. | Cost (\$'000) | % of Total | Ave. Cost (\$) |
|--------------------|------------|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Irrigation canals | 322 | 1,490 | 26.6 | 4,627 |
| Tube wells | 5 | 210 | 3.8 | 42,000 |
| Dug wells | 215 | 1,519 | 27.1 | 7,065 |
| Water supply syst. | 116 | 1,264 | 22.6 | 10,897 |
| Test wells | 13 | 194 | 3.5 | 14,923 |
| *Incomp. schemes | 88 | 920 | 16.4 | 10,455 |
| Total | 759 | 5,597 | 100 | |

*Incomplete schemes included 45 water supply systems, 19 irrigation canals, 17 dug wells, and 7 tube wells.

The above table shows that irrigation channel enhancement and dug wells accounted 53.7 percent of the money spent on irrigation by the project, or a combined \$3 million. Some \$920,000 was spent on uncompleted irrigation and water supply schemes.

Irrigation schemes distribution. The distribution of irrigation subprojects among Gadoon Amazai union councils is shown below.

Table I-4: Distribution of Irrigation Systems among Gadoon Amazai Union Councils

| Council | Water Supp. | | Irr. Channels | | Tube wells | | Dug wells | |
|--------------|-------------|------------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| Gabasni | 18 | 16 | 87 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 4 |
| Gandaf | 10 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 80 | 57 | 27 |
| Ganichatra | 6 | 5 | 40 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 10 |
| Kabgani | 4 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 20 | 125 | 58 |
| Baitgali | 42 | 36 | 67 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| Nara | 17 | 15 | 59 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nagrai | 19 | 16 | 61 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 116 | 100 | 322 | 100 | 5 | 100 | 215 | 100 |

This distribution conforms to the differences among union councils in terms of topography, and the resulting systems of exploitation or ecological arrangements. Only the plains and foothills of Gandaf and Kabgani provide conditions conducive to the employment of tube wells and dug wells. Similarly, improvement and development of irrigation channels to tap existing springs and streams is the most efficient system for watering terraces in the five hilly union councils. Project decisions with regard to location of these subprojects were appropriate.

Benefits of irrigation subprojects. No reliable data are available on the change in local incomes due to project irrigation activities, nor was it possible to collect such data during the evaluation period. However, the changes shown in the tables below are indicative of changes in Gadoon Amazai farmer earnings.

Table I-5: Changes in General Cropping Patterns

| Year | Percentage of Area Under Crops | | | | Cropping Intensity |
|-----------|--------------------------------|-------|-------|-----------|--------------------|
| | Poppy | Wheat | Maize | Cash Crop | |
| 1986/1987 | 23.00 | 32 | 44 | 1.00 | 112% |
| 1987/1988 | 1.00 | 53 | 45 | 1.00 | |
| 1988/1989 | 0.30 | 57 | 42 | 0.70 | |
| 1989/1990 | 0.04 | 57 | 41 | 1.96 | |
| 1990/1991 | 0.06 | 55 | 41 | 3.94 | |
| 1991/1992 | 0.08 | 52 | 44 | 3.92 | 183% |

The changes in cropping patterns shown in Table I-5 do not necessarily reflect the impact of irrigation subprojects. Rather, they are more often the result of coercive measures restricting poppy cultivation.

In their studies, Haq et al. (1993) tried to show the changes in area brought under irrigation:

Table I-6: Increase in Irrigated Area and Families Benefitted

| Union Council | Systems Completed | Families Benefitted | Pre-project Irr. Acreage | New Area Irr. Acreage | Total Irr. Acreage |
|---------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Nara | 13 | 83 | 95.87 | 22.50 | 118.37 |
| Baitgali | 4 | 18 | 8.50 | 23.75 | 32.25 |
| Gabasini | 10 | 58 | 36.68 | 13.77 | 50.45 |
| Ganichatra | 4 | 26 | 16.50 | 2.00 | 18.50 |
| Nagrai | 26 | 409 | 581.20 | 519.50 | 1100.70 |
| Total | 57 | 594 | 738.75 | 581.52 | 1320.27 |

The improvement of irrigation canals in the terraced hillsides increased irrigated land by 581.52 acres, at a cost of \$2,500/acre. This amount is within the range of the average price of land being irrigated. The investment, however, must be thought of as long-term. These canals will be cost-effective over a period of 10-20 years only if the systems are used and maintained.

Table I-7: Dug wells

| Union Council | Systems Completed | Families Benefitted | Pre-project Irr. Acreage | New Area Irr. Acreage | Total Irr. Acreage |
|---------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Ganichatra | 4 | 5 | 20.50 | 0.00 | 20.50 |
| Kabgani | 73 | 85 | 279.91 | 4.71 | 284.62 |
| Gandaf | 31 | 31 | 129.00 | 17.00 | 146.00 |
| Total | 109 | 122 | 429.41 | 21.71 | 451.12 |

Dug wells added 21.7 acres of irrigated land to the plains areas at a cost of \$56,000/acre. This amount far exceeds the price of land, and it is clear that the investment in dug wells will not be recovered.

Sustainability. The evaluation team expects that improvements in existing irrigation channels will be sustained, since there are traditionally established systems of maintenance. Most newly constructed irrigation channels, however, already face problems of maintenance. We verified that some new and improved channels have been abandoned, and others are in a state of disrepair. Haq et al. (1993) reported the following finding on irrigation channels.

Table I-8: Operation and Maintenance of Irrigation Channels

| Union Council | Channels Studied | Poorly Operated | | Poorly Maintained | |
|---------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|
| | | No. | % | No. | % |
| Gabasni | 36 | 3 | 8.33 | 4 | 11.11 |
| Ganichatra | 34 | 3 | 8.82 | 1 | 2.94 |
| Nara | 26 | 1 | 3.85 | 1 | 3.85 |
| Baitgali | 33 | 2 | 6.06 | 6 | 18.18 |
| Nagrai | 38 | 1 | 2.64 | 2 | 5.26 |
| Total | 167 | 10 | 5.99 | 14 | 8.38 |

Compared to other farming systems, irrigated terraced farms are very labor-intensive; they require almost daily maintenance and distribution of water. The addition of 582 acres is an increase of some 79 percent over pre-project acreage, requiring an increase in the demand for labor in an area already experiencing a labor deficit caused by the out-migration of men.

While the engineering aspects and financial arrangements of the water works were carried out properly, there is nothing in the project documentation addressing this increased labor demand. Haq et al. (1993) suggest that there has already been overbuilding.

For dug wells, Haq et al. (1993) reported:

Table I-9: Operation and Maintenance of Dug wells

| Union Council | Wells Studied | Poorly Operated | | Poorly Maintained | |
|---------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------------|--------------|
| | | No. | % | No. | % |
| Kabgani | 84 | 16 | 19.05 | 8 | 9.52 |
| Ganichatra | 16 | 2 | 12.50 | 2 | 12.50 |
| Gandaf | 41 | 31 | 75.69 | 31 | 75.69 |
| Baitgali | 2 | 2 | 100.00 | 2 | 100.00 |
| Total | 203 | 49 | 24.14 | 43 | 21.18 |

As the table above shows, nearly one-half (92 out of 203) of the project dug wells are poorly operated and/or maintained. As early as 1991, Mohammad reported, "We should seriously reconsider the future construction of the remaining 165 dug wells...I am afraid we may end up by just digging holes in the ground and leave these without operation or function. The project officer is requested to resolve this issue with the PCU."

Surveys conducted by consultants and project staff indicate that nearly half of the dug wells constructed through project funds have been temporarily or permanently abandoned. Mohammad (1991) reported that for 35 of the 61 dug wells for which the project had provided diesel motors and pumps, the owners had sold this project-provided equipment.

In cases where individual farmers are benefitting, the prognosis for sustainability seems good. The evidence, however, suggests a good deal of overbuilding.

Tube wells. Tube wells built by the project are in principle owned by a group of farmers, and maintenance is by no means guaranteed. The director of the Gadoon Amazai PCU informed the evaluators that problems have been resolved for the moment by having the NWFP Irrigation Department operate the tube wells, and by asking the farmers to pay users fees.

Irrigation Department management is not known for its efficiency, but for the moment this step is a solution. Nonetheless, long-term sustainability of these wells will depend on the farmers' ability to cooperate in the management of the water system. Again, the team found no anticipation of this problem among project staff or documentation, and no remedies proposed beyond vague references to "a water users association."

Huge costs due to the non-use of some tube wells for more than three years have occurred. In fact it was noticed that the command area for some tube wells are not fully prepared for cultivation once irrigation is provided. The reasons for this waste should be fully investigated so that similar problems can be avoided in future.

Summary of irrigation findings. Some channels—irrigation particularly the newly constructed ones—were found abandoned and/or lacking repair and maintenance. In some cases, users rights were under dispute.

In 1991, Mohammad (1991) reported, "The sustainability of [all three irrigation systems is questionable and doubtful...[they] will remain in operation as long as there is no need for maintenance. The moment they are broken, silted up, slide away or washed away by floods, the beneficiaries do not take interest...We have found 20 irrigation channels which developed problems due to the above reasons and no one...has...repaired these channels." He added that the farmers may revert to the "primitive" system of using unlined channels.

It is too early to tell whether tube wells have been a worthwhile investment. It took three years wells to complete them and the evaluation team we did not receive any satisfying explanation for these delays. Although the NWFP Irrigation Department and farmers have now agreed to operate these wells, the land in the command area is not prepared and the farmers themselves have not been able to work out problems of maintenance, operation, and users rights.

The quality of construction, particularly of irrigation channels, was often poor. Project staff reported, for example, an irrigation channel in Baitgali that was built without the appropriate gradient, so that water could not flow to the command area. Another irrigation channel visited by the team was a new one owned by a project committee leader and taken out of Uthla stream in Ganichatra. The diversion structure had been completely washed away and the channel was dry. The washout occurred a year ago and the owner had no plans to repair it. The team was told that there were many other irrigation channels, particularly newly constructed ones, that were in similar situations.

Test wells. Five successful test wells still await conversion into usable tube wells. Approximately \$22,000 has been expended on each of these wells for drilling, and an additional \$15,000 each for civil works would be required to make the tube wells operational. In addition, considerable amounts of money have been spent on land leveling—money that will go to waste if these wells do not become operational. Once this is accomplished, the land must be prepared and the villagers must develop a system of maintenance and sharing. However, the provision of these funds is not immediately forthcoming.

B2. Poppy Eradication and Agriculture

The Gadoon Amazai project strategy can only be understood in light of the poppy eradication objectives of those who designed the project, and also in light of the massive intervention of troops that occurred in 1986 and 1987 (see section A2, above). The project had been shut down by these events and interviewees explained to the team that USAID had to "buy its way back in."

In theory, poppy eradication projects are a combination of project interventions and law enforcement. The project areas of the Northwest Frontier Province are mountainous and

rugged; some have been administered as tribal areas and the people are used to relative autonomy. History and the system of exploitation have resulted in a settlement pattern of dispersed hamlets that are situated with defense as a primary consideration. Residents have traditionally been armed, and now they are equipped with automatic and even more sophisticated weaponry.

A small constabulary force cannot patrol these areas effectively, and a large constabulary force can be counterproductive, as shown in the Gadoon cases. Official policy now is to use enforcement judiciously, as in the Dir District project, and to concentrate on dealers rather than growers. Donor-financed development can cooperate with these efforts, but the advantages to the U.S. taxpayer of becoming closely identified with another country's law enforcement activities are not clear-cut, and this identification can compromise the development effort.

Land distribution statistics help explain the social structure of the project area. Slightly more than 10 percent of land owners in Gadoon own almost 45 percent of the land (GOP, p.8, 1988), and the concentration is even greater when only irrigated land is considered. The Northwest Frontier Province lead Pakistan in the percentage of owners (85.9) with less than 2 hectares. Estimates of landless families range up to 25 percent, and area ecology is characterized by substantial tenant farming (Naqvi and Rashid, 1992).

Given the objectives of the PCU after the enforcement measures of 1986-1987, logic dictated the funneling of project inputs to large landowners—the men with the most influence and in a position to request that their dependent families cease poppy cultivation. Project inputs were allocated according to land holdings, as reflected in official records, and powerful residents of the union councils defined projects that they presented to the PCU for funding. While the distribution of these construction agreements was based on objective criteria, the distribution was neutral. Thus the allocation of project inputs was skewed only insofar as land distribution was skewed.

After the 1986-1987 events, money began to move into the project in greater amounts. In 1987 the project spent \$3 million; in 1988, \$4.7 million; and in 1989, \$7.7 million. From 1988-1992, slightly more than 75 percent (\$35 million) of the project budgeted for 1984-1992 was spent.

The PCU was very busy during these years. Over the life of the project, 1,100 projects were initiated. On hundred of these were contracts made through line agencies, C&W, and WAPDA, who in turn found contractors to execute construction. The remaining 1,000 were executed through agreements with village project committees. These project committees were dominated by large, powerful landowners who were willing to persuade their dependents not to grow poppies as long as the flow of money continued.

The early timing of project-provided agricultural inputs—i.e., before any of the supporting infrastructure was in place to contribute to crop profitability—and the profligacy with which these inputs were distributed bear witness to the project strategy of buying in and gaining favor with these landowners. (Inputs were distributed based on the land owned by

each farmer, and thus the wealthier landowners received greater amounts.) One could argue, therefore, that it is not simply that increased productivity and popularization of inputs were not necessarily achieved, they were never really objectives.

Agricultural inputs and subsidies. A total of \$5.3 million (14.1 percent) of the project budget was spent on agricultural inputs. Most of these were in the form of direct subsidies for fertilizer, seed, and fruit trees. In the initial project stages, and particularly following the events of 1986-1987, agricultural subsidies were an important part of the Gadoon Amazai effort.

Application of fertilizer and use of improved seeds increase yields, and statistics show that this was the case in the Gadoon area. Normally, both fertilizer and seeds are introduced into a farming system with the objective of increasing long-term productivity under normal market conditions. The question of whether profits from a given crop justify the expense of these inputs must be resolved before massive expenditures are made. In Gadoon Amazai, however, no such demonstrations and experiments were established.

The team found that fertilizer and seeds were given to farmers, who used some on their fields and sold the rest. A total of 10,297 metric tons of fertilizer were given to Gadoon area farmers from 1987-1992, with the amount allotted based on the acreage of land owned. People interviewed explained to the team that it was normal to find fertilizer and seed provided by the project on the open market.

All subsidies for fertilizer and seeds were stopped during the last three years of the project. The data gathered by Haq et al. (1993) do show that some fertilizer is being bought and used by area farmers for wheat. While these amounts are modest (1,201 metric tons in 1993) the fact that purchases are occurring under normal market conditions is a positive sign, though fertilizer and improved seeds were used also to a small extent before the project.

Nevertheless, the yield gap between researcher managed trials of 42.48 maunds/acre and average yield of wheat on farmers' fields of 24-28 maunds/acre shows that there is still tremendous potential for improvement. At the same time, USAID notes that pre-project yields were only 8-10 maunds/acre, suggesting that remarkable progress has been made. These figures require additional comment. Without question, the Gadoon Amazai project (or any other intervention, for that matter) did not effect the trebling of wheat yields (from 8-10 to 24-28 maunds/acre) in the Northwest Frontier Province. USAID's own project managers dispute such an exceptional claim. At the same time, the statistics cited here, for all of their specific inaccuracy, point to significant gains made with the help of project inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, and ancillary infrastructure.

Conclusions. Acreage and yields of major crops like wheat and maize have increased, and newer cash crops like tobacco and rapeseed have been introduced. Increases in harvests of wheat and maize have also reduced the area's dependence on imported food. Although agricultural subsidies were halted, some fertilizer is purchased and used by area farmers.

These advances should be sustained with continued input of new technology (particularly high-yielding varieties), fertilizer, and know-how. An on-farm research unit should be established in the Gadoon project areas to regularly screen, demonstrate, and promote new technology.

Orchards. Although some fruit trees subsidized by the project have begun to yield and the potential income has been estimated at Rs 350/tree/year, some farmers planted fruit trees merely in order to obtain a monthly payment from the project of Rs 750, supposedly to pay a watchman to guard the trees. When this subsidy was withdrawn, interest in raising orchards decreased. Some farmers told the team that in the absence of the monthly payment, they would simply cut down the trees and plant other crops.

The use of agrochemicals on fruit trees and other management practices such as pruning and hoeing were not done systematically. Beneficiaries of fruit tree subprojects are those few owners who have enough land to spare. In fact, it was evident that these orchards have in some cases increased the workload on the landless classes and those who work on the farm as *bagaris*. It is they who will have to establish and maintain these orchards, and their free services will also be required for picking, transporting, and boxing the fruit.

Livestock. The PCU developed agreements for the construction of 20 veterinary dispensaries in the Gadoon Amazai area. According to a survey carried out by Jehanzeb et al. (1992), 11 of these have been completed, and of these 11, six have been handed over to the line agency. Construction costs totaled \$20,000.

Veterinary dispensaries provide routine stockman-level health care; however, a majority lack basic facilities, and staff absenteeism is a common problem. The evaluation team visited dispensaries in Nagrai and Ulla. The sustainability of all dispensaries depends very much on whether they can charge a normal market price, thus permitting recovery of overhead expenses and providing a living for service personnel. Privatization appears to be the only way these dispensaries can continue to operate, but the evaluation team found no discussion of sustainability in the project documentation.

The main beneficiaries of veterinary dispensaries are farmers who own large and small ruminants. Female stock assistants further spread the benefits by expanding coverage to houses where women manage animals in closed quarters. There may be advantage in teaching basic skills at the dispensaries and local schools, but because services are subsidized, supplies frequently run short.

B3. Training and Institutional Strengthening

No government institutions other than selective staff of the Special Development Unit were strengthened by the project. Failure to strengthen line agencies and encourage technology transfer was partly caused by the lack of accountability to AID's social soundness guidelines on the part of PCU staff. (See section B6. below for a fuller discussion of social soundness.) Ignoring the line agencies will result in the long-term loss of investments made and a poor prognosis for sustainability.

B4. Women in Development

The WID component of the Gadoon project included creation of 30 nonformal education (NFE) centers. One line of training concerned health and included the Expanded Program for Immunization (EPI), training of lady health visitors and traditional birth attendants, and improved nutrition through household kitchen gardens.

In addition to health, there were a number of courses offered at NFEs on religious education and vocational skills such as sewing, cutting, and embroidery. In 1991, there were 51 teachers in the 30 NFE centers and since 1986-1987, 2,000 women have participated to some degree in NFE programs. Approximately 25 percent of these participants attended adult education courses, while 368 attended health education courses and 478 participated in the kitchen gardening program. NFE centers have also contributed modestly towards income generation. Some women trained in sewing were able to earn money at home, and others sold vegetables grown in kitchen gardens to other village women.

At present, 11 NFEs are being managed by the Gadoon Amazai field management team and will in principle be taken over by the nongovernmental organization to be created during the project extension to September 1994.

In the health sector, project WID activity centered on training three women health visitors and 35 *dais*, or traditional birth attendants. The project also sponsored the Expanded Program for Immunization, which has provided protection against common childhood diseases to about 2,000 infants and children under five years of age, and to another 5,000 women and girls. NFE instructors were trained to assist EPI as motivators and recorders.

It is unfortunate that EPI was only implemented in three of the seven union councils, as the program was successful and useful. In addition, problems with refrigeration, transport, and thus preservation of vaccines and other perishable items have not been fully resolved.

The kitchen gardening program entailed provision of a kit of seeds, tools, fertilizers and pesticide sprays to local women. Okra, spinach, lemongrass, and tomato were introduced for home consumption. There was no follow-up to this program, and the majority of the gardens have fallen into disuse. Locals interviewed offered several hypotheses for this development. One was that the demands on women's time is such that they are simply unable to tend a garden. Some argue that the nutrients supplied by the gardens are already available in squashes, chilies, and cauliflower, which require less labor. Others blame the lack of follow-up by extension workers.

At the same time, little analysis of the WID activities has been conducted. Quantitative data have been recorded, but there are very few qualitative analyses. The reasons for successes and failures of kitchen gardens, for example, have not been determined. It is known that women went to adult literacy classes, but it is not known whether these women are literate or can use acquired skills in their everyday lives. The same is true for other NFE activities. In general, the team found that the benefits of the

WID program—as was the case with other interventions—tended to go to the well-to-do families.

Project-run girls schools. The project has also been running six girl's schools (three primary, one middle, and two high schools) and in 1992-1993, total enrollment was 349 girls. The project hired teachers from outside the project area and initiated the in-service training of local primary school teachers. The project also paid for uniforms, textbooks, and copybooks to encourage participation; and rented the school buildings. These schools have been taken over by the Education Department, as described earlier in this report, and they represent one of the significant achievements of the project. The program seems to have caught on and there is a good likelihood of sustainability due to high local demand. Over the course of the project, the middle schools in Utlā and Gundaf and the primary school in Sethana were provided with buildings.

From 1989-1992, all of the 50 girls enrolled in the eighth grade took the middle school exams, and all passed. Seventeen of these girls went on to take the high school exams, and all of these passed and completed high school. They were the first women to take this exam in the Gadoon area.

B5. Voluntary Organizations and NGOs

B5a. Strategy

In spite of the concerns expressed in the 1990 evaluation of the project and the strong recommendation to move to a community-based approach, very little action was taken in this regard. The notion of village organizations (VOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) began to be discussed seriously in the project documentation after it was certain that the Pressler Amendment would terminate project spending.

The explicit justification for creating NGOs and Vos was as a means of salvaging the investments that had been made by USAID, but precisely what investments remained to salvage was never specified. The lack a firm definition of the tasks to be performed inhibits the identification of the kinds of voluntary and nongovernmental organizations required.

As a result of this departure from normal procedure, the project record shows a lack of clear objectives, a number of ad hoc decisions, and steps taken and later retracted. For example:

- The implementation of the Hunzai (1992) report based on the Agha Khan Rural Support Program model was withdrawn after being initiated, due to funding constraints and USAID policy changes.
- The project made a commitment of \$10,000 to each VO as an endowment that was later withdrawn.

- The project financed the training at Coverdale of 12 social organizers who were to help form VOs. After three months of training, the 12 were kept on for a further three months as trainees and were provided training allowances. Then they were let go.
- The equality afforded to VOs was abandoned with the switch to a top-down approach and the establishment of the nominated NGO board of directors.

Without identified tasks to be performed, neither the VOs nor the NGOs in question have any direction or purpose at this time.

Villagers have genuine organizations (e.g., *jirgas*) that are integral and indispensable part of productive systems. The NGOs and VOs that were observed lack any productive function, and therefore they cannot be considered genuine organizations. This lack of strategy is nowhere more apparent than in the absence of any bridging structure between the NGO and village VOs. It has not been made clear how the village organizations will be able to coordinate with the umbrella NGO, though mission personnel state that these linkages will be formalized when program money exists.

At the moment, however, the strategy behind formation of VOs and the NGO remains undefined, beyond the vague statement that it seeks to organize groups of concerned individuals with professional experience and/or political influence to undertake development works on behalf of locally expressed priorities. More important, there has never been a coherent, focused, or consistent approach toward meeting the aspirations of the Gadoon Amazai people in this effort. The team found no evidence of basic premises or hypotheses having been questioned or critiqued. Moreover, discussions with the board of directors have failed to convince the team that any clear mission has been established for the NGO.

B5b. Funding

The absence of strategy is further reflected in the vague way in which future financing has been discussed. USAID will not be able to finance operations as long as the Pressler Amendment is in effect, and other sources of money will have to be found. Fundraising and development is an enormous and thoroughly professionalized job for an NGO, and the evaluation team saw no recognition of this in the selection of board members or the content of the training. For example, fundraising was not a major agenda item at the recent three-day meeting in Murree. Uncertain funding will affect recruits to the NGO and certainly the personnel of VOs.

B5c. Voluntary Organization Formation

The team found a number of newly formed VOs in the project areas. Again, as with the NGO, it could only be concluded that these VOs lacked clear missions. In many cases, VOs examined by the team had come into existence in the hope of receiving funding for some activity.

Some VOs have lists of projects for which they would like funding, and some have established savings accounts, though the amounts are insufficient to take on even very modest projects (Rs 500 or 5,000). The idea of creating saving accounts was imposed from the outside, and it is a case of the villagers trying to do what they think will please.

The present NGO is dependent on a single donor, and once current funding is exhausted, the probability of sustainability will be low unless other sources of financing are found quickly. Villagers have other ways of making investments, and it will be up to an NGO to mobilize these resources.

The lack of plans to integrate and develop linkages with local councils, local government, and district councils does not bode well. Team members also commented on lack of recognition of the elaborate and productive pre-existing social organization within the area, of which the *jirga* is the most visible sign. Having developed and maintained elaborate irrigated terraces in such an environment is testimony to the organizational skills of the local people. Project planning seems bent on creating new organizations rather than discovering ways to use the power of the existing system.

Finally, the targeted beneficiaries do not have confidence that the NGO will help them. Villagers suspect the NGO is a continuation of the Gadoon Amazai and Kala Dhaka projects, neither of which respected the needs and the priorities of the people as well as they might have. Serious doubts exist in the minds of villagers regarding the capability and capacity of the board of directors to improve local well being.

Under a separate project, USAID has already spent about \$2 million to establish an NGO called the Sarhad Rural Support Corporation (SRSC). During the deliberations directed at finding a means to continue some of the work begun by the Gadoon project, there were arguments put forth for using this established NGO. Proponents argued that if the SRSC were a failure, there would be no point putting in good money after bad. If, on the other hand, the SRSC were a success, it should be the institutional starting point for continuing work in Gadoon Amazai.

The evaluation team weighed the pros and cons of whether to use the SRSC, and found that there were good and bad points on both sides. We therefore suggest that the expertise of SRSC personnel who have been trained by the USAID be made available to both the SRSC and the as yet formed Gadoon Amazai NGO. In any case, given the tentative nature of the NGO, we recommend that options concerning the use of SRSC be left open.

B6. Project Design and Management

B6a. General Project Management

Along with being the first AID-financed poppy eradication project in Pakistan and basing its strategy on the construction of infrastructure, the third distinction of the Gadoon Amazai project was that it was to be locally executed.

The term "local execution" means that USAID provided financing for the project and turned over its execution and management to a coordinating group selected by the Government of Pakistan called the Project Coordination Unit (PCU). The PCU was responsible for implementing the construction projects agreed on in the project paper and for contracting work to the line agencies and private contractors. The PCU also negotiated private agreements with village-based project committees for construction projects. Of the 1,100 projects executed through the PCU, 100 were done through the line agencies, Communications and Works Department (C&W), or WAPDA. The remaining 1,000 projects were executed by local village committees. In terms of expenditures, however, USAID personnel stated that more than 50 percent of the budget went to the few large projects implemented with the line agencies.

As the project was originally designed, there was to be a technical assistance team (TAT) of six experts: three expatriates and three host country nationals. The expatriate team, comprising an anthropologist, agriculturalist, and forester, was provided through a contract with Development Alternatives International, Inc. (DAI). The Pakistani contingent consisted of an agricultural economist, engineer, and veterinarian. This bilateral team was supposed to advise the PCU, and the TAT had no veto power; whatever influence it had was to be negotiated.

In 1985, USAID hired an additional expatriate engineer through a personal services contract. This engineer worked with a Pakistani team of 14 professionals on engineering, surveying, and monitoring. The DAI team left the project in 1986-1987, following the military intervention into Gadoon Amazai.

The evaluation team feels that the project cost of personnel, overhead, maintenance, and commodities took a disproportionate share of the total budget and was often not translated into achievements that could be appreciated by beneficiaries. For example, the PCU enjoyed several guest and rest houses, numerous vehicles, communications equipment, and a large managerial budget. Because of this high degree of project-based support, sustainability beyond the PACD is very unlikely.

The level of backstopping by USAID also seems to have been inadequate given the size of the project. Whereas considerable travel by Peshawar mission officials was logged on the project, it does not seem to have influenced decisions on resources expenditures that could have been made more efficiently.

The 1990 midterm evaluation pointed out some major deficiencies in project management, particularly high overheads and redundant hiring. The report also noted that supervision of work was insufficient in some of the line agencies, and that C&W had not provided adequate road plans and estimates. The evaluation also cited weak links with line agencies. We concur with these findings, and some of the consequences have been noted above, including the low probability of sustainability. The PCU failed to engage the line agencies sufficiently in their work and did not build on existing structures to work with them. This is particularly true for the Public Health and Engineering Department and the

Department of Education. As a result, there are redundant schools and health units in the project area—schools and health units that will be difficult to staff.

B6b. Beneficiary and Equity Issues

As noted earlier, most project development activities in Gadoon Amazai started after the actions by law enforcement agencies in 1986-1987, as a result of which poppy production came to a virtual stop. There were no clear policy guidelines on which groups would receive project assistance, but it was assumed that the majority of benefits would go to the people who had to forego income from poppy growing. In pre-project days, each village had a few relatively large poppy growers who would advance loans to and buy from small poppy producers and sell their own produce along with purchased quantities to bigger dealers in the Gandaf market.

The profits from poppy are such that farmers are reluctant to give up cultivation. After the entry of constabulary forces and the cutting and aerial spraying of poppy fields, project personnel had to spend much time and effort convincing area residents to accept project interventions. Annex B of this evaluation presents a more detailed analysis of poppy production in NWFP.

It was reasoned by project staff that the larger landowners, because they had dependent and tenant families, were in the best position to convince smallholders not to grow poppy. Thus, dug wells and improved irrigation channels were given more to these landowners; the more land an individual owned, the more project inputs he received.

Large landowners make their lands available through annual or long-term leases, normally to landless tenants or smallholders. New irrigation facilities have increased the value of much of this land, and the lease rates charged to tenants have been raised. Under traditional arrangements of sharecropping, land and water costs are borne by the owner, while all labor and bullocks are contributed by the sharecropper. Provision of free irrigation water has reduced owners' shares of the costs, while those of sharecroppers and tenants remained the same.

An exception to the trend is the project's work on tube wells. Three tube wells are ready to go into operation immediately, while another five will be operational after civil works are completed. All of these wells are reported to be located in areas where average holding size varies from 0.25-1.5 acres. Thus the benefits of tube wells will in theory be equitably distributed among the 800-1,000 smallholders in the area. This placement and accomplishment should be used as an action-beneficiary model for other project-related activities.

In addition, the construction water supply systems benefitted a wide range of people by helping keep water uncontaminated and in some cases reducing the time spent hauling water. Overall, a small but important segment of local farmers have profited from USAID-provided irrigation facilities and other subsidies to the fullest extent possible. New crop varieties, orchards, and higher incomes are incentives for farmers to sustain these

improvements. In addition, landowning families—particularly those with members in Karachi and the Gulf States who were not undertaking any investment in land—are now inclined to invest in land. It is expected that during the coming years more investment in land and more intensive cultivation will take place, leading to higher area incomes.

B6c. Financial Management and Project Accountability

To evaluate financial management and accountability for the project—especially the massive infrastructure interventions—the team examined engineering records and interviewed engineers who worked with the project. We also examined financial records and talked with members of the financial management staff at USAID. Save for some problems with execution and unfinished projects—most of which have been mentioned above—the engineering work of the project was competent and conscientious. In addition, USAID's financial management of the project was sound. Those faults that existed were identified by audits and corrected soon thereafter.

However, while there was project accountability in engineering and finance, there was not accountability in social soundness. With only one or two exceptions, every person connected with the project spoke of the excesses and the socially unsound way with which money was spent. The 1990 evaluation signaled this problem and offered recommendations that were not heeded.

Interviewees who discussed the lack of social soundness fell roughly into two camps. One group argued that the excessive spending and disregard for social soundness were justified by the events of 1986-1987 and the mandate to rid the Gadoon Amazai area of poppy cultivation. The team responds that the project has been implemented at a cost of \$37.74 million. Before the project, it was estimated that 8,824 acres were devoted to poppy and that the benefits were being distributed among 15,500 families. This makes the expenditure per acre of poppy elimination \$4,718, and the average expenditure per family \$2,435. These are not the full costs, however, since poppy production was ultimately stopped by massive armed enforcements, not project interventions. Furthermore, there is a likelihood that farmers in the area will revert to poppy cultivation once project funds dry up.

Members of the other group are aware of the compromises dictated by the unusual situation in Gadoon Amazai, but they hesitate to rationalize the activities of the PCU by invoking the events of 1986-1987.

In either case, the bottom line is that the Gadoon project represents an effort in which the PCU had no injunction to follow USAID guidelines on social soundness, giving the unit an unusual level of autonomy from the donor's standard guidelines, and consequently USAID supervision. The resulting lack of accountability for social soundness requirements permitted the excesses that we have noted in the report.

It has been noted above that when the project began in 1983, a technical assistance team advising on social soundness was established. This team was not given any veto power in the formal structure of the PCU and the chief of party had to negotiate a role for the

TAT. Allowing the effectiveness of such an expensive instrument as the TAT to be determined by personal idiosyncracies and ad hoc negotiation is an unjustifiable risk of donor funds. In this sense, the design of the Gadoon Amazai project was flawed.

USAID and GOP oversight. Overall, the USAID mission seems to have played a passive supervisory role. Even four or five years after the military incursion, after the excesses of the project and the consequences of the failure to follow social soundness requirements were known, and after the warnings and recommendations of the 1990 evaluation, business continued as usual.

Concerning the role of the counterpart, the Government of Pakistan did not take steps to protect the interests of the donor and did not protect beneficiaries. While the PCU staff were vetted and appointed by the government, there was no intervention from the SDU and no active involvement from the Departments of Health or Education.

USAID contributed more than \$2 million to the Special Development Unit within the Planning Department. The SDU was to help donors coordinate their activities with line agencies and to oversee donor-funded projects. The evaluation team found very little trace of SDU activity in oversight or coordination in the project, reinforcing our recommendation that USAID take a custodial role in locally executed projects.

C. Sustainability of the Gadoon Amazai Project

Roads and electrification. Roads and electrification interventions have the greatest probability of sustainability after the PACD. Both inputs are functional to the local production system, and roads have already contributed to the economy of the Gadoon Amazai area by increasing the ease and speed of travel.

Although Gadoon Amazai is rugged mountain terrain and is known as a refugee area, this image is contradicted by the longstanding urban migration of men that touches every family. The stability of family life in Gadoon makes possible the prolonged periods of absence of male members, and male migrants in turn join stable colonies of co-villagers in cities to which they are able to bring other members for apprenticeships and education.

Thus, the society of Gadoon Amazai has been qualitatively and quantitatively much more integrated into the national economy and modern economic life than appearances suggest. Well before the road building under the project, there was considerable travel to, from, and within the region. Indeed, it was the already established demand made that road building a logical project intervention, and one whose probability for sustainability was high. Use of project-constructed roads has increased, as has the number of vehicles in the area. Roads also have the advantage of being relatively class neutral; they can be used by all forms of conveyances: public and private, and motorized and non-motorized.

