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Final Report
Drought Relief Implementation Group

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Executive Summary

The 1991 - 1993 drought severely reduced Lesotho's cereal production to such an extent that the Government was forced to declare a state of drought emergency in May 1992. The Military Government created the Drought Relief Implementation Group (DRIG) in July 1992. DRIG's mandate was to coordinate all drought relief activities for the Government.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided more than 8,000 tons of maize and technical assistance in response to the drought emergency. At DRIG's request, USAID funded a Food and Logistics Coordinator temporary position to assist DRIG's technical needs. The Food and Logistics Coordinator arrived at the height of drought operations in June 1993 and completed the contract with cessation of emergency operations in June 1994.

The Food and Logistics Coordinator was responsible for coordination of all food and logistics matters of Vulnerable Household Feeding (360,000 beneficiaries), Food for Work (50,000 beneficiaries) and Supplementary Feeding (14,000 beneficiaries) Programmes.

His responsibilities included implementing the Vulnerable Household Feeding Programme for the Lesotho Council of NGOs. The Food and Logistics Coordinator reported directly to the Chief Executive of DRIG. On Vulnerable Household Feeding matters, he reported to the Chief Executive of DRIG and to the Executive Director of the Lesotho Council of NGOs.

The following report analyzes in depth all aspects of the Vulnerable Household Feeding Programme which began in earnest in September 1992 and completed in May 1994. In particular, the report assesses institutional capabilities of the Drought Relief Implementation Group, Food Management Unit, and the NGO sector.

Recommendations are made for future emergency operations since drought is a cyclical occurrence in Lesotho. A conclusion reached in the report is that Lesotho's economy is no longer agriculturally dependant but wage based, future emergency operations should consider other methods of food distribution. The past VHF, free food distribution programme was a short term response to what many people believe is a long term problem of decreasing agricultural production and poor climatic conditions. Other considerations for future emergency operations should focus emergency responses on public works projects which have a long term benefit to the community.

Introduction

A. Background

The 1991 - 1993 drought severely reduced Lesotho's cereal production to such an extent that the Government was forced to declare a state of drought emergency in May 1992. The Military Government created the Drought Relief Implementation Group (DRIG) in July 1992. DRIG's mandate was to coordinate all drought relief activities for the Government.

DRIG was a collaborative body of governmental, non - governmental and donor agencies. The secretariat of DRIG consisted of a Chief Executive, Deputy Chief Executive, and a small administrative staff. Donors provided technical advisors for Food and Logistics (USAID), Agriculture (Save the Children Fund/UK), and Health and Nutrition (WHO). UNDP sponsored a Drought Relief Coordinator.

DRIG formed six working groups, including: Food and Logistics, Health and Nutrition, Agriculture, Water and Sanitation, Development and the Executive. The groups met on a regular basis to develop drought policy and procedures, leaving programme implementation to the relevant ministries and non-governmental organizations. DRIG coordinated three emergency feeding programmes: Food for Work, Vulnerable Household Feeding and Supplementary Feeding.

DRIG had no institutional structures and capacities apart from hastily established District Drought Relief Committees. Districts were given no clear terms of reference or resources to implement their programmes. DRIG also suffered from having no resources available to implement drought programmes but was dependent upon a long process of negotiation between the ministries of Planning, Finance and the Prime Minister's Office. These inherent weaknesses in DRIG's structure severely curtailed DRIG's effectiveness as a coordinating body.

DRIG formed the Food and Logistics Group in September 1992. The group consisted of the following organizations: DRIG, Food Management Unit (FMU), Ministry of Health (MOH), Save the Children Fund UK (SCF/UK), World Food Programme (WFP), Lesotho Council of NGOs (LCN), Lesotho Red Cross (LRC), Soil Conservation Home Affairs and Agriculture, Forestry and Civil Works Section (CWS). The convenor was the Chief Executive of DRIG.

The group coordinated the logistics, registration and distribution of the Vulnerable Household Feeding (VHF), Emergency Food for Work (FFW) and Supplementary Feeding (SF) Programmes from July 1992 - April 1994. A detailed terms of reference for the Food and Logistics Group is located in Annex A.

B. Food and Logistics Coordinator

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided more than 8,000 tons maize and technical assistance in response to the drought emergency. In response to DRIG's request for technical assistance, USAID funded a Food and Logistics Coordinator to assist DRIG's technical needs. The Food and Logistics Coordinator arrived at the height of drought operations in June 1993 and completed the contract with cessation of emergency operations in June 1994. The terms of reference for the Food and Logistics Coordinator are located in annex A.2.

As DRIG's Food and Logistics Coordinator, I was responsible for coordination of all food and logistics matters of Vulnerable Household Feeding (360,000 beneficiaries), Food for Work (50,000 beneficiaries) and Supplementary Feeding (14,000 beneficiaries) Programmes.

My responsibilities included implementing the Vulnerable Household Feeding Programme for the Lesotho Council of NGOs. I reported to the Chief Executive of DRIG and to the Executive Director of the Lesotho Council of NGOs on all NGO matters. My principal responsibilities were as follows:

Planned, coordinated, and monitored the Government of Lesotho's and the Lesotho Council of NGOs emergency Vulnerable Household feeding programme reaching 360,000 beneficiaries.

Supervised and managed a staff of 150 distribution point supervisors, seven district coordinators and ten office staff;

Managed \$1,000,000 operations budget, leased 15 vehicles, procured all necessary equipment and was responsible for development of budget plans and proposals for funding of the emergency operation;

Liaised closely with USAID, the European Community Delegation, World Food Programme, Save the Children Fund, the Food Management Unit, Lesotho Red Cross, Ministry of Health, and ministries of Home Affairs and Agriculture for coordinating the food and logistics aspects of the emergency food assistance programme;

Implemented VHF registration techniques requiring meeting District Secretaries, District Relief Committees, Village Development Committees, Chiefs and communities on the procedures of registration of and food distribution to beneficiaries;

Assisted in developing policy, procedures and projects for the Government of Lesotho's Drought Relief Implementation Group and NGO community, including:

- A NGO emergency field manual for emergency operations

- A community based food for work programme targeted to reach 30,000 beneficiaries,

A drought recovery plan that focused on the monetization of food assistance and the implementation of a community based food for work programme,

A mitigation and preparedness plan that also incorporated lessons learned in the past drought operation, and

Prepared and presented an emergency drought operations proposal to the European Community Delegation for \$100,000.

The Food and Logistics Coordinator has fulfilled his terms of reference as they are described in Annex A.2.

The following report analyzes the institutional capacities of organizations that participated in the drought emergency, particularly VHF. The report also presents conclusion and recommendations based upon the past emergency.

I. Emergency Operations Phases I & 2

Emergency operations occurred in two phases. The first declaration of emergency by the Military Government occurred in May 1992 after the National Early Warning Unit's maize estimates forecasted a yield of 25% of normal.¹ Donors and NGOs pressured Government to quickly confront the emergency at hand. After the declaration of Emergency, WFP began the process of implementation of EMOP 5052. This was done quickly due to the regional nature of the drought. Other donors such as Unicef, EC, and USAID had already commissioned studies investigating the extent of the drought.

The first phase of the emergency operated from July 1992 - September 1993. At the height of food distribution from February 1993 - September 1993, 362,000 VHF beneficiaries, 50,000 Emergency Food for Work beneficiaries² and 44,117³ children under five in the SF programme were registered to receive rations on a monthly basis.

The democratically elected Government re-declared the state of drought emergency in May 1993. The second phase of the drought emergency operated from October 1993 - April 1994. The second phase of emergency food assistance was confined to the districts of Mafeteng, Mohale's Hoek, Quthing, Qacha's Nek and Mochhotlong.

¹ Lesotho's average domestic maize production is approximately 45% of requirements. Imports have consistently filled the gap between domestic production and national cereal requirements.

² Each Worker involved in the Food for Work programme received a ration for five people.

³ According to Ministry of Health Supplementary Feeding Reports.

The areas worst hit and deserving of continued assistance were identified through analysing data from the NEWU's crop assessment and DRIG's Household Welfare Study prepared by Sechaba Consultants. 147,555 VHF, 50,000 FFW and 18,833 SF beneficiaries were registered to receive rations.

A. Organizational Responsibilities

The emergency food assistance operations were carried out by government, donor and NGO organizations.

Drought Relief Implementation Group (DRIG) Coordinated implementation of drought operations and was the Government's executive arm in all drought related matters. The Food and Logistics Group formulated policy and procedures for the VHF, FFW and SF programmes.

DRIG targeted the commodities to 310,000 VHF, 44,000 SF and 50,000 FFW beneficiaries in Phase I. In phase II, WFP targeted the commodities to 150,000 VHF, 15,000 SF and 50,000 FFW beneficiaries.

The World Food Programme (WFP) provided 18,145 metric tons of Maize, 1,776 mt pulses and 1,581 mt oil under their emergency programme, EMOP 5052 (June 1992 - September 1993) and EMOP 5052/1 (October 1993 - April 1994). WFP provided \$6,256,189 for EMOP 5052 and \$1,720,768 for EMOP 5052/1. This funding covered the costs of food, transport and ITSH costs.

The Food Management Unit (FMU) was responsible for managing the stock, inter store stock movements and ensuring that stock was available for delivery at the district FMU warehouses.

The Save the Children Fund/UK (SCF/UK) carried out the secondary transport responsibilities for the VHF programme. They transported the food from the district FMU stores to 194 distribution points throughout the country. ODA provided financial assistance for these operations. SCF/UK, through the EC NGO organization EURONAIID, secured 4,250 mt of Maize and 450 mt of pulses for the VHF programme.

The Lesotho Council of NGOs (LCN) acted as the coordinating body for the NGO implementation of registration and food distribution activities. Lesotho Red Cross (LRC), Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL), World Vision International (WV) implemented registration and distribution. To a lesser extent, Caritas and Lesotho Save the Children, Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA) and Lesotho National Council for Women (LNCW), participated in the registration activities in August - November 1992. Lesotho Red Cross, through the International Federation of the Red Cross, secured 3,100 mt of Maize for the emergency.

Civil Works Section formed the largest part of the FFW operation with an allotment of 5,000 workers (25,000 beneficiaries) CWS upgraded roads country wide in the first phase and only in the

worst hit areas in the second phase. Soil Conservation Home Affairs and Agriculture had 1,500 and 1,000 workers respectively. They focused their energy on rehabilitation of dongas and building of dams. Forestry also had 2,500 workers under the emergency.

The Ministry of Health implemented the Supplementary Feeding programme. The programme provided a daily meal of maize meal, pulses and oil. The programme registered 44,117 children in Phase I and 18,633 children in phase II.

B. Commodities Supplied to Lesotho from June 1992 - April 1994.

VHF Programme Phase 1 - 362,000 Registered Beneficiaries. Phase 2 - 147,555 registered Beneficiaries.

Emergency Food for Work Programme 50,000 Beneficiaries phase 1 and 2.

Supplementary Feeding Programme Phase 1 - 44,117 Registered Children Under 5. Phase 2 - 18,633 Registered Children Under 5.

1. Phase 1 - Final food assistance Calculations for the drought emergency from June 1992 -September 1993. All figures in metric tons.

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Donor</u>
Maize	4,097	Rep. of China
	5,000	WFP/USA
	5,000	WFP/EC
	3,000	WFP/Japan
	1,000	Red Cross/PRC
	2,100	Red Cross/Germany
	2,100	WFP/local purchase
Total	22,297	
Pulses	350	WFP/EC
	400	WFP/UK
	500	WFP/Netherlands
	526	WFP/Sweden
Total	1,776	
Vegetable Oil	440	WFP/Finland
	616	WFP/Netherlands
Total	1,056	
Wheat	2,000	EC

Commodities distributed to VHF, SF, and FFW beneficiaries in phase 1.

Maize	21,349
Pulses	1,241
Vegetable Oil	905

Balances were carried over into the phase 2 operation from October 1993 - April 1994.

Maize	8,243
Pulses	537
Vegetable Oil	151

2. Phase 2 - Final Calculations for EMOP 5052 from October 1993 - April 1994. All figures in metric tons.

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Donor</u>
Maize	3,000	SCF(UK)/EURONAIID
	3,045	WFP/local purchase
	1,250	SCF(UK)/EURONAIID
Total	7,295	
Wheat	1,700	Italy/monetized
Total	1,700	
Pulses	450	SCF(UK)/EURONAIID
	626	WFP
Total	1,076	
Vegetable Oil	525	WFP
Total	525	

Commodities distributed to VHF, and SF in phase 2.⁴

Maize	6,217
Pulses	413
Vegetable Oil	202

Surplus balance for VHF and SF Emergency Operations as of May 1994.

