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EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

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January, 1975

OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20523

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EVALUATION
OF THE
PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM
USAID/LAOS

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

NOVEMBER 1969

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INTRODUCTION

At the request of the Director of the U.S. AID Mission, a team from the Office of Public Safety conducted an evaluation of the Mission's Public Safety program. The Team was composed of Mr. Lauren J. Goin, Chief of the Operations Division and Mr. Charles Leister, East Asia Branch of that Division, OPS. Study was undertaken on November 6 and the team departed on November 21 after providing oral briefings as to its findings and recommendations to the USAID Director, the Ambassador and members of their respective staffs.

The purpose of the study was set forth in terms of reference (State 176963 October 17, 1969) as follows:

A. Given the role of the Laos National Police (LNP) under the law and the present circumstances in Laos, the team will identify the police strengths and weaknesses to carry their role, and

B. Will examine the achievements made by the Public Safety program toward program objectives, and the utilization of U.S. and Lao resources by the LNP.

Stated in other words, the team attempted to (1) measure where we are now in our police assistance efforts, using the 1965 Walton-Skuse report¹ as a baseline, and (2) determine where we should be going with U.S. aid in this area. Naturally, such a study must be made against the backdrop of the Lao security situation and the LNP role in assuring internal stability and in the context of other U.S. efforts. Directly affecting the consideration of the charter of aid to be provided the police are such factors as:

A. The present and anticipated North Vietnamese, Pathet Lao and Chinese military actions in Laos, including the influence of what happens as the Vietnam war moves in the direction of disengagement, cease fire or peace.

B. In a general sense, the Royal Lao Government (RLG) ability, with U.S. help to its military forces, to cope with expected military pressures.

C. The appropriate role of the LNP given present and anticipated threats to stability, recognizing the influence of the Lao military forces and the military region

¹"A Survey of the Laos National Police," Frank Walton, Paul Skuse, 15 May 1965.

"war lords" on one hand and the RLG need for a democratically oriented civil police institution on the other, and finally the most important.

D. The interests of the United States in the survival of Laos.

It also held discussions with the Director General of Police, Controller Lit Lunammachak, with members of his staff and with various field commanders. Extensive discussions were held with the Chief Public Safety Advisor and his staff.

The Team wishes to express appreciation to those who gave freely of their time and assisted the Team greatly in its study. Without their help the study could not have been concluded.

Geography²

Laos, the only land-locked country in Southeast Asia, is bordered on the north and northeast by Communist China and North Vietnam, on the south by South Vietnam and Cambodia, and on the west by Thailand and Burma. An elongated country, Laos spans almost 650 miles along its northwest-southeast axis. It is widest across the northern third, where it extends just over 300 miles; in the remainder, the width ranges from 60 to 100 miles. With an area of approximately 91,000 square miles, Laos is about the size of Wisconsin and Indiana combined.

Most of Laos is mountainous or hilly; plains are limited to areas bordering the Mekong River and in scattered upland locations. The mountains and hills are highest and most rugged in the north, where they trend generally northeast-southwest and are characterized by rugged peaks and ridges; deep, steep-sided valleys; and numerous small basins. Most peaks in the north range from 4,000 to 7,000 feet in elevation. In the south, the mountains and hills are oriented generally north-south, are discontinuous, and contain peaks ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 feet above sea level.

The Plain of Jars, situated in the rugged highlands about 110 miles north of Vientiane, is mainly gently rolling and grass covered.

Near the southern end of Laos, the Plateau des Bolovens is situated at elevations generally between 3,500 and 4,000 feet. It is a rolling basaltic plateau bordered on the east, south, and west by 1,000 to 3,000 foot high cliffs.

²Quoted from "Southeast Asia Military Fact Book" AP-210-1-6-69-INT, Defense Intelligence Agency, January, 1969.

Rivers in Laos have a maximum flow during September, and flooding of adjacent low-lying areas occurs at times; they have a minimum flow in March or April. The Mekong generally flows between steep, muddy banks. Its high-water level is normally from 25 to 40 feet above the level during the period of minimum flow. This river is 500 to 800 yards wide upstream from Vientiane but widens to between 800 and 1,200 yards downstream from the capital.

The climate of Laos is monsoonal, with a humid, rainy season from mid-May to mid-September (the southwest monsoon) and a relatively dry season from mid-October to mid-March (the northeast monsoon). Mean annual rainfall varies from 40 to 150 inches, with greatest amounts on the southwestern slopes of the mountains of central Laos. Approximately 70 percent of the annual rainfall occurs during the southwest monsoon and less than 10 percent during the northeast monsoon.

The population of Laos is reported officially as of January 1969 as 2,879,000, but probably is more near the 4 million mark according to experienced observers. For additional details, see Annex A.

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The security situation in Laos traditionally seesaws according to the time of the year (wet-dry seasons) and the RLG forces have recently been unusually successful. The Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese forces are counter-attacking in the south as this is written, and it is expected that they will begin their offensive soon to recapture the Plain of Jars.

In the RLG controlled rear areas the Pathet Lao (PL) operated with small guerrilla bands, denying free movement to RLG forces (and U.S. personnel). Countering these elements is the responsibility of the Royal Army Forces (FAR).

The future for Laos seems bleak to the Team -- recognizing that the other side could drive to the Thai border at any time. The question is what will be the Chinese and/or North Vietnamese intentions after a settlement is made of the Vietnamese war.

In any case, the Team sees the police carrying a heavy burden -- and properly so -- during this period.

With regard to the Public Safety Program the Team feels that significant progress has been made since the Walton Survey of 1965 in the area of institutional development of LNP. Relatively, the police have become more professionally able and their capability to carry out their role has improved.

Specifically, the organizational structure of force and some of its administrative procedures have been developed, logistics/supply support services have been vastly improved, capability to perform more effective patrol has been increased, mobility is considerably greater than it was, a country-wide communications system has been put into operation, most of the elements of a training system have been assembled, and the basic steps toward establishment of a modern records and identification system have been taken.

The Team recognized a need for further improvement of the headquarters operation, felt that patrol activities, particularly in Vientiane, were insufficient, and noted the immediate need for technical assistance in the following areas:

1. Training
2. Investigations and management of Judicial Police operations.
3. Records and identification.

The apparent lack of a civil disturbance control capability in LNP was recognized. Leadership in the force is considered weak, with some bright spots in the middle-management levels. Rural patrol has improved, but should be better.

Present program plans call for a continuation of effort toward institutional infrastructure building. These are essential and minor changes in thrust are proposed by the Team.

It is recommended that:

- A. Project goals be rephrased.
- B. The Program methodology emphasize the shift in the advisor's role from essentially operational to advisory.
- C. Third Country Nationals continue to be used to the extent required.
- D. Increased emphasis be given to re-training the police force.
- E. A concerted effort be made to create a merit system for promotions.
- F. Selected commodities be procured to meet emergency needs.
- G. Technical assistance be provided for the Judicial Police and the Special Police.

II. U.S. INTERESTS IN LAOS

With regard to the last mentioned factor mentioned in Chapter I, "The Interests of the U.S. in the Survival of Laos", a RAND team, in studying rural programs, commented recently on the "fluidity" of U.S. policy. The RAND study looked back to 1965 when U.S. efforts in the Southeast Asia area were on the upswing and at today when "the extent and durability of the U.S. security commitment to Southeast Asia is now seriously in question."³ This study went on to paint a bleak picture of the RLG ability to cope with security threats and concluded that "it is now more true than ever that the outcome of the struggle in Laos will not be decided by developments within Laos", and involving the character of settlement that is brought about in the Vietnam war as seen by the North Vietnamese; how the U.S. may be able (politically) to respond to new pressures on the RLG; and whether the U.S. and Soviet Union will perceive a common interest in stabilizing the political situation in Southeast Asia and agree on establishing Laos as a buffer area. Finally, the RAND team sees the next few years as being "one of greater uncertainty than has prevailed in any comparable period in recent Lao history."

The U.S. interest in Laos has been expressed by the USAID in its Country Field Submission along the following lines:

The basic United States interest in Laos is for its continued existence as a neutral and independent state in the face of the Communist threat. In the longer run, U.S. interests lie in strengthening this national entity subsequent to a cessation of hostilities resulting from a negotiated Vietnam settlement.

1. Objectives

A. The maintenance of an independent Laos, neutral and free from external aggression.

B. The establishment of a broad base of popular support for the government, sufficient to assure political stability without undue reliance on the appeal of specific leaders.

³"Rural Programs in Laos—A Mid-1969 Reassessment (U)", Rand Corporation (Heymann and Downell) AR-464-AID, September 1969 (CONF) page 5.

C. To continue demonstrable impact-type economic and social growth, sufficient to maintain popular support for the Government and to provide the basis for long-term development following the cessation of hostilities.

A recent Comptroller General's report on the USAID⁴ expressed U.S. basic interest as:

"The primary objective of the United States in Laos is the protection of that country's independence and neutrality within the framework of the 1962 Geneva Agreements. The security of the Mekong Valley and the greatest possible restriction of Communist use of Laos for infiltration into South Vietnam and Thailand are basic to this objective."

Asian observers met recently in Singapore to contemplate the immediate fate of Southeast Asia after the Vietnam war ends. According to a news report in the Bangkok Post on November 16,⁵ there was a general agreement of view that the North Vietnamese would consider Laos and Cambodia as unfinished business. They concluded that Laos would inevitably fall under the control of the Viet Minh.

According to reports of President Nixon's statements in recent months, during his visit to East Asian countries, and more recently to those attributed to the Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma during his visit to the U.S. in October, the U.S. continues to have objectives as mentioned above. The question, presently raised by some members of Congress, seems not to be as to methodology and the manner of use of U.S. military aid but questioning whether the U.S. should be giving military aid at all. At this writing, a recent clear policy directive regarding U.S. interests and objectives in Laos has not been forthcoming from the National Security Council, although one is expected as a result of NSSM 51.

The Team does not propose to delve deeply into this complicated policy question per se, but notes that it is a vital one that embraces all of the rest of the East Asian countries and is most directly related to U.S. interests, objectives and commitments in and to Thailand.

In yielding to a temptation to speculate as to the future, the Team sees a bleak prospect for the survival of Laos as a viable national entity. Most assuredly the long range goals for the region held by Communist China and North Vietnam have not changed nor show any signs of doing so. After the Vietnam War ends, it is our estimate that communist adventures will sooner or later have Thailand as a target, with Laos and probably Cambodia falling under their control easily.

⁴"Assistance to Laos Administered by the Agency for International Development", Comptroller General of the U.S. (Secret)

⁵"The Turning World" Colin Garratt, The Bangkok Post, Sunday, Nov. 16, 1969.

Laos today does not possess the human resource capability, nor for that matter apparently the will, to go it alone as a democratic country. Its institutions are built on a feudal "war lord" base with the basic interest of the leaders being personal rather than national.

Laos has been able to resist outside military pressures and internal economic and fiscal demands mainly through U.S. help. The U.S. may or may not continue this degree of aid as one part of a new overall policy for Southeast Asia.

In the meantime, whatever can be done to prepare the Lao government to stand alone must be done.

The maintenance of internal stability is essential to meeting present U.S. interests in Laos, as well as elsewhere in the area. The USAID, for example, in its FY 1971 Country Field Submission stated, "foremost consideration in every Mission undertaking in Laos must be security" and a primary element of the Mission strategy is to, "maintain national viability through continued assistance in stability and security oriented activities to the extent required." Consequently, the Team assumes, as does the U.S. Mission according to comments made to the Team, that the present U.S. policy will be sustained, at least in a general sense, and that the police ability to carry its responsibilities effectively is extremely important to meeting U.S. interests.

III. THE THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY

Laos' geographic position makes it either a buffer against or a bridge for Communist expansion into the heart of Southeast Asia. Its present status as a neutral nation has been guaranteed by the 1962 Geneva Agreements, but North Vietnam has violated the basic provisions of the Agreements from the beginning. At Geneva, North Vietnam agreed to stop interfering in the internal affairs of Laos, to withdraw all military personnel from Laos, to refrain from introducing additional military forces into Laos, and to stop using Laos to interfere in the affairs of other nations, i.e., South Vietnam. None of these commitments have been honored. In addition, the Communist Pathet Lao, despite membership in the tripartite Government of National Union, has obstructed all efforts at national reconciliation and territorial reunification.

Since the 1962 Geneva settlement, the war in Laos has been characterized, at least until the last year or so, by Communist advances in the dry season (November to April) and RLG counteroffensives during the rainy season (May to October). This pattern was recently changed, mostly due to General Vang Pao's initiatives in Military Region II and particularly in the vicinity of the Plain of Jars. The area under Communist "control" represents nearly 3/5ths of the country (see Figure 1) with other areas "contested". Most areas for both sides are under nominal control and guerrillas are free to move in the thinly populated countryside.

Initially, the NVA provided "advisors", then found it necessary to cadre PL units and finally had to commit NVA regular units. This pattern has a familiar ring to those who are familiar with South Vietnam and the history of our military effort.

Royal Lao Government forces number some 54,044 regular army (FAR) troops, commanded by Major General Ouan Rathikoun; 6,000 Neutralist troops (FAN), led by Colonel Somphet Sothsavan; and some 36,500 guerrillas.⁷

⁶In May, 1967 U.S. estimates gave the NVA personnel strength in Laos as 12,860 (NIS 43B GSCREV, page 73).

⁷Data as of October 28, 1969. Source: ARMA, Laos.





Figure 1. Map Showing Communist and RLG Controlled Areas.

One additional factor has been introduced that poses a delicate problem to the RLG and ourselves. The Communist Chinese moved south from Yunan Province some months ago and built a four lane highway to Ban Batene. They are now moving southward from Muong Sai and north to Muong La. Two thrusts are being made. One is an all weather road that extends from Ban Batene through Nam Tha and Ban Pheung to Muong Sai and toward Muong Pakbeng practically to the Thai border opposite Chiang Rai Province. The other is a fair weather road down the Nam Beng valley to the Thai border opposite Nan Province. Apparent Chicom intentions are to (a) prepare reliable roadways to the south from China for military purposes (anti-aircraft emplacements now protect portions of the completed road) and (b) establish a link with Route 7 to the east and north and to provide a major supply route extending from Dien Bien Phu in North Vietnam nearly to the Thai border opposite Chiang Rai Province. It is estimated that 6,000 Chinese, 2,000 of whom are armed, are involved in the building of this road.



(TIME, DECEMBER 5, 1969)

Time Magazine, in its December 5, 1969, issue, reported the substance of the information above. It also reported that "A more likely explanation for the road may be that China is planning to step up aid to the Laotian rebels. During the National Day speeches in Peking last October, Laos was moved up several spots on China's list of 'struggling peoples'. Peking now rates it third in importance, after Albania and Viet Nam."

The RLG has been successful in recent months in driving the Communists out of the Plain of Jars, placing this area under the RLG for the first time in nine years. A thrust by the RLG in the south, eastward from Thakhek and toward the Ho Chi Minh Trail was repulsed, but it represented a fresh initiative in this otherwise static area. During the time the study was being made the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops were making successful advances to the west toward Thakhek.

All observers with whom the Team talked concluded that the Communists (principally the North Vietnamese) could overrun Laos at any time if they were willing to accept the resultant high loss of manpower. Thus, the option rests with the other side and the question will be whether they will make this choice after the Vietnam war subsides.

The political life of the country has strong military overtones. The country is divided into five areas called Military Regions⁸ and commanders are extremely powerful "war lords." A military coup is a possibility but would require two or more of the war lords to get together. As far as could be determined, there is little likelihood of this happening in the foreseeable future.

The King exerts considerable influence and it is generally believed that the PL would not attack Luang Prabang because he lives there.

In 1965, foreigners were able to travel by road without undue risk in areas "controlled" by the RLG. Today, this is not possible due to the possibility of PL ambushes. The Team travelled extensively, but always by air with some side trips by boat and automobile. In a strict sense the ability of RLG forces to move in certain areas, such as the Plain of Jars, is better due to recent military successes. To the south the ability of the RLG to move its forces has diminished. Royal Lao military forces and foreigners cannot move freely on the roads, but more important the Lao civilians have been targets of attack as well. Thus, should this trend continue, the ability of the farmer to get his product to market and for produce to move within the country will be impeded to the economic detriment of the population in general. It should be noted, conversely, that the Pathet Lao rear areas are operational areas for RLG guerrilla forces. It must be concluded that the security of the rural areas is correspondingly less than several years ago.

Police are working in the rural areas (2,865 or 52% are stationed outside of the four principal cities) and are assigned to stations in the most populated parts and to police posts. Rural patrol is being carried out with the police on foot patrol in the villages. In some sensitive areas the police patrol outside of the village and visit other settlements.

In the RLG controlled areas, PL teams are levying rice requirements on the farmers and conducting propaganda meetings. If they are challenged, it is by FAR units -- and seldom.

Subversion, in the sense that the PL is engaging in covert intelligence operations, exists with the principal target being Vientiane and probably Lang Xieng, Vang Pao's headquarters at the present time, and other militarily significant areas.

Terrorism and assassinations have been seldom-used weapons by the PL in Vientiane, although it is recognized that they have the capability to do so. Sabotage has been used

⁸Commanders of these regions are:

MR I - Brig. General Tiao Sayavong

MR II - Major General Vang Pao

MR III - Major General Bounpone Maktheparaks

MR IV - Major General Phasouk Somly

MR V - Major General Kouprasith Abbay

Boundaries of the MRs are shown in Figure 1.

recently, when sapper teams blew up the FAR ammunition dump situated 21 kilometers north of Vientiane. Elsewhere, however these tactics are used frequently. For instance, during the last week of November, four civilian vehicles were reported ambushed which resulted in a number of deaths, including a British nurse. During the same week, one assassination and three kidnappings were reported. During one week in December, seven civilian vehicles were reported ambushed. In addition to the ambushes of civilian vehicles, a number of military vehicles were ambushed the same week.

