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**Final Report**

**EVALUATION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS  
PROJECT (511-0610)**

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**Submitted to:**

**USAID/Bolivia  
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## **I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

In August 1988 USAID/Bolivia undertook the Democratic Institutions Project (511-0610) ("Project") to strengthen the operation of the electoral system and the work of the legislative branch. The original activities were to provide a bridge to a more comprehensive and multi-year program which was to be prepared in 1989 and was to include work with the judicial branch. It later was decided not to go forward with those plans. Instead, the original project justification and the original Grant Agreement were amended several times to extend the life and augment the support for the work with the electoral system and the legislative branch. As a result, the Project's work with the electoral system continued until February 1994 and that with the legislative branch will continue until the end of 1995. At the time of the evaluation (August 1994) \$3 million had been obligated under the Project and it was planned to obligate an additional \$400,000 to cover activities planned for the balance of the life of the Project. These dollar funds were complemented by the equivalent of \$3.664 million in Bolivian funds ("counterpart") which were generated by the A.I.D. balance of payments program.

Although part of the same Project and under the direction of the same office of the A.I.D. Mission, work with the electoral system and with the legislature was carried out independently. The main implementation agency for work with the electoral system was the Center for Electoral Assistance and Promotion ("CAPEL") of the Interamerican Institute of Human Rights while the main implementation agency for work with the legislature has been the Office of International Programs of the State University of New York ("SUNY"). In both activities the Mission concluded that it was politically wise for it to conduct its relationship to the work in a low-key and largely indirect manner.

### **Electoral System**

The objectives of the work with the electoral system were to increase the numbers of citizens registered and voting, to improve vote counting procedures, to improve voter understanding and participation in the electoral process and to strengthen the operations of the National Electoral Court (the "NEC") and the Departmental Electoral Courts (the "DECs") which are in charge of the conduct of the electoral system. The focus of the work was on preparing for and conducting the elections of municipal authorities in December 1991 and 1993 and the election of national authorities in June 1993.

The main modalities of assistance were to provide technical assistance to the NEC and the DECs from CAPEL and to provide counterpart to pay a share of the operating costs of the NEC, to purchase computer equipment for the creation of a national, automated voter registry system and to pay the costs of several media campaigns. The technical assistance was provided pursuant to Cooperative Agreements entered between CAPEL and A.I.D. The counterpart assistance was provided through agreements (called "CIFs") between the NEC and the Division of External Financing and Monetization ("DIFEM") of the Ministry of Economic Development. \$1.417 million was provided to CAPEL and \$2.850 million in counterpart was provided to the NEC.

The objectives and the expected outputs were largely achieved. The three elections were held and considered fair. As a result, the voting system is considered one of the strengths of Bolivian democracy. The number of persons registered rose by some 700,000 between 1991 and 1993 to reach a total of 2.4 million. The incidence of mistakes in the operation of the voting tables and of nullified votes declined substantially. The training program well exceeded the targets set and reached nearly 80% of the persons who staffed the voting tables in the June 1993 election. The use of indefinite registration was introduced to simplify the process. Training materials and instructional manuals were prepared which can provide the basis for work in the future. The principal shortfall was the failure to conduct all the civic education campaigns which were planned.

The accomplishment of the work encountered several problems. Delays in the availability of counterpart contributed to the shortfalls in the media campaigns. Lateness on the part of the NEC in undertaking planning for the elections and rather weak monitoring of the plans once adopted contributed to the administrative problems which arose in the course of the elections. The short period (45 days) between the closing of registration and the holding of elections made it difficult for the NEC to prepare a national voter registration list which it was willing to publish and the failure to publish that list prevented the political parties, civic groups and the general public from assisting in purging the list of incorrect or fraudulent registrations. Technical problems arose concerning the sizing of the capacity of the computers and the compatibility of the equipment provided to the NEC and the DEC's. A dispute arose as to the most appropriate software to use for the various functions to be performed. While none of these problems prevented the accomplishment of the basic objectives, they might have been more effectively addressed if the Mission had been more actively involved with the NEC.

Although overall the work with the electoral system should be considered to have been successful, there are serious issues which face the institutionalization of the improvements achieved and the capacity of the electoral system to meet its responsibilities in the future. Those responsibilities will increase as the system is expected to register and motivate the recently enfranchised population between the ages of 18 and 21 and the million persons of voting age in rural and poor urban areas who are not yet documented and registered and as the system addresses the responsibilities given to it for the operation of the Civil Registry and the delimitation of the new single member Congressional districts and the adjustment of the voter lists to them.

Among the more important of the issues facing the electoral system are the following: (i) The capacity of the computer equipment of the system will need to be increased. (ii) The issue of the appropriate software for the various functions will have to be resolved. (iii) Financing to substitute for counterpart will have to be found to prepare for and conduct the 1995 election. (iv) The permanent staff of the NEC and the DEC's will need to be expanded, trained and given compensation and career status necessary for its motivation. (v) The NEC will need to adopt more professional management to strengthen its operation. It is likely that the NEC will need external assistance in meeting these issues. It is open to such assistance. Given the importance of the electoral system to the continuing effort to consolidate Bolivian democracy and of the NEC

to the accomplishment of the purposes of the new A.I.D. Democratic Development and Citizen Participation Project, it would seem advisable for A.I.D. to consider re-establishing a program of cooperation with the electoral system.

### **Legislative Process**

The objective of the work with the legislature is to improve the support services available to and used by the members. The focus is on the analysis of budget and fiscal issues, the provision of information on existing laws and other topics and assistance in drafting bills. The Project is to assist in the establishment and consolidation of three non-partisan, professionally staffed offices to provide those support services to both houses of the legislature. The scope of the Project is now being expanded to include the establishment of a fourth office to provide training and information concerning constituent outreach.

The main modalities for accomplishing the objective are providing technical assistance through a Cooperative Agreement with SUNY and counterpart support to the work of the support services offices and of SUNY's activities and to limited amounts of local training. To date \$622,736 has been provided to the SUNY Cooperative Agreement (with an additional \$400,000 to be added in the near future) and \$760,000 has been provided in counterpart funds under CIFs between DIFEM and SUNY and the coordinating unit of the support offices.

Work with the legislature did not get underway effectively until after the Cooperative Agreement with SUNY was entered in September 1992. SUNY's in-country Director came on board in January 1993 and its permanent in-country office was opened in April 1993. During the period from October 1992 to the end of 1993 a series of visits were made to Bolivia by advisory teams from SUNY who analyzed the situation facing the accomplishment of the Project's objective and made suggestions for activities to meet it. The analyses and suggestions were the subject of workshops held in Bolivia. In addition, key Bolivians from the legislature and the staff of the support services offices made observation trips to the U.S.

The budget analysis office was re-organized in May 1993, but its permanent director was not appointed until December when the Director and staff of the coordinating unit for the work also were appointed. The staffs for the bill drafting and information management offices were not appointed until April and May of 1994 and those offices are still in the process of obtaining the necessary equipment and of establishing working relationships with sources of information and assistance. As of the time of the evaluation the budget analysis office had been producing work-products which the leadership of the legislature found useful. The other offices had not yet produced any work-product. The fourth office, of constituent outreach services, is still in the conceptualization stage.

While the objective of the work with the legislature has not yet been achieved, progress has been made. SUNY has established a good working relationship with the Vice President of the executive branch who also is the President of the Congress and who oversees the operation of the coordinating unit of the support services offices. The work-product of the budget analysis office

has been well received. Assistance from the U.S. Government has proven to be acceptable to the Congress. Apart from the delays in getting underway, the main shortfalls in expected performance to date have been the lack of detailed planning for establishing and strengthening the performance of the service support offices, the delays and shortfalls in counterpart funding for the equipping and operation of the offices, and the lack of response to requests from the service support offices for on-site technical assistance from advisors able to remain in place for several months.

There are several significant issues facing the conduct of the work and the prospects for achieving institutionalization of the service support offices.

(1) There is a dispute between the Office of the Vice President and the leadership of the lower house as to whether the budget analysis office should remain in the building of the Congress (thereby being more accessible to the key budget committee) or be moved to the building of the Office of the Vice President where the other service support offices and their coordination unit are located. The dispute is both practical and symbolic of who will have most influence over the way in which the services are provided.

(2) At present the Congress pays approximately one fifth of the cost of running the service support offices with the balance being supplied by counterpart. It is likely that the availability of counterpart will be less in the future. This financial problem is causing concern among the staff of the service support offices. The problem is likely to get worse since the service support offices are not likely to be able to meet the demand for their services (if they are successful in their work) without having additional staff and additional financial resources.

(3) The role of the coordinating unit is not yet effective and the need for coordination is likely to grow as the service support offices become more active, their financial needs increase, their overlapping responsibilities become matters of practical rather than theoretical discussion and ways need to be found to make the services available to ordinary members as well as to the leadership of the Congress.

(4) SUNY has played a very prominent and active role in the design and implementation of the activities to date. This is a result of the relatively recent establishment of the service support offices, the still weak management of the coordinating unit, the support which SUNY receives from the Vice President and the decision of the A.I.D. Mission to maintain a low profile. While this role has not caused significant problems to date it has the potential for doing so, and should be reconsidered. The A.I.D. Mission may well be advised to raise its own profile.

(5) SUNY has provided assistance to both the Office of the Vice President and to the A.I.D. Mission on a variety of matters and is considered by both entities to be cooperative and effective. However, the task of getting the four service support offices and their coordinating unit effectively in operation and institutionalized by the end of 1995 is a considerable one. SUNY will need to devote all its energy and all the funds now planned

to be available under the Cooperative Agreement to that task. It will need to be strict in its focus.

Under the new A.I.D. Democratic Development and Citizen Participation Project support is planned for the work of the service support office dealing with training and constituent outreach services and the budget analysis office in reviewing municipal budgets. However, given the uncertainties facing the accomplishment of the objective of the current Project by the end of 1995 it would seem advisable that the new project include the possibility of continued work with all the service support units.

## **II. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

Under the Democratic Institutions Project (511-0610) A.I.D. has been supporting activities to strengthen the electoral and legislative processes since 1988. Amendment No. 1 to the Project Paper calls for an evaluation to be conducted three months before the PACD. While work on the elections systems component was completed in February 1994, the current PACD for the legislative process component is December 31, 1994 and authorization has been given to extend that PACD to December 31, 1995. No previous evaluation has been conducted of the Project.

This evaluation is conducted pursuant to Delivery Order No. 12 (of Requirements Contract AEP-0085-I-00-3003-00) of August 15, 1994. As set forth in the Delivery Order the objectives of the evaluation are:

- To assess the extent to which the Project is meeting its goal and purpose;
- To assess the extent to which the Project is meeting AID/W's program objectives and USAID/Bolivia Mission strategic objectives;
- To recommend strategies for improving project implementation in any follow-on projects through an analysis of obstacles to the implementation of the Project as well as achievements in project management and administration.

The Delivery Order calls on the contractor to focus on six principal areas:

- Goal and Purpose;
- Program objectives and mission strategic objectives;
- Implementation effectiveness;
- Project impact;

- Project innovations and organizing principles; and
- Project monitoring and evaluation.

The Delivery Order also calls on the contractor to answer specific questions. These questions are set-forth in Annex D together with responses to them or indications of where in the text of this Evaluation Report they are addressed.

### **III. METHODOLOGY OF THE EVALUATION**

The methodology used in the evaluation was the traditional one of the review of project related documents from the files of the USAID Mission and the conducting of interviews of persons involved in and knowledgeable about the design and implementation of the Project as well as about the nature and performance of the implementing agencies and the cooperating Bolivian organizations. Judgment about the quality of the work which has been conducted and about the prospects of the cooperating Bolivian organizations was more important than statistical or other quantified analysis. This required that the persons to work on the evaluation team have substantial experience in the topics to be addressed.

The Team Leader had a long career in A.I.D., including being Mission Director in Bolivia, and has had nine years' experience in consulting work including the conduct of evaluations. One of the members of the sub-team for legislative process was a political scientist from Florida International University who has been studying the operation of the Bolivian Congress for several years. The other sub-team member was a lawyer with many years of experience in the legislature of the State of Utah. The two members of the sub-team concerned with the electoral process were experienced data-processing professionals who have planned and evaluated many data management systems. One is an employee of a private consulting firm and the other an employee of A.I.D.'s Office of IRM.

The Delivery Order called on the contractor to supply 44 workdays of a team leader and two other evaluation specialists. From other sources of funding the Mission supplied 22 workdays of two additional evaluation specialists. The five person team spent the period of August 18 through August 26, 1994 in La Paz. The Team Leader remained in Bolivia for the additional period of August 27 through September 2.

Given the nature of the Project, the team was divided into two sub-teams one of which addressed the activities in support of the electoral system and one the activities in support of the legislative process. Each sub-team prepared its own report which is included as an Annex to this Evaluation Report. The Team Leader attended many of the interviews and reviewed the documentation pertaining to both of the Project components.

During their preparations for coming to Bolivia and during their stay in Bolivia the team members reviewed the documents listed and interviewed the persons listed in the Attachments to Annexes E and F. A verbal presentation of the findings of the two sub-teams was given to the Mission on August 26th and a verbal presentation of the overall findings of the evaluation team was given to the Mission by the Team Leader on September 2nd. A draft report was submitted to the Mission on September 20th. Comments from the Mission at the two verbal presentations and in communications later received from the Mission were taken into account in the preparation of the final Evaluation Report which was submitted to the Mission on December 9th.

In addition to the shortness of the time available for the conduct of the evaluation, two circumstances limited to some extent the ability of the evaluation team to meet its responsibilities. One was that the Bolivian Congress was not in session during the time the team was in La Paz and thus it was not possible to have interviews with all the members of the Congress who might have had useful comments. (This circumstance resulted from the facts that the recess of Congress had been announced fairly recently and was not on the regular pattern and that the Mission was eager to have the evaluation conducted in time to be of use to it in planning a new project which is to be authorized by September 30.) The other was that the work on the electoral system under the Project had been concluded in February 1994 and representatives of the key implementation agency were not available in La Paz to be interviewed.

#### **IV. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED**

The findings, recommendations and lessons learned which are set forth in the following subparts are based on the observations and background material which are described in Annexes A, B and C and on the reports of the sub-teams contained in Annexes E and F.

##### **A. Performance of the Implementing Agents**

The actions of the implementing agents are described in Annexes A, B and C. Their role in the major achievements and in the major problems to date is discussed in subparts C and D below. This subpart of the Report describes the approach and style of the two implementing agents and the way that they are viewed by A.I.D. and the cooperating Bolivian organizations.

##### **1. Electoral System--CAPEL**

CAPEL's mode of operating was to send external experts to Bolivia for varying periods of time (usually for up to one or two weeks at a time) to analyze and discuss the situation facing the electoral system and the operation of the NEC and the DEC's. These experts sometimes came alone but usually were part of a multi-person team. The experts were invariably Spanish speaking. The expert teams would then produce trip reports which would include the results of their analyses and observations. These reports would be provided to the NEC and to the A.I.D. Mission.

During the periods of intense work in the months prior to the holding of elections CAPEL arranged to have a representative present in Bolivia for much of the time. However, it never assigned a representative to reside in Bolivia as the A.I.D. Mission had requested and as had been agreed to in principle.

CAPEL put great emphasis on its having an advisory rather than an implementing role. In part for that reason, it would not enter a CIF agreement for counterpart support for the sub-project nor be responsible for obtaining other funds for the use of the NEC and the DEC's. That full responsibility remained with the NEC. When local funding was not sufficient to meet the needs of an activity under preparation CAPEL would decide not to proceed. Furthermore, while CAPEL gave its advice to the NEC and criticized shortcomings in NEC's performance, CAPEL did not attempt to bring any pressure on the NEC to adopt policies or procedures which were being recommended. This stance contributed to the good relations which usually prevailed between CAPEL and the NEC but it also placed a heavy burden on the A.I.D. Mission to see that the necessary implementation steps were taken. (See further comment on this in subpart B below.)

CAPEL also was very conscious of its status as an international organization with a specific mission. It did not see itself as an organization which would follow close direction from A.I.D. or be a channel for the expression of the concerns of A.I.D. Whether or not this attitude was good for CAPEL's relationship with the NEC, it did lead to a feeling on the part of the A.I.D. Mission that CAPEL was not fully cooperative with it.

On balance it appears that CAPEL did a good job. It is well thought of by the NEC and its role in meeting the problems which arose in the conduct of the elections is generally recognized. Although the leaders of the NEC assert that the role of CAPEL became less crucial with each election (as the NEC gained experience) those leaders also say that they would welcome continued assistance from CAPEL and think that it would be very useful to have it.

## 2. Legislative Process--SUNY

SUNY's modality of operation was quite distinct from that of CAPEL. While it sent teams of experts to Bolivia to analyze topics and make recommendations for activities, it also established an in-country office to be the main channel of communication with both the Congress and the A.I.D. Mission. While its status as an academic institution gave it certain independence (and a favorable reception with the Bolivians) it accepted the role of an executing agent of an A.I.D. project and gave its full cooperation to A.I.D. on topics of importance to it. For instance, SUNY signed CIFs to obtain support for its operations and accepted the responsibility for seeking additional funding for the program. SUNY also accepted responsibility for seeing that the Congress took actions which were important to the achievement of the objectives of the sub-project. Indeed, for a short period its in-country Director was the acting head of the only functioning support unit.

In addition to the reports of its visiting teams and the analytical documents which were produced, SUNY gives A.I.D. periodic reports of its activities. (These were to be submitted quarterly but appear to have become semi-annual.)

This modality of operation does not appear to have caused SUNY difficulties with the leadership of the Congress. (Although the evaluators do have concern that the high profile style of SUNY could cause difficulties in the future. See subpart D below.) Indeed, the work of SUNY is highly praised by the Vice President and by most of the observers to whom the evaluation team spoke. Certainly the attitude shown by SUNY has made it a valued asset from the point of view of the A.I.D. Mission.

The work-product of SUNY is not yet as extensive as was that of CAPEL nor has it had as much impact. However, this is most likely due to the fact that SUNY has not been active in Bolivia as long as CAPEL and that the situation facing SUNY, and consequently the program to be designed and supported, was not as defined as was that facing CAPEL.

## **B. Project Monitoring**

The same national professional employee of the Mission has been associated with the design and implementation of the Project since its beginning. That employee is extremely knowledgeable about the Bolivian political situation having himself been a member of the Congress. During the course of the design and implementation of the Project he has been under the overall supervision of several US direct hire and contract employees. The most recent of these supervisors is a U.S. employee with nearly 10 years of experience with A.I.D. working on the strengthening of democratic institutions. This U.S. employee has been in-country for somewhat over a year. The experience of these two Mission employees compliment each other and together they present a very competent resource for monitoring the Project.

The experience of the Mission in the period 1988 to 1991 convinced it that it would be wise to redesign the Project in several ways one of the most important of which was to use an institutional contractor to assist in the implementation of each of the sub-projects. For the Elections System sub-project CAPEL was chosen and for the Legislative Process sub-project SUNY was chosen. It also was decided that it would be wise to keep the profile of the Mission low and especially so in the case of the work with the Congress. Thus the plan was to rely heavily on the two implementation organizations to overcome difficulties and take such actions with the cooperating Bolivian entities as became necessary. This did not mean that the Mission would not have contact with the Bolivian entities involved or that it would not follow developments, but it did mean that it usually would do so indirectly and always in a low key.

Another important factor influencing the Mission's approach to monitoring is the shortage of time on the part of the Mission staff. In the early stage of the Project the national employee also had responsibility for activities concerning the administration of justice and they were given priority by the Mission over the activities involving the Congress and the electoral system. Over time the Mission assigned more personnel and contractor resources to working on the administration of

justice thus permitting the national employee to devote more attention to the activities forming this Project. However, the supervising US employee continues to be responsible for administration of justice activities and since they have been so difficult to nurture he has had only limited time to put into this Project and much of that was devoted to relationships with the home offices of the implementing organizations. This has left a large burden on the national employee making him more dependent on the implementing organizations than might otherwise be the case.

One of the results of these factors was that the Mission did not require reports from or hold periodic reviews with the representatives of the Congress or of the NEC. In the case of the Congress it relied on periodic reporting from SUNY and in the case of the NEC it relied on verbal briefings from visiting CAPEL teams and the review of the written reports produced by those teams. The Mission representatives did meet with representatives of Congress and of the NEC to discuss particular matters and the national employee was able to keep abreast of most developments through his wide range of personal contacts. However, there was no system for follow-up meetings with the Bolivian entities.

Within the Mission staff there has not always been agreement on the approach to take to addressing issues arising under the Project. This does not reflect any basic disagreement on the purposes or strategy of the Project but rather work-styles and personalities. It may have led to less than full communication among the parties and thus may have resulted in decisions which were not based on a full understanding of the situation. With a bit more care these problems can be avoided.

Overall, the Mission is doing a conscientious job of monitoring. However, for the reasons discussed in subpart D below, the Mission may be advised to reconsider its current approach to relationships with Congress. Should it decide to provide assistance to the electoral system in the future the Mission probably should seek a more involved relationship than it had in the past.

### **C. Major Achievements to Date**

The following is a short description of the major achievements of the Project to date. While most of these achievements are also the result of factors other than the work of the Project they are included since in all cases the Project made a contribution to their realization. A fuller description and discussion is provided in Annexes E and F.

#### **1. Electoral System**

Results of the elections of December 1991, June 1993 and December 1993. The main accomplishment of the sub-project is that the elections were held and the results were accepted by the general population as well as by the political class. While there were many complaints about the administrative problems which arose during the course of the elections these complaints did not undermine the validity of the process. Since the Project provided significant support in the planning and conduct of the elections the results should be considered an accomplishment of the Project.

Increase in the number of registered voters. One of the main objectives of the sub-project was to increase the number of citizens registered to vote. This occurred. In the last weeks of registration for the 1991 municipal elections the number of persons registered increased by nearly 600,000. By mid-1993 the number increased by 725,000 for a total of 2.4 million. Some assert that that number is not realistic since it does not take into account the names which are duplicates or are of persons no longer entitled to be registered. Others point out that there are still nearly a million persons who have not been registered (mainly in rural and poor urban areas). Nevertheless, the increase in the number of registered voters clearly has been substantial. Indeed, it exceeded the expectations of the persons who prepared the specifications for the computers to run the automated registry system.

High percentage of registered voters who voted. The number of registered persons who actually voted remained high. The results for the three elections which were the focus of the sub-project are:

| <u>Election</u> | <u>Registered Persons<br/>Who Actually Voted - Millions</u> |
|-----------------|---|
| December 1991   | 1.398   |
| June 1993       | 1.731   |
| December 1993   | 1.189   |

This is less than the targets set in the Mission Action Plans, but still a valid accomplishment.

Decrease in the percentage of invalid votes and mistakes by the personnel in charge of the voting tables. The following table gives the results for the three elections which were the focus of the sub-project:

| <u>Election</u> | <u>% of invalid votes</u> |
|-----------------|---------------------------|
| Dec. 1991       | .057                      |
| June 1993       | .047                      |
| Dec. 1993       | .045                      |

Training of jurors. During the implementation of the sub-project over 100,000 electoral jurors received training. This far exceeded the target of the Project. Furthermore, the percentage of the total number of jurors who received training rose during the course of the sub-project. In December 1991 it was 50%, in June 1993 it was 69% and in December 1993 it was 61%.

Preparation of training material and instruction manuals. Through the efforts of CAPEL training materials and instruction manuals have been prepared which can be used with the electoral jurors and with the trainers of those jurors. While such material will need to be modified to take into account future developments (e.g. changes in the law) they provide a good basis for beginning the preparations for the next electoral cycle leading to the elections of December 1995. Other materials (such as the Guide to Electoral Notaries) may need more extensive revision but still provide a starting point.

Experience in managing elections. The NEC and CAPEL together have gone through three election cycles. In the process CAPEL has provided the NEC with demonstrations on how various techniques for planning and implementing elections might be carried out. While there is concern about the extent to which the experience will be retained as the personnel of the electoral courts change (see discussion in subpart E 1 below) the extensive written record of the experiences prepared by CAPEL and the results of the evaluation seminars which were held with CAPEL's assistance do provide a good knowledge base for future planning by the NEC and the DEC's.

