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ASSISTANCE BAN STUDY

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Carol Rose
Consultant
O/AID/Rep

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This study was contracted for by the Office of the AID Representative to glean lessons learned from the suspension of cross-border assistance which occurred between July 1991 and January 1992. Its views are those of the individuals interviewed. The suspension of cross-border assistance was instituted by the O/AID/Rep in response to a serious deterioration in security in Afghanistan. Its intention was to bring pressure on (a) those directly responsible for the security problems, (b) the particular Afghan political parties which encouraged violence as a policy tool, and (c) those elements of the GOP in a position to influence Afghans causing the security problems to take steps to reduce the security problem. At no time was the suspension directly linked to the two kidnapped American PVO workers, although their release was considered an important signal that security had improved.

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Executive Summary

This Assistance Ban Study has been commissioned by the Office of the AID Representative to Afghanistan (O/AID/Rep) to review the ban on cross border aid and its impact on project supported goals and activities.

The ban on the movement of O/AID/Rep material, money and personnel was imposed from July 17, 1991, through December 29, 1991, in response to the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan.¹

The study was based on in-depth interviews with O/AID/Rep contractors and grantees, their field staff, Afghans recently in Afghanistan, and officials from O/AID/Rep. This report attempts to quantify the impact of the assistance ban based on contractors' estimates of material not delivered, wages and productivity lost, etc. In addition, it includes the views of contractors and beneficiaries on the efficacy of the ban. An attempt also is made to assess how Afghan beneficiaries and contractors managed without O/AID/Rep assistance.

In the months following the ban, the initial security incidents which prompted it were resolved: a French national who was detained in early July was released; two detained Americans were released; eleven stolen vehicles and most of the stolen equipment was returned. It is impossible to assess whether the assistance ban contributed to the improved security climate without knowing the details of negotiations that led to the release of the detainees and return of the stolen equipment. However, Afghans interviewed said the ban prompted some attempts (whether successful or not) by mujahideen commanders to win the release of the detainees.

Impact of the Ban on Delivery of Goods and Services

Viewed in the context of total international assistance to Afghanistan, the ban's effect was marginal. According to O/AID/Rep contractors and grantees, the ban delayed for around six months an estimated \$6.52 million in supplies: medicines, agricultural inputs, construction equipment and educational material. (Total FY 1991 budget for O/AID/Rep contractors and grantees was around \$65 million.) This impeded, but did not shut down, cross border implementation structures. Nor did the O/AID/Rep ban affect programs financed by the United Nations, European organizations, Arab countries or the Soviet Union.

¹ The ban was extended in Ghazni province until January 23, 1992, and remains in effect for Jaghori district as of this writing.

On a micro level, where particular inputs represent a much more substantial portion of individual incomes and community resources, the impact was more keenly felt. There were few indications that beneficiaries were able to find alternative inputs or incomes. People who lived near markets were able to buy some substitutes commercially, but only if they had sufficient money. Most of O/AID/Rep's beneficiaries (and by definition, all of its intended beneficiaries) are the "highly vulnerable" -- people with little in the way of economic cushion or alternatives in one of the world's poorest countries.

According to the 16 O/AID/Rep contractors and grantees surveyed, the key delays/losses to beneficiaries were:

- * Medicine valued at \$1.83 million was not supplied to people in need during the ban, adversely affecting 450,000 patient visits.
- * An estimated 65,000 children under the age of two were not vaccinated at the planned time because of the ban. In some cases, this reduced the effectiveness of vaccinations given prior to the ban.
- * Approximately 10,600 tons of diammonium phosphate fertilizer were not delivered, an amount that could have augmented wheat yields enough to provide wheat for at least 205,000 people for one year.
- * A 25 percent drop in planned O/AID/Rep rural rehabilitation projects for 1991.
- * Delivery of 350,000 - 400,000 textbooks was delayed.
- * Detection (by RONCO mine detection dogs) of an estimated 500 mines and fragments was delayed, undoubtedly creating some cost in life, limb and property.
- * Wages worth \$1.5 million to more than 5,000 casual laborers was lost, affecting an estimated 35,000 dependents.
- * An estimated \$220,000 was spent paying the salaries to project staff idled or in training programs in Pakistan who would have been working in Afghanistan were it not for the ban.
- * O/AID/Rep projects incurred approximately \$90,000 in additional costs in per diem salaries, storage costs, and other unexpected expenses caused by the ban.

Contractor and Afghan Perceptions of the Assistance Ban

In general, contractors and Afghan field staff reported that the assistance ban had little impact on the security situation in Afghanistan. The message was lost in the enormity of the ban.

- * Most Afghan villagers either were not aware of the ban or did not understand why it had been imposed. Many mujahideen commanders continued to receive shipments of lethal military equipment (from the U.S.-Iraq war and elsewhere), diluting the financial impact of the suspension in humanitarian assistance.
- * The scope of the ban was much broader than the area affected by the security situation. While the concept of collective responsibility is familiar to most Afghans at a family or tribal level, the fragmented political situation in the country made it impossible for most Afghan villagers or even mujahideen commanders to influence the behavior of commanders in distant provinces. Afghans reported that most did not understand why they were being "punished" for events over which they had no control.
- * Some mujahideen commanders did attempt to negotiate for the release of the American detainees. However, it was reported that these efforts enhanced the prestige of the kidnapers and raised the political "price" of releasing the detainees.
- * The absence of a written policy explaining the suspension left its intent open to varied interpretations. While some of the Afghans interviewed said they understood the connection between the ban and the security situation, many said that they viewed it as a sign that the United States commitment to the mujahideen was waning. The U.S.-USSR (Russian) agreement to stop all military assistance to Afghanistan as of January 1, 1992, and continuing efforts by United Nations negotiators to find a peaceful settlement to the war reinforced the perception among many Afghans that the United States was imposing the ban in an attempt to force the mujahideen to make peace with the Communist regime in Kabul.
- * The assistance ban also undermined the credibility of the United States as an aid donor. Two Afghans reported that Iran had sent missions to Afghanistan to tell villagers that the United States was unreliable and that they should turn to Iran for future assistance. One Afghan said Saudi Arabia increased its influence in Afghanistan as a result of the assistance ban.

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Finally, most Afghans and contractors agreed that the ban did little to enhance the security of American projects or personnel in the long run. Instead, they said, such policies give Afghans the impression that the American commitment is temporary and thus increases the likelihood of future security problems. Contractors said that safety for American projects and personnel would be better secured by working with local village leaders, relying -- when possible -- on local transportation and distribution systems, enforcing O/AID/Rep's policy of not paying money to mujahideen commanders, and focusing any future economic sanctions specifically on commanders and regions where security problems persist.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACLU:	Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit
AFRANE:	Amitie Franco-Afghans
CCSC:	Construction Control Services Corporation
CHA:	Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
CoAR:	Coordination of Afghan Relief
DAI:	Development Alternatives Inc.
DAP:	Diammonium phosphate (fertilizer)
DoD:	U.S. Department of Defense
FAO:	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
IMC:	International Medical Corps
ICRC:	International Committee of the Red Cross
IRC/RAP:	International Rescue Committee/Rural Assistance Program
IRC/RPA:	International Rescue Committee/ Rehabilitation Program for Afghan Refugees
MCI:	Mercy Corps International
MSH:	Management Sciences for Health
NGO:	Non-governmental organization
O/AID/Rep:	Office of the AID Representative for Afghanistan
ODA:	Overseas Development Administration
SCF:	Save the Children
UNO:	University of Nebraska at Omaha
UNOCA:	Office of the Coordinator for United Nations Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programs Relating to Afghanistan
VITA:	Volunteers in Technical Assistance
WFP:	World Food Program

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN

In the second week of July, 1991, the Office of the AID Representative (O/AID/Rep) in Islamabad, Pakistan, proposed to the Ambassador the suspension of all O/AID/Rep cross-border assistance to Afghanistan.

The recommendation to halt the movement of O/AID/Rep-financed personnel and material across the border was made in response to the deterioration of security in Afghanistan and an assessment that a continuing deterioration would further endanger U.S. government personnel and property and increasingly deprive intended beneficiaries of humanitarian support.

The initial events which triggered the recommendation to suspend aid were the kidnapping of a French O/AID/Rep contract employee, the theft of 11 vehicles carrying O/AID/Rep equipment and payrolls, and the blowing up (by a mine) of a truck belonging to an O/AID/Rep contractor, killing four Afghans and injuring another.

AID Representative Robert Bakley said that internal discussions over the assistance ban were taking place when, "Unbeknownst to us, two Americans were kidnapped. But by then, the programs were already suspended."²

According to official cables, O/AID/Rep learned on July 15, 1991 that two Americans were detained in Jaghori district, Ghazni province. Two days later, on July 17, 1991, then-Ambassador Robert Oakley concurred in the Aid Representative's recommendation to suspend the cross-border program until the overall security situation "improved significantly."³ At the time the suspension was imposed, it was never anticipated it would last as long as it did.

One intent of the ban, said Bakley, was to put pressure on concerned elements of the Government of Pakistan to assist in efforts to improve the security climate and particularly to win the release of the detained Americans. There was also hope that Afghan leadership would likewise see it in their and Afghanistan's interests to take action.

² Interview with Aid representative Robert Bakley, January, 5, 1992.

³ The two detained Americans were not financed or employed by O/AID/Rep.

The State Department in Washington concurred with the decision to ban cross-border assistance. It then reserved the authority to decide when the assistance ban would be lifted.⁴

Most O/AID/Rep contractors and grantees were informed of the ban by telephone from O/AID/Rep officials on or around July 18, 1991. No contractors or grantees interviewed for this study received a written order from O/AID/Rep announcing the assistance ban.

The assistance ban did not stop all U.S. aid to the Afghan people. Projects to assist Afghans who live in Pakistan continued. Lethal (military) assistance, which O/AID/Rep does not supply, continued to flow through other U.S. government agencies.⁵

In the latter months of the ban, surveyors and monitors were allowed to travel to Afghanistan because they were not considered to be providing services to Afghanistan. Their activities were confined to monitoring existing programs and surveying completed construction projects.

In addition, the suspension did not prevent Afghan nationals who were O/AID/Rep employees from carrying out work on existing projects inside Afghanistan, using material and money that had been sent to Afghanistan prior to the ban. The suspension meant, however, that many of these employees were unable to collect their paychecks or their work was curtailed by a lack of supplies or operating funds.

Finally, the U.S. government continued to finance humanitarian programs in Afghanistan through assistance to international donor agencies, particularly United Nations organizations.

There were three authorized exceptions to the suspension. In October, the State Department concurred with the Embassy's recommendation to send shipments of medicines, medical supplies and vaccines to northern Afghanistan in order to ensure delivery before winter snows blocked transport routes. O/AID/Rep also deployed RONCO mine detection dogs and handlers to assist UNOCA

⁴ Around the same time, the Government of Pakistan announced a ban on travel to Afghanistan for all non-Afghan and non-Pakistani expatriate personnel in response to the deteriorating security situation. Employees of United Nations organizations and ICRC were exempted from this ban.

⁵ Washington and Moscow signed a "negative symmetry" agreement in August, 1991, under which both sides agreed to halt military assistance to Afghanistan as of January 1, 1992.

mine clearance workers who were operating in Afghanistan as part of Operation Salaam. Finally, O/AID/REP supplied 1,607 metric tons of diammonium phosphate fertilizer and 507 metric tons of improved wheat seed to FAO and small private organizations to be used during the Fall planting season.

The detained French employee was released in mid-July after ransom was paid. One of the two Americans was released on October 20, 1991. The other American was released on January 4, 1992. All eleven of the stolen vehicles and most of the stolen equipment were returned.⁶

On December 29, 1991, O/AID/Rep announced in a letter to contractors that it had received permission from Washington to reopen the cross-border program effective immediately. The assistance ban remained in effect for Ghazni province. On January 23, 1992, contractors and grantees were notified by telephone that the ambassador had signed an order lifting the ban on O/AID/Rep activities in Ghazni Province, except for Jaghori district. This order was put in writing by the acting Regional Affairs Officer in Peshawar to contractors on January 26, 1992.

The Government of Pakistan's ban on expatriate travel to Afghanistan remains in effect as of this writing.