Finally, because roads were constructed through the C&W Department and are under the care of C&W, there is no ambiguity about who is responsible for their maintenance.

In contrast to road construction, electrification received a low priority and a relatively small investment from the PCU. In addition, because of the prohibitive price of hookups, it has not touched many families in the area. Nonetheless the probability of project intervention sustainability is high—a prediction is based again on the high level of integration with the national economy of Gadoon society, and the demand for electricity throughout the area. Beyond the obvious advantages of television and lighting, there is a wide range of uses that are coming into play, including using electrical power to drive pumps for irrigation.

However, probably the most obvious and compelling need for electrical power is for health care. Electrical power will make refrigerated transport and storage—and thus expanded immunization—possible. It will also make diagnoses and laboratories available locally. Finally, increased vehicular traffic will bring demand for servicing and repair, and electrical power will make this possible with returning urban migrants providing the skills.

Education. Again, belying the seemingly isolated appearance of the area, there is a significant demand for education in Gadoon Amazai. The fulfillment of this demand must be weighed against the poverty and the lack of means of the Department of Education, however. How these conflicting forces work themselves out will determine sustainability.

One constraint is the fact that the PCU did not enlist the line agency (Department of Education) in a long-term collaboration. Only one-third of the 157 school construction projects started resulted in functioning schools. Moreover, USAID's social soundness guidelines were ignored, as were elementary school mapping techniques and human resources requirements necessitated by project overbuilding.

Health. The minimal impact of the investments to build health units and dispensaries is a consequence of the disregard for social soundness. No assessment of the existing system was made to determine needs and how the project could have best aided health workers in the Gadoon Amazai area. The PCU did not enlist the Department of Public Health and Engineering in a long-term collaboration.

Irrigation and water systems. Irrigation systems financed by the donor were contracted to village committees without sufficient understanding of end use and maintenance. Obviously the building was profitable, but as an investment it was a loss. Evidence from the field shows that many irrigation canals are not being maintained.

Dug wells have provided water for a relatively small area at an unacceptably high unit price. Farmers sold off some of the pumps and motors given to them, and many dug wells have been abandoned. Tube wells have great potential for irrigating large areas, but no consideration was made of the local systems of exploitation, land tenure, and cropping patterns. The result is that all end use, distribution, and maintenance problems have not been resolved. The test wells that were financed by the project may never be converted to tube wells.

Poppy eradication. Gadoon Amazai farmers stopped growing poppies as a result of a massive constabulary action and a generous infusion of donor money. In the absence of

substantial enforcement and continued cash flow, the continued likelihood of poppy elimination is low.

Agriculture. Fertilizers and seeds were distributed in an unconventional manner with the result that free market forces will not encourage sustained use of the amounts deemed appropriate by the PCU. Fruit trees were given away and subsidies were provided for watchmen to guard the trees. Some farmers will tear trees out once the subsidies are stopped, though others will keep them, leading to some sustainability.

NGOs and VOs. VOs will exist if they have a reason for being, i.e., if they have a project and financing. Because of the current halt in funds, VOs in the area are organizations in name only.

The nascent NGO is currently being provided training funds by USAID. Under the conditions of the Pressler Amendment, these funds cannot be used for operations, yet the NGO will develop and become sustainable only if it receives operational funding and can perform effectively. The requisite shift to the private sector will be difficult.

Role of PCUs. There is no role that a PCU can profitably play in the operations of NGOs or VOs. The SDU, in theory, should be able to advise and help NGOs and VOs, but in terms of institutional competence and objectives, it is unable to contribute to meeting the social soundness objectives that are called for in this area.

SECTION II

KALA DHAKA PROJECT

SECTION II
KALA DHAKA PROJECT

A. Introduction

A1. Project Purpose, Strategy, and Funding

In September 1988, a second amendment of \$32 million extended the Gadoon Amazai project for five years (through August 1993) and created a new project with similar purpose (and the same length) in the Kala Dhaka area, adjacent to Gadoon Amazai. Recently, the project assistance completion date (PACD) has been extended another 13 months, to September 1994, with the hope of strengthening and/or creating community-based village organizations and NGOs that can sustain project activities beyond project closeout.

The purpose of the Kala Dhaka project was to halt existing poppy production and prevent future increases through a development effort that combines project funding and community participation. This effort was aimed at drawing the Kala Dhaka region and its people into the national economy and recent development trends.

Project strategy was based largely on the location of the Kala Dhaka region. Since Kala Dhaka is contiguous to Gadoon Amazai, it was reasoned that poppy cultivation would move to Kala Dhaka following eradication and enforcement measures in Gadoon. At the time of the project extension, only a small part of the total land area of the Kala Dhaka region was given to poppy cultivation, and thus the project was designed mostly as a preemptive effort.

The project was designed to take place in two phases: a design phase lasting two years, followed by field implementation. This design was perhaps a reflection of the excesses of the Gadoon Amazai project, the failure of the Gadoon project to involve villagers, and the low prognosis for sustainability of many of the inputs. The primary theme of the Kala Dhaka project was community participation.

In contrast to the Gadoon project, which eliminated its social scientist and social soundness requirements, the Kala Dhaka project was to have a separate and fully functioning Technical Assistance Team headed by an anthropologist who was a specialist in community organization. The new USAID strategy for the NWFP, i.e., to shift focus from infrastructure to a greater emphasis on community participation, was to have been put to the test in the Kala Dhaka project.

Following the enactment of the Pressler Amendment, funding was halved from \$8 million to \$4 million, and the PACD was moved to August 8, 1993. In addition, the design and implementation phases were combined.

A2. Project Evolution

Development Alternatives, Inc., (DAI), a Washington contractor, sent a chief of party in the spring of 1990 to head the TAT and to establish an office and base of operations in Manshra, in cooperation with the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) selected by the Pakistani government. The project manager of the PCU had been seconded from the Pakistani civil service. During the first quarter of 1991, the first project director was replaced.

Although the project did not provide the generous funding enjoyed by the neighboring Gadoon Amazai project, it was nevertheless expected that the Kala Dhaka project would focus on infrastructural development with the construction of roads, small irrigation works, water supply systems, and electric power lines—albeit with a more solid social and developmental grounding. Like the Gadoon Amazai project, the PCU was to preside over this construction by coordinating the activities of the line agencies. However, project personnel quickly learned they could not expect support from the Pakistani agencies without financing agency operations in this area. This was because in the poor and remote region of Kala Dhaka, funds for contracting with the line agencies did not exist.

Project expenditures. The modest budget and concerns about sustainability led USAID to change the emphasis of the project from infrastructural development financed by the mission and carried out through outside line agencies, to a ~~multisectoral~~ development effort that would not exclude infrastructure, but would be based on community participation.

Both the PCU and the technical assistance team operated for the length of project on budgets of around \$1.5-2.0 million. Most of the TAT budget was accounted by salaries and expatriate travel. The PCU was given the operating capital. Nearly 19 percent of the unit's budget was devoted to salaries, allowances, travel, and honoraria. Another 15.5 percent was spent for project personnel, and 24 percent was spent on commodities, office equipment, and vehicles. Over the course of the project, the PCU disposed of nine vehicles.

Slightly more than 40 percent of the budget was allocated to field operations, the largest portion of which was devoted to track building (20 percent) and water supply system and school repairs (16.8 percent). Health was allotted less than 1 percent, livestock 1.1 percent, and WID 0.1 percent. Within health, 27 percent of allocated funds were spent, while the WID program spent only 2.7 percent of its allocated funds.

B. Findings and Conclusions

B1. Infrastructure

B1a. Roads

In the early stages of the project, the notion of building surfaced roads in the Kala Dhaka area—and particularly a surfaced road into the Mada Khel area—was abandoned. With the modification of the project strategy and the reduction of financing, it was decided to build and recondition tracks so they could be travelled by four-wheel drive vehicles. These

tracks were called "jeepable tracks." Nearly \$1.9 million was budgeted for the construction of tracks, and about \$300,000 was actually disbursed.

At the close of the project, documentation available to the team evaluation stated that only 3 km of track had been completed. Subsequently, the project engineer informed us that he had inspected and signed off on an additional 7 km, bringing the total of completed track to 10 km. The amount spent directly on the completed track was around \$100,000, or \$10,000/km, a normal cost of building jeepable track in mountainous terrains. However, if the total amount spent is calculated against completed track, the per kilometer figure rises to nearly \$30,000—well above the normal range.

During the last week of the evaluation mission, USAID's local project manager claimed that all tracks initiated had been completed. The project engineer disputed this statement.

The team traveled on some of the tracks financed by the project and found sections uncompleted. Team members were stopped twice by local contractors who demanded payment for sections of road they had finished; however, it was unclear whether this was to be payment for construction services or a user fee of some sort.

B1b. Education and Schools

The project financed repairs for schools in Kotkai, Tuwara, and Nadrai. In addition, a number of teachers were provided with training in pedagogy. In the first phase of the training, 10 matriculates were sent to Haripur. By 1991, 9 of the 10 completed the training and 12 more candidates were sent. Nine of these completed training and 12 more were sent to Thana in Malakand in 1992. During this time, 7 of the candidates who had previously completed the training were absorbed in the Kala Dhaka schools.

As in Gadoon Amazai, the technical assistance team found in Kala Dhaka a strong demand for education. It is, however, very difficult to recruit teachers who will live in the Kala Dhaka area. Some of those who have been hired stay in the towns of Oghi or Mansehra, and do not work in the schools to which they have been assigned.

B1c. Health

The project financed the refinishing of several dispensaries, and the project team initiated an Expanded Program for Immunization. This program did not succeed because the team provided by the Department of Health was not trained. Needles were not properly sterilized and dirty needles were being reused, as were expired vaccines. No attempts to assure the integrity of refrigerated cold chain had been taken.

B1d. Irrigation and Water Supply

The project paper envisaged the design and construction of 40 km of irrigation channels in the first and second phases of the Kala Dhaka project. Because of cuts and changes in funding—as well as other factors—this target could not be reached.

In the end, 10 irrigation channels at an average cost of \$8,500 each were constructed in locations throughout Kala Dhaka. Twenty-two water supply schemes were also completed (average cost: \$7,000). Because of the delay in disbursement of funds and problems of staffing the PCU, many of the irrigation channels could not be started on time and were not satisfactorily completed at the time of the evaluation.

The drinking water supply systems installed by the project have been useful and have benefited a large number of villages, even though villagers do not use the water for drinking since it is too hot or cold depending on the season. Because most villages are close to the river, streams, and springs, the full use and benefits of project interventions have not yet been fully realized. The hazards of drinking the Indus river water, which passes through at least three large towns before reaching this area, have been explained to Kala Dhaka villagers.

B2. Agriculture and Poppy Prevention

Agriculture was considered one of the most important components of the Kala Dhaka project, because it was felt that technical assistance in agriculture could provide preemptive incentives not to grow poppy. The design of the project gave due importance to agriculture, and a full-time position was budgeted as part of the contract. A longer project life would have helped focus even more on those agroforestry practices that had a lasting impact.

Project funding and procurement problems affected the start-up of field trials, and thus the agricultural component lagged behind in the initial stages of the project. New varieties of wheat, maize, and potato were introduced, and even though wheat and maize varieties were already well known to Kala Dhaka farmers, the high price of seed and fertilizer limited widespread adoption. On top of these expenses were prohibitive transportation costs that added as much as Rs 200 per bag. By 1993, project-provided seed had been multiplied on 250 acres. Similarly, three crop seasons were taken to establish trials on 35-250 acres. These trials have helped produce seed that was distributed to farmers. Farmers have also been growing potatoes for some time in these areas, and the project's introduction of improved varieties has increased yields.

During field interviews it became clear that the Kala Dhaka area is still deficient in wheat and vegetables. Some villages, however, reported a surplus production of maize that they were able to sell outside the area. The TAT was successful in getting the National Agricultural Research Center to conduct wheat trials in the region, and it is hoped that with continuation of these trials, the Kala Dhaka community will have long-term access to new high-yielding variety technology. Despite these successes, however, the evaluation team has

failed to see any economic analysis conducted to determine the gross margins of each input's use.

Farm income and nutrition. In the absence of any economic analysis of area yields and acreage, it is impossible to give details on exact change in income due to project intervention. One potential indication of increasing incomes is the fact that potential wheat yields have increased from an average of 370 to 800 kg in 1992 on demonstration plots and farms using improved seeds.

Beneficiaries. The primary beneficiaries of agriculture and social forestry components are those groups that own or till land. The landless classes do not directly benefit.

Sustainability. The agriculture and forestry (see below) activities undertaken by the project are sustainable provided close follow-up is carried out. By involving the National Agriculture Research Center, the project has a good chance of receiving new genetic material and possible infusion of better suited varieties. As surfaced roads still have not been developed, however, it is doubtful that fertilizer use will be practiced on a wide scale.

B3. Forestry and Social Forestry

All activities conducted under the forestry subcomponent of the project have been in collaboration with the Department of Forestry. Between 1990-1992, the department planted almost 659,000 plants. The evaluation team finds this a healthy sign of integration and possible long-term sustainability. Roughly 60,000 saplings were introduced during the 1991 and 1992 seasons under the social forestry program, and the project introduced fast-growing species to generate income and meet fuel and fodder needs. This is a positive shift in upland social forestry that traditionally has been based on long duration chirpines with a growth of 12-20 years. Farmers seldom took interest in these plantations, but the incentive of Rs 0.50 per tree provided to farmers has triggered interest in the component. It is too early to say anything about the magnitude of the benefits, however, as plants have not been harvested. During field visits to the project area, though, the team saw a large number of planted tree saplings, especially around the bunds. However, we had no means to verify mortality and upkeep of the plants, especially as support for the project dwindles.

Horticulture interventions have focused on providing young fruit plants like citrus, mango, dwarf apple, apricot and litchi. The climate near the Indus river closely simulates conditions in Sindh and the lower Punjab, providing excellent potential for mango and litchi, and the team observed several plantations in early stages of development. The main constraint to expanding this program is the lack of parent genetic material, leading to a lower possibility of propagation through grafting, and increasing costs of planting and time required for plant maturity.

Sustainability. As noted above, the agriculture and forestry activities undertaken by the project are sustainable provided close follow-up is carried out. By involving the National

Agriculture Research Center the project has a good chance of receiving new genetic material and possible infusion of better suited varieties.

B4. Women in Development

The WID component of the Kala Dhaka project consisted of interventions in health, education, and income generation, including kitchen gardening, soap making, and a chicken raising program.

Health interventions comprised training of 60 traditional birth attendants *dais* who were provided with a Save the Children midwifery kit. Training also covered personal hygiene, breast feeding and nutrition for mothers, weaning foods for babies, and preparation of oral rehydration solution. In addition, female mobile clinics were held in villages, during which a woman doctor examined 570 women and children. The woman social organizers played a major role in implementing this program.

Kitchen gardening training was initiated in 98 villages, and about 727 women participated. Vegetables such as tomatoes, onions, eggplant, and chilies have introduced, and are used for home consumption.

Soap making was introduced as an income generation activity, and 38 women were trained and soap making equipment and supplies were provided. This program failed, however, because some of the essential ingredients such as caustic soda and sodium silicate were not locally available.

The TAT also initiated a poultry program with the Fayoumi breed of chicken. About 2,101 units of six each were sold to 1,895 households. This program also failed primarily due to an outbreak of Newcastle disease that wiped out the entire flock.

Because of the short duration of the project and the lack of operational funds available to the TAT, none of the WID interventions is expected to last beyond the PACD.

B5. Voluntary Organizations and NGOs

The work of the TAT and the PCU in Kala Dhaka shows that VOs can be formed when there is work and money. If there is no project, then the VO will not exist. For example, field management teams formed in Niazi in 1993 were created to respond to a specific problem through detailed tasks. As a result, they are real and sustainable.

For their own part, NGOs have much work to do in the Kala Dhaka area, but they also must have objectives, competence, and financing.

Role of the PCU. There is nothing the PCU can do to help the desired nongovernmental organization. As stated above, the SDU should be in a position to advise and help the project NGO, but the unit does not have the required competencies or institutional objectives.

In general, the formation of voluntary organizations and an NGO to focus and carry out the broad community-based activities of the Kala Dhaka project has not proceeded as envisioned in the project design. Reasons for the lack of progress in this area are essentially the same as those discussed for the Gadoon Amazai project, in Section I of this evaluation. In brief, there is insufficient coordination and definition among line agencies, the PCU, and the project personnel concerning the purpose of the to-be-created NGO. A lack of funding has further hindered needed developmental activities. Section V of this evaluation contains recommendations and lessons learned concerning the creation and missions of Gadoon Amazai and Kala Dhaka VOs and NGOs.

B6. Project Management and Design

The Kala Dhaka project was designed to combine infrastructural projects with community participation. From start-up, the project was endowed with a technical assistance team headed by an expert in community organization. The Project Coordination Unit was staffed by a civil servant appointed by the government.

The Kala Dhaka project did have a TAT team with the appropriate skills in community development, but the failure to integrate the TAT structurally with the PCU and USAID's choice to ignore the TAT condemned the TAT to irrelevancy. The local consultant, Enterprise Development Corporation (EDC), selected to follow the team from DAI, has not provided any intellectual inputs or programmatic innovations. The EDC TAT team is generally comprised of young and inexperienced staff who have not been able to impose any leadership or momentum.

From the very beginning it became apparent that the TAT and PCU were operating according to two different agendas. Phase I of the project had been set as an exploratory period during which surveys would be conducted, initiatives would be tried, and an operational team would be put into the field, all in preparation for an expanded Phase II. In the event, funding for Phase I one was reduced by half, leaving the TAT with a modest budget for surveys and studies, hiring personnel, and some initiatives. The PCU, which was to have responsibility for contracting out all infrastructure projects, found its potential activities significantly curtailed.

The evaluation team went over project records and memoranda and interviewed a number of project personnel in an effort to unravel the resulting two years of project paralysis. Perhaps the most serious problem lay in the design under which the PCU and the TAT did not have any structural relation. They were enjoined to work together, but there were no structural means for guaranteeing that they would work together.

The TAT was supposed to define projects and give guidance and advice. The PCU had its own operating funds from USAID, and the expenditure of these funds was in no way contingent on the approval of the TAT. Thus the TAT was for the PCU not simply irrelevant, but encumbering. The TAT, for its part, did not have operating funds and was forced to seek those through the PCU. PCU management had been prepared to finance infrastructural projects, but found some of the projects proposed by the TAT desultory.

Saddled with difficulties in getting operating funds, getting the PCU to disburse funds that had been obligated, and generally putting the project in motion, the TAT found itself in confrontation with the PCU. The result was a great waste of talented professional time and labor.

The evaluation team listened to various reconstructions of the problems, and we are convinced the major problem was structural. The project design essentially threw the actors into the field with vague admonitions to get along. The structure of the project, however, was such that the TAT and the PCU could operate independently.

The record is clear and the problems were signaled from the very beginning. Indeed, the Kala Dhaka project is unusually rich in documentation. The chief of the TAT sent memoranda and quarterly reports to USAID that consistently mentioned the problems of cash flow, but the PCU experienced almost constant financial problems. Some local contractors were not paid and to this day have not been paid. DAI arranged to advance money to the PCU a number of times, but these respites were not used to solve the problem. Over the course of the project, the PCU managed to spend only 30 percent of the money allocated to it.

There were other problems on both sides. PCU staff had nine vehicles and were rarely able to put three in the field at any given time. The TAT came under criticism for commencing a number of desultory and abortive projects that had been initiated for the purposes of gaining access to the Kala Dhaka area.

Overall, the evaluation team discovered trouble and conflict in the execution of the project, but we also found that these troubles were reported conscientiously and punctually to the USAID project manager in Peshawar. What happened then is murky, but it is clear that the appropriate and needed step of recognizing a serious design flaw and moving to institute remedies was not taken.

The lessons learned from this case have led the evaluation team to stress in our recommendations a strong custodial role from the donor—USAID in this case. Listening to accusation and counter-accusation does not substitute for competent and professional analysis of the design and structure of a project.

Financial accountability. The team examined the financial history of the Kala Dhaka project and found that an audit had revealed certain irregularities in PCU accounting that were corrected. Nonetheless, the PCU never succeeded in hiring an accountant during its two years of operation and had chronic cash flow problems that were never solved. Ordinarily, since the PCU belonged to the GOP, the government might have been expected to give technical assistance; however, the attentions of the Special Development Unit were similarly elsewhere.

The PCU had nine vehicles, but only three were available for project work. A number of vehicles were parked on the private property of the project manager, and

interviewees at USAID told us that it is the responsibility of USAID project staff to monitor the use of equipment and to repossess it if it is misused or not needed.

The symptoms of USAID's lack of interest in this project remain evident in the project site, the appointments and offices, the abortive attempts to establish activities in the project area, and the disappointment of participants.

C. Sustainability of the Kala Dhaka Project

Both the funding and the time frame for the Kala Dhaka project were cut so severely that many of the inputs will not be sustainable. Project interventions such as the poultry, Expanded Program for Immunization, and other WID projects will likely cease following the cessation of USAID funding. Many of these efforts were mounted by the TAT to gain access to the area under the overall mandate of community development, but the TAT did not have operational funds and was not able to enlist the collaboration of the PCU, which did have the funds but did not spend them.

The project was able to interest the Agricultural Research and Forestry Departments—as well as the National Agricultural Research Center—in working in the region and it is hoped that this will be continued.

Kala Dhaka is similar to Gadoon Amazai in that nearly every family sends men to work in the cities. The roads, despite their condition and difficulty, are used for travel in and out of the region. There is a demand for better roads and every indication that this demand will continue, and thus there will be pressure on the government to maintain this type of infrastructure intervention.

The PCU and TAT did cooperate on building water supply systems, and village committees accepted these because the construction was profitable. Since there exist adequate supplies of water in the area, however, villagers were not convinced of the need for new channels and potable water supplies. Outsiders cite the health advantages of protecting water and the lessening of the time and effort women expend at carrying water. Whether villagers will calculate that these advantages are worth the expenses of maintenance remains to be seen. Irrigation projects completed will likely not be maintained.

SECTION III

UNDCP DIR DISTRICT PROJECT

**SECTION III
UNDCP DIR DISTRICT PROJECT**

A. Introduction

A1. Project Purpose, Strategy, and Funding

In 1984, USAID expanded its support to the Government of Pakistan's efforts to reduce poppy cultivation by making grant of \$10 million to the United Nations Drug Control project (UNDCP) in the district of Dir, in the Northwest Frontier province. Called the UNDCP Dir District Development project, the project is under the direction of UNDCP in Vienna, the successor to the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control.

The \$10 million grant from USAID was made in two installments of \$5 million each, in 1984 and 1986. The terms of the grant required UNDCP to dedicate \$2 million to fund the Special Development Unit (SDU); thus USAID's direct contribution to the project was actually \$8 million. USAID subsequently added another \$800,000 to Dir project. Grants from other donors eventually brought the total funding to \$14.6 million for the life of the project (1985 to 1992). USAID later added another \$800,000 in funding for this project.

The purpose of the Dir project was to implement the Special Development and Enforcement Plan (SDEP) for Opium Producing Areas in Pakistan. Under the grants mentioned above, UNDCP was to undertake three activities:

- Establishment of an SDEP Task Force in Peshawar to coordinate preparation and implementation of projects and to provide assistance in the design, establishment, and support of an SDEP Special Development Unit at the provincial level.
- Formulation and implementation of the Dir project, which was designated as highest priority among SDEP projects by the GOP.
- Formulation and implementation of other SDEP projects in order of priority to be assigned by the GOP.

Project strategy, like USAID's efforts in Gadoon and Kala Dhaka, was to help the people of the Dir District build an improved economic environment that makes poppy growing less attractive. Interventions covered four sectors: infrastructure, institutional development, agricultural development, and resources development and conservation.

A2. Project Evolution

At the project outset, the government's Special Development Unit named a Project Management Unit (PMU) to work with UNDCP. The PMU now consists of 35 people and

costs the UNDCP \$100,000/year. UNDCP provided the PMU with seven vehicles, and all maintenance and running expenses are the responsibility of the unit. UNDCP also provided 20 vehicles to the line agencies.

The Dir project provides funds to line agencies who then put projects out for bid and select contractors. Major initiatives to increase agricultural productivity had been financed through the Agricultural Extension Department, Agricultural Research, Agricultural Engineering Livestock and Dairy Development Department, On-Farm Water Management Department, and Irrigation Department. Other line agencies enlisted to work on the project include the Departments of Communications and Works, Public Health Engineering, Health, Forestry, Local Government and Rural Development, and Industries, Labor, and Manpower, together with the Water and Power Development Authority and the Dir District Council.

Following a series of evaluations that were critical of project performance, a Technical Support Unit (TSU) was formed in 1989. The TSU was headed by two UN expatriate experts and national professionals who were directly responsible to UNDCP management offices in Timargara and Islamabad. The job of the TSU was to work alongside the PMU to build an effective management and monitoring capability. In addition to developing and executing continual monitoring and evaluation, the PMU-TSU was also to work with the line agencies to improve financial control and reporting capabilities.

Monitoring and inspection by the TSU was resisted by the government, however. Eventually, UNDCP was able to bring about a cooperative TSU-PMU inspection and monitoring of all line agency activities funded by the project. As a result of this arrangement, the TSU now approves all project expenditures in addition to its monitoring responsibilities.

B. Findings and Conclusions

UNDCP chose to work through the line agencies to realize physical changes, but the organization also felt that working through these agencies was the best way to improve local institutional capacity and sustainability. UNDCP quickly learned that there is a wide range of capability among the agencies, but that some simply cannot carry out work without contributions to overhead and other institution building. It is not yet clear how UNDCP will proceed to work with the weaker agencies. The PMU is already working extensively with these departments. For example, by the end of 1993, the Dir project had enabled the Department of Communications and Works to complete three major roads totaling nearly 70 km.

After the project had been in the field for two years, it was clear that the government wanted to control the project. The Pakistani PMU seemed to be in trouble; it was relying on proposals submitted by the line agencies and was not able to exercise a strong planning and monitoring role. Partly as a result of these difficulties, the project suffered from cost overruns and implementation problems. For its part, UNDCP was interested in guaranteeing both engineering and social soundness accountability.

Throughout the course of the project, UNDCP has enacted measures to ensure the accountability of the line agencies, not only in the execution of projects, but in their expenditures and financial management.

This brief summary might give the impression that the UNDCP project in Dir was without problems. This is certainly not the case. There have been a series of evaluations that have pointed out design and structural problems. For example, the government continues to press for control, stressing infrastructural development because this will get the most money flowing into the system. Despite such problems, however, UNDCP seems to have been able to recognize and devise remedies as implementation progresses. Flexibility is an important ingredient in this regard.

The evolution of the Dir District project has resulted in a structure that should commend itself to USAID. To begin, the project is under the managerial and financial tutelage of UNDCP. From offices in Vienna, Islamabad, and Temergara, the organization exercises a strong custodial role. In addition, UNDCP was led to form its own TSU as a result of insufficient project oversight and accountability. UNDCP has further continually sought accountability through close attention to detail and structural innovation. The course of this project—and in particular its management—will be worthwhile following.

More substantively, poppy production has not decreased notably in the Dir project area. UNDCP management is working with the government to implement a SDEP mentioned in the project design, under which enforcement and development are to be used together. Both UNDCP and the GOP are anxious to avoid the Gadoon example, however. Ordering police into poppy growing areas is very dangerous and potentially counterproductive. The former district commissioner chose to arrest some growers and traffickers when they were in town at the market. Instead of punishment, however, the commissioner demanded that the prisoners sign agreements promising to cease growing and trafficking. It remains to be seen if this more passive approach will yield results.

SECTION IV

RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

**SECTION IV
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED**

A. Recommendations

A1. Gadoon Amazai Project

A1a. Poppy Eradication and Agriculture

- Project advances concerning agricultural inputs and subsidies should be sustained with continued input of new technology (particularly high-yielding varieties), fertilizer, and know-how. An on-farm research unit should be established in the Gadoon project areas to regularly screen, demonstrate, and promote new technology.

A1b. Voluntary Organizations and NGOs

- The expertise of Sarhad Rural Support Corporation (SRSC) personnel who have been trained by USAID should be made available to SRSC and the as yet formed Gadoon Amazai NGO. Given the tentative nature of the Gadoon NGO, we further recommend that options concerning the use of SRSC in Gadoon Amazai be left open.

A2. Kala Dhaka Project

A2a. Voluntary Organizations and NGOs

- In Kala Dhaka it is too early to expand activities for the formation of an NGO without the experience of an effective NGO in the Gadoon Amazai area (see recommendation above).

A3. Dir Project

- Despite the lack of success in terms of poppy eradication, the evolution of the Dir District project has resulted in a management structure that should commend itself to USAID. To begin, the project is under the managerial and financial tutelage of UNDCP. From offices in Vienna, Islamabad, and Temergara, the organization exercises a strong custodial role. In addition, UNDCP was led to form its own TSU as a result of insufficient project oversight and accountability. UNDCP has further continually sought accountability through close attention to detail and structural innovation. The course of this project—and in particular its management—will be worthwhile following.

A4. General Recommendations

A4a. Women in Development

- The evidence of demand for education and the possibility of involving women should be a target of opportunity for the NGO to be created during the remaining project life.
- Of all the areas where the WID program has offered input, indisputably the most important for women is in health—specifically, maternal-child care, immunization, and preventive medicine. It appears that both the demand and potential return on investment would favor health interventions at the expense of other areas. A health project aimed at women would also attract support from the government, donors and NGOs. Health care and health training were in demand by project area women, and health-related activities should be a priority for future development efforts in Gadoon Amazai.
- Attempts should be made to save project-created nonformal education centers and their activities.
- For WID projects in general there is a need first to study the lives and work of women and determine what projects are likely to create or respond to demand. There must also be extensive follow-up analysis.

A4b. Voluntary Organizations and NGOs

- The 1990 evaluation of the Gadoon Amazai project recommended a shift to community-based participation in the project. The evaluation recommended that village organizations be formed to pursue a more sustainable outcome and that training of villagers be undertaken by the project.

In 1991, Malcom Odell, the team leader of the 1990 evaluation, was asked to do a concept paper on options for an NGO. This paper was prompted by project excesses and the disdain for social soundness. Odell spent two months in Pakistan, where he interviewed nearly everybody connected with NGO work. In his report, he presented a number of options for organizing a project NGO and a number of suggestions for action.

In 1991, USAID financed a paper on NGOs by Harry Jayasinga and Jamshed ul Hasan. This paper was a comprehensive look at the local environment for NGOs and it contained specific actionable recommendations. Most recently, David Smith, a Coverdale consultant, spent several months gathering information on NGOs. He provided this final evaluation team with a draft copy of his report before he left Pakistan in August 1993.

Certainly these papers should provide enough guidance to USAID and the NGO board of directors, and we are concerned about the lack of progress that has been made. The priority, as explained earlier, should be a clear definition of purpose and elaboration of a strategy. The team concurs with the suggestions of the authors of the above papers concerning the importance of choosing modest i.e., doable and well-defined objectives. The authors of the above papers recommend activities, pilot projects, and the like. However, because of the restrictions imposed by the Pressler Amendment, money from USAID can only be used for training and education.

The team's opinion is that there have been enough studies and seminars on the NGO situation in Gadoon Amazai. The immediate and most urgent task is raising money. We therefore strongly recommend that through September 1994, project funds be used to train local personnel in the techniques of fundraising, development, and promotion. For development and promotion, personnel should be taught advertising, survey techniques, media presentations, cost estimation, and public relations. Successful examples of fundraising from other NGOs can also be studied.

- The NGO is not, by definition, a governmental organization. It will be a private entity without privileged access to money. This status requires an outlook and strategy adapted to the private sector. Now that the board of directors is in place, an executive group should also be selected from the private sector to organize education and training adapted to the market in Pakistan. The business school faculties at the Universities of Lahore and Karachi can provide support, personnel, and courses, and short-term expatriates could also be brought in to advise.
- Training should be designed for all levels of personnel expected to take part in the NGO effort. Topics should include ordinary business skills such as accounting and computer literacy, but for the most part should concentrate on raising money.
- It is certain that the effort will die if no additional funds are found before September 1994. The present NGO effort has only two options at present: the USAID project management team can hope for further government money, or they can decide to make the NGO a true nongovernmental organization. The evaluation team strongly suggests they choose the latter.
- A more conventional sequence should be followed for the NGO where the mission is defined first and the appropriate organization is a function of that mission.
- The team has concern over the slow progress made by the NGO and recommends that an implementation schedule, similar to the one offered in the report, be followed. The documentation, interviews and field work have not convinced the team of a clear mission statement or work plan that is responsive to the beneficiaries.

- The team is sympathetic to AID's concern for sustainability and aware the restrictions imposed by the Pressler Amendment that led to the choice of an NGO and ruled out activities other than training. Ordinarily, we would recommend that the nascent NGO define its mission and begin modest pilot projects focusing on a small number of Union Councils in order to gain experience and credibility. AID funding, however, cannot be used for that purpose. The first priority, then, is to attract operational funding. For this reason the team strongly recommends that the remaining AID funding be used for training in the various disciplines that go into fund raising.
- Project NGOs should be encouraged to influence line agencies and other GOP entities to staff completed health and education facilities, and to complete construction (and then staff) of those still being built. USAID should use its influence in this direction as well.
- Project NGOs could also be initially organized around completing outstanding subprojects that would be beneficial to surrounding communities. Provide the NGOs with specific purpose and tasks.

A4c. Project Management

- The evaluation team found very little trace of SDU activity in oversight or coordination in the project, reinforcing our recommendation that USAID take a custodial role in locally executed projects.
- Not building close collaborative ties with line agencies led to overbuilding. Working with line agencies is necessary for building on an existing system, taking advantage of the capabilities and skills of the agencies, and improving the probabilities of sustainability.
- In locally executed projects the donor must insist on structural measures insuring that AID's social soundness guidelines will be honored. AID should take an active custodial role and insist on a strong bilateral monitoring and evaluation unit that has genuine power to guarantee accountability for the protection taxpayers and beneficiaries.
- The Project Coordination Unit should have technical as well as monitoring and evaluation functions. To the extent that it also has executive or fiduciary responsibilities, accountability must be ensured through explicitly assigned oversight structures and entities.
- The role of the Special Development Unit should be carefully reexamined. Initially created to coordinate development projects and liaise among donors, line agencies, and other government entities, the SDU actually provided few services during the life of NWFADP. The unit's guidance and leadership roles should be strengthened and taken advantage of.