Criminality is a matter of police concern, but principally in the cities. Very little is reported in the rural areas, due probably to, (a) an actual lower crime incidence, (b) poor reporting procedures, and most significantly, (c) village elders and tribal councils deal with criminals themselves without calling on the police. In any event, the Team does not consider criminality as a major threat at this time.

In sum, the threat to internal stability continues to be primarily military in nature, with a coincident threat to rural "rear" areas brought on by PL incursions, ambushes, political meetings and harassment of the people. The USAID assumes⁹ "that security conditions will continue to be uncertain for the foreseeable future, possibly even for a considerable period after a negotiated settlement in Vietnam." The Team endorses this assumption with a nod to those who speculate that the situation may get worse after the Vietnam question is resolved at the peace table in Paris.

⁹The Country Field Submission - FY 1971.

IV. THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

History

Assistance to the Royal Lao Government started in 1955 after an extensive survey, conducted at the request of the RLG, by Mr. Byron Engle, consultant to the aid agency at that time, the Foreign Operations Administration. This program continued until 1961 or for a period of just over five years. During that period Chief Advisors Paul Skuse and, later, Jack Ryan submitted detailed plans for the development of a Lao National Police.

In 1965 the RLG requested the U.S. to re-institute its police assistance program and a new survey was conducted by Frank Walton, Paul Skuse and Wendell Motter of the Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development. As a consequence of this study the Public Safety program as it now exists was started and Paul Skuse assigned as Chief Advisor.

Program Documentation

The Walton report¹⁰ is used herein as a base line against which the Evaluation Team has made measurements of accomplishments of the project. Readers are directed to it for greater detail regarding background and the situation existing in April and May of 1965. This report will be necessarily brief regarding much of the history and background information which has not changed since that time.

During the 1956-1961 time period considerable progress was made in the development of an effective Lao National Police (LNP). Fragmented law enforcement agencies were consolidated into a single national police force; a headquarters staff was organized; a training academy was built and more than 600 policemen were given basic police training; 838 participants were sent to the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia for training. The U.S. Government provided nine American police advisors and four Third Country Nationals (TNC) contract technicians. Commodity support included weapons, vehicles, training aids and telecommunications equipment. After General Phoumi Nosavan's take-over in January 1961, the LNP was absorbed by the Directorate of National Coordination (DNC), a paramilitary organization in the Ministry of Defense, and the USAID project was discontinued. The U.S. assistance program from 1955 to 1961 had cost \$1.9 million plus the equivalent of \$12.8 million in local currency.

As Walton noted earlier, little doubt exists that the police suffered professionally and in the eyes of the public after it had been formed into the notorious Department

¹⁰Op. cit.

of National Coordination. For all practical purposes it ceased to function in August of 1960 and deteriorated thereafter into a repressive force responsible to Phoumi Nosavan. The LNP in 1965 was in a state of almost complete disorganization – stripped of its equipment by a number of raids and requisitions by the military, its records destroyed, and its facilities destroyed, preempted or deteriorated. It was necessary, therefore, to start from scratch in instituting the new Civil Police Assistance Program.

The present program began in July 1965. The first Project Agreement was signed on June 28 of that year (No. 5072) and obligated \$900,000 for commodities. The purpose of the program was stated to be for, “. . . . developing and improving the civilian LNP and to establish the respective undertakings and obligations of the parties, including the necessary procedures for the implementation of this Agreement.” It went on to state that AID would:

- Provide advisors, number to be determined.
- The Chief Advisor will assign advisors’ duty posts.
- Provide training in U.S., including travel and per diem, and in third countries.
- Provide materiel and equipment, and consider this for future years—types to be set forth in subsequent agreements.

And that the Laotian Government would:

- Permit advisors to travel freely; furnish transportation.
- Propose qualified candidates for training.
- Provide personnel for in-country training.
- Maintain vehicles and other equipment furnished by the agreement—provide POL and operating supplies.
- Consult with the Chief Public Safety Advisor (CPSA) on budget preparation.
- Consult with CPSA on all matters of major policy—and to develop long-range plans for the improvement of the LNP.
- Release from the counterpart special account, local currency (Kip) needed to support agreement purpose.

The Project Agreement for FY 1966, with revisions, provided for dollars and kip to implement the project, but no narrative description of its objectives.

The Agreement for FY 1967 set forth the project objectives as follows:

Long Range Objective: The overall objective of this project is to provide assistance to the Lao National Police in developing a modern efficient police organization capable of maintaining law and order and combating subversive elements, and to train its personnel in democratic concepts of responsible police administration. (page 2 of 6)

FY 1967 Objectives:

1. Strengthen LNP senior officer abilities to manage police force resources, supervise operations, and train personnel in various specialized fields.
2. Improve the training facilities at the Lao National Police Academy at Done Nounne and continue to develop the curricula.
3. Augment the police capability to control civil disturbances.
4. Assist the police in setting up small arms ammunition reloading and small arms repair facilities.
5. Assist the police in setting up pistol range facilities.
6. Assist the police in the field of logistics and supply.
7. Assist the police in carrying out their essential duties in patrol and transportation functions.
8. Strengthen, and expand the LNP communications system.
9. Assist the police in establishing a modern records and identification system.
10. Assist the police in improving border control capabilities.
11. Assist the police in developing techniques of intelligence collection, evaluation and dissemination.

It went on to specify how the specific objectives were to be implemented. It will be noted that none of the "specific" objectives are actually spelled out and those announced merely reflect functional areas where program resources were focused.

There was no ProAg narrative for FY 1968 and the FY 1969 Agreement (No. 9072, signed on November 16, 1968) provides, by Revision 6, a repetition of the long range goal mentioned above as a description of project objectives. The FY 1970 Agreement deals with the subject of objectives in the same manner.

The USAID's Non-Capital Project Paper (PROP) deals with the description of project goals as follows:

Objectives:

The objectives of this activity are to develop a police organization capable of maintaining law and order and combating subversive elements, and to train its personnel in democratic concepts of responsible and humane police administration.

Work Plan:

In order to accomplish the objectives of this Activity, the following targets were selected:

1. Training of LNP personnel.
2. Upgrading Telecommunications.
3. Providing Police Mobility.
4. Establishment of Automotive Maintenance and Vehicle Control Program.
5. Establishment of Firearms Training, Ordnance Repair and Ammunition Reloading Program.
6. Strengthening of Special Police Operations.
7. Improvement of Identification and Records System.
8. Upgrading LNP Patrol Operations.
9. Improvement in Management of LNP Logistics and Supply Operations.

The Project Implementation Plan (PIP) is more revealing in the area of communications and describes building construction required, but otherwise briefly deals with other objectives as above.

The Team is of the opinion that the generally stated long-range objective described for the program is appropriate. But, it would propose more specificity in the description of discrete targets, allowing for the necessary flexibility in scope to permit the USAID to seize upon development opportunities unforeseen at the time the Agreement is drafted.

Program Resources

It was recommended in 1965 that the program be authorized a six man staff and a secretary. At the present time a five man staff is authorized which includes a Chief Advisor and Advisors in communication, logistics/automotive maintenance, general policing and investigations. The investigations position is presently vacant. For the life of the project, 18 man years of advisory effort have been provided to date (see Figure 2). Due to the staff's small size, all advisors have had to "double in brass" -- for example, the generalist, also the program assistant and is advising the police on training, and the auto maintenance advisor works in three functional areas (see Annex B for a time analysis). The program has been able to function through the use of Third Country Nationals (TCN) from Thailand and some locally hired personnel (see Figure 3). Without the use of these personnel the staff would have had to be doubled, at least, to achieve the same gains.

The Team found that each of the advisors had assumed an operational role in the process of bringing about project accomplishments. Directions are given to "counterparts" and supervisory steps taken to see that they're carried out. The Chief Advisor and his staff recognize that the Lao police leaders should have taken on the burden of administration and management, but believe they are unable to at the present time. The staff agrees that if the usual advisor-counterpart relationship had been relied upon at the outset, practically nothing would have been accomplished.

The USAID Program Officer stated that the operational role of the Public Safety staff is not peculiar to this functional area, but is common to other USAID technical efforts also.

The Team believes that now is the time to place greater emphasis on the transfer of administrative and functional responsibilities to the Lao police commanders. Such a move would have to take place over a period of time, but a "desk next to desk" method should be the most productive. The Public Safety Division has been moving in this direction through the establishment of a logistics system, manned and led by Lao police and in other ways.

A word of caution. It is certain, in the Team's judgment, that the transfer must be gradual and an extended presence of the U.S. advisor will be needed lest the "system" regress to the "old way". In some cases, it may be possible eventually to continue the

No.	POSITION TITLE	CY-65		CY-66		CY-67		CY-68		CY-69		CY-70														
		J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	
1.	Public Safety Officer																									
2.	Deputy Public Safety Officer																									
3.	Public Safety Advisor (Investigation)																									
4.	Public Safety Electronics Specialist Telecommunications																									
5.	Equipment Advisor (Auto)																									
6.	Public Safety Program Assistant																									

Figure 2. Bar Chart – Public Safety Staffing – Direct Hire Advisors.

POSITION TITLE	CY-65		CY-66		CY-67		CY-68		CY-69		CY-70	
	JFMAMJ	JASOND										
Secretary (Translator/Interpreter)-VT NAGARAJAN, Ramassamy ^{1/}												
Maintenance Technician II-VT (Automotive) FEANG FOONG, Sopon												
Maintenance Technician II-VT (Automotive) VACANT												
Telecommunications-VT Specialist II SANGSANA, Pinit												
Radio Technician-PS NOPACCOON, Choosak												
Radio Technician-SK NOSONGKLA, Chalard												
Electronics Technician II-LP WORRAYOS, Pinyo												
Maintenance Technician I-VT Generator Operation Supervisor JAREONPONG, Supat												
Ordnance Technician I-VT SUNGNETRA, Chupongse												
Logistics Technician-VT PORNOPON, Supanchart												
Logistics Technician-VT CHITTEHANG, Vivath												
Master Mechanic-VT/A BERTOUX, Michel J. ^{6/}												
Logistics Technician II-VT/P PHALATYOTHA, Xiene												
Supply Assistant-VT/A KEOVANNALA, Simorn												
Administrative Assistant-VT/T VACANT ^{7/}												
Secretary-VT/A VACANT ^{7/}												
Custodian-VT/P												
Custodian-VT/A												

- ^{1/} Commenced employment USAID/PSD Feb. 2, 1959.
^{2/} Position vacant. Recruitment in process.
^{3/} Position scheduled for phase out, however, as request for a
^{4/} year extension is pending approval.
^{5/} Position scheduled for phase out.
^{6/} Incumbent resigned.
^{7/} Employment covered by a special contract.
^{7/} Programmed increase not yet approved.

Source: PIP-1969.

- VT - Incumbent operating from Vientiane.
LP - Incumbent operating from Vientiane.
PS - Incumbent operating from Vientiane.
SK - Incumbent operating from Vientiane.
VT/A - Vientiane Automotive maintenance project.
VT/P - Vientiane Public Safety main office.
VT/T - Vientiane, Lao National Police (LNP) training project.

Figure 3. Public Safety Staffing - Third Country Nationals and Local Hire Employees.

momentum of development without U.S. direct-hire aid, perhaps with Thai Third Country Nationals. This will have to be assessed with care on a case-by-case basis.

Training of the Lao policemen is a high priority task and is considered to be a most important element in the program. It therefore, receives a high priority in the allocation of funds. A.I.D. funded training is being conducted locally, in Third Countries (especially Thailand), and in the United States. A summary of training provided by category is given in annex C. Also see pp. 25 through 26.

Program: Observations and Conclusions

Starting from scratch to rebuild the LNP in 1965 required a relatively high input of commodities. To date, \$1.9 million has been provided for this purpose through FY 1969 and an additional \$251,000 is planned for FY 1970. Table I gives the breakdown of commodity costs, as well as for other resources for the program to date and projects these through FY 1970 under present planning. For Mission planning through FY 73, see annex D.

As described above, the objectives of the program have been generally stated. Measuring the degree of completion of each of these, therefore, presents some difficulty. With reference to the Walton survey recommendations, however, the Team estimates a considerable measure of accomplishment has been realized in a relatively short time. Table II give the Team's comments in this regard.¹¹

In general, the thrust of the Public Safety program has been to develop a national police organization out of the nearly hopeless situation that the Walton team found in the spring of 1965. The effort was a classic one in institution building and some remarkable gains have been made. This has been the result of good program leadership and management and the willingness of the USAID to commit resources on a timely basis for the most part.

Dollar savings have been realized by the program. Through effective management and strict procurement practices, the cost of spare parts for police vehicles has been reduced by approximately \$45,000. Due to these effective management and procurement practices, expenditures for replacement vehicles has also been reduced by \$30,000. This represents a total savings of approximately \$75,000 of budgeted Public Safety funds for FY 1970.

¹¹Attention is directed to Chapter V, which describes the strengths and weaknesses of the Lao National Police as seen by the Team. Details as to the underpinnings of the police institution—communications, mobility and logistics—are given in this Chapter. Annex E presents abstracts of the Project Appraisal Report, prepared by the USAID in January of this year. (1969)

TABLE I
Direct U.S. Support (Dollar funding)
\$ 000 U.S.

<u>FY</u>	<u>U.S. Personnel</u>	<u>TCN</u>	<u>Participant TNG</u>	<u>Commodities</u>	<u>Other Cost</u>	<u>Total</u>
1955 - 1961 (Closed) ...	\$ 497,600.00	\$ -	\$184,100.00	\$1,139,500.00	\$ 62,500.00	\$1,883,700.00
1965	-	-	-	900,000.00	-	900,000.00
1966	106,000.00	(1,400.00) ^{1/}	60,000.00	382,000.00	9,000.00	557,000.00
1967	108,000.00	14,000.00	105,000.00	295,000.00	132,000.00	654,000.00
1968	143,000.00	33,000.00	47,000.00	189,000.00	88,000.00	500,000.00
1969	118,000.00	35,000.00	55,500.00	165,000.00	89,000.00	466,500.00
1970 ^{2/}	168,000.00	37,000.00 ^{3/}	70,600.00	251,000.00	201,000.00	632,600.00
Grand Total	\$1,140,600.00	\$119,000.00	\$522,200.00	\$3,325,500.00	\$486,500.00	\$5,594,800.00

^{1/} Charged to general technical support.

^{2/} Current project funding.

^{3/} Includes \$3,000.00 for a TCN short term consultant.

TABLE II

WALTON RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the U.S. Government provide assistance to a Laos National Police Force of 5000 men (about 4500 Laos National Police and about 500 Neutralist Police) in the form of Technical Advisors, Contract Personnel, Commodities, Participant Training and Supplementary Budget Assistance.
2. That the program of assistance be phased with a modest number of advisory personnel, commodities, etc. the first year in order that the RLG viability and performance may be closely observed. First year emphasis should be on the re-establishment of the Headquarters and staff sections on a sound foundation.
3. That, if successful during this first phase, the program continue into the second and third phases with an increasing number of advisors. Second and subsequent years emphasis would be on development of police presence and police services in the villages.
4. Special attention should be directed at training, the development of a Central Records and Identification Unit, and the development and installation of a police telecommunication network on a phased basis.
5. First phase of the police telecommunication network should provide Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Savannakhet, and Pakse City Police service as well as a network connecting LNP Headquarters with the police of each of the Provincial Headquarters, including the Neutralist Police.
6. Following phases should provide province to district service followed by district to village and to mobile units.
7. Until such time as the Neutralist Police are merged with the LNP, it is recommended that force be treated as a provincial sub-division of the LNP and provided the same support as is provided a comparable LNP sub-division.

TEAM COMMENTS:

1. In the Process. The program began in September 1965 although funds were obligated earlier by means of ProAg No. 5072.
2. In the Process. Advisory assistance continues to be modest. A continued emphasis is being given to the development of headquarters staff sections. This effort will be a continuing one to some degree for the life of the program.
3. In the Process. The development of staff functions has proceeded to the point where other things can be done—and have been done. The advisory staff remains at one less than proposed in the survey. Police services are being provided in the rural areas.
4. In the Process. The training objective and the Records and Identification objective are about half completed, while the initial plan for a communications network is completed.
5. Completed.
6. Completed to the extent that security permits.
7. Completed. Integration of the Neutralist Force occurred in two phases; 400 officers being absorbed per Decree No. 250 of 26 June 1967 and 300 officers per Decree No. 373 of 29 September 1967. The remainder of the force, by a Decree process, was returned to the Army.

TABLE II (Continued)

<u>WALTON RECOMMENDATIONS:</u>	<u>TEAM COMMENTS:</u>
8. It is most strongly recommended that local currency be provided for the purpose of constructing a National Police Headquarters -- and a National Police Training Academy.	8. Completed. A new Lao National Police Headquarters has been built, with the use of RLG funds only. It is expected that the Police Academy will be completed by the end of CY 1970. Three principal buildings have already been completed for the Academy.
9. It is recommended that the LNP improve, expand and intensify their civic action program by organizing and directing the program at the LNP Headquarters level.	9. In the Process. Some effort has been devoted to civic action, especially in training programs.
10. It is recommended that an Internal Affairs Division be formed in the LNP - this Division to be charged with the responsibility to promptly and fully investigate every allegation charging misconduct of any kind on the part of any member of the LNP. The formation of this new Division should be widely publicized and the filing of legitimate complaints encouraged.	10. Not Started. Initial overtures to LNP leaders met resistance with the conclusion that, while such a move is vital for the LNP, present circumstances indicate little chance for its success.

