

**United States Agency for  
International Development**

**Midterm Evaluation of the  
Zimbabwe Natural Resources  
Management Project  
(Project Number 690-0251.13)**

**ULG Consultants Ltd.  
Highlands, Harare**

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## Table of Contents

	<b><u>Page</u></b>
Acronyms .....	- iii -
Executive Summary .....	- v -
1. INTRODUCTION .....	- 1 -
2. EVALUATION BACKGROUND .....	- 1 -
3. TEAM COMPOSITION AND STUDY METHODS .....	- 2 -
4. PROJECT OVERVIEW: ITS HISTORICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL CONTEXT .....	- 3 -
4.1 PROJECT OVERVIEW AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT .....	- 3 -
4.1.1 Project goals, purpose and elements .....	- 5 -
4.1.2 Project objectives .....	- 6 -
4.2 ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT .....	- 7 -
4.2.1 Geography and land use .....	- 7 -
4.2.2 Social structure .....	- 8 -
4.2.3 Land ownership .....	- 8 -
4.2.4 Stability .....	- 9 -
4.2.5 USAID: its context and role .....	- 10 -
5. ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE EVALUATION .....	- 10 -
5.1 PROJECT CONCEPTUAL ISSUES .....	- 11 -
5.2 PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES .....	- 23 -
5.3 PROJECT ORGANIZATION ISSUES .....	- 30 -
5.3.1 Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management .....	- 32 -
5.3.2 Zimbabwe Trust .....	- 33 -
5.3.3 Centre for Applied Social Studies .....	- 34 -
5.4 REGIONAL NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES .....	- 39 -
6. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS .....	- 42 -
7. RECOMMENDATIONS .....	- 44 -



## Table of Contents (*cont*)

### List of Tables

Table 4.1. Natural Resource Management Project Budget, Zimbabwe Component, (US\$ 000) .....	- 6 -
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### ANNEXES

- A. Logframe: Zimbabwean Natural Resources Management Project
- B. List of persons and organizations contacted
- C. References cited
- D. Current (Dec 93) Status of Recommendations Identified in Zimbabwe NRMP, Community-Based Resource Utilization Component:  
Interim Assessment by Hitchcock and Nangati, 27 July 1992.
- E. Technical appendices:
  - 1. Joint annex, CDSSES and LGS
  - 2. NRPPA
  - 3. WNRMAS
- F. Terms of Reference
- G. Project Implementation Issues to be addressed by the Interim Evaluation  
(TOR pp 11- 35)
- H. Community participation in natural resource management

## Acronyms

APIP	Annual Project Implementation Plan
ART	African Resources Trust
AWF	African Wildlife Foundation
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
CASS	Centre for Applied Social Studies
CCG	CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group
CCU	CAMPFIRE Coordinating Unit
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFTC	Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
DNPWLM	Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EO	Executive Officer
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
GIS	Geographic Information System
GOZ	Government of Zimbabwe
IUCN	World Conservation Union
ME	Ministry of Education
MET	Ministry of Environment and Tourism
MIS	Management Information System
MLAWD	Ministry of Land, Agriculture and Water Development
MLGRUD	Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
MNAECCD	Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Cooperatives Development
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NORAD	Norwegian Development Assistance Programme
NRMP	Natural Resources Management Project
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
PA	Project Administrator (USAID)
PAC	Problem animal control
PACD	Project assistance completion date
PIC	Project Implementation Committee
PID	Project Identification Document
PSC	Project Steering Committee
RC-PCPS	Resident Centred Problem Census Problem Solving
RDC	Rural District Council

SADC	Southern African Development Commission
SAFER	Southern African Fund for Economic Research
SEO	Senior Executive Officer
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
TOR	Terms of reference
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UZ	University of Zimbabwe
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
WC	Wildlife Committee
WCI	Wildlife Conservation International
WWF	Worldwide Fund for Nature
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZERO	Zimbabwe Environmental Resource Organisation
ZT	Zimbabwe Trust

## **Executive Summary**

### **ZIMBABWE NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROJECT MIDTERM EVALUATION**

#### **Purpose of the Natural Resources Management Project: Zimbabwe**

As described by its logical framework (Annex A), the goals of the Project are to increase incomes and enhance the capability of communities to meet basic human needs through sustainable utilization and conservation of natural resources, particularly wildlife. Successful conservation of wildlife resources and better integration of wildlife into the nation's economic development program will accomplish the Project's subgoal of promoting sustainable development of communities through appropriate land use practices on lands that are marginally suitable for agriculture.

The purpose of the Project is twofold:

- (1) To demonstrate, through practical examples, the technical, social, economic and ecological viability and replicability of community-based natural resource management and utilization programs on marginal lands for increasing household and community incomes while sustaining natural resources.
- (2) To improve national and local capability to halt the decline in the wildlife resource base through training, education, protection, communication and technology transfer.

#### **Purpose of the Evaluation and its Method**

Originally proposed for August, 1992 (USAID 1989a), this midterm evaluation was rescheduled to occur towards the end of 1993. It is preceded by an Interim Assessment concluded on 27 July 1992 (Hitchcock and Nangati) as well as by periodic internal evaluations conducted by the Project's implementing partners.

The earlier assessment by Hitchcock and Nangati was prompted by concerns that the Project was not achieving some of its objectives because of a lack of community consensus in the Project target areas, the presence of top-down pressure from implementors, and inappropriate institutional relationships. Special attention was paid in the assessment to Project organization, management, administration and conceptual issues. This Evaluation is intended to build upon the conclusions and recommendations of the Interim Assessment, and concentrate on those issues identified by Project implementors during the course of a

Terms of Reference workshop held by Project implementors between 15 and 21 April 1993. These issues make up pages 11-37 of the Terms of Reference (TOR) which guide this evaluation (Annex F).

The evaluation was based upon interviews conducted with project beneficiaries, district council members, the GOZ Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, and other institutions and persons affected by or concerned with wildlife, and by analysis of project documents, surveys, field visits and other project output data gathered from beneficiaries of this Project.

## **Findings and Conclusions**

The general conclusions of the evaluation are as follows:

- (1) The Project is providing meaningful benefits to residents of the Project area. It continues to suffer faults, however, many of which owe their origin to errors in Project design and misunderstandings in the Grant Agreement.
- (2) The implementing agencies view the Project as providing financial backing, materials, and services to compliment the CAMPFIRE movement; USAID views the project as having a territorial integrity of its own. The difference of views is one of nuance, particularly as the goals of the movement and the Project are similar. It provides a division, however, when the argument of territorial integrity isolates the Project from the activities of the larger movement.
- (3) This Project is a subset of a larger regional Project involving four SADC countries: Malawi, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe. While the Project's regional context has provided a forum for discussion, it has failed to achieve progress in important regional wildlife issues: no international protocols regarding wildlife have evolved from the Project; few workshops have taken place; cross-border poaching threatens Zimbabwe's rhino population; dialogue regarding important wildlife issues remains largely *ad hoc* and according to linkages outside the Project.
- (4) The design of the Project, particularly its sense of regionality, has produced consequences which were unforeseen by Project designers. First amongst these are divisions within the implementing agencies themselves: the idealism of managers in Harare contrasted to the pragmatism of implementors in Bulawayo. This view could be extended to include perceptions between a first world donor, USAID, centred in Harare and concerned largely with administration and accounting, and those of its third world collaborating agencies working principally from Bulawayo and concerned with improving resource management and rural livelihoods. Second is the supposed effect of the Project's activities upon the ethnic divide between the Ndebele (who receive project benefits) and the Shona (who receive no project benefits) — field observers believe its impact to be largely irrelevant.

Third is the tendency of CAMPFIRE, working in locations where animal and human populations are balanced in ways that favour its activities, to ignore the Project area on the premise that it is already serviced by USAID.

- (5) The Project's support of infrastructural development has led to serious problems attributable, in part, to weaknesses in the Project Paper and Grant Agreement. A superficial Environmental Impact Assessment of the Project's proposed activities, a lack of engineering review of major developments, and the failure of the Economic Assessment to evaluate the cost of maintenance introduces questions into the sustainability of infrastructure at the feasibility level; failure or reluctance to evaluate these same issues at the design level has exposed the Project to unknown quantities of risk (a project-supported dam recently failed) which could perhaps be lessened. The Grant Agreement was faulty by not requiring these design-level studies and analyses.
- (6) Despite a precarious basis on which to anchor an effective collaborative partnership, relationships between DNPWLM, ZT, CASS, and USAID have prospered and improved with time. This is due, in large part, to the commitment, talent and tenacity of the Project implementors and participants.
- (7) An earlier Interim Assessment identified managerial problems between USAID and its implementing partners. In an attempt to resolve these difficulties, USAID has instigated personnel changes, held workshops and training, and attempted to increase its flexibility towards the core causes of the problem. USAID perceives the problem to have been addressed; the implementing agencies view them as a continuing source of discord.
- (8) Project implementation is rarely from the bottom-up, that is in response to problems identified by individuals, groups of individuals and villages directly affected by wildlife. Instead, action is often initiated through the rural district councils acting on behalf of wards. Partly due to perceptions of the structure of local government and how it should be addressed (start at the top versus start at the bottom), and to the way in which jurisdiction over wildlife is accorded to communities (appropriate authority is granted to rural district councils), the issue has led to perceptions of distrust of the Project by some communities. The issue becomes particularly acute when it causes dilution of the financial benefits which households view as their due, and the exclusion of some wards, perhaps for reasons related to their suitability for wildlife resource management, from Project investment.

- (9) The CAMPFIRE Association provides a new focus for the movement. Many weakness, structural and managerial, require attention in order to improve its standing within the CAMPFIRE movement.
- (10) The DNPWLM views the CAMPFIRE movement as a successful means of addressing wildlife issues at the community level. As the CAMPFIRE movement continues to expand and, particularly, to involve resources in addition to wildlife, its standing and organization within the Department and the Ministry will require improvement.

## **Recommendations**

- (1) Given the short period of time remaining to this Project, a workshop should be convened to provide Project participants the opportunity to discuss their options for the future. This could include a continuation of the present Project, but with modifications to insure improved local management of natural resources.
- (2) The Project, if it is to continue, should be on the basis of an accord between USAID and its implementing partners — its structure as a regional project has lost its earlier relevance. The DNPWLM should continue as the lead agency; ZT and CASS should continue as implementing partners, though the number of executing agencies may be expanded to include other agencies or institutions. The Project's regional context should either be discontinued or revised; so too should the concept of a targeted area in Matabeleland. In its stead the Project should adopt a national focus with a view towards extending its concepts to natural resources in addition to wildlife.
- (3) The Project should become truly demand driven, that is in response to needs identified by individuals, groups of individuals, and villages. Villagers should increase their participation in the events which shape their lives, including activity identification, design, monitoring, marketing, and maintenance. The Project's investment in infrastructure needs to be adjusted to incorporate safeguards in engineering design as well as concerns about the environmental, financial, and social dimensions of sustainability.
- (4) Disallowed vouchers continue to provide a source of stress between USAID and ZT; CASS, acting through the Bursar of the University of Zimbabwe, continues to be in behind in its submission of vouchers. USAID needs to be sympathetic to these problems and continue to provide assistance to resolve them. The Project Implementing Committee needs overhauling so that it truly becomes a coordinating committee that discusses, coordinates, approves and allocates work by the Project.
- (5) Assistance should be given to the CAMPFIRE Association to improve its standing and capabilities within the CAMPFIRE movement, particularly in the roles of expanding

awareness of natural resource issues, training of local community leaders, and marketing products generated by the resources it helps to manage.

- (6) The disbursement of Project financial benefits needs to devolve more from the district councils into the control of communities participating in the Project.
- (7) Infrastructure such as fencing and water supplies are an essential element of wildlife management in the NRM Project area. Villages are not now able to afford these; they are unlikely to become able to afford them in the future. If wildlife populations are to grow in communal areas they have to be provided with water; people also have to be able to keep them away from their crops, livestock and houses. While minor infrastructural investments should occur with a minimum of disruption, other types such as large dams and reservoirs, mineral development, large-scale irrigation, drainage, and flood control schemes, resettlement and all projects with potentially major impacts on people should undergo the normal studies associated with major investments — Environmental Impact Assessment, engineering review, and economic analysis — in order to assure their sustainability as well as assess the investment required to reduce their risk of failure.

### **Lessons learned**

- (1) Inadequate scrutiny of project design documents increases the opportunity for difficulties during project implementation.
- (2) Before entering into agreements with USAID, participating agencies need an improved understanding of the restrictions they will encounter. Legalistic documents such as Grant Agreements require their clauses be explained at depth and in terms the agencies will understand.
- (3) Difficulties between USAID and its implementing partners are unlikely to vanish as a result of workshops and meetings. Sympathy and understanding are also important.
- (4) When problems owe their source to specific individuals within the AID hierarchy, those individuals should receive counsel. Sources of discord require serious attention.

- (5) Regarding this evaluation, 36 pages of terms of reference are excessive for an effort lasting only several weeks and involving only a handful of individuals. The lack of correspondence between the TOR for the evaluation and that commissioned to individual team members meant that tasks were performed which were outside the framework of the principal study. By denying latitude to the evaluators key issues risked becoming lost.

# **MIDTERM EVALUATION OF THE ZIMBABWE NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROJECT**

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

This document presents the analyses, conclusions, and recommendations resulting from a midterm evaluation of the Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management Project (USAID Project No. 690-0251.13, SADC Project No. 5.0.18). Project financing is by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) acting through the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM); implementing agencies also include ZimTrust (ZT) and the Centre of Applied Social Sciences (CASS) of the University of Zimbabwe. Project effectiveness occurred with the signing of an agreement between USAID and the GOZ on 31 August 1989; the project assistance completion date (PACD) is 31 August 1995; grant agreements with CASS and ZT expire 15 September 1994. The Project is a component of a larger Project involving the participation of four other southern Africa countries: Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi and Zambia. Its objectives seek to:

- manage and protect the natural resource base,
- promote sustainable social and economic development, and
- disseminate knowledge of community management of natural resources.

The goal of the Project is to increase the incomes of Project participants and enhance their capabilities to meet basic human needs through sustainable utilization and conservation of natural resources, particularly wildlife<sup>1</sup>.

## **2. EVALUATION BACKGROUND**

The grant agreement between USAID and the GOZ calls for periodic analyses of the progress of the Project (USAID 1989: 3). In so doing, these evaluations will

- evaluate progress toward attainment of the objectives of the Project;
- identify and evaluate problem areas or constraints which may inhibit such attainment;
- assess how inhibiting factors may be mitigated or overcome; and
- assess, to the degree feasible, the overall development impact of the Project.

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<sup>1</sup>. See project logical framework, Appendix A.

Originally proposed for August, 1992 (USAID 1989a), this midterm evaluation was rescheduled to occur towards the end of 1993. It is preceded by an Interim Assessment concluded on 27 July 1992 (Hitchcock and Nangati) as well as by periodic internal evaluations conducted by the implementing partners.

The earlier assessment by Hitchcock and Nangati was prompted by concerns that the Project was not achieving some of its objectives because of a lack of community consensus in the Project target areas, the presence of top-down pressure from implementors, and inappropriate institutional relationships (USAID 1993a: 5). Special attention was paid in the assessment to Project organization, management, administration and conceptual issues. This Evaluation is intended to build upon the conclusions and recommendations of the Interim Assessment, and concentrate on those issues identified by Project implementors during the course of a Terms of Reference workshop held by Project implementors between 15 and 21 April 1993. These issues make up pages 11-37 of the Terms of Reference (TOR) which guide this evaluation (Annex F).

The following text describes the composition of the evaluation team and the study methods which it adopted; the environmental, economic, and social context of the Project, issues addressed by the evaluation; a summary and discussion of issues which remain outstanding; the findings and conclusions of the evaluation; and its recommendations. The recommendations were discussed with Project implementors during a workshop held in Harare on 15 December 1993; the substance of this document was presented as a debriefing to USAID on 22 December 1993.

### **3. TEAM COMPOSITION AND STUDY METHODS**

The evaluation team is made up of experts in soil and water resource planning (team leader), community development and small-scale enterprises, local government, wildlife and natural resource management administration, and natural resource planning and policy analysis. C. Paskett, the team leader, has worked on USAID-sponsored Projects since 1964. His experience includes assignments in about 30 developing and developed countries worldwide. He has been the team leader of Project formulation missions sponsored by The World Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development; his Project evaluation experience includes Projects sponsored by the Overseas Development Authority and the World Food Programme. A. Mupawaenda, the Community Development and Small Scale Enterprise Specialist, is a Zimbabwean citizen qualified in the UK with post-graduate training in Australia and elsewhere. She is an educationalist and sociologist with experience in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Angola. C. Ota, the Local Government Specialist, is a Zimbabwean citizen who currently holds a senior position on the staff of the University of Zimbabwe. He has over 10 years of organizational development work concentrating on management and administrative structures which increase local participation. His experience includes organizational evaluation, feasibility studies, Project management, and assisting local authorities in developing long-term and short-term plans. G. Child, the Wildlife and Natural Resource Management Administration Specialist, is an internationally experienced Zimbabwean wildlife and natural resource management expert. Dr. Child, while Director of the National Parks Department, helped found Zimbabwe's highly successful approach to community management of

natural resources. J.E. Clarke, the Natural Resource Planning and Policy Analyst, is an experienced specialist in the management of wildlife in protected areas. His interests include the fields of strategic policy formulation, legislation, and management planning of natural resources. His experience includes over 35-years of work in southern and eastern Africa, the Near East, and Southeast Asia.

The team's methods and procedures are expressed by its TOR (USAID 1993:14). This states that, "where applicable, the evaluation is to follow the format and guidelines specified in AID Program Design and Evaluation Methodology Report No. 7, *AID Evaluation Handbook*. The evaluation is to be conducted by interviews with Project beneficiaries, district council members, the GOZ Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM), ZT, CASS) and other institutions and persons affected by Project activities, and by analysis of Project documents, surveys, field visits, and other Project output data gathered from beneficiaries under this Project." Page 15 of Annex F provides further specifications of the types of data the team are to review and the methods it is to follow.

The TOR for this assignment comprises 37 pages of text, 26 pages of which are made up of 1-paragraph statements of issues the team is to address. These tasks were identified by Project implementors during a TOR workshop held in April, and contain two sections: tasks which pertain to the evaluation as a whole and those which pertain to undertakings by individual team members. The correspondence between tasks assigned to the evaluation and those assigned to team members is poor — some would argue it should be perfect. Annex G summarizes tasks assigned to the evaluation and compares them to task numbers from the TOR commissioned to each consultant. It demonstrates that many issues important to the evaluation are disconnected from those assigned to the mission as a whole. Because of this structure the document comprises a main text which discusses issues assigned to the overall evaluation; its technical annexes discuss issues assigned to individual team members.

## **4. PROJECT OVERVIEW: ITS HISTORICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL CONTEXT**

### **4.1 PROJECT OVERVIEW AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Beginning in the early-1980s Zimbabwe embarked on a movement to devolve part of the responsibility for the management of its wildlife resources to local communities. Known by its acronym, CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources), the movement seeks to provide incentives for resource conservation by bestowing benefits, proprietorship, and decision-making power to the communities most affected by wildlife and, in recent years, other resources (King 1993:5). While coverage of the movement is potentially nationwide, its present identification with wildlife generates a natural focus of interest to areas affected by their proximity to game parks and low land suitability for agriculture. Similar efforts in Zambia, notably the earlier Kafue Wetlands Project and the Lupande Project, provided precedents for CAMPFIRE as well as a potential platform from which to improve multinational collaboration in resource management.

Despite the soundness of its underlying concepts, CAMPFIRE in its genesis lacked the financial impulse it required to effectively fulfil its mandate. As early as 1988 Cutshall and Shearing, representing CASS, approached USAID about financial assistance to foster the development of CAMPFIRE-type wildlife ventures. At that time there were no bilateral USAID funds available as the program had been cut for political reasons.

Although Cutshall and Shearing pondered a regional approach to wildlife management, their framework remained conceptual: differences between Zimbabwe's laws and those of its neighbours hindered the development of a regional basis for the devolving of authority over wildlife. During this time, however, concern in Washington and worldwide about wildlife and, in particular, elephants developed into policies which expanded the opportunity for international involvement. Congress passed legislation which required USAID to spend money on elephant conservation. At the same time CITES was seeking to move the African elephant into its endangered (Appendix 1) category.

Zimbabwe argued that the identification of elephants as an endangered species would disturb its elephant management program and create financial problems for communities that had received the right, under the CAMPFIRE program, to manage (sell and market) elephants and elephant products. As an opportunity, CAMPFIRE (and similar programs in other countries) provided a platform for USAID's financial support by addressing issues affecting elephants as well as community efforts to manage them; it also advanced the geographical and physical basis for project identification: most of the region's elephants were located in Hwange National Park, Northeastern Botswana, East Caprivi, Southwestern Zambia ... and the population regularly moved across borders.

Still, USAID is not a conservation agency, but a development agency; its mandate requires it demonstrate the "people-level" impact of its programs. Project formulation required that people be linked to elephants: in Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE provided this bond; in Zambia it was through ADMARE; in Botswana, however, no community-based resource program yet existed. Because of variations in the theme of wildlife management by different communities and the absence of CAMPFIRE activities in the vicinity of Hwange and in Botswana, the Project adopted an experimental (pilot) approach in which each country and USAID was to learn from the different models being used.

Because USAID's funding was through its Southern African Regional Program budget, a connection was sought through SADC's Wildlife Coordination Unit in Malawi. This unit's responsibilities are to conduct regional research, collect data from its three member countries who are implementing wildlife management activities, and to summarize and disseminate this information through workshops, conferences, reports, and newsletters — contributing a focus on "lessons learned".

By 1990 the African elephant had been uplisted to Appendix 1. When Zimbabwe, in 1992, was unsuccessful in its efforts to downgrade elephants as an endangered species the physical and geographical regionality of the Project — that of elephants — began to lose its relevance. Over time, for this reason, CAMPFIRE has become more important than elephant conservation and national concerns have become more important than regional ones.

#### **4.1.1 Project goals, purpose and elements**

The Project's goal echoes those of CAMPFIRE, namely to increase incomes and enhance the capability of communities to meet basic human needs through sustainable utilization and conservation of natural resources, particularly wildlife (USAID 1989a: Annex C). Successful conservation of wildlife resources and better integration of wildlife into the nation's economic development program will accomplish the Project's subgoal of promoting sustainable development of communities through appropriate land use practices on lands that are marginally suitable for agriculture (USAID 1993a:6). The purpose of the Project is twofold:

- (1) To demonstrate, through practical examples, the technical, social, economic and ecological viability and replicability of community-based natural resource management and utilization programs on marginal lands for increasing household and community incomes while sustaining natural resources.
- (2) To improve national and local capability to halt the decline in the wildlife resource base through training, education, protection, communication and technology transfer.

The elements financed by the Project to achieve the goals, subgoals, and purposes listed above include the following:

- (1) community-based resource utilization
- (2) planning and applied research support
- (3) conservation of the resource base
- (4) regional communications and the exchange of information
- (5) managerial and financial components.

Table 4.1 gives the budget accorded to each of the elements listed above. Project inputs and outputs which form the components of these elements are listed in the Project logical framework, Annex A, at the close of this document.

**Table 4.1.** Natural Resource Management Project Budget, Zimbabwe Component, (US\$ 000)

No.	Element	Obligated	ments	dated	Advances	Disburse-	Unliqui-
1	Community development	4180.50	1934.68	2245.82	521.16		
2	Planning and applied research	699.00	191.27	507.73	0.00		
3	Audit	100.00	0.00	100.00	0.00		
4	Wildlife conservation	1481.50	1135.26	346.24	27.98		
5	Regional communication and training	899.30	354.83	544.46	0.08		
7	Inflation	239.70	0.00	239.70	0.00		
TOTAL		7600.00	3616.04	3983.95	549.22		

Source: USAID budget report MXRMP19 dated 3 November 1993

#### 4.1.2 Project objectives

The Project's objectives further amplify the goals described in the preceding section. They include the following (USAID 1989a:15-16; USAID 1993a:8-9):

- Demonstrate wildlife utilization as a preferred and profitable land use in Bulilima-Mangwe, Tsholotsho, Binga, and Hwange Communal Lands.
- Establish resource management programs in the target areas that will be self-sustaining, will offer increased local employment opportunities and incomes, will result in optimal and sustained wildlife yields, and will provide the communities with access to a renewable source of revenues for development Projects.
- Establish and strengthen institutions and decision-making procedures for sustainable resource management and distribution of economic benefits resulting from wildlife activities at the village, ward, and district levels in the Bulilima-Mangwe, Tsholotsho, Binga, and Hwange Communal Lands.
- Transfer, through training and advisory services provided by Zimbabwe Trust, problem-solving organizational, accounting, and management skills, thereby empowering local institutions to plan and administer their own strategy for resource utilization.
- Enable local institutions, by completion of the Project, to assume complete responsibility for wildlife management and distribution of economic and other tangible benefits resulting from the wildlife resource base.
- Increase women's participation in the resource management program at the village, ward, and district levels.
- Expand women's participation in the economy through income generating activities that use the natural resource base in a sustainable manner.

- Enhance social and rural welfare through increased income and access to protein, community development Projects, and expanded participation of women in the economy and the development process.
- Introduce rural communities to basic concepts of community-based resource management and utilization.

Community-based activities have been implemented in most of the Project area for at least 2 years; some areas have received benefits for about 2½ years.

## **4.2 ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT**

The Project encompasses land in parts of two provinces, North Matabeleland (three districts) and South Matabeleland (1 district). These districts contain a total of 32 wards and 168 villages.

### **4.2.1 Geography and land use**

The Project target area is made up of land from natural regions IV and V as identified on the Zimbabwe Natural Regions and Farming Areas map, second edition, 1984, 1:1 million scale. Natural Region IV is hot and low-lying; its mean annual rainfall is between 450 and 650 mm, and poses a constraint to land use. Such land is best suited to semi-intensive animal husbandry; its suitability for rainfed maize is marginal — typical yields are about 0.5 t/ha. Natural Region IV was particularly hard-hit by the 1982-84 drought.

Natural Region V contains hot, low lying land whose mean annual rainfall is less than 650 mm. Without irrigation it is suited only for extensive animal husbandry and wildlife; irrigated areas support sugar-cane and wheat (Moyo 1991: 34).

Land use in the Project area is devoted principally to subsistence cultivation and livestock raising. Interviews with Project-area households indicated that

- outside labour,
- brewing (beer),
- agricultural products,
- crafts,
- small animal husbandry, and
- mopane worm husbandry

are principal wage-earning activities. Of these, outside labour, especially in Tsholotsho and Bulilima-Mwangwe (USAID 1993a:8), is the most important; brewing, mopane worm collection, and marketing provide meaningful sources of income to women (Hawkes 1993).

Median field size varies between 2 and 10 acres. Dominant crops include maize, sorghum (for beer), and millet; groundnuts, sunflower and cotton (2 wards in Binga) are also grown. Households lacking cattle are unlikely to use animal traction to manage their fields; their holdings will be smaller than those of more prosperous farmers. Livestock are often grazed away from home for part of the year; goat herding is largely a women's activity (Hawkes 1993).

#### **4.2.2 Social structure**

The population of Zimbabwe is diverse: at mid-1980 it was estimated to consist of more than 7 million Africans, about 220,000 Europeans, and less than 40,000 Asians and Coloureds. The African population may be divided into two tribal or linguistic groups, the Ndebele and the Shona, otherwise known as the Matabele and the Mashona. While Ndebele dominate the Project area, Tonga, Nambiya, Kalanga, and San, among others, are also present (USAID 1993:8).

#### **4.2.3 Land ownership**

At independence the majority of Zimbabwe's African population (over 60 percent) lived in tribal areas, most of which are overpopulated and overstocked. Subsistence production supplemented by small and irregular sales of surplus crops and livestock, occasional casual employment, and by remittances from migrant labourers provide the basis of the rural African economy. The society is enfeebled by labour migration; most men in their prime and with education are absent. Children constitute about one-half the total population.

From 1930 the holding of land was divided into social categories by the Land Apportionment Act. This Act sought to achieve parallel development through its "two pyramids" policy which divided the country into two racially exclusive parts on the basis of population. Measures were taken to prevent Africans from competing in the markets for agricultural produce. Taxation, the pass laws, land pressures, and the development of new wants ensured that the main role of Africans in the economy was as labour migrants to the European towns, farms, and mines. Little attention was paid to the development of African commercial farming in the Native Purchase Areas which had been set aside, in addition to the reserves, under the Act.

In rural areas land shortage and overcrowding, compulsory destocking, and the forcible removal of Africans under the terms of the Land Apportionment Act from land required for post-war immigrants, parks, reservoir sites, and other uses fostered much discontent. Above all, the Land Husbandry Act of 1951, which struck at the roots of both rural and urban life, acted as a catalyst for mass nationalism. The act involved the substitution of semi-individualized for communal tenure, partly in an effort to conserve the land and improve farming methods; in African eyes the measure was necessary only because of grossly unequal distribution of land. Underestimates of the numbers entitled to holdings and hasty and coercive implementation stiffened opposition when the act began to be applied in 1955. Worst affected were young labour migrants who lost their right to land and security.

During the Rhodesian Front and UDI there was a revived emphasis on segregation, and further attempts were made to tighten control over the African population through the use of the chiefs at local and national levels. Although some of the pressure on the regime was lessened when the unpopular Land Husbandry Act was repealed, this did nothing to solve rapidly deteriorating conditions in the Tribal Trust Lands (former Reserves). Indeed, acute land shortages among Africans were ignored when the consolidation of land apportionment legislation in the Land Tenure Act (1969) increased the proportion exclusively reserved to whites: the Act provided for a European Area (46.7 percent of the total), an African Area (46.7 percent), and a National Area (6.6 percent) of game and forest areas. Similarly provocative, the republic constitution of the same year was framed to exclude majority rule for all time and to eliminate any element of the historic common voting rule.

Amendment of the Act in 1977 maintained traditional land tenure within tribal areas, but opened up the European farming areas to African ownership for the first time. For most Zimbabweans, the struggles of recent decades have had more to do with the land issue than with anything else. The pace of change has not been sufficient to head off uncontrolled resettlement or to establish producer cooperatives on the scale which the government would have liked. Recent years have seen the passage of more effective measures to bring about an equitable distribution of land.

Time has induced change to the way Project-area residents use their land and view the use of wildlife. In pre-colonial times individuals and local groups had access to wildlife on a communal basis. During the period of colonial government the state restricted the exploitation of wildlife. The passage of the Parks and Wildlife Act in 1975 opened the opportunity of communities to gain benefits from wildlife in their areas. The Act contains a provision which empowers the DNPWLM to grant "appropriate authority" status, in effect transferring jurisdiction over wildlife to communities that are able to meet tests of their management ability. The four districts in the Project area received appropriate authority during 1990 and 1991.

#### **4.2.4 Stability**

At independence it was necessary to consolidate three large, hostile and undefeated armies. Progress was slow and serious clashes, along party lines, occurred between guerrilla groups in the vicinity of Bulawayo. As the euphoria of independence waned, there began increasing discussion of the need for a one-party state. Disagreement regarding restrictions of the Lancaster Accords and polarization between the major political parties increased when demotion and, later, dismissal of opposition leaders was accompanied by the discovery of illegal arms caches in Matabeleland followed by arrests of dissidents. Although there were some outbreaks of violence in the province, it is significant that many coalition members failed to heed a call to resign.

The particularly acute land problems of the province, aided by the effects of its worst drought for more than a century, heightened the tense political situation. During 1982 banditry and political violence increased. In an apparent attempt to undermine the economy and discredit the government, there were indiscriminate robberies, killings, and kidnappings of commercial farmers and tourists. Dissidents from the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army were joined by former colleagues who had deserted from the new

national army. The government held the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) to blame; the supply of personnel and equipment from South Africa was also suspected.

Early in 1983, amid allegations of indiscipline and murder of innocent civilians, the Fifth Army Brigade, largely composed of people of Shona-speaking origin and trained by personnel from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, sought to crush the dissidents and protect the important, largely white, commercial farming sector on which so much of the government's economic strategy had come to rest. The passage of time has erased much of the evidence of this struggle and the ill will it generated. Drought and the effects of world depression are more in evidence as causes of insecurity in Matabeleland today.

#### **4.2.5 USAID: its context and role**

Apart from its recent history of political unrest, four significant considerations combine to influence the development of Matabeleland:

- (1) land whose suitability for rainfed agriculture is between low and marginal,
- (2) low mean annual rainfall with frequently recurring droughts,
- (3) proximity to game parks presently being managed under policies which ensure expansion of their wildlife populations, and
- (4) limited local opportunities for employment.

Under its present circumstances in Zimbabwe, wildlife represent an opportunity for management as well as for revenue earning. The Project has sought to expand upon this theme by opening wildlife management to communities and households located in areas of wildlife abundance. The management and wise use of wildlife along the perimeters of the parks makes sense from a conservationist as well as economic view: the resource is renewable; the damage resulting from surplus wildlife populations can be as serious to local residents as the aesthetic one of underpopulation is to nonresidents; underemployment during times of rapid population expansion can threaten the overall process of development including that of democratic evolution. By putting people to work to manage their non-agricultural resources the Project is opening opportunities for stability and economic growth. Other sections of this document review how well that theme has worked and how it might be improved.

## **5. ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE EVALUATION**

The TOR contains specific issues to be addressed during the assessment. These are grouped into four categories: conceptual issues, Project design and implementation issues, Project organizational issues, and regional natural resource management issues.

## 5.1 PROJECT CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

**Issue No. 5.1.1:** To what extent have the assumptions made during project design remained valid?

The assumptions made during Project design relate to the Project's goal, sub-goal, and purpose. These are discussed in the order they occur in the logical framework (Annex A).

**Assumption No. 1. Inflation does not negate the improved purchasing power of increased income.** Zimtrust's Annual Report for 1992 describes how the residents of Tsholotsho Ward 3 received project-generated dividends of between Z\$150 and Z\$195. Since project inception district-level revenues have been growing at a rate higher than the national inflation rate of 20 to 30 percent. Although expansion of the number of Project beneficiaries has caused a reduction of per-capita dividend, this has been offset by a corresponding price increase of typical household commodities — school fees, school uniforms, sugar, soap, ... — much below that of inflation. For this reason the evaluation concludes that real household income, despite inflation, has remained stable or increased.

**Assumption No. 2. Demand for wildlife products is not diminished by international restrictions on the trade in wildlife products.** For the purposes of this evaluation, wildlife products are understood to include physical commodities such as ivory, meat, bone and hides, as well as opportunities for hunting, photographic safaris, and other sports. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) has banned international trade in physical products from elephant, rhino and other animals. While complying with the ban, the GOZ argues the restriction is unjustified for elephant products originating in Zimbabwe. At a national level the loss of trade in leather and ivory is serious — from Hwange National Park alone it amounts to roughly \$Z8 million/year. At the community level, however, curtailed culling by national parks has permitted elephant numbers to rise. Their expanding population has increased off-park incomes by enlarging the opportunity for hunting: sport license fees and safari revenues have increased in response to growing demand.

**Assumption No. 3. Increased income is used to meet basic needs requirements.** The DNPWLM has issued the following guidelines on revenue distribution from wildlife: a) **up to** 35 percent of revenue is to be retained for wildlife resource management by the district council's wildlife management agencies; b) a **minimum** of 50 percent of revenues are to be distributed to wards; and c) 15 percent of gross revenues **may** be retained by district councils as a levy, in effect a 15 percent district council tax on wildlife revenues. In 1992 the Honourable Minister for Environment and Tourism stated, "... it is my Ministry's intention to ensure that the process of devolution continues and that producer communities become increasingly involved in all aspects of wildlife management, especially the financial elements" (Murphree 1993:4).

Murphree continues that "too many councils have ignored Ministerial directives and the Department's guidelines. They have appropriated the bulk of the revenues generated by their producer communities, made promises of revenue distributions to communities which they have not kept, marginalized any participation in wildlife planning and management by communities, created hypertrophic district-level wildlife management and failed to develop training programmes in management for their producer communities. The result has been ignorance of or hostility to the CAMPFIRE Programme, mistrust of councils, increasing intolerance of wildlife and a continued lack of communal environmental controls. These effects are not the fault of the Programme's principles (as our detractors would have it) but the result of a lack of the Programme's proper implementation."