Adoption of one time registration. In part as a result of the growing confidence in the registry system and in part as a result of the urging of the CAPEL experts, the electoral law was changed to permit registration of indefinite duration rather than requiring registration for each election. This will permit the registry system more easily to absorb the large increases in the number of registrants as the voting age is lowered from 21 to 18 and as outreach efforts result in the million still unregistered citizens in rural and poor urban areas seeking registration.

## 2. Legislative Process

Operation of the technical budget office (OPT). The OPT is the technical unit which has been in operation the longest and which addresses what most members of Congress would consider to be the topic of highest priority--strengthening the ability of the Congress to analyze fiscal issues and participate knowingly in the review of budgets presented by the executive branch. The OPT has been able to provide useful work-products and is well known among the members of Congress. In fact, the performance of the OPT is often cited as the reason that there is support for the other plans of the sub-project, the idea being that they too can give useful results eventually.

Acceptability of USG assistance to the congress. When the sub-project was planned there was considerable concern that there would be political objections on the part of several political factions to the Congress' accepting assistance from the US Government at all much less pursuant to agreements which might commit the Congress to take certain actions in return for the assistance. Thus the design of the sub-project placed emphasis on: maintaining a low profile for the USG representatives, recognizing that the timing and extent of the actions to be taken would be subject to the political and other conditions prevailing in the Congress during the implementation of the sub-project and adopting approaches to providing advice which would be least likely to draw criticism. This approach appears to have given good results since the sub-project has remained in operation through two Congresses and several changes in Congressional

leadership and has not been the subject of political objection. Indeed, the sub-project currently enjoys strong support from the President of the Congress and many of the other leaders in both houses.

Useful working relationship between SUNY and the congressional leadership. SUNY is viewed positively by the President of the Congress and most other Congressional leaders. It has been able to present arguments in favor of various reform steps and has pursued disbursements of local currency counterpart under the CIFs which are to support the work of the sub-project and the technical units. It has not aroused major criticism in performing those functions. While there are some potential problems with this role (as discussed in subpart D below) the working relationships established by SUNY have been of utility both to the program being supported and to the AID Mission which often relies on SUNY for this "lobbying" effort.

#### **D. Major Problems to Date**

The following is a brief description of the major problems which the Project has faced to date. Further description is given in Annexes E and F.

##### 1. Electoral System

Lateness in planning and execution. CAPEL consistently complained that the NEC did not start early enough in its planning for upcoming elections and was not rigorous enough in following the schedule of implementation steps which were adopted. The delays in planning and execution had many causes (some of which are treated as separate problems below) but the principal one appears to have been the relatively weak managerial culture which governed the work of the NEC.

Shortfalls in counterpart and other government funding. Throughout the implementation period there have been shortfalls in the GOB's financial support for the work of the electoral system. In part this was caused by general economic conditions but in part it was the result of the hands-off attitude which CAPEL took toward the handling of counterpart funds and the lack of effective lobbying of DIFEM by the representatives of the NEC. Then too, the internal management weaknesses of the NEC contributed to lack of foresight of the needs for fiscal support and to the difficulty of the NEC in meeting the complicated system of obtaining local currency counterpart funds. The impact of these shortfalls in disbursements of fiscal support were felt throughout the operations of the electoral system.

Turnover in personnel of the electoral system. Elections are conducted with many temporary workers. The electoral jurors are chosen from among the general population for service in one election at a time. The trainers of the jurors usually are contracted persons who have not previously performed that responsibility. The intensity of the work in the three to six months preceding each election requires the augmentation of the regular staff of the NEC and the DEC's with temporary contract employees. This situation is intrinsic to the conduct of elections and is a condition which the sub-project took into account in designing the assistance. However, there

also has been a large turnover in the support and professional staff of the NEC which makes it more difficult to achieve lasting improvement in its operations. This turnover appears to result both from the existence of better paid opportunities elsewhere (especially in the case of computer programmers) and from a lack of management's understanding of the importance of, and the need to pay attention to, supporting long term, experienced staff.

Role of *vocales* in management. The NEC and the DEC's are ruled by *Vocales* who are both judges and a board of directors for the management of the organizations. This has tended to involve the *Vocales* in operating roles. Since the *Vocales* are principally lawyers and intellectuals they have not been ideal persons for management. Their role also raises some question of whether they can be impartial judges of the operation of a system for which they have assumed operational responsibilities. There is a current of opinion that the role of judges should be separated from that of manager and general agreement that the operation of the system should be placed in the hands of professional managers and other technical persons with the *Vocales* limiting themselves to an oversight function at most. Although progress was made by CAPEL in getting the role of middle management strengthened, the *Vocales* continue to perform many management functions. This has weakened the management performance of the system.

Weak civic education program. The NEC has the responsibility to prepare and motivate the public to register and to vote. It must provide the information on procedures which the public will have to follow. It also has a responsibility for conducting civic education of a more general nature in order to nurture attitudes which are more supportive of democracy and more likely to lead to the public's participation in the electoral process. CAPEL was to provide the NEC with technical assistance to prepare and carry out this educational effort. At best the results were mixed. The media campaigns to get people to register appear to have produced results (especially in the December 1991 election), but the less than planned effort leading to the June 1993 election probably contributed to some confusion concerning who needed to re-register. However, the more significant shortfall was in the plans for general civic education. That type of effort was given little implementation. In part, this was the result of budget cuts and the priority which was given to the immediate, practical steps of registering and voting. In part, it resulted from the lack of a permanent training or other unit which was called on to work on this type of education between elections. Whatever the reasons, the performance of this responsibility was weak.

Failure to publish the list of registered voters. The assistance program included in its strategy the publication by the NEC of the list of registered voters so that interested organizations and persons (such as political parties and civic groups) could review it in order to bring to the attention of the authorities duplicate registrations or the inclusion of persons who were not entitled to be registered (for instance, because they had died.) This publication was to take place once the automated voter registry was in place and functioning. The computerized voter registration system has been functioning at the national level since 1993. However, the national voter registration list has not yet been published as is required by Bolivian law. NEC has asserted that its responsibility is to publish a voter list which already has been checked for duplicate registrations and that it has been unable to do that for lack of time (partly resulting from the priority which the current NEC gave to improving the system for counting votes). It

further asserts that if it publishes a defective list it will lose credibility with the public. This difference in approach to the purpose and use of a published voter registration list continues although the NEC told the evaluation team that it now plans to publish the national voter registration list by the end of October 1994.

Limited time for preparing the voter registration lists for use by the voting tables. Registration for voting closes only 45 days before the election. That leaves little time for checking the lists for fraudulent and mistaken registrations and for getting the official lists distributed to the DEC's and then the voting tables. This short time has contributed to the errors which have taken place.

A million unregistered citizens. It is estimated that there are one million citizens who are eligible to be registered but are not yet registered. (This does not include the persons between the ages of 18 and 21 who will become eligible to vote under a recent law.) They are mainly in rural and poor urban districts. While the NEC has been successful in increasing the number of registered voters, this mass of unregistered voters is a continuing challenge.

Dispute re the choice of software to run the voter registration system. The NEC's *Vocal* who is in charge of its work on information technology plans to re-write the program which runs the voter registration system using a DBMS (named SID) which was developed by a Bolivian firm for the purpose of counting votes. (At present the SID program is also being adapted for use in managing NEC's fiscal accounts.) This re-writing of the program may cause serious problems to the NEC in preparing itself for the 1995 elections and may also cause some political controversy since one of the owners of the SID program is the son of the *Vocal*.

Technical problems with equipment specifications. Two problems arose with the specifications for the computer equipment provided for the voter registration system. One was that the tape cartridge systems of the DEC's were not compatible with that of the NEC. This condition still needs to be corrected. The other is that the sizing of the capacity of the equipment proved to be too small given the unexpectedly rapid increase in registered voters. The NEC met the immediate problem by acquiring more mass storage devices in 1993, but the resulting capacity of the overall system probably is not adequate to meet the demands facing the electoral system over the next several years.

## 2. Legislative Process

Delays in getting underway. There were substantial delays in getting the current program underway. From the date of Amendment No. 1 of the Grant Agreement in September 1991 until the signing of the Cooperative Agreement in September 1992 little action was taken under the sub-project. SUNY began sending analysis teams to Bolivia almost immediately after the signing of the Cooperative Agreement, but it did not have its in-country Director in place until January 1993 nor its permanent office opened until April 1993. Building on the pre-existing budget analysis unit a revised OPT unit was established in June 1993, however a permanent director for the office was not in place until December 1993 nor was the Director of CICON (the overall coordinating unit) appointed until that time. Furthermore, the other two technical units under

CICON were not formed until April and May of 1994 which was over 19 months after the signing of the Cooperative Agreement and over two and a half years after the signing of Amendment No. 1 to the Grant Agreement. During this time there were various analytical and planning visits to Bolivia by external experts and observational travel by selected members of the Congress and its staff; however, these activities were more in the nature of design and preparation. These delays were brought about by several causes. The work under the sub-project could not get ahead of the support generated for it among the leaders of the Congress and obtaining such support was delayed by the change of authorities resulting from the June 1993 elections. The methodology adopted for preparing the design of the component activities was time consuming and delays in the availability of counterpart financing meant that the rhythm of work was slowed on several occasions. The result of these delays is that the original life of the sub-project has had to be extended by 21 months in order to have a chance of achieving its objectives.

Lack of detailed planning of component activities. The Cooperative Agreement with SUNY charged SUNY with the responsibility of designing the component activities for the sub-project. The methodology to be followed was to bring teams of experts to Bolivia for an initial visit (usually of a week) to discuss with the Bolivians their needs in a certain area and to make preliminary recommendations on how to meet those needs and then have the team return to Bolivia (again, usually for a week) some time later (after both sides had reflected on the preliminary recommendations) in order to hold further discussions and to prepare a final design for the activities. During both visits workshops would be held to discuss the topics being addressed. This pattern was followed in the case of work on the topics of budget analysis, information management and bill drafting although in the last case only one visit was used because the topic had been previously discussed in the course of dealing with the topic of information management. In no case did the final design of the component activities have the detail of budgeting and implementation steps which were called for in the Cooperative Agreement. Those details had to be worked out informally over time by the in-country Director of SUNY. Furthermore, the design of the fourth technical unit (that of training and constituent information) is being prepared in Bolivia without the use of visiting teams from SUNY since funds were not available for that approach. This experience seems to indicate that the methodology chosen for design did not give the expected results and was both expensive and time consuming. However, it may well have made a positive contribution by re-enforcing the image of SUNY and the importance of the themes to be addressed by the sub-project.

Delays in availability of counterpart funding. There have been serious delays in the disbursement of local currency counterpart funding. Since the work of SUNY and of the technical units is heavily dependent on such funding these delays have had a negative impact on the implementation of the sub-project. For instance, they caused delay in the hiring of SUNY's national staff and the procurement of equipment and supplies currently needed by the technical units. To some degree the delays in disbursement under the CIF to the Congress have been due to the inexperience of the CICON Director in these matters and to the inherent complicated nature of the proceedings. The SUNY in-country office appears to have had more success in obtaining disbursements under its own CIF and has tried to be of assistance to CICON in the latter's efforts

to manage its own CIF. With A.I.D.'s encouragement, SUNY also has been active in obtaining the agreement of the Congress to provide funding directly to CICON and the work of the technical units. While this is a useful thing to do under the circumstances, unless CICON becomes more accomplished in managing relationships with DIFEM the sub-project is likely to continue to suffer from financial constraints.

Need for focus on activities being supported. Although the scope of the program being supported by the sub-project does not differ radically from that first put forth under the Project its focus has been narrowed as it became apparent that limitations of funding and of the absorptive capacity of the Congress would make that necessary. There now appears to be agreement that the work of the sub-project should be highly focused on the strengthening of the stature and work of the three technical units and of CICON and on the design and establishment of the fourth technical unit to be charged with training and constituent information. However, in practice this focus may be undermined by both the Congress and A.I.D. The in-country Director of SUNY asserts that "the word is out" in Congress that SUNY will not attend requests which do not concern the central activities of its program. However, the Vice President (who also is the President of the Congress) is in the process of preparing a more formal and better financed structure for his office. In the earlier stages of its work SUNY responded to requests for assistance in this effort and it may well find that it is under pressure to do so again. It will not be easy to resist such requests especially since CICON is an important part of the Office of the Vice President. Then too, SUNY has provided various types of services at the request of A.I.D. and is regarded by the Mission as an entity which can be counted on to be cooperative and effective. That may tempt the Mission to try to use SUNY for program and administrative work which is not within the focus of the current sub-project. Since so much remains to be done this will be a problem for accomplishing the objectives of the sub-project.

Location of the OPT unit. The OPT is located in the Annex of the Legislative Building. It has been there since it was under the direction of the Economic Commission of the lower house. By reason of its location and close working relations with that Commission it is seen as being more linked to the lower chamber than to the Senate and perhaps to the political fortunes of the former president of the Economic Commission who is now the president of the lower house. Because of that and in order to make the OPT functionally more integrated into CICON, the Vice President wants the OPT to move into the building of the Office of the Vice President in which the other units of CICON are located. This idea is resisted by the OPT and some of its supporters in Congress who argue that OPT would lose some of its effectiveness by being physically separated from the offices of the lower house. The existence of this difference of opinion has been a complicating factor in institutionalizing the status and work of the technical units. Its resolution will be an indication of the relative importance of the Vice President and some of the traditional leaders of Congress to the work of the sub-project and will set a precedent for the treatment of the other technical units as they become operative.

Management of the technical support units. CICON is charged with the coordination and management of the technical support units. SUNY is to assist CICON in meeting this responsibility. The effort is complicated by several factors. The OPT is much more established

and known than the other units and, indeed, thinks of itself as being of greater importance than CICON itself. Naturally this creates negative reactions from the other units. Then too, the jurisdictions of the units are not clearly defined and their responsibilities overlap. Without effective management this overlap could lead to friction. The Director of CICON is the channel through which the technical support units are to deal with the Vice President and with the Congress and with the funding agencies. Unless that channel proves to be effective for them the technical support units are likely to seek direct contacts as many think the OPT currently does. The Director of CICON has not yet established effective control over the situation.

Need for on-site technical assistance. The staff of the technical support units has indicated that they would welcome more direct contact with the representatives of SUNY and would like to have technical assistance from external experts who could stay for an extended period of hands-on service. These requests have not been met to date by SUNY which states that it does not have funds available to meet them. SUNY also observes that it is difficult to get the more capable people to agree to come to Bolivia for extended periods. Then too, the terms of the Cooperative Agreement are focused mainly on raising the consciousness of Bolivian leaders to the nature of the reforms to be pursued and to the design of activities to carry out a program for strengthening the work of Congress. Less attention is paid to the implementation of those activities. The cost of the design and conscience-raising phase and of the collateral activities resulted in funding constraints for carrying out the implementation phase. There is a need to rethink the mix of types of assistance which will be required to carry out the current focus of the program.

Role of the bicameral group for the modernization of congress. The Cooperative Agreement with SUNY identifies the Bicameral Group as the counterpart agency for the program. However, the Vice President sees the Bicameral Group as an advisory body and he and CICON as the executive counterpart agent. While recognizing that the membership of the Bicameral Group is important and can be useful in obtaining support within the two chambers, he is skeptical of their willingness to take on executive tasks. However, some members of the Bicameral Group fault themselves for not being more aggressive in following the development of the program with one even suggesting that the Vice President is too busy to give effective direction to the reform effort and that, instead, the chairmanship of the Bicameral Group (which is now with the Vice President) should be rotated among the members of the Group in order to strengthen their feeling of proprietorship and responsibility for follow-up. There appears to be a need to clarify what is to be the role of the Bicameral Group.

Size of staff of technical support units. The current size of the staff of the three technical support units is not large enough to permit them to play the role which is expected of them under the sub-project. In the case of the Bill Drafting and the Research and Information Units this is not currently a problem since they are not yet operational and there is not yet effective demand for their services. However, in the case of the Technical Budget Office the staffing is a constraint. While much of the work of this unit is well received it is largely focused on the needs of a few of the leaders in the Congress. It has not yet sought to serve the general membership or to

address fully the fiscal analysis function (as distinct from the budgetary analysis function) of its responsibilities. An increase in the level of staffing, of course, will aggravate the financing problem discussed below.

Prospects for sustained financing. This topic is discussed in subpart E below. However it should be noted that the uncertain nature of the prospects for sustained financing is having a negative impact on the morale of the staff of the technical support units.

Role and image of SUNY. SUNY appears to be better known among the leadership of the Congress than any of the components of CICON except the OPT. Because of the close working relationship which has developed between the Vice President and the in-country Director of SUNY and because of the encouragement which SUNY has received from A.I.D. to be active in addressing the management and financial issues facing the conduct of the program, SUNY has taken on a role which might be characterized as conducting a policy dialogue with the Congress on the program. Furthermore, SUNY's active stance could cause it to be seen as a lobbying force. SUNY maintains that it is careful to avoid any actions which could be considered partisan and to conduct itself in conformity with the guidance provided by the Vice President. SUNY also states that as CICON becomes more established and able to manage the reform effort its own role can become more the traditional one of only providing technical advice. To date SUNY appears to have been able to play its role without causing significant negative reaction. However, there are risks in this role and it is in the interest of the sub-project that SUNY adopt the more traditional role of an advisory, assistance agent as rapidly as possible.

## **E. Prospects for the Future**

The following discussion presents the best judgment of the evaluators concerning the likely results of the Project's activities. In the case of the Electoral System sub-project the A.I.D. support has been completed and thus the judgments concerning accomplishments of the Project's targets can be more certain. In the case of the Legislative Process sub-project the activities are just emerging from the elaborate design and motivation stage and there is still a year and a quarter to the PACD. Consequently, judgments on the likely results must be more tentative.

### 1. Electoral System

#### a. Achieving Project Goal and Purpose

The Electoral System sub-project clearly has contributed to the achievement of the goal of strengthening democratic institutions and practices through the holding of impartial elections in an effective manner. Progress is still needed in making the electoral system and the registration and voting process more efficient and reliable. However, there is general agreement in Bolivia that the electoral system's performance has been improving and is positive and that this process is one of the important ways in which democracy is taking hold in Bolivia.

The sub-project did accomplish its basic purpose of improving the functioning of the electoral system and of broadening the participation in the electoral process. (See the results of the 1991 and 1993 elections given in subpart C above.) This does not mean that further progress is not needed. There are still a large number (some say a million) of citizens who have not been registered and the process of purifying the voter registration list of duplications and of mistaken and fraudulent entries is not complete. (The Mission Action Memorandum of July 2, 1993 did state that the NEC had requested assistance in consolidating all citizen documentation, in documenting a million citizens in rural areas and in further improving its management and logistic functions. However, these were not adopted as formal measures of progress in achieving the purpose, and the ongoing activities under the sub-project were not modified to address them.) On balance, one must conclude that significant progress toward achieving the Project's purpose was made during the course of the implementation of the sub-project.

b. Achieving Project Targets

Outputs. The sub-project achieved all the output targets identified in Amendment No. 1 to the Project Paper except for the number of media campaigns. It also achieved most of the outputs which were identified in the Cooperative Agreements with CAPEL. Again, the shortfalls were in the number of media campaigns. (Although not a formal output target in either Amendment No. 1 or the Grant Agreements, the failure of the NEC to publish the national voters' registration list is considered by the Mission to be a significant shortfall in the achievement of the sub-project's objectives.)

Inputs from A.I.D. All of the dollar resources called for by the Project Paper (as amended) and by the Grant Agreements were provided. There were no significant delays in work under the sub-project which were due to delays in the availability of the dollar funds.

Inputs from GOB. Amendment No. 1 called on the GOB to provide the equivalent of \$4.483 million to the work of the Project. This amount was increased to \$5.213 million through the various amendments to the Grant Agreement. However, neither Amendment No. 1 to the Project Paper nor the amendments to the Grant Agreement divided that amount between the two sub-projects. Furthermore, there is no existing record of the overall contributions of the GOB to the work of the sub-project. However, the NEC entered CIF agreements with DIFEM which called on it to receive the equivalent of \$2,849,732 in local currency counterpart financing during the life of the sub-project. That amount was received prior to the PACD for the sub-project. The main difficulty with the GOB funding was that it was not always available on a timely basis and thus the operations of the NEC were disrupted or planned activities (such as media campaigns) were not undertaken.

c. Achieving Institutionalization of Reforms

The electoral system, in large, was successful in conducting the 1991 and 1993 elections. In the process it modified its operations to incorporate some of the recommendations made by CAPEL and expanded the use of the automated voter registration system to the national level. However,

there are certain conditions and attitudes which could impede the NEC's building on these accomplishments. Several of these problems were discussed under subpart D above.

In assessing the prospects of the electoral system it should be remembered that the NEC faces several important responsibilities over the near term. While it does not have to re-register the citizens currently registered, it will have to register the 18 to 21 year old population which recently was made eligible to vote and the unregistered rural and urban poor population which is estimated to be a million persons. Furthermore, it has been given responsibility for delimiting the new single member voting districts which are to be created and it may need to adjust its registry rolls and training systems to reflect the configurations of the new municipalities which are to be created. Lastly, the NEC may undertake a civic education campaign which covers many topics other than the mechanics of registering and voting.

Consolidation of automated voter registry. There are two major problems facing the consolidation of the automated voter registry. One problem is that the NEC has been resisting the publication of the national voter registry until it can remove duplications and other mistaken entries. If the NEC does not fulfill its undertaking to publish that list by October, alternatives should be considered such as having the lists published on a Departmental basis in order to reduce any embarrassment to the NEC for defects in the lists while getting them out so that public interest groups and political parties can participate in their correction. The other problem is that the NEC has plans to improve the equipment and software currently being used by the voter registry system by including them in an information architecture which would include the Civil Registry function and the RUN system. This will involve dealing with several distinct computer environments. To attempt this with the very reduced staff currently available to the NEC could well result in a deterioration of the automated voter registration system's ability adequately to serve the 1995 elections.

Increased computer capacity. The current computer capacity of the electoral system is undersized to handle all the requirements necessary to apply the filters to the present data-base and will not be able to handle the predicted increase of voters due to the changes in the electoral law and to the effect of increased outreach efforts to rural areas.

Compensation and training of staff. The staffing of the NEC and the DEC's currently is not adequate to meet the responsibilities with which the organization is charged. For instance, the training unit of the NEC has only two professionals and, due to a decision of the *Vocal* in charge of information technology, the data management staff of the NEC recently has been removed. While it is reasonable to rely on temporary workers to meet the additional training, administrative and other responsibilities which arise in the electoral periods it is important that there be a core, permanent staff to begin the preparatory work well in advance of the electoral period and to provide guidance to the temporary workers who are brought on during those periods. That staff needs to be trained in their duties and compensated so that they will remain with the NEC and the DEC's. The evaluators did not have time to perform a thorough institutional analysis of the

personnel needs of the NEC and the DEC's and therefore suggest that such an analysis be performed before the end of 1994. The evaluation could start from the observations made by CAPEL during its work under the sub-project.

Improved management. During the course of its work under the sub-project CAPEL made many suggestions for the improved management of the electoral system and participated in preparing manuals and other written guidance for carrying out the suggestions. The evaluators did not have the time to determine the extent to which the reforms suggested by CAPEL or other reforms addressing the problems identified currently are being implemented or what may be the impediments to such implementation. However, they formed the impression that the implementation has been spotty and that there is some apprehension, on the part of both persons within the electoral system and knowledgeable observers of it, that management reforms will need outside encouragement and assistance to be effectively implemented. The evaluators suggest this aspect be included in the institutional analysis recommended above.

d. Achieving Financial Sustainability of Enhanced Operations

The NEC is facing several financial conditions which are likely to undermine its ability to meet its responsibilities.

