

PD-ABK-069
91983

Activity Approval Memorandum Afghanistan

Narcotics Awareness and Control Project

A.I.D. Representative for Afghanistan

Submitted for Approval
October 1989

Activity Authorization

Name of Country: Afghanistan

Name of Activity: Narcotics Awareness
and Control Project

Number of Activity: 306-0210

Pursuant to Section 904 of the International Security and Development Act of 1985 and the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, I hereby authorize the Narcotics Awareness and Control Project for humanitarian assistance to the free people of Afghanistan. This project will fund a program of multiple initiatives with and among diverse elements in Afghanistan, including poppy growers, refugees, potential drug abusers, and religious, military and political leaders. The project will include programs of narcotics awareness, poppy elimination, and research and information about narcotics. It involves planned obligations not to exceed \$12,500,000 in grant funds over a period of 42 months from the date of this authorization and subject to the availability of funds in accordance with the A.I.D./O.Y.B. allotment process, to help in financing certain foreign exchange and local currency costs.

The agreement(s) which may be negotiated and executed by the officers to whom such authority is delegated in accordance with A.I.D. regulations and Delegations of Authority shall be subject to the following terms and conditions, together with such other terms and conditions as A.I.D. may deem appropriate.

- a. Source and Origin of Commodities, Nationality of Services:
Commodities and services financed by A.I.D. under this project shall have their source, origin and nationality in the United States of America, Pakistan, Afghanistan and, when agreed to in writing by the A.I.D. Representative, countries in A.I.D. Geographic Code 935. Ocean shipping financed by A.I.D. under the Project shall, except as the A.I.D. Representative may otherwise agree in writing, be financed only on flag vessels of the United States of America.

- b. Waivers and Deviations:
Pursuant to authority contained in Section 904 of the International Security and Development Act of 1985, I hereby approve a deviation from normal audit requirements for end-use and costs incurred in Afghanistan.

Date

ACRONYMS

AAM	Activity Approval Memorandum
ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body For Afghan Relief
ACLU	Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit
AfghanAid	A UK PVO working in Afghanistan
Afghani	Afghan currency, prior to 1989, approximately 10/rupee, 200/dollar; now approximately 17/rupee, 340/dollar.
AID-Rep	Agency for International Development, Office of the Representative for Afghanistan
AIG	Afghan Interim Government
AMRC	Afghan Media Resource Center
ANE	Asia and Near East Bureau, A.I.D.
APC	Afghan Psychiatric Center
ARR	Agriculture and Rural Rehabilitation component, ASSP
ARS	Area Rehabilitation Schemes, under ASSP
ASSP	Agriculture Sector Support Project
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CEP	Commodity Export Program
DAP	Diammonium Phosphate
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
EEC	European Economic Community
ESSP	Education Sector Support Project
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GOP	Government of Pakistan
HSSP	Health Sector Support Project

INM	Office of International Narcotics Matters, Department of State
Jihad	A holy war fought by Muslims
Jerib	Afghan land measure, 1/5th of a hectare
KTH	Khyber Teaching Hospital
MSH	Management Sciences for Health
Mujahideen	holy warriors
NACP	Narcotics Awareness and Control Project
NAU	Narcotics Affairs Unit, INM's field offices.
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NNICC	National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PDPA	Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PEP	Poppy Elimination Plan
PNCB	Pakistan Narcotics Control Board
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
RAP	Rural Assistance Project
Seer	7 kilos
Tanzeem	Afghan word for political party
UNFDAC	United Nations Fund For Drug Abuse Control
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNO	University of Nebraska at Omaha
USAID	United States Agency For International Development
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service
VOA	Voice of America

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	
ACRONYMS	
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	i
I. ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF NACP.....	1
II. DEVELOPMENT AND NARCOTICS IN AFGHANISTAN.....	6
III. BACKGROUND.....	7
A. Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan.....	7
1. Pre-war.....	7
i. Poppy Cultivation.....	8
ii. Agriculture in Pre-war Afghanistan...	9
iii. Pre-war Poppy Cultivation and Enforcement.....	9
2. Current Situation.....	9
i. Production/Distribution/Processing in Afghanistan and Southwest Asia....	9
ii. War Destruction of the Agricultural Base.....	15
iii. Rehabilitating Afghnistan's agriculture.....	17
iv. Agricultural Requirements for Poppy Cultivation.....	18
v. Distinguishing Poppy Based Economies from Marginal Poppy Cultivation.....	20
vi. Scenarios for Poppy Cultivation by Returning Refugees.....	21
B. Constraints to Poppy Eradication in Afghanistan.....	22
1. The Continuing War.....	22
2. Crop Substitution for Poppy Cultivation...	23
3. The Limited Education Base and Shortage of Skilled Technicians.....	24
4. Neighboring Country Drug Trade.....	25
C. Models of Successful Poppy Ban Enforcement and / Substitution.....	25
1. The Search for Substitutes.....	25
2. The Requirements of Enforcement.....	26
3. Enforcement and Substitution Models.....	27
D. Solutions and Possibilities for Narcotics Awareness and Control in Afghanistan.....	30

PROJECT RATIONALE AND STRATEGY.....	32
A. Rational.....	32
B. Relationship to A.I.D. Strategy.....	33
C. Interim, Quasi-Government and Donor Community Involvement.....	35
V. PROJECT DESCRIPTION.....	37
A. Project Goal.....	37
B. Project Purpose.....	37
C. Project Components.....	38
1. Narcotics Awareness.....	38
i. Theme Targeting and Media Avenues....	38
ii. Theme Generation.....	38
iii. Theme Delivery.....	39
2. Eliminating Poppy Cultivation.....	40
i. Site Selection.....	40
ii. Poppy Elimination Plans.....	41
iii. Enforcement.....	42
3. Information and Research.....	43
i. Monitoring and Evaluation: Improving Ongoing Programs.....	44
ii. High Value Crop Research.....	44
iii. Socio-Economic Research on Narcotics in Afghanistan.....	46
iv. Preparing for Future Narcotics Operations within Afghanistan.....	47
VI. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION.....	49
A. Implementation Plan.....	49
1. Project Phasing.....	49
2. Narcotics Awareness Implementation.....	49
i. Building Afghan Capacity.....	49
ii. Building Awareness in the Refugee Camps.....	50
iii. Current Initiatives.....	51
iv. Building Awareness within Afghanistan	51
v. Building Awareness within the Donor Community and Afghan Leadership.....	52
3. Poppy Elimination.....	54
i. Project Supported Poppy Elimination Unit.....	54
ii. PVO Supported Poppy Elimination Activities.....	54
iii. Portfolio-wide Activities.....	54
iv. The Private Sector.....	54
4. Information and Research.....	55
B. Project Administration.....	56
C. Procurement Plan.....	57
1. Project Contractor.....	57
2. Commodity Procurement.....	59

D.	Implementation Schedule.....	60
1.	A.I.D. Documentation.....	60
2.	Narcotics Awareness Component.....	60
3.	Poppy Elimination Component.....	61
4.	Information and Research Component.....	62
VII.	MONITORING AND EVALUATION.....	63
VIII.	FINANCIAL PLAN.....	63

APPENDICES:

- A. Project Alpha
- B. Licorice and other Specialty Crops
- C. Logical Framework
- D. Agriculture Overview
- E. UNFDAC Program
- F. AfghanAid Program
- G. Islamic Injunctions against the Use of Narcotics
- H. ACBAR Narcotics Clause
- I. "When Peace Returns to Afghanistan"

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On September 6, 1989, President George Bush, in his first nationally televised address as President, singled out narcotics as the greatest domestic threat facing America today. To counter this threat, the President introduced a five year anti-narcotics strategy, an important element of which focuses beyond U.S. borders to those areas where narcotics are grown, processed, and sent along their way to international markets. The Narcotics Awareness and Control Project will support the President's strategy by promoting narcotics awareness among Afghans, and by restricting new opium production and, where possible, eliminating on-going poppy production in Afghanistan. It will do so cautiously and systematically and with a full understanding of the difficulties of the task.

The project, extending 42 months at a cost of \$12.5 million, is the first of an anticipated two phase program, the second phase of which is as yet undesigned. Midway through the project, an evaluation will help redirect project resources to the most effective components. A second evaluation after 36 months of implementation will provide the foundation for an amended, or new AAM. This second phase will take account of the evolution of the political situation in rural Afghanistan, as well as the lessons of the first phase.

The project has three components. The first component promotes narcotics awareness to refugees, the resistance forces and their supporting population inside Afghanistan, the resistance political leadership, and the donor community located in Pakistan. Narcotics awareness campaigns will draw the connection in the Afghan mind between narcotics production and cultivation on the one hand and drug addiction and social decay on the other through images, radio, and traveling medical/communications teams delivering highly directed messages. The religious power of Islam will be employed at every level in the society to mobilize the latent forces said to be ready to proscribe both narcotics production and use.

The second component is directed toward eliminating poppy cultivation in areas of Afghanistan where conditions lend themselves to a high probability of success. Seven to eight poppy elimination plans will be negotiated with commanders or local shuras in which A.I.D. will agree to provide development resources in exchange for an immediate poppy ban, or a gradual elimination of poppy cultivation in those instances in which an immediate ban is not a realistic option. Funds under this project will also be available for PVO-supported poppy elimination programs.

The third component of NACP will help to establish an analytical base to facilitate implementation of the project. A monitoring and evaluation unit will track those initiatives

funded in the first two components to identify successes, failures, and their determinants. Recommended program adjustments should emerge on a regular basis from this ongoing analysis. Another aspect of the component will be project-financed research that will attempt to learn more about why Afghans plant poppy and the forces that can prevent and eliminate production. The agricultural and commercial feasibility of high value export crops will also be studied.

The project will be implemented by a contractor under the policy and implementation guidance of the Mission narcotics officer. The contractor will work with and assist in the development of Afghan organizations to undertake critical elements of project implementation. In each component potential collaborators and sub-contracting implementors have already been identified.

Each of the three project components has been designed with the realization that anti-narcotics projects are among the most problematical in A.I.D.'s portfolio. Targetted beneficiaries may not perceive themselves to be beneficiaries in the same sense that beneficiaries of more traditional development activities might; and indeed farmers are invariably set back, at least financially, by successful crop substitution efforts. Along with this typical constraint of conflicting beneficiary/donor interests, the Afghanistan Narcotics Awareness and Control Project carries the atypical burden of operating in a situation of economic debilitation, political destabilization, and infrastructural deterioration. Security considerations prevent direct monitoring and contact between targetted populations and U.S. staff is not possible.

Despite these very real handicaps, we are convinced that there are opportunities for effective and successful anti-narcotics interventions for which we must position ourselves to take advantage. It's been demonstrated through an A.I.D. pilot, Project Alpha, that committed and well respected local authorities, supported with seed, tractors, and other agricultural resources, can persuade farmers to make the switch away from poppy cultivation. It is also becoming increasingly evident that the Afghans themselves are beginning to recognize that narcotics related activities are contrary to the principles of Islam and a further threat to the morality and stability of an already traumatized Afghan society.

I. PROJECT ISSUES

In identifying issues for special attention, the Mission invites Bureau comments and recommendations on these or other subjects important to the successful design and implementation of the Narcotics Awareness and Control Project.

A. Responses to the Congressional Mandate on Narcotics

Prior to February 1989, with a country at war against a foreign invader, donors to Afghanistan placed a distant priority on narcotics. The issue of national survival was paramount. But with the withdrawal of the Soviets, new agendas have begun to emerge. Narcotics elimination is one of them. It is an issue that must be addressed with the same intensity of determination as rehabilitation and resettlement, integration and political cohesion, and self-determination and freedom in Afghanistan.

A.I.D. has accepted its responsibilities in Afghanistan by starting a program that seeks answers to poppy elimination. But A.I.D./Washington should recognize the constraints in which this project will operate, and Congress should not be given unrealistic expectations of the impact, certainly for the initial years of implementation. The Narcotics Awareness and Control Project responds to U.S. priorities, but an issue is whether any anti-narcotics project should be attempted given the current situation in Afghanistan. This AAM is the Mission's position on this first-order question.

B. The Scale, Magnitude and Duration of the Project

There is almost no empirical data base on opium production in Afghanistan. Reports of the location and amount of opium cultivation vary significantly among the concerned U.S. government agencies. Broad areas of Afghanistan may be poppy free, or there may be some opium cultivation in many small valleys this growing season. Northern Afghanistan may be filled with opium poppies growing "off-season" in cold climates, thus escaping standard remote sensing observation; or the north may be filled with wild poppies unconnected to drug production. Each variant has its advocates. There could be many different levels of project activity selected. NACP, the first phase of a two phase project, seeks exploratory results from numerous avenues of attack on opium poppy cultivation.

It seems sensible to tackle narcotics awareness across a broad spectrum of the Afghan leadership and population, to study the location and determinants of poppy cultivation, and to try some specific elimination programs. How many, for how long, depends upon the results of early pilots. Successes could quickly enlarge the scale of the project, failures will tighten future funding commitments. There are other decisions that could be made on scale, magnitude and duration. This AAM presents "best judgment" selections by the Mission.

C. Enforcement

Since the demise of the Public Safety program, A.I.D. has not been chartered to support public security or enforcement agencies. While this AAM does not in any way re-involve the Agency into the provision of support or assistance to the military, police, or other law enforcement agencies, it does propose to enter into poppy elimination agreements that are "enforcement-based," i.e., commanders and/or shuras will be asked to enforce poppy bans to which they have agreed. A.I.D. will not assist these local authorities with the means of enforcement in any way, and will limit its own "stick" to the withdrawal of assistance. The issue is therefore of the appropriateness not the legality of the initiatives that are described in this AAM.

The Mission would propose to deal with this issue by initiating those activities that are legally possible for A.I.D. in the present context of Afghanistan, and simultaneously encouraging greater future involvement from the State Department's Office of International Narcotics Matters and the Justice Department's Drug Enforcement Administration.

D. Atomized Political Units in Afghanistan

In the absence of a legitimate central government, there is no way to implement a large-scale anti-narcotics program. There simply is no one counterpart. NACP proposes to work with those leaders that do exist, the local commanders, local councils, and religious and political leaders -- who will take a stand against opium production. The project will contain a series of small agreements concluded independently and implemented separately. NACP is a project designed to take advantage of local opportunities to reduce drug production.

How and where the AIG can enter the project, add to the strength of the message, or aid in the enforcement of poppy bans, is yet to be determined and will depend largely on how successful the AIG is at organizing itself to address the

problem. President Mojadiddi issued a strong statement against narcotics earlier this year and Minister of Interior Yunis Khalis reportedly may name Commander Abdul Haq head of an internal security unit that will deal with narcotics and other law and order issues. While this is evidence that the AIG is moving in the right direction, it will be some time before it has the ability to act as an effective counterpart. Individual commanders, as well as local shuras, have this ability now and offer the basis for an authorized anti-narcotic project.

E. Religious Sanctions and U.S. Support

The strongest sanction against opium production in Afghanistan may come from religious leaders using the mosque as a platform to enlighten followers to the evil of narcotics. Unfortunately, in the tumultuous political environment of Afghanistan, knowledge that a foreign government was backing specific religious leaders to take such a stand could destroy much of the intended impact. The project will seek to identify mechanisms to support a strong religious anti-narcotics message without damaging or potentially destroying the medium in the process.

F. The Target Drug for NACP

The Narcotics Awareness and Control Project is directed solely at opium production and, to a more limited extent, its use. In Afghanistan, hashish is also grown and exported. Its areas of cultivation and trafficking patterns appear to be distinct from opium. Consistent with our understanding of the priorities of DEA and INM, opium is the target drug of this AAM. Hashish, and its relationship to opium, could however be the subject of studies proposed in the Information and Research component of the project.

G. Implementation Mechanisms

Component two of the project supports rural development activities that are very similar to those being implemented under the Agriculture Sector Support Project with the only significant difference being that those supported under the NACP will be in poppy growing areas and will facilitate crop substitution. The mission thus had two implementation options open to it:

- o Tapping into the Area Rehabilitation Scheme (ARS) network created under the Agriculture Sector Support Project; or
- o Creating a separate but complementary network for narcotics producing areas.

There are several factors that favor the first option of tapping into the existing ARS network: the chances of an early start-up would be enhanced; coordination of respective project activities would be simplified; and, staffing and equipment needs would be reduced (although not as one might initially believe since ARS staff and resource levels would have to be increased to meet the NACP needs). In fact, during the early design stages of the project, the Mission leaned heavily toward option one. However, as NACP designers and ASSP implementers began to think through specific implementation scenarios, it became clear that option one has the potential to hinder the implementation of one or both projects.

Under the integrated implementation approach, NACP activities would unfortunately be limited to areas where there are ASSP-supported ARSs (which may not necessarily coincide with poppy growing areas) or, alternatively, site selection for future ARSs might be skewed in favor of poppy growing areas to the detriment of achieving ASSP objectives. Human resource and commodity allocations would become another point of conflict and project managers would be torn between NACP and ASSP priorities. Furthermore, by meshing the operational side of the two projects, the mission would risk the goodwill built up toward ASSP and ASSP staff by unpopular actions that might be necessary under the NACP, i.e., the termination of assistance in a recalcitrant area.

The selection of option two enables NACP staff to develop expertise and operational modes specific to poppy elimination and ensures NACP staff the flexibility to work beyond the ARSs, in areas selected solely on the basis of anti-poppy criteria. Most important, by maintaining two separate projects, A.I.D. can be sure that each of these important initiatives receives full attention.

H. Specifying the Implementation Plan

There are deliberately no blueprints in the AAM for the introduction and negotiation of a poppy elimination plan for a local community, nor the resources to be devoted to eliminate 5, 50, 500, or 5,000 hectares of poppy production. The knowledge base is not available to make those judgments now, nor can it be assured that what will work in one area will work in another. Sites will be selected on the basis of the opportunity they offer for successful poppy elimination and for testing specific approaches or assumptions.

By the end of the third year of operations, the project should have some reasonable answers that will allow for the development of a more defined second phase of NACP.

I. Budget Uncertainties

The Mission began planning an anti-narcotics project at a time when imminent budget increases were thought to be fairly certain. While these resources did not materialize, concern about narcotics issues is steadily gaining momentum in the U.S. and, more importantly for project implementation, in Afghanistan. The Mission is thus torn between raiding the budgets of effective and needed on-going projects or missing the opportunity to capitalize on and perpetuate the growing Afghan recognition of the problem.

We estimate the need for a first year obligation of \$3.5 million. The project could be initiated with a lesser amount but it would mean phasing the start-up of the three components rather than initiating activities in all three components the first year of implementation. In an effort to ensure the timely start-up of NACP, the Mission is scrubbing its portfolio to determine from which activities funds can be diverted with the least pain. Any reduction in our FY 90 budget will seriously constrain our ability to begin the NACP. Washington assistance would be appreciated in identifying centrally-supported projects that could augment mission resources.

II. DEVELOPMENT AND NARCOTICS IN AFGHANISTAN

Few countries present a greater challenge to development agencies than Afghanistan. Even in the pre-war period, when there was relative stability, traditional practices meant that innovation was resisted. Progress occurred only in slow halting steps. Modernization of agriculture, education, health practices, and the social services proceeded at a glacial pace, in a society slow to assimilate and use new technology's equipment, practices, and concepts. The war and its continuation makes the introduction of positive change that much more problematical.