As this document noted in Assumption No. 1, residents of Tsholotsho Ward 3 received dividends between Z\$150.00 and Z\$195. The evaluation team received reports of communities pooling their resources for such infrastructure as community wells. Murphree observes that "where the programme has been implemented in communities over a period long enough for us to make informed judgements the following results are discernable:

- A re-awakened appreciation of wildlife
- Poaching eliminated or drastically reduced
- Fewer complaints of problem animals
- The emergence of local environmental management structures
- Improved environmental conservation practices
- The use of wildlife revenues for food security in times of drought
- The **local** initiation of land use planning
- An increase in household revenues
- Community-funded local development for schools, clinics, grinding mills and other community infrastructure"

**Assumption No. 4. Communities in target areas are willing and capable of learning skills necessary to manage wildlife and forest resources on a sustainable basis as a means of increasing their income.** The Project continues to sponsor an essentially top-down means of addressing rural issues, that is to say that while it works through districts and wards it has yet to find a successful approach to addressing the problems of individuals, groups of individuals, and individual villages. In the sense of communities as districts and wards there is measurable success in the learning of skills high in the institutional pillar. ZT has conducted training at the village level; the transformation of these skills into wage-earning activities is largely undocumented, however, the Project has not yet approached the issue of forestry (see Annex E.2) as a component of habitat management.

**Assumption No. 5. Natural disasters do not affect existing wildlife resources in target communities.** Drought during 1991-92 seriously reduced habitat quality and quantity and the wildlife population dependent upon it. While wildlife habitat remains degraded from conditions stemming from the drought and continued overuse, wildlife numbers appear to be regenerating. Some would argue that Zimbabwe's elephant population exceeds the carrying capacity of its habitat.

**Assumption No. 6. Continuing market for wildlife and veld products (both domestic and foreign).** As noted in the discussion of Assumption No. 2, the CITES accord on elephant products has seriously depleted an important Zimbabwean market. While the market for other animal products and sporting opportunities is open to development, marketing skills at the village level remain rudimentary.

**Assumption No. 7. Transnational protocols for wildlife management in place.** The protocols intended by this Project appear not to be in place. International activities affecting wildlife and their movements are occasionally *ad hoc* in nature and may not even involve the DNPWLM, e.g. herding by helicopter of elephants between Zimbabwe and Botswana by agreement between the Ministries of Defense. Some would argue that the jurisdiction of the DNPWLM ends at park boundaries, thereby creating opportunities for other agencies to manage wildlife.

**Assumption No. 8. Anti-poaching efforts near target communities protecting wildlife population.** The effect of anti-poaching activities is dependent upon the type of target animal and its location. Much if not most of the poaching of endangered species appears to involve foreign nationals and, for this reason, is not germane to the assumption: of about 80 white rhino in Hwange National Park, the most seriously poached endangered animal in the Project area, only about 2 now remain — black rhino appear to be unaffected (pc, DNPWLM<sup>2</sup>). Other animals are obviously poached though this review was unable to discover its extent. During the course of field work the evaluation received indications of some Project households having reported poachers to the authorities. Increased community awareness and vigilance seem to have benefited from the presence of the Project.

**Assumption No. 9. Communities have authority to limit rights of access to wildlife to residents and safari operators.** Appropriate authority, that is legal jurisdiction over wildlife, was vested in the four districts participating in the Project as a condition of Project inception.

**Issue No. 5.1.2:** Was the four-district geographic focus of the Zimbabwe NRMP appropriate? What have been the costs and benefits of the NRMP geographic focus on ZIMTRUST and DNPWLM national support to CAMPFIRE programs outside the NRM project area? How might relationships with other CAMPFIRE and DNPWLM implementors outside the NRMP project area be strengthened over the remainder of the Project and into the year 2000?

In evaluating this issue one must recall that in 1989 there was no national CAMPFIRE or other non-governmental wildlife management movement in need or desirous of financial support; instead, the Project sought to evaluate concepts of wildlife management by communities on a pilot basis. Under its present guise the Project operates in the districts of Binga, Hwange, Tsholotsho and Bulilima-Mangwe. Three of these districts lie in Matabeleland North, one in Matabeleland South; together they contain 32 wards and 168 villages. The review was unable to find any substantial reason to doubt the Project's

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<sup>2</sup>. pc = personal communication

underlying concepts or its benefits. Its outputs are appreciated by its participating communities and provide a basis for continuation, though no longer as a pilot project. Rather, the evaluation believes the time is now appropriate for an expansion of Project activities. These would, of necessity, be required to take into account the genesis and operations of the now wider CAMPFIRE movement.

King observes that CAMPFIRE's mandate identifies areas neglected by donors as being preferential candidates for its support. She continues to speculate that an area not overlooked, that is a recipient of USAID investment, would lie outside CAMPFIRE's possible assistance (King 1993). Such rigid implementation would indeed increase the risk of isolating the Project from the natural evolutionary processes and cross fertilization that come from joint contact. Project investment — vehicles, material goods, infrastructure — could create a sense of separation from CAMPFIRE's mainstem of development: areas lacking these goods and services would feel segregated from the means they identify with an enhanced capacity for implementation.

The costs and benefits of the Project's geographic focus to ZT and DNPWLM support of CAMPFIRE programmes outside the Project area can be summarized as follows:

- The DNPWLM has been able to transfer some of its materials to areas outside the focus of the Project. In a national sense this has benefited Zimbabwe; in an area-specific sense, however, Project inputs have not been supplemental to existing capabilities because those capabilities were transferred to other sites: the status quo has been improved, albeit not as much as had been hoped at project inception.
- In terms of the current evolutionary phase of wildlife resource management in Zimbabwe, a continuation of the Project's geographic focus would probably be detrimental to ZT. The concentration of activity, the burden of USAID administrative procedures, the managerial focus on infrastructure, the need to become bureaucratic managers, appear to have detracted from ZT's institutional development activities.

A continued geographic focus by the Project would likely isolate its areas of activity from natural resource management developments in the remainder of Zimbabwe. The question of strengthening relationships with other CAMPFIRE and DNPWLM implementors requires the Project be recast to address national problems. Such a move would necessitate a critical examination of the weaknesses of the CAMPFIRE movement (See Annex E.2) as well as the possible supply of inputs to address those shortcomings. Institution building, skill development, and monitoring are probably more important than vehicles and infrastructure.

**Issue No. 5.1.3:** What effect did the addition of Hwange and Bululima Mangwe Districts to the NRMP at a later stage in project design have on the distribution of project inputs to these two districts (and the project areas) and on the ability of implementors to meet project objectives.

The effect of an event which occurred during Project design in 1989 seems almost a moot point and subject to conjecture: the goals and purpose of the Project were defined as were the responsibilities of the implementors in terms of the size and complexity of the targeted area. If we assume the focus of financial input would potentially have been even more concentrated were the Project area to include only two districts (the amount of investment be unchanged from its present level), probably less money would have been spent than that indicated by Table 4.1: the capacity to absorb would be less because of a smaller target area. We doubt the addition of two districts had any bearing on the capacity of implementing organizations to meet Project objectives, particularly as much of the allocated budget remains unspent (Table 4.1). By undertaking the construction of large-scale infrastructure such as dams, ZimTrust may have diverted its concentration from activities more in line with its experience; certainly the unforeseen administrative task of managing USAID money, services, and materials is now seen as an unexpected impediment. This latter burden would likely be independent of the size of the Project area.

**Issue No. 5.1.4:** Given that an objective of the Zimbabwe NRMP is to promote natural resource management, what are the prospects for this beyond PACD and the actions required to enhance this objective?

The prospects for natural resource management beyond PACD are strong and have been enhanced by the Project. Experience has identified weaknesses in natural resource legislation, policy, and other matters which require attention (See Annex E.2). The position of natural resource management would be enhanced were the focus on wildlife to be expanded to include other natural resources, particularly minerals and woodland. Skill development, particularly in marketing and problem animal control (PAC) are other areas which demand improvement. In considering the future the Project's time horizon should be expanded: four or five years is only a first step in a process which may require twenty years or more. The principal impediment is probably not money, but rather skill and institutional development. The actions required include

- a continuation of the Project,
- a redirection of the Project in order that it addresses national rather than Matabeleland problems,
- a concerted effort to develop a national programme and data base to monitor the CAMPFIRE movement,
- a concentration on skill and institutional development,
- an improved attitude towards the design of infrastructure, and
- a concerted effort to build from the bottom-up — individuals, groups of individuals, and villages — rather than from the top-down.

**Issue 5.1.5:** To what extent will communities be able to sustain project objectives and activities (i.e. substantial community control over wildlife and natural resources) by PACD and over the next ten years?

Target-area communities have appropriate authority insofar as wildlife are concerned; their control over wildlife habitat lies less within their immediate jurisdiction, though timber can be sold and revenues collected with the concurrence of the State Forest Authority. The keys to progress lie in skill development, marketing, and institutional development at all levels. Environmentally, it also depends on slowing, halting, and eventually reversing the destruction of rangelands. Improvement is required, particularly in such matters as increased revenues from wildlife management and utilization.

The actual amount of continued progress over the next ten years is conjectural and dependent upon the kinds of changes alluded to above. It would certainly be inappropriate to expect radical improvement. Instead we should expect continued declines in the poaching of some animal species, increased revenues from wildlife, and increased awareness of the value of wildlife. The rate of improvement would increase were villages better able to manage wildlife and its habitat.

**Issue No. 5.1.6:** To what extent are indicators of project progress and benefits to date (e.g. increases in food security or income levels) measurable?

The means of verification of Project progress identified in the logframe (Annex A) are unsophisticated, subject to statistical controversy, and difficult to perform given the means accessible to the implementing agencies. These are discussed in the order they occur in the logical framework.

- **Survey of international trends and records.** The design of the Project entails only a small part of Zimbabwe. To measure the influence of USAID, GOZ, and implementing agency investment in the targeted area upon international trends and records is difficult and subjective.
- **Discussions with other donors to source of food imports.** Imported food owes its source to international trade: it does not originate totally from donor sponsorship. An examination of agricultural statistics would give an indication of production as well as the flow of goods to the Project area. Given an idea of population structure this could be converted to joules or kilo calories and be compared to per capita nutritional requirements. The errors can be enormous. At best the query would provide a regional indication of food status, not a Project-area specific measurement.

- **Available surveys of nutritional status.** See the preceding comments.
- **Land use and productivity records available through government.** See the preceding comments.
- **Comparison of results of baseline and endline data surveys in participating communities.** Surveys of this nature should probably be part of an ongoing effort conducted throughout the duration of the Project, not something which occurs only at the beginning and end. Hawkes' 1993 report on *The Socioeconomic Role of Communities in the NRMP Area* arrived too late to give an indication of the situation in 1989; vegetation surveys begun in 1993 suffer the same fault. Missed opportunities lie particularly in the field of self monitoring, for example queries about nutrition as part of the school curriculum. Improved monitoring must be cognizant of manpower limitations that reduce the ability of CASS and of the DNPWLM to undertake some kinds of surveys.
- **Review of Project, SADC and government records; interviews with NGOs.** In this the evaluation has tried to separate objectively quantifiable data from perceptions — true from false. Both risk becoming disguised when seen only as secondary information garnered from reports. This is not to reject the value of such information but, at the end of the day, they remain someone else's perceptions of conditions at a site. Interviews and meetings with people resident in the targeted area are essential to an analysis of the conditions under which they live. An opportunity foregone by the area-specific nature of the Project is the opportunity of outside communities to join the Project. This measure of the spread effect of an investment is an important indicator of a Project's worth. A Project is succeeding when other communities request to join its activities.
- **Field observations from site visits.** See the above commentary.

**Issue No. 5.1.7:** If the community-based resource utilization model is viable, what design modifications (e.g. institutional involvements and relationships, government versus non-government participation, life of project, geographic coverage, implementation sequencing, funding levels, etc.), if any, would be appropriate to create sustainable wildlife and natural resource management and provide maximum benefits for producer communities?

Changes to the Project design and the way in which it is administered are numerous and should have occurred long before this interim review. Indeed, parts of the Project paper are so poor as to have suggested rejection during the process of Project design; sections of the grant agreement, while legally correct, can be criticized by the way they fail to spell out in common English the impact of requirements upon the grantees and sub-grantees. Despite these difficulties the Project has produced credible results and is worthy of continuation. It requires, however, that changes essential to its success become

understood and implemented. The changes identified by this evaluation comprise improvements in the way that communities participate in the process of natural resource management; improved design and construction of infrastructure; a nationwide approach towards CAMPFIRE which is supportive of existing agendas and methods, but which introduces change where it is appropriate; and a life of Project which offers clearcut opportunities for extension dependent upon measured progress.

**Community participation in resource management.** Appendix H suggests a structured approach to identify and address community needs to improve natural resource management. The model is one which offers promise in terms of the experience of this evaluation team; there are other models and the one described is an example, not a requirement. Regardless of the path eventually selected, the method should

- incorporate the experience of Project implementors,
- be major component of project design,
- receive adequate funding, and
- provide information about the effectiveness of Project activities.

**Environmental Impact Assessment.** The Project paper is notoriously weak in its environmental assessment of potential impacts resulting from the Project; this weakness is echoed by the grant agreement which fails to specify steps to protect the environment. Examples of environmental misdoings include village relocation (see Dzingirai 1993) and dam failure (see PIC notes of its 10th meeting on 4 October 1993). An EIA, after all, is nothing more than a structured means of evaluating an activity, assessing its risk, and then devising means to counteract those risks. For these reasons we recommend that an EIA and engineering review be made of activities involving large infrastructure such as roads, bridges, dams, and canals; extensive wildlife fences should also receive an EIA. The grant agreement should clarify USAID's policy on the requirement of environmental and engineering review.

**CAMPFIRE.** Annex E.2 assesses the current situation of the CAMPFIRE Association and its potential for collaboration with this Project. There are weaknesses within its structure and organization which require attention. Rather than implement CAMPFIRE-like activities, it probably makes sense for the Project to become more actively allied to and supportive of the core of the movement. This would require a clear enunciation of its structure, policy, goals, and objectives; it would also require examination of the modifications to it suggested elsewhere in this document.

**Geographic concentration of activities.** This evaluation has discussed in preceding paragraphs the problems associated with a target area in Matabeleland. To avoid introducing divisions into what should be a coherent means of addressing natural resource management issues nationwide, we recommend the Project be expanded to include all Zimbabwe. Given weaknesses in Zimbabwe's regional collaboration with other SADC countries, we also recommend the Project be restructured solely as a national agreement between USAID and its implementing partners.

**Funding level and life of Project.** Two separate financial calendars govern the life of the project, one for CASS and ZimTrust (94 percent of project funds committed) and the other for the DNPWLM (63.8 percent of project funds committed). The duration of each grant agreement is five years; that of the DNPWLM was signed a year later than those of its implementing partners and, for this reason, will end at a later date. Table 4.1 shows that only approximately half the money allocated to this Project has actually been spent.

The financial calendar of CASS and ZimTrust ends on 30 September 1994; there is no provision to re-obligate the remaining 6 percent of the original obligation. Should CASS and ZimTrust wish to continue, they would require an amendment to their grant agreements as well as an obligation of new money. The DNPWLM is unlikely to finance CASS or ZimTrust out of the moneys remaining in its grant agreement. Should the Project continue or expand, new or amended grant agreements and an obligation of new money are both required.

**Issue No. 5.1.8:** How has Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) affected NRM Project implementation? Given DNPWLM personnel constraints imposed by Zimbabwe's ESAP, will the World Bank's proposed program of support effectively address the Department's deficiencies in institutional capacity (human, material, financial) in a manner that will support NRMP and CAMPFIRE objectives during the remaining life of the NRM Project and beyond?

The amount of time to critically review the effect of ESAP upon Project implementation was not available. It certainly affected the state of wildlife throughout Zimbabwe, particularly with respect to the decline of rhino. The Department's failure to anticipate poacher response to an ESAP-induced reduction of departmental vigilance set the stage for uncontrolled hunting, so much so that Hwange's white rhino population was reduced from about 80 animals to 2 in a matter of months. While this doesn't affect Project implementation, it is symptomatic of the kinds of events that can happen in a weak managerial environment. The DNPWLM is short of staff and this obviously influences its habitat monitoring and anti-poaching roles in the Project.

Annexes E.2 and E.3 discuss DNPWLM capacities to support the NRMP and CAMPFIRE. We doubt there will be any credible increases in those capacities within the near future. While the Project can do little to improve anti-poaching activities other than continue its material support of the DNPWLM, activities such as self-monitoring (see Annex H) could do much to lighten the Department's data collection requirements. Certainly the methodology required by the Project Paper to monitor wildlife habitat is questionable for the very large mammals encountered in the parks. Aerial surveys with limited ground proofing may be a suitable alternative.

**Issue No. 5.1.9:** Would a different form of USAID intervention in the natural resource sector be more appropriate given lessons learned to date under NRMP? Taking into account USAID/Zimbabwe's Country Strategic Plan for fiscal years 1994-98, what types of intervention might have maximum benefit in supporting sustainable wildlife and natural resource utilization?

USAID's Country Strategic Plan for 1994-98 proposes two scenarios, both of which are dependent upon Congressional Presentation levels: under 100 percent financial appropriation resources would be available to support the Mission's food security objective with initiation of a new **bilateral** effort in Natural Resources Management; were less money available this initiative would not take place. The bilateral effort would build upon and expand on-going efforts currently funded from regional resources. The additional support would significantly expand community management of wildlife capabilities and create new sources of income in the rural areas, thus supporting Agency objectives in both environment and economic growth (USAID, 1993b).

A form of USAID involvement different from the form expressed by the goals, purposes, and objectives of this current effort would be inappropriate. The Agency and its implementing partners have gained so much from the activities implemented to date that to abandon the approach would likely be supportive of new errors in another arena of resource management. Rather, it makes more sense to build upon the experiences since 1989 and to restructure the Project along the lines proposed in preceding pages.

**Issue No. 5.1.10:** What specific changes are needed, if any, in the Project Implementation Schedule and Logical Framework.

We recommend the Project be extended to at least 5 years and that this be supported by an expanded commitment of funds. Changes to the Project's logical framework (Annex A) are outlined below:

Page<sup>3</sup>

- A.1 • **Community-level goal and country-level subgoal** no change. To **measures of goal achievement** delete references to Zambia and Botswana. Change the **means of verification** to include self-monitoring supplemented by surveys. To **important assumptions** assume that inflation will play a role in household incomes but that this will be moderated by price adjustments; assume continued controls on wildlife sales resulting from the CITES accord and that these will influence returns from physical wildlife products, but that sporting and other wildlife opportunities may offset these; accept that increased

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<sup>3</sup>. Page numbers refer to Annex A.

incomes will likely remain meagre, but that improved wildlife management will probably increase the scale of these incomes.

- A.2 • **Country-level purpose** no change. To **End-of-Project status** change references to target areas to include target areas nationwide. Delete references to endangered elephants as they appear to be surplus in Zimbabwe. White rhino populations have declined and now appear to be seriously threatened. Their protection should probably be under a separate Project. To **Means of verification** reduce the need for baseline and endline surveys by implementing continuous self-monitoring. If government records are to provide useful data, implement an MIS similar to that in described in Annex H. To **assumptions** delete references to natural disasters — they will occur. Accept that CITES will continue to influence the demand for wildlife products. Accept also that transnational protocols are likely not to be in place unless approached as a specific, high-level activity. Anti-poaching activities near target communities are likely to be more effective for some animals than for others. Communal jurisdiction over wildlife is a subset of appropriate authority. Communities should continue to be tested for their ability to manage the obligations of appropriate authority. By the same token, this same authority should be extended to resources additional to wildlife.
  
- A.4 • To **Outputs: Community-based Resource Utilization** replace locally-recruited wildlife monitors with the self-monitoring scheme mentioned in Appendix H. Modify references to infrastructure in order assure it is constructed and managed in a way that is sustainable. Delete the increased elephant density output: elephants are so numerous they are now damaging their habitat and that of other wildlife. Earlier statements on controls of poaching also include elephants — specific references to this species are superfluous.
  
- To **Outputs: Planning and Applied Research Support** no change.
  
- To **Outputs: Conservation of the Resource Base** accept that there are animals besides elephants which also warrant attention in Zimbabwe's national parks. Monitored plots are proving difficult to implement under the financial and manpower constraints currently affecting the DNPWLM. Some means, perhaps involving funding, is appropriate to improving the monitoring of wildlife and habitat as envisaged by the Project Document.
  
- A.8 • To **Inputs: Community-based Resource Utilization** develop land use plans with assistance involving AGRITEX and the DNPWLM (outside technical assistance is not required in Zimbabwe for this task).
  
- Recover the page missing from the logframe.
  
- To **Inputs: Conservation of the Resource Base** delete regional references.
  
- To **Inputs: Conservation Education and Training** no change.

**Issue No. 5.1.11:** What other actions, strategies, and targets might be adopted to further the objectives of the Zimbabwe NRMP component?

The preceding text outlines a course of action conceived to enhance natural resource management in light of the experience of USAID and implementing agencies. It is probably worthwhile to reiterate the general thrust of these concepts.

- The Project should operate under a framework between USAID and its implementing partners in Zimbabwe. Its coverage should be Zimbabwe, not the SADC region.
- The geographic focus of the Project should be the nation of Zimbabwe, not parts of Matabeleland.
- The Project should seek to strengthen the policies and framework of CAMPFIRE, not implement CAMPFIRE-like activities in isolation from the rest of the movement.
- There needs to be an expansion of the concept of natural resources beyond that of wildlife: wildlife habitat — forests, ponds, streams — is also important.
- The Project's emphasis of issues involving elephants runs counter to Zimbabwe's expanding surplus of this species: other animals are also important.
- The Project needs to become more demand driven, that is it needs to operate in response to a felt need expressed by individuals, groups of individuals, villagers, and agencies. At present it is driven by a faulty Project paper and a grant agreement that has proven difficult for implementing agencies to understand.
- The Project should concentrate on issues its implementing partners have proven abilities to achieve: institution building and skill development. Infrastructure needs to be done in ways that reflect competent engineering judgement and environmental, social, and economic sustainability.
- Flexibility is essential to comprehensive implementation of key tasks such as monitoring. Implementing agencies should not feel bound by a Project paper if they find simpler and more effective ways of performing activities.

## 5.2 PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

**Issue No. 5.2.1:** To what extent have recommendations made in the Hitchcock and Nangati Interim Assessment (July 1992) been addressed?

Annex D summarizes the recommendations made by Hitchcock and Nangati and their current situation.

**Issue No. 5.2.2:** What actions might be taken to allow for greater local autonomy in utilization of project inputs to respond in a more timely manner to perceived community needs? Are there actions which can be taken to provide for more rapid disbursement of funds in support of community interventions?

The issue of local autonomy has been addressed in the discussion of community development in Section 5.1. This evaluation has also discussed the notion of Project inputs concentrating more on skill and institutional development; we also recognize that infrastructure is an important part of wildlife management, but that this has to pay attention to issues of sustainability. These activities should proceed at a rate determined by the demand of local communities and the current capacities of the implementing agencies to implement: incremental staff to increase implementing agency capacities should be avoided. The issue of disbursement of funds in support of community interventions is discussed in Issue 5.2.3 (disbursement is not made directly to the communities: it is made to the implementing agencies in support of their activities). Revenues resulting from CAMPFIRE activities in the Project area are distributed through the district councils and wards. This evaluation report has already discussed the inequities of this situation and made the recommendation that legislation and policy be changed so that the flow of money is as direct to the communities as possible.

**Issue No. 5.2.3:** Are there further actions that might be taken to reduce the amount of time required by project implementors to comply with USAID financial and administrative requirements and to streamline reporting and reimbursement processes?

In its conduct of this Project, USAID insists that it has attempted to be fair and flexible within the limitations imposed by its regulations; it admits to overzealous interpretation of these regulations by some of its personnel; it also states that many of the disallowances it has observed are not black and white issues, but rest more in the shade of grey. All three implementing partners report that USAID's queries on expenditure were often raised long after expenses had been incurred; in some cases expenses were reimbursed and then later questioned. The partners complained that USAID procedures had not been explained fully to them. From the USAID perspective, it seemed that the implementing partners were disregarding guidelines; advance approvals for expenditure were not being sought; and some activities were

being undertaken without proper justification. These circumstances smack of the irresistible force meeting with the immovable object. On one side, the highly organised and bureaucratic USAID, used to handling tens of millions of dollars; and, on the other, relatively small and administratively inexperienced (in the sense of USAID requirements) agencies. It would be unjust to apportion blame: but some accommodation has to be reached if they are to work in harmony.

The recommendations made in the interim assessment that relate to friction between USAID and its implementing partners have been implemented but, in spite of this, financial management problems persist. In this light we recommend the following:

- Approval of a full time Project Coordinator's post in DNPWLM is a welcome step, and one that should be acted upon as soon as possible. After appointment, the Project Officer should be encouraged to make frequent visits to the target area, and demonstrate to the other partners that DNPWLM's presence in the Project is one that represents the whole Department. The Project Coordinator should focus attention, soon after his<sup>4</sup> appointment, at improving communications
  - (a) between USAID and the three implementing partners and
  - (b) in middle-level coordination identified by King (1993), especially between DNPWLM headquarters and its personnel in Matabeleland, and between ZT's offices in Harare and its personnel in Bulawayo.

There remain, however, unpaid vouchers and claims from long past, and the fear that experience of working under USAID support will make some partners fight shy of further involvement. Efforts should be taken to ensure that this does not happen because, whatever the problems may have been, there is much to admire in NRMP and in those who participated, and a Phase Two would have the experiences of Phase One to build upon. Outstanding financial problems should be settled as soon as possible. In particular:

- ZT should give priority to clearing its still unpaid vouchers. ZT reports that auditors have been commissioned to conduct an inquiry during the end of March 1994 to clear this issue.
- CASS should press the bursar's office at the University of Zimbabwe to deal urgently with the backlog of unpaid claims.

There can never be too much communication aimed at avoiding misinterpretation of rules of procedure, or lack of comprehension of USAID requirements for financial management, administration and environmental assessments. For this reason we recommend a meeting (perhaps a special meeting of PIC) be called immediately to deal exclusively with the resolution of all outstanding problems.

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<sup>4</sup>. In this document his is also understood to mean her.

**Issue No. 5.2.4:** How effective has the NRM Project Steering Committee been in improving project implementation?

The Project Implementation Committee (PIC) should provide the main forum for coordination between the three partners and USAID, but fails to do so. It meets every six months in Harare, and the general impression is that it merely looks at progress made to date and tables work plans that have been prepared in advance by each agency. Reporting has taken the place of management. Furthermore, by meeting in Harare, the PIC gives the impression not only of failing to fulfil a coordinating function but also of being divorced from the Project. Neither has the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG) provided an alternative forum. King (1993) postulates that the Group may have assumed that Matabeleland was taken care of by NRMP, or that the Project could somehow be managed through the independent actions of each implementing partner.

DNPWLM thought that six-monthly intervals between PIC meetings were acceptable but that the responsibilities of the committee should be more rigorously defined and followed, so that it functioned as an effective coordinating body. A parallel was drawn between PIC and a SADC fisheries committee, upon which the Department also sits. In the latter committee, work plans and budgets are prepared in advance and

distributed to members so that they may peruse them critically. Members then come to meetings better prepared to discuss and criticise, before deciding whether to approve them.

ZT's view was that meetings of PIC ought to be at three-monthly intervals, and include two or three representatives from each of the four districts in the target area in addition to the implementing partners. The Trust would like to see meetings held in the field, rotating the venue between the four districts.

There is also a Project Steering Committee (PSC) that last met in May 1992 for coordinating the operations of the three partners only. Its usefulness was limited, chiefly because DNPWLM was under pressure from other directions — especially from the heightened activity of rhino and elephant poachers.

There was a form of conference called the CAMPFIRE Forum but it met only once. It included the implementing partners and district councils, convened as an exercise in constructive evaluation and self-criticism. CASS was commended by the participants for putting its performance up for judgement. The forum provided a useful format for communication and collaboration, one that could have been advanced beyond its first meeting.

An overall impression gained from discussions with members of all three implementing partners is that NRMP has never enjoyed that level of formal collaboration needed to fashion an effective and efficient implementation team — one which is able to identify problems and suggest remedies. The reason for this stems from the fact that a management approach was never worked out and set up in the first place; and the three partners have, perforce, operated on an informal basis. As King (1993) wrote:

'The lack of an on-going planning, monitoring and management framework for NRMP has been arguably the biggest failing of inter-organisational collaboration in the Project'.

On the other hand, informal communication between the three partners has evolved as the Project developed, and the Project has developed a more positive air of confidence, although gaps still exist. King (1993) identified these gaps in coordination as lying at the 'diffuse middle level' that should link the implementing partners' headquarters with their field operations; and horizontally between individuals and agencies who are not necessarily located in the same geographical areas.

**Issue No. 5.2.5:** What actions and inputs (human, financial, material) are required over the next 18 months and beyond the life of the project to enhance the participation of women in decision-making and the control and management/utilization of community wildlife and natural resources (including access to benefits and revenues)?

Of fundamental importance to enhanced participation of women is their view of themselves: they must see their participation as important and necessary. Conscientisation and confidence building, especially at VIDCO and WADCO levels, is necessary and this requires workshops and seminars. Conscientisation must be accompanied by opportunities for involvement. A quota system may initially be introduced which requires the participation of women on committees. As women become familiar with committee work the need for a quota system may be lessened.

It may be necessary to reach women through husbands and other males. In the project districts a substantial proportion of the male population works outside the area. This may require that workshops be held during the time the men are home for holidays.

There is need to appoint or allocate a representative in council who would be responsible for gender sensitization. The individual would hold gender sensitization workshops at all levels of council and of other organs of government.

The evaluation of women's participation should occupy an important part of process monitoring. CASS might increase its research on women. There is need to develop a base of knowledge on issues which affect women in order to improve training programs and monitoring and evaluation.

A major contributory factor to the limited participation of women is their low literacy rates in the districts. There is a need to coordinate efforts between the Project and with agencies operating literacy campaigns.

**Issue No. 5.2.6:** What is the appropriate balance between the development of physical infrastructure versus local institutional development? Given the above assessment has the rate of funds disbursement for infrastructure support under the project been appropriate?

Our review of documents related to infrastructure exposes weaknesses in project design and implementation. Infrastructural components implemented by the Project include minor road repairs, dam construction and reconstruction, and wildlife fences. Annex E of the Project Paper recommends a positive determination for components that will have an effect on the endangered, threatened and/or critical habitat of wildlife; it also requires the USAID/Zimbabwe Regional Engineer review specifications and drawings for construction and maintenance (albeit for activities that received a negative determination). Specific issues requiring an environmental assessment (to be conducted as part of the Project Paper) include (USAID 1989)

- game cropping (culling)
- translocation
- fencing
- fire
- water holes
- Illegal use control (protection)
- tourism
- processing facilities
- resettlement.

The environmental analysis conducted subsequent to the determination barely addressed these issues. Certainly, it provided no quantitative assessment of the resources available, the impact of the Project upon them, and the mitigations that might be possible. Its view of resettlement is that it would involve the voluntary movement of groups of 3 to 5 families from areas of important large mammal habitat, not the (some would say forced) relocation of entire villages described by Dzingirai (1993). The Grant Agreement echoes the Project Paper by failing to require analyses of the kinds of infrastructure listed above: in hindsight dams and reservoirs should have been added to this list.

The economic analysis provided by the Project Paper states the Project is not suited to standard economic analysis (USAID 1989:52). Standard economic analysis is appropriate to the Project's infrastructural components; indeed, the analysis provides an essential assessment of the Project's financial sustainability, something the communities will be very concerned about following PACD. Table 9 (USAID 1989:80) provides a model for the wildlife programme in Tsholotsho, yet its fencing component fails to include the cost of maintenance.

Infrastructural activities undertaken by the Project include (USAID 1991-93) the following:

- Rehabilitation of Masili Dam (the dam failed subsequent to its repair)
- 25-km cattle fence planned and pegged (Bulilimamangwe)
- Maitengwe Dam wall repaired (Bulilimamangwe)
- 4 watering pans desilted
- Canals and piping for game watering points in progress
- Koradziba and Soloboni communities relocated for game fencing
- St. Joseph school expanded to accept relocated communities
- Borehole rehabilitated to supply water to the relocated communities
- Game fence in Ward 3 of Tsholotsho constructed
- Two fences near Hwange electrified
- Fishing chalets constructed at Sidinda Island
- 11 km of access road regraded and a bridge constructed over the Sidinda River.
- Tjunga fence construction at Binga completed

Our review of documentation causes us to conclude that infrastructural components of the Project were poorly conceived and evaluated during the course of Project design. Their current implementation has avoided safeguard procedures — EIA, engineering review, economic assessment — essential to ensure their technical and financial sustainability. In some instances infrastructure appears not to be demand driven by individual communities; rather, it seems to have resulted from activities itemized in the Project Paper and advocated by Rural District Councils, possibly as a means of generating employment and gaining access to finance. Nonetheless, its use to manage wildlife, particularly as fencing and watering points, appears to be essential. For this reason we recommend that, in the case of large developments and those that have a potentially negative impact upon people, the safeguards listed above be implemented. Examples of infrastructure which should have an EIA and independent engineering and financial review include

- large dams and reservoirs;
- irrigation, drainage, and flood control;
- land clearance and levelling;
  
- mineral development; and
- resettlement and all projects with potentially major impacts on people.

Where resettlement is proposed, the following policies should be observed:

- (1) The population subject to resettlement should not only maintain its current standard of living but it should also directly share in project benefits.
- (2) The resettlement transition period should be minimized and adequate support for both social and economic development should be provided during the transition period.

- (3) Resettlement should achieve the complete social and economic reestablishment of those dislocated, on a viable productive basis, through the creation of project-funded new employment activities.
- (4) Insofar as changes of occupation are necessary, the replacement opportunities should properly recognize the social, communal, cultural, educational, and vocational profile of those affected, and any changes in economic activities should be introduced on a voluntary basis.
- (5) Resettlement of the agricultural population should be land-based wherever possible.
- (6) Land sharing with host villages should be based on the principle of mutual acceptance and should be planned so as to provide higher incomes (from all sources) for relocatees and hosts.
- (7) The resettlement plans should have popular acceptance and the affected population should be consulted.
- (8) Resettlement distances should be minimized and opportunities for resettling entire communities and natural groups should be provided.
- (9) House and dwelling size allocation at new town and village sites should show improved standards and conditions.
- (10) The resettlement plans for towns, villages and enterprises should minimize the loss of existing agricultural lands.
- (11) The resettlement plans should have adequate institutional arrangements to ensure effective and timely implementation and adequate monitoring and evaluation arrangements.
- (12) The financial resources to carry out the relocation and development proposals should be available when and where required. Development plans should be prepared in concert with relocation plans.
- (13) The impact of resettlement on the natural and socioeconomic host environment should be considered acceptable.
- (14) Only those enterprises that will be economically viable should be considered for relocation and the compensation for the assets of the nonviable enterprises should be used to create new employment opportunities.
- (15) If sharing farmlands does not result in achieving target incomes, some of the labour force should be offered nonagricultural employment opportunities.

### 5.3 PROJECT ORGANIZATION ISSUES

**Issue No. 5.3.1:** How effective and efficient have the implementing partners been as a collective in the Project area? Have they responded appropriately within the context of the Zimbabwe NRMP's purpose, objectives and operating assumptions?

The three operating partners in the NRMP target area are DNPWLM, CASS and ZT. Difficulties that the implementing partners experienced in dealing with USAID, or as a result of having participated in NRMP, have been described and discussed in the preceding section. This section explores the relationships between the three partners as they went about their duties in the field.

Some remarks made to the mid-term review team lead one to express surprise that the Project ever achieved any measure of collective success. Here are some samples, mostly anonymous.

- The Project was designed by one set of people in Harare and handed to another group in Bulawayo to implement. This ensured inconsistency from the start.
- The only field work carried out before the Project implementation document was drawn up, was one field visit to each of the (then) two districts. All subsequent preparatory work was done in Harare.
- The start-up time of the Project was inordinately long because of almost non-existent administration, due to accidents and other unavoidable problems. There was an 18-month period during which the Project Officer's post was unfilled.
- The partners had different objectives from the start. In spite of its CAMPFIRE initiative, DNPWLM is still imbued with a parks and preservation philosophy. Its primary goal is to conserve game animals, and community-based management is no more than a ploy to achieve that. ZT has no interest in wild animals: its objectives are to raise living standards for people in communal lands. CASS is an academic body interested only in research for its own sake and for the furtherance of researchers' reputations and careers.

Finally, from King (1993);

'In terms of Project design, it appears as though USAID were hedging their bets in NRMP by designing a dual-purpose Project to support CAMPFIRE and community development, but in case that didn't succeed in preserving biodiversity, supporting DNPWLM's traditional role as well. This dual role may have undermined the Project.'

