

PROJECT AUTHORIZATION AMENDMENT

Name of Country: Afghanistan
Name of Project: Private Voluntary Organization Support
Project Number: 306-0211

Pursuant to Section 904 of the International Security and Development Act of 1985 and the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Private Voluntary Support Project was authorized on May 16, 1990, with a Project Assistance Completion Date of December 31, 1992, and planned obligations of not to exceed Twenty Million Dollars (\$20,000,000) in grant funds.

That authorization is hereby amended to permit an increase in the life of project funding level to Thirty Seven Million Dollars (\$37,000,000) and an extension of the Project Assistance Completion Date to June 30, 1994.

All other terms and conditions as provided for in the original project authorization shall remain in full force and effect.

Robert N. Bakley
A.I.D. Representative

Date August 27, 1991

Cleared:

Nancy Hardy, PRO (Draft)

Mark Ward, RLA (Draft)

Raymond DeBruce, O/FM (Draft)

Diana Swain, PDIS (Draft)

Jonathan Sperling, D/AID/REP



UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF THE AID REPRESENTATIVE

American Embassy
Islamabad, Pakistan

ACTIVITY AUTHORIZATION

Name of Country: Afghanistan
Name of Activity: PVO Support Project
Number of Activity: 306-0211

Pursuant to Section 904 of the International Security and Development Act of 1985 and the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, I hereby authorize the PVO (Private Voluntary Agency) Support Project for humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan. This project will support PVO activities which contribute to A.I.D.'s overall humanitarian objectives for Afghanistan. It involves planned obligations not to exceed \$20 million in grant funds over a period of 32 months from the date of this authorization and subject to the availability of funds in accordance with the A.I.D./O.Y.B. allotment process to help in financing certain foreign exchange and local currency costs. The planned life of project is through December 31, 1992.

Grant and Cooperative agreement(s), which may be negotiated and executed by the officers to whom such authority is delegated in accordance with A.I.D. regulations and Delegations of Authority, shall be subject to the following terms and conditions, together with such other terms and conditions as A.I.D. may deem appropriate.


a. Source and Origin of Commodities, Nationality of Services:

Commodities and services financed by A.I.D. under this project shall have their source, origin and nationality in the United States of America, Pakistan, Afghanistan and, when agreed to in writing by the A.I.D. Representative, countries in A.I.D. Geographic Code 935. Ocean shipping financed by A.I.D. under the Project shall, except as the A.I.D. Representative may otherwise agree in writing, be financed only on flag vessels of the United States of America.


Pharmaceuticals: Authorized source/origin for materials and supplies, including pharmaceuticals funded under this project, shall be the United States of America, Pakistan, Afghanistan and, when agreed to in writing by the A.I.D. Representative, countries in A.I.D. Geographic Code 935. The grantees shall be responsible for taking reasonable steps to maximize the safety and appropriateness of pharmaceuticals financed through Grants and Cooperative Agreements;

b. Deviations:

Based upon Section 904 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, and the A.I.D. appropriation legislation for FY 1990 (under the Notwithstanding Authority), I hereby approve a deviation from normal audit requirements for end-use and costs incurred in Afghanistan.


Larry Crandall
A. I. D. Representative

May 16, 90
Date

Clearances: Curt Wolters, O/AID/REP	<u>(Draft) 5/10/90</u>
Hank Cushing, RAO	<u>(Draft) 5/09/90</u>
Gary Lewis, O/AID/REP	<u>(Draft) 5/10/90</u>
Tom Eighmy, O/AID/REP	<u>(Draft) 5/08/90</u>
Ted Carter, RLA	<u>(Draft) 5/08/90</u>
John May, USAID	<u>(Draft) 5/08/90</u>
Ray DeBruce, USAID	<u>(Draft) 5/08/90</u>
John Miller, D/AID/REP	



UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF THE AID REPRESENTATIVE

American Embassy
Islamabad, Pakistan

May 10, 1990

ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE A.I.D. REPRESENTATIVE

FROM: Susan Lenderking, Assistant Project Development
Officer *SAL*

SUBJECT: Authorization of the PVO Support Project
(306-0211)

PURPOSE: To authorize the \$20 million PVO Support Project
(306-0211).

Background: In FY 1985, the U.S. Government developed a strategy to provide cross border humanitarian assistance for those Afghans who chose to remain in, or near, their home villages. At the time, Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), which had been operating inside Afghanistan since 1980, were the best mechanism through which to rapidly channel this assistance. A number of grants were thus made to European PVOs for the delivery of health care and cash-for-food. In FY 1986, A.I.D. extended its support of PVO activities by authorizing the \$15 million PVO Co-Financing Project under which a broad range of PVO activities in Afghanistan was eligible for funding. The funding level of the project was increased to \$35 million in FY 1987. Under this project, European PVOs continued to receive support and U.S. PVOs were encouraged to become involved. The two activities which came to absorb most of the project funds were health care training and cash-for-food activities.

As it became apparent that increasing stability in many resistance controlled areas permitted other types of assistance, the O/AID/REP proposed the creation of a Rural Assistance Project (RAP) that would move PVOs away from cash-for-food activities toward rural rehabilitation. The \$10 million RAP was authorized in 1988, leaving the PVO Co-Financing Project to primarily support health activities. In late 1989, the two projects were jointly evaluated by an independent team and the results presented to the O/AID/REP in January 1990.

Discussion: As a result of this joint evaluation and discussion within the O/AID/REP, it was decided to combine all PVO activities under one umbrella project, the PVO Support Project, a 32 month project with a \$20 million funding level. This will simplify project management and documentation requirements and accomodate new directions in sectoral programming.

One of the recommendations of the evaluation team was to separate rural rehabilitation and agricultural development activities into two separate strategies, the former managed as previously under RAP and the latter by the Agriculture Office. In accepting this recommendation, the O/AID/REP laid the groundwork for separate sectoral strategies for PVO activities within the context of the umbrella project. The case for sectoral strategies was furthered by the existence of a PVO health strategy, which predated the evaluation, and by future plans to develop a strategy to promote democratic pluralism.

To encompass these different sectoral PVO activities in the PVO Support Project, it was decided that the project's general document, the Activity Approval Memorandum (AAM), would define O/AID/REP's overall objectives in supporting PVOs and also lay out the framework for the development of sectoral and cross-sectoral strategies. These strategies would then be attached to the AAM as freestanding and separate documents incorporated by reference and explaining in some detail how the O/AID/REP would support PVOs in each selected sector.

With this design, each sectoral strategy may be amended or updated as the situation requires without having to amend the overall project. Additional strategies may also be added as needed. In this way, the O/AID/REP will continue to have, as it did with the PVO Co-Financing Project and RAP, a rapid, flexible mechanism through which to respond to the evolving situation inside Afghanistan.

The AAM and three initial strategies were reviewed and approved by the Mission on April 5. Activities previously funded under the PVO Co-Financing Project and RAP will be carried on respectively through the health and rural assistance strategies, and agricultural development activities will be supported under the agricultural development strategy. The authority to authorize the PVO Support Project was delegated to the A.I.D. Representative by A.I.D./Washington on February 17, 1990 and reconfirmed on May 10, 1990 (see attached cables).

WAIVERS and DEVIATIONS

In signing the Project Authorization, you will also authorize the waivers and deviations included in the attached Activity Authorization which have been justified and documented in prior years. Those justifications are as valid now as they were when initially approved. This documentation appears as Annex C of the PVO Support Project AAM.

- o each grant or cooperative agreement awarded under the project will include a clause permitting a suitable deviation from the strictures of normal audit


requirements for end-use and costs incurred in Afghanistan. It is warranted by the war-time conditions in that country and the current prohibition against any U.S. Government-financed U.S. citizen entering the country;

- o the authorized source/origin for goods and services shall be the United States, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and when deemed appropriate by the A.I.D. Representative, countries in A.I.D. Geographic Code 935;
- o authorized source/origin for materials and supplies, including pharmaceuticals funded under this project, shall be the United States, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and when deemed appropriate by the A.I.D. Representative, countries in A.I.D. Geographic Code 935. The grantees shall be responsible for taking reasonable steps to maximize the safety and appropriateness of pharmaceuticals financed by the Cooperative Agreement;

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the 32 month, \$20 million PVO Support Project (306-0211), including the deviations cited, by signing the attached Activity Authorization.

Attachments: Activity Authorization
ANE Approval Cables (State 053631 and 149688)

Clearances: Curt Wolters, O/AID/REP	<u>(Draft) 5/10/90</u>
Hank Cushing, RAO	<u>(Draft) 5/09/90</u>
Gary Lewis, O/AID/REP	<u>(Draft) 5/10/90</u>
Tom Eighmy, O/AID/REP	<u>(Draft) 5/08/90</u>
Ted Carter, RLA	<u>(Draft) 5/08/90</u>
John May, USAID	<u>(Draft) 5/08/90</u>
Ray DeBruce, USAID	<u>(Draft) 5/08/90</u>
John Miller, D/AID/REP	

CHRON

ACTION APEP INFO AME DCM POL FEF DAO RAO AID SE POLM/12

VZCZC10592
RR RUEHIL
LE RUEHC #3631 0400556
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170558Z FEB 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8945
INFO RUEFPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 4925
BT
UNCLAS STATE 053631

19-FEB-90

TOR: 04:34
CN: 56281
CHFG: AREP
DIST: AREP
ADD:

NAN

AIDAC FOR O/AIDREP

F.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: N/A
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN -- PVO PROJECTS AND COMMODITY
EXPCET PROGRAM

REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 03259 (B) STATE 42355


1. APPRECIATE C/AIDREP CLARIFICATIONS REF (A) ON PVO AND CEP REDESIGN EXERCISES.
2. BASED ON O/AIDREP JUSTIFICATION, ANE CONCURS WITH CEP REDESIGN WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT ADDRESSES CONCERNS EXPRESSED IN REF (B). WE LOOK FORWARD TO REVIEWING THE CEP AMMENDMENT IN APRIL.
3. ACTING AA/ANE DELEGATES AUTHORITY TO O/AIDREP TO AUTOFIZE PVO CO-FINANCING AND RURAL ASSISTANCE. PLEASE KEEP US INFORMED AS DESIGN COMES INTO FOCUS.
4. FYI, ANE/AE MET WITH CEP DESIGN TEAM ON 2/15/90 AND HAVE DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION FAXED TO US. BAKER
BT
#3631

KNNN

ACTION AREP INFO AMR DGM AID

VZCZC10243
OO RUEHIL
DE RUEHC #9688 1300041
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 100040Z MAY 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1608
BT
UNCLAS STATE 149688

10-MAY-90 TOR: 01:32
CN: 20771
CHRG: AREP
DIST: AREP
ADD:



Action
Diana Swan
Susan Lendeh

AIDAC OFFICE A.I.D. REP: AFGHANISTAN

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN PVO SUPPORT PROJECT (306-0211)

REF: A). ISLAMABAD (09243) B). STATE (053631)

MISSION CORRECT. AUTHORITY WAS DELEGATED PER

REF B. BAKER

BT

#9688

NNNN

ACTION	
Due Date
Action Taken	NAN
Date
Initials	SLH

SLH

Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) Support Project
(306-0211)

ACTIVITY APPROVAL MEMORANDUM
(A A M)

Office of the A.I.D. Representative
for Afghanistan Affairs

April 1990

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS.....	i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	ii

PART ONE INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

EVOLUTION OF EXISTING PROGRAM.....	1
ACCOMPLISHMENTS.....	2
EVALUATION ISSUES AND O/AID/REP RESPONSES.....	3
PROJECT RATIONALE.....	6
RELATIONSHIP TO PVO ACTIVITIES FUNDED BY OTHER DONORS.....	7

PART TWO PROJECT DESCRIPTION

GOAL AND PURPOSE.....	8
PROJECT DIRECTIONS.....	8
THE PVO SUPPORT PROGRAM.....	12

PART THREE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

PROJECT COORDINATION.....	14
SELECTION CRITERIA.....	14
GRANT APPROVAL PROCESS.....	18
MANAGEMENT OF EACH SECTOR STRATEGY.....	18
ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE OF THE SECTOR STRATEGIES.....	19

PART FOUR MONITORING AND EVALUATION

MONITORING.....	19
EVALUATION.....	21

PART FIVE
FINANCIAL PLAN

FINANCIAL PLAN.....21

PART SIX
ISSUES SECTION

MANAGEMENT: INTERMEDIARY VS. DIRECT GRANTS.....22

U.S. GOVERNMENT IDENTIFICATION WITH PVO ACTIVITIES
INSIDE AFGHANISTAN.....23

U.S. CITIZEN TRAVEL INSIDE AFGHANISTAN.....24

ANNEXES

ANNEX A: PVO GRANTS BY SECTOR AND RECIPIENT

ANNEX B: PROPOSAL FORMAT FOR GRANTS

ANNEX C; DOCUMENTATION

ACRONYMS

AAM	Activity Approval Memorandum
ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ADI	Agricultural Development & Training
ADO	Agriculture Development Office
AFRANE	Amitie Franco-Afghan
AID	Agency for International Development
AIG	Afghanistan Interim Government
ARR	Agriculture & Rural Rehabilitation
BHW	Basic Health Worker
CHA	Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
CMC	Coordination of Medical Committees
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GAC	German Afghanistan Committee
IMC	International Medical Corps
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRC/RAP	The management unit of IRC's program under RAP
MCI	Mercy Corps International
MOPH	Ministry of Public Health, Afghan Interim Government
MRC	Mokor Reconstruction Committee
MRCA	Medical Refresher Course for Afghans
MSH	Management Sciences for Health
MTA	Medical Training for Afghans
O/AID/REP Affairs	Office of the A.I.D. Representative for Afghanistan
PVO	Private voluntary organization
RAO/PESHAWAR	O/AID/REP's Regional Affairs Office in Peshawar
RAP	Rural Assistance Project Rural Assistance Program
SCA	Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
SCF/US	Save the Children Federation
SWABAC	South West Afghanistan and Baluchistan Agency Coordination
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
UNOCA	United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan
VITA	Volunteers in Technical Assistance
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Office of the A.I.D. Representative for Afghanistan Affairs (O/AID/REP) has two projects through which it supports the activities of private voluntary organizations (PVOs): the PVO Co-Financing Project which makes funds available for any activity which supports O/AID/REP program objectives, but which primarily supports health care training and services delivery, and the Rural Assistance Project (RAP) which makes funds available for the repair of rural infrastructures, the provision of agricultural inputs and the distribution of emergency and resettlement assistance.

As a result of an evaluation of these two projects in late 1989 and discussions within the O/AID/REP, it was decided in early 1990 to consolidate all PVO activities under one umbrella project called the PVO Support Project, a 32 month project with a \$20 million funding level. This was to simplify project management and documentation requirements, and accommodate new directions in sectoral programming.

One of the recommendations of the evaluation team was to separate rural rehabilitation and agricultural development activities into two separate strategies, the former managed as previously under RAP and the latter by the Agriculture Office. In accepting this recommendation, the O/AID/REP laid the groundwork for separate sectoral strategies for PVO activities within the context of the umbrella project. The case for sectoral strategies was furthered by the existence of a PVO health strategy, which predated the evaluation, and by future plans to develop a strategy to promote democratic pluralism.

To encompass these sectoral PVO activities in the PVO Support Project, the project's general document, the Activity Approval Memorandum (AAM), defines O/AID/REP's overall objectives in supporting PVOs and lays out the framework for the development of sectoral and cross-sectoral strategies. Strategies in three sectors -- agricultural development, rural assistance and health -- have been developed and are attached as annexes to the AAM. New strategies will be developed as the O/AID/REP initiates activities in other areas.

Although the new project incorporates the previous PVO Co-Financing Project and Rural Assistance Project and retains many of their provisions, it moves the PVO portfolio in new directions based on changing needs inside Afghanistan. The following is a brief summary of these new directions:

The PVO Support Project will continue to provide emergency assistance for Afghanistan, but there will be a greater emphasis on activities which are sustainable after the PVO activity has been completed. For example, in the health sector, the O/AID/REP will give priority to PVO proposals that focus on upgrading skills of

existing workers, rather than on expanding health worker numbers, and mobilize community support for health care costs. In the rural assistance sector, although the activities will focus on short-term, one-time activities, PVOs will be encouraged to seek sustainability, such as by ensuring that a repaired irrigation system can be maintained by the beneficiaries. In agricultural development, activities which will return communities to self-sustaining food production will be given precedence.

To further support sustainability objectives, PVOs will be encouraged to train Afghans to assume greater leadership roles within their organizations and to forge links with Afghan entities or PVOs to assist them in building their own capacity to plan and execute assistance activities.

The O/AID/REP will also seek greater complementarity between activities implemented by the PVOs and those implemented by the A.I.D. contractors. This will increase the resources directed toward the achievement of A.I.D. sectoral goals and avoid duplication.

U.S. PVOs will receive priority consideration for funding in the PVO Support Project; however, the O/AID/REP will continue to support European PVOs in those instances where the need is not being addressed by an American PVO. Increasing emphasis will be given to those PVOs attempting to address problems in underserved areas and for underserved populations, such as women, children and minority ethnic groups.

Management of the PVO Support Project will be coordinated by the O/AID/REP Program Office. The A.I.D. Representative will assign responsibility for the implementation of each of the respective sectoral strategies to the appropriate staff or technical offices.

PVO SUPPORT PROJECT

ACTIVITY APPROVAL MEMORANDUM

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A. Evolution of Existing Program

Soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, a number of Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) began providing humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan as well as to those Afghans who chose to remain inside Afghanistan. In FY 1985, the U.S. Government developed a strategy to provide cross border humanitarian assistance for war-affected Afghans. To facilitate the rapid start-up of the program, grants were made, on an ad hoc basis, to a number of European PVOs which had already demonstrated an operational capacity inside Afghanistan to deliver health care and cash-for-food. Two U.S.-based PVOs, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and the Americares Foundation, were chosen as intermediary organizations through which grant funding was channeled, in part, to mitigate the discomfort felt by the European PVOs in accepting direct U.S. Government funding.

In FY 1986, A.I.D. designed and authorized the \$15 million PVO Co-Financing Project through which it continued to support the activities of European PVOs and began to encourage the involvement of U.S. PVOs. Although a wide range of activities was eligible for funding under the project, proposals submitted generally fell into one of two categories: cash-for-food and health. In the beginning requests for cash-for-food activities predominated; however, as time went on health care training and support for clinics eventually absorbed approximately 50 percent of annual budgets allocated for PVO activities. In April 1987, A.I.D. authorized an increase in the PVO Co-Financing Project budget to \$35 million.

With a growing interest in expanding and moving non-health related activities beyond simply cash-for-food, A.I.D. designed and authorized the \$9.6 million Rural Assistance Project (RAP) in 1988 to provide a separate mechanism for providing short-term relief and rehabilitation assistance to those who remained in Afghanistan throughout the war and to refugees who wished to return. To permit funding of non-registered PVOs and to avoid increasing the O/AID/REP administrative burden, IRC was chosen as an intermediary through which funds would be channeled and grants administered. The establishment of RAP left the health PVOs as the primary recipients of PVO Co-Financing Project funding.

At the time this AAM was prepared, the O/AID/REF thus had two projects through which it financed PVO activities: PVO Co-Financing, a broadly designed project that has permitted the O/AID/REP to support any

15

PVO activity that relates to the overall program strategy, and RAP, a more tightly designed project through which the O/AID/REP has financed specific, pre-defined types of assistance to rural areas.

During the January 1990 evaluation of the two PVO projects, serious consideration was given to a possible redesign of the PVO portfolio. Several options were entertained: (1) continue the present arrangement; (2) restructure the PVO portfolio into a direct grant/indirect grant split with the PVO Co-Financing Project focusing on direct grants for activities that are relatively high cost, innovative, long-term, and/or developmental in nature and RAP focusing on relatively low cost, routine, short-term, and/or relief activities which could be supported through an intermediary; (3) establish one project and incorporate by reference free-standing and separate strategies for the selection and management of PVO activities in each priority sector; and (4) terminate the two PVO projects, and add a PVO sub-project in each of the sectoral projects being implemented by A.I.D. contractors.

