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**PROGRAMMATIC EVALUATION OF THE EDUCATION SUPPORT
AND TRAINING PROJECT : UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT : SOUTH AFRICAN MISSION**

Dr. Robin Lee

Prof. Tony Morphet

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Introduction

- 1.1. This Report presents a strategic evaluation of the Education Support and Training program of the USAID Mission in South Africa. In doing so, it concentrates on providing a set of guidelines by which ESAT may reach defined, future goals.
- 1.2. The Report proposes that three knowledge bases will be required to implement a longer term ESAT strategy. These are:
 - 1.2.1. a regularly reviewed, educationally-focussed socio-political scenario;
 - 1.2.2. a theory of the process of change in education systems;
 - 1.2.3. an initial survey of the literature in the field of alternative education, in a form that can be updated from time to time.
- 1.3. The Report further provides an initial input on each of these knowledge bases. From the information and analysis provided, it reaches the conclusion that ESAT is not achieving maximum impact by deploying its resources within its present strategy. A re-strategised programme will increase impact, and a proposal to achieve this is made in Section Six of the Report.

2. Socio-political scenario 1990-1996

- 2.1. this period - which is considered to be about the maximum for realistic planning - is characterised as an "interregnum", in which "the old (order) is dying and the new cannot be born." Drawing on a range of published material and personal interviews the evaluators put forward an analysis with the following characteristics:
 - 2.1.1. the current SAG (or a variant of it) will remain in power for the full planning period. In this sense, the SAG is more durable than the present ESAT assumptions recognise;
 - 2.1.2. however, the SAG is under great pressure, internally and internationally. This makes it unlikely that simple, internal repression will be a dominant SAG strategy. Its attempts to develop other approaches will open opportunities for negotiated change in several areas, including education;
 - 2.1.3. black oppositional movements are already and will increasingly be more interested in negotiated change. Projects and programmes which can negotiate important policy changes from the SAG in their sector(s) will obtain increasing political visibility and support;
 - 2.1.4. in sociological terms, the SAG is and will become more "penetrable", and efforts by oppositional groups to achieve control of greater policy space will rise in importance;
- 2.2. on the basis of this scenario, gains in education and other fields will best be made by "organized strategic intervention" on specific issues. The Report quotes Mr. Franklin Sonn, President of the United Teachers Association of South Africa, as follows:

"The matter at issue is the reclaiming of political and social space. This is what I understand by the call for the destruction of apartheid...I am referring to the need for hard and responsible efforts in building up democratic structures like religious organizations, civic associations, youth organizations, women's organizations, area committees, federations or professional organizations."

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3. Change in education systems

- 3.1. ESAT has the stated goal of achieving change in the South African education system. The Report argues that such a goal must be supported by strategies that are, in turn, based upon an understanding of the process of education system change in general;
- 3.2. to meet this need, the Report draws on a theory of education change which identifies three main sources of innovation, namely
 - 3.2.1. internal initiatives, arising from groups and individuals within the education system
 - 3.2.2. external transactions between the system and groups in the society whose needs are not being met by the system
 - 3.2.3. political manipulation of the system to meet the needs of hitherto excluded or neglected groups;
- 3.3. in the present South African situation approaches 3.2.2. and 3.2.3. are most likely to succeed. This is primarily because of the high (but by no means total) centralisation of the South African education system.
- 3.4. however, the pace and extent of this process depends on the degree of organization and resources available to projects which may be able to gain policy space through negotiations. The capacity to achieve gains will develop in 3 phases:
 - through the efficient delivery of education goods by each project
 - * through projects aggregating and focussing demands for increased operating space and authority
 - * ultimately, through negotiations with the state over the control of an education sector
- 3.5. the Report thus proposes a double strategy for general educational change. The confrontational, symbolic, rhetorical and ideological encounter with the state should be maintained. However, at the same time the donor-funded alternative initiatives should develop their capacity to organise and consolidate their position and to press their claims for additional operational space and for a significant share of the resources for and control over educational provision.

4. Literature Survey

- 4.1. an extensive literature survey was commissioned by the evaluators. All materials collected have been deposited with ESAT.
- 4.2. the survey indicated a predominance of criticism of the present system over creative alternatives to it. However, an extensive list of educational needs and demands is clarified by the literature.
- 4.3. the Report also reviews current SAG education policy and the attitudes and activities of the private sector, as well as the views of some professional educationists.
- 4.4. in strategic planning terms, the significant output of the literature survey focusses on three areas:
 - 4.4.1. a set of 4 criteria which have to be considered by funding agencies. These are identified as the political legitimacy of the project; its educational effectiveness; its developmental effectiveness; and the degree to which it meets ethical considerations arising from historical deprivation of certain communities;

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- 4.4.2. the identification of nine potential sectors for funding; namely, teacher education, pre-school education, alternative schools, rural and homeland schools, technical education, school management structures, post secondary education, academic support programmes and literacy.
- 4.4.3. emphasis on the need for funding agencies to ensure that projects "achieve educational and political goals without the one (or other) suffering." (Sonn).

5. Assessment of current ESAT portfolio

- 5.1. the Report points out that the current ESAT strategy is one of "experiment". Such a strategy is useful for gaining experience, but not for achieving goals;
- 5.2. however, within the "experiment" strategy a considerable range and balance of project experience has been built up, which can form the basis of one component of a goal-directed strategy;
- 5.3. in the opinion of the evaluators the present portfolio has a dispersed impact and decisions are made on individual projects in relative isolation. These features can also be improved through the proposed new strategy.

6. Proposed new strategy

- 6.1. the Report proposes a three-level formal strategy, with specified human and financial resources devoted to each level. This will give ESAT a flexibility of response it does not have at present.
- 6.2. Level One involves the creation and administration of a "discretionary fund", with grants of a maximum of \$25 000. The key criteria to be observed in grant-making from this fund are rapidity of ESAT response in cases of acute need; and making of limited, initial grants to projects which may grow to become more significant. An administrative procedure for the discretionary fund is suggested.
- 6.3. Level Two involves an expanded and focussed form of the present portfolio, but with a dominant emphasis on the criteria of general developmental contribution and specific educational and organizational effectiveness. In three Appendices to the Report some concrete proposals are made about the process of assessing applications in accordance with these criteria.
- 6.4. Level Three involves the identification and longer term support of 3-5 institutions, agencies or projects that have the capacity or potential to negotiate greater freedom and authority from the SAG by external transaction or political manipulation.
 - * The objective of the strategy is to obtain the approval of top leadership of these agencies, and then to implement resource provision for the development and training of key individuals within each organization;
 - * The resources provided by ESAT will be used to transfer knowledge and skills to this group. These skills will not be in education proper, but in fields such as organizational development techniques, constituency mobilisation, advocacy techniques, policy analysis and negotiation;
 - * The resources will create within each organization a professionally-equipped infrastructure to negotiate significant changes in the appropriate education sector. These skills may also be usefully deployed within each organization;
 - * A variety of methods of achieving the skills transfer are set out in the Report.

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- * Two possible pro-active roles for ESAT in creating access by educational organizations to consultants and trainers are described.

6.5. In human resource terms, the adoption of this strategy will involve:

- * appointment to the USAID Mission of some in house education expertise;
- * appointment of one additional program officer to ESAT;
- * regularly commissioning updates of the socio-political scenario;
- * creating a panel or network of education advisers to ESAT.

7. **Response to specific questions**

In the final section the evaluators provide specific answers to six questions set out in the evaluation brief, referring to the information and analysis contained in the Report itself.

1. SECTION ONE : INTERPRETATION OF EVALUATION BRIEF

- 1.1. the evaluators were requested to "assist the USAID management evaluate the current ESAT strategy and selection criteria and to make recommendations as to alternative approaches to the allocation of ESAT resources."
- 1.2. in greater detail, two general questions were posed:
 - 1.2.1. "given USAID/SA's objectives and constraints is the current ESAT educational portfolio having maximum impact?"
 - 1.2.2. "how can the selection strategy, focus and grant selection criteria be adjusted to enhance impact?"
- 1.3. in still greater detail, six additional questions were posed concerning, "sectoral objectives and areas of focus"; "greater degree of concentration"; "greater rigour in the selection process"; (targeting) "resources to activities which will contribute to long run improvement of South African education systems"; a set of questions about specific sub-sections of funding of alternative education"; and "should the mission have in-house education expertise?".
- 1.4. in order to answer these questions on the basis of sound professional, logical and sociological principles, the evaluators soon reached the conclusion that ESAT's activities could not only be judged in the context of its origins, the expectations of its Congressional funders or the inevitable rhetoric of the South African situation. It also has to be judged in the context of immediate and likely future trends in South Africa itself, which will permit only certain strategies to be successful and will cause others to fail.

ESAT is an actual, fund-dispensing, decision-taking program, with strong internal and external pressures to "move the money". Yet, it operates in perhaps the most complex area of a complex field (education), which may in turn be the location of the last of all negotiations for South African power sharing - long after residential integration and sharing of other amenities have been achieved.

- 1.5. in this context, the evaluators are strongly of the opinion that ESAT requires three inputs on which to base an adjusted sectoral strategy:
 - 1.5.1. a basic socio-political scenario, to be initially established and agreed as part of this evaluation and then reviewed and updated on an annual basis. This scenario, while indicating the broad trends developing, must also be sensitive to micro-movements in the alternative political groupings and in SAG policy. Above all, it must show areas of opportunity which are created or blocked by these micro movements;
 - 1.5.2. given the ESAT intention to "contribute to the long run improvement of South African education systems", ESAT must itself have a theory of change in education systems. This will provide a broad framework for judging the possibilities of influencing change in South African education systems. Again, this component should be established as part of this evaluation and then regularly reviewed. Without it, ESAT's activities must necessarily be purely responsive and subject to all the limitations of "one case at a time" decision-making;
 - 1.5.3. one of the distinctive features of the "alternative education" scene in South Africa is the multiplicity of views and actors. In some ways this is a positive sign, though it does increase difficulties for project funding agencies. In respect of ESAT program purposes, it means that a survey of the main trends in the field needs to be established and maintained, again extending

to the micro-level, and quite literally including "who said what to whom" at recent conferences. Here, as in the two areas discussed above, the overall slow pace of social, political and educational change in South Africa creates, not a dearth, but an overabundance of internal discussion, goals, strategies and disagreements in respect of micro-issues. In reality, the major change trends occur when "bundles" of micro-issues begin to coalesce around a threat, a challenge or an opportunity. It is essential to have the means to observe (and sometimes predict) this happening and to be poised to act to support positive trends at the right moments.

- 1.6. in the light of the above, this Evaluation includes a socio-political assessment (Section Two) for the period 1990 to 1996; an international theory of educational system change, adapted to the South Africa situation (Section Three); and a survey, based on written (but not necessarily published) material, the earliest of which dates from 1984 and the vast majority from 1988-89 (Section Four.) Ideally, the literature survey might have been supplemented by personal interviews but time did not permit this. ESAT's annual updating should include these in future. In the present document, the evaluators have drawn on their own information networks and colleagues to gain as much immediate knowledge as possible, without undertaking a formal interview program.
- 1.7. on the basis of this information and the strategic approach we advocate, the unavoidable answer to the evaluation brief question regarding "maximum impact" of ESAT's present portfolio (paragraph 1.2.1. above) is "No, it is not having maximum impact." The grounds for this response are contained in Section Five of our Report. Our recommendations concerning increasing ESAT's impact are then given in Section Six and the detailed answers to question I-VI of the Evaluation Brief are given in Section Seven.
- 1.8. we must stress that we have focussed our attention on strategy proper: on the assumptions on which it is based, on the approaches to project funding which flow from it and on the general process to be followed to implement it. It would be impossible and indeed counter-productive for us to go further, and to specify operating procedures and specific institutions with whom funding discussions could take place. These are tactical and operating decisions to be taken only after agreement on the strategic direction.

We are constrained further, first, by the fact that we do not have full knowledge of the operating constraints of USAID internationally, nor of the total institutional environment in which the S A mission functions.

But, secondly and more importantly, strategy is by its nature a set of guidelines for reaching goals. It cannot and should not specify each step or detour along the way - that is the task of tactical and operating plans and personnel and is subject to a spectrum of various possibilities, setbacks and unexpected gains we could not specify in advance.