Maize	1,403
Pulses	
Vegetable Oil	203

Phase 1 and 2 total commodities received for the emergency drought programme.

⁴ At the time of this writing, the final calculations for FFW commodities distributed were not available.

Maize	29,592
Pulses	2,315
Vegetable Oil	1,430
Wheat	3,700

II. THE VULNERABLE HOUSEHOLD FEEDING PROGRAMME

A. VHF Objectives

The objective of the VHF programme was to provide a free monthly food ration of 10 kilograms whole maize, .5 kg pulses and .5 kg oil to 120,000 people initially in June 1992. This was later revised upward, in December 1993, to 310,000 targeted people registered vulnerable as established under criteria developed by the Drought Relief Implementation Group (DRIG). The estimated number of beneficiaries was based upon studies by USAID's Village Drought Assessment Survey, NEWU's Quarterly crop estimates and the European Community's Poverty Mapping exercise. DRIG used these reports as well as the NEWU's crop assessment figures and other available data to gauge the impact of the drought on the general population.

B. VHF Criteria

The criteria did not attempt to separate those people who were simply impoverished and people who were severely threatened by the drought with starvation. In rural areas there was little difference. However, in camp towns and Maseru there was a distinction between drought affected and impoverished. A vulnerable household, eligible for food assistance, was defined by DRIG as a household with no source of cash income, low crop yields or few livestock.

The selection criteria developed by DRIG, WFP and NGOs assessed potential beneficiaries using a point system (Annex B.2). In Annex B.2, Section A.1 of the criteria assessed potential beneficiaries current employment. If candidates were employed they were not eligible for VHF. However, if they received occasional income, they were then screened further in section A.2. Beneficiaries with no employment were screened further in part B.

Section A.2 of Annex B.2 assessed the health conditions of the household with occasional employment. For example, did the household contain aged or disabled people with no means of support; did the household include malnourished children, pregnant and lactating women or chronically ill people. If a household had any of these situations it was screened further in part B. If not, they were not eligible for assistance unless they had no employment.

Section B screened households based upon the maize harvested and the number of livestock within the household. Those households that had no harvest and few livestock were then registered as VHF beneficiaries.

B.1 Strengths of VHF Criteria

Objectivity

As designed the criteria was objective. The criteria took into consideration the many variables that occur within households throughout the country during the drought emergency. The criteria targeted households not directly affected by the drought.

The criteria included the landless, urban and peri urban households who depended upon income rather than agriculture for their livelihood. Indirectly many of the landless households relied upon field labour for their wages and therefore were affected by the drought.

B.2 Weaknesses of VHF Criteria

Complicated Criteria

The criteria was too complicated. The criteria must be simple. Consideration must be made as to who will be conducting the registration. Since the initial registration was completed by the village committees, the criteria must be easy to understand with little room for confusion.

Criteria effectiveness

The effectiveness of the system depends heavily upon the honesty of the candidates and integrity of those registering. There was difficulty in ensuring that people were responding truthfully to the interviewer asking questions on wealth, livestock and crop yield. The point system in the criteria, adopted by DRIG, was confusing to registration teams registering by the stated criteria. In this case different people had different criteria for who was vulnerable.

In some cases village committees and NGOs registered widows, in other areas they registered the aged and the disabled and in another village, the entire village was registered because everyone believed they were affected by the drought. The criteria must be simplified to enable enumerators to target the same people throughout the country.

C. Registration I August 1992 - December 1993: 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 beneficiaries identified. Over registration resulted in Annulment of the first registration and implementation of Registration II.

Table 1
Registration by District⁵

District	Beneficiaries
Butha Buthe	28,686
Leribe	86,565
Berea	41,513
Maseru	151,729
City of Maseru ⁶	40,950
Mafeteng	65,878
Mohale's Hoek	22,302
Quthing	30,872
Qacha's Nek	22,488
Thaba Tseka	24,875
Mokhotlong	25,726
Total	540,794

Berea, Mohale's Hoek, and Maseru were not completed.

Registration of beneficiaries in an emergency situation is the most important time of the operation. It sets the tone for the entire operation. Mistakes are difficult to correct. Therefore it is critical to have an easily understandable criteria, plan of implementation, clear idea of who the target group is and their number, and most especially, an extensive information network. This is a time when demands of immediate action are at their greatest. This is a time when the fewest mistakes can be made.

C.1 Method of Registration

Training of NGOs in registration methods was the first need. LRC conducted training of trainers workshops for Caritas, CCL, World Vision, Lesotho Save the Children, and National Council of Women. The NGO trainers then trained NGO registration teams and village committees on registration and distribution techniques. Where village committees did not exist chiefs were selected to appoint trusted individuals in the community.

⁵ No quota existed in the first registration.

⁶ Registration of Maseru City was discontinued after it was found that few people were affected by the drought emergency.

Village Relief Committees registered beneficiaries under supervision of responsible NGOs. Once the VRCs were established, a registration team would then visit and train the VRC in registration and distribution techniques.

NGO assisted Village Relief Committees in identifying beneficiaries. Where no VRC existed the Village Development Committee completed the task. In some places the VDCs did not function leaving the NGOs to complete the registration with no assistance.

The VRC registered the vulnerable households by calling a pitso. At the pitso, the Village Committee explained the procedure and asked those who felt they fulfilled the above criteria to return to a second pitso a few hours later. The people would be interviewed based on the stated criteria. Those declared vulnerable then received a registration card (Annex B.4.c) with a serial number.

The chief and the VRC would then approve the registration. The village registration form would then go to the DS for approval.

After approval a food requisition form was filled out and given to LCN for processing. A Distribution Point (DP) was created as the focal point for all VHF activities.

C.1.a Strengths of VHF Registration I Procedures

Community Responsibility

The Community was left with the responsibility of registering itself with training assistance from the NGOs.

C.1.b Weaknesses of VHF Registration I Procedures

Over Registration

As a result of the above procedures, approximately 600,000 beneficiaries were registered.

Many households that were not vulnerable were registered.

Chiefs, VRCs and NGOs did not follow registration procedure. Lists were sometimes drawn up without interviewing beneficiaries.

Registration teams and Village members participating in the registration had a difficult time excluding people from the registration.

Politization of VHF during elections

Involving Chiefs, village and district committees in the registration process failed. There were numerous reports of chiefs or committee members denying registration to qualified people because of their political or religious affiliation. There were also reports that NGOs were also using the food distribution to achieve political ends. However, these allegations have not been substantiated.

Poor information dissemination from Maseru to the Districts and to the people.

Information dissemination was not extensive. In a country where communications between districts are good, information did not flow to the people in the rural areas especially the isolated areas. This led to unreal expectations of the people in the districts. In many areas such as Phuleng in Mohale's Hoek and St. Michael in Maseru, everyone believed that they deserved food. Consequently, when they refused to register in accordance of the criteria, they did not receive rations.

A coordinated information campaign was not launched. The result was that donors, politicians, NGOs and Government officials made various announcements about drought assistance for the people. Rumours within communities were widespread and out of control about the assistance coming. When the food did arrive the general feeling was that everyone deserved assistance.

Honesty of the community at large

The registration process depended upon the honesty of the people as well as those registering them. The communities in general resented registration and targeting of food assistance since each individual believed that they had been affected by the drought. Chiefs, VRCs/VDCs and the community were in favour of blanket feeding.

Increase in community tensions

Due to poor information dissemination to the potential beneficiaries, suspicions within the village of who received food and who did not, raised community tensions. In areas where Chiefs or Village Committees drew up lists, suspicions were highest.

C.2 NGO Implementation of Registration I

The non governmental organizations were identified as the most capable and objective group to implement the VHF programme. The NGO and donor community believed that the Government could not fairly implement the programme since the government was in the process of staging elections. The EC funded a study in June 1992 called Drought Relief

and Local Organizations. The study assessed the capabilities of NGOs in implementing a food distribution programme and found that a few NGOs had the management capacity and skills such as Red Cross and SCF/ UK. The report noted that several NGOs, such as LCN, CCL and WV had the will and the capacity, but not the resources.

The Lesotho Council of NGOs (LCN) in collaboration with several local and International NGOs formed the Disaster Humanitarian and Relief Commission in April 1992. The Commission provided a forum for NGOs to discuss how to confront Government with the issue that a severe drought had wiped out the 1992 harvest, a dismal 25% of normal.

Initially, the NGOs divided the country based upon the 60 constituencies. However, several constituencies were left unclaimed. The NGOs then divided the country up for registration purposes by districts.

Caritas was responsible for Butha Buthe, Leribe, Berea, and Maseru. CCL was responsible for part of Mafeteng, Quthing and urban Maseru. World Vision operated in part of Mafeteng and Mochale's Hoek. LRC assumed the three mountain districts. CCL, LSC and LNCW were responsible for urban Maseru which was later removed from VHF as it was determined by DRIG that few people were suffering from the drought but suffering from malnutrition from poverty.

The NGOs began the registration process in August 1992. Since there was no disaster plan available or a database of registered destitute, the NGOs were required to start fresh. The NGO's objective was to visit and register every village in the country. Caritas, CCL and World Vision depended heavily upon purely volunteer support for their registration teams and the village committees to assist them in the registration process.

The Red Cross was the only NGO with the skills, resources and manpower necessary to train other NGOs, register beneficiaries and distribute food to the beneficiaries.

LRC conducted training of trainers workshops for Caritas, CCL, World Vision, Lesotho Save the Children, and National Council of Women. The NGO trainers then trained NGO registration teams and village committees on registration and distribution techniques. Where village committees did not exist chiefs were selected to appoint trusted individuals in the community.

The NGOs believed that entrusting village committees, chiefs and other honourable citizens within the community would not produce a fair registration. LRC responded by employing 30 person action teams in each district to conduct the registration. The teams were in a better position to produce an objective registration.

The other NGOs who operated in the seven lowland districts were not so lucky. Due to limited resources, inexperience and lack of dependable manpower, NGOs relied upon village committees and chiefs for the registration. The result after missing the October 1992 deadline was a completed registration by the end of December of over 600,000 registered beneficiaries in 3,447 villages.⁷

C.2.a Strengths of NGOs Implementation

The NGOs implemented and completed the registration process under extremely difficult circumstances.

The NGOs had limited resources from their budgets to register beneficiaries. Elections and the repercussions of campaigning during registration seriously affected the registration. Also, the isolated nature of the villages contributed to the difficulties carrying out the first registration.

Despite the above difficulties, the NGOs, depending upon volunteers' assistance from the districts, registered all the districts within the country.

The NGOs gained extremely valuable experience and now have the capacity to implement a country wide emergency programme in the future.

The NGO community has extensive experience in registration techniques. In future operations, large or small, the NGO community is equipped to assist.

C.2.b Weaknesses of NGO Implementation of Registration I

Lack of Cooperation between district officials and NGOs

Lack of cooperation with District Officials, as most district personnel were concerned with elections. Occasionally District Officials would interfere rather than cooperate with NGO operations. Each district varied depending on the officials. In Qacha's Nek, this led to unauthorized and uncoordinated distribution in January and March 1994. Other cases included poor cooperation using office space and equipment. This slowed implementation.

Unclear terms of reference in the districts between NGOs and Government Officials.

Unclear terms of reference for the district officials, District and Village Committees and NGOs slowed NGO progress. There was confusion as to who was responsible

⁷ The term village must be used loosely in this instance. A village can be virtually any size. Village number and size are not specifically delineated and established.

for registration and who had authority to register and distribute rations.

NGO coordination of conducting the registration

Several NGOs had different approaches to targeting beneficiaries. Rather than understanding and following the stated criteria, NGOs often improvised stating in one district that all pregnant and lactating mothers were eligible and in another district all disabled and aged people were eligible for VHF assistance.

Limited NGO resources during the first five months of the emergency operations and most of the first registration process.

The NGOs had few resources to actually implement a country wide registration process requiring training for teams, transport, salaries and administration of the operation. Several NGOs had to cease operations due to lack of resources. Government approved a budget, for VHF operations, at the end of November 1992, one month short of completion of the first registration.

Capacity of NGOs

Capacity to undertake such a large exercise varied widely amongst NGOs. Smaller NGOs such as Lesotho Save the Children, National Council of Women, and ADRA were too small to take up a district to register. Caritas initially covered four large, populated districts. After December, when it became clear that they could not conduct a comprehensive and complete the registration on time due to lack of manpower. The three districts were assumed by the Lesotho Council of NGOs, who up until then, had remained in a coordinating role.

Red Cross, the most experienced, encountered the least difficulties in registering quickly and efficiently. CCL and World Vision had previous experience in registration but encountered difficulties due to the large numbers of potential candidates, political tensions, lack of manpower and resources.