A.I.D.'s existing cross-border operations in Afghanistan have been undertaken in the most difficult of circumstances, through remote direction, in a war environment with ever-changing shifts of authority and direction. The results are positive when viewed from the perspective of what can be done in rural Afghanistan. It is a time when any forward progress in a fragmented and torn society counts as a high achievement.

Few subjects present a greater challenge than eliminating drug production and trafficking. In all cases, the farmers are the first to feel the pinch, the international traffickers the last, as the enormous profits available to the drug lords allow the creation of incentives for new production, and the destruction or subversion of the enforcers. In a revision to an old adage, the drug culture corrupts absolutely. In some societies, the drug culture transcends the government, operating in its own realm of power, reward, and retribution. In others, such as Pakistan, thoughtful programs combined with enforcement have reduced production, if not drug processing and export.

Two potential approaches to dealing with the drug problem, reduction of demand, and forceful elimination of the traffickers, are not available to, or within the charter of A.I.D. Each government agency must bring its own skills and capacity to bear upon what may be the overriding social issue of the next decade. As a development agency, A.I.D. can contribute to the war against drugs by doing what it does best, using development resources to create positive change. The task in Afghanistan is to prevent additional acreage being used for opium poppy cultivation while restricting and, over considerable time, eliminating production entirely.

This obligation is accepted as A.I.D.'s necessary contribution to the ending of the international drug menace. The effort to rid Afghanistan of drug producers must go forward in spite of the odds against rapid progress in the existing political-military environment in Afghanistan.

III. BACKGROUND

A. Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan

1. Pre-war

i. Poppy Cultivation

Poppy (Papaver somniferum) cultivation, the production of opium, and its use has a long history in Afghanistan. Marco Polo, while journeying to China in the thirteenth century, observed it in Badakshan province and reported use of opium by the local population. In several areas of Afghanistan, opium has been and continues to be used medicinally. It has also been used as a recreational narcotic; however, this has not been widespread, only occurring in well defined regions.

The provinces of Herat, Badghis, Faryab, Badakshan, Balkh, and Nangarhar have traditionally been the most important opium producers. Other significant poppy growing areas include Nimroz and Upper Helmand provinces. At least four different varieties of opium poppies are produced with an upper limit of production at 2,900 meters elevation.¹ Afghan poppies are of high quality, containing 10-12 percent opium.

Prior to the turn of the century, the opium produced in Afghanistan met local consumption with relatively minor amounts exported. Since then the increasing worldwide demand for heroin has fueled the growth of Afghanistan's poppy fields, production of the resulting opium gum, and its refinement to heroin. During the last 25 years, Afghan opium has been exported in increasing amounts to foreign markets. In the seventies, opium production ranged between 250 and 300 tons per year.² Since 1979, annual exports have increased significantly, to the point at which some experts estimate as much as 800 tons will be exported in 1989.

Although poppy cultivation was illegal in pre-war Afghanistan, the opium trade was extensive, with major trafficking and marketing links with Pakistan, Iran, India, and to some extent the Soviet Union. However, opium processing to heroin, until recently, occurred mainly in neighboring

¹ Amin and Schilz, A Geography of Afghanistan, UNO Center for Afghan Studies, 1976.

² Source: DEA, Islamabad

countries.³ In Pakistan, the tribal agencies bordering Afghanistan, outside central government control, have served as important processing and transshipment locations for opium produced in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan. From the western regions of Afghanistan, opium and heroin was mainly transported via Iran and Turkey.

Although rare in the past in rural Afghanistan, recent traumas and dislocations seem to have increased the incidence of narcotics addiction among Afghans. Prior to the war, comprehensive epidemiological studies carried out between 1967 and 1970 in 4 widely separated villages, 3 located in or near traditional opium use areas, reported that 2.2 percent of the total population of the four villages used opium.⁴ Current information from refugee camps in Pakistan suggests a greater incidence of drug addiction as one result of the ten-year war.

ii. Agriculture in Pre-war Afghanistan

Afghanistan's economy was predominantly rural with agriculture accounting for more than half the GNP, and much of the industrial sector based on processing agricultural products. The main exports were fruit, nuts, vegetables, carpets, and animal products.⁵ Approximately 4.5 million hectares were being cultivated.⁶

However, despite the importance of agriculture to the economy, the agricultural resource base of the country has always been limited. From one perspective, the major problem of the pre-war period was the subsistence nature of much of the farming. Afghanistan's agriculture combined problems of accessibility of markets, a lack of inputs, and technical advice, with small farm size, a large rural population and a

³ References to production statistics, processing laboratories, distribution and marketing systems are from other U.S. government agencies responsible for assembling this information. A.I.D. has no independent sourcing for these reports.

⁴ Buck, Anderson et. al, Health and Disease In Rural Afghanistan, York Press, Baltimore, 1972.

⁵ In 1980/81 Afghanistan exported \$209 million in fresh and dried fruit, \$47 million of hides and skins, \$12.3 million of wool and \$103.6 million of carpets. The total value of all commodities exported was \$705 million, and the bulk of the non-agricultural export was \$233 million of natural gas. (Source: External Trade Statistics, Ministry of Commerce, Government of Afghanistan).

⁶ Amin and Shilz, ibid.

feudal land system. From another perspective, that of the Soviet advisors to the Afghanistan government, the problem was in the feudal land ownership and tenancy system. The Soviet-backed government committed major resources to land reform and state cooperatives in an effort marked with factiousness and failure.

iii. Pre-war Poppy Cultivation and Enforcement

Although little information is available on this subject, there were a number of drug programs and restrictions on poppy growing during the pre-war period. UNFDAC had a mother and child drug education and treatment program based in Kabul. The Helmand valley saw USAID-funded efforts at eradication of poppy in the irrigated command areas. This crop substitution project was interrupted by the 1978 coup. Afghans interviewed during the design of this project recalled government imposed destruction of the poppy crop in their villages during their childhood.

2. Current Situation

i. Production/Distribution/Processing in Afghanistan and Southwest Asia


In 1988-89 Afghanistan was the largest producer of opium in the southwest Asia region, and is now producing equivalent quantities to the Golden Triangle in southeast Asia. It is estimated that between 1,100 and 1,420 metric tons of opium were produced in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran in 1988.⁷ Of this total, 56 percent (600-800 metric tons) is estimated to have originated from Afghanistan. Figure 1, overleaf, gives opium production estimates for southwest Asia.⁸ The quantities produced depend upon the weather, farm-gate prices, and enforcement/interdiction efforts. Both Pakistan and Iran have active anti-drug campaigns. Afghanistan has no effective central government or narcotics control program and the current government in Kabul does not proscribe opium poppy cultivation. Despite costly efforts to control poppy cultivation and opium production in Pakistan, and draconic actions against traffickers in Iran, there has been an average annual increase of over eight percent in the production of opium in the region during the past four years.

⁷ National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), "The NNICC Report-1988: The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States", April, 1989.

⁸ This figure is based on the best information available to the design team.

Figure 1

TRENDS IN OPIUM PRODUCTION SOUTHWEST ASIA: 1975-1989



Various Sources including: NNICCC Report
and DEA estimates

a. Location of the Poppy Cultivation Areas

In 1989, the three main poppy growing areas of Afghanistan were:

- o the south-west in the upper part of Helmand province, along the upper Helmand and Tirin rivers;
- o along Afghanistan's eastern border, in the provinces of Paktia, Nangarhar and Kunar, adjoining Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Agencies, and also inland in Laghman province; and
- o all the northern provinces but especially Badakshan and Takhar.

Other poppy production is said to occur in the western provinces of Herat, Nimroz, and Faryab along the Iranian border and in Zabul in the south-east. (See Figure 2, overleaf)

At the present time only the eastern provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, and Paktia are easily accessible from Pakistan.

b. Supply and Demand Interactions

As the anti-drug programs of Iran and Pakistan become more effective, there will be an incentive within Afghanistan to increase production to meet the requirements of the region.⁹ Higher demand will generate higher farmgate prices to growers. Suitable land is available for expanded cultivation, and there is little risk (at present) to the farmer or trafficker. Without an active program to counteract poppy cultivation, it is likely that the Iran and Pakistan anti-narcotics programs may contribute indirectly to rising levels of opium production in Afghanistan. Any reduction in total regional opium output can only be achieved if Afghan production remains static or is reduced.

Although not targets of an A.I.D. project, morphine base and heroin processing facilities located in Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan feed the drug industry. Major "laboratory" concentrations are reported in the Khyber agency of NWFP, the

⁹ Iran's hard line against internal drug trafficking may be the result of multiple national objectives that could, conceivably, include encouraging poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.

KEY

GROWN LIGHTLY/TRADITIONAL
GROWN MEDIUM-HEAVY/TRADITIONAL
CURRENT MEDIUM-HEAVY/COMMERCIAL




FIGURE 2
POPPY CULTIVATION
AREAS

adjacent Nangarhar province, along the Baluchistan border with Kandahar province, in Helmand Province, and in Herat province along the border with Iran. The majority of Afghan opium is said to be processed in Pakistan and Iran. Afghan morphine base and heroin is shipped to Europe and North America via Karachi and overland through India, Iran and Turkey. It is reported that large quantities are consumed within Pakistan and India.

c. Official Sanctions on the Drug Trade

There are several causes of the increasing role played by Afghanistan in the export of opium and heroin. Because of the war, there is no enforced prohibition on poppy cultivation or opium sales. While individual leaders declare their abhorrence of the drug trade, action taken to date by the Afghan Interim Government has, by force of the AIG's nascent stage of development, been limited to gestures such as President Mojadeddi's public pronouncement against narcotics, and plans such as Commander Abdul Haq's organizational chart for an anti-narcotics security unit. The Kabul government also has been unable to address the narcotics problem. Indeed there are reports that the Kabul regime "lures Mujahideen commanders away" by sanctioning their role in the drug trade. Additionally, agents of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seem to actively collude in the production of opium in certain areas under central government control, probably for reasons of personal gain. There are also reports of a few mujahideen commanders heavily involved in poppy cultivation and opium/heroin trafficking. One such "drug empire" is said to extend over much of the upper Helmand valley, justified by the need to produce cash to maintain fighting forces for the Jihad.

It is also necessary to consider the entire opium/heroin issue against the backdrop of constantly shifting tribal, ethnic and sectarian rivalries. The easy money and the power that springs from opium sales are strong incentives promoting poppy cultivation, as the income generated allows individuals to improve both position and influence. If the experience of other countries applies to Afghanistan, the longer poppy cultivation occurs at current or heavier levels and opium trafficking is allowed to go unchecked, the more difficult it will be to put an end to the drug economy.

d. Domestic Drug Consumption

Opium produced in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan caters to local as well international markets. There has been a significant increase in opium and heroin use over the past five years in Pakistan. In 1986 there were an estimated 700,000 heroin addicts and 260,000 regular opium users. This is particularly alarming considering that in 1980 there were only rare cases of heroin addiction. In 1986, Pakistani heroin addicts consumed 42 tons of equivalent pure heroin. To produce

this amount of heroin, 420 tons of opium are required. Given the accelerated growth of Pakistani heroin addiction between 1980 and 1986, it is safe to assume that heroin addicts in Pakistan now number about 1 million.

In Afghanistan, there are an estimated 100 to 125 thousand opium users and a small but growing number of heroin users. Opium and heroin use in the refugee camps is also growing. If poppy cultivation levels remain high in Afghanistan, and if there is a correlation between increased heroin production and increased heroin addiction as has occurred in Pakistan, Afghanistan may soon be faced with serious internal drug use problems. This will create an increasing population of drug abusers as well as the further entrenchment of the opium/heroin processing and trafficking industry.

ii. War Destruction of the Agricultural Base


After more than ten years of civil war the agricultural base of Afghanistan has been greatly changed from its pre-war condition. There has been widespread fighting, and wholesale movements of population, together with the destruction of roads, buildings, and irrigation systems, and changes in the availability of inputs and the access to markets. The impact of these factors and the extent of the damage is hard to assess.¹⁰

However, three suppositions can be made: that the changes in the agriculture base are likely to vary greatly from region to region; that the return of the refugee populations from Pakistan and Iran will require an increase in total agricultural production; and that complete devastation of the agricultural infrastructure will only be found in circumscribed areas. Figure 3 overleaf, illustrates the provinces from which refugees originated.¹¹

The sole effort to provide an overview of agriculture production and the resource base was attempted originally in 1987 by the Swedish Committee. The resulting Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan did not attempt to make an agricultural census, or a

¹⁰ One source of information on the overall agricultural situation is the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan which, with technical and financial support from A.I.D., surveyed the agricultural situation in the country during 1987/88. The survey was amended and repeated in 1988 and 1989. An initial report from the 1987 survey was based on interviews with over 1300 communities and 20,000 farm families in all 29 provinces of Afghanistan and in the refugee camps. The survey design team chose not to include any poppy farmers in its sample.


¹¹ UNHCR, 1989.



UNHCR TARGET AREAS

First priority

Provinces with more than 50% of original population registered as refugees




Provinces with 35% - 50%



Second priority

Provinces with 20% - 35%



Provinces with 10% - 20%



15

statistically valid sample, so figures on total area farmed, total wheat production, etc. cannot be extracted from the data. Its purpose was to present an overall profile of the "average" farm and the "average" farm family, as selected by field interviewers. The general conclusions were:

- o total agricultural output is one third of the 1978 figures;
- o one third of the farms have been abandoned; and
- o the area cultivated on the remaining farms has fallen by a third, while yields have fallen by 50 percent.¹²

The authors attributed much of this decline to a reduction in the availability of labor (family and hired), combined with a shortage in draught power. All of the animal populations had decreased, with draught animals in particularly short supply. Fertilizer use had fallen and there was some suggestion that the genetic potential of the wheat seed available had declined.¹³ Widespread damage to irrigation systems was also reported.^{14 15}

12 "First Report on the Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan, National Trends and Averages", The Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan, May, 1988.

13 Although no information was available on the wheat breeding programs now in place in Afghanistan, it is clear from Pakistan's experience that without the production and distribution of new wheat varieties on a regular basis, yields will fall badly as old varieties lose their disease resistance.

14 Of the farmers surveyed in the Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan, nearly one third reported destruction of their irrigation systems.

15 There have been a number of specific reports done by the various aid agencies, focused on the particular interests of the donor, and a particular site. Information on the situation is presently scattered throughout the aid community, frequently unrecorded and not easily accessible. As the development of any kind of coordinated rehabilitation program for Afghanistan will require understanding of the extent and nature of the war damage, the information already collected needs collating and synthesizing. For example, Abdul Baquee and John Tacon. "Badghis Insect Infestation Survey", Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, August 1989, Nancy Dupree, "Women in Afghanistan Preliminary Needs Assessment" UNIFEM, August 1988.

iii. Rehabilitating Afghanistan's Agriculture

Any attempt to rehabilitate agriculture and also to prevent the expansion of the acreage under poppy will need to be based on local conditions and circumstances. The heterogenous nature of the agricultural situation in Afghanistan, together with the size of the poppy cultivation problem dictate locally adapted solutions.

There are parts of Afghanistan which have been comparatively less affected by the war. In these areas labor and water are more available, and the application of better seeds, more fertilizer, and improved irrigation could quickly yield large increases in production. Whereas in other areas, the land area farmed is limited by the availability of both labor and water. The increased utilization and expansion of the agricultural area is thus controlled in the first instance by the availability of high quality inputs, and by the rate at which refugees return, as well as by the amount of irrigation rehabilitation and development which is possible.

The distribution of the inputs and supplies for the reestablishment of farming in the abandoned rural areas, as well as for upgrading the agriculture in the more favored areas, is contingent on the availability of a safe and effective transport system. Some important inputs will simply be unavailable in the short term. Any quantity of appropriate wheat seed varieties as well as maize is likely to take a minimum of 1-2 years to produce. In the livestock sector, animals such as draught oxen are not available in large enough quantities to meet the current demand and there will be a substantial time lag in many places before the livestock population increases to the pre-war levels.¹⁶ Forest nurseries will require a season or more to become established.

There will be two kinds of irrigation rehabilitation. The first is the cleaning of karezes and channels, the repair of the diversion works and the reestablishment of the farm distribution systems in those areas where neglect is the major problem.¹⁷ This type of rehabilitation will move ahead quickly, assuming labor is available and the political situation stabilizes

¹⁶ The reduced population of draught animals could have a direct impact on poppy cultivation. One of the bottlenecks in the annual farming cycle is the cultivation of land in the fall. As the rains arrive, land preparation for the fall crop starts, and a shortage of draught power reduces the area planted. With the area available for planting limited, the incentive to plant the small area with the more lucrative poppy crop will increase.

¹⁷ There will also be a need for de-mining of agricultural land and the irrigation systems in some areas.

sufficiently to encourage reinvestment in agriculture. The actual irrigated area which is amenable to rapid individual repair is indeterminable on a national scale, but easily identifiable in a specific area.

Second stage rehabilitation will include the repair of barrages, dams, canals and major irrigation works which have been damaged by the war. This will take longer and will require both an external source of capital and technical capacity.

iv. Agricultural Requirements for Poppy Cultivation

a. Poppy Cultivation in Pakistan

In Pakistan, where A.I.D. has considerable experience with poppy cultivation, its prevention and replacement, the crop is mostly grown on rainfed lands. The yields of raw opium vary from year to year and are strongly influenced by the amount of the rains, and their timing (which influences planting decisions). The annual variation ranges from an average of 8.5 to 14.5 kg/acre (20.9-35.8 kg/ha) of dry opium gum.¹⁸ Individual farmer's yields will depend on their planting date, and the availability of supplemental irrigation.

b. Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan

Much of the same cultural information is applicable to Afghanistan. The land is ox-ploughed and the seed is planted broadcast, mixed with sand, at higher seed rates than those reported for Pakistan (10 kg/ha). The land is dragged following sowing, and germination takes approximately two weeks. The stands are frequently uneven, with 22-25 plants/square meter in a good stand (220-250,000 plants/ha). Weeding is done frequently, with the weeds used as fodder. The crop is flood irrigated as necessary, and flowering starts in March/April depending on the location. Two-to-three weeks later, the harvesting starts, and for about two weeks in April/May there will be intensive harvesting. Individual capsules will be scraped 2-6 times at 3-4 days intervals, usually in the afternoon, followed by collection of the exuded gum the next morning. More than 50 percent of the labor requirement of the opium crop occurs at harvest time. An individual harvester can collect approximately 3 lbs of wet gum a day.

¹⁸ A survey completed by the NAU agriculturists in 1988/89, a dry year, showed a range of average yields from 6.7-10.9 kg/acre (16.5-26.9 kg/ha) of dry opium gum in the tribal areas.

The major difference between the two countries is the widespread availability and use of irrigation in Afghanistan. The importance and the extent to which irrigated poppy is grown in Afghanistan is difficult to determine. What is clear from the Pakistan experience is that under rainfed conditions, a delay in the arrival of the fall rains causes farmers to abandon poppy for that year and move into alternative spring planted crops.¹⁹ The potential effect of irrigation is illustrated by data from the NAU survey.²⁰ Individual plots in Bajaur in this survey which received 219 mm of water during the growing season of October-May yielded 32.5 kg/ha dry opium gum over a five week harvest period, while in Mohmand a crop which received 166 mm of water during the growing season produced 21 kg/ha dry gum. The yields in Afghanistan appear to be generally higher than Pakistan, with 20-50 kg/ha of dry gum reported.