- In 1993 about 13% of its budget was met by counterpart funds under its CIF with DIFEM and even then there were important aspects of the planned program which could not be implemented. The budget needs for 1995 will be larger and there is a real question as to what extent GOB funds will be made available to meet them should counterpart availabilities fall substantially.
- Salary levels for professional personnel, and particularly for computer and data management specialists, will have to go up.
- The capacity of the computers of the NEC and the DEC will have to be increased. This needs to be done before the 1995 elections and may cost about \$100,000.
- The cost of running an improved Civil Registry probably will be more than the revenue generated by the Registry.
- The cost of integrating and running the RUN system is likely to be high.

e. Relationship to the Planned A.I.D. Democratic Development and Citizen Participation Project

A.I.D. is preparing a new project for authorization in September 1994. One of the three principal purposes of the new project will be to achieve the registration of those citizens who are not currently registered and to motivate them to vote. While the new project will involve non-government organizations in that effort its success will depend on the capacity of the electoral

system to identify and register the citizens who are the focus of the effort. The NEC and the DEC's also may have a role in the effort to motivate the new registrants to vote. Thus it is important to the operation of the new project that the NEC and the DEC's have the resources successfully to meet those responsibilities. The early availability of resources to improve the operation of the information technology function of the NEC and the DEC's will be important.

2. Legislative Process

a. Achieving Project Goal and Purpose

The sub-project has made some progress but is far from meeting its goal and purpose. There is a good base of support in the leadership of the Congress for the work of the sub-project, and the design and motivation work which has taken place to date has been useful. Furthermore, the progress made by the OPT is encouraging. Still there are many problems facing the sub-project and the accomplishment of its purpose. They were discussed in subpart D above. If those problems are addressed in the near term it should be possible by the end of 1995 to achieve most of the sub-project purposes as they are now defined--i.e.(i) consolidate the work which is under way, (ii) achieve legal status for the technical services units, and (iii) support the establishment of a new training and constituent outreach services unit. As discussed below, it seems unlikely that the sub-project can achieve permanent Congressional funding for the technical services units by the end of 1995.

b. Achieving Project Targets

Outputs. None of the outputs identified in Amendment No. 1 to the Project Paper have yet been achieved. However, progress has been made in achieving those outputs which are identified in the Cooperative Agreement (as amended) with SUNY. The main shortfalls in meeting these latter output targets are:

- The designs of the activities did not provide the implementation and budget detail which was requested; and
- The development of handbooks and training materials using Bolivian sources has not yet taken place.

In addition, the evaluators think that on-site technical assistance should be provided to the technical support units and that the planning performed under the Cooperative Agreement should include the result of such support as an output.

Inputs. At the time of the evaluation A.I.D. had obligated \$622,736 under the Cooperative Agreement with SUNY. Those funds were provided and A.I.D. was in the process of obligating an additional \$400,000 to support the work of the Cooperative Agreement through the end of 1995. In addition, counterpart funds the equivalent of \$571,007 had been programmed for SUNY and \$514,407 of such funds had been programmed for CICON. Of those amounts \$435,934 had

been disbursed to SUNY and \$324,898 to CICON. This shortfall in counterpart support was a serious problem for the operation of the sub-project. (See discussion in subpart D 2 above.)

c. Achieving Institutionalization of the Technical Support Units

In addition to the problem of financing which is discussed below, there are four obstacles to the institutionalization of the three technical support units which are being supported by the sub-project and of the fourth unit which is to be supported through the planned amendment to the Grant Agreement. One problem is that there should be a more formal legal or regulatory basis for their operation. This does not seem to be a serious problem since there is wide support in Congress for taking this action.

Another problem is that of where to place the units. This question may have to be decided before the formal legal or regulatory basis is adopted. The problem is discussed in subpart D above. At present it seems likely that all the units will be placed in the Office of the Vice President. This step would be part of a broader movement more formally to establish and finance the Office of the Vice President. If that effort fails the very concept of CICON may well be abandoned. Certainly the political tug of war over the use of the units--and especially the OPT--will intensify.

The third problem is the need for the technical support units to produce work which is useful to both the leadership and the membership of the Congress so that it generates continuous support for their existence and needs. This, of course, is the principal purpose being addressed by the sub-project. The OPT already is producing work which is valued by the leadership. It should be able to continue to improve both the quality of the work now being produced and expand the scope of its work as well. Since the other two units have not yet begun to produce any work product and the fourth unit does not even exist, it would be speculative to conclude that they too will be able to achieve that result. However, there is a reasonable chance that they can.

The fourth problem is that in order to produce the kind of work which will generate continuous support the technical support units will need to be more fully staffed with qualified personnel. This implies that compensation levels must be kept adequate and that the necessary training can be provided. The sub-project can address the latter requirement. The former may be addressed by moving the professional positions into the category of *Servicio Civil* which will make them eligible for salary levels somewhat above the usual government levels. The Vice President supports that approach.

d. Achieving Financial Sustainability of the Technical Support Units

Currently the Congress is supplying about 20% of the costs of the technical support units. The balance is being provided by counterpart funding under a CIF with DIFEM. The units also receive support under the sub-project for acquisitions and training. The Vice President recognizes that the Congress eventually should supply all the funds needed for the work of the units, but does not think that it can do so for some time. He has requested CICON and SUNY to prepare

a study of the question and make a proposal of how to approach the issue. Meanwhile the Vice President is encouraging assistance agencies other than A.I.D. to become interested in supporting the work of the technical support units.

In addition to the long run problem of adequate financing there is the short run problem of what will happen if the availability of local currency counterpart is drastically reduced or eliminated in 1995. If that condition were to force an attempt to achieve financing from the Congress on an "accelerated" basis the Vice President fears that the result would be financing only for the unit (the OPT) which is seen as now producing useful work products and that the structure of CICON would collapse.

All in all, the adequate long term financing of these technical support units is far from assured. The sub-project will have to accept the risk since there appears to be no way to protect itself from the possibility of failure on this front. In fact, the best defense against the risk would seem to be the very effort of the sub-project to make the technical support units the source of useful work.

e. Relationship to the New A.I.D. Democratic Development and Citizen Participation Project

One of the three main purposes of the new project is to link the operations of the central government to the new municipalities and vigilance committees whose work and institutionalization are to be supported by the project. Two ways in which this linkage is to be sought are: (i) assisting the members of Congress--and especially those to be elected from single member districts--to be more in touch with their constituents, and (ii) assisting the Congress in its responsibility for reviewing municipal budgets and tax laws and in responding to complaints from the vigilance committees. The first effort will rely heavily on the work of the new technical support unit which is being created under the current sub-project and the second will rely heavily on the work of the OPT. Thus the success of the current sub-project is of importance to the success of the new project. Given the uncertainties confronting the institutionalization and financial sustainability of the technical support units by the end of the current sub-project it would seem advisable to plan to continue to work with those entities under the new project.

**F. Recommendations**

The following Part lists the recommendations made by the evaluation team. The basis and reasons for the recommendations are given in the preceding Parts of this Report and in the Annexes. They are not repeated here.

1. Electoral System

a. For the National Electoral Court

- (1) The NEC should publish the national voter registry for the information of the general public and the political parties.

- (2) The NEC should prepare a 1995 budget request which anticipates the full cost of the 1995 elections and does not rely on counterpart funding for its support.
- (3) In connection with the preparation of the 1995 budget request the NEC should prepare an analysis of its needs for personnel--both for an increased permanent staff and for the temporary workers needed for the conduct of the December 1995 election--and a plan for their appointment and training. The NEC should seek the assistance of external experts in the preparation of the analysis and the plan.
- (4) The NEC should prepare a strategy statement of its role in providing general civic education and a proposal for carrying out that strategy. This strategy statement and proposal should be available for the use in the analysis of the personnel needs of the organization.
- (5) The NEC should start planning for the December elections early in 1995. It should prepare a schedule of key steps to be taken and review that schedule with external experts.
- (6) The NEC should create and staff an office whose primary duty is to monitor the execution of the planning for the December elections and the compliance with the schedule for the preparation and implementation of the elections.
- (7) The NEC should consider creating a clearer division between the *Vocales'* roles as judges and the management of the work of the NEC in preparing for and conducting elections.
- (8) Responsibility for managing the work of the staff of the NEC should be entrusted to a manager of experience and stature. The involvement of the *Vocales* in management should be more in the nature of a board of oversight.
- (9) The NEC should prepare a multi-year strategy for achieving the registration of persons not now registered. The strategy should not be aimed only at the December 1995 elections.
- (10) The NEC should seek a change in the electoral law to permit continuous voter registration and a longer period between the closing of the registration process and the holding of the elections.
- (11) The NEC should re-staff the Information Systems unit as soon as possible. (For suggested types of personnel see Annex E.) The professional staff should be provided with competitive salaries and given assurance of their tenure. Training should be provided to the data management personnel at all levels of the system.
- (12) The NEC should seek external assistance to help it develop a strategy for its Information Systems which addresses the various problems confronting its responsibilities

for voter registration, vote counting, the operation of the Civil Registry and, possibly, the issuance of unified identification cards. The strategy should be a long-range one and not aimed at introducing significant changes prior to the December 1995 elections.

(13) The NEC's budget request for 1995 should include funds for the maintenance of computer equipment and key applications. The NEC should not try to obtain free technical support or programming maintenance from suppliers.

(14) The NEC should take actions to correct the following technical deficiencies before the 1995 elections:

- It should upgrade the present DEC 3100 Microvax to a DEC Alpha machine;
- It should acquire ACCEL, a UNIFY add-on productivity tool;
- It should upgrade the hard disk of all present machines to at least 500 MB;
- It should transfer its present NEC Microvax to the La Paz DEC and procure 486 micros for the DEC's in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Sala Murillo and Sala Provincias;
- It should install in its new machines a tape drive compatible with the Irwin 80 installed in the machines used by the DEC's.
- It should procure a new version of the present Novell LAN software and miscellaneous decision support tools.

(15) The NEC should require that consulting firms which have developed key applications (i.e. DIMA and NEOTEC) provide it with a full set of user documentation and program documentation.

b. For USAID

(1) It should assume that the NEC will need additional external assistance to meet the demands being placed on it by the increasing number of persons who effectively will seek to be registered. There is an immediate need for upgrading the present computer configuration of the NEC and the DEC's which will cost approximately \$100,000.

(2) It should recognize that the NEC continues to need assistance with the strengthening of its training and administrative--logistic responsibilities.

(3) It should reestablish a dialogue with the NEC which could lead to further cooperation with the NEC in the near term.

(4) It should include in the design of the new project support for the work of the NEC in relation to the expansion of the registry of rural citizens and, if it is found to be politically acceptable to do so, for the setting of the boundaries of the new single member districts.

(5) In any resumed program of cooperation with the NEC it should play a more active and direct role in discussions with the NEC than it has in the past.

2. Legislative Process

a. For Congress and CICON

(1) As soon as the new technical services unit is established and its personnel named, CICON should seek to have Congress grant permanent status to itself and to the four technical services offices which it supervises. Preferably this would be done by law but if that would take too long resolutions of each chamber could be used. The important point is that the offices should be given confidence in their future and Congress a sense of responsibility for their performance.

(2) The Vice President and the leadership of the Congress should seek an early resolution to the issue of where the OPT should be located physically. The arguments in favor of OPT's being moved to the Office of the Vice President where the other technical services units are located seem persuasive to the evaluators. However, what is most important is that this dispute not continue much longer since it is impeding other management steps.

(3) As soon as the Information and Research Unit and the Bill Drafting Unit are ready to begin full operations and to produce work-products, CICON should make a sustained effort to make their readiness known to both the leadership and the membership of both chambers. This effort could include group workshops so that the staff of the units could meet the members and discuss what work can be performed and how priorities for responding to requests will be set. The purpose of the effort is both to provide information to the members and to encourage them to utilize the units. A similar effort should be undertaken regarding the new training and constituent relations unit once it has been established.

(4) CICON should be more active in obtaining promised counterpart funds from DIFEM so that the technical services units can receive the equipment and other material support which they require.

(5) CICON should plan now for the staffing which the technical service units will need to meet the demand for their services which is expected to arise as they become fully operational. CICON should not wait until the demand has overcome the capacity of the units to respond. This planning can also be used in discussions concerning the level of funding which is required.

(6) It is clear that the present staff of the OPT is not large enough to meet the current responsibilities of the office much less the growing demand for its services which will occur as members come to realize that they (as well as the leadership) can obtain services from the unit. CICON should now begin to include the costs of additional staff for OPT in its budget planning.

(7) CICON should give priority to completing the plan, requested by the Vice President, for obtaining increasing financial support from the Congress for the work of the technical services units. The plan should not assume the indefinite availability of counterpart support.

(8) CICON should determine what steps would need to be taken to place the professional staff of the technical service units under the *Servicio Civil* and prepare a proposal for doing so.

(9) CICON should pay special attention to achieving a greater sense of unity of purpose and collaboration among the technical service units under its supervision. It also should review the scope of responsibilities of each unit to see if overlap of functions could be avoided or better clarified.

(10) CICON should prepare a joint workplan with SUNY to make clear what are the expectations of both entities concerning the work over the remaining period of the Grant Agreement.

(11) CICON should discuss with the technical services units how its reports and other publications can be most useful to the members of Congress. For instance, it is probably advisable that there be an executive summary for each publication.

(12) CICON should support the early access to INTERNET by the technical services units.

(13) CICON should begin planning now how to utilize the librarian being trained in the U.S. at present.

b. For SUNY

(1) In preparing its workplan for the remainder of the life of the sub-project SUNY should give emphasis to responding to the requests of the technical services units for on-site technical assistance for extended periods.

(2) SUNY should have more frequent and direct contact with the work and the staff of the technical units. It should be possible to do this without diminishing the importance of its work with CICON.

(3) SUNY should be careful to keep its focus on the work with CICON and the technical services units. It should avoid being drawn into other activities which may be good in themselves and of interest to the leaders of Congress or A.I.D. but not likely substantially to further the strengthening of the technical services units.

(4) SUNY should consider using experts from other Latin American countries as well as from the U.S. That might make it easier to obtain on-site technical assistance for extended periods.

(5) SUNY should systematically seek "feedback" from the participants in the seminars it organizes in order to know whether the timing, content and organization of the seminars were well received.

(6) SUNY should review its plans for training to be sure that it is not overlooking an opportunity for using a Bolivian educational or training institution in the conduct of the program.

(7) SUNY should coordinate closely with CICON in any "policy dialogue" or "lobbying" activity which it undertakes. Whenever possible the lead in such efforts should be taken by CICON. The same should be the case in efforts to raise funds from Congress, other Bolivian organizations or foreign assistance agencies.

(8) In preparing its workplan SUNY should include the detailed budgetary and implementation planning and justification which was not produced during the design phase of the work under the Cooperative Agreement.

c. For USAID

(1) USAID should review the way in which it utilizes SUNY to avoid diverting it from the main focus of its work and to be sure that it is not encouraging SUNY to take too active a role in "lobbying" and "policy dialogue" type activities.

(2) USAID should determine at an early time whether or not it is prepared to argue for priority to be given to this sub-project within the probable reduced counterpart availabilities for the coming year. Its decision should be shared with CICON and the Vice President so that firmer planning can be achieved and some of the uncertainties facing the personnel of the technical service units may be reduced.

(3) In designing the new A.I.D. project the Mission should include support for the strengthening of all the technical service units and not just for the work of the new training and constituent outreach unit and the OPT's review of municipal budgets.

## **G. Lessons Learned**

Taking into account the findings and recommendations discussed above, the following are the major lessons learned from the work under the project.

### 1. Use of Implementing Agencies as Spokesmen for A.I.D.

It is not wise to leave to the implementing agencies the major responsibility for conducting the policy dialogue with the benefiting organizations or for addressing problems arising from either the design of the project or from disagreements concerning implementation of the reforms or the policies being supported. A low profile for A.I.D. as a part of the US Government may well be in order and certainly a collaborative style is important for working with such political organizations as the Congress and the electoral courts. However, only a representative of the US Government can really speak for it without running the risk that the spokesman may confuse his technical role with that of the policy maker and having another organization carry the full implementation burden may lead to a lessening of a sense of responsibility by A.I.D. for the outcome.

### 2. Over-Reliance on Counterpart Funds

Reliance on A.I.D. generated counterpart funds for meeting much of the operating expenses of the activities being assisted can cause undesirable effects. It makes it difficult to judge the degree of dedication of the local organizations to the reforms being supported, makes the implementation of the activities dependent on other factors governing the relationship between the two governments and runs the danger of the reforms being abandoned once the support from counterpart funds is withdrawn --and especially if the withdrawal takes place over a short period of time.

### 3. Leaving the Final Design of Activities to Implementing Agencies

Leaving the final design of the activities under the project to the implementing agencies used to carry out the project has the advantages of making design decisions closer to the time of actual implementation, of utilizing the technical expertise of the implementation organizations in the final design work and of assisting the Mission in meeting its workload. The drawbacks of this approach are that the Mission becomes very dependent on the implementing organization for programming guidance and is not in a good position to require greater specificity of planning in the face of the need for implementation action. If the Mission does adopt the approach of having final designs prepared by the implementing organizations it should place particular emphasis on requiring adequate forward planning and compliance with the requirements for scopes of action and workplans.

4. Importance of Institutional Strengthening and Forward Planning

The achievement of specific targets and the production of specific outputs are important objectives for any project. They also are usually more easily measurable than are the degree to which an organization has been strengthened or is able to sustain its new level of activity in the future. However, any project which seeks to improve the performance of an organization should have identified ways in which to analyze whether the improvements are likely to last and what additional steps may be necessary in order to make such sustainability more likely. Those approaches to analyzing sustainability should be adopted and applied early enough in the project to be useful in deciding whether or not to continue working with the organization beyond the original estimated completion date of the project.

5. Use of Technical Advisors from AID/W

The Mission's use of technical personnel supplied by or through AID/W was beneficial to the project. In the case of the work on the computerization of the voter registration list it would have been even more helpful had such technical personnel been made available for periodic oversight visits during the life of the work. It is not clear why such periodic oversight visits were not arranged. Apart from the overall shortage of funds, one reason may have been that since it was not necessary to enter a formal contract for the assistance from AID/W there was no occasion requiring the preparation of a scope and a plan for this aspect of the work. However, even when the services to be provided are without cost to the Mission the preparation of scopes and plans is advisable.

6. Importance of Institutional Contractor

The experience of the Mission in preparing and implementing significant activities without using the services of institutional contractors illustrates the difficulties involved in such an attempt. While not using such contractors may appear in the short run to be cost effective and to expedite the process by avoiding the need to follow selection and contracting processes, unless the Mission itself is generously staffed it is not likely to be able to provide the support and technical guidance which is available through institutional contractors. As a consequence, the activities are not likely to move forward in a timely way.

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**ANNEXES**

**BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT**

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## BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT

While the Project has been in operation since September 1988, the focus of this evaluation is the period beginning in September 1991. This part of the Evaluation Report provides a brief statement of the work which was performed under the Project in the three years preceding that date and of the political and administrative conditions to which the Project responded and under which it worked.

The Project responded to three basic conditions. One was that Bolivia had been developing its democratic institutions since 1977 and was considered to be a good candidate for continued democratic development. The second was that the judicial and legislative branches of the government remained much weaker than the executive branch. The third was that the electoral process was inefficient, fraught with fraud and administratively incapable of managing clean elections or expanding the franchise. The Mission gave first priority to designing and implementing activities with the judicial branch. Thereafter it designed the September 1991 amendment to this Project.

### A. Electoral System

The responsibility for conducting elections is with the National Electoral Court (the NEC) and with the Departmental Electoral Courts (the DEC's) acting under the guidance of the NEC. Municipal elections are held every two years and general elections (for President, Vice President and members of both houses of Congress) every four years. The members (called *Vocales*) of the NEC and the DEC's were appointed as a result of political agreements among the political parties. They were not considered non-partisan. Their term of office was four years. The conduct of the 1987 municipal elections demonstrated many serious weaknesses in the conduct of the elections. In response A.I.D. decided to try to strengthen the performance of the NEC and the DEC's and in particular to help them to prepare for and successfully conduct the general elections scheduled for May 1989 and the municipal elections scheduled for December 1989.

The 1988 Grant Agreement included the types of activities which were to be followed throughout the life of the Project. The major types of activities were: (i) providing equipment, technical assistance and training for the development of an automated, nationwide voter registry; (ii) providing technical assistance and financial support to the design and implementation of the training of the persons who were to carry out the elections (that is the citizens who are selected to staff the voting tables, the judges and notaries who oversee the registration of voters and the conduct of the voting tables and the administrative personnel of the NEC and the DEC's who provide the guidance and support for the implementation of the elections); (iii) and providing technical assistance and financial support for the design and implementation of voter education and registration campaigns by the NEC and the DEC's.

There were two main mechanisms for providing the assistance. The first was to use the *Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral* (CAPEL) to provide the technical assistance and training. CAPEL is a non-governmental organization with its home office in Costa Rica. Its purpose is to provide advice for conducting free and honest elections and observe elections throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. The assistance provided by CAPEL at this stage was provided under a regional A.I.D. project. Under this arrangement some work was done on all the component activities mentioned above, the 1989 elections took place as scheduled, and the relationship between the NEC and A.I.D. was strengthened. However, it was clear that the electoral system still remained weak. The NEC recognized this fact and indicated that it was interested in receiving further assistance from CAPEL.

The other mechanism was the provision of counterpart assistance through agreements (called CIFs) between the NEC and the *Division de Financiamiento Externo y Monetización* (DIFEM) of the Ministry of Economic Development. The main uses of the counterpart were to acquire and remodel a building for the NEC (\$423,000), to run voter registration and motivation campaigns (\$665,000) and to acquire the equipment for the creation of the automated voter registry (\$595,000). This last activity also received support for services from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in developing the RFQ for the purchase of the computer equipment and in acting as purchasing agent. The process of preparing the RFQ, obtaining bids and entering a contract took from October 1988 until January 31, 1991 when a contract was signed with the Bolivian firm DIMA LTD. The equipment was to be sufficient to support an automated voter registry of some 1.9 million persons which was estimated to be the likely registration target for the NEC. The equipment was in-country, but not installed, by June 1991.

Perhaps the most important development of this period was the agreement among the political parties in February 1991 that the electoral courts should be staffed and run on a non-partisan basis. Following that agreement new *Vocales* were appointed to the NEC in August 1991 for a four year period. However, the appointment of the *Vocales* for the DEC's was slower and was not completed until December. Because of that delay, because of the delay in getting the automated voter registry system under way and because of the relatively weak performance of the electoral court system in the 1989 elections there was great concern as to the ability of the system to conduct the municipal elections scheduled for December 1991. In response A.I.D. decided to expand substantially its cooperation with the electoral system.

## **B. Legislative Process**

By 1988 a bicameral legislature had been functioning in Bolivia for six years. Furthermore, between 1985 and 1990 an activist group in Congress proposed significant changes in electoral laws and in the internal rules of order. In response to this situation A.I.D. included in the original 1988 Project support for developing a bicameral consensus re the planning for and staffing of a capacity of the Congress to improve its fiscal and budgetary analysis, its drafting of bills and its administrative support. The Project also included the idea of providing training for legislators and providing equipment, technical assistance and training to make operational the existing, automated legislative data-base.

During most of the 1980s the activist group could not muster enough political strength to secure changes. As is often the case in multiparty systems, reformist legislators spent more time dealing with political disputes than with developing a serious agenda for reform. It should also be noted that the fast pace of market oriented reforms and the other priorities of the ruling coalition did not allow a serious attempt to modernize Congress to get underway.

When the political leadership of Congress changed hands in 1989 the prospects for reform of the legislative branch improved considerably. The inauguration of Vice President Luis Ossio Sanjines produced considerable expectation for change since he had had a long legislative career and was part of the reform group.

### **C. History of Funding**

The Project originally was authorized on August 31, 1988. The life of project funding was \$450,000 in grant funds to cover the 16 month period ending on December 31, 1989. In addition \$150,000 of local currency counterpart funds were to be used in support of the Project. The Project was to strengthen the electoral system and the legislative process and finance the examination of the feasibility of establishing a non-partisan, non-governmental organization to support the strengthening of democracy in Bolivia. (This last element of the Project is not included in the scope of this evaluation.) The Project was to support activities bridging to a multi-year project which would be designed to support the general purposes being served. The Mission's intent was to prepare that project by January or February of 1989. The Mission signed a Project Agreement with the Ministry of Planning and Coordination (MOPC) on September 8, 1988 to carry out the Project. The Project Agreement stated that the Mission would approve Memoranda of Understanding which the MOPC would enter with the benefiting organizations.