After reviewing the options and their respective implications for project management and for accomplishing the objectives of the Afghan program, a decision was made to consolidate the whole PVO portfolio into one project which would be the successor to the PVO Co-Financing Project and RAP. However, the PVO Co-Financing Project Activity Completion Date (PACD) has been extended through March 1992 to permit completion of activities funded under the project. The new project, known as the PVO Support Project, is a 32 month project with a \$20 million dollar funding level. The planned life of project is through December 31, 1992.

The AAM describes the new project, including the O/AID/REP policies and emphases that will guide the selection of PVO activities, how PVO activities will be implemented, how PVO activities will be managed in different sectoral and cross-sectoral areas, and the issues related to PVO strategies. Strategy papers for health, rural assistance and agricultural development are attached. Strategy papers for democratic pluralism and other sectors which the O/AID/REP may decide to support will be prepared as needed.

B. Accomplishments

Since 1979, the war has left most Afghans remaining inside Afghanistan in a situation devoid of easy access to the basic necessities for survival, such as food, clothing, shelter, and health services. To respond to this situation, early U.S. Government efforts concentrated on transferring cash across the border to be distributed by selected commanders to families in their respective regions. Because a considerable portion of the cash went toward the purchase of food, this activity came to be called cash-for-food. A more accurate name would have been survival assistance since families were free to spend the cash on the items most required to meet their basic human needs, e.g., food, clothing,

medicines, blankets. As a result of these activities, many Afghans had access to basic necessities that kept them from severe suffering and enabled them to remain in Afghanistan.

It soon became apparent, however, that increasing stability in many resistance controlled areas permitted other types of assistance. Consequently, RAP was designed to encourage PVOs toward activities which promote the increase of agricultural productivity and rural incomes in Afghanistan, limiting the provision of survival grants to remote, severely disrupted areas. A two-year Cooperative Agreement was signed in June 1988 with IRC for \$9.4 million to administer grants to PVOs for the support of rural assistance and other activities inside Afghanistan. Since its inception, RAP has funded 34 grants to PVOs totaling \$9.1 million. Of this amount, \$6.6 million was for rural rehabilitation activities to increase agricultural production and rural incomes and \$2.5 million was for emergency and survival assistance.

In 1986, the O/AID/REP, through its PVO Co-Financing Project, began funding a number of PVOs to provide Pakistan-based medical training for Afghans. The original objective of the PVOs was to provide emergency medical care to the people of war-torn Afghanistan. Thus, initial training programs concentrated on the treatment of war injuries. Early on, however, it became apparent that, despite the horror and occasional preponderance of war injuries, the medical problems of Afghanistan during the war have been essentially the same as those before the war -- problems of preventive health and primary health care. With this realization came a shift in the training programs from an emphasis on emergency medical care to one of preventive and primary health care.

A.I.D.-supported PVOs have trained approximately 600 mid-level health workers for Afghanistan. According to WHO, over 5,000 health workers are supported by the PVOs, Management Sciences for Health, the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, the Afghan parties, and various Islamic groups. This represents a resource for improving the health status of the Afghan people that has never before existed. A previous point of reference is the fact that there were 138 Basic Health Units in Afghanistan in 1979, with a total staff that probably did not exceed 750.

C. Evaluation Issues and O/AID/REP Responses

Over the last five years, the O/AID/REP has called for three evaluations to document progress made toward achieving project objectives, to identify strengths and weaknesses, to obtain guidance on how to strengthen the activities funded and the mechanisms used to manage them.

The first evaluation (August 14, 1987) focused on cash-for-food activities. The team concluded that the grant funds were used for humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and responsibly administered at a reasonable cost. The main issue raised during the evaluation was the deficient accounting systems of the intermediary organization and

implementing PVOs. The team recommended a need for stronger financial controls and better accountability. The O/AID/REP has addressed the problem by providing the services of an accountant/auditor to RAP and the PVO recipients to assist them with setting up and maintaining more formal accounting systems. The PVOs are now providing more and better information in their quarterly reports on the distribution and utilization of funds.

The second evaluation (August 1987) covered those PVOs implementing health activities under the PVO Co-Financing Project. At the time the evaluation was conducted, the first classes of medical trainees had only recently graduated and little information on the trainees in Afghanistan was available. The overall conclusion of the team was that the PVO training courses were producing qualified mid-level health personnel to work inside Afghanistan, and the PVOs had succeeded in establishing separate networks of health facilities, hospitals, clinics, and mobile units inside Afghanistan. The main issues raised in the evaluation dealt with problems of coordination and monitoring.

The evaluation team endorsed the Coordination of Medical Committees (CMC) coordinating role and recommended that O/AID/REP provide funds for its further establishment. Soon after the evaluation, the O/AID/REP provided funding for CMC. By the summer of 1988, CMC members agreed to follow a standardized list of drugs and a common salary scale for health workers. In addition, the members contributed to the preparation of a therapeutic manual of common diseases found in Afghanistan, which outlined standard treatment protocols acceptable to all members. CMC also developed guidelines for defining the function of low-, middle- and upper-level medical providers in Afghanistan.

The evaluation team also recommended that CMC develop a procedure for the forming of multi-organizational and multi-national evaluation teams who are acceptable to all participating PVOs. CMC has since followed this recommendation, launching three monitoring trips inside Afghanistan to monitor the functioning of the PVO-trained health workers and the facilities. The CMC members found the resulting monitoring reports useful and instrumental in changing program emphasis.

The most recent evaluation (January 1990) assessed the performance of the health activities supported by the PVO Co-Financing Project and all of the activities supported under the Rural Assistance Project over the last two years. Presented below are the primary issues raised by the team:

Evaluation: The evaluation team found that the particular strengths of RAP-funded PVOs were their contacts inside Afghanistan, their low operating costs, and their relative effectiveness in implementing simple relief activities. As activities became more complex, PVOs became hampered by their

limited management capacity and their lack of technical and development expertise. The team recommended that funding of PVO activities under RAP be limited to short-term and technically simple rehabilitation activities.

O/AID/REP Response: A decision has been made to limit PVO activities funded under RAP to simple, rehabilitation activities under \$500,000 and under one year duration. Requests to support

more sophisticated agricultural development activities beyond this level or duration will be managed by the Agricultural Office in the O/AID/REP.

Evaluation: Reports from RAP sub-grantees contained little information about implementation problems or what impact the activities had for the Afghans living in project areas. The evaluation team recommended the development of improved mechanisms for monitoring implementation and impact by PVOs receiving RAP grant funds and by IRC.

O/AID/REP Response: IRC and the Regional Affairs Office in Peshawar collaboratively designed a new proposal format which requires more specificity on project outputs and impact. Recently revised reporting requirements ask PVOs to be more specific in quarterly reports in relating progress made toward achieving set targets. IRC has retrained its monitors and now sends them out with PVO teams. IRC is also about to fill an expatriate monitoring position which has been vacant for several months.

Evaluation: With a sufficient supply of health care workers operating inside Afghanistan, the focus should be on the retraining and upgrading of existing health care workers, rather than the training of new basic health workers. In addition, PVO monitoring activities should focus on the quality as well as the quantity of health care provided by PVO-supported clinics.

O/AID/REP Response: The PVOs have agreed that the training of new workers will basically be eliminated except to a limited extent for underserved areas or attrition. Emphasis will now be placed on upgrading the skills and knowledge of existing mid-level workers, continuing refresher training for upper level health professionals and improving the staffing and management of established clinics. Furthermore, training will focus more heavily on preventive methods and less on curative. PVOs have also agreed to focus on technical monitoring to improve the quality of health care provided by PVO-supported clinics; more effective use of health care worker debriefing sessions; and improving the reliability of collected health data.

Evaluation: In order to facilitate the eventual integration of PVO-supported clinics into a national health system, the health PVOs should increase their efforts at standardization.

O/AID/REP Response: WHO and CMC with MSH participation are streamlining a minimum skills list they developed for low-, middle-, and upper-level health providers. They are now in the process of transforming the skills list into a certification exam that can delineate the various levels. They are also pursuing the development of definitions for various levels of health care facilities including the identification of optimum clinic staffing. Also, the O/AID/REP will strengthen the coordination between the PVO programs and the Health Sector Support Project.

D. Project Rationale

As noted above, during the early years of the A.I.D. Afghanistan program, PVOs were the only means of providing cross border humanitarian assistance. However, beginning in 1986, the O/AID/REP has been utilizing A.I.D. contractors to implement sector programs in health, education, agriculture, and logistics. A.I.D. continues to support PVOs for activities that contractors are unable to carry out or that address needs that exceed what can be addressed exclusively through contractors.

PVOs have strengths and weaknesses that determine how they fit into the overall O/AID/REP program. Their main weakness is their limited technical and development expertise. PVOs typically have young inexperienced staff who are hired to help implement emergency relief programs. This limits their ability to carry out programs that are technically complex or have longer-term development implications.

Another disadvantage from A.I.D.'s standpoint is that PVOs have objectives that are not necessarily the same as A.I.D.'s. PVOs are committed to the objectives of their founders or boards of directors. These are usually humanitarian, but can also be political or ideological. Not only does this limit the ways in which PVOs can contribute to U.S. Government or A.I.D. objectives, but it also causes resentment among Afghans who feel that PVOs are here for their own reasons and pay inadequate attention to the views and desires of Afghan authorities and the Afghan people.

On the positive side, their local contacts and committed staff give PVOs a comparative advantage in identifying and implementing community-level activities, especially in remote areas that are difficult to work in. They have also proven to be an important resource in identifying needs and solutions that were later adopted by major donors, e.g., identification of food deficit and famine areas; the need to move from cash-for-food activities to rural rehabilitation, and seeds and fertilizer; and the need for drug standardization. Also, because of their

low operating costs, they are frequently the most cost-effective means for A.I.D. to support activities that do not require a high level of technical expertise or development experience. And, finally, A.I.D. is also leveraging both expertise and additional financial resources (through private and other government donations of funds, supplies, and trained and dedicated manpower) by continuing to support them.

E. Relationship to PVO Activities Funded by Other Donors

Because of the political situation in Afghanistan, almost all cross border assistance of other donors is channeled through PVOs. The major supporters of PVOs are the O/AID/REP, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), UNHCR, and the U.N. specialised agencies. In anticipation of larger-scale refugee repatriation, other European countries have also been increasing their aid levels over the past year. The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) estimates that cross border humanitarian assistance channeled through PVOs increased 40 percent in 1989 over 1988.

Thus far, in FY 1990, A.I.D. has supported 18 PVOs through its two PVO support projects (seven U.S., six European, and five Afghan). There are at least as many PVOs operating in Afghanistan who do not receive A.I.D. support. These PVOs are implementing activities in health, crop production, rural infrastructure rehabilitation, animal husbandry, human settlements, formal education, non-formal skills development, and mine awareness. The focus of many of these activities is on preparing areas for the larger-scale return of refugees.

Although there has been only more recent formal coordination between donors funding cross border activities, a certain division of labor has evolved based on the particular areas of interest of the various donors. In the health sector, the major donors are A.I.D.; the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) with support by numerous donors, including the Swedish Government; and the Arab countries. Little is known about the Arab programs, but SCA has concentrated on providing medicines to clinics and, to a lesser extent, salaries, while A.I.D. has concentrated on training health workers and financing the salaries and other operating costs of clinics. This arrangement has functioned well and is expected to continue under the new PVO Support Project.

In the agriculture sector, the major donors are A.I.D., UNDP, and FAO. European countries as a group also provide substantial assistance. Since A.I.D. is implementing a major agriculture sector support program through contractors, most of the support to PVOs has been limited to rural rehabilitation activities. SCA and the U.N. agencies have financed the provision of agricultural inputs and rural rehabilitation, as well as agricultural development projects. UNDP has been particularly active in animal husbandry, an area that has not been a significant part of the A.I.D. program.

Except for some U.S. and Afghan PVOs, A.I.D. has been supporting the same PVOs since 1986. O/AID/REP's main concern in programming support for PVOs is that their activities contribute to the overall objectives of the A.I.D. program and are coordinated as closely as possible with the A.I.D. sector programs.

Coordination between A.I.D.-funded PVO activities and those funded by other donors is achieved primarily through three PVO coordinating bodies, ACBAR, based in Peshawar; Southwest Afghanistan and Baluchistan Agency Coordination (SWABAC), based in Quetta; and the Coordination on Medical Committees (CMC) based in Peshawar. ACBAR and SWABAC coordinate PVO activities through sector and regional (province-level) committees. The main purposes of these committees are to share information, standardize approaches, especially at the regional level, avoid duplication, and help coordinate donor funds and priorities with PVO interests and implementation objectives. The health committee has been a disappointment but much of the void has been filled by CMC and, more recently, WHO.

These coordination efforts have resulted in a minimum of duplication between donor programs, but have not led to joint planning either at the regional or sector level. It appears that donors are now beginning to move in this direction. WHO has taken the lead in the health sector. In the agriculture sector, it seems that the most promising avenue at this time is for donors to establish closer ties with the ACBAR and SWABAC agriculture and regional committees.

II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

A. Goal and Purpose

The PVO Support Project is a mechanism to fund PVO activities that contribute to the objectives of A.I.D.'s Afghanistan program. The project goal, therefore, is the same as the overall objective of A.I.D.'s cross border humanitarian assistance program: to alleviate the suffering of Afghans who have stayed in Afghanistan and to facilitate the repatriation of those who left. The purpose of the project is to increase the capacity of U.S., Afghan, and European PVOs to carry out activities in support of the objectives of A.I.D.'s Afghanistan program.

B. Project Directions

As new strategies have evolved to meet the changing needs inside Afghanistan, new directions have been formulated to guide the design and implementation of activities. The redesign of the PVO portfolio presents an opportunity to formally state these new directions which have been developing over the recent past and informally guiding new project development over the last few months. Therefore, in addition to administrative selection criteria which will be applied project wide, five guiding principles represent the overall direction of the O/AID/REP's PVO portfolio.

1. Movement Toward Sustainability

More than ten years of war have stripped millions of Afghans of their ability to earn an acceptable livelihood for themselves and their families. As a result, donor programs have been relief-oriented, often providing goods and services free of charge, or at highly subsidized rates. In some sectors, this availability of support well exceeds the pre-war levels. The health sector is a good example. Free care and medicine is provided throughout the countryside (particularly in those regions which border Pakistan) by the thousands of health workers trained and supported by the donor community.

While in many instances relief activities continue to be justified, donors must begin to concern themselves with the issue of sustainability. The issue will take on increasing relevance as Afghanistan fades away from the world spotlight and the availability of donor resources becomes less certain. More importantly, however, Afghanistan's eventual recovery from the war years will be greatly impeded if donors continue to focus resources on hand-outs rather than programs to restore economic normalcy.

Greater sustainability can be facilitated in a number of different ways. The most obvious, although not necessarily the easiest approach is to require increased community and user contributions to the cost of goods and services provided. Retraining existing staff rather than training new staff, standardizing programs, and relying more and more on Afghan staff at the management levels of donor programs are also approaches that will lead to greater sustainability. There are sure to be others.

Proposals funded under the PVO Support Project will be required to identify any sustainability issues associated with the proposed activity and discuss actions that will be taken by the grantee to address the issues. Proposals must also demonstrate that activities have the potential for being self-sustaining and able to survive in the absence of subsequent grant infusions from the O/AID/REP/

2. Toward Greater Afghanization

From the beginning the O/AID/REP has recognized that rebuilding the Afghan human resource base is critical to facilitating the transition from relief to greater self-sufficiency. Through its sectoral projects, it has developed Afghan capabilities to plan and manage health, education, and rural rehabilitation activities.

The PVOs have, to a more limited extent, also been conscious of the need to develop Afghan capabilities. Over the years, they have relied increasingly on Afghans at the operational level. Afghans have also frequently been appointed to senior technical positions. They are not,

however, commonly found in management and policy making positions. Over the course of the PVO Support Project, A.I.D. will encourage PVOs to train their Afghan staff to assume greater leadership roles. Special emphasis will be placed on designing conceptually sound projects; developing, writing, and negotiating proposals; managing and monitoring activities from a programmatic and fiscal standpoint; and developing and executing policy.

To further strengthen Afghan capabilities and to promote the development of Afghan PVOs, A.I.D. will give special consideration to proposals in which an expatriate PVO is jointly providing assistance with, or strengthening the capabilities of, an Afghan PVO. The Afghan PVO may already exist or it could be a new group, perhaps consisting of the participating expatriate PVO's local staff or its counterpart shura inside Afghanistan.

A.I.D. itself will make efforts to identify and support Afghan PVOs, although it is likely that the support will have to be provided through an intermediary given the registration requirements of the A.I.D. regulations.

In its 1990 Plan of Action, the U.N. also includes plans to build up Afghan PVOs and strengthen Afghan capacity for self-management through training programs and institutional support. International PVOs receiving funding from the U.N. will be encouraged to establish Afghan counterpart organizations and strengthen local indigenous bodies.

3. Toward More Complementarity with Sector Projects

As would be expected, the sector projects being implemented by A.I.D. contractors directly support the objectives that have been set by the O/AID/REP. Through the years, the O/AID/REP has tried to keep the PVOs informed about the policies guiding the activities within each sector project. These efforts as well as those made by some of the coordinating bodies have resulted in considerable complementarity between activities implemented by the PVOs and those by the A.I.D. contractors. At the same time, there have been instances where the practices of some PVOs work against what some of the A.I.D. policies are trying to achieve. This is particularly true with regard to the use of subsidies.

While the O/AID/REP respects the independent nature of PVOs, PVO-funded activities are clearly seen as a vehicle to further U.S. Government objectives. Therefore, under the new PVO Support Project, there will be a greater stress on PVO projects being designed with more attention to the policies governing the activities of the sector projects, and future funding of PVO proposals will definitely consider the extent to which the PVO is willing in the future to stay in step with A.I.D. policy objectives.

Another aspect of A.I.D. support for PVOs has been the transportation of commodities for PVOs through the Afghan Humanitarian Relief (AHR) Flight Program. Under AHR, U.S. Air Force transport planes regularly deliver serviceable, humanitarian excess Department of Defense (DOD) material, which, in the future, will emphasize relatively high cost items such as heavy construction equipment, to Pakistan for the Afghans. PVOs have also been permitted to transport commodities on the flights and the U.S. health PVOs have transported pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and other health care-related commodities. However, this support for PVOs is currently under review. If the PVOs are to continue to utilize the AHR in the future, it will, except in special circumstances, only be under conditions which place the burden on them for clearing their shipments in both the U.S. and Pakistan. Continued use of AHR flights is problematic and surface shipment of PVO cargoes is more likely.

4. Toward Greater Support of U.S. PVOs

In 1985 when the U.S. Government made a decision to provide cross border humanitarian assistance to war-affected Afghans, several European PVOs already had an established operational capacity inside Afghanistan to deliver services and commodities. Initially, the O/AID/REP channeled most of its assistance through these groups. As time went on, the O/AID/REP continued to support the activities of European groups but also began encouraging the involvement of U.S. PVOs. Since then, a number of well qualified and registered U.S. PVOs have entered the field and are carrying out their work effectively.

As a matter of A.I.D. policy, non-U.S. PVOs should increasingly be looking to their own governments for support as U.S. PVOs become the primary recipients of O/AID/REP funding under the PVO Support Project. While U.S. PVOs are often remiss in informing beneficiaries that the source of project benefits is the U.S. Government, at least there exists a U.S. connection when funds are channeled through them. This connection is less frequently made when non-U.S. PVOs implement activities funded by the O/AID/REP. Therefore, the O/AID/REP views such a policy as a way to increase Afghan awareness of the contributions made by the U.S. Government, in addition to other actions already taken and to be taken, to assure that beneficiaries are aware of U.S. support provided to them.

