


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**Sahel Regional Program  
Assessment of Program Impact**



**Africa Bureau  
Office of West Africa Affairs  
Sahel Regional Program  
January 1995**


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## ACRONYMS

AGRHYMET	Agroclimatology, Hydrology and Meteorology Regional Institution
AFR/ARTS/FARA	Africa Bureau/Office of Analysis, Research and Technical Support/Food, Agriculture, and Resources Analysis
AFR/WA	Africa Bureau/West Africa
AFR/WA/RP	Africa Bureau/West Africa/Regional Programs
USAID	Agency for International Development
API	Assessment of Program Impact
CFA	African Financial Community
CERPOD	Center for Studies and Research on Population and Development
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for the Control of Drought in the Sahel
CINERGIE	Informal Unit for Study, Research and Information on Regional Trade
CONACILSS	National Components of CILSS
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAG	Donor Advisory Group
DFA	Development Fund for Africa
DIAPER	Regional Program for Capacity Building in Collection and Reporting of Agricultural Statistics
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEC	European Economic Community
EOPS	End of Project Status Indicators
EU	European Union
FY	Fiscal Year
INSAH	The Sahel Institute
IPC	Implementing Policy Change Project
LAP	Livestock Action Plan
MSI	Management Systems International
NRM	Natural Resources Management
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PACD	Project Activity Completion Date
PADRES	Programs for Applied Development Research in the Sahel
PARTS	Policy, Analysis, Research and Technical Support Project
PRISAS	Food Security Analytical Capacity Building Regional Program
PRISM	Program Performance Information for Strategic Management
PRRD	Sustainable Restructuring and Relaunching Program of CILSS
REDSO/W	Regional Economic Development Support Office/West Africa
RSSA	Resource Support Services Agreement
SO	Strategic Objective
SRI	Sahel Regional Institutions Project
UMOA	West African Monetary Union
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UDEAC	Central African States Customs Union
USAIDs	Overseas Offices of USAID
USDH	United States Direct Hire Personnel
USG	United States Government
WAEN	West Africa Enterprise Network

Figure 1: Objective Tree Sahel Regional Program



## INTRODUCTION

The Sahel Regional Program emphasizes cooperation, collaboration and capacity building in Sahel regional institutions and associations. It places particular emphasis on support to the CILSS (Permanent Interstate Committee to Combat Drought in the Sahel, which includes Cape Verde, Mauritania, Chad, Senegal, Niger, Mali, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Burkina Faso). CILSS is composed of three major regional institutions: INSAH (Institute for Research in the Sahel, which provides analysis and dialogue on sectoral, social and economic topics bearing on regional policy and program issues), CERPOD (Center for Studies and Research on Population and Development, which provides population planning and research services at the regional level) and AGRHYMET (Agroclimatology, Hydrology and Meteorology Regional Institution, which monitors the natural environment and coordinates food situation monitoring and food early warning information at the regional level).

The Sahel Regional Program also emphasizes coordination and collaboration among donors active in the region to promote efficient use of aid resources by supporting USAID's participation in the Club du Sahel. Donors who are most active in the Club are the United States, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The same countries are also major supporters of CILSS programs; additional support is provided by the European Union, the UN (FAO) and Italy.

In this way, the Sahel Regional Program is able to pursue the objectives set by USAID policy, which emphasizes cooperation, coordination and regional approaches where appropriate. Crises prevention is also an element of the program, via support to AGRHYMET and participation in the Club du Sahel's "Food Crises Prevention Network"

### SECTION I: SPECIAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SAHEL REGIONAL PROGRAM

Three major events affecting the Sahel Regional Program occurred in 1994: a devaluation of the FCFA (African Financial Community Franc) on January 12; the reorientation and reorganization of USAID, including a decision to close three USAID Missions (Cape Verde, Chad and Burkina Faso) associated with the Sahel Program; and, the military coup in the Gambia, with the subsequent requirement that the Gambia USAID Mission be closed.

#### *Devaluation of the CFA*

The devaluation of the CFA marked the first change in parity between the CFA and the French Franc (FF) since the currency was created in 1948. The parity was changed from 50 FCFA per FF to 100 FCFA per FF, a 50% devaluation which would potentially have led to a 100% increase in the cost of imported goods.