1.2. STUDY METHODOLOGY

The findings in this report are based on interviews with 16 O/AID/Rep contractors and grantees affected by the assistance ban. (see appendices A and B.)

A total of 40 staff members from contracting organizations participated in the survey. Ten interviews were carried out with Afghans working in these organizations. Interviews lasted from one to three hours.

The author also interviewed officials from O/AID/Rep (including AID Representative Robert Bakley and various project officers) and the United States Embassy in Islamabad (DCM A. Elizabeth Jones). A survey conducted in Afghanistan by O/AID/Rep field monitors in December 1991 and quarterly reports of each contractor provided additional information.

The study relies heavily on contractors' assessments of their own programs. As a result, the findings reflect the views of project staff more than the perceptions of the Afghan project beneficiaries.

⁶ It is a long-standing policy of the United States government not to pay ransom to kidnappers.

Given the geographic and time constraints put on the study, it was difficult to assess the extent to which Afghan project beneficiaries were able to find alternative sources of support during the assistance ban, such as buying goods on the local market or obtaining them from non-O/AID/Rep donors. Nonetheless, there were individual reports of Afghans completing irrigation ditches and roads that had been started prior to the ban. Contractors also developed various coping strategies to maintain project momentum during the ban (see Appendix B).

2. ASSESSING THE MATERIAL IMPACT OF THE BAN

In many instances, the assistance ban delayed -- rather than denied -- project benefits. Often delays were critical: agricultural inputs were unavailable during the Fall planting season and medicines were missing when someone was ill. Delays in hiring casual laborers meant that wages were not delayed, but lost.

In other instances, such as the provision of books or construction of roads, services simply reached the beneficiaries later than expected. The difficulty of getting supplies to the interior of Afghanistan during the winter, when roads and passes are blocked by snow, has continued the de facto impact of the ban in some parts of Afghanistan until Spring, 1992.

2.1. IMPACT OF THE BAN ON MEDICAL PROGRAMS

2.1.1. Discussion of Medical Programs

O/AID/Rep finances three major contractors to provide medical services in Afghanistan. These are Management Sciences for Health (MSH), Mercy Corps International (MCI) and International Medical Corps (IMC).

These three contracting agencies together received around \$12 million from O/AID/Rep in fiscal year 1991. The three contractors run 322 clinics or hospitals in Afghanistan (MSH has 219; MCI has 44; IMC has 59).

As a result of the assistance ban, more than half of the 322 O/AID/Rep-financed clinics or hospitals were unable to obtain adequate supplies of basic medicines and equipment to maintain normal operations.

Problems of resupply became particularly critical with the approach of winter, when roads and mountain passes become blocked by snow and ice. As a result, O/AID/Rep lifted the ban on the delivery of medical supplies to the northern areas of Afghanistan in October, 1991. Supplies to other areas of Afghanistan were

suspended until the final lifting of the ban in January, 1992.

Many clinics that were not resupplied continued to operate during the assistance ban. Health workers provided first aid and doctors prescribed medicines for patients to purchase at local bazaars. Field staff reported that many patients could not afford medicines. The ban had a disproportionate impact on the poor, the disabled, women and children.

Deaths and disabilities stemming from the lack of adequate medical supplies are difficult to measure, since it is impossible to determine how many people would have died or been disabled even with proper medical care. Nonetheless, contractors said that at least some deaths were caused by the lack of medical supplies.

All contractors said the ban had hampered attempts to promote preventive medicine and modern medical practices among Afghans. Said one contractor: "People stopped coming to the clinics when they learned there was no medicine available. In light of the rudimentary awareness of modern medical practices in Afghanistan, the break in assistance undermined efforts to reinforce proper medical practices."

In addition, contractors said that the assistance ban impaired the credibility of health workers and undermined efforts to keep medical care apolitical.

"We are always telling them to keep medicine out of party politics," said one contractor. "Now our counterparts are asking, 'why are vaccinations political?'"

2.1.2. Impact Assessment for Medical Programs

1. Out of the total number of clinics or hospitals funded by O/AID/Rep, contractors estimate that at least 181 (56%) were not resupplied with medicines and medical equipment during the time of the ban. The rest had been supplied prior to the ban.

2. Out of those not resupplied, contractors said that at least 22 clinics or hospitals (12%) were forced to shut down because they did not have adequate funds on hand to pay salaries, maintain food allowances, provide fuel to operate diesel generators, etc.

3. Contractors estimated that at least 450,000 patient visits were "adversely affected," meaning health workers were unable to provide adequate care or medicines to patients. This calculation is based on the average monthly number of patient visits prior to the suspension of aid.

4. Contractors estimated that around \$1.83 million worth of medicines scheduled to be delivered from July to December were postponed as a result of the ban.

5. MSH said that approximately 17,370 children under two years of age and 11,250 women were left without vaccination shots each month during the latter months of the ban when vaccines ran short. In total, MSH estimated that around 65,000 children under the age of two were not vaccinated at the planned time because of the ban.

6. Although difficult to quantify, all medical contractors expressed concern that some people were disabled or had died because of the lack of adequate medical care during the assistance ban. At-risk populations, particularly children and women, were thought to have suffered most.

7. All contractors said the ban has disrupted planning and monitoring activities for 1992. Specifically, MSH staff said that the ban disrupted monitoring programs required for approving new health facilities, delayed by 8 months its plan to move all depots and warehouses to Afghanistan and hampered its household needs assessment survey which would have provided planning statistics for 1992. MCI said its plans to begin a fee-for-service program at MCI clinics were delayed for the duration of the ban, resulting in a \$16,000 loss in anticipated funds for 1992.

8. All contractors reported financial losses and under-utilization of staff as a result of the ban. Specifically, IMC reported that between 25 and 50 field staff monitors returned to Peshawar for supplies during the ban and then were unable to cross back over the border, remaining idled in Peshawar. MSH reported that 354 basic health workers were stranded in Peshawar during the ban. MSH spent an additional \$58,839 over planned expenditures in per diem allowances paid to these workers. Moreover, MSH reported that its Peshawar staff had to work an extra 1,650 hours in order to handle the additional work involved in distributing per diem and salaries to field staff stranded in Peshawar. Field operations also required an additional 800 hours in staffing because of disruptions caused by the assistance ban.

2.2. Impact of the Ban on Agricultural Programs

2.2.1. Discussion of Agricultural Programs

Agriculture has long been the most important economic activity in Afghanistan, providing food and income to millions Afghan farmers and their families. O/AID/Rep's programs help to rebuild Afghanistan's agricultural base by providing improved wheat seed, fertilizer, farm machinery and technical expertise.

O/AID/Rep financed around \$14 million in agricultural projects in 1991, including a \$12 million-a-year contract with Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) to provide agricultural extension, wheat seed and DAP fertilizer. O/AID/Rep also had a \$1.2 million agreement with MCI for agricultural rehabilitation projects and a \$615,000 model farms project administered by the International Rescue Committee/Rehabilitation Program for Afghan Refugees (IRC-RPA). Various smaller projects -- wheat seed distribution, poultry and bee hive management -- were implemented by small NGOs through the International Rescue Committee/Rural Assistance Program (IRC-RAP) and the Asia Foundation.⁷

Most O/AID/Rep agriculture programs were undermined by the suspension of cross-border assistance, particularly because the ban was imposed at the beginning of the Fall planting season when agricultural inputs, such as seed and fertilizer, are critical. Because of the agricultural cycle, often an entire year worth of program inputs was lost due to the assistance ban.

With or without these inputs, Afghan farmers plowed their land and planted seed. Some used improved wheat seed supplied by non-O/AID/Rep assistance organizations. Nonetheless, contractors estimate that at least one-quarter of Afghanistan's fertilizer capacity failed to reach the country during the assistance ban. As a result, the benefits (high yields) of using improved wheat seed, irrigation and modern farming techniques were undermined because adequate fertilizer was not available. Extension agents reported that efforts to promote modern farming methods and seed multiplication were frustrated by the assistance ban.

2.2.2. Impact Assessment for Agriculture Programs

Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI)

1. Prior to the ban, RONCO purchased 12,500 tons of DAP fertilizer for DAI, partly for use with its improved wheat seed. DAI estimates that it would have delivered 10,599 tons of DAP fertilizer to Afghanistan were it not for the ban. DAI estimates the value of the undelivered DAP fertilizer to be \$3.97 million.

2. DAI calculated that the undelivered wheat would have augmented Afghan wheat production by 41,000 metric tons. The estimated value of wheat not produced because of the ban therefore is \$7.2 million.

Assuming that one person consumes 200 kg of wheat annually, DAI estimated that the amount of wheat not produced because of

⁷ Irrigation programs are included in report section on rural rehabilitation and reconstruction.

the ban would have been enough to provide wheat to 205,000 people for one year.⁸

3. DAI estimates that the DAP fertilizer planned for delivery to Afghanistan would have been approximately 25 percent of the entire Afghan absorptive capacity for phosphate fertilizer for 1991.

Because phosphate fertilizer (DAP) is applied mostly during the Fall planting season, the ban meant that much of the fertilizer would not be used for one year, thus affecting the 1992 wheat harvest. DAI staff warned that lower wheat yields because of the absence of fertilizer may force some farmers to consume their wheat seed rather than save some for next year's planting, undermining the benefits of distributing improved wheat seed.

4. To date, storage costs to DAI for undelivered fertilizer total between \$10,000 and \$15,000.

5. Staffing impact: DAI estimates that 18 of its Afghan extension agents were idled in Peshawar because of the ban, costing the project \$3,700. Twenty (20) DAI surveyors were idled in Peshawar because of the ban, costing the project \$17,142. Ten (10) DAI drivers were idled in Pakistan because of the ban, costing \$8,571. Total cost to DAI for workers idled in Pakistan because of the ban: \$29,386. (Most staff was put into training programs.)

6. Eight reapers and five seed cleaners destined for Afghanistan were instead stored in Pakistan. DAI purchased 4,000 backpack sprayers to be used in Spring 1992; they remain in warehouses in Pakistan as of this writing but might be delivered by Spring.

7. Interruptions in monitoring activity impaired DAI's ability to assess the effectiveness of its staff and technologies in the field. Moreover, DAI's efforts to provide mapping services and price data were undercut by disruptions in monitoring activities.

8. The ban hampered DAI extension activities since it appeared the field staff was reneging on promises to provide farm

⁸ O/AID/Rep officials interviewed said that the unused fertilizer could have augmented wheat production by 73,000 metric tons and that one person consumes only 150 kg. of wheat a year. Based on these estimates, total lost wheat production would have been enough to provide wheat for more than 489,000 people for one year.

inputs. DAI lost credibility with Afghan merchants with whom it had contacted about the sale of fertilizer and with farmers because other non-O/AID/Rep organizations continued to supply agricultural inputs during the ban.

MCI Agriculture Programs

MCI reported disruptions in its monitoring activities and delays in delivery of some agricultural inputs. However, project personnel said there was little overall impact on agricultural programs because MCI's diversified base of financing allowed it to rely on other donors to continue programming.

IRC-RPA Programs

IRC-RPA staff reported delays in initiating model farm programs as a result of delays in the delivery of tractors, dome structures, and permission to buy land in Afghanistan.

IRC-RAP Programs

1. Amitie Franco-Afghans (AFRANE) canceled a seed multiplication project that had started in 1990. AFRANE had planned to distribute six to eight metric tons of improved wheat seed to farmers, but had no money to buy back multiplied seed for onward distribution from farmers participating in the program.

2. Prior to the ban, Coordination of Afghan Relief (CoAR), planned to purchase 75 tons of improved wheat seed and 187 tons of DAP fertilizer (from DAI.) These will not be purchased this year because the planting season is finished, but CoAR may apply for a no-cost-extension from IRC-RAP to purchase the inputs next year.

As a result of the ban, CoAR was only able to purchase 100 of 300 beehives it had planned to distribute. The rest were distributed prior to the ban.

Asia Foundation

Save the Children (SCF) had a poultry project stalled by the ban. SCF had signed contracts with potential producers prior to the imposition of the suspension of aid. Only 39 out of 150 families received chicks prior to the ban. The rest of the chicks were sold back to breeders, at a loss of \$96.