- Development projects are always cooperative, demanding the collaboration of donor and host country nationals. In the division of labor there are some jobs that a host country national can do better than an expatriate. It is unfair and, perhaps, unrealistic to place a host country national in a position that will be compromising after the donor has left. The team found that some of the pressures placed on local staff could have been relieved, if expatriates had more field responsibility and closer association with the field projects. The custodial role of USAID in locally executed projects should be stronger than it was in the two projects evaluated.
- AID should initiate, possibly through Program and Policy Evaluation, an evaluation of locally executed development projects to be followed by some policy initiatives.

B. Lessons Learned

B1. Project Management and General Lessons

- USAID managers of locally executed projects should be selected from American citizens as well as from host country nationals. Local personnel, unlike their expatriate counterparts, stay in the host country beyond the PACD often in the project area. If they are too zealous in ensuring U.S. financial accountability, they can find themselves in compromising positions after the withdrawal of donor support. The experience of the Gadoon Amazai and Kala Dhaka projects warrant a greater amount of attention to the management and oversight of these locally executed projects, which have no effective structural means to protect the interests of donors (taxpayers) and intended beneficiaries.
- The three projects evaluated were all locally executed. Evidence shows that host governments have strong motivation to emphasize building of infrastructure because it is the best way to move the most amount of money through the system. In principle, this should be counter to the interests of the donor, who is interested in social soundness guidelines, sustainability, and accountability to taxpayers and beneficiaries.

If this is correct, findings from NWFADP suggest that donors in locally executed projects must take an active custodial, monitoring, and evaluation role. The consequences—even if justified by poppy eradication objectives—of ignoring social soundness guidelines in Gadoon Amazai were low probabilities for sustainability, waste, and the creation of a negative project image.

- Gadoon-Amazai and Kala Dhaka projects suffered from design flaws in administration and management, that led to wasted effort and money. Beneficiaries, farmers, some of whom had been growing poppy, did not receive commensurate benefit, given the resources committed. Both the lack of accountability and the lack of appropriate technical assistance left the interests of the donors and the beneficiaries unprotected

B2. Social Soundness

- Since their inception in the 1970s, the social soundness guidelines of AID's Handbook 3 have been an annoyance to AID programming because they slow down the process of obligating funds. On the other hand, social soundness guidelines, however burdensome and imperfect, are the only measures at AID's disposal to help ensure sustainability and suitability, and to see that the interests of beneficiaries and taxpayers are protected.
- One problem with the nature of AID programming is its preference for moving large amounts of money with the least amount of time and manpower. It was suggested time and time again during this evaluation that AID could get more for its money if it moved to smaller and more closely managed projects.
- If there is a trend toward locally executed projects, it would be normal to expect local executing units like the PCUs to follow AID procedures and guidelines.
- In the Gadoon project after 1986-1987 there was simply no technical assistance team having the required skills and experience in social soundness analysis, the social sciences, community organization, government liaison, education, and health that, had it been given veto power as well as an advisory role, could have brought the number of engineering and construction projects in line with the absorptive capacity of the line departments and the needs of the beneficiaries.

B3. Infrastructure

- Even when political considerations are as important as in case of NWFADP, social and economic aspects of development activities should not be completely ignored. The consequences of the failure to reckon the labor requirements demanded by new irrigation channels are already apparent.
- Considerations of maintenance issues is particularly crucial for community irrigation projects. More effort and resources should have been spent on organizing the beneficiaries and preparing them for maintaining and regulating the use of water.
- Constructing buildings and calling them schools does nothing to advance education. The Department of Education was not engaged sufficiently, and the social and human resources requirements of the ambitious spending on construction were mostly ignored.

B4. Poppy Eradication and Agriculture

- If development and poppy eradication can be mixed, then the correct mixture has yet to be determined. One of the premises of poppy elimination is that improving

the economic circumstances of growers will lower incentives to grow poppy. The evidence of NWFADP thus far does not support this hypothesis.

- In theory, poppy eradication projects are a combination of project interventions and law enforcement. The project areas of the Northwest Frontier Province are mountainous and rugged; some have been administered as tribal areas and the people are used to relative autonomy. History and the system of exploitation have resulted in a settlement pattern of dispersed hamlets that are situated with defense as a primary consideration. Residents have traditionally been armed, and now they are equipped with automatic and even more sophisticated weaponry.

A small constabulary force cannot patrol these areas effectively, and a large constabulary force can be counterproductive, as shown in the Gadoon cases. Official policy now is to use enforcement judiciously, as in the Dir District project, and to concentrate on dealers rather than growers. Donor-financed development can cooperate with these efforts, but the advantages to the U.S. taxpayer of becoming closely identified with another country's law enforcement activities are not clear-cut, and this identification can compromise the development effort.

B5. Women in Development

- In spite of certain cultural impediments, women can and will attend classes, if they are arranged with sensitivity. The director of WID programs at USAID/Peshawar deserves great credit for her intelligent perseverance and for providing this lesson.
- Demand among women for education, improved health care, and income is high. In cases where these were provided women responded and there were no cultural inhibitions preventing participation. The failure to make greater progress in women's projects is a failure of conceiving relevant projects, of follow-up, and of commitment.

B6. Voluntary Organizations and NGOs

- The process of NGO formation is a long and slow one, with no short cuts.
- A distinction must be drawn between a donor-funded and donor-labeled NGO. The NGO that is being funded by USAID risks being identified as USAID's NGO. This labeling is, perhaps, inevitable in the short term, but it is important to recognize this as a problem and to take steps to diversify funding as early as possible. There is a similar danger that the NGO may be identified as the government's NGO. The evaluation team heard both labels being applied to the Gadoon Amazai project NGO, and there was some feeling among interviewees that the NGO would continue the bad practices of the Gadoon and Kala Dhaka projects. Managers of the NGO will have to fight this negative identification.

- The failure so far to involve any genuine village organization in NGO planning and activities alienates locals and compromises the chances for project sustainability.

B7. Community-based Development

- Like social soundness considerations, community-based development slows the influx of money, but it is a more prudent way of enhancing sustainability.

ANNEX A

EVALUATION FIELD NOTES: GADOON AMAZAI

ANNEX A
EVALUATION FIELD NOTES: GADOON AMAZAI

Left Peshawar on July 27, 1993, at 9:30 a.m., arriving at Topi Project Coordination Unit office at about 1 pm. Held brief discussions with the Accountant and other PCU and AId staff, the Director is out of station. Left for Tarbela which is about half an hours drive, settle down in WAPDA rest houses in Tarbela. Jim and Pervez left for Swat to go to Dir project area, the rest of the team stayed in Tarbela.

July 28, 1993

Accompanied by Mr. Omar (Agronomist) and Pauline Milone and some ladies from the local PCU office left for the Gadoon Amazai area. All of Gadoon Amazai lies on the right bank of Tarbela dam, while all the WAPDA rest houses are on the left bank, so one must cross the dam while going to and coming back from the GA field area. The following areas and projects were visited, all in Gadoon Amazai, Swabi District.

| Union Council | Village | Subprojects Visited |
|----------------------|--|---|
| Gandaf | Gandaf | Extension of high school Gandaf Extension of Middle School Gandaf Social forestry Gandaf Citrus orchard Gandaf Tubewell 807 Gandaf Water courses Forest tree nursery Gandaf Feeder road |
| Farmer interviews: | Haji Mira Khan, Nasim Khan, Khaista Khan, Maulana Mohammad Hassan, and Amir Hussain. | |
| | Bisak | Dugwell (open surface) Bada-Bisak-Malakabad road Bisak water supply scheme Bisak Middle School Extension Dugwell Nazar Mohammad Dugwell Haji Ali Gul (5) Social forestry adjoining Bisak (Euclyptus, Ailanthus, Robinea) |
| Farmer interviews: | Mohammad Hassan, Haji Ali Bahadar, Haji Lal Gul, Abdul Shakoor, Mohammad Iqbal, Abdul Razaq. | |

Malakabad Veterinary clinic
 High school building
 Social forestry (Mainly Euclyptus)
 Dugwells
 Orchard (citrus, banana, almonds)
 Pirzaman orchard and dugwell
 Abandoned dugwells (5)

Farmer interviews: Pir Zaman, Aboul Rahim, Nazar Mohammad.

July 29, 1993

Again with Mr. Omar, Dr. Milone, Nasreen and Zarqa, left Tarbela at about 8 AM and arrived in Gadoon project area in about half an hours time. The following areas and projects were visited:

| Union Council | Village | Subprojects visited |
|---------------|---------|---|
| Kabgani | Bada | Bada-Mangalchai-Trait road Middle School building Social forestry (mainly ailunthus) Dugwell |

Farmer interviews: Maqbool Khan, Wali Mohammad, Ali Gul)

| | |
|--------|--|
| Dalori | Government Middle School building Social forestry Kabgani-Dewal Road Kangani citrus Orchard Citrus orchard |
|--------|--|

Farmer interviews: Moham:mad Khan, Abdul Wali, Karam Dad

| | |
|-------|-------------------------|
| Dewal | Primary school building |
|-------|-------------------------|

Farmer interviews: Zarmin Khan, Gul Wali.

July 30, 1993

Stayed in Tarbela and discussed VO related issues with Major Mushtaq and other project related matters with the project staff at Tarbela.

July 31, 1993

Left with Mr. Omar and go to the mainly hilly Union Council of Nara. Three other teams consisting of Pervez-Jim, Zia-Naqvi, and Milone-Nasreen also go to the same Union Council. Briefly stop at Beergall USAID rest house where Jim and Pervez. Following were the areas and sub-projects visited.

| | | |
|----------------------------------|------------|--|
| Nara | Uthla | Irrigation channels old Irrigation channels new Block forestry Social forestry Mahaban catchment area |
| Tenant/share cropper interviews: | | Mohammad Khan, Pir Mohammad |
| | Gobasni | Irrigation channels Farmer/share cropper interviews Parba-dand road |
| | Ganichatra | Social forestry Irrigation channel |
| | Kapla | Village organization member interviews (president Jamroz Khan) Garhi shah Md VO Member interviews (President Mohammad Omar) |

General Impression and Observations

Dugwells. No economic, social, or technical feasibilities were performed before the sub-projects were approved and undertaken. Whoever showed up in the PCU office with an application was granted the approval for a dugwell alongwith accessories. The contract to construct and purchase accessories was given to the owner himself. Less than approved funds were spent on the construction, adversely affecting the quality of the wells and their discharge. In many situations the owners sold out the diesel engines and pumps etc. provided by the project. 5 out of a total of 12 dugwells visited were stated to have been abandoned. This gives credence to the earlier surveys (students and others) that 60 percent of the dugwells were not functioning and probably abandoned altogether. The average command area under each of the dugwell was about 6 acres.

Irrigation channels. The irrigation channels were not well designed, constructed and maintained. Particularly bad maintenance was seen in cases where the project gave irrigation channels to individuals. One such irrigation channel visited was near Uthla and belonged to one PCL Mohammad Ibrahim. We walked to the source of the IC in the upper portions of Uthla stream. The diversion structure was completely broken and no water could possibly flow through the channel. We were told that the channel has been in operational for the last more than one year, and that the owner had no plans for its reconstruction.

Tubewells. Visited two tubewells located in the Gandaf Malikabad Plains and both were ready to operate but were not operating. We were told that the tubewells have been ready for the last three years, but because of some dispute between the land owners in the command area and the irrigation department they could not be operated.

Village organizations. The village organizations were still not well understood and the members formed them on request by the project staff. Some months back some project officials told them that if they formed village organizations they will be given each a grant of 10,000 dollars.

Infrastructure. The school, hospitals, and veterinary clinics were well built and seemed to be maintained well. Due to summer vacations we could not determine the adequacy of utilization of schools and other facilities.

Social forestry. Social forestry projects seem to have been well received and successful in these initial stages. The orchards we were able to visit were a good start, the trees were not in bearing yet. All these activities were subsidized and now that the subsidies have been removed, it is not certain if the activities will be sustained. We heard reports of some fruit trees being uprooted after the monthly payment of 750 rupees was withdrawn. But we were not able to confirm these reports.

ANNEX A1
EVALUATION FIELD NOTES: NAGRAI UNION COUNCIL, GADOON AMAZAI

Participants: Dr. James Keyser
Dr. Pervaiz Amir

Local Elders: Haji Daud
Zarin Gul
Amin Ahmed
Seven others

Members of the evaluation team arrived early in the after noon and visited the various facilities including veterinary school, road track, hospital, project office which had been abandoned etc. We first spent considerable time just walking around the fields to see the maize and tobacco crop. In the evening we held a detailed meeting at Haji Daud's house. We were informed that the project had provided electricity and track roads which had greatly improved communication in the village. Roughly 90 percent of land in the Negrai Union Council was owned by 5-6 feudal lords. These influential groups were the major beneficiaries of the various project inputs i.e. fertilizer, seed, and above all contract for building roads and the hospital. The hospital which will take another 2 months to complete was in bad shape as several rooms were leaking. In general the quality of construction was extremely poor. Various elders in the village had doubts whether an MBBS doctor would stay in this village. We also visited a non project dispensary which was staffed with a paramedic. Health facilities in general are well received in the rural areas.

The veterinary facility developed by the project and now being operated by a staff of the veterinary department seemed to function well. It had the necessary supplies and the stock assistant was familiar with basic preventive medicine. However, he was unable to cater to the demands of nearby areas because of lack of transport facilities.

Tobacco has been a very successful crop and farmers are rapidly shifting toward tobacco. Although electricity has made major difference in the villages outlook toward development many people still cannot afford connections or the electricity charges. There was obvious waste in this component of the project as resources had also been spent to take electricity for over 500-800 meters even to provide a connection to a single household.

We were repeatedly informed that other than tobacco other crops like wheat, maize and vegetables were not going to substitute the lucrative returns the villagers are used to from poppy. It was shocking to note that the poorer classes and beggars were in a desperate economic state, landless, and jobless. One wonders why the project failed to impact these groups and improve their lot. Obviously the big Maliks had gotten fatter and the chairman Union Council received all the contracts.

ANNEX A2
EVALUATION FIELD NOTES: SETHANA, BAITGALI U.C., GADOON AMAZAI

The team comprising HMN and ZAJ alongwith Ms. Nasreen Tanoli and Mr. Mohammad Irshad (Social Organizers) reached Sethana village of Baitgali U.C after traveling in the boat from Darband on August 8, 1993 at 1:p.m. M/S James Keyser and Pervaiz Amir also accompanied the team. They proceeded to another village in Baitgali alongwith Mr. Irshad (social organizer). After climbing the hills for about 15 minutes the team reached the house of Mr. Niaz. The team started discussions (with the help of female social organizer) with the village women on different components of the project. After about 20 minutes some village elders arrived at this place and discussions took place. Their names are:

- | | | | | | |
|-----------------|---|---------------|---|---------------|---------------|
| 1. Mian Gul | - | PCL | } | Beneficiaries | |
| 2. Fazle Rehman | - | Village elder | | | |
| 3. Noor Rehman | - | Village elder | | | |
| 4. Ali Zaman | - | Village elder | | | |
| 5. Niaz | - | Village elder | | | |
| 6. Qureshan | } | Village Women | } | | |
| 7. Maroof | | | | | |
| 8. Faqir Jan | | | | | & |
| 9. Akbar Jan | | | | | Beneficiaries |

After introducing the team's objectives, discussions were held on the following interventions:

Schools. The team was informed that one GPS for boys has been completed and 50 to 60 students are studying with the help of 2 teachers. Similarly one GPS for girls has also been completed but has not yet started functioning. Earlier this school was functioning in a hired building (in a varandah). The government has constructed this new building. Villagers were quite satisfied with the presence of these schools as they considered education very important for their development.

Fruit plots. Four plots were laid out by the project staff of different fruit plants like citrus (malta), plums, apricots, and apples etc. The team was informed that out of these 40-60 percent were successful particularly the malta (citrus). The team later on physically saw these plants. An elder informed us that he had sold three to four crates of malta this year. The villagers were taking keen interest in maintaining these orchards but they complained about certain insect pests and diseases that have destroyed their plants.

Forestry. No forestry plots were given to this village. They were also unaware of any social forestry program.

Water supply. No water supply was carried out in the village. However, the District Council had already arranged a water supply scheme few years back.

Health program. No facility exists regarding health. However one EPI round has taken place in 1992 where village women and children have been vaccinated by the team. The villagers were not satisfied with this program and wanted a regular BHU or RHC because they were facing great difficulties particularly the village women.

Rural electrification. The team noticed installation of electricity poles and wiring in the village. The villagers told the team that Mr. Gohar Ayub Speaker of the National Assembly has done this favour to them and they were expecting electricity supply very shortly.

Irrigation channel. The village elders informed the team about the presence of a big irrigation channel alongwith a small irrigation channel which have been completed with the help of project. About 100 Kanals land was being irrigated through this channel. Their yields of wheat and maize crops have increased (one to one and a half maund per Kanal in case of wheat and 2.5 mds per Kanal in case of maize crop). The village elders informed the team that they were now using improved seed, and chemical fertilizer on their crops at their own although they had to pay an extra transport charges of Rs. 15/- to Rs. 16/- Per bag which was very high. As regards maintenance and case of channel, the villagers were ready to do by themselves.

WID activities. NFE programme was no more there (finished in 1993) which lasted for about seven years. Each year 30-40 girls were trained in different activities including religious education. The team could not verify this number and was not satisfied with NFE programme. Only two girls could be located in the village who were not utilizing their training in any way. Soap training was also given to few ladies but was not used by the people. In the entire village there is only one girl who has passed 5 classes.

Village organization. There exists no village organization in the village. No body had ever visited or talked to the villagers for the formation of a V.O. However, they informed the team that they would also form a V.O. if people of Gadoon Amazai also form these. They were eager to know the aims and objectives of a V.O. and were ready to join the proposed NGO provided they were guided and educated properly.

Vegetable seeds. Some vegetable seeds were given to villagers for kitchen gardening but they have not kept any seed for future sowing. The villagers were of the view that they would bring vegetable seeds at their own and cultivate/grow vegetables. They considered it as their fault and the project or Government were not responsible for its failure.

General problems. The village elders expressed their problems and felt needs such as:

Health. They were facing great hardship and difficulty in carrying their patients to far flung areas after paying Rs. 200/= to Rs. 300/= per patient.

Roads. Due to non-availability of roads, they are facing great difficulty. They informed that road could come through Gadoon Amazai-Bait Gali or Nara which is 30 miles away from their village as there was no road connection between Gadoon Amazai and Kala Dhaka.

Veterinarian dispensary. Due to the nonexistence of veterinarian dispensary their animals and poultry birds could not be vaccinated and they had to loose some animals every year for want of proper care.

Leveling of land. The villagers were also interested in leveling of land through bulldozer so that they may bring more land under cultivation.

Youth training. The villagers suggested that due to unemployment, the matriculants may be imparted training either in agriculture or veterinary science so that they may help the villagers in these fields.

The team was of the view that no proper follow up has been done in this village and no one has ever come to motivate and educate the village men and women. The team noticed that there was great potential and scope in this village which has to be exploited and developed. Regarding the sustainability and future after the project winds up the team found that villagers were ready to form a V.O and also were prepared to start some programs on a self-help basis. Interestingly, it was a surprise to the team that nobody mentioned any promise as promises as made by the project staff as in other Union Councils of Gadoon Amazai.

ANNEX A3
EVALUATION FIELD NOTES: GABASNI UNION COUNCIL, GADOON AMAZAI

Gabasni Union Council

- Located in Swabi portion of Gadoon Amazai
- Consists of 25 villages
- Population approx 20,000
- 12 primary schools (boys)
2 middle schools (boys)
1 middle school (under construction)
1 high school (boys)
8 primary school (girls)
- 1 BHU where additional facilities have been provided but no staff employed yet
- 1 Veterinary dispensary
- Approximately 23 water supply schemes exist at different stages of completion.
No water supply schemes seen at Dagai where women still carry water from the spring.
- One rest house
- 8 rural electrification schemes. Only one village has electricity.
- 88 irrigation schemes provided
9 hand dug wells
15 km of road Satketar Gali and Mangal Chai Road

Intensive discussions were held with:

- Resource persons
- Village leaders
- PCLs
- Teachers (male and female)
- Staff at BHU and veterinary dispensary
- Staff and beneficiaries of NFE and other interventions
- Members of the BOD of the NGO
- Members of VDOs

In addition , team members visited an intervention located at the union council headquarters and the selected villages for physical verification. Villages Gabasni and Mangal Chai were selected for in-depth analysis and to determine the impact of the project intervention.

Agriculture. Three hundred plots of orchard with 110 plants each made up of citrus, apricot, and apple trees. It was established in 1988. There is 50 percent success and is used for home consumption 60-80 plots of social forestry where rate of success is less than 25 percent.

Nonformal education. There were 5 centers but all have been closed down. K.G. was successful in one of the villages. EPI progress has not touched all the villages.

Voluntary organizations and NGOs. These do not exist as such but some irrigation channel, a mosque, and a section of the road has been built through self-help .

Comments and opinions of elders and key interviewees. People felt that their economic position was good when opium used to be grown. Government made promises prior to the initiation of the project but did not honor the commitments. Subsidy in agriculture was withdrawn and no employment provided. Only 10 percent of the employees on the Gadoon Industrial Estates is for the Gadoon area. With the use of spray to destroy the poppy crop, cattle and other crops also suffered.

General Findings

- Benefits were acknowledged from the road built which has cut down the travelling time. From UC Gandaf to to U.C. Gabasni it takes about 1-1/2 hours. The road is an unmettled one. About 70-80 vehicles ply daily. The O&M is undertaken by the people where announcement are made on loud speakers and help is sought. About 200 kanals of land has come under the road.
- After the establishment of the schools the literacy rate in the under ten year-olds has gone up and female literacy is also visible (for school going age).
- With irrigation the yield per kanal has increased by 33%. O&M undertaken by those who benefit from the irrigation water.
- Dug wells have also helped in meeting the water requirements, one of the woman owns a dugwell and has a social forestry plot.
- The agricultural program where plots were provided has come to a standstill where each plot holder was provided Rs. 750 p.m. for 3 years for orchard plots and 2 years for social forestry. With the withdrawal of the wage and subsidized input, the community ceased to maintain the plots (some felt the constraint to be back of water while others did not see the value of these plots). They only maintained them for the cash money they used to receive monthly.

- The concept of V.Os to undertake development activities without financial support is not felt to be feasible by the community. They felt that the jirga system with consensus can see to the community's needs but development needs cannot be met without government or donor help. They were not clear about the role of the NGO.

Village Gabasni

- This is the largest village in the Union Council
- Population is about 5000 persons

General Findings

Opium has been eradicated and replaced with wheat and maize. Initially the project was opposed, only after making economic and financial commitments the project was allowed to proceed. However the commitments made were not fulfilled and the community is bitter about it.

Observations. The distribution of benefits seem to be skewed more in favor of the rich who own more lands and are strategically located closer to the roads. This, however, is a logical outcome of the type of interventions (channels, agricultural subsidy, etc.) that were being implemented. Although development has reached the area, but the economic needs of the people are yet to be met.

Roads. About 20 vehicles ply daily. Mostly Datsun pickups. The major road into the village has been built from the MPA fund. Roads have led to the opening up of the area to internal trade, use of facilities (schools, veterinary dispensary); and transport of patients (esp. women) who can be taken for medical treatment.

Schools. There is a government girls primary school (under construction). The concept of female education is not alien any longer, but the sustainability of interest will depend on the government's commitment to carry on (motivated teachers and lack of absenteeism of staff, etc.). In addition, the building is not yet complete and it is hoped that the investment already made will not go waste.

Irrigation. There are about 9-10 channels in the village. Increase in yield due to availability of water and inputs is 25 percent for wheat and maize. In addition, the community is prepared to undertake the responsibility for O&M. All the channels are functional approximately 50-60 kanals of land can be irrigated by each channel.

Health. A BHU has been completed but staff are not yet in place and the unit is not functional.

Water supply. One water supply scheme exists in this village which fulfills the requirements of most of the village. O&M is undertaken by the local community. No dug wells found here.

Electricity. Most of the village has electricity.

Agriculture. There were 30 plots of orchard with 110 sapling per plot. These were made up of apricot, peach, apples etc. most of these plot have ceased to exist. Three social forestry plots had been provided with 2000 sapling per plot none exist.

Voluntary development organizations. It started in 1992. Previously there was a Gabasni welfare society. This VDO has 43 members. Its aim is to gather savings for self-help. They have a list of activities that they would like to undertake. Bylaws have been framed and they are in the process of being registered.

- 9 Office bearers
- 24 meetings held
- Savings:- Rs. 5730/- in the Bank at Topi

There is scope for local level development with community participation as it is not a new concept in the village. However the V.D.O feels that without external/donor funds they will be unable to undertake an major development work. They are also unclear regarding the role of the umbrella N.G.O.

Nonformal education. There used to be a center that has been closed down. Knitting, cutting, embroidery, religion education, hygiene adult literacy classes were provided. K.6 was also introduced and a number of plot provided. 2 Courses and 1 examination was held. The beneficiaries acknowledged the value and need for the center, to help in income saving and income earning (through tailoring and embroidery). The plots seem to have been provided to the richer women only. In some rudimentary form some of the plots exist.

Village Managal Chai

| | | |
|-----------------|---|--------------------|
| Population | - | About 8000 |
| Cultivable Area | - | 7000 Kanals |
| 32 km from Topi | - | 19 Km from Gabasni |

Roads. Bada Mangal Chai road. The road is not metalled and the quality is poor. The rocky mountainous terrain makes it more difficult. About 10 cars ply daily. O&M is undertaken by the villagers on a joint basis where subsequent to request over the loudspeakers every one lends a helping hand.

Schools. There are 2 girls' primary schools, each of these have about 30 students and 2 staff. Awareness regarding the value of female education exists.

Irrigation. There are about 5 irrigation schemes in this village. One scheme is 1300 ft long and irrigates 100 canals of land; another is about 900 ft long and irrigates about 70-80 kanals. Wheat and maize are cultivated and where irrigation schemes exist the yield per kanal has gone up by 1/3rd.

Dug wells. Two dug wells. No channel constructed hence the wells are not used for irrigation. Moreover the persons on whose land the wells are located do not allow others to use them.

Water supply. In 1989 Phase I was completed at a cost of about Rs. 23 lakhs. Phase II which had been initiated was stopped and the money disbursed was recalled. Availability of water is a major problem in this area.

Veterinary dispensary. A building has been constructed (3 rooms, 1 verandah, 1 latrine). Staff exist. However, there is lack of medicines. About 10-12 animals are brought daily. When medicines are not available prescriptions are written out.

Agriculture. About 25-30 orchards had been provided of 110 plants each mainly made up of plums and citrus. However, with the withdrawal of the monthly salary and lack of water, most of the orchards have ceased to exist. There were 15 social forestry plots made up of eucalyptus etc. where about 5 percent are left.

There seems to be a lack of interest in the community for these plots and the long-term value of this resource is beyond the perception of the beneficiaries.

Women in Development. There used to be a centre but it has been closed down and there does not seem to be much interest for it.

Voluntary development organization. A welfare organization exists with 50 members. This however cannot be taken as a development organization.

ANNEX A4
EVALUATION FIELD NOTES: NARA UNION COUNCIL, GADOON AMAZAI

A. Introduction

A team comprising HMN and Zia Al-Jalaly arrived 1220 p.m. at 12-15 p.m. at Nara Union Council alongwith Mr. Noor Mohammad (Resource person) on July 31, 1993. Nara is located about 57 Km from Topi.

B. Sallent Characteristics of Union Council

This Union Council has 37 villages (list attached). The total population is around 30 to 40,000 and area is approximately 000 acres. The facilities available are road, electricity n your village, two sub-post offices, one high school, four middle schools, 8 girls' primary school, 30 boys' primary school, 1 field assistant, 1 stock assistant, 1 dispensary and 3 wheat flour machines. A telephone exchange has also been installed recently.

C. Interview with Mian Gul Jan

The discussion took place in the Hajra of Mian Gul Jan, a big khan, local leader, ANP councillor, and a member of BOD of the NGO. He has rendered large services in stopping poppy cultivation in the area in the beginning of the program. He has also rendered his services in mobilizing and motivating the population of Union Council and his village for cooperating with the Project Staff. He began by indicating that the rural population are most pleased with the approachable road, of which 9-10 Km passed the rough their Union Council. It has dramatically improved access in and out of the area, bringing an increase in business and service. He also welcomed the electrification and also approved the efforts to strengthen education and health through the addition of 3-4 rooms in the local high school and construction of buildings of a Rural Health Center. The best among the projects completed in this Union Council have been potable water supplies in Kapla and Bela. The team was shown a Tehsil building which is almost complete and will be used by the Tehsil staff after sometime.

This local leader (an old man) was of the view that some changes have occurred during the last ten years due to the efforts of project staff as well as the local leaders including project committee leaders. He particularly mentioned improvement in agriculture and forestry in this area. He pointed out some deficiencies in planning activities and strategy of the project. He was of the opinion that the rural people or villagers were not consulted, guided and motivated. He also referred to lack of coordination between different agencies. Regarding the future, Mian Gul Jan was not very hopeful because these seemed no specific mechanism for sustainability. He was also not satisfied with the proposed NGO of which he is a member of BOD. In his opinion the objectives were not clear and villagers in general

were not fully aware of the non-fulfillment of promises made by the project staff and generally the villagers were not satisfied with the overall performance of the project.

Nara Village: Group Interview with Village Elders

The team comprising HMN and Zia Al-Jalaly held discussions with the following village elders on July 31, 1993 at the Hujra/Dera of Mian Gul Zaman.

1. Mr. Latif Khan, president V.D.O.
2. Mr. Mohammad Pervaiz, Primary school teacher and secretary VDO
3. Mr. Shaukat Ali Khan, Middle school teacher
4. Mr. Gulab Sher, a farmer/beneficiary
5. Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, treasurer, VDO
6. Mr. Niaz Mohammad Khan
7. Mr. Feroz Khan (student 9th class)

After general discussion on different aspects/components of project, the different interventions were discussed regarding this particular village.

Road. They were quite satisfied and happy about the road because it has greatly helped them in facilitating their daily routine activities as well as in agriculture marketing. On an average 9 to 10 vehicles arrive in this village. The team was told that villagers would be interested in repairing and maintenance of road as & when needed.

School. The village elders were also happy to note that 3-4 rooms have been added in the school (which is the only one in the entire Union Council). Presently there are 11 rooms with an enrolment of 500 students and 15 teachers. The result of this school is quite satisfactory. The students however complained about the non-availability of a science teacher without which they are facing a great difficulty. The team was informed that general trend in receiving education is developing amongst the villagers. A few leaders suggested that the school may be upgraded to Higher Secondary level.

Government girls primary school. The team was informed that the building has been constructed but classes have not yet started due to different reasons. The villagers are ready to send their daughters for education.

Tehsil building. The team was told about this building. According to the village elders this building would be used by the revenue and administrative staff in the interest of this Union Council. They were, however, not sure about the types of benefits which they would receive. The village elders were never consulted about the need and construction of the buildings.

Rural Health Center. The team was informed that the building wards, staff residences and quarters are almost complete but the centre has not started its functions. They were happy for having this facility which would definitely improve their health.

Veterinary dispensary. A veterinary dispensary has been built and functioning with the help of a stock assistant. On an average 10-12 animals/chickens are brought for treatment. They however, complained about the non-availability of medicines. According to these elders benefits have reached to those villagers who had animals.

Agriculture plots. Out of 18 plots, 3 plots (orchards) having apples, plums and figs are successful. However, a number of progressive farmers in the village are already using chemical fertilizer and interest in adopting agricultural technology.

Forestry plots. Two of the plots which were laid out by the project staff are not successful. The villagers are however interested in raising forestry plants provided they are given plants of their choice at the right time. The villagers were ready to put their own labor into such programs for improving their agricultures forestry and orchards if they are provided necessary input including guidance by different government functionaries.

Electrification. Rural electrification has recently been done in this village and the local leaders expressed their satisfaction.

Village organization. The team was informed that a VDO was established in February, 1992 having 30 members with a saving of Rs. 600/-. The president, secretary and treasurer were also present. The office bearers informed the team that they have held 3-4 meetings so far. The team was not shown the relevant registers pertaining to VDO. The president of VDO, Mr. Latif Khan was not aware about this organization which was a surprise to the team. The office bearers had no knowledge about the formation, functioning, and aims/objectives of the organization. They had no knowledge about the future plans of V.D.O. or NGO. Even Mian Gul Jan who is a member of BOD was not clear about the VDO except that certain commitments were given by the project staff (GFMT) that an amount up to Rs. 200,000/- would be given to VDO for carrying out different developmental activities.

When the team asked the village elders about the future developmental activities after the Godoon Amazai Project, they were informed that they were not clear about their future as no one had guided or informed us except the NGO. They complained that some promises were made by the Project Staff in the beginning but not fulfilled. They particularly mentioned about the jobs in the Industrial Estate and provision of other facilities like supply of ration on reduced rate, concession in electricity charges etc. etc. In order to ensure sustainability, the village elders indicated that they would do every possible thing provided they are guided and educated about the use and functions of VDO or NGO.

Agriculture/forestry plots. Out of 10 to 12 fruit plots, 3 to 4 are successful and one plot is partially successful. Therefore, the least successful of their projects have been the fruit orchards and forests, where survival rates have been low. According to village elders plants were not available at the proper time and maintenance funds too limited and those too were for a shorter period. No follow up visits were made by the technical staff for their guidance and education, they asserted.

Road. The village elders expressed satisfaction over the accessibility of road which is helping them in different ways like carrying their patients to hospitals, agriculture marketing, bringing household articles from far flung areas and helping in provision of different facilities eg. electricity. On an average 8 to 10 vehicles come to their village. The village elders were worried about the future maintenance of the road. In their opinion it should be black topped if it is to survive properly. They thought that it was the responsibility of the government.

Village organization: The team was informed about the existence of a VDO which was formed 6 months ago with a total membership of 38 members and savings upto Rs. 1100/-. They have so far held 14 to 15 meetings. The village elders were not very much aware of aims/objectives and functions of VDO. They also had no knowledge about the relationship of VDO with NGO. Some elders were of the view that a reasonable amount upto 10,000 US\$ would be given to them to carry on certain activities as they were told by some of the Project staff during formation of so.

To ensure sustainability, the group indicated that they should be given a reasonable amount so that they may start some programs through their village organization. The village elders were not happy over the performance of the project and they also made complaints that the project was not run according to the promises made to the people. The village elders were of the view that due to poverty they might switch over to poppy cultivation.