Above all, in this case the major strategic change we propose is to implement actions which are by their nature the start of a long term interactive process between ESAT and selected alternative education agencies. The strategy is the process. We can point the way but cannot, in this report, travel it with you in advance.

- 1.9. Nevertheless, the Evaluators wish to stress that it is their intention that the Report should be genuinely helpful to ESAT (and perhaps to the USAID mission as a whole). Negative judgments have been reached after careful thought and should be seen only as the starting points for positive proposals. We also appreciate the openness of all USAID personnel with whom we have dealt, the access to USAID documentation and the spirit in which the three formal discussions have been held, including the full discussion of the first draft of this Report.

SECTION TWO : SOCIO POLITICAL SCENARIO 1990-1996

1. Overview : "there are no educational coups d'etat..."

- 1.1. the evaluators indicated in Section One that ESAT (and perhaps the USAID mission) require an educationally focussed 5-6 year scenario to provide a framework within which strategic planning can take place. It is vital to understand here that "scenario" is not an explanation of an inevitable outcome of events. Scenarios are not predictive. Rather they assess intensities of trends and indicate the most likely pattern of forces that will exist during and at the end of a given period. The period itself may often be of a fairly arbitrary nature, determined by legislative or financial time horizons of the project. In this case it is determined by a funding horizon.

Scenarios also cannot fully factor in dynamics arising in a third field from trends identified in two other fields. Those dynamics are usually too complex. Therefore today's scenario writers usually indicate a more positive version of the scenario ("the high road") and a less positive version ("the low road"), and advocate a position somewhere between these. We could have chosen that route - it's a lot safer than the Beltway or the Schoeman Highway!

- 1.2. However such an approach leads to "on the one hand" and "on the other hand" statements, unhelpful for planning action. Accordingly we have chosen to set out our most likely scenario.
- 1.3. In a Report of this length a socio-political scenario can only be stated indicatively, that is by reference to major trend indicators. Only a fraction of the evidence and knowledge on which it is based can be advanced and rigorous simplicity has been employed concerning terminology that other authors have spent years refining. We doubted that you wished to be introduced to the critical concept "syncretic nationalism", however useful it is in current South African policy research.
- 1.4. In blunt terms, the capacity of the SAG and its supporters to maintain the *status quo* is virtually unchallenged and may even have been strengthened by events in 1986-89. Indeed a prominent British commentator recently rightly criticized two standard elements of South African revolutionary interpretation. First, the "crisis model" in which the sense of "time running out" is now quite commonly disregarded in South African predictive literature. Secondly equally unreliable is the concept of "intolerability" - the idea that gross physical conditions and political inequalities will simply cease to exist because they are "intolerable". Whole modern cities prove the error of this view. Sheer "intolerability" of conditions does not stimulate change and may in fact retard it.
- 1.5. We consider the immediate future of South Africa to be a variant of the famous Gramscian perception of "interregnum".

"If the ruling class has lost its consensus, ie. it is no longer leading but only dominant...this means precisely that the greater masses have become detached from their traditional identitiesThe crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear".

The current SA system certainly illustrates this trend.

- 1.6. Also, we are at an early stage of the "interregnum". Policy and strategic differences undoubtedly do exist within the SAG. But they are not yet terminal. Similarly, the loose organization of the MDM does not yet permit it to gain quickly negotiated advantages out of the policy confusion. Zwiakhe Sisulu touched on both elements in his speech to the Conference "Peoples' Education for Peoples' Power" (29 March 1986) when he said: "The (1984/5) situation brought home to (the SAG's) allies that the regime was not long able to rule in the old way...". This was undoubtedly true.

However, he also claimed that "the people are united around a set of fundamental demands..." This was not true and the Emergency and other actions brought that phase to an end. The success of MDM strategy over the next six years will depend upon the degree to which it can unite its supporters around an agreed set of demands within the correct time table. It also depends on identifying and enlarging policy differences in the SAG, already begun by objective forces.

- 1.7. A more realistic emphasis was given by an unnamed black NECC official in Michigan, USA in November 1986:

"Our analysis of the situation is that the state...is something we are going to have to live with for many years to come. This implies that the crisis in education, which cannot be divorced from the overall crisis in the apartheid regime will continue for a long time as well".

Finally, at about the same time Lebamang Sebidi wrote :

"however instant political coups d'etat may be, they cannot bring about instant, radical educational changes...there are no educational coups d'etat."

If there is any single statement that catches the tone of our analysis it is this one.

2. Propositions for ESAT planning

- 2.1. given the above analysis, several unambiguous propositions need to be made about ESAT planning assumptions to 1996. These are:
- 2.1.1. over the 6 year period 1990-1996 the present SAG (or a close variant of it) will remain effectively in political power. There is no single or combined force that can replace SAG. Indeed, divisions among the oppositional forces make it unlikely that totally united opposition could be brought into existence, even if this then had a real chance of defeating SAG. We point to marked differences in attitude between Charterists and black consciousness groups;
 - 2.1.2. however, SAG is under great pressure. It can quite easily maintain its power base by the use of internal repression. But it has to respond to even more telling pressures on international, economic and moral fronts - international debt-rescheduling in June 1990, lack of foreign investment capital for economic growth, sanctions, moral condemnation and a "pariah" status. SAG wishes strongly to escape from these. Thus, gains may be made by concentrating efforts on areas of potential change created by these pressures;
 - 2.1.3. we believe that this set of circumstances may open the door to negotiations on specific issues. With great reluctance the government is indeed preparing to move into areas in which specific negotiations about inequalities of provision can take place. Very recent events, such as the release of ANC leaders indicate that it may be moving also into a broader pre-negotiation phase at the constitutional level;
 - 2.1.4. nevertheless, the tendency of both parties to retain barely achievable pre-conditions for negotiation at the national level simultaneously with a willingness and need to negotiate on issues of "sub policy" will characterise the next few years. It will bring onto the negotiating agenda areas such as housing, education and provision of services. Real gains can be made here, even if the national constitutional settlement takes longer;

- 2.1.5. as a consequence the SAG, while it will remain in power, by no means presents a monolithic front, in policy or in practice. Cracks are appearing, offering opportunities for real educational developments, often with strong political overtones. While "own" and "general" affairs still remains something of a "surrogate for territorial segregation", even this policy can be manipulated to create crises or capitalise on situations.

For example, in an interview in the official state policy publication "R.S.A. Policy Review" in August 1989, Minister Viljoen flatly rejected any "opening of under-occupied white schools to blacks". By late September 1989 Minister Clase was proposing a formula by which exactly this could be done, under a sleight of hand, but with 100% state subsidy. This shift was achieved by a process of political lobbying around a weak point in government policy implementation for which SAG did not have the political will to fight a visible public battle.

- 2.2. it is appropriate here to introduce the concept of "penetrability". It is a commonplace of policy search and advocacy that some official policy positions are more "penetrable" than others - that is, can be more easily changed or taken over by the organized efforts of others. It is the evaluators' view that several areas of state policy bearing upon education and some areas within education are now "penetrable". We list some of these:

- 2.2.1. group areas and free settlement areas. Relaxation of the first and the implementation of the second will create opportunities in education;
- 2.2.2. free or voluntary association of people in non-ethnic groups, which will create demands for the corresponding schools;
- 2.2.3. sheer financial inability to provide schooling for all will incline government to "deals". This may fall in with the "privatisation" approach which also provides opportunities, provided each case is carefully assessed and strategically handled;
- 2.2.4. the obvious inability of the present system and curricula to produce people who are employable in the economy and/or equipped with the skills and knowledge for genuine self employment. This makes SAG vulnerable to private sector pressure, both for external transactions and political manipulation.

- 2.3. In summary, while it remains true that formal state policy "shows no signs of giving way on the principle of segregated education systems" (Hartshorne), opportunities exist to challenge, to negotiate space in which to operate separately, to take chances, and to try other approaches, as the ideology underpinning SAG policy loses force and the political will to implement it breaks down under economic, demographic and organised opposition pressures.

Most commentators now argue that the government either is already in a position in which negotiations of a practical nature can be begun; or is in a rhetorical position about negotiations, that other parties can turn to their advantage.

Schlemmer has observed that in government circles, the term "negotiation" is "losing its concessionary image". It is now seen to concern bargaining about real economic, social, moral and eventually power interests. Esterhuysen, who is very close to inner government circles, further comments: "An emerging conviction among whites, especially the new generation, (is) that South Africa has had enough of conflict, polarization and bloodshed and that a settlement process should be initiated."

3. Opportunities for negotiation

- 3.1. If we can assume increasing opportunities for negotiation arising from policy failure, indecision, internal conflict and external pressure can we assume willingness by black led organizations to consider negotiating interactions? That is a much more difficult question to answer and strong differences of opinion are evident. However, a recent compilation by the Centre for Policy Studies on the negotiations positions of over 20 organizations, with informed overviews by a further eight prominent commentators, creates a general impression that the answer is "Yes", with certain pre-conditions and within certain circumstances.
- 3.2. The most straightforward statement printed in the CPS Negotiations Package is : "The ANC wants political negotiations. I must tell you. There is no need to push them on that...". This was stated by the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Admishin in Harare in March 1989. While the ANC pre-conditions are well-known, its re-consideration of its negotiating position during 1989 also indicates a more favourable attitude to internal negotiations on specific issues.
- 3.3. There is an ongoing debate among the groupings within the internal "extra parliamentary opposition" as regards winning ground by negotiation on specific policies. The existence of the debate is in itself remarkable. After the heavy security action and the losses in leadership in 1987-87, the resilience and resourcefulness of the "extra-parliamentary" movements remains a major pressure on government to change.

A recent publication of the Centre for Policy Studies described this reality as follows:

Above all, the extra parliamentary movement has adapted and survived. The states of emergency enabled the security forces to restrict and dismantle individual organizations, but the movement remains influential. Trade unions have not been substantially weakened, though tougher economic conditions and divisions on sanction policy provide problems. The churches are still intact, alternative newspapers appear and community organization appears to be strengthening.

- 3.4. Experience in practical local level negotiations, the ongoing contact of the Soweto People's Delegation with various official bodies in negotiations on rent arrears and with Eskom on electricity supply and costs all indicate a mood of cautious willingness to try negotiation. This is summed up by Shubane as follows:

"The MDM's policy-making role has shifted from simply opposing government policies to one of devising strategies with which to oppose existing state policies. (our emphasis). The policies of the MDM are affecting major political developments as well as policy formulation of the major political actors throughout the country. (S.A. Foundation Review, September 1989).

Later in the same article, he writes:

"Increasingly it seems as if the MDM will be focussing on the policy arenas. Numerous policy-related issues are under discussion with a view to placing alternative policies on the agenda. Negotiations, which seem to be emerging as a key issue, are a case in point."(our emphasis).

- 3.5. This movement, described by Hartshorne as a "shift from the politics of refusal" is vitally important to ESAT. Coupled with the concepts of SAG durability, but penetrability, the strength of the negotiation movement will determine the overall nature of the socio-political scenario for the time being. Yet our analysis needs to be carried down one further level.

There is an increasing awareness in the MDM and in other black led organizations working for policy change that "organization" and a winnable "issue" are the keys to success in negotiating policy change. This was pre-figured by Zwelakhe Sisulu in his speech to the NECC Conference in March 1986 when he said:

An important difference between ungovernability and people's power is that no matter how ungovernable a township is, unless the people are organized, the gains made through ungovernability can be rolled back by state repression. Because there is no organized centre of people's power, the people are relatively defenseless and vulnerable.

- 3.6. The point is made more academically by Mark Swilling in a recent article in Work in Progress. Four sequential quotations give the essence of his argument:
- (a) "in 1984/6 (civic associations) put forward urban demands that were realizable and backed up with organized mandates."
 - (b) "Urban issues... were seen as negotiable because they affect daily life and hence grassroots structures had an obligation to address them prior to the resolution of the constitutional problem"
 - (c) "the aim was always to strengthen organization by winning gains that could be used to demonstrate the utility of collective action."
 - (d) "This process of "organization before mobilization" will more than likely culminate in local-level negotiations precisely because the winning of short-term gains does help build long-term organization. This, then, will strengthen strategic - as opposed to uncontrolled - mobilization which in turn reinforces, rather than over-stretches, organization." (Work in Progress, 61).
- 3.7. There are, of course, regional variations. Progress is most likely in the Witwatersrand areas, with signs of movement in the Eastern Cape. Strong ideological differences still remain in the Western Cape and the Inkatha/UDF conflict bedevils the Natal situation. In the "homelands" the only serious study (by Hartshorne) certainly indicates possibilities. It will take time and greater resources to develop a sensitive regional variation within the overall strategy.