The devaluation was a historic and a courageous decision deemed necessary to redress a major macroeconomic imbalance. The overvalued currency had reduced the competitive position of member countries in international markets, as well as artificially stimulating substitution of imported goods in place of local production. Economic growth was stagnant, at best, and real per capita incomes were falling.

Along with the devaluation, the CFA-zone heads of state also decided to reorganize (broaden) the two monetary unions. The West African Economic Community (CEAO) was eliminated (one of the first times a regional institution has actually been eliminated in Africa). A new "Economic and Monetary Union" was created in place of the West African Union, and the Central African Union was reorganized. Both unions adopted a more open, more regional approach to economic cooperation, along with acceptance of the importance of the private sector to economic growth in the region.

Immediately following the devaluation, the World Bank and the French announced several "safety net programs" to help soften the immediate impact of the devaluation, especially on the vulnerable urban population. Funds were made available for short term subsidies for essential medicines, foods, fuels and electricity. Paris Club discussions were begun immediately, and debt rescheduling was initiated and/or completed for 10 of the CFA nations (4 in the Sahel). The United States canceled \$6.7 million in debt owed the United States by four of the countries and rescheduled \$140 million of the debt owed by five others.

The devaluation addressed a major constraint to economic growth in the region. Growth is now expected to take a new, positive, trajectory led by increased regional trade, substitution of local goods for imported goods, and stronger export performance for traditional and non-traditional goods. Major immediate beneficiaries of the devaluation will be the rural population, including women, because of greater demand for locally produced foods (cereals, vegetables, etc).

### *USAID Reorganization*

USAID began in early 1993 to refocus Agency strategic priorities, including a decision to close three Missions in countries which are part of the system supported by the Regional Program (Cape Verde, Burkina Faso and Chad). The decision to close the three Missions has a direct impact on the Program only in Burkina Faso, which is the headquarters for CILSS and where the Mission has played an important administrative role in support of the regional program. While it is unlikely that the advantage of a close official link with CILSS and the other donors in Ouagadougou can be replaced, the Program has arranged to absorb the administrative role filled by the Burkina Faso Mission, and to strengthen the in-country support for resident staff funded by the SRI Project.

The decision to close the Cape Verde and Chad Missions will not have a direct impact on the Program. In fact, the increased emphasis now placed on donor coordination and regional approaches means that the Program is more salient as a means of contributing to the resolution of regional issues role via its association with CILSS and the CILSS program, as described below.

The situation in The Gambia is similar. The regional program has one activity which has a direct link to activities in The Gambia -- the Gambia unit of the West Africa Enterprise Network (WAEN). Since the goal of the WAEN activity is to enlarge the role of the private sector in dialogue its with government, it can actually contribute to an eventual resolution of the problem.

### *Political Stability*

The devaluation tended to aggravate some social instability, especially among urban elite (public service and students). There were protest demonstrations in Mali, Niger and Senegal, including calls for large wage increases. None of the countries involved was prepared for the "event", so it took some time for the various administrations to plan, prepare and program. In the end, all nations were able to hold wage increases in the 20-30% range, and, thus, maintain one of the advantages of the devaluation -- to reduce real wages and improve competitiveness. Several countries actually benefited, because the safety net programs included budget support so, for example, Niger and Chad were able to pay arrears owed workers and suppliers. In addition, largely because of the support programs, immediate inflation has been held in the range of 20-30%, and is expect to be much lower in 1995.

Though neither is expected to have a direct effect on the Regional Program, a long term concern is the political consequences of the "Touareg problem" in Mali and the coup in The Gambia. Also, from the point of view of regional economic growth, political instability in Nigeria and Cameroon are important long term concerns.

The emphasis which the Program places on local participation in decision making and in program implementation can be expected to contribute to long run stability in the region.

**SECTION II:  
PROGRESS TOWARD OVERALL SAHEL REGIONAL PROGRAM GOALS**

**GOAL: Food security and ecological balance increased in Sahel West Africa**

*General development*

Although a broad measure of social and economic development ranks the countries in the Sahel among the lowest in the world, these countries have made considerable progress over the past several years (Annex A, Table 1). In aggregate (for the seven countries with data available) the Human Development Index has increased by almost 40% since 1980, with the greatest improvement in Guinea-Bissau, Mali and The Gambia (1992 data). Prospects are good for improved incomes and greater civil participation in most of these countries, so development is expected to accelerate over the next five to seven years. We expect substantial immediate gains in purchasing power in the rural areas, and longer term improvement in life spans and education levels.