A farmer operating under a system which allows some supplemental or total irrigation is not only buffered from the effects of climate and likely to have higher yields, but also is able to switch to a number of high value horticultural and specialty crops which are not options under rain fed conditions.

c. Poppy in the Cropping System

Farmers have to make a trade-off between wheat and poppy. In the pre-war period, poppy was planted as part of a rotation. The poppy was planted in the fall, followed by corn, cotton or vegetables.²¹ The next season, wheat was grown, followed by corn or a fallow, then poppy.

An economic study in 1972 in Nangarhar showed returns from poppy 5-10 times those from irrigated wheat.²² Isolated regions of Afghanistan will grow staple crops such as wheat for home

¹⁹ In 1988, in Pakistan, late rains combined with high onion prices caused a major shift from poppy cultivation.

²⁰ Opium yield data from NAU 1988/89 survey sheets.

²¹ Generally, poppy is planted in October in Nangarhar, December in Helmand. In the northern locations poppy is reported to be spring planted due to the severe winters. This possibility affects the reports on poppy cultivation available from remote sensing or photographic observation taken in the early spring.

²² G.P. Owens, and J.H. Clifton. "Poppies in Afghanistan", USAID, Kabul, 1972.

consumption even when poppy provides a higher cash return.²³ Only when there is an ensured distribution system that allows the purchase of wheat from the proceeds of opium gum sales will poppy cultivation consume up to 90 percent of the available agricultural land.²⁴

v. Distinguishing Poppy-Based Economies from Marginal Poppy Cultivation

Poppy-based economies face the same dangers as any mono-cropping system that depends upon one cash crop. When security conditions closed roads from Afghanistan's northern poppy areas in the 88-89 growing season, poppy prices fell and alternative crops emerged on what had been exclusively poppy fields. When opium markets are available, as they usually have been during the war, poppy is a proven performer. There are no reasons to experiment with other crops, nor is there any motivation to plant fruit trees on poppy land with the intention of switching the cash crop as the trees mature many years later.

Long-standing poppy-based economies cannot be rehabilitated or returned to some pre-war non-poppy production level, in the absence of strong and effective enforcement. A solution that is in any way satisfactory to the local poppy growers must include the introduction of a cash crop substitute that has more economic value than staples such as wheat or corn. The circumstances are very different for local economies based mainly upon non-poppy crops. In these areas with marginal poppy production, the solution is to return the agricultural base to

²³ Farm gate prices for opium gum (August 1989) are 60-70,000 Afghanis a seer. At a seer/jerib, this is a gross return of \$1,500 - \$1,750/hectare. Many factors influence the returns to poppy. Growers will sell short, in return for a guaranteed income at planting. Also within one field a whole series of sub-tenancies may be found with individual harvesters being paid a share of the crop. A by-product is the poppy seed which is locally consumed and can yield up to 1.2 metric tons/ha.

²⁴ Opium was estimated to cover 90 percent of the cultivated land in the winter season in the upper reaches of the Gadoon mountain in NWFP, a testimony to the distribution system and availability of wheat from local markets in Pakistan.

Taking a situation where a family owned a large irrigated holding of two hectares (10 jeribs or 4.4 acres), wheat production even in a good year, sufficient to feed a family of six, would consume approximately half the total available land, allowing poppy to be cultivated on the remaining 40-60 percent. See section in Agricultural Appendix on wheat subsistence.

its pre-war status by assisting in the reconstruction of irrigation systems and improving the availability of agricultural inputs. Market access must also be restored.

While the provinces that have major poppy production are well-defined, individual valleys well outside the identified opium regions may be as addicted to poppy returns as farmers in Nangarhar. Development programs that encompass larger regions such as provinces and districts (wuluswalis and alaqadaris) must survey to determine that agriculture in the project service area is poppy free, and not rely on generalizations that the region is outside traditional poppy areas.

The design of a poppy substitution program depends critically on determining whether the target area contains a poppy-based economy, or only marginal poppy production. There will, of course, be a full range and mix of possibilities calling for carefully-planned poppy substitution strategies that are matched to the local opium-producing situation.

vi. Scenarios for Poppy Cultivation by Returning Refugees

There are two scenarios offered by knowledgeable observers in predicting how returning refugees will react to the opportunity of poppy production. The two scenarios are not mutually exclusive, and should probably be seen as two poles of a continuum. One emphasizes the impact of the destruction of pre-war agricultural infrastructure which has reduced irrigated land by as much as 50 percent, destroyed orchards and decimated livestock herds. In this scenario, the farmer is forced to grow poppy to maintain his family because of a limited ability to farm a larger area of land. This is particularly true for tenant farmers who share agricultural returns with absentee landlords.²⁵ Here, poppy production is an unfortunate residual effect of the war. If this scenario correctly predicts actions, returning refugees will swell the already large tonnage of opium produced in Afghanistan.

A second scenario suggests that Afghans are staunch followers of Islam who are enjoined from growing poppy, abhor it, and at the earliest opportunity consistent with survival, will return to their pre-war production systems. If this

²⁵ Reports from surveyors with AfghanAid, a UK based PVO, in selected poppy-producing valleys in Nangarhar Province suggest that when tenant farmers rent land for a fixed price, they will grow poppy for its high income value. When output is shared on some percentage ration (e.g., the landlord takes 50 percent) the tenant is more likely to grow less valuable and less labor intensive crops than poppy.

scenario is correct, the return of the refugees will have only a marginal impact on poppy production. This is either a) because most refugee families will not return until there is sufficient rehabilitation to provide for basic non-poppy subsistence; or, b) if they do return and plant poppy on part of their land, rehabilitation of the agricultural infrastructure to pre-war levels will quickly eliminate their interest in opium production.

Both scenarios can be influenced by an A.I.D. narcotics awareness and control project, operating in refugee camps and within Afghanistan. The project defined in this document takes into account the dire situation of agriculture in Afghanistan, the potential for improving the understanding of refugees in Pakistan camps, and the prospects for improving agriculture infrastructure inside Afghanistan.

B. Constraints to Poppy Eradication in Afghanistan

1. The Continuing War

Although the last Soviet troops departed Afghanistan in February, 1989, the Mujahideen continue their fight against the Kabul regime, which fights back with the full support of Soviet military equipment and supplies. Major cities remain in the hands of the Kabul government, while most of the countryside is controlled by the Mujahideen. Highways that pass through government-held cities such as Kabul and Jalalabad continue to block the efficient movement of most commodities. The war continues for those in Afghanistan.

This results in three problems that constrain efforts to eradicate poppy. First, neither the PDPA government in Kabul, nor the Afghan Interim Government in Peshawar, has enforceable authority over actions taken in the countryside. This effectively eliminates the most obvious poppy eradication plan--an agreement with a committed central government which has muscle in the rural areas.

Second, the war limits enforcement based upon physical force to the confines of any individual commander's territory inside Afghanistan. The Mujahideen battle against the Kabul regime requires the full measure of coordination among the fighting groups. There is little capacity remaining to enlist multiple commanders in a jointly run enforcement campaign against poppy cultivation or drug smuggling.

Third, access to most areas is constrained both by transportation problems and by security concerns. U.S. personnel connected with the A.I.D. program cannot yet enter Afghanistan. Development planning as well as the implementation of rehabilitation programs are adversely affected by

long-distance direction and management. This limits the development benefits available to be exchanged for local agreements to end poppy cultivation.

2. Crop Substitution for Poppy Cultivation

Experience during the last thirty years in drug eradication programs has failed to discover a single alternative crop to replace poppy. No crop of all those tried and tested has been found which can give the same economic return to large numbers of farmers. Wholesale crop substitution can only be obtained when it goes hand-in-hand with enforcement.

There are a number of specialized high value crops which can duplicate income from poppy in small areas where the conditions are right. However, the huge profit levels in opium trafficking allow the traders to increase farm-gate prices as the supply falls. The economics of poppy cultivation negate the search for high return specialized crops available for large-scale applications, particularly for those recalcitrant poppy growers who are income maximizing and unmoved by any moral, ethical or religious argument.²⁶

Although there are no large-scale, universal substitutes for poppy, there are a number of crops which will grow under the same conditions and offer better-than-subsistence returns to farmers. Furthermore, some offer high returns to a sub-set of farmers with favorable growing conditions and market opportunities. But these crops are not likely to be identical between one valley and another. The equation to be solved is to identify the gap between existing and potential production in any one agricultural environment, while specifying the resources necessary to shift from the current to a future production base. This is an agricultural planning task that is clearly location specific. There are no Afghanistan-wide solutions to poppy substitution requirements.

Complete substitution of opium poppy in Afghanistan, at present levels of production, would require direct action on approximately 40,000 hectares and related activities on 200,000 hectares of adjacent farmland.²⁷ A successful substitution

²⁶ The question of scale is critical to this discussion. There are specialty crops used in medicine with returns that exceed those of poppy cultivation. The cultural demands of these crops, however, make them unsuitable replacements for the 40,000 hectares of poppy in Afghanistan.

²⁷ Based on the DEA production figure of 800 tons, and an assumed average yield of 10 kg/hectare. This estimate also assigns a 1:5 ratio to actual poppy land and adjacent high risk land that could come under poppy cultivation.

program requires access to the area, a supportive administration, prompt delivery of scheduled inputs and a high level of technical and administrative support.

These same requirements are being met under the ongoing rehabilitation effort under A.I.D.'s Agricultural Sector Support Project (ASSP). Correctly planned and managed, rehabilitation efforts that return rural Afghanistan to pre-war production levels can make a major impact on poppy production, particularly in non-traditional poppy-growing areas. This is especially true since one result of the war has been a labor shortage in rural areas that affects poppy cultivation, and slowed the tendency to increase opium production. New agricultural technology that is less labor intensive will find a ready audience among many poppy growers.

3. The Limited Education Base and Shortage of Skilled Technicians

Ignorance of the relationships between poppy cultivation and drug abuse, and between the economic returns from a poppy crop and strengthening the drug industry pervade rural Afghanistan. A lack of literacy, an absence of a world view, and the demands of living in a harsh environment, all make changing the cropping patterns of Afghan poppy farmers a more difficult challenge. In addition, there are few skilled agricultural technicians, a cadre always small but now decimated by the war and attendant brain drain to foreign countries. Thus, the rural population is less able to change, while change agents with new agricultural technology are few and far between. These constraints affect the pace of which new concepts can be introduced into rural Afghanistan.

4. Neighboring Country Drug Trade

Afghanistan's position in the regional drug trade depends directly upon Pakistan and Iran, and indirectly on Turkey and India for opium processing and open routes for transshipment. Efforts to achieve poppy eradication in Afghanistan could be upset easily by events in other countries in the distribution chain.

Already effective poppy eradication programs in Pakistan are resulting in increased cultivation in Afghanistan. The successful interdiction of processing laboratories in Pakistan could push laboratories as well inside Afghanistan and further entrench Afghan poppy interests.

These examples highlight the critical need for good contingency planning, effective monitoring/reporting, and, when possible, practical regional coordination. Anti-drug programs in the countries of the region will be most effective when concerted efforts are taken. But there are obvious limits to cooperation with Iran at this time.²⁸ A.I.D.'s contribution will need to focus on preventing and eliminating opium production in Afghanistan while supporting other U.S. government agencies in the completion of their regional coordination tasks, where possible.

C. Models of Successful Poppy Ban Enforcement and Substitution

1. The Search for Substitutes

Unless dictated by a religious or moral imperative, the voluntary elimination of opium poppy is dependent upon the economics of alternative crops. In remote rain fed land, no crop has proven equal to the return from poppy. In easily accessible irrigated lands, a number of crops can compete with poppy at today's prices. But opium gum responds to the laws of supply and demand. The holdouts who grow irrigated poppy when their neighbors accept substitutes (alternative crops), will find that the price rises and the returns on raw opium outperform the substitutes. The market rewards scarcity.

Efforts to find substitutes that match income from poppy in remote rain fed locations have continually failed, from the oft-told stories of red beans in Thailand, to proposals for wholesale saffron cultivation in the Gadoon area in Pakistan.²⁹ Income substitutes that are close approximations of the returns from irrigated poppy production, on the other hand, do exist at prices prevailing under conditions of "average" poppy production.

²⁸ But increasing drug traffic can lead to unanticipated results. The USSR has reportedly approached UNPDAC to assist in a drug prevention program to stop flows from Afghanistan from reaching the Soviet Union.

²⁹ In the mid-1960s, a U.N. program in North Thailand introduced a "solution" to poppy cultivation among the hill tribes. USAID furnished red bean seed. Soon, tons of red beans flooded a market where they were not a food choice of the local

Well managed fruit and nut production in Afghanistan could compete with the returns from poppy, if pre-war markets could be re-constituted.³⁰ Specialty crops such as licorice, cumin and caraway are other possibilities. As in any thoughtful agricultural development program, local conditions and production possibilities must be matched to market access. When this can be done, development programs and moral suasion may "encourage" entire irrigation command areas to eliminate poppy production.

2. The Requirements of Enforcement

To obtain success in eliminating poppy cultivation that is already underway, some counterbalancing force to the profit motive must be present. This countervailing power to the income maximizer acts as "enforcement." "Enforcement" to end or prevent poppy cultivation is anything that works that is not purely voluntary.

When the economic returns to substitutes for poppy are high, a show of force, or the announcement of the possibility of a show of force, will generally end production. This was the case in the fertile land irrigated by the lower Swat canal in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, where farmers grew poppy during the 1978-79 season. A new edict making poppy illegal and a few visits by government officials eliminated production. There was no poppy cultivation within major irrigation systems in Pakistan in 1981-82.³¹

Thais. Donors ended up with warehouses of unsold beans. There remains no alternative that can compete with opium on thousands of hectares of remote rainfed land. Truly high value crops are grown under conditions and cultural techniques not found among poppy cultivators.

³⁰ Based upon discussions with Dr. Wakil, horticulture advisor to the Agricultural Sector Support Project and previous Minister of Agriculture in former King Zahir Shah's government, apples can return 250-750,000 Afghanis/jeerib. Fruit production requires good transportation systems to ensure high returns. Opium gum is easily transportable, does not spoil, and can be stored.

³¹ Development Alternatives, Inc., "Recommendations for a Revised Narcotics Strategy for USAID/Pakistan", 1981, page 12.

When the local economy is poppy-based, and the alternatives are poor, major confrontations may result as military forces attempt to destroy what the population sees as the source of their survival. Clashes with the Gadoon farmers killed 13 villagers in 1986, with sufficient political backlash to halt the enforcement program for one full year.³² But government enforcement did continue, and in the absence of poppy, the economy of Gadoon can no longer support the labor base required for the opium harvest. Slow but significant emigration is reportedly taking place.

Enforcement may take avenues other than armed force. Sanctions can provide effective "enforcement" when the leadership, or the community, or a special subgroup, agrees to... take poppy-ending actions that are levied as requirements on members of the group or area. Sanctions may be as light as pressure to conform to community or religious standards, or to adhere to agreements made in exchange for development benefits. The key is to determine what sanctions will act as behavior modifiers for poppy cultivators. There are few answers for rural Afghanistan. The Project will conduct socio-economic research to increase knowledge of the sanctions that will provide enforcement power to help end poppy cultivation.

3. Enforcement and Substitution Models

Because there are no time-tested and documented poppy elimination programs in present-day Afghanistan, reference to poppy substitution programs in nearby NWFP are useful. In Pakistan, the following program strategies were used in poppy-based economies:

³² Reported by the technical assistance team which worked in USAID Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Area Development Project.

Figure 4

Poppy Substitution and Enforcement Strategies in Pakistan³³

<u>Program</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Development Resources</u>	<u>Enforcement</u>
NWFADP (Gadoon)	USAID	Heavy	Fixed Schedule
TADP/ Bajaur	USAID	Moderate	Poppy Ban
Buner	UNFDAC	Modest	Fixed Schedule (Loosely Implemented)
Dir	UNFDAC	Modest	Fixed Schedule (Loosely Implemented)
Malakand	NAU	Moderate	Fixed Schedule
Bajaur/ Mohmand	NAU	Modest	Fixed Schedule

All these programs had the support of the local government and enforcement agencies, perhaps somewhat analogous to Afghanistan's local commanders.³⁴ All had official legal sanction, somewhat analogous to religious sanction in Afghanistan. And all offered some development

³³ There are alternative categorizations of enforcement programs. NAU, for example, sees all of their programs, as well as UNFDAC's, as fixed schedule enforcement. The differences are whether development activities commence while poppy is still being grown, and the level of commitment to the enforcement schedule. USAID/Pakistan threatened and fully intended to withdraw all support to NWFADP if the enforcement schedule was not maintained. UNFDAC allows a much more flexible interpretation of enforcement schedules, as witnessed by the seven-year wait before enforcement occurred in Buner. NAU projects in Malakand, Bajaur, and Mohmand, if correctly interpreted, call for the elimination of poppy cultivation before development benefits begin.

³⁴ Any analogy between Pakistan and Afghanistan is fraught with the potential for misinterpretation. Even pre-war Afghanistan had far less central government control over outlying areas, and less efficient transportation networks compared to Pakistan during the 1980s. The war has greatly reduced what limited capacity existed in Afghanistan. Examples on Pakistan only show what can be accomplished under various strategies when enforcement is feasible.

benefits. As could be expected, the less governmental control over the area and/or the greater dependence upon poppy as the cash crop the more difficult is poppy eradication.

The implementing agencies had different agendas. USAID intended to undertake a development project, and to show real progress in infrastructure, educational access, health and agricultural improvements. The high project cost per acre of cultivated poppy reflected both the high concentration of poppy on the Gadoon mountain, and the developmental perspective of the donor.

USAID-supported NWFADP was negotiated at the Federal level, and contained carefully structured enforcement schedules and heavy, sophisticated development inputs. It serves as one of the successful and expensive models of local development combined with poppy eradication, but not, unfortunately, applicable to Afghanistan at this time.

UNFDAC supports projects that allow the local government to take enforcement action. Buner and Dir are locally directed programs that call for enforcement when the area has been "softened" by development benefits. When that time arrives, since the "fixed schedule" is often modified, the local authorities are expected to take forceful action to end poppy cultivation. This concept is based upon the illegality of poppy cultivation, which is tolerated only because of the poor circumstances of the local population, and the absence of government development inputs. When the inputs supplied by the poppy substitution program are deemed adequate by local officials, cultivation is stopped. In Buner this was six or seven years after the project began.

UNFDAC crop substitution programs do not offer a good model for Afghanistan. There is no local authority that has the permanence to make agreements to be honored six years in the future. Further, in Afghanistan there is not a legal structure that is being enforced by the actions of local authorities. This model is only applicable in established, law-based areas with government continuity. Rural Afghanistan, at present, does not qualify.