The original Project Authorization was amended on September 17, 1991 to increase the life of project funding by \$1,250,000 to a total of \$1,700,000 and to extend the life of the Project by three and a half years until June 30, 1993. (The life of project funding includes \$294,000 from the first grant which had not been used.) In addition, \$3.271 million of local currency counterpart funding also was to be used in support of the Project. The Project Paper Amendment which supported this expansion of the Project was prepared instead of the new Project Paper which had been planned for completion in early 1989. It is the document which most systematically sets forth the scope and purposes to be served by the Project. The expanded Project was begun through an amendment to the Grant Agreement on September 27, 1991 which added \$500,000 of FY 1991 funds.

A second amendment to the Grant Agreement was entered on July 27, 1992 which added \$1,000,000 from FY 1992 funds (this was \$250,000 more than planned under the Project Paper Amendment) for a new life of project total of \$1,950,000. The PACD was extended by nine months to March 31, 1994.

A third amendment was authorized by Action Memo on November 10, 1992 which added \$1,050,000 of grant funds for a new life of project total of \$3,000,000. The purposes and component activities of the Project were not changed. The increased funds were to finance activities in support of the 1993 general and municipal elections and the expansion and

acceleration of work under the legislative process activities. This amended authorization was implemented through an amendment to the Grant Agreement of March 1, 1993.

By an Action Memo of July 2, 1993 the PACD for the legislative process activities was extended by nine months to December 31, 1994. By Action Memo of June 30, 1994 this PACD again was extended by one year to December 31, 1995 and \$400,000 was authorized to be added to the life of project funding for a new total of \$3.4 million covering the period September 1988 through December 1995.

As of the time of the evaluation the total of funds authorized for the Project was \$3.0 million. Of that amount \$2.95 million had been obligated under grant agreements with the GOB and \$2.7 million had been committed. In addition, life of project plans called for local currency counterpart support of the equivalent of \$5.213 million of which \$3.988 million were programmed and \$3.664 million had been provided. Since the focus of the valuation is on the period beginning in September 1991 it should be noted that of the above amounts \$156,000 in grant funds and \$1.767 million in counterpart funds were expended in the period before that time leaving \$2.844 million and \$3.445 million in counterpart in support of the activities which are the focus of this evaluation.

Some of the dollar and counterpart funds were used for the costs of administration and monitoring by A.I.D. and for other collateral activities. The focus of this evaluation is on the activities conducted by the two implementing agencies contracted by A.I.D. The dollar support for those activities and the associated counterpart support was as follows:

|                          | <u>US \$ millions</u> |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| <br>Electoral System:    |                       |
| dollars obligated        | 1.417                 |
| counterpart programmed   | <u>2.850</u>          |
| total                    | 4.267                 |
| dollars committed        | 1.417                 |
| counterpart provided     | <u>2.850</u>          |
| total                    | 4.267                 |
| <br>Legislative Process: |                       |
| dollars obligated        | .623                  |
| counterpart programmed   | <u>1.085</u>          |
| total                    | 1.708                 |
| dollars committed        | .623                  |
| counterpart provided     | <u>.761</u>           |
| total                    | 1.384                 |

**DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT**

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## DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

The following sub-parts contain a description of the Project as it is set forth in Amendment 1 of September 1991 with such modifications as were introduced by subsequent Amendments and Action Memoranda authorizing increases in funding and extensions of the PACD as listed in Annex A.

### A. Goal

The goal of the Project is the broad one of assisting Bolivia in the consolidation of its democratic institutions and practices. The measures of the achievement of the goal are the holding of impartial elections in an effective manner, the passing of key legislation in a timely and effective manner and the performance by Congress of its oversight role in an effective manner. The goal and the measures of progress have not been changed during the life of the Project.

### B. Electoral System

#### 1. Purpose and End of Project Status

The purpose of the electoral systems sub-project is to improve the functioning of the electoral system and broaden participation in the electoral process. The measures of progress toward the achievement of the purpose are those of:

- increased numbers of citizens registered and voting;
- improved vote counting procedures resulting in a decreased number of challenges;
- improved voter understanding of and participation in the electoral process; and
- the NEC and DECs using internal administrative needs assessment as a management tool.

The 1991 and subsequent Amendments to the Project Paper did not adopt numerical targets for these measures of progress. (The original 1988 Grant Agreement did have some numerical targets.) However, the Cooperative Agreements with CAPEL and the workplans prepared under those Agreements did have some numerical and concrete targets. (See sub-part B 5 below.) The sub-project was focused first on the preparations for and conduct of the municipal elections of December 1991 and then on the general and municipal elections of 1993. Furthermore, the Mission Action Plans do contain measures of progress. That for 1995-1996 shows: (i) a planned level of 24,000 citizen jurors trained for elections day in 1993; (ii) a planned level of 2.0 million persons registered for the general elections of 1993 and of 1.5 million for the municipal elections

of 1993; and (iii) a planned level of 1.8 million valid votes in the 1993 general elections and of 1.5 million in the municipal elections. Similar targets are not included for subsequent years since the Project was not expected to continue to work on those aspects of the electoral system.

## 2. Components

The components were of the same type as those in the original Project Paper. Technical assistance was to be provided to the NEC and to the DEC's to improve their operations and especially the process of registering voters and conducting the elections and in designing and implementing voter motivation and citizen education campaigns. Dollar and counterpart funds would be made available for sending personnel of the electoral courts and of political parties to seminars and conferences abroad and, in the case of counterpart funds, for paying some of the costs of the operation of the NEC, for conducting opinion surveys and the media campaigns and for acquiring and remodeling a building for the DEC for La Paz. These types of components were maintained throughout the life of the sub-project but with the emphasis shifting from design to implementation and consolidation.

## 3. Outputs

The 1991 Amendment called for the achievement of the following specific outputs:

- one automated voter registry installed and operating on a pilot basis for the 1991 municipal elections;
- training provided to 100 trainers who in turn would train 10,000 citizen jurors who staff the voting tables;
- one media campaign on the new NEC/DEC non-partisan mandate;
- four media campaigns to promote voter registration, participation and education;
- one needs assessment on NEC financial management and organization;
- one NEC and one DEC building acquired and remodeled;
- attendance at several listed international seminars and conferences.

These outputs were not modified by subsequent amendments to the Project Paper or to the Grant Agreements. However, as mentioned above, the Mission Action Plan for 1995-1996 shows a planned level of 24,000 citizen jurors trained for the elections of 1993. Moreover, the Cooperative Agreements with CAPEL and the workplans adopted under them did contain specific short term outputs to be achieved. (See subpart B 5 below.)

#### 4. Inputs

The main inputs were \$1,416,907 provided to CAPEL under Cooperative Agreements with A.I.D. during the period September 27, 1991 through February 15, 1994 and \$2.850 million in local currency counterpart dollar funds provided under CIFs between DIFEM and the NEC. The dollar funds provided to CAPEL were used for providing technical assistance to NEC by external advisors sent by CAPEL for short term visits and for meeting the costs of attendance at international conferences by personnel of the electoral system and the political parties. The local currency counterpart was used to finance the costs of a portion of NEC's operations, for the costs of the temporary employees who conducted the training programs and assisted in the administration of the elections and for the conduct of the media campaigns, and for the acquisition and remodeling of the two buildings.

#### 5. Implementing Agent - CAPEL

The main implementing agent was CAPEL. Its responsibilities were set forth in a Cooperative Agreement of September 27, 1991 and in five amendments to that Agreement.

The initial Agreement obligated \$357,462 for use during the period ending on February 17, 1992. It was focused on providing assistance in the preparation and conduct of the December 1991 municipal elections. CAPEL was to provide technical assistance to the design and conduct of the program to train the jurors and to the design, implementation and evaluation of motivation/education campaigns to improve the image of the NEC and the DEC's, provide civic education re elections, promote voter registration and get out the vote. CAPEL also was to provide technical assistance in the establishing of a Project Implementation Unit, in scheduling and tracking electoral activities, and in the coordination of data-banks. In addition, CAPEL was to send observers for the municipal elections and to conduct a post-mortem with CAPEL officials concerning the technical conduct of the elections. Finally, CAPEL was to assist the NEC in choosing persons to participate in selected international conferences and pay for transportation, lodging and all the expenses associated with attendance at those conferences.

Amendment No. 1 of March 10, 1992 simply extended the period for use of the funds until June 30, 1992.

Amendment No. 2 added \$145,000 for use during the period ending on September 30, 1992. CAPEL was to provide technical assistance to CAPEL: in planning and running two evaluation conferences for the *Vocales* and support staff of the DEC's and for representatives of the political parties; in preparing an institutional development plan; and in planning and holding an administration workshop/seminar for the *Vocales* and support staff of the DEC's. CAPEL also was to prepare preliminary drafts of: (i) a design of organizational structures showing the functional/authority relations between NEC and the DEC's as well as within the NEC and each DEC, (ii) a manual of functions to guide the NEC and the DEC's, (iii) job descriptions for the main categories of NEC and DEC positions, and (iv) a draft of internal regulations for NEC and

DEC operations. CAPEL also was to assist in the preparation of an electoral calendar and tracking system and to continue to support attendance at international conferences by NEC and DEC personnel.

Amendment No. 3 of February 11, 1993 added an additional \$332,000 to the Cooperative Agreement and extended the life of the Agreement to March 31, 1994. The focus of this Amendment was the conduct of the general elections of June 1993 and of the municipal elections of December 1993. CAPEL was to provide technical assistance: to designing and carrying out a training plan for the electoral administrators at the DEC and local levels; to preparing teaching materials for the training of election notaries and electoral jurors; to preparing the Electoral Timetable for the 1993 general elections; to improving the standard forms and documents to be used in the 1993 elections; and to designing messages to be used for public education. In addition, CAPEL was to provide technical assistance in the design and implementation of a seminar aimed at Bolivian media owners, managers and journalists and to fund the costs of attendance by electoral officials at international conferences. Finally, CAPEL was to provide technical assistance to the NEC in planning for the orderly transfer of responsibility to the NEC of the Civil Registry as called for by a 1992 law. The terms of this last aspect were to be set forth in a request from the NEC. To facilitate the accomplishment of these tasks CAPEL was to have a representative continuously present in La Paz.

Amendment No. 4 of March 15, 1993 added \$672,117 to the Cooperative Agreement to meet the costs of the program set forth in Amendment No. 3.

Amendment No. 5 of May 20, 1994 reduced the amount provided to the Cooperative Agreement by \$89,672 to a total of \$1,416,907 and changed the expiration date of the Agreement to February 15, 1994. The Amendment also listed the specific tasks which CAPEL was to meet in preparation for and conduct of the municipal elections of December 1993 (which had already been held). The tasks were similar to those which CAPEL had performed in connection with the general elections of June 1993 but also included steps aimed at the permanent establishment in the NEC of the capacity to meet its responsibilities. Among these latter tasks were to provide technical assistance to: (i) prepare the final design of the internal organization structure of the NEC and the DEC, (ii) establish the new management divisions, (iii) complete the organization manual, (iv) implement the permanent correspondence registration guide, (v) establish a National Director's Council for planning and information exchange purposes, (vi) establish a permanent Electoral Planning Office, (vii) establish and operate a permanent training unit and (viii) develop a training strategy which may include electoral inspectors under the training program. Finally, should there be funds available, CAPEL was to provide technical assistance to the planing and implementation of the transfer to the NEC of responsibility for the Office of the Civil Registry and the "Registro Unico Nacional (RUN)."

The following is the final breakdown of the dollar commitments to CAPEL for the conduct of its responsibilities under the Project:

|                               | <u>US\$</u>      |
|-------------------------------|------------------|
| Pre-Grant Expenses            | 18,046           |
| External Technical Assistance | 409,117          |
| Program Administration        | 583,239          |
| Complementary Activities      | 150,354          |
| Overhead                      | 236,151          |
| Audit                         | <u>20,000</u>    |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                  | <b>1,416,907</b> |

6. Other Donors

The NEC did not receive assistance from other donor agencies during the period covered by the evaluation. It is now exploring the possibilities of obtaining such assistance but to date has no firm prospects for obtaining any.

It should be noted that the Spanish Government has provided assistance to the RUN which is to be transferred to the NEC. However, the NEC does not agree with the approach which was taken by the Spanish assistance to RUN and is not likely to want to utilize that assistance in the future.

**C. Legislative Process**

1. Purpose and End of Project Status

The purpose of the sub-project is to improve the legislative support services of the Congress. The measures of progress toward the achievement of this purpose are:

- the availability to legislators and committee staff of legislation, draft bills and records through automated, computer means;
- improved bill drafting, fiscal analysis and legislative research support available to legislators;
- increased use by legislators of the support services available.

The purpose of the sub-project has not been changed.

Numerical targets were not adopted in the Grant Agreements to measure progress. However, the Mission Action Plan for 1995-1996 adopts four measures of progress: (i) the percent of laws originating in Congress, (2% in 1994, 4% in 1995) (ii) the numbers of committees using the new legislative support services (4 in 1994 and 6 in 1995) and (iii) the number of public entities

having an effective SAFCO law compliance mechanism (14 in 1993, 30 in 1994 and 60 in 1995). During the life of the Project more emphasis has been placed on achieving permanent status for the organizational units which are to provide the support services.

## 2. Components

Amendment No. 1 of September 1991 adopted three major components for the sub-project. The first was to provide training for legislators, committee advisors and support staff. A working group was to be established to set policy and organize training in the core topics of: legislative research, library science, information resource management, budget analysis, bill drafting techniques and economic and environment impact analysis in lawmaking. The training program was to include observation trips, long and short term course work abroad and the upgrading of local training facilities.

The second major component was to change the existing automated retrieval system for legislative documents so that it would be compatible with other systems and be more useful.

The third major component was to establish facilities and permanent, non-partisan staff to provide the support services. The focus was on research facilities (with a staff of two Bolivian researchers, two Bolivian lawyers and four Bolivian financial analysis) and a library service which would be supported with funds for acquisitions. In addition, local currency counterpart would be used to remodel a building to house the data-bases and the library service.

In the implementation of the sub-project the component of reforming the legislative data-base was abandoned as not of equal priority with the others, and the Action Memo of June 30, 1994 called for the creation of a new support office to provide constituent, outreach services. The other major components of the sub-project have not been changed. However, their scope and approach have been modified. The emphasis on the creation of a traditional library service has been replaced with a focus on establishing a system of electronic access to various sources of information and the focus and operation of the training component has been somewhat narrowed to be in direct support of the modified focus of the other components.

## 3. Outputs

The outputs called for by Amendment No. 1 of September 1991 are:

- one training needs assessment completed;
- one training program designed;
- 20 legislators, 20 committee advisors and 20 support staff trained;

- installation of a 20 PC LAN and development of full text search and retrieval software;
- basic infrastructure for the library of Congress completed including remodeled building.

These outputs were not expanded or modified formally as the components of the sub-project evolved. However, some further specific targets were included in the Cooperative Agreements entered with SUNY (see sub-part C 5 below.)

#### 4. Inputs

The inputs for this sub-project consisted largely of \$623,000 provided to SUNY under Cooperative Agreements and \$761,000 of local currency counterpart funds provided to SUNY and the Congress under CIFs. The dollar funds provided to SUNY were used for providing technical assistance from outside Bolivia, for financing attendance at international events by representatives of the Congress and to meet the costs of SUNY's operations in the U.S. and in Bolivia. The local currency counterpart funds were used to fund the local costs of the training, to support the operation of the technical units being established, to meet the local costs of SUNY's operations in Bolivia and to meet some of the costs of the international travel of Bolivians.

#### 5. Implementing Agent--SUNY

The Mission concluded that it would need a strong implementing agency to assist it in carrying out this sub-project. It considered several alternatives including the use of an existing consortium of universities and NGOs which held a regional contract from A.I.D./W. In response to the expressed preference of Bolivians to deal with a US educational institution, to the favorable view which leaders in the Congress had of SUNY and to SUNY's performance in a Congressional improvement effort in Chile, the Mission decided to use SUNY as the principal implementing agent for this sub-project. This decision process took nearly a year.

The role of SUNY as the principal implementation agency was arranged through a Cooperative Agreement of September 3, 1992. The Agreement obligated \$250,000 of an anticipated life of project funding of \$622,736. The funds were to cover the period ending February 28, 1993 with the balance of the life of project funding to cover the additional project life through March 31, 1994. In addition, there was to be a GOB contribution (largely from counterpart funds) of \$146,621 during the initial period and of a total contribution of \$386,139 over the expected life of the Agreement.

The Cooperative Agreement called on SUNY to provide technical assistance to the Congress in establishing a Legislative Research Center consisting of a Fiscal Analysis Unit, a Bill Drafting Unit and an Information and Research Unit and in designing a training program to meet the needs of those units. The techniques to be used in carrying out those tasks were:

- motivational/observation/study tours for Bolivian legislators and staff personnel;
- consultancy visits to Bolivia by expert teams with the usual approach being to have a preliminary visit to assess the situation and the needs and to make preliminary recommendations and a follow-up visit to address the observations provided to the first visit and to present a more elaborate report and recommendations for discussion;
- the conduct of workshops and seminars to discuss the reports prepared and the topics being addressed;
- the development of handbooks and training materials (including videos) using Bolivian sources; and
- the preparation of designs of activities to carry out the recommendations (the designs were to include a description of the activities, detailed budgets for them, suggested implementation responsibilities, workplans, timetables, and scopes of work for consultants and others to be used.)

Priority tasks for SUNY were to be to:

- determine the priority areas for development of a legislative information and research capability and develop a program (including technical assistance and training) for achieving it;
- establish, together with a local academic institution, a non-partisan, legislative research service to serve members of the Congress on demand.

To meet its responsibilities SUNY was to establish an office in Bolivia which would have the legal authority to enter contracts and to manage funds. Its counterpart Bolivian agency was to be the Bicameral Committee for Legislative Modernization which is chaired by the Vice President of Bolivia who also is the President of the Bolivian Congress.

Amendment No. 1 of January 4, 1993 adjusted the budget of the Cooperative Agreement to provide a line item for subcontracts. All other terms remained the same.

Amendment No. 2 of March 18, 1993 added \$372,736 to reach a planned life of agreement total of \$662,736.

Amendment No. 3 of April 14, 1994 extended the life of the Agreement until December 31, 1994 to give more time to SUNY to achieve the establishment of the technical units and to get the training program under way.

The Mission Action Memo of June 30, 1994 authorizes the addition of \$400,000 to the Cooperative Agreement with SUNY and the extension of the life of the Agreement by a year until the end of 1995. The purposes of this expansion of the funding and life of the Agreement would be to:

- consolidate the work which is underway;
- achieve legal status and permanent Congressional funding for the technical services units;
- support the establishment of a new training and constituent outreach services unit.

The underlining rationale for this work is to prepare Congress to be able to respond to the demands of the new law concerning local participation in government which also will be supported by a new A.I.D. project now under preparation.

Prior to the addition of the \$400,000 mentioned above, the budget for the Cooperative Agreement is as follows:

|                           | <u>A.I.D.</u><br><u>(\$US)</u> | <u>GOB</u><br><u>US \$</u> |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Salaries                  | 243,283                        | 105,184                    |
| Travel and Transportation | 59,600                         | 69,800                     |
| Allowances                | 71,200                         | 82,160                     |
| Equipment                 | 29,302                         | 37,013                     |
| Participant Costs         | 28,890                         | 0                          |
| Subcontracts              | 35,000                         | 0                          |
| Other Direct Costs        | 43,248                         | 91,982                     |
| Indirect Costs            | <u>112,193</u>                 | <u>0</u>                   |
| <b>TOTAL</b>              | <b>622,736</b>                 | <b>386,139</b>             |

#### 6. Other Donors

The sub-project has received support from the *Corporacion Andino de Fomento* (CAF) and from the Organization of American States (OAS). CAF provided \$36,000 to help finance the visit to the U.S. in July 1994 by the Vice President of Bolivia, selected members of Congress and the staff of the technical units. The OAS has committed \$50,000 for the support of three in-county seminars during the fall of 1994. One seminar will be devoted to the work of each of the three existing technical service units. External experts will be brought to participate with the staff of the units and other key Bolivians. SUNY and CICON will be in charge of planning and arranging the seminars.

**HISTORY OF IMPLEMENTATION 1991-1994**

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## HISTORY OF IMPLEMENTATION 1991-1994

The following sub-parts describe the major conditions and actions which have comprised the implementation history of the two sub-projects since the authorization of Amendment No. 1 to the Project Paper.

### A. Electoral Systems

This discussion is organized by the major events of the implementation period: the municipal elections of December 1991, the general elections of June 1993, the municipal elections of December 1993 and the bringing to fruition of a reliable, nationwide, automated voter registry system.

#### 1. The Municipal Elections of December 1991

On September 13, 1991 agreement was reached between CAPEL and the NEC on a program of assistance for the municipal elections of 1991. The short time remaining before the close of the registration period on October 16th and the conduct of the elections on December 1st meant that CAPEL and the NEC had to work under great pressure to carry out the agreed program. The task was made even more difficult by the failure of the Bolivian authorities to nominate all the *Vocales* of the DEC's until December.

CAPEL formed a team of experts largely based in Costa Rica and had a resident representative in Bolivia during the pre-election period to coordinate the activities as they were carried out in Bolivia. Responsibility for the program on NEC's part was given to an Executor Unit with temporary personnel consisting of a Director, an administrative assistant, an educational assistant, five instructors, a public relations officer and a secretary.

Electoral training. CAPEL assisted in training the six temporary training employees of the NEC and 116 trainers (called *promotores*) who in turn trained 28,091 electoral jurors who staffed the voting tables. (This amounted to just over 50% of the total number of electoral jurors.) CAPEL also helped design and produce 35,386 instruction booklets for the use of the electoral jurors on some 12,000 voting tables. Because of delays in the formation of the Executor Unit CAPEL had to take a more active role in the preparation and publication of the instruction booklets than had been planned. As part of the training program CAPEL designed and drafted forms and manuals dealing with the activities which would be involved in conducting the election and sent a team of its advisors to several DEC's to see how the training program was being implemented. The overall effect was positive since the number of errors committed affected much less than 1% of the votes cast.

Civic education campaign. A public opinion poll, for which CAPEL contacted a Bolivian firm, was conducted in September. It revealed that there were strong negative opinions about the electoral institutions and the likelihood that the upcoming municipal elections would be fair. In part to counteract that situation a publicity campaign was conducted in all the mass media. The campaign cost \$420,718 (of which \$95,587 was for technical assistance). To carry out the campaign the sub-project produced six television spots, six radio jingles, six socio-dramas, three posters, three fliers and a similar number of press notices. 43% of the resources of the campaign were devoted to the registration drive which was held from October 6th to 16th. 57% of the resources were used in support of the get-out-the-vote effort of November 21th to December 1st. While it is difficult to say to what extent the publicity campaign had an effect on the results, those results were quite positive. During the registration drive the number of persons registered rose to a total of 1.678 million, and some 83.5% of those registered in fact voted. This gave an abstention rate of only 16.5% which is well below the rates for the 1989 elections.

Electoral logistics and administration. CAPEL provided technical assistance to redesigning the forms for recording the opening and closing of the voting tables and the counting of the ballots and to producing the schedule of activities to be carried out in preparing for and conducting the elections. However, this election timetable was not used principally because of the late startup in preparations. The redesigned forms were used and contributed to the result that errors were found in only 4.7% of the voting tables.

Election observers. CAPEL provided a multi-disciplinary, multi-national team of 13 electoral analysts to observe the conduct of the elections.