The repair of M-1 and M-2 carbines represents a considerable savings to both the United States and Royal Lao Governments. Since the inception of the Firearms Ordnance operation on June 18, 1967, a total of 533 carbines have undergone major repair. The average repair cost per carbine is \$30.36. In comparison to replacement cost of \$77.00 each, this represents a savings of \$22,941.

The ammunition reloading operation has developed the capability to reload an average of 600,000 rounds of ammunition per year. This creates a savings of \$8,820.00 when compared to the purchase of the factory reloaded ammunition.

The Team sees the present police institution as having a reasonably adequate mobility, communications and logistics infrastructure, with generally poor LNP leadership in most elements. Gains that have been made in these areas are sustained by the efforts of U.S. advisors and Thai technicians. National Police leadership, in general, is weak -- for example, the Director General Lit Lunammachak, has been in office for over a year, but has not travelled outside of Vientiane. His first trip was to Sam Thong with the Evaluation Team.

On the other hand the Team met with some very competent younger officers, such as the Province Police Chiefs at Paksan, Thakck and Pakse, who obviously command

their personnel well. The Chief of Police at Paksan, to illustrate the awareness of some younger officers of the police role, has developed a plan to "help the people carry out their development efforts". His plan has as its objectives: "a) crime prevention, b) obtain information on subversives and their activities, c) deny popular and material support to the Pathet Lao, and d) improve the image of the police in the eyes of the public by acting as teachers for the children and by helping the farmers with their crops." He also intends to conduct training classes for the police in his command, emphasizing training as a means by which his plan's objectives can be reached.

Specific gains toward various project goals have been made.

Training: Since 1965 the U.S. has provided for training of various kinds. Forty two key officers have been trained in the English and French General Courses at the International Police Academy in Washington; 112 have been trained in third countries (Thailand and Malaysia principally) and 1,122 have been trained in-country (see Annex C). A central training complex at Done Moune just north of Vientiane will be completed with the construction of two more major buildings (scheduled during FY 70), but even now can accept students. To complete the training complex, additional buildings will have to be constructed. Plans exist for the construction of a gymnasium, a maintenance building, a new perimeter road around the back of the "groupe scolaire" building, the installation of a fire hydrant system and for grading and drainage of the grounds. With the availability of funds, this additional construction could be completed in FY 1971 or early in FY 1972.

The Public Safety Staff has developed training plans over the years and has used these in working with the LNP staff toward the development of an institutional capability for training all ranks of the police. Much needs to be done in this area.

Regular NCO refresher training has been suspended for sixteen months pending completion of new classroom/barracks buildings. However, other in-service specialized training continued during this same period of time even though conditions were far from ideal. One Public Safety advisor now devotes a minor portion of his time to this activity and another handles participant training as an added responsibility.

The availability of training resources in Thailand has been especially valuable in developing a level of competence on the part of the LNP in several aspects. This training has involved LNP personnel in fields of records and identification, photography, firearms training, ammunition reloading, basic communications and generator maintenance and criminal investigations. To the extent that adequate courses covering these and other necessary areas cannot be developed for the LNP training Center, the Thai resources should be drawn upon.

While considerable progress has been made in training LNP members since late 1965, the Team believes that a greater effort is now needed. The Training Center is well enough developed to allow an additional 50 - 100 students to attend with some crowding.

It is urgent that the Lao policeman, at all levels, be given refresher training to upgrade individual quality. The urgency stems from the Team's feeling that the police must have even a greater role to play within the next few years if Laos is to have a reasonable chance at becoming a viable nation.

Specific accomplishments in training have been:

A. U.S. Training

Since reestablishment of the Public Safety Program, 42 LNP officers have been trained at the AID/OPS International Police Academy (IPA) in the United States as of November 1969. One policeman has completed an 18 month course in Electronics Systems at RCA Institute, New York, and another policeman is presently enrolled in the same program which he will complete in November 1970.

During FY 1970, 12 LNP officers will attend courses at the IPA. Projected U.S. training at IPA for FY 1971 through FY 1973 is anticipated to be approximately 36 LNP officers at a cost of about \$120,000.

B. Third Country Training

From FY 1965 to date, AID has sponsored the training of 112 LNP personnel in Thailand in various special fields of police operations. Training for 56 more participants has been programmed for FY 1970 funding. From 1965 to date, three officers received training in Malaysia under joint U.S.-British sponsorship. In FY 1971 through FY 1973, the USAID plans to train approximately 65 LNP officers and non-coms in Thailand at an estimated cost of \$38,600.

C. Local Training

The LNP has conducted training programs locally for 1,122 policemen and policewomen, non-commissioned officers and cadet officers during the past three years. Eighty-five cadet officers are currently in training at the Police Academy.

The USAID has also sponsored a number of local training programs for LNP personnel including English language training, vehicle, radio and generator maintenance; mathematics; typewriting; stock records; warehouse operations and procedures; use of AID supplied equipment; fire-fighting; etc. This training has involved both classroom and on-the-job training. To date, 333 LNP personnel have completed these specialized training courses and 167 are currently undergoing training.

Mobility: The project has provided adequate bicycles, jeeps and trucks to meet the present transportation needs of the police. At the present time, vehicles provided earlier are approaching the age of being uneconomical to repair and should be replaced. Project plans through FY 1973 include costs for a replacement program. A maintenance and repair facility has been constructed, personnel trained and a management system installed. It is significant to note that this effort was delayed due to an attempt to have police vehicles repaired by the Public Works garage (Travaux Publique) as a Mission policy. This was found to be unworkable and the present USAID Director authorized a change in policy to allow the development of this capability within the LNP. The present motor maintenance Public Safety advisor arrived only in July, 1968, but has made visible, concrete steps forward in this relatively short period.

The present system for distribution of POL utilizes a coupon book and calls for an LNP administrator (Chief of Supply, "Service de L'Intendance") to distribute these within the force. The net result is that many are misused or sold. The budget for POL is about 25 million Kip with 21 million of this retained in the capital and the balance sent to the provinces. Of 129 vehicles in the police inventory, 75 are in Vientiane. A study conducted by the Motor Maintenance advisor revealed that actual POL needs for those vehicles assigned to Vientiane could be met at a cost of about 11 million Kip. Police officers commented to the Team that use of vehicles and generators was hampered because of a lack of fuel.

Although the USAID does not provide funds for POL for the police, the Chief Advisor has recognized current practices as hindering the effective operation of the force and as an indicator of poor administrative supervision. He has presented a copy of the Motor Maintenance Advisors study, referred to above, to the Director of the police with suggestions for improvement.

Due to initiative on the part of the project Chief Advisor, a low cost boat building program has yielded dramatic results. Thirteen boats of a local design were built in Laos at a cost of about \$200 each and equipped with a motor costing about \$100 (see Figure 4). These have provided a means of transportation on the Mekong River, which, in the absence of roads, filled a key need. Police carpenters, using donated lumber and in some cases USAID contributed cement and roofing, have established several police posts for villages along the upper reaches of the river.

Communications: The project action plan has been that set forth in the Walton Study and designed by OPS Telecommunications' Engineer Wendell Motter. Basic communications equipment, which arrived in the spring of 1966, has provided a capital-to-province headquarters link, at least for the RLG controlled portion of the country. Fourteen stations are involved in this net and were found to be working reliably. Intra-province networks have been installed, embracing 46 VHF-FM and 48 SSB radios. Not




Figure 4. Locally constructed police boats for use on the Mckong River.

all of these have been installed according to the original plan due to a shift in the security situation (12 units), one set was captured by the Pathet Lao and four have been shifted to other needs.

In remote areas, generators are installed to provide power of the charging of wet-cell storage batteries. The practice used is for the various stations to monitor a schedule, which means that except for the scheduled times, the set is off the air and the station cannot be reached. Reasons for this given to the Team were (a) inadequate number of operators for a 24 hour watch, (b) lack of fuel for the generator, and/or (c) "running the radio all of the time would wear it out." If an "alert" should be declared the radios are then monitored continuously.

In sum, a communications network has been established for both urban and rural policing; some police have been trained as operators and repairmen and training for more is planned; and maintenance facilities have been built in Vientiane, Pakse and Luang Prabang. All of this has been in accord with the basic system designed in 1965. The Team believes that a fresh look should be taken at Police communications' needs in the

more sensitive areas. For example, in Sam Thong, south of the Plain of Jars and especially on the Plain itself, the police posts were unable to communicate by radio and had to rely on written messages passed by hand (usually via aircraft pilot who would be working the area). The Team proposes that four stand-by emergency packages be procured embracing one base station and ten tactical units. One or more of these should be made up of VHF-FM OPS-FM-5 and FM-1 units and the balance should be composed of HF-SSB equipment.

Logistics: With a relatively large commodity input by the program in FY 1965 and 1966, meticulous care was exercised by the PSD staff in keeping detailed program records. The records system devised then evolved into one that could (and should) be used by the LNP for accountability and budgetary preparation purposes. The program has developed an excellent example of technical assistance leading to institution building. At the present time, program and LNP records are kept side by side, using the same system. National policewomen, led by an LNP Lieutenant, staff the office and are assisted by a Thai technician. A significant, preplanned campaign is being made to transfer the burden of responsibility for administering the logistics system to the LNP.

The Team sees this as a welcome move, but believes that at least a Thai technician and probably a U.S. advisor will have to keep close touch with this activity for the immediate future. Regarding the system itself, the Team found it to be very effective and probably as efficient as any manual system that is used in any Public Safety program, if not more so.

Ordnance Repair and Ammunition Reloading: A capability has been developed for repair of handguns, carbines and some other weapons in the police inventory. The project has provided a total of 3,169 weapons of standard police type, consisting principally (2,957) of .38 caliber revolvers (see Annex F for details and information regarding distribution). Over six hundred of the latter still remain in the warehouse and the Chief Advisor states that these will not be distributed until the individual officer is able to qualify in the use of the weapon on the firing range. Ammunition reloading is being carried out at a capability rate of 50,000 rounds per month. This is considered adequate for all training and operational needs at the present time. United States support will be required for the time being for the procurement of spare parts, brass, lead, primers and powder.

Identification and Records: A records system based on the ten finger Henry classification has been developed and over 41,000 prints are on file. The program utilized a Thai technician for the provision of technical advice and LNP personnel were trained in Thailand. The system has barely started and its value has not been realized by the LNP as yet nor is adequate LNP supervision provided to ensure follow-up on operational procedures. Additional technical aid is needed in this area.

Special Police: The capability of this, the intelligence element of the police, is reported as good and to have good leadership. A records system has been established and personnel have been trained in Special Police operations. Just over three man years of technical assistance has been provided, ending about five months ago with the transfer of the advisor to other duties. Agent networks have been developed which have led to advance intelligence such as the forewarning of the successful PL sapper attack on the army ammunition dump near Vientiane. However, the army discounted this information and took no precautions.

Past technical assistance has been effective and training programs provided yearly by TDY specialists, have been worthwhile. In order to sustain the development of the Special Police, technical assistance is needed in two general areas, substantive police administration and management, and intelligence operations. The Mission plans to provide expertise in the latter area. A significant degree of advisory assistance should continue to be provided in the area of police administration.

Patrol Operations: The Team was unable to observe much in the way of urban patrol operations in the capital. This, in spite of devoting one day and night to the study of this question. The organization of the Metropolitan Police is adequate, but the execution of preventive patrols falters. Public Safety assistance has been provided the police in the area of patrol operations. For example,

1. At the request of the Chief Advisor, the British conducted a special training course in Patrol Operations and Radio Dispatchers duties in Malaya in September 1968.
2. The four LNP officers, who attended the International Police Academy General Course No. 22, were given a four weeks specialization course in Patrol Operations.
3. In February 1969, six high-ranking officers from the Vientiane Metropolitan Police spent 2 weeks in Bangkok studying Patrol Operations at the invitation of the Thai National Police. Expenses were shared by the LNP and the Thai National Police.
4. Ten selected junior officers and NCOs from Vientiane Metropolitan Police were sent to Bangkok in June 1969 for a four weeks course in Patrol Operations.
5. PSD has provided the Vientiane Metropolitan Police with six radio-equipped vehicles especially designed for patrol operations. Also provided were 90 bicycles with the understanding that they would be used for patrol. PSD provided a radio base station, trained dispatchers and also provided some plywood and other materials to set up a dispatchers room.
6. Public Safety Advisors have ridden in the patrol cars and have conducted critiques with the supervising officers.

The problem seems to be not so much that the U.S. effort has fallen short, but that the LNP has demonstrated inefficiency and poor leadership.

Rural patrolling is more prevalent, with the police assigned to posts patrolling in the villages and reportedly, in the surrounding area. This represents a security rather than a crime-prevention purpose since criminality in rural areas is not a major problem. These patrols serve to obtain information on Pathet Lao activities and to bring the principal extension of government to the people. One senior police official told the Team that the police officer in the village is not attacked by the PL for fear of alienating the people. Information obtained by the police patrol is usually of PL activities after the fact and is passed to his superior, up to the Province Police Chief and then to the Chief of the Special Police. At the same time this information is given to the army commander in the area, who has primary responsibility for countering PL actions. The program has devoted relatively little in the way of advisory assistance to these functions per se. The Chief Advisor and, to a lesser extent, the members of his staff, work with Provincial Police Chiefs relative to rural patrolling during trips out of the capital. The major contribution by the program toward improved rural policing has been in helping to meet the mobility and communications needs in many cases.

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William H. Littlewood

Date: 1/14/91

James L. Harper

Director

XA/PI

U.S.A.I.D.

V. THE LAO NATIONAL POLICE AS AN INSTITUTION

The Role of the LNP

The role and organizational structure of the National Police of Laos is set out in Royal Decree (Order in Council) No. 375 (as amended) promulgated December 7, 1965, by which the organization is held responsible for "maintenance of public security, execution of laws and regulations, and maintenance of order in collaboration with the Armed Forces and public services of the Kingdom." (See Annex G).

The specific missions and tasks of the LNP, generally, remain the same as outlined in the Walton survey.¹²

Decree No. 375 has been amended by the following orders:

No. 94 (Ordonance Royale) of 26 April 1966 which shifted authority (to appoint certain LNP commanders) from the Director General to the Minister of Interior;

No. 404 of 24 October 1968 which requires that candidates for promotion to positions in the highest levels of command in the LNP be nominated from the ranks of the LNP;

No. 360 of 26 September 1967 which revises the chart of organization set out in the original decree.

Additional basic directives are given in the following two orders:

No. 377 of 7 December 1965 in which uniform and insignia requirements are prescribed;

No. 343 of 26 October 1967 which establishes the LNP rank structure, salary schedule and promotion procedures and requirements.¹³

¹²Op. Cit., pages 43-4.

¹³This Decree supercedes Decree No. 376 of 7 December 1965.

By this series of decrees, the LNP is placed within the Ministry of Interior and a definite chain of command is constructed from the Ministry directly down through the Director General of National Police to Provincial (Khoueng), District (Muong) and finally sub-district or canton (Tasseng) police units. A chain of responsibility upward, uninterrupted via the same route, is implied.

The Team found, however, that allegiance on the part of provincial police to the Chao Khoueng (Province Governor) and the regional military commander is a predominant factor affecting the function of the police as a national institution. Furthermore, the "kings" of Laos, principally the recognized king, Savang Vatthana, who formerly was king of Luang Prabang in the north; and Bounum Champassak, now referred to as "prince" who was at one time king of the Sedone-Champassak area in the south, wield extreme influence in the selection and assignment of government officials -- including the police. This factor is predominant to that of the war lords of the five regions. The net effect is that normal procedures of institutional management and operation are set aside in favor of the old, practically feudal way.

In theory, provisions in the joint directive of 18 August 1964 referred to in the Walton survey,¹⁵ which places provincial police under the Chao Khoueng, were abrogated by Decree No. 375.¹⁴ In actuality, the spirit of the joint directive is still respected. Furthermore, provisions for martial law remain and, indeed, are in force in practically all parts of the country.

The Team found some indications that this dual responsibility of the province Chief of Police is a problem at present, especially regarding the assignment of personnel. The situation opens the possibility that an ambitious Governor or regional commander could exercise an undesirable degree of control over the police of his jurisdiction.

Operationally, the role of the urban police is to provide conventional civil police services, and that of the rural force is, mainly, to provide a point of contact between the citizen and his government.

General Police Organization

The present organization of the Lao National Police (Figure 5) reflects some changes that have taken place since the Walton-Skuse study in 1965.¹⁶ The effect of these

¹⁴Several high ranking police officers state that Decree No. 375 does not abrogate the old directives which place the provincial police under the authority of the Chao Khouengs. They further state that at the recent three week seminar (held in November 1969), which was attended by all Chao Khouengs, provincial police commanders and army commanders, it was emphasized that the Chao Khoueng is the senior Government official in the province and that all other Government officials are subordinate to him and subject to his orders. The police say that, if a Chao Khoueng gives an illegal order to a provincial chief of police, the latter can appeal up through police administrative channels to the Minister of Interior for a decision.

¹⁵Op. Cit., pages 41-42.

¹⁶Op. Cit., page 62.




Figure 5. Organization of the Lao National Police.

changes has been to move certain functions into a Division status and to broaden the span of control. New Divisions have been formed for Communications Service, Logistics and Support Service, Health Service, Material Service and Suburban Police Service. Two of these were formerly under the General Secretariat as subordinate elements (Communications and Health) and the others represent innovations.