While U.S. registered PVOs will receive priority consideration for funding under the PVO Support Project, the O/AID/REP will assess on a case-by-case basis the comparative advantage the European PVO may have (e.g., working in areas of Afghanistan where U.S. PVOs have not yet established contacts) and continue funding when it makes sense to do so.

5. Toward More Geographical, Ethnic, and Gender Spread

Under this new project, increasing emphasis will be given to those PVOs attempting to address problems in underserved areas and for underserved populations (e.g., women, minority ethnic groups). In past

years, significant amounts of O/AID/REP and other donor resources have been focused on programs in Eastern Afghanistan. Continuing efforts in those areas are still required, but special efforts are needed to move into new areas. Future preference therefore will be given to PVO proposals which involve activities that focus on underserved areas, that reach ethnic groups that have so far lacked the constituency that could articulate their needs, and serve to expand the services provided to women and children.

C. The PVO Support Program

1. The Use of Sector Strategies

This project is designed to fund any PVO activity that fits within the overall objectives of the A.I.D. program. Some of the activities that have been funded under the previous two PVO projects include:

- o assistance to address emergencies caused by war or natural disasters;
- o the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure and small-scale distribution of agricultural inputs;
- o larger-scale agricultural production projects;
- o training of health care workers and support to rural health clinics;
- o supplies to rural schools; and
- o food aid to support rural works in areas to which refugees will be returning.

In order to manage these diverse activities, it is useful to group them according to the humanitarian and development objectives to which they contribute. In instances in which there are several grants to several PVOs in support of common objectives, sector strategies will be formulated. These strategies will provide the basis for selecting activities to be funded and for measuring their impact. Each strategy will contain the following information:

- o A description of the needs and existing situation in the sector.
- o A discussion of A.I.D.'s objectives in the sector against which progress will be measured.
- o A description of the types of activities that will be funded to achieve sector objectives.

- o A description of how the sector program will be managed, how individual grants will be reviewed and approved, and how performance and impact will be monitored and evaluated.
- o An analysis of issues that are critical to the achievement of sector objectives.

Three strategies have already been prepared. These are summarized briefly below. A fourth strategy is anticipated for an activity that will promote democratic pluralism.

2. Summary of Existing Strategies

a. The Health Strategy

The objective of the PVO health strategy is to improve access to and the quality of health care available to the rural population of Afghanistan. Previous A.I.D.-funded PVO activities have trained large numbers of health workers and supported clinics in Afghanistan. The specific objectives to be achieved during the period of the revised health strategy will be to: 1) upgrade the quality of health workers through retraining; and 2) increase the institutional sustainability of the health care system by: a) standardizing the qualifications of health care workers and the staffing and equipment requirements for rural clinics, and b) coordinating with the A.I.D. health sector program.

b. Rural Assistance Strategy

The purpose of the short-term activities funded under the rural assistance strategy will be to increase food availability and increase cash income for basic necessities. Activities funded under this strategy include: the rehabilitation of small irrigation systems and rural roads; the supply of agricultural inputs, draught animals and agricultural mechanization; access to basic necessities for populations in disrupted or resettlement areas; and improved health care for animals. These activities will result in: 1) Afghans surviving emergency situations without having to leave their home villages; 2) Afghans resettling in their country provided they have basic necessities to help sustain them for an initial period; and 3) rural communities able to provide more of their basic necessities through increased agricultural production.

c. Agricultural Development Strategy

The purpose of the activities funded under the agricultural development strategy will be to increase agricultural production and rural incomes. Anticipated outputs of the activities funded under this strategy are: the adoption of new technologies, the increased availability of mechanization, the development of marketing channels and processing facilities, and development or rehabilitation of rural infrastructure.

3. Activities Outside of Sector Strategies

Activities will also be funded outside of the sector strategies. For the most part, they will be considered when the O/AID/REP plans to support PVOs in the sector or when the activity is directly related to a developed program strategy. For instance, the O/AID/REP has been supporting a CARE food-for-work activity that is directly relevant to the O/AID/REP food assistance strategy.

III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

A. Project Coordination

The Program Office will have overall responsibility for coordinating this project. Its role will consist of:

- o assessing overall project performance, especially in terms of stated project directions;
- o reassessing the role of PVOs in the context of changing needs, contractor capabilities, and funding levels;
- o allocating funds among the sector strategies and for activities that fall outside these strategies. These budget allocations will be based on: 1) an assessment of changing needs for PVO activities in the different sectors, 2) an assessment of past PVO performance, and 3) changing policies and priorities within the overall O/AID/REP program; and
- o management of specific grants, as determined by O/AID/REP, not clearly falling under other office responsibilities. The technical offices (agriculture, education, health, RAO/Peshawar) will manage subgrants within their respective sectors or as directed by O/AID/REP in cases of technical overlap.
- o preparing generic project documentation.

B. Selection Criteria

1. PVOs

To receive direct grants, PVOs must satisfy eligibility criteria which are intended to determine the veracity, implementation capability and administrative capacity of PVOs to implement the type of activities funded by O/AID/REP under the PVO Support Project. There are also certain criteria which are specific to PVOs working cross border. The following is a list of the requirements. The last four criteria are Afghanistan specific:

The PVO must:

- o be registered with A.I.D. as a private and voluntary organization, following FVA/PVC guidelines;
- o be non-political, philanthropic and public service-oriented in its purpose and be engaged in voluntary, charitable or development assistance; not be a research organization or university or similar accredited institution of higher learning;
- o be controlled by an active and responsible governing board which meets at least annually and whose members serve without compensation; if paid officers serve on the board, they cannot constitute the majority of any decision;
- o under its own established priorities and programs, obtain, expend and distribute its funds in conformity with accepted ethical standards, without unreasonable cost for publicity, fund raising and administration;
- o each grant proposed to be funded pursuant to this project authorization will be considered as to whether it meets, or is subject to, A.I.D. policy requirements regarding a 25% project contribution from non-A.I.D. sources. In each case, due regard will be given each proposed activity as to the overall nature and scope of the activity to be conducted and the overall interests and needs of the cross border humanitarian assistance program in Afghanistan.
- o receive 20 percent of its total annual funding for international activities from sources other than the United States Government. This is in accordance with Public Law 101-167 (FY 1990 Appropriations Act for foreign operations, export financing and related programs), which requires that "None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act for development assistance may be made available to any United States private and voluntary organization, except any cooperative development organization, which obtains less than 20 percent of its total annual funding for international activities from sources other than the United States Government." In implementing this project, the Mission will take the necessary steps that the requirements of the legislation are complied with in accordance with Agency interpretations of that provision. Development assistance funded grants will be made only to PVOs which meet this requirement. We note that this requirement does not apply to contracts with PVOs nor to grants funded from Economic Support Funds.
- o have auditable financial records; and

29

- o have a No Objection Certificate (NOC) and be tax exempt under the laws of Pakistan;
- o have a full-time representative in Pakistan with authority to sign a grant or cooperative agreement(s) with A.I.D.;
- o have relevant experience in assisting Afghans or a record of successful experience in implementing development projects under adverse political and development conditions; and
- o agree in writing within its proposal that no U.S. citizen will travel inside Afghanistan as long as this remains U.S. Government policy.

To show that the PVO meets the above criteria, the following documentation should be provided:

- o Information describing the purpose of the organization, its methods of management, and scope of program;
- o documentation signifying A.I.D. registration;
- o NOC from the Government of Pakistan, and copy of tax exemption certificate;
- o previous fiscal year's annual audit report for the home and local offices covering income and expenditures from all sources;
- o the budget for the PVOs current fiscal year;
- o most recent annual report of program activities;
- o names and addresses of members of the Board of Directors; and
- o list of contributions other than from A.I.D.

2. Activities

PVOs must also meet certain criteria in order for their proposed activities to qualify for support under the PVO Support Project. These are:

- o the activity must address a documented need that falls within the priority areas supported by the O/AID/REP program;
- o the activity must be technically feasible and logistically implementable;
- o the PVO and its implementing partners in Afghanistan must have the capacity to implement the proposed activity; and

- o the activity must be financially viable, i.e., all costs must be documented and the resources to meet those costs must be available from this project or elsewhere;

3. Proposals

The proposal format to be used by PVOs to provide the above information is presented in Annex B.

4. Continuing Waivers And Other Deviations

Many of the activities that will be financed under the PVO Support Project will be activities carried over from the PVO Co-Financing Project and RAP. Given the on-going nature of the activities, the waivers and deviations approved under the two predecessor PVO projects continue to be justified. Following is a review of those waivers and deviations:

- o The IRC has acted as an intermediary for RAP and for selected health grants under the PVO Co-Financing Project. Justifications for other than full and open competition were approved for the two projects on March 15, 1988, and July 14, 1989, respectively and are attached as Annex C. The circumstances under which the waivers were approved have not changed and the O/AID/REP will continue to use IRC as an intermediary for RAP (as a component of the PVO Support Project) and selected health activities. Per Handbook 13, Chapter 2, Paragraph B3c, competition is not required for amendments to existing assistance awards.
- o Commodities and services financed by A.I.D. under this project shall have their source, origin, and nationality in the United States, Pakistan, Afghanistan and, when agreed to in writing by the A.I.D. Representative, countries in A.I.D. Geographic Code 935. Afghanistan is generally an ineligible source for A.I.D.-financed goods and services, however, in a late May-June 1987 exchange of cable traffic (Islamabad 11584, State 184924, Islamabad 13957) it was determined that the very nature of A.I.D.'s legislatively mandated program of cross border assistance required procurement inside Afghanistan.
- o Handbook 1, Supplement B, Chapter 4, indicates that, as a general rule, the source of A.I.D. financed pharmaceuticals is limited to the United States. This is primarily to ensure that pharmaceuticals distributed are safe and efficacious, having been manufactured in accordance with accepted quality standards. In an October 13, 1987 memorandum (Annex C), the O/AID/REP justified a policy of permitting "the local procurement of pharmaceuticals when accompanied by adequate safeguards, as determined by competent advice, concerning standards of safety, efficacy, and quality." The basis for the policy remains valid and, thus, the local procurement of pharmaceuticals will continue to be approved.

- o Per standard O/AID/REP procedure, each grant or cooperative agreement awarded under the project will include a clause permitting a suitable deviation from the strictures of normal audit requirements for end-use and costs incurred in Afghanistan. This deviation is necessary given the limited general access inside Afghanistan and the current complete prohibition on the travel of A.I.D.-financed U.S. citizens inside Afghanistan. Although not a deviation, it is important to note that per 87 State 147877 (Annex C), the A.I.D. Representative has the authority to approve PVO grants on a limited or no competition basis up to \$5 million.

C. Grant Approval Process

There will be four steps in the approval of grants to PVOs under this project. The first is to establish funding levels for each sector based on past experiences in the sector and O/AID/REP priorities vis-a-vis other program demands. The second step is the preparation and submission of proposals by the PVOs. These proposals will follow the format in Annex B and will also be consistent with the objectives and directions of the relevant sector strategy, when appropriate. Guidance to the PVOs regarding O/AID/REP sector-level concerns will be provided by the responsible technical office.

The third step is the substantive review and approval by the technical or staff office. The review will determine whether the proposed activity 1) effectively addresses a priority need, 2) is feasible, and 3) can be implemented by the proposing PVO. Once the proposal has been approved by the technical or staff office and, for proposals over \$500,000 or which entail policy issues and concerns, the A.I.D. Representative, the final step is the awarding and negotiation of the grant by the Grants Officer.

D. Management of Each Sector Strategy

In each sector strategy individual grants will be reviewed and approved, implementation and expenditures will be monitored, and progress toward achieving strategy objectives will be assessed. The main difference in the procedure followed by the different strategies will be determined by whether or not intermediary organizations are used to administer grants to the implementing PVOs. The main advantage of intermediaries is that they reduce the administrative burden on limited O/AID/REP staff. The main disadvantage is that there is often less substantive contact between the technical or staff offices and the implementing PVOs.

Sector programs that consist of many small activities are better suited for management through intermediaries. This type of program creates a large administrative workload, but individual activities rarely raise significant technical or policy issues, making direct A.I.D.

management less necessary. RAP is a good example of this model. Consequently, it will continue to be managed by RAO/Peshawar through an intermediary.

Programs consisting of larger-scale activities, however, frequently raise issues that require the direct involvement of A.I.D. technical offices. These activities can also have important implications for the A.I.D. sector support projects. For this reason they are best managed using direct grants or cooperative agreements rather than through an intermediary.

Even for PVO programs that require direct A.I.D. management, an intermediary will be used as an administrative pass-through when the implementing PVO is not registered with A.I.D. This will most likely continue to be the case with Afghan and European PVOs. In these cases, the main purpose of the intermediary is to meet a U.S. Government legal requirement and its responsibilities are limited to routine administration and financial management. In such cases, substantive grant review and management responsibilities will remain with the O/AID/REP technical office.

E. Activities Outside of the Sector Strategies

Certain activities to be funded under this project contribute to priority O/AID/REP objectives but are not carried out on a large enough scale to require a sector strategy. Frequently, these activities will be encouraged by the O/AID/REP and be designed jointly with an appropriate PVO. This was the case, for example, with the food-for-work activity currently being implemented by CARE. For future such activities, the review process will be as described in section C above. All proposals will have to contain the information called for in Annexes B and C before they can be reviewed and approved by O/AID/REP.

The decision regarding whether to prepare a sector strategy will depend on the number of PVOs and the number of activities contributing to a common set of objectives. When warranted by the level of activity, a sector strategy will be formulated containing the information specified in Part II, C, above.

IV. Monitoring and Evaluation

A. Monitoring

Monitoring cross border projects in Afghanistan is one of the most problematic and contentious issues facing donor agencies and PVOs alike. The persistence of armed conflict and political rivalries prevailing in many areas of the country, the poor transport conditions, the relative lack of communications, the presence of land mines, complex cultural factors, and the fact that U.S. citizens are prohibited from going inside

Afghanistan all serve to undermine A.I.D.'s capacity to adequately assess the effectiveness of field activities inside Afghanistan. Even in more typical development contexts, performance monitoring presents challenges to its implementors. The above mentioned factors, however, make this project particularly difficult to monitor and evaluate.

At the same time, the collection and use of performance data is crucial to the effectiveness of this project. Periodic feedback on project effectiveness will flag problems as they arise and permit quick corrective action. This is particularly important with activities funded under this project given that they all have one year or less to make a meaningful contribution to the problems at hand.

All PVOs receiving O/AID/REP funds will be expected to have a credible mechanism for monitoring implementation and impact of the activities on the lives of the intended beneficiaries. Thus, PVOs must go beyond monitoring outputs (e.g., number of health workers trained, number of meters of a karez rehabilitated) to what may be considered the intended outcome or impact (e.g., quality of health care available, increases in food production and increased incomes available for basic necessities). From a methodological standpoint, it will be necessary for PVOs to have performed some assessment of pre-project conditions in order to measure impact. This type of information is also crucial for designing the activities in the first place. Spending some time and money on this effort will be a valid activity expense.

Monitoring and evaluation specialists are turning more to employing rapid appraisal methodologies to collect data throughout project implementation. PVOs will be encouraged to use rapid appraisal which translates into selecting smaller samples, using more efficient methods of collecting data (e.g, focus groups, key informant interviews, in-depth interviews with a small number of beneficiaries) and focusing on a limited number of indicators. The point of rapid appraisal is to go beyond the collection of impressions by using the rigor of research methodology but on a small scale.

Each PVO will be required to submit quarterly reports that include: progress made in implementing activities, problems encountered, noteworthy successes, and a discussion as to which activities are likely to have a positive impact on beneficiaries. PVOs should also be encouraged to provide an analysis of unintended effects, both positive and negative to further understand the dynamics of implementing projects inside Afghanistan. Periodic meetings should be scheduled by the O/AID/REP sectoral backstop officer. These meetings should include a representative from the Program Office, from the sector project contract team, PD Office, RAO/P and relevant PVOs, as well as any intermediary. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss progress made toward achieving sectoral objectives and be a problem-solving session for current and anticipated issues.

B. Evaluation

In addition to the in-house performance monitoring of each PVO activity and the outside monitoring done by IRC for RAP sub-grantees, the entire PVO Support Project will be subjected to external evaluation.

If, after the next 12-18 months, it appears that activities will continue under a phase two, an external evaluation should be conducted prior to the design of a second phase. At a minimum, such an evaluation would look at how PVOs fit into the evolving O/AID/REP program and whether the current mechanisms chosen for managing PVO activities continue to make sense.

Evaluations of the impact of the PVO sector programs will, whenever feasible, occur in conjunction with an evaluation of the sector project to which they are associated. For example, the next evaluation of the health sector project should include an assessment of the contribution PVO health activities have made to the achievement of the overall health objectives of the O/AID/REP. The same will occur with the other PVO activities and the sectors to which they belong.

V. FINANCIAL PLAN

The following represents an illustrative financial plan and may be modified based on individual proposals and availability of funds:

GRANTEES	FY 90	FY 91	TOTAL
1. Freedom Medicine (FM)	600,000	0	600,000
2. Mercy Corps International (MCI)	850,000	850,000	1,700,000
3. Construction Related Training for Afghans (CRTA)	400,000	400,000	800,000
4. CARE	1,300,000	1,300,000	2,600,000
5. IRC (RAP) Cooperative Agreement	4,800,000	4,300,000	9,100,000
6. International Medical Corps (IMC)	* < 2,300,000 >	2,300,000	2,300,000
7. Freedom Medicine (FM)	* < 800,000 >	0	0
8. Mercy Corps International (MCI)	* < 2,300,000 >	2,300,000	2,300,000
9. IRC (Health) PVO Umbrella	* < 1,100,000 >	600,000	600,000
TOTAL :	\$ 7,950,000	12,050,000	20,000,000

* Non-Add. FY 90 grants of \$6,500,000 under predecessor PVO Co-Financing Project:

FY 90 PVO grants planned under PVO Co-Financing:	\$ 6,500,000
FY 90 PVO grants planned under PVO Support:	\$ 7,950,000
	=====
Total PVO grants planned in FY 90:	\$14,450,000
	=====

25

VI. ISSUES SECTION

A. Management: Intermediary vs. Direct Grants

With growing staffing constraints throughout A.I.D., Missions are increasingly faced with deciding how to more effectively manage their PVO portfolios. A.I.D. has begun turning to intermediaries to relieve the programming, monitoring and administrative burden of dealing with PVOs individually. There are a number of advantages to using intermediaries in this way. It provides a viable means for A.I.D. to continue to fund an array of individual PVO activities without exacerbating the existing Mission management burden. Working with an intermediary can have a positive impact on capacity building of the organization. Creating such capacity can be a positive force in leveraging other resources because it can serve as a convenient conduit of funds from donors that do not have a sufficient institutional presence to administer grants. Experience has shown, however, that there are certain disadvantages to using intermediaries which should be kept in mind to minimize their potentially negative impacts.

Although direct grants represent an A.I.D. management burden that intermediaries can relieve, this is not always an immediate benefit. In the short-term, intermediaries often need a lot of attention. A.I.D. must provide a great deal of guidance (written as well as oral) because the intermediary will be in a position to make decisions that, if not fully aware of A.I.D.'s policies, strategy and agenda, could hurt or not serve A.I.D.'s interests. This has been the case with IRC/RAP. In the beginning stages of RAP, the O/AID/REP had to work closely with IRC to help them develop the capability to select, manage and monitor activities in ways similar to how A.I.D. would under a direct grant. IRC has now benefitted from this capacity building and is, in fact, relieving the O/AID/REP's management burden of dealing with so many PVO activities.