D. Registration II February - March 1993: 362,000 beneficiaries identified. Quota of 310,000 Established.

After the first registration of 600,000, beneficiaries, DRIG determined that a large percentage of non vulnerable people had been registered. There were numerous reports of entire villages being registered and individuals registered at more than one distribution point. Consequently, food stocks could not support an unanticipatedly high number of beneficiaries. The initial food allocation in the June 1992 donor appeal for 120,000 beneficiaries for 9 - 12 months was increased to 310,000 beneficiaries in December 1992.

DRIG announced a re-registration and a quota of 310,000 beneficiaries for January and February 1993. The quota was implemented country wide. The method of developing the quota is not particularly clear but resulted from analysing the Poverty Mapping exercise conducted by Sechaba consultants, USAID's Drought Assessment Survey and the NEWU crop estimates. DRIG also considered the amount of food that was targeted and in the pipeline for Lesotho.

Table 2
Registration by District

District	Beneficiaries	Quota
Butha Buthe	33,419	16,208
Leribe	50,389	47,493
Berea	33,842	27,917
Maseru	66,876	47,285
Mafeteng	45,792	43,550
Mohale's Hoek	40,312	31,640
Quthing	26,453	26,460
Qacha's Nek	19,875	20,718
Thaba Tseka	27,126	23,628
Mokhotlong	18,286	25,101
Total	362,370	310,000

D.1 Method of Registration

Some changes were made in the registration procedures. The quota system forced communities with numbers over quota to lower the number of beneficiaries registered. In many instances the community simply reduced the ration per family to feed more families. This policy was later prohibited. However, the mistake had been made and it was difficult to alter.

Trained LCN Registration Teams registered vulnerable households with assistance from the Village committees.

Public gatherings or pitsos were introduced to verify registrations. This empowered the beneficiaries to register their complaints if registration teams, chiefs or village committees selected non-vulnerable households.

Continuous registration during distribution enabled teams to weed out those households which were not truly vulnerable.

An effort was made to post names in places where villagers would see names of vulnerable people. This was an attempt to keep the non vulnerable from registering.

D.2 NGO Reorganization

LCN Resources

The LCN received 2.5 million maloti from the GOL in November 1992 to implement the VHF registration and distribution operation in all ten districts. LCN undertook a massive reorganization of VHF operations. Previously, NGOs operated on their own budgets and to some extent their own procedures. As a result, coordination was extremely difficult. Standardized procedures, budgets for operations, and lessons learned from the previous registration increased NGO efficiency in the re-registration. LCN completed the re-registration in two months as opposed to four months for the first registration.

LCN Implementation

LCN moved from a coordinating role, with few resources to support the implementing NGOs, to an implementing organization as well as a coordinating body. LCN moved into the districts of Maseru, Berea, and Buta Buthe and later to Leribe districts. Caritas had formerly been responsible for these districts. Caritas consistently struggled to meet deadlines and in many cases their registrations were suspect due to the large numbers of registered beneficiaries in those districts. Caritas did not have the personnel, budget, or the organizational management capacity to conduct an objective and fair registration considering the size and population of their districts.

World Vision assumed control of Mohale's Hoek in its entirety. The District Drought Relief Committee, headed by the District Medical Officer, had attempted the difficult process of registering a portion of Mohale's Hoek with no resources or personnel.

Christian Council of Lesotho managed Mafeteng and Quthing. Red Cross Remained in the three mountain districts of Mokhotlong, Qacha's Nek and Thaba Tseka.

LCN Organization

LCN hired seven District Coordinators, 150 Distribution Point Supervisors, a District Coordinating Supervisor, an Administrative Officer to manage the accounts and information systems, two monitoring teams and four registration teams to implement operations in the seven lowland districts.

Food and Logistics Coordinator - This position was funded by USAID. The Coordinator managed the overall implementation of the VHF programme and worked for DRIG and LCN to formulate VHF policy and procedure. He also liaised and coordinated with the NGOs involved in the VHF programme.

LCN District Coordinating Supervisor DCS - managed the District Coordinators and solved problems on the district level often requiring travel to distribution points or villages undergoing registration to mediate disputes. The DCS liaised closely with district officials. The DCS brought field problems to the LCN drought technical advisor.

LCN District Coordinators - liaised closely with implementing NGOs, such as World Vision, District Officials, Food management Unit and SCF. The DCs managed 15 - 25 Distribution Point Supervisors DPS. The DC was a central figure on the district level for registration and distribution activities. The DC's terms of reference required excellent management and interpersonal skills.

Distribution Point Supervisors - Since the NGOs managing the seven lowland districts did not have 30 person teams as did Red Cross, LCN hired a responsible candidate at each Distribution Point. This person assisted in registration and managed the food distribution.

Registration Teams - Registration Teams consisted of 8 people per district. They were needed in the four districts that LCN took over from Caritas. They were responsible for conducting the re-registration from February to March 1993.

Monitoring Teams - The LCN monitoring teams were responsible for ensuring that DPS and DC were doing their jobs correctly. They reported directly to LCN.

Transport of teams to register beneficiaries was urgently needed as the NGOs were pressured to complete the process of registration. LCN hired on average between 10-15 vehicles to carry out the registration and distribution operations. LCN received 300,000 maloti from SADC to purchase four vehicles.

D.3 Registration II Implementation

The majority of villages were re-registered with little problem. Villages and Distribution Points that had specially elected committees tended to work better than already existing bodies such as the chief and VDCs. When problems arose, ie., villages refusing to lower numbers to quota, the special committees, drought relief committees, were able to assist the NGOs in lowering numbers to include only the most vulnerable.

In the second registration, 776 villages were registered that were not previously registered in the first registration. As a result, VHF numbers increased to 362,000 beneficiaries. (Please see Annex C.2 for a detailed report by DP of registered beneficiaries.)

The registration was scheduled to be completed in February 1993 but was completed by the end of March 1993. Isolated villages were registered as late as May 1993. The extra month needed to complete the registration was due to registering a large number of missed villages and through time consuming pitsos to reduce registration to the quota.

D.3.a Strengths of Registration II

NGOs registered beneficiaries to the established quota of 310,000 at the height of elections.

The reorganization and availability of resources donated by Government, enabled the NGOs to register beneficiaries faster and more efficiently. The result was a reduction of beneficiaries from over 600,000 to 310,000. The NGOs achieved the quota while increasing the number of villages by 18%. This figure did climb to 362,000 due to registration in areas where registration had not occurred. Poor registration and unregistered villages were found particularly in former Caritas districts of Maseru, Berea, Leribe and Butha Buthe.

NGO registration procedure shifted away from village committees and Chiefs to the use NGO teams and public meetings (pitsos).

The NGOs found that the best possible way to reduce numbers was to use NGO teams, who were, for the most part, objective, to conduct the re-registration. Pitsos publicised the registration so that people could see who was being selected. This procedure helped reduce the complaints that chiefs and village committee members were interfering by showing favouritism.

D.3.b Weakness of Registration II

Community coping mechanisms prevented an objective registration

Holding pitsos and public meetings had the effect of opening the process to the public. However, the theory that non vulnerable would not register and that communities would keep the registration to only the vulnerable was flawed. Community coping mechanisms were much stronger due to the continuing needs of the poor from the relatively wealthier neighbours. Thus, a vulnerable person did not inform registration teams or VDCs of non vulnerable neighbours because of continuing needs such as food, seeds, and other household necessities, in the future. As a

result, antagonisms developed between registration teams and village communities.

Information dissemination was poor.

New cards were issued but to many people, who had old cards, this did not matter. A card entitled them to food. This caused severe problems at the time of distribution when people brought Green cards (Registration I) while after December only Blue Cards (Registration II) were accepted. NGOs spent considerable time explaining in pitsos how and why the changes were taking place. This did not make NGOs popular in many areas particularly in Maseru District where many DPs refused to lower numbers of beneficiaries according to the quota.

Government assistance was absent during elections.

The elections were a priority for the Government. However, the need for Government to actively support drought operations was critical, particularly in information dissemination.

The same criteria was used.

Similar problems were encountered with the criteria as in the first registration. Training had improved enumerators skills in implementing the criteria.

Reduction in rations rather than people

As mentioned previously, In many distribution points villages reduced rations rather than people. Rather than increase community tensions by excluding people, many villages chose to reduce the ration. Since the ration was based on nutritional needs, reduction of rations severely affected the poorest people with large families.

E. Registration III October - November 1993: 147,555 beneficiaries identified. Targeted distribution to designated areas needing continued assistance - Mafeteng, Mohale's Hoek, Quthing, Qacha's Nek and Mokhotlong.

Registration III in phase II of VHF operations was conducted expeditiously. 1,385 villages in the three districts of Mafeteng, Quthing and Mohale's Hoek were registered in five weeks. The two mountain districts were not registered again as DRIG determined that the previous registration was acceptable.

LCN sent registration teams into the three districts and completed the task in the same manner as the Registration II. By this time the NGO infrastructure ran smoothly. The final registration was 10% lower than the previous number of registered beneficiaries. (See Annex C.3 for a complete report of registration by Distribution Point.)

Table 3
Registration by District

District	Beneficiaries	Quota
Mafeteng	43,205	43,550
Mohale's Hoek	42,156	31,640
Quthing	17,465	26,460
Qacha's Nek	21,211	20,718
Mokhotlong	23,518	25,101
Total	147,555	147,469

E.1 Strength of Registration III

The Registration went quickly with few problems

Five weeks of registration completed the operation. CCL assisted LCN in Mafeteng and Quthing and LCN operated in Mohale's Hoek, facilitating a quick and smooth registration. The only registration problems encountered were in 2 DPs in Mohale's Hoek and 2 DPs in Mafeteng.

E.2 Weakness of Registration III

Parliamentary interference

On four occasions at Mafeteng DPs (Motsekua and Thabang) and Mohale's Hoek DPs (Phuleng and Liphiring), parliamentarians interrupted registration to insist that everyone be fed. At other DPs Chiefs, VDCs and Parliamentarians presented lists of people to the DC on who should be registered. These types of actions not only slowed down registration and food distribution but more importantly prevented the truly needy from receiving rations. These actions illustrated the continuing problem of politization of food assistance.

F. Logistics and Food Distribution

Food Management

The fast and efficient movement of food was critical to the success of actually feeding the beneficiaries. A large amount of coordination and cooperation was required between Government, donors and NGO organizations to make this action occur.

WFP

WFP was responsible for transporting 58% of food to

Lesotho. Other Bilateral donations were Red Cross, SCF-UK/EU and Republic of China donations (Please see section II of the report). These donations are included in the overall emergency food assistance targeted to Lesotho. Due to the lag time from the declaration of drought emergency, the submission of the appeal for emergency food assistance and the time the food actually arrived, was close to five months. Because of the lack of food at the time of the declaration of the emergency in June 1992 and delays in registration, food distribution before November used the PRC donation and borrowings made from other development projects within FMU.

FMU

Once the food arrived in the country, it became the responsibility FMU. This was FMU's first country wide emergency with large numbers of beneficiaries. FMU had the difficult task of ensuring that sufficient stock was available for all food related projects including the emergency programmes of VHF, FFW and SF.

Increasing the speed and efficiency of the distribution process was critical to moving food to the beneficiaries. The Logistics and Food Group played a large part in developing necessary systems of procedures that ensured accountability and control for the responsible agencies. The final system that developed was a flow of requisition forms from the DP to the District to Maseru. Once the Requisition had been received and verified by the NGOs and FMU, FMU released the stock to the secondary transporter (SCF/UK) who then delivered the rations to the DP for distribution. Please see Annex B.1 for VHF distribution procedures.

The manual system of managing balances and reporting to headquarters was slow, taking nearly a month to reconcile accounts. Transfers from one store to another took time and proved extremely difficult to do expeditiously due to slow accounting methods. As a result, difficulties arose in ensuring that enough stock was available in district stores for transport to the DPs by SCF/UK.

F.1 Strengths of food management

FMU's previous experience of managing the school feeding programme assisted its performance in the emergency.

FMU had sufficient storage capacity for all programmes.

FMU's speed in transferring and borrowing food stocks improved with the length of the operations.

F.2 Weaknesses of food management

Causes of Delays

Slow Accounting Procedures

Procedures for accounting of food stocks on a monthly basis was slow for an emergency situation. FMU did not have the capacity to manage their stock on a week to week basis. This prevented FMU from having the ability to plan and ensure that stocks were available at warehouses for the beneficiaries on a weekly basis.

Communications

Poor communication between district warehouses and Maseru slowed all aspects of food management.