*Economic Growth*

Broad based economic growth is the ultimate measure of food security. Prospects for economic growth in the region improved dramatically when the CFA countries elected in early January to devalue the currency by 50%. While this alone cannot solve the "growth problem" or assure food security, it was a much needed adjustment. Prior to the devaluation, real per capita economic growth rates were negative or near zero in four of the nine countries (Annex A, Table 1). In aggregate, the nine countries lost almost one percent in real per capita income in 1993, the latest year for which there is data. An improved competitive situation, more rational allocation of resources to local vs. imported foods, and a greater incentive to invest in regional trade is expected to push per capita economic growth to a sustainable level of around 3% per year by 1996.

*Ecological balance*

Ecological balance, as measured by changes in per capita "availability" of forest and woodlands, declined by 3.4% per year in the 1980's -- population growth rates of 2.7% and a reduction in forest and woodland area of 0.7% per year (Annex Table 1). Per capita availability of forest areas only (excluding woodlands) decreased at a much higher rate -- 4.1% per year.

The Desertification Convention, scheduled for early implementation beginning 1995, is expected to help protect existing forest and woodlands. Bilateral and regional programs to improve agro-forestry practices and land policy in Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, and Niger will contribute to reduced pressure on the eco-system. Combined, these programs reverse the trend and should increase availability by 1% per year by the year 2000.

**Sub-Goal 1: Regional cooperation allows market development**

The Sahelian states, and West Africa in general, have come to realize that active economic cooperation is essential for economic growth in the region. This awareness is reflected in the many regional institutions (ECOWAS included) in that part of sub-Saharan Africa. The Sahelian states are especially dependent on trade with the coastal states. However, until the recent devaluation of the CFA, a combination of surplus dumping (European red meat), the overvalued exchange rate, and formal and informal barriers to trade acted to discourage trade between the Sahel and the Coastal states. The situation changed dramatically when the CFA was devalued. It helped to open both domestic, regional and international markets to local products.

The value of recorded export trade between Sahelian and other West African states is used as an indicator of progress for this sub-goal (Table 1). Between 1987 and 1992 this trade amounted to 12.6% of the total export trade of the Sahelian states. Conversely, over the same period, recorded export trade from the Non-Sahelian-Coastal states to the Sahelian states amounted to only 2.8% of the total exports by Non-Sahelian Coastal states (Table 1).

Trade between these three groups of states in 1993 was distributed about the same as the 1987-92 average, with approximately 12% of the total from the Sahelian going to West Africa.

Data for 1994 are not yet available, but the devaluation has had a significant impact on regional trade. On the negative side, The Gambia, and to some extent Guinea Bissau, lost because a major incentive for formal and informal trade with CFA zone countries was eliminated. On the positive side, the devaluation acted to stimulate considerable import substitution from both domestic and regional sources, especially rice and meat. Estimates are that trade between West African states could double if formal barriers are removed. The Sahelian states, especially the rural sector, will be the largest gainers.

#### Sub-goal 2: Democracy and governance improved

This sub-goal is measured by the Political Rights and Civil Liberties indexes produced by Freedom House. They measure rights of association, expression, participation and freedom of movement. Countries are classified according to "not free", "partially free", and "free", depending on individual classification of civil liberties and political rights (Table 2). Analysis has shown that political and civil freedom are positively correlated with economic growth.

As mentioned above, the coup in The Gambia has shifted it from a "free" to a "not free" status, which has also forced a revision in expectations about economic growth. It is expected to post negative growth over the next several years. Burkina Faso, on the other hand has instituted some significant reforms, so it has shifted from "not free" to "partially free". This change is reflected in prospects of economic growth. The other Sahelian countries have maintained past rankings.

#### Sub-goal 3: National policy decisions increasingly reflect intra-regional realities

Attainment of this sub-goal is measured by the existence of complementary National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs), avoidance of unanticipated food crises, and the existence of regionally attuned national population policies. Each of these indicators is generated at the national level, often as a result of bilateral actions and activities, so overall attainment is a reflection of donor coordination, regional cooperation, and assistance from regional institutions to national governments.