Evaluation seminar. CAPEL provided technical assistance in organizing and running a seminar in March 1992 for the *Vocales* and key staff of the NEC and the DEC's. The purpose was to evaluate the conduct of the December 1991 elections. A substantial report identified many logistical and administrative problems which had arisen and identified their probable causes. Among the main findings were that: (i)the election should be planned with more lead time; (ii)the instructional material should be supplied to the trainers with more lead time; and (iii)there should be better communication and coordination between the NEC and the DEC's.

Future work. CAPEL presented a proposal for providing technical assistance in preparation for the June 1993 general elections. The future responsibilities of the NEC were likely to grow as the number of registered voters increased and as responsibility for the Civil Registry was transferred to it.

## 2. General Elections of June 1993

In August 1992 NEC sent CAPEL a formal request for assistance in the conduct of the 1993 elections. This resulted in an agreement in October for a program of support through July 1993. A workplan to carry out that agreement was concluded in December 1992.

Institutional strengthening. As part of the program CAPEL assisted the NEC in preparing initial drafts of the following documents:

- Internal Personnel Regulations for the Electoral Courts;
- Manual of Functions and Structure of the Electoral Courts;
- Institutional Regulations for the Electoral Courts;
- Manual of Procedures for Registry, Handling and Filing of Correspondence;
- Table of Priority Actions until March 15, 1993;
- Analysis of the Communication Function of the NEC;
- Proposal for the Creation of the Directory of Electoral Organization; and
- Proposal for the Hiring of Temporary Personnel.

CAPEL also provided technical assistance in improving the organization of the budget and personnel systems and in holding workshops to discuss the Institutional Regulations, the Manual of Functions and Structure and the Table of Priority Actions.

Electoral administration and logistics. CAPEL provided technical assistance in further redesigning the forms to be used by the electoral tables and in producing a schedule of actions for the preparation and conduct of the June elections. (The schedule was approved by the NEC in January 1993.) It also assisted in the design of a tracking system for that schedule and sent several Missions to observe how the NEC and the DEC were doing in following the schedule.

Electoral training. CAPEL had suggested the creation of a special Technical Administrative Unit which would have charge of training for the elections. However, CAPEL decided to entrust that responsibility to its existing Division of Electoral Training and Citizen Promotion. CAPEL provided technical assistance in designing and conducting training courses for four of the training personnel of NEC, for 27 Departmental Supervisors who were to oversee the training program and to 342 trainers of the electoral jurors. As part of the training program CAPEL helped to revise the Instruction Booklets for the electoral jurors and to design portfolios and audio cassettes to be used in the training of the jurors. (Contracting difficulties resulted in the late arrival of these products.) The training program managed to reach 31,724 persons or 69% of the electoral jurors. CAPEL also provided a Guide for the *Notarios Electorales* but the NEC had begun its own version and did not use the draft presented by CAPEL. (CAPEL found serious errors in the guide prepared by the NEC.)

Citizen promotion. There were to have been promotional campaigns which covered both the practical aspects of registering and voting and the basic principles of democratic civics. In late March CAPEL submitted its comments on the NEC's plans for the promotion campaigns and included a schedule of steps which should be taken. There were continuing discussions concerning the nature of the campaigns, but in May the NEC reported that there were not enough budgetary resources to support the type of campaigns which had been planned. (The availability of local currency counterpart funds for the registration campaign had been reduced by DIFEM from \$600,000 to \$240,000.) Given the circumstances CAPEL decided not to go forward with further assistance on this topic.

Horizontal cooperation. The *Vocales* of the NEC decided that they were too busy to participate in international conferences.

Civil registry. At the request of the NEC, CAPEL sent an expert to prepare a study of the Civil Registry. In January 1993 the NEC requested technical assistance concerning the Civil Registry and CAPEL sent a proposal. However, the NEC later withdrew its request for assistance.

Observation team. CAPEL sent an multi-disciplinary, multi-national team of electoral experts to observe the elections. It noted many problems which had arisen during the voting and observed that there was much public criticism of the competency of the NEC and the DEC's although there also was general respect for their honesty. Among the problems mentioned by the observation team were the following:

--re registration:

The electoral legislation provides too little time for the preparation of the voter list after the close of registration.

There are inconsistent systems of registration.

The computer program used contains problems.

Economic limitations curtailed the programs.

--re the voter list (the *padron*):

Electoral notaries made many errors and need training.

No system exists for exchanging information with the Civil Registry.

--re equipment:

There is a need for more appropriate computer equipment.

Indelible ink should be of better quality.

--re supervision:

The voting table personnel should have access to electoral judges and notaries for advice.

Evaluation seminar. CAPEL provided technical assistance in the planning and holding of a seminar to evaluate the performance of the general elections. In addition to the comments from the observation team the seminar had many observations concerning ways in which the election process had been defective. Among them are the following.

- The NEC and most of the DEC's were not yet organized according to the Institutional Regulations which had been adopted in February.
- The NEC did not set up a special unit to run the elections but relied on its usual administrative office.
- The manuals re correspondence and temporary employees were not put into practice.
- The schedule of election steps was not followed.
- Budget requests were not based on the timing of needs but on level disbursements from DIFEM.
- Computer equipment was provided late to the DEC's.
- Materials for registry and for voting arrived late in many instances.
- There was confusion on how to handle persons who had registered prior to 1991 with documents which were no longer acceptable.
- The warehouses used and the sites of the voting tables were often in poor condition.
- Training was provided only for election mechanics and not for general civic purposes.
- The training program was not vetted with the DEC's.
- The instruction materials for the training often were distributed late.
- Notaries receive low pay and little training and they make a lot of errors.

- The unit of training of the NEC needs more definition and training itself.
- The program could not supervise the work of the Supervisors enough to avoid distortion in the information given to some of the electoral jurors.

### 3. Municipal Elections of December 1993

Having recognized that there were significant problems in the conduct of the June general elections, the NEC and CAPEL made a special effort to improve the conduct of the December elections. In general the planning for the work started earlier.

Institutional strengthening. CAPEL began by assisting in organizing in September an analysis of the administrative situation facing the electoral system. This was followed by a workshop on the functions of the various operating divisions of the NEC. A workplan for each division was then prepared as was a statement of the function of the Council of Directors. CAPEL also assisted in the preparation of forms for controlling and evaluating the training program and of the final version of the Manual of Organization and Functions.

Electoral administration and logistics. CAPEL assisted in the preparation of the Schedule of the steps to prepare for and conduct the elections. It was delivered in late September. CAPEL also sent its expert staff members to perform monitoring visits to the DEC's to discover problems which were not known to the NEC. CAPEL also helped organize the evaluation of the election which was held in January 1994.

Electoral training. CAPEL assisted the Executing Unit to analyze the budget needs and to prepare a schedule of events. It helped organize training events for the 28 Supervisors selected by the DEC's and for representatives of the political parties and for the training provided to the 264 trainers who in turn provided courses to 53,560 electoral jurors which is nearly 61% of the total number of jurors. CAPEL also provided technical assistance in the preparation of 5,000 copies of an Instruction Booklet for Electoral Notaries, of 100,000 copies of an Instruction Booklet for the Electoral Jurors, of 927 copies of a Teaching Guide for the trainers, and of 350 copies of audio cassettes. Much of the material in these publications was based on products of the June elections.

Promotional campaign. There was to have been a promotional campaign to explain the nature of the voter registration list and the use of computer programs in elections. However, CAPEL concluded that the NEC had not received enough budget funds to make such a campaign worthwhile. Perhaps as result, only 1,189,896 persons voted which gives an abstention rate of nearly 47% of the registered voters. (Part of the reason for the large number of apparent non-voters may be that the registered voter list had not been purified to eliminate duplications and expired registrants.)

Horizontal cooperation. Several visits were organized both before the election and in early 1994.

#### 4. Automated Voter Registry

Work on perfecting the automated voter registration system has continued throughout the period of the sub-project. A contract was signed in January 1991 between the NEC and the Bolivian firm DIMA to supply the computers and the computers were delivered in-country by June of that year. As a pilot effort equipment was installed in the Santa Cruz DEC in time for the 1991 municipal elections. During 1992 the equipment was installed in all the remaining DEC systems and was used on a nationwide basis during the 1993 elections. Data from the Voter Registration Books were inputted to the data-bases of each of the DEC systems during 1991, 1992 and 1993. This work was performed by personnel of the NEC and the DEC systems.

The effort to carry forward this aspect of the sub-project was not without problems. The initial specifications of the equipment turned out to produce an insufficiently large capacity in the face of the large increase in registrations in the course of the 1993 elections; for various reasons the NEC has not been willing to produce a national voter registration list for public use; and some operator errors in the Santa Cruz DEC during the 1993 general elections caused public criticism of the whole system. (These problems are discussed more extensively in Annex E.)

#### **B. Legislative Process**

There was little activity under this sub-project until the Cooperative Agreement was signed with SUNY in September 1992. The discussion below of the implementation of the sub-project is arranged according to the main topics addressed by the work of SUNY.

##### 1. SUNY's Presence in Bolivia

While the home office of SUNY began operations under the Cooperative Agreement immediately after it was signed, the Director of its office in Bolivia was not hired until January 1993. He moved into temporary office space in the USAID Mission until the permanent quarters for the SUNY office were ready in April. In that month DIFEM began to provide counterpart funds under the SUNY CIF agreement. The availability of these funds permitted SUNY to hire its national staff of: a Deputy Director, an Administrative Assistant, an Executive Assistant, a Financial Analyst/Computer Specialist and a Messenger. Prior to this time the Deputy Director had been working for SUNY as a consultant.

##### 2. Budget and Fiscal Analysis

SUNY began the work in October 1992 with a visit for one week by a five person team to evaluate the Bolivian budgetary process. It identified the constraints to Congress' ability to participate equally in the budget process and made several recommendations for action. They were that:

- Congress needs to determine what information it needs to get in order to meet its responsibilities;
- Congress should use specialized persons to analyze the budget presented by the executive branch and not let them be distracted with other tasks;
- Congress should review the experience of the Auditor Generals of several US states;
- Budget personnel of the Congress should visit the U.S. to observe legislative budget offices in action;
- Congress should establish a Technical Budget Office (OPT) consisting of a Director, two technical analysts and an office expediter.

The team offered to supply programs which might be used in analyzing the budget and to prepare a manual on the budget process for the use of the members of the Congress.

The same team returned for a week's visit in January 1993 for further discussions concerning the recommendations and future plans. At that time emphasis was placed on the need to have a non-partisan staff. This partially reflected the criticism which was being directed at the OPT which had been established by Congress and was under the direction of the President of the Economic Commission of the lower house whom persons accused of using the OPT for his own political purposes.

The Congress reorganized the OPT in May 1993 along the lines suggested by the SUNY teams. However, the President of the Economic Commission of the lower house lost his reelection bid in the June 1993 elections and the OPT was without a leader. At the request of the Vice President, who also is the President of the Congress, the SUNY country director assumed the temporary direction of the OPT. Following a public search, a new permanent director for the OPT was appointed in December 1993. He took over the professional staff which had been in place since the OPT was first created. The OPT began to issue a series of studies and reports for the use of the Congress.

Because of the natural affinity of the Economic Commission with the work of the OPT, the unit again began to be seen as primarily responsive to that Commission. This appearance is reinforced by the fact that the OPT is located in the annex building of the Congress close to the offices of that Commission.

The work of the OPT currently appears to be the result of the efforts of the Bolivian staff. SUNY has not been providing direct technical assistance or training to it.

### 3. Improved Information and Research

In June 1993 SUNY sent a team of four experts for a week to study the needs of a Congressional Library and of Congress to have research services (other than those concerning the budget) available to it. The team left a preliminary report and, following the modality of operation adopted by SUNY, returned to Bolivia for a week in early October 1993 for further discussions. The November report of the team addressed several topics and made recommendations concerning them. The topics were the Information and Research Unit which was being proposed, the Congressional Library, the Legislative Archives, and the Communication and Computer Networks.

The topic of most importance for the sub-project was that of the Information and Research Unit. The team recommended that the unit be headed by a professional librarian with experience abroad and knowledge of the English language. The other two analysts should be university graduates with four years' experience in an applied science. The team recommended that the unit have a basic reference collection, at least two PCs, access to CD-ROM and Internet technologies and relationships with several libraries from which it could borrow material. The team recommended that the unit be funded by the Office of the Vice President but that it be located in the Legislative Building.

The Information and Research Unit was organized in April 1994 following most of the recommendations of the SUNY team. Its staff consists of a director and two specialists. They were chosen after public announcements requesting expressions of interest. It is located in the building of the Office of the Vice President. The unit is still in the organizational stage. It does not yet have all the equipment which it needs to function (apparently due to shortfalls in disbursements from counterpart funds). It has not yet produced any work-product. SUNY has not been providing any technical assistance or in-country training to the unit. (But see description of external training and observational travel below.)

### 4. Bill Drafting Assistance

Although SUNY did not send a special team to Bolivia to analyze the needs for assistance in bill drafting, that topic was included in the study of the needs for modernizing and strengthening the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) which was produced by SUNY team which visited Bolivia for a week in December of 1993.

The Unit for Bill Drafting was established in May 1994. It consists of a director and two lawyer generalists. As in the case of the Information and Research Unit, it is located in the building of the Office of the Vice President; it is still in the organizational stage; is awaiting equipment; and has yet to produce any work-product. It has not been receiving technical assistance or in-country training from SUNY.

5. Centro de Investigacion del Congreso (CICON)

CICON was established in December 1993. Its staff consists of a director who was appointed in that month and three professional staff support persons. It reports to the Vice President. Its purpose is to coordinate the work of the three units described above. It does not produce analytical work itself. It is the official counterpart agency for the work of SUNY under the Cooperative Agreement. It receives financial support from both counterpart funds under a CIF and directly from the Congress. Currently the latter's support of \$100,000 covers approximately one fifth of its annual operating expenses.

6. Extension and Legislative Training Service (SECL)

With the encouragement of A.I.D. and the Vice President, SUNY is preparing a proposal for establishing a new technical services unit which would provide training to members of the Congress and information about the new single member districts which will be created. The design work is being carried out by a Bolivian professional contracted by SUNY. In addition, some of the funds which were authorized to be added to the sub-project by the Action Memorandum of June 30, 1994 will be used by SUNY to contract for the full-time services of a U.S. person to work on establishing the new office and carrying out its program. The formal establishment of the new office should take place in the fall of 1994.

7. General Analytical Assistance

In addition to the team visits and analyses which have been instrumental in the design and planning for the technical support units described above, SUNY has responded to requests for assistance which have been submitted to it by leaders of the Congress and the Vice President. The more important of those responses have been the following:

- In August--September of 1993 SUNY supplied two experts for a week to analyze the needs for modernizing and strengthening the Chamber of Deputies;
- In late August of 1993 SUNY sent a four person team to participate in a seminar on legislative management which SUNY helped the Vice President organize;
- In October and in November of 1993 SUNY supplied two separate experts to address the topics of the restructuring of the Office of the Vice President and the general orientation of the work of that Office;
- In November 1993 SUNY supplied an expert for two days to review the efforts to introduce administrative reforms to the operation of the Chamber of Deputies;
- In December 1993 SUNY supplied a four person team for a week to suggest a range of project activities which would be supportive of the general effort to strengthen the competency of the Congress.

8. External Training and Observation Travel

SUNY is supporting long term training in library science for a Bolivian librarian who will return to work in the legislative library. She will obtain a Masters degree and plans to return to Bolivia in October 1994.

SUNY has arranged and supported observational travel for several groups of Bolivians. It arranged a study tour of several sites in the U.S. for the Director of CICON. He was accompanied on that tour by SUNY's country director and its home office project manager. In July 1994 SUNY arranged a week's visit to the U.S. by the Vice President, several members of the Congress, the staff members of CICON and the three technical service units and six persons from Chile and Argentina who were experienced in legislative programs. Representatives from SUNY in Bolivia and in New York as well as a representative of A.I.D. in Bolivia also accompanied the team. The team visited Washington, D.C. and state government offices in New York. It also attended the annual meeting of the National Center for State Legislatures in New Orleans.

**ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

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## ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The following is a list of the specific evaluation questions presented in the Delivery Order. Under each question there is a conclusionary answer and, if necessary, a reference to where in the body of the report the question is further addressed.

### 1. Goal and Purpose

- a) Are the assumptions made in the logical framework of the project paper still valid? If not, what are the implications for meeting project purposes and goals.

The assumptions are still largely valid. Two qualifications are required. (i) The assumption that Bolivia and the United States will maintain good relations may need further discussion. If the issue of the degree of success in reducing coca production leads to a serious reduction in the level of counterpart resources available for the activities before other funds are available to support them their success and sustainability will be placed in jeopardy. (ii) The assumption that voter motivation/education campaigns are successful in overcoming voter mistrust, apathy and cynicism appears to make an assumption of what should be one of the objectives to be sought. The work under the Project has contributed to progress in achieving that objective.

- b) Have the covenants and conditions precedent established in the project agreement been met as appropriate to date?

Yes.

- c) Is there evidence that the project has improved efficiency, coverage, and administration of the beneficiary institutions to date? If not, why not?

In the case of CAPEL there is such evidence. In the case of the Congress the improvement to date only has been in the performance of the budget analysis office. See Parts IV C and D.

- d) Is there evidence that the project has improved democratic participation of democratic institutions and people to date? if not, is such evidence likely by project completion?

In the case of the electoral system sub-project the answer is yes. See Parts IV C 1 and IV E 1. In the case of the legislative process sub-project there is not yet much evidence. There is a fair to good chance that by the end of the sub-project such evidence will exist. However, the effort should be continued by the new A.I.D. project to improve the chances.

- e) Is there evidence that project activities will be sustained after the project completion date?

There is some, but there are serious problems facing the sustainability of the improved operations. See Part IV D.

- f) In light of the validity of the assumptions made in the logical framework, are current time lines adequate for meeting project purposes and goals?

In the case of the electoral system, yes. In the case of the legislative process, probably not. Further work will most likely be necessary under the new project.

## **2. Program Objectives**

- a) What evidence exists that the Project contributes to higher level USAID/Bolivia Mission objectives?

The program goal is to assist Bolivia in the consolidation of its democratic institutions and practices. This is also one of the four major goals of the CDSS. The electoral system and the legislative process are core democratic institutions. Their strengthening clearly contributes to consolidating democratic institutions and practices.

- b) To what extent does the Project fit within collaborative efforts across technical sectors to meet USAID/Bolivia strategic objectives?

Success in improving the quality of the analyses and drafting which goes into the legislative process will result in better laws and regulations for the conduct of programs in all sectors.

- c) To what extent is there coordination among all Mission activities in democratic initiatives?

All the activities in democratic initiatives are conducted under the supervision of the same Mission Office. However, there was no coordination between the implementing agencies for each of the sub-projects.

- d) What indicators of progress in meeting strategic objectives does the Mission employ and to what extent do democratic initiative indicators contribute to such aggregate measures?

The Democratic Institutions Project serves the strategic objective of "improved effectiveness and accessibility of key democratic institutions and practices." There are two program outcomes being sought. One is "upgraded legislative functions and enhanced accountability in national and local government." The indicators of progress for this outcome are the number of congressional committees using the new legislative support services and the percentage of laws originating in Congress. The targets are to have four congressional committees use the support services in 1993 and 1994 and to have that

number increase to eight in 1995 and 1996. According to the Mission's records only two committees used the support services in 1993 and 1994 and information had not yet been compiled on the percentage of laws enacted in 1944 which originated in the legislature.

Under the program outcome of "increased citizen participation in local government and civil society" the indicators of progress being used are the number of citizen jurors trained, the number of eligible voters registered for the general and municipal elections and the number of valid votes cast. The number of jurors trained was far in excess of the target for the 1993 elections, and the number of voters registered for the 1993 elections substantially exceeded the targets. The number of valid votes cast in those elections was below the target set, but the percentage of votes cast which were found to be invalid declined.

These indicators are useful in judging the progress being made on the strategic objective. However, they are not sufficient. In the case of the electoral systems component the Mission has recognized that its attention should shift to participation at the local level and to the participation of the rural population which has been relatively absent from the electoral process and not simply focused on overall participation figures. In the case of the legislative strengthening component the targets being used do not address the utility of the services to the members rather than to the leaders of the legislature, and they do not take into account the important role the legislature has in modifying legislative proposals (such as the budget) from the executive branch as distinct from originating legislation.

- e) To what extent have Mission activities been coordinated with other donors to increase effects in the sector and to avoid duplication of effort?

Other donors have not had programs of assistance to the electoral system or to the legislative process. The sub-project for legislative process has received some support from the CAF and the OAS. Both the NEC and the Congress are now seeking support from other donor agencies for their future programs. The Mission would be advised to become an active participant in that process.

### **3. Project Implementation**

- a) To what extent is the implementation of Project activities meeting initial time lines and, if needed, have effective actions been taken to improve the pace of implementation?

The Project is not meeting the initial time lines and, indeed, the PACD has been repeatedly extended. The reasons for this are discussed in Annex C. The main action taken to improve the pace of implementation was the decision in September 1991 to use institutional implementing agencies in each of the sub-projects. The main remaining challenge is to keep SUNY focused on providing technical support to strengthening the service support units.

- b) To what extent has the Project developed and implemented adequate financial planning, tracking, reporting, and accounting systems?

The evaluators did not have sufficient time to look thoroughly at this aspect of the Project. However, our impression is that the financial planning, tracking, reporting and accounting systems have not been as thorough as would be desirable. In part this reflects the fact that the Project has been evolving and has been funded from both dollars and counterpart as they became available. This has made firm financial planning difficult. In part, the situation reflects the style of CAPEL which did not see itself as an implementing agent of A.I.D. and thus did not provide periodic progress reports. In part it reflects the decision of the A.I.D. Mission to take a low key approach to monitoring and guidance. For instance, joint reviews of progress were not held with the implementing and benefiting organizations.

- c) How effective is the formal organization, reporting and communication among key institutions (.e.g. implementing units, USAID, other donors, etc.) participating in the project? Where impediments to effective communication are found, how can they be overcome?

The formal organization of reporting and communication is weak. The informal is better. Periodic formal reviews among representatives of USAID, the implementing agencies and the benefiting organizations could help. Some additional attention could be paid to assuring that information within the Mission is more effectively communicated (See Part IV B.)

- d) What formal and informal communication channels and problem solving strategies are employed at various organizational levels? Have they been effective? Can they be improved?

See question 3 (c) above and Part IV B.

- e) Have adequate procedures been established to procure, distribute, warehouse, track, maintain and control end product use of commodities supplied through the project?

The Project (that is, the dollar funded Project) has not provided a significant number of commodities. They have been provided by counterpart funds.

- f) What implementation strategies have been established for adjusting and accommodating to changing country and USAID conditions? How effective are these strategies?

The principal implementation strategy change was the adoption of the use of institutional implementation agencies in September 1991. That was an effective strategic change. As the staffing of the Mission's work on democratic initiatives increased, as the political acceptability of the USG's working with the electoral system and the Congress became

clearer and as the need for reinforcing the technical and advice-giving work of the implementing agencies became advisable, it would have been useful for the Mission to modify somewhat its low key, indirect approach to providing direction and seeking changes in policy. This modification should be considered.

- g) To what extent have changing agendas and objectives within the National Electoral Court and the Bolivian Congress affected Project implementation, and what strategies have been established for adjusting to these changes?

The history of the implementation of the two sub-projects is provided in Annex C. The major changes in the agenda and objectives of the electoral system are its assumption of responsibility for the operation of the Civil Registry and, possibly, the RUN national identity system and the probable attempt to integrate into one system all the automated programs now being used for various functions. The major change in the agenda and objectives of the Congress is the attempt, now in process, to create a strong Office of the Vice President to which the service support functions would belong. The sub-project on legislative process is accepting this as desirable. It will have to find ways to assure that the other leaders of the Congress continue to accept and support the sub-project's efforts under those conditions.

- h) What has been the effect of strategies to promote USAID policy dialogue issues, public and private sector cooperation, and donor coordination?

The basic strategy of the Mission has been to use the institutional implementing agencies to carry out policy dialogue issues, public and private sector cooperation and donor coordination. The successes and limitations of this approach are discussed in Parts IV C and D.

- i) To what extent have the activities and presence of other donors affected implementation of the Project?