SCF estimates that 111 families lost income from the suspension of the poultry project. SCF assumes that each family averages 30 rupees a day income from the sale of eggs once chicks are old enough to produce. SCF estimates total wages lost because of the ban was therefore around \$12,000. This amounts to Rs. 2,700 (US \$110) in lost wages per family. The ban was felt

most by SCF's target groups: women, children and the disabled.

2.3 Impact of the Assistance Ban on Rural Reconstruction and Rehabilitation

2.3.1. Discussion of Rehabilitation Programs

A key component of O/AID/Rep's activities in Afghanistan is the reconstruction and rehabilitation of roads, irrigation systems, and other aspects of rural infrastructure.

In 1991, O/AID/Rep financed around \$25 million in infrastructure rehabilitation. The largest contractors were Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA), which has a cooperative agreement for \$5.8 million; Construction Control Services Corporation (CCSC), which has a contract for \$12 million; and CARE, which has a cooperative agreement for \$5.8 million to supply hand tools and cash-for-work on road and irrigation projects. Some rehabilitation work also was carried out by small private voluntary organizations through grants administered by IRC-RAP.

These programs were delayed by the halt in assistance, particularly because the timing of the ban coincided with optimal months in which weather is favorable for construction work.

Most O/AID/Rep reconstruction projects have resumed since the lifting of the ban, thus Afghan beneficiaries suffered from a delay -- rather than denial -- of construction services.

Nonetheless, one of the most damaging impacts of the assistance ban was lost wages that would have been paid to casual laborers, many of whom depend on project salaries to support their families. One contractor (CARE) reported that some refugees who had repatriated to Afghanistan as part of a food/cash-for-work program returned once again to Pakistan during the assistance ban.

All contractors reported that the assistance ban meant that some projects stopped leaving work unfinished. As a result, the infrastructure situation sometimes was made worse than if no work had been started, i.e., roads were abandoned with large construction holes left behind, irrigation systems were dug up for repair and remained unusable.

2.3.2. Impact Assessment for Rehabilitation

1. A rough estimate of the total number of casual laborers (construction crews, ditch diggers, karez cleaners, etc.) is that around 4,500 workers lost employment with O/AID/Rep reconstruction projects for one to five months as a result of the

assistance ban.

(CARE: 3,000 workers; CCSC: 250 workers; VITA: 500 workers; AFRANE: 384 workers; CoAR: 400 workers.)

2. According to contractor estimates, more than \$1 million in wages from O/AID/Rep projects were not paid during the time of the ban (one to five months, depending on contractor).

(CARE: \$664,800; VITA: \$146,000; CCSC: \$30,000; CoAR: \$105,600; AFRANE: \$150,000)

3. Assuming that each worker supports a family of seven, this would mean that more than 31,000 dependents were affected by lost financial support from O/AID/Rep projects during the assistance ban.

4. CARE reported that 57,750 repatriated refugees enrolled in their food security program were unable to obtain hand tools or rations when CARE shut down its operations. A CARE survey in Urgun district of Paktika province found that as of November, 1991, 20 percent of the participants in its food security program had returned to Pakistan. If that percentage is extrapolated to all repatriated refugees enrolled in the program, approximately 11,500 refugees may have returned to Pakistan during the assistance ban. There are many reason why refugees may have returned to Pakistan -- winter weather, military conflict, etc. - - but it can be assumed that at least some returned because CARE halted its food security program.

5. Contractors estimated the total value of construction materials not delivered to Afghanistan as a result of the ban was around \$650,000. (CARE: \$200,000; CCSC: \$300,000; VITA: \$122,500; Solidarites: \$96,000; AFRANE: \$100,000; CoAR: \$175,000.)

If materials and lost wages are combined, the total value of services not delivered during the ban rises to around \$1.7 million.

6. Contractors were unable to agree on a uniform measure of lost productivity. But all agreed that road construction was delayed as a result of the ban. Specifically:

- * VITA reported a 28 percent drop in productivity.
- * CARE reported that 10 Km of road construction was delayed.
- * CCSC reported that 100 Km of road construction was delayed, a 25 percent drop in annual productivity.

7. Improved irrigation schemes were delayed as a result of the project. Specifically:

- * VITA reported a 28 percent drop in productivity.
- * CARE said that 40 irrigations projects were delayed, which could have irrigated 1,760 hectares of land this season.
- * Solidarites delayed construction of a diversion dam that

would have provided direct benefits to 400 families and indirect benefits to 2,000 people.

* AFRANE estimated that cleaning of 96 karezes was halted due to the ban. Each karez serves 40-50 families, thus 3,800 - 4,800 families (up to 33,600 individuals) were denied or delayed the benefits of a rebuilt or cleaned karez.

* CoAR reported that the cleaning of 100 karezes was delayed because of the ban. Each karez serves 40-50 families, thus 4,000 - 5,000 families (up to 35,000 individuals) were denied or delayed the benefits of a rebuilt or cleaned karez.

* Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA) estimated that cleaning karezes was delayed in 50 villages.

8. Many construction projects were forced to bring their field staff back to Pakistan because they were unable pay salaries in Afghanistan during the ban. In most instances, workers were enrolled in training programs while in Pakistan. Nonetheless, contractors implementing rural rehabilitation programs paid approximately \$190,000 to field staff either idled or in training in Pakistan who otherwise would have been working in Afghanistan. (CARE: \$64,000; CCSC: \$87,500; VITA: \$36,000 plus \$3,000 in per diem.)

2.4. IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN ON EDUCATION PROGRAMS

2.4.1. Discussion of Education Programs

Thirteen years of war in Afghanistan has crippled the nation's already weak educational system. The provision of schools in Afghanistan will play a role in encouraging repatriation of Afghan refugees who otherwise might prefer to remain in Pakistan to educate their children.

O/AID/Rep has focused on promoting primary education by providing approximately \$8.5 million worth of support annually through a project implemented by the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO). UNO supports 1,259 primary schools in all provinces of Afghanistan, sends approximately 1.54 million textbooks into Afghanistan annually and has 132 monitors and 28 master trainers working in the country.

These educational programs suffered less than medical, agricultural or rural rehabilitation programs, largely because UNO had sent supplies to most of its schools just prior to the ban. In addition, the lifting of the aid suspension occurred when resupplies were scheduled for delivery. O/AID/Rep-financed teachers were paid prior to the ban and should have continued teaching throughout the period.

2.4.2. Impact Assessment for Education

1. The opening of UNO's first Manpower Training Program Center in Afghanistan was placed on hold. The net financial impact was that the program was \$128,500 under its planned expenditures for the two quarters affected. UNO estimates that the suspension of the Manpower Training Program Center resulted in 100 potential students losing five months of training (500 man-months of training) in 1991. Originally, the manpower training program was to be in Ghazni province; it now will shift to Qandahar province.

2. Because of the border closing, UNO said that textbook resupplies for 200 schools (16 percent of UNO primary schools) will arrive two months after the schools open in the Spring of 1992. Each school has around 130 students. In total, UNO estimates that 230,000 students will receive textbooks and supplies 2 months late this Spring.

Overall, UNO estimated that the delivery of approximately 350,000 - 400,000 textbooks to Afghanistan was postponed.

3. Production of textbooks by UNO was placed on hold during July-November 1991, in part because warehouses reached capacity due to the ban. The initial effect was that UNO produced fewer textbooks than projected. Textbook production expenditures were \$264,000 below projected expenditures for July through October 1991. Because of the resumption in production of textbooks for distribution in refugee camps in November, however, the net effect including the first quarter of FY 1992 (October - December 1991) was a drop in the projected textbook budget of around \$16,000.

4. Spring teacher training seminars were canceled because teacher training surveyors could not go inside Afghanistan during the Fall to survey potential training sites for the Spring. Consequently, UNO estimates that approximately 240 teachers will be deprived of one month (240 man months) of in-service training during Spring 1992.

5. UNO was authorized by O/AID/Rep in November to place greater emphasis on refugee schools in Pakistan, which meant that some school supplies, textbooks, transport, monitoring and teacher training programs shifted from Afghanistan-based to refugee camp schools in Pakistan.

2.5. IMPACT OF BAN ON OTHER PROGRAMS

In addition to its programs in agriculture, medicine, education, and rural rehabilitation, O/AID/Rep finances activities to promote mine clearance in Afghanistan and income-

generation among Afghan women. In addition, RONCO assists in U.S. Government efforts to distribute surplus DoD items, including clothing and medical equipment, to Afghan NGOs and AID contractors for use in Afghanistan.

2.5.1. Mine Clearance:

RONCO Consulting Corporation is involved in training dogs and their handlers for mine detection activities in Afghanistan. Their dogs are deployed in conjunction with UNOCO/Operation Salam agencies, which provide the mine field mapping and mine clearance personnel.

RONCO's demining program was suspended until late October. For the period of the ban, no mines were cleared by RONCO. Based on the monthly average of the previous six months of work, RONCO estimates that approximately 500 additional mines and fragments could have been found and disarmed during the three months of the ban. (See Table 1)

It is difficult to estimate how many people may have died or been maimed because of the delay in the mine clearance program. Nonetheless, the assistance ban halted efforts to make Afghanistan safer for anyone living or working there.

TABLE 1: RONCO DEMINING PROGRAM

months	anti-person	anti-tank	unexploded ordinance and fragments	Total mines cleared	Monthly average
Jan - June 1991	265	46	663	974	162

RONCO staff said that 114 people were kept in Peshawar undergoing training and refresher courses related to dog handling rather than working in Afghanistan. Consultants were brought in to run these refresher courses in dog handling.

2.5.2. DOD Surplus Deliveries

Some 93,000 surplus DoD items, including clothing and medical equipment/supplies were inventoried and stored in RONCO warehouses during the ban.

2.5.3. Women's Income Generating

Through IRC-RAP, Save the Children (US) operates income generating handicraft projects in Baghlan, Nangarhar and Ghazni provinces, focused primarily on poor women and the disabled. As

a result, the assistance ban was most damaging to people SCF considers to be "at risk."

Around 500 Afghan families left SCF's income-generating project because handicraft kits were not delivered. Many of these joined projects operated by non-AID/Rep financed organizations, but others simply lost their main source of income.

3.0 ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF THE BAN: PERCEPTIONS OF CONTRACTORS AND AFGHAN BENEFICIARIES⁹

It is difficult to determine the impact of the assistance ban on the security environment in Afghanistan. However, discussions with contractors, Afghan field staff members and people who recently returned from the Afghanistan suggests the ban had mixed results.

The majority of contractors and grantee personnel interviewed said, with the benefit of hindsight, that they thought the ban had little impact on the security situation. They expressed concern that if O/AID/Rep suspends assistance again in the future, it would further undermine the integrity of aid programs and put field staff in danger.

The Afghan community was divided. The majority said the point of the ban was lost on most Afghans. The people either didn't know about the ban or didn't understand why they were being punished for security incidents far beyond their reach. A few Afghans interviewed said the ban sent a clear signal that American assistance depends on the good behavior of mujahideen commanders.

3.1 CONTRACTOR PERCEPTIONS

1. Ban was too broad

Contractor personnel generally expressed the view that the assistance ban had no impact on the security situation in Afghanistan because it was applied too broadly. Many suggested that if the ban were imposed in order to win the release of American detainees, it should have been focused exclusively on Ghazni province or on Jaghori district.

⁹ Contractors and grantee personnel, field staff and Afghan leaders agreed to share their perceptions of the ban on the condition that their names not be revealed lest it endanger their relations with O/AID/Rep.

"The ban was a complete waste of money with little impact on the security situation. Most commanders didn't care because they were not personally affected."

"The ban failed to connect the policy with the problem because it was not publicized. It would be better to limit it to the area where the problem occurred and then publicize the reasons on Voice of America."

"AID went nuclear right away. Once they had imposed the ban there was nothing more they could do. Next time, people will expect a similar response."

"There was total incomprehension by contractors and Afghans as to what the kidnapping in Ghazni had to do with our work in a distant province. Afghans don't talk to each other in the next valley, much less across the country."

2. Ban was Misinterpreted

Contractor personnel said that because the logic behind the ban was never put in writing to contractors, many felt it was open to varied interpretations by Afghans as well as contractors. Many suggested that the ban was politically motivated, signaling a reduced United States commitment to Afghanistan.

"People in the field had a tough time convincing locals that the ban was imposed not by O/AID/Rep but was an order from Washington. There was some propoganda that America was pulling out, especially when negative symmetry was announced."

