

**Report to the AID Administrator
from the
Task Force on Personnel Ceiling Reductions**



**December, 1981
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MANAGER TO MANAGER

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AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
REPORT ON REDUCING PERSONNEL LEVELS

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Report on Reducing Personnel Levels

Executive Summary

The Agency's direct hire workforce ceiling for FY 1981 received from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was 5,351 full time employees in permanent positions. Approximately 1,475 of these positions were for Americans assigned overseas; some 1,850 were for Foreign National employees; and the remaining 2,026 were for Americans in AID/Washington.

As part of President Reagan's effort to achieve a balanced federal budget in FY 1984, AID has received from OMB substantially lower workforce ceilings for the years 1982-1984. To meet these reduced levels during this period, the Agency will have to reduce its direct hire workforce by approximately 700 full-time positions.

At the direction of Administrator M. Peter McPherson, this task force was formed for the purpose of identifying options for how the Agency can attain these workforce reductions, and to identify the program and policy changes that will be required for the Agency to function effectively given reduced personnel resources. Members of the task force, representing AID/Washington bureaus and offices, drafted the attached report based on their research and discussions. Information and data used in developing options were collected from a variety of official Agency reports and sources. Early in this effort, task force members canvassed their respective bureaus/offices on a limited basis to compile a universe of suggestions, alternatives, and recommendations for achieving staff reductions. This survey then resulted in five broad areas of analysis for the report: Program Policy Changes, Alternatives to Direct Hire Staff, Changes in Internal Policies and Procedures, Administrative Efficiencies, and Reorganization/Consolidation/Elimination of functions. Throughout the task force effort, there was

continual discussion about the validity of the various staff savings proposed. In pursuing its objectives, the task force members kept in mind the comparative advantage the Agency has over other donors in its unique approach to delivering assistance. We sought to preserve those functions that have directly contributed to AID's development as an effective agency for assisting less developed countries in the design and implementation of innovative economic and social development programs.

A summary of the options identified in the report is presented in the following chart. The task force developed these options with the intent that some but not all would be selected for implementation. Virtually all of the options require hard decisions by AID management. No attempt has been made to rank order the options in terms of the level of difficulty of implementation.

It is important to note that the staff savings indicated for the options listed are not additive. In some instances, selection of one option may obviate the need for selection of another option. Although the task force has attempted to avoid redundancy and double counting, some options are interrelated and may appear to be duplicative. Once a decision package of options is selected, it is also important to note that significant additional staff work by appropriate offices will be necessary.

SUMMARY OF OPTIONS

OPTIONS	RANGE OF PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS	ESTIMATED TIME FRAME FOR ACHIEVING PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS					
		1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	BEYOND
<u>Sector Concentration</u>							
Food Production	50-100						-----
Population	35-50	-----					
Health	50-70		-----				
Energy	None						
Education	100-150	-----					
Other Sectors/Offices	20-30						-----
<u>Mission Staffing</u>							
Small Programs	65-80						-----
Medium - Large Programs	175-185						-----
<u>Methods of Providing Assistance</u>							
	50-100						-----
<u>Conversion of FN's to Contract</u>							
Group I	120-130	-----					
Group II	90-110	-----					
Group III	175-200						-----
<u>Travel & Transportation Policies</u>							
Voucherless Travel	58						-----
Travel Arrangements	20-25						-----
<u>Office Automation/Modularization</u>							
	100-150						-----
<u>Data Processing Systems</u>							
S&T Economic and Social Data Services	6						-----
S&T Development Info. Unit	10-15	-----					
Financial Accounting/Control System	15-20						-----
Mission Accounting/Control System	20-30						-----
Staffing Ratios	35-45	-----					
<u>Reorganization/Consolidation/Elimination</u>							
IG Office of Security	8	-----					
PM Recruitment Staff	5	-----					
PM Employee Relations/Svcs.	5	-----					
PM Training and Development Office	8-10	-----					
PM Policy Development	5						-----
SER Data Management	15-20						-----
SER Management Planning	10-15	-----					
SER Commodity Management	10-15	-----					
SER Contract Management	None						
SER Management Operations	15-20	-----					
PPC Evaluation	6	-----					
PPC/Planning & Budget	5-10	-----					
PPC Policy Development/Program Review	5	-----					
Science & Technology Bur.	25-30	-----					
Geographic Bureaus	50-75	-----					
Regionalization	25-40	-----					
Non-Develop. Related Func.	150-200	-----					

I. BACKGROUND

AID obtains its workforce resources under a variety of arrangements and authorities--direct hire U.S. and Foreign National employees, contractors, personnel of other federal agencies who are assigned to work with AID by agreement between the two agencies, and individuals made available through the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA).