Table 1. Recorded Export Trade Between West African States (% of total exports)

Exports to:	Exports from:		
	Sahel	Non-Sahel Coastal States	West Africa*
Sahel			
1987-92 Average	4.8%	2.8%	3.1%
1993	4.4%	3.0%	3.1%
Non-Sahel Coastal			
1987-92 Average	7.7%	5.3%	5.6%
1993	7.5%	6.1%	6.3%
West Africa*			
1987-92 Average	12.6%	8.2%	8.7%
1993	11.9%	9.1%	9.4%

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 1994.

\* Excludes Sierra Leone, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.

Table 2. Comparative Measures of Freedom in Sahelian Countries

	1991/92	1993/94
Burkina Faso	NF	PF
Cape Verde	F	F
Chad	NF	NF
Gambia	F	NF
Guinea Bissau	PF	PF
Mali	PF	PF
Mauritania	NF	NF
Niger	PF	PF
Senegal	PF	PF

Source: Freedom in the World, Freedom House, various issues.

**NEAPs.** The Desertification Convention is the major event which impacts on complementarity of NEAPs in the region. While this process has just begun, with early actions yet to be determined, it is expected that associated planning, dialogue and environmental monitoring will make a major contribution. At the present, three of the nine Sahelian states have developed NEAPs (Gambia, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau).

**Food crises avoided.** One of the great achievements of the Club du Sahel/CILSS system has been the avoidance of famine in the Sahel. Rainfall variation is probably the one most important factors in the region, and below "normal" levels are a frequent occurrence. However, several strong national early warning and market information systems, along with a regional center at AGRHYMET, and careful coordination and review have helped avoid crisis situations. Rainfall this cropyear has been above average, so Sahelian states are not expected to face any significant food problems this year.

### SECTION III PROGRESS TOWARD STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAM OUTPUTS

**Strategic Objective 1:** Assist national governments, regional institutions and private sector associations to identify, clarify, and implement policy options which promote trade and investment in the West Africa Region.

Two indicators are used to measure progress toward achievement of this SO: (1) the number of countries using comparative advantage as the basis for setting trade policy, and (2) changes in transactions costs for major products.

#### Indicators for Strategic Objective 1:

Assist national governments, regional institutions and private sector associations to identify, clarify, and implement policy options which promote trade and investment in the West Africa Region.

Program Outputs and Indicators	Base-line 1993	1994	Planned							
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 Total
<b>Indicators for Strategic Objective 1:</b> Countries using comparative advantage as a basis for setting trade policy.	0	3	1	2	1	1	*	*	*	8
Transactions costs for regional trade of major commodities reduced 20%.	0	4.5	5%	7%	8%	10%	12%	15%	18%	20%
<b>Program Outcome 1.1:</b> Dialogue on monetary reform and policy. (Scale of 0 to 10)	0	5	5	8	10	10	10	10	10	10
<b>Program Outcome 1.2:</b> Dialogue aimed at reducing obstacles to trade in the region. (Scale of 0 to 10)	0	3	5	7	10	10	10	10	10	10
<b>Program Outcome 1.3:</b> Private participation in identifying, establishing, and expanding regional trade potentials. (Scale of 0 to 10)	0	4.5	5	7	10	10	10	10	10	10

The first indicator is a measure of how active countries are in establishing conditions for sustainable growth, and the second is a measure of how effectively the conditions have been implemented. The existence of "enabling

conditions" alone is not a direct measure of impact on incomes and economic growth because policy change alone is not sufficient to generate economic growth. However, it is a necessary condition for sustainable change. Additional elements must accompany policy: transparency and credibility. Individuals must believe that policy is appropriate, made with a real intent to implement, and they must believe that changes and/or reversals will not be capricious. We have elected to use action plan implementation as a measure because it embodies the necessary elements. It is possible to reduce transactions costs without policies based on comparative advantage. However, such reductions would not be sustainable. In fact, they could lead to incentives to invest in non-productive activity, resource diversion, and could generate a drag on economic growth. This is why we have selected the two indicators as an "indicator pair" to be measured jointly. Program Outcomes 1-3, below, measure the process through which SO 1 is achieved.