The Narcotics Affairs Unit (NAU) is the local arm of the International Narcotics Matters Office (INM) within the Department of State. After the demise of the Public Safety Program of A.I.D., INM assumed responsibility for providing funds, equipment and training to security forces detailed to work against narcotics. Their charter also extends to funding development benefits in direct exchange for an agreement not to grow poppy. NAU in Pakistan utilized a poppy ban enforcement agreement. That is, within the service area of the particular development benefits provided, local authorities negotiated an agreement with local leaders to ban poppy cultivation. NAU provided funding to pay for line department goods and services:

agricultural extension, fruit trees, irrigation structures, tube wells, etc. Each year benefits are designed to extend coverage and gain a further reduction of opium output. NAU has no development charter, and the most poppy ban for the least money outlay would be one way of characterizing their involvement in suppressing poppy cultivation.

NAU has a "no nonsense" approach to poppy elimination, but its application seems more appropriate for settled districts of Pakistan with its clear enforcement capacity than rural Afghanistan where the widespread presence of arms has sometimes turned local confrontations into pitched battles. The NAU program has now entered Pakistan's tribal areas in what will be a far more difficult environment. However, enforcement in Bajaur and Mohmand began last year in irrigated areas of Southern Mohmand and the main Khar Valley of Bajaur. Officials in these areas have expressed confidence about their ability this year to remain ahead of the negotiated enforcement schedule.

Afghanistan presents an even more difficult challenge for poppy elimination based upon the NAU poppy ban model, one that must be approached with some trepidation given the lack of a stable local authority, the concentration of high-tech arms, and the demonstrated willingness and ability to use them.³⁵

D. Solutions and Possibilities for Narcotics Awareness and Control in Afghanistan

In the absence of a central government in Afghanistan that has authority over poppy producing areas, there are four countervailing pressures that might be applied to reduce poppy cultivation:

- o Banning poppy cultivation through the military power of established commanders;
- o Banning poppy cultivation through the religious power of established religious leaders: maulavis, and mullahs;

³⁵ The absence of programs in Afghanistan of the Narcotics Activities Unit further constrains A.I.D. options. In 1982, the poppy elimination strategy of USAID/Pakistan was to leave the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) until later, concentrating instead on the Gadoon area. This was due in part to the tenuous government control of large areas of Bajaur and Mohmand. In 1989, after successful programs in NWFADP, USAID's strategy is to enter poppy cultivation portions of the FATA region after NAU programs obtain enforcement agreements with local officials. In Afghanistan, A.I.D. is assuming both substitution and enforcement encouragement (although not the application of force or support to enforcement units) until NAU can once again assume enforcement responsibilities.

- o Banning poppy cultivation through the peer pressure of the community (shura, jirga, etc.); and
- o Banning poppy cultivation by individual farmer agreement in exchange for retractable development benefits.

The four sanctions have differential impact on poppy growing areas depending upon whether the local economy is poppy-based or whether other crops predominate with only limited opium production. The following options might be profitably tested in Afghanistan:

- o For non-poppy-based local economies, trade modest development benefits for an end to cultivation, conditioned upon a poppy elimination plan negotiated with individuals or local leadership--commanders, shuras, and/or mullahs, Maulavis, etc.;
- o For poppy-based local economies, bring to bear all sanctions, military, religious, community and individual, through a negotiated poppy elimination plan which includes the introduction of a new or rehabilitated economic system to replace opium gum as the cash crop; and
- o In either situation, study the determinants of poppy cultivation and test the efficacy of military commanders, religious leaders, as well as other community leaders to seek special circumstances where more limited sanctions (and cost) will accomplish the desired objective.

III. PROJECT RATIONALE AND STRATEGY

A. Rationale

In spite of all the constraints to effective poppy eradication in Afghanistan, this is an appropriate time to begin a program of narcotics awareness and control. Six reasons support the importance of starting U.S. funding for this project before the establishment of a free central government in Kabul.

First, the demand for action against the drug trade from Afghanistan will not wait. This priority is established by the Administration and Congress with increasing intensity as our domestic drug problems capture headlines in every urban newspaper. With the departure of the Soviets, narcotics control has been added to the list of objectives of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. This is consistent with President Bush's new narcotics strategy which elevates narcotics control to a foreign policy priority.

Second, many refugees in camps in Pakistan are hoping to return in the near future. Those within the camps offer a unique target of opportunity for drug awareness. An appropriate campaign now, targeted at refugees, has the capacity to infuse a new understanding of the potential danger from involvement in drug production and use. Starting now, such a campaign could extend beyond merely reducing refugee involvement in new poppy cultivation to active participation in programs to eliminate already existing production.

Third, while drug use has been rare in rural Afghanistan, the travails of the war and the physical and psychological hardships of the refugee camps have greatly increased the number of Afghan abusers. In a situation similar to Pakistan, Afghanistan may have a major drug epidemic before the leadership understands the magnitude and seriousness of the problem. By acting now to publicize the issue of drug abuse and to show the direct linkage between production and use, a narcotics awareness program can crystalize action against an incipient drug epidemic and help prevent the occurrence of the human tragedies caused by addiction.

Fourth, there is a growing recognition among Afghans that narcotics related activities are contrary to the principles of Islam and a further threat to the morality and stability in an already traumatized Afghan society. Evidence that Afghans are prepared to address the narcotics problem is growing. A number of commanders met this summer specifically to discuss narcotics problems and resolved to lead their followers out of poppy cultivation if assistance could be provided to make other crops viable. Several commanders and local leaders (in addition to the commander in the Project Alpha area) have taken the initiative to approach A.I.D. for assistance in making alternative crop cultivation possible in their respective areas

of jurisdiction. In some instances, local authorities are reportedly beginning to ban poppy cultivation without the promise of outside assistance. A commander in the south of Afghanistan was reportedly successful at getting 400 mullahs in his and surrounding regions to condemn poppy cultivation as un-Islamic. In this positive environment, providing selected commanders and local leaders with resources to soften the economic losses from poppy elimination and strengthening the voice of those religious leaders who are willing to publicly condemn drug-related activities as un-Islamic, could help significantly reduce total opium production.

Fifth, there is and will continue to be great deprivation inside Afghanistan. The agricultural infrastructure of the country has been torn asunder. Entire communities that depend upon irrigation, agricultural inputs, and access to a market for survival have been forced to return to basic marginal subsistence, with the migration of millions of refugees. The end of the war will not return their productive capacity to its previous state. In this situation where little grows, many local leaders and farming communities will be willing to exchange marginal poppy cultivation for development benefits. The devastation has been so complete in some areas that even poppy-based economic systems are reportedly open to negotiating for development inputs in exchange for the adoption of a new economic base. There will be unique opportunities for rehabilitation and change over the next few years as the transitions already underway in the countryside occur. Correctly supported, these forces can be mobilized to assist in eliminating poppy cultivation.

Sixth, as an increasing number of donors provide growing amounts of funding for Afghanistan's rehabilitation, it is a propitious time to mobilize the donor community against narcotics. As the donors adopt a unified voice and philosophy on drug elimination, the impact on Afghanistan will be far greater than alternative approaches that allow commanders or communities to shop their needs to those with the least restrictive requirements for drug elimination. A coordinated approach from all cross-border donors can multiply the impact of A.I.D.'s contributions. It will make clear that all programs inside Afghanistan are governed by the requirement to deal directly with the growing drug problem.

B. Relationship to the A.I.D. Strategy

Early on, the mission recognized that the growing narcotics problem in Afghanistan had serious implications for the stability of the country as well as for the future relationship between Afghanistan and the United States. Acting on this recognition, the mission, in October 1987, proposed the following policy measures which were accepted by AID/W.

- the Agricultural Sector Support Project would not fund activities in areas where poppy is known to be cultivated;
- The resistance leaders would be made constantly aware of the USG's strong concern that the resistance do all it can to eradicate poppy production;
- A.I.D. would consider providing agriculture and rural development assistance in poppy producing areas, if commanders were willing to cooperate in eradication efforts; and
- A.I.D., with the assistance of other USG and GOP agencies, would attempt to identify commanders willing to cooperate.

Mission records document that all four measures have been carried out successfully. The most pro-active effort has been a poppy elimination pilot known as Project Alpha. Under Alpha, which was initiated in the fall of 1988 through the Commodity Export Program, A.I.D. responded to a direct request for assistance from a commander in a poppy growing area to support the commander's campaign to curtail poppy production in several districts in his area. Reporting on the success of Project Alpha in late spring 1989, the commander said that he had been very satisfied with the results. He asserted that there have been no poppy harvested in areas under his control. Poppy that had been planted had been cut down or, when mines were a danger (some of the areas, at times, were under Kabul control), eaten by goats.

Monitoring reports from ASSP staff and other sources confirmed that the Alpha commander had indeed been able to effect a reduction of poppy cultivation in his area of control. Success was greatest in the commander's immediate district but there was also limited success in the contiguous areas. Project Alpha demonstrates the ability of committed and well respected local authorities to eradicate poppy cultivation in areas under their jurisdiction with what this particular commander characterized as a combination of "anger and mercy."

In early 1989, AID/W approved the mission's Interim Narcotics Strategy for Afghanistan. This strategy endorsed and expanded on the October 1987 measures. Cooperation with the resistance, local authorities, the Government of Pakistan, and the United Nations was identified as critical and it was agreed that the reach of A.I.D. support should be extended to awareness as well as rural development activities.

The NACP is the logical next step in this deliberate, evolutionary process. It fits easily into the mission's overall program strategy of supporting rehabilitation in Afghanistan and promoting the establishment of a cohesive national government. NACP will be closely coordinated with activities implemented under the mission's sectoral projects and, in some instances, there may be jointly supported activities. For example, the

Education Sector Support Project may help set up a primary school at a NACP site, or the NACP may assist the ESSP in the preparation of anti-narcotics messages for primary school and adult education textbooks. The Commodity Export Program will also, to the extent objectives of the two projects coincide, support the implementation of the NACP. Already it has enabled the project to initiate Project Alpha. The CEP will also be used to support the Afghan Media Resource Center with the establishment of a Narcotics Awareness Unit prior to the authorization of the NACP. Both Alpha and the AMRC activity are pre-implimentation initiatives that will facilitate the early start-up of the NACP.

On a much broader level, the project will take positive steps toward satisfying U.S. policy on narcotics even before a free government has been reestablished in Kabul. It directly addresses the Congressional mandate to use A.I.D. funding in those countries where narcotics sanctions are in force, using the informal as well as quasi-government entities available in present-day Afghanistan. It should also allow A.I.D. to provide programmatic details that justify the certification of effective actions toward narcotics control required by Congress.

The project will directly support the "International Initiatives" component of President Bush's recently announced anti-narcotics strategy. The opening paragraph of the component states:

The source of the most dangerous drugs threatening our nation is principally international. Few foreign threats are more costly to the U.S. economy. None does more damage to our national values and institutions or destroys more American lives. While most international threats are potential, the damage and violence caused by the drug trade are actual and pervasive. Drugs are a major threat to our national security.

The international initiatives component goes on to say that we cannot expect to counter the drug threat effectively "without supporting and being supported by other nations....Only through broad, cooperative international efforts can we reduce the foreign drug supply to our country while motivating other nations to assist us in our drug control efforts and combat the drug menace themselves."

The NACP is a direct attempt to motivate the people of another nation to fully recognize the moral and social consequences associated with the high prevalence of narcotics and to help them to make the shift away from poppy cultivation.

C. Interim, Quasi-Government and Donor Community Involvement

This project is designed to influence both representatives of the Afghan people in local, regional or national forums, and

those members of the international donor community providing assistance to Afghanistan, providing input to their policies and encouraging actions that support narcotics awareness and control. Although many individual leaders of the Afghan resistance movement have expressed their position on drug involvement, and some international organizations have specific programs aimed at poppy production and narcotics awareness, this subject does not yet pervade all actions in support of a free Afghanistan. The Narcotics Awareness and Control Project intends to change the ground rules for assistance funding in Afghanistan.

The AIG or its successors presents a special case where awareness of the problem and policy change must come about sequentially. Since the AIG has limited ability to make happen what it directs, edicts and proclamations without teeth--fatwahs that will not be followed--further reduce its power to lead a diverse coalition of Afghans. Instead, A.I.D. support will allow those leaders who come forward in their support of drug elimination to increase their visibility and base of support through campaigns directed at awareness, and specific programs for development. Ministries, regional leaders, and willing commanders within the resistance will be approached to sponsor portions of the project's activities, and to take credit for successful development initiatives that reduce and eliminate poppy cultivation. This will strengthen the position of those in consonance with U.S. policy on narcotics issues, and move the entire leadership of the resistance closer to the desired policy framework.

The project may work cooperatively with UNPDAC and specific PVOs, possibly AfghanAid, Mercy Corps, and Save the Children, that have begun to generate drug awareness and elimination programs. This includes the potential for joint funding of agreed sub-projects and the joint generation of policies for the U.S., UN, ACBAR, SWABAC, and Islamic donors and organizations supporting Afghanistan rehabilitation. In addition to establishing a coordinated relationship with the donor and implementing agency community, the Narcotics Awareness and Control Project will seek to directly influence field actions and programs in support of the project's goals and objectives.

V. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

A. Project Goals

Within the difficult environment of war-torn Afghanistan, the goals of the Narcotics Awareness and Control Project are to:

- o reduce narcotics production in Afghanistan and thereby reduce trafficking; and
- o prepare solid groundwork for an anti-narcotics program based and directed from inside Afghanistan.

B. Project Purposes

Conditioned by the realities of present-day Afghanistan, the purposes of the Narcotics Awareness and Control Project are to:

- o increase awareness of the destructive influences of drug involvement upon society's moral fiber among the leadership and population of free Afghanistan;
- o coalesce the leadership of the resistance movement, the donor community, and the organizations implementing assistance programs into launching and maintaining an effective anti-narcotics program;
- o test and demonstrate viable methods of matching development benefits and rehabilitation assistance to the elimination of poppy cultivation;
- o reduce existing poppy cultivation while preventing new production, within the limits of the constraints extant in rural Afghanistan; and
- o acquire a better understanding of the socio-economic factors contributing to poppy cultivation and trade, in order to positively influence the other purposes.

Movement toward these ambitious objectives must be judged within the context of the political, military, economic and social conditions pervading Afghanistan at this time. There are no easy answers, but equally important, there is good justification to proceed. The project has an opportunity to move against each target. However, the timing and magnitude of forward movement may well be in the hands of forces and conditions external to the direction and management of the project.

C. Project Components

The Narcotics Awareness and Control Project defines a process that takes advantage of what the circumstances within Afghanistan will allow, and what A.I.D.'s mandate allows it to deliver. Since there are no well-defined paths to follow, the project will proceed to build upon early initiatives, pilots and tests to find larger-scale solutions and achieve the project's goals and purposes. There are three project components: A) Narcotics Awareness; B) Poppy Elimination; and C) Information and Research. One contractor will be selected to manage the implementation of all three components. Detailed implementation plans can be found in Section VI.

1. Narcotics Awareness

i. Theme Targeting and Media Avenues

The awareness component targets the leadership of the resistance movement both inside and outside Afghanistan (commanders, political party leaders, Interim Government officials, etc.); the molders of Islamic behavior (mullahs, maulavis); the population that is within, or soon will be within, resistance areas (mujahideen, refugees, farmers, etc.); and the donor community. The objective of the awareness component is to fulfill the first two project purposes.

Media avenues will include radio, film and video, written educational material for children, written materials for the literate, carefully presented pictures, posters and displays for the illiterate, and scripts for teams travelling inside Afghanistan.³⁶ Themes will include: the social tragedy of drug addiction; its impact on family life; and the corrupting influence of the drug trade, linking the dangers of addiction to the cultivation of poppy and the production of opium. Two separate avenues will be developed for themes, one targeted at the users, the other aimed at the growers and potential growers.

ii. Theme Generation

Narcotics awareness themes will be generated by a combination of project-sponsored specialists in drug abuse communications, and Afghan organizations with special skills and

³⁶ Posters in support of de-mining operations, warning of the danger of mines, had the unfortunate effect of convincing teenage children to locate and dig up mines, resulting in serious injury. The posters were withdrawn. Afghan society is more oral than visual, and posters or pictures must be generated with care and tested to ensure that the intended message is correctly conveyed.

interests in media presentations. The project will also draw upon the resources made available by the ANE Bureau's Narcotics Education Project, and special programs sponsored by the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB), the latter will be considered for possible adaptation.

The project will also complement and support the planned activities of other organizations involved with heightening narcotics awareness. UNFDAC/Peshawar has an emerging program for narcotics awareness among Afghanistan refugees living in Pakistan that includes specialist consultant skills in theme generation. The Afghan Media Resource Center will provide video and film footage of drug abuse among Afghans, and will be able to provide radio scripts with some assistance from communications consultants. Horizon, a local PVO working in Peshawar, will organize drug awareness teams to visit refugee camps.³⁷ The Education Sector Support Project, implemented by UNO, has begun work on educational themes applicable to primary school children in their programs inside Afghanistan, using material developed for Pakistan.

With several new activities presently being initiated, the need for a coordinated, professionally implemented theme generation capacity is obvious. The project will furnish the specialists required and assist Afghan organizations to contribute to this endeavor.

iii. Theme Delivery

The project will support the delivery of themes in the following ways:

- o to all Afghans, through religious prescriptions delivered from mosques, at madrassas, and in Islamic meetings;
- o to refugees living in camps through teams that communicate drug abuse dangers;
- o to Afghans inside Afghanistan, through radio, print and poster media, and travelling teams with video/film;
- o to school children, through education materials passed to teachers;
- o to mujahideen through literacy programs and health clinics;

³⁷ Horizon is a Pakistani NGO based in Peshawar, led by Dr. Khaled Mufti, which has a network of social workers in refugee camps working on anti-drug abuse programs.

- o to tanzeem and interim and regional government leaders through personal visits, newsletters and print media; and
- o to the donor community through personal visits, newsletters and print media, and organizational involvement in drug awareness campaigns.

2. Eliminating Poppy Cultivation

Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan can be loosely broken down into two categories: low intensity and high intensity. Low intensity areas are, for the most part, those in which cultivation is a recent phenomenon, triggered by conditions resulting from the war. Traditional poppy growing areas with minor acreage dedicated to poppy can also be categorized as low intensity. In these areas of marginal contamination, rehabilitation to a level approximating the pre-war economy - coupled with effective local enforcement - can prevent further, and eliminate existing, poppy cultivation.

High intensity areas are those in which the economy of the area is largely dependent upon the cultivation of poppy and has been so over a long period of time. The reduction and eventual eradication of poppy cultivation in high intensity areas requires a program that is fundamentally different from the approach taken in the low intensity areas. The income which was previously generated from the poppy crop has to be at least partially replaced. Consequently, a search for new technology and production possibilities is necessary to determine high value crops that more closely approximate the income from poppy.

Most of the activities sponsored under this component will take place in low intensity areas. High intensity areas will be eligible for support in those instances in which special conditions exist that are exceptionally conducive to successful poppy eradication. All activities will be viewed as pilot efforts and will be monitored carefully for lessons that can be applied to subsequent activities.

1. Site Selection

A program which links the supply of inputs to poppy farmers with agreements to reduce and stop production can only work in situations in which there are strong community authorities committed to poppy elimination and limited pressures from external forces to grow poppy. Given the Mission's intention to take advantage of targets of opportunity and the pilot nature of the project (which is driven by a desire to learn what works in different situations) flexibility in selecting schemes will be critical. Consequently, while the following selection criteria have been developed, they should be considered illustrative at this point.