While the intermediary is often considered a more responsive mechanism for funding PVOs than direct grants, experience has shown that it can suffer from a flexibility standpoint. Because the intermediaries must serve what they think are A.I.D.'s priorities, they are dependent on a set of criteria to guide them in selecting PVO activities as well as helping PVOs to shape their proposals. Unfortunately, applying an externally produced set of criteria to activity selection lacks a dynamic quality that can exist when managed within the Mission, where decisions regarding selection is enriched by exposure to constantly evolving strategy discussions. Innovation, therefore, can be squelched when intermediaries are used. In the case of IRC, this potential problem seems to have been largely avoided through the close contact IRC, as well as the PVO community, has had with RAO/Peshawar.

When intermediaries are used, further space is created between A.I.D. and the beneficiaries. This extra distance usually results in A.I.D. not getting credit for being the financial source of the benefits. While there is no assurance, and some evidence to the contrary, theoretically there is a greater chance, and more actions A.I.D. can take, to get credit when direct grants are used. While most of the PVOs funded by the O/AID/REP have been remiss in giving credit to the O/AID/REP, mechanisms have been built in and successfully implemented by IRC to ensure that the U.S. Government does receive credit for activities implemented by RAP sub-grantees, such as in annual reports and requiring receipts from local commanders and others inside Afghanistan acknowledging the U.S. as the donor.

Lastly, the use of an intermediary can represent a lost opportunity for A.I.D. to connect with local PVOs. Often closer contact with local groups can leave a more favorable impression of U.S. Government humanitarian intentions and contributions than they may have had prior to the contact. Also, the work of A.I.D. staff can also benefit from this contact by gaining a better understanding of the problems that A.I.D. is trying to address and ideas on how to improve their strategies and supporting activities. Despite the use of intermediaries, the O/AID/REP appears to have managed to maintain a substantive relationship with local Afghan groups and individuals.

B. U.S. Government Identification with PVO Activities Inside Afghanistan

Over the last five years, A.I.D. has been the principal donor behind much of the humanitarian cross border effort for Afghanistan. Yet, it appears that the U.S. Government is receiving little recognition from beneficiaries as the source of project support. While this lack of credit for contributions made is not unique in this situation, it is one that is more difficult to address because U.S. Government citizens are prohibited from going inside Afghanistan.

Frequently when a Mission becomes aware that the PVOs implementing A.I.D.-funded activities have been remiss in informing beneficiaries that the source of its benefits is the U.S. Government, an important recommendation is for A.I.D. staff to increase their frequency of site visits. In the Afghan context this is not permitted and, consequently, the U.S. Government loses out on an opportunity to be associated with good work.

Several possibilities are being considered to address this problem. First, there will be a greater emphasis on increasing support to U.S. PVOs and decreasing the support given to the Europeans. It can be safe to assume that the likelihood of being associated with the benefits resulting from European PVO activities is negligible. While U.S. PVOs are often remiss in informing beneficiaries that the source of project benefits is the U.S. Government, at least there exists a U.S. connection when funds are

channeled through them. Another action that the O/AID/REP can consider is increasing the use of the A.I.D. symbol and name on commodities issues (e.g., vehicles, tractors, bags of food), near supported infrastructure (e.g., health clinics, rehabilitated irrigation schemes) and on all A.I.D. financed documents that are circulated inside Afghanistan (e.g., forms, green books). And, finally, once the ban prohibiting A.I.D. staff and U.S. citizen contractor and grantee employees from entering Afghanistan is lifted, more Afghans will become aware of the U.S. Government's association with the humanitarian efforts that have gone on for the past five years.

C. U.S. Citizen Travel Inside Afghanistan

When A.I.D. first began implementing the cross border humanitarian assistance program for war-affected Afghans, the State Department issued a prohibition against any U.S. Government-financed American citizen from entering Afghanistan. While an unusual prohibition for typical A.I.D. programs, it was, in the beginning, understandable given the context. With the changing political situation, this prohibition is now unwarranted and clearly proving to be counterproductive.

Private Voluntary Organizations Support Project
(306-0211)

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

Office of the A.I.D. Representative
for Afghanistan Affairs

April, 1990

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND.....1

PART TWO
RATIONALE

PVO CAPABILITIES TO MANAGE LARGE AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS.....2
PVO AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN THE O/AID/REP PROGRAM.....3
THE NEED FOR A SEPARATE PVO AGRICULTURE SECTOR STRATEGY.....3

PART THREE
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

OBJECTIVES.....4
ACTIVITIES.....4
SELECTION CRITERIA.....6

PART FOUR
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

ORGANIZATION.....6
THE REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCESS.....7
MONITORING AND EVALUATION.....7

PART FIVE
FINANCIAL PLAN

FINANCIAL PLAN.....8

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Since 1987, the O/AID/REP has funded PVO rural rehabilitation activities through the PVO Co-Financing Project and later the Rural Assistance Project (RAP). These activities largely have been for the rehabilitation of irrigation systems, mostly karezes. More recently, PVO proposals have also included requests to fund small quantities of agricultural inputs, draft animals, and agricultural equipment.

In the past year, several PVOs have submitted proposals for agricultural projects that were larger and considerably more complex than the typical PVO rural rehabilitation projects funded earlier under RAP. These proposals raise technical and policy issues that have a direct bearing on the objectives of the Mission's Agriculture Sector Support Project (ASSP). For these reasons, they will be managed by the Agriculture Office under a new PVO Agricultural Development Strategy.

The activities to be funded under this strategy will contribute to the objectives of the Agricultural Development and Training (ADT) and the Agriculture/Rural Rehabilitation (ARR) components of the ASSP. The PVOs will add to the capacity of the A.I.D. contractors by carrying out activities that stem from the PVOs local contacts or reflect their particular areas of interest or expertise. Activities under the PVO agricultural development strategy will be closely coordinated with the activities of the ADT and ARR contractors and, in some cases, may be jointly implemented.

Two factors tend to limit the number of PVO agricultural development activities receiving O/AID/REP support. First, PVOs have limited expertise or experience in the design and management of agricultural development activities. Second, donor funding for agriculture is increasing, especially from the U.N. agencies, with the potential danger that PVOs could become overextended or duplicative in their activities.

O/AID/REP's Agricultural Development Strategy is designed to complement other donor funded PVO agricultural activities. For example, most of the UN funded PVO agricultural projects have had budgets of less than \$100,000. PVO projects to be funded under the O/AID/REP's Agricultural Development Strategy will contribute

directly to the achievement of ASSP objectives and will likely have annual budgets in the \$500,000 to \$1.5 million range. Also, funding commitments under the PVO Support Project will only be made in one year increments, limiting activities to those which can achieve sustainable benefits in less than one year.

II. RATIONALE

The AID cross border humanitarian assistance program began as an emergency relief effort. As the situation began to stabilize, there was a gradual shift in emphasis from emergency relief to rural infrastructure rehabilitation, mainly irrigation systems. PVOs were well suited for these early activities because, through their local contacts; they were able to identify needs and organize what were essentially local self-help projects. In early 1988, O/AID/REP designed a separate PVO support project, RAP, which reflected the reorientation from emergency relief toward rural rehabilitation.

Many of the PVO rural rehabilitation proposals included the supply of small quantities of agricultural inputs, mostly seeds and fertilizers, and in some cases draft animals. These efforts, which rarely exceeded \$300,000 in total cost, have increased the impact of infrastructure rehabilitation on agricultural production and helped return conditions in the project area closer to what they were before the war. In most cases, they did not raise significant technical or policy issues nor did they exceed PVO design and implementation capabilities.

During the past year, several RAP-funded PVOs have submitted proposals for somewhat larger agricultural development projects involving improved seeds, mechanization, improved production technologies, including the introduction of new cash crops. These proposals required the formulation of a PVO Agricultural Development Strategy that addresses the following concerns:

A. PVO Capabilities to Manage Large Agricultural Projects

Experience with RAP has shown that PVOs have the capacity to implement simple rural rehabilitation activities. Several PVOs however, seem to be making a commitment to larger agricultural development projects. They feel that rural infrastructure rehabilitation is only the first of several actions required to increase the incomes and standards of living of rural Afghans.

O/AID/REP believes that only some of these PVOs have the technical expertise to implement relatively large-scale agricultural development projects. Most PVOs are relief oriented organizations with limited experience with more technically

complex agricultural projects. Although efforts are being made to recruit more technically competent staff, the majority are young with little or no experience in developing countries. Given these limitations and the need to closely coordinate PVO agricultural activities with the ASSP, O/AID/REP guidance and supervision will be needed in both the design and implementation of agricultural development projects.

B. PVO Agricultural Activities in the O/AID/REP Program

Within the context of the overall objectives of the ASSP, i.e., increased agricultural production and rural incomes, there are two reasons for funding PVO agricultural development activities over rural rehabilitation activities or ASSP contractor activities. First, following a PVO rural rehabilitation activity with an agricultural development project achieves a greater development impact than terminating the PVOs activities and moving to another rural rehabilitation activity elsewhere. Second, when a PVO proposes an activity that makes a contribution to ASSP objectives, it is clearly complementary to what would be achieved using only A.I.D. contractors. At least one of these conditions must be met for the O/AID/REP to allocate funds to PVOs for agricultural development.

C. The Need for A Separate PVO Agriculture Sector Strategy

The overall purpose of RAP as originally designed was to increase agricultural productivity and rural incomes. PVO agricultural development activities fit within this purpose and could have been funded under RAP. However, the activities originally intended to be funded under RAP were limited to short-term rural rehabilitation and small-scale agricultural input distribution. A management structure using an intermediary (IRC/RAP) was set up to assist the O/AID/REP in the management of these activities, with RAO/Peshawar responsible for the substantive review and approval of individual activities. Neither IRC/RAP nor RAO/Peshawar has the expertise to review, approve and manage agricultural development projects.

Agricultural development activities require technical input during design, review and approval, and require close coordination with the ASSP. This implies a slower, more thorough review process, and more Agriculture Office technical involvement during review and implementation. Assuring the sustainability of benefits is also more complex. Key issues include the economic feasibility of the production technology, the availability of remunerative markets, and the institutional support needed for production, processing and marketing. These needs argue for PVO agricultural development activities to be managed in the ASSP context rather than in the PVO Rural Assistance Program context.

III. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

A. Objectives

The overall objective of activities under this strategy is to increase agricultural production and rural incomes in Afghanistan. At the end of each year of funding, Afghan farmers benefiting from these activities will be producing more food or cash crops and the rural population will be earning more cash income from on-farm employment. While this impact will not be directly measurable, indicators such as quantities of inputs utilized, area planted under irrigation or improved seeds, or the number of beneficiary farm households affected will be used to assess achievement of the overall strategy objective.

O/AID/REP's major concern is that increases in production and income resulting from these activities be sustainable. Benefits should not depend on A.I.D. funding beyond one year nor on political stability at the national level. Activities that do not meet these conditions will require special justification to be funded under the PVO Support Project.

The specific objectives to be achieved by this strategy are:

- o increased food crop production, processing and marketing through restoring traditional cultivation practices prevalent before the war;
- o increased food output and farm incomes through the introduction of new technologies and cash crops into Afghan farmers' production systems;
- o rehabilitation of rural infrastructure; and
- o increased rural employment both on-farm and related to the processing of agricultural products.

O/AID/REP will emphasize that the proposals be specific in terms of desired objectives and how the achievement of these objectives is to be measured after activity completion.

B. Activities

O/AID/REP seeks to guide PVOs towards supporting those agricultural development activities where the need is greatest, where PVOs have demonstrated capabilities to contribute and where other assistance is still inadequate. PVOs will be encouraged to identify such needs based on their experience and contacts inside Afghanistan at specific locations where they have been working in the past.

At the same time, during the design process the O/AID/REP Agriculture Office will work with interested PVOs to assure that their proposed interventions are consistent with the overall objectives of the ASSP and, as necessary, coordinated with the programs of the ASSP contractors. For example, one proposal currently under O/AID/REP review would, if approved, receive inputs and extension support from the ADT component of ASSP and perhaps road improvement support from the ARR component.

From the experience and perspectives of both the PVOs and the O/AID/REP the needs of rural Afghanistan are converging into a list of priority concerns that offer the basis for a working relationship in rehabilitating the sector.

O/AID/REP will give first priority to PVO activities which directly complement those currently underway as part of its Agriculture Sector Support Project. These include:

- o the marketing of agricultural inputs -- seeds, seedlings, fertilizers and farm equipment, especially tractors and irrigation pumps; and
- o the introduction and/or marketing of cash crops.

Several PVOs already have well developed linkages with local farm communities that enable them to enhance O/AID/REP's efforts to deliver badly needed production inputs and to communicate improved cultivation practices. O/AID/REP will entertain PVO proposals in these activity areas where these local linkages exist and can be tailored in direct support of ASSP activities.

At the same time the O/AID/REP will encourage PVOs to assist in meeting other unmet agriculture development needs. Some illustrative projects are:

- o reforestation for firewood and erosion control;
- o small animal husbandry -- poultry, goats, sheep breeding and health care; and
- o provision of farm production credits.

Deforestation caused by 10 years of war must be reversed before irreparable harm is done to the country's soils and land. Similarly, the need to restore animal protein in rural family diets will be critical to long-run human health and nutrition. The need for credit to enhance the purchasing power of returning farmers and their families is also vital to restoring healthy open markets for agricultural inputs.

The annual budget for each activity under this strategy is expected to be in the \$500,000 to \$1.5 million range. Activities under \$500,000 will be funded under the PVO Rural Assistance Program (RAP).

C. Selection Criteria

The decision on whether to fund an activity under the PVO agricultural development sector strategy will be based on the following selection criteria:

- o The activity must be consistent with the objectives, policies and priorities of the ASSP and, when appropriate, complement ASSP contractor activities in the area;
- o The PVO must have demonstrated management and technical capacity to implement the project;
- o The design must be technically and financially sound and logistically implementable;
- o Project benefits must be sustainable under existing and foreseeable social and political conditions in the region; and
- o The activity must include effective arrangements for monitoring implementation and impact.

Activities funded under the PVO Agricultural Sector Strategy must contribute to ASSP objectives and complement activities of the ASSP contractors either because they are located in areas where the contractors do not operate or they reflect the pertinent expertise or approach of a particular PVO that would not be readily available through the contractors.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

A. Organization

Activities funded under this strategy will be reviewed, approved and monitored by the O/AID/REP Agriculture Office through cooperative agreements or direct grants to the implementing PVOs. It will be the responsibility of the O/AID/REP Agriculture Office to assure that each PVO agricultural development activity is conducted as an integral part of the ASSP. The O/AID/REP office will also assist PVOs, as necessary, in the design of proposals that meet the criteria listed in the previous section.

B. The Review and Approval Process

To initiate a request for O/AID/REP funding, PVOs will submit a concept paper that discusses the proposed activity. Once it has been determined that the proposal meets all of the conditions necessary for approval, the PVO will submit a full proposal using the format presented in Annex C of the PVO Support Project AAM. O/AID/REP concerns during this process will deal primarily with consistency with ASSP objectives and key feasibility issues. Once the activity has been approved O/AID/REP will enter into a grant or cooperative agreement which will be signed by the Grants Officer.

When a PVO wishes to undertake activities directly linked to the ASSP and is willing to do so under direct O/AID/REP guidance, the approval process will consist of negotiations between the O/AID/REP, the PVO and, when appropriate, the concerned ASSP contractor regarding the activities to be undertaken with O/AID/REP funds. These activities will usually be implemented under a cooperative agreement which specifies the responsibilities of both parties in what amounts to a joint O/AID/REP-PVO undertaking.

C. Monitoring and Evaluation

PVOs will be responsible for monitoring both the implementation and impact of their activities. The approved proposal will include an annual workplan and the PVO will specify the arrangements for monitoring the execution of the workplan. The PVO will also submit quarterly reports to the O/AID/REP covering progress in relation to the workplan, reasons for delays, and significant actions including redesigns or notable successes.

The development impact of each activity will be evaluated on an annual basis (prior to the end of each grant period) and at the end of the activity if the duration is longer than one year. The evaluations will deal with the impact on agricultural production, rural incomes, and objectives specific to the activity (e.g., the introduction of a new productivity-increasing technology or a new cash crop). This implies that PVOs will either submit the necessary baseline data in their proposal or collect it early in the implementation process.

AID/REP will also evaluate the overall PVO agricultural development strategy as part of the next ASSP evaluation scheduled for early 1991.

V. FINANCIAL PLAN

Unlike the PVO health and RAP sector strategies, which are ongoing, it is not possible to project the financial requirements of the agricultural development strategy. For planning purposes, the O/AID/REP will budget \$3 million for between two and six activities. If feasible proposals require less funding, the balance will be made available for other viable PVO activities at the beginning of the fourth quarter of the annual grant period.

Private Voluntary Organizations Support Project
(306-0211)

H E A L T H S E C T O R S T R A T E G Y

Office of the A.I.D. Representative
for Afghanistan Affairs

April, 1990

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE
INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.....1
PVO ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE HEALTH SECTOR.....3
RELATIONSHIP TO A.I.D. STRATEGY.....3
RATIONALE FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT TO PVOs.....4

PART TWO
STRATEGY DESCRIPTION

OBJECTIVES.....6
STRATEGY DIRECTION.....7

PART THREE
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

GRANT PROCESS.....10
AFGHAN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FLIGHT PROGRAM.....11

PART FOUR
MONITORING AND EVALUATION

MONITORING.....11
EVALUATION.....12

I. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

A. Historical Perspective

In FY 1985, the U.S. Government initiated a cross-border humanitarian assistance program to help relieve the suffering of those Afghans who chose to remain inside Afghanistan. To facilitate the rapid start-up of the program, grants were made, on an ad hoc basis, to a number of European PVOs which had already established an operational capacity inside Afghanistan to deliver health care, food aid, and cash-for-food. Because the European PVOs were uncomfortable accepting direct U.S. funding, the grants were made through the U.S.-based International Rescue Committee and the Americares Foundation.

In FY 1986, A.I.D. designed and authorized the \$15 million PVO Co-Financing Project through which it continued to support the activities of European PVOs and began to encourage the involvement of American PVOs. From the start, the cash-for-food and health activities were the two biggest draws on project resources, with health care training and support for clinics eventually absorbing roughly 50 percent of annual budgets set aside for PVO activities.

A.I.D. authorized a \$20 million increase in the PVO Co-Financing Project to \$35 million in April 1987. A little less than one year later, in an effort to accelerate the evolution from cash-for-food to rural relief activities, A.I.D. designed and authorized the \$10 million Rural Assistance Project, leaving the health care PVOs as the primary recipients of PVO Co-Financing Project funding.

As it stands, A.I.D., through the PVO Co-Financing Project, is supporting three American, three European, and three Afghan PVOs, as well as a group set up to coordinate cross-border health activities, the Coordination of Medical Committees (CMC). The three American PVOs, which in FY 1989 received about 75 percent of project funds, are all funded directly by A.I.D. who is the majority donor. The European and Afghan PVOs and the CMC receive lower percentages of their budget from A.I.D. and are funded through an intermediary, the International Rescue Committee. Following are brief descriptions of the groups and their activities:

- International Medical Corps, (IMC) an American PVO, has graduated five classes from its eight-month training program. Its 200 graduates are working in approximately 50 clinics and four small hospitals supported by IMC in Afghanistan. It operates a training hospital in Nasir-Bagh near Peshawar.
- Mercy Corps International, (MCI) an American PVO, has graduated 119 students from a six month training program. It employs 99 of these graduates in its 3 small hospitals, 23 clinics, and 15 mobile units in Afghanistan. It operates a training hospital in Quetta.