The bulk of AID's workforce is made up of full time direct hire employees serving in permanent positions. Overseas, some 1,475 U.S. personnel are responsible for the administration of Agency programs and projects, including the functions of program planning, development, evaluation, and management support. Very few of these U.S. personnel actually engage in project execution, however, as the Agency supplements its staff with the expertise of contractors and other federal agency personnel for project design and implementation.

Some 1,850 Foreign National direct hire employees complement the U.S. direct hire staff overseas. Most of the Foreign Nationals provide support in the administrative and clerical fields; however, some, perform jobs which could be -- and in the past often were -- performed by U.S. staff such as engineers, economists, participant training officers, personnel officers, and a wide range of other specialists. Because of their knowledge of local customs and practices, Foreign National employees are very effective and far less costly.

In AID/Washington, there are approximately 1,900 full-time, direct hire Americans in 418 organizational units responsible for a wide range of functions, including the provision of policy and program direction to the overseas posts and a variety of program and management support services.

As of September 30, 1981, the Agency had 5,270 full time direct hire employees in permanent positions in Washington and overseas, exclusive of IDCA, as well as 398 part-time and temporary employees.

In the last several years, the Agency has sought to achieve staffing levels both overseas and in Washington which are austere but, at the same time, the levels considered necessary to accomplish AID's objectives. In setting these balanced levels, however, three basic constraints effect management judgements, and decisions.

First, the Office of Management and Budget establishes a worldwide, direct hire employment limitation. For FY 1981, the authorized level was 5,351 full-time employees in permanent positions — including both U.S. and Foreign National employees in the U.S. and overseas. Under this limitation, the Agency distributes its workforce between AID/Washington and overseas and among its organizational elements. In addition to this limitation, the Agency also receives from OMB a limitation on the number of employees it may have in part-time, full-time temporary and intermittent positions. However, beginning in FY 1982 the limitation authorized by OMB will be stated in terms of full-time equivalent work years (FTE) for all categories of direct hire employment.

Second, MODE (Monitoring Overseas Direct Employment) is a control mechanism exercised by the Under Secretaries Committee of the National Security Council, with staff support from the Department of State. MODE controls the total number of employees assigned abroad who contribute to the official U.S. government presence and profile overseas. (For AID, this category includes all U.S. and

Foreign National direct hire personnel and personnel of other federal agencies working under Participating Agency Service Agreements.) In general, this constraint does not prevent AID from staffing its missions as it deems appropriate to carry out its assigned responsibilities. In certain cases, however, U.S. Ambassadors, as the personal representatives of the President and the Secretary of State, may — and have — objected to AID's proposed staff levels because of official policy considerations. In those instances where AID and the Ambassador cannot reach agreement on the staffing levels required, an appeal process within the Department of State and, subsequently, to the Under Secretaries Committee has been established and can be used.

Third, there are limitations on the Agency's appropriations, especially, the Operating Expense Account, since that is the source from which Agency personnel are paid. Additionally for AID, Congress has established a limitation on the amount of funds that may be spent in Washington. This has had a major effect on the decisions senior Agency management make on the mix of AID's personnel, between AID/W and overseas.

AID's direct hire workforce has changed significantly over the years. From an on-board level of about 14,750 direct hire personnel in 1961, the Agency reached a peak of some 18,000 in 1968. Between 1968 and the end of fiscal year 1981, the workforce has been reduced by approximately 12,300 (4,800 U.S. and 7,500 Foreign National employees), a decrease of 68%, to a level of about 5,300.

There are a number of factors which affected the changing workforce levels. The peak employment of the late 1960's reflected the expansion of the Agency's programs in the Southeast Asia area. Then during FY 1969, AID sustained a 12% reduction in American personnel overseas--both AID direct hire and other Federal agency personnel serving with AID under Participating Agency Service Agreements--and a similar reduction in Foreign National personnel under the President's Balance of Payments Program (BALPA), the purpose of which was to save staff cost outflows overseas. The Washington staff was also reduced (through reduction-in-force procedures) by approximately 12% during this period due to a reduction in the FY 1969 administrative appropriation.

During FY 1970 the Agency's overseas staff was reduced further under another exercise--Overseas Presence Reduction (OPRED)--in which the President directed that by June 30, 1970, AID and other government agencies reduce overseas employment 10% below the June 1969 level in order to minimize the official U.S. Government profile overseas. For purposes of OPRED, AID overseas employment was defined to include: (1) AID direct hire employees in permanent positions, (2) other U.S. agency employees working for AID under Participating Agency Service Agreements, and (3) American personal service contract employees. Under OPRED, AID actually reduced the total number of employees overseas by 758 Americans, or 14%. In the same period Foreign National employment was reduced by over 854 people or 10%.

In FY 1971, AID achieved a further reduction of 12% overseas. The President directed the Under Secretaries Committee of the National Security Council to continue to monitor and control U.S. Government presence abroad.