These remarks, gleaned from several sources, suggest a precarious basis on which to anchor an effective collaborative partnership; but, in spite of them, relationships between the partners prospered and improved with time. In a recent examination of the Project, King (1993) records that:

'The pace has been slow and uneven with many setbacks... but the mood of the Project is more positive than it was a year ago... This is due in part to the commitment, talent and tenacity of the Project implementors and participants...'

and again:

'NRMP has weathered many storms, often related to the process of initiation in a difficult climate. The Project appears to have settled in and gained widespread acceptance. Participants have "embraced criticism", learned and changed. Adaptability, and the willingness to incur scars through risk-taking, experimentation and innovation, have been critical to that robustness, sustainability and progress of the Project.'

Whatever interviewees' ideas may be as to the hidden motives of the implementing partners, there is little doubt that the partners' professional interests and perspectives vary markedly from one to the other. DNPWLM's professional wildlife managers come from a protected areas' background that traditionally gave law enforcement high priority. Only since 1961 have managers recognised that this focus fails to take into account the realities of those who live outside parks and reserves, and that the retention of protected areas is becoming increasingly untenable.

ZT's professionals approach CAMPFIRE from an altogether different direction. For them it is a strategy to combat poverty and provide a better standard of living for rural communities. The fact that the strategy may also help conserve game animals may not be important *per se*, although the survival of these animals is clearly an essential prerequisite for success of the strategy.

CASS's social scientists have yet other perspectives. CAMPFIRE and NRMP provide opportunities for testing hypotheses concerning community management of natural resources, common property regimes and community dynamics. For them, whether or not the Project reaches its goals and objectives may be less important than recording and analysing success or failure.

Thus, successful implementation of NRMP required that three very different interest groups worked together effectively and in a coordinated manner, keeping the specific purpose of the Project firmly in sight. It is a tribute to their commitment and determination that they have managed to do so with little serious conflict and with mounting success, in spite of the fact that inter-organisational contacts have been patchy.

Greatest contact between the implementing partners is that involving DNPWLM and ZT. At the Harare level, ZT liaises with the Department's CCU, although this communication is concerned with community wildlife programmes throughout Zimbabwe. At Bulawayo level, the local ZT Manager and the Department's Senior Ecologist occupy the same office block and are in regular contact. CASS's infrequent presence in the target area, and its essentially research role, precludes much contact with the other two organisations. The following subsections discuss the organizations' role in terms of the Project's goals, objectives, and purpose.

### **5.3.1 Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management**

The DNPWLM is the Project's lead agency, and its responsibilities relate to conservation of the wildlife resource: training community scouts (or community wildlife workers, as they are better termed), and monitoring wild animal populations and habitats. Participation in NRMP coincided with a difficult time for the Department, during which it incurred a loss of 250 junior posts as a consequence of an IMF/World Bank initiative for the government to restructure its economy.

Other factors have contributed to radical change in the Department's ability to manage wildlife resources. One of these is the rapid and favourable response to the CAMPFIRE movement. The Department attempts to provide services to communities requesting its assistance in wildlife matters. As CAMPFIRE continues to expand, these requests are ever extending the Department's capacity. Annexes E.2 and E.3 propose changes to the structure of the Department in order that it will be better able to deal with CAMPFIRE-related activities.

A common criticism made or implied by its partners was that no officer appeared to represent the Department as a whole in the target area. Responsibility for NRMP was, in fact, given to an Assistant Director in Harare; but NRMP was only one of his duties, and his presence was not felt in the field. A Senior Ecologist, based in ZT's office in Bulawayo, lacked delegated authority to represent the Department except on routine matters; and the implementing partners perceived him to be a representative not of the Department as a whole but only of its Research Division. Similarly, the Provincial Wardens were recognised as representing only the Department's Management Division.

One of the Department's responsibilities was to train up to 100 community scouts; but there were long delays in getting this programme off the ground although the Department now reports that it is going well. Delays in the arrival of Project aircraft and other equipment affected the completion of monitoring work.

The Department's recent stand on problem animal control (PAC) in districts that have approved authority status did not win its partners' fullest approval. Some thought it premature because RDCs are not ready to handle this problem. One characterised it as an example of an agency trying to rid itself of a problem by throwing it into another's lap.

The stand on PAC took the form of, 'An open letter from the Director to all District Councils with Appropriate Authority for wildlife', dated 19 July 1993. It stated unequivocally that problem animals in districts that had appropriate authority status was the responsibility of those districts. 'By accepting the authority for wildlife in your districts,' read one section, 'you took on the problems that would go hand-in-hand with the benefits.' There is logic here because, under the procedures for awarding appropriate authority status described above, RDCs have to prove to the Department's satisfaction that they are competent — and this should include the capacity to carry out or arrange for PAC. However, as the Department admits that it sometimes 'bends the rules' when approving applications for appropriate authority, it is not surprising if some districts find that they are unable to cope with this particular problem.

In reality, the Department is not so strict as the open letter suggests. Its field staff do answer requests to deal with problem animals, although the RDCs usually provide transport and pay their

subsistence. And the letter was sent out partly to discourage requests for PAC that recur in a curiously seasonal pattern shortly before the Christmas and Independence holidays.

The same letter also stresses that the DNPWLM no longer sets district quotas for hunting but, rather, modulates and approves those that the district proposes. This strikes some implementing partners as being a bit rich, for the Department has only to disapprove a quota if it finds it unacceptable. The dividing line between `setting' and `approving' is a narrow one. But the latter are relatively minor issues, and the two other implementing partners and the RDCs work for the most part in harmony with DNPWLM.

### **5.3.2 Zimbabwe Trust**

ZT's role is that of institution building and monitoring progress. According to the project document, it

"will be responsible for working with the district councils, wards, villages and household members in the target areas in our effort to strengthen their capacity for managing their natural resources. This work will include providing advice in administration. In addition, the Trust would provide input on monitoring, accounting, record keeping, as well as prepare annual Project Implementation plans, and quarterly and semi-annual reports."

ZT's monitoring function, fulfilled through what the Trust calls process-oriented monitoring, is carried out at six-monthly intervals, in which information is gathered on how well institutions (district councils, WADCOs, VIDCOs, and wildlife committees) are developing. Unfortunately, the monitoring programme was only started two years into the Project, and all concerned with the Project (including ZT) recognise that it would have been better to have introduced this at the start of NRMP.

ZT maintains a constant presence in the target area through its four Area Managers (one to each district). Because of this, because of DNPWLM's weakness on the ground (see above), and because of criticisms levelled at CASS (see below), the Project has tended to become identified locally with ZT.

ZT was involved with CAMPFIRE from its early days, and came into NRMP because of its commitment to that programme. The Trust sees NRMP as a component of CAMPFIRE — a view shared by all three partners. Its principles and objectives are those of the CAMPFIRE movement. NRMP is CAMPFIRE in the target area, and ZT views them as one and the same thing.

To ZT, NRMP is a human survival strategy that has two objectives.

- a) To achieve socially sound land use as a form of community development.
- b) To achieve sustainable community practices, although the Trust admits that this is a tall order to accomplish in the five-year life of the Project.

ZT tries to avoid going into areas and setting up institutions. Its approach is to discover the needs of communities and the means to satisfy them by encouraging them to decide what they require. It is a community's decision whether it wants a CAMPFIRE committee, and the relationship that this will have to its WADCOs and VIDCOs. The Trust then builds on this by providing assistance.

An important contribution to the generation of public awareness is ZT's publication of Action Magazine targeted at youth and CAMPFIRE. The understanding of young people of CAMPFIRE is crucial to the future continuity and success of the movement.

One criticism levelled at the Trust (which the Trust denies) is that it instructs its Area Managers to support RDCs and foster expectations in rural communities. However, higher expectations in rural communities may irritate the RDCs, and it is arguable that the two instructions are incompatible — which introduces a built-in inconsistency to the Project. According to CASS, this phenomenon manifests itself cyclically in all four districts and has not become a permanent obstacle to progress in any one of them.

### **5.3.3 Centre for Applied Social Studies**

CASS's chief role is research, and its approach has been four-pronged. The relative successes of its studies described below are based upon CASS's own judgment.

- a) Socio-economic surveys to provide baseline data in the most important wards of all four districts in the target area. The field work has been completed and the data computerised. The Centre has been criticised by its partners for not producing the results of these surveys in readable form. However, work has begun, and some printed data are now available.
- b) Studies of critical institutional issues: the role of livestock husbandry in Bulilima-Mangwe district; internal human migration in and out of the target area; and communal land tourism as an indicator of success. This role has been bedeviled by ill-fortune — especially difficulty in filling fellowship posts with suitable applicants. Success to date is rated about fifty per cent.

- c) Problem solving, as circumstances arise, such as the introduction of fencing in northern Tsholotsho district. This role has been carried out successfully.
- d) Institutional monitoring, designed to complement rather than overlap with ZT's monitoring programme. It seeks to record changes over time, and is proceeding successfully.

Although some aspects of CASS's research have gone well, a common criticism expressed by its partners is that it did not appear until two years into the life of the Project; and that, since then, its presence in the Project area has been slight. The Centre accepts these as valid criticisms, and realises in hindsight that the vacuum should have been filled by the appointment of a senior professional to the target area.

**Issue No. 5.3.2:** Do implementation problems continue to exist as a consequence of the structure, functions and orientation of the organizations and/or their personnel implementing the project? What strategies and inputs might be required to overcome existing constraints?

With few exceptions this review does not regard implementation problems to be caused or result from the structure, functions and orientation of the organizations and/or their personnel implementing the Project. The majority of the Project's problems result from faulty design, an issue which was discussed on previous pages. Exceptions to the role of organizational structure and personnel responsible for Project shortcomings include the following:

- Queries by USAID of implementing agency compliance with USAID rules seriously damaged the morale of those agencies, encumbered them with incremental staff they were ill equipped to afford, and delayed the completion of tasks. It appears that at no time was attention paid to the reasonableness of the tasks outlined by the Project paper, or of the procedures or requirements set out by the grant agreement. It can be argued that the grant agreement was signed, therefore it must be complied with. This begs the question of whether it or its implications were understood to the full depth required to engender compliance.
- USAID complaints that CASS is overly tardy in its submission of vouchers, sometimes after two years. The fault lies not in CASS but in the structure of the Bursar's office at the University of Zimbabwe. Delays have been compounded by the Cass Program Administrator having been ill for six months, unwillingness or inability of others to assume her tasks, and periodic strikes by university staff and the impact these have had on compiling records and presenting requests for reimbursement.
- While the structure of the DNPWLM gives the responsibility for CAMPFIRE to an Assistant Director in Harare; the delegation of responsibility to field positions has been ambiguous. Clearly, some restructuring is called for, but it has to be in proportion to the anticipated impact, importance, and managerial requirements imposed by CAMPFIRE.

**Issue No. 5.3.3:** What are the advantages and/or disadvantages of increased participation from other Ministries, agencies and organizations involved in natural resource management/utilization and community development in support of NRMP and CAMPFIRE objectives? Could the extension activities of other organizations be integrated and strengthened locally in support of CAMPFIRE and NRMP objectives without increasing bureaucratic impediments? How might useful participation be encouraged over the remaining life of the project and beyond?

and

**Issue No. 5.3.4:** What actions might be taken over the life of project to improve interministerial coordination and communication in support of CAMPFIRE objectives? What strategy might be followed for the longer term?

Several organisations are reputedly interested in being involved with NRMP or with CAMPFIRE programmes in general. There is a general perception that CAMPFIRE has the smell of success about it, and potential donors and NGOs believe that involvement with it may provide means for increasing profiles and advancing their power bases within the country. Some of the organisations believed to be interested are

- CARE
- Southern African Foundation for Economic Research (SAFER), and
- Zimbabwe Environmental Resource Organisation (ZERO).

WWF do not, at present, have the resources to expand their current monitoring involvement with CAMPFIRE outside the Project target area.

DNPWLM currently feels that additional donors and NGOs should be kept to a minimum as adequate resources for training and capacity building are already provided through the present Project. The same view has been expressed by the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group. It is doubtful whether increased participation would be useful over the remaining life of NRMP; and, if it were to be introduced, bureaucratic impediments might be exacerbated. But increased participation will become essential in the future as CAMPFIRE expands its horizons beyond wildlife management.

Project participants already anticipate CAMPFIRE activities extending to cover fish, caterpillars (mopane worms), timber, grazing and minerals. The first two are already, by legal definition, 'wild life', and their exploitation can be encompassed within the existing framework of CAMPFIRE. At the last departmental CAMPFIRE planning workshop (Anon., 1993), special attention was given to fish and a new output added: 'Fisheries and water bodies extension system'. The remaining three resources would require

the attention of the Natural Resources Board of which the Department of Natural Resources is the secretariat.

The expansion of CAMPFIRE to include timber in communal lands as a natural resource for management and use at community level seems to be a natural move. It was discussed with a member of the Forestry Commission during the midterm review mission, and it appeared that existing arrangements could easily be adapted to fit the CAMPFIRE scenario. Two divisions of the Forestry Commission have relevance to NRMP and to the CAMPFIRE programme in general. They are

- (1) The Indigenous Resources Division, which manages state forests, and has resource-sharing Projects to share revenue derived from the use of state forests with communities in adjacent communal lands.
- (2) The Extension Division, which is responsible for mediating between RDCs and concessionaires in the exploitation of timber resources on communal lands.

The second of these is the more relevant to the CAMPFIRE philosophy, and could be adapted to it. At present, when an RDC wishes to exploit a commercial timber resource upon communal land within its district, the following procedures must be observed:

- (1) The RDC informs the Forestry Commission, and the Commission carries out an inventory of the resource and sets the limits of exploitation.
- (2) The RDC then invites bids from potential concessionaires, and selects one.
- (3) The Commission now issues a contract, on behalf of the RDC, and takes a silvicultural levy (a proportion of the total selling price) from the concessionaire.
- (4) The RDCs keep the revenue thus earned, and producer communities receive no direct benefits.

According to the Forestry Commission representative, this arrangement is entirely legitimate because, under existing law, RDCs are owners of all timber growing within their districts. In principle, however, this is not far removed from CAMPFIRE for, under extant law, the 'ownership' of wildlife on communal lands is vested in the RDCs. Clearly, changes to the relevant laws would have to be made, and guidelines introduced for the allocation of revenue along lines similar to those for existing CAMPFIRE earnings from the use of game animals. It would start CAMPFIRE along the road to community management of natural resources other than game animals, an aim that has been implicit in the CAMPFIRE movement from the start.

The DNPWLM holds the view that sharing responsibilities is fine in principle but, were too many other organisations to be engaged, they might swamp the efforts of one another and generate confusion. At present, WWF is monitoring some CAMPFIRE programmes and the Department would be happy for

it to expand its activities; but, as is already mentioned above, WWF is unwilling, at present, to take on more work. Before it can call in further organisations to share its responsibilities, DNPWLM must decide how it intends to address specific issues related to CAMPFIRE, and this will determine which organisations may be relevant.

The Department is presently attempting to define its role within the CAMPFIRE movement. According to a recent workshop (Anon., 1993), DNPWLM sees its responsibilities as the production of six outputs:


- (1) Establish legal mechanisms for local empowerment;
- (2) Policies of government ministries affecting CAMPFIRE to be made consistent;
- (3) Establish a local resource management programme.
- (4) Monitoring, research, evaluation and establishing data bases and information systems;
- (5) Developing a fisheries and water bodies system; and
- (6) Project (programme?) management.

What is lacking, however, are

- clearly defined goals for the programme,
- strategic objectives leading to the goals,
- an appraisal of the values of the actions selected as priorities,
- methods, and
- a schedule and list of anticipated products.

Once these are established, the Department can decide on priorities and apportion its resources accordingly. After it has done so, it can make decisions regarding the most advantageous partnerships to pursue.

In the view of the review mission team, a higher priority for DNPWLM is to establish an appropriate entity within the Department to deal with CAMPFIRE and game ranching. At present, the CCU is a small unit which lies in the fourth tier of the departmental hierarchy:



When fish is included as a CAMPFIRE resource, reporting through the Branch of Terrestrial Ecology will be inappropriate; and it is doubtful whether Research is its most suitable Branch. Furthermore, the importance of the CAMPFIRE movement surely warrants that the Unit be strengthened and assigned a higher level ranking in the Department than it presently enjoys.

## 5.4 REGIONAL NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES

**Issue No. 5.4.1:** How applicable is the Regional NRMP design to the Zimbabwe NRMP component?

and

**Issue No. 5.4.2:** Is the Zimbabwe NRMP component contributing effectively to the furtherance of the overall objectives and purpose of the Regional NRMP?

and

**Issue No. 5.4.4:** What is the relationship of the Zimbabwe NRMP component to efforts to protect elephant and rhino populations in the region?

SADC has adopted a Regional Natural Resource Policy and Development Strategy which identifies wildlife as an important integral component of the region's natural resources (USAID 1989:22). In response to this strategy, USAID formulated the NRMP "... to facilitate regional cooperation among participating SADC member states in managing and protecting the Natural resource base of the SADC region for purposes of sustainable social and economic development as well as protection of ecological diversity, and to disseminate knowledge of community management of wildlife resources among SADC member states" (USAID 1989:15). Implementation of the Regional Strategy rests with Malawi's Ministry of Forestry and Natural Resources which serves as the SADC Coordinator for Forestry, Fisheries and Wildlife; the NRMP works only with the Wildlife Sector Coordinator, Mr. Matthew Matemba<sup>5</sup>.

To achieve its regional objectives, the Project was to assist the Coordinating Unit to compile baseline information, monitor changes that occur, and draw together data on wildlife resources, rural communities, and government and non-government institutions. The Project was also to assist the Unit in organizing liaison visits, regional workshops and technical seminars, and in servicing the Project Coordinating Committee. Because USAID/Zimbabwe manages the finances and administration of the Project's Malawi component, a Project Specialist (no longer with the project) was contracted to work in the Wildlife Sector Coordinating Unit to coordinate the research activities of the three countries implementing NRMP, and to distribute information (the Project's lessons learned) to these implementors and other SADC countries. Since the Project Specialist is an employee of USAID/Zimbabwe, she answered to an office/project manager in Harare, originally the NRM Project Officer. The Project Administrator, who was originally intended to be an assistant to the Project Officer, assumed the Project Officer's responsibilities when the Project Officer resigned in 1991. Because the Project

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<sup>5</sup>. There are three separate sector coordination units in Malawi: inland fisheries, forestry, and wildlife.

Administrator/Officer is not a US direct-hire employee, however, he is not permitted to carry out a supervisory function. Therefore, although the Project Specialist submitted her reports to USAID/Zimbabwe through the Project Administrator/Officer, she and the Project Administrator/Officer were both supervised by USAID's General Development Officer.

Regional accomplishments include (USAID 1991-93)

- PA visits to Botswana, Zambia and Malawi during 1991 and 92,
- Project implementation workshop held in Bulawayo in 1991,
- Project Coordinating Committee meetings during 1991 and 92,
- Project implementation workshop held in Malawi during 1992,
- Semiannual Project Implementation Committee meetings during 1992 and 93,
- Regional workshop on models of community participation and involvement in NRM activities held during 1992,
- Establishment of a regional natural resources management library, and
- Sponsorship of a gender/PRA workshop held in Zimbabwe during July, 1993.

Project implementation problems focus on delays in identifying and hiring project administrative personnel and the subsequent resignations of two of them. Administrators within the DNPWLM appear not always to be aware of USAID's financial support of meetings with their regional counterparts. The flow from Zimbabwe to SADC of Project-sponsored information appears to be largely administrative: its impact on the social, technical, and economic dimensions of natural resource management within the region appears to be minimal.

Several questions become important in evaluating the relevance of a regional design to a Zimbabwean problem:

- Has the regional exchange of information materially improved the implementation of the Zimbabwean component? Has Zimbabwean expertise materially improved regional management of its natural resources?
- Could this same exchange have occurred without the support or intervention of USAID, that is are SADC's communication lines adequate to the task?
- Is a regional approach antithetic to a Project design which encapsulates only part of a nation's wildlife, those resident in the targeted area?

The available evidence would indicate that regional issues are being inadequately addressed by the kinds of cooperation envisaged by this Project. The most immediate indicator is the decimation of Zimbabwe's white rhino population, apparently by poachers from Zambia and using Zambian marketing links to the orient. Despite a workshop discussion of models of community involvement, the approach used in Zimbabwe remains top-down through the RDCs. Reports on wildlife population trends and movements appear to be nonexistent. No international protocols appear to have been generated by Project

involvement. For these reasons we conclude the regional NRMP design wants either serious rethinking or, failing that, to be dropped.

**Issue No. 5.4.3:** Are there additional interventions that might be initiated in furtherance of Regional NRMP objectives and purpose, and the SADC Natural Resource Strategy?

SADC's strategy statement is more an iteration of policy than a strategy; its relationship to NRMP objectives is, at best, weakly defined. The Project's objectives (see section 4) are unambiguously cast in terms of development of a targeted area. To build upon the present structure of a regional effort requires greater depth of investigation than this national-level evaluation has been afforded in its TOR. We would need to know, for example

- the precise structure and mandate of the SADC wildlife initiative,
- its relationship to other donors and institutions, and
- its past and expected effectiveness upon regional policy.

From the perspective of this review SADC appears to be weak with little influence upon wildlife issues within the region, in Zimbabwe, and in the targeted area. The issue of additional activities or financial expenditures in support of SADC's wildlife strategy appears to be unjustified in terms of the performance evaluated above. While the strategic value of a regional resource management authority is appealing, the actual accomplishments of the existing regional institutions negates that sense of attraction. For these reasons we recommend against additional interventions in SADC wildlife matters.

**Issue No. 5.4.5:** How might Malawi/SADC coordination of regional analysis and information exchange be enhanced, as well as the flow of output information from the Zimbabwe NRMP component to Malawi/SADC?

To be effective any organization requires the complement of personnel essential to carrying out its mandate. Obviously, a replacement Regional Coordinator is demanded if the flow of information between the Regional Office and participating countries is to follow. Secondly, we need to examine exactly what the flow of information is to achieve, and whether or not it duplicates existing channels of information exchange, e.g. the OAU, UNEP, IUCN, WWF, SARCUS, .... The flow of information is unjustified if change or improvement is not intended, unwanted, or unlikely to result from it. Lastly, we need to ask if regional analysis and information is important to the design of a Project which affects only part of the country in which it is housed.

During the course of this review we found no participant who believed the flow and analysis of regional information was essential to his mandate. For this reason we conclude the continuation of a regional coordination component to be unwarranted.



## 6. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Our evaluation concludes the Zimbabwe component of the Project has provided benefits to the areas in which it has worked. In so doing it has operated under design and administrative difficulties which would have caused many projects to fail outright. That it has not serves as a testament to the soundness of its underlying concepts, essentially those of the CAMPFIRE movement.

Some parts of the Project have operated better than others. Those that have not gone well owe the principal cause of their shortcomings to inadequate project design. Contributing to this have been administrative problems unanticipated by Project participants. Considerable quantities of money remain outstanding, in part because of participating agency unfamiliarity with the regulations under which they came to operate; important too has been the stress these regulations have caused to these agencies.

Some elements of Project design seem conceived with the goal of creating confusion. An example is the Project's regional dimensions which encompass the totality of three SADC countries (Malawi has a coordinating function, not an implementing one), yet the Zimbabwe component focuses only on Matabeleland, a kind of mathematical incongruency that defies definition; or does the regional aspect exclude Zimbabwe but include Matabeleland? The CAMPFIRE movement, whether by design or merely by perception, is tempted to ignore areas which receive donor assistance: it ignores the Project area, largely because of its association with USAID.

CAMPFIRE has been making important gains during the time of Project activities, so much so that the DNPWLM has been hard pressed to maintain service links to new communities coming into or expressing the desire to join CAMPFIRE. It forces one to consider the situation of Matabeleland had not the Project executed its activities in the region. Certainly CAMPFIRE would be established, though possibly not to the extent it is today. Much of this evaluation concerns itself with the cost of that gain: was it appropriate? We believe it was.

This is not to discount the opportunity for improvement, however, and these will be addressed in the following section. We find the gap between the USAID-sponsored Project and the CAMPFIRE movement to be unfortunate; something that has to be mended. Similarly unfortunate is the rigorous attention of USAID to its rules and regulations, and the stress, financial and worrying, that this has caused its implementing partners. Some relief to this is overdue.

Failed infrastructure is a problem throughout much of Africa. This Project has also left its mark: a failed dam, relocated villages for a fence to exclude wild animals — the project design ignored the cost of fence maintenance, a critical element of its financial sustainability. Both these problems owe their origins to faults in design. The Project Paper as well as the Grant Agreement failed to consider the risk of environmental, social, and economic failure, and the level of expenditure the Project was willing to concede

to mitigate failure. This is something an Environmental Impact Assessment and Engineering Review are designed to evaluate, yet both have been inadequate in terms of this project investment.

A prescriptive approach to project implementation is simple to execute and lends itself to tallying achievements; it also is subject to collapse once donor financing is withdrawn. Our review shows the Project to be largely prescriptive and driven from the top-down, that is to say through the rural district councils. A better approach would be to respond to the expressed needs of individuals, groups of individuals, and villages; but only in the sense of what the Project can be designed to provide. There are many approaches; the intent of this evaluation is to signal a need. USAID and its implementing partners need to consider a development path which takes into account their experience in and around the Project Area. We believe it should focus more on individual villages and groups of individuals and less on RDCs. RDCs have an important role to play as coordinators at the District level; their role as decision makers and implementors, however, needs to be moderated to take directly into account the views and opinions of households involved face-to-face with wildlife.

The financial benefits of the Project to individual households could increase. Much of the problem appears to rest in the way Project-generated monies are distributed by the RDCs: the application of a 15 percent levy on wildlife benefits is too high; the receipt by affected villages of 50 percent of those same returns is too low. Indeed, we understand there are times when no payments are made to villages. These benefits are pecuniary and their impact should be felt by individual households if they are to lend their support to the Project.

The regional components of the Project appear not to have achieved their objective. Meetings and workshops have been held, but the influence of these upon wildlife management in individual countries appears to be nonexistent: no international protocols have evolved from the Project; communications between countries about their wildlife appear to remain very much *ad hoc*; the post of the Regional Coordinator is still unfilled; cross-boarder poachers have decimated Zimbabwe's white rhino population. There appears to be a host of issues which could be addressed yet the preference appears to follow channels other than those sponsored by the Project. For this reason we conclude the regional component fails to provide adequate benefit and, for this reason, should be discontinued.

USAID wants its implementing partners to follow its administrative procedures and rules; the implementing partners believe these rules to be restrictive, demanding, outside their normal procedures, and different from the rules required by other donors. Strict application of these rules, perhaps zealous application of them, has left ZT encumbered with large amounts of expenditures disallowed; CASS is still working with the bursar of the University of Zimbabwe to apply the procedures so as to receive payment. The perception of USAID is that the partners have been involved with accounting and audits for some time, have attended workshops giving instruction in these procedures, and should now be at a state where they understand the rules and regulations; the perception of the partners is one of continuing problems. On the basis of the evidence we reviewed we conclude the problems remain insofar as debts remain outstanding, and that USAID should provide further assistance to resolving those debts in a sympathetic and equitable manner.

The Project offers considerable strengths, but these strengths are the same ones inherent in the CAMPFIRE movement and in the implementing partners: DNPWLM, ZT, CASS. The most important of these is the soundness of the basic premise: using natural resources for the good of the people who live with them. Add to this the technical abilities and good will of the Department, the proven ability of ZT to assist communities in their institutional development, and the ability of CASS to assess the social dimensions of development, and the mix becomes very powerful. For these reasons we conclude the Project should continue, albeit in a modified form, for at least another five years with opportunities for further continuation should its performance so warrant.

## 7. RECOMMENDATIONS

The preceding section concludes the Project is providing benefits of a type and quantity that justify its continuation; it also concludes that changes to the Project are important if it is to both decrease its risks and increase its achievements. This paper offers some suggestions regarding those changes. These should not be presented in isolation, however, but require the deliberation of the implementing partners. For this reason we recommend that a major seminar or workshop be convened, at which the participants will reappraise NRMP and decide

- ways in which the current Project should be realigned or redesigned;
- how the Project, and any follow-on programme, should relate to the national CAMPFIRE programme; and
- the relevance, scope and broad design of a Phase Two Project.

The need for this forum is pressing. Grant agreements for ZT and CASS expire on 15 September 1994 (although DNPWLM's continues until 31 August 1995), and new funding agreements must be in place by July 1994. Participants should include representatives from (at least)

- the three implementing partners,
- USAID,
- MET,
- all members of the CCG, and
- the four RDCs in the target area.

Other participants might include representatives of WADCOs, VIDCOs and local ward or village committees, and potential donors apart from USAID. This forum would also provide the opportunity for involving organisations whose presence may be relevant to the future expansion of CAMPFIRE to manage natural resources other than game animals: for example, Forestry Commission, MLAWD and the Natural Resources Board.

The agenda of the forum is the possibility of a Phase Two Project and the structure it might take. Although the general goals should remain unchanged the Project will have to be modified in several

respects. Certainly the same partners should be retained if they are willing. DNPWLM should remain the lead agency because it is the arm of government that holds responsibility for wildlife management; and wildlife in its broader concept (game animals, small mammals, birds, fishes and invertebrates) is likely to remain the resource of major concern under CAMPFIRE in the immediate future.

It would be a pity to lose ZT and CASS. They should be encouraged to stay, and the way made easy for them to do so. ZT will (on its own admission) continue to work with CAMPFIRE no matter what may be the future for NRMP. But if the Project does go into a Phase Two, ZT's considerable experience would be an immense advantage. So ought CASS to stay. It is the ideal organisation to monitor social progress from a more detached position than ZT, which is more concerned with implementing programmes and building institutions. Ways should be explored, in the near future, of addressing the problems that face the three partners in continuing to work on a Project that receives financial support from USAID.

One difficulty that faces ZT's extended participation in NRMP is reluctance to continue acting as an intermediary between USAID and RDCs. Ways in which USAID could give support grants to RDCs without using ZT should be explored.

If CASS continues into a Phase Two Project, a suitably qualified professional should be posted permanently to the target area so as to give the Centre a permanent presence there.

The degree to which USAID might spread its support more widely over DNPWLM's operations, should be investigated: the Department would like support to cover all its operations in Matabeleland North; some of its officers would like to see support for CAMPFIRE in general, a view which we endorse. Certainly, action should be taken to foster and facilitate communication between the four districts under NRMP and other CAMPFIRE districts. Ways in which this may be achieved should be explored by the CCG. In a Phase Two Project, funding ought to be provided for this purpose — to facilitate visits, workshops, and other channels of communication.

The PIC needs overhauling. It should be converted into a full coordinating committee that discusses, coordinates and approves work in the target area. Its membership may have to be expanded by including, for example, MLGRUD, CAMPFIRE Association and district representatives. Thought should be given to holding meetings more frequently and some, if not all of them, in the target area.

A wider role should be found for the CAMPFIRE Association. Present indications are that the Association is good at spreading awareness but less effective at servicing. Several persons interviewed believed that the Association's weakness lay in its board members being unaware of the significance of CAMPFIRE and who are, therefore, dominated by the organization's more knowledgeable executive branch.

The Association has a wide range of ideas but needs to set priorities as well as decide its direction and chief functions. Having made these decisions, it should embark upon long-term planning and be given support to do so. When its application to be registered as a Welfare Organisation is approved it will be

eligible to receive direct donor support. The Association should aim at becoming a strong producers' association. Its potential for assisting CAMPFIRE and NRMP will then be greatly enhanced.

The Association should devolve its membership beyond RDCs. At present it plans to extend membership to wards; but ultimately it needs to draw its membership from the producer communities — the people who actually `own' and stand to gain or lose from management or neglect of wildlife. By doing so it can become a more vigorous organisation. The existence of a more robust Association should help to enhance coordination among individual CAMPFIRE programmes, and between NRMP and other CAMPFIRE districts, as well as promoting learning and diffusion of innovation among the various CAMPFIRE programmes.

One of the most useful tasks that the Association might undertake would be to become a servicing agency that monitors CAMPFIRE activities nationwide, and relieve DNPWLM of that responsibility. The Association is already well aware of the importance of advancing its marketing role; and of sponsoring associated training. In the context of the former, two models on which the Association might base its expansion into marketing are the Ostrich and Crocodile Producer Associations, both of which have firm grips on their industries.

In order to play the wider role described above, the CAMPFIRE Association needs to be strengthened through additional external financial support. Changes in the law may also help it to identify its true members — the ones who stand to gain or lose from wildlife management or neglect.

The sympathies and support of MPs and local politicians for CAMPFIRE and the Project should be enlisted. They should be brought into the picture, kept informed, invited to meetings and ceremonies and invited to say a few words when they do attend. Where this is already being done, it should be continued.

DNPWLM should also continue to help evolve the process under which appropriate authority is devolved. In this context, a key question for CAMPFIRE in general is to decide what is a `resource management community'. This is a task that CASS might accept on behalf of the Project. It may not, however, be a simple task. Perhaps the definition of `resource management community' will vary from resource to resource, even within the limited context of game animals. Some animals have very small home ranges; others roam further afield. Many animals move from one locality to another in response to seasonal changes. Concepts of proprietorship or custodianship will vary accordingly.

NRMP should begin seeking ways of bringing natural resources other than game animals into CAMPFIRE. It is recommended that discussions be held with the relevant organisations. To start with, discussion might be held within CCG, with a view to identifying options and strategies. After that, a forum could be established that might include the Forestry Commission, MLAWD and Ministry of Mines — whichever organisations may be appropriate. The purpose of convening the forum would be to identify and then coordinate the steps that would be needed if other natural resources were to be added to the CAMPFIRE programmes. These steps would almost certainly include amendments to existing legislation.

The current state of inter-ministerial co-ordination appears to be adequate to the needs of NRMP in spite of the fact that no one in MET was prepared to speak with the mid-term review mission team. Commitment to NRMP was expressed by MLGRUD and (within MET) by DNPWLM. However, ways to widen inter-ministerial coordination and communication should be sought, particularly with a view to devolving appropriate authority for the management of natural resources further down the rural hierarchy, and to extending CAMPFIRE's interests beyond game animals. This recommendation is elaborated below.

The recommendations that relate to friction between USAID and the implementing partners, made in the interim assessment report have been implemented but, in spite of this, financial management problems persist and are addressed below.

- Approval of a full time Project Coordinator's post in DNPWLM is a welcome step, and one that should be acted upon as soon as possible.
- After appointment, the Project Officer should be encouraged to make frequent visits to the target area and demonstrate to the other partners that DNPWLM's presence in the Project is one that represents the whole Department.
- The Project Coordinator should focus attention, soon after his appointment, at improving communications
  - (a) between USAID and the three implementing partners and
  - (b) by encouraging agencies to improve their middle-level coordination between different units (see King (1993), especially between DNPWLM headquarters and its personnel in Matabeleland, and between ZT's offices in Harare and its personnel Bulawayo.

- It is probable that many lessons have been learned by donor and implementing partners as a result of the tensions described in this document and that some problems will not recur. There remain, however, unpaid vouchers and claims from long past, and the fear that experience of working under USAID support will make some partners fight shy of further involvement. Efforts should be taken to ensure that this does not happen because, whatever the problems may have been, there is much to admire in NRMP, and in those who participated, and a Phase Two would have the experiences of Phase One to build upon. Outstanding financial problems should be settled as soon as possible.
- There can never be too much communication aimed at avoiding misinterpretation of rules of procedure, or lack of comprehension of USAID requirements for financial management, administration and environmental assessments. For this reason we recommend that a meeting (perhaps a special meeting of PIC) be called immediately to deal exclusively with the resolution of all outstanding problems.