"Western style populist pressure is simply not operative in Afghanistan at present, which renders this policy cruel as well as perverse. If US/AID thinks that people who kidnapped the two Americans will think twice, they are sadly mistaken. There was no direct link between the ban and the release of the Americans. Not many lessons were taught."

3. Ban hurt the wrong people

Most contractor personnel expressed concern over the human costs of the ban -- sick people were denied medical care, farmers were unable to grow sufficient food. In addition, many said they were dismayed that lethal military equipment captured in the U.S.-Iraq war was being sent into Afghanistan while humanitarian aid programs were shut down. This sent the wrong signal to the Afghans, they said, punishing innocent villagers while continuing to arm mujahideen commanders and fighters.

"Projects are aimed at helping the poorest people, who should not become victims of U.S. political policies. Political games should not be played using poor people as pawns."

"This policy is wrong-headed. It distresses the average Afghan who is facing critical medical crises on a personal level. This situation is compounded by an extremely poor harvest and the onslaught of winter."

"If wheat and fertilizer were used to kidnap the two Americans, it would make sense to impose this ban. But since Kalashnikovs and military hardware was used to do it, why did the military program continue while humanitarian aid was cut?"

"It was shameful to see U.S. weapons flowing into Afghanistan while humanitarian aid was shut down."

4. Ban increases security problems

There were fewer security incidents against O/AID/Rep and non-AID project personnel during and after the ban. But many contractor personnel expressed the opinion that the assistance ban would make it more difficult to work in Afghanistan in the future.

"The ban will encourage Afghan commanders to disrupt aid by seizing more vehicles and personnel in an attempt to disrupt negotiations."

"The ban strengthened the hand of Afghans who do not want health services delivered and want to keep the United States out of Afghanistan."

"If political and financial gains are to be made from kidnapping and releasing hostages, this will encourage further security incidents."

[The U.S. government does not pay ransom.]

5. Ban hurt contractor credibility in the field

Program field officers said that despite attempts to explain the ban to Afghan villagers, many held their organizations responsible for the suspension of programs.

"We are part of the U.S. system and this made us look very dumb. We had developed a rapport with the people, then, for no fault of theirs, we had to renege on the people who we had hired to work for us and forfeit our promises to help them."

"Many Afghans became suspicious because we were there monitoring projects but not providing inputs. Many said they thought that we were spies."

"Our field staff were put in the awkward position of not being able to fulfill their promises to local leaders, which destroyed our credibility because they thought that we had stolen the money intended for projects."

6. Security is the responsibility of project staff

Almost all of the contractor personnel volunteered the opinion that the two American detainees (who were not O/AID/Rep employees) and victims of vehicle theft failed to take basic precautions before going into Afghanistan.

"Americans should learn the lesson that before they go inside they should get permission and security assurances from commanders. They must tell commanders in advance. The two Americans kidnapped were irresponsible in this regard."

"Aid implementors are largely to blame for security problems in Afghanistan. They do not use the existing Afghan ways of distribution, but instead drive fancy trucks with radios." [Many O/AID/Rep groups already use local distribution channels.]

7. Ban highlights the need for donor coordination

Contractor personnel said the effectiveness of the ban was hampered by the lack of coordination with other non-O/AID/Rep contractors, such as the United Nations organizations.

"The ban would have been more effective if other donor agencies had participated. Local populations become confused when some programs are continued while others stop. This was a missed opportunity for greater coordination between donor agencies."

8. Consultation between O/AID/Rep and Contractors

Contractor personnel and O/AID/Rep Project Officers said that O/AID/Rep should have first consulted with them as to the proper response to the security situation. According to AID Representative Bakley, contractors were consulted during the course of the ban and, at a meeting he held in Peshawar to discuss the suspension, most voted to continue it until the two detained Americans were released.

"Aid has resources beyond its immediate hires in Islamabad. It has contractors and NGOs to whom it gives grants. It was a pity not to use those people as sounding boards on an issue that affects them and their constituents."

"This is the most political aid environment I've ever worked in."

"AID should stop trying to micro-manage projects."

9. Concern about future O/AID/Rep bans

Many contractor personnel expressed distress that O/AID/Rep would interpret the ban as a success and would institute another suspension in the future.

"There is a need to know what the plan will be in the future. If this is going to continue to be a U.S. AID response to security incidents we may as well shut down and go home, because something is sure to happen in the future."

"You cannot run a program that shuts down every six months. It is impossible function this way and completely discredits AID."

[Many projects had also been affected by disruptions to projects caused by the Gulf War in early 1991.]

3.2 AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS

Although this study did not allow for a trip to Afghanistan, the questionnaire asked Afghan field staff to report anything that commanders or shura leaders said to them regarding the ban. The author also relied on a survey in Afghanistan conducted by O/AID/Rep monitors in December 1991.

1. Ban went unnoticed

Afghan field staff reported that most Afghan villagers were unaware that a ban had been imposed.

A survey of 16 basic health workers and school teachers -- all of whom worked for O/AID/Rep projects -- conducted by O/AID/Rep monitors in December found that 12 interviewees (75%) knew about the ban. However, all of those interviewed worked for organizations affected by the ban.

"Most Afghans didn't have time to think about the ban. They had too much else to think about -- like hunger."

2. Ban was misapplied and misunderstood

Afghan field staff reported that village leaders, mujahideen commanders and people working on aid projects knew about the ban, but few understand the logic behind it.

The O/AID/Rep survey of basic health workers and school teachers in Afghanistan confirms this finding. Out of the 12 Afghans who knew there was a ban in place, only 5 (41%) thought it was related to the kidnapping of Americans. One thought the contractor had stolen the money; one thought there was a change in direction of the program; one said America had cut a deal with the Russians; and four (33%) didn't know why aid had stopped.

"Local villages had no access to information so they didn't know why the aid was stopped. Some blame the United States and said it was unreliable. It had a detrimental impact on the trust-building process that is so important for projects."

"Commanders who were told of the kidnapping asked me, 'who? where? not me! Why are we being punished? We are against such acts, but we are poor people. Why are you punishing the poor and disabled? We cannot control commanders'."

"Some commanders said that the kidnapers were their enemies and did not understand why the United States government was punishing everyone."

"This is a low-profile humanitarian assistance program for the poorest people. We are not giving money to commanders or tribal leaders, so it hurt only the poor people who don't understand why it was imposed. In the meantime, the commanders were getting Iraqi tanks and missiles, so people didn't believe that all aid was cut off."

3. Ban was political

Afghan field staff reported that many Afghans interpreted the ban as a political move by the United States to distance itself from the Afghans. Moreover, the negative symmetry agreement between Washington and Moscow clouded the issue; some Afghans thought the ban was a sign of Russian-American collusion against the mujahideen.

"Afghan leaders were skeptical that the ban was related to security matters. Instead, they perceived it as a lack of interest by the United States in Afghanistan and a reversal of the policy of assisting the mujahideen. They saw it as a shift in the American concern with Afghanistan and an accommodation with the Russians."

"Many commanders told me they thought the ban was a political decision, linked with the US-Russian agreement on negative symmetry and was the beginning of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan."

"Many Afghans said the United States was trying to impose a negotiated solution to the war on the Afghans, especially since the UN negotiator Benon Sevon was active at the same time."

4. Ban strengthened US adversaries

Two Afghan field staff reported that Iran used the opportunity of the ban to increase its influence in Afghanistan and to discredit the United States. One said that Saudi Arabia had expanded its control as a result of the ban.

"During the ban, three missions arrived from Iran in our province to tell villagers that the United States is unreliable and that they should turn to Iran in the future. This gave tremendous propaganda advantage to Iran vis-a-vis the United States."

"[Saudi] Arabian groups expanded their operations in places where the United States was pulling out."

"Many people asked the commanders why work had stopped. When told the reason they doubted the commanders and blamed the Americans."

5. Ban increased security problems

Many Afghans warned that the ban increased security problems as commanders search for new sources of income and villagers perceive that the United States commitment to the Afghan people is temporary.

"Commanders who didn't receive money became angry because other people were getting WFP wheat. Some decided to find other income sources, such as hijacking trucks carrying wheat."
[O/AID/Rep does not authorize money being paid to commanders.]

"Commanders started getting nervous that their incomes would be shut off forever. This, in turn, made the people more afraid."

6. Ban made it more difficult to release hostages

Two Afghan leaders said that the ban undermined efforts to win release of the two American detainees. One reported that Afghan commanders thought they would be rewarded personally with all O/AID/Rep assistance if they won the release of the detainees. Many Afghan field staff reported that the ban increased the prestige of the commanders holding American captives.

"A lot of people tried to participate in the release of the Americans because they thought that if they helped they would get the reward of all the American aid for themselves. As a result, it increased the price of the release of the American."

"People understood that the commander who kidnapped the Americans was just trying to get projects for his area. They knew that the kidnapers must obtain some kind of reward for the hostages at the risk of losing credibility with the local people."

"At the beginning, the majority of commanders wanted to release the kidnapped foreigners. But the pressure they put on the commander who kidnapped them made him stronger and stronger in his decision not to release them."

7. Security problems linked to AID policy

Afghans agreed with contractor personnel perceptions that the kidnapping of two Americans and theft of U.S. vehicles was the fault of the way in which O/AID/Rep assistance is distributed (although the two kidnapped Americans had no association

whatsoever with the O/AID/Rep program and the NGOs have had problems as well with the theft of funds and commodities).

"If O/AID/Rep would work with people who know Afghanistan they would have fewer security problems. Instead, they import their own people and give them lots of money, without realizing that the money goes to commanders. You shouldn't give money to commanders. There are 5,000 to 6,000 commanders in Afghanistan. If you give money to all of them, then you will have 5,000 to 6,000 security problems."

"AID should give money to people who know how to manage it, not to other Americans who use it to buy Pajeros and Land Cruisers. We know how to talk to shuras. We don't promise them money, but we understand how to talk to them. And we have no security problems."

8. Ban improved security situation

Four Afghans (out of 10) interviewed said the ban helped to win the release of the hostages and contributed to the overall improvement of the security situation in Afghanistan.

"When they understood why the ban was imposed the commanders agreed to search for a solution to the kidnapping, going to Ghazni and communicating with the kidnapped Americans and attempting to negotiate for their release."

"A lot of commanders wanted to fight a war with the kidnapers."

"The ban had some impact on the release of the hostages because many people tried to get them out, but only after they understood why there was a ban. That took about four months."

"This sends a signal to the Afghans that they must wake up and stop the security problems."

"Commander Yar Khan came to my office and said he had made up his mind to cooperate with us and not make more confrontations if we would come back."

9. Ban increased Afghan awareness of dangers of relying on the United States

Afghans said the ban made them feel the United States was unreliable and that Afghanistan must push for self-reliance.

"The ban sent a message to Afghan farmers that they should no longer rely on the United States for inputs and must find alternatives to achieve self-reliance in preparation for the day when the United States assistance stops."

"It is better to have a good enemy than a bad friend."

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

In the months following the ban, the incidents which prompted the AID/Rep. cross-border suspension were resolved: the French national who was detained in early July was released; the two detained Americans were released; all eleven of the stolen vehicles and most of the stolen equipment were returned.

It is impossible to assess whether the assistance ban contributed to the improved security climate without knowing details of the negotiations that led to the release of the detainees and return of the material. However, it appears that the ban prompted some attempts (whether successful or not) by local commanders to win the release of the detainees.

But was the assistance ban worth the cost in human suffering and deterioration of project integrity? Did it improve or hamper the long-run security climate in Afghanistan? Does the notion of collective responsibility make sense in the fragmented political environment of Afghanistan? Could the ban have been equally or more effective if targeted only on those regions where security is a problem? Are there alternative ways to enhance the security of project workers and material?

These questions were reflected in a U.S. Embassy cable sent to Washington in the final month of the ban:

"We feel strongly that the suspension to areas governed by commanders with no involvement in, nor influence over, the events in Ghazni has become counterproductive to our humanitarian efforts. The program was suspended because of security concerns. However, tribal leaders and commanders in some of the areas most affected by the suspension have come to believe that the suspension was politically motivated...it is particularly important that we send a signal to these leaders that our decision was not punitive, except in Ghazni."

It is with these issues in mind that the following conclusions are offered to O/AID/Rep.