- a local authority (e.g., a military commander, a tribal or religious leader, or a shura) with the will and the ability to enforce a poppy ban exists;
- the area is not a traditional or high intensity poppy growing area or, if it is, exceptional circumstances exist which make poppy elimination a strong possibility;
- the area is in great need of development inputs including irrigation, agricultural input assistance, housing, etc.;
- there are no drug lords that control production and distribution in close proximity;
- there are no processing laboratories operating in the area;
- there is no monopoly buyer of the opium output; after harvest the opium is transported for sale by the individual farmers;
- there is no futures market, i.e., drug traders do not enter into buying agreements with the farmers before the crop is planted; and
- there is no assistance being provided by A.I.D. or other donors to nearby sites under different terms and conditions that could jeopardize the success of either activity unless it is assured that the differences can be ameliorated or are inconsequential.

ii. Poppy Elimination Plans

Once a site has been selected, poppy elimination plans will be negotiated with the local authorities and/or with the participating population³⁸. The plans will vary from situation to situation but all will contain two essential elements: a timetable by which elimination will be achieved and a timetable by which assistance will be provided. Given the long-term nature of

³⁸ In Project Alpha, no direct link was made between poppy elimination and the provision of assistance; thus, negotiations were held only with the local commander. A PVO activity being implemented by Afghanaid has required each farmer in a participating area to sign an agreement to not grow poppy. The different approaches are each appropriate to the particular situation.

successful poppy elimination activities, all project sites will, to the extent possible, be selected by August 1990 so that three year timetables can be developed. These timetables will be adjusted, if and as needed, on an annual basis.

The poppy elimination timetable could call for total elimination in the first year or it could permit phased elimination. The timetable dealing with the provision of assistance will identify when, what, and how assistance will be delivered. Most of the assistance will be of an agricultural nature, e.g., agriculture inputs and/or irrigation rehabilitation. However, education, health, and other types of assistance might also be made available if there is a strong demand in the community and the promise and delivery of these interventions will contribute to poppy elimination.

Provision of assistance will be phased so that in the first year of implementation, assistance packages will avoid providing anything that would facilitate poppy cultivation. In Project Alpha, for example, first year assistance consisted of wheat seed, wheat threshers, tractors, and food. After an area has met the terms of its agreement in the first year of support and proven its commitment to poppy elimination, it will become eligible for other types of support the following years.

Most of the poppy plans will seek to return areas to their pre-war agricultural status, promoting the cultivation of wheat, fruit trees, grapes and/or vegetables. The project, in very limited instances, will experiment with the cultivation of higher value crops, such as cumin, caraway and licorice. Prior to introducing these higher value crops, the project will conduct research on the agricultural conditions and the technical expertise that are prerequisites to successful cultivation and on the international demand and local marketing links that are prerequisites to successful commercialization.

One issue to be examined on a site-by-site basis is the extent to which assistance will be subsidized. It is anticipated that participants will make annual contributions of increasing in-kind or financial support to whatever assistance is provided in order to facilitate an eventual weaning from the project.

iii. Enforcement

Experience around the world has demonstrated that poppy elimination projects cannot be successful in the absence of actual enforcement or the on-going threat of enforcement. This project does not have the advantage of a powerful central government that is capable of shifting the current ratio of profit to risk to the point at which the risks outweigh the profits. It will, however, be working at the local, not the national, level. At the local level, there are leaders who clearly perceive the corrupting influence of poppy cultivation

and who are prepared to take action against it in situations in which alternative sources of income can be made available. Given their proximity to the problem and the often absolute control they hold in their areas of influence, these leaders have the ability to enforce agreed upon poppy bans, probably with more effectiveness than any central government in Afghanistan has ever been able to muster. The project itself will not provide local leaders with the training or physical means of enforcement, but by making alternatives to poppy cultivation possible, the project will legitimize the enforcement local leaders already have the capability to exercise.

In some instances enforcement by the local authority could be physical, i.e., the plowing under of poppy fields planted contrary to agreements and possible punishment of the violator. In many instances, however, the enforcement will be social. While Afghans are well known for their fierce independence, it is primarily independence from outside domination. As is true in most rural and tribal societies, pressure to conform to local mores is strong. Project objectives are furthered to the extent that poppy cultivation can be defined in the minds of the people as un-Islamic and counter to the life style of good Muslims. It has been reported time and again that in many regions of Afghanistan this basic belief is already in place but has been set aside because the war-generated destruction of the agricultural sector has left many farmers with no choice but to grow poppy for their economic survival. Islam has the flexibility to permit followers to eat pork if the situation is desperate and no other food is available. Likewise, if no other means of economic support is possible, poppy cultivation becomes a tolerated activity. However, the cultivation of poppy (and the consumption of pork) lose their acceptability once the situation corrects itself and conditions are conducive to proper Islamic behavior.

This project hopes to take advantage of this belief and of the decentralized nature of authority in Afghanistan. The project leans heavily on the "carrot" approach of changing behavior with the termination of assistance the only "stick" at the project's direct disposal.

3. Information and Research

The final component of the Narcotics Awareness and Control Project will support the creation of an Information and Research Office with four responsibilities. This office will:

- o collate information from inside Afghanistan on the success of poppy elimination plans; provide design guidance to organizations engaged in cross-border assistance, and assist the donor community to implement a consistent narcotics policy;

- o provide economic, agricultural, and commercial research on high value crops;
- o commission socio-economic research on the determinants of poppy cultivation; and
- o prepare for future anti-narcotics operations managed from within Afghanistan.

The details of these four sub-components are described below:

i. Monitoring and Evaluation: Improving Ongoing Programs

One important responsibility of the Information and Research Office will be to monitor and evaluate all anti-drug programs to distill lessons that will be valuable for future sub-project activities. In this regard, the Office will collect information to judge success of ongoing poppy elimination plans and programs. Utilizing reporting from its own field staff as well as from the MAP component of the ASSP and from cooperating donor organizations and regional field offices, the Information and Research Office will determine which pilot tests are successful, which have failed, and the factors which contributed to the successes and the failures. By extracting the variables that determine success and failures second generation improvements can be made, based upon knowledge that was not available as the pilot tests were first funded. Lessons learned through the ongoing monitoring and evaluation effort will be disseminated to other organizations involved in anti-narcotics programs. Likewise, the office will reach out to these organizations to gather further information on their experiences with design and implementation. It will build on the relationships established to ensure that all donors are acting in a complementary and coordinated manner.

ii. High Value Crop Research

Within the wide range of micro-environments in Afghanistan there are a gamut of second stage technology options available as substitutes for opium poppy. Once initial first-stage agricultural programs have been established and major infrastructure repairs completed, then, at selected sites within any particular project area, there will be opportunities to introduce new commercial agricultural practices. These could range from spices and oilseed crops through fruits and vegetables to specialty drug plants. Although these are only solutions for a subset of the total area, they will allow the generation of higher incomes by certain farmers with a subsequent multiplier effect on the whole economy.

All of these potential crops have been tested at some point, and this relevant information is freely available. In Pakistan, for instance, the Agricultural Development Bank has been testing and evaluating specialty crops. They usually require a higher level of husbandry than the common field crops such as wheat and maize, but this is counterbalanced by the higher returns. The major problems in producing these alternatives have usually been marketing rather than agronomic ones.

Therefore, marketing arrangements should begin the search for new technologies--there must be an established marketing channel at prices that provide high returns to farmers. The more esoteric crops will need initial technical assistance in developing markets. The project will commission feasibility and marketing studies on likely new substitutes.

Once the market demand has been determined, the agronomic introduction of one or more of these new crops can be carried out on a small-scale pilot basis. An initial survey to evaluate the situation on the ground, followed by a few trials and then an extension team can work with selected farmers to develop the production system. In many ways, these single crop extension programs are easier than having general agronomic responsibility for all crops. Training can be focused, and specific extension aids can be produced and fine tuned. The farmers are also frequently more open to training, as they tend not to have any preconceptions on how to grow the crop.

The NAU in Pakistan has put together a number of cropping patterns for the Tribal Agencies based on rotations of cereals with high value vegetables such as potatoes, tomatoes and onions. Similar rotations can be used in the same conditions over the border in the adjacent provinces, and new rotations for the other areas can be developed. Cereals are retained in the rotation to produce fodder from the straw for animals.

Concurrently with the development of the new crop opportunities and the existing crop base, there will be opportunities to establish perennial crops in some of the project areas. The reestablishment of Afghanistan's liquorice industry could be one goal of commercialized agricultural development. In 1987, whole liquorice root was selling for 40-50 cents/lb in New York.³⁹ In pre-war

³⁹ International Trade Centre UNCTAD/GATT, "Market Brief: Liquorice Root".

days, Kandahar was the big export center and shipped 14,500 metric tons in 1974.⁴⁰ Cumin is another specialty crop which has a high value/weight ratio like opium gum with potential for Badakshan. It was grown in the Helmand crop substitution projects in the 70's.

Over a period of 5-10 years, the fruit and nut crops can be restored to pre-war levels. They have always been important export crops and their potential farmgate income is high.⁴¹ Some rehabilitation of the existing orchards will be required, combined with replanting and new plantings in suitable areas. There is a general need for tree planting activities of all kinds in many areas of Afghanistan. This is traditionally a very popular activity.⁴²

Once the pilot projects are up and underway, effort could be put into developing a larger program of research and testing which could be responsible for evaluating further options. These options could be used in the future as part of an expanded program. With forethought, it should also be possible to design these development efforts in such a way that they could become the forerunner of a new field agricultural research capacity for Afghanistan.

iii. Socio-Economic Research on Narcotics in Afghanistan

Three major subjects will be studied by the project to learn how to plan better programs that eliminate poppy production. The first will be information on the effectiveness of drug awareness campaigns, essentially sampling the targets of the various media themes identified in the first component of the project, and then determining how to improve the presentation to influence desired behavior. The second will be on the determinants of the decision to grow poppy: the importance of religious, economic, social, financial, land tenure, credit and security considerations that impact upon a farm family,

40 Amin & Schliz, *ibid.*

41 See Appendix D for details of fruit and nut growing areas in Afghanistan.

42 In the Gadoon project, even at the height of the confrontation in 1987, when all the other activities had shut down, farmers were will arriving at the project office to collect trees for the spring planting.

community, and/or leadership.⁴³ The third will be on the determinants of poppy elimination once engaged in cultivation: which development benefits (education, health, agricultural, roads, irrigation) singularly or in combination have the most impact in which particular situations upon the decision to stop production by the family, community, and/or leadership. Other relevant research will also be financed; for example, whether or not cannabis has determinants of production and marketing similar to poppy.

This socio-economic research requires the capturing of attitudes and depends for authenticity upon sophisticated sampling and survey techniques, if the decisions are indeed individual, or sophisticated institutional analysis if the decisions are imposed. At this time there are judged to be no organizations in Afghanistan or Peshawar that could undertake these studies without significant technical assistance, training and review of the raw data findings. Given the conditions inside Afghanistan, the first stage studies should be conducted in refugee camps, to include those visitors who have just returned from inside, to increase the sample of those with recent knowledge of conditions there.

The project will provide the framework for the studies to be undertaken and use specialists to create the specific research subprojects and assist in the implementation. A decision will be made early into project implementation whether the project should commission research from an organization with international capacity, or assist some yet-to-be-determined Afghan organization or agency to build the capacity necessary to undertake the socio-economic research tasks.

iv. Preparing for Future Narcotics Operations within Afghanistan

The Narcotics Awareness and Control Project anticipates the future establishment of increasingly formal control of area within Afghanistan by resistance forces. This would allow two significant changes to the project. First, enforcement activities could be shared between local authorities

⁴³ Poppy cultivation may not, in many instances, be an independent decision by individual farm units. Rather, it may be a response to a larger set of pressures, for example, from opium purchasers who, with or without the agreement of the commander or commanders of the area, purchase the crop before it is planted and provide credit to farmers without alternative agricultural inputs for non-poppy crops. In these instances, the locus of decision power must be determined before attitudinal research is conducted at the inappropriate level in the decision-making chain.

and the more regionalized or centrally established authority. Second, the Department of State's Narcotics Affairs Unit, which is an active participant in anti-narcotics programs in Pakistan, could be chartered for Afghanistan, allowing some of the components of the project to be shifted to their responsibility.

All activities undertaken in support of the Narcotics Awareness and Control Project will have applicability to a revitalized agriculture program in a consolidated government. Project managers will be ever aware of this and guide the evaluation of the project so as to facilitate the eventual absorption of anti-narcotics activities into the government structure.

VI. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

A. Implementation Plan

1. Project Phasing

The Narcotics Awareness and Control Project must move forward with all deliberate speed to generate actions that have no proven precedents in present day Afghanistan. Consequently, the Project will be divided into two phases. Only the first will be funded under this AAM. The second will be described and authorized as an amendment to this AAM or as a new AAM.

The implementation strategy for the first phase is to attack the narcotics problem in Afghanistan through many different paths, testing, trying and carefully evaluating the results. These early initiatives will be distilled for the lessons and successes that will make up the larger and more definitive second phase of the project. The first phase of the project is planned for 42 months. This will permit time for the competitive selection of the contractor and three full years of implementation.

Bringing Afghans into the process of designing implementation strategies will be critical to the success of the project. NACP must be an Afghan-supported initiative, through whatever Afghan organizations can be mobilized. This incorporation will start by assisting fledgling organizations and interested individuals establish the capacity to contribute to drug awareness and control in Afghanistan.

2. Narcotics Awareness Implementation

i. Building Afghan Capacity

There is not at present an Afghan organization that can define the targeting and media avenues, generate the themes and the presentations, and organize and manage the implementation of the various awareness approaches to the target audiences. Building this capacity will need to be a part of the early stages of the project.

The most obvious candidate for institutional strengthening is AMRC. The Center has trained professionals who could, after exposure to narcotics awareness issues, develop messages for radio, video, print/picture/poster, and direct script (for traveling teams) media. The Director of the Center is keenly interested in the possibility of developing this new capacity, and believes he is ready to begin operations. Supported through the project contractor, and assisted by short-term specialists in drug awareness media, AMRC could become a major contributor to a narcotics awareness campaign.

The Afghan organizations created under the mission education and health projects provide two other opportunities to prepare and disseminate anti-narcotics materials. Thought has already been given to including such materials in the textbooks and health program and the NACP will support this effort. Support could also possibly be provided to compliment UNFDAC and USIS efforts as both are interested in sponsoring awareness activities among refugees and inside Afghanistan. UNFDAC has already employed the Pakistani NGO, Horizon, to begin a pilot communication effort.

ii. Building Awareness In the Refugee Camps

Living in or attached to camps in Pakistan are an estimated two to three million Afghan refugees. The present concentration of Afghans, soon to be scattered throughout the countryside, presents an unprecedented opportunity for a drug education and awareness campaign.

Within the camps there is also a growing problem of drug abuse. A cohort of adolescents have grown up in the camps under difficult conditions, without knowledge of traditional Afghan culture and society. Many of these young males have no agricultural experience and limited employment opportunities. They are now turning in increasing numbers to easily accessible drugs. Heroin addiction is an escalating Afghan problem. A census of the number of Afghan heroin addicts in hospitals and jails in NWFP showed an increase from 29 in 1984, to 374 in the year ending June 1989. In 1989, 81 percent of the addicts were unmarried, and all but 3 were males.⁴⁴

There are some comparisons with the situation in recent years in Pakistan. There is now a national consensus that drug abuse among Pakistanis is a growing, near epidemic problem. However, in the time that it has taken to reach that consensus, hundreds of thousands of additional Pakistanis became drug abusers. For Afghans, newly exposed to this narcotic, there is the opportunity to defeat the drug momentum before it reaches epidemic levels. This is the first objective of the narcotics awareness component targeted at refugees.

⁴⁴ Dr. Khalid a Mufti, "Problem Statement", UN/Pakistan Programme for drug abuse control.

There is the additional potential to link the dangers of drug abuse to the production of poppy. As the internal dangers of drug abuse can be related to the internal production of opium, additional pressure can be brought to bear on poppy cultivation.

A program of preventative education will be needed, one that incorporates the right message, and presents it in the right media. The target population is mainly functionally illiterate and its level of visual literacy is low. The use of correct cultural cues and the skillful use of the religious prohibition on intoxicants to produce a simple effective message will require knowledgeable consultants working with Afghan organizations dedicated to spreading the anti-narcotics message.

There is a strong ethnic community and political structure in the camps which is available for spreading information. It should also be possible to tie into and use the religious networks, and incorporate and support existing community efforts to address the problem of drugs in Afghan society. Other agencies are prepared to lead this initiative. A.I.D. can provide guidance and will consider funding as opportunities present themselves.

iii. Current Initiatives

USIS, in conjunction with the Afghan Media Resource Center, is in the process of producing a film on the problems of Afghan drug abuse. This will include portions filmed locally by AMRC and will be produced professionally in Washington. It focuses on the international problem of drugs, and includes shots of crop substitution programs in Thailand. The Afghan footage will mainly be of addicts, their families and their treatment in the Lady Reading Hospital, Peshawar.

In a separate activity, UNFDAC is gearing up to support a pilot program to provide drug awareness to refugee camps. Two camps have been selected, and UNFDAC has sponsored a seminar and created a steering committee and working group for this effort. An Appendix provides the details of the UNFDAC program and the potential for A.I.D. involvement.

iv. Building Awareness within Afghanistan

There are six avenues that can be used to build awareness of the narcotics problem inside Afghanistan. Each of the six will involve Afghan organizations that, with assistance, will develop the targeting, themes and delivery vehicles for a narcotics awareness program.

- o religious instructions from mosques and in Islamic meetings: NACP contacts
- o print, poster, and video: AMRC

- o radio (BBC, VOA, Radio Pakistan, and Free Afghanistan): AMRC
- o primary school curriculum materials and mujahideen literacy programs: ESSP, AMRC
- o health worker training programs: HSSP, AMRC
- o travelling narcotics awareness teams: AMRC

For the travelling narcotics awareness teams two Afghan doctors associated with the Afghan Psychiatric Center (APC) and the Khyber Teaching Hospital (KTH), who are particularly interested in the drug abuse awareness problem, have suggested the inclusion of a doctor or health professional along with the narcotics specialist to attract Afghan audiences.⁴⁵ They have offered their support in the training of teams to publicize the growing threat of drug addiction inside Afghanistan, and the links between cultivation and consumption. It might also be useful to involve a local religious leader in the program presentation. The final composition of the team and its operating techniques should be the product of discussions with local Afghan doctors and social welfare workers, AIG personnel, and other technicians active in, or aware of drug abuse prevention and/or poppy cultivation elimination activities. Different areas could require a different mix of expertise.

The mobile teams will also report information to the project headquarters which may be useful in identifying opportunities for future poppy elimination activities. After testing for team composition and theme relevance, four teams will be recruited, trained and launched during the first year of the project.

v. Building Awareness Within the Donor Community and Afghan Leadership

Narcotic awareness campaigns for refugee camps and inside Afghanistan are essential but they will need reinforcement to be successful. The magnitude of their impact will depend upon gaining the full support of the AIG, tanzeems, regional leaders, as well as with donors: UN agencies, international NGOs, GOP entities, and others working with Afghans

⁴⁵ On the other hand, a mobile video camera and carefully selected presentations may be all the service attraction needed to command an audience in rural Afghanistan. NACP will test the mobile team composition prior to training and equipping the initial four units.

whether in the camps or cross-border. There must be an exhibited commitment on the part of all the players in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan. The impact of this project, directly hinges upon the Afghan perception of how seriously the assistance community treats the narcotics issue.