Hardly at all.

#### **4. Project Impact**

- a) To what extent has the project met overall and individual activity targets and are there differences by gender?

See the discussion in Part IV E. There is no information on which to form an opinion as to whether there are different outcomes of the activities by gender. The Project did not call for the collection of such information nor did it identify gender specific targets.

- b) Has a national baseline been established from which to measure overall project impact and impact by gender?

No formal baseline was established. The number of citizens who were registered and were voting before the Project began (1988) or began effectively (1991) might be used for the electoral system sub-project, but existing figures are not considered to be reliable.

- c) To what extent has a system for monitoring the progress of each activity and of the project as a whole in meeting milestones and improving implementation been set in place?

There are semi-annual reports of progress on achieving outputs and there is information concerning relevant conditions such as the number of persons registered and voting and the nature and number of the work-products produced by the service support offices of the Congress.

- d) To what degree has the project affected institutional strengthening and change to date? Has it improved the administration of the beneficiary institutions?

See the discussion in Parts IV C, D and E.

## **5. Project Innovations and Organizing Principles**

- a) Are the assumptions made in establishing the organizing principles still valid?

The need for institutional implementing organizations is still real. The degree to which the Mission needs to adopt a low-key, indirect manner of providing guidance and seeking change should be reconsidered. The reliance on counterpart funding for the success of the efforts may no longer be valid.

- b) Have the organizing principles been pursued actively and effectively by the technical assistance to date?

See the discussion in Part IV A.

- c) Is there evidence that local institutions have been strengthened as a result of the technical assistance to date?

See discussion in Part IV E.

- d) Given the political sensitivities involved in providing outside assistance in the electoral and legislative areas, how well has the Project prepared and implemented a strategy to secure the commitment of beneficiaries and prevent problems?

The Mission has been very sensitive to the potential problems in providing assistance to the electoral and legislative organizations. It has managed to avoid major problems while achieving progress. However, its low-key, indirect approach may have placed too much reliance on the implementing organizations in seeking changes in the electoral and

legislative organizations. Achieving sustainability of the activities may require a more active Mission involvement.

## **6. Project Monitoring and Evaluation**

- a) Is the monitoring and evaluation system for the project adequate?

This is the first evaluation conducted of the Project since it was begun in 1988. That is too long for a project to be in operation without the benefit of an independent review.

The on-going monitoring system for the legislative process sub-project could be strengthened by having periodic joint reviews of progress by representatives of the Mission, the Congress and SUNY. The system also could be strengthened by having the workplan for the balance of the life of the sub-project which is now being prepared by SUNY include in it specific targets to be achieved in each of the remaining quarters.

- b) What are the indicators and do they provide reliable data?

See discussions under 2 (d) above.

- c) Do you recommend alternative impact indicators, as appropriate?

Some indicators of impact of the legislative process sub-project which might be used are: (i) number of requests for services from the support offices from the leadership of the Congress and from the members of the Congress; (ii) level of financial support from the Congress with its own funds for the work of the service support offices; (iii) number of bills which are drafted by the service support office; (iv) degree to which fiscal and budget analyses are utilized and result in changes in pending legislation. This last indicator would need to be further elaborated to be useful. The workplan being prepared by SUNY would be a vehicle for adopting such concrete indicators.

**STATUS REPORT  
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS PROJECT  
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS - AUTOMATED VOTER REGISTRY  
PROJECT No. 511-0610**

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### Attachments:

1. List of Persons Interviewed
2. List of Documents Consulted
3. Statement of Work

**STATUS REPORT  
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS PROJECT  
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS - AUTOMATED VOTER REGISTRY  
PROJECT No. 511-0610**

**I. BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT**

In 1987, the AID Mission undertook an effort to identify the components of an automated voter registry and to identify computer hardware needs. In September 1988 the Democratic Institutions Project (511-0610) was authorized. The most pressing activity under this Project was the continued support to the electoral system.

In October 1988, AID contracted for the development of a RFQ for the acquisition of computer equipment to be used for an automated voter registration system. Upon arriving in Bolivia, the team found that the information to support the development of the RFQ was not adequate. Specific findings included the following:

The previous study had proposed systems only for the four largest Departmental Electoral Courts. This was unacceptable to the Bolivian National Electoral Court (*Corte Nacional Electoral* (NEC)). The NEC thought a partial installation would not be politically or systematically appropriate.

The to be developed RFQ was for hardware only with software development targeted as a later activity. Given the lengthy procurement process, it was thought that two separate procurement would require too much time. Additionally, AID/IRM prefers "Off-the-Shelf" software solutions over open-ended software development projects. Therefore, it was suggested that the RFQ cover both the computer equipment and the application solution in one firm-fixed price solicitation. The NEC and AID project personnel concurred with this suggestion.

The previous study's equipment and sizing recommendation was based on an information record size of approximately 100 characters and did not define the functionality of the system (since the application was to be developed later no functional description was available). A preliminary review by the team determined that the manual voter registration process captured between 300 and 400 characters of information.

The previous study had no verifiable estimates for the number of records to reside on each system nor estimates for growth.

The previous study used terminology that was suggestive of a specific computer manufacturer.

Due to the above factors, the RFQ development team determined that the previous study could not be used as a basis for the to-be-developed RFQ. Since the team had contracted for the development and delivery of a RFQ, it took immediate steps to gather the information necessary to complete its obligation. These steps included the following:

Reviewing electoral laws.

Gathering data from the NEC on the previous elections' registration totals and vote counts.

Reviewing the electoral registration process from the step of registering with an Electoral Registrar to the step of preparing the voting table for vote casting.

Meeting with the NEC to validate the findings.

Meeting with the NEC to define, refine, or validate automated processes to replace manual processes.

Meeting with the NEC to define, refine, or validate expected registration totals and growth estimates.

The outputs from these steps were working papers consisting of a functional description, a functional specification, and sizing spreadsheets. These were used in preparing the RFQ. Information contained in the workpapers was included in the RFQ as SECTION 4 SCOPE OF WORK and SECTION 5 TECHNICAL DISCUSSION.

The draft RFQ was completed and submitted to USAID/Bolivia in January 1989. On December 8, 1989, the Bolivia Ministry of Planning and Coordination, through their purchasing agent, the United Nations Development Program, Office for Project Services, (UNDP/OSP) released Bidding Invitation No. OPS/BOL/044/250, ACQUISITION OF COMPUTATION EQUIPMENT: MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES TO AUTOMATE THE BOLIVIAN NATIONAL VOTER REGISTRATION. This invitation had an original due date of February 8, 1990 but a subsequent one month extension changed the due date to March 1990.

On February 19, 1990, an evaluation team under contract to the UNDP/OSP came to Bolivia to evaluate the to-be-submitted bids and to make a recommendation to the UNDP. On approximately February 23, 1990, the evaluation team held a final question and answer session with representatives of bidding companies. One major concern of the prospective bidders was that of bidding a fixed-price figure for the data capture tasks. The UNDP representative and the evaluation team made a determination that the price of the data capture tasks would not be part of the price evaluation. However, it was stated to the prospective bidders that if the selected bidder had included data capture costs in their bid, then they would have first-right-of-negotiation for the data capture tasks. If no data capture prices were submitted, then the UNDP could select a company to perform those services using normal selection processes.

On March 8, 1990, 15 bids from 9 companies were received. From March 9, 1990 through March 23, 1990 the evaluation team reviewed the bids and developed the findings and recommendation report. The evaluation process was audited by AID/IRM to ensure compliance to the evaluation factors and equally of consideration to all bids. The final report recommended the selection of DIMA LTD., a Bolivian firm, to implement the *Registro Justo de Votantes* (RJV).

In June 1990, a member of the RFQ development team met with DIMA in La Paz, Bolivia. The purpose of the visit was to review the technical aspects of the system with DIMA and to clarify any misunderstandings.

## **II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT (as amended)**

### **A. Purpose**

The development and installation of an automated system that will meet the Bolivian electoral law in establishing a permanent and current voter registry. It is to permit screening and identification of multiple registrants, so as to reduce opportunities for voting fraud.

### **B. Outputs**

Computer equipment, computer programs, program documentation, procedural documents as related to steps necessary to run the system, and procedural documents as related to steps necessary to create and distribute registration lists for publication and voting lists to voting locations.

### **C. Inputs**

Source RFQ, requirements of the NEC stated as system needs.

### **D. End of Project Status**

System is installed and operational with approximately 2.3 million voter registrants in the database.

### **E. Prospective Extension and Expansion**

Provide for the system to interrogate the RUN system or any installed Civil Registry system.

### **III. HISTORY OF IMPLEMENTATION STEPS TAKEN**

On January 31, 1991, a contract was signed between the Bolivia Ministry of Planning and Coordination and DIMA LTD. This contract was for the equipment and services as bid by DIMA LTD. in response to the RFQ and to changes negotiated between the parties.

During June 1991, a member of the RFQ development and Bid evaluation team visited the DIMA project team in La Paz, Bolivia. At this time all equipment was in-country but had not been installed in the Departments or the NEC. DIMA's understanding of the technical issues and approach was reviewed.

A pilot system of RJV was installed in the Santa Cruz Department for the 1991 Municipal Elections. During 1991 and 1992 the equipment was installed in all DEC's and the NEC.

During 1991, 1992, and 1993 the data from the Voter Registration Books was inputted to the databases in each of the 10 Department systems and an additional 700,000 registrations were recorded due to voter registration drives for a total registration population of 2.3 million.

### **IV. MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS TO DATE**

In computer systems that are operational every day a count of the successes can be very high. For systems that balance bank statements a success is each correctly balanced account, for systems that assist airplanes a success is each uneventful takeoff and landing but, for voter registration systems such as RJV, the count of successes is small because the system is only visible during an election process. In Bolivia this translates to three times in a four year period. If achievements are measured by the number of times a system runs then to-date the RJV can only claim three successes or major achievements; namely:

- Pilot test in Santa Cruz during the 1991 Municipal Elections,
- System used nationwide for the 1993 General Election, and
- System used nationwide for the 1993 Municipal Elections.

However, in voter registrations systems the achievements are not the number of times it runs but the number of citizens that participate in the privilege and right of voicing their opinion in the selection of individuals who will govern and lead their municipality and country and the number of times persons trying to devalue the honest vote through invalid voting are stopped. In measuring these achievements the RJV can point to 2.3 million achievements from the voter registration of 1993 and it can count 200,000 achievements in the identification of fraudulent registrations prior to the 1993 General Elections. In the future it will count an additional

2,000,000 successes as the 18 year olds are given the right to vote and as the rural undocumented are recognized through the efforts of the RUN system and then exercise their rights to register to vote and have their say on election day.

The RJV can also claim as an achievement the change in the Electoral Law providing for a one time registration rather than the previous requirement to register prior to each election. This change aids those persons who would be placed in a hardship situation where they have to travel to register and then a month later travel to vote. Now, as long as a person participates in the election process their registration remains valid.

In all interviews conducted where the person was asked their evaluation of the RJV voter registration system all agreed that it was one of the most important achievements in Bolivia's continued strengthening of the democratic processes. Those interviewed included not only the NEC and some DEC personnel who may be justifiably proud of their achievement but, interviews included legislative persons, the past President of the Lower House, and the present Vice-President of Bolivia. All agreed that RJV was an unqualified success.

## **V. MAJOR PROBLEMS TO DATE**

The activities of the Court and DIMA have been conducted with no auditing oversight by the sponsor (Ministry of Planning and Coordination), the procurement agency (UNDP), or the AID/Bolivia project team. The AID Project had attempted to place a person in an oversight/auditing role, but financial negotiations for the service were unsuccessful. When it was known that the negotiations with the person were not going to be successful, the Project should have found another party or requested assistance from AID/IRM. Because no third party auditor was present, no formal test and acceptance procedure was performed. The absence of a formal test and acceptance procedure was not a fatal omission but, some of the difficulties discovered in the past two years could have been identified much earlier.

### **A. Computer Equipment**

There have been three problems with the computer equipment.

1. The tape cartridge system of the Departmental Court systems are not compatible with the tape system on the NEC system (and vice versa). The source RFQ called for the proposed configurations to have media that would permit the exchange of data between the NEC and the DECs. DIMA now claims that the 3.5 inch floppy drives were proposed as this media. The evaluation team believed the proposed tape cartridge system was the media to be used. In support of the evaluation team is the fact that if the floppy disk was the media, then the tape system did not have to be proposed. This condition should be corrected.

2. The systems at the NEC and the largest DEC's rapidly outgrew their capacity. The sizing specified in the source RFQ was based on the registrations for the 1985 elections with 10% growth for 1989 and 1993. Given 1.6 million registrants in 1985 the system was minimally sized for 1.9 million registrants in 1993. However, the success in the voter registration area resulted in a 1993 General Election registration of 2.2 to 2.3 million persons. This figure completely overwhelmed the in-place systems capacities. During 1993 additional mass storage devices were acquired to accommodate the increased requirement but, an addition burden will be placed on the systems next year due to a change in the Bolivian voter laws. The new law lowers the voting age to 18. This will add an estimated 700,000 to 1,000,000 new registrants to the voter registration system. The capacity of the system will have to be increased.

3. During the 1993 General Election a problem occurred in Santa Cruz where the names of registered voters did not appear in the voter list at the voter's assigned table. The NEC estimates this problem affected not more than 500 people. An investigation by the NEC identified the physical cause as a situation where the last name contained a tilde. When the tilde code was sent to the printer it caused the printer to print a blank line and skip printing the registrant's information. Since this problem did not occur in all departments it would appear that the condition was caused by some action taken by the computer staff in the Santa Cruz Department. During the team's interviews we were told that shortly before the General Election, the Santa Cruz Department lost their experienced system person to the private sector and the operations of the system was delegated to a less experienced person. The loss of staff to the higher paying private sector or the inability to attract qualified staff due to low wages, appears to be a problem that affects both the National and Departmental Courts. At the time of this evaluation the NEC had no information systems staff assigned to the voter registration system. This situation may also be compounded by a different prioritizing of systems by the present court over the court that left in 1991. The previous NEC's agenda gave the highest priority to the creation and implementation of a voter registration system with other systems to follow. The present NEC stated that the first priority is vote counting systems. In light of this it is normal that given a limited budget, more resources will be given to the higher priority system.

## **B. Relations with DIMA and NEOTEC**

1. During the period of June 1991 to August 1991, DIMA developed a systems specification document it called a "PRE-CARPETA". This document contained table descriptions, table relationships, screen formats, and report formats. DIMA's intent was to present this document to the NEC for review and approval. Changes requested by the NEC would be recorded in this document. In August 1991 a new NEC was appointed and approved. DIMA met with the Court and presented their Pre-Carpeta. The Court instructed DIMA to stop work on the design and development while the Pre-Carpeta was reviewed. However, at the same time the Court instructed a third-party to develop, within two weeks, a product that could be shown to the press and the political parties. A considerable amount of the specifications used in the third party effort was data from the DIMA Pre-Carpeta.

2. A concern, if not a problem, is the lack of documentation. Since August 1991 the NEC has made changes to the original specifications. DIMA LTD. agreed to a fix-price product based on the specifications contained in the source RFQ and their bid. While the NEC may request changes from DIMA and DIMA may agree to the changes, any such changes should have been re-negotiated as part of the legal contract signed by the Minister of Planning and Cooperation and DIMA LTD. The NEC did request changes to the software and DIMA made those changes to the software and recorded the changes in their Pre-Carpeta, but the NEC to-date has not signed the Pre-Carpeta. DIMA, believing that the system has not received final approval because the Pre-Carpeta has not been signed, has not delivered system documentation.

3. The NEC 'vocal' responsible for Information Technology, the Director of the Information Committee, voiced a concern that the NEC is dependent on one contractor (DIMA) for support to the RJV. This dependency was verified when the evaluation team received a demonstration of the system. The NEC has no trained staff and had to rely on DIMA to run the system. However, our review identified other instances where the institution has made itself dependent of one contractor (NEOTEC). The SIMONEL vote counting system was developed by NEOTEC using a DBMS developed by NEOTEC named SID. The Director has stated he wants to re-write the RJV and RUN using the SID DBMS, and at present NEOTEC is developing the NEC accounting system using SID. To our knowledge NEOTEC is the only consulting company in the world with SID knowledge and expertise. Compounding this situation is the fact that the owner and Director General of NEOTEC is the son of NEC's Director of the Information Committee. This existing family relationship may provide rich soil for a political campaign to discredit the NEC through apparent charges of conflict of interest or worse.

### **C. Timing of Voter Registration**

An area that causes problems in system processing is the timing of voter registration. When the original system was designed there were two assumptions: one, a person would only register once and re-registration would be required only if the person moved or if they were dropped from the voter rolls after not voting in consecutive elections and two, the restrictive 90 day registration period would be eliminated. The first condition has been met. The second condition has not yet been implemented. During the 1993 General Election information to be entered into the Departmental Systems was being submitted for entry up to the day before the election. This did cause problems in the Cochabamba and La Paz Departments. The volume of data will be less in the next election since 2.3 million people will not have to re-register, but the limited time between the close of registration and election day does not permit processing by both the Departmental Courts to check validity within its database and processing by the NEC to check validity across Departments.

### **D. Publication of Voter Registration List**

The final outstanding issue is the production and publication of the Voter Registration List. Although the project has not been problem free, none of the problems were serious enough to unduly delay or prevented the achievement of the Project's purpose, the creation of an automated

voter registration system and its fully operational status and use in elections. This has been achieved and demonstrated in both nationwide General Elections and the local Municipal Elections. The one blemish marring an otherwise unqualified success is the failure of the NEC to publish the voter registration list as required by Bolivian law. Sizing of the system can not be the problem because the NEC did load the full voter database (2.3 million records) for the June 1993 General Election and performed validity checks on all the registrants. The NEC has stated that the list must be an official list without errors when it is published. This is an impossibility since errors can not be corrected until the public has an opportunity to see and validate the entries on the list. The NEC told members of the evaluation team that the list will be published not later than October 31, 1994.

## **VI. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE**

### **A. Meeting Project Targets**

Voter registration. Critical to the project is printing the voter registration lists which has not yet occurred for technical, staffing, and philosophical reasons. An issue to be resolved is the divergent views between the Project team's desire to let the public have access to the lists before full filtering has taken place, and the management of the NEC desire to "purify" the list before publication. Additionally, an upgrade of hardware and a reconstruction of a solid Information Resources Management organization within NEC must occur.

Voter participation. Improving the voter participation in the elections of 1995, will necessitate the recreation and support of organizational units to conduct mass media motivation/education campaigns. The vote counting procedures appear to have been strengthened with the use of the software package SIMONEL in the 1993 elections. Assuming that the system will be utilized in 1995, it should satisfy one of the objectives of the project

Information management and technology. The resolution of information technology/information management issues has become one of the critical success factors for the NEC and for the future of the project. How well the present systems of voter registration and voter counting are supported and utilized in the elections of 1995 will determine the success of the project. From a technical point of view, the following will limit the probability of success, unless some corrective measures are taken:

- The present computer at the NEC is undersized to handle all the computational requirements necessary to apply the filters to the present database (2.2 million of registered voters) and will not be able to handle the predicted increase of 1 million potential voters due to the change in the electoral law (allowing 18 year olds to vote).
- Some of the microcomputers at the Departmental Courts (Sta. Cruz, Cochabamba, La Paz) will need to be upgraded to handle the predicted increase in voters.

- All the micros will need significant increases in hard disk capacity.
- The whole "Informatica" function of NEC must be recreated from scratch. Just prior to the evaluation team visit to the NEC all the staff had left either for better salaries in the private sector, or had been fired.
- Training for Departmental Systems administrators, and programmer/analysts at NEC as well as the DEC's will be a continuing need.

## **B. Achieving Institutionalization**

A paradox exists. The Automated Voter Registry system must be considered a success since it registered 2.2 million voters in the elections of 1993, and its existence provided an increased degree of credibility to the political process, the NEC/DECs, and the GOB. However the present NEC 'vocal', responsible for Information Technology, is not happy with the system and would like to replace it with an integrated system. Furthermore the reasons listed by the Director:- undersized computers, unfriendly operating system (Ultrix and Xenix), dependency on one single consultant (DIMA) for technical support, inability to support DOS front- end applications, incompatibility of tape drives between the DEC's micros and the NEC unix box - are all valid from a technical point of view. To these we would add; non-existent user documentation; and non-user-friendly interface. However, in spite of all these shortcomings the system works well and there is qualified staff available to support it. In a visit to the La Paz Rural DEC we were very impressed with technical staff and its knowledge and ability with the system.

Thus, from a strategic point of view the technical members of the evaluation team agree with the need in the long run to integrate all the systems into a rational information architecture. The additional duties incurred by the NEC, the Civil Registry function, and the proposed acquisition of the RUN system creates, from an Information Technology point of view, a nightmare. In the near future the NEC will be responsible for different computer environments such as DEC UNIX and Xenix for RJV and IBM RISC6000 for RUN; different Data Base Management Systems , Unify for RJV, Informix for the RUN system, and the DOS based SIMONEL system using a system developed in Bolivia using a DBMS called SID that only one single company, NEOTEC, supports.

However, the team takes exception both to the timing and target information architecture proposed by the Director of the *Comision de Informatica* of NEC. It would be an almost disastrous step to attempt to migrate the present voter registry system (RJV) to another machine environment and data-base management system BEFORE the elections of 1995, when at the present time NEC has no dedicated computer staff other than its capable manager and two junior members borrowed from the Auditing unit of the NEC. Furthermore, to use as the underpinning Data Base Management System for the Voter Registry, the Civil Registry, RUN and the voter counting system a DBMS (SID) developed by a small local consulting firm, lacking

documentation, national trained staff, or the required infrastructure that a mature off-the-shelf commercial software offers, would put in jeopardy advances that the NEC/DECs achieved in 1993.

Thus, to shore up the gains achieved so far, assure a successful 1995 election, with a potential 1,000,000 new voters, and protect the institution from a potential failure the NEC is faced with the paradox of needing to sustain a system that is not optimal for the requirements of the future. Critical to the institutionalization of the RJV, is the creation of a strong viable Information Technology organization, capable of maintaining and operating a very complex architecture (Unix, Xenix, DOS, AIX, SID and Windows) and providing technical support and training to the DECs. To achieve this the NEC must have strong support from the GOB, DIFEM, USAID's present as well future projects, and local consulting firms.

### **C. Achieving Financial Sustainability**

Without financial nurturing from the GOB to rectify low salaries of the technical staff, instill a sense of job security, assure budget lines for maintenance of computer systems, and provide maintenance of critical applications - there is little or no possibility of achieving institutional sustainability at a satisfactory level of performance.

DIFEM funds that were critical in 1993 (approximately U.S. \$1.5 million) for technical resources as well as voter registration drives, and voter education, dried up 1994. Funding of these activities will be required in 1995! It is doubtful that the NEC and DECs can be ready for the 1995 elections without immediate short term assistance from USAID (about \$100,000). This assistance is needed to increase the capacity of the present computer configuration of the Voter Registration system in the NEC as well as the DECs.

Although the NEC receives some income from its function of maintaining the Civil Registry (about Bs 17 Millions in 1993), the predicted income will not be adequate to cover all the responsibilities assigned to the institution. Furthermore, by absorbing the RUN system, the NEC is inheriting a financial albatross. Not only will funds be required to correct the problems that the last donor left unresolved, but funds are required to complete the goal of identifying and documenting the remaining rural population. So far the RUN has only produced 500,000 identity cards out of an estimated population of 1.8 million.

### **D. Relationship to New AID Project**

One of the components of the new project is to assure that the printing by municipality of the registered voters and other desirable information takes place. This outcome of the project will partially depend on how healthy the RJV is and how viable the departments of *Informatica* at the NEC and DECs are. Thus, the capacity of the institutions to resolve information technology as well as information management issues, becomes a critical success factor for this new project. The size of the information technology component could easily surpass the initial \$500,000 earmarked for the endeavor.

A challenge for the new project will be how to assist the NEC in automation issues, partially because of the intended integration of the RUN system to the other systems of the NEC, and the nature of RUN (photo and fingerprinting of individuals).