4. Conclusion

- 4.1. We have argued that the socio-political scenario is based on a durable state, which has lost political direction and will and become penetrable but not "over throw-able." Gains in education and other fields must be made by organized strategic intervention on specific issues. In the education context we cannot express it better than in the words of Franklin Sonn, President of the United Teachers Association of South Africa in a speech at UWC in August 1989 (Sonn, 1989) :
- "What is at issue here is not so much the release from bondage of a country under the control of foreign power or the reclaiming of geographical territorial space, but the redressal of the political imbalance and the subsequent legitimization of the government. The matter at issue is the reclaiming of political and social space. This is what I understand by the call for the destruction of apartheid...I am referring to the need for hard and responsible efforts in building up democratic structures like religious organizations, civic associations, youth organizations, women's organizations, area committees, federations or professional organizations."
- 4.2. The remainder of our Report aims to provide a case for ESAT turning its attention to providing resources directly for these "hard and responsible efforts." To quote Sonn once more : "There is a new seriousness about the importance of education and ways and means (must be devised) to achieve educational and political goals without the one (or other) suffering."

SECTION THREE : CHANGE IN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS

3.1. General theory of change

Educational systems are social constructs. They change over time as the social structure itself develops in response to pressures from organised demands, the availability of resources and the distribution of social powers. Political structures set the terms and conditions of change. The patterns of interaction between the various social agencies and actors in education produce the pressures which act on the structures of that system to produce specific changes.

A theoretical framework for analysing these (inevitably) complex processes can provide a way of defining possibilities and obstructions to any planned intervention aimed at securing long-term change.

The best expression of current theory (incorporating the insights of macro-sociological research from many schools of thought including systems theory, exchange theory, Marxism and Structural Functionalism) is to be found in Margaret Archer's Social Origins of Educational Systems (1984).

Archer's work traces the historical development of the two main, divergent forms of secular state educational systems - the centralised and the decentralised systems. The typical cases she cites are France and Britain respectively.

The importance of this distinction lies in the fact that the structure of each system sets different kinds of limits to the processes of interaction and change available to the actors and agencies involved in education.

In analysing patterns of educational change Archer identifies three kinds of significant interactions:

- INTERNAL INITIATION
- EXTERNAL TRANSACTION
- POLITICAL MANIPULATION

All three processes are always active in educational systems, but they carry different degrees of potential for effecting change in the two different forms of state system (centralised and decentralised). The potential of each of the three processes depends in the degree of "penetrability" of the central state authority and the distribution of power within the state and the education system.

3.2. Internal Initiation

Internal initiation describes the process through which education professionals working within the system develop innovative concepts, models and practices, introduce them into their own fields of work and subsequently diffuse them through the system. The process usually involves professional research and development within schools, followed by diffusion through professional networks by means of publications, demonstrations and conferences, leading gradually to the formal adoption of the procedures by the official governing bodies of the system.

3.2.1. Capacity for Introducing Change: Internal Initiation

Internal initiation as a system change process has significant potential in decentralised systems for two main reasons.

Firstly, because the components of a decentralised system possess a high degree of autonomy the professional staff have high status and wide discretion over what is taught, by whom, and how. As a consequence they have the capacity to innovate.

Secondly the political centre which governs the system has a relatively low degree of direct reach into and control over the day-to-day performance of the various parts of the system. Its main functions are to provide resources and maintain and monitor the overall performance of the disparate parts. As a consequence it is less able to impose direct restrictions on the detailed practices of the system.

In centralised systems the internal initiation process has a low potential for introducing change.

In this system context the central state authority maintains a uniform and direct line of control from the top down to the lowest levels of activity. Autonomy is not available to the various components (except possibly to areas of high prestige such as universities) and the status of professionals remains low because they act as the implementors of central decisions with little discretion over their own practice.

For internal initiation to succeed in the centralised system the proposed change (whether to curriculum, school model or management procedure) must be directly sanctioned by the central authority prior to any diffusion within the system. The state, inevitably, has few incentives to support such activity.

3.3. External Transaction

External transaction refers to the process through which a body external to the system contracts to provide resources to part of the system in exchange for some particular service which is not available as part of the regular system provision. The contract serves to reshape educational practice in that part of the system. The external agent is usually an organized group which needs the services of educated "products" of the system, but is unable to meet its requirements from current graduates. In earlier periods this group could be the military or the legal establishments, which required different kinds of training to that offered by the church. More recently the private sector has conducted many of these transactions. The activities of donor bodies also stimulate external transaction, but for much more diffuse reasons. External transactions raise special kinds of problems relating to the investment of funds by a program such as ESAT.

3.3.1. Capacity for Change : External Transaction

As with the internal initiation process the capacity of external transactions to introduce change is significant in decentralised systems and for similar reasons (relatively) insignificant in centralised systems.

The autonomy of the parts of the decentralised system makes it much more responsive to the demand activity of the educational and labour markets - and to the supply of external resources. Change is therefore relatively easily introduced.

3.4. Political Manipulation

The term political manipulation refers to the ways in which pressures on the educational system coming from within (from disadvantaged groups) and outside (from groups whose output needs are not being met) are aggregated, organised and directed as focused political demands on the central governing political authority. The process entails the formulation of educational pressures as political factors which the governing authority has to meet in order to secure and maintain its position.

3.4.1. Capacity for Change : Political Manipulation

Political manipulation is a significant source of change in both centralised and decentralised systems of education. The crucial distinction however is that it is the ONLY fully viable source of significant change in a fully centralised system. Where the central authority holds full control of education all forms of tension and dissatisfaction with the current conditions of provision must be translated into political terms. Then change must be sought through bargaining and negotiation with the political authority. This may take the form of specific exchange bargaining for limited goals or more generalised confrontative negotiations for long term changes. The change capability of political manipulation is directly related to the penetrability of the central state authority.

3.5. Education change processes in South Africa

All three of the processes Archer categorises are presently operating to some degree in South African education. There are "internal initiations" arising from activities by teachers. (One interviewee described efforts by teachers to take over the Department of Education and Training's "topdown" school management program and put it to their own uses). There are a wide range of externally transacted change initiatives, while the capacity is increasing for political manipulation of the system by oppositional groups. We now focus on how these processes are working themselves out in the South African situation.

3.6. The South African System : Conditions for Change

Most commentaries on South African education (usually written from perspectives internal to the system (eg: Malherbe, Behr) take the view that the system is powerfully centralised. Many features of the historical development appear to confirm this interpretation. In the century-long conflict between English and Afrikaner interests the key to the distribution of educational opportunities and constraints has been found in the levers of state power. From the Anglicization policy of the British colonies in the Cape and Natal, through to the post-1948 Afrikaner advance under Christian National Education, it has been the legislative authority and the accompanying command of resources which has effected the essential changes.

Further, in Black education, the Bantu Education Act of 1954 and the Education and Training Act of 1978 demonstrate the power of state responses to pressures and demands. Authority in the Black sub-system is doubly entrenched in that it is both highly centralised and insulated from direct political pressures. The state department responsible for the operation of the system not only holds all the decision-making authority (from the most trivial to the most extensive) it also, at the same time, cannot be held to account by the groups and individuals whom it serves. It is by statute, accountable only to an electorate whose mandate requires it to offer negatively discriminatory provision. On the face of it therefore, it would seem that the architects of the system have succeeded in their design to make the system immune to any form of change process.

The situation is not however as extreme as it may appear. Despite the features noted above it is not, and really has not ever been, wholly accurate to classify the South African system as fully centralised.

There has been evidence from at least the beginning of this century that the centralizing thrust of education policy has come up against clear limits. Part of this evidence comes from the growth of the quasi-independent Afrikaans school movement of the 1930's and 40's - itself a key component of the development of Afrikaner Nationalism. A second part of the evidence comes from the failure of the National Party government to impose its centrally generated policy of Christian National Education on the four white Provincial systems. The ex-British colonies (Cape and Natal) successfully resisted, even in the state schools, the imposition of significant elements of the policy and retained several of the procedures and practices of the earlier period (School Boards, School Committees, etc).

Added to this must be the acceptance by the central authority of the English and Church private school sub-system, as well as its reluctant acceptance of the autonomy of the English speaking universities which it continued (after 1959) to subsidise without being able to exercise direct policy control.

The conclusion must therefore be that though the system as a whole has a strongly centralized core structure and a tradition of authoritarian direction there have always been limits to this authority because on the one hand the state has lacked both the political power and the financial resources to carry through a fully centralised policy program, while on the other hand, resistance to the imposition of centralised policy has been vigorous and sustained.

3.7. Current Prospects of Actions for Change

Given the conclusion reached above the immediate prospects for change-oriented action in the system - and particularly in the Black sub-system - do not appear encouraging. In Archer's terms it would seem that "political manipulation" offers the only viable means for initiating significant moves for change. However, even that avenue, in the South African context, is subject to strict limitations. This has in fact been, until recently, the experience of people working for change in the education arena.

The present situation is less rigid than it has been for a considerable time. As noted above the thrust towards centralization has always had its limits; but the more important fact in the recent period is the clearly discernible shift in the distribution of social power. There can be no doubt that power is moving away from the established state and towards the oppositional Black political organizations. The "reform" process serves more as an indicator of this continuing shift than as any substantive policy or program. This does not mean that the state is about to yield control but it does indicate that it is obliged to move its position to maintain its authority.

Taken together these elements provide a loose framework for considering the change potentials in the South African educational system.

The dominant fact remains that the route to far-reaching systemic education change lies through the central political authority. The quantitative scale of the system, the volume of resources required even to maintain it at its present level of performance and the power of legislative and administrative sanction mean that only the resources of the state provide the necessary capacity to effect far-reaching and long-term changes in the total system.

The important new factor in the assessment of the position of the state is the fact that, whereas it has been, until the recent past, impenetrable by any influence or pressure coming from outside the governing political elite, it is now vulnerable to, and penetrable by, the demand of oppositional interest groups. On the basis of recent evidence it would seem that the central authority, in order to resolve some of its problems, is prepared to bargain with pressure groups and organised lobbies on a limited range of, what it sees as, "marginal issues".

The most obvious evidence of this is in the shifting boundary of administrative control. The state remains ready to exercise its controls over dissidents within the system (detention of teachers and students). Yet at the margins of the system it has not prosecuted (although it has harassed) those actors who are operating outside of the law by running unregistered

schools. Nor has it taken any action against those who are actively and publicly working to subvert the ideology of the system (eg: SACHED and the SACC). Where educational actors have linked themselves to overtly political movements (NECC) it has taken action to proscribe, but where the work has remained within identifiable educational boundaries it has allowed clearly oppositional activities to proceed.

The "bargain", implicitly rather than explicitly agreed upon, is that if other agencies will operate alongside the system, and at its margins, without attacking it politically, they can be accommodated.

This is a relatively new feature of control and a sure sign that the system realizes the force of the pressures upon it, both demographic, administrative and political.

The second piece of significant evidence can be seen in the state's readiness to "privatise" some of its schools. Under the stress of the implications of some of its other policy shifts (free settlement areas) it is no longer able to sustain the uniform definitions of function on which the operation of the centralised whole has depended in the past. It is therefore compelled to redefine and narrow its limits - allowing other actors to take *de facto* control of portions of the system. This process seems likely to continue - even to accelerate - though at the same time it is clear that it has limits. No National Party government will consider the sacrifice of the Afrikaans speaking school sector.

What seemed therefore at first glance to be poor prospects for change through political manipulation appear to be improving fairly rapidly as a direct result of the major political stresses within the structure, themselves developing and intensifying as a result of shifts in the distribution of power within the state and the society.