1. AID projects were missed

Although most Afghan villagers were unaware that the ban had been imposed, the direct beneficiaries of O/AID/Rep programs suffered as a result of the assistance ban. Thousands of Afghans did not receive proper medical assistance, thousands of Afghan farmers were denied the benefits of improved agricultural inputs; thousands lost wages to support their families.

Many Afghans found alternative means of coping without U.S. government assistance -- Afghans who could afford it bought medicines on the local market, farmers planted local varieties of wheat, workers found alternative means of support. Nonetheless, the assistance ban hit the poorest of the poor, who rely most on U.S. assistance for their basic needs.

2. Repeated assistance bans would undermine the credibility of the U.S. government as an aid donor

Many Afghan field staff reported that the ban undermined the credibility of the U.S. government as a donor. The ban reportedly reduced American influence in Afghanistan.

In many instances, Afghans looked to other donors for assistance: the United Nations and European charities. Afghans also said that the ban enhanced the influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan.

The resumption and large size of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan is likely to reverse the perception that the United States is no longer committed to Afghanistan. Nonetheless, a repetition of the assistance ban may permanently undermine U.S. credibility and influence in the country.

Repeated assistance bans also would damage the credibility of O/AID/Rep with contracting assistance agencies and staff. The ban undermined staff morale at most agencies; frequent suspensions of assistance would damage project integrity and inspire many assistance workers to look elsewhere for employment.

3. Economic sanctions are most effective when focused on problem areas or individuals

The message of the ban was lost in the enormity of its geographic scope. There was no central Afghan government to pressure. Thus the notion of collective responsibility, which is familiar to the Afghans on the local or family level, lost its meaning in the fragmented Afghan political context.

Some mujahideen commanders did attempt to negotiate for the release of the American detainees and return of U.S. government material. In some instances, it was reported that this enhanced the prestige of the kidnappers and raised the political "price" of releasing the detainees. Whether it also led to the eventual release of the two Americans cannot be known without access to the details of the negotiations.

In any case, the assistance ban may have been more effective if focused only on those provinces or districts where security is

a problem. Most Afghans, including mujahideen commanders, have limited or no influence over the behavior of those who would steal cars or kidnap aid workers in a distant province. Afghans reportedly did not understand why they were being punished for the acts of a commander who they consider to be an enemy.

Moreover, many commanders continued to receive supplies of military hardware throughout the ban. The suspension of humanitarian assistance thus put pressure on poor Afghan villagers, who have little influence over the security situation, but failed to pressure some powerful mujahideen commanders to act.

4. Economic sanctions are most effective when tied to clear policy goals

The order to suspend cross-border projects was never put in writing. As a result, it was open to widely ranging interpretations by contractors, field staff, and Afghan beneficiaries. Some thought it was linked to the security situation, others saw it as a political decision by the United States to abandon Afghanistan.

Moreover, O/AID/Rep never stated clearly what conditions had to be met in order to lift the ban. Many people thought the ban was linked to the two detained Americans, yet it was partially lifted before the second American detainee was released. This reinforced the opinion of those who said the ban was politically motivated.

Because the assistance ban coincided with the signing of a negative symmetry agreement between the United States and USSR (Russia), many Afghans interpreted the closing of projects as evidence that Washington and Moscow were in collusion against the mujahideen.

Attempts by United Nations negotiators to push for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan also were linked in the minds of some Afghans to the assistance ban. Those who wished to undermine peace efforts thus used the aid suspension to argue that the United States government was using its humanitarian assistance to force the Afghan people into a settlement.

5. Alternative actions to enhance security for U.S. personnel and projects in Afghanistan

Security will continue to be a problem as long as Afghanistan is at war. Nonetheless, there are precautions that U.S. government personnel and project officials can take to diminish the risk of working cross-border.

Safeguards suggested by contractors and Afghan field staff include:

- Obtain security guarantees from local shuras and other village leaders prior to working in an area.
- Use local transportation and distribution methods for traveling in Afghanistan or distributing supplies to projects. When possible, avoid driving expensive vehicles while in Afghanistan.
- Discontinue any practice of paying money or giving material to mujahideen commanders; instead work with shuras and village leaders.
- Promote local participation and investment (time or labor) in project activities.
- Work toward creating permanent projects rather than temporary ones in which people feel they have nothing to lose by stealing project material or kidnapping project personnel.
- Create a permanent "security incidents" database which O/AID/Rep could circulate periodically to project personnel, warning assistance workers which areas and commanders might pose a risk to project implementation and enabling them to take necessary precautions.

The O/AID/Rep reports that all of these safeguards are, to varying extents, already in place:

- Contractors and Grantees do, for the most part, obtain security guarantees from local shuras and other village leaders;
- Local transport is used increasingly, particularly with the dismantling of the transport wing of the ACLU;
- O/AID/Rep does not authorize the practice of paying money to commanders;
- Local participation is increasingly solicited in project activities;
- Despite the relief nature of the O/AID/Rep program, many of the project activities are geared toward sustainability;
- Work on a data base began simultaneously with the start of this study.

APPENDIX A:

ASSISTANCE BAN QUESTIONNAIRE

NAME OF ORGANIZATION: _____

DATE OF INTERVIEW: _____ TIME: _____ to _____

NAME AND POSITION OF INTERVIEWEE(S):

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION: _____

LENGTH OF TIME BAN AFFECTED YOUR ORGANIZATION: _____

AMOUNT OF O/AID/REP MONEY (total dollar amount and % total project monies) TO YOUR ORGANIZATION for FY '91:

IMPACT ON CONTRACTORS

1. QUANTIFY (gross estimate) the cost of materials and services that would otherwise have been provided to beneficiaries were it not for the ban.

a. What was the difference between your actual and your predicted expenditures for (i) fourth quarter 1991, (ii) first quarter 1992.

Predicted fourth quarter FY '91 _____
Actual fourth quarter FY '91: : _____
Difference: _____
Predicted first quarter FY '92 _____
Actual first quarter FY '92 _____
Difference: _____

b. Cost of materials that didn't go inside:

c. What, if any, storage costs did you incur during the ban? How much and what materials were stored?

d. what, if any, items were sold or given away? To whom?

e. What, if any, impact did it have on your monitoring activities? What, if any impact, will this have on your project?

2. STAFFING IMPACT.

a. Cost of salaries and numbers of workers who otherwise would have been working inside:

b. How many of your field staff quit, stopped working or continued despite the ban?

(APPENDIX A)

c. Where you paying workers idled in Peshawar? If so, what was that cost? What were they doing?

f. How did field staffs perceive and react to the ban?

3. COPING STRATEGIES

a. Were any of your projects able to continue? Which ones? How were they able to proceed?

b. Does your field staff have imprest (advance) money and/or materials? If so, how much and how long were they able to operate without additional inputs?

c. What alternative sources of financing was your organization able to rely upon? (Other sources of assistance, commercial purchases or reliance on private workers?)

d. In what other ways was your organization affected by the ban?

4. CONTRACTOR PERCEPTIONS

a. Why do you think USAID imposed the ban?

b. What, if any, impact has the ban had on your relations with USAID? Has this changed your perception of working with USAID?

5. MATERIAL IMPACT ON TARGET POPULATIONS

a. Quantify the impact of the assistance ban in terms of inputs not delivered? (schools closed, books not delivered, vaccinations not performed, fertilizer and wheat seed, saplings, etc.)

b. What was impact on target populations? (deaths due to vaccinations not performed, distress at or indifference to school closing.)

6. PERCEPTIONS OF BENEFICIARY COMMUNITY

a. Did any Afghan leaders (commanders, shura leaders, etc.) ever speak with you about the ban? If so, who? What did they say? If not, why do you think not?

b. If so, did they (leaders) say why they think it had been imposed?

c. If so, how did they say this affected their attitudes as

(APPENDIX A)

working partners? How do they perceive O/AID/REP?

d. Is so, did they say how the ban affect their status among their communities?

e. If so, did they say how the ban affects their attitudes toward security issues?

f. Were Afghan leadeers able and willing to organize in order to continue services that O/AID/Rep had been providing in order to substitute for lost inputs? What, if any, alternative sources of funding did they rely upon?

7. POST-BAN PROGRAMS

a. What are your plans for utilizing materials previously frozen by the ban?

b. What is the impact of the late delivery of goods and services (i.e. medicines that expired, seed too late to be planted, etc.)

c. In what ways, if any, did the ban disrupt your planned activities for 1992? Will you hire extra staff to manage these goods or services? Will you use carry-over materials to supply your projects? Will you buy fewer items this year? Is there any cost savings ?

APPENDIX B: Summary of Contractor/Grantees Interviewed

Management Sciences for Health (MSH)

Mercy Corps International (MCI)

International Medical Corps (IMC)

Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA)

RONCO Consulting Corporation

Construction Control Services Corporation (CCSC)

CARE

University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO)

Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI)

International Rescue Committee/Rehabilitation Program for Afghan Refugees (IRC-RPA)

International Rescue Committee/Rural Assistance Program (IRC/RAP):

Afghanaid

Amitie Franco-Afghans (AFRANE)

Coordination of Afghan Relief (CoAR)

Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA)

Save the Children (SCF)

Solidarities Afghanistan

Management Sciences for Health (MSH)

Interviews:

Laurence Laumonier Ickx, field operations advisor
Paul Ickx, child survival and disease control
advisor
Mary Gasper, finance officer

January 22, 1992

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

MSH operates 219 clinics or hospitals in all provinces in Afghanistan. It has a staff of 2,874, including 1,344 basic health workers.

MSH's 1991 budget was \$8.5 million, all of which came from O/AID/Rep.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

1. MSH estimates that 130 clinics or hospitals (60 percent) were not resupplied during the ban. Many; were forced to operate without dispensing medicines. Eight MSH clinics (3 percent of the total) were shut down because of inability to resupply them during the ban.

2. MSH said that medicines and medical supplies valued at \$1.3 million were not delivered to Afghanistan because of the assistance ban.

3. UNICEF provides vaccines for MSH, but delivery of these was delayed because O/AID/Rep provides salaries for vaccinators and injection and cold-chain equipment. Vaccines not delivered during the ban: 190,840 TB vaccines; 141,140 measles vaccines; 374,140 DPTP (diphtheria, typhoid, polio) vaccines; 322,600 tetanus shots. Total monetary value of vaccines not delivered during the ban: \$350,000.

4. MSH estimates that at least 155,000 patient visits were adversely affected by the lack of medicines and supplies. In other words, around 4,500 patients were left without adequate care each day. On average, around one-third of the patient visits are made by women; a quarter are children.

5. MSH said that approximately 17,370 children from the target age group of under two years and 11,250 women were left without vaccination shots each month as a result of the ban. In total, MSH estimates that 64,269 children under the age of two were not vaccinated at the planned time because of the ban.

The ban hit women, children and the poor particularly hard. Although difficult to quantify, MSH staff said that a fair percentage of patients would suffer severe handicaps or death to complications of disease left untreated because of the ban.

6. MSH spent an additional \$58,839 over planned expenditures in per diem monies for 354 basic health workers (representing 30-40 clinics) who were stranded in Peshawar and unable to return to work in Afghanistan.

7. MSH staff had to work an additional 1,650 hours in order to handle the additional work involved in distributing per diem and salaries to field staff stranded in Peshawar. Field operations also required an additional 800 hours in staffing because of disruptions caused by the ban.

8. MSH said its planning activities were disrupted by the ban:

a. Monitoring programs were reduced, hampering the approval of new health facilities for the following quarters.

b. The ban delayed MSH plans to move its programs into Afghanistan. A strategy to have all depots and warehouses in Afghanistan was delayed at least 8 months.

c. MSH's household survey on the delivery of services and needs assessment was abandoned and all previous work lost because of the ban. This means MSH will have no accurate statistics for planning for the next year.

9. MSH staff said the program's credibility was damaged because its field staff has been telling the Afghans that their program is non-political. MSH is always telling Afghans to get out of party politics; that health is not political. Now, it seemed even vaccinations became a political issue of O/AID/Rep.

MSH fears that its administrators lost credibility with the local population due to the inability to delivered promised goods and services.

As a result, MSH efforts to promote health education and preventive medicine were discredited because supplies were unavailable and clinics forced to shut down.