Under the present organization the span of control is broad, where 12 Division Chiefs report directly to the Director General or his Deputy. Reporting directly to the Director General has been the custom in the Lao police for years, regardless of how the organizational chart was drawn and in fact today extends to officers below the chiefs in the chain of command.

To some extent the nature of the added Divisions suggests the character of development of the force and is aligned with the Public Safety Program's objectives. The placing of importance on an activity by giving it prominence in the police organization has some value, but certainly doesn't contribute to sound management of resources on the part of the force as a whole. The proposed organization included in the Walton study (page 82) represents the kind of structure that should be strived for and which would provide for good management. Figure 6 reproduces the organizational chart as proposed by Walton, with some minor modifications by the Evaluation Team. The principal change proposed by the Team concerns giving the Inspection Staff the responsibility for Public Relations and Internal Affairs.

At the present time, the Inspector General's position is principally a sinecure. The present incumbent is General Bounkhong Pradichith, formerly Director General of the Police, who does practically nothing relating to the functions of the Inspector General. In fact he is shortly to assume the duties of Prefect of Luang Prabang. There is a dire need for the effective functioning of an Inspector General for the force. As Walton proposes, this officer should report directly to the Minister of Interior . . . and be his principal counselor on the effectiveness and the integrity of the police force.

One major step has been taken which facilitates the functioning of the National Police headquarters operations. A new National Police Headquarters building was completed early in 1968 (Figure 7) which allowed the assembly of the various parts of the organization under one roof. The Ministry of Interior is also housed in this building. Construction of motor pool facilities on the grounds is contemplated in the near future. It will be noted that the construction of such a headquarters building was one of the recommendations of the Walton Report. The building was constructed with the use of funds allocated to the police by the RLG (although not designated for this purpose) and and no U.S. funding was involved.

Public Safety offices are also situated in this building as well as at the respective police installations coincident with their responsibilities (auto maintenance and communications). This is an ideal arrangement, not followed in all Missions.




Figure 6. Proposed Organization of the Lao National Police.




Figure 7. The new National Police headquarters building in Vientiane.

It was reported to the Team that the numbers of police utilized in headquarters amounted to 916 officers and men, including those assigned to the Metropolitan and Special Police (see Table III). A casual examination of various offices in headquarters led the team to the conclusion that very few of those assigned to clerical functions were busy and that the headquarters was overstaffed. To determine exactly the number of personnel required would demand a careful Division by Division audit of function and job description . . . a task requiring more time than available to the Team. Such a study should be conducted, however, in the interest of an economy in the use of manpower. The Team observed that women police were being used in certain clerical functions, and apparently effectively. It is likely that women civilian employees could be used more extensively for clerical tasks thereby relieving trained police personnel from this task.

Police Manpower

In May of 1965 the strength of the police was given as 5,254, which included 478 neutralist police.¹⁷ Today the strength of the LNP is 5,466 and are distributed as indicated in Table III. By comparing the earlier distribution data with that in Table III

¹⁷See the Walton Report, page 73.

TABLE III
DISTRIBUTION OF LAO NATIONAL POLICE (LNP)
BY RANK AND ASSIGNMENT

ASSIGNMENT	CONTROLLER			COMMISSIONER			INSPECTOR				BRIGADIER			SUB-BRIGADIER			CIVILIANS	TOTAL Officers	TOTAL Policemen	TOTAL Civilians	GRAND TOTAL
	First Class	Second Class	Third Class	First Class	Second Class	Third Class	First Class	Second Class	Third Class	Cadet	First Class	Second Class	Third Class	First Class	Second Class	Policemen					
Director's Office	1	1		2	1		2				1		3	11	4	4	1	7	23	1	31
Office of Inspection		1	1	1	2			4	1			1		5	6	8		10	20	0	30
Detachment Ministry of Int... ..		1			2		1	1			2				1	1		5	4	0	9
Administrative		1	1	1	4	3	4	13	6		11	10	42	33	24	22	17	33	142	17	192
Logistics and Support			1	2	1	1	3	7	1		5		16	4	2	6	1	16	33	1	50
Materiel - Motor Pool		1		1	1		6	2	1		3	3	10	9	8	4		12	37	0	49
Communications		1			3	1	1	1		14	3	3	14	18	6	8	1	21	52	1	74
Health			1					3			2		7	6	1	19		4	35	0	39
Special Police			7	4	5	2	11	13	8		11	13	27	68	19	2	6	44	140	6	190
Urban Police			1	3	10	12	29	51	52		76	40	88	218	120	90		158	632	0	790
Territorial Police			1	3	1	1	4	5	2		6	4	6	15	4	4	3	17	39	3	59
Immigration Police		1	1	1	4	6	7	10	8		13	11	14	16	6	11	1	38	71	1	110
Judiciary Police			1	1	1	7	11	9	15		6	6	13	17	6	11		45	59	0	104
Instruction			1	3	3	3	5	9	12	47	3	2	8	32	16	14	1	83	75	1	159
Samparn Cadet (Thailand)										10								10	0	0	10
Total General	1	7	10	19	36	41	84	128	106	71	142	93	248	452	223	204	31	503	1,362	31	1,896
PROVINCIAL POLICE																					
Attapeu				1			3	2	1		3	7	29	62				7	101		108
Borikane					3	1	6	3	3		7	19	14	52	17	10		16	119		135
Champassak				1	2	3	4	7	5		13	6	12	60	14	2		22	107		129
Houa Khong					2	2	1	2	3		9	8	49	53	9	16		10	144		154
Khammouane				3	3	1	7	9	9		32	49	32	151	9	5		32	278		310
Luang Prabang		1			2	4	11	13	6		27	20	121	138	43	6		37	355		392
Phong Saly				1	1	1		3	6			1	5	6	5	6		12	23		35
Houaphanh					1	1	1	3			1	3	5	11	3	5		6	28		34
Saravane					1	1		8	3		11	9	34	73	30	9		13	166		179
Savannakhet				3	6	3	20	14	15		34	75	78	313	14	4		61	518		579
Sayaboury					2	4	5	16	7		17	13	49	75	18	19		34	191		225
Sedone				2	3	8	11	13	24		26	37	65	205	23	11	2	61	367	2	430
Sithandone			1		1	1	3	2	4		9	5	15	38	28	7		12	102		114
Vientiane				1	1	6	10	29	27		31	29	87	147	58	51		74	403		477
Wapikhamthong			1	1	1		4		5		8	1	37	71	13	3		12	133		145
Xieng Khouang						1	3	4	2		5	13	9	12	19	56		10	114		124
Total Province	1	2		13	29	37	89	128	120	0	233	295	641	1,467	303	210	2	419	3,149	2	3,570
GRAND TOTAL	1	8	12	32	65	78	173	256	226	71	375	388	889	1,919	526	414	33	922	4,511	33	5,466

Source: LNP October 1969 monthly personnel strength report, October, 1969.

it can be seen that although the total number of police has increased slightly (4%) in the last four years plus, those assigned to headquarters duties have increased 65%. Those assigned to duties other than headquarters increased 4.8%. The implication is that an internal distribution of personnel has been made in order to increase the number of personnel devoted to headquarters functions at the expense of those assigned to police operational tasks. The ratio of headquarters personnel to the total force strength in 1965 was about 1 : 10; today it is 1 : 6.

Urban Police Operations

Strictly speaking, Vientiane is the largest urban center in Laos. The municipal police of this city of 132,283¹⁸ people consists of a force of 790 men whose organization is structured as shown in Annex H. In each of the four precincts of the city there are, on the average, ten police posts to which is assigned a team of approximately nine patrolmen. At any given time, roughly one-third of this patrol force is available for work on the street, while a third staff the police posts, and the remainder are on relief. There is no city-wide change of shift at a given hour, nor is leave authorized, other than for illness, under the readiness posture in which the LNP remains.

Patrols based in the precinct police posts may be by motor vehicle or, more commonly, by foot or bicycle. Two men are normally employed in patrol, each of whom is armed with a sidearm. At night and for special operations, larger groups work as teams which may be mobile or which may establish temporary checkpoints where inquiries regarding vehicle registration and alien identity checks are made. The Team observed a night-time checkpoint operation, which utilized cadets from the Police Training Center.

Observations by the Evaluating Team of patrol activity in the city were made during daylight and at night; once during an evening when the police knew they were being observed and on several other occasions when they did not. The Team feels that, while the mechanism for patrol exists, the highly desirable single or two-man foot patrol operation is seen too rarely.

Centralized functions of the Vientiane Metropolitan Police include traffic law enforcement and accident prevention, prevention and repression of vice, enforcing municipal health and sanitary regulations, protection of local and foreign dignitaries, and the manning of approximately thirty fixed guard posts throughout the city at the request of the Prefecture and in compliance with RLG orders. Firefighting and fire prevention are also the responsibility of the Metropolitan Police.

¹⁸As of December 1968. Source: USAID/OP.

Rural Police Operations

The Evaluation Team spent several days in both the northern and southern back-country areas of Laos examining police responsibilities and practices. In several of the villages in the north that were visited by the Team, the police post is centrally located and the hub of village activity. The Police post depicted in Figure 8 represents a police presence in the area made possible by virtue of the fact that the police are able to move along the Mekong River on which the village is situated. There are no roads in this part of the Province and prior to the construction of the police boats, there were no police services provided such settlements along the river.

The provincial police headquarters and district (Muong) police posts appear to be active and respected elements with the local community, sometimes the sole representative of the central government constantly visible to the citizenry. The police role is a function of this relationship, the police providing the critically important point of contact between the people and the civil government. On more than one occasion the Team noticed definite manifestations of confidence and trust in the police on the part of the public and other government agencies.

To cite an example, the Xieng Khouang Province Police work with the hundreds of refugees who pass through processing centers of the province each day. Both Lao Government officials and USAID officers working with the refugee operation, praised highly the work of police in the program, and it is evident that the police are receiving the cooperation of the people.

The planned, and now real, result of this growing confidence is the building of the police role in intelligence collection. Rural police in Laos are gradually becoming more effective receptors of information and, where the recently established point-to-point telecommunications network exists, are able to transmit intelligence and situation data quickly to processing centers. It is axiomatic that the best continuous source of useful operational intelligence is the public, through the policeman "on the beat."

What is now developing in Laos insofar as the police/public relationship is concerned has proved to be an essential element in the internal defense mechanism in many countries, most notably Vietnam, Thailand and particularly, Korea.

Nevertheless, the abilities of the police are restricted due to the security situation. In much of the rear area under the control of RLG, free movement of the RLG forces, including the police, is denied by interdiction by the Pathet Laos. Consequently, police patrolling is limited to areas immediately surrounding the village or town in which they are situated. The Team was informed that the police in Saravan, an enclave surrounded by the PL, "patrolled" in nearby villages in plain clothes in order to maintain contact with the public and to glean information on PL activities. Thus, the conduct of rural




Figure 8. A typical police post located in a village in Houa Khong Province along the Mekong River.

police preventive patrols as is normally thought of in peaceful societies is circumscribed by the situation found today in the countryside in Laos.

As might be expected, the security situation in the enclave areas of Saravan and Attapeu in the south is tenuous. The police in these cities confine their patrol activities to the city proper and to surrounding villages to the extent possible. In Saravan, the police have been given the responsibility by the military commander for the protection of the north end of the airport runway. They have built bunkers and foxholes that are manned each night (Figure 9) and have been loaned some fatigue uniforms, two .30 caliber machine guns, two BAR automatic rifles and one 60 mm mortar, by the military. Police strength in these two enclaves is 295 and sufficient for the nature of work conducted.

The rudiments of a village security force have been developed in some areas, particularly in the south. Villagers, armed with hunting weapons, accompany the police on their patrols in areas surrounding the villages. Within the larger towns and cities, other government officials also assist in security patrols. This is especially true in the enclave cities and in Paksan and Thakek.



Figure 9. Police man foxholes at night in the Saravan enclave.

Transportation and Mobility

Annex I reflects the size and deployment of the LNP vehicle fleet as of the date of this evaluation.

Proper utilization of vehicles is a difficult problem for any foreign police organization. Police vehicles are primarily used to increase the effectiveness of patrol operations by increasing mobility, and secondarily for transport and drayage purposes. In actuality, the Team observed very few instances of use of vehicles for patrol.

Reduction of availability of LNP fleet vehicles is most frequently due to a lack of fuel or deadlining because of equipment malfunction.

The Team was made aware of, and actually observed, use of USAID provided police vehicles for transportation of the families of members of LNP. This and other nonofficial use of the vehicles is considered a harmful and serious diversion of police resources. In recognizing this, the Chief Advisor has discussed this problem extensively with the Director General of the police and has refused to consider the provision of replacement

vehicles for the police fleet through project assistance until this problem is dealt with by the police. He reports that there has been a considerable improvement in the use of police vehicles during the last six months.

Vehicle repair and preventative maintenance operations are being given substantial support through activities of the PSD Maintenance Advisor and the provision by AID of spare parts and repair and test equipment.

Prior to February, 1969, LNP vehicles were serviced by the USAID maintenance unit. Subsequent to that date the LNP were required to obtain service using Lao resources. Minor repairs (1st, 2nd and some 3rd echelon) were then made in an unenclosed temporary shed with a dirt floor, major work being done on a very low priority basis by the Ministry of Public Works. Repairs there were made with delays averaging one hundred days per job.

In July, 1969 a new maintenance facility, designed by personnel of the Public Safety Division, was opened (see Figure 10). The unit is now staffed by approximately 22 LNP mechanics, most learning their trade on the job, and administrative and clerical personnel. In addition to close operational and technical support by the Public Safety Advisor, the USAID provides the services of two TCNs (both Thai) and two local hire employees (a master mechanic originally from France, and a Laotian supply assistant).




Figure 10. The new National Police auto maintenance garage in Vientiane.

The Team observed the maintenance facility as a new but working and effective unit where considerable practical training is being given on a daily basis. The ultimate goal is total assumption of responsibility by the Laos with TCNs providing continuity during the interim period following phase-down of U.S. assistance.

Spare parts are provided by AID through dollar purchases and LNP budgeted funds. A small stock of frequently used items is kept at the maintenance center, the bulk in a central warehouse. An excellent and strict stock control system has been put into service and is maintained jointly by the Laos and their advisors.

POL is supplied by the LNP, gasoline being issued by a ration system using chits as vouchers for driver purchases at local gas stations. At the time of the evaluation LNP was completing the installation of gasoline tanks and measured delivery pumps, and it is assumed that the chit system will be eliminated.

The PSD has recommended that no further expansion of the LNP patrol vehicle fleet be made at present. A need is recognized, however, for 4 communications service vehicles, an ambulance and two trucks.

In addition to the land-bound vehicles, the LNP also operates a small marine force of 21 river boats 26-feet in length, powered by long-shaft motors, and four 21-foot shallow-draft boats which use a conventional 50 horsepower outboard engine. The boats are used mainly on the Mekong River and in addition to their use as patrol craft, provide access to otherwise isolated police posts, particularly north of Ban Houei Sai. Most of the craft operate south from the Burma border at Ban Khouane to Ban Houei Sai, and in the vicinity south of Vientiane. During the flood of August, 1969 the police marine fleet provided essential emergency services to not only the Laotian citizenry but the official American community as well. PSD assistance to the police marine operation was minimal at the time of the evaluation.

Communications

A point-to-point radio network, designed by Public Safety telecommunications personnel and described in the Walton report, has been installed and is now operating in Laos (see Figure 11 and Annex J). There are 113 radio sets presently in use. The police headquarters in the principal city of each government controlled province is linked to LNP headquarters (Phase I of the initial development plan) and key police posts at the Muong (District) level are linked to other posts and, of course, their province police headquarters. Installation of this latter intraprovince, and the second phase of the development plan, is nearly completed. The original plan has been modified slightly. Four installations have been removed and re-installed at other points because of security considerations; one radio has been lost as a result of hostile action; and a few sets found their way into the vehicles of senior police officials. This latter use of radios has been carefully controlled and is minimal.




Figure 11. Map showing LNP communications network.

The networks operate on either a regular schedule or alert basis. The regular mode of operations involves the making of calls and handling of message traffic according to a preset schedule. Thus, province police headquarters monitor their frequencies only on certain hours. This arrangement is employed to minimize consumption of LNP provided gasoline to operate battery-charging generators. The alert mode of operation requires that all stations listen for calls on a 24-hour basis and is employed only in emergencies. As a practical matter, the use of a reporting schedule considerably limits the utility of the police radio networks. Vital information, or word of an enemy attack, must await the next scheduled reporting time, which may be as much as two hours later. The Team believes that Province headquarters and the LNP headquarters radios should be "on the air" 24 hours a day. Thus, district station and post radios could transmit information promptly at all times.

The LNP radio maintenance and repair activity is located in the new repair/warehouse complex in Vientiane (Figure 12), which also houses the vehicle, arms and ammunition facility and central LNP warehouse. Since January 1967, satellite repair shops have been located at three points throughout the country -- Pakse, Savannaket, and Luang Prabang. They are staffed by Lao police personnel with a TCN supervisor, skilled in routine repair procedures, and LNP on-the-job trainees.




Figure 12. The radio repair center in Vientiane.

The central shop is staffed by LNP technicians and one Thai TCN. From the beginning of the current program, training of technicians has been given close attention. Of 23 men trained in Thailand in the past, 21 remain on the job, only 5 of which show promise of significant development. One technician is now in training in the United States and another, having completed a similar program in the U.S., is considered particularly skilled. There are, as of the date of the evaluation, 13 men in Thailand who have completed 11 months of an 18-month course.