## ANNEXES

- A. Logframe: Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management Project
- B. List of persons and organizations contacted
- C. References cited
- D. Current (Dec 93) Status of Recommendations in Zimbabwe NRMP, Community-Based Resource Utilization Component:  
Interim Assessment by Hitchcock and Nangati, 27 July 1992.
- E. Technical appendices:
  - 1. Joint annex, CDSSES and LGS
  - 2. NRPPA
  - 3. WNRMAS
- F. Terms of Reference
- G. Project Implementation Issues to be addressed by the Interim Evaluation (TOR pp 11 - 35)
- H. Community participation in natural resource development

**LOGFRAME: ZIMBABWE NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROJECT**

Narrative summary	Objectively verifiable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p><u>Community-level goal</u></p> <p>Increased income and enhanced capability to meet basic human needs through sustainable utilization and conservation of natural resources, particularly wildlife.</p> <p><u>Country-level sub-goal</u></p> <p>To promote sustainable development of communities on lands that are marginally suitable for agriculture</p>	<p><u>Measures of goal achievement</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana meeting food needs through domestic production or imports funded with own resources.</li> <li>• In Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana households have sufficient income to ensure adequate nutrition of household members.</li> <li>• Increased percentage of GDP attributable to revenues from wildlife utilization.</li> </ul>	<p><u>Means of verification</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Survey of international trends and records.</li> <li>• Discussions with other donors to source of food imports.</li> <li>• Available surveys of nutritional status.</li> <li>• Available analyses of GDP.</li> <li>• Land use and productivity records available through government.</li> </ul>	<p><u>Assumptions for achieving goal</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inflation does not negate improved purchasing power of increased income.</li> <li>• Demand for wildlife products is not diminished by international restrictions on trade in wildlife products.</li> <li>• Increased income is used to meet basic needs requirements.</li> </ul>

Narrative summary	Objectively verifiable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p><u>Country-level purpose</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To demonstrate, through practical examples, the technical, social, economic and ecological viability and replicability of community-based natural resource management and utilization programs on marginal lands for increasing household and community incomes while sustaining natural resources.</li> <li>To improve national and local capability to halt the decline in the wildlife resource base through training, education, protection, communication, and technology transfer.</li> </ol>	<p><u>End of Project status</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Natural resource utilization will be demonstrated to be a preferred and profitable land use in marginal lands in 0-10 target areas.</li> <li>Resource management programs will be self-sustaining, will offer employment opportunities, will result in optimal and sustained wildlife yields, and will generate revenues for local development.</li> <li>The decline of endangered elephant and rhino populations will be halted in targeted areas and nationally.</li> <li>Governments, decision-makers, and opinion leaders throughout the SADC region will be better informed on natural resource management methods and impact.</li> <li>Heightened public awareness of the value of natural resources for economic growth and development.</li> </ul>	<p><u>Means of verification</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Comparison of results of baseline and endline data surveys in participating communities.</li> <li>Review of Project, SADC, and government records; interviews with NGOs.</li> <li>Project evaluation.</li> <li>Field observations from site visits.</li> </ul>	<p><u>Assumptions</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Communities in target areas willing and capable of learning skills necessary to manage wildlife and forest resources on sustainable basis as a means of increasing their income.</li> <li>Natural disasters do not affect existing wildlife resources in target communities.</li> <li>Continuing market for wildlife and veld products (both domestic and foreign).</li> <li>Transnational protocols for wildlife management in place.</li> <li>Anti-poaching efforts near target communities protecting wildlife population.</li> <li>Communities have authority to limit rights to access to wildlife to residents and safari operators.</li> </ul>

Narrative summary	Objectively verifiable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p><u>Country-level purpose, (cont)</u></p>	<p><u>End-of-Project status, (cont)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutions and decision-making procedures for sustainable resource management and distribution of economic benefits resulting from the natural resource base will be established and strengthened at the village, ward, and district levels on communal lands in participating SADC member states. These institutions will assume complete responsibilities by the end of the Project.</li> <li>• Participation of women in resource management programs will increase at the village, ward and, potentially, district levels in the targeted SADC member states. The role of women in the economy and their access to income will be improved through income-generating activities that use the natural resource base in a sustainable manner.</li> </ul>	<p><u>Means of verification, (cont)</u></p>	<p><u>Assumptions, (cont)</u></p>

Narrative summary	Objectively verifiable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p><u>OUTPUTS</u></p> <p>A. <u>Community-based Resource Utilization</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Up to 100 locally-recruited wildlife monitors and other technical and management personnel trained and employed by the District Councils to work at the community level.</li> <li>• Construction of supporting infrastructure, such as fences and watering points.</li> <li>• Maintenance of optimum animal population levels for controlling problem animals.</li> <li>• Developed and refined survey and monitoring techniques.</li> <li>• Improved understanding of elephant habitat interactions.</li> <li>• Measurable habitat recovery in areas where elephant densities have been reduced.</li> <li>• Increased elephant densities in those areas where elephants may formerly have been excluded.</li> </ul>			

Narrative summary	Objectively verifiable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p>A. <u>Community-based resource utilization (cont)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Recovery of statistical data from elephant censuses to monitor demographic parameters.</li> <li>• Protecting of adjacent communal lands.</li> <li>• Negligible elephant mortality due to poaching and continued protection of endangered species in the Project area.</li> </ul> <p>B. <u>Planning and Applied Research Support</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Socio-economic data collection and analysis relevant to Project implementation, monitoring and evaluation.</li> <li>• Identification and analysis of culturally determined rights, responsibilities, and practices relating to environmental, social, and economic resources.</li> <li>• Identification and analysis of micro-level individual, household, and communal motivational and decision</li> </ul>			

Narrative summary	Objectively verifiable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p>B. <u>Planning and applied research support</u>, (<i>cont</i>)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Investigation of centre-periphery relationships in bureaucratic, legal, and administrative structures, with the inherent conflicts over resource control these relationships involve.</li> <li>• High-level professional training for up to three research fellows in the socio-economic and institutional dimensions of environmental management.</li> <li>• Publications regarding the dynamics of community-based resource management in the target area.</li> <li>• Up to three baseline socio-economic surveys conducted at the beginning of the project, with parallel surveys conducted at the end of the project.</li> <li>• Up to three in-depth longitudinal studies.</li> <li>• Participation in regional seminars and conferences.</li> </ul>			

Narrative summary	Objectively verifiable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p>C. <u>Conservation of the resource base</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved capacity to census and monitor elephant populations, conduct applied research on elephant carrying capacities in the Project area, manage the elephant population, and protect the elephant population from illegal hunting.</li> <li>• Habitat and vegetation monitoring.</li> <li>• Annual reports and periodic updates providing full details of the numbers, trends, density, and distribution of elephants in the Project area.</li> <li>• Annual reports and periodic updates on habitat change in monitored plots and the relationships between their change and elephant density and management actions.</li> <li>• The strengthening of the Interpretation and Extension Units of the Department of Wildlife and National Parks through workshops, equipment, and establishment of</li> </ul>			

Narrative summary	Objectively verifiable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p>C. <u>Conservation of the resource base, (cont)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Production of educational materials including scripts for use on radio programs, videos, "Action" magazine and other teaching tools.</li> <li>• Workshops with village , district and provincial authorities on community-based resource utilization.</li> <li>• Presentation to the general public.</li> </ul> <p><u>INPUTS</u></p> <p>A. <u>Community-based resource utilization</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fund for expenditures to enhance the use of wildlife through District Council activities.</li> <li>• Revenues from wildlife utilization.</li> <li>• Technical assistance for development of land plans.</li> <li>• Commodities, including aerial</li> </ul>			

**NOTE:** The page following the text in the preceding block is missing both from bound copies of the project paper as well as from the original document on file in the project design office of USAID.

Project logframe, (cont)

Narrative summary	Objectively verifiable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p>C. <u>Conservation of the resource base</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational support for periodic aerial census surveys.</li> <li>• Commodities including a mainframe computer</li> <li>• Support for a joint Zimbabwe/Botswana workshop or seminar to plan the research and monitoring component of the program.</li> <li>• Equipment to undertake aerial surveys of elephant populations, including aircraft rehabilitation, upgrading of aircraft photographic monitoring capability, and mainframe computer.</li> </ul>			

Narrative summary	Objectively verifiable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p>C. <u>Conservation of the resource base</u>, (<i>cont</i>)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Equipment required for assistance in the protecting of communal lands (capture and translocation, including vehicles, communications equipment, and field equipment).</li> <li>• Equipment, including vehicles, field equipment for anti-poaching patrols and vhf radio equipment for protection of elephant and other poached species.</li> <li>• Support for liaison with Botswana.</li> </ul> <p>D. <u>Conservation education and training</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training in conservation education through workshops, seminars, conferences, and site visits.</li> <li>• Commodities, including printed materials such as Action Magazine, a mobile training unit, and educational materials.</li> <li>• Commodities, including equipment for an interpretation center.</li> </ul>			

Source: United States Agency for International Development. 1989. Natural Resources Management Project: Regional Overview. Harare.

**LIST OF PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED**

## Annex B

Child, Dr Brian — Senior Ecologist, CAMPFIRE Unit, DNPWLM  
Clarke, Jeanette — Research Officer, Forestry Commission, Harare  
Claudius, — Provincial Wildlife Officer, Hwange  
Cumming, Dr David — WWF, Harare  
Cutshall, Dr Charles — Project officer, NRMP  
Dhlomo, M J — Head of development and technical services, Bulilimangwe RDC (ex—CEO of the erstwhile RC)  
Dube, T — ZT field representative  
Hawkes, Prof Roland — CASS (visiting professor)  
Jones, M A — Senior Ecologist, DNPWLM, Bulawayo  
Kasere, Steve — Communication and Information Officer, CAMPFIRE Association  
Manyonganise, E — Senior Administrative Officer (legal), DNPWLM  
Maposa, G S — District Administrator, Bulilimangwe  
Matongo Mr — Under Secretary, District Development Fund, MLGRUD  
Maveneke, T N — CEO of CAMPFIRE Association, DNPWLM  
Metcalf, Simon — Social researcher, CASS  
Monro, R H T — General Secretary, ZT  
Moyo, Jabulani — ZT Area Manager, Bulilimangwe  
Moyo, N D — Executive Officer (community services), Bulilimangwe  
Murphree, Prof M W — Head of CASS  
Murray, Steve — ZT (Information dissemination and editor of 'Action' magazine)  
Mushauri, Joshua — Director, SAVER  
Nduku, Dr W K — Director, DNPWLM  
Pangeti, G N — Deputy Director (Management), DNPWLM  
Rihoy, Liz — ZT (monitoring officer)  
Thomas, Steve — ZT (training and institutional development)  
Zondo, M. — ZT field representative

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**Current (Dec 93) status of recommendations in Zimbabwe NRMP,  
Community-Based Resource Utilization Component: Interim Assessment  
by Hitchcock and Nangati, 27 July 1992**

Recommendation	Current status
Fundamental differences between USAID and implementing agencies can be improved through a more flexible approach to Project management and better communication.	Discussions, consultations, and changes of personnel have aimed to resolve the causes of these differences. Implementing agencies, however, have yet to feel the effect of these.
Meetings and seminars should be held between USAID and its implementing partners to explain and clarify USAID procedures and management.	Two meetings were held within the last 6 months. These included a week-long seminar on Project accounting procedures. Nonetheless, implementing agencies believe USAID procedures are difficult.
Communications could improve were a Project coordinator/administrator to be located in DNPWM. The coordinator would serve as liaison between implementing agencies and USAID.	USAID has approved this recommendation and has funds available to support it. The post is presently being advertised.
Greater flexibility by USAID, particularly in the distinction between Project-related activities and appropriate cost, is essential to improved relations between USAID and the implementing agencies.	Forthcoming changes in USAID personnel are hoped to resolve this issue.
USAID assistance is necessary to ensure the implementing agencies are prepared for USAID audits.	The impacts of this issue vary between agencies; its resolution has been largely through the experience of undergoing an audit. At this writing Zimtrust has successfully experienced audits and understands the procedure; CASS is less well prepared and may require assistance of this sort.
Rapid expansion of the Project is imposing an increasingly heavy load on the implementing agencies. Extra staff financed through the Project grant agreement would resolve much of this issue.	Incremental staff should be financed through the proceeds of the Project rather than an increase of grant money.
Increased community-level training of wildlife committees and game guard monitors.	Although a good idea, the means of achieving this are constrained by limited agency capacities and budget. The different options require further attention.
Improved land use planning is essential to management activities being implemented in the Project area.	The concept of land use planning, though valuable, remains largely unimplemented. Communities outside the targeted area but participating in CAMPFIRE have been known to implement LUP.

Recommendation	Current status
A clear policy is required on Appropriate Authority and CAMPFIRE guidelines to improve the breakdown of costs and benefits.	While on the agenda of every Project meeting, the issue remains unresolved. A 50 percent split of community benefits is low for some communities. Legal amendments are required to extend Appropriate Authority to other natural resources.
The participation of women can be enhanced by lessening the burdens of household labour, particularly the transport of water and fuel. A national seminar should address this issue and find means to resolve it.	A regional workshop scheduled for May, 1994, will address this issue. Personnel reductions have decreased the capacities of some agencies to deal with this problem. Some communities are said to have used wildlife-generated revenues to finance wells.
The monitoring procedures of the NRMP need to be improved, particularly with respect to matters of institutional development.	ZimTrust has successfully implemented a Process Oriented Monitoring System to monitor institutional development.
All districts in the NRMP should have a full-time CAMPFIRE manager on the staff of the district council.	This they have.
The DNPWM should expand its CAMPFIRE-related personnel as well as the budget for their activities.	This evaluation proposes change to the structure of CAMPFIRE within the DNPWLM. The lead agency for the movement is now the CAMPFIRE Association.
CASS should produce a summary of the results of its baseline survey of the socioeconomy of the Project area. CASS should also fill the vacant position of Research Fellow.	These data were summarized by Hawks in a 1993 publication. The position of Research Fellow has been successfully filled.
CASS should hold a seminar on participation and community empowerment models as well as the issue of Appropriate Authority and its relationship to non-wildlife resources.	While within CASS' role, this activity has not yet been addressed.
ZimTrust should provide training not only to executive officers of the district councils but also to district councillors.	This is possible but remains an untouched issue.
Identification is necessary of the policy changes required to extend Appropriate Authority status over natural resources besides wildlife. Communal areas should also have authority to negotiate revenue from mineral exploitation.	A CAMPFIRE forum was held to address this issue, but was unattended by representatives from mines or water. Many other agencies did participate, however. The issue remains unresolved.

**ANNEX E: TECHNICAL APPENDICES**

- 1. Joint Annex: a) Community Development and Small-scale Enterprise Specialist and b) Local Government Specialist**
- 2. Natural Resources Planning and Policy Analyst**
- 3. Wildlife and Natural Resource Management and Administration Specialist**

**COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISE**  
**AND**  
**LOCAL GOVERNMENT**

**INTRODUCTION**

This technical annex is developed from field interviews conducted during a period of one week late in 1993. It was pointed out to us and we accept that there was not enough time to do a thorough job. We attempt, nonetheless, to present our findings and perceptions as accurately as possible. We do not deny that our biases and experiences colour our interpretation, though we honestly tried to minimize the effects of these factors. Our report is written jointly because of the considerable overlap and duplication between community development and local government; it follows the general outline of issues used by the main report.

**CONCEPTUAL ISSUES**

**Is the 4-district project focus appropriate?**

Early in the project it was perhaps appropriate for USAID to concentrate its funding in four districts. It would now seem, however, that this focus has lost much of its previous relevance. By concentrating on selected wards the Project may have unwittingly contributed to friction — between participating and non-participating wards as well as between communities and their councils. The same focus may also have fostered divisions between ZT's Bulawayo Office, whose officers seem to prefer autonomy, and its Harare Office, whose officers seem to believe that operating from one centre would streamline its organization. The regional focus, by concentrating investment on only a part of Zimbabwe, may also have complicated ZT's otherwise national orientation.

The project, by not financing workshop attendance outside the Project area, may have stifled opportunities to share experiences with others working in natural resource management. By concentrating in Matabeleland, the Project may have unwittingly contributed to regional tensions.

**To what extent are indicators of project progress and benefits measurable?**

Our interviews show that most beneficiaries believe they have benefited from Project activities. ZT has provided good administrative, financial, and infrastructural support. We believe its achievements could improve were additional resources to be allocated to institutional development and training.

Despite complaints of some communities that the DNPWLM needs to increase its activity, DNPWLM and ZT have cooperated to provide training and workshops. This will become increasingly important if communities are to become more active in problem animal control (PAC).

## Annex E.1

The Project has affected the participation of local people in different ways. The following examples illustrate the alternative paths this can follow:

- Wildlife Committees (WCs) have been installed at village, ward, and inter-ward levels in each of the Project districts. In some locations the WCs have become effectively integrated into existing government. In one district, for example, the chairman of the inter-ward committee was also the vice-chairman responsible for the conservation committee. In such instances the Project has reinforced existing local government.
- In comparison to the above example, friction has resulted where WCs were established parallel to existing VIDCOs and WADCOs. Lack of proper communication and understanding have contributed to mistrust and suspicion.

If progress and benefits are measured solely in monetary or other tangible forms, then not much has been achieved. If, on the other hand, progress is measured in terms of attitude, awareness, consciousness, team building, and potential for future development, then the Project has made considerable achievement. Communities are better off. The Project's social and economic benefits include an expanding awareness of developmental issues and increased participation in public affairs. Increasingly, the communities are becoming effective in political life. Quite a number of communities have invested their Project revenues in activities such as building schools, clinics, roads, and community halls. Without the project these investments would not have been made.

### **What design modifications are appropriate to ensure project benefits and create maximum benefits?**

A principal element of the Project is its union of three implementing partners: ZT, CASS and DNPWLM. Successful implementation depends on the quality as well as the extent of their collaboration, something which can be assessed through the views of project beneficiaries. In the following text we present perceptions of the District Councils, WADCOs, VIDCOs and WCs of the impact of activities implemented by ZT, DNPWLM and CASS. From these data we then suggest measures to improve the work of these organisations.

There are divergences in the perceptions of ZT by District Councillors, WADCOs and VIDCOs. In each project district we visited, WADCOs, VIDCOs and producer communities positively perceive ZT and appreciate its role in the project. There was an expression of concern, however, about its narrow developmental focus. A contrast was made to Plan International which, in its adopted ward, uses a holistic approach to development.

The perceptions of District Councillors vary. On one extreme are council officials who view ZT as rabble rousers: agents who turn the people against their councils. This is an apparent reference to allegations of ZT setting up parallel and competing structures to local government. Some district council officials complained that ZT had made promises which were not fulfilled. Such views are in the minority. The majority of district councils positively perceive ZT's role. They often appreciate ZT as an independent arbitrator or intermediary between council and other government. It appeared to us

## Annex E.1

that there was a relationship between the amount and quality of initial training received by ZT's area managers and Council perceptions of ZT.

ZT's area managers, while expected to play a major role, have been disadvantaged by their lack of exposure to courses in training and skill development. Managers responsible for infrastructure often found themselves diverted from activities in institutional development; field officers were often in conflict with headquarters over the way to approach district councils. In this latter regard, ZT's headquarters seems to have advocated an interpretation of resource ownership that left complex issues unrecognized; field officers, on the other hand, preferred to involve the local power structure. In Hwange, where traditional leaders were at first left out, the project made very little progress; once the leaders were consulted, however, communities quickly became mobilized.

Most levels of local government and producer communities were appreciative of the work of the DNPWLM. Several concerns were expressed about the alleged division between DNPWLM's research and management units. Some wardens claimed they were not informed of workshops planned by the research unit. The objectivity and neutrality of the research unit in providing advice to councils was queried, particularly since some hunters and safari operators had, in the past, been employees of the unit — members of the research unit refuted allegations of their bias towards safari operators. Other concerns were the slowness of the DNPWLM to train game scouts, and the unreasonably short time allotted to training.

Although the presence of CASS was acknowledged by Councils and others in the field, the research it conducts was not perceived as being directly linked to the project. CASS' high staff turnovers have impeded its supervision of research fellows, delayed appointments at UZ, and hindered the recovery of expenses. These difficulties, in turn, have limited CASS' impact, with the result that

- (1) CASS has had a low visibility in the field. It has not yet produced a monitoring plan.
- (2) CASS' research is not easily translatable into action; it has not provided meaningful feedback to the communities.
- (3) Because data are not easily accessible, CASS has only partially achieved its institutional monitoring goals.
- (4) CASS has only recently appointed a gender specialist; input in this area has been limited.

Not much was said about USAID except that its rules are complicated compared to those of other donors. There were some complaints of unfulfilled promises.

The assumptions on which the design was based appear not to have been fully worked out. ZT, for example, was expected to concentrate on institutional development but ended up assuming responsibilities for infrastructural development; DNPWLM was expected to play a more active role

than it has actually done; CASS was expected to engage in applied and action research, but its output has been mainly academic.

Strengthening of ZT would require

- (1) realignment of its activities to focus principally on institutional development; and
- (2) improved training of area managers.

It has also been suggested by some that ZT's operations could more effectively be run from Harare (many observers disagree with this observation). ZT should perhaps consider strengthening its training by increasing its number of trainers nationally. These could then be deployed to the provinces on a rotational basis.

The CAMPFIRE section of the District Councils appears to be understaffed in all districts. A concerted effort to develop effective management skills should be undertaken by District Councils and Producer Communities .

We understand there is a restructuring of the National Parks. We reported earlier that the level of collaboration between the research unit and the management unit was thought to be less than desirable. By restructuring, the DNPWLM might become better able to play a more active role in the NRMP as well as improve its internal collaboration.

CASS has relied on research fellows to carry out its applied and action research. This provides a fundamental contradiction: research fellows are promoted on the basis of academic research; the work of researchers in the NRMP calls for applied and action research. CASS needs to reconsider its *modus operandi*, perhaps by finding ways to conduct needs-driven research appropriate to the project. We are not suggesting that basic research is not needed for the NRMP, but that it is important to strike a balance between applied and basic research, particularly as basic research may not be policy oriented.

Steps to be taken to ensure project benefits and create maximum benefits include the following:

- (1) There should be continued and intensified promotion of the CAMPFIRE concept, particularly to build a sense of common vision and commitment. The concept should be extended to other natural resources so as to increase the number of beneficiaries. This means more workshops and seminars, preferably near the homes of the participants, especially if the participation of women is to be enhanced.
- (2) There is a need to train management skills at the village, ward, inter-ward and council levels.
- (3) There is need for increased dialogue and joint planning between ZT and district councils.

- (4) There is need for the various cooperating partners to refocus on the activities they are supposed to carry out.

### **What specific changes are needed, if any, in the Project Implementation Schedule and Logical Framework?**

Changes in the implementation schedule are discussed in the main section of the report; in this section we concentrate on some aspects of the logical framework that relate to the goal of increasing incomes and enhancing the capability to meet basic human needs. Our description is developed from interviews with ordinary people as well as with traditional leaders.

One of the fundamental assumptions of the logical framework is that the NRMP project, through its encouragement of participation in local communities, will improve the use of natural resources. In turn this will lead to income generating activities that will make it possible for the local communities to meet basic human needs.

Our interviews focused on three areas: (1) grasp of the CAMPFIRE concept, (2) training provided by the project, and (3) project successes and problems. In a district we designated as No. 1 there was evidence that people had grasped the concept of CAMPFIRE, which they described as "being about conservation of natural resources and ecosystems, management of resources, and a strategy to develop our community through resource utilization." Between 1991 and 1992 this community had received four courses, each lasting 2 to 3 days — during 1993, although the people perceived a need for more training, no courses were given. These courses were to promote awareness of the project, and resulted in the formation of wildlife committees. It was strongly suggested that training should include field visits to other areas having similar activities.

The community identified its success with the establishment of wildlife committees and its collaboration to identify potential income generating projects — they listed a petrol station as their priority need. There are obvious implementation problems: First, it does not appear the community received advice on the economic viability of the projects. Second, the community complained that their application to council for the petrol project in November, 1992, had not been acted upon. Our own discussions with council officials revealed they did not believe the petrol project was viable, an opinion which was not conveyed to the community. Other projects such as the building of chalets, according to the community, were blocked by council. The request to have a sub-post office had not been met. The people are frustrated by the lack of encouragement their initiatives receive. There are no income generating activities to result from the monies disbursed from NRMP — the main source of income seems to be from selling goats.

A second problem involves the limited participation of women. We believe this to result from a lack of confidence by women; cultural and social factors also play a role. A large number of the male population works in Botswana and South Africa. The in-laws, who act as custodians of their daughters-in-law during the absence of their sons, are not enthusiastic about training activities, especially if these are conducted far from home. It was suggested that workshops be held in December in order to involve both husbands and wives. This would be helped if trainers were able to train additional

## Annex E.1

trainers in the villages. Education and training were perceived as critical, yet it appears that much remains to be done.

Inter-unit relationships proved to be an area of discontent. Community mobilization, although a success, resulted in frustration as people realized their inability to realize their decisions. It was this frustration that led interviewees to describe their councils as oppressors. Although the local councillor worked very well with wildlife committees, he felt powerless against the council's executive wing. The relationships between council and wildlife committees did not provide an enabling environment for the growth of income-generating activities; problems with the inter-ward committees led lower government to complain about the adequacy of information they received.

The logical framework assumes the mobilization of local communities will result in increased decision-making powers. This seems to address only part of a much wider problem, something which could possibly be approached by developing lobbying and coalition-building skills in the local communities.

In the district we designated as No. 2 the situation was very different. In this district the ward committee is headed by an efficient and effective woman councillor. The first noticeable difference between districts 1 and 2 was the excellent quality of relationship among different levels of government; the council was also strong in its rapport with the executive wing.

The ward we visited, despite being one which received only small amounts of money from the project, had made considerable advances in building income-generating activities. For instance, the ward was busy constructing a community hall and a water tank. The hall, which would be hired out for weddings and other social functions, would provide the venue for a self-financing sewing project. A number of lessons can be drawn from this ward: First, profitable investments are possible if communities are encouraged to collaborate (the logical framework makes the household as the unit of assessment of project benefits; a more meaningful unit may be the ward). Second, success stories need to be disseminated in order to provide role models for other communities. Third, it is important to understand success stories in order to identify the factors underlying their achievements.

In district No. 3 initial problems arose from a lack of understanding of the Project's basic concepts, a situation which has since improved. Women's participation, possibly due to low literacy levels, was meagre in this district. Women expressed their desire to acquire skills in literacy, sewing, and the making and marketing of baskets. Flexibility by the project in the need to build a range of skills may be essential to meeting its overall goal of natural resource management. A core need is the development of management skills; the method to achieve this may vary from one district to another.

Traditional leaders are an important component of the project. District 3 made no progress in its activities until traditional leaders were consulted and gave their blessing to the project. The role of traditional leaders is mainly to act as advisers; they are not part of local government. An important principle is the recognition of existing power structures and the use of these to benefit the project.

### Small Scale Enterprise Development

## **Annex E.1**

The Project logframe assumes the project will increase the incomes of its participants. One way for this to happen involves the use of Project monies as support capital for income-generating activities. We discuss below our experience with small-scale enterprises in the Project area.

The emphasis to put money in the pockets of individuals has limited the amount of capital available to enterprises which require substantial investment. The project has concentrated on hunting safaris, leaving little finance available to small-scale industries. Attempts to introduce ecological tourism still need to be followed through.

Our interviews showed that people were anxious to embark on business as a way of using their Project money. Business suggestions included planting medicinal trees near boreholes; ostrich farming; leather tanning and crafts; commercial husbandry of mopani worms; making and marketing traditional baskets; brick making; marketing river sand and decorative stones; operating safari camps; and building tourist chalets next to Maitengwe dam and along the Zambezi River.

### **What other actions, strategies and targets might further the objectives of the Zimbabwe NRMP?**

There is no doubt that in some communities traditional leaders, as custodians of the land and its resources, remain very influential. We attended a colourful handing over of project monies ceremony in one district where all traditional leaders were invited. The project cheque was handed over to the Chief who, in turn, gave it to the wildlife committee. When we interviewed the chiefs it was clear, despite the lack of a clear policy on their role, that they wanted involvement. Perhaps they should participate in the wildlife committees.

An area that needs careful scrutiny is that of policy. By statute, appropriate authority over wildlife is invested in the District Councils. Differences in interpretation arise in the spirit of the law, some arguing that appropriate authority was granted to the Councils on behalf of the communities to whom the authority should be devolved. Devolution needs to be viewed in terms of the national policy on decentralization. This policy recognizes that the devolving of authority must be linked to the capacity of a community to manage. The communities themselves acknowledged they do not yet have the ability they require. Their situation echoes the need to intensify training and capacity building of local communities.

We detected no fundamental differences among communities in the distribution of Project-generated revenues. Some did not oppose using a portion of their income for district development, as long as this facilitated getting council support for other projects. There is merit in this proposal, especially in districts where Project revenues may be their most important source of income. Several communities are spending their project monies on activities that are the traditional responsibility of the council: schools, water supplies, clinics and roads.

Some councils complained that the 2% levy by the CAMPFIRE Association exceeded the monetary value of the benefits it provided. Some preferred a flat fee to the percentage levy. It is important for the association to demonstrate the benefits it provides to its members.

## **DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES**

### **To what extent have the recommendations of the Interim Assessment been addressed?**

One of the recommendations of the Interim Assessment concerns the participation of women. Our interviews and observations show the issue has hardly been addressed. We discuss elsewhere in this paper the serious constraints faced by women. We have also indicated that one of the most impressive ward committees in the project area was headed by a woman.

The recommendation to strengthen institutional development through increasing manpower and training has been partially fulfilled: there are area managers in each of the four districts, although one district lacks a campfire manager; other specialist personnel recommended by the assessment have not been placed. The DNPWLM is still limited in its ability to provide training speedily and effectively. Community members and game scouts indicated they had received limited instruction. The pattern of training for game scouts was one week in 1991, two weeks in 1992, and two months in 1993. Game scouts believed their training was inadequate.

Some of the recommendations relating to CASS have been implemented. A summary of baseline data has been distributed to implementing agencies. Questions have been raised about its usefulness, however. Research on critical institutional issues includes the following:

- (1) Lagisa system/stock grazing system,
- (2) Internal migration,
- (3) Development of communal based tourism other than safari hunting, and
- (4) Research on the fence in Tsholotsho.

We are not aware of CASS holding a seminar on participation and empowerment models or on appropriate authority as it relates to non-wildlife resources.

ZT has targeted process monitoring at 32 ward committees in four districts. Every six months a questionnaire is administered to area managers. At this writing two reports have been produced. Problems that need attention include

- the use of English, thereby inhibiting the participation of some WC members,
- problems of construct validity, the degree of fit between indicators and the underlying concepts they purport to measure, and
- lack of observation of monitoring processes and interactions.

### **What actions might permit increased local autonomy in the utilization of projects inputs to community needs?**

We believe local autonomy implies the ability of communities to influence their destiny; it entails effective decision making, the ability to implement decisions, the ability to influence government so that it is favourably disposed to the ideas of the community, and the ability of the community to maximize its benefits with respect to its inputs. While the law may provide an enabling environment, it is the

## Annex E.1

relationships on the ground that define what communities may actually do. Monitoring reports by ZT show that WCs in Binga have been very influential in Council decisions; they also show that WCs in conflict with their council perform poorly. The possibility is that the more effective the WC, the more confidence the council has in it as well as the willingness to allow greater autonomy in decision making.

In improving the autonomy of local government, it is important to broaden and increase the participation of its different groups. It appears the Project has placed little emphasis on training in group methods and group dynamics, both of which are essential components of participatory methodology. We believe workshops in participatory methods to be essential, especially to improve the capacity of area managers as facilitators.

The monitoring system is an essential element in the development of local autonomy. While the current process-oriented monitoring system has great promise, the Project needs to remember the goal of developing community skills in self monitoring. Local communities, over time, should be able to implement the monitoring system as well as analyse its results. Monitoring information is crucial to effective decision making. Autonomy implies not only reduced dependency on district councils, but also decreased dependency on NGO implementing agencies. It means that efforts must be made to increase hands-on management training in local communities.

There is need for CASS to fundamentally modify its approach to research. The research agenda should develop from the grassroots if the Project is to become serious about its bottom-up participatory approach. More of applied and action research is required to assist communities in achieving their goals. The research should also feed into and strengthen monitoring at the community level.

An important issue in local autonomy is the question of the devolution of appropriate authority to the local level. In previous paragraphs we have described the issues surrounding devolution. Several views are possible. One centres on the need to strengthen relationships between local communities and their councils. Local autonomy is enhanced by building effective alliances throughout all local government structures: cooperation is more effective than conflict to achieve local autonomy. Another view suggests that local autonomy is achieved by emancipating local communities through legislative changes or mobilization. Local autonomy is seen as being accompanied by conflict and power struggles. The essential difference between these views is that of pragmatism versus political theory. We believe that more should be done to strengthen community relationships; that autonomy will result from effective communication and understanding. We do not believe that autonomy is necessary in all activities: there are some areas better left to the Council while others are performed better at the local level. The activities that are better decentralized is a question of management capacity at each level of government.

### **Are there opportunities to reduce the time to fulfil USAID financial and administrative requirements?**

Our individual terms of reference did not refer specifically to USAID requirements; rather, they inquired about actions that might improve direct DC, WADCO and VIDCO access and communication through Harare-based funding and monitoring. Is direct communication desirable? District councils agreed that communications should go through the council. A number of districts

admitted, however, that they lacked the capacity to deal directly with USAID, hence the reason infrastructure was thrust on ZT.

The problem of slow responsiveness in dealing with problems has two dimensions: The first concerns the approval of projects by council, and seems related to the quality of relationship between a council and its WCs — complaints of slow council response were reported in only one district. The second is about the relationship between the implementing agencies and USAID. We were told that USAID rules and regulations were a cause of problems. From the perspective of the implementing agencies there was need for more flexibility.

### **What actions and inputs are required to enhance the participation of women?**

A fundamental aspect of women's participation is that women must see their participation as important and necessary. Conscientisation and confidence building, especially at VIDCO and WADCO levels, is necessary and essential to the Project; to be effective it requires workshops, seminars, and other forms of support. Workshops may have to be held during holidays because of the absence of husbands who work away from home.

The development of consciousness must be accompanied by opportunities for involvement. There is need to appoint or allocate someone in council responsible for gender sensitization. A quota system, which could be phased out as women become familiar with committee work, might require a minimum number of women on councils. Interagency efforts are required to combat low literacy among women, a major factor responsible for limiting their participation in government.

ZT's programme of process monitoring should have a concern about women's development; CASS should also increase its research on women. There is need to develop a database on the issue in order to improve training programs and evaluation procedures.

### **What is the appropriate balance between development of physical infrastructure and local institutional development? Has project funding of infrastructure been appropriate?**

We really have no data to determine if the balance between investment in infrastructure and institutional development has been appropriate. Complicating the comparison is the qualitative nature of benefits which arise from institutional development, while those from infrastructure are largely quantitative. We previously noted two problems, the first being that infrastructural development was thrust on ZT in a way which diverted attention from its demonstrated interest in institutional development. Secondly, a lot of money was poured into infrastructural development without assessing the costs of maintenance. Future maintenance of infrastructure may only be possible through the councils, something they may hesitate to undertake if financial costs are high. Because the full costs of activities may not be apparent to local communities, their judgement on activities may be clouded. We observed people, obsessed with infrastructural development, who assessed progress in terms of construction; it is they who made allegations of unfulfilled promises.

Project funding of infrastructure has been appropriate only to the extent that infrastructure was necessary to realise the project's goals. Problems appear to have arisen from the fostering of unrealistic

expectations. Competent technical assessment of proposed physical projects seem not to have been undertaken for all activities. The sustainability of some of the infrastructure after PACD is a matter of concern.

### **PROJECT ORGANISATIONAL ISSUES**

#### **How effective have been the implementing partners as a collective? Have they responded appropriately to the requirements of the project?**

Design of the project required collaboration between four distinct entities: USAID, ZT, CASS, and the DNPWLM. Problems between USAID and its implementing agencies appear to be endemic and to have affected implementation. Each partner is easily capable of reciting a litany of woes about its dealings — financial, bureaucratic, and procedural — with USAID. There also is discomfiture over the area-specific nature of the project, particularly its risk of reinforcing divisions both within the country and within the partner organizations. Lack of a common vision within and between partner organisations has made it difficult for cooperating groups to act as a collective. The differences were particularly marked between field officers and those at headquarters. Difficulties in cooperation were further exacerbated by staff shortages; both CASS and ZT experienced problems resulting from shortage of staff and turnover.

#### **Do implementation problems continue? Might inputs overcome these constraints?**

The Project was designed to unite three implementing and one funding agency in an effort to improve natural resources. This union assumes a management structure which is capable of achieving the Project's outputs and goals. The structure and the relationships which it assumes have not always been evident. These problems, in the field as well as in Harare, and between as well as within agencies, are gradually being overcome.

The monitoring of project implementation is important. ZT has devised a good instrument which, we believe, still requires minor modifications; CASS needs to increase its input into the monitoring process.

The clarification of policies and legislation may resolve some implementation problems. Nevertheless, there are districts where, for practical purposes, many worthwhile decisions originate from below the council level. It is worthwhile to learn from these districts and attempt to replicate their successes.