COPING STRATEGIES:

1. MSH doctors continued to prescribe medicines to patients, who then were required to spend Rs. 45-300 per prescription or go without medicine.

2. Some health workers continued to work without coming to Pakistan for their salaries.

International Medical Corps

Interview: Richard Gyory, director
January 15, 1992.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

IMC runs 59 hospitals or clinics in 27 provinces in Afghanistan. There are approximately 472,000 patient visits each month, or 5.7 million patient visits annually, in IMC clinics and hospitals.

O/AID/REP gave \$2.8 million to IMC for Fiscal Year 1991, approximately 95 percent of IMC's total budget.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

1. Fourteen (14) IMC clinics and three hospitals were not resupplied by the ban. These ran out of medicines and supplies in October and November and were forced to shut down. (Forty-two IMC clinics were resupplied and paid through to April 30, 1992 prior to the imposition of the ban and, therefore, were unaffected by it.)

2. IMC estimates that approximately 150,000 patient visits were adversely affected by the ban. In some cases, patients were unable to obtain medicine but were otherwise treated by the medical staff. Often, people stopped coming to the clinics when they learned there was no medicine available.

IMC said that 22 percent of patients left without adequate medical care were women and girls (33,000) and approximately one-third (50,000) were children.

Although no precise figures on deaths due to lack of medical supplies are available, IMC staff said that the high infant mortality rate due to diarrhoea -- particularly during the summer months -- suggests that some people died because of the assistance ban.

3. IMC said that \$149,000 was held in escrow throughout the ban: \$89,000 in salaries, transport and operational costs and \$60,000 worth of medicine that otherwise would have been sent to the 17 clinics and hospitals affected by the ban.

4. IMC efforts to promote preventive medicine were hampered by the ban since the break in assistance undermined efforts to reinforce medical practices.

5. Requests for extra re-supply to Khost due to heavy fighting were unable to be met.

6. Between 25 and 50 field staff monitors returned to Peshawar for supplies during the ban and then were unable to cross back over the border, remaining idled in Peshawar.

COPING STRATEGIES:

1. IMC's predicted and actual expenditures were unaffected by the ban because all medicine is purchased through cooperative purchase agreements in Pakistan.

2. Out of IMC's total field staff of 498 people, an estimated 50 stopped working because hospitals and clinics were unable to continue operation without needed medical supplies. None of the field staff quit due to the ban.

3. IMC's vaccinations (EPI) program was unaffected by the ban since it is financed by UNICEF.

Mercy Corps International (MCI)

Interviews:

Neil Huff, country director
Myron Jespersen, agricultural project coordinator
Dr. Iman, medical doctor and director of cross-border operations.

January 20, January 23, 1992

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

Mercy Corps International operates medical and agricultural programs in Afghanistan.

It has 44 hospitals and clinics in 8 provinces in Afghanistan. It has a grant from O/AID/Rep for medical supplies and services worth \$1.8 million, plus medicines valued at \$350,000. MCI also is supported by the World Health Organization (WHO).

It's agricultural projects are based in Helmand, Qandahar, Oruzgan and Zabul provinces. Work focuses on production and distribution of wheat seed, rehabilitation of orchards and vineyards, pilot activities to determine potential for high value cash crops and rebuilding of irrigation systems.

MCI's agricultural programs receive around \$1.2 million from O/AID/Rep for FY 1991. Other donations come from the World Food Program, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the Canadian High Commission. O/AID/Rep funds make up 65 percent of MCI's cash budget for agriculture or about half of its combined cash-and-commodities budget.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

Medical programs:

1. MCI has 44 hospitals or clinics in Afghanistan, 37 (84 percent) of which suffered interruptions in supplies due to the ban. Clinics and hospitals ran out of generator fuel, food allowances and salaries to pay health workers.

MCI's TB model treatment centers also were closed for the duration of the ban.

2. MCI estimates that \$123,641.00 worth of medical supplies remained unutilized because of the ban on resupplying clinics in Afghanistan.

3. MCI estimates that 156,000 patient visits were affected adversely by the ban, i.e. patients were unable to obtain medicines from their clinics due to the halt in resupply.

Although difficult to quantify, MCI staff said the ban had contributed to the break out of malaria and TB in the summer, and would heighten the risk of a measles epidemic this winter.

4. MCI plans to begin a fee-for-service program at MCI clinics were delayed for the duration of the ban. As a result, MCI said the program lost an estimated \$16,000 in anticipated income.

Agriculture programs:

1. MCI monitoring trips to Afghanistan were canceled, disrupted planning activities and project evaluation.

2. MCI was forced to look elsewhere for agricultural inputs (see coping strategies), which caused delays in the delivery of farm inputs during the fall planting season.

MCI staff said that some farmers couldn't wait any longer for delivery of wheat seed and fertilizer. As a result, they planted local varieties which have a lower yield. MCI estimates that the ban affected around 1,500 farmers in this regard.

Overall impact

MCI estimates that around 60,000 people in Ghazni migrated out of the province due to hardships, including winter weather, the cutoff in medical supplies and a lack of seed, fertilizer and food as a result of the assistance ban.

COPING STRATEGIES:

Medical programs:

1. Most MCI clinics were able to continue serving patients with existing supplies for one to three months, but eventually all ran out of medicines.

Some clinics attempted to continue minimal operations by taking loans from local commanders for generator fuel. None were able to buy medicines.

2. MCI dental offices, laboratories and X-ray units continued to operate throughout the ban.

3. MCI doctors and health workers continued to do diagnostic work and to prescribe medicines.

Agricultural programs:

1. MCI personnel said they were able to obtain 380 metric tons of DAP fertilizer and 380 metric tons of improved wheat seed

from the FAO. This seed and fertilizer was given to the FAO by another O/AID/Rep contractor, Development Alternatives Inc.

2. Most of the Afghanistan-based staff remained in-country and their salaries were deposited in bank accounts in Pakistan, as was normal procedure.

3. MCI personnel said that money generated from sale of agricultural inputs was used to cover field operating expenses normally paid from the Quetta office.

4. Some staff said the ban gave MCI an opportunity to change its programming directions, particularly by charging fees for service. It is believed that recipient communities will be more accepting of a fee-for-service program because they now understand the dangers of not having any services.

Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA)

Interview:

Eng. M.M.A. Sediq, Chief of Party
Robert B. MacMakin, Deputy

January 21, 1992

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

VITA carries out reconstruction and rehabilitation of feeder roads and minor irrigation projects in 16 provinces in Afghanistan.

Its two-year budget is \$11.6 million, 100 percent of which is financed by O/AID/Rep.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

1. VITA had a \$452,183 drop in actual versus projected expenditures during the final quarter of 1992, primarily in program support and technical assistance outlays.

VITA estimates it had a drop in productivity of around 28.5 percent. More importantly, VITA missed the most productive 4-5 months for work, since snow has closed many roads and hindered resumption of its work until the spring.

2. The ban forced VITA to decrease its work force inside Afghanistan from 750 people to 200 people. VITA estimates the value of lost wages from its project to be \$146,000.

VITA estimates that each worker supports a family of seven people, thus the number of direct financial beneficiaries dropped from 5,250 to 1,400. In other words, an estimated 3,850 dependents lost financial support of VITA during the ban.

In Konar province, VITA staff heard that the halt in labor-intensive work freed up men for fighting.

3. VITA estimates that approximately \$122,500 worth of materials -- concrete, wood, backhoes, etc. -- were delayed from going into Afghanistan because of the ban.

4. VITA estimates that it paid \$36,000 to workers to be in Pakistan who otherwise would have been working in Afghanistan. Most were in training programs.

VITA paid \$3,134 to workers as a per diem for living in Pakistan who otherwise would have been based in Afghanistan.

5. At least 40 drivers, cleaners and mechanics were idled in Peshawar, crowding the VITA office and causing a drop in staff morale.

COPING STRATEGIES:

1. VITA had a training program for most of its workers who were idled in Peshawar, including training for equipment operators and mechanics.

2. Imprest and advance money provided prior to the ban enabled some Afghanistan-based workers to continue working for one to three months, as well as to maintain a VITA presence on the project site.

3. VITA advised some Afghans to seek alternative financing sources, such as the United Nations, in order to continue projects.

4. Afghan villagers continued to construct at least one road with the financial assistance of local commander. Another road was built on the assumption that workers would be paid later by VITA.

5. AID/Rep donated \$95,000 worth of gabions (2,200 total) to UNOCA for use in Helmund.

**RONCO Consulting Corporation
(Commodity Export Program)**

Interviews:

Joe George, transportation and logistics officer
Roger Guichard, finance officer
Khurshid Khan, administration/management specialist
Irshad Akhtar, senior procurement officer
John McHale, Peshawar area logistics officer

January 16, January 20, 1992

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

RONCO's main activity is procurement of supplies for O/AID/Rep contractors. In addition, RONCO was implementing a humanitarian food relief and commodity distribution program until June 1992, which shut down apparently unrelated to the ban. RONCO also is involved in training dogs and their handlers for mine detection activities in Afghanistan. The dogs are deployed in conjunction with UNOCA/Operation Salam agencies.

RONCO's total projected budget for its own projects in FY 1991 was \$7.622 million. In addition, RONCO planned to procure \$16 million in commodities for other O/AID/Rep projects. RONCO's total projected budget was \$23.6 million. 100 percent of RONCO's budget was financed by O/AID/Rep.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE:

1. The largest impact of the ban was on RONCO's mine clearance program, which was suspended until late October. For the period of the ban, no mines were found by RONCO. Based on the monthly average of the previous six months of work, RONCO estimates that approximately 500 additional mines or fragments could have been detected, were it not for the ban.

RONCO DEMINING PROGRAM

months	anti-person	anti-tank	unexploded ordinance and fragments	Total mines cleared	Monthly average
Jan - June 1991	265	46	663	974	162

2. RONCO staff members said that field staff morale suffered because of inactivity and uncertainty about the future stemming from the assistance ban.

3. Prior to the ban, RONCO had planned to transfer 2,000 tons of vegetable oil to Development Alternatives Inc.(DAI). When this plan fell apart, RONCO gave 600 tons to the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees and earmarked 1,000 tons of vegetable oil for transfer to CARE. CARE was unable to accept shipment because it could not move the oil over the border. RONCO therefore was forced to keep the remainder in its Peshawar warehouse.

4. Delivery of 12,500 tons of DAP fertilizer that RONCO had procured for Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) was hampered because of the assistance ban. DAI scrambled to find warehouses to store the fertilizer and supplies backed up in Karachi.

COPING STRATEGIES:

1. Procurement orders seemed unaffected by the ban and RONCO's existing warehouses were used to store material that could not be given to contractors for shipment to Afghanistan.

2. RONCO stated that 114 people were kept in Peshawar undergoing training and refresher courses related to dog handling rather than working in Afghanistan. Consultants were brought in to run these refresher courses in dog handling.

**Construction Control Services Corporation (CCSC)/
Afghan Construction & Logistics Unit (ACLU)**

**Interview: Robert Benton, Chief of Party
Ron Lovell, Finance and Administration**

January 22, 1992

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

CCSC provides technical assistance and administrative support to ACLU to build roads and bridges in five provinces in Afghanistan: Badakhshan, Takhar, Konar, Logar and Paktia.

It has an annual operating budget of approximately \$12 million and is 100 percent financed by O/AID/Rep.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

1. CCSC/ACLU shut down its operations in Afghanistan in November, 1991, in response to the assistance ban. As a result, CCSC was forced to move equipment valued at \$2 million out of Afghanistan in response to threats that equipment might disappear if the project closed. [Some of this equipment was in need of maintenance.]

Since it requires one month to pull expensive equipment out of Afghanistan and another month to return it to the work sites, CCSC estimates that the project lost two months worth of work in Afghanistan.

The two-month work stoppage meant that 20 - 30 kilometers of road was not built because CCSC/ACLU chose to halt its operations.

2. CCSC staff estimated that the lack of material inputs reduced the productivity of existing projects by half prior to the closing of its operations in Afghanistan. As a result, about 20 kilometers of road were not built inside Afghanistan that otherwise would have been constructed.

In total, CCSC estimated that nearly one-quarter of a year in productivity was lost because of the ban.