Transfers

Transfers between projects within the district system were slow and difficult to accomplish since FMU did not have up to date balances at district warehouses.

Overall Capacity

FMU had problems of ensuring that the correct amount of food was available for distribution. The cause of this shortage was due to incorrect distribution of commodities within the warehouse system. For example, in August and September 1993, approximately 50 tons of vegetable oil was located in the Mokhotlong FMU warehouse when 15 tons was required. Meanwhile Leribe district had no vegetable oil. These types of logistical problems occurred in June, July, September 1993 and again in March and April 1994.

G. Transport

G.1 Primary Transport

Primary transport of food commodities was the responsibility of WFP, the donating country, or NGO. In the past when food was needed immediately, organizations made a local purchase. However, due to the regional nature of the drought, few regional countries were in a position to export cereals to Lesotho. Lesotho had access to well established road, rail and port networks.

Donations from abroad took 3-5 months and 2-4 weeks for local purchases to arrive in Lesotho. Once the commodities arrive in Durban, the transport network to Lesotho is excellent. Some delays were incurred in Durban where large amounts of food aid were being shipped from South African and Mozambique ports throughout the region. On arrival in Lesotho, the commodities were delivered to FMU warehouses throughout the country based on anticipated need.

G.2 Secondary Transport

SCF/UK's extensive experience with delivering food to primary schools for the 30 years made it the obvious choice for implementing the transport of commodities to the DPs. The secondary transport is a difficult task in Lesotho. Many DPs were located in isolated areas on poor roads especially in the mountain and foothill regions.

Road Conditions to Distribution Points:

Good	122
Fair	30
Bad	27

SCF/UK received over \$900,000 in funding from ODA to implement the secondary transportation of food stocks. In phase I They transported 16,900 tons of commodities to 194 distribution points. In Phase II SCF transported 6,598 tons to 104 distribution points.

They hired field officers for every district. The field officers, with assistance from the Maseru office, contracted vehicles to deliver the food to the DPs. The Field Officers liaised closely with FMU and NGO District Coordinators to ensure that they were prepared for the delivery of food to the DP.

SCF/UK procedures for moving the food required that field officers ride with the vehicles to make sure that the food actually went to the DP. SCF/UK issued their own waybills to track the food and its movements. On release from the FMU store, the driver, the Distribution Point Supervisor and the Field Officer signed the waybill. The waybills were then returned to Maseru where they were placed into an information system.

Table 4
Delivery of Food in Metric Tons

District	Delivery Phase I	Delivery Phase II	Total
Butha Buthe	1,241.20	-	1,241.20
Leribe	2,667.12	-	2,667.12
Berea	1,866.07	-	1,866.07
Maseru	1,509.26	-	1,509.26
Mafeteng	1,178.33	2,180.63	3,358.96
Mohale's Hoek	2,210.13	1,934.18	4,144.31
Quthing	1,551.19	922.71	2,473.90
Qachu's Nek	1,237	764.77	2,001.77
Thaba Tseka	1,372	-	1,372
Mokhotlong	2,054.49	796.29	2,850.78
Total	16,886.79	6,598.58	23,485.37

G.3.a Strengths of the Secondary Transport System

SCF/UK delivered rations in remote areas under all conditions on a regular basis throughout the emergency using local capacity within the districts.

SCF/UK transferred the extensive experience gained in the school feeding programme to the VHF programme with good results. The systems used for school feeding - management, administrative, personnel and data collection - were already in place.

SCF/UK received sufficient funding from ODA to implement the programme from the beginning.

G.3.b Weaknesses of the Secondary Transport System

Causes of Delays

Contracting disputes between contractors and SCF/ UK occasionally slowed distribution. In some districts there were claims of favouritism made by contractors who did not receive contracts with SCF/UK.

Roadworthy vehicles with the correct papers were sometimes hard to come by. This delayed distribution to the beneficiaries.

Offloading of Rations

SCF/UK could not give a specific date to when the commodities would arrive at the DP. Usually the District Coordinators were given a three day window for delivery. It was unrealistic to have beneficiaries wait on hand for three days for the truck to arrive. Notification of beneficiaries was also delayed, requiring food to remain at the DP for several days before distribution began.

Delivery of rations to DPs at dusk or after dark. It was extremely difficult to get people to offload the trucks after dark. Also, security was difficult to maintain at DPs.

H. The Distribution Point System

Distribution of the food to the beneficiaries is the final stage of the emergency operation and the most decentralized. Up until this point, accountability of the food was easily managed due to already established procedures.

At this point many variables arise. Where to place the DP? Who manages the DP? Who distributes the rations? How do the donors know the selected people received the correct ration? What are the reporting procedures?

H.1 Distribution Point Selection

Distribution Points were ideally located in a central village, servicing approximately 20 villages depending on the population. The DP had to be accessible to SCF/UK trucks for delivery of rations. Storage facilities needed to be secure and capable of holding the stock for a period initially estimated for a few days.

In actual fact, in late 1992, when registration and distribution were in progress simultaneously, DPs were selected relatively haphazardly. For example districts managed by Caritas placed most DPs at Missions. Red Cross used tents or clinics for temporary DPs. Other DPs were placed in community halls, wool sheds, former Coop Lesotho buildings, stores, schools, and occasionally, chiefs residence although this was avoided at all cost.

Table 5
Distribution Point Types

Distribution Point Type	Number
School	28
Community Hall/Building	49
Mission	31
Clinic	15
Food Management Warehouse	5
Ministry of Agriculture	11
World Vision Site	1
Private	54
Total	194

The size of the DP varied. St. John Tlali DP in Maseru had over 7,000 beneficiaries from over 45 villages. Other DPs had as few as 200 from 5 villages. The average DP had just over 20 villages with 1,840 beneficiaries.

As the programme developed NGOs moved or created new DPs thus increasing their central locality and decreasing the numbers of beneficiaries. At the height of the programme the NGOs had 194 DPs.

H.1.a Strengths

The distance travelled to a distribution point varied depending on villages proximity to the DP. 64% of beneficiaries were under two hours away from the DP. 14% were under three hours. 22% of the beneficiaries were farther than three hours. Only on isolated occasions were the NGOs forced to pay for storing food at sites. A few missions in particular were adamant that payment be made for storing of relief food. In most cases, communities, shop owners, private individuals and missions were gracious in assisting the NGOs in storing food when it was needed.

H.1.b Weaknesses

28% of DPs were placed in private storage, such as chief's compounds, traders' storerooms or unused buildings belonging to individuals within the community. This figure reflects the limited DP site placements available for safe, secure storage on the village level especially in isolated areas. Security of stores was a consistent problem. Watchmen were hired at most stores.

H.2 Distribution Point Management

Initially the lowlands DP's were managed in coordination with a responsible Village Relief Committee and a volunteer NGO representative. Red Cross used its own staff to distribute food. After the first distribution in November and December, The NGOs realized that this was not the best procedure. Many Committees were not responsible and in one case a chief in Berea distributed four tons of food to unauthorized people. Too many people were involved with the DP and no one person was accountable for the food.

After the NGOs received resources from the Government to implement the programme, LCN placed a paid NGO representative at each DP who coordinated activities with village committees. The Distribution Point Supervisor (DPS) was responsible for receiving, storing, and distributing the rations to the beneficiaries. The DPS notified villages of upcoming distributions and participated in registering of vulnerable households. The DPS also submitted DP food requisition and distribution reports to the DC to account for the food that has been received and distributed.

H.2.a Strengths

The first system did not work because no one was left accountable. The hiring of DPS introduced accountability to food distribution. The DPS had terms of reference to fulfil. Failure to fulfil the TOR resulted in disciplinary action and some cases termination. Considering the number of people LCN employed for the operation, 170 people, less than 10% were released for irregularities such as stealing food.

The Village Committees that were functioning continued to play an important role in assisting the DPS with distributing the food. They did this voluntarily.

The public nature of food distribution gave the activity legitimacy with the beneficiaries.

H.2.b Weaknesses

DPS play a large and unsupervised role in the food distribution process. This left the system open to abuse. For example a DPS in Berea left his post for over a month and came only to collect his pay check.

In a few cases, DPS were dishonest, participating in activities such as registering non vulnerable, stealing and selling food. For example a DPS in Moyeni attempted to steal 90 bags of maize but was stopped and arrested in a government vehicle at a police barricade.

In most cases DPS collaborated with others to sell the food. In other cases, people in the village, threatened the DPS to give them food.

This type of decentralized system depended upon the honesty and integrity of people to do the job for the good of the needy. Selfish acts such as stealing or selling vulnerable peoples food is a disgrace. A more detailed section on VHF theft will follow in the distribution section.

H.3 Distribution of Food at the Distribution Point.

Distribution of food at the DP can be a very difficult and dangerous activity. It can also be very well organized with few problems. Much of what happens at distribution is dependant upon the registration and the training of DPS in the task of safely distributing food to beneficiaries.

All DPS received training before their first distribution from the District Coordinator. At the training, the DPS learned about the difficulties of distribution - crowd control, stock management, and the best method of distribution. Distribution can get out of control as the incidents in Rothe and Thupalikaka in Maseru district indicated. Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike stormed the stores in August 1993 and stole over 17 tons of maize.

The general pattern was that once the food arrived and was stored, messages were sent to villages announcing what day they should come and collect their rations. On the specified day the villages arrived with their registration cards. Distribution was done by village and name of beneficiary. On receiving the rations, the Beneficiary signed or "crossed" the registration card at the DP to verify receiving the ration.

The DPS oversaw the distribution with assistance from the Village Development/Relief Committee. In some cases, where the VDC was inactive, other DPS from the district assisted in distribution.

H.3.a Strengths

Distribution occurred without incident most of the time. DPS and VDC did distribute food to the beneficiaries once they received it.

There were a few isolated cases where distribution had to be postponed until differences could be settled. This occurred in places where the registration had caused problems and those not registered had come to the distribution to receive a ration. In this type of case the DPS was instructed to close down distribution and get help from the District Coordinator, VDC, Chiefs, and police. The two cases where distribution got out of control were Rothe and Thupalikaka.

H.3.b Weaknesses

The system left room for abuse by DPSs and VDCs. A dishonest DPS could sell food or steal food even with reporting procedures in place. Monitors and visits by the District Coordinators helped assist DPS and sort out irregularities if they occurred.

Food distribution, on occasion caused friction within communities. A large number of people believed that they were affected by the drought and should therefore receive food. On days of distribution, people sometimes demanded to be fed.

Chiefs, parliamentarians, members of VDCs sometimes put the DPS in awkward positions by bringing lists of people to the distribution point insisting that they be fed. NGOs assessed the situation on a case by case scenario. The people were not fed but were screened. In some cases, the chiefs assistance was appreciated in others the assistance verged on interference and intimidation.

In an extreme case of interference the DS and a Parliamentarian from Qacha's Nek distributed food to unauthorized people. Red Cross was the only organization allowed to distribute food. The officials gave food to non vulnerable households. The result was that 385 registered beneficiaries did not receive their ration.

H.3.c Unauthorized Distribution and Theft

Unauthorized distribution occurred in nearly every district. For example in Leribe at the Lejone DP the VDC distributed food without the DPS's presence. Records were not kept as to who the food was distributed to. The same type of events also occurred in Mafeteng, Qacha's Nek, Mochale's Hoek, Maseru and Berea. In these places VDCs, Parliamentarians, or chiefs participated in the unauthorized distribution.

In a few instances general looting took place. In Maseru at Rothe and Thupalikaka DPs a mob of over a hundred people stormed the stores. Also in Quthing at the Tsatsane DP a number of people broke into the store at night and looted seven tons of food.

Petty theft was a consistent problem. Since many of the DP sites were not completely secure, break-ins were a common occurrence with at least 2 reported thefts per distribution country wide. All thefts were reported to DRIG.

H.4 Distribution Point Reporting

DPS must account for the distributed food by producing a distribution report. The information collected was food received from SCF/UK, food issued to beneficiaries, and food balances

remaining in the store. The DPS measures the amount issued to the beneficiaries by totalling amounts issued on the registration cards. The report was collated by the DC and presented to the DS for approval.

The reports were sent to DRIG for analysis and cross checking with FMU, SCF/UK and WFP. Monitoring teams also visited DPs on a daily basis to check stock in stores, measure stock against waybills and ensure that distribution went smoothly. The monitoring teams, employed by LCN, ensured that DPSS fulfilled their duties accurately and honestly.

H.4.a Strengths

Reporting on distribution was done on a consistent basis by the District Coordinators.

H.4.b Weaknesses

The NGOs had limited oversight of the DPS's actions once distribution was completed. The reports could be easily altered to hide any irregularities that might have taken place.