In FY 1972 and FY 1973, AID's direct hire staff was reduced by more than 3,300 employees--a two-year reduction of 25%. This reduction, resulting from a Reform Plan initiated by the Agency in 1972, was achieved through a consolidation of program and management support services in Washington, a tightly enforced hiring freeze, and the separation of Foreign Service staff serving in time-limited appointments.

Reductions continued in the Agency's direct hire overseas staff during FY 1974 resulting from program changes, as well as new ways of doing business, whereby actual project implementation was carried out by others--the host country itself, the U.S. private sector, or other federal agencies.

During FY 1975, the overseas AID direct hire staff was reduced dramatically as a result of the termination of programs in Indochina--by about 525 Americans and about 1,600 Foreign Nationals.

As a result of new initiatives legislated by the Congress in the Foreign Assistance Act, e.g., new initiatives in agriculture development, disaster relief, women in development, environmental concerns, the Sahel, and the Middle East, continued restructuring has been necessary in the size and skills composition of the AID staff. As the Agency has adjusted its workforce to changing program requirements, the Agency's personnel levels have continued downward annually with marginal reductions achieved over the past five years.

Statement of the Problem

As part of President Reagan's effort to achieve a balanced federal budget in FY 1984, AID received in February, 1981 substantially lower personnel ceilings

from OMB for the years 1982-1986:

FEBRUARY CEILING PROJECTIONS FOR DIRECT-HIRE PERSONNEL

FY 1981		FY 1982		FY 1983		FY 1984		FY 1985		FY 1986
<u>Ceiling</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Ceiling</u>								
<u>5,351</u>	<u>-100</u>	<u>5,251</u>	<u>-283</u>	<u>4,968</u>	<u>-112</u>	<u>4,856</u>	<u>-111</u>	<u>4,745</u>	<u>-111</u>	<u>4,634</u>

The President's second budget revision in September, 1981 proposed that the personnel reductions targeted for the Agency be achieved over a shorter period, 1982-1984. The proposed new ceilings are as follows:

REVISED OMB CEILING PROJECTIONS FOR DIRECT-HIRE PERSONNEL

1981		1982		1983		1984
<u>Ceiling</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Ceiling</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Ceiling</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Ceiling</u>
<u>5,351</u>	<u>-228</u>	<u>5,123*</u>	<u>-232</u>	<u>4,891*</u>	<u>-240</u>	<u>4,651*</u>

* IDCA functions must be absorbed within these levels.

As is apparent, the problem that AID now faces is how to achieve an overall staff reduction to 4,651 permanent full time employees with tenure by the end of 1984.

Accordingly, at the direction of Administrator M. Peter McPherson, this task force was formed to develop options that the Agency can consider to reduce the size of its workforce down to the levels shown above, and to propose policy and program changes which will be required for the Agency to function effectively with reduced personnel.

In the discussion that follows, a series of options are presented that the task force has developed in response to the directive from the Administrator. None of the options

provide quick, easy, or painless solutions to the problem of meeting AID's responsibilities and objectives with fewer personnel. However, the task force believes that the options discussed in this paper are the most reasonable alternatives to achieving the targeted personnel reductions with the least disruption to the Agency and dislocation of its valued and dedicated employees. Estimated staff savings and the estimated time frame for realizing these savings are included in the discussion of each option.

II. PROGRAM POLICY CHANGES

In spite of the decline in direct hire personnel and dwindling annual appropriations over the past several years, AID has continued to provide development assistance in a wide range of sectors and to address special development concerns with scarce staff and program resources. In order to maintain this broad development effort, AID has spread its staff and dollar resources to cover the entire development spectrum. Insufficient effort has been made to eliminate Agency participation in any sector or to resist the pressures of special interests. The result is that AID has reached a point where its personnel and financial resources are being spread so thin in some countries that AID's program represents only a token presence in certain sectors of activity. The task force believes that by concentrating AID's direct hire personnel resources in fewer countries, by addressing only a select number of development sectors, and by using less staff intensive delivery mechanisms to a greater extent, AID could achieve more meaningful impact in those countries and sectors where it remains active, while at the same time reducing the overall number of personnel overseas and in Washington.

Sector Concentration

Sector concentration offers the possibility of saving several hundred positions overseas and in Washington while at the same time placing more financial and personnel resources in the areas of our principle development concerns. It is recognized that AID cannot prescribe solutions to development problems from Washington which can be uniformly applied in each country in which it works. Nor should AID structure its system so rigidly as to foreclose any possibility of working outside its principle sectors of concentration when a given country situation makes AID involvement in other sectors critical.