3.8. The Significance of External Transactions In this Context

External transactions with educational actors working at the margins of the system have been a feature of general educational activity for thirty years, though it is in the period since 1976 that donor funded initiatives have increased to a significant size.

These initiatives have made possible the development of project work aimed at meeting some of the demand for access to education and at introducing change processes into education practice generally.

Since 1986, two factors have altered the significance of these developments. The first comes as a consequence of the shifts in the *de facto* state policy outlined above. The second is the result of the massive increase in the availability of donor resources.

The full impact of these two factors has not yet been fully measured but the broad outlines of the effect at least are visible. One part of the effect is the enlargement of the so-called "alternative sector" at all levels of education from pre-school and literacy to higher education. The growth in this sector shows no sign of abating though it is inevitably uneven and spasmodic. New parts of the sector develop in response to particular crises or changes of political direction, or to donor perceived opportunities or constraints.

A second part of the effect is that the large volume of available funding brings into existence projects which are unable to find the skilled personpower to manage and direct their operations to full effect. As a result, the maintenance of an "alternative" political identity often counts for more in the operation of the program than the efficient and effective delivery of goods.

The shift in state policy towards permitting, tolerating or even benignly neglecting alternative education activity has meant that projects which began as a form of contestation of the education provision of the state have now been granted a quasi-legitimacy and allowed to function alongside the central system. They offer additional, rather than counter opportunities.

The significance of these implications in the present context is that if the process of external transaction is to maintain and increase its change potential it will have to do more than occupy the space opened up for it on particular educational sites by policy and implementation contradictions with the central political and educational authorities.

Some means will have to be found for the externally created alternative movement to increase its capacity to build a coherent constituency on whose behalf it can bring pressure to bear on the system and force it to negotiate greater authority for each project. In practice:

- this must be through the efficient delivery of goods by each project
- aggregating and organizing demands for increased operating space and authority
- ultimately negotiating with the state over the control of its operations

It is at this point that the process of external transaction begins to overlap with the process of political manipulation.

3.9. The Significance of Internal Initiation In the South African Context

The internal initiation of change is, even under the most favourable circumstances, a very slow process. Its focus is inevitably on the crucial micro-detail of classroom transactions and school governance. Its capacity for effecting structural and systemic changes is circumscribed but its importance in sustaining the creative and constructive capacities of educational work cannot be overestimated.

In the South African context and particularly in the Black sub-system there is an acute need for internally generated innovation. Curriculum content is seriously out of touch not only with local conditions but with modern currents of thought as well. Curriculum processes are authoritarian in style and inhibitory of learner based discovery methods. Class transactions tend to be rigidly formalised. Teacher research is not encouraged and while some provision is made for professional and intellectual development among teachers its scope and quality is disputed.

These are long-standing problem conditions in the system which are, in their way, typical of the forms of practice which develop in tightly centralised systems. Recent developments in school practices in the Black system point to even more serious problems. Several commentators (most notably, Hartshorne) have drawn attention to the fact that in the highly politicised environments of the large urban township there has been a disastrous collapse of authority. Students refuse to accept either the knowledge authority or the disciplinary order exercised by the teacher and the conditions and habits of learning itself are being drastically undermined. Such conditions only emphasise more strongly the need for innovative approaches in which both teachers and students can believe, and which they can use. The key to the problem lies in the professional status of the teachers.

There are several significant donor-funded projects which attempt to address these problems through intervention strategies which provide both qualification upgrading and support for the professional development of teachers. (TOPS, SEP, etc.)

The work of these projects has to be seen in a long-term perspective since their immediate impact on the structural and systemic problems is never likely to be large. What they do serve to promote, however, is a crucial educational value embedded in innovative practices and perspectives. This is the notion that teachers can and should as professionals own and direct the practice of their work. In a long term perspective this can reasonably be seen as profoundly subversive of the instrumentalism on which the practice of the present system rests. It is also crucial for any development of a post apartheid system.

3.10. Current Opposition Political Strategies In this Context

From 1976 on, education has been the site of mass action in opposition to the system. The typical strategies of the period 1976-1986 have been the boycott of classes and the institution of awareness programs. Over the decade a number of student organizations have taken leadership roles in organising the action and articulating the demands of students. The culmination of these strategies came with the 1986 decision of the NECC to call on the students to return to school, the reasoning being that schools provided the base from which to organize and that students should equip themselves for the future.

The boycott and disruption strategy was notably successful in creating a mass demand for change, in undermining and devaluing the official state ideology for schooling and in signalling to the country and the world the conditions under which students were systematically denied valid education. What the strategy was unable to do was to generate either significant changes in the state practice or viable mass alternatives. This, at least in part, was the result of the fact that the strategy was a necessarily all-or-nothing confrontation with the existing order. Its confrontational style succeeded in reaching the ideological goals of focusing the grievance and unifying the struggle, but as a consequence, it was not able to begin the replacement of the system.

It is our impression (gathered from a number of formal and informal sources) that the directly confrontative strategy is now being supplemented by a second line strategy of "penetration of the system" and "of taking ownership of the things that are ours". This is a highly significant development, though it is still relatively untried or tested. In this respect we refer to moves by teachers to take over Departmentally-initiated school management structures.

Summary and Conclusion

Following the arguments and observations set out above it appears that prospects for significant education change in the South African system lie principally in the development of a double strategy within educational change actions. The confrontational, symbolic, rhetorical and ideological encounter with the state should be maintained. However, at the same time the donor-funded alternative initiatives should develop their capacity to organise and consolidate their position and to press their claims for additional operational space and for a significant share of the resources for and control over educational provision.

Such a double strategy is made necessary both by the experience of 1985/86 when the state was able to demonstrate its strength and durability against the confrontation of the mass movement, but also by the subsequent experience in which the increasing penetrability of the state makes it responsive to organized strategic pressure.

For donor funded projects such a double strategy entails not only the maintenance of political identity but also the development of organizational capacity in order to build constituencies through the delivery of educational goods. In turn, these constituencies provide the authentication of political negotiation within education.

SECTION FOUR : CURRENT OPINIONS IN ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION FIELDS : OPPORTUNITIES, CONSTRAINTS, ACHIEVEMENTS 1986- 1989

4.1. Overview

- 4.1.1. In order to construct the background for the assessment of ESAT's impact within the field of alternative education the evaluators commissioned a review of the current literature dealing with the field. What follows in this section is a series of quoted or adapted selections from the review paper interspersed with focussing comment from the evaluators.
- 4.1.2. In the collected material (submitted with this report as a resource file) there is only one published book. The rest of the items are journal articles, conference papers and addresses or published interviews. Almost all are presented as contributions of the moment and are directed towards particular audiences. As a consequence they date rapidly and their value lies in the ways in which they contribute to a grasp of the unfolding scenario of alternative education. They represent a slightly more stable form of the micro-issues referred to in Section One. Some will lead nowhere. Others will begin to coalesce with similar ideas around issues and institutions which will have the durability and potential to become candidates for ESAT support.
- 4.1.3. There are four papers of particular interest and importance : Sisulu's keynote speech at the N.E.C.C. Conference 1986; the N.E.C.C. keynote address at the 1986 Michigan Conference; and Hartshorne's papers: Post Apartheid Education : Concepts in Progress Process given at the 1986 McGraw Hill Seminar; and Post Apartheid Education : the Coming Opportunities (1987) Read together these four papers set out the basic terms for considering the issues of alternative education. The remainder of the file adds depth, nuance or particularity to these positions.
- 4.1.4. Reviewing the collection in general it is necessary to point out that the majority of the discussions are concerned with the analysis and definition of the shortcomings of existing provision. Correspondingly there is a relatively low proportion which concentrates on the possibilities and opportunities for engaging in the creation of alternative programs and achieving changes in the existing system. In our opinion this imbalance goes beyond the usual predominance of criticism over creativity. It indicates that few alternative education agencies have seriously thought about strategic options available to change the system or developed the capacity to articulate or implement programs to wrest gains from the system. Despite this imbalance the same basic spirit drives all but the most defensive government sourced contributions - this is the need to respond in some direct and constructive way to the needs and demands made evident in the Black system.

4.2. Needs and Demands

The research review lists the needs and demands as follows:

4.2.1. NEEDS

(a) Improvement of teachers

There is a generally acknowledged recognition that teachers in black education are underqualified. Among their shortcomings are their poor knowledge base, outdated and ineffective methods and techniques of teaching, teacher-centred classroom management, low morale, and confused visions of society and their role in it. The response to this situation has been fairly extensive in-service training schemes, offered both by the DET and private organizations and donors. A criticism of DET programs is that they are certification-orientated. While enabling the government to display

impressive statistics, they have not led to a great improvement in classroom performance nor to an increase in teacher motivation. Nevertheless both state and progressive community organizations are envisaged as having roles in such INSET in future (Hartshorne and others) ?

(b) Amenities and equipment

With an estimated one million children still not at school (Viljoen), and widespread overcrowding for those who are at school, it is clear that more schools and classrooms need to be built. Few schools have well-stocked and functioning libraries. Given the government's call for more technical and vocational education, the almost complete lack of laboratories and technical centres/workshops is also serious.

(c) Provision for alternative, formal education

Many observers are concerned about the long term economic, personal and social consequences of the high drop out rates in the formal system. This attrition occurs at all stages, for a variety of reasons, including DET policies and personal factors. Perhaps the most critical are those dropping out early in schooling and Matric failures (Hartshorne, Mphahlele, Corke).

(d) Provision for pre-school education

Most educationists believe that the first few years are critical for successful schooling. The very high dropout rates in the early grades in DET schools are cause for concern, as well as the inadequate foundations of those who continue. (Motumi, Taylor). In recognition of this, the DET has a school preparedness program operating. It is regarded as inadequate by critics. At present state provision is minimal, with most funding coming from the private sector. In future the state has indicated that pre-school education might be a community responsibility.

(e) Compensatory and academic support programs.

There have been calls from many black community spokespersons for programs to help the educationally disadvantaged (Alexander). This has been strongly supported by industry (O'Dowd, Hofmeyr). Actual requests range from nutrition for primary schoolers to study aid at post-graduate levels, with tertiary education usually being the focus. However, some writers have called for academic support to be scrapped (Moulder, Thembela), considering it wasteful, humiliating, and inappropriate.

(f) Scholarships and bursaries.

Arising mainly from the widespread financial hardship among many blacks, there is a need for scholarships, loans and bursaries to be made available, for secondary and particularly tertiary education. Although much is already being done, it is insignificant in comparison to the requests received (Coggin).

(g) Literacy

There is no doubting the magnitude of the problem and the limitations of current programs, state and alternative, but few ideas exist on how to tackle the problems. There is a view that only a post-apartheid government would have the resources, credibility and will to tackle this successfully. (French).

(h) Alternative educational opportunities

This is a wide area, outside and within the formal sector. It includes established private schools, newly-formed "street academies", Matric rewrite tuition, help with UNISA study, training for small business operators - anywhere where there is demand for knowledge, skills or educational contexts that the state does not provide to the satisfaction of the client. There are probably many "cracks" to be investigated, but they are not always highly visible.

4.2.2. Demands(a) A single department

The most widely publicised demand arising from the education crisis is for a single nonracial education department. The government has created the Department of National Education to oversee education, but insists on education being an "own affair."

(b) A new concept

Peoples Education theorists call for a radically new concept of education: critical, subversive, empowering, with new curricula and new methods (Krus, Van der Heever, Thlagali).

(c) Compulsory education

Compulsory primary and secondary education is seen as a basic right for all. Tertiary education should be provided for all who demand it.

(d) Relevance

There is an insistence that education should be relevant. Some of the rather divergent views of what constitutes relevance range from work-guaranteeing skills (Mazibuko, Thlagali) to the affirmation of African values and culture (Vilakazi).

(e) Control

Control of education is insisted on by virtually all spokespersons. Much Peoples Education rhetoric lays emphasis on community control; and occasionally explicit and often implicit control of state spending policy.

(f) Politicisation

There is widespread rejection of programs, formal and alternative, which aim at (or are thought to aim at) depoliticising education.