3. CCSC continued to pay salaries of its field staff and casual laborers throughout the ban by depositing money in banks in Peshawar. As a result of closing its operations in November, CCSC paid approximately \$87,500 for permanent staff idled in Pakistan for one month.

4. CCSC estimated lost wages of \$60,000 for 250 Afghan casual laborers who were laid off when it shut down operations

for two months because of the assistance ban.

5. CCSC had planned to spend approximately \$1 million on supplies and staffing during the period of the ban. As a result of the suspension, materials such as diesel fuel, cement, steel, etc., could not be shipped over the border. CCSC staff said that construction materials valued at \$300,000 were not supplied to Afghanistan because of the suspension in aid.

COPING STRATEGIES:

1. CCSC/ACLU continued to pay its 350 permanent staff and 250 casual laborers until the final month of the ban. These workers were employed in manual construction projects, such as could be carried out without additional equipment or supplies -- road grading, dry masonry work, and breaking rocks.

2. During the two months that field staff were "idled" in Pakistan, CCSC enrolled some workers in training programs and required others to take annual leave.

3. Equipment pulled out of Afghanistan was overhauled and subject to routine maintenance.

CARE

Interview: William Huth, program manager
John Stiles, monitor
Asif Rahimi, leader of cross-border activities

January 15, 1992.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

CARE runs an Afghan Village Assistance Program in Konar and Paktika provinces comprised of two components: a food security program involving a one-time distribution of hand tools and periodic provisions of food to assist refugee repatriation; and a cash/food for work program for the reconstruction of community assets in preparation for returning refugees while, at the same time, providing labor and a source of income for those who already have returned.

IN FY 1991, CARE received approximately \$5.8 million from O/AID/Rep. CARE received wheat valued at \$5,500 from the World Food Program for its food-for-work program as well as \$75,000 from its home office in New York. O/AID/Rep thus provided around 82 percent of CARE's total budget.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN::

1. CARE was forced to shut down its Paktika program one week after the ban when cash ran out. Its program in Konar had enough cash to continue for two months but was forced to shut down because of fighting.

Overall, CARE's expenditures during the ban dropped by approximately \$850,000 or 51 percent below planned expenditures.

2. CARE has enrolled in its food security program 3,500 families in Konar (29,750 individuals) and 3,500 families in Paktika (28,000 individuals). Thus, 57,750 returned refugees enrolled in the food security program were unable to obtain their hand tools or rations due to the assistance ban.

The point of CARE's program is to promote repatriation of refugees from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Although no precise figures on the impact of the ban on repatriation are available, a CARE survey in the Urgun district of Paktika province found that as of November, 20 percent of the Afghans enrolled in its food security program had returned to Pakistan.

3 1,500 workers in Konar and 1,500 workers in Paktika were

not employed in food/cash for work programs as a result of the ban.

Of the total work force not employed, 150 were skilled laborers making Rs. 100-120 a day. 2,850 were unskilled laborers paid Rs. 40 per day. Assuming laborers would have worked 24 days a month, CARE estimates around Rs 16.62 million in lost wages (US \$664,800) during the ban.

4. CARE assumes that each laborer in Konar supports a family of 8.5 people, thus 12,750 dependents lost CARE's financial support during the ban. CARE assumes that each laborer in Paktika supports a family of eight people, thus 12,000 dependents lost CARE's financial support due to the ban. TOTAL: 24,750 individuals lost CARE's financial support during of the ban.

5. CARE estimates that 24 villages in Konar and 16 villages in Paktika benefit from irrigation systems built or reconstructed under its programs and were adversely affected by the assistance ban.

CARE estimates that 1,760 hectares of land could have been irrigated under its programs were it not for the ban.

6. CARE was forced to delay construction of one 10 KM road that would have served 13 villages.

7. CARE ordered its entire field staff of 88 people to return to Peshawar for training. Total cost of salaries paid to field staff in Peshawar was Rs. 1.6 million (U.S. \$64,000) during the period of the ban.

COPING STRATEGIES:

1. CARE received had \$500,000 worth of food donated by RONCO. Because this was non-deliverable and vulnerable to rotting, CARE gave the food to the World Food Program under the stipulations that (i) it be used only for refugee camp feeding programs in Pakistan and (ii) an equivalent amount of food be returned to CARE once the ban was lifted.

2. CARE's field staff returned to Peshawar to participate in training in irrigation, road building, construction techniques, computers, technical drawing, English language, administration, management, math, field administration and budgets.

3. CARE continued throughout the ban to send Afghan monitors to its projects in Paktika and Konar to ensure that warehouses were not looted and to reassure the people that they

would return once the restrictions on cross-border activities had been lifted.

4. CARE field staff report that irrigation system repair in one community in Paktika was carried out by the local community and that other communities approached the Danish and other groups to request that the work started by CARE be completed, but nothing was started in this regard.

University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO)

**Interview: Gerald Boardman, Chief of Party
Ramona Klassmeyer, Finance Officer
Professor Azimi, deputy team leader**

January 20, 1992

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

UNO operates 1,259 primary schools in all provinces of Afghanistan. UNO sends approximately 1.54 million textbooks into Afghanistan annually and has 132 monitors and 28 master trainers working in the country.

UNO has annual budget of approximately \$8.5 million, 100 percent of which is financed by O/AID/Rep.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

1. The opening of UNO's first Manpower Training Program Center in Afghanistan was placed on hold. The net financial impact was that the program was \$128,500 under its planned budget for the two quarters affected. UNO estimates that the suspension of the Manpower Training Program Center resulted in 100 potential students losing five months of training (500 man-months of training) in 1991.

Originally, the manpower training program was to be in Ghazni province; it now will shift instead to Qandahar province.

2. Because of the border closing, UNO said that textbook resupplies for 200 schools (16 percent of UNO primary schools) will arrive two months after the schools open in the Spring of 1992. Each school has around 130 students. In total, UNO estimates that 260,000 students will receive textbooks and supplies 2 months late this spring.

3. Production of textbooks by UNO was placed on hold during July-November 1991, in part because warehouses reached capacity due to the ban. The initial effect was that UNO produced fewer textbooks than projected. It's textbook production expenditures were \$264,000 below projected expenditures from July through October 1991. Because of the resumption in production of textbooks for distribution in refugee camps in November, however, the net effect including the first quarter of FY 1992 (October - December 1991) was a drop in the projected textbook budget of around \$16,000.

Overall, approximately \$563,000 in textbooks scheduled for delivery into Afghanistan was postponed.

4. Spring teacher training seminars were canceled because teacher training surveyors could not go inside Afghanistan during the Fall to survey potential training sites for the Spring. Consequently, UNO estimates that approximately 240 teachers will be deprived of one month (240 man months) of in-service training will be lost during Spring 1992.)

COPING STRATEGIES:

1. UNO was authorized by O/AID/Rep in November to shift its program emphasis to refugee schools in Pakistan, which meant that some school supplies, textbooks, transport, monitoring and teacher training programs shifted from Afghanistan to refugee camp schools.

2. Female teacher training programs continued in Peshawar.

3. Most textbooks, teacher trainers and monitors were sent into Afghanistan in May and June. As a result, most UNO-supplied schools in Afghanistan were able to maintain normal operations.

Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI)

Interview:

Richard Smith, Chief of Party and Project Manager
Don Oelsigle, advisor, Agricultural Development and Training
Sher Ali, finance officer
Noori Arif, director, Agricultural Development & Training
Tom Harrington, agricultural economist
Nabi Aslami, cereal crop specialist

January 17 and January 20, 1992

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

DAI has agricultural programs in Helmand, Qandahar, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, Paktika, Nangarhar, Baghlan, Takhar and Parwan provinces. Its primary programs include agricultural extension and the sale of agriculture inputs -- improved wheat seed, fertilizer, farm machinery and fruit tree seedlings. It also collects agricultural price and market information and conducts surveys of Afghan agriculture.

DAI is a \$30.26 million project running from August 1989 until December 1992 (approximately \$12 million annually). It is financed entirely by O/AID/Rep.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

1. Prior to the ban, RONCO purchased 12,500 tons of DAP fertilizer on DAI's behalf, partly for use with its improved wheat seed. DAI estimates that it would have delivered 10,599 tons of DAP fertilizer to Afghanistan were it not for the ban. DAI estimates the value of the undelivered DAP fertilizer to be \$3.74 million.

2. DAI calculates that the undelivered fertilizer would have augmented Afghan wheat production by 41,000 metric tons. The estimated value of wheat not produced because of the ban therefore is \$7.2 million.

DAI assumes that one person consumes 200 kg of wheat annually. Therefore, the amount of wheat not produced because of the ban would have been enough to provide wheat to 205,000 people for one year.¹

¹ O/AID/Rep officials interviewed said that the unused fertilizer could have augmented wheat production by 73,000 metric tons and that one person consumes only 150 kg. of wheat a year. Based on these estimates, total lost wheat production would have been enough to provide wheat for more than 489,000 people for one

3. DAI estimates that the DAP fertilizer planned for delivery to Afghanistan would have been approximately 25 percent of the entire Afghan absorptive capacity for phosphate fertilizer for 1991.

Because phosphate fertilizer (DAP) is applied mostly during the Fall planting season, the ban meant that the fertilizer would not be used for one year, thus affecting the 1992 wheat harvest.

DAI staff warned that lower wheat yields because of the absence of fertilizer may force some farmers to consume their wheat seed rather than save some for next years' planting, undermining the benefits of distributing improved wheat seed.

4. Additional storage costs to DAI for undelivered fertilizer was approximately \$15,000.

5. Staffing impact: DAI estimates that 18 of its Afghan extension agents were idled in Peshawar because of the ban, costing the project \$3,700. Twenty (20) DAI surveyors were idled in Peshawar because of the ban, costing the project \$17,142. Ten (10) DAI drivers were idled in Pakistan because of the ban, costing \$8,571.

Total cost to DAI for workers idled in Pakistan because of the ban: \$29,386. (Most staff was put into training programs.)

6. Eight reapers and five seed cleaners destined for Afghanistan were instead stored in Pakistan. DAI purchased 4,000 backpack sprayers to be used in Spring 1992; they remain in warehouses in Pakistan.

7. Interruptions in monitoring activity impaired DAI's ability to assess the effectiveness of its staff and technologies in the field.

8. The ban hampered DAI extension activities since it appeared the field staff was reneging on promises to provide farm inputs. DAI lost credibility with Afghan farmers because other non-O/AID/Rep organizations continued to supply agricultural inputs during the ban.

COPING STRATEGIES:

1. When the ban was imposed and DAP fertilizer was called forward from RONCO, O/AID/Rep donated 1,381 tons of DAP fertilizer to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); 127 tons to the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan; and 100 tons to the Environmental Awareness

year.

Foundation of Afghanistan. The remainder of what was called forward was stored in DAI warehouses. The portion not called forward remained in Karachi warehouses under control of RONCO's sub-contractor.

2. Prior to the ban, DAI purchased 507 tons of improved wheat seed for Afghanistan. This was given to the FAO and the Swedish Committee for distribution in Afghanistan.

3. DAI staff that otherwise would have been working in Afghanistan were placed in manpower training programs.

4. DAI continued to collect price and market data for Afghanistan throughout the ban. In addition, DAI conducted surveys of Afghan agriculture and markets during the ban. The organization also maintained its mapping operations during the ban, although it lost its ability to do ground-truthing to supplement satellite imagery for its Geographic Information System.

**International Rescue Committee/Rehabilitation Program
for Afghan Refugees (IRC-RPA)**

Interview: Bob Bouvier, agriculturalist

February 10, 1992

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

IRC-RPA has various rehabilitation projects in Afghanistan, including a model diversified farm project that operates in six locations in Afghanistan (Paktia, Paktika and Logar provinces). There also is a training farm for Afghans in Pakistan.

IRC-RPA received a \$615,000 grant from O/AID/Rep for period covering September 1991 - September 1992 to help finance the model farms, about 58 percentage of the program's total FY 1991 budget.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN

1. Delivery of seven tractors, valued at \$70,000, was postponed.
2. Delivery of seven dome structures, valued at \$2,500 apiece, was postponed.
3. Purchase of 14 oxen was postponed.
4. RPA seed demonstration program was postponed, missing the entire winter wheat planting season.
5. Model poultry project was postponed.
6. Reforestation and tree-cutting program was postponed.