- Freedom Medicine, (FM) an American PVO, has graduated 168 students from a six-month training program, and presently supports 106 clinics inside Afghanistan. It is now shifting its attention to the development of a new three-month advanced medical training program designed to upgrade the medical skills of mid-level health workers, and preparing to transfer its facilities and programs to the AIG Ministry of Public Health. It operates a training hospital in Thal, near the Parachinar salient.
- The German Afghanistan Committee (GAC) operates 13 clinics in Central and Eastern Afghanistan. It will likely be the first O/AID/Rep supported organization to move its training inside Afghanistan to peri-urban small hospitals, with German technical assistance.
- Medical training for Afghans (MTA) is the collaborative effort of Aide Medical Internationale, a French PVO, and Solidarite-Afghanistan, a Belgian group, to train "physician assistants," medics with 16 months of training who can function autonomously in a rural clinic or under a doctor's supervision in a hospital. As of January 1990, 53 students had graduated from the MTA course.
- Medical Refresher Course for Afghans (MRCA) is run by a French PVO to upgrade the knowledge and skills of Afghan assistant doctors and assistant nurses, x-ray technicians, dentists, and anesthesiologists. MRCA and MTA, together with the Sandy Gall Foundation (prosthetics), operate a European funded training hospital in Peshawar.
- The Afghan OB/GYN hospital in Peshawar, an Afghan PVO, delivered 3,600 babies and treated over 18,000 women in 1989. An average month of health care delivery services at the clinic include 1,600 - 2,000 outpatients, 300 deliveries and 15 major operations. Patients are primarily refugees but also include women from inside Afghanistan.
- The Psychiatric Center for Afghan Refugees; an Afghan PVO, in Peshawar treated over 26,000 patients for torture and other war and displacement related psychiatric problems in FY 1989, almost 8,000 of whom were women and almost 4,000 of whom were children.
- The Afghan Women's Resource Center, an Afghan PVO, began its program of literacy and knitting classes for uneducated women in November 1989. An A.I.D. grant made it possible to add an element of health education to the program.

52

- The Coordination of Medical Committees (CMC) works to improve and coordinate the health care programs of cross-border PVOs. An important objective of the CMC has been the standardization of drug lists and salary scales, analysis of clinic records from inside Afghanistan, and preparation of a data base and facilities map for its members.

-B. PVO Accomplishments in the Health Sector

The original objective of the Health PVOs was to provide emergency medical care to the people of war-torn Afghanistan. Thus, initial training programs concentrated on the treatment of wounds, the amputation of limbs, and the placement of chest tubes. Early on, however, it became apparent that, despite the horror and occasional preponderance of war injuries, the medical problems of Afghanistan during the war have been essentially the same as those before the war -- problems of public health and primary health care. In an analysis of approximately 50,000 patient visits to clinics inside Afghanistan, CMC determined that trauma, including war-related injuries, accounted for less than five percent of all clinic visits.

Over the past three years, training programs have evolved to emphasize public health care. Curricula draw heavily from the concepts pioneered in "Where There is No Doctor" and have profited from the exposure each organization has had to medical field conditions inside Afghanistan. The recent project evaluation found the overall quality of the PVO training programs to be good.

Through these programs, PVOs have trained over 2,000 mid-level health workers for Afghanistan. A.I.D.-supported PVOs have trained approximately 600 of these workers. According to WHO, over 5,000 health workers are supported by the PVOs, Management Sciences for Health, the Swedish Committee, the Afghan parties and various Islamic groups. This represents a resource for improving the health status of the Afghan people that has never before existed. A previous point of reference is the fact that there were only 138 Basic Health Units in rural Afghanistan in 1979, the year the Soviets invaded.

C. Relationship to A.I.D. Strategy

At the same time it was supporting the development, expansion, and improvement of PVO programs, A.I.D., under its Health Sector Support Project, with Management Sciences for Health (MSH) as the institutional contractor, was also working to create an Afghan capability to plan and deliver health care services. This capability was first vested in the Health Committee of the seven

party resistance Alliance and later in the Afghan Interim Government's (AIG) Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) when it subsumed the responsibilities of the Health Committee.

The most significant achievement of the MOPH, through the Health Sector Support Project, has been the training and deployment of almost 1,500 basic health workers (each of whom has three months of training) and the establishment of 112 clinics. The project has also supported the development of Area Health Schemes in three administratively organized, multi-province regions of the country where the AIG has minimal presence. A public health training center is located in Peshawar with additional health training camps along the frontier.

The efforts of the PVOs and the Ministry of Public Health are directly complementary. Together, their resources represent the potential for the lower- and mid-level tiers of a national health care pyramid, with the MOPH-trained BHW forming the base and the PVO-trained medics providing the necessary mid-level knowledge and skills and referral services. The pyramid model has already been demonstrated at the regional level in the Area Health Schemes, particularly in the Northeast, far from Peshawar based warehouses and expatriate trainers. The ability to make the pyramid a reality at the national level will take a number of years and depend on a variety of factors, including progress on the sustainability issue, the capability of the MOPH (and its successors) to assume increasing levels of responsibility, and of course the incorporation of regional hospitals currently in PDPA held cities.

A.I.D. financed PVOs are expected to contribute to the U.S. policy of supporting the AIG (or its successor). In the health sector, individual PVOs as well as PVO coordinating groups, such as CMC and ACBAR, are encouraged to develop effective working relationships with the MOPH. Freedom Medicine, with its plan to gradually fold its resources into the AIG, has gone the farthest in coordinating its program with the AIG. The success with which the AIG is able to integrate the staff and clinics of Freedom Medicine will be an important indicator of its ability to establish itself as an effective government entity.

D. Rationale for Continued Support to PVOs

PVOs represent an important dimension to the overall A.I.D. health program for Afghanistan. Their staff travel willingly inside Afghanistan under difficult and dangerous conditions, and have a strong commitment to establishing effective working relationships with the people they are assisting. As a result, they generally have good knowledge of local needs and working conditions and good relations with local authorities.

Another advantage of PVOs is their ability to respond rapidly and flexibly to a wide range of medical situations. For example, Freedom Medicine was able to respond quickly to a request for emergency medical assistance during the bombardment of Khost in 1987.

There are also important budgetary advantages to supporting PVOs. Four facts emerge from a comparative cost analysis among PVOs and the institutional contractor MSH:

1. Higher order PVO facilities with higher trained staff cost more per facility and more per patient than lower order Basic Health Centers, as one would expect;

2. With some variability, depending upon organization practice and accessibility to Peshawar, "No Doctor Clinics" of similar physical and staff configurations, supported by either the PVOs or MSH, cost approximately the same, as one would expect; BUT

3. For similar skill levels and training, PVO expatriate staff cost only one seventh (1/7) as much as a fully supported contractor; and

4. As intended in the PVO Co-Financing Project, PVOs act as multipliers of A.I.D. funding by leveraging donors from other national governments, international organizations and private donors who do not contribute to A.I.D. contractors. Freedom Medicine, which probably would not have come into existence without A.I.D. funding, for 1990/91 leverages 54% of its Afghanistan budget from non-A.I.D. sources. For International Medical Corps, the figure is 25%, and for Mercy Corps International, it is 52%. For those European and Afghan PVOs and the CMC funded under the IRC umbrella, the percentages of external funding tend to be higher yet. In several cases, outside donors condition their support on the grantee also receiving O/AID/Rep funds, thus the budget process itself encourages policy coordination in a way which single source funded contractors can not.

In short, dollars expended on PVOs buy more TA resources and more health services than single source funded contractors. The initial O/AID/Rep health program relied solely on PVOs. Return to a PVO implemented health program based in Afghanistan under a clear U.S. umbrella and "attribution" formula, is a possible fall back position in case of severely restricted funding.

Outside of flexibility and budgetary considerations, PVOs have played an important role in keeping the struggle and needs of the Afghan people alive in the minds of the world community. Few would argue against the continued need for this role.

II. STRATEGY DESCRIPTION

A. Strategy Objectives

The health strategy for the PVO Support Project must be seen as a complementary part of other donor activities and O/AID/Rep's larger health portfolio (The Health Sector Support Project) with its institutional contractor, Management Sciences for Health (MSH). MSH works with other donors and is concerned with the training/retraining, supplying and monitoring of Basic Health Workers, the lowest and most numerous order of the health pyramid. At the same time MSH also concentrates on strengthening Afghan institutions (the Ministry of Public Health of the AIG) and on supporting a training center as the most visible and effective arm of the MOPH. The MOPH in toto or, as modules such as the training center, is preparing to move into Afghanistan and take on the responsibility of a National Ministry of Public Health. The PVOs occupy a large and critical niche in this scheme -- with other donors, PVOs provide mid- and higher-level training not covered by MSH. They provide facilities in areas of Afghanistan where the AIG or Afghan regional authorities are not represented. They provide flexibility of response and alternative approaches to health care delivery under uncertain conditions inside Afghanistan and they provide medical training and exposure to a range of Afghans who are not part of the AIG. A.I.D. describes three objectives in the September 1988, Amended AAM for the Health Sector Support project:

- o improve first aid and emergency services including medical and surgical care for war casualties -- phasing down as the need subsides;
- o expand general health care services for civilians including women and children as well as mujahideen; and,
- o enhance the capability of the Alliance Health Committee, now the AIG Ministry of Public Health, other organized Afghan entities (private or public), and/or organized areas to plan, organize, and manage expanded health care activities.

The PVOs have already made significant contributions to the achievement of the first two objectives. Increasingly, through their cooperation with the AIG/MOPH, they are making a contribution to the achievement of the third objective as well.

The January 1990 evaluation of the PVO Co-Financing and Rural Assistance Project found "The management system for the PVO health program should be the model for PVO programs that raise important policy issues or are closely linked to the AID/Rep Sector Programs " (pp. xii, 80). As such, it is useful to review the five principles that have guided the O/AID/Rep Health Office in funding and implementation actions since

1988 (88 Islamabad 26344--attached) and have influenced the program directions of this AAM as well as the directions of this particular strategy document.

1. PVOs will provide support for training activities at the mid-to-higher levels of the health care pyramid vis-a-vis 4SH (the principle of complementary with sector project);

2. Training of Afghans is favored over the direct provision of medical services by expatriates and extension of training inside Afghanistan is strongly encouraged (the principles of Afghanization, support of Afghan PVOs, greater geographic ethnic and gender spread);

3. There are limitations on funding new PVOs given budget restrictions and start-up costs;

4. There will be relatively greater funding of U.S. PVOs and consequently less funding for European PVOs to encourage their seeking funding from other sources;

5. Expansion of facilities will be in congruence with training capacity and budget constraints, improved quality and avoidance of white elephants (principles of sustainability). These principles have been extended into the 90/91 grant year with additional stipulations regarding monitoring, co-financing, cooperation with the AIG or its successor, and utilization of newly created facility and population data bases to rationalize facility numbers and locations.

B. Strategy Direction

Under the Health Sector Support and the PVO Co-Financing Projects, A.I.D. has been able to make a substantial contribution to the development of an extensive health care delivery network inside rural Afghanistan. Thousands of people who never before had access to health care providers are now being served. Despite this considerable accomplishment, the need for health service inside remains great, and there is a natural tendency of the donor community toward even further expansion, especially when equipment and pharmaceuticals are often "free of cost" (in a financial sense since costs are paid by other donors) and the cost of training is relatively cheap. Unfortunately, salary and pharmaceutical resupply costs create a recurrent cost burden that a free Afghan government will be unable to assume. In order to avoid the tragedy of unstaffed, unstocked, and unmaintained white elephant facilities in post-war Afghanistan, A.I.D. will, over the life of the strategy, focus on consolidating and increasing the effectiveness of gains to date. Specifically, PVOs will be encouraged, by A.I.D. funding decisions, and dialogue to move in the directions described in the following paragraphs.

A major emphasis will be on upgrading the skills and knowledge of existing lower and mid-level health workers and Afghan doctors to provide referral services for the population and upward mobility options within the health system for proven performers. Refresher training for upper level health professionals and improvements in the staffing and management of established clinics will be emphasized. The training of new health workers and the establishment of new clinics will be eligible for support but will require written justification, including back-up data from CMC, WHO, or ACBAR data bases, to justify the need. Spontaneous or coordinated consolidation of poorly located duplicative clinics will be encouraged based upon newly available location maps and data bases of facilities and district level population estimates.

Another high priority will be expanding the proportion of women and children being served by the health services delivery network. This will be most effectively accomplished by increasing the number of female health care providers.

A.I.D. will increasingly expect PVOs to deal with the issue of sustainability. The current donor-sponsored distribution of care and pharmaceuticals, free to patients, is not sustainable. In the future, donor support will have to be complemented by support from a free Afghan government and from the beneficiaries themselves. Yet, it is important to remember that few countries in the world, certainly none as basically poor and as recently war-ravaged as Afghanistan, have completely self-sustaining health systems void of subventions from donors and the national budget. Recognition must be given to the principle that the most cost-effective health care is preventive. But, people do not pay for prevention--they pay to have illnesses treated, wounds dressed and broken limbs set.

"Sustainability", then, for the medium-term, becomes a realistic and supportable mix of (a) self-sustaining measures (fee-for-pharmaceuticals or revolving drug funds, fee-for-service, and community contributions in cash or kind); (b) national budget, subventions and (c) donor contributions (O/AID/Rep, U.N., Islamic, other bilateral and private or institutional). Fortunately, pursuit of sustainability so defined has historical precedents in fees-for-pharmaceuticals, private pharmacies in urban areas, and private practices for poorly paid government doctors. Reintroduction of these concepts, which may still be alive and well in PDPA controlled cities, must be pursued as donor resources for the resistance inevitably dwindle over time.

O/AID/Rep, as arguably the largest paymaster (PVO plus MSH), can have influence here, but, absent coordination, including Islamic donors, effective implementation will be difficult. As an example, MSH would have difficulty implementing a fee-for-pharmaceutical program when another donor is providing free pharmaceuticals

from a clinic in the same district. Again, O/AID/Rep staff and PVO staff with O/AID/Rep policy guidance need to continue to work through the existing coordinating bodies (CMC, ACBAR, WHO, UNICEF, perhaps the new Islamic Coordination Council, and ideally the AIG/MOPH or its successor) to further common goals.

An acknowledged prerequisite for movement toward sustainability is standardization. Already, CMC has served as a forum for the preparation of standard drug lists, a manual for the uniform diagnosis and treatment of common diseases, a standard monitoring questionnaire and a common salary scale. PVOs are now developing a minimum skills list for low-to-middle, and upper-level health workers, with the ultimate objective of developing an exam that can delineate and certify various levels of skills and knowledge.

Definitions for the different levels of health facilities have also been developed through MSH and ACBAR coordination. Just as optimum treatments were identified, clinic staffing and training levels are being standardized as are laboratory procedures (a joint O/AID/Rep, WHO, ACBAR undertaking).

A.I.D. will also encourage PVO cooperation in the refinement of data bases held by CMC, WHO, ACBAR, and the AIG. Information on the location and staffing of clinics will be indispensable to coordinating current, and planning future health care programs for Afghanistan when combined with district level (325 Woleswalis/Alaqadaris) population estimates developed by O/AID/Rep.

Sustainability issues would be further served by the Afghanization of PVOs. O/AID/Rep presently supports three Afghan-managed PVOs. Other expatriate PVOs currently employ Afghans in their senior technical positions. Increasingly, A.I.D. would like to see PVOs train Afghans to serve in policy and management positions as well.

Afghanization also implies that the surreal "Peshawar bubble" must burst. Eventually the Peshawar based AIG/MOPH or its successor will have to move inside or risk becoming an appendage to non-A.I.D. and non-U.N. donors, and increasingly irrelevant in terms of providing medical services inside to Afghans. Thus, "portability" is an essential part of the health strategy. The MOPH Training Center, supported by MSH, is intended to be portable, as are the trained Afghan medical and administrative staff. PVOs must also be prepared either to move inside with the blessing of a successor Afghan government or gracefully turn over their facilities and allow their staff to be incorporated in what will first be a poorly funded and ineffectively organized, decentralized Ministry of Public Health.

III. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

A. Grant Process

A.I.D. has made both direct and indirect grants to PVOs in the health sector. Direct grants have gone to American PVOs and have been in the \$1 million to \$2.5 million range per PVO per year. Indirect grants, which have been made through the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and formerly Americares, have gone to European and Afghan PVOs, and to CMC. These grants have not exceeded \$750,000 and have typically been in the \$50,000 to \$150,000 range.

A.I.D.'s health office has played a substantive role in the review and approval of all grants, whether awarded directly or indirectly. While IRC has done little more than act as a pass through, it has served a legitimate and valuable purpose in its role as an intermediary. From a workload point of view, it has diminished the amount of staff time required to grant funds to a PVO. In FY 1989, for example, A.I.D. was able to make one grant to the IRC Cooperative Agreement instead of five grants to five different PVOs. More importantly, from an implementation point of view, the IRC Cooperative Agreement provides A.I.D. with an entity which can hold obligated funds until it makes practical sense to commit them. This is uniquely important to the O/AID/Rep program which is operating without the benefit of a host country government to which obligations can be made. Relieved of the pressure to obligate funds to implementing PVOs before the end of the fiscal year, A.I.D. can take the time to work with these groups to ensure that proposals that are financed are as thoughtful and well planned as possible. Similarly, the cooperative agreement permits A.I.D. to hold a small pot of funds to be released quickly in response to medical emergencies (e.g. increased fighting). Under the PVO Support Project, A.I.D. will continue to make both direct and indirect grants on the same basis on which it has done so in the past.

Given existing and anticipated funding constraints, A.I.D. will, except in exceptional circumstances, limit its support to PVOs with which it has already associated itself. A.I.D. is under increasing pressure from new PVOs, especially those which have operated in refugee camps, to provide funding. Since the level of funds set aside for PVOs is unlikely to increase it will be difficult to consider proposals from new PVOs without cutting the budgets of existing proven programs. Thus, new proposals will not be accepted for consideration except in exceptional circumstances, unless they involve the strengthening of Afghan PVOs, improving health care delivery to women and children, or experimenting with an innovative approach to health care delivery or sustainability. In accordance with stated principles, European PVOs have received

increasingly diminished shares of the O/AID/Rep PVO health budget as contributions to American and Afghan PVOs have risen. U.S. PVOs will continue to receive relatively greater funding than European PVOs and the European PVOs will be encouraged to seek funding from their own respective governments, the U.N. and other bilateral, institutional or private donors. A.I.D. will, however, continue to support its existing roster of European PVOs as long as they fill a niche not being met by an American PVO.

B. Afghan Relief Flight Program

Under the Afghan Relief Flight Program, U.S. Air Force transport planes regularly deliver serviceable, non-lethal excess DOD material (from sleeping bags to heavy construction equipment) to Pakistan for support of Afghans. PVOs are also permitted to transport commodities on the flights and the U.S. health PVOs have taken effective advantage of this resource to transport pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and other health care-related commodities. A.I.D. and DOD will continue to provide this international transport support to A.I.D.-financed PVOs over the life of the Afghan Relief Flight Program. The following general steps will be followed in the approval and delivery of PVO-donated commodities:

- PVO XXX fully describes the commodities to the responsible officer on the Afghan Desk which are checked against a pre-approved list of eligible commodities;
- the Desk officer cables the description to the Mission for approval giving the cable a cargo request number.
- the Mission project officer makes a determination as to whether the commodities are acceptable. If so, (s)he contacts PVO XXX's Pakistan office to determine whether the commodities are desired.
- Mission project officer will cable AID/W that the commodities are rejected or approved for transport;
- The PVO XXX will be responsible for obtaining required GOP approvals and for pick up of the commodities soon after their arrival in Pakistan. Onward transport to the border or inside Afghanistan will also be the responsibility of the PVO.