4.2.3. Comment

The compressed presentation of black needs and demands highlights all the basic elements in our definition of the situation. It is important to note that the definition of needs arises out of conditions of systems failure (teachers, schools, libraries, drop out rates, etc.) On the other hand the formulation of the demands rests upon a political interpretation of the educational situation. Archer's broad distinction between education transactions (whether internal or external) and political manipulation is clearly illustrated.

The main actors in the political construction of the education crisis have been the N.E.C.C. (easily the strongest initiative - Hartshorne 1987), the EOC and SACHED. This role has, as the previous section argued, been largely ideological and activist - rather than strategic and delivery orientated.

4.3. S.A. Government Policy

- 4.3.1. As Hartshorne suggests, there are probably hidden agendas in government policy. For instance, there is evidence that government cannot implement its ten-year plan to equalize educational provision. The subsidy formula appears to continue to favour white education. A further concern is that a component of educational provision will be an own community affair - with whites able to provide at vastly higher levels. In white education, claimed decentralisation has led to greater central government control, through the abolition of provincial control in favour of control by the Ministry of Education and Culture.
- 4.3.2 Yet official policy appears to favour decentralisation, as these quotations from Terblanche (Superintendent-General, Department of Education and Culture) show: "Excessive centralisation of education obviously has administrative disadvantages..." and "centralisation harbours the danger that minority groups will be dominated by larger groups."
- 4.3.3. Viljoen (1989) notes five principles that should be considered in future educational planning: Relevance, Performance, Choice, Continuity and Affordability. Two of these principles are strongly evident in black demands, namely Relevance and Choice, and are thus obvious candidates for contestation and, perhaps, negotiation.
- 4.3.4. In another interview, Viljoen (1987) claims that "Government is fully aware that different population groups, particularly whites, favour education in group context (sic)", as grounds for providing separate facilities. Yet if the principle of choice is to be honoured, and the wishes of the white electorate heeded, then those whites wanting local schools to become nonracial have a strong case.
- 4.3.5. At present government thinking in education seems to emphasise simultaneously national unity and group diversity (Terblanche). There will inevitably be contradictions, here which can be exploited. In short, government policy has many internal contradictions, departmental practice does not always follow government policy, and various actors are wrestling control away from government, on the right (parents at Menlo Park School) and the left (Catholic schools and street academies).

4.4. Industrial perspectives

- 4.4.1. In the White Paper on the de Lange Report government indicated that non-formal Education should be the joint responsibility of the private sector and State, although there is a lack of clarity about their respective roles and responsibilities. There is a growing private sector acceptance of this position, as evidenced by private sector funding of "alternative" education.

There is also strong consensus that more vocational and technical education needs to be provided, and less academic. Government does not wish to see the pendulum swing too far, however, while industry is approaching near despair about the lack of technically qualified personnel.

- 4.4.2. Industry places an emphasis on quality rather than quantity. A perspective exists that sees highly competent managerial and technical abilities as the economy's, and thus the nation's primary need. However, the absolute numbers involved here are not large and can be met by well-planned bursary and academic support programs.

4.4.3. A major limitation in meeting the needs of industry is the possibly insurmountable difficulty of providing the wherewithal, particularly teaching skills in technical and vocational education. Technical education is far more expensive than academic education at all levels; there are perpetual shortages of industrial arts, maths and science teachers, even at white schools. Ways will have to be found of creating the necessary value changes in white and black students, such that vocational/technical careers will be preferred to professional/academic ones (the present preference for academic education is perfectly rational, given that white collar jobs have more status, independence, managerial potential, and financial reward.) Both government and industry, faced with technical problems, look to technicist solutions, thereby failing to acknowledge the importance of political processes, negotiations and democratic demands in delineating educational policies.

4.4.4. Comment

4.4.4.1. The research review confirms in abbreviated form the thrust of the arguments about conditions of change developed in Section Three of this Report. The evidence points towards the contradictions in government's policy and the legal and constitutional framework and between both and actual educational practice. What the review does not sufficiently stress is the point reiterated by Hartshorne in his two papers:

"In looking at the next five years it is absolutely clear that no fundamental changes within the system can be expected - segregated divisive education is to remain" (Hartshorne 1986:20).

At a speech given in the SACC Education Forum on 4 October 1989 he emphasized the view that the state would fight a powerful rearguard action in education, although it would yield ground at the margins. He confirmed this view on a personal interview with the evaluators on 5 October.

4.4.4.2. Secondly, the review considers the perceptions of capitalist industry, but does not make reference to the concerns of the trade union movement regarding technical and vocational education. There is little or no printed material reflecting these views, but there is informal evidence that some of the larger unions (NUMSA in particular) are showing interest in certificated education and training for their members. This may have an important bearing on the problems of rejection which surround technical education for blacks and provide a significant new field for ESAT funding.

4.5. Educationist observations

- 4.5.1. We need education systems that critique society as well as training managers to run it (Soni); and that eschew providing ready-made solutions in favour of process/discovery approaches (Morrow).
- 4.5.2. Only significant funding of tertiary education will enable blacks to attain a "first world inheritance" (Coggin). To achieve parity in per capita educational expenditure, over 10 000 new teachers will be needed annually; and they will need excellent training if they are to transform society. Quality in the educational environment is vital, at all levels, from pre-schools to College, otherwise human and economic wastage occurs. (Hartshorne, quoting Heyneman).
- 4.5.3. There is a need to establish pre-university colleges. (Saunders). There are great dangers in the state diverting funds from tertiary to other sectors. Perceptions of Wits respondents noted both a need for high standards and other (new) selection criteria for identifying and admitting students (Innes). -

- 4.5.4. There is a need to support institutions on compensatory distance education (Samuel).
- 4.5.5. There are opportunities for innovative programs in the Homelands (self-governing and TBVC) (Hartshorne).
- 4.5.6. More attention needs to be given to worker education (Hartshorne, Hofmeyr, emphasised also by Peoples Education - see Kruss)
- 4.5.7. There is an urgent need to reform or replace the present examining system, along the lines of the Independent Examination Board (Corke, Mphahlele).
- 4.5.8. A difficult but vital need will be to recreate the habit of learning in students (Muller, Alexander).
- 4.5.9. Comment

The eight points listed for educationists gives some insight into the professional concerns of the teaching body. The emphasis on quality and innovation within the system as well as on the organization and management of its structures recalls the discussion of internal initiation in Section Three.

4.6. Tactical Achievements

In the struggle against government conceptions of education, a number of tactical victories have been achieved. Some have taken place within or close to the system over a period of time, others, more recently, in total opposition to it.

4.6.1. Examples close to the system are:

- the Independent schools obtaining acceptance for nonracial admission policies, and gaining state funding;
- Universities gaining the right to admit black students;
- Acceptance of private-sector involvement in secondary education (adopt-a-school, READ), and the funding of tertiary education projects like SEP and SELP.
- the growth in influence of organizations like PROTEC, TOPS, SACHED.
- SAAECE and other individual pre-school programs

4.6.2. Examples of alternatives to the system are:

- establishing "street academies";
- winning teachers' loyalty on increasing scale as agents of change;
- commencing work on new curricula,
- establishing a highly visible conception of education that is radically different from the existing dominant concept.

4.6.3. Comment

The list of tactical achievements is not immediately impressive when considered against the scale of needs and the conditions of the educational crisis. It does however become significantly more impressive when placed within the relevant time frame. Considering that the state maintained a virtually unchallenged (and unchallengeable) control of the system for more than 25 years the change that has been carried through in the last 10 and more particularly in the last 4 years begins to look more significant. The impression that the rate of change is accelerating and will continue to do so is probably accurate, but the list of consequences for funders given below should moderate expectations.

4.7. Consequences for funders

The Needs/Demands of all stakeholders/sectors cannot be met. A consequence will be unfulfilled expectations on large a scale. It will be necessary to decide which needs cannot be ignored, and which expectations the nation can most afford to postpone or deny. Four major criteria are suggested by the literature for making decisions in allocating scarce resources:

4.7.1. Political

It is vital to achieve political legitimacy in present-day South Africa. There is thus a need to balance long term goals like "group rights" or "equality" or a "nonracial socialist democracy" with systems that meet immediate needs. Here factors like maximum visibility of the organizations's own policies, coupled with answers to its most powerful critics, would be objectives. The emphasis is likely to be on quantities, sums of money spent and number of people reached.

The credibility of the recipients, and thus of the donor/promoting agency, with a view to the advantages of creating short/medium/long term alliances/goodwill for the donor are typical concerns of private sector and overseas donors. Although both will necessarily take cognisance of recipients' demands and objectives, it is unlikely that they will singlemindedly set out to meet them.

4.7.2. Educational effectiveness

This can be seen as the rate of return on investment in terms of educational achievement. For instance, a sum invested in primary education might be dissipated through excessive attrition, whereas the same sum could have measurable impact in, say, inservice training of maths teachers.

4.7.3. Developmental effectiveness

This is the return on an educational investment in strengthening the economy, stimulating industry, providing scarce skills, contributing to social services etc. To take an often-made private sector point, training white engineers might not fulfill criteria 1, 2, 4, of this section, yet be developmentally justified as being the quickest and cheapest way of providing industry with the skills it needs, breaking a specific skills bottleneck and stimulating economic growth with benefits to a much wider range of people than the few who are needed and trained.

4.7.4. Ethical

The consideration here is motivated by questions of social justice - which groups, communities, or individuals need educational resources most to compensate for cycles of poverty, oppression and deprivation. To many the issue is: what educational policies will most advance egalitarian objectives?

4.8. Funding policies

4.8.1. The N.E.C.C. keynote address to the Michigan Conference on US Initiatives devotes a great deal of attention to the issues of funding. The view stated may be taken as canonical of the Black opposition view as it was articulated in 1986. Deep suspicion of funding from the US characterises the whole commentary. The basic points can be summed up succinctly. US funding

- will secure the long term interests of capitalism
- will stem the democratic tide
- will develop a black middle class leadership through scholarships and programs
- will depoliticise education
- will betray the people of South Africa who demand to exercise democratic control over their own education.

The paper proffers this solution to the funding issue:

"Democratic South African organizations such as the UDF have rapidly developed in the past few years. Any initiative in the arena of education must be carefully planned and implemented in collaboration with such organizations of the democratic movement".

The most obvious interpretation of this view is that funding must come under political control.

4.8.2. In his discussion of post apartheid education Hartshorne makes a similar though less overt point about funding.

"Clearly private sector trusts and foundations will be influenced by perceptions of clients, shareholders and directors, by over-simplified judgements made by a head office in another country, by external codes and by the pressures of international policies in areas such as disinvestment and sanctions: but unless the most powerful influence or decisions on fundings is the realities of the educational situation in South Africa itself, and the perceptions of those realities held by the communities for which that education is intended resources could well be misdirected to shoring up a crumbling edifice." (Hartshorne 1986:39)

The implications of these observations will be taken up in the discussion of strategy in Section 6, but with these in mind the review of the literature identified nine possible areas for funding.

4.9. Possible areas for donor funding

4.9.1. Teacher education

There is a general consensus that the need is there, that any educational reforms will founder if the skills and morale of teachers are wanting. There are already many programs operating, with mixed success, however, and significant progress will require logistics that only the state can provide. New experimental approaches deserve support. The role of Teacher Associations and Student Associations should not be overlooked.

4.9.2. Pre-school education

Consensus exists about the need for pre-school education; The claim is now accepted that satisfactory school preparedness underlies all other education objectives. Consideration could be given to specific aspects, such as teacher training and management of pre-school centres.

4.9.3. Alternative schools

A range of alternatives to state education currently exists, most of which rely extensively on donors. Particularly interesting are schools which reintegrate dropouts and failures, that is, schools which provide a second chance at Matric. Also important are schools that compensate for the vacuum left by presently defunct DET schools, albeit that their futures are uncertain.

4.9.4. Rural schools, including Homeland schools

A new discourse is developing which condemns the neglect of these sectors by all factions. The scale of any operation (geographic and financial) is likely to be daunting, however. Initial funding might need to be for research into possible viable operations (ELTIC and TELIP have done a little work here).