LCN monitors and District Coordinators did not have the manpower to monitor every distribution point during distribution. The DC was lucky to make it to all the DPs once during the distribution period.

I. Distribution of Rations

Distribution continued from September 1992 through April 1994. Distribution during phase I of operations began September 1992 in Mokhotlong and ended September 30 1993 in all ten districts. The food provided during this time was enough for one distribution a month. However, the reality was that distribution began in September in Mokhotlong and by the beginning of November 1992, 55,587 beneficiaries received rations in Mokhotlong and Thaba Tseka at 35 DPs. Distribution increased as more DPs were selected and beneficiaries registered. By the end of December 1993, 600,000 beneficiaries had been registered and nearly as many had received a ration.

There was no distribution in January 1993 due to re-registration and distribution began in earnest in March 1993. May - July 1993 distribution was sporadic as commodities were slow in reaching the district warehouses and distribution to beneficiaries took longer than anticipated. Transportation to the DP was also delayed on occasion due to contract problems and breakdowns.

NGOs in March and April 1993 distributed to 310,000 beneficiaries. At the same time registration was still going on in areas missed previously. By June 1993 the number of beneficiaries registered had climbed to 362,000 country wide. In August and September 1993 distribution was widespread. The closing date of Phase I was 30 September 1993. Distribution at

the DPS carried on into October to finish distributing stocks, to close down distribution points, collect registration cards and close down district drought offices staffed by the ICN District Coordinators.

Phase II distribution began in early December in the three lowland districts of Mafeteng, Mohale's Hoek and Quthing. Red Cross began distribution in January after completing their seed distribution activities in November and December.

The three lowland districts received a total of 5 distributions and the two mountain districts received 4 distributions.

The table below displays the number of distributions based on the total number of months in the emergency beginning in September 1992.⁸

Table 6
Number of Distributions per District⁹

District	Distribution Phase I	Distribution Phase II	Total
Butha Buthe	3.5	-	3.5
Leribe	5	-	5
Berea	5	-	5
Maseru	2	-	3
Mafeteng	3	4.5	7.5
Mohale's Hoek	5.5	5	10.5
Quthing	5	5	10
Qacha's Nek	5	4	9
Thaba Tseka	6	-	6
Mokhotlong	7	3.5	10.5

⁸ Although the emergency began officially in July 1992, the first distribution did not take place until September 1992 in Mokhotlong. A monthly ration was planned for the emergency. Actual implementation varied as the table indicates.

⁹ Phase I of this table reflects the number of distributions based upon the registered total of each district for a total of 362,000. Phase II is based upon the registered total of each district totalling 147,555.

III. Achievements and Constraints

A. Achievements

DRIG Coordination

The DRIG structure facilitated coordination between the many different organizations within the drought operations. The Logistics and Food Group operated throughout the emergency as a forum for problem solving and policy development. This enabled the group to coordinate all aspects of emergency food assistance.

DRIG's executive intervened on behalf of the NGOs on numerous occasions when differences arose between district officials and the NGOs. DRIG also facilitated action within government on policy decisions such as government support of NGO implementation of the VHF programme.

DRIG increased its staff with operations officers in Health, Agriculture and Food and Logistics. The added staff improved planning, coordination and implementation of food assistance programmes.

Flexibility

DRIG exhibited flexibility on numerous occasion but primarily in the case of passing responsibility of registration and food distribution to the NGOs.

NGO Implementation

The NGOs successfully implemented a country wide programme of registration and food distribution. The skills and knowledge gained in the emergency will assist the people of Lesotho in the future when other disasters strike.

B. Constraints

DRIG Capacity

Lack of Resources

DRIG had no funds at its immediate disposal to assist implementing organizations. At the outset of the emergency, a fund had been created but Government did not allocate resources to the fund. DRIG's inability to disburse funding immediately hampered the implementation of VHF, FFW and SF operations. This was partially due to slow Government procedures for releasing resources.

DRIG did not have independent monitors to monitor and evaluate the VHF, FFW and SF on a regular basis.

Terms of Reference

DRIG's authority to enforce policy was limited due to its ambiguous terms of reference and resources. DRIG relied upon coordination and consensus to develop policy. In most cases this type of decision making worked, however there were times when direct action was required of ministries to implement directives during the emergency.

A specific example was the lack of cooperation by several District Secretaries in assisting with emergency operations in the districts. DRIG could not go directly to the DS but through the relevant ministry, in this case, Home Affairs.

Information Collection

Each agency collected its own information throughout the emergency. In general it improved throughout the emergency. FMU produced monthly stock reports. SCF/UK developed a database system collecting various transport information such as the truck contractors, kms travelled and the amount delivered. LCN produced distribution reports and developed a database for numbers of people registered by village and district. Although much of the correct information was being collected and monitored by individual organizations, DRIG had no real capacity to collect, coordinate and use the information collected.

Surveys and evaluations specifically assessing VHF, SF and FFW was not done. As a result, there is no quantifiable information available on the emergency food assistance programmes reaching the targeted population. In analysing the programmes, there is little reliable data available establishing that VHF, SF and FFW food assistance reached the target populations.

NGO Capacity

The beginning of the drought operations revealed that though many NGOs wanted to participate in the operations that relatively few had the management and organizational capacity to undertake the operations.

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Conclusions

The VHF operations demonstrated that targeting, criteria and registration were as important as the distribution. A good distribution was dependent upon organized decision-making from the day the declaration of emergency was made. Planning is therefore critical to the success of the operation.

Monthly distribution of rations was extremely difficult to accomplish. In almost every case distribution averaged every other month or worse. A delay of a week in any link in the chain threw off the entire schedule.

Targeting

Vulnerability was determined by level of poverty rather than effects of drought.

Simple and concise criteria is essential for people to understand. This prevents registration teams from using different criteria in different districts.

Registration

A good registration is dependent upon clear and concise criteria and specified target group.

Information dissemination to the rural population was critical to the success of registration which was linked closely with the success of the entire operation.

Objective and fair registrations were not possible using village and district authority due to the belief that most people deserved food within the community. The first registration displayed this by having a registration of nearly 30 % of the country. However, once the quota and registration teams assumed more responsibility in the registration process, the registration was reduced by half.

District and village support of VHF operations varied from district to district. District, Village and NGO Terms of reference and responsibility were unclear. Interference in registration and distribution such as the case in Qacha's Nek on several occasions, especially unauthorized food delivery by the DS and a parliamentarian as occurred in March 1994 undermined the legitimacy of the NGO operation.

Some village level authorities feared public reprisal. This led to many cases where entire villages were registered for fear of turning a person away. Chiefs or villages selected beneficiaries unfairly.

Village committees, Chiefs and the community in general placed political, psychological, and social pressure on registration team members. These actions weakened the validity of the registration and hindered teams from successfully registering beneficiaries.

As a result community relations have suffered due to the registration and distribution process.

Community coping mechanisms should not be interfered with but used in cooperation with relief assistance.

Food Management

Consistent delays in providing enough stock at district warehouses negatively impacted the programme. The delays can

be attributed to slow accounting procedures at the district and central level and poor communication between district and central FMU. Without food balance information, transfers from other warehouses and delivery to district stores was slow.

Distribution

Trouble free distribution was dependent upon a well conducted registration.

Theft of food at the distribution point was a problem.

Accounting for food given to beneficiaries was difficult due to decentralized and isolated nature of the DPs.

B. Recommendations

VHF Operations

Resources and Planning

Resources must be made available to implementing organizations immediately upon declaration of emergency. Resources will assist in improving an organized response to the emergency.

Flexible disaster plans are necessary. The past emergency had little to work with in developing criteria, registration, and distribution methods.

Collating, analysing and coordinating information is critical to improving performance of organizations and increasing accountability. An important part of any future emergency coordinating body will be improved information coordination.

Conduct surveys and evaluations during the emergency to assess the impact of the intervention.

Targeting

Targeting of beneficiaries must be better defined. The criteria, simplified and clear as to who is eligible. For example, exclude people from towns and people of good working ability, targeting the elderly, pregnant and lactating mothers and families with malnourished children.

Increase the data available to assess the target population. This will allow for speedier food delivery if the number of estimated beneficiaries is known from early warning reports and other data collected by other ministries. A system of registered destitute persons would save ministries and NGOs time and resources in future disaster situations

Institute a quota once data has indicated the estimated target population. This will prevent large over-registrations.

Assessment of community coping mechanisms is necessary to best target relief assistance. This may mean limiting the target group to the aged, disabled and pregnant and lactating women. Other target groups could receive assistance through food for work projects, for example.

Registration

There must be a massive information dissemination campaign before any registration takes place. This will clarify who is eligible. Also design the programme to be self selecting on the part of the beneficiary. Introduce a public works programme for all able bodied people who fulfil the criteria and provide free food assistance to pregnant and lactating mothers, disabled and aged who fulfil the criteria. The benefits would be that fewer people would sign up for work programmes and the free food category would be easier to identify. This may assist in targeting beneficiaries without the huge problems of over registration.

Put the resources into registration immediately. Registration is the foundation to a smooth distribution. However, at the time of registration, demands are highest for actual implementation. Therefore, it is imperative for continued training in registration techniques.

Continue to use NGOs as the implementing agencies for registration. The local committees are useful in assisting the NGOs as they have local expertise. NGOs can be more objective than local committees.

Distribution

Distribute yellow maize to the beneficiaries. The Basotho favour white maize. Yellow maize would be more self selective. People who are registered but not vulnerable may not want yellow maize and therefore remove themselves from the vulnerable category. Yellow maize may also limit thefts as it is not worth as much as white maize.

Distribute food to registered beneficiaries in the rural areas only. Town centres are extremely difficult to register and many of the problems such as theft and over registration centre around urban or peri urban DPS. In the case of severe drought where starvation is a serious issue, distributing to the rural areas only will help prevent an influx to towns.

Alternative methods to free food distribution must be assessed. The past emergency reflected a problem of purchasing power rather than shortage of maize. At no time was there a shortage of maize in the market place. Government subsidies prevented rising prices due to scarcity of the product.

Alternative Distribution Procedures for long term operations

Alternative methods of resource transfer should be assessed. The free food distribution method did provide food to the target group. However, the resources needed to accomplish this task were large. A parallel storage, transport and distribution network was created to distribute food when a well established trading network already existed.

A voucher system could be developed where NGOs conduct the registration, issuing food tickets reimbursable at local traders or in the case no traders at designated Distribution Points. Traders have participated in these schemes before. Traders will participate if the reimbursement procedures are not time consuming.

A fund could be established and managed by government. For speedier disbursement, NGOs also could manage the fund. Fast reimbursement will keep traders participating. Monitors in all districts would be necessary to ensure that traders are not cheating beneficiaries of their rations.

Public Works Projects

Many people who received free food under VHF were capable of working. In future disaster or drought situations, expansion of public works projects would put people to work and assist in rehabilitation and longer term development goals.

Alternative means of reimbursement for public works projects should be considered. Cash for work programmes empower the worker with a real wage. Since Lesotho is a cash based economy, labour should be reimbursed in cash rather than food.

Monetization of donated food assistance

Monetizing food is not a new concept for Lesotho. It could be used to provide resources for a voucher system or cash for work.

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Annexes

- A. Food and Logistics Terms of Reference
- A.2 Coordinators Terms of Reference
- B Vulnerable Household Feeding Procedures
- C VHF Registration I, II, III

ANNEX A

Logistics and Food Distribution Group

5. Terms of Reference. On behalf of DRIG:

- a) To ensure that emergency food aid is stored, handled, transported and distributed with the maximum expedition, efficiency and economy practicable in all the circumstances associated with the current drought crisis: for vulnerable household feeding (VHF); food-for-work (FFW) feeding; community-based supplementary feeding; and hospital-based therapeutic feeding programmes.
- b) To compile emergency food aid requirements, match these with firm pledges and notified consignments, and advise DRIG of predicted shortfalls.
- c) To work closely with the Regional Logistics Centre in Harare in order to monitor emergency food aid arriving at the designated port of entry and its transportation by road or rail via nominated entry points to Lesotho.
- d) To supervise and monitor FMU stock dispositions, inter-store movements and issues to SCF (UK) and other emergency transport agencies involved with moving food aid to distribution points (DPs), VHF beneficiaries, FFW sites, and supplementary and therapeutic feeding locations.
- e) To supervise and monitor continuing VHF registration, the issue of ration cards, and the processing at all levels of food requisition forms.
- f) To coordinate the plan and all related arrangements for expanding the emergency FFW programme.
- g) To prepare, keep under review and update the DP Opening Programme (with numbers of beneficiaries and commodity requirements), the FFW site Opening Programme (with numbers of workers and commodity requirements), the Supplementary Feeding Opening Programme (with numbers of recipients and commodity requirements), and the Therapeutic Feeding Operating Programme (with numbers of patients and commodity requirements).
- h) To maintain a running check of in-country transport requirements, availabilities and hiring rates for food and non-food aid purposes, and advise DRIG of anticipated shortfalls or funding problems.
- i) To maintain a running check and prepare a monthly statement of food aid 'due in' and feeding requirements 'due out', and inform DRIG.
- j) To identify drought-related training, information and communication requirements and inform the Development Group.