IV. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

A. Monitoring

The persistence of armed conflict and political rivalries, the poor transport conditions, the relative lack of communications, and

complex cultural factors all serve to undermine a PVO's ability to adequately assess the effectiveness of field activities inside Afghanistan. The difficulty of monitoring health activities is compounded by the number of health workers that need to be monitored, the mobility of health workers, and the limited capacity of a single monitoring team to locate a representative number of workers during a single mission from which to draw sufficient information for an evaluation of activities.

Despite these difficulties, each A.I.D.-financed PVO has set up a monitoring system which seeks to verify the availability of health workers and the delivery and appropriate distribution of medical supplies; assess the quality of the health care provided; and determine health trends in rural Afghanistan. Those systems consist of site visits, debriefing of health workers returning to Pakistan for resupply; and the analysis of health worker green books which contain information from patient interviews.

PVOs have consistently sought to improve their monitoring capacity and are coordinating through CMC on ways in which to do so. Already, they have agreed on a standard monitoring format. CMC has also initiated a number of joint-PVO, expatriate monitoring missions.

CMC increasingly views itself as an agent of independent monitoring for its members. Two missions were completed in the fall of 1988 and there have been three subsequent missions. An important objective of the monitoring missions has been to assess the utility of the green book as a reference tool during patient follow-up visits and to identify trends or facts that affect medical training or field operations.

Under present circumstances, A.I.D. is generally satisfied with PVO self-monitoring and supports the actions that have been taken by CMC. However, given the continuous need to strengthen accountability, A.I.D. requires that proposals describe monitoring systems, include a summary of monitoring results, and identify planned actions for improving future monitoring.

B. Evaluation

Since 1985, A.I.D. has conducted two major evaluations of PVO health activities and two additional evaluations of the Health Sector Support Project (MSH). A third PVO evaluation will be scheduled when appropriate, perhaps as early as 1991, when funding levels and Afghanistan's future political make-up are better known. It will determine whether there have been any shifts in the role of PVOs and, if so, what changes A.I.D. should make to respond to those shifts; whether the types of PVO activities being funded continue to be appropriate; and whether there is a continued need

to support European PVOs. The evaluation will also examine project success in encouraging retraining vis-a-vis new training activities; promoting an increased focus on maternal/child health care; and moving toward greater sustainability by incrementally introducing fees for health care, increasing standardization, and Afghanizing the PVO community. The 1987 and 1990 evaluations and quarterly reports should be used for baseline data.

Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) Support Project
(306-0211)

R U R A L A S S I S T A N C E S T R A T E G Y

Office of the A.I.D. Representative
for Afghanistan Affairs

April 1990

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.....1
ACCOMPLISHMENTS.....1
RELATIONSHIP TO A.I.D. STRATEGY.....3
RATIONALE FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR PVOs.....4

PART TWO
STRATEGY DESCRIPTION

OBJECTIVES.....5
STRATEGY DIRECTION.....6
ACTIVITIES.....8

PART THREE
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

INTRODUCTION.....9
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.....10
GRANT PROCESS.....10
MONITORING AND EVALUATION.....12
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.....13

PART FOUR
FINANCIAL PLAN

BUDGET.....14
DISBURSEMENTS.....14

PART FIVE
ISSUES

INCENTIVES FOR PVOs TO MOVE INTO NEW AREAS.....15
FERTILIZER PROCUREMENT.....15

65

ANNEXES

- ANNEX A: NARRATIVE PROPOSAL
- ANNEX B: TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR SURFACE IRRIGATION STSTEMS
- ANNEX C: TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR CLEANING AND REPAIRING KAREZES
- ANNEX D: TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR SEED AND FERTILIZER
- ANNEX E: TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR FARM TRACTION
- ANNEX F: QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
- ANNEX G: MONITORING FORM

RURAL ASSISTANCE STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A. Historical Perspective

Because of the urgent need for food in Afghanistan during the war, a number of international private voluntary organizations (PVOs) located in Peshawar and Quetta began cash relief programs to enable Afghans remaining in Afghanistan to purchase food and other basic necessities. When the U.S. Government, in the spring of 1985, developed a strategy for providing cross border humanitarian assistance to resistance controlled areas, the private voluntary agencies, which had been working inside Afghanistan since soon after the war began, were the best mechanism through which to initially channel this assistance.

In 1986, the Office of the A.I.D. Representative for Afghanistan in Islamabad (O/AID/REP) incorporated this program into the PVO Co-Financing Project, under which a broad range of activities were eligible, but the two activities which absorbed the most funds were health care training and cash grants distributed to families who had little other means of support.

In 1988, it became apparent that increasing stability in many resistance controlled areas required other types of assistance to stem the flow of displaced persons and the O/AID/REP initiated a PVO Rural Assistance Project (RAP) that would continue to provide survival assistance, but would increasingly concentrate on rural rehabilitation aimed at increasing food production and cash incomes in the stabilized areas of Afghanistan. In June, 1988 A.I.D. signed a Cooperative Agreement with IRC to act as an intermediary for RAP on its behalf. Under this agreement, \$9.6 million dollars was allocated over a two-year period for subgrants to PVOs implementing cross border projects achieving the above objectives.

B. Accomplishments

Because of the war many Afghans did not have access to the basic means of survival -- food, clothing, shelter and health services. Due to intense fighting, donor organizations were unable to safely transport goods and cash-for-food (survival assistance) was the most effective way of providing relief. Cash-for-food was distributed through selected commanders who disbursed it among families in their region so that they could buy items to meet basic human needs. Thus, the greatest percentage of early RAP subgrants were for survival and emergency assistance which rapidly provided cash, food and other commodities to areas facing critical shortages and to victims of natural disasters or military actions. These grants have been widely credited with helping beneficiaries to remain inside Afghanistan.

As the areas under resistance control expanded and a measure of stability returned to rural communities, local commanders and village committees initiated requests for assistance in rehabilitating irrigation systems and roads to renew agricultural production. The preponderance of cash-for-food activities funded by RAP began to decline as requests for rural rehabilitation assistance accelerated.

From August 1988 through March 31, 1990, \$9.1 million in 34 subgrants was provided to ten PVOs for survival assistance, emergency relief and rural rehabilitation activities in 16 provinces of Afghanistan. Of the first 14 subgrants, half were for survival and emergency assistance. The most recent 14 subgrants included two survival and one emergency relief grant. The 11 remaining subgrants have been for rural rehabilitation.

The majority of the rural rehabilitation activities were cash-for-work programs involving the cleaning and repair of canals and karezes. Most of these traditional irrigation channels in Afghanistan became inoperable as a result of bombing or through lack of maintenance due to the absence of labor. Resuming the water supply is an essential prerequisite to renewing agricultural productivity. Other rural rehabilitation activities focused on distributing agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and farm machinery, and protecting animals through immunization and dipping -- a natural progression in PVO activity as irrigation systems became functional.

Whenever possible, survival and emergency relief activities were followed by rural rehabilitation assistance activities so that the beneficiaries would not become dependent on continuing infusions of cash and basic necessities and have the opportunity to renew subsistence agriculture activity.

The following is a brief description of the PVOs funded by RAP and their activities:

AFGHANAID is a U.K.-based relief organization which has recently moved towards rehabilitation projects. It has received eight subgrants from RAP totalling \$2.2 million for projects in Badakshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Kapisa, Baghlan and Parwan provinces. Two of these were for emergency relief activities and one was for survival assistance. Another subgrant combined survival assistance with rural rehabilitation and four were solely rural rehabilitation, including irrigation work, animal health care, and the provision of seeds and fertilizer.

AFRANE is a French relief organization working cross border. Its RAP-funded activities have been for rural rehabilitation. It has received eight RAP subgrants totaling \$1.1 million for projects in Herat, Badakshan, Kandahar, and Logar provinces.

SOLIDARITE AFGHANISTAN is a French organization primarily funded by RAP for survival and emergency relief assistance in Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, and Wardak provinces. However, the two most recent subgrants to Solidarite were for irrigation rehabilitation and the provision of agricultural equipment in Kabul and Kandahar. Subgrants to Solidarite total \$1.1 million.

MERCY FUND is a U.S. PVO which began working in Afghanistan as a relief and health organization. Its first two RAP subgrants were for emergency assistance associated with the siege of Jalalabad in April 1988. Since then it has received two subgrants for the rehabilitation of olive production at the Ghaziabad State Farms and an additional subgrant for emergency relief supplies in Nangahar province. Subgrants to Mercy Fund total \$1.1 million.

MERCY CORPS INTERNATIONAL (MCI) is a U.S. PVO based in Quetta working on projects in South-West Afghanistan. Since it is primarily interested in development projects, it has received only two RAP subgrants, one for emergency relief and one for rural rehabilitation (irrigation work) totaling \$250,000.

SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND is oriented towards development, but has received four subgrants from RAP totaling \$1.5 million for rural rehabilitation assistance (irrigation work and agricultural inputs) and income generating (for women) projects in Nangahar, Ghazni, Baghlan and Zabul provinces.

CARE is a U.S. PVO and recently received a RAP subgrant for \$1 million for a food-for-work rural rehabilitation assistance project in Kunar which has recently begun implementation.

COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (CHA) is an Afghan PVO which is beginning rural rehabilitation activities in Farah, a remote and difficult area bordering Iran. CHA received \$260,000 for a cash-for-work project to repair irrigation systems and roads.

MOKOR RECONSTRUCTION COMMITTEE is a new Afghan PVO operating in a little served area of Ghazni where it is about to begin irrigation rehabilitation work with a subgrant of \$47,000.

RECONSTRUCTION AUTHORITY FOR AFGHANISTAN (RAFA) is an Afghan PVO which has recently received a subgrant of \$185,000 for administrative assistance in developing proposals for rural rehabilitation activities to be submitted to funding sources other than A.I.D. Several RAFA proposals have already been funded by U.N. agencies.

C. Relationship to A.I.D. Strategy

When the U.S. Government initiated its cross border humanitarian assistance program in 1985, cash relief activities were a high priority.

However, as conditions changed inside Afghanistan and the growth of resistance controlled areas allowed communities to reestablish, the devastation to rural irrigation systems and infrastructure and the need to provide appropriate rehabilitation assistance became urgently apparent. RAP's creation in 1988 gave the O/AID/REP a rapid, flexible mechanism through which to meet these changing needs while at the same time enabling it to continue its earlier mandate to provide emergency humanitarian relief to areas where survival was critical or where military action or natural disasters had occurred.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, the O/AID/REP developed a comprehensive resettlement and rehabilitation strategy. This included redesigning the project portfolio to allow for more flexibility in responding to the unpredictable situation inside Afghanistan. RAP quickly adapted to O/AID/REP's changing priorities by funding an increasing number of rural rehabilitation activities. Although repatriation did not take place in the numbers anticipated, growing political stability in many areas accelerated the demand for rehabilitation assistance and PVOs were quick to respond. Some requests came from shuras and commanders organizing local committees to plan and execute small- to medium-scale reconstruction projects.

Since 1987 the O/AID/REP has also been assisting reconstruction and rehabilitation activity in Afghanistan through a Cooperative Agreement with Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) managed by the O/AID/REP's Agriculture Office. Many of VITA's activities are analogous to projects funded under RAP's rural rehabilitation subgrants. One of the main differences is that VITA manages its projects through field offices referred to as Area Rehabilitation Schemes (ARS) and is in closer contact with the Afghan Interim Government's Ministry of Agriculture. Under a new Cooperative Agreement signed recently, VITA will continue its ongoing activities in rehabilitating agricultural and rural infrastructure, including irrigation work, road and bridge repair and the provision of agricultural inputs. Although a small number of VITA and RAP activities are in the same geographic area, the need for small-scale rural works is greater than the resources of either program. PVOs also work in provinces not yet entered by VITA. By funding both the VITA program and PVOs, the O/AID/REP can expand both the quantity and geographic diversity of its rural rehabilitation assistance.

D. Rationale For Continued Support for PVOs

Because of their traditional mandate and experience and effective contacts with local commanders and village leaders built up since 1980, PVOs remain the most uniquely qualified organizations through which to provide emergency relief and survival assistance inside Afghanistan. While the need for this type of assistance has declined, such situations still arise because of renewed fighting, natural disasters, as in the current famine in Northern Afghanistan, or because PVOs have begun working

in provinces previously too dangerous or too isolated. Thus, support to PVOs for emergency relief and survival assistance continues to be an important element in A.I.D.'s Afghanistan program.

An ability to attract low-paid, but highly committed staff to live and work under difficult rural conditions gives PVOs a comparative advantage in identifying and implementing the simple, small-scale, rural rehabilitation activities typical to RAP. The O/AID/REP funds for these types of activities are particularly cost-effective when channeled through PVOs. PVOs have also penetrated some of the more remote provinces underserved by direct A.I.D. contractors. In those areas, PVOs are the only means for the O/AID/REP to support rural rehabilitation activities.

Since PVOs have been working inside Afghanistan since 1980, they have overall been able to develop and maintain the close contacts with local commanders and village leaders which are essential to successful cross border activities. They have been able to observe first-hand the ever-changing situation in Afghanistan and identify needs as they occur. Since U.S. Government employees are prohibited from entering the country, they have opened a window into Afghanistan through which the O/AID/REP has been able to promptly and effectively channel emergency and rural rehabilitation assistance.

II. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

A. Objectives

The overall objectives of the new PVO Rural Assistance Program (RAP) [1] are to increase food availability and cash incomes for basic necessities for the people remaining inside Afghanistan and those who return, as well as to provide relief and survival assistance as needs dictate. Activities will be funded which provide sustenance during emergencies and assistance to stabilized communities to renew agricultural and income-generating activities.

The impact of survival assistance activities will be measured in terms of the number of individuals or households receiving food and other basic necessities. Increased food production and rural incomes will be more difficult to quantify. The achievement of these objectives will be measured in terms of the increased area under cultivation, the increased area planted with improved seeds and utilizing fertilizer, and benefits accruing to communities as a result of improved roads, such as better access to markets. The end result will be that populations facing

[1]RAP was the acronym for the previous Rural Assistance Project. Since it is no longer a separate project, but a strategy incorporated into the new PVO Support Project, it has been renamed the Rural Assistance Program. However, the acronym will remain the same.

emergencies will have avoided severe hardships, including starvation, and populations in stable rural areas will be meeting more of their own food requirements and generating increased cash incomes to purchase other basic necessities.

B. Strategy Direction

1. Focus on Relief and Rehabilitation

Under RAP, the O/AID/REP has been able to respond to changing needs inside Afghanistan by increasing its agricultural and rural rehabilitation activities. However, as PVOs moved toward larger-scale agricultural production projects, confusion arose as to when rehabilitation activities became agricultural development and whether agricultural development fitted into RAP's design.

Experience with RAP thus far indicates that most PVOs operating cross border are primarily relief oriented and lacking the technical capacity for agricultural development. There is additional concern within the O/AID/REP that RAP should retain its original mandate to provide a mechanism through which A.I.D. can respond rapidly and flexibly to the unpredictable Afghan situation. Tying RAP to long-term agricultural development tends to confuse strategy objectives and creates management requirements that differ considerably from those of a relief and rehabilitation program. Also, large-scale, long-term, million dollar activities, even if they are rural rehabilitation, can have a significant impact on agricultural development in an area and should, therefore, be the responsibility of the Agriculture Office.

Consequently, the new RAP will concentrate exclusively on relief and short-term rural rehabilitation activities. Activities to be funded will be selected on the basis of need and simplicity of execution. As noted above, it is these types of activities that PVOs are particularly well suited to implement. The existing RAP management system, which is designed to provide quick responses to PVO requests and close monitoring of numerous small scale activities, will be retained.

2. Increased Attention to Impact on Beneficiaries

In the past, good performance under RAP depended on achieving the targets specified in each approved subgrant. No systematic attempt was made to link the successful completion of individual RAP activities to the achievement of RAP's stated purpose of increasing agricultural productivity and rural incomes.

The new RAP will move away from simple verification of project completion to an assessment of the impact the project has had on the target population. Thus, PVOs will include in their final reports

system has been repaired, or the expected yield after the distribution of seed and fertilizer, or the benefits to a community of a rehabilitated road. Although there is little systematized baseline data on rural conditions inside Afghanistan, PVOs will be asked to include in their proposals detailed descriptions of the current situation at the activity site so that this can be compared with the changes attributed to project intervention in the end-of-activity reports. Overall, verification of the completion of project activities will still be used as one indicator of success, but attention will be paid to other indicators which assess an activity's impact and its progress toward achieving RAP's overall objectives.

3. RAP's Relationship to the Agricultural Development Strategy

Under the overall umbrella of the PVO Support Project, the new Rural Assistance Strategy will support only relief and rehabilitation activities while agricultural development activities will be funded through the Agricultural Development Strategy and managed directly by the Agriculture Office, which has responsibility for the O/AID/REP's agricultural program. However, while RAP is outside the management of the Agriculture Office, by the nature of its activities it contributes to the O/AID/REP's overall agriculture sector objectives and its accomplishments must be assessed in light of these. Also, RAP needs to be aware of Agriculture Office priorities and achievements in order to assure that RAP activities remain consistent with the O/AID/REP objectives in the agriculture sector. This can be realized through an exchange of project documentation and periodic joint meetings between the Agriculture Office (including its new Peshawar-based Agriculture Advisor), RAO/Peshawar, IRC/RAP and Agriculture Office contractor representatives.

4. Encouragement of U.S. PVOs

RAP has consistently encouraged the increased participation of U.S. PVOs and will continue to do so. European PVOs have been encouraged to seek funding from their home public and government donors, and others, such as the U.N. Afghanistan which was almost entirely supported by A.I.D. for its earlier cross border cash-for-food activities is now receiving only 28 percent of its funding from A.I.D. and 60 percent from the U.K. Government.

However, there are several factors which recommend continued support for European PVOs. The number of PVOs, both U.S. and European, working cross border is relatively limited. Those U.S. PVOs working cross border have shown an increasing interest in expanding their activities towards longer-term agricultural development while European PVOs have remained oriented towards RAP's short-term relief and rehabilitation objectives. European PVOs also bring geographic diversity to RAP's program since, in the past, they have been more likely to work in underserved areas than U.S. PVOs. This enables RAP to spread its assistance across Afghanistan

and to reach Afghans who are otherwise isolated. For these reasons, European PVOs have a continuing contribution to make to the O/AID/REP's overall objectives to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.

5. Increasing Sustainability Through the Strengthening of Afghan Institutions

RAP has recently approved three subgrants to new Afghan PVOs. The new RAP will continue to fund Afghan entities as appropriate, including assistance in developing proposals, as a means to building indigenous institutions which will facilitate the eventual transition from relief to development. Afghan PVOs are also helpful in identifying areas of real need and tend to operate in underserved areas. In a period of political transition, they may prove a valuable mechanism for providing assistance when other implementing organizations may be less welcome. Overall, indigenous PVOs, because of their familiarity with the language, culture and geography of their country, are often more effective agents of change than expatriate PVOs.

RAP will also continue to explore the possibilities of assisting local shuras or village committees formed inside Afghanistan to become local implementing partners for the purpose of community relief and rehabilitation activities. Shuras are made up of respected and influential village leaders and/or local commanders and traditionally meet on an ad hoc basis to mediate disputes, allocate resources and rule on community concerns. On their own initiative, or with support from the donor community, an increasing number of shuras are attaining more permanent status as local councils or implementing partners and may become appropriate vehicles through which to channel rural rehabilitation assistance.

C. ACTIVITIES

There will be three categories of subgrants in the new RAP strategy -- survival assistance, rural rehabilitation, and resettlement -- with the major emphasis, in the absence of resettlement movements, on survival assistance and rural rehabilitation projects.