#### **What are the advantages and disadvantages of increased participation by other agencies, institutions, and ministries?**

There are several advantages of increased participation by other agents. The concept of natural resources management and utilisation extends much broader than the Project's current focus on wildlife. Expanding the project's activities to address additional resources would require the cooperation of other agencies, for example the Forestry Commission; problems stemming from low literacy would require the attention of the Ministry of Education and Culture; political aspects of the Project might be improved were the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development to become more directly involved.

## **Annex E.1**

The participation of additional agencies would help contribute to a more integrated and holistic approach to development; it might even reduce duplication and overlapping of activities. We noticed in our interviews that demands by different donor agencies were causing discomfort in the councils. Cooperation could facilitate a common approach which would also save time. In this way the increased participation of other agencies could also accelerate the pace of the project.

There are disadvantages as well. As the number of participants increase it means different agendas, missions and foci which may dilute the project. Problems of assigning responsibility may also result from enlarging the number of participating groups. From our experiences in the field it would appear the benefits of increasing the participation of other agencies would outweigh the disadvantages.

## NATURAL RESOURCE PLANNING AND POLICY ANALYST

### 1. Introduction

The primary purposes of this annex are:

- a. to report upon institutional arrangements in support of community-based management and use of wildlife and other natural resources, and relevant policies, programmes and legislation; and
- b. to recommend strategies for improving community development and natural resource policy, planning, legislation and regulations to enhance inter-ministerial and inter-organisational cooperation and coordination.

There were 18 individual terms of reference (TORs). Sixteen of them were sorted into eight groups, according to their subject matter, and addressed below in sections 2 to 9 of this annex. The first paragraph of each section cites the individual TOR(s) relevant to that section. TORs 17 and 18 are not reported here because they refer to matters assigned to the Local Government Specialist, who reports upon the issues concerned in another annex. Recommendations under all TORs are assembled in section 10.

The methods used in addressing the TORs were:

- a. Interviews with 23 relevant individuals;
- b. Discussions with team colleagues and Bruce Mead of ULG, Harare; and
- c. Consulting the documents listed in section 11.

Two field visits were made during the 27-day mission: a one-day visit to Bulawayo, and a two-day visit to Plumtree in Bulilima-Mangwe Rural District. Apart from travelling time between the UK and Zimbabwe, the remainder of the mission was spent in Harare.

### 2. Ministerial commitment, communication and cooperation

This section examines commitment to the Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP) at ministerial level; and the state of communication and cooperation with this level and with lower levels — so far as the project is concerned (TOR 1). Linked with TOR 1 is TOR 11, which considers actions that might be taken, during the remaining life of the project, to improve coordination and communication in support of the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE); and strategies that might be followed over the longer term. These are addressed under 'Recommendations' in section 10.

## Annex E.2

The Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) is the ministry most directly involved with the project via its Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM). Officials in the ministry declined to be interviewed by review mission team members, and pointed them to the Director of DNPWLM for information on commitment to NRMP and inter-ministerial communications. Meetings were held, therefore, with the Director and Deputy Director (Management) of the Department, from whom relevant information was obtained.

The Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD), which is responsible for local government institutions, is also interested in the CAMPFIRE movement and NRMP. Although the ministry has not yet taken an active part it is, according to several interviewees and to King (1993), a staunch supporter of CAMPFIRE; and the Provincial Administrator for Matabeleland North has appointed a deputy with responsibilities for CAMPFIRE in that province.

An interview was held with a Deputy Secretary who described how MLGRUD had first entered discussions on community wildlife management in the early 1980s. Officials of the Ministry had visited Gokwe District, together with others from the Ministry of Finance, DNPWLM, and the latter's parent ministry the (then) Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. The aim of the visit was to encourage councillors to enter into a wildlife programme, but they were not persuaded.

After this, DNPWLM continued its efforts — along with the help of Zimbabwe Trust (ZT) and the University of Zimbabwe's Centre for Applied Social Science (CASS). MLGRUD took no part in this continuing initiative but was kept informed of developments. Today, a Deputy Secretary is in regular contact with ZT.

At ministerial level, current communications relating to NRMP take place between MET and MLGRUD in three ways

The first is via meetings of the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG), a forum which discusses issues relevant to CAMPFIRE throughout Zimbabwe. The Group's composition is described below under section 5, which examines the CAMPFIRE Association.

The second channel of communication at ministerial level comes into play when a Rural District Council (RDC) applies for appropriate authority status under the provisions of section 95 of the Parks and Wildlife Act. This section empowers the Minister (for MET) to appoint suitable RDCs as 'appropriate authorities' (for consumptive uses of wildlife) in respect of 'such area of Communal Land as may be specified ...' The Minister may also amend or revoke such appointments.

In order for an RDC to obtain appropriate authority, the following procedures are followed, which involve both ministries.

- a. The RDC submits a project proposal to DNPWLM.

## Annex E.2

- b. DNPWLM representatives visit the district and discuss the application. They look to see whether the RDC has the managerial capacity to manage its wildlife, and whether it has wildlife committees in place. Its overall objective is to discover whether the RDC is capable of sustaining a CAMPFIRE programme.
- c. Based upon the findings of the visit, a DNPWLM committee meets and decides if the RDC's proposal is acceptable. The committee may accept or reject (with reasons) the application. If rejected, the RDC can resubmit it after attending satisfactorily to the points that led to the earlier rejection.
- d. Once accepted, DNPWLM liaises with MLGRUD so as to secure its agreement. If acceptable to MLGRUD, DNPWLM drafts a statutory instrument under the Parks and Wildlife Act, and sends it to its parent ministry for scrutiny and onward transmission to the Attorney General's office.
- g. If approved, the Attorney General's office prepares the final statutory instrument, which is published in the Gazette.

The third channel of communication is used, only rarely, when a dispute arises between an RDC and DNPWLM over some aspect of CAMPFIRE, and MLGRUD is called upon to mediate. This has led some critics to observe that the ministry is only reactive instead of being proactive.

MLGRUD's chief contacts with the project occur at the lower level, where the RDCs are in frequent contact with local members of ZT and DNPWLM, especially the former. ZT's Bulawayo office and its Area Managers liaise as a matter of routine with representatives of the Provincial Governor and Administrator, and the RDC's Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Executive Officers (EOs). Contact is constant, and the two work together (in the words of one CEO) 'like brother and sister'. Within this relationship, the RDC's job is that of overseeing the use of resources, while ZT serves as the catalyst and go-between linking USAID with the RDC. Apart from USAID involvement, this relationship pre-dates NRMP, having been active since the early days of community mobilisation in about 1988. There have been little or no institutional problems; and those that have arisen have generally been due to personality differences.

ZT believes, however, that some local government officials at RDC level, while giving overt support to CAMPFIRE, see it as a force with the potential to undermine their authority. By attempting to foster awareness of natural resource values in producer communities, and by encouraging expectations of reaping financial rewards from managing these resources, some district councillors and their officials perceive the Trust and the project as rabble-rousers, exhorting the people to rise against them.

MLGRUD's contacts with DNPWLM at the lower or field levels are chiefly through

- a. Application by RDCs for 'appropriate authority' status (see also above),

- b. Training of community scouts or community workers,
- c. Provision of technical advice — especially on monitoring and exploiting wildlife, and
- d. Assistance with problem animal control (PAC).

The main lines of communication are with the Senior Ecologist in Bulawayo, the Provincial Warden at Hwange and other departmental staff in the field. RDCs believe that they need the Department's continued support because (on their admission) they do not yet have sufficient capability to carry out all aspects of management. On the other hand, the Department's resources are limited so that, for example, although the Department sends its skilled hunters to carry out PAC, the RDCs provide transport and subsistence allowances.

One area in which contact occurs each year between the RDCs and DNPWLM is for the setting of annual game animal off-take quotas. Provisional quotas are first set by ward committees, often with the help of council officials, community scouts and local DNPWLM personnel. Eventually they are passed to the Department for approval; but if the Department has reservations about the quotas, some negotiation ensues.

Two other ministries have marginal connections with NRMP.

- a. Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development (MLAWD), which links in through its extension services to people living in communal lands.
- b. Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Cooperatives Development (MNAECCD), especially in respect of women's participation.

At lower than ministerial levels, some communication and cooperation occurs at field level between DNPWLM (and its project implementing partners — CASS and ZT) and departments of the other ministries listed above.

Inter-ministerial communication at both levels was reported to be satisfactory. Commitment to NRMP is high in MET, although the project involves only one of its departments; and MLGRUD is a less involved but committed backer. As the CAMPFIRE movement expands to include natural resources other than those currently defined as 'wild life', other ministries will play a more than marginal role. In particular, if grazing becomes a natural resource within the scope of CAMPFIRE, closer cooperation will be needed with MLAWD; and, if minerals are to be added, the Ministry of Mines must be involved. Two other organisations within MET must also enter the arena in due course — the Forestry Commission and the Department of Natural Resources. (This topic is elaborated under section 6 below.)

During interviews, it was suggested by a ZT spokesman that the Ministry of Education (ME) should have been involved at the start of CAMPFIRE but was not: and that its

presence and input have thus been missing from NRMP. Volume II 'Country-specific project descriptions', dated 18 August 1989, states (on p4) that the project address several issues in the field of education and training, including, 'The integration of conservation issues into the existing primary and secondary school curriculum'.

In this context ZT reported that, earlier in 1993, an accordance was reached between it and ME on the introduction of wildlife into the agriculture section of the schools' curriculum: but, for the time being, the ministry was unable to take action due to lack of funds.

A contrary view on education expressed by DNPWLM was that CAMPFIRE should not get involved with long-term education, but should concentrate upon training community scouts and fostering local management capability.

Ways in which other ministries may be drawn into the CAMPFIRE movement are considered below under sections 6 and 9.

### **3. Coordination between USAID and the implementing partners**

This section considers the degree to which USAID has become more flexible in its approach to project implementation in support of the project's ostensibly 'bottom-up' orientation, as a result of recommendations made in the interim assessment (TOR 3); at ways of simplifying procedures (TOR 4); and actions that could be taken to improve communication and coordination, financially and administratively, with DNPWLM (TOR 5).

#### **'TOP-DOWN' OR 'BOTTOM-UP'?**

'NRMP in Matabeleland appears to be more of a top-down, district-wide, comprehensive programme than in other areas of Zimbabwe (which have) a more focused village/ward level orientation.' (King, 1993).

Most persons interviewed agreed with this statement. NRMP, they believe, is implemented in a more 'top-down' manner than CAMPFIRE programmes outside of Matabeleland. NRMP is said to be excessively devoted to the construction of water points, fences and other physical infrastructure; and less with institution building or wildlife management.

That this should be so is hardly occasion for surprise. Given the presence of a single large donor and a project that is being initiated simultaneously in four districts spread across a vast tract of land, the project could hardly be otherwise. The way in which NRMP was designed and structured inevitably make it 'project-driven'.

The three implementing partners accuse USAID of being inflexible, to the detriment of the project. But USAID argues that it strives to be as flexible as possible within the rules'

system to which it must adhere; and that it responds to the needs and wishes of the implementing partners, who are committed to a 'bottom-up' approach to development. USAID's support grants, given to ZT and CASS to cover operating costs, are consciously administered so as to allow scope for adaptive management — but within USAID's administrative constraints. And where the implementing partners have asked for expenditure to be varied, USAID has tried to comply: for example, funds intended for training research scientists were diverted to pilot training, at the request of DNPWLM. Sometimes, however, the flexibility sought by the implementers fails to materialise, or at least not rapidly enough. DNPWLM are convinced, for example, that had USAID been more flexible in giving emergency support earlier in 1993, when the Department was suffering severe financial deprivation, the catastrophic loss of rhinos in Hwange National Park might have been averted.

In spite of these criticisms progress has been made, although some argue not enough and in the wrong direction. People involved point to successes — not only physical infrastructure but also institution building; increased local awareness of the value of natural resources; increased vigilance on the part of producer communities; reduced poaching; increased numbers of game animals; and increased revenues from community wildlife management.

Less desirable, however, is the relative separation of the four districts in the NRMP target area from the rest of the CAMPFIRE movement. The project has its own funding and its own round of workshops, and the four districts have become locked into an 'incestuous' relationship. DNPWLM's CAMPFIRE Coordinating Unit (CCU) observed, for example, that Binga should be meeting and exchanging ideas with Gokwe and Nyaminyami — two districts outside the NRMP target area but with which Binga has more in common than it does with Hwange or Tsholotsho. However, even the Department's own guidelines militate against its CCU's greater involvement with NRMP. One of the Unit's responsibilities in fostering the growth and spread of community wildlife management is, 'to assist in grass-roots implementation in those areas neglected by donors' (King, 1993, quoting from a departmental report). The Unit is small, it operates on a tiny budget and has to set its priorities prudently. As the districts in NRMP are far from being neglected by donors, it is not surprising that CCU has had little contact with them — a factor that exacerbates their isolation.

Some of the early, experienced champions of CAMPFIRE may adopt the view that Matabeleland is well provided through USAID funding, and that the province does not need additional support. King (1993) suggests that this aspect of isolation may have been reinforced by inter-tribal suspicions between Matabele and Shona peoples.

Whether or not the 'project-driven', isolated NRMP has produced 'better' results than CAMPFIRE elsewhere is debatable. DNPWLM inclines to the view that it has not. So does CASS. But the comparison is a difficult one to make. Binga is one of the best districts in the country — second only to Nyaminyami in terms of revenue earned during 1992. In contrast, Hwange is one of the worst — earning the least revenue of all CAMPFIRE

districts in the same year. There are other variables to consider, apart from whether a district is within or outside of NRMP: for example, the relative richness of local wildlife resources, geographical and demographical characteristics, not to mention political and institutional variables.

Finally, perhaps one indicator of success and progress is the widespread support that the project now enjoys in Matabeleland, from individuals to influential regional agencies. 'It seems no longer to be in anyone's interest openly to oppose CAMPFIRE and most recognise that the program is supported by central government', (King, 1993). Only one or two Members of Parliament (MPs) are reported by ZT's Area Managers and RDC executives to be dissenters from this general view. (See also section 8.)

### ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

In their interim project assessment, Hitchcock and Nangati (1992) noted fundamental differences and considerable tensions between USAID and the three implementing partners, and observed that these accounted for the project's major problems. They arose from problems in management and administration, and from inadequate communications.

The implementing partners discovered that USAID's accounting requirements were more time-consuming than they had imagined, and found that they were administered in what seemed to them to be a rigidly-interpreted manner. USAID, of course, has procedural rules that it must follow, and cannot abandon them to suit the wishes of individual aid recipients. Acceptance of USAID grants places upon recipients a duty to keep financial records in accordance with the donor's requirements; and these are subject to scrutiny by auditors who are registered with USAID. Provision of goods and services also demands that laid down procurement procedures be followed.

It was clear to Hitchcock and Nangati (1992) that, at the start of NRMP, DNPWLM in particular had not been fully aware of the complexities of USAID's financial and procurement systems, or of the demands that participation in the project would make of the Department. Subsequently, the Department found itself becoming increasingly disenchanted with USAID. There were (its officers reported) delays in procurement of equipment and the items that arrived were, sometimes, not those that had been ordered. This, DNPWLM claimed, adversely affected project activities such as vegetation monitoring and environmental education extension work. Furthermore, the Department found that it was incurring expenditure for which it was not going to be reimbursed by USAID because (in its opinion) supporting documentation was inadequate or because the expenditure was not approved in advance.

All three implementing partners reported that USAID's queries on expenditure were often raised long after the expenses had been incurred. In some cases, expenses were reimbursed and later questioned. The partners complained that USAID procedures had not been explained fully to them.

## Annex E.2

From the USAID perspective, it seemed that the implementing partners were disregarding guidelines; advance approvals for expenditure were not being sought; and some activities were being undertaken without proper justification.

These circumstances smack of the irresistible force meeting with the immovable object. On one side, the highly organised and bureaucratic USAID, used to handling tens of millions of dollars; and, on the other, relatively small and administratively inexperienced agencies. It would be unjust to apportion blame, but some accommodation has to be reached if they are to work in harmony.

In an attempt to ameliorate these difficulties, Hitchcock and Nangati (1992) recommended several actions. In brief, these actions were as follows:

- a. An initial meeting of USAID and DNPWLM to discuss the problems that had arisen between them; subsequent meetings of USAID and the other two implementing agencies (CASS and ZT); and a seminar on project procedures and management, to be attended by the three implementing agencies.
- b. Appointment of a project coordinator/administrator, to form a single channel of communication between USAID and the implementing agencies. This person would be located in DNPWLM.
- c. Greater flexibility within USAID so far as definitions of terms such as 'project-related activities' and 'appropriate cost' were concerned; and meetings of USAID and the implementing agencies to work out in detail the procedures whereby cost allocations are made, to ensure that relevant USAID circulars are available to the partners, and that the requirements prescribed in these circulars are fully understood by the partners.
- d. Assistance from USAID to ensure that the implementing partners are prepared for audits required under US government regulations; steps taken to assist CASS to resolve its accounting issues prior to audits; and thought given to ways of reducing the heavy administrative burdens imposed by audits on the implementing agencies and the auditors.

The mid-term review mission found that the extent to which these recommendations have been implemented are as follows.

- a. A meeting was held by USAID and DNPWLM during the period between the interim assessment and the mid-term review mission. Other meetings were held between USAID and ZT's financial staff, and with financial personnel in CASS. A week-long seminar was mounted, for selected officers from the implementing partners, on project accounting procedures. The seminar was rated a success by USAID and the three implementing partners.

- b. USAID approved the recommendation that a project coordinator be located in DNPWLM, and reported that funds are available to support it. At the time of the mid-term review mission, team members were told that the post had been advertised within DNPWLM.
- c. During the mid-term assessment interviews, USAID pointed out that it has no powers to vary or abandon the rules of procedure under which it operates, although it can exercise limited flexibility in interpreting terms such as 'project-related activity' and 'appropriate cost'.

According to USAID, the degree of trauma caused by audits varied from one implementing partner to the other but that this has been resolved, largely through the experience of undergoing audits. However, in spite of Hitchcock and Nangati's (1992) recommendations, and the steps subsequently taken to comply with them, tensions persist.

#### ZIMBABWE TRUST

In ZT's opinion, the demands made by USAID have been the most difficult obstacle that the Trust has faced in implementing its role in NRMP. And this the Trust still maintains, 17 months after the interim assessment report was written.

At the time of the mid-term review mission, USAID reported that ZT was up-to-date in its ability to comply with mandated procedures, and had recently submitted its vouchers in a more timely manner. ZT agrees that it is now clear on procedures and definitions, and that business has been running fairly smoothly for the past few months; but, nevertheless, major difficulties remain.

When the project agreement was first signed, ZT believed that it had the managerial capacity to handle the administrative work load, for it had participated in similar projects financed by other donors. It soon discovered, however, that USAID's requirements were more demanding, and that an inordinate amount of time had to be devoted to fulfilling them — to the detriment of the Trust's other responsibilities and (most important) to its ability to play its part in NRMP. The amount of time spent on office procedures proved to be about equal to that spent on field work: and USAID's financial, managerial and reporting requirements called for full-time managers in both the Harare and Bulawayo offices. Furthermore, working on the project undermined ZT's own organisational integrity, for USAID accounting requirements run contrary to those of ZT. Vehicle log books have had to be changed to comply with USAID demands, and new rules laid down to cover the use of vehicles and per diem payments. USAID will not accept ZT's own auditors, as do other donors. A dichotomy has occurred within ZT, which has led to internal stresses and ill-feeling between those of its personnel engaged upon NRMP and those working on other operations. The Bulawayo staff (on NRMP) operate under different conditions of service from other ZT staff, and the latter perceive their colleagues to be favoured in terms of the number of workshops they attend and their access to vehicles and computers. On the other hand, those with access to project vehicles express irritation at USAID constraints that do

## Annex E.2

not allow them to use these vehicles for travel outside the project area, even to attend to what appear to be project-related duties — for example, participation in workshops. Their colleagues on non-NRMP duties are allowed greater leeway. This internal division is a result of the Trust's participation in NRMP.

According to USAID there remain outstanding ZT vouchers totalling US\$90,000, which have been disallowed for being used on non-project activities.

Further complications continue to occur between USAID and ZT, the latter having had expenditure requests totalling over Z\$1.13 million rejected during November 1993 because of reported non-compliance with environmental assessment requirements. ZT has disputed this, however, and it appears that some (although not all) of the requests will now be met by USAID. It seems that this hitch stems from lack of understanding over the provisions for environmental assessments in the Project Proposal caused by inadequate advice on the subject in the Grant Agreement.

During February or March, 1994, ZT will review its role in the project area so as to plan a programme of future work. The plan will be based largely upon community recommendations. Although its grant agreement with USAID expires on 15 September 1994, ZT told the review mission that it will retain its personnel in the project area until the end of that year. So far as a proposed Phase Two of NRMP is concerned, ZT is determined to continue working with the CAMPFIRE movement, irrespective of USAID involvement. If USAID wants to assist the programme that ZT agrees with district councils, ZT will not object provided that this can be done without disrupting its internal integrity. The Trust has also expressed its reluctance to continue in the role of intermediary between USAID and RDCs. It believes that the RDCs are capable of handling direct grant support from donors.

With respect to the last issue, RDC personnel were asked to express their views on the subject of having ZT or any other NGO as an intermediary between RDCs and a donor. Three out of four districts expressed a preference for an intermediary because, they said, it saves RDCs the time and trouble of arranging tenders and overseeing construction. Those who thought otherwise did so because they believed that to work without an intermediary was faster and less complicated.

## CENTRE FOR APPLIED SOCIAL STUDIES

CASS's problems are equally burdensome. USAID reported that the Centre submits vouchers for reimbursement after intolerably long delays. In some cases, vouchers have been submitted two years after expenditure was incurred. The root of this failure to comply with USAID procedures is reported to lie not in CASS itself but in the bursar's office of the University of Zimbabwe. Delays traceable to that source have also been compounded by the bursar having been off duty for six months, and unwillingness or inability on the part of those deputising for her to fulfil all of her functions.

In spite of these problems, some progress was made and CASS's accounts had appeared to be ready for auditing in mid-1993. However, arrival of the auditors coincided with a series of strikes by non-academic personnel at the university, which included members of the bursar's office. Because of this, the auditors were unable to get access to all the records that they needed — an obstacle that affected other donors as well.

The mid-term review mission was told by CASS that, as a result of its experiences of working in NRMP, it would not be prepared to go into a Phase Two under the same conditions as apply now. The NRMP is not critical to it, and participation in it has dislocated CASS's functioning. This would not necessarily mean that CASS become inactive in the four Project districts: CASS has a mandate from the DNPWLM for socio-economic and monitoring research activities on CAMPFIRE nationally and will continue to carry out this function whatever the funding sources may be.

## DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL PARKS AND WILD LIFE MANAGEMENT

Being a government department, DNPWLM cannot receive direct grants from USAID. Instead the donor provides it with goods and services. As a result of its discussions with USAID officers, following the interim assessment report, and the subsequent seminar, the Department believes that it understands and can cope with USAID's requirements. The Department's chief concern about its participation in NRMP now is that the scope of the project is too narrow.

The Department and its two implementing partners regard NRMP as a component within the nationwide CAMPFIRE initiative. By funding operations in the four districts of the project target area, USAID has enabled DNPWLM to divert to other areas funds that would otherwise have been used in those districts. In this respect, the existence of the project has helped strengthen the Department.

In the early planning stages of the project, DNPWLM had hoped that the project would support departmental operations as a whole by including total national park management within its remit. The rationale for this is that the parks harbour the core resources upon which wildlife management in adjacent communal lands depend — the two being interlinked ecologically. However, USAID was unwilling to support so wide a mandate

over so broad a geographical area. Instead, it agreed to cover selected management activities in all areas of the wildlife estate (national parks and safari areas) within the target area. These activities were

- animal population and habitat survey and analysis,
- law enforcement against poaching,
- culling, and
- capture and translocation.

But it would not support water supplies for wild animals, road works, tourism activities or any of the basic administrative functions. Neither would it purchase arms or ammunition, nor would it sanction the use of aircraft, purchased for aerial survey work, on anti-poaching exercises.

When NRMP was being designed, DNPWLM hoped that it would support CAMPFIRE rather than be an independent project. However, in hindsight, it would be ingenuous to expect USAID to foot the bill for all of DNPWLM's operations in Matabeleland. As King (1993) put it, 'USAID is a very territorial organisation ... it wanted to take credit for ... the impact of its funding. No (donor) organisation gives general institutional support'. From this grew the misunderstanding and tensions that were later recorded by Hitchcock and Nangati (1992).

If the project is to enter a Phase Two stage, DNPWLM will press for it to be widened so as to support all departmental activities in Matabeleland North. However, it seems unlikely, at this stage, that USAID would agree to such a broadly based request.

#### **4. Effectiveness and efficiency of the three operating partners**

The three operating partners in the NRMP target area are DNPWLM, CASS and ZT. This section considers their effectiveness and efficiency as a collective in the target area, and the extent to which they have responded appropriately within the context of the project (TOR 2).

Difficulties that the implementing partners experienced in dealing with USAID, or as a result of having participated in NRMP, have been described and discussed above. This section explores the relationships between the three partners as they went about their duties in the field.

Some remarks made to the mid-term review team lead one to express surprise that the project ever achieved any measure of collective success. Here are some samples, mostly anonymous.

- The project was designed by one set of people in Harare and handed to another group in Bulawayo to implement. This ensured inconsistency from the start.

## Annex E.2

- The only field work carried out before the project implementation document was drawn up, was one field visit to each of the (then) two districts. All subsequent preparatory work was done in Harare.
- The start-up time of the project was inordinately long because of almost non-existent administration, due to accidents and other unavoidable problems. There was an 18-month period during which the Project Officer's post was unfilled.
- The partners had different objectives from the start. In spite of its CAMPFIRE initiative, DNPWLM is still imbued with a parks and preservation philosophy. Its primary goal is to conserve game animals, and community-based management is no more than a ploy to achieve that. ZT has no interest in wild animals: its objectives are to raise living standards for people in communal lands. CASS is an academic body interested only in research for its own sake and for the furtherance of researchers' reputations and careers.

Finally, from King (1993);

‘In terms of project design, it appears as though USAID were hedging their bets in NRMP by designing a dual-purpose project — to support CAMPFIRE and community development, but in case that didn't succeed in preserving biodiversity, supporting DNPWLM's traditional role as well. This dual role may have undermined the project.’

These remarks, gleaned from several sources, suggest a precarious basis on which to anchor an effective collaborative partnership; but, in spite of them, relationships between the partners prospered and improved with time. In a recent examination of the project, King (1993) records that:

‘The pace has been slow and uneven with many setbacks... but the mood of the project is more positive than it was a year ago... This is due in part to the commitment, talent and tenacity of the project implementors and participants...’

and again:

‘NRMP has weathered many storms, often related to the process of initiation in a difficult climate. The project appears to have settled in and gained widespread acceptance. Participants have "embraced criticism", learned and changed. Adaptability, and the willingness to incur scars through risk-taking, experimentation and innovation, have been critical to that robustness, sustainability and progress of the project.’

Whatever interviewees' ideas may be as to the hidden motives of the implementing partners, there is little doubt that the partners' professional interests and perspectives vary

## Annex E.2

markedly from one to the other. DNPWLM's professional wildlife managers come from a protected areas' background that traditionally gave law enforcement high priority. In only relatively recent times have managers recognised that this focus fails to take into account the realities of life for those who live near parks and reserves, and that protection of these areas is becoming increasingly untenable.

Throughout eastern and southern Africa the scenario has been the same — dwindling resources being guarded within protected areas that are becoming islands of wild land in a rising and menacing sea of humanity. It is entirely understandable if wildlife managers see in CAMPFIRE a means of achieving goals and objectives that are unattainable using traditional fortress techniques.

ZT's professionals approach CAMPFIRE from an altogether different direction. For them it is a strategy to combat poverty and provide a better standard of living for rural communities. The fact that the strategy may also help conserve game animals may not be important *per se*, although the survival of these animals is clearly an essential prerequisite for success of the strategy.

CASS's social scientists have yet other perspectives. CAMPFIRE and NRMP provide opportunities for testing hypotheses concerning community management of natural resources, common property regimes and community dynamics. For them, whether or not the project reaches its goals and objectives may be less important than recording and analysing success or failure.

Thus, successful implementation of NRMP required that three very different interest groups worked together effectively and in a coordinated manner, keeping the specific purpose of the project firmly in sight. It is a tribute to their commitment and determination that they have managed to do so with little serious conflict and with mounting success, in spite of the fact that inter-organisational contacts have been patchy.

Greatest contact between the implementing partners is that involving DNPWLM and ZT. At the Harare level, ZT liaises with the Department's CCU, although this communication is concerned with community wildlife programmes throughout Zimbabwe. At the Bulawayo level, the local ZT Manager and the Department's Senior Ecologist occupy the same office block and are in regular contact. CASS's infrequent presence in the target area, and its essentially research role, precludes much contact with the other two organisations. The roles of the three partners in NRMP are examined and discussed below.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL PARKS AND WILD LIFE MANAGEMENT

DNPWLM is the project's lead agency, and its responsibilities relate to conservation of the wildlife resource such as training community scouts (or community workers, as they are also known), and monitoring wild animal populations and habitats. Participation in NRMP coincided with a difficult time for the Department, during which it went through a restructuring process that incurred a loss of 250 junior posts.

A common criticism made or implied by its partners was that no officer appeared to represent the Department as a whole in the target area. Responsibility for NRMP was, in fact, given to an Assistant Director in Harare; but NRMP was only one of his duties, and his presence was not felt in the field. A Senior Ecologist, based in ZT's office in Bulawayo, lacked delegated authority to represent the Department except on routine matters; and the implementing partners perceived him to be a representative not of the Department as a whole but only of its Research Division. Similarly, the Provincial Wardens were recognised as representing only the Department's Management Division.

One of the Department's responsibilities was to train up to 100 community scouts; but there were long delays in getting this programme off the ground although the Department now reports that it is going well. Delays in the arrival of project aircraft and other equipment, delayed monitoring work.

The Department's recent stand on problem animal control (PAC) in districts that have approved authority status did not win its partners' fullest approval. Some thought it premature because RDCs are not ready to handle this problem; one characterised it as an example of an agency trying to rid itself of a problem by throwing it into another's lap.

The stand on PAC took the form of, 'An open letter from the Director to all District Councils with Appropriate Authority for wildlife', dated 19 July 1993. It stated unequivocally that problem animals in districts that had appropriate authority status was the responsibility of those districts. 'By accepting the authority for wildlife in your districts,' read one section, 'you took on the problems that would go hand-in-hand with the benefits.' There is logic here because, under the procedures for awarding appropriate authority status described above, RDCs have to prove to the Department's satisfaction that they are competent — and this should include the capacity to carry out or arrange for PAC. However, as the Department admits that it sometimes 'bends the rules' when approving applications for appropriate authority, it is not surprising if some districts find that they are unable to cope with this particular problem.

In reality the Department is not so strict as the open letter suggests. Its Scouts do answer requests to deal with problem animals, although the RDCs usually provide transport and pay their subsistence. And the letter was sent out partly to discourage requests for PAC that recur in a curiously seasonal pattern shortly before the Christmas and Independence holidays.

The same letter also stresses that the DNPWLM no longer sets district quotas for hunting but, rather, approves those that the district itself sets. This strikes some members of implementing partners as being a bit rich, for the Department has only to disapprove a quota if it finds it unacceptable. The dividing line between 'setting' and 'approving' is a narrow one.

But the latter are relatively minor issues, and the two other implementing partners and the RDCs work for the most part in harmony with DNPWLM.

### ZIMBABWE TRUST

ZT's role, among other tasks, involves institution building and monitoring progress. The latter function is fulfilled through what the Trust calls process-oriented monitoring, carried out at six-monthly intervals, in which information is gathered on how well institutions (district councils, WADCOS, VIDCOS, and wildlife committees) are developing. Unfortunately, the monitoring programme was only started two years into the project, and all concerned with the project (including ZT) recognise that it would have been better to have introduced this at the start of the NRMP.

ZT maintains a constant presence in the target area through its four Area Managers (one to each district). Because of this, because of DNPWLM's weakness on the ground (see above) and because of criticisms levelled at CASS (see below), the project has tended to become identified locally with ZT.

ZT was involved with CAMPFIRE from its early days, and came into NRMP because of its commitment to that programme. The Trust sees NRMP as a component of CAMPFIRE — a view shared by all three partners. Its principles and objectives are those the CAMPFIRE movement. NRMP is CAMPFIRE in the target area, and ZT views them as one and the same thing.

To ZT, NRMP is a human survival strategy that has two objectives:

- (1) To achieve socially sound land use as a form of community development.
- (2) To achieve sustainable community practices, although the Trust admits that this is a tall order to accomplish in the five-year life of the project.

ZT tries to avoid going into areas and setting up institutions. Its approach is to discover the needs of communities and the means to satisfy them, by encouraging them to decide what they require. It is a community's decision whether it wants a CAMPFIRE committee, and the relationship that this will have to its WADCOS and VIDCOS. The Trust then builds on this by providing assistance.

One criticism levelled at the Trust is that it instructs its Area Managers to support RDCs and foster expectations in rural communities. However, higher expectations in rural communities may irritate the RDCs, and it is arguable that the two instructions are incompatible — which introduces a built-in inconsistency to the project. According to CASS, this phenomenon manifests itself cyclically in all four districts, and has not become a permanent obstacle to progress in any one of them.

### CENTRE FOR APPLIED SOCIAL STUDIES.

CASS's chief role is research, and its approach has been four-pronged. The relative successes of its studies described below are based upon CASS's own judgment:

- (1) Socio-economic surveys, to provide baseline data, in the most important wards of all four districts in the target area. The field work has been completed and the data computerised. The Centre has been criticised by its partners for not producing the results of these surveys in readable form. However, work has begun, and some printed data are now available.
- (2) Studies of critical institutional issues, such as the role of livestock husbandry in Bulilima-Mangwe district; internal human migration in and out of the target area; and communal land tourism as an indicator of success. This role has been bedeviled by ill-fortune — especially difficulty in filling fellowship posts with suitable applicants. Success to date is rated about fifty per cent.
- (3) Problem solving, as circumstances arise, such as the introduction of fencing in northern Tsholotsho district. This role has been carried out successfully.
- (4) Institutional monitoring, designed to complement rather than overlap with ZT's monitoring programme. It seeks to record changes over time, and is proceeding successfully.

Although some aspects of CASS's research have gone well, common criticisms expressed by its partners is that it did not appear until two years into the life of the project and that, since then, its presence in the project area has been slight. The Centre accepts these as valid criticisms and realises, in hindsight, that the vacuum should have been filled by the appointment of a senior professional to the target area.

### FORMAL COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

The Project Implementation Committee (PIC) should provide the main forum for coordination between the three partners and USAID, but fails to do so. It meets every six months in Harare, and the general impression is that it merely looks at progress made to date and tables work plans that have been prepared in advance by each agency. Reporting has taken the place of management. Furthermore, by meeting in Harare, the PIC gives the

impression not only of failing to fulfil a coordinating function but also of being divorced from the project.

Neither has the CCG provided an alternative forum. King (1993) postulates that the Group may have assumed that Matabeleland was taken care of by NRMP, or that the project could somehow be managed through the independent actions of each implementing partner.

DNPWLM thought that six-monthly intervals between PIC meetings were acceptable but that the responsibilities of the committee should be more rigorously defined and followed, so that it functioned as an effective coordinating body. A parallel was drawn between PIC and a SADC fisheries committee, upon which the Department also sits. In the latter committee, work plans and budgets are prepared in advance and distributed to members so that they may peruse them critically. Members then come to meetings better prepared to discuss and criticise before deciding whether to approve them.

ZT's view was that meetings of the PIC ought to be at three-monthly intervals, and include two or three representatives from each of the four districts in the target area in addition to the implementing partners. The Trust would like to see meetings held in the field, rotating the venue between the four districts.

There is also a Project Steering Committee (PSC) that last met on May 1992 for coordinating the operations of the three partners only. Its usefulness was limited, chiefly because DNPWLM was under pressure from other directions — especially from the heightened activity of rhino and elephant poachers.

There was a form of conference called the CAMPFIRE Forum, which included the implementing partners and district councils but met only once. Convened as an exercise in constructive evaluation and self-criticism, CASS was commended by the participants for the way in which it exposed its performance for judgement; other Collaborative Group partners were also asked to do the same thing in the future.