The Livestock Action Plan for Mali, Burkina and the Cote d'Ivoire is the first of a planned series of action plans we will help implement to support SO 1. We have evaluated its impact purely in terms of the effect on livestock marketing costs, which amounts to a minimum estimate because other commerce will also profit from reforms achieved through the implementation process. The change in transaction costs is conservatively estimated to be \$1.8 million in 1994, or 4.5%. We can estimate total the impact by assuming that 20% of the gain is transmitted back to producers (\$360,000), that the multiplier which captures direct and indirect benefits is 4 (\$1.440 million), and that the increase in trade is double (\$2.880 million per year plus the direct and indirect value of the increased trade).<sup>1</sup> These are immediate impacts of the devaluation and implementation of the action plan.

In addition to the measures implemented by the three governments as part of implementing the LAP, several countries had already imposed duties, or otherwise restricted subsidized European beef sent to Africa: the Cote d'Ivoire had a compensating duty; Senegal, Togo and Nigeria had systems which nearly prohibit European beef imports (with attendant possibilities of fraudulent imports from neighboring countries). These measures helped increase demand for Sahelian beef by restricting supply and by increasing prices, which had declined in the Cote d'Ivoire by over 20% because of cheap imports.

**Program Outcome 1.1: Promote dialogue on monetary reform and policy.** The 50% devaluation of the CFA was the major monetary policy related event in 1994. This was a much needed, long discussed, policy change. The United States and other donors had been analyzing impact of the overvalued exchange rate for some time, but the governments concerned had been denying, in fact resisting, the need for discussion and action, so there was little official debate and no participation by knowledgeable local authorities. Most of the CFA-zone governments, as a result, were not prepared for the devaluation and its immediate political/social consequences. In addition, the sensitive nature of the French Franc-CFA link prevented an open discussion of the issue at donor meetings. A related issue, the CFA relative to other currencies in the region, was also not discussed to any degree. One exception was a dialogue between Niger and Nigeria under the auspices of the Club du Sahel and CILSS. Overall, the attainment of this PO in 1994 is rated 5/10.

**Program Output 1.2: Facilitate dialogue aimed at reducing obstacles to trade in the region (rated on a scale of 0 to 10).** In 1994 the Regional Program has supported to date, the Mali-Burkina Faso-Cote d'Ivoire Livestock Action Plan (LAP) and the West Africa Enterprise Network and began foundation work on horticulture sub-sector action plan process as the vehicles for this dialogue. The emphasis is on participant involvement. In 1994 the LAP managed numerous negotiations in the three countries. These negotiations resulted in substantial cost reductions by eliminating or easing formal and informal barriers to trade. The WAEN has developed strategies, intended to reduce barriers to trade, but has not had time to implement them. Overall, 1994 attainment is rated at 3/10.

**Program Outcome 1.3: Promote sector private participation in identifying, establishing, and expanding regional trade potentials. (Scale 0 to 10).** The LAP and the WAEN are also the main focus of this

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<sup>1</sup> The multiplier is based on economic linkage research for Burkina Faso (IFPRI). The increase in trade is based on reporting from Burkina and Mali.

PO in 1994. Since the WAEN has just begun, the LAP is the major contributor to this PO in 1994. Under the auspices of the LAP, private operators in the region met in Abidjan, where they recommended that the effort be expanded to Ghana and Togo; both are major livestock markets with a potential for increased regional trade. The Mali unit of the WAEN arranged two meetings with Malian officials to discuss the role of the private sector in Mali. Since each of these activities this is just the beginning of the initiative, the overall rank for 1994 is evaluated at 4.5.

**Strategic Objective 2: Regional dialogue increased on the role of civil society and communal, local and national governments in achieving improved management of natural resources, food security, and market development.**

The Program's support to this SO is longstanding. It began in earnest with the Segou Conference of 1989, at which representatives of rural, grassroots views first sat at the table with Sahelian policy makers. It was followed by years of careful African-led or collaborative analyses of policy options in decentralization and appropriate frameworks for individual initiative in sustainable resource management and use. These efforts allow the Program to count among its accomplishments major contribution to the successful realization of the Praia conference on Land Tenure and Decentralization held June 21-24, 1994. As reported in the FY96 Action Plan, previously excluded groups were actively involved in the preparation and conduct of the five-day meeting and were able to successfully press their agenda with the CILSS (as the representative of its member state governments).