4.9.5. Technical education

This appears to meet all four of the criteria outlined above rather better than most areas. There is consensus from government, Peoples' Education and private sector spokespersons on the importance of maths, science and technical education (Engelbrecht, Viljoen, Maree, AECI, Barlow Rand, Thlagali, EOC

Conference Report, and others). A difficulty might be identifying the most suitable ways of promoting it. See also Innes's reservation on black technicians, which he suspects might perpetuate inequality.

4.9.6. School Management structures

Something is needed in opposition to the DET's TOPDOWN program, with its hierarchical and undemocratic implications. An alternative could involve parents, community, worker/union and student representatives as well as educationists. A problem is that the client base and provision is at present non-existent.

4.9.7. Post Secondary Education

The post-secondary sector needs to be rapidly and widely extended. At present only two bridging initiatives exist between school and university (LEAF and KHANYA College). What is required is a new range of institutions (eg: Community Colleges) which will offer advanced training and education to post matric students across a broad front of activities.

4.9.8. Academic Support

There is a consensus among government, industry, educationists and radical opposition groups that ways must be found to train more black South Africans for high-level technical and managerial careers. University education is the obvious avenue. Without academic support this cannot be done. It also satisfies political, developmental and ethical criteria to a large extent. The recent proposals by Assistant Secretary of State Cohen on US funding to South African universities may increase opportunities in this area.

4.9.9. Literacy

State provision of literacy training is confined to voluntary night schools where it is part of a school-equivalent curriculum. Industry offers several in-house programs. In community based education there are several projects (Learn and Teach, E.L.P., USWE, A.L.P., N.L.P., PROLIT, etc.) but even at the most optimistic assessment their total capacity is very small. The needs are vast.

The most recent information (October 23 personal communication) indicates that the ANC wants to give high priority to a national literacy campaign. There are several potential areas for funding -training of volunteers, materials development, research and infrastructural organization. The problems for funding are the small scale of the project initiatives and the factional divisions within the field.

4.10. Conclusion

The literature survey is as close as one can get in printed material to the ebb and flow of opinion about alternative education and educational system change. It confirms many of the general points we have made; but most notably it does not in itself generate a strategy of the kind required by ESAT. That issue is addressed in Section Six of this Report.

SECTION FIVE : REVIEW OF THE CURRENT PORTFOLIO

5.1. The purpose of this section of the Report is to provide substantiation for the judgement given earlier that the current ESAT portfolio is not having maximum impact in the field.

5.2. A Description of the Portfolio

The portfolio has been constructed to carry out the commitment made in the CAAA to provide educational support for Black South Africans.

The Portfolio functions in close relation to the COLD programme, the basis of the distinction being that ESAT works in formal and COLD works in non-formal education. This sets a boundary to the field of operation of ESAT itself, though definitions of "nonformal" are themselves quite flexible.

The field of nonformal alternative education presently served by ESAT funding is divided into six sectors:

- (a) Community Based Schools
- (b) Pre School Programs
- (c) Literacy Programs
- (d) Materials Development and Research
- (e) Teacher training and upgrading
- (f) Bursary Activities (Community)

The current portfolio lists 32 grant agreements differently distributed within these sectors.

It is acknowledged in the documentation that ESAT has built up the portfolio through a "flexible" and "experimental" engagement with a wide range of schools and organizations. At the end of the experimental period the portfolio presents to the evaluators the following features:

5.2.1. Features of the Portfolio

- The two major investment areas are (a) Community based Schools and (e) Teacher training and Upgrading (each receiving roughly \$1,5 million annually).
- The smallest sector investment is in (c) Literacy
- The least satisfactory (as noted in the implementation status document) is (f) Bursary Activity.
- The major grant in (d) Materials Development is to Skotaville Publishers and on the evidence in the documentation it seems that the interpretation of "materials" is broad. There are no grants for materials research.
- In sector (b) Pre School Programs grants support to a range of activity including national organizational work, training and individual pre-school activity.
- The agreements concluded represent a radical selection from a much vaster flow of requests and proposals.

- Considered as a whole, the portfolio is substantial. Given the amount of processing which each agreement requires the evaluators can understand the administrative pressure on personnel in ESAT.
- Limits are set to the size of the individual grants by the capacity of organizations to receive and effectively utilize funds.
- There appear to be few if any links and relations between the different projects receiving funds.
- The portfolio shows that the ESAT program is in touch with a significant number and variety of activities in the alternative education field.
- The program appears to have encountered relatively little resistance to US funding. However, absences from the portfolio may in part be due to this factor.
- The program has tested some of the limits to its activity set by US legislation. We refer to the legal opinion regarding the grant to Perspectives in Education.
- The limits to engagement in the field are set by the narrow range of actors and agencies and the presence of large amounts of donor money. The procedures which the programme is required to follow also prevent it from making quick responses to requests, which also sets a limit to what can be done.
- Grants are selected in terms of two sets of criteria. One set employs standards of political "currency" - community credibility and leadership profile. The other employs developmental standards - valuable delivery, impact on need, long term growth potential. In the portfolio it appears that the political currency criteria have been dominant. It would seem that the programme has found it difficult to integrate the two sets of criteria.

5.3. Analysis of assumptions underpinning the Portfolio

The portfolio represents the on-the-ground outcome of the initiative begun in the CAAA. The program has developed an "interpretation" of the task set by the legislation. This interpretation necessarily rests upon a set of assumptions about how the field is organized (the sector division); what the significant movements in the field are; and how these movements link up with the broader opposition to apartheid.

The assumptions which the evaluators believe underpin the present portfolio are as follows:

- In the South African political context education action represents a significant, if not major, agency for contesting apartheid and changing the political system.
- The Black oppositional movement possesses a significant degree of organizational coherence and unity of approach.
- The educational work of oppositional groups links with a conscious overall political strategy.
- The oppositional political movement has the capacity in a medium term time scale to build enough power to displace the system.
- The task of foreign donors is to provide resources to strengthen the political movement and contribute to the disappearance of apartheid.

- Investment in education provides an important way to achieve the strengthening of the political movement and will contribute to the base of the future society.
- The SAG is neither capable of, nor prepared to negotiate changes which could be of meaning or use to Black South Africans committed to the transformation of the society. For this reason the prohibition on interaction by USAID with the SAG is defensible.
- Foreign donors should follow the internal Black oppositional prescription to isolate the regime.

The evaluators readily accept that this framework of assumptions was formulated - explicitly in the legislation and AID strategy and implicitly in the thinking of staff - under the confrontative conditions of 1985/86. We also recognise that they represent an accurate and appropriate interpretation of the rhetorically and ideologically presented account of the South African situation at that period.

What we are arguing in this Report is that this framework of assumptions and interpretation no longer provides an adequate means of developing a full and accurate understanding of what is taking place - either in education or oppositional politics.

The assumptions are, in an obvious way, dated. They also reflect only one side of the action of the Black opposition - namely the ideological projection of the struggle conveyed through public rhetoric designed to unify oppositional forces and focus the action in stark terms. We have argued in this Report that there is (and in a sense there always has been) a second side to the oppositional struggle which requires more attention.

5.4. Constraints Operating on the Formation of the Portfolio

The portfolio operates under constraints emanating from the field on one side and from the legal framework established in the CAAA on the other. Neither of these sets of constraints will be easily modified and together they impose considerable strain on the programme because the CAAA (and USAID) require action on the basis of a policy formulation which fails to register the complexities of the field. A wide gap is possible between legislative and mission goals and on the ground funding possibilities.

It is at this point that the analysis of the assumptions given above becomes salient. We think it is possible to disentangle the formally constituted constraints and the informally constructed assumptions which constitute the planning framework for the programme. The goals of the programme remain to challenge apartheid and to support the process of change but a different set of assumptions about how change can take place (derived from the interpretation of the experience of the project and a fuller understanding of the context) will provide a planning framework to enable more focussed action in the field.

A new interpretative framework will serve to narrow the gap between goals and work in the field. It will also, over time, restructure the portfolio.

5.5. Assessment of Portfolio Performance

The central problem with the present portfolio, is that it cannot reach the goals set down in the strategic document of the mission.

There need to be two qualifications to this statement. Firstly, we are saying more than that the programme is not achieving the goals - but also that as currently constituted it cannot do so. The 32 grant agreements work within the constraints and assumptions of the mission but they do not add up to a coherent programme which can help to strengthen the oppositional movement and carry it through to its goal of defeating the state and ushering in the post-apartheid society.

The second qualification in therefore that the present portfolio shows that it is possible to plan and work on the basis of confrontational assumptions and interpretations, only to find the end result disappointingly close to making only additional provision alongside that of the state.

5.5.1. Assessment of Strategy

ESAT has been managed as an experiment. An experiment does represent a kind of strategy, but it is essentially a strategy for "finding something out". It is by definition not a satisfactory way to achieve pre-determined goals.

The ESAT experiment has operated within the macro-strategy of the mission. Its contribution to mission goals has been small but it has found out a great deal about work in alternative education and about how to move from the experiment to a strategic plan.

5.5.2. Portfolio Range and Balance

The portfolio range and balance is impressive - with the exception perhaps of regional distribution. The literature review identified 9 likely areas for funding. ESAT already operates in six of these -the other three (school management, post secondary and academic support) all present difficulties of one or another kind, but also offer opportunities.

5.5.3. Decision Making on Grants

The strongest impression given by the collected portfolio is of responsive, one-at-a-time politically -directed decision making. A harsh criticism would be that the programme is using its resources to buy itself a place in the educational/oppositional political movement. A more generous view would see the programme as responsive to the shifts in political priorities in the field. Both views would share the opinion that the programme followed the direction set by public political expression.

Educational/development decisions do feature in the portfolio (SAAECE, PROMAT, READ) but at present they would appear to be outweighed by political decisions.

There is evidence of decisions which integrate the political and developmental (teacher associations in particular) and the plans for 1990 suggest that the funding of large-scale long-running projects (SEP, TOPS) will increase the development component of the portfolio.

The goal in the decision making area should be to develop a framework which will integrate the political and developmental criteria and generate a matrix of indicators which apply to the actual conditions in the field.

5.5.4. Operations

The most accurate description for the operations impact of the portfolio is that it is "dispersed". It is recognised that it is extremely difficult, acting under the programs mandate, to invest \$3.5 million annually in a field which is as diverse and as fragmented as alternative education.

The field is filled with a host of small scale projects most of which lack the organizational capacity to absorb and make effective use of large grants. Large grants in these circumstances constitute a considerable threat to the general culture of alternative educational projects. Organizations are swamped with funds; financial discipline is undermined and worst of all, donor money comes to be seen as freely available for personal use. ESAT deserves credit for not contributing to these conditions.

The programme staff have won deserved praise for the attention which has been given to the institution and operation of proper financial systems in AID funded projects. The contribution is of value to the field as a whole - and contrasts with the approach of some other funding agencies.

Under these conditions it is not at all a surprise to find a dispersed impact. Further it is not any simple matter to focus the resources to achieve more directed impact although if the goals are to be achieved something of this kind will have to be attempted.

5.6. Conclusion

The portfolio demonstrates a significant and impressive entry into a difficult and contested field. The experiment has been thoroughly conducted and has produced valuable results of various kinds. Action on the basis of the results, as discussed above, lead the evaluators to believe in the need for a new interpretative framework constructed on the basis of reassessed assumptions, and the establishment of a strategic plan which will direct the decision making procedures and the operational implementation at different levels. This is set out in Section Six.

SECTION SIX : PROPOSALS FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE CURRENT SECTORAL STRATEGY

- 6.1. In this Section, we set out a proposal for a new strategy for ESAT. We recommend that ESAT discontinue its present "loosely structured selection procedures", however valuable these have been during the early years of the programme. We propose instead the introduction of a three level, formal strategic approach, with specific human and financial resources devoted to each level. We believe that this approach will introduce a flexibility and range of responses to opportunities that ESAT does not have at present,

Within our proposals for each level of strategy, we distinguish between "strategic content" and "strategic process". In "strategic content", we specify the organizational and program outcomes for ESAT in pursuing the strategy. In "strategic process" we provide guidelines for the achievement of these outcomes, including where possible concrete suggestions as to how to implement the proposed strategy.