An overall impression gained from discussions with members of all three implementing partners is that NRMP has never enjoyed that level of formal collaboration needed to fashion an effective and efficient implementation team — one which is able to identify problems and suggest remedies. The reason for this stems from the fact that a management approach was never worked out and set up in the first place; and the three partners have, perforce, operated on an informal basis. As King (1993) wrote:

'The lack of an on-going planning, monitoring and management framework for NRMP has been arguably the biggest failing of inter-organisational collaboration in the project'.

On the other hand, informal communication between the three partners has evolved as the project developed, and the project has developed a more positive air of confidence, although gaps still exist. King (1993) identified these gaps in coordination as lying at the

`diffuse middle level' that should link the implementing partners' headquarters with their field operations; and horizontally between individuals and agencies who are not necessarily located in the same geographical areas.

## **5. The CAMPFIRE Association**

This section examines the CAMPFIRE Association: its responsibilities and whether they are appropriate and manageable (TOR 6); its relationship to the four districts under NRMP and the benefits that the districts receive from membership (TOR 7); additional roles that it might play in resolving conflicts and promoting CAMPFIRE objectives, and the resources required from donors (TOR 8); and the legal status of the Association, and actions that may be necessary if it were to receive grant support from USAID (TOR 9).

### **STATUS**

The CAMPFIRE Association was founded in 1989, after the first two districts (Guruve and Nyaminyami) were granted appropriate authority to manage their natural resources. Its first annual general meeting was held in May 1991. The initial stimulus to form an association grew from a wish on the part of a few interested councils to take a stand on the issue of ivory marketing, which was about to be discussed at the 1989 CITES meeting in Lausanne.

The association serves as a producer association composed of RDCs who have received appropriate authority status under section 95 of the Parks and Wildlife Act, or whose applications for this status are under consideration. It has a formally drawn-up constitution.

At present there are 22 members, four of them from the NRMP target area — Binga, Hwange, Tsholotsho and Bulilima-Mangwe RDCs. In October, 1993, the association became a non-governmental organisation member of the World Conservation Union (IUCN). And on 1 November 1993, it applied to be registered as a Welfare Organisation under the Welfare Organisation Act of 1966. Once this registration is approved the association will be eligible to receive grants directly from funding agencies such as USAID.

There is a board of management, all chairmen of RDCs, comprising:

- the Chairman;
- two Vice-chairmen; and
- nine members.

The current Chairman, Mr Chafasuka, is also an MP.

### **RESOURCES**

The executive staff occupies an office in Harare and comprise

- the Chief Executive Officer,
- an Administrator/Treasurer/Secretary,
- a Filing Clerk,
- a Typist, and
- an Office Orderly.

The current Chief Executive Officer is Mr. T.N. Maveneke.

In addition to these, a Communications and Information Officer, supported by ZT, works full-time with the Association.

The Association has two vehicles, a Toyota Landcruiser and an Isuzu, the latter being used by the Communications and Information Officer.

Financial resources come from two main sources:

- (1) Half the running costs are met by the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA), the grant being routed via ZT. The latter is the only outside body to attend the Association's otherwise closed board meetings.
- (2) Each member council pays an annual levy of 2 per cent of its gross earnings from CAMPFIRE activities. This amounted to over Z\$70,000 in 1992.

#### **RESPONSIBILITIES**

The Association's responsibilities are as follows:

- (1) Lobbying government departments on matters that are of concern to its members and the residents of their districts; and establishing and fostering linkages between them and relevant government ministries and departments.
- (2) Providing an advocacy service for communities within the member council districts.
- (3) Promoting environmental conservation and sustainable development, and fostering a unified national approach to this. At present (the Association claims), relevant government organisations tend to operate in relative isolation (e.g., DNPWLM, Forestry Commission, Department of Natural Resources and Ministry of Mines.)

- (4) The dissemination of information about CAMPFIRE and associated matters. This is done chiefly through its monthly publication 'CAMPFIRE Newsletter', which is sent to members, numerous NGOs and foreign embassies, and to many organisations outside Zimbabwe.
- (5) Engaging in relevant participatory applied research, and the documentation of natural resources in communal areas. This is done in association with other interested parties e.g., members of the CCG (see below).
- (6) Chairing the CCG, which is composed of:
  - Members of the CAMPFIRE Association;
  - DNPWLM;
  - ZT;
  - CASS;
  - WWF;
  - African Resources Trust (ART), which acts as the Group's information wing; and
  - MLGRUD.
- (7) Identifying other organisations associated with, or interested in, the CAMPFIRE movement, and directing enquiries in the appropriate directions.
- (8) Identifying training needs and locating sources of training and funding.
- (9) Providing marketing advisory services for its members — for example, by holding directories of tourism and safari companies; keeping members informed as to the legitimacy and reliability of these companies, and advising members how to negotiate with them; and advising on ways of investing money earned through CAMPFIRE activities.
- (10) Running awareness training workshops, the aim of which is institution building and training of local communities so that they may make informed decisions on project identification, design, implementation and evaluation. To start with, the Association concentrated upon training members of WADCOs and VIDCOs; but it now recognises that, in future, it will also have to extend training to RDCs. This, it believes, is the critical level to train if full local managerial capacity for wildlife and other natural resources is to be attained.

All of these functions are appropriate to the ultimate success of CAMPFIRE and, therefore, of NRMP. The Association is, however, hard stretched to cover all of these responsibilities, and the capacity of its financial accounting system is low at present.

#### RELATIONSHIPS TO DISTRICTS IN THE NRMP TARGET AREA

## Annex E.2

The Association's relationships to the four districts in the NRMP target area are no different in kind from those that it has with its other member districts, and the benefits that the members receive (if any) will be similar. However, from 1992 on, the Association has been involved in project evaluations, and its CEO was facilitator at the CASS review.

The benefits of Association membership received by the districts appear, from RDCs' perspectives, to be slight or non-existent, at least at present. Some local government officials reported that the only benefits yet to come from their RDCs' membership was the exchange of information provided by the monthly newsletter and the opportunity it gave for circulating ideas. Some voiced displeasure with the 2 per cent levy paid to the Association, on the grounds that they got little or nothing in return. However, many officials accepted that there are potential benefits, which may become manifest with time. The fact that the Association had been asking its members to submit projects for which it would try to secure funding was a positive step.

From the Association's perspective, its benefits to date may have been intangible but (in its own estimation) are none the less important for that. The CEO cited four benefits:

- (1) International contacts, the benefits of which, although not immediately obvious, filter down to producer communities. For example, the Association's role at CITES meetings in pressing for the marketing of elephant by-products.
- (2) The dissemination and exchange of information through its own newsletter and other media.
- (3) Its role in arranging training facilities. For example, it secured funding for an SEO from Cheredzi district (not in the target area) to attend a tanning course in Canada so that he could return to his district and pass on his newly-acquired skills. The aim of this was to boost the growth of small scale local industries using the by-products of wild animals. Another example was the Association's part (in conjunction with the IUCN) in organising six-week training courses in 'the environment and social sciences'.
- (4) The Association's constant pressure to ensure that as high a proportion as possible of the money earned from CAMPFIRE activities is kept out of the hands of RDCs and goes to the producer communities is of direct benefit to those communities.

## ADDITIONAL ROLES

Suggestions have been made that the Association should become the lead agency in the NRMP, but most outsiders think this undesirable at this stage, and unlikely. And it was unclear whether this was a suggestion for immediate action or for a possible Phase Two of the project.

The Association is unbalanced in so far as it is dominated by its CEO, while its board of RDC councillors lack the confidence and technical knowledge to give it direction. At present, the CEO is not receiving the degree of guidance that the board should be giving, and is not being held accountable to it. A wider role for the Association in NRMP or in CAMPFIRE in general seems unlikely until its board adopts a stronger position: and, at present, the Association lacks the managerial capacity to play an implementing role in the project.

However, the Association has plans to develop its capacity to elaborate its present functions and add others. Firstly, it aims to expand the perceived benefits to members described above, and make them more tangible. It plans to work more closely with RDCs to ensure that wildlife-generated earnings are properly audited, and that as much as possible goes to producer communities. In order to achieve this it wants the extant allocation guidelines modified. At present, the guidelines, made by DNPWLM and endorsed by MLGRUD, suggest that revenues earned from CAMPFIRE activities should be allocated three ways:

- (1) 15 per cent retained as a council levy;
- (2) 35 per cent (maximum) go to cover management costs; and
- (3) 50 per cent (minimum) go to producer communities, to be used at their discretion.

The Association will seek to have guidelines drawn up to suit individual circumstances in each district. Some districts, it maintains, can afford to allocate a much higher proportion of its CAMPFIRE-generated revenue to producer communities. For example, Mudzi RDC (not in the target area) has a stated policy that gives the following allocation:

- (1) 15 per cent council levy;
- (2) 15 per cent management costs; and
- (3) 70 per cent to producer communities.

The Association believes that, unless this is done, other RDCs will try to stick to the 50 per cent (minimum) guideline, even though they can afford to pass on higher allocations to producer communities.

The Association will also campaign against the 15 per cent council levy, which is (in effect) a tax upon wildlife. No such tax is levied upon revenue derived from cattle husbandry or

arable farming, and to impose it upon wildlife puts management of the resource at an economic disadvantage.

Secondly, the Association wants to expand its role in training and fostering awareness of natural resource values. It is well aware that its presence in the districts is, at present, slight, and it wants to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of producer communities.

Thirdly, the Association wishes to expand its membership to WADCOs or ward wildlife committees; and it will press for the law on 'appropriate authority' status to be modified so that it can be given to wards. However, several others with interests in CAMPFIRE favour appropriate authority being devolved to 'resource management communities' (see below under section 9), which could be wards but which, in most cases, will probably comprise smaller groupings of people.

### ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

The Association is already attempting to operate on several fronts within the constraints of a tight budget and with a small body of personnel. In order to cope with this more successfully, and to provide for expansion of its responsibilities, additional resources will be needed. These are listed below:

- A Resource Marketing Officer. To expand from being merely an advisory service into that of selling the market potential of communal lands, especially in the tourism and safari hunting fields.
- An Assistant Information Officer. So that the Association can further develop its ability to collect, collate and disseminate information to the residents of the communal lands. In particular, it hopes to produce versions of the newsletter in vernacular languages, so that they are available to greater numbers of rural inhabitants.
- A Training and Awareness Officer. To make communities more aware of the basis behind the CAMPFIRE movement; to explain to them the options that they have in managing their natural resources; and the advantages and disadvantages of different options.
- A small sub-office in Bulawayo, to give the Association better access to, and coverage of the four districts in the target area, plus others to the south. This office would be staffed by an Executive Officer and a support personnel of two.

The expanded programme outlined above would entail the purchase of at least

- three more vehicles,
- two desktop computers,
- one lap-top computer, and
- audio-visual equipment.

Possible donors are ZT (with whom the Association already has a working relationship), IUCN (of which it is already a member), ODA, the Norwegian Aid Agency (NORAD), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Wildlife Conservation International (WCI — a branch of the New York Zoological Society), WWF, African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Southern African Development Commission (SADC), Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) and USAID.

In order to obtain grant support from USAID the Association must be registered as a Welfare Organisation and prove that it has the capacity to comply with the donor's rules of procedure and audit. The first of these criteria is close to being met, the Association having already applied for registration. The second criterion is unlikely to be satisfied in the immediate future because the administrative capacity is limited and inexperienced (see above).

### 6. Additional assistance by other organisations

This section looks at the extent to which NGOs might assist in training and capacity building at district, ward and village level (TOR 10); and the advantages or disadvantages of increased participation by other organisations, whether their extension activities might be integrated and strengthened in support of CAMPFIRE and NRMP; and how future participation might be encouraged (TOR 12).

#### INCREASED NGO PARTICIPATION

Several organisations are reputedly interested in being involved with NRMP or with CAMPFIRE programmes in general. There is a general perception that CAMPFIRE has the smell of success about it, and potential donors and NGOs believe that involvement with it may provide means for increasing profiles and advancing their power bases within the country. Some of the organisations believed to be interested are

- CARE,
- Southern African Foundation for Economic Research (SAFER), and
- Zimbabwe Environmental Resource Organisation (ZERO).

WWF do not, at present, have the resources to expand their current monitoring involvement with CAMPFIRE outside the project target area.

DNPWLM currently feels that additional donors and NGOs should be kept to a minimum as adequate resources for training and capacity building are already provided through the present project. The same view has been expressed by the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group.

## INCREASED PARTICIPATION BY OTHER MINISTRIES, ETC.

It is doubtful whether increased participation would be useful over the remaining life of NRMP; and, if it were to be introduced, bureaucratic impediments might be exacerbated. But increased participation will become essential in the future, as CAMPFIRE expands its horizons beyond wildlife management.

Project participants already anticipate CAMPFIRE activities extending to cover fish, caterpillars (mopane worms), timber, grazing and minerals. The first two are already, by legal definition, 'wild life', and their exploitation can be encompassed within the existing framework of CAMPFIRE. At the last departmental CAMPFIRE planning workshop (Anon., 1993), special attention was given to fish and a new output added — 'Fisheries and water bodies extension system'.

The other three resources, however, would need the active participation of, respectively, the Forestry Commission, Agritex and the Ministry of Mines. A fourth agency, the Department of Natural Resources should also be brought into the discussions.

The expansion of CAMPFIRE to include timber in communal lands as a natural resource for management and use at community level seems to be a natural move. It was discussed with a member of the Forestry Commission during the mid-term review mission; and it appeared that existing arrangements could easily be adapted to fit the CAMPFIRE scenario.

Two divisions of the Forestry Commission have relevance to NRMP and to the CAMPFIRE programme in general. They are

- (1) The Indigenous Resources Division, which manages state forests, and has resource-sharing projects to share revenue derived from the use of state forests with communities in adjacent communal lands.
- (2) The Extension Division, which is responsible for mediating between RDCs and concessionaires in the exploitation of timber resources on communal lands.

The second of these is the more relevant to the CAMPFIRE philosophy, and could be adapted to it. At present, when an RDC wishes to exploit a commercial timber resource upon communal land within its district, the following procedures must be followed:

- (1) The RDC informs the Forestry Commission, and the Commission carries out an inventory of the resource and sets the limits of exploitation.
- (2) The RDC then invites bids from potential concessionaires, and selects one.

- (3) The Commission now issues a contract, on behalf of the RDC, and takes a silviculture levy (a proportion of the total selling price) from the concessionaire.
- (4) The RDCs keep the revenue thus earned, and producer communities receive no direct benefits.

According to the Forestry Commission representative, this arrangement is entirely legitimate because, under existing law, RDCs are owners of all timber growing within their districts. In principle, however, this is not far removed from CAMPFIRE for, under extant law, the 'ownership' of wildlife on communal lands is vested in the RDCs. Clearly, changes to the relevant laws would have to be made, and guidelines introduced for the allocation of revenue along lines similar to those for existing CAMPFIRE earnings from the use of game animals. It would start CAMPFIRE along the road to community management of natural resources other than game animals, an aim that has been implicit in the CAMPFIRE movement from the start.

The NRMP target area would be an appropriate place in which to try out this extension of CAMPFIRE, whether or not this occurs in the context of support grants from USAID. It should be the subject of discussion by the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group, and within the MET.

## **7. Assistance for DNPWLM from other organisations**

This section considers the degree to which DNPWLM's NRMP responsibilities might be shared with other organisations (TOR 13).

The DNPWLM's view was that sharing responsibilities is fine in principle, but if too many other organisations were to be engaged, they might swamp the efforts of one another and generate confusion. At present, WWF is monitoring some CAMPFIRE programmes and the Department would be happy for it to expand its activities; but, as is already mentioned above, WWF is unwilling, at present, to take on more work.

Before it can call in further organisations to share its responsibilities, DNPWLM must decide how it intends to address specific issues related to CAMPFIRE, and this will determine which organisations may be relevant.

The Department is presently attempting to define its role within the CAMPFIRE movement. According to a recent workshop (Anon., 1993), DNPWLM sees its responsibilities as the production of six outputs:

- (1) Establish legal mechanisms for local empowerment;
- (2) Policies of government ministries affecting CAMPFIRE to be made consistent;

- (3) Establish a local resource management programme. (Rather cryptic and, therefore, not very helpful to the reader.)
- (4) Monitoring, research, evaluation and establishing data bases and information systems;
- (5) Developing a fisheries and water bodies system; and
- (6) Project (programme?) management.

What is lacking, however, are

- clearly defined goals for the programme,
- strategic objectives leading to the goals,
- an appraisal of the values of the actions selected as priorities;
- methods, and
- a schedule and list of anticipated products.

Once these are established, the Department can decide on priorities and apportion its resources accordingly. After it has done so, it can make decisions regarding the most advantageous partnerships to pursue.

In the view of the review mission team, a higher priority for DNPWLM is to establish an appropriate entity within the Department to deal with CAMPFIRE and game ranching. At present, the CCU is a small unit that lies in the fourth tier of the departmental hierarchy:

- (1) Director's office
- (2) Research Division
- (3) Branch of Terrestrial Ecology
- (4) CAMPFIRE Coordinating Unit.

When fish is included as a CAMPFIRE resource, reporting through the Branch of Terrestrial Ecology will be inappropriate; and it is doubtful whether Research is its most suitable Branch. Furthermore, the importance of the CAMPFIRE movement surely warrants that the Unit be strengthened and assigned a higher level ranking in the Department than it presently enjoys.

## **8. Communication with political officials**

This section considers how project implementors might improve communication with political officials so as to increase support for CAMPFIRE and NRMP (TOR 14).

Questioning in the four districts revealed that some politicians do attempt to exert pressures contrary to the interests of CAMPFIRE. Such cases are almost invariably the work of individual MPs, rarely of councillors.

Pressures are reported to come from politicians who strike populist attitudes. For example, an MP making representation on behalf of a constituent who hopes to graze his livestock on land reserved for wildlife management, and making an issue of the rights of people being paramount over those of wild animals. Others have tried to exploit the issue that people were once ejected from their homeland to enable national parks to be created.

Some district officials took the view that pressures of this nature are easily repelled — and that only a minority of MPs are involved. In general, reported the officials, politicians support CAMPFIRE; but some older politicians have entrenched, reactionary views that no amount of education or persuasion will alter. Their influence, however, is on the wane.

## 9. Legislative change

This section considers actions that might be taken to prepare for legislative change to further devolve authority to WADCOs and VIDCOs for community management of wildlife and other natural resources (TOR 15).

When it was first promulgated, the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act gave powers to owners to use wildlife on their land. In the case of privately land, the owner was self-evident. In the case of communal land, ownership was vested in the (then) Ministry of Internal Affairs, whose representatives were the District Commissioners.

A latter amendment to the Act paved the way for RDCs to be appropriate authorities, 'for such area of Communal Land as may be specified (by the Minister for MET in a Gazette notice)'. However, the intention from the earliest days of the 1975 Act had been eventually to devolve appropriate authority for wildlife management beyond district authorities to the lowest possible level — to a hypothetical entity called the 'resource management community'. This entity was never defined (although it is said that CASS had once intended to do so) — but if devolvement is to be pursued, it should be defined in a way that is appropriate to the structure of local communities. Attempts at so doing, by CASS, ZT, and DNPWLM, have met with difficulty. Hasler (1993) concludes that

"The lowest accountable units, the institutions for local resource management, emerge situationally in response to the historical hierarchy of vested interests in resources, local cultural and political dynamics and the specifics of the ecological resource base. There is therefore no formula for identifying the nature of these institutions in every ward in every district, since they emerge as a result of both local and broader circumstances and they change over time."

Most persons interviewed wanted appropriate authority for wildlife to be devolved to below RDC level. Contrary views came from some RDC officials and (unexpectedly) from some villagers. Many of the latter, when questioned, said that the RDC officers were better able to handle this responsibility. So long as the revenue came to them, it did not appear to matter much who had the management authority.

Some (for example, the CAMPFIRE Association) favour WADCOs as the repository for appropriate authority. Others (for example, DNPWLM) want authority to go to village level. But arguments over ward or village muddy the issue: the essence of the matter is that power must go to that grouping of people whose members are the actual producers and who have an economic stake in success or otherwise — that is, the 'resource management community'.

Changes to the Parks and Wildlife Act are already under way, made imperative by recent amendments to local government legislation. Under the Rural District Council Act of 1988, District Councils (who were formerly responsible for communal land only) and Rural Councils (freehold land) have been amalgamated to form RDCs. Within the RDCs new wards have been formed out of blocks of freehold land. The anomaly now arises that, in these new wards, owners of freehold land automatically have appropriate authority over wildlife but that wards in communal land cannot, because appropriate authority for them can only be held by the RDCs. DNPWLM currently favours an amendment to the Parks and Wildlife Act such that appropriate authority is given to 'the occupier' — a term that may or may not be synonymous with 'resource management community'.

Within the next few years, legislative changes should be made not only to accommodate new concepts in devolvement of appropriate authority but also to allow CAMPFIRE to encompass the management and use of natural resources other than wildlife. CAMPFIRE and the law was the subject of a ZT study (Wood, 1990), and a reading of this report this suggests that several acts may be involved. They include

- the Communal Land Act;
- the Communal Land Forest Product Act;
- the Forest Act;
- the Mines and Minerals Act;
- the Natural Resources Act;
- the Parks and Wildlife Act;
- the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act;
- the Rural District Council Act; and
- the Rural Land Act.

### 10. Recommendations

The overriding recommendation is that a major seminar or workshop should be convened, at which the participants will reappraise NRMP and decide

- (1) the ways in which the current project should be realigned or redesigned;
- (2) how the project, and any follow-on programme, should relate to the national CAMPFIRE programme; and
- (3) the relevance, scope and broad design of a Phase Two project.

## Annex E.2

The need for this forum is pressing. Grant agreements for ZT and CASS expire on 15 September 1994 (although DNPWLM's continues until 31 August 1995), and new funding agreements must be in place by July 1994. The optimum time for this forum is as soon as possible after the planned ZT workshop, scheduled for February or March 1994.

Participants should include representatives from (at least)

- the three implementing partners,
- USAID,
- MET,
- all members of the CCG, and
- the four RDCs in the target area.

Other participants might include representatives of WADCOs, VIDCOs and local ward or village committees, and potential donors apart from USAID. This forum would also provide the opportunity for involving organisations whose presence may be relevant to the future expansion of CAMPFIRE to manage natural resources other than game animals: for example, Forestry Commission, MLAWD and Department of Natural Resources.

Some of the specific recommendations that follow relate to the extant NRMP. Others are more relevant in the longer term, especially beyond the current NRMP and into a possible Phase Two.

The current state of inter-ministerial co-ordination appeared to be adequate to the needs of NRMP in spite of the fact that no one in MET was prepared to speak with the mid-term review mission team. Commitment to NRMP was expressed by MLGRUD and (within MET) by DNPWLM. However, ways to widen inter-ministerial coordination and communication should be sought, particularly with a view to devolving appropriate authority for the management of natural resources further down the rural hierarchy, and to extending CAMPFIRE's interests beyond game animals. This recommendation is elaborated below.

The 'top-down', 'bottom-up' controversy is unavoidable, given that NRMP is essentially 'project-driven'. But USAID tries to be flexible within its constraints, and should continue to do so.

The recommendations that relate to friction between USAID and the implementing partners, made in the interim assessment report, have been implemented but, in spite of this, financial management problems persist and are addressed below.

Approval of a full time Project Coordinator's post in DNPWLM is a welcome step, and one that should be acted upon as soon as possible.

After appointment, the Project Officer should be encouraged to make frequent visits to the target area, and demonstrate to the other partners that DNPWLM's presence in the project is one that represents the whole Department.

## Annex E.2

The Project Coordinator should focus attention, soon after his appointment, at improving communications

- a. Between USAID and the three implementing partners.
- b. By improving middle-level coordination, especially between DNPWLM headquarters and its personnel in Matabeleland, and between ZT's offices in Harare and its personnel in Bulawayo (see King (1993)).

It is probable that many lessons have been learned by donor and implementing partners as a result of the tensions described in section 3, and that some problems will not recur. There remain, however, unpaid vouchers and claims from long past, and the fear that experience of working under USAID support will make some partners fight shy of further involvement. Efforts should be taken to ensure that this does not happen because, whatever the problems may have been, there is much to admire in NRMP and in those who participated, and a Phase Two would have the experiences of Phase One to build upon.

Outstanding financial problems should be settled as soon as possible. In particular

- a. ZT should continue to work with USAID to clear its still unpaid vouchers (US\$90,000 worth). If possible, USAID should help ZT to prepare its case.
- b. CASS should press the bursar's office at the University of Zimbabwe to deal urgently with the backlog of unpaid claims.

There can never be too much communication aimed at avoiding misinterpretation of rules of procedure, or lack of comprehension of USAID requirements for financial management, administration and environmental assessments. It is recommended that a meeting (perhaps a special meeting of PIC) be called immediately to deal exclusively with the resolution of all outstanding problems.

Thought should be given now to the possibility of a Phase Two project. Its general goals should be the same although the project will have to be modified in several respects. The same partners should be retained if they are willing. DNPWLM should remain the lead agency because it is the arm of government that holds responsibility for wildlife management; and wildlife in its broader concept (game animals, small mammals, birds, fishes and invertebrates) is likely to remain the resource of major concern under CAMPFIRE in the immediate future.

It would be a pity to lose ZT and CASS. They should be encouraged to stay, and the way made easy for them to do so. ZT will (on its own admission) continue to work with CAMPFIRE no matter what may be the future for NRMP. But if the project does go into a Phase Two, ZT's considerable experience would be an immense advantage. So ought CASS to stay. It is the ideal organisation to monitor social progress from a more detached position than ZT, which is more concerned with implementing programmes and building institutions. Ways should be explored, in the near future, of addressing the problems that face the three partners in continuing to work on a project that receives financial support from USAID.

One difficulty that faces ZT's extended participation in NRMP is reluctance to continue acting as an intermediary between USAID and RDCs. Ways in which USAID could give support grants to RDCs without using ZT should be explored.

If CASS continues into a Phase Two project, a suitably qualified professional should be posted permanently to the target area so as to give the Centre a permanent presence there.

The degree to which USAID might spread its support more widely over DNPWLM's operations should be investigated. Ideally the Department would like support to cover all of its operations in Matabeleland North. Some of its officers would like to see support for CAMPFIRE in general.

Beginning immediately, action should be taken to foster and facilitate communication between the four districts under NRMP and other CAMPFIRE districts. Ways in which this may be achieved should be explored by the CCG. In a Phase Two project, funding ought to be provided for this purpose — to facilitate visits and workshops, and other channels of communication.

PIC needs overhauling. It should be converted into a full coordinating committee that discusses, coordinates and approves work in the target area. Its membership may have to be expanded by including, for example, MLGRUD, CAMPFIRE Association and district representatives. Thought should be given to holding meetings more frequently and some, if not all of them, in the target area.

A wider role should be found for the CAMPFIRE Association. Present indications are that the Association is good at spreading awareness but less effective at servicing. Several

## Annex E.2

persons interviewed believed that the Association's weakness lay in its board members, who are not fully unaware of the significance of CAMPFIRE, and who are, therefore, dominated by the more knowledgeable executive branch. A partial remedy might be to include some executive members of RDCs on the board.

The Association has a wide range of ideas but needs to set priorities, decide what direction it is going to take, and what its chief functions are going to be. Having made these decisions, it should embark upon long-term planning, and be given support to help it do so. When its application to be registered as a Welfare Organisation is approved, it will be eligible to receive direct donor support. The Association should aim at becoming a strong producers' association. Its potential for assisting CAMPFIRE and NRMP will then be greatly enhanced.

The Association should devolve its membership beyond RDCs. At present it plans to extend membership to wards; but ultimately it needs to draw its membership from the producer communities — the people who actually 'own' and stand to gain or lose from management or neglect of wildlife. By doing so it can become a more vigorous organisation. The existence of a more robust Association should help to enhance coordination among individual CAMPFIRE programmes, and between NRMP and other CAMPFIRE districts, as well as promoting learning and diffusion of innovation among the various CAMPFIRE programmes.

One of the most useful tasks that the Association might undertake would be to become a servicing agency that monitors CAMPFIRE activities nationwide, and relieve DNPWLM of that responsibility. The Association is already well aware of the importance of advancing its marketing role (see above) and of sponsoring associated training. In the context of the former, two models on which the Association might base its expansion into marketing are the Ostrich and Crocodile Producer Associations, both of which have firm grips on their industries.

In order to play the wider role described above, the CAMPFIRE Association needs to be strengthened through additional external financial support. Changes in the law may also help it to identify its true members - the ones who stand to gain or lose from wildlife management or neglect.

The sympathies and support of MPs and local politicians for CAMPFIRE and the project should be enlisted. They should be brought into the picture, kept informed, invited to meetings and ceremonies and invited to say a few words when they do attend. Where this is already being done it should be continued.

DNPWLM should also continue to investigate and process the issue of devolvement of appropriate authority. In this context, a key question for CAMPFIRE in general is to decide what is a 'resource management community'. This is a task that CASS might accept on behalf of the project. It may not, however, be a simple task. Perhaps the definition of 'resource management community' will vary from resource to resource, even within the

limited context of game animals. Some animals have very small home ranges; others roam further afield. Many animals move from one locality to another in response to seasonal changes. Concepts of proprietorship or custodianship will vary accordingly.

NRMP should begin seeking ways of bringing natural resources other than game animals into CAMPFIRE. It is recommended that discussions be held with the relevant organisations. To start with, discussion might be held within CCG, with a view to identifying options and strategies. After that, a forum could be established that might include the Forestry Commission, MLAWD and Ministry of Mines — whichever organisations may be appropriate. The purpose of convening the forum would be to identify and then coordinate the steps that would be needed if other natural resources were to be added to the CAMPFIRE programmes. These steps would almost certainly include amendments to existing legislation.

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## **WILDLIFE AND NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATION SPECIALIST**

### **INTRODUCTION.**

This report covers a part of the mid-term evaluation of the Natural Resources Management Programme (NRMP) in western Matabeleland and funded by USAID. It is divided into two sections, one dealing with the detailed formal Terms of Reference for the Wildlife and Natural Resources Management Administrative Specialist, and the second with more general issues relating to the project.

The NRMP is to assist Zimbabwe with the management of its parks and wildlife resources in the north west of the country. Here there are internationally significant national parks and reserves, including the Victoria Falls and Zambezi National Parks which are part of the Natural World Heritage Site, centred on Victoria Fall and shared with Zambia. There are also rich wildlife resources on Communal and Commercial farm land outside the protected areas. These biologically diverse resources are being conserved and developed in support of the local rural economy in accordance with Zimbabwe's innovative wildlife policy.

Emphasis on developing the capacity of local communities to manage their renewable resources, especially "their" wildlife and its habitats, is a relatively recent phenomenon globally. There are many conservationists who still oppose the concept in favour of continued costly, often unaffordable, centralised government control over such resources. There are also many who favour the idea, but have only a rudimentary understanding of its underlying socio-economic strengths and weaknesses. The CAMPFIRE movement in Zimbabwe has emerged as a pioneering programme of international significance to understanding the implications of community resource management. CAMPFIRE has gathered momentum only within the past decade and the NRMP has been part of the programme for over four years of that time. As a consequence, CAMPFIRE and NRMP are both still very exploratory and this important attribute of the project should not be overlooked when evaluating its progress.

### **METHODOLOGY.**

The limited duration of the evaluation necessitated reliance on information provided by key actors in the programme. While the frankness with which most questions were answered was very impressive, such information is bound to reflect personal attitudes to particular issues. Neither were there sufficient knowledgeable people associated with administrative aspects of the project to obtain an "average" opinion.

Against this the CAMPFIRE movement has been well publicised in both the popular and scientific press over the past few years. This has provided a useful body of emerging understanding against which to judge progress in the present project.

RESULTS.

**A. Response to Detailed Terms of Reference.**

1. DNPWLM's normal duties bring it into regular contact with all levels of the community in the project area. Additional collaboration with the public, as a direct result of the project, has been mainly at District Council level. Here the Department's major contribution has been in assisting the Councils to select suitable Safari Outfitters and to negotiate equitable leases with them.

Theoretically, servicing of producer communities by the Department has been less effective than it might have been. This can be attributed to three main factors:

- (i) the speed and flexibility with which the CAMPFIRE concept is being embraced spontaneously by rural communities and ratified legally by Government on a national front;
- (ii) the speed at which understanding of community based resource management is growing and the implications of this to sustainable rural development; and
- (iii) the inability of the Department, as a whole, to adapt quickly enough to the changing situation. There is need for a substantial and carefully controlled shift in the Department's emphasis, away from some traditional approaches to wildlife management.

Even in Zimbabwe, where there have been innovative changes towards devolving the rights to manage and use wildlife to landholders, since the early 1960s, this requires a purposeful effort by the Department. A structured transition from the present position requires that the Department should

- (i) decide its specific mandate in relation to particular issues under circumstances that will vary with time and place;
- (ii) determine how it will implement this mandate;
- (iii) develop the capacity to implement this mandate, through:
  - (a) the training and tasking of staff of all categories, as appropriate, and
  - (b) the nurturing of durable partnerships inside and outside Government;
- (iv) publicise its policy and strategy, particularly:
  - (a) among its own staff;
  - (b) among partners; and

### Annex E.3

- (c) at the local community level so that those affected know just what to expect from the Department; and
- (v) set up a system for assembling, storing and analysing information to
  - (a) monitor progress of the CAMPFIRE movement throughout the country; and
  - (b) where necessary, to direct research or redirect the Department and its partners' efforts.

The designing and setting up of a database to support the monitoring of the CAMPFIRE movement is seen as an important need by the DNPWLM CAMPFIRE Coordinating Unit. Consideration should be given to assisting the Department design and set up such a database during the proposed second phase of NRMP. This is one situation in which the Department might benefit from Technical Assistance, not only with designing, setting up and running the database, but also with training staff to assume the function.

2. The human, material and financial inputs available to DNPWLM appear to have been used reasonably efficiently by the Department, but to have been generally insufficient for the purpose. The Department assigned one Senior Ecologist to the Project almost full time, to complement the work being done by ZT. In this regard, the Department chose not to deploy additional staff to the project area for fear of "swamping" the project area with personnel and confusing the local rural folk. In retrospect, it seems likely that the Ecologist would have benefitted from having some assistance.

The situation was less satisfactory when it came to acquiring equipment. There were often protracted bureaucratic delays and some of the items purchased by the donor were unsuited to the purpose for which they were intended. The Departmental Ecologist on the project had to borrow a vehicle and a series of personal computers before this basic equipment, for which provision existed in the project agreement, was made available to him after 18 months. A delay, amounting to 30 per cent of the life of the project, in the delivery of essential working equipment was both frustrating and stultifying. It was particularly unfortunate in view of the limited trained and experienced people available.

Many delays and difficulties in having project funds released for the purpose for which they were intended were cited by DNPWLM staff. Officers expressed a reluctance to place orders because they were embarrassed when payments to suppliers often took up to 6 months. Staff also gave examples of the purchase of unsuitable equipment; a lorry for use on game capture being the epitome of this inefficient use of project resources. Despite the Department's knowledge of the Kalahari, which is one of the sandiest deserts in the world, its specifications were ignored. Amongst other defects, the vehicle acquired has twin back wheels which shows the most elementary lack of appreciation of local working conditions.

Experience in evaluating a number of projects similar to NRMP emphasises the importance to a project's success of having a project-friendly accounting system. This is especially important where the project is breaking new ground in developing a concept, as in the case of NRMP, when speed and flexibility are often critical to success. As a matter of principle, a financial accounting system should be tailored to the project it serves, rather than the reverse. This would appear to be particularly pertinent

in the present context where the project arrogantly demands that local officials master a complex foreign bureaucratic system for the sake of this single aspect of their work. There can be little doubt that NRMP would benefit significantly from the early introduction of a more appropriate accounting system.

3. Question 3 is dealt with in the report from the Community Development Specialist.

4. DNPWLM is encouraging communities around the country to test a variety of models for implementing CAMPFIRE principles. Those models that show most promise then act as demonstrations from which other communities can learn in a constant interchange of experience between communities. The four CAMPFIRE communities within the project area have unfortunately become somewhat isolated from this process by virtue of being part of the project. This could easily be rectified by facilitating the exchange of information between project area communities and other communities in the CAMPFIRE movement. This will require, however, that project funds can be spent outside the project area on such items as travel and subsistence for community representatives.

Training and developing prominent personalities in the CAMPFIRE movement from local communities is approaching the stage where there is need for a more formalised training and extension programme to augment the above system of demonstrations. This is a service to communities in which the Department should participate, although the lead role might be better placed with the CAMPFIRE Association.