The careful preparation for and carrying out of the Praia Conference, coupled with the significant shift toward democratization among a majority of the CILSS member states has set the stage for the definition of a strategic objective that incorporates efforts to promote dialogue on political and economic participation, pluralism and the effectiveness and responsiveness of government, largely in the context of security of resource tenure and private enterprise development.

As this is the first year of activity under this newly formulated SO, most of the energy has been invested in establishing indicators collaboratively with a working group on civil society development operating under the aegis of the CILSS. Very little data are yet available.

**Indicators for Strategic Objective 2:**

**Regional dialogue increased on the role of civil society and communal, local and national governments in achieving improved management of natural resources, food security, and market development.**

Program Outcomes and Indicators	Base-line	1994	Planned							
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 Total
<b>Indicators for Strategic Objective 2:</b> Meetings on the role of civil society and governance in improving management of natural resources, public service delivery, and food security.	0 ('94)	0	1	1	2	2	2	2	*	10
Relevant stakeholders are included in planning, implementing and follow-up of the discussions.	NO ('93)	Some	Some	Some	Most	Most	Most	Most	Most	Most
Decisions reflect positions put forward by various stakeholders.	NO ('93)	<50 %	<50 %	<50 %	<50 %	<50 %	<75 %	75 %	75 %	75 %

Program Outcomes and Indicators	Base-line	1994	Planned							
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 Total
<b>Program Outcome 2.1: Approaches which strengthen problem-solving, advocacy and networking capacities of grassroots and other civil society organizations.</b>										
Number of CILSS countries which review Praia Conference recommendations	0 ('94)	0	2	2	2	2	*	*	*	8
Informal rural organizations network is formed and participates in fora concerning rural development strategy and policy. (workshops held)	0 ('94)	0	*	1	*	*	*	1	*	2
Mechanisms for local dissemination of successful experiences in local development are developed and used.	0 ('94)	0								
Increased awareness of special problems faced by women and other traditionally disadvantaged groups in obtaining and using natural resources.	0 ('94)	0	*	WS	*	*	*	*	*	3
<b>Program Outcome 2.2: understanding of the benefits associated with effective patterns of decentralization and democratization.</b>										
Database of case studies of successful local NRM management and public service provision is used for strategy and policy.	*	*	*	Data-base	Uses = 3					
National decentralization commissions are established and exchange information.	0 ('94)	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8 Total
<b>Program Outcome 2.3: Develop strategies for enhancing the administrative and technical competence of community, local, regional and national government entities.</b>										
Experiences in formulating natural resource legislation sensitive to local needs are shared.	*	*	WS							
Approaches and policy implications of ways of mobilizing resources for local development are disseminated.	*	*		WS						
Stakeholders participate in dialogue on legal frameworks for local development.	*	*		WS						
Exchanges on local management of tenure conflicts are held.	*	*			WS					

WS=WORKSHOP.

**Program Outcome 2.1: Identify approaches which strengthen problem-solving, advocacy and networking capacities of grassroots and other civil society organizations.**

Of the 24 rural (peasant) delegates at the Praia Conference, eight were women. They had a major impact on the tone and content of the proceedings and ensured that the final Declaration reflected the reality faced by 51 per cent

of the Sahelian population, whose access to land and other natural resources is far from secure. For example, the Declaration acknowledges that the reinforcement of local structures must take into account the fact that such organizations are traditionally male dominated and not responsive to women's needs. Another women's issue that would never have made it into the Declaration without their insistence is the need to control birth rates and completed family size in relation to women's ability to exercise their land rights.

**Program Output 2.2: Facilitate regional understanding of the benefits associated with effective patterns of decentralization and democratization.** The primary activity under this PO in 1994 was preparation for the Praia Conference. Research prepared for the conference:

- Showed that in Chad, local communities are capable of achieving the same quality of results in the provision of primary education as the state at 1/9 of the cost.
- In multiple locations in Mali, identified successful user-based efforts to govern and manage renewable natural resources, e.g. pastures, watersheds, fisheries and forests resulting in more sustainable resource use.
- Documented examples of collaborative, community/municipal government approaches to urban sanitation in Dakar and resultant enhancements in environmental health.

**Program Outcome 2.3: Develop strategies for enhancing the administrative and technical competence of community, local, regional and national government entities.**

Impact reporting will begin 1995.