The task force proposes that a policy determination by the Agency be made which will concentrate AID personnel resources in three or four key development sectors with the gradual elimination of organizational units and reduction of AID personnel now assigned in support of sectors other than those chosen for concentration. Under the new policy directive, missions would be limited to developing programs in the selected sectors, with small country programs being limited to only one or two sectors and larger country programs addressing three or four sectors of development. New AID development activities proposed by missions which are outside of the chosen sectors of concentration would be approved only on an exception basis at the Assistant Administrator level. AID interventions in any non-concentration sector would be structured by the mission in such a manner that no specialized direct hire personnel in the field or a technical backstopping office in Washington would be required.

Assuming AID embraces a policy of sector concentration and elimination over time of special interest programs and projects, the issue remains as to which sectors of concentration should be selected, and concomitantly, which substructures within selected sectors should receive priority attention. The process of selecting the Agency's principal sectors may lead to endless debate and result in reduced Agency effectiveness in the interim. The task force recognizes that there is no magic formula for arriving at the number of sectors or for choosing the areas of concentration; nevertheless, since the number of sectors in which AID is involved is one of several major determinants of the Agency's personnel needs, the task force believes that the need to limit sector involvement is compelling. It is the general consensus of the task force that the following sectors be considered as options for concentration:

Food Production

Food production would be the area of least controversy as a sector of concentration and must continue to be the major funding category for AID. Less clear, however, is a definition of what should be encompassed in this sector. Rural infrastructure, rural income, forestry, fisheries, nutrition, and many other projects are now being funded from the broadly defined appropriation account called Agriculture, Rural Development and Nutrition. An easy decision would be to define food production to include all of these related areas. Some small personnel savings could be achieved by doing nothing more than structurally combining those organizational units in the Agency which deal with these areas. The more difficult decision is to exclude from the functional definition of the food production sector, any ancillary activities not primarily related to increasing food supply. A narrower focus on increased food production would result in substantial personnel savings and a greater concentration of AID's staff and development resources on food production problems over time.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>50 - 100</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1983 - 1986</u>

Population

Even though there is some current domestic political pressure spilling over into AID's Population program, the critical importance of maintaining a strong effort to curtail world population growth is virtually unquestioned in the development community. Because of the sensitivities of U.S. government direct involvement

in family planning in many countries, especially in the early years of our program, AID has developed its largest and most sophisticated set of intermediaries in this sector. The Brazil, Mexico, Columbia (and soon Tunisia) population programs are totally operated through intermediaries. The task force believes that with less effort than would be required in any other sector, virtually all AID effort in this sector could be channeled through the intermediary mechanism. Direct involvement by AID personnel would then be reduced to a small program management group in Washington with some evaluation, monitoring and research capabilities. The overseas staffing to support AID's population effort would be limited to one direct hire employee in each mission to coordinate large country programs. Small country programs would be coordinated and monitored in the field by population officers assigned on a regional basis to cover several country programs.

Estimated Staff Savings: 35 - 50

Estimated Time Frame: 1982 - 1985

Health

AID continues to see declines in country programs in the Health sector due in part to relatively low host country priorities for Health activities, the heavy recurring cost problems associated with primary health care delivery, and the high investment costs inherent in water and sewage projects. The concept of primary health care has been demonstrated many times and AID can claim some fair share of the credit for the shift in public health thinking throughout the world. (It is not necessary to continue to fund additional demonstration projects to sell the concept.)

The task force believes that AID's limited health resources would be best utilized by focusing on disease control, an area where U.S. researchers are prominent

and active and where other funding sources are limited. Concentration on disease control could be implemented primarily by contract mechanisms and minimal direct hire resources would be required. This task force option proposes that any health projects funded other than for disease control be designed for implementation by intermediaries. Possible exceptions to this policy would be large ESF water projects such as in Egypt.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>50 - 70</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1983 - 1985</u>

Energy

Oil price increases over the past decade have made the plight of energy poor developing countries even more precarious. If budget resources normally destined for development in these countries continue to be siphoned off for petroleum imports, needed development cannot occur.

Energy is a new sector for AID. A major emphasis on this sector would require some small increase in field personnel, but there are few, if any, trained personnel in the Agency capable of providing the support necessary to mount such a major development effort in this sector.

The task force believes that AID should resist its traditional pattern of hiring professional expertise to address new highly technical development problems. An alternative approach would be to follow the example of the early days of the Population Program where AID generalists were given a year of specialized training. Given the present role being played by the private sector and the International Financial Institutions in energy and AID's limited financial and personnel resources,

it would perhaps be best to concentrate AID's efforts in the planning, technical assistance and training areas. Community woodlot, "social forestry" and new technology development would be done only through intermediaries with limited direct hire staffing or AID/W organization. Very limited numbers of AID personnel would then be necessary to monitor and support this sector of concentration.