Kapla Village: Group Interview with Village Elders, July 31, 1993

The team (HMN and ZAJ) arrived at Kapla village alongwith Mr. Noor Mohammad (Resource Person) at 2.05 p.m. and held meeting with village elders in the Project Rest House. The following village elders were present:

1. Mr. Ali Haider, a farmer and beneficiary
2. Mr. Shams Khan, " "
3. Mr. Naimat Khan, PCL, shopkeeper
4. Mr. Gul Rehman, PCL, farmer
5. Mr. Bahadur Khan, a farmer
6. Mr. Haider Khan, a farmer
7. Mr. Shamsur Rehman a farmer
8. Mr. Maluk Khan, a farmer
9. Mr. Safdar Khan, Numberdar
10. Mr. Munir,
11. Mr. Shahid Khan (a matriculate) treasurer VDO
12. Mr. Sartaj (a non-matriculate)
13. Mr. Niaz Muhammad

This is a small village, situated 50 km from Topi with a population of 80 households (600-700) and an area of 1500 Kanals (approximate). The following interventions were discussed:

Water supply. One scheme of water supply is giving great benefit to the people. Prior to this scheme the villagers used to face great difficulties in getting potable water. According to these elders the health of the population has considerably improved and now their women can devote maximum time to their household activities. The villagers did not see any problem associated with operating and maintaining this water supply scheme.

Irrigation scheme. This scheme is providing irrigation facility to 800-900 Kanals and the farmers are growing wheat and maize crops. Their yields have increased (25 to 30 percent). They are however, concerned about the future maintenance of this channel.

Rural electrification. The villagers were satisfied with this scheme which is providing them great facility. All the villagers are getting benefits out of this scheme.

ANNEX B

EVALUATION FIELD NOTES: KALA DHAKA

ANNEX B
EVALUATION FIELD NOTES: KALA DHAKA

Kala Dhaka, a provincially administered tribal region of Northwest Frontier Province, lies in Mansehra District of former Hazara (now Mansehra) Division. It has a population of 303,000 living in 253 villages and spread over 254,000 acres. Details regarding each of the five Pushtun tribes of Kala Dhaka are given in the table below:

| Tribe | Population | No. of villages | Area (acres) |
|---------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Bazikhel | 112,500 | 100 | 95,000 |
| Madakhel | 72,500 | 39 | 75,000 |
| Hassanzai | 58,200 | 56 | 4,500 |
| Akazai | 38,500 | 34 | 25,000 |
| Nusratkhel | 21,300 | 24 | 14,000 |
| Total: | 303,000 | 253 | 254,000 |

With respect to land use, availability, and cultivation, the following data were provided by the Department of Agriculture, Mansehra.

| Cultivated Acres | Uncultivated Acres | Total |
|------------------|--------------------|---------|
| 74,893 | 179,107 | 254,000 |

The area under different crops is as follows:

| Maize | Wheat | Rice/paddy | Poppy | Forest | Total |
|--------|--------|------------|-------|--------|---------|
| 62,000 | 53,000 | 12,000 | 630 | 83,000 | 210,630 |

Two days were spent in Mansehra holding meetings with USAID and PCU staff, some line agencies, and the deputy commissioner. The Kala Dhaka region was itself 3-4 hours drive from Mansehra and was visited on August 8-9, 1993. Notes of these visits are given below:

August 8, 1993

Approach to the northern areas of Kala Dhaka is via Thakot on the main KK highway. Driving northeast towards Gilgit, Thakot is about 90 km from Mansehra and 114 km from Abbotabad. 20 km towards Mansehra is Batgram where we stopped to have tea. Another 30 km from here towards Gilgit is Bisham, but we left the KKH as well as the cars near Thakot and crossed on foot a bridge on a small tributary of Indus. On rented pickups traveled south along the left bank of Indus. All along the left bank is Kala Dhaka area (used to be called Hazara Tribal until recent years). On the other side along the right bank of river Indus is Swat area. The area is green, picturesque, and very mountainous. The slopes are steep and the shingled or track road is in very bad condition and at places extremely dangerous. This is mainly Bazikhel territory, but a large number of Akhundkhel, the Syeds of the area also live here. The following villages were visited.

1. Sado Khan
2. Dawar Mira
3. Kand
4. Mator
5. Arbistan
6. Shawe Koi
7. Zizarai
8. Shadag
9. Cham
10. Shagai

The following persons were interviewed in the northern Sado Khan and Shagai clusters:

1. Zarmadan Khan, PCL of village Sado Khan an Akhundkhel
2. Noor Khan, PCL village Kand
3. Miraj Amir of village Mator
4. Omar Sarab of village Arbistan
5. Siddique of village Arbistan
6. Fazal Rahim of Village Mator
7. Sher Afzal of village Shawe Koi
8. Ashraf Khan of village Shawe Koi
9. Shamroz of village Shawe Koi
10. Mulla Sahib of village Zizarai
11. Munir Gul of village Shadag
12. Syed Shah of village Shadag
13. Zarif Shah of village Cham
14. Einur Rehman of village Shagai
15. Latif Shah of village Shagai
16. Faridun of village Shagai

The following sub-projects were visited:

Sado Khan Cluster

1. Irrigation channel at Sado Khan
2. Water supply system sado Khan
3. Irrigation channel Khand
4. Social Forestry khand
5. Irrigation channel shawe Koi
6. Social Forestry sado Khan
7. WSS Mator
8. Irrigation channel Arbistan
9. Social Forestry Arbistan

Shagai Cluster

1. Water supply scheme Shagai
2. WSS Shadag
3. WSS Cham
4. Social Forestry Cham
5. Social Forestry Shagai
6. Irrigation channel Butooo Banda
7. WSS/BHU Shagai

August 9, 1993

The southern entry to Kala Dhaka is through Darband, a town on the banks of Tarbela lake and Indus river, and about 2 hours drive from Manehra. The road passes through Oughi, a sizable town and market for Kala Dhaka residents, but populated by Hindko speaking Tanolis and other tribes. The track from Darband north was closed due to a flood in one of the Indus river tributaries. So we took a boat upstream from Darband. The areas close to Darband on the right bank are included in Baitgali Union Council of Gadoon while on the left bank lies Kala Dhaka. The tribe living in the southern reaches of KD is Hassanzai and for some distance they occupy both banks of the river Indus. About 2 hours upstream navigation brought us to an area where the right bank was inhabited by Madakhel tribe, the left bank still Hassanzai territory, but not far from Alakhel tribal territory. The following villages, all Hassanzai were visited:

1. Kandar
2. Kotkay
3. Nawe Killi
4. Kambela
5. Kiana

The following persons were interviewed:

- 1. Noor Samad Khan of village kandar a PCL and Mashar**
- 2. Haji Laiq Dad of village Kianae a PCL and elder**
- 3. PCL Mokarram Khan of Kianae**
- 4. Abdul Shakoor of Katkae religious and tribal leader**

The following subprojects were visited in Kandar cluster:

- 1. Water supply scheme Kandar**
- 2. GPS Kotkae**
- 3. Irrigation channel Kambela**
- 4. Irrigation channel kianae**
- 5. WSS Kotkae**
- 6. Social Forestry Kotkae**
- 7. Social Forestry Kambela**
- 8. Social Forestry Kianae**

Observations

- 1. Schools and basic health units got some minor and at times insignificant repairs, white wash and paint. Although useful but not very impressive and not as expected by the people.**
- 2. Water supply schemes are by and large functioning, although in some cases the maintenance was very bad. Most villages close to the river bank prefer to use the "Sin" i.e. river water, because in the summer it is colder than the piped WSS water. People still do not realize the dangers to health while drinking Indus river water, which passes through at least three major towns upstream. The general feeling is that the river water is sweet and healthy. But the importance of provision of potable water can not be denied, and over time people will get used to it and realize the benefits of potable water. At this stage whether provision of WSS was a priority need expressed by the villagers themselves before these projects were started, remains a question. People do have more pressing needs of roads and health etc.**
- 3. Irrigation resources development is the most important need of Kala Dhaka area. A total of 13 irrigation channels were initiated and all of them have been completed to some useful extent, although some work remains to be done in almost all cases. The farmers in this area seem to be more interested in agriculture, take it more seriously and it provides subsistence living to majority of the area residents. Large tracts of fertile land can be brought under cultivation, if adequate irrigation facilities are provided. All types of crops can be grown, and in fact some farmers expressed interest in raising animals if irrigated pastures could be established along the slopes.**

4. Useful discussions were held with the village elders/masar about the property rights, land distribution system, and the tribal social organization in the area.

5. The following village organizations have been formed:

| Sector | Cluster | No. of VOs |
|--------|-----------|------------|
| North | Sado Khan | 10 |
| | Shagai | 8 |
| South | Kandar | 2 |
| | Geway | 2 |

The social organization work has started in earnest only 1-2 months ago. The villagers have no understanding of the concepts and basic philosophy of self-help based village organizations. Even the social organizers are uncertain about their work, its procedures and objectives. The villagers and members that we talked to thought that the forming of village organizations was just a prerequisite for receiving project funds. This situation is understandable since it is widely accepted that for remote tribal areas like Kala Dhaka, at least for some initial years, the villagers can only be organized around some economic development activities.

6. The PCI as well as others interviewed complained of mismanagement and embezzlement of sub-project funds. We were told that kickbacks were demanded not only by the PCU staff but also by the banks and all others involved in the project matters. The social organizers explained that one cause of the complaints was that for the last few years the PCU engineers were handling all construction and expenditure work themselves. The PCLs wanted to do those jobs themselves, as was the case in Gadoon Amazai. Only since early this year it was decided to hand over the construction work to the project committee leaders. Unfortunately this was too close to project subsistence completion date, and not much funds were left to expend. According to the social organizers the PCL were unhappy because their expectations did not come true and were thus expressing their frustration.
7. The social forestry plantations as well as the new crop varieties introduced seem to have been well received by the population. Incentives and subsidies were involved at all levels, and it is only now that the incentives are being removed. What happens after subsidies have been removed remains to be seen.
8. The social organization of the KD tribes is not well understood by the project and others involved in development work. No efforts seem to have been made to undertake thorough studies of the traditional systems of tribal hierarchy, leadership, and even the jirga system. Reports of village surveys conducted more than two years ago are not available.

ANNEX B1
EVALUATION FIELD NOTES: KOTKAI, KALA DHAKA

The team comprising HMN and ZAJ alongwith Mr. Mohammad Irshad (social organizer) and Shahida Tanoli (lady social organizer) reached Kotkay village by traveling on boat from Darband at 10 A.M. on August 9, 1993. The boat took about 75 minutes. Discussions were held with the following at a tea shop/hotel in Kotkay bazar:

1. Mr. Mohammad Wahab (Imam of a mosque)
2. Mr. Gul Bahadur (Village elder)
3. Mr. Ibrahim Khan (a villager and owner of the shop).

In the beginning Maulana Mohammad Wahab and his companions were not willing to talk but later on were persuaded by the team to cooperate. After listening the objectives and nature of work of the team they were ready to talk. The following interventions were discussed:

Irrigation channel. An irrigation channel was identified and approved in this village and first payment was made to Maulana Mohammad Wahab (PCL). Digging of about 1200 ft. channel took place but afterwards some village politics disturbed the completion of the scheme. According to Maulana Wahab the Project staff selected another person for undertaking this irrigation channel without consulting him or the villagers. Due to this act of Project staff problems were created in this village and the scheme remained incomplete. Due to this reason these leaders had earlier refused to talk to the team because it might create trouble amongst different-groups in the village.

Water supply scheme. According to these village elders this scheme was constructed by the project staff in Kotkay bazar and is benefiting the shop/hotel as well a Primary School located about half a KM from the bazar. The village already had a water supply scheme. These village elders were not very happy with this scheme as they thought that benefits were not utilized by a large number of villagers.

Government primary school (repair and maintenance). The team visited the school building and observed that the floors of two rooms have been plastered with the cement and paints have been done on the doors etc. A cement post for raising flag has also been made. The village elders were not satisfied with this type of work.

Nursery-social forestry. A nursery over on area of 6 - 8 Kanals was established at an annual rent of Rs. 4800/= . Five persons like Chowkidar, Malis etc. were also posted at a cost of Rs. 4500/= per month. Poplar and mulberry plants were developed at this nursery. The village elders were not satisfied with this nursery because they felt that they already had sufficient forest plants. The interest of the villagers in this scheme was limited except that some persons were receiving benefits in the form of rent and salaries.

Agriculture-seeds program. The project staff did distribute some vegetable and maize seeds along with fertilizer but it was not very successful. The village elders were of the opinion that no technical advice was given about planting/sowing of vegetable seeds and also no follow up activities were taken by the project staff in this regard.

Experimental fruit orchard program. Fruit plants like citrus, plums, and apricots were given to the villagers which were partly successful because many plants had an attack of insect pests and diseases. According to these village elders they had never applied any insecticide or pesticide because they could not get this facility. They were interested in growing fruit trees provided they are given complete advice and other facilities.

Free mobile health clinic. The team was informed that only once a team had come to their village for vaccinating their children and women.

Beekeeping. A villager namely Sultan Mohammad was trained in beekeeping and discussions took place in detail. He has successfully developed two other boxes (frames) but due to reasons unknown the colony has been disturbed and he could not get (crop) honey this year. He, however, was firm not only Bee to continue this scheme but also wanted to train other villagers in beekeeping.

Kitchen gardening. The team visited the kitchen gardening program and met with few ladies particularly Mrs. Beladal who had also received training as TBA. In this village the community had given six marlas of land for growing different vegetables. The lady member of our team (ZAJ) visited the site and saw some brinjal, gourd, lady finger, chillies and cucumber plants. These vegetables were grown more like a wild plants and had no planting sequence. The village women informed that they were not given any technical advice. Some plants have been attacked with disease and they did not know any method to control. According to these village women, they would still continue growing these vegetables on their own either through the seed which they have saved or would ask their men to get seed from Darband or Mansehra.

TBA training. The village women informed that out of seven women trained, two were still there (Gul jan and Mrs. Biladal) but they were not practicing.

After in-depth discussions with the village elders and women, their problem seemed to be of a health project because they were of the view that they have to pay an amount of Rs. 1000/= to the boatman for taking their patient to Darband, Oghi, or Mansehra. They were neither interested in social forestry nor in electricity or roads. Their priority is a basic health unit. Although there is no village organization in this village, the villagers seemed to be ready for forming the same provided they are properly guided and educated. The villagers however, complained that no government worker/official or project staff had visited this village (except a few times in connection with the project matters). The women in this village were also keen to do certain useful things if some one trained them in certain activities. The team found villagers very courteous, friendly and receptive in all respects.

Village Garhai (Hasan Zai), Kandar Cluster, Hasan Zai Tribe

The team comprising HMN and ZAJ alongwith the two social organizers namely Mr. Mohammad Irshad and Shahida Tariqi arrived Garhai Hasan Zai village by crossing the lake through boat at 12:25 p.m on August 7, 1993. This village has a population of 1200 persons and cultivated area is approximately 3500 Kanals. The village has one primary and one middle school for boys and one girls primary school with two teachers. There is one religious school (Dini Madrassa) where about 160 children come for learning Islamic education and Urdu. This building has been constructed by the villagers on self help basis and has four rooms with no roof.

The team held discussions in a Hujra where the following village elders were present:

1. Mr. Mumtaz Khan, General Secretary, VDO and a local leader
2. Mr. Lal Faraz Khan, village elder
3. Mr. Abdul Qadeer, a farmer,
4. Mr. Sartaj Gul, a farmer
5. Mr. Sahibur Rehman, president, VDO and
6. Mr. Naseeb Dad, treasurer

The following interventions were discussed:

Soapmaking. Two women have been trained in this village while one man was imparted training in soapmaking at Peshawar. Very little progress has been made through this scheme.

Beekeeping. One man has been trained and he had started a box but no success has been made due to some disease in the colony.

Vegetable seeds. Some seeds were distributed but they have only used for their house consumption. They have not collected seeds for future through seed multiplication process as nobody had ever visited this village after distributing seeds.

Free mobile health clinic. The team was informed that only once a team had come to the village for vaccination purpose. They had also given some medicines and vitamins, syrups etc., but those were not sufficient for all the population.

Agriculture and forestry plots. No agriculture plots were given to this village, however, 10,000 plants concerning forestry like Khona (wild olive), palosa (phulai), Bekian and bamboos what??? etc. Some success has taken place particularly with bamboo plants/trees. The village elders however, complained that the villagers from the upland come to this village and destroy their forest plants and trees.

Improvement in yields of crops. Although no specific programme was initiated by the project staff yet they were using improved seed and chemical fertilizer. Their yields of wheat and maize crops are 8 maunds and maize 7.5 maunds per Kanal respectively which

seem to be highly satisfactory. It may be due to this fact that they want to become self-reliant in these crops and also want to get rid of the high transport charges for bringing the grains from Darband or Mansehra. The team was informed that Rs. 27/= per bag was the minimum amount which a person had to pay for transporting to this village.

Village organization. The team was informed that a VDO had recently been formed in the village on July 13, 1993 with the help of social organizer. The total membership is 100 with a savings of Rs.500/=. They have also formed a nine-member working committee for smooth functioning of their VDO. They have not yet held any meeting but they are planning to hold a meeting for an oath taking ceremony as well as explaining the members about the functions of the organization and duties of members. They were also busy in preparing by-laws of the VDO. The team also talked to Mr. Sahibur Rehman, the President, Mr. Mumtaz Khan, General Secretary and Mr. Naseeb Dad, the treasurer of the VDO. They were very happy having a VDO in their village and they assured the team that they would run this VDO provided they are trained, guided, and educated. They were also prepared to join with other apex organization or NGO if formed. In their opinion they would not face any problem in nominating a person from their VO or from their tribe. Mr. Mumtaz Khan, (educated upto Middle level - 8 classes) general secretary of the VDO had lot of ideas and plans in his mind which he wanted to do through this VDO. Some of the problems and needs which were identified by the village elders were: Irrigation channel (for which a study survey has been done by the project staff but nothing has been done), road (track from the river side upto village), Sanitation/hygiene and cleanliness of village streets; and completion of religious school. The village elders pointed out about a source in their village from where clean drinking water could be supplied provided some big pipelines are installed. Their women bring water from this source. The office bearers of the VO were ready to start these schemes through their VO on self help basis. They were only waiting for strengthening their VO and some out siders for and educating them to run the VO.

The team was pleased to note that sufficient potential for local leadership development through VDO was available in this village. Unfortunately they have not been guided and trained about the objectives and functions of the VDO. Generally the villagers were found to be quite friendly and courteous with the team. They have plans in their minds for village planning. The interesting thing which the team noted was that they never mentioned about the outside help or showed any dependence on the Government. They even complained to the social organizer (who was with the team) that he had never visited their village since July 13,1993 and requested him to visit them for future guidelines. The team formed this impression that there seems to be no specific strategy and methodology with regard to formation of VDO. The villagers were not explained correctly about the aims, objectives, functions and future of village organization.

ANNEX C

EVALUATION FIELD NOTES: WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

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EVALUATION FIELD NOTES: WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

Interviews of Women

Gadoon Amazai and Kala Dhaka

Villages of Gandaf, Kabgani, Besik, Malikabad, Dalori Bala, Devil, and Nara

Discussions were held in NFE centers and in homes stimulated by the following questions:

"Which components improved your life?" The NFE is the best part of the project. We want the NFE to continue since it offers education when there is no primary school. We don't want the NFE to leave our village. It has made a difference in our lives. The second best part is the girl's primary school. Third is roads since it makes it possible for teachers and instructors to come. We need more than one girl's primary school. There have been too many broken promises. We were told we would get 15 girl's primary schools and we only got three. We want girls' schools sited in the village; not off in some isolated area. We were told we would get NFE certificates of completion and we never did. We want education for our children. There is a need to upgrade the girl's middle school to grade 10 and include science courses so that girls can become doctors, LHV's, dentists, and nurses (a woman teacher). For me, it has been the kitchen garden. I never had a chance to go to school. So, instead I try to learn to grow vegetables well. After the kitchen garden kit supplies were used up, I had to use dung for fertilizer, and production decreased. I still am able to grow many vegetables for my household though. I would like more advice.

"How about improvements in the water supply?" There is not enough water either for drinking or for irrigation (Nara). The Ground Water Tanks (GWT) can cause sickness. A snake got in the GWT and caused the cholera deaths in another village. We were immune because we knew about Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS).

"How about the health component?" The lady health visitor (LHV) has never visited our village. We prefer having our babies delivered by the dai who charges rupees 300 for a boy, and rupees 200 for a girl. She is more experienced than the midwife at the Basic Health Unit (BHU). We have less children than our mothers did. There are no family planning supplies at the BHU. We want family planning after we have four or five children, but our husbands do not want to use contraceptives because they think it is illegal from the viewpoint of Islam since children are a gift from God. Some educated husbands allow their wives to use contraceptives. Some women don't tell their husbands but go to a lady doctor in Topi for contraceptive injections.

"Has life improved for most people in the village since the project was initiated?" There are too many poor people (Nara). They don't have decent clothes or enough to eat. About 30 percent of the people are in great need. Please do something about it. Women

are glad that there is no more opium growing because it was too much work. It is the men who want it.

Interviews of Women and Men Enroute and at Kala Dhaka Villages of Niway Killay and Kandar

(On boat to Niway Killay, homeopathic doctor, Dr. Kalim Ullah): The KDADP reconstituted a boy's primary school for the villages, Marrir and Nadary; the girls' primary school was established three years ago. We have four dai who have not yet been trained by the BHU which is one half kilometer away. Many of our animals and chickens have died because the veterinary services are five kilometers away. The best KDADP components have been first the roads, second health and education facilities and WSS's. The women in the villages want income earning training. The men are leaving. If there are four men, three will go to Karachi.

Niway Killay and Kandar Villages

The best KDADP component is the track. We like the kitchen gardens and grow corn, okra, cucumber, and spinach. We eat the vegetables ourselves and give them to the children. We just harvested a lot of onions. You can see them stored in the houses. If there are more women in the family there are better kitchen gardens. When we save extra vegetables, or eggs, we don't sell them. It is not in our culture to sell such things (Niway Killay). We eat fish caught in Tarbella Lake (with nets held up by empty plastic bottles). We sell chickens, eggs, ghee, and one woman sells sewed salwar kemis for 20 to 30 rupees (Kandar). We are satisfied with the water. There also are house connections (one house had a bath stall). We need a metaled road first, then electricity, and education third. Another woman said, no, we need education first and then improved transport. We only have transport twice a day, in the morning the transport goes to town, and in the afternoon it comes back. We women prefer traveling by boat. Still another woman said we need a metaled road, then a hospital, and last, electricity. Because we lack electricity as you can see we only have a kerosene driven fan (turned on after much pumping for the guests' benefit). We can't have a refrigerator either so we have to go to the river to get cool water.

We only had two vaccinations of EPI and we had to take the boat to Darband twice to complete the last two shots (Niway Killay). We never had the EPI (Kandar). We collect firewood from the river (probably floated down as a result of illegal logging). It is washed down from the jungle and tossed up on shore to dry out. A lot of our men have gone to Karachi. They can stay from one to one and one half years. sometimes the mother and wife go. The girls become educated in Urdu there. The men like to use their Karachi money first to build a house with a metal roof. Then they buy household things, clothes, and a radio, and last they will use their money to arrange a marriage. We women would like to have sewing machines. A few women embroider empty fertilizer bags and make them into prayer mats. They also embroider pillow cases and tablecloths. Yes, we have the soap making equipment (shown large metal wok-like pan, ladle, and box into which soap mixture is poured for hardening and division into bars). We haven't used the equipment lately because we used up all the supplies we were given, and we only can get them in Peshawar

and there is no one around to buy them now. (When soap is unavailable only water is used to clean the dishes, and ashes and sand to clean the pots). I am a midwife who received training as a TBA (brought out kit in metal box with razor blades, nail brush, soap, gauze, cloth, and pot), and received information on pre- and post-natal care, and nutrition for the mother and weaning food for the baby after four months. I don't charge for deliveries whether it is a boy or a girl. They can give me something if they want to. The BHU is three kilometers away (Kandar). The male community health worker strolled in and said the most common village ailments were skin diseases and whooping cough. Beekeeping is in another village, and it was taken over from women by one man because there are many boxes containing the bees which have to be moved when the hive moves to a new location.

**Interview with Dr. Muhammed Aqwel
BHU, Uvla, Gadoon Amazai**

The BHU is being upgraded to a Rural Health Center (RHC) which will be equipped with a laboratory, dental clinic, and x-ray facilities. It will have four medical doctors, two male, one female, and one dentist. There has been no change in the morbidity and mortality rate for the uneducated as a result of the project supplied WSS's. Only the educated have improved their morbidity rates. Due to the lack of knowledge of proper sanitation procedures in the village the drinking water supply often becomes polluted. Consequently, there are severe outbreaks of gastro-intestinal illnesses. The NFE hygiene and sanitation training is not professional enough. The NFE teachers should have more training from the BHU doctor, and/or the Department of Health. It is difficult to understand why project supported NFE hygiene instructors have never sought advice, help, or training from the BHU. The NFE trainers need to emphasize and re-emphasize sanitation and nutritional principles. To maintain sanitation, village and school latrines are needed. The NGO, Tanzeem Haqooqul Ibad Gadoon (Gadoon Organization for Human Rights) is the only agency supplying latrines to the villages. The NGO also supplies WSS to schools.

There is much protein and calorie malnutrition, particularly among the poor, in the Gadoon-Amazai villages. There also are mineral and vitamin deficiencies, and a lack of sufficient iodine in the water supply which leads to a high incidence of goiter. There is much neo-natal umbilical cord infection as a result of the use of a non-sterile knife by the dai, and relatively high infection rates in seven- and eight-day old circumcised male infants as a result of the use of non-sterile cutting instruments by the barber. Both of these practices contribute to relatively high infant mortality rates. Female infants and children can be neglected. Many girls and women suffer from anemia. Each village should have three community public health workers, trained by the Department of Health. The community public health workers are not as effective as they should be because they lack kits. They should dispense family planning information, but family planning is a policy which is just on paper. There are no family planning supplies.

**Interview with Dr. Mohamad Rafiq, District Health Officer
Mansehra**

Ten village health workers (VHW) from the Kala Dhaka area received training in sanitation, ORS, symptoms of iodine deficiency disease and diarrhoea, and the need for EPI. They only were paid during the training period. After that we let them earn some money by selling medicines. Kala Dhaka has 11 BHU, but no RHC as yet. We have trained 68 TBA from the settled areas. The building of village latrines has been suggested. The "malik" in each village is responsible for the WSS, and he can contact the BHU for advice. As for morbidity and mortality rates for Kala Dhaka, ask the Deputy Commissioner (D.C.). We only receive health statistics from the settled areas. The statistics from the Kala Dhaka BHU's are not reliable. There are no LHV's in Kala Dhaka; they only are present in the settled areas. We have not had any direct contact with the KDADP and therefore we can not take over the mobile clinics. A link should have been established. Possibly, UNICEF or Save the Children will sponsor them. Kala Dhaka is a very difficult area to service due to inaccessible terrain. It can take the villagers one or two hours to reach a BHU. Then there are many landslides, too. The foundation of the BHU's on the left side of the Indus River collapsed because of one. Traditional attitudes prevent optimum use of health facilities in Kala Dhaka. We established a dispensary in Manjakold (sp?) but the public is not using it enough even though we are dispensing some medicines for malaria and diarrhoea free. We only charge for the most expensive ones. The majority of patients at the BHU are women. Many have gynecological problems. The male doctors treat the women through a TBA intermediary. Water is deficient in iodine in Kala Dhaka, and those afflicted by iodine deficiency disease need two capsules and an injection within a year to prevent developing goiter. There are a lot of infections caused by staphylococcus bacteria in Kala Dhaka.

ANNEX D

EVALUATION FIELD NOTES: PARD PESHAWAR

ANNEX D
EVALUATION FIELD NOTES: PARD PESHAWAR

The NWF Area Development Projects (NWFADP) Evaluation Team met Mr. Abdullah, Director PARD/NIPA, Peshawar on August 19, 1993, Thursday at 10.00 a.m. at the request of the Asianics Agro-Dev International, Islamabad, to solicit his views on the projects under evaluation. The following team members attended:

- | | |
|--------------------------|-------------|
| 1. Dr. James M.B. Keyser | Team Leader |
| 2. Dr. Pauline D. Milone | Member |
| 3. Dr. Pervaiz Amir | Member |
| 4. Dr. S. Zia Al-Jalaly | Member |
| 5. Mr. Hasan Mehdi Naqvi | Member |

Mr. Abdullah, Director PARD/NIPA asked the leader of the group to initiate the discussion in the light of their evaluation study of NWFAD Project so that problem areas could be focussed upon. Dr. James Keyser team leader of the group highlighted the aims, objectives of the assignment and briefly referred to the state of things on ground. Responding to this the director remarked that the main focus of their discussion would be the achievements of the projects and their sustainability in future. The group agreed on this framework of discussion and rest of the time was spent on the major issues involved therein.

The director initiated the discussion by referring to the location of the poppy growing areas in the province and emphasized that inaccessibility of these areas combined with the socio-religious sanctions against the cultivation of poppy was the main reason for the persistence of this menace in such isolated pockets of the province. Since almost 50 percent of the poppy cultivation took place in Gadoon Amazai Area, therefore, this pocket was rightly selected for administrative action. There was intense pressure on the government to ensure complete eradication of poppy which resulted in an unprecedented punitive action including use of choppers, police and civil armed forces. This resulted in number of casualties and the government was awakened to provide a substantial answer to the employment problems of the local population after fully realizing that a punitive action not followed by a visible economic activity would complicate matters and would be counterproductive. The area developmental program was already on ground before the use of force but the developmental activities pertained only to the social sector and partly to building up of infrastructure. This obviously did not satisfy the local population because these activities did not ensure their livelihood. Certain incentives in the form of fertilizers and seeds were added to the area development program but it did not make much difference. Employment promises in the government departments and abroad did not materialize. It was against the backdrop of these developments that an industrial estate located in the Gadoon Area was thoughtfully proposed by the provincial government and thus GAIE (Gadoon Amazai Industrial Estate) was born. In order to attract investment in this desolate area SRO-517 was issued by Central Board of Revenue which provided an attractive incentive of duty

free import of raw material to be specifically utilized in the Industrial units located at GAIE. This was the only way to ensure investment because earlier arrangements failed to attract the investors. SRO 517 provided a big boost and substantial activities started but unfortunately it generated criticism from other parts of the country which resulted in reviewing the concessional framework and thus eventually the concession provided in SRO 517 in the form of duty free import of raw material was substantially reduced. This as expected resulted in the slowing down of the investments and there is no hope of any further investment in this estate. Even the industrial plots are being returned to Sarhad Development Authority. The provincial government introduced an employment formula for GAIE which specified 65 percent employment for Gadoon, 25 percent for Swabi and 10 percent for the remaining parts of the province. Out of approximately 7000 employees as reported by the Department of Industries, 39 percent employment goes to Gadoon, 19 percent to Swabi, 16 percent to NWFP and 26 percent to other parts of the country. The issues were raised at various levels including the provincial legislature and instructions were issued by provincial government to follow the employment formula in letter and spirit. GAIE was supposed to provide complete employment cover both directly and indirectly but owing to the withdrawal of concessions that promise would remain unfulfilled if corrective measures are not taken to attract and sustain further investment.

Director PARD was of the opinion that reversing the decisions of the government may not be possible and the only insurance which could be provided to GAIE was to accommodate the manufactured goods of this estate under the mutually arranged quotas between USA and Pakistan which was justifiable because GAIE was a narcotics related project and thus had better claims to such a treatment. This was the only way, to sustain reasonable investment and employment in this area.

The discussion also centered on the institutional support for sustaining the economic activities in the project areas. The director was of the view that the most effective institutional framework for such situations was the local government. Leaving the entire responsibility to the NGOs was not desirable because of the fragility of NGO culture. He further observed that mushrooming of NGOs in the recent years should be critically examined and it should be empirically determined whether the recent growth of NGOs was a consequence of the availability of foreign funds or a genuine psychological shifts for organizing the communities. It is likely that the recent NGO expansion is the result of availability of funds which he called "availability Syndrome". The charges of corruption against the government institutions did not justify the bypassing of the government and wholly relying on the NGOs because the government institutions have some accountable framework which the NGOs painfully lack.

The discussions also turned towards the proliferation of developmental organizations dealing with the project areas. This made things difficult to integrate into a durable and predictable framework. Director PARD/NIPA was of the view that instead of creating numerous organizations it would have been more pragmatic to reinforce the line departments with Planning and Development Department playing the role of monitoring and evaluation agency. If planners implement and then evaluate themselves things are likely to be less objective. He further observed that this spread of organizations as he saw it was mostly due

to the misplaced exuberance of advisors and expatriates whose preference was visibility rather than sustainability of the projects. The provincial government being on the receiving end mostly responded to such atomistic approaches. However the achievements of the provincial government should be seen in the light of the constraints placed on them.

The director further commented on the role of PARD/NIPA in promotion of Human Resource Development, research and experimentation. He further observed that PARD was quite capable of monitoring and evaluation of such projects with pronounced bias for rural development. He emphasized that as in the recent past PARD monitoring and evaluation exercises would be academic and would concentrate both on the achievements and failures without unnecessarily sweetening their critiques. This was necessary because any critical study which was not academically sustainable could not be used as training material in the class room which has been the testing ground for all other research activities so far. "We do not leave the research exercises in the drawers and use them as our own training material." He also observed that PARD/NIPA involvement in such type of exercise would be within the policy framework of the government.

In the end, director of PARD/NIPA emphasized that his views were of personal nature and he was looking at things as a practitioner of Rural Development. His views have nothing to do with the official standpoint of the provincial/federal governments which could be obtained by members of the team by having discussions with the concerned quarters.

The team leader thanked Mr. Abdul'ah for the highly informative session and the practical solutions offered regarding various problems pertaining to NWFAD projects.

ANNEX E

A NOTE ON EDUCATION IN GADOON AMAZAI

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A NOTE ON EDUCATION IN GADOON AMAZAI

Establishing schools or expanding facilities was one of the interventions that the project has been undertaking. Initially- the schools had also been started in rented buildings, but keeping in view the long term sustainability of such an activity, buildings have been constructed. The need for buildings was also fact in order to lessen the burden of recurrent expenditure (rent) on the government exchequer as ultimately the schools are to be taken over by the government of NWFP.

Design

The standard design for a primary schools consists of 2 rooms and a verandah. This is being followed. While for a middle school the government requirement is 3500 sq.ft of land and for high Schools, it is 5300 sq.ft of land. The design of the high and middles school seem to be satisfactory.

Findings and observation

The total number of schools constructed for girls stand at 45 and for boys it is 112 of which 80 of the boys schools and 22 of the girls schools have been completed (see appendix 1). In most cases the project has been able to introduce schools in areas where the concept of education did not exist. This was particularly the case for girls education. A start was made with the adult literacy education that had been started through the NFE centers. for a primary girls schools.