COPING STRATEGIES:

1. RPA continued to pay staff salaries and operate most of its programs by relying on non-O/AID/Rep donors.

**International Rescue Committee/Rural Assistance Program
(IRC-RAP)**

Interview: Andrew Wilder, coordinator, IRC-RAP

January 21, 1992

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

IRC-RAP is a grant-making, reporting and monitoring project that administers cross-border projects implemented by private voluntary organizations. Most grants provide cash-for-work for irrigation and road repair projects which provide employment and restore rural infrastructure. The other main component of RAP grants is the transportation and distribution of seeds, fertilizers, farm machinery and other agricultural inputs to Afghanistan.

Since its inception in June 1988, RAP has funded 58 grants totalling \$12.62 million through various U.S., European and Afghan organizations.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

1. RAP estimates that 12 projects were affected by the ban. Total funding on the 12 projects was \$2.98 million. (See table on next page and individual grantee reports.)
2. RAP delayed financing approval for five NGO projects which were nearing approval at the time of the ban. Since the lifting of the ban, one new grant agreement has been signed and four are awaiting final US/AID approval, totaling \$335,000.
3. IRC staff said that NGOs were put into awkward position of not being able to fulfill their promises to local leaders. This damaged project credibility since some Afghans assumed local NGOs had stolen the money intended for projects.
4. IRC staff reported that O/AID/Rep and IRC had lost credibility with local communities and many NGOs were directly damaged in terms of support from local communities. RAP is seen as unreliable for failing to live up to its promises.

**IRC-RAP GRANTS AFFECTED BY THE BAN
(Suspended financing)**

CONTRACTOR	PROJECT TYPE	TOTAL DOLLAR AMOUNT	LOCALE
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance.	Irrigation rehabilitation,	\$220,818	Farah
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance.	Irrigations, tractors, seed and fertilizer	\$187,859	Farah Ghor Nimroz
Save the Children, USA	Irrigation, road repair, cash-for-work	\$207,005	Ghazni
Save the Children, USA	Womens' Income Generating (handicrafts)	\$265,949	Ghazni Baghlan Nangarhar
Save the Children, USA	Emergency relief	\$16,000	Nangarhar
ESAR	Karez cleaning	\$57,131	Paktika
Coordination of Afghan Relief	Irrigation, seed, fertilizer	\$213,859	Ghazni
Coordination of Afghan Relief	Irrigation, seed, fertilizer, bees	\$228,709	Ghazni Wardak
AFRANE	irrigation, tractors, seed, fertilizer	\$259,733	Ghazni
Solidarites Afghanistan	Road repair and irrigation work	\$58,122	Wardak
Solidarites Afghanistan	Diversion Dam	\$81,757	Wardak Maidan
Afghanaid	Erosion control	\$201,018	Takhar
APPROX. TOTAL:	\$2.98 million		

Afghanaid

Interviews:

John Humphrey, director
Stuart Worsley, projects officer

January 27, 1992

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

Afghanaid is a British NGO working on agricultural rehabilitation and rural reconstruction programs in six provinces in Afghanistan.

At least 82 percent of its money comes from the Overseas Development Administration. In 1991, Afghanaid received a \$201,000 grant from O/AID/Rep, administered through the IRC-RAP program for wheat seed multiplication, distribution, extension and irrigation projects in Takhur province.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

1. Because Afghanaid operates on the British fiscal year, which runs from April 1 to March 31, it started work on the Takhur project prior to receiving financing approval from IRC-RAP. It was told about the IRC grant in August, two months after the ban had been imposed. At that point, it used ODA funds from other projects (which were canceled for reasons unrelated to the ban) to complete the project in Takhur.

2. The primary impact of the assistance ban, therefore, has been on Afghanaid's planning for 1992. Insofar as O/AID/Rep has decided not to finance any more European NGOs, it remains unclear whether Afghanaid will be eligible to use the grant monies awarded last year that have yet to be spent.

3. Afghanaid staff said that the assistance ban thwarted their efforts to expand their donor base beyond ODA.

AMITIE FRANCO-AFGHANS (AFRANE)

Interview: Shahir Zahine, program manager
January 15, 1992.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

AFRANE is a small French NGO established in 1980 to work for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. AFRANE has karez-cleaning and irrigation, wheat seed multiplication, mechanical training, and riverbank protection projects in Badakhshan, Logar, Herat and Ghazni provinces.

In 1991, AFRANE got \$259,000 from O/AID/Rep administered through the IRC-RAP program. Of that, \$60,000 had been released at the time of the ban. About 60 % of AFRANE's funds come from O/AID/REP.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

1. AFRANE canceled a seed multiplication project that had started in 1990. AFRANE had planned to distribute six to eight metric tons of improved wheat seed to farmers, but had no money to buy back seed from farmers participating in the program.

2. Progress on cleaning 96 karezes was halted due to the ban. AFRANE estimates that each karez serves 40-50 families. AFRANE said that 3,840 - 4,800 families (up to 33,600 individuals) were denied or delayed from the benefits of a rebuilt or cleaned karez -- increased water flow for agricultural land.

3. Each karez-cleaning project employs four laborers, thus AFRANE estimates that 384 Afghans lost employment during to the ban. Half of those were skilled workers who would have made Rs. 100 a day; half were unskilled workers who would have been paid Rs. 50 a day. Assuming 26 working days a month, unpaid wages totalled Rs.3.74 million (\$150,000).

4. River bank protection programs were suspended during the ban. Monetary value of delayed riverbank protection work: Rs.100,000 (US \$4,000).

COPING STRATEGIES:

AFRANE continued to pay its office staff in Afghanistan (23 total) from alternative sources of financing. Road repair work continued using WFP wheat on a food-for-work basis.

Coordination of Afghan Relief (CoAR)

Interview: Engineer Naim, director
January 15, 1992.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

CoAR is an Afghan non-governmental organization created two years ago to promote the reconstruction of infrastructure in Afghanistan. It has projects in Ghazni, Wardak and Logar provinces.

CoAR got \$440,000 from O/AID/Rep, administered through the IRC-RAP program. This is just over half of its total operating budget. Prior the ban, 60 percent of its O/AID/REP funds were released.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

1. Prior to the ban, CoAR planned to repair 100 karezes using RAP cash-for-work and WFP food-for-work. CoAR said that 35 percent of the work was completed during the ban using the WFP component of the project.

2. CoAR estimates that 4 laborers are required to clean one karez. CoAR pays skilled workers RS 100 a day; unskilled workers are paid Rs. 50 a day. Assuming one-third of the work was completed using WFP food-for-work, CoAR estimates approximately Rs. 2.6 million (US \$105,692) in lost or delayed wages during the ban.

3. CoAR plans to purchase 75 tons of improved wheat seed and 187 tons of DAP fertilizer and urea were postponed because of the ban. These will not be purchased this year because the planting season is finished, but CoAR may apply for a no-cost-extension from IRC-RAP to purchase the inputs next year.

4. As a result of the ban, CoAR was only able to purchase 100 of 300 beehives it had planned.

COPING STRATEGIES:

1. CoAR was able to complete 35 percent of its proposed karez-cleaning using the WFP component of its operating budget.

2. Its field staff of 50 people continued to be paid from alternative sources of financing.

Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA)

Interview:

Abdul Salam, director

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

CHA is an Afghan non-governmental organization operating in 150 villages in Farah province in far-western Afghanistan. Its programs are primarily karez-cleaning and agricultural inputs.

It gets \$402,125 from O/AID/Rep, administered through the IRC-RAP program. It also receives money from the Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan and wheat from the World Food Program. O/AID/Rep funds comprise about half of CHA's total budget.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

1. Most of CHA's projects were 90 percent complete when the ban was imposed, thus the impact was primarily on starting new projects because IRC froze approval of new assistance grants.

2. In at least 50 villages (of 150 total), CHA was unable to complete irrigation systems before the ban was imposed. As a result, some farmers from those villages were unable to plant their wheat this season and lost the entire year's crop.

3. Seven people, including one engineer, quit CHA when they were not paid. These people had been trained by CHA, thus experienced manpower was lost with detrimental consequences for future project implementation. However, payments to karez cleaners had been made prior to the ban.

4. Winter floods may ruin some projects that were not completed, wiping out the entire benefit of work done prior to the ban.

5. Local villagers had no access to information so didn't know why the aid was stopped. Some blamed CHA and said they were unreliable. It had a detrimental impact on trust-building process.

COPING STRATEGIES:

Most of the budget was already spent when the ban was imposed. Some additional work continued with WFP wheat as payment.

Save the Children (SCF), U.S.A.

Interviews:

Paul Fishstein, field office director
Art Martin, Peshawar office director
Engineer Patuni Hedayat, Income generating manager

January 17, January 23, 1992

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

Save the Children (US) has agricultural projects in Qandahar, Zabul, Nangarhar and Ghazni provinces as well as income generating projects (handicrafts) in Baghlan, Nangarhar and Ghazni provinces.

Its O/AID/Rep budget, administered through IRC-RAP and the Asia Foundation amounts to \$625,358, or 92 percent of the Peshawar field office budget.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

1. SCF estimates that \$50,000 worth of agricultural and handicraft inputs was not delivered to Afghanistan during the ban -- wheat, chicks, feeders, drinkers, and sewing kits.

2. SCF's poultry project was stalled by the ban, although SCF had signed contracts with potential producers prior to the imposition of the suspension of aid. Only 39 out of 150 families received chicks prior to the ban. The rest of the chicks were sold back to breeders, at a loss of \$96.

3. SCF estimates that 111 families lost income from the suspension of the poultry project. SCF assumes that each family averages 30 rupees a day income from the sale of eggs once chicks are old enough to produce. SCF estimates total wages lost because of the ban was therefore around \$12,000. This amounts to around Rs. 2,700 (US \$110) in lost wages per family.

The ban was felt most severely by SCF's target groups: women, children and the disabled.

4. Around 500 Afghan families quit SCF's income-generating project because handicraft kits were not delivered. Many of these joined projects operated by non-AID/Rep financed organizations.

5. Additional storage costs imposed on SCF due to the ban came to \$709. SCF estimates that three chowkidars quit because they were not paid during the ban.

6. SCF planning operations were hampered because it was left with 60 percent of its project budget unspent and only two

months left in the project contract to spend it.

COPING STRATEGIES:

Pakistan-based work continued and field staff were employed in training programs and planning for future projects.

Solidarites Afghanistan

Interview:

Olivier Rousselle, director

January 27, 1992

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

Afghan Solidarites is a French non-governmental organization the works in infrastructure reconstruction, irrigation repair, mechanization and price stabilization in Qandahar and Wardak provinces of Afghanistan.

At the time of the ban, Solidarites had two projects financed by O/AID/Rep, administered through the IRC-RAP program. The first grant was \$58,122 for road repair; the second grant was \$81,757 for building a diversion dam. About 80 percent of Solidarites total budget came from these two projects.

IMPACT OF THE ASSISTANCE BAN:

1. When the ban was imposed, Solidarites had \$15,000 unspent on its roads project. Work on the diversion dam had not yet started since the ban came just days after Solidarites signed a cooperative agreement with IRC-RAP. Thus, no work was done on the diversion dam.
2. Solidarites was forced to postpone the construction of a diversion dam in Wardak until August 1992 -- more than one year delay. Work must be done between August and November when farmers have harvested their crops and can afford the temporary diversion of rivers and streams while the dam is constructed.
3. Approximately 400 families failed to receive the direct benefits of the diversion dam; Solidarites estimates that 2,000 people would benefit indirectly from the project (better yields, cash invested in local economy, etc.).
3. Solidarites abandoned its road repair projects, sometimes leaving large holes in the road bed that were worse than if work had never started.
4. Solidarites estimates that 140 day laborers lost their income for three months because of the work stoppage.
5. Construction materials, such as cement, wood, and steel, valued at around \$40,000 were not purchased in Afghanistan as planned during the ban.

6. The ban contributed to the possible closing of Solidarites Afghanistan as the halt in the organization's key projects made it difficult to convince other donors to maintain financial support from the home office in Paris.

COPING STRATEGIES:

1. Solidarites Afghanistan has submitted revised budgets to IRC-RAP so that it may complete the two projects in 1992.

2. Solidarites Afghanistan maintained paid salaries for its core professional staff of Afghans by soliciting small donations locally.