6.2. Level One : Smaller grants

6.2.1. Content :

ESAT should create a "discretionary fund" consisting of an agreed percentage of the total annual budget, to be disbursed in small amounts (say, up to \$25,000) with minimum processing of applications. This fund should be used for two main purposes:

- rapid action in respect of proposals of real urgency or need in the field of alternative education only, where crises of an acute kind may be met or major impact may be achieved by immediate responses (eg. unexpected shortfalls in funding of otherwise well-organized conferences on alternative education topics).
- initial, one-off investments in projects and programs that might have possibilities of entering strategic levels Two and Three. Swift, helpful grants may open doors to future contact with projects of potential.

The time horizon of project support through this strategy is 3-6 months.

6.2.2. Process

We recommend that a small "discretionary fund group" be established to review applications in hand and to establish criteria for decision-making. One person from this group should then be designated responsible for assessing applications and proposing responses to the group for decision. Once it has been decided to fund a proposal, the simplest possible administrative procedures should be followed in processing the grant.

The grants made should be assessed quarterly by the discretionary fund group and the experience incorporated into ongoing decision-making.

After 12 months, ESAT should consider commissioning an independent assessment of the scale, scope and impact of all discretionary grants. This Report should be discussed by a wider group within USAID and revised guidelines set, if necessary, for the second year of operation.

6.3. Level Two : Portfolio of projects

6.3.1. Content :

ESAT should continue to fund, but at a higher level than it presently does, a portfolio of projects that are achieving or have the potential to achieve real delivery of educational goods in any one of the nine areas of alternative education identified in our literature survey. In this portfolio, major strategic emphasis should be placed on developmental objectives and on the provision of financial and human resources for strengthening the projects to achieve these. These projects are not however conceived of as the major change agents in the South African educational system, but will contribute to the essential basis for quality post apartheid education in South Africa.

The time horizon of project support through this strategy is 3-5 years in respect of each project.

6.3.2. Process

The construction of the portfolio requires the exercise of two different selection and decision processes. The first is the selection and prioritization of sectors while the second is the selection of programmes or projects within the various sectors.

Both processes depend on the accumulation of information and the development of the knowledge bases which we have discussed in this report. The formal socio-political and educational change scenarios are needed to provide some form of analytical grid which will make it possible to discriminate both between the various sectors and within each sector. The scenarios will, of course, change over time and the need to update information must remain an important consideration.

In proposing an analytical grid we are not doing much more than attempting to formalise, to some degree, the present decision processes which ESAT uses. Our view is that ESAT has followed, in an informal way (with considerable success) the shifts in the salience of different sectors - from teacher education to pre-schooling to alternative schools. We think some degree of formalization is useful because it may be able to produce some capacity to predict the shifts in salience as well as the emergence of new sectors of activity.

The information gathered from immediate short term engagements in Level One work will be invaluable for this purpose, particularly as it is interpreted in terms of the socio political and educational scenarios.

Criteria for Selection and Prioritization among Sectors

(a) The Problem of "Needs"

The concept of meeting needs is less than useful in attempting to make selection decisions. Needs in all sectors - both among people seeking education and among projects providing opportunities - are vast. Moreover needs are not comparable across sectors. In Level Two ESAT should endeavour to build up a developmental policy rather than finding itself caught in the position of responding to needs. Level one is a need response strategy.

(b) Developmental Criteria

USAID has extensive international experience in constructing developmental criteria though it is true that South Africa presents particular problems - notably the close linkage between oppositional political work and development - which render that body of experience only partially useful.

The chief problem in constructing developmental criteria is to identify the major processes that are at work in the alternative education field as a whole, and to test the various sectors against them. The matrix grid which follows (See Appendix 1) is an attempt to do this - it is meant to indicate possibilities rather than to prescribe criteria. It needs to be argued against and refined rather than adopted as is.

Our view is that there are THREE developmental (and hence political) processes at work across the nine sectors of the alternative education field. They are:

- The changing (from white to black) of the social composition of the trained high level personpower outputs of the system. (This process relates to the CAAA goal of producing Black leadership and incorporates the bursary activity of USAID. It is conducted through external transaction).
- The stimulation of developmental change processes in the structure and operations of the educational system itself. (This relates to the CAAA goal of laying the foundations for a post-apartheid system. It reflects internal initiation).
- The opening up of routes of access to education to people who have historically been excluded either through legislation or economic exploitation. (This also relates to the post apartheid goal and is a product of external transaction.)

These three processes are in themselves very different though each one has important claims to assert in the general process of development. They operate in different ways and with different force in all of the nine sectors in the field. The important thing for a selection procedure is for it to be able to produce some degree of cross sector comparison. An example of such a comparison is presented in Matrix 1 in Appendix 1.

(c) Political Criteria

We have accepted the USAID view that developmental work in South Africa is inevitably also political in content. There are no simple technical solutions to the problems in education and the Mission has therefore a specifically political task to fulfil.

In the light of this we have attempted to produce a list of 5 criteria which we think provide the means for making the initial developmental decision effective in political terms.

The criteria are:

- The volume and quality of organized and articulated demand for educational services in any given sector. (Organized demand is significantly different to assumed needs.)
- The oppositional political profile of educational work in the given sector. (In some this is high, in others low, but it is present in all.)
- The organizational development of the sector. The issue here is the level of organization development generally present within the sector. Can the scale of the existing projects meet the demands? Are the organizations effective?

- Co-operative/competitive issues between projects in the sector. Sectors differ in the degree of political and educational contestation and factionalism taking place.
- Does the sector operate with an over or undersupply of funding and is there competition between funding sources for project opportunities?

In Appendix 2 these five criteria have been organized into a decision matrix to indicate how they might operate.

Criteria for Project Selection Within Sectors

The assumptions of the following discussion are that the process of selection between sectors is complete and that the decision making group has available a considerable body of knowledge and information about the projects operating within any chosen sector.

We have identified 4 criteria to assist in the process of making decisions between projects. These do not include the procedural questions of whether or not the grant can be properly processed by USAID; nor do they take into account refusals by projects of USAID funding.

The criteria are:

- Internal organizational strength
Here we have in mind a cluster of factors which contribute to maintaining organizational effectiveness. They include the quality of leadership; the nature of the decision making procedures; authority, role and job definitions, and accountability; professional standards of work both in the field and in administration.
- Capacity to deliver
Here we are looking at both scale, quality and cost effectiveness. The criterion operates by examining the point of delivery and posing the question: "Who receives what goods at what cost and to what use are they put?"
- Constituency politics
Through this criterion it is important to distinguish between grassroots participation in the project as against provision for a small elite group or systems of personal patronage.
- Impact Strategy and Effectiveness
The main distinction focussed in this criterion is between a rhetorical/ideological strategy directed towards the construction and projection of political images and a constituency building strategy aimed at encouraging direct participation of the users of the service.

In Appendix 3 we have applied these criteria to the pre school sector to show how they can be expected to produce potential decision scores.

Conclusion

In attempting to establish criteria for selection ("tools for decision making") we have produced three sets - developmental and political for prioritizing the sectors, and organizational for prioritizing the project work within the sector.

We are well aware that putting numbers to complex social action and behaviour is always a drastic and risky business. We have followed this path because we think that through this process the debates about developmental, political and organizational objectives can be specified and focussed in ways which will produce rational decisions. The production of a scored decision path also assists in the process of reviewing ESAT field effectiveness. Regular reviewing will refine the criteria and the assignment of scores to characteristics.

6.4. Level Three : Negotiation of Policy Change

6.4.1. Content :

ESAT needs to conceptualise, develop, test extensively and then implement a long term strategy to strengthen 3-5 selected, larger projects and their associated constituencies, with the skills and expertise needed for them to make major negotiated gains from the present educational system in the educational areas in which they operate. This strategy will shift ESAT's emphasis from "education" support (which is provided for in Levels One and Two) to the development and "training" of education professionals in non-educational skills; for instance, organizational development to establish in-project capacity for negotiating and advocacy campaigns; strategic planning skills; analysis of probable opposition tactics; direct negotiating skills; promotional capacity; and constituency mobilization. The basic goal is to improve the skills of and increase the support for political gains in the educational field.

The time horizon for project support through this strategy is 3-7 years.

6.4.2. Process

The longer term strategy we are proposing poses the greatest challenge for ESAT. Yet, it is undoubtedly the most important of the three levels of strategy and one through which an interactive process can be launched with alternative education institutions in South Africa, which in turn have a chance of changing the system by a combination of external transactions and political manipulation. It is also ambitious and not assured of success. We have accordingly indicated a point at which a "go/no go" decision can be taken.

For clarity, the strategic process is now set out quite schematically.

1. The starting assumptions of the strategy are set out in Sections Two and Three of this Report. In summary:

- the SAG is both more durable and more penetrable than is commonly assumed;
- major gains can be made in several fields in which discrimination persists within a 6 year planning time scale. This includes real gains in education practice and policy. However, education does remain probably the most difficult area to make these gains. ESAT (and USAID) expectations should be realistic;
- all elements of opposition to the SAG agree on the need to continue extreme pressures on the SAG to change its policies. This pressure must be both internal and external. At the same time, there is a current (and, we believe, growing) conviction that radical replacement of entire national policies by more acceptable ones is at present far less likely than negotiated, specific changes in sectors and sub-sectors of policy. The ideology and political will to defend every single aspect of discriminatory policy has gone. But not all areas offer equal chances for short term change;

- as a consequence, while ESAT cannot itself interact with the SAG, there are opportunities to strengthen and provide resources to educational agencies that can and will do this, if they can see a realistic chance of making specific educational and general political gains. The proposed strategy aims to provide the resources to achieve these gains through strengthening other agencies;
2. This third strategic element of ESAT's total programme should be aimed at between 3 and 5 institutions in the first place;
 3. The objective of the strategy is to obtain the approval of top leadership of these agencies, and then to implement resource provision for the development and training of key individuals within each organization. These individuals will probably include some members of the voluntary controlling boards or committees, senior administrative personnel and some of the professional staff - in other words, people who make the programme work.
 4. The resources provided by ESAT will be used to transfer knowledge and skills to this target group. This will not be further knowledge of or skills in education proper, but rather knowledge and skills related to
 - organizational development techniques
 - constituency mobilization
 - interest articulation and promotion
 - advocacy and lobbying techniques
 - policy analysis and methods of implementing policy change
 - management of transition situations
 - negotiating skills, including analysis of opponents' cases and skills with a view to countering these
 - use of information, data, statistics, personal cases, histories and anecdote in effective persuasion
 5. The purpose of this focussed input of resources will be to create within these organizations a professionally equipped infrastructure to prepare for, help to conduct, conclude and consolidate negotiated gains in freedom, autonomy and specific education rights from the SAG in the educational field in which the organization works. Given the nature of the South African situation almost all these policy gains will have political content and consequences. The programme will remain, in every case, under the leadership and direction of the organization itself.
 6. The acquisition of these skills by the intermediate level management or administrative workers, while mainly aimed at providing the organizational infrastructures for successful negotiated gains from SAG, could also have beneficial effects on the internal management/administration of the project, as many of the skills are generalizable to that situation. Some of the organizations assisted will already be associations or federations in the maintenance of which all these skills are vital.
 7. The appropriate assistance programme would be developed in detail in consultation with each organization. In principle, ESAT funds granted for this purpose must be entirely under the control of the organizations concerned, subject only to the usual USAID procedures. For purposes of illustration however, the financial resources could be used by the organizations in any or all of the following ways:

attendance by staff at appropriate training courses in South Africa and abroad;
 organization of in-house training courses, tailored to the needs of the agency;
 employment of consultants;
 strengthening staff at lower levels to permit staff on the ESAT sponsored programme to devote greater time to this development;
 collection of information necessary as a basis for negotiating positions;
 travel for purposes of consultation with other organizations in the same field, with a view to co-ordinated change strategies;
 and many other activities well documented in the literature on interest group formation, mobilisation and advocacy.