Because the new project will also have an automation component in legislature, it will become almost a necessity that among the staff of the new technical assistance team one of the members be a seasoned senior analyst in Information Technology.

## **VII. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. For NEC/DECs**

1. Confronting the challenge of registering 1,000,000 new voters, and to minimize the problems similar to those that occurred in the June 1993 general election where the time gap between the last day of registration and voting day was too short resulting in massive data entry problems, we recommend that the NEC explore a change in the voting law for the elections of 1995. This change in the law would allow for the continuous registration of voters. This change would perhaps increase the rural participation by allowing more time for voter registration drives.
2. The GOB must normalize the civil service status of the NEC staff thus assuring that the NEC/DECs will be able to staff and keep a competent cadre of technical staff.
3. The NEC Information Systems unit must at least have the following personnel:
  - 1 Unix system administrator,
  - 1 Novell LAN administrator,
  - 1 Data Base Administrator with some experience in Unify or similar DBMS,
  - 2 technical support staff dedicated to support the DEC's systems administrators and users (must know some Xenix and DOS; one of them would be on the road providing hands-on support),
  - 1 senior systems analyst, and
  - 2 programmers (one of them should have experience in Unify, the other in DOS/Windows based decision support tools).
4. The NEC should undertake, with technical support from a well respected consulting entity, the formulation of a Strategic Information Systems Plan. The Strategic Plan is critical to help resolve key information architecture issues, and set the priorities for the allocation of limited resources. (A suggested scope of work is provided in Attachment 3.)
5. The NEC should not attempt to migrate the present RJV system to a different machine and language environment before the 1995 elections.

6. The NEC should upgrade as soon as possible its present DEC 3100 Microvax to an DEC Alpha machine, to be able to sort, filter and print the present registry of voters data base.
7. To improve the productivity of its programmers the NEC also should acquire, even as a temporary measure, ACCEL which is, a UNIFY add-on productivity tool.
8. We recommend that the present NEC Microvax be transferred to the La Paz DEC and new 486 micros be procured for the following DEC's. Cochabamba, Sta Cruz, Sala Murillo, Sala Provincias, as well as for the NEC so it can run a copy of the DEC software to provide adequate technical assistance. In addition, we strongly recommend a massive upgrade of the hard disks of all the present machines to at least 500 MB.
9. The NEC should procure and install in its new machine a tape drive compatible with the one the DEC's machines have installed (Irwin 80)
10. The NEC also should procure a new version of the present Novell LAN software, and miscellaneous decision support tools (e.g. statistical package, project management software, etc).
11. The NEC should undertake a massive training program to benefit the technical staff of the DEC's as well as NEC staff, since a large turnover occurs frequently. The training should consist of a package including: Basic Unix administration, DOS, Unify, PC maintenance. The systems administrators in the DEC's should be able to change a board on a micro, or add memory, or a new device controller without the assistance of outside consultants.
12. The NEC should require that both consulting firms, DIMA and NEOTEC, which have developed key applications provide a full set of user documentation and program documentation.
13. The NEC management must make an effort to assure that its 1995 budget not only includes maintenance of computer equipment, but also maintenance of its key applications. The NEC should not expect and/or demand from the software firms that developed applications, free technical support and /or programming maintenance.

#### **B. For DIMA**

1. While commending the professionalism of the firm in continuing to provide technical support even though payment were in some cases late or non existent, we strongly recommend that the firm complete and deliver the user documentation of the RJV.
2. DIMA should make an effort to implement improved user friendly screens in any new release of the RJV.

### C. For USAID

1. The project team may want to reconsider the tactical objectives of the proposed extension of the present Project to reprogram a \$100,000 "life vest" in commodities and services for NEC. Without an upgrading the present computer configuration of the NEC and DEC's it is doubtful that voter registration can absorb the predicted 1,000,000 new voters, creating a potential debilitating political crisis
2. USAID may wish to enter in a policy dialogue with GOB re the wisdom of having the NEC inherit the RUN system. It is doubtful that at this stage of its evolution the NEC could absorb the RUN system and its functional role, without debilitating its other key functions. Furthermore, a model where the citizen is considered an economic entity (contributing to the GNP) as well as a political entity, may at this juncture have a better fit with the national agenda, more so in light of the proposed redistribution of wealth due to the privatization of some government enterprises
3. In the design of the new project, where the participation triangles are playing a key role, the intended creation of additional municipalities will create additional demands on the "padron", thus creating additional needs on the computing capabilities of the system. This will require the resizing of the NEC component of the new project.
4. The ability of the NEC TO deliver a clean voter registry list in 1995 is one of the critical success factors of the new project. The new project design team may want to explore ways to nurture the institution, and perhaps play a role of ombudsmanship in persuading key GOB institutions to increase their support of the NEC. The present state of neglect by some GOB institutions of the NEC must be replaced by active financial and organizational support.

**LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED**

**USAID/La Paz**

Walter Guevara, ODI Deputy Director  
Carl Cira, ODI Director  
Eduardo Mendiola, DI Project Coordinator  
Peter Natiello, Project Design Officer  
Anne Beasley, Evaluation Officer  
Yamil Cardenas, Information Technology Manager

**CORTE NATIONAL ELECTORAL (NEC)**

Ivan Guzman de Rojas,, Vocal  
Jorge Lazarte, Vocal  
Huascar Cajias, President  
Alcira Espinoza, Vice President  
Alfredo Bacangel, Vocal

Amalia Aliaga, Auditor and acting chief for Informatica  
Franklin Ergueta Lazo, Director Administrativo Financiero

**CORTE DEPARTMENTAL ELECTORAL (DEC) of La PAZ, SALA PROVINCIAS**

Federico Troche, Vocal  
Eugenio Condor, Chief of Informatica

**REGISTRO UNICO NACIONAL (RUN)**

Marcelo Penaranda, Director

**DIMA**

Marcelo Vergara, Project Manager for the DIMA/NEC Project

**NEOTEC**

Marcel Guzman de Rojas, Manager and Designer of SIMONEL and SID

**LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED**

CDSS:" Bolivia Country Development Strategy Statement 1989-1993", USAID/La Paz, April 1988

Project Paper: "Democratic Institutions Project" 511-0610, USAID/La Paz, Aug. 1988

Project Paper: "Democratic Institution Project- Amendment Number 1" 511-0610, USAID/La Paz, Sept 1991

Project Status Reports: "Democratic Institutions Project (511-0610)  
Oct. 1, 1993-March 31, 1994 "USAID/La Paz

Bidding Invitation OPS/DOL/044/250: "Acquisition of Computation Equipment: Materials, Equipment and Services to Automate the Bolivian National Voter Registration" UNDP, La Paz Bolivia, Dec 1989

Pre-Carpeta: "Proyecto Sistem de Registro Nacional de Votantes de Bolivia" DIMA, La Paz, Feb 1991

Report: "Informe Final del Program de Asistencia Tecnica Bolivia 1991-1994" IIDH/CAPEL, April 1994

Report: "Informe Final del Program de Asistencia Tecnica ANEXOS Bolivia 1991-1994", IIDH/CAPEL, April 1994

Report: "Informe de la Mision de Observacion Elecciones Generales Bolivia Junio de 1993", IIDH/CAPEL, Aug 1993

Report: "Evaluacion, Diagnostico y Recomendaciones Sobre la Tarea realizada por las Cortes Electorales de la Republica de Bolivia con motivo de las elecciones generales celebradas el 6 de Junio de 1993", IIDH/CAPEL, Aug. 1993

Report: "Informe N. 3 de Mision Tecnica, Elecciones Municipales 1993, Corte Nacional Electoral Republica de Bolivia", IIDH/CAPEL, Nov. 1993

Guide: "Manual de Organizacion y Funciones del Sistema de Cortes Electorales de Bolivia", CORTE NACIONAL ELECTORAL, La Paz, Nov. 1993

## STATEMENT OF WORK

### I. Background

As a result of the recent information technology evaluation conducted by external consultants, a recommendation was made to the Bolivian National Electoral Court (NEC) to formulate a Strategic Information System Plan. This plan is considered as a critical success factor to resolve key information architecture issues and set priorities for the allocation of limited resources.

### II. Objectives

Define and prepare an Information Technology Strategic Plan for the National Electoral Court of Bolivia. The plan should include the IT initiatives that NEC should undertake within the next five years to support its institutional mission, goals, and objectives.

### III. Tasks and Deliverables

In meeting proposed objective, successful IT consulting services (CS) should identify critical information needs for the Bolivian National Electoral Court (NEC) to support its mission, goals, and objectives. Based on the information needs analysis, the CS should define a portfolio of applications and an information technology architecture that support strategic objectives. NEC will create a technical committee to work in conjunction with successful CS during the execution of tasks and activities and will evaluate and approve partial and final deliveries.

The CS should evaluate the Voter and Civil Registry functions and define an information technology strategy to eliminate duplication of effort and data redundancy. Based on the analysis of information needs, the CS should identify functional requirements at a macro level, a conceptual design for each application, and an institutional hardware and software architecture to support the implementation. The following critical tasks and deliverables should be included as a minimum in the work plan by successful CS:

#### Task 1. Information needs assessment

The CS should review the existing NEC functional infrastructure, NEC mission, goals, and objectives. The CS then should identify critical activities, success factors, and information needs to support NEC objective. In addition, the CS should identify possible changes in current NEC organization dealing with information management and information technology and staffing requirements. The CS then should assess current IT infrastructure and determine information gaps. Based on this analysis, it should identify functional requirements at a macro level for each NEC functional area.

Deliverable: Information Needs Assessment for NEC.

## Task 2. Alternatives to fill the information gaps

The CS should identify alternatives to fill information gaps, taking into account institutional capability to absorb information technology resources, host country technology development, and resource availability. Best on the analysis of alternatives, the CS should propose a hardware, software, and a communication architecture to support the implementation of IT initiatives, and define which IT standards, policies, and procedures are necessary to ensure successful implementation. The CS should determine the approach for implementation from functional and operational points of view (centralized versus decentralized approach)

Deliverable: Alternatives to meet NEC information needs

## Task 3. Recommendation of best alternative and definition of applications portfolio for the NEC

Based on the two previous deliverables, the CS should prepare the applications portfolio to meet NEC information needs. For each application the CS should determine the strategy for development and implementation (off-the-shelf versus in-house development), and evaluate which resources (both internal and external) are needed to support implementation and integration requirements. Consultant should determine the priority of implementation based on contribution of these applications to strategic objectives. A plan for implementation should be prepared based on priorities and availability of resources.

Deliverable: IT Strategic Plan

## IV. Qualifications

The CS to carry out the IT strategic plan should lead the effort and propose a team composition to conduct the analysis. The CS will be responsible for managing and coordination the execution of tasks and preparing deliverables. Qualifications for this CS are:

- Experience in management and coordination of tasks for preparing IT strategic plans
- Experience in system analysis and design of complex systems
- Experience in Elections Information Systems (desirable)
- Spanish language capability

## V. Level of Effort

3-4 Person-weeks should be adequate to complete the tasks defined above and prepare task deliverables.

**NOTE:** Since the presence or not of the RUN will play a critical role in defining the overall Information Architecture of the NEC, this task should start only after the GOB and/or the Legislature decide if the *Registro Unico Nacional* (RUN) will be part of or not of the NEC portfolio of duties and responsibilities.

**Annex F**

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**EVALUATION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS PROJECT (511-0610)  
LEGISLATIVE PROGRESS**

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**EVALUATION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS PROJECT (511-0610)  
LEGISLATIVE PROGRESS**

**I. BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT**

This Project was authorized on August 31, 1988 with an original Project Completion Date (PACD) of December 31, 1989. The Project was subsequently amended to increase funds for a Life of Project (LOP) authorized total of \$3,000,000 and to extend the PACD to December 31, 1994.

The Project was authorized in response to the remarkable development of Bolivian Democracy during the ten years from 1977 to 1987. Despite serious setbacks, such as the 1980 Garcia Meza Coup, there was overall democratic development throughout the 1980s. Congress was the center of consensus and political compromise, but was deficient in carrying out its law making and oversight functions. The Judiciary and the Electoral Courts remained as secondary players, subject to Executive interference, and exposed to scandal for caving in to political and other pressures. Under these conditions, the checks and balances mandated by the Bolivian Constitution of 1967 were not effective.

**Growing Reform Movement**

To understand its nature and conduct the Project must be placed within the context of Bolivian politics and the evolution of political institutions since 1985. While it can generally be stated that Bolivian political institutions were in absolute disarray --especially during the initial period of transition to democracy-- it is also true that an inter party reformist current was evident in the legislature. Between 1985 and 1989 an activist group proposed significant changes in electoral laws, internal rules of order, and the like. During a good portion of the 1980s, despite its attempts at reform, this group of reformers could not muster enough political strength to secure changes. As is often the case in multiparty systems, reformist legislators spent more time dealing with political disputes than with developing a serious agenda for reform. It should also be noted that the fast pace of market-oriented reforms and the other priorities of the ruling coalition did not allow a serious attempt to modernize Congress to get underway.

When the political leadership of Congress changed hands in 1989, the prospects for reform in the legislature improved considerably. The inauguration of Vice President Luis Ossio Sanjinés produced several changes. Ossio had a long legislative career and formed part of the group of reformers. As Vice President and as President of Congress, Ossio championed reforms in the legislature and worked closely with the legislators from the major parties toward modernizing the legislative assembly. He was aided by the re-election of the reformist legislators mentioned above. Throughout his tenure, the Vice President made several international trips to secure

support for his attempts to modernize Congress. During one of these trips, he approached the International Parliamentary Union (IPU) and requested international assistance to modernize the legislature. The IPU was helpful in making the Bolivian request broadly known; and, in some measure, the interest put forth by the Congress coincided with the planning of the Mission.

### **Role of SUNY**

The Legislative portion of the Project could not proceed without an adequate implementation agency. Early Mission attempts centered on the Consortium for Legislative Development (CLD), but these efforts did not prosper. Vice President Ossio expressed a preference to work directly with a U.S. university given the excellent reputation enjoyed by several of these institutions in Bolivia. Moreover, Ossio believed that a university would be perceived as purely technical and a-political. During one of his trips to the United States, Ossio met with representatives of the State University of New York (SUNY) who impressed him enough to warrant an invitation to present an offer to provide technical assistance to modernize the Bolivian Congress. The State University of New York (SUNY), through its Office of International Programs (OIP) presented a proposal which was accepted in 1992.

SUNY entered into a cooperative agreement with USAID/Bolivia in September 1992. Additional subcontracts were also signed subsequently. In addition to USAID funds the Project was funded through a *Convenio de Financiamiento e Implementation* (CIF) with the *Dirección de Financiamiento y Monetización* (DIFEM). USAID funding was to cover all U.S. expenses, the hiring of international consultants, and allowances for SUNY's in-country Project Director. Bolivian funds were to be used to pay office costs including employee salary and benefits, Bolivian travel to training seminars, and equipment. An additional CIF was signed to pay for additional equipment and the hiring of professional staff. Over the life of the project, delays in the disbursement of DIFEM funds has been an ongoing struggle that caused delays in several of SUNY/Bolivia's proposed activities. Even at the outset of the program local SUNY staff was not hired owing to disbursement delays. Unless some other mechanism is found to cover SUNY's costs in Bolivia, this will be an ongoing problem that may threaten the short-term sustainability of the Project.

In late 1992 SUNY inaugurated its activities in Bolivia with a team visit to evaluate the Bolivian budgetary process and to respond to a request from the then Vice President of Bolivia who had previously visited with members of SUNY in New York. In October a series of seminars on the budgetary process were held for members of Congress. A report written in Spanish and English subsequently was used to develop a fiscal handbook.

In early 1993, SUNY opened its offices in La Paz, hired a project director, a Bolivian consultant, and a staff. It then moved ahead with plans to hire a professional staff for the OPT. Moreover, a second SUNY Fiscal Team arrived in Bolivia in January to observe the budget process in operation. The team also met with Vice President Luis Ossio's Working Group for the

Modernization of the Congress, a multiparty, bicameral unit established to guide the operation of the *Centro de Investigación del Congreso Nacional* (CICON). At the time only the *Oficina Técnica del Presupuesto* (OPT) was in operation.

SUNY moved ahead with plans to establish two other additional units including, a bill drafting and research component. Within its scope of work SUNY brought a series of experts to provide diagnoses of congressional needs. In general, congressional opinion is that most of the seminars were worthwhile although poorly attended. Written reports were provided in late 1993.

While the objective of SUNY was to provide technical assistance, its role evolved into a full fledged lobbying effort. At different times, the SUNY team in Bolivia has worked the halls of Congress in an attempt to secure support for both the restructuring of the OPT, the creation of other units, and the long-term sustainability of the Project. A point needs to be made here about this role. Members of Congress are comfortable with the presence of a U.S. based university and almost consider it high time that the legislative branch has benefitted from the expertise of foreign advisers. In the view of many in Congress, SUNY provides a legitimate channel for U.S. funding. This apparently is also the view of the USAID mission in Bolivia.

### **Office of Budget Analysis**

During this period the Bolivian Congress established the *Oficina Técnica de Presupuesto* (OPT) to provide budgetary analysis for members of Congress. Subsequently SUNY experts helped restructure the unit. Initially, the OPT was directed by the president of the fiscal commission of the lower house. It produced a series of technical reports for members of Congress.

Owing to the fact that the OPT was dependent on the president of the fiscal commission in the lower house, some congressional members accused Jorge Torres Obleas, then president of the commission, of using the OPT to further his political career. While this perception may have been in error, linking the OPT to one member of Congress and channelling all requests for information and support through the commission he chaired gave at least the impression that the new unit was intended to serve at best only the chair of the Economic Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. Torres Obleas's role also triggered complaints from members of the Senate about the linkages of the OPT to a single lower house committee and its chair. It is important to note, however, that this role reflects a basic and common political reality within any legislative assembly. Deputies in leadership positions utilize resources to support their own political careers.

The OPT functioned most of the 1992-1993 period under the modality described above. Deputy Jorge Torres Obleas became a passionate advocate of the office and was instrumental in guiding the process along. With the hiring of Francisco Sánchez -- a U.S. based person who had worked with Michigan's non-partisan Senate Fiscal Agency and who had been a part of SUNY's fiscal consultant team that visited Bolivia in October 1992 -- as project director in January 1993 the

restructuring of the OPT got under way. SUNY also hired Luis Luna, a political analyst and adviser to the president of the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies, as a consultant to the project. Mr. Luna was subsequently hired as SUNY/Bolivia's assistant director.

The inauguration and subsequent restructuring of the OPT, coincided with a very contested campaign during the 1993 general elections. Complaints by the then opposition MNR that Deputy Torres refused to make the OPT information available must be placed within this context. In any event, the electoral process and outcome had an impact on the evolution of the legislative support units.

Following the June 6, 1993 elections, Deputy Torres Obleas and his party lost their bid for re-election and the project faced a short period of uncertainty. Leadership at the OPT was left vacant and in the interim period congressional leaders asked Mr. Sánchez of SUNY to direct the unit on an interim basis until a new director could be found. Mr. Sánchez, a U.S. national, expressed some concern over this new role especially because it involved access to sensitive Bolivian data. Mr. Sánchez informed the evaluators that he made a conscious effort to excuse himself when sensitive data was discussed. This did not seem to raise any concerns within Congress; however, it was a risky maneuver given the structure of the legislative assembly.

### **New Congressional Leadership**

The election of a new legislative leadership in both the *Cámara de Diputados* and the Senate gave a new impulse to the Project. The new leadership was supportive of legislative modernization throughout this period. Moreover, the election of Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, the first ever indigenous leader to reach high office, as Vice President brought with it a new impulse for the Project. From the outset, Mr. Cárdenas played a key role in securing political support for legislative modernization from both the executive branch and Congress. The new Vice President worked closely with Mr. Sánchez and SUNY. During his first year in office he has presided over a series of missions aimed at modernizing both the legislature and the office of the Vice Presidency.

In the latter part of the 1993, the Project moved ahead full steam with SUNY efforts to recruit a permanent non-partisan director of the OPT. Following an advertised search, Mr. Germán Molina, a budgetary specialist was hired. The change in conception of the OPT is worth noting. With the new director, the OPT began to publish a number of deliverables initially envisioned by the Project. Apart from continuing to publish the monthly "Boletín Mensual de Ejecución Presupuestaria," the OPT distributed among members of Congress a series of *informes técnicos*, *Ayudas Memorias*, *Cuadros Estadísticos* and the *Sumario Fiscal 1990-1993*. All members of Congress interviewed manifested that the publications were useful. Of particular use is the *Sumario Fiscal* which traces the evolution of the budget since 1990. According to members of the OPT, however, SUNY funds were not used to produce this document.

Throughout the legislative year 1993-1994, the OPT renewed and strengthened its ties to the fiscal commission of the lower house. Again charges that the OPT became too closely linked with Javier Campero Paz, the new president of the fiscal commission surfaced. Moreover, members of the SUNY team expressed concern that the president of the fiscal commission was using the resources of the OPT in the legislative annex for partisan matters. Owing to the sensitive nature of the relation with the president of the commission this matter was not brought up.

### **Role of Vice President**

Vice President Cárdenas also attempted to increase the size and strengthen the role of the *Grupo Bicameral de Modernización del Legislativo*, established under former Vice President Ossio. With a multiparty and bicameral composition of 13, Cárdenas expected to count on a board of advisors that would guide the evolution of the CICON and its constituent units. Vice President Cárdenas and the few members of the Bicameral Group that met with the evaluators noted that only a reduced number participate in the regular meetings; most forget the meetings or chose not to attend. This is largely a problem facing all Vice Presidents. One of the former members of the congressional leadership in the lower house noted, for example, that there is a tendency to dismiss the Vice President as unimportant and his meetings as not worthwhile attending. Former Vice President Ossio recently published a book entitled *La Quinta Rueda del Carro* reflecting the general sentiment that the Vice-presidency is largely a ceremonial position.

The position of the Vice President may have long-term implications for the project. SUNY and USAID correctly perceive a great deal of support forthcoming from Vice President Cárdenas. The Vice President told the evaluating team that the Project ranks very high on his list of priorities for the next three years. In his view, if he manages to consolidate CICON in that time period he will consider himself successful. Yet in the future Cárdenas may have bigger battles to fight with powerful members of Congress and the executive branch. The team's impression is that the Vice President has gone to great lengths to fight for the Project. A story was often told to the evaluating team that on one occasion when the executive cut off information to the OPT, the Vice President faced down the cabinet and forced them to restore the flow.

### **Work of Technical Service Units**

The 1993-1994 legislative year finished with a big bang of activity in the National Congress. Several key pieces of legislation were passed including several significant reforms to the Constitution. The role played by the OPT during this period appears to have been important, especially in providing data to members of Congress during the approval of the budget in March 1994. The team was not able to assess the impact of OPT activity on other pieces of legislation although the *informes técnicos* on these pieces of legislation are very noteworthy.

Perhaps of greatest significance is the fact that approximately \$bs 500,000 (\$100,000) were appropriated by the Bolivian Congress and written into the budget for the CICON project. Vice President Cárdenas believes that this is a clear indication of the commitment of the Congress to

the long-term sustainability and the institutionalization of the CICON. Despite this success, however, the team noted a rather unusual development that could potentially become a tricky political issue in the future. The money appropriated by the Congress is to be disbursed directly to SUNY which, in turn, will administer the funds and transfer them to CICON. In the opinion of several legislators, this was simply a mistake that was largely rooted in the fact that SUNY has greater visibility in the Congress than the CICON, a new name with little recognition beyond the Bicameral Group. Vice President Cárdenas also expressed concern but noted that when an attempt was made to change the beneficiary from SUNY to CICON, he was told that it would not only imply a delay in the disbursement of the funds but could threaten the funding. In any event, the team believes that future attempts to secure congressional funding ought to make sure that the appropriate agency becomes the recipient.