In all, some progress is being made toward the goal of LNP assuming total responsibility for the full spectrum of maintenance and repair activities necessary to support their telecommunications system. For the future, it is planned that the Thai TCN personnel will provide supplementary support in the most complex technical areas. At the present time, and for the next two years at least, the program requires the full-time services of a U.S. telecommunications advisor. His main duties will continue to be to develop the LNP radio technical personnel and to assure the use of sound logistical procedures. He will also have to provide systems engineering knowledge to the expansion of the network to accommodate emergency police needs.

Investigations

Investigations of most reported offenses in Laos are made by the Judicial Police Service of the LNP. Personnel of this service are assigned to the Province and metropolitan police headquarters, and act as officers of the court.

A table of reported offenses by type and number is shown in Annex K. Verifiable data reflecting clearances and disposition of offenders is unavailable.

Offenses committed in rural Laos are usually handled by local or tribal councils and thus, most of the little rural crime which does occur, goes unnoticed by the government. In terms of volume, rural crime coming to the attention of the police is low. Most offenses involve minor thefts, cattle stealing and the like. The use of tribal councils for dispensing justice was seen quite often in areas populated by hill tribes. The council is made up of representatives of the respective tribes, each of which deal with respective tribal members. Matters arising from inter-tribal offenses, such as one tribal member committing an offense against another, may be reported to the police. Others are dealt with by the council.

Evidence collection facilities exist, but are minimal and the capability for adequate crime scene investigation was not observed by the Team. Examination and evaluation of physical evidence is not presently an LNP capability.

The Team observed a number of weaknesses in the Administration of crime investigation and in processes related thereto. The part-time services of a Public Safety investigations

advisor are needed in this area. The LNP should recognize the need for impartial and effective investigations. This need, and the desirability of meaningful crime statistics and records actually exist at present. It would seem to be an opportune time to introduce improved management and procedures in this field.

Records

A partially centralized records and identification unit is in operation at LNP headquarters. Systems implemented by a Thai TCN,¹⁹ without U.S. advisory assistance, are functioning and include an alphabetical subject index file, a fingerprint card file, and dossiers arranged by index numbers. The unit classifies incoming sets of identification prints and reportedly has the capability of searching and identifying partial and developed latent prints. It was reported that over 41,000 fingerprint cards are on file, including those from applicants for identification cards and arrested persons. However, identification personnel reported that no identification had been made from latent prints to date.

The Evaluation Team was concerned by what appeared to be a lack of activity in the records and identification section and feels its potential is not being realized by the LNP. Furthermore, it was noted that dossiers are charged out to, or are filed in other depositories in the country.

The need for improved management and procedures in this activity was apparent to the Team and it is recommended that an Advisor, skilled in police records and identification procedures, be assigned to the unit on at least a part-time basis. His efforts will have to be supplemented by a language qualified Thai TCN.

Training

National Police training activities were, at the time of the evaluation, at an ebb. Lack of facilities during construction of the new Police Academy resulted in some suspension of recruit and LNP sponsored in-service training for the past sixteen months. (USAID sponsored participant training has continued and is referred to in the Chapter entitled "The Public Safety Program".)

¹⁹Special Police Colonel Chai Sevikul, Chief of the Fingerprint and Central Records Office of the Thai National Police Headquarters, Bangkok. He has a B.S. in Police Science and an M.A. in Public Administration from Washington State University. PSD tries to obtain his services on a TDY basis for a four week period twice a year. He is much more effective than an American advisor because of his fluency in the Lao language and the fact that all records are written in Lao.

In October 1969, a reorganization of the LNP Training Service, as proposed by the Public Safety Division, was effected by the RLG. Police planning includes a cadet training program covering a period of three years. The project advisor advises against this because the LNP can send police cadets to Thailand's cadet academy as they have done over the past few years.

Construction of the Police Academy is progressing, albeit behind schedule. Three of the four new buildings housing classroom and dormitory facilities are finished and the firearms range has been completed (Figures 13 and 14). Under present commitments, there remains to be constructed an additional building of "Groupe Scolaire" design, mess facilities and a perimeter barrier. Additional improvements including a maintenance building, gymnasium, security facilities, other minor structures and landscaping are proposed.




Figure 13. One of three new "groupe scolaire" classroom and dormitory buildings which have been built at the Police Training Center near Vientiane.




Figure 14. The new firing range at the Police Training Center.

The Team sees a need for more vigorous across-the-board training efforts by the LNP. The program has concentrated on speciality training to advantage and plans to continue with this type of training. However, there is additional need for in-service non-commissioned and officer training dealing with general policing, management, budgeting, police-public relations and marksmanship.

There is also a need for extensive planning for future training, and for close guidance of the LNP during initiation of a new and acutely-needed training program as mentioned above. The Team feels the services of a full-time Training Advisor are required, to give technical assistance to the LNP, and to coordinate their program with participant training activities to meet the total manpower needs of the police organization.

Riot Control

Consultations with the PSD staff indicated a lack of riot control capability on the part of the LNP.

U.S. assistance in this area has been limited to the provision of 1,710 units of tear gas since 1965, the majority of which remains in warehouse inventory. As can be seen from Table IV, a portion of these are older than four years and can be expected to be unreliable. These should be used for training purposes. In addition to munitions, the Program has provided riot control helmets, several tear gas guns, 100 shotguns with ammunition and riot batons. Riot control is included in the curriculum for the recruit and for NCO in-service training at the Police Training Center. However, there has been no riot or crowd control training given the LNP for the past sixteen months.

The Team feels that the LNP is neither equipped, nor trained, to deal effectively with civil disturbances of any magnitude. In the present circumstances, the responsibility for riot control in an emergency situation most probably would be given to the Lao military very early during an incident. Consequently, unless crowd control and indoctrination in minimum use of force has been a part of their military training, a difficult situation may be compounded instead of eliminated.

The chances of a civil disturbance occurring in Vientiane is judged to be small at this time and none have occurred in the past four years. Nevertheless, an appropriate plan should be developed, encompassing training and preparation of a police emergency force and operational procedures and instructions. This should be coordinated with military planning to place emphasis on the police as the first line of defense against civil disorders.

Aside from the provision of necessary riot control equipment, the Public Safety project has been active in training key officers in riot control measures. During FY 56 and 58 two groups of officers attended the International Police Academy and specialized in riot control training. In all, fourteen LNP officers have been trained in this subject. At the police training center, 696 non-commissioned officers have been given refresher training

TABLE IV
TEAR GAS MUNITIONS INVENTORY

	AGE, YEARS				TOTAL
	4	3	2	1	
GRENADE, CN BURNING	200		200	144	544
GRENADE, CN BLAST			200	176	376
PROJECTILE, CN BURNING			150	196	346
PROJECTILE, CN BLAST	140		150	154	444
TOTAL	340		700	670	1,710

in riot control measures since 1965, and 99 recruits have been trained since that date in this subject. Earlier, the British provided training for 71 officers and NCOs in riot control subjects as a part of the police field force training program in Malaya.

At the present time, the Vientiane Metropolitan Police has a riot control force of 36 officers and men which it claims is immediately available for riot control duty. The LNP headquarters has a riot control company of 179 officers and men, which were trained at the police training center. However, these police personnel have not had refresher training and their effectiveness, indeed, in civil disturbances is open to doubt. Although the chief advisor has repeatedly urged refresher training for these units, the Lao police state that the Lao people are docile and will not resort to riots. The chief advisor has countered by stating that civil disturbances are possible anyplace as we in the United States have found out in the last decade. It is likely that a riot will have to occur before the police change their attitude in this regard.

The present police policy appears to be that, should a riot occur, the first group called on would be the police cadets in training at the police training center.

VI. THE LAO MILITARY FORCES

The Team has neither the intent nor competency to examine the capabilities of the Lao military forces nor, for that matter, to examine critically those U.S. efforts designed to assist them. It is important, however, that these matters be studied to determine the extent to which they bear on the role of the police in ensuring the internal security of the nation and the U.S. efforts in this regard.

The armed forces are made of the army, the Royal Army Forces (FAR), the air force, a river flotilla and a neutralist force (FAN). The total strength of these units is reported to be 54,000 regular forces and 6,000 neutralists. In addition, a force of some 36,500 guerrillas have been trained and equipped with U.S. help.

The country is divided into five Military Regions (see footnote, page 12, and Figure 1), and the Regional Commanders exert considerable influence on the happenings in their respective areas.

The military forces have the responsibility for the pursuit of the war against the Pathet Lao, including the provision of security in the rear areas. Battalions are deployed in the rear areas for this purpose and, as reported to the Team by one Battalion Commander, conduct patrols in areas adjacent to their cantonments to deny free movement to the PL. Other observers report, however, that the army does not engage in patrol to the extent that they should, and this would tend to account for the apparent free movement of the PL. It was also reported that army patrols use police personnel on occasions where the police officer is more familiar with the terrain and particularly, where the policeman knows villagers and can be successful in questioning them about PL activities. In any event, any patrolling that is done is conducted by the FAR, since the police do not have the capability nor the training. Guerrilla elements do some patrolling in what is referred to as the contested areas, but are more likely to be found in PL controlled areas.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Military Assistance is supplied pursuant to an agreement dated December 23, 1950, between the U.S. and the Government of Laos, supplemented by three exchanges of letters, the first dated September 10, 1962, between Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and the U.S. Ambassador. U.S. military assistance is being provided at the request of

of the Royal Lao Government. This is authorized by Article 6 of the 1962 Declaration and Protocol between the U.S. and other Governments of the Neutrality of Laos.

Beginning in FY 1968, military assistance for Laos and Thailand was transferred from the regular MAP program under the Foreign Assistance Act to the Military Services budget (MASF). However, the basic system of program development, review and approval is continuing without major change and basically in accordance with Military Assistance Manual as applied to MAP under the Foreign Assistance Act.

The U.S provides nearly all the arms, equipment and ammunition received by the Royal Lao armed forces. Limited assistance is also provided by Thailand, and by France in steadily decreasing amounts. Total deliveries between 1953 and the end of FY 1968 under the U.S. program have amounted to \$424.6 million.

Since 1965 military grant aid has been in the following amounts (in millions of dollars).

<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>		<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
MAP	MAP	MAP	MASF	MASF	MASF
39.9	51.8	52.9	31.5	90.1	96.0 (est.)

Actual requirements are affected by the course of military operations, and the assistance is given in order to sustain the operations of the Army forces (FAR and FAN) and the Air Force (RLAF). Less than 1% of the program costs is for investment items.

Beginning in FY 1969 the DOD assumed from A.I.D. responsibility for funding the provision of foodstuffs and related air delivery to military and paramilitary forces in northern Laos.

Administration of the Program

The Office of the Deputy Chief of the joint U.S. MAAG in Bangkok (DEPCHJUS-MAGTHAILAND) functions as the Laos MAAG, with the execution of the program being handled within Laos by the Requirements Office of the USAID. Programs are developed jointly by these two offices and submitted for review and approval through CINCPAC and regular MAP channels in the Pentagon.

Security Considerations

The draft Military Assistance Manual, prepared by ODMA/Plans in the Department of Defense, contains the following instructions regarding classification with respect to the Laos military assistance program:

"5. Special Security Instructions

a. Basically, the existence of a U.S. Military Assistance program for Laos is unclassified but the scope, quantity and specific nature of this assistance must be classified at least Confidential. In fact, the existence of military assistance for Laos is not to be publicized.

b. The fact that military assistance for Laos is the Mission of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAILAND is classified Secret and the organization handling military assistance is likewise classified Secret. This means that the Secret classification applies when the basic mission of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI of organization for providing military assistance to Laos is disclosed, i.e., the specific responsibilities of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI for military assistance to Laos and/or when details of the organization of this military assistance in Thailand are specified.

c. Association of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI Thailand with Laos is classified Confidential, e.g., message traffic to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI referring in any manner to Laos. This is necessary to preclude the possible disclosure of classified association by accumulation of messages otherwise unclassified.

d. Furthermore, the fact that the U.S. Government and the Royal Thai Government are formally involved in the military training of Lao students in Thailand is classified Confidential. Third country participation in military assistance activities within Laos is also classified Secret-NORFORN, and limited distribution procedures must apply."

The Military Technical Support program funds amounting to about \$4 million each year are used to pay the staff of the Mission Requirements Office (RO), to provide imported food for the FAR and FAN forces and to aid in the administration of the MAP program for Laos. Since the Geneva Agreements prohibit stationing United States military personnel in Laos, the RO has been charged with preparing recommendations for the Military Assistance Program for Laos, placing orders for any arranging delivery of military assistance materials and arranging for training of Lao military personnel outside Laos. The RO is also charged with monitoring the use of MAP materials insofar as is consistent with the Geneva Agreements.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Evaluation Team found that the program has made significant and in some cases, dramatic gains in the face of difficult circumstances. These circumstances, mostly, are represented by the Laotian scene and security situation and the shambles the police force was in at the outset of the program. Consequently, the Team has few recommendations to submit and these reflect observations and findings set forth elsewhere in the report.

For the future conduct of the Program, it is recommended that:

A. Project Goals Be Rephrased:

It is considered advisable to sharply define project goals in order to facilitate an evaluation of project accomplishments and to define clearly in the ProAg exactly what both the U.S. and the RLG propose to do. Suggested language for the goals of the project are:

1. To establish a Police Training Center, including buildings of suitable design, for the training of ___ cadet officers, ___ NCO personnel, ___ recruits and ___ in-service personnel each year.
2. To establish a communications capability within the LNP which will involve,
 - a. Installation of equipment at 13 province police headquarters in a network that provides voice and telegraphy transmission with LNP/HQ in Vientiane.
 - b. Installation of low-power two-way radio systems (mobile, fixed, and portable stations) for four major cities.
 - c. Installation of intra-province radio stations (fixed point-to-point) for _____ stations and _____ police bases.
 - d. Establishment of communications center at the new LNP Headquarters, Vientiane.
 - e. Installation of manual telephone switching system (120 lines) at the new LNP Headquarters, Vientiane.

- f. The development of four emergency communications support packages for temporary use in sensitive areas, composed of one base station and ten tactical radios each.
 - g. The development of adequate repair facilities which will employ ten trained LNP technicians.
3. Create a police records and identification system, based on the Henry fingerprint classification, for use throughout the country.
 4. To establish a repair facility for police weapons and an ammunition reloading capacity for reloading _____ rounds of .38 caliber ammunition monthly.
 5. To establish a logistics system for the LNP allowing accountability for police equipment, including consumables, and efficient warehousing and distribution of all police equipment according to need.
 6. To establish an automotive maintenance capability through the 5th echelon, able to maintain and repair a fleet of 150 vehicles of about six various makes.
 7. To ensure through technical assistance, a maximum of urban and rural patrol to bring the police closer to the public.
 8. To continue the professional development of the Special Police and the Judicial Police abilities in intelligence and criminal investigations, respectively.
 9. To improve individual and collective abilities of police administrators in the management of police resources.

It will be noted that each of these goals should have specific activities subordinate to them, which will describe the manner in which the goal is to be reached.

The question of phase-out of the program was addressed by the Team. Mission planning to date (See the PROP) carries through FY 1973 and beyond that, the mission states, "as long as the RLG lacks the necessary financial resources and technically competent human resources, the Civil Police Administration Project will have a major role in assisting the RLG to develop an efficient civil police force. The Final Contribution Date of FY 1973 is appropriate only if other outside financial and technical assistance is available to the RLG by that date." The Team endorses this view.

B. The Program Methodology Emphasize the Shift in the Advisor's Role from Essentially Operational to Advisory:

It is certain, using hindsight, that the rebuilding of elements of the LNP would not have been possible had the customary advisor/counterpart relationship been relied

upon in the provision of technical assistance. It is true that this kind of relationship does exist between the Chief Advisor and the Director General today, but otherwise the advisors have assumed an operational role. This is to say that decisions are made by the advisors and directions given to the police for their execution.

The Public Safety effort has been directed toward placing the burden of this responsibility on the police where it belongs. Illustratively, the logistics system and supply procedures are being dealt with in such a way as to train decision makers—looking to the day that they can assume their proper tasks without outside help. The Team proposes that this effort be intensified to include all functional areas receiving U.S. technical assistance.

As mentioned elsewhere, this must be done carefully and the pace taken toward this goal determined on a case-by-case basis. Personalities will be a major factor—and above all, we must not endanger the gains that have been made to date by a premature dependence on the Lao officer for administration and management.

One procedure that might be helpful is that used in the logistics area. The LNP supervisor's desk is placed next to the advisor's (the TCN in the case of the logistics system). All matters then could be dealt with by both, thus the "desk-by-desk" method representing an intensive "on-the-job" training means for the Lao supervisor.

C. That Third Country Nationals Continue To Be Used To The Extent Required:

The Team was very favorably impressed with the quality of the Thai TCNs and with the fact that without them, there would have been a lower level of technical assistance. For example, only 18 man years has been provided in over a period of five years through U.S. direct-hire advisors. The use of TCNs has allowed this contribution to be most effective. For the next several years, a high input of technical assistance will continue to be needed. Without constraints on U.S. direct-hire employment, the Team would prefer to see two additional advisors added to the staff (training and police records). Through the use of Thai technicians, the job can be done with the present U.S. staff—even though U.S. advisors will continue to be responsible for tasks in addition to their regularly assigned function. The TCN represents a relatively inexpensive, language qualified, technically-able resource that is acceptable to the Lao police, and that functions effectively under the supervision of the U.S. Advisor.

D. That Increased Emphasis Be Given To Re-Training the Police Force:

The program has been successful in training police officers in various specialties, in Laos, Thailand, Malaysia and the U.S. This should be continued with particular emphasis on training at the OPS International Police Academy in Washington.

The major need is to proceed urgently with the development and fullest possible use of the partially-completed Police Training Center (formerly referred to as the Police Academy). Reduced training activity has been experienced for the past 16 months, reportedly due to the construction of police buildings. Now is the time to reinstitute training on a broad scale.