8. USAID itself might play two pro-active roles, either by itself or by funding a research agency to carry out the work. First, it could research and build up a register of South African individuals and agencies able to offer expertise and guidance in these areas. Secondly, it could systematically survey and select American individuals and agencies for the same purpose. Both registers could be made available to participating organizations to increase their range of choice.
9. The evaluators are perfectly conscious that ESAT actions in terms of this strategy may be misconstrued in many quarters. This will be for historical reasons and because it may be interpreted as heralding a more "activist" role for USAID. We therefore recommend proceeding with caution in accordance with the following steps:
 - (a) full discussion and agreement within USAID (November 1989).
 - (b) judicious testing of the idea with individual South Africans able to give political, educational, operational and "image" responses. The responses to this testing - which may be done directly by USAID or indirectly on behalf of USAID - will provide the "go/no go" decision point (February 1990).
 - (c) If "go", identification of agencies with which the initial 2-3 contracts may be concluded. These agencies will probably have the following characteristics: national or significant regional spread of activities; operate in one of the alternative education areas; be providing genuine educational goods or services to clients; and have fairly high profile political leadership well-inclined to negotiation. ESAT should initiate discussion with these agencies (May 1990).
 - (d) Internal programs could be launched after July 1990.

6.5. Human Resources

- 6.5.1. the USAID Mission in general, and ESAT in particular, undoubtedly requires in-house educational expertise. It is our considered opinion that the "disjuncture" we have observed between the stated goals of the ESAT programme and the present and likely future impact of the projects actually funded is linked to lack of educational theory and analysis. The in-house education expertise would be devoted to ensuring that project funding decision-makers have the educational analysis needed to identify small projects likely to grow and to create and sustain networks into all the areas of alternative education we have defined. The evaluators have a strong preference for a full time professional appointment, preferably of someone with educational experience in South America.

- 6.5.2. the additional project funding through the discretionary fund and the increased activity in the normal portfolio indicate the need for an additional program officer in ESAT itself. This could be a more junior appointment, permitting the present experienced project development officers to concentrate on quality decisions in respect of the portfolio and on the development and implementation of the longer term strategy.
- 6.5.3. responsibility for strategic level three should be allocated to a single person on the existing staff. It is not envisaged that it will involve all his/her time.
- 6.5.4. two further kinds of expertise will have to be acquired on an appropriate basis. These are for the socio-political scenario preparation and update and for the periodic assessment by South Africans of ESAT's plans. The scenario work can quite easily be commissioned on a contractual and professional basis from an appropriate South African agency. The South African education advice could be obtained either through an informal network of contracted, professional consultants and/or by establishing a formal advisory panel. In both cases, the in-house educational expert could manage or carry out these processes.

6.6. Conclusion

The evaluators make no apology for the complexity of this section on alternative strategy. Change in South Africa is complex : massive forces are involved; the stakes literally include life and death. While the ultimate costs and gains rest with us South Africans, any other country hoping to contribute should ideally operate on strategies adapted to the local complexity and sustained over the appropriate time.

SECTION SEVEN : RESPONSE TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS IN THE EVALUATION BRIEF

- 7.1. **Question I :** Are the stated sectoral objectives and areas of focus still appropriate in the current environment? Are there any that need to be added or deleted?

From the document entitled Education Support and Training, we have derived the following "sectoral objectives" for USAID's education programs in general and ESAT in particular:

- 7.1.1. "to support indigenous, nongovernmental initiatives which test improved models for basic education for disadvantaged South Africans and confront the waste of human resources victimized by the apartheid education system." (p.29)
- 7.1.2. Later material in the same document serves to add further "sector objectives aimed at (addressing) basic education for black South Africans at the community level" and "(focussing) on those areas where...replication of successful models (can be) developed and tested in situ." (p. 29)

Elements of these objectives undoubtedly remain valid for ESAT, namely : support for basic education; support for nongovernmental initiatives; and delivery of educational goods and services to meet human needs. To these however, we propose should be added : strengthening selected organizations to enable them to interact with the education system and make policy gains.

Conversely, in the light of our analysis of the way education systems change, it does not seem that replication of models of alternative education should remain a sector objective. Our analysis indicates that winning gains from the system is more important than replicating a multiplicity of large scale initiatives alongside it.

- 7.2. **Question II :** Is the current, highly flexible but relatively unfocused, approach to ESAT resource allocation the best use of AID resources to contribute to the overall program objectives? Or would a greater degree of concentration, in functional terms, provide us opportunities for greater impact?

No, the current approach to ESAT resource allocation is not the best use of AID resources. While, in a modified form, it remains a component of the best allocation, it requires to be complemented in the manner argued throughout the Report.

- 7.3. **Question III:** If the current approach remains appropriate to mission objectives, how can it be refined to achieve a greater rigour in the selection process and to ensure maximum impact of AID funds?

As a portion of a broader strategy of resource allocation the development and maintenance of a portfolio of projects producing real educational goods and services remains appropriate and important. The process of determining priorities can however definitely be refined, and the Report makes detailed proposals on this topic.

- 7.4. **Question IV :** In what way can USAID target its resources to activities which will contribute to the long-run improvement of South African educational systems?

Our answer to this is given in Section Six of the Report, and involves a specific strategy aimed at strengthening educational institutions, initiatives and projects to enable them to exert pressure and conduct negotiation that will lead to long term educational change.

- 7.5. **Question V :** Are our current activities within stated areas of focus making maximum advantage of USAID program funds?

No, better use could be made of funds in stated areas of focus. Proposals to achieve this are made in paragraphs 6.2., 6.3. and 6.4. of the Report.

7.6. Question VI : Should the mission have in-house education expertise to provide a greater range of advice and guidance on education matters?

Yes, the mission should definitely have in-house education expertise of the kind we have described in paragraph 6.5 of this Report.

7.7. In conclusion, the evaluators wish to state that the development, testing, implementation and impact of a major strategy programme of this kind is a venture that will yield results only over significant time scales. The developmental impacts will be felt after the turn of this century and under whatever government then rules. By supporting nongovernmental initiatives, creating developmental skills and strengthening capacity to negotiate for the achievement of real interests, ESAT will surely be laying some of the basis of a democratic future for South Africa.

ACRONYMS USED IN THE REPORT

AECI	:	<i>African Explosives and Chemical Industries</i>
A.L.P.	:	<i>Adult Learning Programme</i>
BELC	:	<i>Border Early Learning Centre</i>
CAAA	:	<i>Comprehensive Anti Apartheid Act</i>
COLD	:	<i>Community Outreach and Leadership Development Project</i>
CPS	:	<i>Centre for Policy Studies</i>
DET	:	<i>(South African) Department of Education and Training</i>
E.L.P.	:	<i>English Language Programme</i>
ELRU	:	<i>Early Learning Resources Unit</i>
ELTIC	:	<i>English Language Teacher Information Centre</i>
EOC	:	<i>Educational Opportunities Council</i>
ESAT	:	<i>Educational Support and Training Project</i>
FCW	:	<i>Foundation for Community Work</i>
INSET	:	<i>In-service education and training (of teachers)</i>
LEAF	:	<i>Leadership, Education and Advancement Foundation</i>
MDM	:	<i>Mass Democratic Movement</i>
NECC	:	<i>National Education Crisis Committee</i>
NLP	:	<i>National Language Programme</i>
NUMSA	:	<i>National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa</i>
PROLIT	:	<i>Project Literacy</i>
PROMAT	:	<i>Project Matriculation</i>
PROTEC	:	<i>Programme for Technological Careers</i>
READ	:	<i>Read, Educate and Develop</i>
RSA	:	<i>Republic of South Africa</i>
SAAECE	:	<i>South African Association for Early Childhood Educare</i>
SACC	:	<i>South African Council of Churches</i>
SACHED	:	<i>South African Council for Higher Education</i>
SAG	:	<i>South African Government</i>
SELP	:	<i>Schools English Language Programme</i>
SEP	:	<i>Science Education Project</i>
TBVC	:	<i>Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei</i>
TELIP	:	<i>Teachers English Language Improvement Project</i>
TOPS	:	<i>Teacher Opportunity Programmes</i>
TREE	:	<i>Training and Resources for Early Education</i>
UCT	:	<i>University of Cape Town</i>
UDF	:	<i>United Democratic Front</i>
UNISA	:	<i>University of South Africa</i>
USAID	:	<i>United States Agency for International Development</i>
UTASA	:	<i>United Teachers Associations of South Africa</i>
UWC	:	<i>University of the Western Cape</i>
USWE	:	<i>Using Spoken and Written English</i>

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APPENDIX 1

MATRIX GRID 1: DEVELOPMENTAL CRITERIA FOR SECTORS

	CHANGING THE COMPOSITION OF HIGH LEVEL PERSON-POWER OUTPUTS OF THE SYSTEM	STIMULATING DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE IN THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM	OPENING UP ACCESS ROUTES TO EDUCATION FOR EXCLUDED GROUPS	IMPACT
LITERACY	1	1	5	BROAD LONG-TERM
PRE-SCHOOL EDUCATION	1	2	5	
ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS	1	2	5	
RURAL EDUCATION	1	2	5	
TEACHER EDUCATION	2	5	1	MORE FOCUSED MEDIUM-TERM
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT	2	5	1	
TECHNICAL EDUCATION	5	2	2	FAIRLY SPECIFIC SHORT-TERM
POST SECONDARY ED	5	2	2	
ACADEMIC SUPPORT	5	2	2	

READING THE GRID

The scoring is based on a simple 1-6 low to high contribution to the developmental process. The scores given are our example and would in a decision process represent our starting point in the debate to be modified and refined by further evidence.

The forms of impact noted in the right hand column represent the outcome of the patterns of scores. We would suggest that E.S.A.T. should distribute resources across the different forms of impact and in that way build a coherent development portfolio by sector.

APPENDIX 2

MATRIX GRID 2: POLITICAL CRITERIA FOR SECTORS

	VOLUME AND QUALITY OF ORGANISED DEMAND	OPPOSITION POLITICAL PROFILE	ORGANISATION DEVELOPMENT SCALE AND EFFECTIVENESS AND	CO-OPERATION /COMPETITION CONTESTATION AND FACTIONAL DISPUTATION	FUNDING SUPPLY; RELATION BETWEEN MONEY AND ACTIVITY	OVERALL SCORES
LITERACY	2	4	1	1	2	10
PRE-SCHOOL ED	4	4	3	3	4	18
ALTERNATIVE ED	5	4	2	2	3	16
RURAL ED	2	2	1	3	1	9
TEACHER ED	3	3	4	4	4	18
SCHOOL MGT	2	2	2	2	2	10
TECHNICAL ED	1	1	2	3	2	9
POST SECONDARY	4	2	1	3	2	12
ACADEMIC SUPP	3	3	4	4	3	17

READING THE GRID

The scoring in this grid is more complex than grid 1.

In column 1, 5 represents high volume and quality.

In column 2, 5 represents a high political profile.

In column 3, 5 represents a high degree of organisation.

In column 4, 5 represents a high degree of co-operation and minimal factional contest.

In column 5, 5 represents a good match of money and field activity - lower scores indicate either under or oversupply.

The pattern of overall scores produces, we think, a reasonable profile of the political topography of alternative education. E.S.A.T. has in fact followed the high scoring sectors (except for Academic Support).

The political "rating" of the sectors *is* important for E.S.A.T.'s work but as we have argued elsewhere we think that at level 2 the developmental selection of sectors should take priority with the political selection operating as a modifier.

APPENDIX 3

MATRIX GRID 3: CRITERIA FOR PROJECTS
PRE-SCHOOL SECTOR

	INTERNAL ORGANISATIONAL STRENGTH	CAPACITY TO DELIVER	CONSTITUENCY POLITICS (GRASSROOTS SUPPORT ELITE DIRECTION PERSONAL NETWORKS)	IMPACT STRATEGY	OVERALL SCORES
E.L.R.U.	3	2	2	3	10
GRASSROOTS	3	4	3	4	14
B.E.L.C.	4	4	3	4	15
F.C.W.	2	2	2	1	7
KHANYA	1	1	2	1	5
T.R.E.E.	3	2	2	3	10
NOTOKOZWENI	3	3	3	3	12
SAAECE	2	2	2	3	9

READING THE GRID

We offer this grid as an example of the way in which the project operations within a particular sector can be assessed. Each score represents a complex judgement of a cluster of factors. All are open to debate. Over time the criteria can be refined and developed - both in terms of field activity and E.S.A.T. positions (eg: on black leadership). In our view the scoring given above represents a reasonable profile of the field operations and offers a factored analysis of the project's profile.