Estimated Staff Savings: None

Estimated Time Frame: N/A

Non-Concentration Sectors

Education

AID has had a steadily declining presence in the Education sector and the task force believes that as one of the options to reducing staff, it could be eliminated as a target sector for AID programs. Those few missions which presently have active education programs and wish to develop new activities in the sector would have to justify their proposals as exceptions to AID policy. Any new education initiatives would be designed and implemented by mechanisms that would not require AID direct hire participation.

Most of the more than 250 AID employees in the Education/Human Resources area are engaged in the support of training offices in missions and the Office of International Training in Washington. Increased use of intermediaries for international training would accelerate the current trend away from direct involvement by AID in participant training. Greater use of institutional contracts for country or regional training programs as well as the current effort to contract out the functions of the

International Training Office would bring to a minimum the need for AID direct hire involvement in training.

Estimated Staff Savings: 100 - 150

Estimated Time Frame: 1982 - 1985

Capital Project and Infrastructure

The sector concentration options proposed by the task force do not provide for major initiatives in road building, rural electrification, power, water, transportation, or construction activities. However, this may be in conflict with the increased levels of ESF and recent efforts to projectize ESF resources. We believe, however, that ESF capital projects can be designed for less staff intensive monitoring and that AID's organizational backstopping can be streamlined and reduced. The personnel savings estimated for Health and the Rural Development sectors include the bulk of the estimated reductions that could be made by reducing AID direct participation in infrastructure projects.

Other Sectors and Special Interests

This task force option would gradually eliminate or consolidate all offices and personnel positions which support non-concentration sectors. Many small offices such as WID, PRE, and FVA/PVC have been established in the past in response to "special concerns"; staff has been assigned to these offices and each has budget resources at their disposal. AID can no longer afford to continue this "lip service" approach to special concerns. Special concerns should be addressed by policy determinations regarding programs and not by maintaining offices for each special concern.

Estimated Staff Savings: 20 - 30

Estimated Time Frame: 1983 - 1986

Mission Staffing

The task force recognizes that one of AID's great strengths and comparative advantages, is the in-country presence of missions staffed with experienced, development assistance experts. Accordingly, the task force is reluctant to propose any changes which might compromise this advantage. At the same time however, our analyses have indicated that there is considerable variation in mission staff levels which cannot be explained by program size. As a result, the task force feels that reductions are possible in some missions.

The Agency has made a number of attempts to deal with the problem of determining the optimum size of field missions. In 1979, a PPC plan for doing "more with less" advocated classifying missions by program size and assigning personnel based on a core staff concept. After conducting an analysis of the CDSS, and staff requirements at the mission level, PPC, in another study, concluded that core staffing was a necessary means for conserving scarce staff resources. Much of this earlier research attempted to establish criteria for use as a base from which objective staffing decisions could be made. Unfortunately, no firm policy decisions resulted from these earlier efforts.

The Office of Financial Management (FM) recently conducted a survey as the first step of a broader effort to develop a long range policy for staffing the Agency's overseas missions. One of the objectives of the survey was to identify general criteria and valid, objective indicators for use in determining appropriate staff levels for missions. The traditional measures of program size, number of active projects, and the size of the pipeline formed the foundation of FM's

data base. Their assumptions were that Mission staff levels are established based primarily on these general criteria. Their findings proved this assumption to be incorrect. The study disclosed that there is little, if any, direct correlation between mission staff and the amount of the annual program budget; the number of projects in the mission program; or the size of the pipeline. FM discovered instead that virtually all mission staffing decisions are made case by case, mission by mission, on a "subjective priority" basis. FM also found that a very important criteria for setting and maintaining staff levels was the operating or management styles of the Mission Directors. The FM study concluded that there is no consensus among the regional bureaus that there are valid criteria by which to compare the size of one mission to another.

Recognizing the unique characteristics of each AID recipient country and the need to preserve flexibility, the task force has attempted to analyze AID mission staffing and makes the following observations:

Small Programs

The task force feels that low levels of development assistance can be delivered effectively to some countries with greatly reduced resident U.S. direct hire staff and with few if any Foreign National direct hire staff. The task force set a \$5.0 million average annual program level and listed all countries falling under that category. Twenty one countries are included of which seven now have no direct hire staff assigned. This would suggest that our intuition is correct, or at least that such programs have been developed to be managed, in certain circumstances, with no in- country staff. U.S. and Foreign National direct hire staff in the remaining 14 countries ranged

from 3 to 31. The largest missions have relatively large pipelines and numbers of projects, reflecting larger program levels in prior years. The total direct hire staff in those countries is 120, of which 47 are in Guyana (31) and Paraguay (16).

It is highly unlikely that all or even the majority of these positions could be eliminated in the very near term but a significant net savings could be achieved by a) eliminating all staff at the lowest level, b) maintaining just one or two Foreign Nationals at some posts, c) assigning one U.S. and one or two Foreign Nationals at several others, and d) substantially reducing the positions in Gambia, Burundi, Guyana, and Paraguay unless major program increases are imminent. These reductions would be partially offset by the need to assign some additional staff to regional or neighboring missions to monitor the programs in the reduced countries on a TDY basis.