The donor community needs to be mobilized on the Afghan narcotics issue. The message will be that responsible aid for rehabilitation should not support, directly or indirectly, poppy cultivation. Some positive actions are already underway. The Mission has an approved narcotics strategy, and the Embassy has established an interagency Afghan Narcotics Working Group. UNFDAC has recently established a field office in Peshawar, and the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghanistan Reconstruction (ACBAR) has reviewed the issue in some depth at sub-committee and steering committee meetings, and adopted a policy to guide their field activities.⁴⁵ The UNDP has sponsored a poppy clause, and inserted it into their guidelines for NGOs applying for grants. This process of increasing narcotics awareness needs to be accelerated. The Narcotics Awareness and Control Project will support coordinated donor action against narcotics production and help define and establish priorities for donor involvement.

The project will arrange and conduct workshops and conferences, providing a forum for the international community to discuss the issues and the impact that opium has on the rehabilitation and development of Afghanistan. The project will also, in cooperation with UNFDAC, undertake other activities on a smaller scale to convince agencies to adopt and enforce appropriate narcotics elimination strategies. With similar objectives, the project will also sponsor workshops, seminars, and conferences geared toward audiences of Afghan leaders and opinion shapers.

The project will publish, in association with UNFDAC, a bulletin which examines the issue through educational material and actual case studies. This bulletin will be specifically aimed at the assistance community as well as AIG and other Afghan agencies. Finally, the project will stimulate the creation of a narcotics task force made up of involved donors and Afghans to ensure coordination and planning of relevant activities.

46 See the Appendix on PVO and UN poppy policies and programs.

3. Poppy Elimination

Poppy elimination activities will be implemented through several mechanisms. Most will be implemented through a poppy elimination unit established by the project contractor. The project will also have the authority to make grants to PVOs that are implementing anti-narcotics activities that are consistent with the project. The NACP may, on occasion, draw from the Afghan capabilities available through other projects in the Mission portfolio. Finally, there may be opportunities to involve the private sector.

i. Project-Supported Poppy Elimination Unit

The project contractor will establish a poppy elimination unit of Afghan agricultural extension specialists and agricultural engineers. Since it is expected that no more than seven to eight poppy elimination activities will be implemented by the unit in the first phase of the project, the unit should require a professional Afghan staff of less than fifteen persons. The project contractor will be responsible for upgrading the technical skills of the staff; training the staff to develop and negotiate poppy elimination agreements; and assisting the staff to organize itself into a functioning unit.

ii. PVO-Supported Poppy Elimination Activities

PVOs will be invited to submit proposals for A.I.D. support under the project. PVO proposals will be reviewed by a committee chaired by the mission project manager of the NACP and consisting of the project managers of the Rural Assistance Project and the ASSP, the Chief of Party of the NACP contract team, and the senior Afghan in the NACP's poppy elimination unit. The committee will review and recommend approval/disapproval of each proposal. Should the committee be unable to reach agreement on a particular proposal, the A.I.D. Representative will review the arguments and make a final decision. Grants will be made directly by the Mission.

The NACP contractor, through its poppy elimination unit, will provide technical support to PVO grantees as appropriate and, in all instances, monitor the performance of PVOs.

iii. Portfolio-Wide Supported Poppy Elimination Activities

On occasion, the NACP may draw from Afghan capabilities available through other projects in the mission portfolio. For instance, teachers trained under the ESSP or

health care workers trained under HSSP may be posted at an NACP site if requested. Support could also be requested from the ASSP; for example, technical advice from an ASSP-employed monitor who might be visiting a nearby site. In most instances, the cost of support provided by the other projects will be minimal and will be borne by the project providing the support. Support of a more significant level would be reviewed by Mission personnel to determine cost responsibility.

The NACP will likewise facilitate the inclusion of anti-narcotics messages in the outreach programs of the other projects, i.e., textbooks developed by ESSP; radio and other extension programs established by ASSP; and health programs sponsored by HSSP.

iv. The Private Sector

Although it is not yet assured, there is a possibility that a private sector firm may be willing to assist farmers make the switch from poppy to licorice cultivation by providing agricultural extension assistance and farm to market support. If the crop feasibility studies determine that licorice is a viable crop alternative and an appropriate arrangement with the firm can be reached, the mission would like to be in a position to support the initiative.

4. Information and Research

The sub-components that make up the Information and Research component depend critically upon the availability of prime contractor staff, who design programs to be carried out by field staff of NACP or by sub-contractors. The Monitoring and Evaluation component will be managed by a small cadre trained to collect and analyze field information on the success of all anti-narcotics programs. Since there have been no programs completed in the present environment, there is much to learn. The Monitoring and Evaluation unit will make certain the lessons learned are made available to Afghan leadership and the assistance community, as well as to project managers.

Commercializing second stage agricultural technology will call for the completion of feasibility studies on selected crops--particularly their pricing and marketing arrangements--and field testing the agronomic possibilities. The expatriate agriculturalist will manage this effort, with short-term expertise in the various specialty crops considered for introduction in Afghanistan drawn from Afghan, Pakistani, and international consultants.

The conduct of socio-economic research on narcotics issues will also improve the project over the long run. Unfortunately, there are no Afghan organizations presently deemed capable of performing this task. The capacity will have to be developed over time--building on small sub-contracts with technical assistance to improve Afghan skills--or sub-contracted to

organizations that already have this capacity. A contractor will complete the design of the required outputs from the studies and, with A.I.D., determine whether to build upon existing organizations or bring in new capacity. The first studies on awareness, economic and non-economic determinants of poppy cultivation will be ready for implementation within approximately six months after the beginning of project implementation.

B. Project Administration

The Mission has designated a direct hire Special Projects Officer who will spend half to three quarters time on the NACP. The Special Projects Officer will receive technical support from the Mission's agricultural and other staff. The project will be responsive to general guidance from the Narcotics Coordinating Working Group representing the entire U.S. Mission to Afghanistan.

The role of the Afghan Interim Government, or its successors, remains to be determined. The Narcotics Awareness and Control Project can be folded into the AIG, as are some components of the health program, or run independently as are the agricultural cross-border operations, or adopt some middle ground. In this period of political and military instability, it is hard to specify the implementation modalities that will be appropriate when the prime contractor is selected and in place. At that time however, A.I.D. will determine the appropriate degree of integration and make that policy decision clear to the selected contractor.

The Government of Pakistan remains a very interested player in providing support to Afghanistan. Previous close linkages to a non-traditional A.I.D. counterpart in Pakistan accounted for cross-border operations that proceeded with little difficulty. It is not possible to tell, at this time, the most appropriate roles that GOP personnel will play, nor the exact organization that will be given the oversight responsibility for anti-narcotics programs for Afghanistan, if any. If the prior GOP organization remains involved, then there should be fewer organizational difficulties. This coordination linkage is a responsibility of the Mission, and will be determined within the context of the entire U.S. Government program for Afghanistan.

C. Procurement Plan

1. Project Contractor

The Mission will prepare a request for proposal (RFP) to be issued immediately upon AID/W approval of the project. The RFP will be open to the private sector, voluntary agencies, universities, other institutions, or partnerships of any of these organizations. The contractor must demonstrate an ability to implement the project as described and fill the following positions with qualified individuals.

Long Term Technical Assistance

<u>Position</u>	<u>Responsibilities</u>	<u>Person Months</u>
Chief of Party	Overall Program Management; Specific responsibility for component three, Information and Research	33
Agriculturalist	Specific Responsibility for component two, Poppy Elimination	33
Communications Specialist	Specific responsibility for component one, Narcotics Awareness Campaign	33
Financial/Admin- istrative Officer	Responsible for maintaining financial records and setting up and administering office.	33

Illustrative
Short Term Support

<u>Expertise</u>	<u>Purpose</u>	<u>Person Months</u>
Social Science Support	Assist chief of party with design and execution of socio-economic studies, and monitoring and evaluation	15
Crop Specialists	Assist chief of party with identification of various cash crops and contractor's resident agriculturalist in training poppy elimination unit staff	10
Crop Commercial-ization Support	Assist chief of party with development of market plans for specialty crops	10
Engineering Support	Assist contractor's resident agriculturalist train poppy elimination unit staff	15
Communications Support	Assist contractor's resident communications specialist enhance capabilities of ANRC and train mobile awareness units	10
Administrative Support	Assist chief of party and contractor's resident financial and administrative officer with management and administration	5
Computer Support	Assist in the automation of information covered under component three	5
		—
		70

Local Staff To Be Supported
Under Contract

<u>Position</u>	<u>Responsibilities</u>	<u>Person Months</u>
Agriculturalists	Staff of Poppy Elimination Unit	210
Engineers	Staff of Poppy Elimination Unit	210
Monitors	Program accountability	180
Analysts	Evaluation and Analysis	90
Communications	Liaison with AMRC and supervision of media teams	60
Media Teams	Heightening narcotics awareness	198
Support . . .	Accountants, Secretaries, drivers, security, char force	360
	TOTAL	<u>1308</u>

2. Commodity Procurement

Commodities, equipment and supplies for the Narcotics Awareness and Control Project will be procured by the Mission's procurement agent under the Commodity Export Program. This channel was used to procure the supplies for Project Alpha, and is the vehicle of choice for all Mission project procurement. Arrangement for the delivery of commodities inside Afghanistan will be the responsibility of the NACP staff.

D. Implementation Schedule

1. A.I.D. Documentation

<u>Task</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Date</u>
1. Complete AAM	Mission	Oct 89
2. Approve AAM	AID/W	Nov 89
3. Authorize AAM	Mission	Nov 89
4. Prepare specifications for contractor or contractors	Mission	Nov 89
5. Release RFP	Mission	Nov 89
6. Award contract	Mission	March 90
7. Review progress	Mission	Quarterly
8. First Evaluation	Mission	June 91
9. Evaluation/Redesign	Mission	Sept 92
10. Amend or submit new AAM	Mission	Jan 93
11. Project Activities Completion Date	Mission/Contractor	March 93

2. Narcotics Awareness Component

<u>Task</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Date</u>
1. Strengthening AMRC	Contractor	Intensive May-Oct 90; on-going thereafter
2. Prepare radio scripts	Contractor working with AMRC	Jun-Dec 90
3. Prepare primary school curriculum	Contractor working with UNO	Jun-Dec 90
4. Prepare literacy messages	Contractor working with UNO	Jun-Dec 90
5. Prepare health worker messages	Contractor working with MSH	Jun-Dec 90
6. Begin narcotics newsletters	Contractor	May 90

- | | | |
|---|-------------|------------|
| 7. Hold donor workshops | Contractor | June 90- |
| 8. Launch media teams into Afghanistan | Contractor/ | Jul-Dec 90 |
| 9. Discuss component progress with contractor | Mission | On-going |

3. Poppy Elimination Component

<u>Task</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Date</u>
1. Begin recruiting and training component field staff.	Contractor	Mar 90
2. Identify project sites and counterparts	Contractor in consultation with Mission	May 90
3. Begin review of PVO proposals	Mission	May 90
4. Develop poppy elimination plans	Contractor	May-June 90
5. Award PVO grants	Mission	June 90
6. Begin delivery of inputs to project sites	Contractor	July 90
7. Provide agricultural and engineering assistance to project sites	Contractor	begin June 90
8. Discuss monitoring and evaluation reports with Research and Information Unit	Contractor	begin Sept 90
9. Discuss component progress with contractor	Mission	on-going
10. Update poppy elimination plans	Contractor	April-June 1991

4. Information and Research Component

<u>Task</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Date</u>
1. Begin recruiting and training component staff	Contractor	May 90
2. Establish research agenda for high value crops	Contractor	May 90
3. Establish research agenda for socio-economic studies; determine how socio-economic studies can be conducted.	Contractor	May 90
4. Begin planning monitoring and evaluation activities	Contractor	June 90
5. Initiate feasibility studies for high value crops	Contractor	June 90
6. Deploy monitors		Aug 90
7. Initiate socio-economic studies	Contractor	Aug 90
8. Discuss monitoring and evaluation reports with poppy elimination unit and with Mission	Contractor	begin Sept. 90
9. Discuss component progress with contractor	Mission	on-going

VII. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Field aspects of the first two components of the project, Narcotics Awareness and Poppy Elimination, will be monitored on a continuous basis by Afghan staff trained under the third component of the project, Research and Information. The contractor will submit quarterly reports to the Mission which will report on the monitors' assessments of on-going field activities as well as provide the contractor's assessment of overall project performance, describe the project's cumulative and quarterly progress against pre-stated objectives, and discuss near and long-term future objectives. Given the number of activities that will be supported and the number of organizations that will be involved in the project, the monitoring effort and the quarterly reports will be carefully designed so that A.I.D. can track progress on all fronts.

An evaluation is set for 18 months into project implementation to assess project performance and to recommend mid-course adjustments in modes of implementation. It will measure project success in strengthening Afghan capabilities to implement awareness, elimination, and research activities and assess the impact of each of the three project components. A second evaluation, which will provide the basis on which the second phase of the project will be designed, will take place 36 months into project implementation. Both evaluations will include AID/W representation, in addition to independent consultants with experience and expertise in narcotics awareness control projects.

VIII FINANCIAL PLAN

It is difficult to provide an accurate estimate of project costs until specific project sites are selected and the narcotics awareness campaign is more fully developed. Another complicating factor is the ever-changing situation inside Afghanistan. Transportation costs are largely dependent on road and security conditions and these conditions are not always constant. Consequently, the attached budget is notional. It is based on experiences in financing activities under the Mission's other projects. Experience with the area rehabilitation schemes under ASSP was especially useful.

A \$3.5 million obligation is planned for FY 1990. The majority of these funds will be obligated some time around March 1990 to the institutional contractor selected to help implement the project. The obligated funds will finance a full year of technical assistance support (to enable the contractor to make appropriate commitments to staff) and the anticipated local support and program costs through December 1990. Other FY 90 project funds will be obligated through grants to non-profit organizations. Remaining FY 90 funds will be retained by the O/AID/Rep for expenditure on logistical support for the contractor. Subsequent obligations of \$5 million and \$4 million are planned for FYs 1991 and 1992 respectively. Following is a summary of the methods of financing:

Operating Costs of the Contractor: All technical assistance operating costs will be recovered by the contractor on a cost reimbursement basis pursuant to the terms of the contract.

Commodities and Program Costs of the Contractor: The contractor shall pay for all commodities procured from the U.S. and third countries through A.I.D. letters of commitment or with cash advances as determined by the A.I.D. Representative. Commodities and other items procured locally will be paid in cash or rupee checks using advances authorized by the A.I.D. Representative. The contractor will enter into arrangements with the CEP contractor who will undertake the procurement.

Contractor Logistic Support Costs: All funds budgeted for logistic support will be retained by the Mission for direct disbursement.

PVO Grant Costs: The mission will advance funds for the costs of approved PVO activities in accordance with A.I.D. rules and regulations.

Funds are available in the contingency line item to audit the project.

Estimated Budget

<u>Category</u>	<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Technical Assistance Costs</u>		5,494,412
Long Term ⁴⁷		
-- Recurrent Costs of 132 Pm @ \$27,097/Pu	3,576,804	
-- One Time Costs for Four LT contractors	517,608	
Short Term		
-- 70 Pm @ \$20,000/pm	1,400,000	
<u>Local Staff Costs</u>		227,355
Awareness Unit		
-- 60 Pm of professional staff @\$260/pu	15,600	
-- 198 pm of media teams @\$285/pm	56,430	
Poppy Elimination Unit		
-- 105 pm of professional agriculturalists and engineers @\$285/pm	29,925	
-- 315 pm of Agriculturalist and engineer technicians @\$120/pm	37,800	
Information & Research Unit		
-- 180 pm of monitors @\$190/pm	34,200	
-- 90 pm of analysts @\$ 260/pm	23,400	
Project Support Staff	30,000	
<u>Program Costs</u>		6,425,000
Development, Production, and Distribution of Awareness Materials	1,000,000	
Contract Supported Poppy Elimination Schemes		
--7 schemes x \$175,000/scheme/year x 3 years	3,675,000	
PVO supported Poppy Elimination schemes	750,000	
Research and Information	1,000,000	
<u>Contingency</u>		353,233
	TOTAL	\$12,500,000

⁴⁷ These figures are based on information found in the USAID/PAKISTAN document: "Financial Guidelines and Standard Cost Estimates."

PROJECTED EXPENDITURES

C A T E G O R Y	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93	T O T A L
	(NOV 89 - SEPT 90)	(OCT 90 - SEPT 91)	(OCT 91 - SEPT 92)	(SEPT 92 - MAR 93)	
CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS					
Technical Assistance	1,046,550	1,700,656	1,700,656	1,046,550	5,494,412
Local Staff Costs	25,000	70,355	85,000	47,000	227,355
Narcotics Awareness	100,000	300,000	400,000	200,000	1,000,000
Poppy Elimination	350,000	875,000	1,400,000	1,050,000	3,675,000
Research and Information	75,000	250,000	400,000	275,000	1,000,000
Contingency	25,233	100,000	150,000	78,000	353,233
GRANT OBLIGATIONS	100,000	175,000	325,000	150,000	750,000
T O T A L	1,721,783	3,471,011	4,460,656	2,846,550	12,500,000

Activity Approval Memorandum Afghanistan

Narcotics Awareness and Control Project

ANNEXES

A.I.D. Representative for Afghanistan

Status Report

On

PROJECT ALPHA

Project Alpha is a pilot narcotics control program, conducted under the Commodity Export Program (CEP). Initiated in the fall of 1988, as the result of a direct request for assistance from a Mujahideen commander in Nangarhar Province, it involves the supply of food and agricultural commodities to support his efforts to curtail poppy growing in his area.

From November 1988 through March 1989, farm implements (two tractors, two ploughs, two trailers, and two cultivators) and 600 metric tons of wheat, 46,788 kilograms of sugar, and 104,000 kilograms of ghee were provided, plus two threshers in June, 1989, for a total value of \$159,264. The goods were delivered from Peshawar to the commander's warehouse in the tribal agency adjacent to Nangarhar, and from there the commander provided his own transportation into Afghanistan and made distribution throughout the subdivisions involved in Alpha. Originally it had been hoped to use much of the wheat as seed, but because of difficulties starting the project, the wheat arrived after the main planting season and thus only about 5 percent was used as seed. The rest was milled for consumption.

Reporting on the success of Project Alpha in late spring, 1989, the commander said that he was very satisfied with the results. He asserted that there had been no poppy production in areas under his control. (Some had been planted in areas then under Kabul regime control, but this had been cut down, or eaten by goats where mines were a danger. There is, of course, other farmland in the subdivisions not under his control.) He noted that he had not wanted to link distribution of assistance too closely to poppy eradication because if he did, the people would make a direct connection and he would be in the business of paying them not to grow poppy every year. It is his view that growing poppy is wrong. That is what he tells his people as well as saying they should not grow it. Then, when the people behave correctly, he tells them there are others concerned about their needs and are willing to help by supplying food and other assistance. He said what works best is a combination of "mercy and anger;" he supplies the anger and A.I.D. supplies the mercy.