- In terms of design, the 2 room primary schools seem to be too congested to accommodate the different classes, especially where the teachers are not trained to teach different classes at the same location simultaneously.
- The total enrollment in the boys school is approximately 3529. There are 99 girls studying in the boys schools.
- Total number of teachers in the boys schools stand at 229 Only 13 of the boys schools have water connection
- Most of the girls schools have a latrine which is not available to the boys schools (primary).
- 10 of the boy schools have no furniture/mats while the rent are fully or adequately furnished.
- For the middle and high schools the absence of science laboratories is felt.

Source: NWFAD Project Analysis report in Gadoon Amazai Education (boys school).

The present status of the 45 girls schools show 22 of these to have been completed and 18 of these have been handed over to the GONWFP. These are:

| | |
|---------------------|---------------|
| 1. GGPS Ziarat Bala | U.C. Baitgali |
| 2. GGPS Baitgali | " |
| 3. GGPS Devi | " |
| 4. GGPS Singah | " |
| 5. GGPS Perba | Nara |
| 6. GGPS Degra | " |
| 7. GGPS Dhero | Gandaf |
| 8. GGPS Gundaf | " |
| 9. GGMS Gundaf | " |
| 10. GGPS Qadra | Kabgani |
| 11. GGPS Takail | " |
| 12. GGPS kot | Gabasni |
| 13. GGPS Mangalchai | " |
| 14. GGPS Sokali | " |
| 15. GGMS Uvla | Ganichatra |
| 16. GGPS Saproona | Gabasni |
| 17. GGMS Bhatti | Nagrai |
| 18. GGMS Shahdum | Nagrai |

BOYS SCHOOL COMPLETED

| | <i>GPS</i> | <i>GMS</i> | <i>GHS</i> | <i>TOTAL</i> |
|--|------------|------------|------------|--------------|
| Total number of completed boys schools | 53 | 14 | 7 | 74 |
| Total number of schools in operation | 46 | 13 | 6 | 65 |
| Schools not in operation | 6 | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| No. of students enrolled | 1663 | 781 | 1085 | 3529 |
| No. of teachers assigned | 84 | 79 | 98 | 261 |
| Girls students enrolled | 105 | 2 | 2 | 109 |
| No. of schools with latrine | 0 | 12 | 6 | 18 |
| No. of schools with water | 4 | 4 | 4 | 12 |

1 excluding 210 students under 5 years of age in GPS.

Source: NWFADP Analysis reports on Gadoon Amazai Education (Boys sector). May-June 1993.

Appendix-2

| | <i>No.</i> | <i>%</i> | <i>No. completed</i> | <i>%</i> |
|-------------------------|----------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Total schools | 157 | 100 | 102 | 100 |
| male | 112 | 71.34 | 80 | 78.43 |
| female | 45 | 28.66 | 22 | 21.57 |
| total rooms(additional) | 13 | 12.75 | | |
| total repairs | 6 | 5.88 | | |
| new schools | 83 | 81.37 | | |
| Sub sector Education | | <i>(Rupees)</i> | <i>US\$</i> | |
| Costs | 46,265,797.00 | | 1,850,631.88 | |
| completed schools | 31,041,362.00 | | 1,241,654.48 | |
| cost per school | 304,327.08 | | 12,173.08 | |
| Schumacker's survey | <i>No.</i> | <i>No. functioning</i> | <i>%</i> | |
| boys' schools | 68 | 49 | 72.06 | |
| Functioning schools | <i>Primary</i> | <i>middle</i> | <i>High</i> | |
| | 30 | 11 | 8 | |
| Union Councils | <i>No.</i> | <i>%</i> | | |
| Baitgali | 41 | 26.11 | | |
| Ganichatra | 9 | 5.73 | | |
| Gabasni | 28 | 17.83 | | |
| Kabgani | 14 | 8.92 | | |
| Nara | 25 | 15.92 | | |
| Nagrai | 23 | 14.65 | | |
| Gandaf | 17 | 10.83 | | |

Appendix-3

GIRLS SCHOOL

| Union Council | Primary | Middle | High |
|----------------------|----------------|---------------|-------------|
| Baitgali | 10 | - | - |
| Nara | 8 | - | - |
| Gandaf | 5 | - | 1 |
| Ganichatra | 4 | - | 1 |
| Gabasni | 10 | - | - |
| Kabgani | 2 | 1 | - |
| Nagri | 1 | - | - |
| Total | 40 | | |

Note: The two high schools have recently been upgraded from middle schools.

CAFETERIA

For High School

1. Enrollment in 8th class not less than 15.
2. Enrollment in feeder schools not less than 20.
3. 35 students be available for enrollment in class IX.
4. No other high school exists within the radius of 6 Km of the proposed school.
5. 5400 sq.ft of land within the school premises be available for construction and upgradation.

For Middle School

1. Enrollment in 4th/5th class not less than 15.
2. Enrollment in 4th/5th class in feeder schools not less than 20.
3. 35 students available for class VI.
4. No middle school exists within the radius of 6 km.
5. 3500 sq.ft of land available within or adjacent to the proposed school free of cost.

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ANNEX F

A NOTE ON EDUCATION IN KALA DHAKA

ANNEX F
A NOTE ON EDUCATION IN KALA DHAKA

The education sector was handled under the "Community-based Small Infrastructure" category of activities. The literacy rate in the project area is about 1 percent overall and less than 1 percent for women.

Design

Keeping in view the limited resources available to undertake different activities and the high cost of construction of buildings on one hand and the need to involve the community on the other hand, the project strategy involved 3 approaches firstly, as there are already about a hundred schools in the area the emphasis was on helping with repair of the existing schools and making them operational (see table 1). No new school was built.

The second approach was the training component, where a number of teachers were provided with PTC training. In the first phase 10 matriculates were sent for training to Haripur (1990). In 1991, nine of these (1990 batch) completed the training and 12 more candidates were sent. Nine of these completed training and 12 more were sent to Thana in Malakand for training (1992). During this time seven of the candidates who had previously completed the PTC training were absorbed in the Kala Dhaka schools.

No women could be sent for PTC training as educated females are not available in the project area.

Five persons were trained in PTC In-Service short-term training. The third approach was the formation of Education Committees which were to help create the environment in the villages (through dialogues with Jirgas and through motivation) to enable the female teachers who are posted in the schools at Kala Dhaka, to be able to function. The question of security is a major factor in maintaining the services of these teachers. The education committee and the social organizers also helped the education department to gain access to some of these schools that existed only on paper and helped to make them functional

Beneficiaries

At one level the beneficiaries include the young school going age boys and girls who now have an opportunity to attend school regularly in some of these areas. Previously, even through schools existed in the area, the teachers assigned to these schools either did not join their posts or attended the schools infrequently. The situation was worse in the case of the girls schools, where the teachers were unable to reach the assigned posts and continue with their tasks due to the non-conducive environment. The project helped to make the schools functional with the community's help and participation.

At the second level, the beneficiaries include the local matriculate males who have received PTC training and some of them have been absorbed into the Kala Dhaka schools. This has led to regular teacher attendance on one hand and improved the income levels where the income earned by the teacher are a part of the family income. This is also an incentive for other individuals to go in for education and take up teaching as a profession. However, there is not possibility for the female segment of the population to benefit in a similar manner since all the female teachers come from outside the village.

Sustainability

The project's activities as such were not on a long-term basis, nor was there an infrastructure component included. However, the project made an effort to involve the community through motivation and creation of awareness regarding the value of male and female education. If the government department makes the necessary efforts or the community feels the need for educating the young population and approaches the relevant government departments the activity will be sustainable. At this point it is not possible to determine whether the community will be able to continue with these activities or whether the value of education will be important to the community.

It is important to note that the schools visited were located at a distance from the center of habitation with difficult access. Little planning seems to have been undertaken in locating the schools where they would be accessible to the children. In one particular village (Garhi Hassanzai) after the construction of a Madrassa (even though it is incomplete and has no roof) there is a large attendance of 160 students, many of them have left the formal schools and joined the Madrassa.

Schools in the Project Area

| | No. of schools |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|
| GPS (boys) | 50 |
| GMS (boys) | 10 |
| Mosque schools | 66 |
| High schools (recently upgraded) | 1 |

Source: Office of ASDEO (Mansehra)

There are 6 primary schools for girls. These are located in the following villages.

| | |
|--------|---------|
| Dillo | Garhai |
| Kanar | Zangao |
| Bimbar | Marmari |

ANNEX G

A NOTE ON GADOON AMAZAI IRRIGATION SCHEMES

ANNEX G
A NOTE ON GADOON AMAZAI IRRIGATION SCHEMES

A. Introduction and Design

Traditionally all crop raising in Gadoon Amazai area has been dependent upon either direct rainfall or on irrigation channels derived from natural springs and perennial streams. The springs and perennial streams existed only in the higher altitude hilly areas comprising five of the seven union councils of the project area. These union councils are those of Nara, Gabasni, Ganichatra, Baitgali, and Nagrai. The remaining two union councils of Gandaf and Kabgani consist mainly of lowland plains and traditionally only rainfed agriculture was practiced here.

In the project paper it was envisaged to develop irrigation systems in the two areas by following two different approaches. In the hilly areas the irrigation channel systems have worked effectively and it was decided to limit project interventions to the lining of existing channels and construction of a few new irrigation channels. For Gandaf-Malikabad plains it was decided to first undertake an underground water resources survey through Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The survey revealed that plenty of underground water reserves existed and that if exploited most of the Gandaf-Malikabad plains and foothills could be brought under irrigation. In this case it was decided to invest in surface or hand dug wells and in tube wells to tap both the shallow and deep underground aquifers.

A1. Irrigation and Water Supply Sector Costs

The costs shown in Table G-1 are based on information contained in the 7/21/93 report, provided by the GA project office at Tarbela.

Table G-1: Costs of Irrigation Systems

| <i>System</i> | <i>Total No.</i> | <i>Total Amount</i> | <i>Cost M Rs. % of total</i> | <i>Average Cost/Sys. (Rs.)</i> |
|---------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| IC | 322 | 29.8 | 33.12 | 92,650 |
| TW | 5 | 4.21 | 4.68 | 842,000 |
| DW | 215 | 30.382 | 33.77 | 141,000 |
| WSS | 116 | 25.58 | 28.43 | 220,500 |

The information in Table G-2 provided by the by the Office of Engineering, USAID, shows the additions that have occurred in irrigation and water sectors, since the evaluation in 1990.

Table G-2: Increase in Irrigation Systems Since 1987 and 1990.

| | <i>Irrig.</i> | <i>Chan. Dugwells</i> | <i>Tubewells</i> | <i>WSS</i> |
|-----------|---------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------|
| 1987-1990 | 128 | 48 | 5 | 60 |
| 1990-1993 | 322 | 215 | 5 | 116 |
| % Change | 152 | 348 | 0 | 93 |

Taking into account the various socioeconomic as well as accessibility factors prevailing at the time, the costs per system seem to be within reasonable limits. The progress in the development of new irrigation systems since the last evaluation has been satisfactory.

A2. Irrigation Schemes Distribution

Distribution of irrigation subprojects among union councils is shown in Table G-3.

Table G-3: Distribution of Irrigation Systems in Various UCs.

| <i>Union Council</i> | <i>Water SS</i> | | <i>Irr. Channels</i> | | <i>Tubewells</i> | | <i>Dugwells</i> | |
|----------------------|-----------------|------------|----------------------|------------|------------------|------------|-----------------|------------|
| | <i>No.</i> | <i>%</i> | <i>No.</i> | <i>%</i> | <i>No.</i> | <i>%</i> | <i>No.</i> | <i>%</i> |
| Gabasni | 18 | 16 | 87 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 4 |
| Gandaf | 10 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 80 | 57 | 27 |
| Ganichatra | 6 | 5 | 40 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 10 |
| Kabgani | 4 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 20 | 125 | 58 |
| Baitgali | 42 | 36 | 67 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| Nara | 17 | 15 | 59 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nagrai | 19 | 16 | 61 | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 116 | 100 | 322 | 100 | 5 | 100 | 215 | 100 |

The differences among various union councils with respect to forms of irrigation systems are mainly based on topographic conditions prevailing in each of the administrative divisions. Only the plains and foothills of Gandaf and Kabgani provide conducive conditions and the need for tubewells and dugwells. Similarly Improvement and development of irrigation channels to utilize the existing water resources from springs and streams is the

most cost effective way to be followed in the five hilly union councils. The project decisions with regard to location of sub-projects was appropriate and fully justified.

B. Benefits of the Irrigation Subprojects

B1. Elimination of Poppy and Increase in Area Under Staples

Although elimination of opium poppy cultivation is mainly the result of enforcement measures, the development and improvement of irrigation systems have given farmers some incentives and hope for better income and a reasonable living even without poppy cultivation. Most of all the replacement of poppy by wheat, the main staple of the area, is an important step towards self sufficiency in food. Table G-4 shows a progressive increase in the total cropped area as well as in the area under wheat, while only a negligible area remains under poppy.

Table G-4: Elimination of Poppy Production

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Total cropped Area</i> | <i>Area under poppy</i> | <i>% of total area</i> | <i>Area under wheat</i> | <i>% of total area</i> |
|-------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 1983 | 30,000 | 7,500 | 25 | 10,500 | 35 |
| 1986/87 | 37,793 | 8,824 | 23 | 12,137 | 32 |
| 1987/88 | 47,112 | 448 | 0.9 | 25,293 | 54 |
| 1988/89 | 49,349 | 157 | 0.3 | 28,269 | 57 |
| 1989/90 | 52,533 | 22 | 0.04 | 29,889 | 57 |
| 1990/91 | 52,494 | 32 | 0.06 | 28,994 | 55 |
| 1991/92 | 50,881 | 40 | 0.08 | 26,620 | 52 |

The above data has been taken from various USAID and consultant reports, but our own field investigations and interviews confirmed that these figures were approximately correct.

B2. Change in Income Due to the Irrigation Development Activities

No reliable data are available, nor was it possible to collect any during the evaluation period. However the changes in the areas as shown in Table G-5 are indicative of changes in farmer incomes.

Table G-5: Change in General Cropping Patterns

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Percent of total area under the crops</i> | | | | <i>Cropping Intensity</i> |
|-------------|--|--------------|--------------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| | <i>Poppy</i> | <i>Wheat</i> | <i>Maize</i> | <i>Cash crops</i> | |
| 1986/87 | 23 | 32 | 44 | 1 | 112% |
| 1987/88 | 1 | 53 | 45 | 1 | |
| 1988/89 | 0.3 | 57 | 42 | 0.7 | |
| 1989/90 | 0.04 | 57 | 41 | 1.96 | |
| 1990/91 | 0.06 | 55 | 41 | 3.94 | |
| 1991/92 | 0.08 | 52 | 44 | 3.92 | 183% |

The studies conducted by consultants Haq, Khan, Toru, Mahmood, Ali and Naeem (Condition Survey on Fruit Orchards and Irrigation Sub-Projects, May-June, 1993), show that significant changes in total area under irrigation and in cropping patterns have occurred since the introduction of various irrigation systems (Tables G-6, G-7, and G-8).

Table G-6: Increase in Irrigated Area and Families Benefited

| <i>UC</i> | <i>System</i> | <i>Systems Compltd</i> | <i>Families Benefited</i> | <i>Pre-proj Irr. Ac.</i> | <i>New Area Irr. Ac</i> | <i>Total Area Irr. Acres</i> |
|--------------|---------------|------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| NA | IC | 13 | 83 | 95.87 | 22.5 | 118.37 |
| BI | IC | 4 | 18 | 8.5 | 23.75 | 32.25 |
| GI | IC | 10 | 58 | 36.68 | 1377 | 50.45 |
| GA | IC | 4 | 26 | 16.5 | 2 | 18.5 |
| NI | IC | 26 | 409 | 581.2 | 519.5 | 1100.7 |
| Total | | 57 | 594 | 738.75 | 581.6 | 1320.3 |
| GA | DW | 4 | 5 | 20.50 | 0 | 20.50 |
| KI | DW | 73 | 85 | 279.91 | 4.71 | 284.62 |
| GF | DW | 31 | 31 | 129 | 17 | 146.00 |
| Total | | 109 | 122 | 429.41 | 21.71 | 451.12 |

Table G-7: Changes in Cropping Patterns Due to Irrigation Channels

| <i>UC</i> | <i>Wheat</i> | <i>Maize</i> | <i>Poppy</i> | <i>Cash Cr.</i> | <i>Total inten.</i> | <i>Cropping %</i> |
|---------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| NA | 15 | 90.62 | 81.87 | 0 | 187.49 | 196 Prev |
| | 118.37 | 118.37 | 0 | 14 | 250.74 | 212 Curr |
| BI | 0 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 0 | 17 | 200 |
| | 32.25 | 32.25 | 0 | 9 | 73.5 | 228 |
| GI | 0 | 36.68 | 36.68 | 0 | 73.36 | 145 |
| | 50.45 | 50.45 | 0 | 1500 | 115.9 | 230 |
| GA | 0 | 16.5 | 17.5 | 0 | 34 | 184 |
| | 18.5 | 16.5 | 0 | 7 | 42 | 227 |
| NI | 0 | 581.2 | 581.2 | 0 | 1162.4 | 106 |
| | 834 | 949.7 | 0 | 144 | 2124.4 | 203 |
| Total: | 15 | 733.5 | 725.75 | 0 | 1474.3 | 112 |
| | 1053 | 1167 | 0 | 189 | 2409.6 | 183 |

Table G-8: Changes in Cropping Patterns Due to Dugwells

| <i>UC</i> | <i>Wheat</i> | <i>Maize</i> | <i>Poppy</i> | <i>Cash Cr.</i> | <i>Total inten.</i> | <i>Cropping %</i> |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| *** | | | | | | |
| GA | 0 | 0 | 20.5 | 0 | 20.50 | 100 |
| Prev. | | | | | | |
| | 20.5 | 20.5 | 0 | 1.00 | 42.00 | 204 |
| Curr. | | | | | | |
| KI | 0 | 279.91 | 279.91 | 0 | 559.82 | 196P |
| | 284.62 | 284.62 | 0 | 6.91 | 576.15 | 202C |
| GF | 6.00 | 86 | 86.5 | 0 | 178.5 | 122P |
| | 132.5 | 0 | 128.5 | 20 | 281.00 | 192C |
| Total: | 6.00 | 366.41 | 386.41 | 0 | 758.82 | 168P |
| | 437.62 | 433.62 | 0 | 27.91 | 899.15 | 199 |

The increase in area under irrigation, and the changes in cropping patterns are expected to have resulted in increased incomes to farmers. Comparing current farmer incomes with pre-project income from poppy production is not relevant. The inclusion of progressively higher cash crop area and more emphasis on wheat will result in higher incomes and in self sufficiency in the local staple wheat.

C. Beneficiaries/Equity Issues

C1. Most project development activities in Gadoon Amazai started after action by law enforcement agencies in 1986-87, as a result of which poppy production came to a virtual stop. There were no clear policy guidelines as to which groups will receive project assistance, but it was assumed that majority of project benefits will go to the people who had to forego incomes from poppy growing. In pre-project days each village had a few relatively large poppy growers, who would advance loans to, and buy from small producers of the area, and sell their own produce alongwith purchased quantities to bigger dealers in the Gandaf market. During 1986-87 the project and PCU personnel spent tremendous time and effort in convincing the area residents to accept project interventions. Those who were first convinced included an unproportionately higher number from the former producer cum dealer groups. The dugwells and newly built irrigation channels were given to the richer and more influential farmers of the area. According to best available estimates only the top 20 percent of the farmers were able to avail about 90 percent of the project benefits.

C2. Large land owners give their lands on annual or long term lease, normally to landless tenants or small holders. New irrigation facilities have increased the value of land and the lease rates charged from the tenants or leasees have been raised. Under traditional arrangements of share cropping, land and water costs are borne by the owner, while all labor and bullocks are contributed by the share cropper. Provision of free irrigation water, has reduced owners share of the costs while those of the share cropper or tenant remained the same.

C3. Three tubewells are ready to go to operation immediately while another five will be operational after civil works are completed. All tubewells are reported to be located in areas where an average holding size varies between 1/4th of an acre to one and one half acre. The benefits of tubewells will be equitably distributed among the 800 to 1000 small holders of the area once the project is completed.

D. Sustainability

Provision of irrigation facilities, particularly in the plain areas of Gadoon, have created new and keen interest in agriculture among area residents. This was obvious from the various interviews with farmers in all the union councils. A small but important segment of local farmers have availed the AID provided irrigation facilities and other subsidies to the fullest extent possible. With new crop varieties, orchards, and high incomes there is a new interest in agriculture, which is expected to be sustained.

Land-owning families particularly those with family members in Karachi and the Gulf States who were not undertaking any investment in land before, are now inclined to do that. It is expected that during the coming years more investment in land and more intensive cultivation leading to higher incomes will take place.

Improvements in the previously existing irrigation channels would be sustained, since there are traditionally established systems of maintenance. However, most of the newly

constructed irrigation channels are already faced with problems of disrepair, abandonment, and with reported disputes. Benefits from these channels will probably not be possible to sustain.

The less than 50 percent of the dugwells that were given to genuinely deserving farmers are being maintained well. Because of their private ownership and higher profits as both land and water become more productive, these will be sustained.

The tubewell projects could be successfully sustained, if beneficiaries are able to form water users associations for their management. The Director F'CU informed the team on August 17 that the problems between the NWFP Irrigation Department and the beneficiary farmers have finally been settled, and the department will start operating the tubewells with immediate effect. The irrigation department is managing tubewell and other irrigation systems throughout the country. Like other government run systems these are not efficient. For the long term sustainability the farmers must organize themselves and form water users associations.

E. Conclusions

Implementing irrigation projects through project committee leaders was an unwise decision, which gave rise to many problems including inferior quality of work.

Surveys conducted by consultants and project staff indicated that 60 percent of all dugwells constructed through project funds have been temporarily or permanently abandoned. Another survey showed that in case of 58 percent of the dugwells surveyed, the owners had sold away the project provided motors, pumps and other accessories.

Some irrigation channels particularly the newly constructed ones were found abandoned, lacking repair and maintenance and in some cases disputed.

Expenditure on tubewells is a worthwhile investment, but a delay of over three years after they were complete in all respects was an avoidable waste. Although the NWFP irrigation department and farmers have now agreed to operate these tubewells, the land in the command area and the farmers themselves are not yet prepared to take full advantage of these new irrigation systems.

Consultants Ghufuranul Haq, Mohammad Azhar Khan, Murad Ali Toryu, Ilyas Mahmood, Niaz Ali, and Mohammad Naeem, conducted a survey and reported their findings in "Condition Survey on Fruit Orchards and Irrigation Sub-projects (May-June, 1993)" by Consultants: The Tables G-9 and G-10 are based on their report of the findings:

Table G-9: Operation and Maintenance of Irrigation Channels

| <i>Union Council</i> | <i>No. of IC Studied</i> | <i>Poor Operation</i> | | <i>Poor Mainten.</i> | |
|----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-------------|----------------------|--------------|
| | | <i>No.</i> | <i>%</i> | <i>No.</i> | <i>%</i> |
| Gabasni | 36 | 3 | 8.33 | 4 | 11.11 |
| Ganichatra | 34 | 3 | 8.82 | 1 | 2.94 |
| Nara | 26 | 1 | 3.85 | 1 | 3.85 |
| Baitgali | 33 | 2 | 6.06 | 6 | 18.18 |
| Nagrai | 38 | 1 | 2.64 | 2 | 5.26 |
| Total | 167 | 10 | 5.99 | 14 | 8.838 |

Table G-10: Operation and Maintenance of Dugwells

| <i>Union Council</i> | <i>No. of IC Studied</i> | <i>Poor Operation</i> | | <i>Poor Mainten.</i> | |
|----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|----------------------|--------------|
| | | <i>No.</i> | <i>%</i> | <i>No.</i> | <i>%</i> |
| Kabgani | 84 | 16 | 19.05 | 8 | 9.52 |
| Ganichatra | 16 | 2 | 12.50 | 2 | 12.5 |
| Gandaf | 41 | 31 | 75.69 | 31 | 75.69 |
| Baitgali | 2 | 2 | 100 | 2 | 100 |
| Total | 203 | 49 | 24.14 | 43 | 21.18 |

The tables show that by and large the studied irrigation channels were operated and maintained well. The same is the case with dugwells except in Gandaf and Baitgali.

An earlier survey conducted by consultants Jahanzeb, Dilawar, Iftikhar Ali, and Ghufranal Haq, indicated the presence of the following serious problems:

- In 35 out of the 60 cases of dugwells surveyed, the owners had sold out the irrigation motors and pumps that were provided to them by the project.
- In Besak area of Kabgani union council a share cropper of a land owner who was awarded a dugwell, revealed that the same owner was also awarded another 4 dugwells by the project.
- In one village in union council Gabasni for a parcel of cultivable land of a few acres an irrigation channel as well as a dugwell was approved by the project.

- In another village of Gabasni union council an irrigation channel was approved and at least partially built but there exists no irrigable or even cultivable land in the vicinity.
- The quality of construction, particularly in case of irrigation channels, was observed to be extremely poor. An irrigation channel in Baitgali which were not able to visit, was reportedly built without the appropriate gradient, so that water could not flow through gravity to the purported command area.
- One irrigation channel that we were able to visit was a new one owned by a PCL, Mr. Ibrahim and taken out of Uthla stream in Union Council Uthla/Ganichatra. The diversion structure was completely washed away and the channel was dry. This was in this condition since last year and the owner had no plans to construct/repair it. We were told that there were many other irrigation channels, particularly the newly constructed ones who were in similar situations.

F. Recommendations

1. The NWFDP should, for the remaining time of its life, concentrate on the successful subprojects and provide whatever assistance is possible to continue the benefits from these subprojects.
2. The project personnel can mediate to resolve differences between and among various groups of farmers in case of any controversies over the location and use of irrigation channels.
3. Irrespective of whether village development organizations are formed elsewhere in the region, special efforts should be made by the project to organize the beneficiaries of tubewell and irrigation channel systems provided by the project and form water users associations. The recommendations advanced by 1990 evaluation, emphasized, in general, on the formation of sustainable village organizations. Particular emphasis was placed on setting up water user associations responsible for maintenance, and repair etc. of the various completed water sector projects. Nothing in this respect seems to have been done.
4. 5 successful testwells still await to be converted into usable tubewells. An approximate amount of 450,000 rupees has been expended on each of these 5 tubewells for their drilling. An additional 300,000 rupees expenditure on civil works for each of the tubewells would be required to make the tubewells operational. Considering the scarcity and high value of irrigation water, it makes sense to spend the additional money rather than forego the money already spent and the water that is so precious.

G. Lessons Learned

1. Even when political considerations are as important as in case of NWFADP, social and economic aspects of development activities should not be completely ignored, and should be given due consideration. More thorough economic and social feasibility studies

would have facilitated a beginning towards a balanced development without obstructing the achievement of political objectives.

2. Considerations of maintenance issues is particularly crucial in case of community irrigation projects. More effort and resources should have been spent on organizing the beneficiaries and preparing them for maintenance and regulating the use of water.

3. Huge costs due to the non use of tubewells for over 3 years have occurred. In fact it was noticed that the command area for neither of the tubewells is fully prepared and ready for cultivation when irrigation is provided. The reasons for this waste should be fully investigated so that similar problems could be avoided in future.

4. In Gadoon as in other arid and semi-arid areas water is one the most valued resources, and normally a variety of formal and informal rules and regulations for its exploitation and use exist in the society. Such existing rules and the relevant socioeconomic factors should be fully understood before an intervention in this area is undertaken. Such an understanding will help in allocation of the resource in ways that are consistent with an optimal use and maintenance of irrigation systems.

ANNEX H

A NOTE ON KALA DHAKA IRRIGATION SYSTEMS

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A NOTE ON KALA DHAKA IRRIGATION SYSTEMS

A. Introduction/Design

A1. The Area

Kala Dhaka in its landscape and topography is similar to Gadoon Amazai, but seems to have relatively better potential for agricultural development. There is more cultivable land and river Indus and its various tributaries passing through the area provide better irrigation facilities. The land utilization and crop production statistics provided by the department of agriculture at Mansehra indicate that the area has a total cultivable area of 254,000 acres, out of which 74,893 is cultivated while 179107 remains uncultivated. Also the area under various crops in acres is shown as follows:

| Maize | Wheat | Paddy | Poppy | Forest | Total |
|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|---------|
| 62,000 | 53,000 | 12,000 | 630 | 83,000 | 210,630 |

As elsewhere in the region, the population density in Kala Dhaka is high and productive and cultivable land resources are limited.

A2. Wesh, The Land Distribution System

Wesh in Pushtu means distribution and in this context means land distribution among and between tribes and subtribes. To understand the land distribution system, a brief introduction of the people and their social organization is needed. The following table shows the areas tribewise population, number of villages and total area owned by each tribe at this point in time.

| Tribe | Population | No. of Villages | Area (Acres) |
|--------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Bazikhel | 112,000 | 100 | 95,000 |
| Madakhel | 72,500 | 39 | 75,000 |
| Hassanzai | 58,500 | 56 | 45,000 |
| Akazai | 38,500 | 34 | 25,000 |
| Nusratkhel | 21,300 | 24 | 14,000 |
| Total | 303,000 | 253 | 254,000 |

The peculiarity of the Wesh system is that the area occupied by each tribe, the number of villages, and of course the population all change after a fixed period of time. After every 40-45 years the land owned by each tribe is redistributed among its male

members. In the beginning land, except some set asides and provision for the grand (pagrai) Khan, and for the Syeds, the land was divided between the tribes (kaam) on the basis of their male population. Within tribe the land is distributed between the sub-tribes (Khel) on the same basis of male members. The redistribution after every 40-45 years requires that each subtribe leaves its cultivated fields and villages for another one. We were told that in recent years all but one tribe, Madakhel, decided on permanent Wesh systems for future. But the presence of the system until now has had important implications, as far as peoples attitudes towards land and its uses, inputs, and productivity are concerned.

One effect of the Wesh system has been that although highly profitable opportunities existed, there were no incentives for an individual to invest in land and irrigation resources development.

A form of the "Tragedy of the Commons" prevailed in Kala Dhaka area. It was realized by the project staff in the earlier stages that the development of irrigation systems in the area would go a long way in the overall development of the area. Such irrigation resources development would also fulfill one of the most sought after but often illusive objective of the development projects; spreading project benefits to maximum community members. Under the Wesh system this would have been possible to achieve.

B. Costs

The project paper envisaged the design and construction of 40 kilometers of irrigation channels in the first and second phases of the Kala Dhaka project. Because of cuts and changes in funding as well as other factors, this target could not be reached. However, a total of 10 irrigation channels each at an average cost of Rs. 170,381 were constructed in various localities of Kala Dhaka. 22 water supply schemes each at an average cost of Rs. 143,251 were also completed in the area.

C. Benefits

Basically due to delay in disbursement of funds and problems of staffing etc. in PCU, many of the irrigation channels could not be started on time and were not satisfactorily completed at PACD.

But not being completed does not mean that the investment was not useful. The remaining work on partially lined irrigation channels could easily be undertaken by the beneficiaries. Even in situations where only diversion structures were constructed at source, the beneficiaries indicated that if they were sure that no outside assistance was forthcoming, they could pool their resources to construct at least unlined channels. Since the projects have recently been undertaken and most require different degrees of additional work to be completed, the benefits are not felt yet. The area in general has plenty of easily available water resources, mainly in the form of springs and perennial streams. The irrigation channels are derived from these sources and once completely operational, the area brought under irrigation would be significant. One irrigation channel visited in the village of Kiana, is expected to irrigate an area of about 40 acres once completely operational.

The drinking water supply systems have been useful and have benefitted a large number of villages. Since most villages are close to the river or to the streams and springs, the utilization and benefits are not fully realized yet. The hazards of drinking particularly the Indus river water which passes through at least three large towns before reaching this area are gradually being clearer. Discussions with local health workers revealed that drinking the river water was causing some diseases and they were trying to discourage local people from drinking this water. They thought that the project funded water supply systems were useful.

D. Sustainability

Most irrigation channels are owned by groups who are from the same lineage and are related with each other. These groups have traditional systems of cooperation and conflict resolution and have experience in managing common resources. There has always been limited uses of spring, stream, and river water for various common uses including drinking water. Once fully operational, the irrigation channels will be sustained. Since there is almost no government presence in the area, the sustainability of WSS is in doubt, unless local communities fully realize the importance of potable drinking water.

E. Conclusions

In a remote tribal area which has been neglected in the past with regard to development activities, the appearance of project people raised great hopes and expectations. Many factors, mainly related to management and inter-departmental relations resulted in not fulfilling of most of people's expectations.

F. Recommendations

In case of many projects some additional work needs to be done before they are completely functional. The project staff with help from headquarters should consider providing additional funds for at least some deserving cases of irrigation channels.

It is important that project advisory services be continued for as long as possible. Either new social organizers with expertise and expertise be employed, or the existing ones be provided more training to efficiently perform the important job of social organization. The KD area is endowed with natural resources of rangelands, forests, water, and soils, which if utilized optimally and sustainable levels, could improve peoples living conditions.

G. Lessons Learned

In Kala Dhaka-type areas it helps if a small number of projects or even one successful project in a highly visible central location is undertaken right from the beginning. Such an activity establishes trust and confidence among the area residents. This could not be done in KD area and today although there are some scattered successes, people generally feel that nothing has been done for the development of their area. They just see large number of fancy cars and highly paid project staff in Mansehra and in KD, but no change in their own lives.

ANNEX I

ECONOMICS OF POPPY PRODUCTION

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ECONOMICS OF POPPY PRODUCTION

Poppy production is practiced both in barani and irrigated areas. Yields of the crop have been noted from 14-20 kilos per acre. Farmers report even higher yields like 3-4 kilos per kannal and roughly 32 kilos per acre. However, without a crop cut it is difficult to ascertain the real level. A member of our team has also evaluated a project in Afghanistan where poppy yields are reported at 18 kilos. Earlier gross margin analysis has been conducted in the Dir project area. This analysis is useful for comparison of results in the Gadoon area. Since, poppy has been virtually eliminated and the evaluation team visited the project areas in summer when there is no poppy crop much of the information obtained to develop budgets is based on recall of farmers. Several parameters used in this analysis have been provided by the Dir Development project. These coefficients were updated based on interviews with farmers in Gadoon area.