Irrespective of how this programme is organised, it should be based on a thorough assessment of the needs of the market. This will avoid any top-down imposition of the wrong approach, particularly in the selection and training of local community wildlife managers, as has been alleged. It will also facilitate the development of appropriate teaching and extension packages for use in promoting and explaining CAMPFIRE concepts and principles.

5. The DNPWLM should take the following actions to enhance its role in developing community capacity to manage and use wildlife correctly:

i) **Clarify the Legal Status of Appropriate Authorities** - Some ambiguity seems to be surfacing as to the definition of Appropriate Authorities as a consequence of the amalgamation of District and Rural Councils. This seems unnecessary, as the spirit of the Parks and Wild Life Act is clearly to devolve the rights and responsibilities for managing and using wildlife to landholders, and the status of landholders has not altered. The Department should ensure that this interpretation of the legislation is correct and should make this known.

ii) **Redefinition of Appropriate Authorities in Communal Areas** - The situation relating to Appropriate Authorities in the Communal Areas should be refined. At present this status can be given only to the Council, whereas sound management of wildlife should often be at village level. While a Council may have a coordinating role with respect to the management of wildlife in a Communal Area, the resource cannot be managed efficiently at that level.

The legislation should be revised to allow the Minister to devolve authority for wildlife in Communal Areas to a level below the Council. It is probably undesirable to define this level in law, as the composition of each authority could vary with local circumstances, although in most situations it is likely to be the VIDCO.

iii) **Improved Monitoring** - As indicated above. The flow of information generated should reach the VIDCO level.

iv) **Evaluation and Redirection of Project** - The project should be evaluated and redirected with reference to the shifting emphasis of the whole CAMPFIRE movement. This necessitates a mechanism that will examine progress area by area and actor by actor, so as to improve the direction of the project and liaison between the partners. It is important that, as the need for action is defined, the responsibility for implementing it is delegated to a particular actor(s) who should report measurable progress by an agreed date.

Any intention by DNPWLM to move away from its traditional role in managing wildlife outside protected areas should be handled carefully. There are good reasons why some of its existing functions should be handed over to Appropriate Authorities; but in doing so, it is important to avoid giving the impression that the Department is simply seeking to evade its responsibilities. This is especially true of PAC work, as depredations by wild animals can become a highly emotional topic that is easily exploited politically by vested interests.

A countrywide DNPWLM policy and strategy for PAC is an early priority. Losses due to wild animals are a trade off against having wildlife and being able to benefit from it. Controlling problem animals to balance such costs against the likely benefits from the animals is clearly a function in which local communities should be involved. The proposed policy and strategy should define the roles and division of labour between the local authorities and the Department, and it should provide for the necessary legal framework for communities to assume their share of the work.

The project should facilitate workshops to decide project policy; and to develop and implement strategy, including the training of local community personnel in PAC work. It should also assist establish a PAC monitoring system, and the provision of the necessary equipment, such as suitable fire arms, traps etc., for use by community personnel.

6. DNPWLM's extension and interpretative programme is reported to be weak with respect to projecting and extending the CAMPFIRE movement. It would appear that it could benefit from considerable strengthening in three main areas:

- (i) the provision of extension services at community level. These might concentrate on:
  - (a) spreading the CAMPFIRE message in those parts of the project area districts that are not involved in the project, and
  - (b) broadening the perspective of CAMPFIRE in the WADCOs within the project area. Too many people are still thinking only of sharing money from elephant, rather than beginning to view a broad spectrum of wildlife as a resource base that can offer a diversified sustainable livelihood; and
- (ii) the mounting of an on-going campaign to inform the public about CAMPFIRE, including:
  - (a) the provision of displays and written material in National Parks, particularly Hwange, Victoria Falls and Zambezi, to keep both foreign and domestic visitors informed about CAMPFIRE and the progress of the movement, and
  - (b) close liaison with Action magazine as a regular outlet for information about the movement.
- (iii) the upgrading of the Department's Interpretative unit. This is an area in which the US is particularly well equipped to assist Zimbabwe.

7. As already indicated and for very good reasons the DPNWLM's middle management is less well informed about CAMPFIRE than might be theoretically desirable. The Department has already scheduled a total of 15 staff meetings and workshops to address this issue during 1994. After Staff from the field have been briefed about CAMPFIRE and its implementation the message will require reinforcement and updating. This suggests the need for a regular in-house newsletter, for which resources are not presently available, but which could be provided through the project.

8. The Department's regional officers have little control over project inputs for a number of reasons, including

- (i) the rather inflexible and project unfriendly accounting system; and
- (ii) the somewhat ill defined project direction which has resulted in weak liaison, apportionment of responsibilities and accountability among the partners implementing the project. This can be attributed to insufficient attention to the creation of effective machinery for the on-going direction of the project, which has been exacerbated by Department's reluctance to step into the gap when things have begun to go wrong. The latter is in turn due to the fact that responsibility for the project, within the Department, remained at Deputy Director level. As a consequence, there was less attention to the project and less continuity in direction

than there would have been had responsibility been formally delegated to a lower level in Head Office.

This situation could easily be rectified with the introduction of a project friendly accounting system and more effective project direction, centred within the Department.

9. and 10. These items are reported on by the Natural Resource Planning and Policy Analyst.

11. The question of improved PAC is addressed in 5 above.

12. No real attempt was made to analyse the ramifying effects of the national Structural Adjustment Programme, imposed on Zimbabwe by the World Bank. This would have required much more time than was available during the present short assignment. For example, the Department was required to make personnel redundant, which accentuated existing staff shortages for effective ground coverage patrols in the face of a serious poaching threat. Experience in Zimbabwe and elsewhere has demonstrated that the ability of an organisation like the DNPWLM to curb rhino and elephant poaching is closely related to the resources that it can mobilise against such poaching. Determining the extent to which the loss of 250 men affected law enforcement would, however, require very detailed information that would need to be analysed against the many other variables that might be involved.

The restructuring and reorganisation of the Department, also sponsored by the World Bank, is in any case of greater immediate importance to the project. If the proposals now before Cabinet are approved it will greatly improve the Department's ability to perform its functions and accommodate such activities as the NRMP. The proposed package visualises the Department's operations being decentralised and made much more business like, without it abrogating its responsibilities for the proper conservation and servicing of the nation's wildlife resources.

13. Reported on by the Natural Resources Planning and Policy Analyst.

## **B. General Issues Relating to the Project.**

Once again acknowledging the considerable progress achieved thus far during this innovative project, there are a number of general issues that deserve attention. The following observations blend new ideas with topics already touched upon in the last section in an attempt to present a balanced picture of the project as a whole.

It is most commendable that the project has been implemented by the main relevant Zimbabwean actors, rather than by a firm of foreign consultants under contract. This is in itself a major credit to the project. It also helps explain the propensity of the project executants to review their own performances critically, some would say over critically. Their sole purpose in contributing to the present evaluation is to make the project as efficient as possible.

Introducing the CAMPFIRE concept to local communities requires considerable personal reorientation, by all concerned — from project executants, through District Councillors to the people on the land — away from the conventional approaches to managing wildlife in the Communal Areas. Changing

peoples' attitudes is of necessity a slow process that requires sympathetic patience. This is especially true when dealing with conservative peasants who have developed a healthy scepticism for the vacillating authority to which they have been subjected for decades.

The long term credibility of the project depends on a number of issues, including the following:

- The need for the DNPWLM to clarify its policy and objective, and to make these widely known, with regards to its role in promoting, legalising and servicing the CAMPFIRE movement. Clearly defined policy guidelines for the application of CAMPFIRE, from the Central Government Department responsible for the key wildlife resource, will help avoid a tendency for CAMPFIRE to be viewed as a "different thing by different people";
- In the light of the above, the need for clear positive project direction, leading to its efficient administration, including the introduction of a more project friendly financial accounting system. Consideration should be given to the greater involvement of the Rural/District Councils and the CAMPFIRE Association in the implementation of appropriate aspects of the project;
- A less top-down approach to implementing the CAMPFIRE concept, with greater emphasis on the development of locally appropriate institutions. Members of the local communities should be provided with as much information as possible about how they can manage their wildlife and other resources so they can decide their own agendas, rather than being told what to do. Institutions should then be evolved, in consultation with the Rural/District Councils, to maximise the benefits that these people can derive from the efficient and sustainable use of "their" resources;
- Closer integration of the programme in the project area, with the countrywide CAMPFIRE movement; and
- A better system for monitoring the implementation of CAMPFIRE in the project area and the country as a whole.

A major issue confronting the successful implementation of CAMPFIRE revolves around the "ownership" of wildlife and who should be entitled to benefit from its use. Many still view wild animals as a communal asset to be managed for the benefit of the whole district. This view is as flawed socio-economically as the view that it is a national or international asset, to be managed nationally or internationally. Unless the rights to use and benefit from wildlife and the obligation to manage the resource efficiently can be allocated to individuals or small identifiable social entities, the resource becomes an open access public asset prone to abuse.

Deciding on the size and composition of the "producer communities", to whom the rights and accountability for wildlife should be devolved is a sensitive issue that needs to be handled delicately by the project. The situation is exasperated by the fact that the Rural District Councils lack an adequate tax base in Communal Areas, in particular, and are therefore short of funds. This has prompted some Councillors to argue for the use of revenue from wildlife for politically popular communal developments away from the areas in which the revenue is earned and where the people bear the opportunity costs of supporting large destructive game animals like elephant. This is clearly an inequitable, short-term solution to the shortage of capital for development, which is a direct threat to the survival and continued use of wildlife by the people who share their land with the resource.

**Annex F Terms of Reference**

**REGIONAL NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROJECT (690-0251)  
EVALUATION PLAN  
FOR  
MID-TERM EVALUATION  
OF  
ZIMBABWE COMPONENT, NUMBER 690-0251.13**

**Section One: Activity to be Evaluated**

The Zimbabwe portion of the regional project to be evaluated, Zimbabwe NRMP, is an AID-funded project of assistance to the Government of Zimbabwe (authorised at US\$7,600,000) which supports the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM), Zimbabwe Trust (ZIMTRUST) and the University of Zimbabwe's Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS). The project grant agreement is currently expected to run from 31 August 1989 to 31 August 1997. The specific purpose of the Zimbabwe NRMP is to (1) demonstrate, through practical examples, the technical, social, economic and ecological viability and replaceability of community-based natural resource management and utilization programs on marginal lands for improving household and community incomes while sustaining natural resources; and (2) improve national and local capability to halt the decline in the wildlife and natural resource base through training, education, protection, communication and technology transfer.

**Section Two: Purpose of the Evaluation**

Under the Regional NRMP, mid-term evaluations are being conducted on both a regional and a country by country basis in year three of the Regional NRMP. An interim assessment of the Zimbabwe component was conducted over the period from 25 June - 27 July 1992 to address shakedown issues identified during initial project implementation. The objectives of that assessment were:

- ! to assess the implementation performance on the community-based resources utilization component of the Zimbabwe NRMP within the broader context of rural development in Zimbabwe, and
- ! to assess the institutional and relational underpinnings of the project model in Zimbabwe in comparison with alternative rural community empowerment models.

That assessment was prompted by concerns that the project was not achieving some of its objectives because of the lack of community consensus in the project target areas, "top-down" pressure from implementors, and inappropriate institutional relationships. Special attention was paid in the assessment to project organizational, management and administration issues as well as conceptual issues (e.g. participation, methods of community empowerment). In addition, project design and implementation issues were explored. The findings, conclusions and recommendations emerging from the assessment were used to help overcome some of the initial constraints to project implementation and provided an important and useful guide to the project implementors on actions to be taken to enhance project effectiveness. It is intended that the mid-term evaluation build up the conclusions and recommendations

of the interim assessment, and concentrate on those issues (new and outstanding) which were identified by project implementors during the course of Terms of Reference development for the mid-term evaluation (April 15 - April 21, 1993). Those issues fully vetted during the interim assessment are to be re-visited only if appropriate follow-up action has not yet been taken by the project partners. Given that an objective of the Zimbabwe NRMP is to promote natural resource management, the evaluation will examine the prospects for this beyond PACD and the actions required to enhance this objective.

The mid-term evaluation will also address certain Regional NRMP issues not covered by the interim assessment of the Zimbabwe component.

### **Section Three: Background**

#### **A. Introduction**

The SADC Regional Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP) was designed to facilitate sustainable social and economic development in local communities while protecting biological diversity through regional cooperation and bilateral activities in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia as well as through a regional coordination element located in Malawi. Project emphasis is on efforts to enhance community involvement in management of commonly shared wildlife and natural resources in the region, and the sharing of project experience among the bilateral project sub-projects.

#### **B. Project Goal, Purpose and Objectives**

The regional project goal is to increase incomes and enhance capability to meet basic human needs through sustainable utilization and conservation of natural ecosystems. Successful conservation of wildlife resources and better integration of wildlife into the nation's economic development program will accomplish the project's sub-goal of promoting sustainable development of communities through appropriate land use practices on lands that are marginally suitable for agriculture.

The purpose of the regional project is to improve the social and economic well-being of residents of rural communities by implementing sustainable community-based wildlife conservation and utilization programs.

The specific purpose of the Zimbabwe component is to (1) demonstrate, through practical examples, the technical, social, economic and ecological viability and replaceability of community-based natural resource management and utilization programmes on marginal lands for improving household and community incomes while sustaining natural resources; and (2) improve national and local capability to halt the decline in the wildlife and natural resource base through training, education, protection, communication and technology transfer.

The Zimbabwe NRMP is to assist community based projects and promote the conservation and sustainability of the local natural resource base. It is especially important to note that the Zimbabwe NRMP is one element of an ongoing national program of decentralisation of the management and benefits of wildlife to local communities.

The project elements include:

- (i) community-based resource utilization
- (ii) planning and applied research support
- (iii) conservation of the resource base
- (iv) regional communications and exchange of information

The interim assessment provided the following summary of the economic and social context of the project:

Zimbabwe NRMP is being implemented in a geographically discrete target area in the western part of the country. Communal lands in four districts make up the primary target area: Binga, Hwange, Tsholotsho and Bulilima-Mwangwe. These districts fall into two provinces: Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South. Project activities relating to conservation of the resource base (e.g. aerial censuses, habitat and vegetation monitoring) are also being carried out in and around Hwange National Park. At a meeting between the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management and USAID/Zimbabwe, it was agreed that the Project Agreement would be amended to include two additional areas, Chete Safari Area and Chizarira National Park.

As the NRM Project Paper notes, the land base of Southern Africa imposes severe limitations on conventional agricultural and economic activities. This is particularly true of the region in Zimbabwe which makes up the target area for the NRMP. Falling within Natural Regions IV and v, the target districts and Parks and Wildlife Estate areas in the project are agriculturally marginal. Rainfall averages between 450-650 mm per year and is highly variable both in space and time. Seasonal shortages of rainfall occur relatively frequently, and droughts are not uncommon. Primary land use patterns in the target area, therefore, are a combination of subsistence, cultivation, livestock raising, and wage employment. Labour migration to towns, commercial farms, and the mines of South Africa is not uncommon, especially in Tsholotsho and Bulilima-Mwangwe.

The NRM Project is being complemented in an area which historically has had varying and complex relations between people and wildlife and other natural resources. In pre-colonial times, individuals and local groups had access to wildlife on a communal basis, although this access was governed by customary rules. After the imposition of colonial rule, the state took control of wildlife, and access to wildlife on the part of local people was restricted. It was not until 1975 with the passage of the Parks and Wildlife Act that the possibility of people gaining benefits from the wildlife in their areas was restored (Parks and Wildlife Act 1975). The Act contains a provision that enables the Ministry of Environment and Tourism to designate district councils in communal areas as "Appropriate Authorities" for the management of wildlife on land within their areas. Essentially, this meant that people in communal areas could have access to revenues accruing from wildlife for the first time since the end of the 19th century. The NRMP target districts received Appropriate Authority status under the Parks and Wildlife Act in 1990-1991.

From a social and economic standpoint, the situation in the NRM Project areas is complex. The target area is made up not only of land in two provinces and four districts, but these districts are sub-divided further into wards and villages. The target areas of the NRMP currently include 32 wards and 168 villages. There is a fair amount of ethnic heterogeneity in the NRM Project areas as well, with Tonga, Ndebele, Nambiya, Kalanga and San, among others, residing in the region. A sizable proportion of these people have been resettled from other places as a result of the establishment of commercial farming areas, national parks and safari areas, and the construction of Kariba Dam in the 1950s.

Project objectives include:

- ! Demonstrate wildlife utilization as a preferred and profitable land use in Bulilima-Mwangwe, Tsholotsho, Binga and Hwange Communal Lands.
- ! Establish resource management programs in the target areas that will be self-sustaining, will offer increased local employment opportunities and incomes, will result in optimal and sustained wildlife yield, and will provide the communities with access to a renewable source of revenues for development projects.
- ! Establish and strengthen institutions and decision-making procedures for sustainable resource management and distribution of economic benefits resulting from wildlife activities at the village, ward and district levels in the Bulilima-Mwangwe, Tsholotsho, Binga and Hwange Communal Lands.
- ! Transfer, through training and advisory services provided by Zimbabwe Trust, problem-solving organizational, accounting and management skills, thereby empowering local institutions to plan and administer their own strategy for resource utilization.
- ! Enable local institutions, by completion of the project, to assume complete responsibility for wildlife management and distribution of economic and other tangible benefits resulting from the wildlife resource base.
- ! Increase women's participation in the resource management program at the village, ward and district levels.
- ! Expand women's participation in the economy through income-generating activities that use the natural resource base in a sustainable manner.
- ! Enhance social and rural welfare through increased income and access to protein, community development projects, and expanded participation of women in the economy and development process.

- ! Introduce rural communities to basic concepts of community-based resource management and utilization.

The primary target areas for community-based project activities in Zimbabwe fall within Bulilima-Mwangwe, Tsholotsho, Binga and Hwange Communal Lands. Community-based activities within these communal lands are being implemented by Zimbabwe Trust (a rural development NGO with an environmental orientation), who is responsible for institutional development and personnel training. Zimbabwe Trust receives ecological and technical assistance from Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) research ecologists and Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) of the University of Zimbabwe Social Scientists.

Community-based activities have been under implementation in all four Communal Lands for at least two years, and in some areas for as long as 30 months.

#### **Section Four: Statement of Work and Team Composition**

The rationale for both the Zimbabwe mid-term evaluation and regional NRMP mid-term evaluation is to assess project status and progress so that, if necessary, mid-course adjustments can be made to enhance and improve future project implementation.

The Evaluation Team shall consist of five (5) individuals:

- A team leader with previous experience in conducting A.I.D. evaluations, an understanding of A.I.D. programs and procedures, and a natural resource management background (TL);
- An individual with extensive experience in community development, small-scale enterprise and informal sector interventions in Africa (CDSE) and training of community leaders, district leaders and teachers in natural resource CDSE;
- A specialist in local government organizational relationships and the management of local government at the district, ward, and village level in Africa (LG),
- A natural resource planning and policy analyst with extensive experience in assessing national institutions, policies and legislation related to natural resource management in Africa (POL);
- A wildlife and natural resource management (WNRM) administrative specialist with experience in the design and implementation of natural resource and wildlife monitoring and analysis programs in Africa;
- Individuals assigned by the Government of Zimbabwe/DNPWLM who will work with the team to provide input into the assessment.

4. Specific Implementation Issues to be Addressed During the Assessment

Project Conceptual Issues

Based upon the analysis of the materials gathered, and drawing upon experiences and case materials from alternative rural community development models, the team shall address the following issues and provide recommendations for the future.

1. To what extent have the assumptions made during project design remained valid?
2. Was the four district geographic focus of the Zimbabwe NRMP appropriate? What have been the costs and benefits of the NRMP geographic focus on ZIMTRUST and DNPWLM national support to CAMPFIRE programs outside the NRM project area? How might relationships with other CAMPFIRE and DNPWLM implementors outside the NRMP project area be strengthened over the remainder the project and into the year 2000?
3. What effect did the addition of Hwange and Bulilima Mwangwe Districts to the NRMP at a later stage in project design have on the distribution of project inputs to these two districts (and the other project areas) and on the ability of implementors to meet project objectives?
4. Given that an objective of the Zimbabwe NRMP is to promote natural resource management, what are the prospects for this beyond PACD and the actions required to enhance this objective.
5. To what extent will communities be able to sustain project objectives and activities (ie substantial community control over wildlife and natural resources) by PACD and over the next ten years?
6. To what extent are indicators of project progress and benefits to date (eg increases in food security of income levels) measurable?
7. If the community-based resource utilization model is viable, what design modifications (eg institutional involvements and relationships, government vs. non-government participation, life of project, geographic coverage, implementation sequencing, funding levels, etc.), if any, would be appropriate to create sustainable wildlife and natural resource management and provide maximum benefits for producer communities?
8. How has Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) affected NRM Project Implementation? Given DNPWLM personnel constraints imposed by Zimbabwe's ESAP, will the World Bank's proposed program of support effectively address the Department's deficiencies in institutional capacity (human, material, financial) in a manner that will support NRMP and CAMPFIRE objectives during the remaining life of the NRM Project and beyond?

9. Would a different form of USAID intervention in the natural resource sector be more appropriate given lessons learned to date under NRMP? Taking into account USAID/Zimbabwe's Country's Strategic Plan for FY 1994-1998 what types of intervention might have maximum benefit in supporting sustainable wildlife and natural resource utilization?
10. What specific changes are needed, if any, in the Project Implementation Schedule and Logical Framework?
11. What other actions, strategies and targets might be adopted to further the objectives of the Zimbabwe NRMP component?

### **Project Design and Implementation Issues**

The team shall review the NRM Project's design and implementation documentation and, based upon such investigations as well as the findings and recommendations from the interim assessment and other relevant enquiries, evaluate the following issues and offer recommendations for the future.

1. To what extent have recommendations made in the Hitchcock/Nangati Interim Assessment (July 1992) been addressed?
2. What actions might be taken to allow for greater local autonomy in utilization of project inputs to respond in a more timely manner to perceived community needs/ Are there actions which can be taken to provide for more rapid disbursement of funds in support of community interventions?
3. Are there further actions that might be taken to reduce the amount of time required by project implementors to comply with USAID financial and administrative requirements and to streamline reporting and reimbursement processes?
4. How effective has the NRM Project Steering Committee been in improving project implementation.
5. What actions and inputs (human, financial, material) are required over the next 18 months and beyond the life of the project to enhance the participation of women in decision-making and the control and management/utilization of community wildlife and natural resources (including access to benefits and revenues)?
6. What is the appropriate balance between the development of physical infrastructure versus local institutional development? Given the above assessment has the rate of funds disbursement for infrastructure support under the project been appropriate?

### **Project Organizational Issues**

## **Annex F**

The evaluation shall include an examination of the institutional goals and operational objectives of the project implementors, as well as the characteristics, orientation and attitudes of personnel in these organizations as they impact upon the implementation of the NRM Project in Zimbabwe. Based on this examination as well as the findings and recommendations from the interim assessment, the team will evaluate the following issues and offer recommendations for the future.

1. How effective and efficient have the implementing partners been as a collective in the Project area? Have they responded appropriately within the context of the Zimbabwe NRMP's project purpose, objectives and operating assumptions?
2. Do implementation problems continue to exist as a consequence of the structure, functions and orientation of the organizations and/or their personnel implementing the project? What strategies and inputs might be required to overcome existing constraints?
3. What are the advantages and/or disadvantages of increased participation from other Ministries, agencies and organisations involved in natural resource management/utilization and community development in support of NRMP and CAMPFIRE objectives? Could the extension activities of other organizations be integrated and strengthened locally in support of CAMPFIRE and NRMP objectives without increasing bureaucratic impediments? How might useful participation be encouraged over the remaining life of the project and beyond?
4. What actions might be taken over the life of project to improve inter-ministerial coordination and communication in support of CAMPFIRE objectives? What strategy might be followed for the longer term?

A more detailed set of questions is provided in Annex A - Evaluation Guide to Organization-Specific Issues. These issues were identified through consultation with the implementing partners during Terms of Reference Development for the mid-term evaluation.

### **Regional Natural Resource Management Project Issues**

1. How applicable is the Regional NRMP design to the Zimbabwe NRMP component?
2. Is the Zimbabwe NRMP component contribution effectively to the furtherance of the overall objectives and purpose of the Regional NRMP?
3. Are there additional interventions that might be initiated in furtherance of Regional NRMP objectives and purpose, and the SADC Natural Resource Strategy?
4. What is the relationship of the Zimbabwe NRMP component to efforts to protect elephant and rhino populations in the region?
5. How might Malawi.SADC coordination of regional analysis and information exchange be enhanced, as well as the flow of output information from the Zimbabwe NRMP component to Malawi/SADC?

### **B. Specific Objectives of the Evaluation**

It is intended that this evaluation should be pro-active in nature. The evaluation team is expected to devote as much or more attention to providing action recommendations where deficiencies and/or new opportunities for achieving or exceeding project outputs are identified as that spent in the review of actual project performance.

The primary objective is to serve as forward planning mid-term evaluation of needs and requirements. A second objective is to address Regional NRMP evaluation issues specified under Section 4.A. above, Specific Implementation Issues to be Addressed During the Evaluation - Regional Natural Resource Management Project Issues.

### **Section Five : Methods and Procedures**

Where applicable the team will follow the format and guidelines established by USAID in the Supplement to Chapter 12, AID Handbook 3, Project Assistance, entitled, "AID Program Design and Evaluation Methodology Report No. 7".

The evaluation shall be conducted by interviews with project beneficiaries, District Council members, the GOZ Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, USAID/Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Trust, Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) and other institutions and persons affected by project activities, and by analysis of project documents, surveys, field visits, and other project output data gathered from beneficiaries under this project.

The team will use the following data collection and analysis methods :

1. Review, all relevant project documentation and interview DNPWLM, ZIMTRUST, CASS and USAID/Zimbabwe staff familiar with the project to review the current status of work, accomplishments and progress made since the initiation of the project and their perception of future needs during the remaining life of the project (and beyond).
2. Where possible interview direct community beneficiaries of the program, with emphasis on beneficiaries below the Chief and Headman level to determine community perceptions of the project and how it could be made more effective.
3. Conduct interviews and discussions with other agencies and organizations, including Government of Zimbabwe departments, safari operators, NGO's and other donors who have knowledge of, or whose activities are affected by, the project. Where appropriate examine work documents, reports, survey results and internal reviews or evaluations that may be of significance to the assessment.
4. Review the management and administrative policies and procedures of the project, with an emphasis on co-ordination of project activity including fiscal issues when relevant.
5. Review and analyze baseline data sets and impact indicators developed by the project for use in determining project progress.
6. Determine whether gender issues are being treated successfully by the project.

The team members may use such statistical and other analytical techniques as they deem appropriate to the tasks assigned them.

USAID will make available all relevant design and implementation documentation as well as CASS survey and analytical reports and project related ZIMTRUST and DNPWLM documents.

## Section Six : Individual Scopes of Work

A five (5) member Evaluation Team will be composed of :

### Team Leader

**Primary Responsibilities :** Coordinate the mid-term evaluation process to ensure assessment objectives are successfully achieved by the individual specialists as well as the team.

### **Summary of Specific Responsibilities :**

#### Project Design and Implementation Issues

1. With other team members determine the extent to which the recommendations made in the Hitchcock/Nangati Interim Assessment (July 1992) have been addressed.
2. Assess with the assistance of other team members the extent to which implementation problems continue to exist as a consequence of the structure, functions and orientation of the organisations and/or their personnel implementing the project.
3. Determine with the assistance of other team members what actions might be taken to allow for greater local autonomy in utilization of project inputs to respond to perceived community needs in a more timely manner. Identify actions which can be taken to provide for more rapid disbursement of funds in support of community interventions.
4. With other team members recommend further actions that might be taken to reduce the amount of time required by project implementors to comply with USAID financial and administrative requirements and to streamline reporting and reimbursement processes.
5. With assistance from other team members assess how the project might foster greater community control and management of non-wildlife resources (e.g. safari hunting, photographic safaris, fisheries, forestry, thatching grass, minerals).
6. Evaluate the effectiveness of the NRM Project Steering Committee in improving project implementation.
7. Assist the Community Development Specialist in identifying actions and inputs (human, financial, material) which may be required over the next 18 months and beyond the life of the project to enhance the participation of women in decision-making and the control and management/utilisation of community wildlife and natural resources (including access to benefits and revenues).
8. With other team members determine how Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) has affected project implementation. Given DNPWLM personnel

constraints imposed by Zimbabwe's ESAP, determine with assistance from Wildlife and Natural Resource Management Administrative Specialist the degree to which the World Bank's proposed program of support will effectively address the Department's deficiencies in institutional capacity (human, material, financial) in a manner that will support NRMP and CAMPFIRE objectives during the remaining life of the NRM project and beyond.

9. Determine with other team members the appropriate balance between the development of physical infrastructure versus local institutional development. Evaluate whether the rate of funds disbursement for infrastructure support under the project has been appropriate.

#### Project Conceptual Issues

10. Determine the extent to which the assumptions made during the project design remain valid. Outline any additional constraints not identified during project design.
11. Given that an objective of the Zimbabwe NRMP is to promote natural resource management, determine with other team members the prospects for this beyond PACD and the actions required to enhance this objective.
12. Assess with other team members whether the four district geographic focus of the Zimbabwe NRMP was appropriate. Evaluate the costs and benefits of the NRMP geographic focus on ZIMTRUST and DNPWLM national support to CAMPFIRE programs outside the NRM project area. Recommend how relationships with other CAMPFIRE and DNPWLM implementors outside the NRMP project area might be strengthened over the remainder of the project and into the year 2000.
13. With assistance from other team members determine what effect the addition of Hwange and Bulilima Mwangwe Districts to the NRMP at a later stage in project design had on the distribution of project inputs to these two districts (and the other project areas) and on the ability of implementors to meet project objectives.
14. Evaluate with the assistance of the other team members the degree to which communities will be able to sustain project objectives and activities (ie. substantial community control over wildlife and natural resources) by PACD and over the next ten years.
15. With the other team members assess the extent to which indicators of project progress and benefits to date (eg. increases in food security or income levels) are measurable.
16. If the community-based resource utilization model is viable, determine with other members what design modifications (eg. institutional involvements and relationships, government vs. non-government participation, life of project, geographic coverage, implementation sequencing, funding levels, etc.), if any, would be appropriate to create sustainable wildlife and natural resource management and provide maximum benefits for producer communities.

17. With other team members determine whether a different form of USAID intervention in the natural resource sector might be more appropriate given lessons learned to date under NRMP. Taking into account USAID/Zimbabwe's Country Strategic Plan for FY 1994-1998 recommend what types of intervention might have maximum benefit in supporting sustainable wildlife and natural resource utilisation in Zimbabwe.
18. Recommend with other team members specific changes needed, if any, in the Project Implementation Schedule and Logical Framework.
19. Determine what other actions, strategies and targets might be adopted to further the objectives of the Zimbabwe NRMP component.

Regional Natural Resource Management Project Issues

20. Assess the applicability of the Regional NRMP design to the Zimbabwe NRMP component.
21. Determine whether the Zimbabwe NRMP component is contributing effectively to the furtherance of the overall objectives and purpose of the Regional NRMP.
22. Recommend additional interventions that might be initiated in furtherance of Regional NRMP objectives and purpose, and the SADC Natural Resource Strategy.
23. Assess the relationship of the Zimbabwe NRMP component to efforts to protect elephant and rhino populations in the region.
24. Recommend how Malawi/SADC coordination of regional analysis and information exchange might be enhanced, as well as the flow of output information from the Zimbabwe NRMP component to Malawi/SADC.

Team Leader Coordination

25. Oversee the activities and tasks of the evaluation team and insure conformance with the mid-term evaluations TORs.
26. Present evaluation results orally to USAID/Zimbabwe and project implementors. Integrate individual team member work products (including evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations) into draft and final mid-term evaluation documents.

Qualifications : Over ten (10) years experience in natural resource management and institutional relationships at the national level in developing countries. Over five (5) years experience with USAID project implementation. At least five years experience working in Africa. Extensive knowledge of NRM projects in Africa and underlying causes for their successes and failures highly desirable. Appropriate degree in a natural resource related field. Proven ability to work well in a team setting under fixed deadlines. Excellent writing and communication skills.

### **Local Government Specialist**

Primary Responsibilities Review all laws and procedures under which district governments operate and which are germane to NRMP and the districts' role in it. Outline what district may do, should do and are prohibited from doing with respect to local control of wildlife resources and divesting control to wards and villages. Interview all district administrators and staffs to determine their views of NRMP; its problems and successes and how the project relates to their administration and administrative responsibilities. Solicit views and comments from all Council Chief executives and Council officers assigned to NRMP and Council wildlife committee to obtain from them specific information about NRMP progress and constraints.

Summary of Specific Responsibilities : under the direction of the Team Leader, the Local Government Specialist will :

1. With assistance from the Community Development Specialist solicit views about the district government role in implementation from ZIMTRUST area managers, the project monitoring officer, DNPWLM and CASS staff. Formulate recommendations to enhance their effectiveness in relating to district government.
2. With assistance from the Natural Resource Planning and Policy Analyst assess the extent to which a clear policy on 'appropriate authority' and guidelines relating to CAMPFIRE has been established by the various agencies involved in the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group and identify actions which may be necessary to make this policy more explicit. Evaluate the degree to which District Councils' understanding of 'appropriate authority' continues to vary from those held by other implementors or community residents. Assess District Council, WADCO and VIDCO current views on community producer communities and identify additional actions which might be taken to foster common perceptions by District Councils, WADCOs and VIDCOs.
3. Determine how District Council/Ward/VIDCO perceptions of ZIMTRUST/DNPWLM/CASS and USAID have affected project implementation and actions which might be taken to improve collaboration among partners in building community development capacity under the NRM Project.

4. Identify steps that might be taken to improve direct DC, WADCO and VIDCO access and communication with Harare-based funding and monitoring/evaluation agents (including USAID, DNPWLM, ZIMTRUST) to improve responsiveness, reduce turnaround time in project approvals and modifications and to minimise paperwork requirements.
5. With assistance from the Community Development Specialist assess whether revenues distributed to producer communities are being used to maximum effect and actions that might be taken to improve community utilisation of these revenues.
6. With assistance from the Community Development Specialist determine whether current percentage distributions of wildlife and natural resource revenues among District Councils and communities are appropriate. Recommend actions which might be taken to encourage further distribution of revenues and further transfer of revenue management responsibility to producer communities.
7. Assist the Team Leader in identifying actions and inputs (human, financial, material) which may be required over the next 18 months and beyond the life of the project to enhance the participation of women in decision-making and the control and management/utilisation of community wildlife and natural resources (including access to benefits and revenues).
8. With assistance from the Community Development Specialist evaluate the extent to which local communities are effectively involved in the 'hands-on' management of their natural resources.
9. With assistance from the Community Development Specialist assess the degree to which communities have become able to make decisions about ways to utilise their resources and how to allocate the revenues/benefits from such utilisation.
10. With assistance from the Community Development Specialist assess the degree to which the project has addressed local peoples social and economic/financial needs.
11. With assistance from the Community Development Specialist determine the extent to which ZIMTRUST has fulfilled its role in training local institutions in community development, management and accounting skills necessary for planning and implementing project activities. Also determine the degree to which ZIMTRUST has been able to extend training not only to executive officers of the District Councils but also to the District Councillors.

12. Assist the Community Development Specialist in determining whether the addition of natural resource managers, trainers or ZIMTRUST area managers to each District Council would be an appropriate use of NRM Project resources during the remaining life of the project. Assess the appropriateness of current CAMPFIRE manager staffing levels and responsibilities, and, if needed, recommend actions that might be taken to increase staffing levels?
13. With assistance from the Natural Resource Planning and Policy Analyst assess how the anticipated (July 93) restructuring and amalgamation of GOZ local authority under the Rural District Council Act of 1988 will affect NRM project objective (eg. the creation of Rural District Councils by combining and restructuring District Councils and Rural Councils).
14. Evaluate the extent to which partial re-instatement of the powers of local chiefs may enhance CAMPFIRE and NRMP objectives.
15. Assist the Natural Resource Planning and Policy Analyst in recommending actions that might be taken among GOZ Ministries and Departments and project implementors to prepare for legislative change to further devolve authority to WADCOs and VIDCOs for community management/utilisation of wildlife and natural resources.
16. Assist the Natural Resource Planning and Policy Analyst in determining how project implementors might improve communication with national and local political officials to increase political support for CAMPFIRE, for achievement of NRMP objectives and for future interventions.
17. Assess efforts at coordinated land-use planning at the District, Ward and VIDCO levels and recommend actions to foster greater coordination (eg. support to Agritex).
18. Identify additional actions that might be taken by District Councils, Wards and VIDCOs to provide adequate financial and material support to community CAMPFIRE workers for wildlife management, protection, PAC and wildlife/ecological monitoring.
19. Assist the Community Development Specialist in assessing the extent to which ZIMTRUST administrative/financial support to District Councils has been adequate and appropriate.
20. Assist the Community Development Specialist in evaluating whether the balance between ZIMTRUST institutional development support and infrastructural support to Districts, WADCOs and VIDCOs has been appropriate.
21. Assist the Community Development Specialist in assessing to what extent the existing responsibilities of community CAMPFIRE workers in the Districts are appropriate and manageable.