The commander said he would like to continue Project Alpha and enlarge it, expanding the type of assistance offered as well as the area included. Although there had been no Americans or other independent monitors who had gone inside Afghanistan to verify the 1989 results of Project Alpha, we had no reason to doubt the commander's claims and other information available supported what he had told us. We were prepared to consider continuing Project Alpha. In order to independently examine results of the commander's poppy ban, and plan further assistance and possible expansion of the project, O/AID/REP asked the contract organization working in agriculture, VITA, to send an assessment team to the area in mid-September.

few specific facts on the district came out of the September 21 oral assessment from the VITA team, such as population and former levels of poppy production, but the team did assert that overall opium production was less this year than last. The team concurred that there had been no poppy production in areas directly under the commander's control, but there remained some growing and harvesting of opium in adjoining areas less subject to his influence. The team's evaluation was that the commander has acted wisely, moving carefully by keeping the source of the assistance secret. He had not made himself a target for his enemies.

The VITA team said that it was worthwhile to continue pilot Project Alpha, involving the strong, local shura which includes the commander, in the development of a poppy elimination plan. The plan would involve more tractors, provision of fertilizer and seeds, and possible development of better roads and irrigations facilities, such as intake structures. These could be apportioned through the shura, with charges to users. The estimated number of jihrebs which would come under the plan is 50,000.

O,AID,REP requested \$200,000 from FY'89 fall-out funds to continue and slightly expand Project Alpha through the opium growing season of late October, 1989 through May, 1990. Washington was unable to meet this request but the mission was able to identify funds in the Commodity Export Program. The larger Narcotics Awareness and Control Project now being developed will probably not be operational until early 1990, and would miss this fall's planting season. When it becomes operational, it will absorb Project Alpha.

Planning and agreement with the commander and shura remain to be worked out. This must include a poppy elimination agreement, the quantities of seed and fertilizer to be supplied, plus tractors, as well as how they will be distributed. Quantities and delivery of food supplies will also have to be negotiated. Monitoring and supervision of the project will have to be an integral part of the plan. Because planting is carried out in the Project Alpha area around November, all of this will need to be accomplished in October.

The project offers both opportunities and problems. It came into being because of a request and not from O,AID,REP seeking out a specific area in which to work. Information about the area has been imprecise, which has made it difficult to assess the relative cost of Project Alpha. It appears relatively expensive however, and probably non-replicable in its current form. Nevertheless, it was a beginning with a good chance of success in an area close to the Pakistan border where transportation and contact were feasible. Given the reputation of the commander, confidence in his ability to deliver resources and enforce the poppy ban appeared justified. Project Alpha has also set an example — that the USG is serious about eliminating poppy production and is willing to work with and assist those interested in working with us. Moreover, it has provided many of the empirical insights necessary for the drafting of this AAM. There remains one organizational problem with respect to any follow an activity, however A.I.D.'s non-traditional GOP counterparts for the entire cross border program were at first unwilling to cooperate on Project Alpha. Knowing their assistance to be critical for moving commodities

through sensitive tribal areas, the mission was persistent and eventually brought them around. There seems to be good GOP receptivity for joint cooperation at this time, given high level review and approval of the concepts in this document.

Appendix B

Licorice and other specialty crops

In an opium substitution project which attempts to introduce high value crops for replace part of the existing opium production, there are a number of general steps that need to be taken.

Phase I consists of pre-feasibility and feasibility studies. The project staff with the support of short term TA with specific expertise in agronomy, marketing, and processing should:

- o Identify suitable locations for the crop substitution efforts;
- o Select a number of potential crops for that area; and
- o Conduct an initial technical and financial feasibility study.

The best crops identified through this process are taken into phase II, which consists of field testing and further studies. During this phase the project staff need to:

- o Collect suitable planting material;
- o Set up field production trials to test varieties and cultural practices;
- o Develop harvesting and packing techniques; and
- o Test market the product.

Phase II ends with a summary technical report on the best available techniques and processes, and a detailed financial analysis of the viability of the crop. This is concluded with a recommendation as to whether the crop should be developed further or abandoned.

The recommendation to proceed should include details of the scale of the production required, the major constraints to and technical requirements of production, market information including the standards and grades demanded and the private sector linkages that are to be used, and describe any further studies that are necessary to develop further the processing side of the crops including the use of by-products.

Phase III is full commercialization, this should be left to the private sector, and A.I.D.'s role should be confined to initial technical advice during the start up, and occasional help with pilot studies in processing and market economics.

A potential pilot study

The mission has been approached by Sheikh Amjad Rashid, Managing director and Chief Executive of International Multi Foods Ltd, Karachi. He has discussed with the agronomist on the ST design team the possibility of developing licorice production and processing as a substitute income source to replace poppy.

He is willing to assist a ST team with local support and information while they are preparing an economic and technical feasibility study on specialty crops for Afghanistan. A Phase I study would take 3 months and require 4 full time people. Two agronomists, one a Afghan, the other an expatriate with international production and marketing experience in specialty crops, a Pakistani food technologist/processing expert and an expatriate economist/small business specialist. The main focus of the feasibility study could be licorice, but saffron, mushrooms, cumin, and lemongrass should also be examined. A complete list can be drawn up by the ST team. Directing the team at a number of crops will maximize its utility and increase the likelihood of finding a successful opium substitute. Also much of the information that will be collected during a feasibility study, e.g. the transport arrangements, is non-crop specific and common to whatever is grown in a particular area.

Assuming a suitable crop is found, the NACP crop substitution project could provide the expertise required for phase II. The farmers could be trained in the agronomy, the post harvest technology and the grading and packing. Local businessmen in Afghanistan could be encouraged and assisted to store and transport the products to the border with Pakistan. Multi Foods has indicated that they are prepared to enter into one year contracts, for indefinite quantities of licorice, with a three month guaranteed price, (fob the Pakistan border), based on the world market price.

Following a successful one year pilot production and marketing trial, a Phase III project moving into large scale production and with increased emphasis on processing could be considered.

APPENDIX C

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

From: FY 90 To: FY 91
Date Prepared: 22 Aug. 1989

Project Title: Narcotics Awareness & Control Project

Total USG Funding: _____

NARRATIVE STATEMENT / PROGRAM OR SECTOR GOAL	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS / GOAL	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS / GOAL
Accelerate the rehabilitation of Afghanistan's agricultural sector through the reduction of narcotics production and trafficking.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Elimination or reduction of poppy cultivation in areas of project activity -Rehabilitated agricultural economies, not based on poppy cultivation, in areas of project activity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Monitoring by other USA agencies -AID/REP project reports. -Project evaluations -Field observations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The security situation in Afghanistan does not further deteriorate, making access impossible -Local demand and need for relief and development activities remains high
PROJECT PURPOSE	END OF PROJECT STATUS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION/ PURPOSE & OUTPUTS	ASSUMPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING PURPOSE AND OUTPUTS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Increase awareness of the negative influence of narcotics on Afghanistan among all Afghans -Catalyze the establishment and implementation of a strong anti narcotics strategy within the existing relief and development community -Eliminate poppy cultivation in project activity areas, while testing alternative tactics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Adoption of anti narcotics position by Afghans at all levels of society -Poppy cultivation is reduced in other non AID/REP project areas through enforcement of non negotiable poppy clauses -Project activity areas converted to productive non poppy dependent economies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Data available from project's monitoring and evaluation unit -Project evaluations -AID/REP project reports -Field observations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Cooperation with local Afghan farmers and regional authorities is possible -Other relief/dev. agencies share negative sentiments about narcotics but lack knowledge about what their role might be -Project advisors can identify and manage the delivery of viable assistance packages perceived as useful and valuable by locals -Availability of qualified Afghan technicians to work as project staff and to serve as sub-contractors in the implementation of the awareness campaign
OUTPUTS	NATURE OF OUTPUTS		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Multi media awareness campaign implemented -Unified drug policy adopted by foreign agencies -Existing AID/REP projects begin anti drug action -Participation in UNFICM planned awareness prog. -Health/awareness teams active cross border -Poppy Elimination Plans implemented in ANS's -PEP's implemented in opium economy areas with intensive agricultural and other development inputs effectively made -PEP's implemented in opium economy areas with scattered inputs necessary to satisfy local perceived needs only -Monitoring and evaluation unit gathered and analyzed field and office data so as to allow innovative planning for follow on activities -Research done on local socio-economic drug issues -Commercial and technical sector studied 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Radio spots, visuals, jingles and presentations -ACDME, UNFICM, and UN agencies adopt strategies -AID/REP projects implement anti drug themes -Refugees in camps exposed to awareness program -Local villages covered by health/awareness teams -14 -4 -4 -18 proposed PEP's developed -Reports issued -New or improved commercial initiatives tried 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Awareness program sub-contractor will effectively stimulate and utilize the area coverage of the existing AID/REP contractors, including those projects with a meaningful anti drug message -UNFICM also assumes a significant leadership role in mobilizing relief/dev. community support -Mass media resources are available
INPUTS	IMPLEMENTATION TARGETS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION/ INPUTS	ASSUMPTIONS FOR PROVIDING INPUTS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Long and short term TA -Local project staff -Vehicles, computers, and other required equipment necessary to implement the project -Agricultural commodities and materials -Construction materials and equipment -Local manpower -Staff salaries and operating expenses -Land for construction activities -Private trucks for hire 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -See implementation schedule, commodity and technical assistance plans in the project paper 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -AID/REP project records -Project evaluations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -AID/REP and UNFICM proposed funding for these activities is authorized, obligated, earned, committed and disbursed in a timely manner -All activities are undertaken in accordance with agreements made between the project and the local beneficiaries -Construction is undertaken according to agreed upon standards and practices and is approved for payment -No major detrimental changes to the agricultural environment occur

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

73

Appendix D

Agricultural Overview: Afghanistan
Based on Amin & Shilz, 1976.

Afghanistan is divided into a large number of climatic regions and altitudes, with much of the land uncultivated mountains and plains. The country has its highest elevations in the north-east in the Pamir region, with an altitude of 4,000-7,000 metres, from the north-east region running south-west is the Hindu Kush, which divides the country into north and south. The northern side of this range is drier and from it a loess plateau slopes away to the Kara Kum desert. Three quarters of the land area particularly the central and eastern portions are dominated by the Hindu Kush range and associated smaller ranges. Particularly in the eastern portion, narrow valleys and steep rugged peaks are common. In the south and west the land slopes away to a desert region lying 500-1,000 metres above sea level.

The country has three main water sheds, only one of which drains to the sea, via the Kabul, which flows to the Indus. The rivers which flow north, like the Amudarya; and those which flow towards the Iranian plateau, like the Helmand lose themselves in the Iranian and Central Asian deserts and salt lakes. Agriculture derives much of its water from the mountains and this snow melt produces high water levels in the spring and early summer, (March-June) during the rest of the year the flows reduce or disappear, with the minimum flows usually occurring in September.

With the land frequently mountainous and the rainfall low, agriculture is dominated by irrigation from the snowmelt in the rivers and streams, with smaller areas irrigated by karez systems which tap the underground drainage. The fields are along the valley bottoms or the alluvial fans at the junction of the hills and the plateaus are utilized, particularly in the northern provinces. The extent of the area irrigated is limited by the amount of snow melt and rain in the river that year.

After dividing the country into three catchments; the Amu with 1,213,000 irrigated ha, the Indus with 524,000 irrigated ha and the Seistan with 847,000 ha, the ADB in 1971 estimated the source of the irrigation water in each of the regions. Rivers provided 78.6% of the total irrigation water, springs 14.1%, karezes 6% and wells 1.2%. The pre war estimates showed that the less populated west and north had a higher number of irrigated jeribs per head than the less well served, as well as more highly populated east.

Karezes are found mainly in the band of alluvial soils which bounds the south-western edge of the mountains, and irrigated 123,000 ha in the Seistan basin, 38,000 ha in the Indus and only 7,000 ha in the Amu basin in 1971. The horizontal tunnel of a karez taps back into the alluvial fan and emerges on the plain below. It is built and maintained from vertical shafts which may occur at intervals of c. 20 metres, the deepest of these shafts may be 30-80 metres deep and the length of the horizontal system can vary from several hundred metres to several kilometers. The flows are seasonal and seepage losses can be high. The annual maintenance of the karez is usually divided among the community depending on their allocation of water.

The altitude, climate and availability of rainfall/irrigation restrict the crops possible. In the central and northeastern areas, the cold winters and short growing season restrict the cropping, whilst in the warmer southern areas, two to three crops are possible, but water is frequently the limiting

factor. Much of the major investment in irrigation in Afghanistan has been into the large irrigation systems in the Helmand, Nangarhar and Sardah.

The climate is dry continental, with wet winters and dry summers, and extremes abound. Altitude and topography dominate the climate, and so even though they are on the same parallel, the length of the growing season in Jalalabad is 315 days, in Kabul 210 days and in Herat 228 days. Much of north eastern and central Afghanistan lies above 2,400 metres, (eg. Badakshan) and has long winters, (up to six months). In the zone around Kabul, at an altitude of 1,300-2,4000 meters, the climate is temperate, and there are four well marked seasons, with annual rainfall from 300 to 400 mm. (Eg. the provinces of Kabul, Ghazni, Katawaz, lower Badakshan and the lower Kunar). Between 900-1300 metres the summers become warmer and the rainfall falls to less than 200 mm, (eg. Kandahar, part of Ghor and parts of Herat) Moving south and eastward the altitude falls to below 900 metres and rainfall drops off to less than 100 mm. The area of the lower Kabul river is unusual in its combination of low altitude and higher rainfall, eg 172 mm at Jalalabad. Helmand province although further south has a growing season 1-3 weeks later than Nangarhar, which can grow citrus and bananas.

Elevation is the single most important factor affecting the rainfall and the length of the growing season, whilst orographic factors provide monsoonal moisture on the east and southern slopes of Paktia and Kunar from the summer monsoon, which controls the forest growth in this area. Over much of the rest of the country the humid period is longer in the north and that is the slope on which trees are found in the wetter portions of the central and northern areas. The rainfall in Afghanistan is very variable as is common in the semi-arid climates.

A pre war estimate based on a figure of 7.8 million ha of cultivated land suggested that 2.5 million ha were barani, 5.3 million ha had irrigation facilities and of these only 2.5 million ha had regular annual irrigations. The 68% of the cultivated area that was irrigated produced 80-85% of the crop products. On the barani land the most important crop was wheat, which grew on c. 1 million ha, and produced 21% of the total wheat crop.

Wheat and to a smaller extent barley are the only significant barani crops. Wheat is grown from 300-3,000 metres and occupied c.75% of the total cultivated area in 1971, and c. 90% of the area under food crops, or 2.3 million ha, with an average yield of 900-950 kg/ha. The total production of wheat is strongly influenced by climate as c. 50% of the area is barani. The barani yield is 500 kg/ha or less and the irrigated yield 1300 kg/ha or more.

Irrigated corn is the second most important crop, with c. 500,000 ha grown in summer 1971 and yields of 1.3-1.7 tons/ha. Barley is the third major crop of the country grown for winter livestock feed, under irrigated conditions, alongside wheat. The area in 1971 was 350,000 ha and yields were c. 1.1 tons/ha. Rice is grown on a limited scale in those areas warm enough and provided with enough water. Laghman, Kunar and Nangarhar all produce rice.

Prior to the war, the areas in the north and west produced a surplus of food grains which was supplied to the deficit areas in the southeast and east. Part of the reason for the deficit in the east was the higher population density in these areas.

Fruit has always been important in the economy of Afghanistan, producing much of the foreign exchange. A wide range of fruits are grown. At the

higher altitudes are found mulberries, almonds and cherries; pomegranates, grapes and walnuts are found at the intermediate levels and citrus and bananas at the lower levels. Pistachio, olives, apricots, dates, and melons are also grown. The occasionally severe winters can cause severe damage to the fruit crop. Grapes are important with raisins for export formerly produced in the provinces of Herat, Kandahar, Kabul and Parwan. Citrus and olive were produced in Nangahar around Jalalabad. Pomegranates came from Parwan, Kandahar, Nangarhar and Samangan. Apricots are found throughout much of Afghanistan, but Kabul and Kandahar are the important centers, much of the crop is dried and exported, as are the almonds produced in Kandahar, Zabul, Baghlan, Kunduz, Balkh, and Herat. Most apple varieties require a chilling period during the winter and the major production areas are in Badakshan, Kabul, Parwan, Kandahar, and Samangan. The development of low chilling varieties will allow the expansion of the commercial crop to new areas. The province of Badakshan produces the bulk of the walnut crop.

Around the urban centers a range of vegetable crops are produced. Commercial production of potatoes and onions is important in Kabul, Wardak, Bamyan, Ghazni, and Logar. Before the war a large proportion of the crop was exported to Pakistan. It remains to be seen whether the development of the commercial crops in the Punjab and NWFP has closed or reduced these markets

Sugar and cotton are the two important industrial crops. Cotton has been encouraged by the government due to its high requirement for labour and its multiplier effect on the economy, to develop the textile, oil and soap industries. Kunduz/Baghlan/Takhar and Samangan produced about half of Afghanistan's crop pre-war, Balkh/Jawzjan/Faryab produced c. 30% and Herat and Badghis 10%. Sugar from both beet and cane is produced in Afghanistan. Baghlan is the big beet center, whilst Nangahar and Laghman produce cane.

The vegetation is that of the semi-desert or steppe, it is only along the eastern border with Pakistan on the southern side of the Hindu Kush that forests are found. Livestock production is based on nomad herding and transhumance, with winter pasture on the southern plains, and c. 30 million hectares are pasture of some sort. The extent of the southern pasturage depends on the rains and in the wetter years even dry farming is possible.

Soils of Afghanistan from Dr Kerry Connor

Deforestation (less than 4 percent of Afghanistan is forested) and relief have combined to produce considerable erosion in many parts of Afghanistan. The resulting runoff has left many areas with no topsoil at all. Major soil types by area include:

- sands the along the Amu Darya in northwestern Afghanistan and in most of southern Kandahar and parts of southern Helmand,
- high mountain desert steppe soils all along the Hindu Kush range from the northeast (Wakhan/Badakshan) southwest through the center of the Central Highlands,
- high mountain meadow steppe soils in a belt surrounding the high mountain desert steppe soils,
- mountain brown forest soils along the Pak/Afghan border in Paktya and northern Paktika as well as in northern Kunar (parts of Nuristan) and Laghman,

- mountain dark serozems in scattered areas of the southern parts of the northern provinces, in the Central Highlands, Kabul province, most of Logar and northern Ghazni provinces, and diagonal belts reaching into the western provinces of Herat and Farah,
- mountain light serozems in thin belts along the northern Helmand in the Central Highlands and along the Hari Rud in western Herat province,
- light serozems and brown semidesert soils in a belt along the Pakistan border in Kandahar province, along the northern and western parts of Kandahar, the northern two thirds of Helmand and the eastern parts of Farah provinces,
- a mixture of light serozems with brown semi-desert soils in parts of southern Kandahar and Helmand provinces, and along the Afghan/Iran border in Farah, and a small portion of the northeastern Hari Rud basin,
- Saline soils near Abi Istada (southeastern Ghazni) and along the Helmand river in western Helmand and Farah provinces as well as the very southern tip of Helmand. Although the soil maps do not show salinity elsewhere, there are reports of saline soils in other parts of the western provinces, e. g., Herat.
- takyrs in tracts along the Helmand river in southern Helmand and Farah provinces,
- alluvial soils, meadow alluvial soils, mostly saline and irrigated soils in places along the Kabul, Helmand, Arghandab, Hari Rud, Balkhab, and Kunduz rivers and the northwest segment of the Murghab.