- k) To give progress reports as required and to keep the Chief Executive, DRIG appraised of critical problems as they occur.
- l) To recommend the re-allocation of sectoral resources to urgent drought relief tasks when these are deemed to have higher priority than their original assignments.
- m) To make drought-related, sectoral funding proposals for consideration by the Executive Group.

Annex A.2

Food and Logistics Operations Officer Terms of Reference

1. General Scope of Work

a. This consultancy involves planning, coordinating and monitoring of the drought relief measures concerned with the wide ranging logistics and food distribution sector, and also involves planning post drought recovery plans in this vital sector in a disaster prone country so heavily dependent on food supply.

b. As the Logistics and Food distribution specialist based at the Drought Relief Operations Centre in Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, the Food and Logistics Operations Officer will spend a large proportion of his time in the field evaluating the results of planning as well as coordinating and monitoring drought relief measures and determining post drought recovery plan requirements.

c. The consultant is responsible to the Chief Executive of DRIG to whom he reports, but he works closely with the staff of the Drought Relief Operations Centre, Food Management Unit, SCF/UK, NGOs, District Secretaries and other agencies and individuals involved with drought relief and post drought reconstruction and rehabilitation.

2. Specific Operations Centre Duties

a. To act as the specialist logistics and food distribution advisor to DRIG and attend monthly meetings in order, principally, to give sectoral progress reports.

b. To convene and chair the fortnightly meetings of DRIG's Logistics and Food Group attended by Government officials involved part-time with drought relief and post drought recovery.

c. To be a member of DRIG's Executive Group that meets weekly and as such, to contribute to executive policy decisions related to drought relief.

d. To be a member of DRIG's Development Group that meets fortnightly and as such, to participate in the planning, training, and data provision related to post drought reconstruction, rehabilitation and recovery, leading into disaster mitigation, preparedness and response measures and linking with longer term development projects.

e. To maintain the sectoral information display in the Drought Relief Operations Centre.

3. Specific Field Duties

a. To visit districts regularly and assist with the effective running of the ten District Operations Centres from logistics and food distribution standpoints.

Annex B.1

**VULNERABLE HOUSEHOLD FEEDING: FOOD AID
DISTRIBUTION PROCEDURE**

VHF = Vulnerable Household Feeding
DP = Food Distribution Point

FRF = Food Requisition Form

Village	<u>Village Community (trained and supervised by NGO)</u> <ol style="list-style-type: none">Registers needy/vulnerable as VHF beneficiaries according to the guidelines attached at "A" and using the form attached at "B"; registration is an on-going process.Submits completed and verified registration forms at "B" to DP on which the area is dependent for food aid supply according to the current VHF schedule.
DP	<u>DP Supervisor</u> <ol style="list-style-type: none">Receives registration forms at "B" and issues a serial number for each controlled ration card, attached at "C" and retains the ration card at the DP for each vulnerable household.Prepares consolidated DP FRF attached at "D" and sends to NGO VHF coordinator at district, according to the current VHF schedule.
District	<u>NGO VHF Coordinator</u> <ol style="list-style-type: none">Receives DP FRF's and retains copies for accounting and information purposes.Prepare consolidated District FRF attached at "E" bearing the DS's signature and stamp.Sends District FRF to LCN according to the current VHF schedule and keeps DS informed of progress.
LCN Maseru	<u>NGO Coordinator</u> <ol style="list-style-type: none">Receive Districts FRF's and retains copies for accounting and information progress.Sends Districts FRF's to FMU immediately.
FMU Maseru	<u>FMU Coordinator</u> <ol style="list-style-type: none">Receives District FRF's and stamps each form.Having checked stock situation, sends District FRF's to SCF(UK) immediately.

SCF/UK

Secondary Transport Manager

1. Receives District FRF's with FMU stamp.
2. Liaises with DP supervisor on delivery dates.
3. Liaises with NGO VHF Coordinator at district on delivery dates.
4. Draws VHF food aid to appropriate FMU store.
5. Delivers VHF food aid to appropriate DP.

DP

DP Supervisor

1. Receives VHF food aid (maize, grain, pulses and veg.oil).
2. Inform town/village committee to arrange food distribution to beneficiaries, under NGO supervisor.

Village

Village Committee

1. Distributes rations to VHF beneficiaries with ration cards.
2. Updates VHF registration.

District

NGO VHF Coordinator

1. After rations have been distributed, district coordinators completes Distribution Reports for all DPs attached at "F" and sends form to LCN.

LCN Maseru

NGO Coordinator

1. Submits distribution Report to DRIG for analysis with FMU and SCF/UK records.

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This questionnaire is to be used by the Village Drought Relief Committee when interviewing households believed to be vulnerable.

1. NAME:
2. VILLAGE:
3. CHIEF:
4. DISTRICT:
5. NO. OF PEOPLE IN THE HOUSEHOLD:

(A.1)

INITIAL SCREENING OF VULNERABLE HOUSEHOLD

	0 POINT	1 POINT	2 POINT
Employment within a household	Somebody employed (including on food-for-work) with income to support the household	Somebody employed but does not assist the household	No one employed.
Income generating activities within the household (e.g. shops, shebeen quest, rented house, builder/carpenter, mechanic, sewing and knitting, selling farm, chicken, eggs etc.)	Get income regularly.	Once in while get very little income.	No income at all.
	0 POINT	1 POINT	2 POINT

- All household with 3 to 4 points should be further screened under table B
- All households with 0 points and (+) 2 points do not qualify for assistance. However, if the household has 1 point and (+) 1 point, they can proceed to B.2.

(A.2)

SCREENING DEPENDING ON HEALTH CONDITIONS

1. Aged people	cannot do anything
2. Disabled people	cannot do anything
3. Malnourished under 5 years	at least one child is admitted into hospital due to diarrhoea and malnutrition
4. Pregnant/Lactating	unhealthy person in that household
5. Sick with chronic condition	cannot do anything

All households with 1 and (+) 1 points who have a member with a health condition described above are further screened under table B. Those who do not have such a member do not qualify for assistance.

FURTHER SCREENING CRITERIA FOR VULNERABLE HOUSEHOLD

	0 Point	1 Point	2 Points
Fields (Harvest) No. of <u>Bags/person</u> within a house hold (Bag = 90kg)	More than 2 bags	1 to 2 bags	Less than <u>One</u> bag
Animals (cattle, sheep and goat)	Over 30 units	15 - 30 units	Less than 15 units
	0 Points	1 Point	2 Points

All households with 3 to 4 points qualify.

NOTE:

Fields

To calculate no. of bags per person:
(Divide)

Total no. of bags harvested in the past year (by) _____ = _____

 Total number of persons in household _____

Animals

A. cow = 5 units x _____ (number of cows) = _____
 B. sheep = 1 unit x _____ (number of sheep) = _____
 C. goat = 1 unit x _____ (number of goats) = _____
 Total (A+B+C) = _____

**MOUSO OA LESOTHO
KOPO EA SETSI SA KAPO
--DISTRIBUTION POINT REQUISITION**

Lebitso la Mekoalo
 Name of NGO: _____
 Seterake
 District: _____
 Setsi sa Kobo
 Distribution Point: _____
 Palo ea Malapa :
 No. of Vulnerable Households : _____
 Palo ea Bahloki :
 No. of Beneficiaries : _____

Nomoro ea Kopo
 Requisition No. _____
 Letsetsi
 Date : _____
 Lebitso la
 Name of DPS : _____
 Tekeno
 Signature _____
 Palo ea mase
 No. of Villages : _____

Tseba A. Commodities	Sekepele sa khoeli Monthly Ration (kg)	Palo ea bahloki No. of Ben.	Kakaretso ea boima Total Quantity (kg)
MAIZE POONE	10		
PULSES/LINADA	0.5		
OIL/OLI	0.5		

**LENANE LA METSE
B. VILLAGE LIST**

Mabitso a mase Name of Villages	Palo ea malapa a bahloki No. of Vulnerable Households	Palo ea bahloki No. of Beneficiaries	Mabitso a mase Name of Villages	Palo ea malapa a bahloki No. of Identified Households	Palo ea bahloki No. of Beneficiaries
1. _____	_____	_____	11. _____	_____	_____
2. _____	_____	_____	12. _____	_____	_____
3. _____	_____	_____	13. _____	_____	_____
4. _____	_____	_____	14. _____	_____	_____
5. _____	_____	_____	15. _____	_____	_____
6. _____	_____	_____	16. _____	_____	_____
7. _____	_____	_____	17. _____	_____	_____
8. _____	_____	_____	18. _____	_____	_____
9. _____	_____	_____	19. _____	_____	_____
10. _____	_____	_____	20. _____	_____	_____

*Mabitsoeli oa setsi sa kobo o ka hlalosa manane a mase 'me o ka a kenya foromoeng ena.
 *Mabitsoeli oa setsi sa kobo o ka kopu bo tharo tsa foromo ena kopu ea pele e sa le eena, bo peli bo komiti ea seterake ea likoloni.

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MUSO OA LESOTHO
 GOVERNMENT OF LESOTHO
 FOROMO EA KOPO EA SETEREKE
 DISTRICT REQUISITION FORM

SETEREKE
 DISTRICT _____

NOMORO EA KOPO
 REQUISITION NO. _____

LEBITSO LA MONGOLI OA SETEREKE
 NAME OF _____

LETSATSI
 DATE _____

TEKENO
 SIGNATURE _____

LENANE LA LITSI TSA KABO
 DISTRIBUTION POINT LIST

KAKARETSO
 TOTAL TONNAGE

SETSI SA KABO
 DISTRIBUTION
 POINT

MOKHATLO
 RESPONSIBLE
 NGO

LENANE LA MALAPA
 NUMBER OF
 HOUSEHOLDS

LENANE LA BAHLOKI
 NUMBER OF
 BENEFICIARIES

POONE
 MAIZE

LINAOA
 PULSES

OIL
 OIL

				POONE		LINAOA		OIL	
				No of Bags	Total Weight	No of Bags	Total Weight	No of Containers	Total Weight
1									
2									
3									
4									
5									
6									
7									
8									
9									
0									
1									
2									
3									
4									
5									

TOTAL
 KAKARETSO _____

ANNEX C.1
 LCN REGISTRATION I (INCOMPLETE) - PHASE I
 AUGUST - DECEMBER 1992

RECORD #	DISTRIBUTION POINT	NGO	BENEFICARY (NUMBERS)	HOUSEHOLD (FAMILIES)	*1 wk turn around time given
** DISTRICT OF Berea					
62	St Cecilia	CAR	5929	1343	11/30/92
63	PhororongSch/Sebetta	CAR	5874	1957	12/24/92
64	Makube	CAR	2232	565	11/23/92
65	Bethany/(Maatholoana	CAR	5012	1410	11/23/92
66	Lekokoaneg	CAR	1813	478	12/13/92
95	Zion R.C.	CAR	4590	1244	11/30/92
105	TV/Assumption	CAR	1595	558	12/13/92
106	Co-op Ha Koali	CAR	6243	1412	12/13/92
126	Bela-Bela StTheresas	CAR	0	0	/ /
127	Gethsemany	CAR	1691	542	01/15/93
128	Molatsane Co-op	CAR	3101	740	01/15/93
129	Pulane/HaPatrick	CAR	1917	259	12/24/92
130	Ha Moshthi/Pitsaneng	CAR	669	221	12/24/92
131	StMagdalena Tsebana	CAR	1747	556	12/24/92
132	Mamathe	CAR	0	0	/ /
** Subtotal **			41513	11285	
** DISTRICT OF Butha-Buthe					
49	Mafikalisiu	CAR	1260	412	01/17/93
50	Libono	CAR	0	0	/ /
51	Thakabanna	CAR	1628	510	01/17/93
52	Sheeshe/St Thomas	CAR	573	178	01/17/93
53	Seboche/St Charles	CAR	857	263	01/17/93
54	Qalo LEC	CAR	3113	777	12/23/92
55	St Paul	CAR	7197	1730	11/30/92
96	Sekubu	CAR	2207	555	11/30/92
138	Matsoaing	CAR	1450	329	01/17/93
139	Ngoajane	CAR	0	0	/ /
140	StPeter's Moteng	CAR	544	196	01/18/93
141	Khukhune	CAR	3116	620	12/23/92
142	Tsime	CAR	0	0	/ /
150	Linakeng Clinic	CAR	2015	568	12/23/92
154	Manitilobo ACL	CAR	1773	396	01/17/93
155	*Linkung	CAR	591	182	01/18/93
** Subtotal **			25324	6716	
** DISTRICT OF City Maseru					
11	MSU Boys Village	LSC	1434	487	12/14/92
77	Qoaling	LNCW	14791	4139	12/24/92
93	ABIA High School	CC	4239	1087	12/17/92
152	McshoeshoeII M-East	LNCW	7781	2310	12/24/92
158	Tsosane LEC	LNCW	7467	1983	12/24/92
153	Matala RC PriShl	LEC LNCW	5238	1592	12/24/92