Training programs of various kinds have been well thought through by the Public Safety staff in working with their police counterparts. One area of disagreement between the PSD staff and the Lao police is the matter of cadet training. Public Safety's view is that cadet training at the police training center is an expensive way of dealing with what appears to be a minor problem. For example, approximately 20 officers are attrited per year and this need can be met effectively and economically through the training programs in the Thai national police system. The LNP position is that they see training of their police officers in Thailand as a loss of face and insist that they must have the capability for training their own people in Laos. They further point out that the Lao army has a similar school and reiterate that they must have a capability for a similar purpose. The Team sees the problem of overcoming the Lao view as a difficult one and, while agreeing with the Public Safety staff approach in terms of the most effective way of meeting the problem, believes that it may be necessary to bow to realities as they exist and assist them with the cadet program in the police training center. In any event, training of cadets should not exceed 20 per year, which in, and of itself, presents an uneconomical use of Lao police training resources. At the same time the Team would encourage the chief advisor to continue his efforts to persuade the LNP Directorate from following this course and to use the Thai police resources if at all possible.

With regard to non-commissioned officers, the Team proposes that an annual promotional course for NCOs be given to provide training for those at the patrolman-level who are eligible for promotion to a non-commissioned rank. Additionally, there should be extensive in-service training programs for those presently holding non-commissioned ranks in the force.

With PSD assistance the LNP is restricting its recruitment to those personnel having special skills (for example, the recent recruitment of 14 technical school graduates now being trained as radio technicians in Bangkok). The general plan is to continue recruiting small numbers of persons possessing skills needed while at the same time allowing the overall LNP personnel strength to gradually drop by attrition. During the period of the Team's visit they received a strong impression that additional manpower was required in certain areas of the country which had been vacated by military forces as a result of the shift in locus of military action. With respect to the general plan for attrition of the force to reduce its numbers, the Team proposes that considerable monitoring of the need for police personnel be conducted in

order to assure that adequate trained personnel are available to meet the requirements for police service in all areas of the country. The force strength level estimated in the Walton-Skuse report of 5,000 men appears to the Team to be a good round number estimate of needs. But, on the other hand, at the present time, given the manner in which personnel are used by the LNP, the present 10% over-strength figure would not seem excessive in this regard.

With respect to inservice training, a maximum number should be retrained so as to retrain all personnel within four years. The Training Center's facilities should provide the nucleus for this effort supported by the use of mobile police teams and by provincial schools in the most populous provinces. This training, including marksmanship, probably need not exceed four weeks.

The principal target is to give refresher training to all police, including officers, in the subjects of; police operations, police intelligence, police public relations, changes in the law, marksmanship, and security tactics (together with some paramilitary subjects).

E. That a Concerted Effort be Made to Create a Merit System for Promotion:

Today the police are automatically promoted after remaining in grade for a specified number of years. A concerted effort should be made, through technical assistance, to effect the adoption of a system of promotion through merit. This should be tied in closely with courses offered at the Police Training Center, which should be one of the prerequisites for promotion.

F. That Selected Commodities Be Procured to Meet Emergency Need:

The Team sees this need to exist today in communications and in protective clothing. The communications project has been pursuing a plan laid down earlier during the Walton study. Today the police are engaged in security operations in sensitive areas such as the Attapeu and Saravane enclaves and at the southern approaches of the Plain of Jars at Sam Thong. The Team found inadequate tactical communications at these locations--places where the need is urgent. It is proposed that four packages of communications equipment be procured with each module, composed of a base and up to ten satellite stations. These should represent additions to existing radios in any area and not a separate network. These packages should then be distributed to sensitive areas after a careful analysis of the need by the PSD staff. The distribution should be temporary, and the units should be moved on to other sensitive areas as the needs dictate. Mainly, the LNP (through PSD) needs the flexibility to be able to respond to urgent needs of this kind quickly. Sometimes these needs cannot be foreseen, such as the refugee security problem at Sam Thong and the surrounding area. The total cost of two VHF-FM and two SSB packages is estimated at about \$30,000.

Another need to which the program should respond is for fatigue uniforms and steel helmets. Police in Saravane, Attapeu and the Sam Thong locations are engaged in paramilitary activities, including the manning of foxholes. To the extent possible, the police have begged clothing and weapons for this duty from the Army, with some success, but not enough to meet their needs.²⁰ It is proposed that the program purchase bolt cloth and that the uniforms be made at the Army-owned factory in Vientiane. Steel helmets, (about 600), should be procured now through the Army Material Command, if they are not available through excess property.

The Chief Advisor has been endeavoring to acquire used fatigue uniforms and ponchos through excess property for the past year without success. Fatigue uniforms are needed for the police in the areas mentioned above and for the use of the students at the Police Training Center, for a total of about 600 uniforms. The Team has no way of estimating U.S. costs involved for these items, but they should not be more than \$10,000.

G. That Technical Assistance Be Provided For the Judicial Police And Special Police:

Until about five months ago, a U.S. advisor assigned to the Public Safety staff, provided technical advice to the Special Police. He has since been transferred to other duties. The Team proposes that his position be filled with a Public Safety advisor, to provide advice to the Special Police on police organization and management and to provide technical assistance to the criminal investigation and criminal records element of the LNP.

In the latter case, emphasis should be on basic elements of investigation, criminal and identification and records and narcotics investigations. To assist in this effort, the advisor will undoubtedly require the services of a Thai TCN to work with the criminal records development.

With respect to the Special Police, the Embassy now maintains liaison with this element, wherein one officer is assigned this task as a collateral duty. Embassy officers advised that this liaison will continue and will deal with operational matters only. The advisor proposed above should be concerned with the function of the Special Police as an organizational element of the LNP, including matters of management, administration and organization. Especially important is the functions and relationship of the Special Police with respect to those of the rest of the force.

It is important that the Public Safety Advisor and the Embassy liaison officer work very closely together so that each is fully aware of the interests and activities of the other. Naturally, there will be some operational matters which will

²⁰Each policeman is issued one regular uniform each year and this is not appropriate for combat duty of this type.

be of no concern to the Public Safety Advisor. The main interest of both should be that a common thrust of technical assistance is provided the Special Police—and certainly that they do not work at cross purposes. The Team sees this as feasible and feels confident that the principal Embassy supervisor and the Chief Public Safety Advisor can assure that the two advisors work together as a team.

In discussing this recommendation with USAID Director Mann, he stated that he had no objection to the inclusion of such an advisor on the Public Safety staff, but that it should be recognized that personnel ceiling constraints dictated that the Mission would have to be provided an additional ceiling level to accommodate the increase. He said that the Mission could not “absorb” the increase implicit in the recommendation.

Costs:

The presently-planned commodities expenditures and other costs are reflected in Part V of the Project Implementation Plan (reproduced for reference as Annex D).

PRESENT TOTAL PROGRAM COSTS

	\$000	
	<u>FY 1970</u>	<u>FY 1971</u>
Technicians (5)	205 (54 mm)	159 (60 mm)
Participants	70	60
Commodities	251	307
Other Costs	<u>106</u>	<u>36</u>
TOTAL	632	562

The additive costs involved in the recommendations contained in this evaluation report are small (approximately \$40,000 for commodities). The Team examined program components to determine if the \$40,000 additional commodity requirements could be absorbed within present funding reflected above. In reviewing FY 1970 plans, it is concluded that without entirely sacrificing presently planned on-going activities, such as auto spare parts and radio spare parts procurement, the present funding level could not accommodate recommended additives. It is considered very important to begin the replacement program this year, and at the pace planned by the USAID. Therefore, the Team concludes that ongoing activity costs should not be sacrificed, but that \$40,000 should be added to the program for the commodities proposed.

ANNEX A

LAOS – GENERAL INFORMATION*

LAND: (U)

91,000 sq. mi.; about 5% cultivated, 4% pasture, 3% other arable, 88% forests or unsuitable for cultivation

PEOPLE: (U)

Population: 2,879,000; males 15-49, 672,000; 360,000 fit for military service; average number currently reaching usual military age (18) annually 27,000; no conscription age specified

Ethnic divisions: 47% Lao, 14% Tai, 25% Phoutheng (Kha), Meo, Yao, and other

Religion: 50% Buddhist, 50% animist and other

Language: Lao official, French predominant foreign language also used in administration

Literacy: about 12%

Labor force: about 1,268,000; over 90% agriculture; 159,286 engaged in manufacturing and services; 11,864 government employees

Organized labor: only civil servants are organized

GOVERNMENT: (C)

Legal name: Kingdom of Laos

Capital: Vientiane (Luang Prabang royal capital)

Political subdivisions: 16 provinces subdivided into districts, cantons, and villages

Type: constitutional monarchy

Legal system: based on civil law system; constitution of 1947 superseded by International agreements of 1962 and subsequent events; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Branches: King, 59-member National Assembly, 12-member King's Council; provisional coalition government formally composed of three "tendencies" – neutralists, Communists, rightists -- but Communists not participating

Government leaders: King, Savang Vatthana; Premier, Souvanna Phouma, Deputy Premier, Leuam Insisiengmay, rightist

Suffrage: universal over age 18

Elections: National Assembly was designated by King in general elections held in 1967

*Drawn entirely from National Intelligence Summary 43B GSCREV, May, 1967

Political parties and leaders: Neo Lao Hak Sat, Communist-front organization which includes the Lao People's Party (Communist), only party active
Communists: Lao People's Party (clandestine) membership unknown
Other political or pressure groups: Communists are resisting "neutralist" government; insurgent Communist forces with North Vietnamese backing pose serious threat to existing government; other political groups are informal and associated with regional family and military leaders; Royal Armed Forces (FAR) leaders, Commander-in-Chief Ouan Rathikoun, and Generals Kouprasith Abhay, Phasouk Somly and Vang Pao
Members of: U.N., IMF, ECAFE, Mekong Committee, UNCTAD, Colombo Plan, SEAMES

ECONOMY: (S)

GNP: US\$189 million (1966 est.), \$70 per capita
Agriculture: main crops -- rice (overwhelmingly dominant), corn, coffee, tobacco; 90% self-sufficient; food shortages -- rice and small quantities of corn, cotton, tea; major food problem is distribution
Major industries: tin mining, timber
Shortages: capital equipment, petroleum, transportation system
Electric power: 15,000 kw. capacity (1967); 30 million kw.-hr. produced (1967), 11 kw.-hr. per capita
Exports: US\$2 million (1967 est.); tin ore, timber, unroasted coffee; undeclared exports of opium significant but value unknown
Imports: US\$30 million (1967 est.); vegetables, petroleum products, rice, transportation equipment, machinery, textiles
Trade: imports from Thailand, U.S., Japan, U.K., Indonesia, Hong Kong; trade with Communist countries insignificant; Laos a major transit point in world gold trade, with gold imports worth \$82.1 million in 1967, but imports have fallen off sharply in 1968
Aid: U.S. -- US\$528.3 million 1954-67 (grants); all others, US\$71.5 million; U.N. technical assistance, \$5.3 million through 1967
Monetary conversion rate: 240 kip=US\$1; open market rate approximately 505 kip=US\$1 (1968); all but restricted list of developmental commodities now imported at open market rate
Fiscal year: 1 July - 30 June

COMMUNICATIONS: (C)

Highways: about 7,700 mi. (including Communist-held areas); 500 mi. paved, 400 mi. gravel, 1,500 mi. improved earth, most of remainder unimproved and often impassable during rainy season (June -- October)
Inland waterways: about 2,850 mi., primarily Mekong and tributaries
Ports (river): 5 principal (Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Savannakhet, Pakse, Thakhek), 4 minor ports

Civil air: 14 major transport aircraft

Airfields: 352 total, 211 usable; 3 with permanent-surface runways; 20 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.

Telecommunications: service to general public considered poor; radio network provides generally erratic service to government users; limited international service by radiotelegraph; radiobroadcast transmitters operate in a few towns; 1,500 telephones, 35,000 radio receivers

DEFENSE FORCES: (S)

Royal Armed Forces:

Personnel: army 46,000, air force 1,500 (104 pilots), river flotilla 450, Auto Defense du Choc 5,000

Major ground units: 62 infantry battalions, 1 artillery regiment of 4 battalion-size groups, 1 armored regiment of 4 company-size groups

Neutralists:*

Personnel: army 6,000

Auto Defenses du Choc (ADC):

Major ground units: 50 separate company-size units

Communists and pro-Communists:

Pathet Lao, 45,325; North Vietnamese Army regular units, 31,195; Deuane Dissident Neutralists 1,700, Khamouane Dissident Neutralists 1,300, plus about 15,000 NVN personnel, consisting of an undetermined mix of regular troops and civilian laborers, are estimated to be in Laos for the purpose of building, maintaining, and securing infiltration routes between North Vietnam and South Vietnam

Major ground units: 152 infantry battalions (Pathet Lao 28, Pathet Lao with NVA advisers 35, Pathet Lao/NVA 36, NVA 39, Deuane Dissident Neutralists 7, Khamouane Dissident Neutralists 7)

Supply: Royal Armed Forces and neutralist forces dependent on U.S. and France; Pathet Lao dependent on North Vietnam, U.S.S.R., Communist China

Military budget: for fiscal year ending 30 June 1968, US\$34,416,666; about 51% of total budget

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY: (S)

Special Police of the Lao National Police, domestic; National Center of Documentation (CND), domestic/foreign; Intelligence Division (G-2), General Staff, Royal Armed Forces, domestic

*The Neutralists are moving toward incorporation into the army; however, they retain a separate status.

ANNEX B

DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND WORK LOAD PUBLIC SAFETY EQUIPMENT ADVISOR (AUTO)

Responsibilities fall within three civil police administration sub-projects:

1. Automotive Maintenance and Vehicle Control
2. Firearms Repair and Ammunition Reloading
3. Marine Police

In order to effectively perform the duties required in these areas, a 54 hour work week is a normal requisite. The following information indicates the time percentages required to conduct these functions:

1. Budgeting, procurement, receipt and control of commodities.	24 hours	46%
2. Administrative advisory duties:	10 hours	18%
a. Establishing organizational structure.		
b. Preparing standard operating procedures.		
c. Establishing proper reporting systems.		
d. Establishing efficient records systems.		
e. Surveys and forecasts of maintenance trends and subsequent requirements.		
3. Responding to AID/W Office of Public Safety and Mission queries on project.	10 hours	18%
4. Direct operational technical advisory assistance and training.	8 hours	14%
5. Mission special projects	2 hours	4%

- NOTE:
1. Provincial inspection tours are required.. Time spent on these trips require additional hours to be added on the normal work week.
 2. Prior to the writing of this report, items 1 through 5 were reduced to absorb approximately 40% of time spent in monitoring Public Safety Division's construction projects.

ANNEX C

PUBLIC SAFETY TRAINING

October 1969

Completed

Place, Type of Training, Duration	Entered Tng. This Month	Total In Training	This Month	This FY To Date	Cum. Total To Date
Local					
Lao Police Academy					
Basic Training (6 mos.) (NCO)	0	0	0	0	696
Cadet Officers (3 yrs.)	0	85	0	0	76
Officer Candidates Course (1 yr.)	0	0	0	0	40
Recruit Training (6 mos.)	0	0	0	0	99
Firearms Training (24 hours.)	0	0	0	0	56
Radio Operator's Tng. Course (6 mos.)	0	0	0	20	30
Basic Fingerprint Tng (1 w.)	0	0	0	0	36
Semboune Academy, Vientiane					
Policewomen's In-Service Tng. (6 mos.)	0	0	0	0	89
English Language Tng. (Beginners-240 hrs.)	2	73	8	8	90
English Language Tng. (Advanced-240 hrs.)	0	8	3	3	54
USIS - Movie Projection Tng. (1 w.)	0	0	0	0	4
USAID/CM - Reproducing Machines (3 days)	0	0	0	0	2
USAID/MTS - Driver Preventive Mtnc. (2 days)	0	0	0	0	27
-Automotive Mtnc. (Mechanics)	0	0	0	0	14
-Automotive Mtnc. (Admin.)	0	0	0	0	1
-Stock Records Clerk	0	0	0	0	2
USAID/OSM-In-Service Training Whse. & Stock Records Clerk	0	0	0	0	3
PSD-Commo. Eqmt. Mtnc. (21 days)	0	0	0	1	1
PSD-Generator Mtnc. (3 mos.)	0	1	0	3	3
PSD-Firearms Repair & Mtnc. (40 hrs.)	3	0	3	9	17
PSD-In-Service Training (on going)					
Communications Eqmt. Mtnc. Stock Records Clerk	0	21	0	0	8
Communications Generator Mtnc.-	0	1	0	0	1
Communications Automotive Maintenance, Mechanics	0	15	0	0	0
Automotive Maintenance, Admin	0	9	0	0	0
Admin	0	3	0	0	0
Supply Records Clerk	0	7	0	0	1
USAID/MGS Firefighting	0	0	0	0	32

PUBLIC SAFETY TRAINING (Continued)