Wheat Production and subsistence requirements

The following table and chart show the relationship between land area, wheat yields, and wheat consumption. The amount of wheat available for sale or the deficit which needs to be purchased is dependant on a number of factors; the size of the family, the area farmed and the wheat yields that season. A one hectare/five jerib farm is below the breakeven point for subsistence in a "bad" wheat year. As the family size increases, the land requirement to grow wheat increases. One scenario is that if wheat for purchase is not freely available, perhaps because of poor access, prices or market limitations, then there is a strong incentive for a small farmer to grow wheat on all of his land. The cash return from opium gum is only useful if wheat can be purchased. Conversely if the land area is small and wheat is freely available, then there is an incentive to grow only opium and use the income to purchase wheat.


WHEAT PRODUCTION FOR SUBSISTENCE:

		AREA (jeribs)			
	Area farm	2.5	5	7.5	10
	Area farmed	1.9	3.8	5.6	7.5
		WHEAT PRODUCTION Kg/farm			
	Good yield, 300 kg/jerib	570	1140	1680	2250
	Poor yield, 150 kg/jerib	285	570	840	1125
WHEAT CONSUMPTION		SURPLUS/DEFICIT			
@ 180 kg/person/annum		kg/farm	family with "Good" yield		
Family of 4	720 kg	-150	420	960	1530
Family of 6	1080 kg	-510	60	600	1170
Family of 8	1440 kg	-870	-300	240	810
		kg/farm	family with "Poor" yield		
Family of 4	720 kg	-435	-150	120	405
Family of 6	1080 kg	-795	-510	-240	45
Family of 8	1440 kg	-1155	-870	-600	-315

ASSUMPTIONS

Good yield, 300 kg/jerib, 1500 kg/hectare
 Poor yield, 150 kg/jerib, 750 kg/hectare

Wheat production and consumption Subsistence farming



● Family of 4 + Family of 6 * Family of 8
 □ 300 kg/jerib × 150 kg/jerib

Assumes 75% land is farmed

Appendix E

UNFDAC Program

Following a meeting in July 1989 between UNFDAC and the Commission for Afghan Refugees on the prevention and the problems of drug abuse, attended by members of the donor community in Peshawar, a steering committee and a task force was established to organize an anti drug campaign in 1989/90. Project preparation discussions started mid-June 1989 between UNFDAC and the Commissionerate for Afghan refugees, with the intention of developing a campaign in 1989/90. UNFDAC is presently developing the strategy for this drug awareness campaign, and a specialist consultant on anti-drug media campaigns has been in Pakistan during August. The program is in the late design stage.

Program Objectives

- o To create/enhance awareness on drug abuse and its consequences among afghan refugees prior to their return to Afghanistan;
- o To establish understanding of the linkage between drug abuse and opium poppy cultivation; and
- o To reduce the potential number of returnees who will resort to opium poppy cultivation once back in Afghanistan.

The program will be aimed at young males and intends to increase their level of drug awareness. Many of the refugees return to Afghanistan to help with the harvesting and transport of opium. This is the first phase of a program which will move cross border from 1990.

The UNFDAC program will start with a pilot project run by a PVO in two camps, one near Peshawar, the other in the rural area near Swabi. It will be directed initially at the young male refugees. It is intended to develop a subsidiary program aimed at females as experience is accumulated. The pilot project will produce and refine the approaches. It will also develop and test the teaching aids which can be used in the expanded campaign. There are also plans for the project to develop links with the GOP, AIG, and other members of the donor community that either have experience in drug awareness/social work in the camps and cross border, or that could contribute and become part of the expanded program.

The programs objective is to create awareness of the social problem of drug abuse and to demonstrate the link between opium poppy cultivation and drug addiction. This preventive education pilot is the first stage of a larger long term program that could be extended to all refugees. Further new projects will be developed from the experience gained in the first stage.

Parallel to the campaign in the camps there are plans to develop links with the authorities in the areas to which the refugees will return. Efforts will be made to educate the key players and to prepare the ground for the supporting role the local authorities will have in any prevention and eradication program in the field.

A Steering Committee has been set up to monitor the initial efforts and evaluate the results. The proposed composition of the committee at this point is representatives from:

- o The refugee camps
- o The Commissionerate for Afghan refugees
- o The Pakistan Red Crescent Society
- o UNHCR
- o UNOCA
- o UNFDAC

The Working Group is composed of Afghan organizations, such as the Afghan Media Resources Center and other PVOs supporting and managed by Afghans. The Narcotics Awareness and Control Project could add targeting, media expertise and funding to the UNFDAC pilot, and be in a position to extend the program to other refugee camps if the results are positive. The UNFDAC project will manage a fund which will grant sub-contracts for its various sub-components.

The target beneficiaries are the 560,000 people in Barakai camp. Implementation will start in September 1989. The first phase will last till March 1990 and the second phase from April 1990 till August 1990. A preliminary budget provision of \$51,000 has been made by UNFDAC. This will be used for project preparation, training, development of communication tools, surveys and evaluation.

Appendix F

AfghanAid Program

AfghanAid, a UK based NGO operating 61 sub-projects in Afghanistan, is presently discussing a pilot project aimed at reduction and eradication of opium production in a poppy-based economy in Achin district of Nangarhar province. In a carefully selected location, AfghanAid has designed a Poppy Elimination Plan and negotiated poppy eradication agreements with a number of poppy farmers, community leaders, and the local Mujahideen commander, who represents Hezb-i-Islami, Khales. The agreements are based on the nature of the inputs supplied and linked to their life, eg. oxen have been distributed and the anti-poppy contracts are for the life of the oxen. For the entire group of farmers there is a phased reduction plan, which has a target of reductions of 40-70% in the 1989 season, 70-90 percent in 1990, moving towards 100 percent coverage in 1991.

The project is in a Shinwari area located very close to Khyber agency in Pakistan, allowing reasonable road access. The existing agricultural production is approximately 1,000 hectares with 45 percent of the land in opium, the rest in wheat. Some corn is also grown in the summer. Approximately half of the land is farmed by tenants under contract with absentee landlords. An AfghanAid survey suggested that nearly three quarters of these tenants are planting poppy. Recently the area has seen a large increase in the number of returning refugees, with a total population now estimated at 60,000, spread over 50 villages. This is down from a pre-war population of 100,000, but up from an estimate of 10,000 people in 1986. The immediate needs of the population are in housing, agriculture, irrigation (an aqueduct supplying Mohmand valley is in need of repair) and health. At the present time a program in irrigation repair, construction of clinics and a survey of the road and water situation is underway. The low literacy levels of the population limits the alternative options for income generation.

AfghanAid is designing the project and coordinating the various donors who are interested in taking sub-contracts. The project builds on their experience in the valley, and has a number of components, some of which have been accepted for funding, while others are still under discussion with various donor agencies.

This is not the first year of AfghanAids involvement in the Achin area, but the first year in which a major anti-poppy thrust has been made. In 1987 AfghanAid carried out a cash for food project, in 1988, 42 houses were rebuilt. In 1989, 120 oxen were distributed in the area, and at a price of 8,000/- each this represents more than a single years return to poppy. The distribution of the oxen resulted in contracts with farmers for no opium production on 111 jeribs of existing poppy land. The irrigation in the valley is 90% snow melt, 5% from the karezes. 23 out of the 25 karezes are in need of repair, 19 of these karezes are minor, with three being of major importance to the valleys. Contracts have already been signed for irrigation repair covering an additional 405 jeribs of opium land. The snow melt to Mohmand valley is carried from the hills by an aqueduct, which is in need of major rehabilitation.

The target is to remove the opium production on about 450 hectares of land producing about 5-7 tons of dry opium. The anti-poppy plan has a rehabilitation component, doing house rebuilding, irrigation repair, (the three main karezes and the aqueduct), road repair and building, construction

of schools, health centers and clinics; and an agricultural component which includes trials, a veterinary clinic and the distribution of wheat seed and fertilizer.

Sub-contracts are being made by AfghanAid which is arranging the funding. Habitat are planning to rebuild 500 houses at 5,000/- each. Save the Children is planning to do education projects/schools. ODA is funding the irrigation, and ODA/FAO are funding the agriculture. Ockanden venture will be building a warehouse, the Dutch are considering funding the veterinary component, and the Germans are looking at health. The local roads are few and in poor repair, so a road project is being considered by Shelter Now. The total planned cost of the project over 18 months is \$1.3 million.

Appendix G

Islamic Injunctions Against the Use of Narcotics

The following discussion addresses the development and nature of Islamic formal injunctions against the use of narcotics. It contains some background information useful to understanding the wide application of Islamic injunctions. This information was provided by several sources, including Dr. Ismael Burhan of the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska-Omaha; Dr. Mohammed Saleem, an Islamic scholar and Director of Muslim Aid; and Mr. Abdul Mahaz of Muslim Aid.

The Koran was written by the Prophet Mohammed over a twenty-three year period. Although today it often is regarded as a theoretical model, it was intended to be a practical response to the problems caused by human nature and its weaknesses. Islam is based on the premise that everything a person has, including one's physical and psychological health, is a blessing from God. The objective of the Prophet's teachings is to assist followers to protect these blessings. At the time of the Prophet Mohammed, two primary vices permeated society: excessive intake of alcohol and gambling. Both of these behaviors pose a risk to mental and physical health, as well as to one's ability to place faith in God from which all blessings come. Consequently, these behaviors had to be eradicated. The Prophet, however, realizing that time was required for the people to trust his judgement, waited 13 years before the first Koranic injunction against the use of alcohol and gambling. In addition, the three primary injunctions against these behaviors, written within approximately one year, increase in severity.

The first injunction states that one may not consume alcohol or any other substance that brings an imbalance to the mental processes just before or while praying (i. e., one may not pray while "intoxicated"). The second injunction was intended to prepare the way for the actual prohibition of gambling and alcohol and other mind altering substances. It stated that alcohol and gambling have both negative and positive characteristics. Limited intake of alcohol, for example, may have medical benefits and gambling may result in increased wealth. But, the Prophet had concluded from his and others' observations, that the negative outweighed the positive qualities. The last of the initial injunctions prohibited the consumption of alcohol and related substances and gambling because they damage health (physical and mental), faith, and submission to Islam. These injunctions appear repeatedly throughout the rest of the Koran, re-stated in the context in which an alcohol or gambling problem arose.

No specific reference to "narcotics" appears in the Koran. The Koran, however, forms a foundation of basic principles from which inferences can be made throughout time and concomitant changing behaviors. The inference drawn by Islamic scholars and jurists subsequent to the death of the Prophet is that a prohibition against any substance producing an imbalance in mental processes or altering the state of mind necessarily includes narcotic substances (i. e., a drug subject to level definitions as a narcotic regardless of its chemical properties). This position is made clear in a variety of places, most commonly in writings addressing Islamic pre- and proscriptions on health-related issues. For example, the book Al-Kabair (Most Undesirable Practices)

details all the prohibitions and prescriptions for maintaining good health.
It frequently is used in Koranic schools for children aged 6 through 12.

Appendix H

ACBAR NARCOTICS CLAUSE

All agencies implementing projects in Afghanistan will include the following narcotics clause in all aid contracts between the agency and its local counterpart in Afghanistan:

THE AID AGREED UPON IN THIS CONTRACT WILL NOT IN ANY WAY BE USED TO ASSIST IN THE CULTIVATION OF NARCOTIC CROPS.

1. Fertilizer will not be applied to narcotic crops.
2. The supply of water through irrigation maintenance or rehabilitation will not be used to irrigate narcotic crops.
3. The provision of traction, mechanical or animal, will not be used to cultivate land for narcotic crops production.

United Nations

Policy on poppy cultivation

The following text is part of the Standard UN Proposal Format entitled, "Guidelines for Submission of project Documents to UN Agencies". These Guidelines will soon be adopted by all UN Agencies for all proposal submissions for projects in Afghanistan.

1. All implementing agencies requesting UN funds for projects in areas producing or likely to produce opium poppy should commit themselves to support and contribute to the UN efforts in reducing/eliminating such cultivation. The precise nature and modality of such support will be defined in specific projects on a case by case basis.
2. It is the responsibility of the implementing agency and counterpart body to ensure that the project activities will in no way contribute to poppy cultivation. UN agencies will immediately stop financial assistance should there be any evidence of the project contributing to poppy cultivation directly or indirectly.
3. Implementing agencies interested in UN assistance in this field may contact the UNFDAC office in Peshawar for advice on the formulation of project proposals.

UN Policy as modified and accepted by ACBAR

1. All implementing agencies requesting UN funds for projects in areas producing or likely to produce opium poppy should commit themselves to support-and-contribute-to UN efforts in reducing/eliminating such cultivation. The precise nature and modality of such support will be defined in specific projects on a case by case basis.

2. It is the responsibility of the implementing agency and counterpart body to make every appropriate effort that the project activities will in no way contribute to poppy cultivation. UN agencies will immediately stop financial assistance should there be any evidence of the project contributing to poppy cultivation directly or indirectly.
3. Implementing agencies interested in UN assistance in this field may contact the UNFDAC office in Peshawar for advice on the formulation of project proposals.

Saturday, September 23, 1989

THE MUSLIM

When peace returns to Afghanistan

By WAJAHAT LATIF

A refugee taking refuge from danger in his home will return only when he comes to the voluntary conclusion that it is safe to return. What awaits the Afghan refugee upon his return to an Afghanistan at peace?

Opium production in Afghanistan has been on the increase in spite of years of turmoil. The ongoing war caused damage to the irrigation systems, karez and diversion channels have been destroyed. Agricultural production has been neglected on account of shortage of seeds, fertilizers, etc. The result has been that people have taken to poppy production as a cash crop in the war years which has led to increased drug trafficking (reported to have risen from 300 tonnes in 1978 to over 1,000 tonnes ten years later) from Afghanistan on various routes. The area under poppy cultivation in 1987-88 was reported to be 100,000 acres. Although poppy is also grown in Herat, Nangarhar, Kandahar, Helmand and Kunar, it is estimated from an assessment of acreage under poppy production that the highest poppy production is in Badakhshan.

RETURN OF PEACE

Badakhshan, in the north-east of the country, is inhabited traditionally by Tajiks, Turks and Arabs. The chief occupation is farming. Rice, wheat, corn, cotton, linseed, poppy and sesame are grown in the valleys; barley and legumes in the hills. Vine, fruit trees and nuts are also grown and live-stock is raised for milk and skins. In addition, the province has mineral wealth in the shape of unexploited sulphur deposits and precious stones.

As early as 631 and 644 AD Hwen Tshang visited Badakhshan. Arabian geographers of the 10th century speak of its mines of ruby and azgre. Marco Polo, ac-

ording to some, the most outstanding traveller and explorer from the West to journey to Asia in the Middle Ages (13th century), noted opium addicts in the region (although some accuse him of not noticing the Great Wall of China). Badakhshan owed part of its prosperity to traffic in slaves in the late 19th century when "a strong man was considered a fair exchange for a large dog or horse, and a fine girl for about four horses."

When peace returns to Afghanistan, the refugees will return. But return to what? In September 1988 in Herat he would have found 40 per cent of the city totally destroyed, roads inside and outside the city damaged, 60 per cent of the trees around Herat cut down for security reasons. Nearly half the villages in the province are seriously damaged or totally destroyed. And 60 per cent of all surgery patients in the hospital are war wounded. School system has collapsed, health and nutrition situation is critical; there are little or no drugs and supplies, only one doctor per 50,000 inhabitants.

In Kunar in December 1988 he would have found roads in appalling condition and mined, education and health services non-existent, economic activity low and physical infrastructure, i.e. power, the saw mill, irrigation canal, communications, either badly run down or destroyed. Large areas of pine forests have been denuded.

In Paktia in late December 1988 the returnees would have found that 60-80 per cent of the pre-war population remained in their homes inside their traditional village society. But the damage caused to this backward province by the conflict in terms of sheer neglect and increasing impoverishment of the rural population is alarming.

This is a depressing scenario. But for an emotional pull for the homeland, some refugees may

not even like to return. But if the refugees or the internally displaced Afghans return to their devastated villages, they are likely to think of poppy for quick profit and thus, the potential increase of poppy production and consequent increase in drug traffic in the region exists.

The time to deal with the problem is now, and the way to deal with it through a multi-dimensional approach of education, treatment, crop-substitution and enforcement, i.e. reducing demand and production at the same time. A comprehensive drug abuse prevention strategy for Afghanistan must be integrated with the agricultural, educational and health sectors of rural development in such a way that the over-all designs of rehabilitation have built-in anti-narcotic measures. It is an uphill task, not least because of tribal, sectarian and other divisions in the Afghan society.

MUTUAL INTERESTS

The drug scene in Afghanistan should be of very serious concern to Pakistan which is in the process of developing an effective narcotics policy. The lack of control over poppy production in Afghanistan in the war years has led to heroin production in the border areas of Afghanistan and traffic through Pakistan. In the period 1984-86, 20,000 kgs of heroin from Afghanistan were seized in Pakistan. In fact, the geographical location of Pakistan and Afghanistan in a poppy-growing region inevitably creates a mutuality of interests against drugs for both countries.

According to Professor Thomas Thornton of John Hopkins University, Afghanistan remains a key factor in US-Pakistan relations; but he thinks that with the Soviet withdrawal the parallel Afghan policies of the two countries

may diverge.

But, there can be no divergence in US and Pakistan policies on drugs, as both share a deep concern over the increasing rate of drug abuse and narcotics trafficking. Therefore, a joint anti-drug policy between Pakistan and Afghanistan, supported by the US and other developed countries, is something the concerned authorities should work for.

Any Afghan government should welcome international support for poppy eradication programmes and control of illicit drug traffic. They have an addiction problem of their own. A UN mission to Badakhshan in 1972 reported 40,000 to 50,000 opium-heroin addicts in a population, at that time, of 400,000.

In the field of rural development, experts are discovering that the involvement of the villagers in the project identification as well as management in a participatory rather than a representative sense, seems to be the key to success. Aga Khan Rural Support Programme in the Northern Areas of Pakistan is an example where such an involvement is developing physical as well as social infrastructure successfully. There is every reason to believe that the idea will work for poppy eradication. Because, in the end, it is the Afghan people themselves who have to face their drug problem.

Durrani, Ghulzais, Yusufzais, Kakars, the Tajiks, the Kizilbashs and the Hazaras, the Eimaks, the Hindkis and the Balochis, however many their tribal differences, must develop consensus in their diversity and find the correct solutions. The spirit of Afghan character was summed up by an old man to Mountstewart Elphinstone, the English envoy to Shah Shuja in 1809: "We are content with discords, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood; but we will never be content with a master."