During the 1993-1994 legislative year, the SUNY team completed diagnostics on the *Unidad de Información e Investigación* (UII) (November 1993) and the *Unidad de Anteproyectos de Ley* (UAL) (February 1994). With SUNY supervision a professional staff was hired and each unit developed a work plan for the coming year. In July, the staff of the three units visited several state legislatures as part of an overall training program. The evaluation team sensed a great deal of support for the UAL and UII units from legislators interviewed. If implementation procedures follow they should provide much needed assistance in bill drafting and research for members of Congress. Members of the Bicameral Group noted, for example, how useful the UAL would have been in providing input for the discussion of the *reglamento de debates* that was undergoing revisions at the time of our visit. At issue, however, is whether a reduction in counterpart funding will affect the implementation of these units in the near future. Any shortfall could delay their work plan and affect their usefulness in the near future.

The team also sensed that the establishment of these additional units generated a healthy dose of competition among units. Yet too much competition may be dangerous. For example, one of the crucial problems in the future will be the location of units. The new directorship of CICON has been located in the old Central Bank building which was transferred to Congress in 1992. The UAL and the UII have also been located in the same building. Mainly because these units have not been fully implemented and have not had a chance to work directly with Congress, they are not well known in Congress and the distance from the legislative palace (two blocks) may not contribute to a close working relation with Congress, at least in the near term. Because these units are not yet ready to meet any demands -- they do not yet have equipment and are not really prepared to carry out their work plan -- it is probably best that they become known gradually in Congress. A great fear is that they will become known quickly and will be unable to respond to requests for information and assistance.

Another issue concerns the fact that the OPT remains housed in the legislative annex building and in very close proximity to the functioning of the Congress. Members of the OPT believe they should not be moved to the old Central Bank building because this would damage their effectiveness. Conversations with members of the Bicameral Group, Vice President Cárdenas, and others, suggest a great deal of support for moving the OPT to join the other units. In their view only a coordination unit should be housed in the legislative palace which could then relay

requests for information and assistance to the units via modem. Opposition members of the Bicameral Group also noted that if the OPT were moved, this would minimize charges that it has become the tool of the chair of the fiscal commission or the exclusive property of the Chamber of Deputies.

### **Recent Events**

In August 1994, a new leadership was chosen for the Cámara and for the Senate, to function for one year. This change in leadership was simply a reflection of a traditional one year term of office mandated by the *reglamento de debates*, the internal legislative organization. Javier Campero Paz, the chair of the fiscal commission was elected president of the Chamber of Deputies. Members of the USAID Mission viewed this development with much optimism because, in their view, he had championed CICON and had played a very close working relationship with members of the OPT. The Mission and SUNY also noted that Guillermo Bedregal, the former president of the lower house was not a strong advocate of the Project. One member of the evaluating team, however, spent a considerable amount of time with this individual and recorded only positive comments about the Project. Mr. Bedregal, however, was a bit weary of funding SUNY and was not enthusiastic about what he termed poorly attended and low quality seminars. The evaluating team also noted that Mr. Bedregal was adamantly opposed to direct USAID funding for Congress noting that there are "fringe sectors" that would certainly question U.S. intervention. In short, Mr. Bedregal believes that the appropriate agency to carry out technical assistance to Congress is SUNY. As was the case with other interviewees, Mr. Bedregal expressed concern over a perceived lobbying role on the part of SUNY staff.

In mid-August 1994, the Bolivian National Congress approved a new constitution. The reforms introduced in the charter will have a great deal of impact on the future of the Project. Among the most relevant reforms is the provision of five-year terms for the president and legislators. Thus, every legislator would participate in five separate legislative organizations during the term for which elected. Additionally, the new constitution establishes a new mechanism for the election of deputies. Beginning in 1997, fifty percent of the chamber will be elected from party lists and the remaining fifty percent will be elected from single member districts. This change will alter dramatically the kind of legislator that arrives in Congress. He/she may be less educated and with no congressional experience whatsoever. It is also likely that the business carried out in the chamber also will change. This new development will generate a great deal of work for the legislative support units.

## **II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT**

The Project will assist the legislative process through training of legislators, committee advisors, and support staff, automation of legislative document storage and retrieval, and establishment of bill drafting and fiscal analysis support services.

## **A. Project Purpose**

The Project's purpose is to improve the administration and bill drafting functions of the Congress and to support pro-democracy organizations. This was restated in the amended project authorization of September, 1991 to be "The Project will improve the electoral and legislative branches of government in Bolivia through an automated electoral registry, voter education/motivation campaigns, juror training, electoral seminars, administrative needs assessment, and improved electoral infrastructure; and training for legislators, committee advisors, and support staff, automated legislative documents retrieval systems, and improved congressional research facilities.

## **B. Outputs**

1. Seminars for Legislators sponsored by the Andean University beginning in 1990.
2. Existing legislative data base codified and indexed. 1990
3. Seminar on lobbying conducted by Andean University. 1990.
4. Congressional research facilities improved. 1992
5. Congressional employees trained in research services. 1991-1992.
7. Chairmen of Senate and House Finance Committees invited to visit U. S. Congress and to attend Budget Seminar at State University of New York. 1991.
8. Bi-Cameral Task force for Legislative Modernization is organized by and presided over by congressional leaders.
9. High level workshop on budget process conducted. Senate proposed a bi-cameral Budget Technical Office. 1992.
10. Presentation to Congress in two major consultations to assist in the formation of a bi-cameral budget office. 1992-93,
11. Two transmission meetings held with out-going and incoming leadership of both houses 1993. Lower house leadership requested increased assistance. 1993. President of Congress requested and received help in reorganizing his office. 1993. SUNY completed reorganization of Congressional Budget office and preliminary report on bibliographic and documentary services. 1993. Three staffers of Congressional Budget office complete short term training in the U.S. 1993. One person started master's program in Library Science. 1993. Budget staff visited National Center for State legislatures and several state legislatures in company with SUNY/Bolivia Director 1993.

12. Oct. 1 1993 through March 1 of 1994 was very productive and brought to partial fruition many months of work on this Project. The accomplishments during this period were the following:
  - a. The Congressional Budget office (OPT) established with Project support became fully operational.
  - b. Vol. I of the Budget Handbook, a clearly indexed Budget Guide, and a series of periodic financial reports were published by OPT with SUNY assistance.
  - c. The Research and Information Office (UII) was staffed and its new Director presented work plans.
  - d. Positions under bill drafting unit (UAL) were advertised and collective selection process began.
  - e. Mission suggested that the Training Unit (SEC) be given an extension capability to enable legislators to reach poor marginal urban and rural constituents.
  - f. The new leadership decided partially to complete the new annex building and use the balance of funds for legislative support services established with SUNY assistance.
  - g. The Project provided management assessment assistance to the lower house and to the office of President of the Congress in response to requests from recipients.
  
13. In the period of March 1, 1994 through the date of this report the following have been accomplished:
  - a. OPT has begun to publish periodic reports in the form of a bulletin to Members of Congress
  - b. OPT has responded to requests from the Budget Committee.
  - c. The Director of OPT attended a study conference in Ecuador.
  - d. Volumes I and II of the Legislative Procedures Manuals were published and distributed. Volume III is being prepared for release.
  - e. The Director of UII was selected in June of 1994. The Director and two professionals were employed, and a work projection report prepared.

- f. The selected and trained librarian has finished her Master's degree in preparation for assumption of librarian duties in the Congress in September.
- g. A Director and two assistants were selected and employed by CICON to constitute the *Unidad de Anteproyectos de Ley*. The Office presented a workplan.
- h. A Director of the *Servicio de Extension y Capacitación Legislativa* (SECL) was Chosen and employed. With the implementation of the three Legislative Service offices and the selection of a director of SECL the activities of SUNY have multiplied as might be expected. The above is not intended to be exhaustive of the SUNY/CICON activity or participation.

### **C. Inputs**

The inputs to the Project are closely related to the outputs as set forth above. The inputs to this Project are to a large degree reflective of the support nature of the program and the exercise of the talents of persuasion, encouragement, and moral support.

### **D. End of Project Status**

The Project is scheduled to end in December 1995. To date the OPT has been in operation for nearly two years. The other two units are in place and are scheduled to be performing major functions in the near future. A salutary atmosphere for reform has been established in both houses of Congress and in the Vice Presidency.

## **III. MAJOR PROBLEMS TO DATE**

- 1) The size of the units is too small to satisfy requests for information and services from 157 members of the Bolivian congress. Increasing the size and expanding training opportunities depends on funding availability.
- 2) Despite efforts to insure its non-partisan nature, the OPT continues to be perceived as the unit linked to the economic commission of the Chamber of Deputies and the ruling party. According to some of our interviewees, the president of the commission during the 1993-1994 legislative year often held meetings in the OPT's office and used office supplies on a regular basis.

3) SUNY/Bolivia's Role

- a) Many of our interviewees had a difficult time clearly identifying SUNY's role. Many were aware of SUNY's technical role but could only point to a perceived lobbying effort on the part of SUNY staff members.
- b) There is little contact between SUNY representatives and the staff of each unit. SUNY representatives appear to be better known by the legislators than the members of every CICON unit except the OPT.
- c) Requests for bibliographic material, training seminars, visits by experts, and the like are either delivered very slowly or are still outstanding. SUNY representatives explained that these delays are due to funding problems. Evaluators were not able to get a satisfactory answer regarding the spending pattern of the SUNY project. How were funds spent? Were funds spent only on writing the diagnostics?
- d) The most serious problem has to do with the lobbying effort on the part of SUNY/Bolivia staff to secure congressional funding. This effort netted \$500,000 (\$100,000) payable to SUNY/Bolivia. The evaluators understand that an attempt was made to correct the situation but fearing a major delay or even a change of heart, the transfer mechanism was kept in place. The main source of concern has to do with a fear that information that the Bolivian Congress gave money to an American institution rather than directly to CICON may become public knowledge. As it now stands, CICON will receive the money but will do so only after it is disbursed to SUNY.
- e) The quality and quantity of seminars put on with SUNY sponsorship was questioned by several legislators. Two of our interviewees claimed, for example, that the September 1993 seminar was a total failure because few legislators attended and the speakers spoke too broadly. One former legislator (who has been in Congress for eight years) also noted that the SUNY experts came here with prepackaged notions about the functioning of legislatures. This individual spent a considerable amount of time with SUNY experts and, in his view, the reports did not reflect any conversation the expert had with members of the Bolivian Congress. Another member noted that one of the speakers at the seminar knew less than any member of Congress in attendance and had to be corrected on several occasions.

4) Counterpart Funds

- a) The complex mechanism that governs the release of Bolivian counterpart funds is quite problematic although the team understands it is linked to

broader U.S. mission objectives in Bolivia. This situation has produced a great deal of uncertainty and will have an impact on the future of CICON.

- b) Any reduction in counterpart funds may result in salary reductions, layoffs, and other measures detrimental to keeping the Project going. Because of the likely short-fall in counterpart funds, the job security of the staff of all three units is under question. The dilemma for the CICON units is how they will survive with scarce resources.

5) Long-term Financing of the Project

- a) Despite the appropriation by the Bolivian Congress of \$100,000, the Project will require a good dose of foreign funds. The team is aware of the overall health of the economy in Bolivia and doubts that, at least in the middle to short-term, the Project will be self-sustaining.
- b) The Vice President has attempted to secure other donor support. None have made a firm offer to date. The belief that international support will continue on an indefinite basis must be discouraged.

#### **IV. RECOMMENDATIONS**

##### **A. For Bolivian Organizations**

1. That increased emphasis and importance be given by legislative leadership to the agencies of Congressional creation, namely CICON as a non partisan administrator of the Legislative Service Offices and the *Grupo Bicameral de Modernización Legislativo* and as a source of legitimate non- partisan support. This should be done to insure that the services being performed by the Legislative Service Offices are not compromised in favor of any office, legislator, or committee.

2. The physical offices of all Legislative Service Offices should be located in the new Congressional office building to allay the perception that the OPT is the servant of the *Comisión Económica* or of its Chair.

3. Ideally, the Legislative Service Offices, including the proposed SECL, should be given permanent status in statutory law. The evaluators recognize that it would be easier to legitimize the Legislative Service Offices by resolution. It would, however, be easier to repeal or change such resolution. In the interest of stability and permanence the status of both the Offices and their governance should be rooted in statute.

4. As soon as possible in the interest of good management, independence, and congressional pride the Bolivian Congress should take over the cost of the support of the

Legislative Service Offices. At a minimum, the Bolivian Congress ought to pursue alternative donors to diversify the source of funds and to prevent over reliance on a single agency.

5. CICON with the assistance of the Legislative Service Offices should undertake seminars, publications, and one-on-one discussions and consultations with Legislators to inform all Legislators of the services which can be made available to individual Legislators by the Legislative Service Offices.

6. As individual Legislators become familiar with the services that the Legislative Service Offices can provide, the requests for service will exceed the capacity of the Offices to provide quality service. The Congress should be prepared to provide for the enlargement of the Legislative Service Offices as the need for such enlargement develops.

7. The assigned task of the OPT is partially defined by the nature of the budgetary process. The definition of the task would indicate an appropriate increase of personnel so that at least one analyst would be available to be assigned to each administrative department of the national government.

8. Counterpart funds, which pay either partially or in full for the legislative initiatives, should flow directly to Congressional accounts or CICON for disbursement without going through the contracting agent. This would appear to eliminate an unnecessary focus of irritation.

**B. For Cooperative Agreement Institution (SUNY)**

1. SUNY, the Cooperative Contract Agent, should use its good offices with discretion to assist in any appropriate way the implementation of the above stated recommendations for the Bolivian Congress.

2. SUNY, in its role with Congress, should limit itself to providing information, leaving the lobbying role to CICON and its supporting board as well as other supportive legislators.

3. SUNY should work with CICON to assure that counterpart funds destined to CICON for its participation be directed to CICON or other appropriate legislative body for disbursement.

4. SUNY should exercise its influence to flesh out the SECS office so that if the Legislative Service Offices are institutionalized the SECS is included in the structure.

5. SUNY should encourage legislative tracking of the work of the Legislative Service Offices and their accomplishments.

6. When scheduling seminars SUNY should pay particular attention to the needs of the Congress and the newly established legislative offices. There is a need for a more diverse group of experts to visit, including some from Latin American countries.
7. Any publications produced by the OPT or any other unit should take into account that legislators rarely have the time to read, much less digest, complex information. It is recommended that a good executive summary be provided with each publication.
8. There should be a concerted effort to prevent overlap and duplication among the Legislative Services Offices.
9. SUNY should move diligently to implement the UAL and UII. It would be particularly useful for the UII to move quickly in the direction of getting access to INTERNET and other sources to strengthen the research capacity of the entire Congress.
10. SUNY should insure that the new librarian is phased-in gradually to prevent any confrontation with the existing arrangement.

**C. For USAID**

1. Support an addition budget for one year to allow the legislative offices to mature.
2. That the responsibility of administration of this program be left with SUNY.
3. Analyze true budget needs for the additional year including, equipment, seminars, training, travel, and the like.
4. USAID should inform the Bolivian Congress and SUNY that the funding for the Project is intended to be short term only and that the principal objective is to achieve institutional self-sufficiency in the long term.
5. Any future evaluation should be scheduled for a time when Congress is in session.

**PEOPLE INTERVIEWED**

Luis Luna, SUNY/Bolivia  
Eduardo Mendiola DI Project Coordinator  
Walter Guevara, OID Deputy Director, USAID/Bolivia  
María Woolgar de Blacutt, Project Coordinator SUNY/Bolivia  
Carl Cira, ODI Director  
Fernando Pereira, Director, CICON  
Javier Bejarano, Director, UII  
Rodolfo Iturralde, Director, UAL  
Germán Molina, Director, OPT.  
Anne Beasley, Evaluation Officer, U.S. Embassy  
Marisol Fernández, Asistente Técnico, OPT  
Rodrigo Orihuela, Asistente Técnico, OPT  
Javier Campero Paz, President of the Chamber of Deputies  
Mario Blacutt Mendoza, Oficial Mayor Cámara de Diputados  
Enrique Mendizábal Eyzaguirre, Oficial Mayor Senado Nacional  
Edil Sandóval Morón, Chair, Comisión de Constitución Chamber of Deputies  
Ernesto Machicao, Minister of Information  
Henry Oporto, Adviser to Vice President Cárdenas  
Guido Capra Gemio, Senator, MNR  
Tito Hoz de Vila, Deputy, ADN  
Hugo Carvajal Donoso, Deputy, MIR  
Guillermo Bedregal, Deputy, MNR  
Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, Vice President of Bolivia  
Walter Zuleta Roncal, Primer Secretario Senado Nacional  
Javier Campero Paz, Deputy, MNR, President of the Chamber of Deputies  
Luis Ossio Sanjinés, former Vice President of Bolivia

**LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED**

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**I. US Government**

David Dlouhy, DCM, US Embassy

Lew Amselem, Political Section, US Embassy

Carl Leonard, Mission Director, USAID

Lewis Lucke, Deputy Mission Director, USAID

Carl Cira, Director of the Office of Democratic Initiatives, USAID

Walter Guevara, Deputy Director of the Office of Democratic Initiatives, USAID

Eduardo Mendiola, DI Coordinator of the Office of Democratic Initiatives, USAID

Anne Beasley, Evaluation Officer, USAID

Peter Natiello, Project Development Officer, USAID

Yamil Cardenas, Information Technology Manager, USAID

**II. International Organizations**

Hernan Escudero, Representative of the Andean Development Corporation

Samuel Eaton, Representative of the Organization of American States Development Program

**III. National and Departmental Electoral Courts**

Husascar Cajias, President of the NEC

Alcira Espinoza, Vice President of the NEC

Ivan Guzman de Rojas, Vocal of the NEC

Alfredo Bocangel, Vocal of the NEC

Jorge Lazarte, Vocal of the NEC

Marcelo Galindo, ex-Vocal of the NEC

Franklin Ergueta, Administrative Director of the NEC

Amalia Aliaga, Auditor and Acting Chief for Information of the NEC

Federico Troche, Vocal of the DEC for La Paz

Eugenio Condor, Chief of Information of the DEC for the DEC for La Paz

#### **IV. Entities Related to the Electoral System Work**

Marcelo Penaranda, Director of the RUN

Marcelo Vergara, Project Manager for the DIMA contract with the NEC

Marcel Guzman de Rojas, Manger of NEOTEC and Designer of SIMONEL and SID

#### **V. Members of Congress**

Victor Hugo Cardenas, President

Luis Ossio Sanjines, ex-President

Javier Campero Paz, President of Chamber of Deputies

Guillermo Bedregal, ex-President of Chamber of Deputies

Tito Hoz de Vila Quiroga, Deputy and member of the Bicameral Group

Hugo Carvajal Donoso, Deputy and member of the Bicameral Group

Guido Capra Jemio, Senator and member of the Bicameral Group

Edil Sandoval Moron, Deputy and President of the Commission on the Constitution,  
Justice and the Judicial Police

**VI. Staff of Congress**

Mario Blacutt Mendoza, Official Mayor of the Chamber of Deputies

Enrique Mendizabal Eyzaguirre, Official Mayor of the Senate

Henry Oporto, Advisor to the President of the Congress

Walter Zuleta Roncal, First Secretary of the Senate

**VII. Staff of CICON**

Fernando Pereira, Director of CICON

German Molina, Director of the OPT

Rodolfo Iturralde, Director of the UAL

Javier Bejarano, Director of UII

Marisol Fernandez, Technical Assistant in the OPT

Rodrigo Orihuela, Technical Assistant in the OPT

**VIII. SUNY**

Francisco Sanchez, Country Director

Luis Luna, Deputy Country Director

Maria Woolgar de Blacutt, Project Coordinator

**IX. Other**

Ernesto Machicao, Minister of Information

**LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

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**I. A.I.D. DOCUMENTS**

- 1) 1989--1993 Country Development Strategy Statement
- 2) 1988 Project Paper for the Democratic Institutions Project
- 3) 1991 Amendment No. 1 to the 1988 Project Paper
- 4) Action Memorandum of November 10, 1992 re Amendment No. 3 to the 1988 Project Paper
- 5) Action Memorandum of July 2, 1993 concerning the extension of the PACD and the addition of funds for the Project
- 6) Action Memorandum of June 30, 1994 concerning the extension of the PACD and the addition of funds for the Project
- 7) Grant Agreement of September 8, 1988 between USAID and the Minister of Planning
- 8) Amendment No. 1 to the Grant Agreement dated September 27, 1991
- 9) Amendment No. 2 to the Grant Agreement dated July 27, 1992
- 10) Amendment No. 3 to the Grant Agreement dated March 1, 1993
- 11) Mission Semi-Annual Status Reports Re the Project for the periods:

October 1988--March 1989  
April 1989--September 1989  
April 1990--September 1990  
October 1990--March 1991  
April 1991--September 1991  
October 1991--March 1992  
April 1992--September 1992  
October 1992--March 1993  
April 1993--September 1993  
October 1993--March 1994.

## **II. RE ELECTORAL SYSTEM**

### **A. A.I.D.**

- 1) Cooperative Agreement with CAPEL of September 27, 1991
- 2) Amendment No. 1 to the Cooperative Agreement of March 10, 1992
- 3) Amendment No. 2 to the Cooperative Agreement of September 28, 1992
- 4) Amendment No. 3 to the Cooperative Agreement of February 11, 1993

### **B. N.E.C.**

- 1) Bidding Invitation NO. OPS/BOL/044/250
- 2) Contract with DIMA Ltd. of January 31, 1991
- 3) Pre-Carpeta Re Project for System of National Voters Registry--from DIMA
- 4) Report to the Bolivian Congress for August 1991 to July 1992
- 5) Report to the Bolivian Congress Concerning the General Elections of 1993

### **C. CAPEL**

- 1) Report of the Results of the Evaluation Meeting Concerning the Electoral Process of 1991
- 2) Final Report Re the Program of Technical Assistance, March 1992
- 3) Report of Technical Mission No. 6, March 24, 1993
- 4) Analysis of the political situation confronting the general election of June 1993
- 5) Report of the Observation Mission for the General Election of June 1993
- 6) Evaluation, Analysis and Recommendations Concerning the Work of the Electoral System in the General Election of June 1993
- 7) Final Report (with Annexes) of the Technical Assistance Provided in the Period January 10, 1992 through March 31, 1993
- 8) Reports of Technical Missions No. 1, 2, 3 and 4 during August through December of 1993

- 9) Manual of Organization and Functions of the Electoral Court System of November 1993
- 10) Final Report (with Annexes) of the Program of Technical Assistance during 1991-1994

### **III. RE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS**

#### **A. A.I.D.**

- 1) Cooperative Agreement with SUNY of September 3, 1992
- 2) Amendment No. 1 of the Cooperative Agreement of January 4, 1993
- 3) Amendment No. 2 of the Cooperative Agreement of March 18, 1993
- 4) Amendment NO. 3 of the Cooperative Agreement of April 14, 1994

#### **B. SUNY**

- 1) Quarterly Reports for the periods:  
September 1992--November 1992  
December 1992--February 1993  
March 1993--August 1993  
September 1993--February 1994
- 2) Draft Summary Progress Report--prepared in April 1994
- 3) Report of Preliminary Findings Concerning the Budget Process--October 1992
- 4) Follow-up Report of Preliminary Findings Concerning the Budget Process--January 1993
- 5) Critical Analysis of Proposed Constitutional Reforms--May 1993
- 6) Preliminary Report Concerning the Library of the National Congress--June 1993
- 7) Report Concerning the Modernizing and Strengthening of the Chamber of Deputies--September 1993
- 8) Report Concerning the Restructuring of the Office of the Vice President--October 1993
- 9) Report Concerning the Strengthening of the Capacity for Research of the National Congress--November 1993
- 10) General Orientation for the Office of the Vice President--November 1993

11) Report Concerning Assistance to the Administrative Reform of the Chamber of Deputies--  
November 1993

12) Strengthening of the Legislative Competence of the National Congress:Bill Drafting--  
February 1994

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1) Workplan for 1994

2) Manual of Operations

3) Report of Activities for First Semester of 1994

4) Selected Technical Reports

5) Periodic Reports on the Implementation of the National Budget

6) Booklet on Fiscal Summary for 1990-1993--February 1994