Place, Type of Training, Duration	Entered Tng. This Month	Total In Training	This Month	This FY To Date	Cum. Total To Date
Basic Mathematics-Communications (120 hrs.)	0	0	0	0	13
Advanced Mathematics-Commo (80 hrs.)	0	0	0	0	1
USAID/BPR-Automotive Mtnc. (Admin)(100 hrs.)	3	3	0	2	2
-Automotive Mtnc. (4 mos.)	0	0	0	0	13
Typwriting (120 hrs.)	2	3	0	5	40
USAID/Power-Generator Mtnc. (2 w.)	0	0	0	0	2
USAID/TTB-Electrical Mtnc. (200 hrs.)	0	0	0	0	2
TOTALS	<u>10</u>	<u>229</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>1,455</u>
U.S.A.					
International Police Adademy, Wash., D.C.					
Special Actions (Riot Control) (11 w.)	0	0	0	0	8
IPA General Course (16 w.)	0	0	0	0	15
IPA French General Course (16 w.)	0	0	0	4	17
IPA Senior Course (14 w.)	0	0	0	0	2
Communications Training (18 mos.)	0	1	0	0	1
TOTALS	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>43</u>
Third Country - Thailand					
Records & Identification (8 w.)	0	0	0	0	30
Photo Lab Techniques (8 w.)	0	0	0	0	5
Firearms Training (4 w.)	0	0	0	0	1
Administrative Firearms Training (8 w.)	0	0	0	0	4
Reloading Operations (4 w.)	0	0	0	0	0
Basic Communications (15 mos.)	0	13	0	0	23
Generator Maintenance (16 w.)	0	0	0	8	16
Criminal Investigations (16 w.)	6	6	0	0	18
Patrol Operations (4 w.)	0	0	0	10	10
Malaysia - Joint U.S. - British					
Motor Pool Operations (3 w.)	0	0	0	0	3
TOTALS	<u>6</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>115</u>

ANNEX D

COMMODITY PROCUREMENT PLANS

	FUND REQUIREMENTS					
	FY-69	FY-70	FY-71	FY-72	FY-73	TOTAL
U.S. INPUTS (U.S. \$ Thousands or equivalent)						
COMMODITIES:						
Miscellaneous General Supplies	5	12	12	12	12	53
Miscellaneous General Supplies for rehab. and construction or police building	-	10	10	10	10	40
Repair parts for Weapons	5	5	3	2	2	17
Firing Range Equipment	2	2	2	2	2	10
Riot Control Equipment	3	1	1	1	1	7
Ammunition and Explosives	30	30	30	20	20	130
Vehicles	-	90	150	75	75	390
Vehicular Equipment Components (parts)	30	45	45	45	45	210
Tires and Tubes	10	10	10	10	10	50
Pirogus Motor and Repair Parts	4	2	2	2	2	12
Maintenance & Repair Shop Equipment	2	7	5	5	5	24
Telecom Equipment and Spare Parts	40	26	26	26	26	144
Photographic Equipment	3	1	1	1	1	7
Training Aids and Devices	2	2	2	2	2	10
Office Equipment and Machines	8	8	8	8	8	40
TOTAL	<u>144</u>	<u>251</u>	<u>307</u>	<u>221</u>	<u>221</u>	<u>1,144</u>
OTHER COSTS:						
Short-Term Consultants – TCN	3	3	3	3	3	15
Contractual Services – L.A.G.	4	4	4	4	4	20
Construction – Police Academy	-	150	-	-	-	150
MRO – Miscellaneous Small Purchases	3	5	5	5	5	23
Local and International Travel – U.S. & TCN	2	2	2	2	2	10
Transportation (Bangkok to Laos)	25	25	25	25	25	125
TCN Salaries	32	34	22	20	20	128
Construction: LNP Motorpool Facility	-	15	-	-	-	15
TOTAL	<u>69</u>	<u>238</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>486</u>

ANNEX E

ABSTRACTS FROM THE PROJECT APPRAISAL REPORT OF JANUARY, 1969

There is no previous PAR for this project. The following is a brief summary of the history of the project from its beginning:

The Civil Police Administration Program for the Lao Police was initiated in September 1955, in response to a request from the Royal Lao Government (RLG). This resulted in providing the RLG with technical assistance in surveying the organization and management of the Lao National Police (LNP). Provision was made for commodity assistance by procuring radio equipment, vehicles, miscellaneous supplies for logistics support, and by providing training (foreign and in-country).

Considerable progress was made in improving the capabilities of the LNP during the first phase (1955-1961) of the project: fragmented police forces were consolidated into a single LNP; a headquarters staff was organized; a training academy was established at Done Noun, 13 km. from Vientiane; and 838 participants were sent to the U.S., the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaya for training. The U.S. Government provided nine (9) American police advisors and four (4) Third Country Nationals (TCNs).

The police project was discontinued in FY-1961 due to the removal of the LNP from the control of the Ministry of Interior and its absorption by the Directorate of National Coordination (DNC), an agency of the Department of Defense.

After the unsuccessful coup d'état of February 1965, the control of the LNP was re-established under the Ministry of Interior, and USAID assistance was resumed in June 1965. In order to develop the LNP into a modern, efficient police organization capable of maintaining law and order and combating subversive elements, the following targets were chosen:

- Training of LNP personnel (foreign and in-country)
- Construction of police facilities
- Improvement of identification and records system
- Establishment of ordnance repair and ammunition reloading
- Upgrading telecommunications
- Strengthening of special police operations
- Establishment of automotive maintenance operations
- Improvement in management of LNP logistics and supply operations

- Establishment of LNP Firearms Training Program
- Upgrading of LNP patrol operations

(1) Overall performance and effectiveness of project implementation in achieving project targets can be stated as satisfactory. Considerable progress has been made to date in the implementation of the above listed project targets.

(2) This project contributes to a great degree toward the achievement of national and sector goals. Development of a country's economy, and productive mobilization of its economic potential, cannot be accomplished without a minimum degree of personal security, peace in the community, and stability of government.

(3) There have been no unusual or unexpected costs in the Civil Police Administration Project. The commodity cost has constantly declined with each year's funding. The initial commodity cost was higher because of the destruction or seizure of police material (weapons, vehicles, radio equipment, etc.) by various power groups during the numerous coups and counter-coups which began in August 1960 and continued to occur for the next four and one-half years. When the Public Safety Program was reestablished in June 1965, the LNP had only a limited quantity of equipment, most of which was unserviceable and of poor quality. Participant training is another area with a yearly budget decline. FY-1967 is an exception as it was necessary to train a large number of communications personnel required to operate and maintain the LNP radio networks.

(4) The continuance of the Civil Police Administration Project is considered essential to country development and the furtherance of U.S. objectives. (See (2) above.) As long as the RLG lacks the necessary financial resources and technically competent human resources, the Civil Police Administration Project will have a major role in assisting the RLG to develop an efficient civil police force. The final contribution date of FY-1973 is appropriate only if other outside financial and technical assistance is available to the RLG by that date. If all professional guidance and financial assistance is withdrawn, the LNP is likely to retrogress and its capability to maintain law and order, preserve the public safety, and contribute to the internal security will be greatly diminished.

CONSTRUCTION OF POLICE FACILITIES

A. Police Pistol Range (completed)

B. Police Academy Buildings

Significant material assistance was held in abeyance until a reliable source of potable water could be developed. During FY-67 a deep well was drilled and sufficient potable water is now available for the Academy. In FY-67 authorization was granted for construction of one "groupe scolaire" type structure (a standard-plan Lao school building). In FY-68 authorization was granted for construction of two additional "groupe scolaire" type structures. A combination kitchen/mess hall building was planned for FY-69 but was canceled because of budget limitations. In FY-70 it is planned to construct the combination kitchen/mess hall and barracks building.

*C. Rehabilitation of Communications Center

D. Construction of Communications Radio Repair Facilities

E. Construction of generator sheds

*F. Erection of permanent type antenna towers and masts

G. Warehouse and Repair Complex (motor vehicle maintenance; radio, generator and ordnance maintenance; and warehouse) (completed)

H. LNP Motorpool (completed)

IMPROVEMENT OF IDENTIFICATION AND RECORDS SYSTEM

Full development of a modern records and identification system, based on Henry System of fingerprint classification and filing, was hampered by the lack of a Public Safety Advisor/Records and Identification. This problem was solved by USAID enlisting the services of Colonel Chai Sevikul, Deputy Chief, Criminal Records Office, Thai National Police, and his assistant. Consequently, a Central Records and Identification Bureau has been established in lieu of the outmoded system formerly used in Indochina; thirty-five LNP officers who were trained in Thailand during FY-66 are part of the staff. A photo laboratory has been equipped and LNP personnel have been instructed in photographic techniques.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ORDNANCE REPAIR AND AMMUNITION RELOADING

USAID has assisted the LNP in this activity by setting up a temporary ordnance repair and small arms ammunition reloading operation pending completion of the construction of the facilities to permanently house the project.

UPGRADE TELECOMMUNICATIONS BY ESTABLISHING A COUNTRY-WIDE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

A. Installed primary radio circuits between LNP Headquarters in Vientiane and provincial police headquarters

*Behind the original schedules.

B. Installed a low-power two-way radio systems (mobile, fixed, and portable). Total includes 33 sets for estimated growth.

C. Installed intra-province radio stations (fixed point-to-point). Total includes 21 sets for estimated growth.

D. Establishment of communications center at the new LNP Headquarters in Vientiane.

E. Installation of manual telephone switching system (120 lines) at the new LNP Headquarters in Vientiane.

F. Spare parts, test equipment support, and procurement of radio equipment for replacement and systems growth.

Development of the police telecommunications system will level off in FY-1970 and will be followed by a program that provides spare parts and replacement of test equipment for a very active maintenance operation. A limited growth in the radio system is anticipated and this will necessitate procurement of equipment to meet these requirements.

STRENGTHENING OF SPECIAL POLICE OPERATIONS

This unit of the LNP continuously receives attention from advisory efforts, mainly concentrated on classroom and on-the-job training. A uniform records system has been established in the Special Police Headquarters and its provincial units.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AUTOMOTIVE MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

Prior to FY-68, the maintenance of LNP vehicles was performed by USAID Motor Transportation Branch (MTB), as the LNP lacked the capacity. During the period of USAID responsibility, MTB accepted and trained 14 police mechanics and 2 administrative personnel. Public Safety made special arrangements for 16 weeks of training in the Bureau of Public Roads mechanics school and, to date, 4 police mechanics have finished general mechanics school, 2 are currently in training, and 2 have finished electrical mechanics on-the-job eight weeks of training. Three police officers were sent to Malaysia under joint U.S. and British sponsorship for training in motor pool operations.

In February 1968, the police assumed the responsibility of maintaining and repairing their vehicles and commenced the operation under the supervision of two Public Safety Third Country Nationals (TCNs) from temporary facilities constructed by USAID. A permanent motor-vehicle repair facility is presently under construction. In July 1968, full services of an American Public Safety Advisor were assigned to this Project.

IMPROVEMENT IN MANAGEMENT OF LNP LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY OPERATIONS

To assist the LNP establish an adequate warehousing commodity control system, USAID organized and trained LNP personnel in proper warehousing procedures. From April 1967 and until August 1968 (at which time USAID lost its right of occupancy

due to expiry of the lease), the training activity was conducted in USAID furnished facility. Pending completion of new warehouse facilities, LNP warehouse personnel are working at the LNP Headquarters in Vientiane.

ESTABLISHMENT OF LNP FIREARMS TRAINING PROGRAM

As part of this program, USAID has constructed a pistol range at the LNP Academy at Done Noun. PSD plans to commence the firearms training program during FY-69.

UPGRADING OF LNP PATROL OPERATIONS

In order to develop improved mobile and foot patrol operations in the major cities of Laos, PSD plans to train 30 LNP officers and non-commissioned officers in Thailand.

	Behind Schedule	On Schedule
1. Participant Training		
a. U.S.A.		x
b. Third Country		x
c. In-Country Training		x
2. Construction of Police Facilities		
a. Police Pistol Range		x
b. Replacement of wooden buildings at the Police Academy with concrete structures.	x	x
c. Rehabilitation of communication centers. PSD has concentrated on the installation of intra-province network radio stations and completion of rehabilitation of communication centers were given a lower priority.	x	
d. Construction of communications radio repair facilities		x
e. Construction of generator sheds		x
f. Erection of antenna towers - erection of antenna towers is behind the original schedule because of revised priorities in replacing temporary antenna masts	x	
g. Construction of a complex which is to house automotive maintenance, small arms repair and small arms reloading operations, warehouse operations and repair of communications equipment (Construction delayed due to various problems in construction and subsequent change orders. Completion anticipated on or about February 1969.)	x	
3. Communications		
a. Installation of equipment at 13 province police headquarters in a network that provides voice and telegraphy transmissions with LNP/HQ in Vientiane		x
b. Installation of low-power two-way radio systems, mobile, fixed, and portable		x
c. Installation of intra-province radio stations (fixed point to point). Twelve delayed due to insecure locations	x	
d. Establishment of communications center at the new LNP Headquarters, Vientiane		x
e. Installation of manual telephone switching system (120 lines) at the new LNP Headquarters, Vientiane (FY-68 funds). Procurement commenced December 1968. Delayed action due to frequent changes in plans for location of telephone sets. Equipment is now expected in-country April 1969.	x	

	Behind Schedule	On Schedule
f. Spare parts, test equipment support, and procurement of equipment for replacement and systems growth		x
4. Improvement of Identification and Records System-		x
5. Establishment of Ordnance Repair and Ammunition Reloading-		x
6. Strengthening of Special Police Operations		x
7. Establishment of Automotive Maintenance Garages		x
8. Improvement in Management of LNP Logistics and Supply Operations		x

Overall Implementation Performance

The project is on schedule. A significant achievement has been the upgrading of LNP communications. It was necessary to start from scratch, procure commodities, implement various training programs and finally effect the installation of a country-wide radio network. Full achievement is hampered by poor military security in some locations. The quality of Lao performance related to this target activity has been quite satisfactory and LNP cooperation has been excellent.

On the other side of the ledger, the problem areas which plagued the project since inception of the new Civil Police Administration Program have been in the field of construction.

Participants

The participant training programs in the U.S. and third countries have covered a wide variety of professional levels, from staff senior police officers training (16 weeks) to lower echelon training in special skills related to the police field, such as fingerprint classification, police photography, and support activities such as ammunition reloading, maintenance of vehicles, generators and communications equipment. More and more training will be conducted locally as facilities and instructors become available and the third country training programs will be reduced accordingly.

Commodities

With rare exceptions, all Public Safety commodities were purchased from the United States. Out of the total dollars spent on procurement of commodities since 1965, 34.2% (\$616,000) were expended for procurement of vehicles, garage equipment and spare parts; 28.3% (\$500,000) went toward procurement of communications equipment and spare parts; and 21.4% (\$379,000) were spent on procurement of arms and ammunition. The balance, 15.5% of the funds, was used for procurement of other miscellaneous commodities. In general the quality of commodities, adherence to specifications and markings have been satisfactory.

FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

In the past, the lack of coordination and cooperation between ministries has presented some problems. For instance, the military authorities have refused to recognize the authority of the civil police over military offenders in off-duty, off-post status. However, recently, the Commanding General of the 5th Military Region authorized the civil police to arrest off-duty military personnel in possession of weapons and explosives to prevent incidents at the annual That Luang Festival. However, a full measure of law and order will never be attained until civil authorities are given jurisdiction over military personnel.

A National Documentation Center was recently established to coordinate the collection, evaluation and dissemination of information generated by the intelligence sections of the Laos National Police and the Army. Another measure which should improve coordination in the recent establishment of a Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Security composed of senior military and civilian officials to coordinate security measures in the Vientiane area. Plans are being made to organize similar security councils at the provincial level.

Another problem has been the reluctance of "Travaux Publics" to cooperate in the implementation of USAID's plan to have that Agency perform 3rd, 4th, and 5th echelon repairs of police vehicles. The "Travaux Publics" vigorously opposed the proposition, insisting that it was already overtaxed in caring for its own fleet. When finally forced to accept it, they deadlined the police vehicles for an excessive period of time and charged the LNP exorbitant rates for labor charges. The problem is being dealt with by terminating the agreement with this element and by giving the LNP a greater capability for the maintenance of its vehicle fleet.

The host country is incapable of financing this project, and in fact, must rely on the U.S. and other donor-countries to finance its budget deficit in order to carry on normal government operations.

Progress toward a society of law and order is hampered by lack of a sophisticated legal profession, untrained judiciary, and outdated and inadequate body of laws and ordinances.

Because of the RLG's lack of financial resources, its physical resource inputs and supporting facilities have been limited and insufficient to support this project. The LNP has, however, rendered excellent cooperation in providing the manpower required to implement the various programs. The RLG has also provided funds to construct a LNP headquarters building in Vientiane which will contain the various headquarters bureaus and sections which have heretofore been housed in scattered buildings throughout the city. This consolidation, which was recommended by the Walton-Skuse Police Survey Team, should greatly improve the operating efficiency and administration of the LNP. The Director General of Police has provided office space for USAID's Public Safety

Division in the new LNP Headquarters building. This will facilitate liaison between PSD and the several bureaus and sections of the LNP Headquarters and make for better working relationships. By means of self-help projects the LNP has also built a large number of police posts in rural areas without the assistance of the U.S.

While the LNP has lacked the necessary facilities and the capability of maintaining its equipment, considerable progress is being made to overcome these deficiencies as a result of the USAID-financed police construction and training programs. However, it will take several years to adequately train LNP technicians to properly maintain the equipment furnished by the U.S. (especially the communications equipment).

Because of the RLG's limited financial resources, it is doubtful that the LNP will be able to sustain its vehicle, fleet and communications system after the U.S. terminates its financial assistance.

The project has been hampered by the almost complete lack of technical skills in the LNP and the low level of education of its personnel. For instance, in selecting personnel for communications training, it was necessary for USAID to institute a course in basic mathematics before the participants could be sent to schools in Thailand for basic electronics training, as most of the participants had only a third or fourth year education level. The USAID is doing much to upgrade the technical education and experience of LNP personnel.