The following is a brief description of each category:

Survival Assistance

Survival assistance will be provided when the ability of local populations to provide resources for their own survival is threatened. This assistance would typically occur in areas suffering critical shortages of food and other basic necessities due to emergencies such as drought, floods, locusts and other natural disasters, or in areas of renewed military action, such as at the siege of Jalalabad and during the recent coup attempt. Survival assistance will also be provided in areas where there have been long-term shortages of food and basic necessities

and will, when necessary and appropriate, be followed by rural rehabilitation assistance to obviate the need for continued survival assistance. Survival assistance will include cash-for-food and other necessities and emergency relief supplies, such as food, tents, medical supplies, and blankets.

Rural Rehabilitation Assistance

Rural rehabilitation will include simple, short-term production and income-oriented activities which will assist communities to renew agricultural activity through infrastructure rehabilitation, the supply of inputs for crop production, animal health care and other rural and agricultural activities as appropriate. Based on past experience with RAP, the largest need will be for the rehabilitation of irrigation systems. It is expected that most proposals for irrigation rehabilitation will include an agricultural input supply component. The rehabilitated irrigation systems will allow farmers to increase production in these newly irrigated areas. Rural rehabilitation will occur in areas where there is a stable population, available labor, and community support and participation.

Resettlement Assistance

Resettlement assistance is unlikely to be a major RAP activity until movement towards larger-scale repatriation is evident. These activities will focus mainly on sustaining returning populations until they are able to reestablish their economic independence through the resumption of farming or other income-earning activities. They will assist, but not be limited to, populations returning to areas that have already received some rural rehabilitation assistance. When resettlement assistance is targeted for areas where PVOs have had no prior experience, PVOs will be required to demonstrate the feasibility of resettlement by assessing the social and economic conditions in the area to which the beneficiary population proposes to return. As and when the need for resettlement assistance increases, further selection criteria will be developed by IRC/RAP as provided for in the Cooperative Agreement.

III. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

A. Introduction

The absence of centralized authority over rural Afghanistan which constitutes 90% of the country's area, localized ethnic and political rivalry and militance, and the deterioration of avenues of transport and channels of communication, have led to an ad hoc and disparate distribution of resources. The lack of stability and problems of inaccessibility hamper the collection of broad-based data, or disproportionately increase its cost in terms of time and money in relation to the value of its application. The establishment of planning priorities is largely dependent on information available now;

implementation priorities cannot focus exclusively on the greatest need, but on what is possible under given conditions within a reasonable time frame. RAP cannot remove these constraints, but will attempt to optimize delivery of assistance through as many PVOs, to as many communities, and to the maximum number of beneficiaries as possible.

Each RAP subgrant will generally address the needs of a contiguous geographic area. The maximum amount of a single subgrant will be \$500,000, with a maximum duration of one year from the time the grant is funded.

A. Organizational Structure

The probability of a large number of short-term subgrants mandates the use of an intermediary organization to relieve the excessive management burden on the O/AID/REP staff. From August 1988 to March 31, 1990, a total of 34 subgrants of a year's duration or less were facilitated through an intermediary to ten PVO's. Because most of the PVO's providing cross border assistance to Afghanistan, and both current and potential sub-grantees are headquartered in Peshawar, management of RAP will be concentrated there. Subgrants to U.S. and non-U.S. PVO's will be made through a Cooperative Agreement with an intermediary organization, IRC, and jointly managed by the intermediary and the O/AID/REP's Regional Affairs Office (RAO) located in Peshawar.

Sub-grantees will deal primarily and most intensively with IRC's RAP staff. The RAP staff, in turn, will communicate primarily with the RAO project manager. The project manager will refer finalized sub-grantee proposals to the Regional Affairs Officer for final substantive approval and to the O/AID/REP's Grant Officer in Islamabad for final administrative approval.

C. Grant Process

Under RAP, four sequential steps are involved in the granting of funds to a PVO, the first step being relatively the most time-consuming, complicated and creative. Each step will be taken in conformity with terms and conditions of the Cooperative Agreement and will be governed by the application of appropriate guidelines. Currently applicable guidelines, appended as Annexes A-G, are intended to illustrate the deliberation applied in the grant process. Guidelines will be amended to conform with the approved RAP redesign and applied appropriately in each step of the grant process:

1. Proposal Development

IRC/RAP must be prepared to deal substantively with both those sub-grantees who have had experience with USAID and the RAP system and with those PVO's who lack implementational experience under RAP. Annex A includes the criteria by which a PVO's eligibility for a RAP subgrant

76

will be determined. Generally, proposed PVO activities must be consistent with prevailing RAP strategy and show awareness of current conditions in Afghanistan. This helps to focus the discussion on the need for a specific activity in a specific area, the PVO's absorptive capacity, and the current availability of RAP funds. Participation in numerous PVO fora convened in Peshawar and Quetta, for example, ACBAR and SWABAC, will enhance IRC/RAP's ability to assess PVO interest, capacity, capabilities, and acceptability in the complex and politicized atmosphere of cross border assistance. Proposals for subgrants under RAP will be developed within the context of the guidelines contained in Annex C and will be evaluated for funding by the application of criteria in Annex D. Deviations from the guidelines will be justified and may be considered to the extent that they foster the development of implementable proposals, diversity of grant recipients, geographic dispersity, and appropriate administrative and management controls. Existing guidelines may be amended and additional guidelines developed to insure better management of project resources and more refined identification of project impact. The level of support to a grantee will depend on the overall congruity of a sub-grantee's projects to the applicable guidelines.

During the time that IRC/RAP is providing guidance to the potential sub-grantee in the development of a proposal, the RAP staff will consult closely with the project manager to insure that potential administrative and implementational problems have been adequately identified and addressed with regard to current O/AID/REP priorities and the evolving political and social conditions in Afghanistan.

Upon finalization of the proposal by the sub-grantee, IRC/RAP will review the proposal substantively. The proposal will only be submitted to the RAO for approval if it has been recommended by IRC/RAP.

2. RAO/Peshawar Review

The RAO project manager will review the proposal and accompanying recommendations of IRC/RAP with a view to recommending approval of the proposal by the RAO. The proposal will be reviewed to further ensure its consistency with RAP's strategy and the prevailing guidelines (ref. Annexes). If a proposal is found deficient, it will be forwarded as presented to the RAO with the project manager's comments. Upon review by the RAO the proposal will be returned to IRC/RAP for remedial action. IRC/RAP and the prospective sub-grantee will work in concert to revise the proposal so that it is in a form which can be accepted and approved. IRC/RAP and the PVO may consult closely with the project manager, who may mediate any disagreement between them.

3. O/AID/REP Approval

Upon review of an acceptable proposal the project manager, appending his recommendation, will submit it to the RAO. Final substantive approval of a proposal, including its consistency with A.I.D.

policies will rest with RAO. A proposal approved by the RAO will be submitted to the Grant Officer for final administrative approval. Upon completion of the approval process, IRC/RAP will be notified to initiate a sub-grant agreement. Annex E contains a copy of the currently applicable sub-grant agreement.

4. Funding

Prerequisite to the release of funds by IRC/RAP will be an approved sub-grant proposal including a detailed budget (Annex C) and a signed sub-grant agreement (Annex E) which will include a payment schedule.

D. Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring A.I.D.'s cross border assistance projects is an arduous and dubitable activity for all groups working inside Afghanistan. The continuing intermittent fighting, mountainous terrain, scarcity of adequate transportation, and kaleidoscope of ethnic and cultural mores, severely undermines any donor organization's monitoring capacity. However, to the extent possible, RAP has strived to promote a systematic collection and analysis of data at the PVO level. PVOs are required to include a monitoring plan in their proposals and must submit quarterly implementation reports to IRC/RAP. In addition, the Cooperative Agreement with IRC provides for an independent monitoring capacity in the IRC/RAP management unit.

As in the past, the new RAP will require that PVOs monitor the implementation and analyze the impact of their activities funded by RAP. Monitoring teams of Afghan and some non-U.S. expatriate personnel will submit written reports and give oral debriefings on their return from visits to activity sites inside Afghanistan. This material will be collated for inclusion in the quarterly and final reports submitted to IRC/RAP. Based on recommendations made by the recent evaluation, IRC/RAP is working with sub-grantees to improve monitors' reports and PVO quarterly and final reports, by including more specific data and estimates on the benefits of the activities as they relate to RAP's overall objectives.

Another improvement will be to structure the proposals and quarterly reports so that implementation targets are identified in the proposal and quarterly reports assess progress against these targets. The proposals will also specify impact targets (area under irrigation, yield increases from agricultural inputs, sustained increases in production) which will be reviewed in the end-of-activity reports.

IRC/RAP will review and analyze sub-grantees' reports and prepare quarterly reports on project implementation and impact for RAO/Peshawar and the O/AID/REP. At the end of each year of the Cooperative Agreement, IRC/RAP will submit to the O/AID/REP an annual report assessing overall

program performance and impact. This report will discuss significant implementation problems, design issues and the impact of RAP activities on agricultural production, rural cash incomes, and the availability of food and other basic necessities in rural areas of Afghanistan.

IRC/RAP will continue to develop its own independent monitoring team. Presently, there are eight Afghan monitors and a non-U.S. expatriate monitor will be added shortly. Before traveling inside Afghanistan, the monitors will be briefed by the PVOs on their current activities and given assistance in locating activity sites. PVO monitors will also accompany IRC/RAP monitors whenever possible. The monitors' trip reports and oral debriefings will be reviewed by IRC/RAP and the information included in IRC/RAP's quarterly reports to RAO/Peshawar and the O/AID/REP.

RAO/Peshawar will review IRC/RAP's quarterly reports and convey any implementation or policy concerns to the O/AID/REP in Islamabad. These reports will also go to the O/AID/REP's Data Collection and Analysis Unit in the RAO/Peshawar office. This unit has been established to assess and consolidate PVO and contractors' reports and establish a computerized database which will facilitate the O/AID/REP's overall planning and evaluation functions.

In order to assist the flow of communication between the various O/AID/REP participants in Afghanistan's rural rehabilitation, IRC/RAP will call periodic meetings, usually after each round of quarterly reports has been received, which will include IRC/RAP, RAO/Peshawar, the Agriculture Office and, as appropriate, A.I.D. contractor representatives. At the discretion of IRC/RAP and RAO/Peshawar, representatives from PVOs funded by RAP may also be invited and the United Nation's Development Program (UNDP) which is also funding PVO rural rehabilitation activities.

The O/AID/REP will review the new RAP in 1991, in the context of the related components of the ASSP, and will include an evaluation of PVO performance, project management by IRC/RAP and RAO/Peshawar, and progress toward achieving RAP's overall objectives.

E. Reporting Requirements

Sub-grantees will be required to submit through IRC/RAP a separate quarterly narrative and financial report for each outstanding grant. In addition, IRC/RAP will submit an overall quarterly narrative and financial report covering all activities. The format of quarterly reports has been standardized by the O/AID/REP and is uniform for all O/AID/REP projects. Annex F describes the quarterly reporting requirements in detail.

The Cooperative Agreement includes terms and conditions which govern the submission of monthly financial reports by IRC/RAP.

Each sub-grantee will submit a final report for each sub-grant approved under RAP. The report will include the location of each project activity, unit cost and beneficiary information. The report will describe project impact and the indicators used to assess it.

One year from the date of the signing of the amended Cooperative Agreement, IRC/RAP will prepare an annual report which summarizes RAP's accomplishments and impact. The annual report will set forth a work plan for the subsequent project year.

The total reporting requirements are outlined below:

1. Sub-Grantee Reports
 - a. quarterly narrative and financial reports
 - b. end of activity reports
2. Intermediary Reports
 - a. monthly financial reports
 - b. monitoring report for each grant, by trip
 - c. quarterly narrative and financial reports
 - d. annual report

The number and nature of reports may be modified by RAO/Peshawar or the O/AID/REP.

IV. FINANCIAL PLAN

A. Budget

The budget is illustrative for planning purposes:

	<u>FY '90</u>	<u>FY '91</u>
1. Program	4,400,000	3,900,000
2. Administrative	340,000	340,000
3. Monitoring	60,000	60,000
TOTAL	4,800,000	4,300,000

B. Disbursements

The intermediary will apply for advances against the amount obligated in accordance with the standard provisions of the Cooperative Agreement. The amount of advances will be scheduled on the basis of the disbursement schedule of each subgrant and the intermediary's requirements per the monthly financial reports and in accordance with recent O/AID/REP's Controller's procedures to limit advances to the minimum requirements for all the O/AID/REP contractors and sub-grantees.

60

V. ISSUES

1. Incentives for PVOs to Move into New Areas

PVOs expend considerable time and resources establishing themselves in an area, developing contacts with local commanders and other leaders, determining the level of need, the amount of community support, the security situation, etc. It is thus not unnatural for PVOs to continue working in the same area even after a number of projects have been completed. This understandable inertia, however, means that some provinces have received little assistance from the international community, especially those to which access is difficult or dangerous. Even in provinces well-served by donors, there are still areas within them which have received little assistance.

The question arose as to whether RAP should provide incentives to PVOs to move into new areas, such as by reserving a percentage of funds for activities in new areas or rejecting new proposals for well-served areas. Since the areas receiving less assistance are frequently those to which access is difficult or dangerous, it was felt that PVOs, who already cope with severe hardships working inside Afghanistan, should not be forced to spread their activities. However, under RAP, proposals which enable a PVO to make a pre-assessment of a new area to determine need and implementation possibilities will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

2. Fertilizer Procurement

As RAP's emphasis has moved towards rural rehabilitation and the provision of agricultural inputs, PVOs have expressed their frustration over the restriction under the IRC Cooperative Agreement on fertilizer procurement from within Pakistan, where fertilizer is a subsidized commodity prohibited from legal movement cross border, and Afghanistan where fertilizer production is under the ownership of the current regime. Since the cost to PVOs of importing U.S. fertilizer in the small amounts required by them is prohibitive, the dilemma will be resolved by increasing the amount of fertilizer brought in under the Agriculture Support Project (ASSP) through its contractor and making it available to the PVOs funded under RAP.

RURAL ASSISTANCE STRATEGY

A N N E X E S

ANNEX A - NARRATIVE PROPOSAL

ANNEX B - TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR SURFACE IRRIGATION SYSTEMS

ANNEX C - TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR CLEANING & REPAIRING KAREZES

ANNEX D - TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR SEED AND FERTILIZER

ANNEX E - TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR FARM TRACTION

ANNEX F - QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

ANNEX G - MONITORING FORM

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE
RURAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
PROPOSAL FORMAT

PART A: SUMMARY INFORMATION

1. Project title:
2. Submitting agency:
3. Project location:
 - a. Province:
 - b. District(s):
 - c. Village(s):
4. Starting date and estimated completion date of project:
5. Brief description of project objective and activities:
6. Type of project and \$ amount:

	PROPOSED	APPROVED
a. Village assistance	\$	\$
b. Emergency assistance . . .	\$	\$
c. Resettlement assistance. .	\$	\$
	-----	-----
TOTAL	\$	\$
	-----	-----

7. Proposal submission and approval dates:

	Date Received	Date Approved	Signature
a. IRC/RAP			
b. RAO Project Manager . .			
c. RAO			
d. USAID Grants Officer. .			

A3

PART B: ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION

1. Country in which home office is located:
2. N.O.C. from the Pakistan Government: Yes No Applied For
3. Registered with USAID: Yes No Applied For
4. Member of ACBAR and/or SWABAC: Yes No Applied For
5. Agree to abide by ACBAR Poppy Cause: Yes No
6. List grant numbers, dates, and amounts of all previous USAID funds received for cross-border projects in Afghanistan.

PART C: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. For how long has your organization been working in:
 - a. Afghanistan --
 - b. the province concerned --
 - c. the district(s) concerned --
2. Briefly describe the activities of other humanitarian agencies working in the same district and in the district(s) adjacent to your project area. Discuss the coordination established with these agencies and the influence their activities might have on your project area.
3. Name the ethnic groups present in the province and specify which ones will benefit from this project.
4. Give the name and composition of the shura(s) and/or the names and party affiliations of commanders with whom you will be dealing and describe their role in the project.
5. Describe in detail the political and military situation in the project area.
6. Briefly describe the agricultural situation of the province and district before the war.
7. To the best of your knowledge, are poppies being cultivated in your project area?

PART D: PROJECT INFORMATION (See attached guidelines)

THE PROBLEM:

1. Describe the problem in the target area that this project seeks to address, and analyze its causes.
2. Describe the contribution that the local community will make (and/or is making) to address this problem.

THE PROJECT OBJECTIVE: [Note: An objective is a specific measurable statement of what is to be accomplished by a given point of time. Do not confuse objectives (i.e. irrigating 44 hectares of land by November 1990) with activities (i.e. cleaning 6 karezes).]

3. What are the measurable objectives of your project?

PROJECT ACTIVITIES: [Note: Project activities are the specific procedures undertaken to achieve the project objective.]

4. Describe in detail the rationale for each project activity being proposed (i.e. cleaning karezes, distributing seeds & fertilizer, etc...).

5. Give a detailed work plan with the dates when project activities are expected to begin and end.

6. List the key personnel who will be working on the project and give their qualifications. (Note those that will be permanently based at the project site.)

7. Provide a summary table of the type, quantity, unit cost, and total cost of inputs required for each activity. Provide detailed technical information for all project activities in the appendices (see attached guidelines).

8. What technical advice was received during proposal development?

9. Describe the criteria used to select project beneficiaries, and give the following information on the number of beneficiaries:

- a. Number of skilled and unskilled workers receiving salaries;
- b. Number of families using the project unit; and
- c. Number of indirect beneficiaries in the surrounding community.

10. Discuss the costs of your proposed project relative to its expected benefits.

11. Describe the major risks and constraints that this project potentially could face.

12. Describe the long term impact of the proposed activity and discuss its sustainability in terms of the local environment and resources.

PROJECT MONITORING & EVALUATION: [Note: Project evaluation is the process by which actual performance is compared with planned performance.]

14. Describe in detail your monitoring plans, emphasizing the methods you will use to demonstrate to your own organization as well as to donors, the extent to which the objectives of the project are being accomplished.

15. Describe in detail the criteria you intend to use to evaluate project performance in terms of the appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, and side effects of the activities being undertaken.

PART E: BUDGET INFORMATION

1. What is your bank account number and address?
2. Are there other funding sources for this project (give names + amounts)?
3. Give program costs, operational costs, and administrative costs as a percentage of the total budget.
4. Describe the measures being taken to insure that project funds will be transported and disbursed in a fiscally responsible manner.
5. Attach a detailed budget:

PART F: APPENDICES

1. Detailed technical information for project activities.
2. Map (1:250,000 scale) identifying project sites.
3. Other information.

TECHNICAL GUIDELINES
FOR SURFACE IRRIGATION SYSTEMS

Please answer the following questions, remembering that the information provided will have to be systematically compared with the information collected during project implementation and presented in Quarterly Reports.

Please note that construction activities will not be allowed unless adequate technical data is provided as well as evidence that qualified staff will be supervising these activities.

Some of the information requested below for each surface irrigation system may call for the same answer (i.e. tools to be provided, local authorities, etc...). Please note if this is the case and do not repeat the same information for each irrigation system.

A. Provide the following information for each canal:

1. Woluswali & Aliquadari;
2. Name of irrigation system;
3. Name of water source (river, stream);
4. Name of village closest to intake;
5. Estimated distance in km. from source to furthest distribution point;
6. Authority or authorities with whom the project was negotiated (commander, shura, party, etc...);
7. Local authority overseeing or coordinating this project;
8. Selection criteria for the canal;
9. List all villages that do and/or will utilize water from this canal;
10. List the number of families currently residing in each village;
11. Give the number of direct beneficiaries;
12. Land area in jeribs irrigated now;
13. Estimated land area in jeribs that will be irrigated;
14. Actual flow rate;
15. Number of skilled laborers required;
16. Number of work days required for skilled laborers;
17. Daily salary of one skilled laborer;
18. Total cost of skilled labor (workers x days x rate);
19. Number of unskilled laborers required;
20. Number of work days required for unskilled laborers;
21. Daily salary of one unskilled laborer;
22. Total cost of unskilled labor (workers x days x rate);
23. Total cost of labor (skilled + unskilled);
24. If food for work is planned, specify food items and quantities;
25. Value of the ration (food for work);

26. List goods or services (gabions, cement, concrete);
27. If construction is involved, provide technical support;
28. Cost of the good or service;
29. Cost of other goods and services;
30. Total cost (labor + goods + services);
31. Average cost per meter.