22. Assist the Community Development Specialist in determining the extent to which ZIMTRUST has promoted local institutional development and the constraints it has faced.

Qualification At least ten (10) years direct involvement in developing local government institutions, and at least five (5) years experience in local government/community development in Zimbabwe. Professional skills in public policy formulation and implementation at the local level. Extensive knowledge of successful District, Ward and Village level. Extensive knowledge of successful District, Ward and Village level government operations in other African contexts highly desirable. Appropriate degree in a field applicable to public policy and administration at the local level. Proven ability to work well in a team setting under fixed deadlines. Excellent writing and communication skills.

### **Community Development and Small-Scale Enterprise Specialist**

Primary Responsibilities : Evaluate community development issues and successes under the Zimbabwe NRMP and suggest additional approaches for strengthening NRMP community development initiatives.

Summary of Specific Responsibilities : Under the direction of the Team Leader, the Community Development/Small-Scale Enterprise Specialist will :

1. Interview representatives sets of ward and village wildlife committees in each of the project areas. Assess the effectiveness of local organisation and suggest steps that should be taken to improve it.
2. Interview a representative group of "traditional" leaders (chiefs, headmen, sabhukus) depending on the area. Suggest actions that should be taken to integrate project implementation with traditional views and customs.
3. Consult with ordinary citizens (not leaders or committee members) about the progress and problems of the project in the various districts. Formulate actions that should be taken to enhance local participation.
4. With assistance from the Local Government Specialist determine the extent to which ZIMTRUST has promoted local institutional development and the constraints it has faced.
5. Determine how residents in the project's target Wards view ZIMTRUST and whether ZIMTRUST and District Councils have adequately collaborated in building community development capacity in the NRM Project areas.
6. Evaluate the adequacy of orientation and training of ZIMTRUST personnel.

7. With assistance from the Local Government Specialist determine the extent to which ZIMTRUST has fulfilled its role in training representatives of local institutions in community development, management and accounting skills necessary for planning and implementing project activities. Also determine the degree to which ZIMTRUST has been able to extend training not only to executive officers of the District Councils but also to the District Councillors.
8. Evaluate how effective ZIMTRUST has been in developing and/or disseminating appropriate training materials in necessary community development, management and accounting skills.
9. Evaluate whether ZIMTRUST's institutional development monitoring (POM) system is being used to maximum effect and what additional actions might be taken to further strengthen this component.
10. Assist the Team Leader in recommending actions and inputs (human, financial, material) which may be required over the next 18 months and beyond the life of the project to enhance the participation of women in decision-making and the control and management/utilization of community wildlife and natural resources (including access to benefits and revenues).
11. Evaluate ZIMTRUST's effectiveness in assessing the needs of women, facilitating communication of these expressed needs to VIDCOs, WADCOs and District Councils, in providing a mechanism to ensure that women's concerns in wildlife and natural resource management/utilization are conveyed to District Councils, and in informing women of their rights and obligations under the project.
12. Assess ZIMTRUST's effectiveness in expanding the sustainable and profitable use of the natural resource base by women (e.g. by promoting a general increase in the level of economic activities, by transferring technical and problem-solving skills, by reducing constraints that they face such as provision of water, and by enhancing women's access to resource income-generating opportunities such as the harvesting and processing of veld products).
13. Determine how successful ZIMTRUST has been in fostering expanded women's involvement on community wildlife committees.
14. Determine the extent to which ZIMTRUST has the capacity to promote the examination of gender issues and women's involvement in CAMPFIRE through other approaches such as regional or national seminar(s).
15. With assistance from the Local Government Specialist assess the degree to which ZIMTRUST administrative/financial support to District Councils has been adequate and appropriate.

## Annex F

16. Evaluate whether the balance between ZIMTRUST institutional development support to WADCOs and VIDCOs and infrastructure development has been appropriate.
17. Assess the extent to which the existing responsibilities of community CAMPFIRE workers in the Districts are appropriate and manageable.
18. Determine whether an accelerated approach to training of Community CAMPFIRE workers and local community leaders would be appropriate and feasible during the remaining life of project. Identify actions which may be necessary to develop a systematic training plan for community CAMPFIRE workers and community leaders at the District, WADCO and VIDCO levels.
19. With assistance from the Wildlife and Natural Resource Management Administrative Specialist assess the extent to which DNPWLM and ZIMTRUST have collaborated in training for wildlife and natural resource monitoring and wildlife protection. Identify mechanisms to improve perceptions of DNPWLM by residents in the project's target WADCOs and VIDCOs.
20. Assess whether inputs to ZIMTRUST (human, material and financial for community development have been used appropriately. Determine whether they have been sufficient for the organization to carry out its role under the project.
21. With assistance from the Local Government Specialist determine whether the addition of natural resource managers, trainers or ZIMTRUST area managers to each District Council would be an appropriate use of NRM Project resources during the remaining life of the project. Assess the appropriateness of current CAMPFIRE manager staffing levels and responsibilities, and, if needed, recommend actions that might be taken to increase staffing levels.
22. Recommend additional inputs (personnel, training, material and financial support) which may be necessary over the near-term to strengthen ZIMTRUST's role in developing community capacity to carry out effective community development and local management/utilization of wildlife and natural resources.
23. Identify additional actions that might be taken to reduce the amount of ZIMTRUST staff time devoted to dealing with USAID regulations and to handling the various administrative and managerial demands that are required of them under the ZIMTRUST grant agreement.
24. Suggest actions which might be taken to further improve ZIMTRUST/USAID communication and coordination on financial and administrative procedures.
25. Assist the Local Government Specialist in soliciting views about local participation in implementation from ZIMTRUST area managers, the project monitoring officer, DNPWLM and CASS staff, and in formulating recommendations to enhance their effectiveness in relating to district government.

## Annex F

26. Assist the Local Government Specialist in evaluating the extent to which local communities are effectively involved in the 'hands-on' management of their natural resources.
27. Assist the Local Government Specialist in assessing the degree to which communities have become able to make decisions about ways to utilize their resources and how to allocate the revenues/benefits from such utilization.
28. Assist the Local Government Specialist in assessing the degree to which the project has addressed local people's social and economic/financial needs.
29. Assist the Local Government Specialist in determining whether current percentage distributions of wildlife and natural resource revenues among District Councils and communities are appropriate and in recommending actions which might be taken to encourage further distribution of revenues and further transfer of revenue management responsibility to producer communities.
30. Assist the Local Government Specialist in assessing whether revenues distributed to producer communities are being used to maximum effect and actions that might be taken to improve community utilization of these revenues.
31. Evaluate the usefulness of CASS studies and analyses to project implementors and CASS's effectiveness in disseminating research results and advisory services.
32. Recommend actions and inputs that may be required to improve communication of research results and provision of advisory services with other implementing agencies or organizations whose activities affect, or could affect, achievement of NRMP and CAMPFIRE objectives.
33. Identify further actions which might be taken to improve CASS/USAID administrative relationships.
34. Recommend actions that might be taken by CASS and USAID to encourage the University of Zimbabwe and the university bursary to provide CASS with greater fiscal and administrative autonomy.
35. Evaluate CASS's institutional needs and capacity building requirements to improve the Centres's effectiveness in support of NRMP and CAMPFIRE objectives.

**Qualifications:** At least ten (10) years direct involvement in community development and small-scale enterprise training in Africa or other Third World settings, with at least five (5) years experience in community development related work. A minimum of five (5) years in establishing sustainable small-scale community-based enterprises in rural settings and professional skills in socio-economic assessment and monitoring at the community level. Natural resource management experience an advantage. Extensive knowledge of successful community/private sector joint ventures and sustainable small enterprise projects in Africa highly desirable. Appropriate degree in a field applicable to community development. Proven ability to work, will in a team setting under fixed deadlines. Excellent writing and communication skills.

### **Wildlife and Natural Resource Management Administrative Specialist**

#### Primary Responsibilities:

To evaluate the effectiveness of DNPWLM and ZIMTRUST in building community capacity in wildlife and natural resource management and protection and to identify additional actions and inputs which may be required to improve community wildlife management/utilization, monitoring, problem animal control (PAC) and wildlife protection in the project areas.

Summary of Specific Responsibilities: Under the direction of the Team Leader, the Wildlife and Natural Resource Management Administrative Specialist will:

1. Assess the degree to which DNPWLM and District Councils, WADCOs and VIDCOs have adequately collaborated in the management, monitoring and protection of wildlife in the Project areas.
2. Determine whether inputs to DNPWLM (human, material and financial) for wildlife conservation have been used appropriately and whether they have been sufficient for DNPWLM to carry out its role under the project. Determine whether personnel have received adequate training and orientation.
3. Assist the Community Development Specialist in assessing the extent to which DNPWLM and ZIMTRUST have collaborated in training for wildlife and natural resource monitoring and wildlife protection and in identifying mechanisms to improve perceptions of DNPWLM by residents in the project's target WADCOs and VIDCOs.
4. Recommend how DNPWLM might become more effective in training of project area communities in wildlife and natural resource management, monitoring and protection (e.g. village leaders, wildlife committees, teachers, Community CAMPFIRE Workers, etc.).

5. Suggest additional actions and inputs which may be required to enhance the Department's role in developing community capacity to carry out effective wildlife and natural resource management, monitoring and protection over the life of the NRM Project and the longer-term.
6. Identify additional actions which may be necessary to ensure the NRMP DNPWLM extension/interpretative program component is implemented successfully.
7. Suggest additional actions which might be taken to increase DNPWLM middle management understanding and support of CAMPFIRE principles.
8. Assess the extent to which DNPWLM regional offices have control over project inputs (human, material, financial). Recommend actions that might be taken to increase regional DNPWLM control.
9. Assist the Natural Resource Planning and Policy Analyst in determining the degree to which other non-governmental organizations involved in wildlife and natural resource management might further assist the DNPWLM in carrying out village, ward and district level training and capacity building.
10. Assist the Natural Resource Planning and Policy Analyst in determining the degree to which DNPWLM responsibilities as outlined in the Project Paper (e.g. wildlife and ecological monitoring, land-use planning, enforcement) might be shared with other agencies or organizations.
11. Identify actions and inputs (human, material, financial) which may be required to improve problem animal control (PAC) and wildlife protection in the project area, both by DNPWLM and community CAMPFIRE workers over the remaining life of the project and beyond.
12. Given DNPWLM personnel constraints imposed by Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Adjustment Program assist the Team Leader in determining the degree to which the World Bank's proposed program of support will effectively address the Department's deficiencies in institutional capacity (human, material, financial) in a manner that will support NRMP and CAMPFIRE objectives during the remaining life of the NRM Project and beyond.
13. Assist the Natural Resource Planning and Policy Analyst in identifying additional actions which might be taken to further improve NPWLM/USAID communication and coordination on financial and administrative procedures.

**Qualifications:** A minimum of ten (10) years experience in wildlife management administration and knowledge of civil service system organization and personnel development planning, especially in Zimbabwe, organizational management and administration with an emphasis on mid- and lower-level staff development. At least five (5) years experience in Zimbabwe or other Southern African contexts as an organization and management advisor. Extensive knowledge of alternative approaches to civil service operations in developing countries and familiarity with alternative cost-effective approaches to wildlife/natural resource monitoring in African countries highly desirable. Proven skills in budgetary and financial management. Proven ability to work well in a team setting under fixed deadlines. Excellent writing and communication skills.

### **Natural Resource Planning and Policy Analyst**

**Primary Responsibilities:** Assess Zimbabwe's institutional arrangements in support of community-based management/utilization of wildlife and natural resources, policies, programs and legislation. Recommend specific strategies for improving community development/natural resource policy, planning, legislation and regulations to enhance interministerial and interorganizational cooperation and coordination.

**Summary of Specific Responsibilities:** Under the direction of the Team Leader, the Natural Resource Planning and Policy Analyst will:

1. Interview relevant people at the ministerial level of government to assess commitment to NRMP and the state of communication and cooperation within this level and with lower levels about the project.
2. Determine with other team members how effective and efficient the implementing partners have been as a collective in the Project area. Evaluate the extent to which they have responded appropriately within the context of the Zimbabwe NRMP's project purpose, objectives and operating assumptions.
3. Evaluate the degree to which USAID has become more flexible in its approach to project implementation to support the NRMP's ostensibly 'bottom-up' community development orientation as a result of recommendations identified in the interim assessment.
4. Identify additional opportunities for simplifying USAID administrative procedures or organizational arrangements (or for increasing USAID flexibility in interpreting financial and administrative requirements) to improve project effectiveness among project partners.
5. With assistance from the Wildlife and Natural Resource Management Administrative Specialist identify additional actions which might be taken to further improve NPWLM/USAID communication and coordination on financial and administrative procedures.

## Annex F

6. Assess the degree to which the CAMPFIRE Association's current responsibilities are appropriate and manageable.
7. Assess CAMPFIRE Association relationships to the four districts under NRMP and the benefits they receive from CAMPFIRE Association membership.
8. Suggest what additional role the CAMPFIRE Association might play in resolving conflicts and promoting CAMPFIRE objectives at the District Council, Ward and VIDCO level and what resources (human, material, financial) would be required from donors for this purpose.
9. Determine the legal status of the CAMPFIRE Association with the Government of Zimbabwe and actions which may be necessary for the Association to receive grant support from USAID.
10. With the assistance of the Wildlife and Natural Resource Management Administrative Specialist and other team members determine the degree to which other non-governmental organizations involved in wildlife and natural resource management might further assist the DNPWLM in carrying out village, ward and district level training and capacity building.
11. Determine what actions might be taken over the life of project to improve interministerial coordination and communication in support of CAMPFIRE objectives and strategies which might be followed over the longer term.
12. With assistance from other team members evaluate the advantages and/or disadvantages of increased participation from other Ministries, agencies and organizations involved in natural resource management/utilization and community development in support of NRMP and CAMPFIRE objectives (e.g. Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development, the Forestry Commission, the Department of Natural Resources, the Cooperatives Department of the Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Cooperatives Development, the Ministry of Education, NGOs, Agritex extension workers, community development workers, rural community coordinators, district community development officers, environmental health technicians and teachers). Assess whether the extension activities of such organizations could be integrated and strengthened locally in support of CAMPFIRE and NRMP objectives without increasing bureaucratic impediments. Recommend how useful participation might be encouraged over the remaining live of the project and beyond.
13. With the assistance of the Wildlife and natural Resource Management Administrative Specialist determine the degree to which DNPWLM responsibilities as outlined in the Project Paper (e.g. wildlife and ecological monitoring, land-use planning, enforcement) might be shared with other agencies or organizations.

## Annex F

14. With assistance from the Local Government Specialist and other team members determine how project implementors might improve communication with national and local political officials to increase political support for CAMPFIRE, for achievement of NRMP objectives and for future interventions.
15. With assistance from the Local Government Specialist and other team members recommend actions that might be taken among GOZ Ministries and Departments and project implementors to prepare for legislative change to further devolve authority to WADCOs and VIDCOs for community management/utilization of wildlife and natural resources.
16. Assess the degree to which other donors/organisations may be interested in supporting NRMP CAMPFIRE objectives during the remaining life of the project or beyond.
17. Assist the Local Government Specialist in assessing the extent to which a clear policy on 'appropriate authority' and guidelines relating to CAMPFIRE have been established by the various agencies involved in the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group and in identifying actions which may be necessary to make this policy more explicit. Assist in evaluating the degree to which District Council's understanding of 'appropriate authority' continues to vary from those held by other implementors or community residents, in assessing District Council, WADCO and VIDCO views on community participation and the distribution of wildlife revenues to producer communities and in identifying additional actions which might be taken to foster common perceptions by District Councils, WADCOs and VIDCOs.
18. Assist the Local Government Specialist in assessing how the anticipated (July 93) restructuring and amalgamation of GOZ local authority under the Rural District Council Act of 1988 will affect NRM project objectives (e.g. the creation of Rural District Councils by combining and restructuring District Councils and Rural Councils).

**Qualifications:** Over ten (10) years international experience with national-level natural resources management policies, policy-making and legislation, and institutional relationships involving Government Ministries. At least five years experience working in sub-Saharan Africa. Extensive knowledge of NRM projects in Africa and underlying causes for their successes and failures highly desirable. Appropriate degree in a natural resource related field. Proven ability to work well in a team setting under fixed deadlines. Excellent writing and communication skills.

## **Section Seven : Reporting Requirements**

The format of the evaluation report will follow AID guidelines established in the "The Supplement of Chapter 12 of AID Handbook 3", and shall organise materials responding to the Statement of Work and include an executive summary not to exceed five pages, findings, conclusions and recommendations, lessons learned, a table of contents, the body of the report, and appropriate appendices (eg. logical, framework, evaluation scope of work, contact list, bibliography, etc).

The team leader, and other team members as appropriate, shall meet at a minimum weekly, while in Zimbabwe, with the USAID/Zimbabwe NRMP Project Administrator for a progress report. Any issues encountered will be raised during these meetings. The team leader shall prepare a brief annotated outline for the proposed final report within the first three days of the assessment, together with individual team member task responsibilities, estimates of level of effort per task and a proposed time schedules for interviews and preparation of draft sections for each member of the team. The Project Administrator will review the draft outlines and evaluation schedules and make such adjustments as shall be required by USAID/Zimbabwe. The report will be written jointly by the assessment team under the coordination of the team leader who will be responsible for submission of the document to relevant institutions and for leading debriefing sessions and presentation of the final draft report.

The evaluation team leader shall submit three copies of a typed draft report to USAID/Zimbabwe for comment no more than four weeks after date commencement of the evaluation and no later than five days prior to the team's departure. A comprehensive oral report (briefing) should be given to the Mission Project Implementation Committee two days later.

Within two weeks of submission of the draft report the team leader will receive comments on the report from USAID/Zimbabwe. Two additional days per team member will be provided for additional revisions that may be required by USAID/Zimbabwe prior to finalizing the assessment document. An additional five days shall be provided for team leader incorporation of team member and USAID/Zimbabwe suggested revisions. The team leader shall then respond to these comments and submit twelve copies (eleven bound and one not bound) of the final report to USAID/Zimbabwe no later than two weeks after receipt of comments.

**Annex G: Project Implementation Issues to be Addressed by the Interim Evaluation (TOR, pp. 11-35)**

NOTE: The numbers in the following table refer to TOR task numbers. The table shows the correspondence between the TOR for the overall assignment and the tasks assigned to individual consultants.

Code:	TL	Team Leader
	CDSSSES	Community Development & Small-Scale Enterprises
	LGS	Local Government
	NRPPA	Natural Resource Planning and Policy Advisor
	WNRMAS	Wildlife and Natural Resource Administration

## Annex G

### Project Implementation Issues to be Addressed by the Interim Evaluation (TOR, pp. 11-35)

Issue	Responsibility				
	TL	CDSSES	LGS	NRPPA	WNRMAS
<u>Conceptual issues</u> (TOR, pp.11-12)					
1. To what extent do design assumptions remain valid?	10				
2. Is the 4-district Project focus appropriate?	12	1			
3. What was the effect of 2 additional districts during Project design have on input distribution and the ability of the Project to meet its objectives?	13				
4. What is the opportunity for natural resource management to continue after the end of Project activities?	11, 14				
5. To what extent can communities carry on Project activities and objectives after the end of Project activities?					
6. To what extent are indicators of Project progress and benefits measurable?	15		22		
7. What design modifications are appropriate to ensure Project benefits and create maximum benefits?	16		3, 10		
8. How has ESAP affected implementation of NRM?	8				
9. Would a different form of USAID intervention better address NRM issues? What might these forms be?	17				
10. What specific changes are needed, if any, in the Project Implementation Schedule and Logical Framework?	18	2, 3			
11. What other actions, strategies and targets might further the objectives of the Zimbabwe NRMP?	19	2	2, 22		

## Annex G

Issue	Responsibility				
	TL	CDSSSES	LGS	NRPPA	WNRMAS
<u>Design and implementation issues</u> (TOR pp. 13-14)					
1. To what extent have the recommendations of the Interim Assessment been addressed?	1	6, 7, 8, 9, 20		17	2
2. What actions might permit increased local autonomy in the utilization of Project inputs to respond to community needs?	3, 5	4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31	1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 18, 19		
3. Are there opportunities to reduce the time required to fulfil USAID financial and administrative requirements?	4	23, 24, 33, 34	4	3, 4, 5	
4. How effective has the NRM Project Steering Committee been in improving Project implementation?	6	23			
5. What actions and inputs are required to enhance the participation of women.	7	10, 11, 12, 13, 14,	7		
6. What is the appropriate balance between development of physical infrastructure and local institutional development? Has Project funding of infrastructure been appropriate?	9	16	20		
<u>Project organizational issues</u> (TOR, p. 13)					
1. How effective have the implementing partners been as a collective? Have they responded appropriately to the requirements of the Project?		15, 35	11, 12	1, 2, 18	1, 3
2. Do implementation problems continue? Might inputs overcome these constraints?	2	17, 20, 21, 35	11, 21		1
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of increased participation by other agencies, institutions, and ministries?		18, 21, 32	13, 14, 15, 16	6, 10, 12, 13, 16	
4. What actions might improve interministerial coordination and cooperation to support CAMPFIRE objectives?		18, 21		7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15	

## Annex G

Issue	Responsibility				
	TL	CDSSSES	LGS	NRPPA	WNRMAS
<u>Regional NRM issues</u> (TOR, p. 14)					
1. How applicable is the Regional NRMP design to Zimbabwe's NRMP component?	20				
2. Is Zimbabwe's component contributing to the objectives and purpose of the Regional NRMP?	21				
3. Are there additional interventions that might further regional NRMP objectives and purpose, as well as enhance SADC's Natural Resource Strategy?	22				
4. What is the relationship of Zimbabwe NRMP to regional efforts to protect elephant and rhino populations?	23				
5. How might Malawi-SADC coordination of regional analysis and information exchange be improved, as well as its flow of information to Zimbabwe NRMP?	24				

NOTE: This tabular TOR is an abbreviated form of the TOR provided as part of this contract. Readers should refer to the original document for further explanation of issues and activities. Numbers in cells refer to individual TOR task numbers in the original contract.

## COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The **objective** of community development is to get each village progressively moving towards sustainably practising environmentally-safe natural resource management in a manner that is both in accordance with government policy yet customised according to the prevailing

- (a) state of the natural resources each village has the right to use;
- (b) accessibility of each village to resources, markets and any regional institution including credit or other sources of assistance that may be made available;
- (c) individual and collective willingness and capability of the villagers and villages; and
- (d) real and perceived needs of individuals and groups of villagers and villages.

There are other **objectives** which are implicit in this overall objective that need to be simultaneously realised. Amongst these are the progressive development of villager and village awareness and understanding of

- (a) the extent to which the quality of life of each villager and village depends on how well they are able to protect their immediate environment;
- (b) the need for change; and
- (c) how changes in both the immediate environment and quality of life stem from the individual and collective choice of activities and inter-relationships and trade-offs between, for example, activity choice, quality of life, choice of foodstuffs (product mix and diet), access to the safe domestic water supplies, and waste disposal, etc....

All of these objectives involve choice. Such choices could be prescribed and imposed. Or they can be made in a participatory manner, and there is a whole spectrum of intermediate positions. The more prescriptive an approach the less the need to foster participant awareness and understanding, and the more difficult it is to attain a self-sustaining, self-enhancing result. Under a participatory approach the choices will vary with the circumstances that confront each villager and village at the time they are called upon to participate in a decision. One of these circumstances would be the level of assistance offered. Increasing the levels of assistance provided in order to entice villager or village participation may enhance initial levels of participation, but it will also mask the extent to which whatever is achieved will be continued once the levels of assistance provided are no longer available. To maximise post-Project sustainability, the Project would put in place an **ongoing process** that enables villagers and villages to: identify their needs; propose their own and be exposed to and consider alternative solutions; choose, then plan and implement their preferences with **whatever levels of assistance can be provided**. The only restraints placed on villager and village choice by other participants (the government and regional officials, the financiers and any technical assistance provided) is that whatever is chosen must be demonstrably in line with prevailing government, regional and Project policies and objectives to be eligible for any form of Project or other sources of assistance.

We suggest a village-level, resident-centred problem census problem-solving (RC-PCPS) planning process. This ongoing approach, which is repeated annually, helps individuals identify and rank the problems they face and to seek out and suggest their own solutions. It introduces and demonstrates in-village and on-farm alternatives to these solutions, and provides sufficient resources to allow individuals to prove they can achieve the same results. It leaves the choice of which solution to adopt to the individual and groups of individuals and villages. Some of these decisions will be associated with external assistance; others will not — and that information must be provided and understood by each individual and group before they make their decisions. Appropriately designed, a RC-PCPS planning process produces a succession of rolling annual plans that marry individual willingness to participate with available levels of individual, government and external assistance. The entire process is carried out in the village with the individuals and this requires regular visits to each village. In so doing it automatically produces solutions that can be implemented relative to the resources, capabilities and ease or difficulty with which each village can be accessed.

The approach is initiated with simple, easily understood concepts and activities, and is progressively evolved at rates commensurate with the initial and subsequent levels of awareness, understanding and proficiency the villagers and villages and regional staff display. It is iterative, non-threatening and people-oriented. It is non-prescriptive and basically learned on-job by doing, using the villagers and villages and existing in-line regional staff working with the Project-funded advisers. As it evolves any need for institutional reform also emerges, but initially it only involves the provision of staff that can be deployed to work full-time on the approach as they are trained to become community development specialists. After three years (iterations) the villagers and villages and regional staff are generally sufficiently well practised in its techniques to continue with little outside assistance. The more proficient of the in-line staff are generally also sufficiently confident to repeat the process in new villages. But, as a process, it is always capable of being improved. Indeed, as the Project area develops and as markets appear and villagers and village aspirations grow, it is important that the process continues to evolve as a means of introducing new concepts, activities and procedures, and to avoid stagnating to the point of no longer being relevant to the emerging demands of the more developed participants. The institutional setting is generally in need of similar evolutionary adjustment.

The nature and extent of participation by communities that indicate a willingness and capacity to become involved with the Project would be determined using RC-PCPS techniques. This is conducted in the village and is a non-threatening, focused discussion that uses small group dynamics to elicit: first, a complete and ranked census of the real and perceived problems of individuals, households, and the village as a whole; and second, the community's proposed solutions to these problems.

The RC-PCPS approach provides the setting in which all participants can contribute. No problem is rejected; all solutions are considered. Community members are the only contributors. The final prioritisation of problems and preferred solutions is theirs. The Project's contributions are confined to facilitating the creation of the setting in which the RC-PCPS approach can be conducted. The Project-provided RC-PCPS "facilitation" must not contribute to the discussion other than to explain the process. No promises are made to avoid raising expectations at this early stage of planning.

The problem census process is flexible, but normally would involve the following steps for a village in the Project area:

## Annex H

- Arrange problem census time and location after initial contact with the village. At this stage options for segregation are left open but the village leader and other community members are invited to make a decision by the time of the problem census.
- The problem census commences with the coming together of the community. If segregation is preferred, men and women may meet in separate locations. Problems from all groups are considered equally, but we do not believe it should impose outside values on participating communities during the problem census. The poor and women can be targeted by careful definition of the activity framework. The Project's Community Development Specialist would explain the process and, with other staff from regional institutions, facilitate the problem census. Participants work as individuals, small groups, and then as a community in a structured process to record, either with paper and pencil or through the facilitators, problems which they perceive at the household and village level.
- Participants regard the lists of ranked problems from small groups and collectively prioritise these problems to form a ranked problem census for the village community. This is recorded by the facilitator. After this, appropriate community groups and institutional staff would visit selected areas of village land to clarify the nature of priority problems and explore possible solutions to those falling within the mandate of the Project.
- Possible solutions to priority problems are identified by participants with involvement from the Project. This is the first problem-solving session which introduces Project components, and the framework within which the Project can work, to participants. It also clearly identifies problems which are outside the Project mandate. Solutions to problems which fall within the Project mandate are generally recorded to form an indicative village plan. These solutions become activities for detailed discussions during the second problem-solving session where annual village plans are prepared.

Solutions identified during the first problem-solving sessions are used by the Project to prepare a draft village plan. This is indicative only and is used to implement Project activities with participating communities. Budgets for each village area are used to ensure that activities selected during the second problem-solving session are appropriate to institutional capacity and Project budgets. The first problem-solving session would include discussion and development of rangeland management plans with villages. This would include strategies for community management of common lands.

Figure H.A presents the logic of the planning cycle which the Project would use to plan and implement Project activities. Figure H.B represents the relationship between problems identified by community problem census and problems which fall within the Project framework. Problems in set (A) fall outside the Project objectives and cannot be addressed by the Project. In our experience, villagers will accept this, and prefer to know what the Project will address. They are innately suspicious of Projects claiming to be able to solve all problems. Problems in set (B) have solutions which fall within the Project's framework. These components will be readily adopted within village and household capacity to do so. These components can be used as incentives to increase adoption of solutions to problems in set (C). These are components which solve problems which the Project wishes to address but which are not regarded as priorities by participating villagers. Such components often have collective rather

than individual benefits, as well as a longer pay-back period, and may include issues such as wasteland and wildlife management. Balancing (B) and (C) is the art which participatory natural resource management requires for successful implementation.




Figure H.A. Proposed village planning cycle




Figure H.B. Village problems and Project activities

After the community's problems and solutions have been documented, the same small group dynamic techniques that comprise RC-PCPS are used to discuss in detail with participants what the Project has to offer, the conditions under which the activity must operate, and the nature of each activity the Project's participating organisations are mandated to implement with that particular village. Solutions to priority problems falling within the mandate of the Project are identified from the menu of Project-supported options available to participants. Each solution or set of solutions is discussed in detail and an implementation plan agreed between appropriate government institutions and community groups with inputs from the Project. A village-level land management plan for each village could form an important part of the package of solutions to be implemented by the Project. The end point of this procedure is an annual plan of natural resource management activities which the villagers have chosen. It is their plan of action for the coming year and has been chosen from within the spectrum of interventions and treatments the Project is mandated to undertake.

The annual village plan identifies who is to do what, where and when. It clearly identifies each villager or group of villagers who have agreed to participate and the land areas on which this participation is to take place. It equally identifies which agency would deliver Project inputs, which of these Project inputs would be free (if any), and the price and conditions associated with payment for other components. Natural resource management plans would detail how community members using those resources would organise themselves to collectively manage them. The grouping, selected and organised by the community, would be the vehicle through which Project activities would be implemented. The planning process is completely informal. It is documented on the wall sheets and used during the RC-PCPS sessions, and it is from these that the lists of participating households, agreed activities and hence required inputs are drawn up by the Project.

Once annual village plans are finalised they are aggregated into an annual plan for each ward and district. The district plan is then disaggregated by government and non-government agencies. These components then become part of those agencies' annual plans. Each agency then forwards its Project activities in its normal annual budget. Similarly, annual District plans are aggregated to form an Annual Project Plan which outlines activities, budgets and financial commitments for the Project, the counterpart agencies, and community groups. This forms the annual outputs against which Project implementation is monitored. Expected outputs, expenditure and implementation targets are detailed in the annual Project plan as are flows of funds and participants.

Commitments made during problem-solving sessions, by participants and by institutions providing services or technical support, form the basis for Project implementation. These commitments would be recorded in writing and would include an implementation calendar for certain activities; labour and other inputs from participants; services, equipment and training provided by institutions; and procurement needs. The detailed implementation schedule would then be put into operation. This would start with appropriate demonstrations and research, as well as implementation of activities which solve priority problems identified by the participants. Participating households could replant gullies, and habitat management groups in each participating village could meet. Project activities and daily work would overlap in many cases and gradually the village planning process would become one of the steps in the decision-making process at individual, household, and village levels. In this way, communities in the Project area will start to become more conscious of their role as natural resource managers.

Similarly, government institutions will increasingly work together and rely on participatory approaches to program planning and implementation.

The RC-PCPS process is repeated annually but the time with which the process can be conducted and processed into the required village and Project annual plans declines as the communities and Project staff involved become more familiar with the procedure. By Project completion there would be a wide spectrum of natural resource management experience amongst participants. Participatory area planning is a rolling annual mechanism which quickly becomes institutionalised as a village decision-making process.

The Project and its participating agencies would monitor the implementation of Project activities. In particular, it would monitor **where** interventions are actually implemented, to ensure that they are consistent with village and District plans and the objectives of the Project. They would monitor the **area** treated by each intervention so that incremental production information can be derived from yield data provided by existing agricultural statistics and auto-recorded information. Finally, the Project's management unit would monitor the rate of Project implementation.

We believe that the monitoring process should itself contribute to the strengthening of people's capacities for participation and natural resource management. This is because participation is not a short-term objective. Auto-recording monitoring techniques exist for use in participatory natural resource management Projects. These rely on the development of monitoring strategies which provide answers of interest to participants as well as to the Project. Annual activities are not difficult to monitor quantitatively (i.e. what was done) but with most natural resource management Projects it is also important to monitor **where** activities were implemented. This is a spatial as well as quantitative monitoring system which is required. A simple **geographical information system** (GIS) can increase the efficiency of this work where large Project areas are to be monitored.

Where there are large numbers of participants in a Project and there are equity issues concerning gender, ethnicity, or poverty, monitoring data need to be collected at least to the household level. This volume of data is most constructively used with a **Management Information System** (MIS) which can identify beneficiaries, Project activities, and flows of Project investment. Self-recorded data collected from each participating household provide a powerful auditing tool when combined with a MIS.

Monitoring data would be used at village and District level to modify Project activities to better adapt them to the local environment and to ensure that Project interventions are implemented in accordance with micro-catchment plans.

In a Project such as this, in which the risk of physical degradation of the land resource is being countered, it is essential to centre work around the people actually carrying out the daily operations which cause the unwitting degradation. In the villages it often is the women who do much of this. They must therefore be involved in all the micro-planning if any degree of success is to be achieved.

It is easy to state the solution but harder to achieve it. But this particular problem is important and to some extent the ultimate success or failure of the Project hangs on the ability to achieve the total support of village women. In particular, we give strong encouragement to the Project and its participating agencies to recruit as many women staff as possible. Particular support is essential to the training of women from the staff and from the villages, and several local training consultants will be women.

For the Project to establish both an effective management regime and an operational geographical information system, it will be essential that computerised MISs be developed. These systems would have the objectives of providing a linkage between Project planning, monitoring and decision-making activities and streamlining Project information flows. The systems developed would be capable of providing rapid collation, analysis and management reporting of the data so that its timely presentation would be of most advantage to Project management.

With this focus and under the circumstances currently prevailing in the Project area, the success of community development would be measured by the success of the process to continue after Project completion. This translates to the extent to which the process has enabled individuals and groups of villagers and eventually villages to make and continue to make responsible decisions for change that are in accordance with government, regional, and Project policies and objectives. Tangible measures of the component's sustainable success include: the number of villages involved in the Project; the number of groups in these villages actually making and implementing their own decisions; improvements in quality of life; and measurable reductions in environmental degradation. In effect, the process is designed to ameliorate constraints arising from villager and village reluctance to participate. This increases the rates at which villagers and villages choose to adopt and continue to practice new activities. Progressively, the rates of participation and the adoption of new practices rise to the limits imposed by the availability of resources, technology, villager capability and markets.

The training elements in the demonstration and skill improvement described above would be further augmented by the use of field days at the site of the Project-controlled demonstrations and more progressive Project participants' fields, visits to other villages, and study tours to villages and activities in neighbouring districts. All of the processes and activities to be introduced could be underpinned by the use of mimeograph cartoon fliers that show each step that needs to be followed to achieve the required results. Where possible, video material could also be used, and the exchange of such material between villages used to develop a twin village concept prior to attempting to arrange reciprocal exchanges of village personnel to learn first-hand from each other. This approach is geared to the adaptation of technologies and activities already in use in other developing countries. There is currently more than sufficient material available from these sources to meet the demands of community development in the Project area for at least half a decade, by which time a nationally-sponsored extension and research Project might be available to build on the adaptive capabilities established in this Project.