**Indicators for Strategic Objective 3:  
Decision makers have ready access to relevant information on food security,  
population and the environment.**

Objective, Program Outcomes and Indicators	Base- line	1994	Planned							
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 Total
<b>Indicators for Strategic Objective 3: Number of country rationales and concerted actions for food security, NRM, population which reflect sound development methodologies and access to regional info. systems NEAPs, pop. policies, and food security policies.</b>	0		*	*	3	*	*	6	*	8
<b>Program Outcome 3.1: Maintain and improve food security monitoring and disaster mitigation systems.</b>										
Food Aid Charter observed	YES ( '93)	YES								
Functioning Food Crisis Network	YES ( '93)	YES								
Timely provision of Greenness Maps by AGRHYMET (days for transmission ).	10 ( '93)	7	5	3	1	1	1	1	1	1
Increased application and utilization of Information Management tools, technology and methods for Sahel Early Warning (countries)	4 ( '94)	4	*	2	3					9
<b>Program Outcome 3.2: Support the development and application of an environmental planning and monitoring system to coordinate NRM interventions on a systematic basis in ecological contexts.</b>										
African Annex drafted		Draft								
Donor discuss, review and agree on elements of the Annex		*	Re- view							
Early start program in place in member states	0 ( '93)	0	3	4	1	*	*	*	*	8
U.S. Government agrees to Convention		Signed				OK'd				
Post-ratification program in place in member states							5	4	*	9
INSAH managed exchanges about determinants and impacts of agricultural and NRM practices	None	None	Plan							

Objective, Program Outcomes and Indicators	Base- line	1994	Planned							
			1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 Total
Program Outcome 3.3: Population policies and action plans are based on analyses of demographic variables underlying regional population dynamics, including the determinants of fertility, mortality and migration trends and levels.										
National and regional analysts conduct analyses of variables underlying regional population dynamics (studies on fertility, mortality and migration)	1 ('94)	1								
Analysis results are disseminated via appropriate communications systems (Monthly publication)	YES ('93)	YES								
Population policies and action plans completed (number and quality)										
Policies produced	5 ('93)	2	2							9
Action Plans developed	0	0	0	0	9					9
Action Plans implemented						1	3	4	1	9

**Strategic Objective 3: Decision makers have ready access to relevant information on food security, population and the environment.**

The CILSS/Club du Sahel model has proven to be one of the most successful donor-local institutional models in Africa. Originally created as a mechanism to coordinate food aid to the Sahel, it has evolved to become a center for environmental monitoring and early warning (AGRHYMET), for population research and policy and strategy development (CERPOD), and for economic and social policy analysis and dialogue (INSAH). AGRHYMET and CERPOD have been the strongest of the CILSS institutions, but CILSS has recently completed a major restructuring which will strengthen INSAH and the CILSS headquarters. CILSS also produced its first long-term programming document, which defines and focuses the institution's program for the next three years. The donor organizations that support the CILSS programs are reviewing and refining the Three-Year plan with CILSS. This SO captures USAID's contribution to the multi-donor effort. The CILSS (AGRHYMET and INSAH) have been given a major role as "monitors" of the application and impact of the Desertification Convention.

**Program Outcome 3.1: Maintain and improve food security monitoring and disaster mitigation systems.** Although the Sahel is subject to periodic shortages in rainfall, with resultant variations in food and pasture production, the region has been able to avoid famine for most of the last 20 years -- attributable to coordination through the CILSS/Club complex. The principles behind this coordination are imbedded in the "Food Aid Charter", an informal agreement between CILSS states and the donors which calls for improved coordination, joint preparation of food balance sheets, improved monitoring and evaluation procedures, encouraging local and regional market development and avoidance of consumption habits dependent on imported food aid. Success in application of the Charter is reviewed at the annual meeting of the "Food Crisis Prevention Network", which includes the donors, CILSS and multilateral agencies such as FAO. Application of the Charter in 1994 was rated "fair to good", largely because financial problems in most states caused delays or shortages in the collection and reporting of food price and food availability data.