B. For all the canals give one summary table showing:

1. Total number of villages;
2. Total number of families;
3. Total number of direct beneficiaries;
4. Total land area in jeribs irrigated now;
5. Total estimated land area in jeribs that will be irrigated;
6. Total labor cost for skilled labor (workers x days x rate);
7. Average daily rate for one skilled laborer;
8. Total cost of labor for unskilled labor (workers x days x rate);
9. Average daily rate for one unskilled laborer;
10. Total labor cost;
11. Total food for work, specifying food items and quantities;
12. Total value of the ration (food for work);
13. Total list of goods or services;
14. Total cost of the good or service;
15. Total cost of other goods and services;
16. Total cost (labor + goods + services);
17. Total average cost per meter.

45

TECHNICAL FORMAT FOR SUBMITTING KAREZ PROPOSALS TO RAP

Draft 4/20/90

I INTRODUCTION

Background:

The need for a technical format arose because NGOs were submitting data in a variety of different forms. These different formats made it difficult to determine the difference between what one NGO proposed and what another NGO proposed. Furthermore, in some cases the data provided was not adequate for fulfilling RAP's reporting requirements to USAID.

RAP has previously prepared a document called "Technical Guidelines for Construction Activities." These Guidelines should be consulted when gathering the data used to prepare a proposal for karez repair.

Objective:

The objectives of the technical formats for karez repair are:

- 1.) To provide RAP with all the information required to assess the viability of a project.
- 2.) To provide RAP with the specific information required by USAID using the units required in USAID's database.

The formats are intended to allow some flexibility to the NGO, but also gather all the information required in the form which it is required.

Summary:

The accompanying formats are intended to be filled out and submitted in the proposal. They consist of the following:

1.) A "SUMMARY TABLE." The Summary Table is to be inserted into the proposal under Part D #7 where technical details are requested.

2.) A "KAREZ DATA SHEET." A Karez Data Sheet will be prepared for each karez to be submitted under the proposal. The information provided in the Karez Data Sheet will provide the basis for monitoring the project. The Karez Data Sheets will be included under Appendix 1 "Technical Details."

II COMMENTS ON PREPARING THE SUMMARY TABLE

General:

In the accompanying table items are capitalized, while units are not capitalized. It is critical that NGOs use the units specified if at all possible. The table is meant to be a sample. No information should be deleted. However, if an NGO believes other information is also necessary to support their proposal this can be added to the Summary Table.

Structure:

The main part of the table has 4 sections:

A.) A "GENERAL INFORMATION" section which will have specific required data in specific units.

B.) A "WORK TO BE DONE" section. This is the most flexible of the sections. Many different approaches may have validity (e.g. engineer's estimates, local people's estimates, karezqan's estimate). However, for any estimate someone must assess the work to be done. This section should present this information in quantifiable terms. [Use MKS units if at all possible (i.e. linear meters, cubic meters)].

C.) A "LABOR REQUIRED" section. All estimates should be converted to estimated man-days of skilled and unskilled labor.

D.) A "COSTS" section in which labor cost, materials and other costs, and total cost will be summarized. The material and other costs should be given in more detail on the KAREZ DATA SHEET.

All quantifiable numbers should be summed at the base of the table.

Below the table the following information should be provided:

A.) The METHODS used to gather the data presented in the table. These explanations should be very brief (e.g. flow determined using float method, length of karez measured with a tape etc.).

B.) A BASIS OF COST section that describes how the amount of work to be done is converted to a cost. This will include assumptions about labor productivity rates and daily labor charges.

III COMMENTS ON PREPARING THE KAREZ DATA SHEET

General:

The same comments about units mentioned in section II apply to the KAREZ DATA SHEET. In addition, because the Karez Data Sheet will also be used by RAP's monitors, names should be written in both english and Farsi/Pushto (if possible). Use of the Farsi/Pushto script may reduce confusion when monitors try to locate a person or place in the field.

Structure:

The structure of the KAREZ DATA SHEET parallels the SUMMARY TABLE, but should allow the NGO to provide more descriptive details. The NGO may want to provide a sketch map to accompany the KAREZ DATA SHEET, however a sketch map is not required.

If an NGO feels that the space on the KAREZ DATA SHEET is not adequate to describe the problem or the work to be done, the information should be presented on the back of the sheet of paper.

evan/ap20kar

KAREZ DATA SHEET

1. NAME OF KAREZ:		5. KAREZ LENGTH (meters):			
2. NAME OF VILLAGE(S):		6. DEPTH OF MOTHER WELL (meters):			
3. DISTRICT NAME:		7. FLOW RATE (liters/sec) (include date of measurement)			
4. PROVINCE NAME:					
8. DISTANCE FROM OUTLET TO FURTHEST IRRIGATED POINT		10. PARTY			
9. RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY					
11. ON SITE AUTHORITY FOR THE PROJECT					
12. NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES (families):		Before	Now	Target	
13. NUMBER OF JERIBS IRRIGATED:					
14. COMMENT ON CONDITION of KAREZ: (i.e. What happened to it ?)					

15. DESCRIBE WORK TO BE DONE: (in Quantifiable terms if possible)					

16. WELLS		Total Number:		Number Need Repair:	
17. LABOR		Number Laborers	Man-days	Daily Salary(Rs)	Total(Rs)
- skilled					
- unskilled					
18. EQUIPMENT (describe)		Quantity	Unit Price(Rs)	Total(Rs)	
19. OTHER COSTS Rs (specify):					

20. TOTAL COST Rs:			21. AVERAGE COST PER METER: (Total cost/Length of Karez)		

26

SUMMARY TABLE
FOR KAREZ PROJECT

IMPLEMENTING AGENCY:

PROVINCE:

GENERAL INFORMATION										WORK TO BE DONE			LABOR REQUIRED		COSTS				
DISTRICT	VILLAGE	KAREZ	LENGTH	FLOW	COMMAND AREA		BENEFICIARIES			i.e.g. meters of cleaning/digging			UNSKILLED	SKILLED	MATERIALS		TOTAL		
					NOV	TARGET	INDIRECT	DIRECT	SALARIED	Volume of excavation/masonry work, etc.	man-days	man-days			LABOR	OTHER		IRs.	IRs.
Name	Name	Name	meters	liter/sec	Jobs	Jobs	10 People	10 Families	0 People										
1.1																			
1.2																			
1.3																			
1.4																			
1.5																			
1.6																			
1.7																			
1.8																			
1.9																			
1.10																			
1.11																			
1.12																			
1.13																			
1.14																			
1.15																			
1.16																			
1.17																			
1.18																			
1.19																			
1.20																			
1.21																			
1.22																			
1.23																			
1.24																			
1.25																			
1.26																			
1.27																			
1.28																			
1.29																			
1.30																			
1.31																			
1.32																			
1.33																			
1.34																			
1.35																			
1.36																			
1.37																			
1.38																			
1.39																			
1.40																			
1.41																			
1.42																			
1.43																			
1.44																			
1.45																			
1.46																			
1.47																			
1.48																			
1.49																			
1.50																			
1.51																			
1.52																			
1.53																			
1.54																			
1.55																			
1.56																			
1.57																			
1.58																			
1.59																			
1.60																			
1.61																			
1.62																			
1.63																			
1.64																			
1.65																			
1.66																			
1.67																			
1.68																			
1.69																			
1.70																			
1.71																			
1.72																			
1.73																			
1.74																			
1.75																			
1.76																			
1.77																			
1.78																			
1.79																			
1.80																			
1.81																			
1.82																			
1.83																			
1.84																			
1.85																			
1.86																			
1.87																			
1.88																			
1.89																			
1.90																			
1.91																			
1.92																			
1.93																			
1.94																			
1.95																			
1.96																			
1.97																			
1.98																			
1.99																			
1.100																			
TOTAL																			

NOTES

- 1.) METHODS: (Briefly describe the methods used to obtain the information provided).
 - A.) Length of Karez:
 - B.) Flow Rate:
 - C.) Command Area:
 - D.) Direct Beneficiaries:
 - E.) Work to be done:
 - F.) etc.

- 2.) BASIS OF COST: (Briefly describe how the work to be done was converted to a cost estimate. Mention labor productivity rates and daily labor wages).

TECHNICAL GUIDELINES
FOR SEED AND FERTILIZER

Please note that all seeds and plants being proposed for introduction into Afghanistan must be evaluated and approved by the Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan. Seedlings are to be evaluated and approved by VITA.

In preparing proposals please refer to, and follow the recommendations and standards of, ACBAR's October 1989 publication, "Guidelines for the Planning and Implementation of Projects for Agricultural Rehabilitation in Afghanistan."

A. SEED:

1. Woluswali & Aliquadari;
2. Name of villages and amount of seed recieved by each village;
3. Authority with whom the project was negotiated (name, party, shura);
4. Local authority overseeing or coordinating this project;
5. Total number of tons of seed;
6. Price of one ton;
7. Total transport cost;
8. Other costs (i.e. storage);
9. Total cost;
10. Is the land lalmi or irrigated;
11. What varieties of seed are being used;
12. Is winter and/or summer wheat being provided;
13. What is the planting schedule;
14. When will the seed be delivered to the project site;
15. What is the elevation of the project site;
16. What source is providing the seed;
17. Is the seed certified;
18. Is the seed local;
19. Is the seed treated;
20. What is the expected rate of germination;
21. What is the expected yield per jerib;
22. What is the expected number of jeribs that will be seeded;
23. What provision has been made for storage;
24. What provision has been made for training;
25. Will the seed be given, sold, or lent;
26. Is there a plan to redistribute seed;
27. What is the implementation plan and schedule;
28. What criteria were used for selecting beneficiaries;
29. How much seed will each beneficiary receive;
30. What is the total number of direct beneficiaries;
31. Will fertilizer be provided along with the seed.

B. FERTILIZER (DAP & UREA):

1. Woluswali & Aliquadari;
2. Name of villages and amount of DAP & Urea recieved by each village;
3. Authority with whom the project was negotiated (name, party, shura);
4. Local authority overseeing or coordinating this project;
5. Total number of tons of DAP & Urea;
6. Price of one ton of DAP & Urea;
7. Total transport cost;
8. Other costs (i.e. storage);
9. Total cost;
10. Is the land lalmi or irrigated;
11. What is the ratio of DAP to Urea to seed;
12. When will the fertilizer be applied;
13. When will the fertilizer be delivered to the project site;
14. What is the elevation of the project site;
15. What is the source is of the fertilizer;
16. What is the expected yield per jerib;
17. What is the expected number of jeribs that will be fertilized;
18. What provision has been made for storage;
19. What provision has been made for training;
20. Will the fertilizer be given, sold, or lent;
21. What is the implementation plan and schedule;
22. What criteria were used for selecting beneficiaries;
23. How much fertilizer will each beneficiary receive;
24. What is the total number of direct beneficiaries;
25. Will seed be provided along with the seed.

TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR FARM TRACTION

Please answer the following questions, remembering that the information provided will have to be systematically compared with the information collected during project implementation and presented in Quarterly Reports.

Some of the information requested below for farm traction may call for the same answer (i.e. tools to be provided, local authorities, etc...). Please note if this is the case and do not repeat the same information for each irrigation system.

A. BULLOCKS:

1. Woluswali & Alaquadari;
2. How many bullocks will be provided;
3. What is the price per head;
4. Give transport costs;
5. Give other costs;
6. Give total cost;
7. From where are the bullocks coming;
8. From whom will they be bought;
9. How many km. are they going to travel and how;
10. Compare compatibility of climatic conditions and altitude to those found in afghanistan;
11. Show availability of fodder;
12. To whom will they be distributed (criteria of selection);
13. Who will be the direct beneficiaries;
14. Will they be given, sold, or loaned;
15. Will they be owned collectively or individually;
16. What is the expected rate of mortality;
17. What veterinary care will be provided (at time of buying and afterwards);
18. What measures are being taken to insure that bullocks will be used for farm traction;

B. TRACTORS:

1. Woluswali & Alaquadari;
2. Number of tractors already present in each Alaquadari;
3. Number of tractors that you intend to distribute to each Alaquadari;
4. Number of other machines (thrashers, reapers, seed cleaners, etc...);
5. Cost of tractors;
6. Cost of other machines;

7. Cost of transport of tractors and other machines;
8. Total other costs;
9. Total cost (tractors + other machines + transport + other costs);
10. Where will the tractors be purchased;
11. How will they be transported to the project site;
12. Where will the other machines be purchased;
13. How will they be transported to the project site;
14. What brand are the tractors;
15. What is the horsepower of the tractors;
16. What brand of tractors have traditionally been used (if any);
17. What brands are the other machines;
18. What brands of other machines have traditionally been used;
19. What provision is being made for spare parts;
20. What provision is being made for fuel;
21. What provision is being made for proper use and maintenance;
22. What provision is being made for ballasting;
23. Who will own the tractors and other machines;
24. Will they be given, sold, or loaned;
25. Give the number of direct beneficiaries;
26. What was the criteria for selection.

TECHNICAL GUIDELINES
FOR CLEANING & REPAIRING KAREZES

Please answer the following questions, remembering that the information provided will have to be systematically compared with the information collected during project implementation and presented in Quarterly Reports.

Please note that construction activities will not be allowed unless adequate technical data is provided as well as evidence that qualified staff will be supervising these activities.

Some of the information requested below for each karez may call for the same answer (i.e. tools to be provided, local authorities, etc...). Please note if this is the case and do not repeat the same information for each irrigation system.

A. For each karez we need to know the following:

1. Woluswali & Aliquadari;
2. Name of karez;
3. Name of village;
4. Total number of families in the village;
5. Authority or authorities with whom the project was negotiated (commander, party, shura);
6. Local authority overseeing or coordinating this project;
7. Criteria used for selecting the karez;
8. Distance from source well to last well;
9. Depth of mother well;
10. Number of wells;
11. Estimated distance from source well to furthest surface distribution point;
12. Brief explanation of whether karez needs cleaning, repairing, or both;
13. Estimated number of direct beneficiaries through employment;
14. Estimated land area in jeribs irrigated now;
15. Estimated land area in jeribs that will be irrigated at end of project;
16. Number of skilled laborers required;
17. Number of work days required for skilled laborers;
18. Daily salary for one skilled laborer;
19. Total cost of skilled labor (workers x days x rate);
20. Number of unskilled laborers required;
21. Number of work days required for unskilled laborers;
22. Daily salary of one unskilled laborer;
23. Total cost of unskilled labor (workers x days x rate);
24. Total cost of labor (skilled + unskilled);
25. If food for work is planned, specify food items and quantities;
26. What is the value of the ration (food for work);

27. List goods or services;
28. Cost of the good or service;
29. Cost of other goods and services;
30. Total cost (labor + goods + services);
31. Average cost per meter.

B. For all the canals give one summary table showing:

1. Number of karezes;
2. Total number of families benefiting;
3. Total number of direct beneficiaries through employment;
4. Total land area in jeribs irrigated now;
5. Total land area in jeribs that will be irrigated;
6. Total cost of skilled labor (workers x rate x days);
7. Average daily cost of one skill laborer;
8. Total labor cost of unskilled labor;
9. Average daily cost of unskilled labor;
10. Total labor cost;
11. Total food for work component, specifying items and quantities;
12. Total value of the ration (food for work);
13. List of all goods or services;
14. Total cost of the good or service;
15. Total cost of other goods and services;
16. Total cost (labor + goods + services).

PART B:

FINANCIAL SUMMARY TABLE (IN US\$)

<u>BUDGET COMPONENT</u>	<u>BUDGET (US\$)</u>	<u>PLANNED</u>	<u>THIS QUARTER</u>			<u>NEXT QUARTER PLANNED</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURES TO DATE / % BUDGET</u>
			<u>ACTUAL EXPENDITURE</u>	<u>CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS</u>	<u>DIFFERENCE</u>		
SURVIVAL GRANT	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
VILLAGE ASSISTANCE	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
EMERGENCY ASSIST.	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
RESETTLEMENT GRANT	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	=====	=====	=====	=====	=====	=====	=====

NOTE: Details of the above in accordance with Budget Line Items of your approved Proposal should accompany this table.

150

PART C

QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT

SUB-GRANTEE:

GRANT PERIOD:

A. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT:

FROM (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)

TO (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)

Period covered by the next report:

FROM (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)

TO (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)

B. CASH ADVANCE USE AND NEEDS:

IN US\$

- | | | |
|-----|--|--------|
| 1. | Cash advance on hand at the beginning of this reporting period (line 8 of previous quarterly report). | \$0.00 |
| 2. | Advance(s) received during this reporting period. | \$0.00 |
| 3. | Interest earned on cash advance during this reporting period. | \$0.00 |
| 4. | GROSS cash advance available during this reporting period (lines 1, 2, & 3). | \$0.00 |
| 5. | Less interest remitted to IRC during this reporting period. | \$0.00 |
| 6. | NET cash advance available during this reporting period (line 4 minus line 5). | \$0.00 |
| 7. | Disbursements during this reporting period (with complete supporting documents). | \$0.00 |
| 8. | GROSS amount of cash advances available at the end of this reporting period (line 6 minus 7). | \$0.00 |
| 9. | Disbursements to representatives/monitors against program costs without receipts as at the end of this reporting period. | \$0.00 |
| 10. | NET amount of cash advances available at the end of this reporting period (line 8 minus 9). | \$0.00 |

RURAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

QUARTER EXPENDITURE REPORT (QER): (to be submitted to IRC in the first week of the last month of the quarter).

SUB-GRANTEE:

<u>GRANT COMPONENT</u>	<u>BUDGET</u>	<u>PREVIOUS QUARTER ACTUAL EXPENSES</u>	<u>THIS QUARTER PROBABLE</u>	<u>NEXT QUARTER PLANNED</u>
SURVIVAL GRANT	-----	-----	-----	-----
VILLAGE ASSIST.	-----	-----	-----	-----
EMERGENCY ASSIST.	-----	-----	-----	-----
RESETTLEMENT G.	-----	-----	-----	-----
TOTAL	=====	=====	=====	=====

- NOTES:
1. Actual ledger expenditures for the first two months of the quarter plus estimated expenditures for the final month of the quarter.
 2. Grant expiration date is
No expenditure must be incurred after this date.

RAF MONITORING

PVO: _____

GRANT # _____

DATE: _____

PROVINCE: _____

DISTRICT: _____

SERIAL NUMBER				
NAME OF KAREZE				
PARTY	PROJECT NEGOTIATED WITH			
	OVERSEE THE PROJECT			
VILLAGE				
		PROPOSAL	MISSION 1	MISSION 2
FAMILIES				
% OF DESTRUCTION				
DISTANCE FROM SOURCE TO LAST WELL				
DEPT OF MOTHER WELL				
DISTANCE FROM SOURCE WELL TO FURTHEST SURFACE DISTANCE				
WELL	NUMBER			
	CLEANING			
	REPAIR			
	CLEANED & REPAIRED			
JERIBS IRRIGATED	NOW			
	END OF PROJECT			
FLOW OF WATER (1 cubic/second)				
LABOR & WAGE REQUIREMENT	SKILL	DAYS		
		NUMBERS		
		WAGE/LABOR		
	UNSKILL	DAYS		
		NUMBERS		
		WAGE/LABOR		
FUND ALLOCATED				

173