If all staff were eliminated from the six countries with five or fewer current staff, the gross savings would be 23 positions. This would appear to be feasible, a priori, because in terms of average program levels, pipeline, and number of projects, those six countries are very similar to the seven countries with no staff at present. Of course, other country-specific criteria would have to be taken into account before making such a decision. As a next step, if the staff of the other eight missions with average annual program levels of \$5 million or less were reduced by half, an additional savings of 54 positions would result.

USAID MISSIONS WITH ANNUAL PROGRAM LEVELS OF \$5.0 MILLION OR LESS

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>FIVE YEAR AVG. OYB</u>	<u>06/30/81 PIPELINE</u>	<u>NO. OF PROJECTS</u>	<u>US/FN 09/30/81 ON-BOARD</u>
1. Benin	\$ 2.5*	\$ 7.1	5	0
2. Burundi	\$ 3.9*	\$ 7.2	5	12
3. Cape Verde/ Guinea-Bissau	\$ 4.8	\$ 19.5	16	11
4. Central Afr. Rep.	\$ 1.0*	\$.3	6	0
5. Congo	\$ 1.3	\$.3	3	0
6. Djibouti	\$ 2.1	\$ 3.5	5	3
7. Equitorial Guinea	\$ 1.0*	\$.4	2	0
8. Ethiopia	0	0	3	5
9. Gambia	\$ 5.0	\$ 12.3	9	12
10. Guinea	\$ 2.7	\$ 7.0	3	4
11. Mauritius	\$ 2.0*	\$.3	4	0
12. Rwanda	\$ 4.0	\$ 7.3	10	10
13. Sao Tome/Principe	\$ 1.6	\$ 1.7	1	0
14. Seychelles	\$ 1.1	\$ 1.4	3	0
15. Sierra Leone	\$ 2.4	\$ 3.7	7	8
16. Uganda	\$ 3.8	\$.5	3	<u>4</u>
Total Africa				69
17. So. Pac. Reg. (Fiji)	\$ 3.5	\$ 2.1	4	<u>3</u>
Total Asia				3
18. Columbia	0	\$.1	5	4
19. Guyana	\$ 3.8	\$ 34.2**	12	31
20. Paraguay	\$ 3.3	\$ 8.7	14	<u>16</u>
Total Latin America				51
21. Lebanon	\$ 3.5	\$ 5.2	10	<u>9</u>
Total Near East				9
Agency Total				<u>132</u>

* Less than 5 years' programs averaged.

** As of 09/30/81, pipeline was reduced to \$29.0.

Estimated Staff Savings:

65-80

Estimated Time Frame:

1982 - 1985

Medium and Large Programs

The task force reviewed staffing patterns for all countries with average annual programs between \$5.0 million and \$10.0 million. There are thirteen countries in this group with direct hire staffs ranging from 0 in Spain to 79 in Bolivia for a total of 424 positions:

USAID MISSIONS WITH ANNUAL PROGRAM LEVELS BETWEEN \$5.0 AND \$10.0

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>FIVE YEAR AVG. OYB</u>	<u>06/30/81 PIPELINE</u>	<u>NO. OF PROJECTS</u>	<u>US/FN 09/30/81 ON-BOARD</u>
1. Gambia	\$ 5.0	\$ 12.3	9	12
2. Ghana	\$ 6.2	\$ 20.5	17	55
3. Lesotho	\$ 9.3	\$ 20.7	23	22
4. Malawi	\$ 5.2	\$ 11.1	7	7
5. Mauritania	\$ 6.2	\$ 10.4	12	39
6. Swaziland	\$ 6.8	\$ 17.3	15	<u>23</u>
Total Africa				158
7. Burma	\$ 6.5*	\$ 4.1	1	<u>6</u>
Total Asia				6
8. Bolivia	\$ 7.9	\$ 68.7	31	79
9. Ecuador	\$ 8.3	\$ 12.6	18	28
10. Guatemala	\$ 9.3	\$ 48.4	23	47
11. Panama	\$ 9.3	\$ 52.0	26	<u>71</u>
Total Latin America				225
12. Morocco	\$ 9.9	\$ 19.5	16	35
13. Spain	\$ 7.0*	0	0	<u>0</u>
Total Near East				35
Agency Total				<u><u>424</u></u>

* Less than 5 years' programs averaged.

A review of the staffing patterns for the largest AID missions discloses 21 missions (excluding Egypt) with 50 or more total U.S. and Foreign National direct hire personnel. The direct hire employees at these missions total approximately 1,600 or an average of 80 employees per mission. In many cases these large staff levels are leftover from the era when missions were given a U.S. direct hire project manager and related support staff positions for each project as new projects were added to the program.