Cost of Production of One Hectare of Poppy (Rupees)

Output

| | |
|------------------------------|---------------|
| 35 kilos of Poppy @ 2500 | 87,500 |
| Poppy Seed 750 kilos @ Rs 20 | 10,000 |
| Value of residues | <u>21,000</u> |
| Total | 99,500 |

Inputs:

| | |
|---|------------|
| Land Preparation (10 Mandays @ Rs 45) | 450 |
| Animal Drawn implement 5 Mandays @ Rs 90) | <u>450</u> |
| Total | 900 |

Sowing Costs

| | |
|----------------------------------|-------|
| Seed Costs 5 Kilos at Rs 20/Kilo | 100 |
| 5 Mandays @ Rs 45 | 2,025 |
| Animal drawn implements 5 days | |

Chemical Fertilizer plus FYM 1,500

Irrigation 20 Mandays
19 Mandays @ Rs 45 855

Hoing

18 Mandays @ Rs 45 805

Harvesting (gum extraction, plucking etc.)
45 Mandays for Rs 45) 2,025

Other costs (equipment as blades and bags) 500

Total Cost of Production 8,710
Total Gross Income 99,500

Net Profit 90,700

(Please note that net profit per acre is Rs. 46,482)

Comparison to Other Crops

USAID has estimated gross margins for closely competing crops like wheat and maize. These gross margins run between Rs 2700 for wheat and Rs 2650 for maize per acre. When compared to poppy obviously these crops or even any other agriculture crop is not a perfect economic substitute.

ANNEX J

A NOTE ON STRENGTHENING THE NGO: GARASP

ANNEX J
NOTE ON STRENGTHENING THE NGO: GARASP

A. Background

Nongovernmental organizations have grown rapidly in numbers in recent years and now are taking on a larger role in development work. Their influence has grown with the growth in their numbers and in the amounts that they disburse. Today, these organizations are active both in the industrialized and developing world in raising funds for development and providing other forms of assistance. Most non commercial institutions outside the government could loosely be termed NGOs. The World Bank however, defines developmental NGOs as those private, non-profit organizations that work with developing countries to relieve suffering, promote the interest of poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services or undertake community development.

NGOs in the developing countries are increasingly independent and assertive in their relations with funding agencies from the developed nations. While NGO numbers and resources are impressive their coverage is often limited, quality varies and their impact provokes debate and occasional skepticism.

In Bangladesh, for example NGOs cluster is around Dhaka and three districts. Specialized health and family planning NGOs work in about 13000 out of over 80,000 officially recognized villages. NGOs with strong credit programs, including 400 branches of the Grameen Bank, reach only an estimated 6 percent of the population below the poverty line.*

NGOs should be judged, however, not so much by their number and resource flows as by the out solution they make to raising awareness of development issues and moving other institutions to become more responsive to the needs of the poor. But not all NGOs are well equipped for this task, despite the best of intentions. Many small NGOs still need to develop their managerial capacity. A large number are founded and managed by one leader. There is occasional mismanagement, or even misdirection, in many developing countries. To encourage mutual support among NGOs in developing countries, NGO umbrella organizations are being strengthened by NGOs themselves or through external assistance. For many years, the basic focus of evaluation of NGOs was on small projects initiated by NGOs. In recent years, there has been a movement away from project centered evaluation to assess the institutional development contributions of NGOs. In this process, there has also been greater awareness of the relevance of government action or approaches of community participation to the effectiveness and outcome of NGO endeavors. Many developing countries' governments are actively seeking

* Please see Finance and Development, a quarterly publication of the IMF and the World Bank, December 1990.

ways to encourage more NGO action. Governments in India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Bolivia, Mexico, Jordan, Egypt, Uganda and Togo belong to this group.

B. The Concept of Community Participation

Keeping in view the importance of NGO, there is a need to understand the concept and strategy of community participation. "Community participation" is the process by which groups of community residents affect the planning, implementation, management utilization or maintenance of a service, facility or activity. Thus, merely receiving a service and paying service charges are a very limited form of participation since it has influence on the way the service is delivered. Similarly an organized individual actions, even though they do influence projects or service provision, are not considered Community Participation (CP).

Although CP has numerous connections in the context of diverse experience of the Asian countries, two broad approaches have gradually emerged. Firstly, it is perceived to be a conscious process of organization development and empowerment of the disadvantaged people at the grass roots. Through a participatory process, the disadvantaged acquired the means, the resources and the capacity to initiate and sustain development. This is the more radical view advocated by the social activists and some of the NGOs, who have warned against external interventions and promoters of participation. According to this perception the governments and the donor agencies tend to envisage CP as merely instruments of project implementation. Instances have been cited where rural development projects in the name of participation have meant mass utilization of poor people for building roads, irrigation channels or other physical infrastructures which have not generated significant benefits for them. Under authoritarian systems, people are merely ordered to participate, the bureaucracy inevitably wielding an ever increasing power. The radicals instead would emphasize "conscientizing" people at the grass roots and building up a "critical awareness" amongst them as measures to promote CP immediate increase in income or economic welfare is not necessarily the objectives of the CP effort. Rather, the objective is to enable the particular community to organize itself slowly but surely, so that it can acquire the necessary capacity to deal with an adverse social situation and finally initiate collective action for self-reliant development. In this organization development and participation process which have been tried out and found successful in the first approach. The common features of two approaches to CP may include the following:

- A clear focus on a broad range of target groups which may comprise the landless, the small and marginal farmers, women in the poor households, the backward social class and castes, tribal communities, the unemployed youth, depressed operational groups etc. Their development entails a target group-based approach.
- Instituting grassroots organizations characterized by:
 - Clear social and economic objectives
 - Accountable leadership
 - Homogeneity of interests (that is, based on class, gender, community, caste, occupation or a social group)

- A degree of participatory management
- Greater self reliance
- **Conscious involvement of different categories of members of the group in:**
 - Identification of community interest,
 - Articulation of development objectives,.
 - Formulation of plans for further action,
 - Group action for implementation,
 - Generation of local and external resources,
 - Selection of leadership,
 - Collective evaluation and self criticism, and
 - Sustained development effort.
- **Micro-level development action aimed at greater welfare of the group through enhancement of its political and social power as well as higher income. The latter can be made possible through:**
 - Discrete project activities and investment choices based on estimated cost and benefits
 - Technical assistance and guidance
 - Project management
 - Project evaluation
 - Other technical functions such as agricultural extension, rural credit and primary health care

C. Main Elements of CP Program (for developing a strong NGO)

The following six elements are important in developing a strong NGO.

Program content. This is a crucial element, since it must provide an internal propelling force, which can motivate the community-based organization to plan, initiate, implement and sustain development actions. The contents have varied a great deal, ranging from specific project-type activities to social empowerment process—but they have generally aimed at meeting basic development needs.

Well-defined process. Program contents to be implementable, must be based on a well defined process, which spells out the sequence of actions to be taken by the community. The key feature of the process is, of course, the "participatory" character of the program, while the intensity and level of participation vary from program to program, procedures at the grass roots have to be simple enough but well defined. The CP process is initiated through the conscientization of motivation work of the community leaders, social organizers and extension agents. The NGOs have to clearly demonstrate the critical role of community organizers in this regard. Successful programs are likely to be driven by new technologies which can easily be adapted to local needs and which lead to increase in income and productivity.

Leadership. This is a key factor and whether it is reproducible or not remains a highly debated question. Replicable programs clearly cannot wait for charismatic leaders to appear. Some of the recent NGO experiences, however, tend to suggest that leadership characteristics needed for managing community programs, can be locally created. Such leadership has to emerge from within the community; more important, it must earn confidence of the community and remain directly accountable to it. Selection of leaders through a democratic process and leadership training are considered to be the main instruments of a successful NGO.

A grassroots organization. A village organization enables the participatory process to develop on its own, is another key determinant for a strong NGO or community participation program. Once again, there is increasing evidence that depending on the program contents, main principles of organization development at the grass roots level are clearly discernable. They should be built around homogeneity of community interests; tend to be small, cohesive and have clear goals. To be reproducible, similar organizations need to be established by following simple procedures and motivational work.

Posting personnel for technical work. The NGO, while essentially non-bureaucratic in character, will deploy personnel for technical work, whether on a voluntary basis or on pay roll. Such staff require technical as well as social and organizational skills. The main instrument available for such resources is on-the-job training which, in due course, could be supplemented by institutional training e.g agricultural extension, community development, paramedics etc.

Availability of financial resources. While in the beginning availability of financial resources from outside is necessary it is never a sufficient condition for self-sustained community based-NGO. To be self reliant the NGO has to make efforts to generate and mobilize resources that are locally available. Success of the NGO depends, therefore, on its ability to either find supplementary resources or mobilize own savings. This in some cases, has been accomplished through regular savings and internal discipline of the group.

D. Rationale and Objectives of the Proposed NGO

The proposed NGO in the Gadoon/Amazai area should focus on development of village organizations (as institutional innovation) with active involvement of local people in their own development. The main aim of this NGO should be to increase the capacity of local people to solve their own problems so that they could plan and implement their own developmental activities or programs. The objectives should be geared around raising their local incomes and improve the quality of life. The mechanism through which this NGO implements its developmental activities at village level is the village organization. The village organization is a mass coalition of all those residents of village whose common economic interests are best served by organizing as an interest group. The organization should be formed around the NGO's sponsored program/scheme or project that may draw a VO's commitment to implement and maintain the program or scheme.

The thrust of NGO's contribution in this partnership for development should be towards creating a self-perpetuating institution through which village can act in concert to manage their material and human resources so as to attain progressively high standard of living.

The following functions with some modifications (as adopted by AKRSP in their initial stage) can be performed by the proposed NGO in Gadoon-Amazai area:

- The organization of people at the village level to meet common needs and to provide or obtain service through collective action.
- The training of local people in a range of organizational and technical skills.
- The mobilization of savings to support the development of a program scheme or project and to serve as collateral for collective borrowing to expand further the capital available to the community.
- The introduction of new activities and technologies to enhance net incomes.
- The development of strategies for the productive and sustainable use of the natural resources in the project area.

E. Present Status

Subsequent to the 1990 evaluation of NWFADP the ground work for an NGO was started. The chronology of events (October 1990 to June 1993) is as follows:

10/1990 The Northwest Frontier Area Development Project was evaluated in July and August, 1990 and the evaluation team recommended that:

1. Village level organizations be formed mobilizing and involving the communities in self-reliant problem-solving, and providing a mechanism for identifying, coordinating, and effectively utilizing local and outside resources in the pursuit of sustainable development and income generation.
2. The methodology, staff, training, and resources to develop village level organizations and help provide them with ready access to available outside technical know-how, inputs, savings programs, and credit.

07/1991 Concept Paper by Malcolm J. Odell "Review of options and recommendations for final two years of gadoon-amazai project". Three models were examined:

1. PONGO: Privately organized NGO (starts as a new entity).
2. GONGO: Government organized NGO (SRSC; staffed with some former government officials but acts independently)

3. **GLIDE:** Government line department (Mardan IRDP, GTZ Pak-German; uses a VO approach working through government line departments).

Three mechanisms for long-term support were identified:

1. Other donor support from European and United Nations Drug Control Program sources.
2. Capital endowment or trust fund to be established with "Residual USAID funds."
3. Public/private partnerships drawing on the business and industrial community such as the Gadoon Industrial Estate.

10/1991 "Community-Based NGO Development Initiative Report in Northwest Frontier Province" PACT, INC. Report by Harry Jayasingha (PACT) and Jamshed ul Hasar. (USAID Engineering, Peshawar).

Recommendations

Establish separate task forces in the following areas:

- Private Rural Initiatives Program with a U.S. PVO
- Conservation, drug issues, public-private enterprises
- Polytechnic training and development institute

03/1992 A twelve week community participation training program was developed by Rahat Saghir of CDS/Islamabad and a team of 12 "volunteers" was selected and trained through Coverdale.

08/1992 AKRSP's Izhar Hunzai's Report on "From poppy substitution to sustainable development: conceptual framework and action plan for project transformation"

The program included the following packages:

- **Social organization.** Establish a network of democratic village organizations.
- **Techno-economic measures.** Establish improved local systems for natural resource management and optimum use.
- **Revitalization of WID program.** Promote social and economic welfare of rural women.
- **An institutional support mechanism.** Sustain all the above programs.

- 11/1992 An AKRSP's consultant Fazal-e-Malik was hired for providing on the job training to the three social organizers selected out of the 12 trainees trained through coverdale. During this period the community development program and formation of village organizations was also initiated in the area.
- 12/92 Gadoon field management team consisting of one program coordinator, three male social organizers, three female social organizers, and two support staff was hired and fielded.
- 01/93 Tariq Durrani started meetings/interviews for identification of the potential board members for the proposed Gadoon NGO.
- 02/93 A workshop for briefing and educating the potential board members on three NGOs (Gadoon, Kala Dhaka and Kurram) was held under the auspices of Coverdale. A team building workshop for the Gadoon field management team was arranged in Peshawar by coverdale.
- 04/93 First Meeting of the Board of Directors was held in Gala Rest House/Topi. A chairman and two vice chairpersons for Swabi and Bunir districts and a board secretary were selected.
- 05/93 Second Meeting of the Board of Directors was held in Gala Rest House/Topi. One Additional Chairperson for Haripur district was selected. Committees were formed for registration of the NGO, selection of insignia for "GARASP" and collection of project data were formed.
- 06/93 Third Meeting of the Board of Directors was held in Gala Rest House/Topi.
- 07/93 Fourth Meeting of the Board of Directors was held.
- 08/93 A three day workshop was held for training the board of directors at Bhurban Pearl Continental hotel which was followed by a Meeting of the Board of Directors.

Strategy

There was a change in strategy and community participation approach was adapted as the new strategy. Villagers were motivated to organize themselves with the help of social organizers. They were also asked to hold meetings, and generate savings. Presently there are about 20 VOs at various stages of development. Despite the formation of new VOs at the village level, the project has been unable to provide any clear cut objective, strategy or direction to the VOs. The VOs have held meetings, elected their office bearers, and started savings because they have been asked to do so. This is a form of community participation imposed by request from the GFMT team and not grown out of concern at the grassroots. It is not a spontaneous act based on the needs of the people with an identified strategy to match those needs.

- In the early quarter of 1993 an umbrella NGO was established with a Board of Directors (BOD). The Board of Directors was nominated from the lists provided by the Deputy Commissioner, the GONWFP and other decision makers. The aim was to include persons in the BOD who can provide direction to the NGO, be able to negotiate with GOP and donor agencies, and lay down the plans and policies. They are to be accountable to the VDOs. The BOD has already held 5 meetings.
- A GFMT has also been formed to help establish the strategies that lead to smooth transition with the phasing out of the USAID funding.

The staff of the GFMT consists of the following:

- 1 Programmer coordinator
- 4 SAs and
- 2 Office staff

In October 1993, new staff is expected to be inducted for one year. This will include about 13 for Gadoon Amazai region and about 20 for Kala Dhaka area.

However, presently there are some conceptual problems which impinge on the implementation of activities and lead to confusion regarding the future course of action. The two major ones are:-

- The BOD has been established with a top-down approach. At the same time VDOs are being set up with the strategy of community participation and bottom-up approach. The latter is a long-term strategy with no short cuts. In the immediate future there are no identifiable contact points or mechanisms to bridge the gap or that can enable the NGO and the VDOs to work as an integrated body, and benefit from each others strength. The functioning VDOs are aware of the existence of the NGO but do not see a role for them selves. The NGO is aware of the needs of the VDO and expect to work together in the long term when the VDOs have matured but there is no mechanism to bring the two together.
- The social organizers (both males and females) despite being committed and dedicated are unable to provide any direction to the communities that they work with, due to lack of orientation regarding the strategy, objectives, training, and experience.
- The time frame for expected outcome must be realistic especially if community participation is the avowed strategy.
- The VDOs and the NGO are being established in a void. There are no focussed identifiable activities. The VDOs are project sponsored have been established without any future program. The NGO has a similar history. Without identifiable focused activities and objectives it would be unrealistic to set a route of progression for the NGO.

- **USAID is presently funding the efforts to create NGOs and VDOs. US\$ 600,000 has been earmarked for this activity up to September 1994. However, the Pressler Amendment does not allow for the establishment of trust fund or endowment for the NGO or VDOs to undertake development activities. It is not clear either to the staff, the BOD, or the community as to who will fund the future activities.**
- **The NGO has not attributed an active role to the Government of NWFP through the line department or the Union Councils (even as *ex officio* members) yet the NGO expects the support and sponsorship of the government of NWFP for funding and provision of other facilities.**

ANNEX K

EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

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A. Activity To Be Evaluated

Project Title : North West Frontier Area Development (NWFAD)
Project Number : 391-0485
USAID Funding : Grant \$54.9 Million
LOP : FY 83 - FY 93
Revised PACD : September 30, 1994
Previous Evaluations : First - September, 1987
Second - July, 1990
Planned Evaluation : Final - June 1993

B. Purpose of Project

The purpose of the Gadoon Area Development Project is to change the Gadoon Amazai area economy from one based on poppy cultivation to a diversified agricultural and non-agricultural system with strong ties to the national economy, which will facilitate the GOP's enforcement efforts with regard to poppy cultivation and narcotics production¹.

C. Purpose of the Final Evaluation

The final evaluation is needed in order to assess the achievements toward project purpose. The evaluation will address:

- The continuation of activities in the project area in the enforcement of poppy eradication and the simultaneous development of the project area and its people.
- The question of the sustainability of project investments in:

¹ The original purpose statement was later expanded in 1988 when the project was amended to include Kala Dhaka and Drug Abuse Prevention Resource Center components. The purpose statement of these components are given along with their descriptions.

- Training of government managers and technicians and local people in support of project objectives and investments.
 - Technology transfer, information technology, planning management skills, and in specific areas such as agriculture, training, village organization, private enterprise, etc.
 - Infrastructure (roads, education/health facilities, and water supply/ irrigation).
 - The development of public and private institutions supporting community and area development.
- Recommendations in how the evaluation findings and recommendations should be incorporated in a plan of action having at least a five-year time frame, with specific focus on answering the questions of how to continue:
 - The development of private community based organizations.
 - Their governance through representative Boards of Directors selected from the project area; and.
 - The formation and development of district level NGOs having the capacity to plan, manage, and raise money and other resources from private and public sources in support of local self-help initiatives.
 - The socioeconomic impact of the project interventions on the people of the area.

D. Background

The NWFADP represents the first USAID narcotics-related development intervention in Pakistan. This approach includes infrastructure, agriculture, education, non-formal education, vocational training, and health interventions in support of Government of Pakistan (GOP) - imposed bans on poppy production. A \$20 million project was started in Gadoon Amazai area in 1983 when the area produced more than 50 percent of Pakistan's poppy crop. The scope of the project was extended in December 1984 to cover activities under the GOP's Special Development and Enforcement Plan (SDEP) for poppy growing areas in the NWFP through a grant to United Nations Funds for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). This \$10 million grant to UNFDAC was in two equal installments of \$5 million each (one in 1984 and the other one in 1986). This grant provided 60 percent of a 5-year funding for the Special Development and Enforcement Plan in poppy growing areas, the Dir Area Development Project and a one year extension of the Buner Project which was completed in 1987. Recognizing the long-term benefits of off-farm employment, USAID provided \$1 million in 1987 for the construction of infrastructure in a 195 acres industrial estate in the project area which is almost complete.

A second, \$32 million, amendment in September 1988 extended development activity in Gadoon-Amazai for another 5 years, expanded project activities to open up the adjacent, potential poppy growing, Kala Dhaka area and provided funds for the establishment of a Drug Abuse Prevention Resource Center (DAPRC). With this second amendment the total authorization of the project came to \$63 million. A funding cut of \$8.089 million resulting from the reduced the project obligation to \$54.911 million.

The second amendment divided the project into three distinct components and set the eradication of opium poppy production within a process of rapid socioeconomic development in the remote areas of Pakistan as the overall goal of the project. The project also has a goal of eliminating drug abuse in Pakistan.

The PACD of the project has recently been extended for a period of 13 months from August, 1993 to September, 1994. This extended period will be utilized to strengthen community based village organizations (VOs) and to create NGOs to provide support to these VOs. All other activities of the project are scheduled to be completed by August 9, 1993. Due to the limitations resulting from the enforcement of the Pressler Amendment, no further PACD extension or additional USAID fundings is possible.

A brief description of each component follows:

Gadoon-Amazai. The purpose of the Gadoon-Amazai component is to change the Gadoon-Amazai area economy from one based primarily on poppy production to a diversified agricultural and non-agricultural system with strong ties to the national economy.

This component encompasses a number of socioeconomic development interventions, including infrastructure (roads, water supply schemes, irrigation channels, village electrification); agriculture improved agricultural practices); both formal and non-formal education; vocational training and health. To ensure maximum participation of communities and the sustainability of project investments, village organizations (VOs) are being set up in the project area and non-government organizations (NGOS) are being created to provide support to these VOs.

Kala Dhaka. The purpose of the Kala Dhaka component is to halt the existing poppy production and prevent future increases through a development effort which combines project funding and community participation. This effort is aimed at drawing the region and its people into the national economy and recent development trends.

The activities under this component are in the areas of access improvement (track), community-based rural works, agriculture, education, health and WID. A major emphasis of the program is to enhance self-help development capacities at the grassroots level by setting up community based organizations. A number of VOs have been set up in the area and the process to create an NGO is underway.

Drug Abuse Prevention Resource Center (DAPRC). The purpose of the DAPRC component is to support and encourage local, provincial and national efforts to achieve a

drug-free society through reduction of both drug demand and drug production. A secondary purpose is to serve as a clearinghouse for distribution of accurate information on drug abuse prevention acceptable in the Pakistani context.

Under this component, USAID has worked collaboratively with the Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control, through its Narcotics Control Division (NCD), to build a viable drug awareness institute capable of training and unifying a national NGO and Prevention Resource Consultant Network (PRCN) to enhance its outreach efforts. DAPRC has specifically been active in the training of trainers, designing and implementing counter narcotics campaigns targeted at different audiences, funding research, hosting national and international conferences, and establishing a library-documentation center.

E. Statement of Work

The primary focus of the evaluation will be on the achievement of the project objectives and targets as modified in 1988 project amendment, and on the redirected project strategy adopted in 1990. The evaluating team shall: (1) evaluate the appropriateness of changes in objectives and the methodology adopted since the 1990 project evaluation; (2) assess progress to date in implementing the NWFAD Project, including progress in relation to findings, conclusions and recommendations made in 1990 evaluation; (3) review and assess the implications of Pressler-mandated cut backs in achieving objectives and targets originally conceived in the project paper, as modified in 1988 project amendment and 1990 mid term evaluation; (4) review and assess adequacy and effectiveness of strategy used to involve beneficiaries in development e.g., setting up of VOs and creation of NGOs; and, (5) review and assess the adequacy and effectiveness of project efforts to ensure sustainability, including, but no limited to, maintenance of project-constructed infrastructure, once the USAID assistance to the project is over.

Especially, under each component, the evaluation team shall address the following:

Gadoon-Amazai

1. To what extent has the project achieved its stated purpose of integrating the 15,588 families residing within Gadoon-Amazai into the national economy? To what degree has the area economy changed from a poppy based subsistence agriculture to a diversified agriculture and non-agricultural economy?
2. How successful, in terms of sustainability, was the project strategy in each of the seven Union Councils; which groups of people were the actual beneficiaries for each of the major interventions, e.g. roads, schools, agriculture, irrigation schemes, potable water supply schemes, health units, and village electrification? Assess the degree of utilization of these interventions. Also, assess capability of the beneficiaries and the government to maintain and operate these interventions:

- (a) Who benefited from the major road projects and how are the roads presently being utilized? What economic and social benefits occurred from each of the 13 different road segments constructed?
 - (b) Who benefited from the school construction program in each of the seven Union Councils? What is the degree of utilization of the 44 girls' and 110 boys' schools?
 - (c) To what extent did the 519 new irrigation schemes benefit farm families in each of the seven Union Councils? incomes from agricultural inputs change following the availability of the water channels, the dug wells, and the tube wells?
 - (d) To what extent has the quality of life improved following the health sector interventions in areas such as constructing 165 potable water supply schemes, and the building of 6 basic health units?
 - (e) Who benefited from the 54 villages receiving electricity hook-ups? How many kilowatts are presently being consumed each year compared to ten years ago? What percentage of the households in each Union Council have legally been connected with WAPDA meters? To what degree does WAPDA continue to subsidize the villagers?
3. Who benefited from the agricultural subsidies and have yields changed following the removal of the subsidies? What groups of farmers and tenants have increased their net incomes following the poppy substitution program? How did the horticultural and forestry subsidies affect the net incomes of the participants? How has the removal of the subsidies affected their net incomes?
 4. Assess the adequacy and effectiveness of project strategy of setting up VOs and NGOs for the purpose of ensuring project sustainability beyond the PACD.
 5. Review the newly established VOs in respect to the members' willingness to participate in development, ability to identify common problems and find solutions thereto, level of savings, and other aspect of VO viability.
 6. To what extent have village organizations (VOs) become functional in sustaining project investments within their own environment? Have the VOs begun projects on their own utilizing their own savings?
 7. To what degree did project investments in WID programs benefit women and girls? What project-funded interventions, such as the non-formal educational centers and project girls' schools are continuing? How have they managed to remain productive following the withdrawal of project subsidies?

8. To what degree was the project managed in an efficient and effective manner by both the Government of Pakistan and the USAID? To what extent will be financial and physical targets reached by the PACD?

Kala Dhaka

1. To what extent did the Kala Dhaka project strategy of involving community participation through village organizations in local development schemes achieve its targets? In which areas of Kala Dhaka was the strategy most successful and what factors were most important in affecting the outcome?
2. What was the impact on the beneficiaries of the project interventions in the following areas:
 - (a) **Agriculture and forestry.** How did the introduction of new potato, maize, and wheat varieties affect the net incomes of the families in the tribal areas? To what extent did the horticulture interventions affect farm income and nutrition of farm families? To what extent did the forestry and social forestry programs benefit farm families? How did the change into a social forestry program affect the program and farm families?
 - (b) **Women in development.** To what extent did the poultry development program affect villager's income and nutrition? What was the impact of the kitchen gardening program and to what extent has it been sustained? How did the project interventions in the promotion of female education in the area affect the literacy level? What was the effect of the health interventions?
 - (c) **Community-based small infrastructure schemes.** To what extent was the project successful in implementing the community schemes through village participation? What were the major factors causing delays in implementing such schemes? What was the affect on villagers of the project's community-based potable water supply schemes and the school and health improvements?
 - (d) **Track improvement.** To what extent was the project successful in improving tracks using village participation? Which tribes benefitted from the high altitude track improvements? Did the withdrawal from the project plan of the construction of the West Bank Road affect the project's impact on the Mada Khel tribe? To what degree are the Gadoon-Amazai roads connected to the Kala Dhaka project's roads?
3. What were the critical factors that affected the implementation of the 48 village subprojects identified through community organizations in each of the seven clusters?

4. To what degree was the project managed and administered in both an effective and efficient manner by the Project Coordinating Unit (PCU) of the GOP, the technical assistance team, and USAID?
 - (a) To what extent were the financial and physical targets as stated in the technical assistance team's scope of work reached by the PACD?
 - (b) How effective was the financial process of the GONWFP and USAID in meeting the needs of the project expenditures? How effective was the role of the TA team in enhancing the PCU's financial capabilities?
 - (c) How could the management and administrative structures have been more effective in achieving the project's objectives?
5. Did the redirected project strategy that followed the Pressler mandated cutbacks achieve the desired results of drawing the region and its people closer into the benefits from interactions with the national economy?

C. Drug Abuse Prevention Resource Center (DAPRC)

1. How effective has the DAPRC been in enhancing public awareness about the drug abuse through its outreach and training program? Assess the adequacy and effectiveness of its outreach program. How can this program be made more effective?
2. To what extent has DAPRC succeeded in achieving its main purpose of supporting and encouraging local, provincial and national efforts to achieve a drug-free society through reduction of both drug demand and drug production?
3. To what extent has DAPRC succeeded in achieving its stated outputs?
4. How successful has DAPRC been in making a name for itself among the other provincial, national and international agencies dealing with drug abuse in Pakistan?
5. What strategy can and should be implemented to strengthen the DAPRC-NGO-grassroots linkage?
6. Does the DAPRC possess the capability to effectively and consistently monitor the effectiveness of the anti-narcotics campaigns? What systems can DAPRC put in place for enhancing its monitoring and evaluation operations?

D. United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP)

To evaluate the effective use of USAID \$10 million grant to UNDCP the team shall:

1. Meet and interview the UNDCP officials managing the Dir District Development Project, for which the grant was given, and assess UNDCP effectiveness in managing the project.
2. Based on the information in the evaluation and progress reports as well as on those gathered through interviews assess the effectiveness of the project in eliminating poppy cultivation in the area and achieving its other stated objectives.

E. Cross-cutting Evaluation Issues

The following questions should also be addressed by the evaluation team.

E1. Sustainability

- Which benefits are likely to be sustained after US AID funding ends?
- Identify and make recommendations for sustaining the recently established VOs and NGOs in Gadoon-Amazai and Kala Dhaka.
- Identify and make recommendations for sustaining the newly established DAPRC.
- Identify the role that PCUs can effectively play in development once the VOs and NGOs get firmly established in both Gadoon-Amazai and Kala Dhaka. Will there be a need for PCUs?

E2. Women and Development

How has the project had an effect on women in Gadoon-Amazai and Kala Dhaka?
What measures should be adopted to get more women benefited through this project?

Lessons Learned

- What specific lessons have been learned from the project?
- What has been the positive/negative effects of the project on the local population?

F. Methods and Procedures

The evaluation is scheduled for June/July, 1993. It is estimated that at least eight weeks will be required to adequately complete the comprehensive scope of work with a seven member team (four expatriate and three local). The expatriate team will meet in Washington and have interviews with the contractor's home office staff and review the technical assistance team's documents before travelling to Pakistan. The team leader should plan to

spend one additional week in Pakistan to complete the final draft of the report. The schedule is estimated as follows:

- | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|---|
| Washington D.C. 3 days | : | Preparation for assignment, interviews with DAI Office and review of documentation; |
| Travel to and from Pakistan | : | 4 days |
| Islamabad, 3 days | : | Interviews with USAID staff |
| Peshawar 2 days | : | Interviews with USAID and GOP/SDU staff. |
| Gadoon-Amazai/Tarbela 10 days | : | Interviews with PCU/GFMT Staff, field visits to all 7 Union Councils and interviews with villagers and members of village organization in 3 different Union Councils. |
| Informal Presentation 2 days | : | Gadoon-Amazai specific debriefing/information sharing session with RDD staff. |
| Mansehra, 2 days | : | Interviews with USAID and GOP/PMU and local contractor team. |
| Kala Dhaka, 6 days | : | Interviews with field teams and villagers in all six clusters. |
| Informal Presentation 2 days | : | Kala Dhaka specific debriefing/information sharing session with RDD staff. |
| Islamabad, 2 days | : | Interviews with DAPRC, Narcotics Control Division, and UNDCP staff. |
| Peshawar or Islamabad 6 days | : | Analysis of data, write-up of draft report. |
| Islamabad, 2 days | : | Presentation of draft report in a workshop to USAID and GOP staff and final report writing. |
| Islamabad, 6 days | : | Final report writing, team leader only. |

The team shall have a six-day work week. The contractor shall be responsible for the hiring of local specialists through subcontracting with local firms/individuals. The team will make its own administrative and logistics arrangements, including secretarial support and international and local travel.

G. Composition of Evaluation Team

The evaluation team should be composed of the following:

Project management specialist (expatriate team leader). The team leader shall have an advanced degree in economics, public administration or social science, with extensive experience in the management, evaluation, monitoring, and implementation of large multi-sectoral USAID projects. The person shall have worked in regional development projects in remote areas in such diverse areas as community development, agriculture, agroforestry, irrigation, and rural infrastructure development. This person will serve as team leader and will have overall responsibility for coordinating evaluation, apportioning work assignments among team members and overseeing the drafting and presentation of the final evaluation report.

Social scientist/WID specialist (1 expatriate and 1 local). Female rural sociologists or anthropologists shall at least have master's degree in sociology or anthropology with substantial planning, evaluation, and implementation experience in large multi-sectoral rural area development projects preferably with USAID. They shall have broad background in rural development, organizing women's groups in villages, and experience in non-formal education. A knowledge of rural sociology and the roles of women in a Pakhtoon culture would be a great asset. The local social scientist must be fluent in verbal Pushtoo.

Community development specialist (1 expatriate and 1 local). The specialists with Master's degree in any social or behavioral science, shall have extensive project experience in project evaluation, monitoring, design implementation and management. They shall have worked in remote areas on community-based development projects involving small scale enterprise, rural health, and rural infrastructure development. The specialists should have experience in the formation and operation of village organizations and non-governmental organizations. The local specialist must be fluent in verbal Pushtoo.

Agricultural economist (local). The agricultural economist shall have a broad background as a generalist in agricultural sciences. He/she must be able to assess the impact on the farmers and the community of the project interventions. The agricultural economist shall have a background in rural development projects with field crops, horticulture, livestock, and forestry experience.

Counternarcotics education, awareness, and prevention specialist (expatriate). The drug prevention specialist should have broad background as a generalist in the area of drug abuse prevention, awareness, and education. The person must be an experienced designer and implementer of a counternarcotics demand reduction, education, awareness, outreach, and fund raising institution, with preference given to both U.S. and developing country experience. The specialist must have demonstrated expertise in mass media and marketing methodologies and developing organizing, and managing governmental and non-governmental institutions and linkages between them. This specialist will work for four weeks only. The team leader will determine the time frame for this specialist.

H. Reporting Requirements

H1. Format of report. The final report shall contain the following sections:

- **Table of Contents**
- **Acronyms**
- **Basic Project Identification Data Sheet.**
- **Executive Summary of non more than three single spaced pages reviewing major findings, conclusions and recommendations. A sample format will be provided by the Mission.**
- **Body of the report, which includes a description of the country context in which the project was developed and carried out, and provides information (evidence and analysis) on which the conclusions and recommendations are based. Conclusions should be short and succinct; the recommendations should be action oriented.**
- **Differentiation between findings, conclusions and recommendations should be clearly made. The main body of the report should not be more than 40 pages.**
- **Appendices - these should include at a minimum:**
 - **Evaluation Scope of Work**
 - **Logical framework together with a brief summary of the current status of original or modified inputs and outputs**
 - **Description of methodology used in the evaluation (e.g., the research approach or design, the types of indicators used to measure change, how external factors were treated in the analysis)**
 - **A bibliography of documents, individuals and agencies consulted**
 - **Findings/conclusions/recommendations matrix**
 - **An evaluation summary in the USAID/W prescribed format**

H2. Submission of Report

Submission of report will be in three stages: (1) the team leader shall submit 20 copies of the draft report at least three days prior to the workshop in which the report will be discussed with USAID and the GOP; (2) the team leader shall submit ten copies of the draft final report, after incorporating changes and recommendations agreed to in the workshop, to the Chief, Rural Development Division at least three days before his departure from Pakistan; and (3) the contractor shall submit 50 bound copies of the final report again to the Chief, Rural Development Division, O/ADD within eight weeks after the evaluation.