In general, except for those officers who have graduated from the Thailand Police Academy (a 4-year course), the LNP is lacking in planning and management skills. The USAID is attempting to correct this situation by providing advisory services and by sending selected personnel to the U.S. for training in police administration and management techniques at the International Police Academy.

During the past three years, the LNP has established police posts in many rural areas throughout the country. There has been no sign of reluctance on the part of police personnel to accept assignments to these posts, many of which are isolated and located in insecure areas subject to enemy attacks, even though a number of policemen have been killed, injured or captured as a result of enemy action.

The USAID is of the opinion that there is too great a concentration of police in the City of Vientiane due largely to overstaffing of the LNP Headquarters. However, the presence of what we consider to be an excessive number of police in Vientiane is due to political factors which cannot be reconciled at this time.

The police, like other civil servants of the RLG, are poorly paid and most of them must devote time to tilling their small farms or garden plots, or operating taxis and

samlors after duty hours to supplement their income. The USAID has endcavored to convince the RLG that quality of personnel should be stressed rather than quantity which would permit higher pay for civil servants without an increase in budget funding. However, the RLG has been reluctant to decrease its personnel because of political reasons.

ANNEX F

PROJECT FURNISHED FIREARMS PROFILE

I. PROCUREMENT DATA						
Description	PIO/C No.	Item No.	Quantity Procurement	Quantity Received	Quantity Issued	On Hand USAID
Revolver .38 Barrel 4''	5-50492	1	1,500	1,500	1,500	0
Revolver .38 Barrel 4''	5-60292	1	1,500	1,457	1,457	0
TOTAL			3,000	2,957	2,957	0
Revolver .38 Barrel 6''	5-80198	1	12	12	12	0
TOTAL			12	12	12	0
Revolver .22 Barrel 4''	5-50521	1	40	40		
Revolver .22 Barrel 4''	5-60292	15	20	20	60	
Revolver .22 Barrel 4''	5-70372	3	40	40	2	38
TOTAL			100	100	62	38
Shotgun 12 gauge	5-50492	2	50	50	50	0
Shotgun 12 gauge	5-60292	2	50	50	50	0
TOTAL			100	100	100	0

II. DISTRIBUTION DATA				
	Revolver .22 Barrel 4''	Revolver .38 Barrel 4''	Revolver .38 Barrel 6''	Shotgun 12 Gauge
Director General of Police	—	12	1	—
Health Service	1	4	—	—
Materiel Service	15	153	4	9
Intendance Service	2	32	—	—
Instruction Service	20	65	7	50
Administration Service	3	59	—	—
Communication Service	—	20	—	—
Inspection Service	—	15	—	—
Territorial Service	—	50	—	—
Immigration Service	—	100	—	—
Metropolitan Service	—	387	—	—
Special Service	—	115	—	—
Judicial Service	—	65	—	—
<u>Commissariats</u>				
Luang Prabang	1	103	—	1
Vientiane	1	187	—	1
Paksane	1	50	—	1
Khammouane	1	97	—	1
Savannakhet	1	125	—	1
Wapikhamthong	1	52	—	2
Saravane	2	67	—	1
Attopeu	1	53	—	1
Sedone	3	118	—	1
Champassak	1	66	—	1
Sithandone	1	45	—	1
Sayaboury	1	80	—	1
Xieng Khouang	1	98	—	1
Phongsaly	1	60	—	1
Houa Phan	1	24	—	1
Houa Khong	1	40	—	1
LNP Warehouse, Vientiane	2	615	—	24
	62	2,957	12	100

ANNEX G

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

KINGDOM OF LAOS

ORDER IN COUNCIL

No. 375 of 12/7/65

We, Boroma Setha Khatya Sourya Vongsa
Phra Maha Sri Savang Vatthana, King of Laos

DECREE:

Chapter I. General Provisions

Article 1: A Directorate General of the National Police (Tamrouat) is created in Laos, the organization of which is fixed by this Order in Council. The Directorate General of the Police is placed under the direct command of the Director General of the National Police who is responsible to the authority of the Minister of Interior.

Chapter II. Functions

Article 2: The main functions of the National Police are to look after the maintenance of public security, the execution of the laws and regulations, to assure the maintenance of order in collaboration with the Armed Forces and the public services of the Kingdom.

Chapter III. Organization and Functioning

Article 3: The National Police is organized with one Directorate General (Krom Tamrouat), several provincial organs called provincial commissions of the Police (Kong Kamkabkane Tamrouat Pracham Khoueng), several conscription organs called sections (Kong Tamrouat Pracham Muong) and several internal organs called squads (Mouat Tamrouat Pracham Tasseng) and posts (Dane Tamrouat).

Article 4: The Directorate General of the National Police (Krom Tamrouat) is organized into:

- 1) Inspection of Services of the Police (Kong Banjakane Chare Tamrouat).
- 2) Administrative Service of the Police (Kong Banjakane Pokkhong Tamrouat).
- 3) Service of the Special Police (Kong Banjakane Tamrouat Santibal).
- 4) Service of the Judicial Police (Kong Banjakane Tamrouat Youtidham).
- 5) Service of the Metropolitan Police (Kong Banjakane Tamrouat Nakhonbal).
- 6) Service of the Provincial Police (Kong Banjakane Tamrouat Phouthone).
- 7) Service of the Immigration Police (Kong Banjakane Tamrouat Touat Khen Khao Nuong).
- 8) Service of the Police Logistics (Kong Banjakane Phalathikane Tamrouat).
- 9) Service of the Police Education (Kong Banjakane Suksa Tamrouat).
- 10) Service of the Police Health (Kong Banjakane Satharanasouk Tamrouat).
- 11) Service of the Police Transmission (Kong Banjakane Susane Tamrouat).
- 12) Service of the Police Ordnance (Kong Banjakane Samphayout Tamrouat).

Article 5: The Director General of the National Police (Athibodi Krom Tamrouat) is selected from among the Chief Commissioners or, in the absence of whom, from among the Commissioners of the Police and assisted by:

- a Deputy Director General (Rong Athibodi Krom Tamrouat).
 - an Inspector of the Services of the Police (Chare Tamrouat).
- the Deputy Director General and the Inspector General of the National Police are selected in the same conditions as those for the Director General of the National Police.

(Article 5 Amended By Decree 404 Of 24 Oct '68)

Article 6: The Deputy Director General of the National Police has the permanent delegation of authority from the Director General for the internal affairs of the service and for certain affairs specially conferred upon him by the Director General of the National Police. In case of absence or prevention, the latter is replaced by the Deputy Director General.

The Inspectors of the Services of the National Police is charged with assisting the Director General of the National Police in:

- the supervision of the functioning of the service of the Police at all levels.
- the application of the code of discipline.
- the studies, planning and establishment of the police regulations.
- the program of public relations.
- the liaisons and the special missions entrusted by the Director General of the National Police.

Article 7: The Services of the Police (Kong Banjakane Tamrouat) are each directed by a Commissioner or a Police Superintendent, bearing the title of Chief of the Police Service (Phon Banjakane) assisted by a Deputy.

Article 8: All the Chiefs of Services have the same prerogatives and in the precedence order come immediately after the Deputy Director General and the Inspector of the Services of the National Police.

Article 9: In each province a Provincial Commission (Kong Kamkabkane Tamrouat Pracham Khoueng) is created with its headquarters at the chief town of the province.

The breakdown of the Police personnel among the provincial commissions of the Police shall be made subject of an order of the Minister of Interior.

Article 10: Each of the provincial commissions is directed by the Commissioner or a Police Superintendent bearing the title of Provincial Police Superintendent (Phou Kamkabkane Tamrouat Pracham Khoueng), assisted by a deputy superintendent and bearing the title of deputy to the provincial police superintendent (Rong Phou Kamkabkane Tamrouat Pracham Khoueng).

Article 11: In each Muong, a police section is created (Kong Tamrouat Pracham Muong) responsible directly to the Provincial Commission of the Police. The Sections are each directed by a police inspection bearing the title of Section Commander of the Muong (Phou Bangkab Kong Tamrouat Pracham Muong).

Article 12: In each Tasseng, a squad (Mourat Tamrouat Pracham Tasseng) is created, directly responsible to the Police Section of the Muong and directed by a Police Sergeant bearing the title of Police Squad Leader (Nai Mouat Tamrouat) and in several posts (Dane Tamrouat) directed each by a police lance-corporal bearing the title of Chief of the Police Post (Nai Dane Tamrouat).

Article 13: A commission of the Prefectoral Police (Kong Kamkabkane Tamrouat Pracham Phanakhone) has been specially provided for the Prefecture of Vientiane, Administrative Capital of Laos.

The Commission of the Prefectoral Police is administratively responsible to the Prefect of the City of Vientiane and technically to the Directorate General of the National Police (Metropolitan Police Service). It is directed by a police superintendent bearing the title of Vientiane Prefectoral Police Superintendent (Phou Kamkabkane Tamrouat Pracham Phanakhone). The Metropolitan Police Chief can, cumulatively with his normal functions, direct the Vientiane Prefectoral Police Commission.

The Vientiane Prefectoral Police Commission is subdivided into several districts (Kong Tamrouat Pracham Nuong Nay Thesabane) directed each by a deputy superintendent or a police inspector.

Article 14: The nominations to the following functions shall be pronounced:

By Order in Council (Cabinet Council Session)

- the Director General of the Police (Athibodi Krom Tamrouat)
- the Deputy Director General of the Police
- the Inspector of the Service of the Police
- the Chiefs of Services of the Police

By Presidential Order

- the Deputies to the Chiefs of Services
- the Provincial Police Superintendents
- the Vientiane Prefectoral Police Superintendent
- the principals of the schools and training centers of the Police

By Order of the Minister of Interior

- the Chiefs of Office of the Directorate General of the Police
- the Chiefs of Section at the Provincial Police Commissions
- the District Chiefs of the Vientiane Prefectoral Police
- the Section Chiefs of the Muong

By Decision of the Director General of the Police

- the Section Chiefs of the Directorate General of the National Police
- the Sub-Section Chiefs of the Provincial Commissions of the National Police
- the Section Chiefs of the Office of the Vientiane Prefectoral Police

(Last Section Amended By Decree 94 Of 26 Apr '66)

Article 15: The powers and internal organization of the National Police, the police schools and the police training centers shall be determined by the Order of the Minister of Interior or, according to the case, by the inter-Ministerial Order.

(Article 15 Amended By Decree 360 of 26 Sep '67)

Article 16: In the remote areas not yet endowed with highway system, a section of mounted police, equipped with pack-and-saddle horses, may be created and attached to the Provincial Commission of the Police.

Article 17: In the provinces bordering the Mekong River or in the areas passed through by the navigable and floatable rivers, a section of water police equipped with motor boats, vedette boats and any other means of locomotion needed to assure the

presence of the police may be created and attached to the provincial commission of the Police and the Vientiane Prefectoral Police Commission.

Article 18: The Director General of the National Police shall receive the same allowances (in kind and in money) as the Province Chief.

Chapter IV. Final Provision

Article 19: The Order in Council No. 174 dated July 9, 1964 and all the provisions contrary to this Order in Council are abrogated.

Article 20: Our Prime Minister, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of the National Defense and War Veterans, the Ministers of Finance, of Interior and of Justice are charged, each for his own concern, with the implementation of this Order in Council.

Done in our Royal Palace, Duang Prabang, December 7, 1965

His Majesty the King of Laos
(signed) Sri Savang Vatthana

Prime Minister, President of the Council of Ministers
(signed) Prince Souvanna Phouma (Chao Krom Mana)


Minister of Interior
(signed) Pheng Phongsavar

Sighted at the Financial Control, No. 151 dated 11/15/65
(signed) Sisouk Na Champassak, Minister of Finance

Certified true copy: (Signed) Sisouphan Sukhaseum for: Director of Admin. Affairs
Outgoing No. 4/P dated 1/3/66.

ANNEX H

ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE HEADQUARTERS VIENTIANE



ANNEX I

LAO NATIONAL POLICE VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION

	JEEP			STATION WAGON	LIGHT TRUCK		MEDIUM TRUCK		HEAVY TRUCK			MISC.	TOTAL
	CJ-5	CJ-6	Willy CJ-3B	J-100	D-100	IVH 1200	D-500	J-3800	Water	Wrecker	Bus Truck	Fork Lift	
HEADQUARTERS	23	14	1	17	2	2	5	5	1	1	1	1	73
Public Safety Division.....													
CCAAC/CIC.....													
Administrative Service.....													
Logistics & Support Serv. ...													
Immigration Service.....													
Instruction Service.....													
Judicial Police Service....													
Materiel Service.....													
Special Police Service.....													
Health Service.....													
Communication Service.....													
Suburban Police Service....													
Urban Police Service.....													
Ministry of Interior.....													
General Inspection.....													
PROVINCES													
Phong Saly.....		1											1
Attopeu.....		1											1
Borikhane.....	1					1	1						3
Champasack.....	1						1	1					3
Houa Khong.....		1											1
Khammoune.....	1			1		1	1						4
Luang Prabang.....		1		3		2	1						7
Saravane.....		1				1							2
Savannakhet.....	1			2		2	1	1					7
Sayaboury.....		1				1							2
Sedone.....		1		2		1	1	2					7
Sithandone.....		1				1							2
Vientiane.....	1	8				1		1					11
Wapikhamthong.....	1					1	1						3
Xieng Khouang.....						1							1
Houa Phanh.....								1					1
TOTALS	1/29	30	1	25	2	15	12	11	1	1	1	1	129

^{1/} USAID procured 30 each; however, one vehicle was blown up.

ANNEX J

LAO NATIONAL POLICE PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS AND INTRA-PROVINCE RADIO NETWORKS

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE OF EQUIPMENT</u> ¹
ATTOPEU PROVINCE	
Attopeu (Hq.)	SA-100
Muong Houei Kong	SBT-20B
BORIKHANE PROVINCE	
Paksane (Hq.)	SA-100
	MOTRAC
Muong Pakkading	MOTRAC
Muong Prabathphone Sane	MOTRAC
CHAMPASSAC PROVINCE	
Champassac (Hq.)	SA-100
	MOTRAC
Muong Phonethong	MOTRAC
Muong Soukhouma	MOTRAC
Tasseng Donc Talat	FM-5A
HOUA KHONG PROVINCE	
Ban Houei Sai (Hq.)	SA-100
	SBT-20B
Tasseng Nam Kheung	SBT-20B
Tasseng Tone Pheung	SBT-20B
Tasseng Ban Danc	SBT-20B
Tasseng Ban Khouane	SBT-20B
Tasseng Ban Houei Or	SBT-20B

¹At each location, there is one each of type indicated.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE OF EQUIPMENT</u>
KHAMMOUANE PROVINCE	
Thakhek (Hq)	SA-100 SBT-20B MOTRAC
Muong Sibounheuang	SBT-20
Muong Hinboun	MOTRAC
Muong Phone Tiou	SBT-20B
Muong Xieng Vang	FM-1A
Muong Nong Bok	MOTRAC
LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE	
Luang Prabang (Hq.)	SA-100 SBT-20B MOTRAC
Muong Xieng Ngeun	MOTRAC
Muong Pak Scuang	FM-5
Muong Nanc	SBT-20B
Muong Kassy	SBT-20B
Muong Khay	SBT-20B
SARAVANE PROVINCE	
Saravane (Hq.)	SA-100
SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE	
Savannakhet (Hq.)	SA-100 SBT-20B RCA VHF
Muong Saraphoum	SBT-20B
Muong Sebang Fai	SBT-20B
Muong Outhoumphone	MOTRAC
Muong Dong Hene	MOTRAC
Muong Khanthaboury	FM-5A
Muong Keng Kok	SBT-20B
Muong Phommachady	SBT-20B
Tasseng Lahanam	SBT-20B
Tasseng Tha Prachoom	SBT-20B
SAYABOURY PROVINCE	
Sayaboury (Hq.)	SA-100 SBT-20B
Muong Hong Sa	SBT-20B

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE OF EQUIPMENT</u>
SAYABOURY PROVINCE (Continued)	
Muong Paklay	SBT-20B
Muong Xieng Hone	SBT-20B
Muong Kene Thao	SBT-20B
Muong Phieng	SBT-20B
Tasseng Tha Deua	SBT-20B
Tasseng Botene	SBT-20B
SEDONE PROVINCE	
Pakse (Hq.)	SA-200 RCA VHF
Muong Paksong	MOTRAC
Muong Prathoumphone	MOTRAC
Muong Souvannakhili	MOTRAC
Muong Phantha Oudom	MOTRAC
SITHANDONE PROVINCE	
Khong Island (Hq.)	SA-100 MOTRAC
Tasseng Done Khadane	FM-5A
Tasseng Ban Khone	FM-5A
Muong Moulapamouk	MOTRAC
Muong Salam Phao	MOTRAC
Ban Kamaou	FM-5A
VIENTIANE PROVINCE	
Vientiane (LNP Hq.)	SA-100
Vientiane (Provincial Hq.)	RCA VHF SBT-20B
Muong Phone Hong	MOTRAC
Muong Sanakham	SBT-20B
Muong Vang Vieng	SBT-20B
Ban Keun	MOTRAC
Muong Na Saythong	MOTRAC
Muong Saythany	FM-1A
Muong Phanthaboun	MOTRAC
Muong Say Fong	FM-5A
Tasseng Tha Deua	MOTRAC
Ban Done	MOTRAC

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE OF EQUIPMENT</u>
WAPIKHAMTHONG PROVINCE	
Khong Sedonc (Hq.)	SA-100
XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE	
Sam Thong (Hq.)	SBT-20B

NUMBER OF LOCATIONS

Intra-Province	- 57
Provincial Police Headquarters	- 14

AS OF NOVEMBER 1969