The task force reviewed the staffing patterns and employment levels of medium to large missions and related program size, pipeline, and number of projects for similar size missions. In general, the analysis affirmed the findings of the FM study, i.e., that there is little consistency in the way missions are staffed. The data showed little correlation between overall staff size and program size or number of projects or pipeline. The analysis also included calculation of five year average program levels and a comparison of U.S. and Foreign National staff to these levels. Although there is considerable variation in total staff size among missions, which is not explained by annual program levels, there does appear to be a general relationship between program size and U.S. direct hire presence, especially in the U.S. management staff.^{1/} This suggests that a core staffing concept based on U.S. direct hire staff would be a useful guide to AID/Washington management in making staff allocations. Our analysis included experimentation with formulae derived from standard numbers of U.S. direct hire management positions

^{1/} USDH management positions include all "non-technical" staff, e.g. Mission Director, Program Officers, Capital Resources Development Officers, Controllers, Executive/Admin. Officers, General Service Officers, Personnel Officers and secretaries to those officers.

for various program levels and factors for determining the appropriate number of U.S. technicians or project officers. Unfortunately, upon application, the various formulae developed by the task force proved to be unacceptable. As a result, the task force concluded that there are too many significant variables which impact on mission size to allow for the development of a fixed formula for determining optimum mission staff levels. This conclusion supports the findings from another FM study which was recently completed. This study presented information to AID management to assist in the resolution of requests for overseas staffing increases. In this study, FM noted that based on their analysis there doesn't appear, as yet, to be a systematic way to determine the appropriate size of a mission. Because it was clear that any correlational analysis comparing different objective criteria will not automatically identify missions which are overstaffed, FM had to include other less objective criteria for the purpose of their review. Accordingly, they reviewed mission staffing patterns and identified anomalies in the staff size of missions with similar size and program levels. The analysis was done on a mission by mission basis.

The results of their review concluded that there are 24 medium to large missions which are overstaffed. These include: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen. Furthermore, FM states that there are a few subtle similarities between these 24 missions. First, many of them have special assistants or advisors in the Office of the Mission Director. These advisors and assistants appear to duplicate the efforts of the program and sector offices. Second, several missions have "luxury"

positions and activities. These activities include computer systems design capability, library, graphic arts, and communications media. However progressive these functions and ideas are, FM believes they are luxuries that the Agency can no longer afford to staff with direct hire employees.

In the absence of objective standards to determine mission size and composition, mission staff levels will continue to be set based on the best information available with the recognition that final decisions at times may be intuitive and seemingly subjective. The FM study indicates that the following staff savings could be accomplished.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>175 - 185</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982 - 1985</u>

Methods of Providing Assistance

The task force believes that mission programs could be planned and implemented effectively within the staffing limitations being proposed if program design and implementation policies such as those discussed below were expanded upon and other program management innovations were adopted.

- In countries where AID's primary objective is a resource transfer, increase the use of sector support programs and commodity import programs. For example, a rural sector grant under a project was started recently in Botswana and a directed commodities program is beginning in Tanzania. In FY 1982, Senegal is proposing a sector grant as a method for focusing government attention on needed agriculture policy reforms and for helping with balance of payments problems. Similar projects will be

proposed for Malawi, Somali, Upper Volta, Uganda, and Cameroon in FY 1982 or FY 1983. These sector grants or commodity import programs (ESF funded) will be closely coordinated with PL 480 Title III or Title II 206 programs to secure improved policy dialogue and greater impact from related project activity. (If such programs with minimum direct hire requirements can be employed in Africa we assume they have worldwide applicability.)

- To the extent infrastructure activities are programmed, particularly in ESF countries, utilize less staff intensive modes to manage projects relative to the resources transferred.
- Where possible, every effort should be made to institutionalize effective host country management to specifically reduce the need for AID staff. In some instances, the integration of management components into implementation contracts to relieve perceived needs for direct hire project managers should be encouraged. Missions should be asked to shift the bulk of technical assistance projects to more self-contained approaches, i.e., self-sufficient management, with AID's role limited to monitoring and review. This is an approach which was also recommended by the Kivimae Task Force.
- Make greater use of intermediaries. PVOs and Peace Corps can play a very important and growing role as intermediaries in our programs. The employment of PVOs should be expanded, with some caveats. In some instances, the use of PVOs in AID programs does not reduce mission workload; and in some regions there is frequently a heavy mission

support role for PVOs that is inadvertent, but unavoidable. We need to assist PVOs in strengthening in-country and U.S. backstopping management capabilities and provide orientation to required AID procedures.