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LCN COMPLETED REGISTRATION/NOT

*Indicates a new DP

RECORD #	DISTRIBUTION POINT	NGO	BENEFICARY (NUMBERS)	HOUSEHOLD (FAMILIES)	*1 wk turn around time given
** Subtotal **			40950	11598	
** DISTRICT OF Leribe					
48	Khabo LEC	CAR	0	0	/ /
56	St Denis	CAR	0	0	/ /
57	Mate/Villa Consc	CAR	0	0	/ /
58	Ltl Flower/Kolonyama	CAR	2857	790	12/23/92
59	St Monica	CAR	0	0	/ /
60	Mamohau/Lejone	CAR	0	0	/ /
61	Maputsoe/Coop/St Luk	CAR	0	0	/ /
94	Ha Seshote-Lagetto	CAR	7012	0	11/23/92
107	Our Lady Mositi Lour	CAR	1955	404	12/14/92
108	Pontmain Pitseng	CAR	6372	1893	12/14/92
109	Likhakena Lec	CAR	2840	673	12/14/92
110	Mahobong CO-OP	CAR	4061	1114	12/14/92
123	Mokokoana	CAR	0	0	/ /
124	Peka/St Rosa	CAR	6027	1710	12/23/92
125	StMargaret/Qoaolosin	CAR	6147	1397	12/23/92
144	Maryland	CAR	3916	990	12/23/92
145	Hlotse Co-op	CAR	7524	1568	12/23/92
146	Mokati	CAR	3081	1114	12/23/92
** Subtotal **			51792	11653	
** DISTRICT OF Mafeteng					
9	Maoela	WV	1233	387	10/19/92
10	Lekhari	WV	1142	342	10/19/92
81	Samaria	CC	12707	2660	11/08/92
82	Maf-St Gerard	CC	11035	3010	11/08/92
83	Qalabane	CC	2401	591	11/08/92
84	Thabana Morena	CC	4338	1170	11/08/92
100	Kolo	CC	7108	1938	12/02/92
101	Makhakhe	CC	1210	344	12/02/92
102	Litsoeneng	CC	1034	282	12/02/92
104	Tsakholo	CC	376	121	12/02/92
147	Thara Tsoeu	CC	2886	719	12/23/92
148	Motsekuoa	CC	6869	1936	12/23/92
149	Sebelekoane	CC	1561	339	12/23/92
85	#Qaba	CC	9773	2336	12/15/92
103	#Khclokoe	CC	1597	305	12/15/92
163	#Ribaneng	CC	608	159	12/15/92
** Subtotal **			65878	16639	
** DISTRICT OF Maseru					
67	St Leo- Makhoathi	CAR	3088	707	12/06/92

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LCN COMPLETED REGISTRATION/NOT

*Indicates a new DP

RECORD #	DISTRIBUTION POINT	NGO	BENEFICARY (NUMBERS)	HOUSEHOLD (FAMILIES)	*1 wk turn around time given
68	Mazencd	CAR	10257	2444	12/13/92
69	Marakabei/StJohnBapt	CAR	3104	517	01/15/93
70	Likalaneg School	CAR	902	352	01/18/93
71	St Benedict-Khanetsi	CAR	3003	1100	11/23/92
72	Fatima-Ramabanta	CAR	3943	1165	12/13/92
73	St John Tlali	CAR	7645	2205	11/23/92
74	St Peter C-Tsceneng	CAR	5101	1051	12/18/92
75	Thaba-Bosiu LEC	CAR	5078	1779	11/30/92
76	Hlalele R.C.	CAR	2617	592	12/13/92
78	St Louis-Matsieng	CAR	7511	1739	11/30/92
79	St Joseph-Korokoro	CAR	9648	2355	12/06/92
80	Roma	CAR	11906	2673	12/18/92
97	StRotriguesShoaepan	CAR	5921	1180	11/30/92
98	StRotriguesMachakela	CAR	1464	241	11/30/92
99	StRctriguesMotangane	CAR	1692	342	11/30/92
120	Likatseng/St.Bernard	CAR	3365	791	12/18/92
121	StPeter Claver/Rothe	CAR	5956	1154	12/18/92
122	StPeterClav/Thupalik	CAR	8297	1739	12/18/92
133	Nazareth	CAR	17004	3096	12/23/92
134	Masupha(Naz. line)	CAR	2939	713	12/23/92
135	Massabielle Ha Tsiu	CAR	0	0	/ /
136	St Leonard Semonkong	CAR	11478	1594	01/15/93
137	St Michael's	CAR	7173	1701	01/15/93
151	Setibing StPhilomena	CAR	1977	350	12/23/92
172	Sengclinci Semonkong	CAR	3263	566	01/15/93
173	TsenekengSemonkons	CAR	1501	417	01/15/93
156	*Mantsebo	CAR	5496	1329	01/18/93
**	Subtotal **		151729	33892	
**	DISTRICT OF Mofales Hoek				
12	Tsolcane	WV	1174	303	10/19/92
13	Mpharane	WV	3479	895	10/26/92
14	Nehana	WV	1784	542	11/08/92
19	Panta	WV	2084	569	10/19/92
154	*Mofales Hoek	MHD	2438	579	12/16/92
165	*Setanteng	MHD	219	31	12/16/92
166	*Tsolcane	MHD	2058	266	12/16/92
167	*Liphireng	MHD	1162	209	12/15/92
168	*Siloe	MHD	879	194	12/16/92
169	*Khitsane	MHD	616	120	12/15/92
170	*Lithipeng	MHD	169	59	12/16/92
**	Subtotal **		16062	3767	
**	DISTRICT OF Mckhotlong				
1	St. James	LRC	2375	850	09/21/92

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LCN COMPLETED REGISTRATION/NOT

*Indicates a new DP

RECORD #	DISTRIBUTION POINT	NGO	BENEFICARY (NUMBERS)	HOUSEHOLD (FAMILIES)	*1 wk turn around time given
2	Malubalube	LRC	898	321	09/21/92
3	Malefiloane	LRC	2070	575	09/21/92
4	Makhoaba-St Martin	LRC	3208	651	10/26/92
5	Senkosae/Lechesa	LRC	1713	405	10/26/92
6	Phahameng	LRC	2368	630	10/26/92
21	Molikaliko-Mabuleng	LRC	1897	558	10/09/92
22	Moeketsane	LRC	1280	254	10/09/92
23	Khateii	LRC	1630	426	10/09/92
24	Mapholaneng	LRC	778	315	10/09/92
28	Tloha-re-Bue (MEI)	LRC	789	285	10/26/92
29	Mckhotlong	LRC	4329	1070	10/26/92
30	Linakaneng	LRC	2391	855	10/26/92
**	Subtotal **		25726	7295	
**	DISTRICT OF Qacha's Nek				
	160 #Rooijane	LRC	1130	305	01/18/93
**	Subtotal **		1130	305	
**	DISTRICT OF Qacha's Nek				
36	Sehlabathebe	LRC	1307	292	11/08/92
37	Ramatseliso	LRC	1702	430	11/08/92
38	Hill-Top	LRC	506	176	11/08/92
39	St Francis	LRC	1847	354	11/08/92
40	Aapulasi	LRC	2226	473	11/08/92
41	Qacha's Nek	LRC	3024	882	11/08/92
42	Hermitage	LRC	1283	334	11/08/92
43	Ha-Mpiti	LRC	1772	478	11/08/92
44	Ha-Mosi	LRC	616	229	11/08/92
45	White-Hill	LRC	1163	337	11/08/92
46	Ha-Sekake	LRC	1085	259	11/08/92
47	Qhcalinyane	LRC	791	253	11/08/92
157	*Mateanong	LRC	3750	970	01/18/93
159	*Mcshebi	LRC	286	108	01/18/93
**	Subtotal **		21358	5575	
**	DISTRICT OF Quthing				
86	Tsatsane	CC	1407	343	11/23/92
87	Mt. Moorosi	CC	2276	595	11/23/92
88	St. Gabriel's	CC	1442	391	11/23/92
89	Pekane	CC	1411	335	11/23/92
90	Dilli-Dilli	CC	1067	312	11/23/92
91	Tele	CC	2332	410	11/23/92
92	Sixondo	CC	970	199	11/23/92
111	Kubung	CC	742	215	12/14/92

LCN COMPLETED REGISTRATION/NOT

*Indicates a new DP

RECORD #	DISTRIBUTION POINT	NGO	BENEFICARY (NUMBERS)	HOUSEHOLD (FAMILIES)	*1 wk turn around time given
112	Mphaki	CC	5930	1503	12/14/92
113	Qhoali	CC	911	258	12/14/92
114	Seforong	CC	496	133	12/14/92
115	Peete	CC	1902	383	12/14/92
116	Makcae	CC	5691	1307	12/14/92
117	Tosing	CC	1173	250	12/14/92
118	Qomo-Qomong	CC	360	99	12/14/92
119	Moyeni	CC	1972	405	12/14/92
**	Subtotal **		30082	7138	
**	DISTRICT OF Thaba Tseka				
7	Bobete	LRC	2502	709	10/19/92
8	Semenanyane	LRC	3352	978	10/19/92
15	St. Theresa	LRC	1791	566	10/19/92
16	SeHonghong	LRC	816	263	10/19/92
17	Linakeng	LRC	903	243	10/26/92
18	Linakaneng	LRC	1599	463	10/26/92
20	Auray	LRC	452	186	10/19/92
25	Matebeng	LRC	816	263	10/19/92
26	Lephci	LRC	1732	500	10/19/92
27	Mountmatre	LRC	2491	717	10/19/92
31	Lipohong	LRC	716	234	11/06/92
32	Khohlontso	LRC	1768	584	11/06/92
33	Semena	LRC	634	176	11/06/92
34	Lekholecane	LRC	951	309	11/06/92
35	Bereng	LRC	1806	550	11/06/92
161	#Bokong	LRC	1595	520	11/29/92
162	#Mohlapaneng	LRC	951	309	10/20/92
**	Subtotal **		24875	7570	
***	Total ***		496419	123433	

C.2
 LCN REGISTRATION II - PHASE I
 FEBRUARY - APRIL 1993

ID #	DISTRIBUTION POINT	NGO	BENEFICIARY	QUOTA
** DISTRICT Of Berea				
43	Sebetia	LCN	3389	3289
126	Mohlatsa	LCN	215	0
222	Mokhathi	LCN	908	0
224	Koma-Koma	LCN	493	0
128	Moletsane	LCN	4307	4307
50	Masoelinq Coop	LCN	701	788
106	Ha Koali	LCN	3596	3297
127	Gethsemany	LCN	620	946
129	Pulane/Ha Patrick	LCN	174	569
130	Moshati/Pitsaneng	LCN	707	375
65	Bethany/Matholoana	LCN	3006	2807
66	Lekokoang	LCN	1315	1015
223	Sekamaneng	LCN	809	0
62	St Cecilia	LCN	3389	3320
131	St Magdalena/Tseetsa	LCN	1278	978
132	Mamathe	LCN	2398	2605
242	TY (TY Lecoop)	LCN	1028	893
225	Mapoteng	LCN	328	0
227	Kolojane	LCN	485	0
64	Makube	LCN	2906	1258
126	Bela-Bela	LCN	1770	1470
** Subtotal **			33842	27917
** DISTRICT Of Butha Buthe				
155	Linkung	LCN	548	312
140	St. Peters	LCN	2342	287
150	Linakeng	LCN	1754	1063
138	Matsoaing	LCN	906	0
53	Seboche/St Charles	LCN	831	452
181	Motete	LCN	683	497
96	Sekubu	LCN	1309	1165
142	Tsime	LCN	1490	1775
54	Qalo	LCN	2458	1643
154	Mantlobo	LCN	2414	936
51	Thakabanna	LCN	1245	859
141	Khukhune	LCN	1363	1117
212	Oholagho	LCN	1415	781
55	St Paul	LCN	1865	3800
49	Mafikalisiu	LCN	2175	665
182	Lesacana	LCN	500	454
7	Sheshila	LCN	202	100
52	Sheeshe/St Thomas	LCN	1904	302
250	**Rampai	LCN	3089	0
251	**Morifi	LCN	4926	0
** Subtotal **			33419	16208