I. Evaluation Time Frame

The evaluation team is scheduled to start its work on/about June 7, 1993 and will end on/about August 4, 1993. All team members will be recruited for a period of 45 work days except for the team leader and counternarcotics education, awareness, and prevention specialist who will be required to work for 51 and 24 work days, respectively. All team members will be required to work 6 days a week and on holidays.

ANNEX L

SCHEDULE OF VISITS UNDERTAKEN BY THE EVALUATION TEAM

ANNEX L
SCHEDULE OF VISITS UNDERTAKEN BY THE EVALUATION TEAM

- July 18, 1993 Evaluation team members (Asianic Agro Development International) mobilization and arrival at Islamabad.
- July 19, 1993 Evaluation team members from USA arrive at Islamabad.
- July 20-23, 1993 Evaluation team meeting with USAID staff at Islamabad (afternoon).
- July 24-26, 1993 Evaluation team meetings, study of different documents and preparation of report outline and guidelines for field work.
- July 28-31, 1993 Evaluation team visits to different Union Councils for field survey in Gadoon Amazai Project Area. The other members rejoin the team and visit different Union Councils in Gadoon/ Amazai Project area.
- Aug 1-6, 1993 Evaluation team, meeting at Peshawar USAID/Office, Maj (Retd) Tariq Mahmood Program Coordinator GFMt, Mr. David A. Smith of Coverdale.
- August 7, 1993 Evaluation team arrives at Mansehra for field survey in Kala Dhaka Project. On August 7, 1993 and holds meeting with Mr. Sadaqat Ali Khan, project manager KDADP, and female social organizers.
- August 8, 1993 Evaluation team meeting with the entire project staff, Mr. Azizur-Rehman, EADA Mansehra, and collection of necessary documents concerning Kala Dhaka project for review of literature.
- Aug 9-12, 1993 Evaluation team visits different khels both North and South for field survey work.
- Aug 13-27, 1993 Evaluation team work at Peshawar in connection with:
- a) Meeting with different line departments (education, health).
 - b) Meeting with USAID staff on August 16, and August 22, 1993 for debriefing.

- c) Meeting with Mr. Tariq Durrani regarding NGO on August 15, 1993.
- d) Meeting with Mr. Abdullah, Director PARD Peshawar on August 19, 1993.
- e) Meeting with Ms Meraj Qaim Shah, Lady Member, BOD, GAARSP.
- f) Analysis of data.
- g) Writing of first draft.

Aug. 26, 1993

Evaluation team departs Islamabad.

Aug. 27-28, 1993

Team gives report a shape to first draft.

Aug. 29, 1993

Submission of first draft report to USAID Peshawar.

Aug. 30-31, 1993

Evaluation team gives final shape to report.

Sep. 02, 1993

Presentation of report to Mr. John Blackton, Mission Director, USAID/Islamabad.



ANNEX M

PERSONS CONTACTED AND INTERVIEWED

ANNEX M
PERSONS CONTACTED AND INTERVIEWED

USAID/Islamabad

- Arnold J. Radi, Chief O/ARD
- John B. Swanson, Chief Agriculture and Rural Development and Environmental Officer.
- Christine Sheckler, Program and Narcotics manager
- Mohammad Asif Bhatti, Program Specialist, O/ARD
- Judy Shumacher

USAID/Peshawar

- Hank Shumacher
- Tariq Durrani
- Sohail Maqbool Malik, Project Officer, NWFADD
- Umer Mohammad, Management Specialist, RF Division
- A. Rauf Khan, Project Manager, N.W.F.A.D.P.
- Rashida Khanum, WID Specialist, Technical Support and Planning Unit.
- Ishtiaq
- Mehdi Zaman

Coverdale

- Douglas Grube, Chief of Party
- David A. Smith, Independent Consultant

Project Staff (KDADP)

- Dr. Hamad Agha, Project Manager PCU, KDADP.
- Sadaqat Ali Khan, Project Manager KDADP
- Iqbal Niazi, Social Scientist, KDADP
- Mohammad Irshad, Social Organizer
- Mohammad Jamshed, Social Organizer
- Shahida Khan, Senior Social Organizer
- Mehreen, Social Organizer
- Shahida Tanoli, Social Organizer
- Ara Begum, Social Organizer
- Asia Ejaz, NFE Trainer, Besik
- Ijaz Zahoor, Project Engineer

Project Staff, Gadoon Amazal

- Chan Badshah, Chief Accountant
- Noor Mohammad (A Resource Person)
- Nasreen Kusar, Social Organizer
- Zarqa Iqbal, Social Organizer

Gadoon Amazal Rural Area Support Program (GARASP)

- Major (Retd) Tariq Mahmood, Program Coordinator, Gadoon Field Management Team.
- Haji Gul Zaman, Member BOD
- Haider Zaman, Member BOD
- Mrs. Meraj Qaim Ali Shah, Member BOD

UNDCP

DIR District Development Project

- Angus Geddes, CTA/DDDP and Head of Technical Support Unit (TSU)
- Alexander Segar, Deputy Field Advisor, UNDCP
- V. Venturello, Pand D Officer/DDDP

UNDCP, Saidu Sharif

- Yousaf mahmood, Program Officer, UNDCP

Technical Support Unit

- Arif Khan - Civil Engineer
- Mohammad Fahim - Agricultural Expert TSU/DDDP
- Shamsul Wahab - Civil Engineer
- Abu Saeed - Agricultural Expert, TSU.

Government of Northwest Frontier Province

- Javed Iqbal, Director General, SDU, N.W.F.P.
- Adnan Bashir, Deputy Commission, Div
- Shahjehan, Director Primary Education
- Murtaza Khan, Deputy Commissioner, Mansehra.
- Dr. Israr Ahmed, Director Basic Health Units
- Dr. Mohammad Rafiq, District Health Officer, Mansehra
- Dr. Mohammad Aqeel, Medical Officer, BHU, Utlā
- Aziz-ur-Rehman, Extra Assistant Director Agriculture, Mansehra.
- Lal Faraz, Technician, BHU
- Amir Khan, Assistant, Vet. Dispensary, Utlā.
- Shaukat Jabeen, ADEO (Female) Mansehra

Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Peshawar

- **Abdullah, Director**

Chemonics International, Washington D.C.

- **Edward Rawson**
- **Allen Eisendrath**

Village Elders, Farmers, and Beneficiaries

Gadoon Amazai Project

- **Haider Zman, Member BOD**
- **Safdar Shah, PCL**
- **Rahat Shah, School Teacher**
- **Sher Shah, School Teacher**
- **Hanif, School Teacher**
- **Humayun Khan, School Teacher**
- **Rahimullah**
- **Imdad**
- **Imdad**
- **Mariam, School Teacher**
- **Sabeka, primary School Teacher**
- **Mehr Afzoon, Skilled Worker, NFE**
- **Amroon, Beneficiary**
- **Mustafzar Beneficiary**
- **Zahir Taj Beneficiary**
- **Nasib Zehra Beneficiary**
- **Syed Imran Khan, Ex-Chairman UC, Panawal Village**
- **Gul Rahman, PCL**
- **Sher Rahman]**
- **Haji Rahman] Beneficiaries**
- **Hussain Khan, PCL**
- **Qutub Shah, PCLK, Local leader and Farmer**
- **Shah Mohammad Khan, PCL, Local Leader and Malik**
- **Shan Mohammad Khan, Local Leader and PCL**
- **Muzammal Khan, Numberdar and PCL**
- **Rahima, Women PCL Leader**
- **Mohammad Hayat Khan**
- **Farid Khan, PCL**
- **Said Shah Badshah PCL and Local leader**
- **Sher Mohammad, Beneficiary**
- **Akhunzada, Beneficiary**
- **Hakimzada (Teacher)**

- Rizat Women Beneficiaries
- Bibi Amran "
- Misrin "
- Saeeda "
- Musabaka "
- Zaheer Shah, Ex-Project Staff, Mangal Chai Village
- Haji Munawar Khan, PCL and Local Leader
- Asim Shah, PCL
- Mohammad Rauf, PCL
- Rehan Shah, PCL
- Jamshed Khan, Teacher
- Shamsher, Assistant at Vet. Dispensary
- Sultan Shah, Beneficiary
- Haji Noor Badshah, Lambardar
- Haji Zardad Khan, Beneficiary
- Haji Safeer, Local Leader and Beneficiary
- Mian Guljan, Member BOD and Local Lreader
- Latif Khan, president VDO
- Mohammad Pervez, Teacher Primary School and Secretary VDO
- Shaukat Ali Khan, Teacher, Middle School
- Gulab Sher, Farmer (Beneficiary)
- Liaqat Ali Khan, Treasurer, VDO
- Niaz Mohammad Khan, Student 9th Class
- Feroz Khan, Student 9th Class
- Ali Haider, Farmer (Beneficiary)
- Shamos Khan Farmer (")
- Niamat Khan, PCL and Shopkeeper
- Gul Rahman, PCL and Beneficiary
- Bahadur Khan, " "
- Haider Khan, " "
- Shamsur Rahman " "
- Malook Khan, Local Leader
- Safdar Khan, Numberdar
- Munir Khan, Farmer (Beneficiary)
- Shahid Khan, Treasurer VDO
- Sartaj, Student
- Niaz Mohammad, Student.
- Mohammad Wahab, Religious Leader, Kotkay
- Gul Bahadur, Beneficiary
- Biladal Khan,
- Sultan Mohammad "
- Wife of Diladal Khan "
- Ms. Gul Jan, TBA "
- Mumtaz Khan
- Lal Faroze Khan

- Abdul
- Sabibur Rehman, President VDO
- Naseeb DFad, Treasurer, VDO
- Zarmadan Khan, PCL, Village Sado Khan
- Noor Khan, PCL Village Kand
- Miraj Amir of Village Mator
- Omar Sarab of Village Arbistan
- Fazal Rahim of Village Mator
- Haji Mira Khan, Farmer, Gandaf U.C.
- Nasim Khan, " "
- Khaista Khan, " "
- Maulana Mohammad Hasan, Farmer Gandaf U.C.
- Amir Hussain, Farmer "
- Mohammad Hassan, Farmer
- Haji Ali Bahadar, Farmer
- Haji Lal Gul, "
- Abdul Shakoor, "
- Mohammad Iqbal "
- Abdul Razal "
- Maabool Khan " Kabgani U.C.
- Wali Mohammad " "
- Ali Gul " "
- Mohammad Khan "
- Abdul Wali "
- Karam Dad "
- Zarmin Khan "
- Gul Wali "
- Mohammad Khan "
- Pir Mohammad "
- Mohammad Omar, President V.O.
- Sher Afzal, Village Shaue Koi
- Ashraf Khan, Village Shawe Koi
- Shamroz of Village Shahekoi
- Mulla Sahib of Village Zizarai
- Munir Gul of Village Shadag
- Syed Shah of Village Shadag
- Zarif Shah of Village Cham
- Einur Rehman of Village Shagai
- Latif Shah of Village Shagai
- Faridun of Village Shagai
- Noor Samad Khan of Village Kandar, a PCL and Elder
- Haji Laiq Dad of Village Kiana a PCL and Elder
- Mokarram Khan, of Village Kianas, a PCL
- Abdul Shakoor of Katkae, religious and tribal leader

ANNEX N

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BIBLIOGRAPHY**

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ANNEX O

WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT IMPACT AND ISSUES

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WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT IMPACT AND ISSUES

A. Introduction

Until the initiation of the WID program of the Northwest Frontier Area Development project, girls and women in this region of Pakistan had been restricted by purdah from actively seeking means to improve their own welfare. The WID program has subsequently given NWFADP women a modest chance for personal growth and improved health and nutrition, and provided some vocational training opportunities. Most important, considering that rural Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) females had an illiteracy rate of 96.2 percent in 1991-1992 (Economic Survey 1991-1992, GOP, in Naqvi and Rashid 1992, p. 42), the WID program has increased educational opportunities for girls and women. It also has succeeded in modifying male attitudes, to a small degree, concerning women's rights to have their own activities apart from their household and agricultural duties.

B. Gadoon Amazai Project

The WID program was first introduced in Gadoon Amazai in 1986, and faced extraordinary difficulties getting started. There was great male hostility to the establishment of nonformal education (NFE) centers for women. When that was overcome, there were serious logistical problems reaching remote villages; in some cases a three-four-hour boat ride had to be followed by a four-hour walk over rocky terrain. There was also the problem of overcoming untutored attitudes towards improvements in health, hygiene, sanitation, and nutrition.

At present, as in the past, all WID program components in the Gadoon Amazai project are channeled through the NFE centers, which were established, starting in 1986, in seven union councils: Gandaf, Gabasni, Kabgani, Ganichatra, Nara, Nagrai, and Baitgali. WID programs are chiefly in the fields of health, girls' and adult education, agriculture, and vocational training. The WID centers also teach life skills, like personal hygiene and religion, and function as a refuge and women's forum for socializing and discussing mutual concerns.

B1. Health

There are approximately 80 major villages in the Gadoon project area, and while there has not been a formal count of the population, estimates vary widely from 130,000-160,000 for both sexes. Females make up approximately 50 percent of the population, or 65,000-80,000 individuals. Of those, only three village women were selected for training in health in 1989-1990 (Purpose Level Monitoring System, March 1993); two to become lady health visitors (LHV) and one to become a health technician. Training periods were two years for the LHV and 18 months for the health technician, according to the Department of

Health. As of August 1993 there were no reports that the LHV had practiced in the Gadoon project area.

Thirty-five *dal*, (traditional midwives) were trained to become traditional birth attendants (TBA) by the Department of Health, receiving a knowledge of modern hygiene and improved mother and infant nutrition. Due to unmodified traditional attitudes and/or a lack of information on the relationship of sterile delivery techniques to reduced infant and maternal mortality, not all village women take advantage of the TBAs in villages in where they are present. Some still prefer to use untrained *dals* (interviews, August 1993).

The project-sponsored Expanded Program for Immunization (EPI) was started in 1989, and was to be conducted at all NFE centers. Five NFE instructors were trained to assist EPI as motivators and recorders. EPI afforded protection against common childhood diseases and tetanus to more than 5,000 infants and children under five and more than 2,000 girls and women in 1989-1990 (Purpose Level Monitoring System, March 1993). However, the program has not yet reached all of the women and children in the target population. The program has not been carried out consistently, primarily because between 1990 and the reactivation of EPI in July 1993, there was no program. The required sequence of four cycles of inoculations was completed in the villages of only three of seven union councils. Cycles were interrupted in the four other union councils due to various factors: lack of transport, dissatisfaction of health technicians with their field allowances and the arduous terrain, and absence of female health technicians more acceptable to women seeking inoculations for themselves and their children.

Some of the most beneficial NFE courses, potentially, are in health. However, out of 20 NFE centers surveyed in September 1992, only six taught courses in personal hygiene and use of oral rehydration salts (ORS) to prevent diarrhea in children and adults. Only 271 women of the 1,621 women enrolled in NFE centers received this training. Furthermore, of the 21 NFE trainers surveyed in 1992, only 10 had any formal health training courses (Assessment of Women's Non-formal Education, 1992). In spite of educational deficiencies, trainers have undertaken many beneficial tasks including conducting courses in personal hygiene, hand-washing, sanitation, nutrition, child care, and the importance of using ORS. In Nagrai, trainers distributed iron pills because there is a higher incidence of goiter in there than in any other project area. NFE trainers also conducted a children's growth monitoring program in 1987-1988.

The water supply systems installed in 116 villages have the potential to improve the health of all villagers, men and women. They also will relieve women and girls of the arduous task of having to walk long distances to fetch water several times daily for household needs (see discussion of water systems below for further information).

B2. Girls' Education

The project provided six girls' schools (three primary, one middle, and two high schools) that enabled 349 girls to become educated (Purpose Level Monitoring System, March 1993). The project also trained primary school teachers and paid for uniforms,

textbooks, and copybooks to encourage continuing attendance of the poorest girls. Like the boys' schools constructed by the Gadoon Amazal project, girls' schools do not all have sufficient supplies, books, furniture, or water supplies and latrines.

B3. Women's Education

The NFE centers provide a site for adult education and numeracy. In several areas, where the girls' primary schools lacked a teacher, the centers' literacy courses have been the only source for female education and reading materials in the village. However for adults, visual aids and additional graded reading materials are needed that contain subject matter relating to feminine concerns and daily work routines. Since such materials are not yet available, adult graduates of the program often have not progressed and easily forget what they have learned. Since three out of the 21 trainers were found to be illiterate in 1992, three NFE centers lacked this program (Assessment of Women's Nonformal Education, 1992)

B4. Agriculture

NFE centers also offer valued courses in kitchen gardening that have produced table vegetables like okra and spinach and herbs like lemongrass to improve household nutrition. While some of the kitchen garden programs—such as the allocation of 50 tomato plants to women for planting—did not succeed for the majority of participants due to insufficient training, in some gardens, tomato plants or other vegetables like onions first cultivated in nurseries flourished. After fulfilling household needs, the remaining surplus can become a modest source of income through sales to other women in the village. At present, there are two project area women's groups organized around kitchen gardening.

A 1990 income-earning kitchen garden pilot project in Nagrai to help three poor landless women in each of three villages through profits earned from growing tomatoes, failed when the tomato plants died (Javed and Khanum 1990). Lacking profits from the sale of tomatoes, the poor women were unable to pay the landowner's rent for the small plots. The landowners became angry and the pilot project was dropped. A suggestion that the landless grow vegetables in containers was never acted upon.

Like other project components, agricultural programs have been disconcerted by the program change from offering subsidies to promoting self help. In particular, when the kitchen garden kit of free seeds, fertilizer, tools and pesticide spray were used up, some recipients gave up because they lacked seeds; others could not afford to buy fertilizer and pesticide spray, and had to return to traditional gardening methods that produced lower yields.

B5. Vocational Training

Courses on soap and candle making were unsuccessful and had to be dropped because it was too difficult and expensive to maintain supplies. The most popular and successful training appears to be in sewing, embroidery, knitting, and learning to cut patterns and cloth.

The project supplied sewing and embroidery machines to each NFE center, and a few knitting machines to some centers. It was reported that 178 women had established their own garment making business in the project area (Assessment of Women's Non-Formal Education 1992), and two women's groups each have been formed to sell sewing in their own villages.

B6. Character of NFE Centers

NFE centers created under the project do not have their own facilities in each village. Instead, they occupy one or two rooms rented from a village household. Quite often these quarters are located in rather confined spaces, with poor lighting, inadequate ventilation, and lack of essential sanitary amenities. The rationale for renting rather than having permanent quarters is that the concept can be inexpensively replicated and thereby more widely distributed. In some of the larger villages, centers have moved several times to provide an opportunity for participation to women in several parts of the villages. Other reasons for moving have been village faction conflicts and friction with house owners from whom rooms were rented.

At present, the NFE trainer lives at the NFE center for 26 days a month, and while there are scheduled times for instruction, she is almost always there when village women have time to drop by. She is chaperoned by a female servant. The centers' long-term policy is to turn themselves into self-sustaining village institutions. To that end, the NFE leadership has already started training village girls and women to become instructors. It is hoped that local women trainers will foster a strong sense of village identity with the NFE centers.

In 1988, there were 30 NFE centers in Gadoon Amazai and plans to establish additional ones. Then, due to a combination of factors such as trainer absenteeism; lack of coordination among training, tools, and raw materials; male resistance and male harassment of trainers; inefficient record keeping; and lack of curriculum development; the number of centers dwindled to 22. Most recently, as a result of the change in USAID policy, funding only was available for the most viable 11 centers of the project.

B7. Beneficiaries

The majority of women attending NFE centers appear to be well dressed, and thus do not include the poorest girls and women of the village. It is not clear whether poor women may be too busy working to attend, or whether they are intimidated from attending because the center is situated in a house in which they do not feel welcome. In one village in Nara, it was reported that the majority of attendees were the relatives of the house owner (Assessment of Women's Nonformal Education, 1992).

While the EPI and training of *dai* should have benefitted all girls and women in the villages where they were implemented, the kitchen garden program was allocated to female members of landholding families who could spare the space for a small plot. In 1992-1993, 298 women attended NFE training courses (Purpose Level Monitoring System, March 1993).

B8. Future Plans

The NFE center leadership is in the process of expanding NFE curricula to include teaching more income generation skills, like raising silkworms, and is exploring the possibility of establishing liaisons with private enterprises. According to a social organizer, the NFE may organize income earning support groups for village widows and divorcees, as well. One social organizer has started to introduce eucalyptus tree saplings to the kitchen gardens and along the edges of fields as a future source for firewood. The eucalyptus' propensity to sap soil nutrients and moisture from the surrounding terrain, could cause serious soil depletion problems as the trees mature, however.

B9. Sustainability

USAID funding for the Gadoon Amazai WID program was administered by Coverdale from August 10 to October 9, 1993. Since October 10, the program will be under the supervision of the Pakistani contractor who wins the USAID bid. Funding will be sufficient for a WID program coordinator, two female organizers, and 11 NFE trainers. After that date, the program is supposed to be managed and funded by the project-created NGO, the Gadoon Amazai Rural Area Support Program. According to NFE trainers, village women who attend NFE centers fully support them in every way they are able to, and would make extraordinary efforts to maintain them in their villages. The six WID project schools were taken over by the Department of Education in August 1993. It is not certain whether the Department of Health will have sufficient funds to continue WID health programs like EPI and the training of more *dais* to become TBAs. No funds have been earmarked for disbursement to these programs by the field management team.

B10. Recommendations

- To ensure that NFE's are sustained and managed professionally on a long-term basis after September 1994, a non-NGO alternative should be considered such as putting the program under the direction of the Social Work Department at Peshawar University, the Women's Division of the Department of Social Welfare, or the Outreach Directorate of NWFP Agriculture University.
- A core curriculum of essential subjects including health, sanitation, and adult literacy, should be developed and taught in all NFE centers. Marketing surveys must be conducted prior to developing new vocational training courses. Where possible, courses should be developed that use locally available materials like leather, clay, reeds, and wood.
- The suitability of food preservation or food processing courses, based on local production, should be explored with the Malakand Food and Vegetable Institute, which has "extension training materials in Pushtu and female food technologists" (Durrani 1992). The NFE program also would benefit from receiving design advice for their sewing and embroidery courses, either from the national handicraft

center, Threadlines, or designers who are knowledgeable about quality standards, fast-changing urban trends, and tastes.

- To develop vocational skills and prevent boredom, a series of progressively more difficult courses should be developed. New courses should be presented to maintain enthusiasm for NFE. Courses could be introduced that are recommended by Pakistani women's organizations, such as teaching materials on the Pakistan constitution, the importance of women exercising their fundamental right to vote, and women's legal rights under religious and secular law. NFE trainers also need periodic refresher courses to keep abreast of these and other new ideas.
- Women who form groups to develop income-earning enterprises need marketing advice and additional capital through some kind of savings and loan program. Loans could be made available through a program developed on the Grameen Bank model, which accepts collective responsibility in lieu of collateral. Recently, there also has been a suggestion that the new Women's Bank establish a "special window" for poor women (*The Muslim*, August 17, 1993). At present, village women's main source for very small amounts of capital are their own circular savings societies. Since project subsidies are no longer available for kitchen garden experiments, a source of capital is vital if poor landless women are to be enabled to rent land to grow crops for better family nutrition and profit. With loans, poor women could buy and raise animals for profit as well.
- The accelerating out-migration of men seeking off-farm employment in the Gadoon Amazai Industrial Estate (GAIE)—and to the larger Pakistan urban areas and abroad—means village girls and women will have a greater range of agricultural tasks to look after. At present, women are heavily involved in all aspects of maize and wheat cultivation, in addition to kitchen garden cultivation and animal care. Village women complain that their chickens and animals die and that there has been no advice or aid to prevent recurrence. They need direct agricultural and veterinary extension advice and service. Attention should be paid to women's animal care needs by female extension workers and social organizers who recently received training (only for a week) in livestock management practices from the Outreach Directorate, NWFP Agriculture University, under USAID's TIPAN project (*The News*, July 23, 1993). It would be beneficial if female agricultural extension workers were trained as well. Both kinds of courses should last for longer than a week and should thoroughly cover their respective subjects, as well as investigate appropriate technology devices to lighten women's workloads.
- With the discontinuance of subsidies for fertilizer, animal dung is being spread by girls and women in the fields and kitchen gardens. Composting courses should be developed for agricultural extension workers to teach to village women so that this kind of fertilizer is decontaminated. This would cut down on the number of flies spreading infectious bacteria to uncovered foods after settling on animal excreta.

- Where water supply systems have been installed, women have been freed from expending a great deal of time on this task. However, they still have to spend an inordinate amount of time collecting fuelwood and fodder for their animals. A social forestry program should be developed that by planting an all-purpose species of tree (e.g., acacia) on plots close to each village could provide fuel and fodder and prevent soil erosion. The World Food Program is interested in promoting the planting of trees for social forestry plots under its Food for Work program, and perhaps could extend this program to feed and fuel lots.
- Rigorous courses in hygiene, sanitation, and nutrition, including an emphasis on the need to use iodized salt in cooking, should be taught to NFE instructors by professionals in preventive medicine from the Basic Health Units or the Health Department. Alternatively, these professionals could teach the courses directly to village women themselves. Some Gadoon Amazai women are already interested in practicing family planning, but if the family planning program is to become a reality, supplies have to be stocked and available at the BHUs or dispersed from their own centers, as is the case in Gandaf.
- Aid for NFE literacy and other programs should be solicited from UNICEF, UNIFEM, the ILO, and international NGOs like Save the Children or Care, which are experienced in developing programs for disadvantaged women. These entities could also help with advice, materials, and curriculum development.
- In terms of administration, NFE centers should be supervised more rigorously to prevent prolonged teacher absenteeism.
- If the objective of the WID program is to provide a center where all village girls and women, including the poorest, feel welcome, centers should have their own quarters so that they are not identified with the homeowner who rents the rooms. More important, centers need adequate space, with an independent water connection, latrine, furniture, library, and electricity providing good lighting for sewing and other handiwork. All of this is in addition to adequate equipment and supplies related to course content.

C. Kala Dhaka Project

C1. Introduction

The women in Kala Dhaka are more disadvantaged than those in Gadoon Amazai for several reasons. Their village areas, as punishment for a 19th-century tribal rebellion, never received any services during the British colonial period. In addition, their mobility is restricted by purdah to household tasks and agricultural work. Stern family and cultural traditions evaluate them merely in terms of the number of children they produce—males preferred—and the amount of work they perform (Hussain, 1992). In addition, the Kala Dhaka project, which started in 1992, has had far fewer funds and a shorter period of time (only about a year and a half) to provide a WID program. Finally, since Kala Dhaka women

live in a Provincially Administered Tribal Area rather than a settled area, they have been less exposed to modernizing influences than have Gadoon Ainazai women. Provincial line agencies, unless so directed by the district commissioner, do not automatically provide basic services to their area. As yet, no Kala Dhaka project villages have electricity.

Kala Dhaka girls and women have had little or no opportunities for education, and consequently female illiteracy rates are above 97 percent. Girls are married at a very early age (in most cases marriages occur directly after puberty), and the majority of girls go from childhood directly into child-bearing adulthood. Consequently, the region has a very high birth rate and mother-child dependency ratio. Yet the women have had little access to modern medical care for their gynecological and obstetrical problems. Before NWFADP intervention, they had no trained TBAs, only *dais*—traditional untrained midwives. As a result, maternal mortality rates have been relatively high.

In addition to household tasks, project-assisted women work very hard in all aspects of agriculture. It is estimated that 75-80 percent of the local economy is dependent on women's labor. This percentage has probably increased lately since it is adjudged that 90 percent of Kala Dhaka men migrate to Karachi, leaving the women to cope with all farm tasks.

C2. Water Supply

In the 65 villages where the project has been active, social organizers have stimulated the formation of village action committees to construct small-scale water supply systems, with technical assistance from the project. The 40 water schemes that have been installed have relieved women in 40 villages of the burden of fetching water over long distances, since water now is piped directly into village stand pipes and even, in a few instances, into houses.

C3. Vocational Training

The Kala Dhaka project WID program has only provided training and resources in health, agriculture, chicken raising, and vocational skills. The project has not sponsored NFE centers, adult literacy courses, or girls's primary education, though it helped accelerate the opening of two girls' primary schools (see education section of this report for information on the status of eight government-sponsored girls' primary schools).

Project-sponsored vocational training appears to have provided little additional income to village women, for various reasons. Soap making was designed as a program that would coordinate with the production of mustard oil from mustard seeds planted in the kitchen gardens. The program was conceived also as a means to improve sanitation and hygiene, reduce household expenditures on the commercial product, and provide income. Toward this end, 38 women from 12 villages were trained to undertake this endeavor (Purpose Level Monitoring System, March 1993). In January 1993, the women were given metal soap-making equipment and supplies to fulfill the soap-making formula. In Kandari, two men even became interested in establishing a small soap factory there. They were taken by the female WID specialist to visit a Haripur soap factory for advice and to familiarize themselves with

how they could obtain supplies for the women, as well as for their own future project. They also were taken to Kashif Chemicals, and met with the general manager of the Hatar Industrial Estate, Haripur.

It was agreed that the Haripur entrepreneurs would provide free transport to the Tarbela Lake boat landing and would reduce the price of chemical ingredients for the Kala Dhaka villagers. After the WID specialist left the project in March 1993, and the technical assistance contractor withdrew, soap making apparently collapsed for the men as well as the women. Once supplies were used up, it was too difficult for many women to continue, since two essential ingredients for soap making—caustic soda and sodium silicate—are not readily available. In fact, according to one report they can only be found in Peshawar, though perhaps more realistically also in Haripur. Since women lack mobility and many males who could shop for the necessary ingredients are away in Karachi, soap making did not thrive.

C4. Health

Women in selected accessible villages have benefitted from the WID specialist's design of training for 60 *dats*, chosen from four of the seven village clusters in the Kala Dhaka region, to become traditional birth attendants. From their 14-day training period, they have acquired a knowledge of pre-and post-natal care, sterile delivery techniques, personal hygiene, importance of breast feeding, maternal nutrition, weaning food for the baby, and EPI. They were also equipped with a Save the Children midwife kit.

The most highly appreciated project-sponsored health component was the coordination by project female social organizers—without Department of Health assistance—of three mother-child health clinics. These clinics, often referred to as mobile health clinics (though no touring medically equipped vehicle was involved), were held once in a BHU and the other two times in the rooms of a village house. They brought a female doctor for the first time to treat 570 women and children from 15 villages. Previously, women in need of a female medical doctor would have to travel long distances to area hospitals located at Thabot, Darband, and Oghi, since the BHUs lacked female doctors and were usually understaffed. There are plans to continue this valued program and visit every village in the Kala Dhaka region on a rotational basis if adequate funding is available. The Department of Health has declined to cooperate in staffing the mother-child clinics, claiming that their funding is earmarked only for settled area programs. Although they give most of the advice to women on nutrition, sanitation, and personal hygiene, current social organizers have not received any formal training in health that qualifies them to teach these subjects.

C5. Agriculture

Beekeeping. Beekeeping was introduced as a women's activity, but was soon taken over by men, probably as a result of the need to move the boxes when the hives were transported to new locations.

Chicken raising. The chicken raising program was inaugurated in 1990 with the idea that after fulfilling family nutritional needs, the surplus of chickens and eggs could provide

added income for women. More than 2,000 Fayoumi chickens were distributed to 1,895 households from 1990-1992 (Purpose Level Monitoring System, March 1993). The program suffered from high rates of chicken disease due to the lack of available timely vaccinations against Newcastle Disease. Consequently, the Fayoumi chickens all died or were eaten. The majority of chickens surviving in the villages at present are of a different breed, and were bought from a Mansehra commercial chick raiser who periodically sells a starter pack of five female chicks and one cock to villagers. These chickens are generally considered to be for household consumption or egg laying. The small number of eggs produced, (about 20 per month) are eaten by the household, and any surplus is sold in the village or given away. Some village women say it is against their tradition to sell food to fellow villagers.

Even there were high enough production to contemplate marketing chickens and eggs outside the village, it is doubtful it would be profitable considering the difficulty of travel in the area. Moreover, the initiators of this program were likely unaware of the substantial competition offered by large-scale chicken raising enterprises (500-1,000 chickens) for egg production and meat situated near towns like Mansehra and Qalendra.

Kitchen gardens. Kitchen gardens were initiated in 36 villages in early 1992, and 106 women participated in this program (Purpose Level Monitoring System, March 1993). There were no kitchen garden kits supplied; rather, demonstration plots were laid out and planted, and fertilizer and seeds were distributed seasonally to participants. The gardens were very successful for a year, particularly in high altitude areas, like the villages of Seri cluster. In fact, it was reported in September 1992 that in Sado Khan village in north Kala Dhaka, women were producing a surplus that they sold to neighbors and village shopkeepers (Shameen Khan, 1992). In the lowlands, gardens were most successful in the villages of Kandar and Niway Kilay, though not in Shagai, where the women were not cooperative. Some of the more adept gardeners were even trained in seed preservation.

After the WID specialist left in March 1993, there was only sporadic distribution of seeds, sometimes too late, but no fertilizer. Consequently, some gardens were no longer well tended; some not at all. Others continued, relying on natural fertilizer, and had reduced production. Nevertheless, in the villages of Kandar and Niway Kilay, gardens are still productive, even with reduced yields. In these two villages, kitchen gardens were observed by the team to be well-tended, intensely planted small plots where onions, tomatoes, and other table vegetables are raised. The growing of mustard seeds continues, since it was encouraged in the past to produce oil for hairdressing and soap making. It is also grown for its leaves, which are cooked as a vegetable. Spinach is increasingly favored in these gardens, as a result of village women receiving nutrition information from relating the curing of anemia to higher iron consumption. At present, the largest part of kitchen garden vegetable production is for home consumption, and little is sold for reasons similar to those discussed above in chicken raising. Women do earn small amounts in some villages on an irregular basis from non-project traditional production, for example from selling ghee to a neighbor when they have a surplus, or sewing a traditional garment for another woman who lacks sewing skills.

C5. Education

For girls' primary education, the WID specialist formed education committees in two villages in Kandar-Kotkal cluster with the help of social and community organizers. They were able to collect supplies, furniture, and books to enable two government girls' primary schools to open. A third education committee was in process in Geway cluster when the former WID specialist left in March 1993.