AGRHYMET is the primary CILSS institution involved in the regional food early warning system. It provides technical support, monitoring, and reporting services for CILSS member states. It produces greenness maps during the rainy season so progress can be monitored, accumulates and reports rainfall data on a ten-day cycle, and reports insect and other problems, all on a regional basis. AGRHYMET has been a close collaborator with the USAID-

FEWS program in the past, and even closer collaboration is expected in the future. Since timely communication is essential to early warning reporting, AGRHYMET has begun to establish an electronic communication system between it and collaborators in the member states. In 1994, pilot systems were established and tested in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (AGRHYMET headquarters). A fully operational system will reduce information transmission time from the present seven days, to three days within three years, and to one day within five years. Beneficiaries include the 45 million people who live in the region.

The electronic communication system will all help collaborating national institutions improve their own reporting capabilities. Four of the nine CILSS states now produce a monthly bulletin. By 1997, all nine states should be producing national early warning bulletins, based in part on databases and other information accessible at AGRHYMET. AGRHYMET will provide the necessary technical training to its collaborating institutions.

In 1994, AGRHYMET collaborated with CERPOD to prepare a GIS-based presentation for the World Population Conference held in Cairo. It was widely praised as the best analytical work presented by a Sub-Saharan African delegation. The collaboration was deemed so successful by both institutions that both have committed to additional joint efforts, thus taking the first tentative steps toward developing a regional long-term capacity that can be available to the Sahelian states.

**Program Outcome 3.2: Support the development and application of an environmental planning and monitoring system to coordinate NRM interventions on a systematic basis in ecological contexts.** This PO is focused on completion, acceptance and implementation of the Africa Annex to the Desertification Convention. The Annex, itself, was drafted in June 1994 and discussions on early actions were held in October. The United States also signed the Convention in October.

**Program Outcome 3.3: Population policies and action plans are based on analyses of demographic variables underlying regional population dynamics, including the determinants of fertility, mortality and migratory trends and levels.** CERPOD is the CILSS institution which provides demographic analyses, population policy, planning, and strategy development assistance to CILSS states (in fact West African states). By the end of 1994 CERPOD had assisted seven of the nine CILSS states to develop population policy statements. A major analysis, "Regional Adolescent Fertility and Medical Barriers to Contraception" was initiated in 1994.

Table 1. General Status Indicators for Sahelian Countries

HDI Rank (of 173)	Country	Human Development Index			Population - 1992		Population Annual Growth Rate			Real GNP/Capita: Percent Change in PPP\$		Forest and Woodlands	
		(1)			(1)		(1)			(2)		(3)	
		1980	1992	Percent Change	Millions	Percent Total Sahel	1980 -1992	Expected 1992- 2000	Most Recent (1992)	% Change 1993 vs (1990-92)	Planned Annual Rate 1992- 2000	Area Thou. Ha 1990	Annual Percent Change 1981-90
122	Cape Verde	n/a	0.474	--	0.4	0.9%	2.1	2.8	2.3	3.4	2.7	6	0.0
143	*Senegal	0.233	0.322	38.2%	2.1	17.1%	2.9	2.7	2.8	1.1	2.6	7,544	-0.6
158	Mauritania	n/a	0.254	--	7.8	4.6%	2.4	2.8	2.7	-5.4	0.4	554	0.0
164	Guinea Bissau	0.148	0.224	51.4%	1.0	2.2%	1.9	2.1	2.1	-46.9	1.5	2,021	-0.7
166	Gambia	0.148	0.215	45.3%	0.9	2.0%	3.0	2.5	3.2	3.4	1.0	97	-0.8
167	*Mali	0.146	0.214	46.6%	9.8	21.4%	2.6	3.1	2.9	6.3	2.5	12,144	-0.8
168	*Chad	0.151	0.212	40.4%	5.9	12.9%	2.4	2.8	2.6	-2.3	4.7	11,434	-0.7
169	*Niger	0.163	0.209	28.2%	8.3	18.2%	3.3	3.2	3.2	4.7	1.0	2,550	0.0
172	*Burkina Faso	0.151	0.203	34.4%	9.5	20.8%	2.6	2.7	2.9	0.3	4.8	4,416	-0.7
	Total	0.167	0.233	39.9%	45.7	100%	2.7	2.9	2.9	-0.7	2.9	40,766	-0.7

\* CFA zone country.

(1) Data from Human Development Indicators 1994, UNDP. Note for comparison: USA HDI=0.925.

(2) World Bank, World Development Report 1994, World Bank databases, and various SPA reports.

(3) World Resources Institute, World Resources 1994-95.