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LCN COMPLETED REGISTRATION
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ID #	DISTRIBUTION POINT	NGO	BENEFICIARY	QUOTA
** DISTRICT Of Leribe				
171	Matukeng	LCN	1029	1071
214	Khabo	LCN	2459	0
215	St. Luke	LCN	585	585
146	Mokatj	LCN	3926	1722
110	Mahobong Coop	LCN	3370	2270
94	Ha Seshote-Leqetto	LCN	2800	3919
124	Peka/St Rose	LCN	4600	3369
180	Lipetu Moreneng	LCN	525	796
145	Hlotse Coop	LCN	3707	1722
144	Maryland	LCN	1398	2183
214	Hloeheng	LCN	3635	0
58	Ltl Flower/Kolonyama	LCN	2300	1597
60	Mamohau	LCN	1900	1600
59	St. Monica	LCN	3538	5624
213	Lejone	LCN	1600	1500
125	St Margaret	LCN	2413	3436
109	Likhakeng	LCN	1000	1587
179	Ha Mositi	LCN	1426	3552
108	Pitseng Coop	LCN	880	3561
176	Ha Phooka/Tlakuli	LCN	2614	4447
248	Matlameng	LCN	1500	0
247	Qoqolosing	LCN	2413	2952
246	Mahlabatheng	LCN	771	0
** Subtotal **			50389	47493
** DISTRICT Of Mafeteng				
82	St Gerard	CCL	5086	7283
85	Qaba	CCL	5050	6450
101	Makrakhe	CCL	710	798
104	Tsakholo	CCL	1248	218
102	Litsoeneng	CCL	1161	622
48	Matelile/Seeiso	CCL	2300	0
103	Kholokoe	CCL	1028	1054
149	Sebelekoane	CCL	1530	1030
100	Kolo	CCL	3691	4691
63	Ribaneng	CCL	2701	401
148	Motsekuoa	CCL	4334	4533
147	Thaba Tsoe	CCL	2105	1904
81	Samaria	CCL	8086	8386
83	Qalabane	CCL	1084	1584
84	Thabana Morena	CCL	3336	2863
229	Maola	WV	1225	890
228	Lekhari	WV	1017	753
** Subtotal **			45792	43550
** DISTRICT Of Maseru				
137	St. Michael	LCN	4262	2367

LCN COMPLETED REGISTRATION

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ID #	DISTRIBUTION POINT	NGO	BENEFICIARY	QUOTA
79	Qhomane	LCN	4998	4997
70	Likalaneng	LCN	309	297
230	Matsieng	LCN	4130	0
220	Thupalikaka	LCN	3421	0
233	Khanyetsi	LCN	2937	2937
133	Nazareth	LCN	5824	5611
121	St. Peter/Claver	LCN	1683	1683
151	Setibing/St. Philome	LCN	2482	652
134	Ha Masupha	LCN	970	969
68	Mazenod	LCN	4435	3384
219	Rothe	LCN	4429	4429
232	St. John Tlali	LCN	5308	2722
234	Likatseng	LCN	1959	1110
235	Ts'enekeng	LCN	495	495
236	Sengclinic	LCN	624	1176
237	St. Leonard	LCN	998	3787
238	Likotsi	LCN	694	694
218	Makhoathi/St Leo	LCN	1055	0
239	Thaba Putsoa	LCN	210	0
80	Roma	LCN	4440	3929
69	Marakabei	LCN	2433	1024
231	Fatima	LCN	5336	1464
76	Ha Hlalele	LCN	1373	864
75	Thaba Bosiu	LCN	2071	2694
**	Subtotal **		66876	47285
** DISTRICT Of Mhales Hoek				
185	Poga	WV	2223	591
210	Monyake	WV	1330	1317
184	**Mekaling	WV	1222	0
178	Tsoloane	WV	626	604
174	Ha Mane	WV	2415	2350
95	Sefateng	WV	814	1098
170	Lithibeng	WV	697	655
169	Khitsane	WV	1125	554
168	Siloe	WV	938	979
207	Mohalinyane/Lefikeng	WV	1218	1212
19	Panta	WV	1827	1827
13	Mpharane	WV	3484	4444
61	Sephapho/Mokoroane	WV	2287	2047
167	Liphiring	WV	1554	1638
187	Magoala	WV	1302	1219
191	Likueneng	WV	1120	1863
192	Mahali hali	WV	1594	603
97	Thaba Isoeu	WV	1439	1566
189	Phuleng	WV	1276	230
211	Holy Cross	WV	1301	0
210	Sekoati	WV	1095	878
190	Reserve	WV	2413	1932

LCN COMPLETED REGISTRATION
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ID #	DISTRIBUTION POINT	NGO	BENEFICIARY	QUOTA
32	Phamong	WV	1468	604
27	Tlhabeli	WV	1137	563
188	Ntjebeleng	WV	1285	1219
14	Nonana/Ketane	WV	1696	1647
208	Moletsane	WV	1416	0
**	Subtotal **		40312	31640
** DISTRICT Of Mokhotlong				
24	Mapholaneng	LRC	1536	754
23	Khatheli	LRC	890	1581
6	Phahameng	LRC	2081	2296
22	Moeketsane	LRC	868	1241
21	Molika Liko	LRC	1402	1840
4	St Martin	LRC	1454	3111
5	Lechesa	LRC	1161	1661
240	Linakeng II	LRC	1768	1768
28	Tloha-Re-Bue	LRC	349	765
2	Mahuba-Lube	LRC	1698	1575
1	St. James	LRC	2529	4403
3	Malefiloane	LRC	2550	4106
**	Subtotal **		18286	25101
** DISTRICT Of Qachas Nek				
241	Qacha's Nek	LRC	840	2233
37	Ramatseleiso	LRC	1028	1565
39	St Francis	LRC	812	1699
40	Aupulasi	LRC	1505	2047
38	Hill Top	LRC	761	465
42	Hermitage	LRC	386	1180
159	Mosnebi	LRC	297	263
44	Ha Noosi	LRC	771	753
45	White Hill	LRC	1359	1069
46	Sekake	LRC	3793	998
47	Choalinyane	LRC	1125	1125
57	Mateanong	LRC	3199	3450
160	Rooijane	LRC	1039	1039
36	Sehlapathebe	LRC	894	1202
43	Ha Mpiti	LRC	2066	1630
**	Subtotal **		19875	20718
** DISTRICT Of Outhing				
92	Sixondo	CCL	843	850
119	Moyeni	CCL	2892	1735
116	Makoae	CCL	5060	5008
86	Tsatsane	CCL	1224	1238
90	Dilli Dilli	CCL	1450	938
91	Tele	CCL	2216	2052

LCN COMPLETED REGISTRATION
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ID #	DISTRIBUTION POINT	NGO	BENEFICIARY	QUOTA
114	Seforong	CCL	1131	436
89	Pokane	CCL	1227	1241
115	Feete	CCL	1654	1673
117	Tosing	CCL	1020	1032
112	Mpnaki	CCL	2216	5218
113	Ohoaii	CCL	793	801
118	Oomo-Oomong	CCL	313	316
88	St Gabriels	CCL	1789	1268
87	Mt. Moorosi	CCL	1980	2002
111	Kubung	CCL	645	652
**	Subtotal **		26453	26460
** DISTRICT Of Thaba Tseka				
162	Mohlanapeng	LRC	679	893
29	Methalaneng	LRC	971	970
26	Lephoi	LRC	3599	3987
34	Lekholoane	LRC	1069	893
33	Semena	LRC	987	595
161	Bokong	LRC	1080	1499
35	Bereng	LRC	2250	2250
20	Auray	LRC	3750	424
31	Lipohong	LRC	819	948
17	Linakeng	LRC	833	848
15	St. Teresa	LRC	1160	1683
16	Sehong hong	LRC	925	767
25	Matebeng	LRC	1416	767
7	Bobete	LCR	2000	2351
8	Semenanyane	LCR	1826	3250
30	Linakaneng	LCR	1512	1503
249	**Khomolileng	LRC	2250	0
**	Subtotal **		27126	23623
***	Total ***		362370	310000

C.3
 LCN REGISTRATION III - PHASE 2
 NOVEMBER 1993

DISTRIBUTION POINT NGO BENEFICIARY

** DISTRICT of Mafeteng		
St Gerard	CCL	1589
Qaba	CCL	5183
Makhakhe	CCL	794
Tsakholo	CCL	913
Litsoeneng	CCL	653
Matelile/Seeiso	CCL	1510
Kholokoe	CCL	1180
Sebelekoane	CCL	996
Kolo	CCL	2122
Ribaneng	CCL	1721
Motsekuoa	CCL	2813
Thaba Tsoue	CCL	1769
Samaria	CCL	3288
Qalabane	CCL	295
Thabana Morena	CCL	2018
Maoela	WV	832
Lekhari	WV	840
**Sekameng	CCL	1522
**Ralintsi	CCL	559
**Tebang	CCL	1812
**Bolikela	CCL	286
**Likhoele	CCL	789
**Thabaneng	CCL	1700
**Masemouse	CCL	1000
**Malumeng	CCL	
**Malealea	CCL	
**Ramatseliso	CCL	1000
**Mapotu	CCL	1990
** Subtotal **		43205

** DISTRICT of Mochales Hoek		
Poga	WV	1799
Monyake	WV	1598
**Mekaling	WV	1222
Tsolcane	WV	672
Ha Mane	WV	2308
Sefateng	WV	703
Lithipeng	WV	1037
Khitsane	WV	1156
Siloe	WV	1078
Mohalinyane/Lefikeng	WV	1106
Panta	WV	1195
Mpharane	WV	3345
Sephapho/Mokoroane	WV	1999
Liphiring	WV	1262
Maqala	WV	1232
Likueneng	WV	1082
Mahali hali	WV	1590

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LCN COMPLETED REGISTRATION PHASE II
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DISTRIBUTION POINT	NGO	BENEFICIARY
Thaba Tsoeu	WV	1813
Phuleng	WV	1281
Holy Cross	WV	1306
Sekoati	WV	2792
Reserve	WV	882
Phamong	WV	1993
Tihabeli	WV	1894
Ntjepeleng	WV	1782
Nohana/Ketane	WV	1701
Moletsane	WV	1270
**Tlokotsing	LCN	496
Shalane	WV	562
** Subtotal **		42156
** DISTRICT of Mokhotlong		
Mapholaneng	LRC	1675
Khatheli	LRC	901
Phahameng	LRC	2046
Moeketsane	LRC	970
Molika Liko	LRC	890
St Martin	LRC	1355
Lechesa	LRC	1371
Linakeng II	LRC	1682
Tloha-Re-Bue	LRC	419
Mahuba-Lube	LRC	1254
St. James	LRC	3035
Malefiloane	LRC	2761
Linakeng I	LRC	1314
Semenanyane	LRC	1988
Bobete	LRC	1857
** Subtotal **		23518
** DISTRICT of Qachas Nek		
Qacha's Nek	LRC	840
Ramatseliso	LRC	1048
St Francis	LRC	980
Apulasi	LRC	1652
Hill Top	LRC	761
Hermitage	LRC	1101
Moshebi	LRC	297
Ha Noosi	LRC	771
White Hill	LRC	1359
Sekake	LRC	4156
Qhoalinyane	LRC	1125
Mateanong	LRC	3122
Rooijane	LRC	1039
Sehlabathebe	LRC	894
Ha Mpiti	LRC	2066

LCN COMPLETED REGISTRATION PHASE II
 =====

DISTRIBUTION POINT NGO BENEFICIARY

** Subtotal **		21211
** DISTRICT of Quthing		
Sixondo	CCL	1051
Moyeni	CCL	1867
Makoa	CCL	1921
Tsatsane	CCL	1843
Dilli Dilli	CCL	471
Tele	CCL	1661
Seforong	CCL	137
Pokane	CCL	680
Peete	CCL	814
Tosing	CCL	590
Mphaki	CCL	3068
Qhoali	CCL	404
Qomo-Qomong	CCL	967
St Gabriels	CCL	647
Mt. Moorosi	CCL	980
Kubung	CCL	364
** Subtotal **		17465
*** Total ***		147555