C6. Future Plans

The WID specialist had plans for a food preservation and a credit program to market surplus vegetables, but left the program before these ideas could be realized. The current female social organizers have plans to stimulate a savings program to enable women to buy sewing machines so they can sew garments for their own families. Under this plan, one half of purchase price for the desired equipment would come from women's collective savings, and half would come through a matching grant from the project. There also are plans for a food preservation course to make jams, jellies, and ketchup. The social organizers are sensitive to the Kala Dhaka girls' and women's needs, and want the WID program to expand to include adult literacy courses given at NFE centers.

C7. Beneficiaries

Project benefits in health would appear to have been equitably distributed within the villages affected. While many women hold vaccination cards for themselves and their children, not all villages have received the Expanded Program of Immunization. Kitchen gardens benefitted the female relatives of landowners since only those families had land to donate for such a purpose. However, the WID specialist reports that in almost all communities food surpluses would be distributed to the poor. Soap making equipment was only given to 38 women in 250 major Kala Dhaka villages. Water supply systems, since they release water through stand pipe faucets, provide water to all women who want it without discrimination in the 116 villages that have them.

C8. Sustainability

The Kala Dhaka WID program was taken over by the USAID contractor, Coverdale, from August 10 to October 9, 1993. During this short period, Coverdale proposed to carry out an ambitious program to address a number of problems. It was to promote a concern for the poor, organize adult literacy classes for both sexes, and determine causes for primary school dropouts. This is a pertinent concern since the NWFP has the second-highest female dropout rate in Pakistan, after Baluchistan (Basic Education for All, Statistical Profile 1981-1990-2000, in Naqvi and Rashid, 1992, p. 57). Coverdale planned to continue EPI activities and hold free medical camps and two more mobile clinics with a female doctor in attendance. It also was to have social organizers concentrate on teaching the improvement of sanitation, hygiene, and nutrition, including the need to include adequate minerals in the diet and iodized salt, since the water supply is deficient in iodine and goiter is endemic. At the same time the project will work to improve agriculture, especially the growing of vegetables, and

fruits and livestock management. After the Coverdale Interregnum, the WID program will be sustained by the Pakistani contractor who wins the USAID bid for supervising the continuance of the field management team (FMT). The FMT will consist of six male and six female social organizers and one program coordinator. The six female social organizers will administer the ongoing WID program, which after September 1994 will probably be administered by an NGO, and the poorest women will receive aid from the SRSC program if they live in one of the villages with 80 percent of the population living below the poverty line.

C9. Recommendations

- As suggested for Gadoon Amazai, long-term sustainability, funding, and professionalism for the WID program would be assured if a line agency like the Department of Social Welfare (Women's Division), or the Social Work Department of Peshawar University were selected to administer the WID program.
- Income-earning training courses should be preceded by a market survey and cost-benefit analysis, if outside supplies are required. Training courses either should be exclusively dependent on locally and readily available materials, or be related to an instituted reliable distribution network that reaches village women. Ideas for income generation from processing local produce should be solicited from the Malakand Fruit and Vegetable Institute, which has extension training material in Pushtu.
- Women need extension advice on seed selection for kitchen gardens and field crops, and on animal and fowl rearing. They also require follow-up visits whenever a new agricultural program is introduced.
- Rigorous courses in sanitation, hygiene, and nutrition should be taught to social organizers by medical professionals from the Department of Health or medical doctors from BHUs. Aid to improve the welfare of Kala Dhaka village women should be sought from such NGO programs as UNICEF and Save the Children.
- A loan program should be set up so that poor women can increase their income and family nutrition by renting cultivatable land and buying animals for rearing.

D. Cross-cutting Project Activities that Impact on WID

D1. Water Supply System Safety

Gadoon Amazai. In providing 116 water supply systems, the project has benefitted women greatly by reducing the time and energy they had to expend collecting water for household use from sources often located over rocky terrain from 1-3 km from their homes. Another hoped-for benefit from supplying potable water was a discernable reduction in the waterborne disease rate and a general improvement in health of the child and adult-user population. However, the healthfulness and purity of the water has been compromised by

broken, and—broken into—distribution pipes, by inadequate and careless construction of poorly maintained groundwater tanks, and by traditional methods of acquiring and transporting water. The consequences resulting from water pollution are evident from a lack of reduction in the waterborne morbidity rate. In fact, there has been an increase in gastrointestinal epidemics, including in August 1993, serious illness and deaths of infants and children from cholera. Diarrhea in infants and children is a very serious illness derived from a lack of hygiene and unclean water. The Gadoon Amazai area shares with the rest of rural NWFP the highest under-five diarrheal mortality rate of all rural populations in Pakistan (*Infantile Diarrhea: A Manual for Medical Practitioners*, Dr. Mushhtaq A. Khan, in Naqvi and Rashid 1992, p. 32).

Traditional water collection methods cumulatively have raised the count of *shigella* and other harmful bacteria in wells and groundwater tanks. Women were observed putting their own water containers—which can be any sort of tin from any kind of product, or a pot, attached to their own ropes made of an assortment of materials—into the wells. Women also dip their own containers into the groundwater tank since not all tanks are equipped with faucets. The practice of washing clothes next to a well can likewise contaminate water. The lack of public latrines in the villages and the schools is yet another cause for concern related to water supply safety.

The majority of water supply systems will not be maintained by the government because they are too small. It is hoped that social organizers will stimulate village action committees to sustain the small-scale systems since they are an essential village service.

Recommendations. Distribution water pipes should be buried where possible to prevent break-ins and undue weathering. Piped water, apart from house connections, should not be collected in uncovered groundwater tanks. Ideally, drinking water should be released through a standpipe faucet. If groundwater tanks are necessary, they should be maintained to prevent leaks, be covered, and equipped with a faucet. Wells should be roofed, and only one container should be lowered into well water, and then emptied into covered, clean household containers.

The hygiene courses taught at NFE centers must emphasize preventing water contamination and should be taught by professionals from the Basic Health Unit or the Department of Health. Linkages between health care professionals in the BHU and the NFE centers are essential to maintain since the Public Health and Engineering Department does not supervise small-scale supply systems. Doctors in the BHU want to prevent further epidemics and should be consulted about course content, and duration. Several BHUs in the Gadoon Amazai will expand to become equipped with laboratories capable of periodically testing village water supplies, thereby helping prevent waterborne disease epidemics.

Kala Dhaka. Twenty water supply schemes have been constructed in the Kala Dhaka project area by village action committees, with technical assistance from the project engineer, rather than from the Public Health and Engineering Department. In design, they are superior to the Gadoon Amazai systems since the pipes carrying the water into the village for household use empty at standpipes equipped with a faucet, or become house connections.

The potential for contamination is therefore reduced. The one cause for concern is the number of distribution pipes lying exposed on the ground, and thus susceptible to breakage and break-ins. More women appear to use covered containers like a large thermos to collect water than in the Gadoon Amazai. Nonetheless, in spite of the convenience of having a safe water source close to home, village women still fetch what they call "cool water" from nearby springs and rivers. They do this because lacking electricity, they have no refrigeration. Exposed project pipes heat the water, and residents prefer cool water for refreshment. The "cool water" collected from rivers can be polluted, and spring water—though it usually is dammed running water—can become contaminated by the practice of each woman dipping individual small pots into the source to fill larger containers. This is particularly the case if women have not washed their hands after manually laying fistfuls of fertilizer (animal dung) around field crops.

According to the village construction agreement, these water supply systems are to be maintained by the villagers themselves, some of whom have acquired pipe fitting skills. Consequently, these small-scale systems have a good chance of being locally sustained.

Recommendations. Distribution pipes should be laid underground. Sanitation and hygiene courses should emphasize the safety of piped water in comparison to cool water, and should give advice on hygienic methods of cooling it until village electrification makes refrigeration of piped water possible.

D2. Off-farm Employment and Migration

Gadoon Amazai. In the original 1983 project paper, off-farm employment was regarded as holding "the best long-term potential for improving the economic position of residents." It was obvious that neither the cultivation of wheat and maize, nor livestock rearing, would offset the drop in household income caused by the poppy eradication program. Consequently, it was concluded that to qualify residents for well-paying off-farm employment it was necessary to concentrate on skill training. Starting in Phase I, there was a concerted effort to provide such training to male residents of Gadoon Amazai under the auspices of the project coordination unit and the Overseas Pakistani Foundation. There were some off-farm employment opportunities available in construction for project infrastructure implementation; other potential job opportunities were in openings for service in the police and armed services. These opportunities were to be tabulated and publicized by the Sarhad Development Authority with the hope that male residents would find employment in the project, the national economy, or overseas.

In Phase II, the emphasis shifted to developing skills for employment in the new Gadoon Amazai Industrial Estate (GAIE), for which the project had contributed a prepared site with leveled land, delineated streets, a water supply, and electricity. As a result of extravagant subsidies offered by the Finance Ministry to offset the disadvantages of a remote site, more than 250 factories were established there. It was even thought that ultimately the GAIE would accommodate 550 factory units. The Sarhad Development Authority was to supply information on emergent job opportunities there, and exert efforts towards procuring 65 percent of GAIE job opportunities for male residents.

For various reasons these policies are no longer completely operative. PCU training was stopped in 1992 because the unit could not place trainees. The contract with the Overseas Pakistani Foundation to train Gadoon Amazai residents for national and overseas employment has been terminated as well. At present, no agency encourages the employment of project area residents. The general view is that since the GAIE is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance—which has as its first priority the encouragement of investment rather than the supply of employment—not much can be done. Factory owners are free to choose as employees whoever they want, and all things being equal, they choose those workers with the best qualifications who accept the lowest wages.

On an individual basis, it is difficult for residents—particularly from villages located farthest from the GAIE—to acquire information about jobs available. Opportunities for employment are published in newspapers that rarely reach many of the villages. The majority of Gadoon Amazai residents employed at the GAIE come from the nearby villages on whose land GAIE was established: Gandaf, Malikabad, and Besik. They make up the majority of the 3,163 local people, or 41 percent, of the 7,808 employed in the GAIE as of March 31, 1993.

However, the latest information indicates there has been a decline in employed Gadoon Amazai male residents to 38 percent. Most employment applicants from the area are unskilled, with little education, and would not be considered for the apprenticeship positions manufacturing enterprises are supposed to offer under the Pakistan Factory Act. The relatively high cost of transport, the time consumed traveling by villagers farthest from the GAIE, and the lack of inexpensive accommodations at the estate, are all added factors inhibiting employment of more male Gadoon Amazai residents. Those men unable to find employment in the GAIE migrate to Karachi and to a lesser extent to other large Pakistan urban areas. Gadoon Amazai men also made up a portion of the 32.5 percent of NWFP rural origin migrants who worked abroad (Population Census of Pakistan, 1981, in Naqvi and Rashid, 1992, p. 112.).

Recommendations. The GAIE should not merely be an isolated "little Karachi" set in the midst of the Gadoon Amazai area. It should have responsible economic ties to its hinterland. The Ministry of Finance has offered all kinds of concessions to factories and enterprises to locate at the GAIE. While the original subsidy on imported raw materials has been withdrawn—and as a result there has been a decline in the number of functioning factories to around 200—substantive benefits still remain. The GAIE, by providing off-farm wage employment, helps ensure the cessation of poppy growing. If the Finance Ministry or an international drug interdiction program could be prevailed upon to subsidize the GAIE so that concessions to labor-intensive industries to site themselves in the GAIE could be offered, much unskilled Gadoon Amazai labor would be absorbed. Similarly, if subcontracting arrangements from GAIE factories to use Gadoon Amazai women's vocational skills (e.g., sewing and embroidery) could be organized, women's situations in village society would improve substantially. Coordination between GAIE agroprocessing factories and the raw materials produced in Gadoon Amazai such as leather and oil seeds would also advance the welfare of local villages. The plans for creating a GAIE city, with housing, a hospital,

schools, and a commercial center surrounding the factories ultimately should provide more economic opportunities for the residents of the project area as well.

Kala Dhaka. The migration of Kala Dhaka men to seek employment in Karachi has been increasing since the inauguration of the Kala Dhaka project due to the low returns from agriculture. Since 1990, wives and other family members have increasingly accompanied male migrants. In Karachi, Kala Dhaka villagers join existing communities of earlier Kala Dhaka migrants and form associations. Kala Dhaka men have become quite successful in such fields as transport (working as drivers of trucks, buses, and rickshaws), as tea runners, whitewash painters, mechanics and shipbreakers, and to a lesser extent security guards. Some Kala Dhaka men have even become gasoline station owners. The income and remittances from Kala Dhaka employment are usually used first to build a new house with a metal roof, or to put a metal roof on an existing house. Next, the money goes for kitchen appliances, clothes, and a radio, and last for the expenses of marriage. Periodically, migrants who continue working in Karachi for a year or more return to Kala Dhaka. The daily buses to Karachi from Kala Dhaka towns like Darband testify to the bouncing character of this rural-urban migration. As a result of the popularity of Karachi employment, there are now villages emptied of vigorous males where only the young, old, and women are left to cope with farm work. Karachi employment has even affected the socioeconomic standing of families in the villages. The top of the social hierarchy is no longer occupied exclusively by landowners; families with many sons who earn income in Karachi have high status as well.

D3. Social Forestry

Trees planted in the first small plot scheme of 1987 and the large block system of March-April 1990 have had low survival rates. In the project's recently instituted social forestry scheme, 12,000 trees were planted by farmers who received Rs 6,000 (\$300) collectively. The trees planted will provide watershed protection, soil conservation, leaves for fodder, and branches for fuel. In 10 years they will be harvested and the wood will be sold to a match factory, with the proceeds going to the villagers. In future, the World Food Program may reimburse those who plant trees under its Food for Work Program, so that project costs will be further reduced. Social forestry is the most successful venture in the Kala Dhaka project since it is the only intervention where as the number of inputs increased the costs went down.

D4. Project Benefit Distribution

Better roads (particularly to isolated areas that only had paths before), more schools (including for girls), and expanded health facilities have benefitted large segments of the population in the NWFP. In addition, the project has tried to provide at least one component to every village. However, because the main objective of NWFADP was poppy eradication, several project benefits have not been distributed equitably. This occurred, apparently, because the main emphasis had to be on putting proposed project infrastructure in place as quickly as possible since project components were regarded by villagers as their promised quid pro quo for giving up poppy cultivation. As a consequence, and perhaps inadvertently, it is principally the larger landowners—who are also often clan leaders—and their families

who have benefitted most from small-scale water supply systems, electricity, irrigation, and subsidies for cultivating high-yield variety seeds and planting forestry and horticulture saplings. They also benefitted most from veterinary services since they own most of the livestock.

This result has occurred also because the NWFP has the highest percentage of land holdings from 20-60 ha in size, and the second highest number of holdings of more than 60 ha (Agricultural Census Organization, GOP, 1980, in Naqvi and Rashid 1992, p. 133).

Village society in the NWFP is made up of contentious self-interest or affinity groups, the most important of which is the extended family. Beyond this unit, loyalties can be attached to the brotherhoods (*beradri*), neighborhoods (*patti*), tribes, occupational caste members, factions, and even political parties. As a reflection of this lack of cohesion, there is not one but several men's meeting places (*hujra*) and several separate meetings (*jirgas*) in each village. The relations of female as well as male villagers are affected by this divisiveness, which erupts occasionally into feuds and vendetta.

Gadoon Amazai. According to project documentation, the 4 percent of the population that owns more than 12.5 acres of land per family controls 33 percent of the total land area. All of the above project components require land and/or the ability to pay for its service, where required. The most affluent extended families—often the original settlers of the village area—own or have been allocated the most land and are able to dominate village society because they constitute the apex of a system of patron-client relations.

Landless people like the Gujars and Ajars and members of carpenter, barber, blacksmith, and shoemaker castes, constitute the poorest members of the villages. Estimates of their numbers range from 10-30 percent from village to village. The landless may not even own their own houses. They can live in the house of their patron, who in return for giving them shelter and food receives their labor. Their children also work for the patron and generally do not go to school. The landless also make up a disproportionate number of the malnourished population.

Above the landless in the village social hierarchy are the small farmers who own one half of an acre or less, and who often work as sharecropper tenants for larger landowners. In some Gadoon Amazai villages it is estimated by residents that more than 50 percent are sharecroppers for absentee landlords. Sharecropper wives work in the fields more often than the wives of landowners—a fact confirmed by comparing Gandaf with other villages in the area. Gandaf is considered a "landlord village" whose landlords even own land in upland villages. It is the only village in the project area where no women work in the fields.

When a limited number of benefits are offered by the project, the affluent villagers, because their higher incomes and education enable them to have greater mobility and better communications with the outside world, hear of what is offered first and apply for them. Their ascendancy in village society enables them to receive these benefits without substantial challenge, and they then exert their influence to afford these benefits to other members of their extended family or self-interest group. For example, in the village of

Malikabad, five dug wells were allocated to members of one extended family who registered each family plot in a different family member's name.

Other causes of inequitable distribution have to do with the necessity to receive donated land to site project components such as a gravity flow water tank. As a matter of course, tanks are sited advantageously in front of the house of the land donor, who may restrict use by all village women. Even the donation of land for a school is regarded as bestowing the exclusive privilege on the landowner to appoint the *chowkidar* (caretaker).

Improved seeds for agricultural and horticultural crops, and for nurseries and demonstration plots, go first to farm owners who are willing to set aside land for planting. Larger landowners also have access to more fodder that their wives cut for animals, and thus they can have larger herds that benefit from project-provided veterinary services.

Electricity has provided general benefits to schools, basic health units, and some nonformal education centers for women. However, electricity only has been installed in about 10 percent of households because the majority of small farmers cannot afford to pay for the electricity meter and monthly charges. Similarly, while water supply systems potentially benefit approximately 45 percent of the project area population, not all villagers have equal access, and many women continue to use traditional water supply sources. As would be expected, house connections are not widespread because only the more affluent user households can afford to pay additional charges.

A further reason for unequal distribution of benefits has to do with geographical situation and administrative function. In each of the seven union councils in the Gadoon Amazai area (Gandaf, Gabasni, Ganichatra, Kabagni, Nagrai, Baitgali, and Nara) the village capitals (which have the same name as their respective councils) have more components than other villages in the same council. Similarly, Gandaf, the village capital for the project, has more project components than any other village. Lowland and accessible villages also are similarly favored

Finally, there is the lack of specificity in project documents subsequent to the 1983 original project paper, which stated: "An equitable distribution of project benefits is critical to the achievement of the Gadoon Amazai project's purpose," and which targets small farmers and landless laborers. Nowhere in subsequent project documentation is it stated that benefits have to be distributed equitably, nor is any target population detailed apart from WID program recipients. As a result, distribution of project benefits has tended to reinforce existing semi-feudal village social structures rather than benefit more disadvantaged villagers.

Recommendations. A socioeconomic survey of village society should precede the distribution of project benefits. From survey results the range of village household incomes will become apparent. If it is the objective of the project to target the village poor, the project document should state this unequivocally and propose methods through which the targeted population can be organized to be assured of these benefits. If the project objective is an equitable distribution of a limited number of benefits, then some mechanism should be suggested, such as a drawing or lottery, to ensure this outcome.

Kala Dhaka. The project has provided components such as tracks, water supply systems, special WID programs, and repair of health centers and schools, that have improved the quality of life of many area residents. It has provided other benefits in agriculture, forestry, and irrigation that have benefitted landowning households more than other village households. Landholdings are smaller in Kala Dhaka than in Gadoon Amazai due to the surrender of village lands to Tarbella Lake, the precipitous terrain, and inheritance. Kala Dhaka villages contain two major and one minor landowning system. A smaller number of landowners, the Sitanadar, have permanent ownership of their lands; while a larger number of landowners, the Pukttoon, hold *dawari* entitlements under the *wesh* system to various size units of three differing fertility levels (called *torah*) that are allocated on a rotational basis. This can occur every 30-70 years, and the degree of fertility of the land to be received is determined by drawing lots.

Landowning conveys status in Kala Dhaka society, and the larger the plot of land owned or allocated, the more influential the landholder's role in village decision making. Old age and religious knowledge, without landownership, has secondary prestige, and having sons earning income in Karachi is a burgeoning status determinant. A third category of landownership confers semi-permanent usufruct rights, called *serimar* or *serimara khawrah*. Those who receive *serimar* are men who perform village services, like the *imam*, who receives a generous allocation of land, and the boatman, who receives a modest portion.

Those families with land rights who receive project components such as an irrigation channel, orchard, forest plot, or high-yielding seeds, will benefit to the largest extent in the long run. Realizing this, there is a tendency for those who have impermanent land rights to convert to permanent land ownership to secure the continuation of benefits for their families in future generations.

The poor are derived for the most part (but not always) from landless people, Faqirnama, or *faqirs*, who may rent land on a yearly lease basis (*kalang*) work it as tenants. Another category of Faqir is made up of animal tenders (Gujars and Kurastani) who may only have tents to live in. Artisans, Qasabghar, carpenters, barbers, blacksmiths, leather workers who make charpoys and other articles, cobblers, and potters do not own land, but are usually given a house. The poorest villagers are supposed to receive financial aid from *zakat* funds, which are collected at the federal level. However, *zakat* funds are disbursed to village landowners who, it is alleged, often distribute the money among themselves rather than to the poor. The Sarhad Rural Support Corporation (SRSC)—the NGO scheduled to operate in the Kala Dhaka region after September 9, 1994—will select villages with the largest number of poor as target beneficiaries. At present, SRSC estimates as much as 80 percent of the population can be classified below the poverty line in many villages. Part of the reason for the large number of poor is the out-migration of the most capable residents to Karachi, where they stay for longer and longer periods, leaving behind the less able.

Recommendations. The SRSC program will only cover selected villages with populations containing the highest percentages of poor in the Kala Dhaka region. The poor in these villages need to be targeted with beneficial programs even if they constitute less than a majority of the village population.

D5. Nongovernmental Organizations

SRSC, funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development, will implement its program in Mansehra Division (formerly Mansehra District), which includes the area covered by the Kala Dhaka project. SRSC has as its principal program objectives improving the living standard of the rural poor and promoting soil conservation. After a basic socioeconomic survey of the area was conducted, it was determined that as much as 80 percent of the population of many villages are living below the SRSC defined poverty line of Rs 400/month. The SRSC approach to poverty alleviation is through a participatory program in which the poorest villagers define their needs and priorities—i.e., what is required to attain *khushali* (happiness) from the people's own viewpoint. SRSC will help the poor translate these needs into realistic project goals, capable of achievement to a large extent through the formation of self-help groups and SRSC organizational and technical assistance.

Gadoon Amazai. Tanzeem Haqooqui Ibad Gadoon (Gadoon Organization for Human Rights), was started in June 1992 as an NGO dedicated to improve the health and welfare of Gadoon Amazai villagers. It was founded by Mohammad Aqeel Farooqui and includes other medical doctors and distinguished professionals on its board of directors. It uses funds derived from Muslim religious contributions to construct latrines and water supply systems in Gadoon Amazai villages and schools by stimulating villagers to contribute 50 percent of construction costs through self-help. It conducts free medical camps and dispenses free medicine for the poor, orphans, widows, and disabled. Treatment of epidemics and disaster relief also is on the organization's agenda, along with public sanitation and preventive medical advice. The group works to reduce maternal mortality rates, gives first aid training, and campaigns against drug abuse. Since this NGO was founded on the basis of Islamic religious principles, it has more potential for sustainability than many others.

The Gadoon Amazai Rural Area Support Program (GARASP) was, as of the first week in August, not officially registered, but it should be soon. Steps toward forming a Pakistani umbrella NGO began about two years ago, and the collapse of the 1992 Gadoon Amazai program accelerated measures toward forming this NGO. The USAID program to form village organizations in Ganichatra, Gabasni, and Nara union councils had involved training of volunteer motivators by Coverdale based on principles and advice from the Aga Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP). The VOs were told if they continued their activities for three months they would be eligible for \$10,000 each to implement their prospective projects. Then in January 1992, USAID changed project policy, AKRSP withdrew, and USAID said it would no longer continue the Gadoon Amazai NGO program. Instead, the mission suggested that an umbrella management NGO be formed to provide leadership, direction, and supplementary funding to VOs that would be organized for self-help in fundraising and small-scale village project implementation. Initially, villagers refused to accept this new policy, but recently, the chief of the Rural Development Division formed 20 VOs of about 40 members each that will implement the self-help concept under the supervision of GARASP.

A 17-member board of directors has been chosen for GARASP, derived from a wide population spectrum including farmers, politicians, retired soldiers and policemen,

professionals, and an industrialist. A charter has been formulated that especially directs GARASP activities toward a concern for the poor. A workshop was to be held in August to decide whether to affiliate with AKRSP and to learn fundraising techniques. Potential funding sources to be considered were: the Trust for Volunteer Organizations, Bilateral Assistance Programs, National Rural Support Program, MPA and MNA funds for village development, and the Annual Department Program of the provincial line agencies.

GARASP will take over the functions of the Gadoon Amazai Field Management Team when USAID funding expires in September 1994. These functions include the activities of two female and two male social organizers, one WID program coordinator, and 11 NFE trainers.

Liaisons have already been formed between GARASP and the TIPAN Outreach Directorate. A memorandum of understanding states that the Gadoon Amazai area has been selected as a pilot project for community development work in coordination with NWFP Agricultural University in Peshawar. The program will include agricultural research on fruit and vegetable crops and farming systems, as well as field and farm demonstration plots. Male and female agricultural extension workers will be trained, including six female agricultural extension workers specializing in livestock management. In addition, GARASP has been informed that a British Council scheme to train primary school teachers and supply books is tentatively scheduled to operate in the Gadoon Amazai area.

Kala Dhaka. The remaining Kala Dhaka project personnel, who will become members of the Field Management Team, are planning to form an NGO with a board of directors of influential members, including 2-3 distinguished members from the Kala Dhaka area. A "general body council" is contemplated as the coordinating body of this NGO.

ANNEX O1
INTERVIEWS WITH WOMEN AND PROJECT PERSONNEL

**Interviews of Women, Gadoga Amasai
Villages of Gandaf, Kabgani, Besik, Mallkabad, Dalori Bala, Devil, and Nara**

Discussions were held in NFE centers and in homes, stimulated by following questions:

- "Which components improved your life?" The NFE is the best part of the project. We want the NFE to continue since it offers education when there is no primary school. We don't want the NFE to leave our village. It has made a difference in our lives. The second best part is the girl's primary school. Third is roads since it makes it possible for teachers and instructors to come. We need more than one girl's primary school. There have been too many broken promises. We were told we would get 15 girl's primary schools and we only got three. We want girls' schools sited in the village; not off in some isolated area. We were told we would get NFE certificates of completion and we never did. We want education for our children. There is a need to upgrade the girl's middle school to grade 10 and include science courses so that girls can become doctors, LHV's, dentists, and nurses (a woman teacher). For me, it has been the kitchen garden. I never had a chance to go to school. So, instead I try to learn to grow vegetables well. After the kitchen garden kit supplies were used up, I had to use dung for fertilizer and production decreased. I am able to grow many vegetables for my household, but I would like more advice.
- "How about improvement in the water supply?" There is not enough water either for drinking or for irrigation (Nara). The GWT can cause sickness. A snake got in the GWT and caused the cholera deaths in another village. We were immune because we knew about ORS.
- "How about the health component?" The LHV has never visited our village. We prefer having our babies delivered by the *dai* who charges rupees 300 for a boy, and rupees 200 for a girl. She is more experienced than the midwife at the BHU. We have less children than our mothers did. There are no family planning supplies at the Basic Health Unit. We want family planning after we have four or five children, but our husbands do not want us to use contraceptives because they think it is illegal from the viewpoint of Islam since children are a gift from God. Some educated husbands allow their wives to use contraceptives. Some women don't tell their husbands but go to a lady doctor in Topi for contraceptive injections.
- "Has life improved for most people in the village since the project was initiated?" There are too many poor people (Nara). They don't have decent clothes or enough to eat. About 30% of the people are in great need. Please do something about it.

Women are glad that there is no more opium growing because it was too much work. It is the men who want it.

Interviews of Women and Men, en route and in Kala Dhaka Villages of Niway Killay and Kandar

On boat to Niway Killay, homeopathic doctor, Dr. Kalim Ullah: The Kala Dhaka reconstructed a boy's primary school for the villages, Marrir and Nadary; the girls' primary school was established three years ago. We have four *dai* who have not yet been trained by the BHU which is one half kilometer away. Many of our animals and chickens have died because the veterinary services are five kilometers away. The best Kala Dhaka components have been first the roads, secondly health and education facilities and WSS's. The women in the villages want income earning training. The men are leaving. If there are four men, three will go to Karachi.

Niway Killay and Kandar villages: The best Kala Dhaka project component is the track. We like the kitchen gardens and grow corn, okra, cucumber, and spinach. We eat the vegetables ourselves and give them to the children. We just harvested a lot of onions. You can see them stored in the houses. If there are more women in the family there are better kitchen gardens. When we have extra vegetables, or eggs, we don't sell them. It is not in our culture to sell such things (Niway Killay). We eat fish caught in Tarbella Lake (with nets held up by empty plastic bottles). We sell chickens, eggs, ghee, and one woman sells sewed *sahwar kemis* for 20 to 30 rupees (Kandar). We are satisfied with the water. There also are house connections (one house had a bath stall). We need a metaled road first, then electricity, and education third.

Another woman said, no, we need education first and then improved transport. We only have transport twice a day, in the morning the transport goes to town, and in the afternoon it comes back. We women prefer traveling by boat. Still another woman said we need a metaled road, then a hospital, and last, electricity. Because we lack electricity as you can see we only have a kerosene driven fan (turned on after much pumping for the guests' benefit). We can't have a refrigerator either so we have to go to the river to get cool water. We only had two vaccinations of EPI and we had to take the boat to Darband twice to complete the last two shots (Niway Killay). We never had EPI (Kandar). We collect firewood from the river (probably floated down as a result of illegal logging). It is washed down from the jungle and tossed up on shore, where it dries out. A lot of our men have gone to Karachi. They can stay from one to one and one half years. Sometimes the mother and wife go. The girls become educated in Urdu there.

The men like to use their Karachi money first to build a house with a metal roof. Then they buy household things, clothes, and a radio, and last they will use their money to arrange a marriage. We women would like to have sewing machines. A few women embroider empty fertilizer bags and make them into prayer mats. They also embroider pillow cases and tablecloths. Yes, we have the soap making equipment (shown large metal wok-like pan, ladle, and box into which soap mixture is poured for hardening and division into bars). We haven't used the equipment lately because we used up all the supplies we

were given, and we only can get them in Peshawar and there is no one around to buy them now. (When soap is unavailable only water is used to clean the dishes, and ashes and sand to clean the pots). I am a midwife who received training as a TBA (brought out kit in metal box with razor blades, nail brush, soap, gauze, cloth, and pot), and received information on pre and post natal care, and nutrition for the mother and weaning food for the baby after four months. I don't charge for deliveries whether it is a boy or a girl.. They can give me something if they want to. The BHU is three kilometers away (Kandar). The male community health worker strolled in and said the most common village ailments were skin diseases and whooping cough. Bee keeping is in another village, and it was taken over from women by one man because there are many boxes containing the bees which have to be moved when the hive moves to a new location.

Interview with Dr. Muhammed Aqwel, Basic Health Unit, Utlā, Gadoon-Amazai.

This BHU is being upgraded to a Rural Health Center (RHC) which will be equipped with a laboratory, dental clinic, and x-ray facilities. It will have four medical doctors: two male, one female, and one dentist. There has been no change in the morbidity and mortality rate for the uneducated as a result of the project supplied WSS's. Only the educated have improved their morbidity rates. Due to the lack of knowledge of proper sanitation procedures in the village the drinking water supply often becomes polluted. Consequently, there are severe outbreaks of gastro-intestinal illnesses. The NFE hygiene and sanitation training is not professional enough. The NFE teachers should have more training from the BHU doctor, and/or the Department of Health. It is difficult to understand why project supported NFE hygiene instructors have never sought advice, help, or training from the BHU. The NFE trainers need to emphasize and re-emphasize sanitation and nutritional principles. To maintain sanitation, village and school latrines are needed. The NGO Tanzeem Haqooqul Ibad Gadoon (Gadoon Organization for Human Rights) is the only agency supplying latrines to the villages. This NGO also supplies WSS to schools.

There is much protein and calorie malnutrition, particularly among the poor, in the Gadoon-Amazai villages. There also are mineral and vitamin deficiencies, and a lack of sufficient iodine in the water supply which leads to a high incidence of goiter. There is much neo-natal umbilical cord infection as a result of the use of a non-sterile knife by the *dai*, and relatively high infection rates in seven and eight day old circumcised male infants as a result of the use of non-sterile cutting instruments by the barber. Both of these practices contribute to relatively high infant mortality rates. Female infants and children can be neglected. Many girls and women suffer from anemia. Each village should have three community public health workers, trained by the Department of Public Health. The community public health workers are not as effective as they should be because they lack kits. They should dispense family planning information, but family planning is a policy which is just on paper. There are no family planning supplies.

Interview with Dr. Mohamad Rafiq, District Health Officer, Mansehra

Ten village health workers (VHW) from Kala Dhaka received training in sanitation, ORS, symptoms of iodine deficiency disease and diarrhoea, and the need for EPI. They only

were paid during the training period. After that we let them earn some money by selling medicines. Kala Dhaka has 11 BHU, but no RHC as yet. We have trained 68 TBA. We only have funds for training TBA from the settled areas. The building of village latrines has been suggested. The "malik" in each village is responsible for the WSS, and he can contact the BHU for advice. As for morbidity and mortality rates for Kala Dhaka, ask the DC. We only receive health statistics from the settled areas. The statistics from the Kala Dhaka BHU's are not reliable. There are no LHV's in Kala Dhaka; they only are present in the settled areas. We have not had any direct contact with the Kala Dhaka and therefore we can not take over the mobile clinics. A link should have been established. Possibly, UNICEF or Save the Children will sponsor them. Kala Dhaka is a very difficult area to service due to its inaccessible terrain. It can take the villagers one or two hours to reach a BHU. Then there are many landslides, too. The foundation of the BHU on the left side of the Indus River collapsed because of one. Traditional attitudes prevent optimum use of health facilities in Kala Dhaka. We established a dispensary in Manjakold (sp.?) but the public is not using it enough even though we are dispensing some medicines for malaria and diarrhoea free. We only charge for the most expensive ones. The majority of patients at the BHU's are women. Many have gynecological problems. The male doctors treat the women through a TBA intermediary. Water is deficient in iodine in Kala Dhaka, and those afflicted by iodine deficiency disease need two capsules and an injection within a year to prevent developing goiter. There are a lot of infections caused by staphylococcus bacteria in Kala Dhaka.

ANNEX O2
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