- Expand co-financing of projects with other donors, where other donors would act as "executing agents". Many Western donors, the World Bank, OPEC funded institutions, and the EEC, we believe, would welcome U.S. initiatives in co-financing. In order to achieve maximum benefit however, AID practices must be modified, particularly in joint projects, so that we are able to accept the work of others.

- Encourage mission in-service training programs for professional Foreign Nationals whose skills need to be upgraded as a condition for further employment. In time, we believe that in-service training programs could substantially reduce U.S. direct hire requirements.

- Using contract mechanisms and resident hire employment, many missions have taken advantage of the immediate availability in the host country of highly qualified personnel who know the country and who speak the host country language fluently (frequently Americans who have served there as Peace Corps volunteers, American dependents, and expatriates). Also, these personnel are often available at substantial cost savings because they are already living in-country. Moreover, these people are usually employable for the life of the project (normally three to five years) obviating the requirement for a change in personnel in mid-project.

It is difficult to quantify the staff savings that would accrue as a result of the implementation of the above policies. However, we have included a rough estimate for illustrative purposes.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>50-100</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982 - 1986</u>

III. ALTERNATIVES TO DIRECT HIRE STAFF

Conversion of Foreign National Employees to Contract

A review of mission staffing patterns reveals that anomalies exist in the manner in which many non-professional support services are acquired. The differences range from missions that acquire virtually all non-professional support services from Foreign National employees hired on a direct hire basis to missions which acquire these services primarily by hiring Foreign Nationals under contract actions. Those employees whose services are frequently acquired on a contractual basis are: chauffeurs, janitors, warehousemen, librarians, maintenance/charforce personnel, travel and transportation personnel, and clerks. However, this practice is not uniformly applied throughout the world as there is no Agency policy which provides specific guidance to missions regarding procurement of these services. To the extent possible, all missions should contract for support services now being provided by direct hire Foreign National personnel.

In conducting its analyses of direct hire Foreign National personnel, the task force prepared uniform staffing patterns for all USAID missions and offices worldwide as of June 30, 1981. These staffing patterns reflected on-board employment levels for both U.S. and Foreign National personnel. The Service Computation Dates for all Foreign National direct hire personnel and, where possible, all Foreign National personnel employed under contract were reflected.

The task force then reviewed the data and categorized all non-professional employees into functional groups. The first group included chauffeurs, drivers, maintenance personnel, janitors, warehousemen and librarians. The second group included all

mail distribution, communication and records, travel and transportation and computer personnel, as well as all clerks (except accounting clerks). The third group included all direct hire Foreign National secretaries.

The results of the review were then tabulated (Annex 4). The tabulation includes the total number of direct hire personnel in each of the functional groups. It also categorizes the personnel into groups with 0-5 years, 5-10 years, 10-15 years, and over 15 years of USG service.

Group I Conversion

In this option, the task force proposes that the first group be removed from the direct hire rolls, and that their services be obtained by using contract mechanisms. The task force felt however, that not all of the 185 Foreign National employees in this group should be terminated. Some of these Foreign National employees are included in the U.S. Civil Service Retirement System and are within three years of retirement eligibility. For compassionate reasons and to minimize the impact of such action on the morale of other Foreign National staff, those employees in the U.S. Civil Service Retirement System who are within three years of retirement should be retained as direct hire employees until retirement. As severance payments are necessary even when Foreign National employees are converted to contract, the estimated cost of terminating Foreign Nationals in the first group was calculated based on the severance pay plans submitted by each mission.

In mid November, as part of the overall task force effort, an Action Memorandum went forward to the Administrator recommending the termination of direct hire Foreign National Employees in the following skills categories: custodial,

housekeeping, maintenance, transportation, library, audio-visual, communication media, and other service type activities. The task force recommended that where necessary these services should be obtained through the various contract mechanisms available to the Agency.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>120 - 130</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982</u>

Group II Conversion

The second grouping of Foreign National non-professional employees totals 229 in the functional categories of mail distribution, communication & records, travel and transportation, and computer data processors. Selected conversion to contract in these functional categories could be achieved in the medium term. Exceptions to these conversions would have to be made based on security, access to Embassies, and other considerations.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>90 - 110</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982 - 1984</u>

Group III Conversion

The third group consists of Foreign National secretaries. In numerous missions, secretaries have been employed under contract for many years, while other missions have sustained policies of employing all secretaries on a direct hire basis. Conversion to contract of this functional group would achieve significant savings, but would require discretion and careful analysis, again because of security consideration, access to Embassy facilities and so forth.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>175 - 200</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1983 - 1985</u>

IV. CHANGES IN INTERNAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Travel and Transportation Policies and Procedures

In response to widespread criticism in recent years of federal government practices regarding the performance of travel and transportation, an interagency travel management improvement project headed by OMB was formed. Representatives from the Department of State, Department of Defense, General Services Administration, Office of Personnel Management and the General Accounting Office participated in this project. A "Report on Strengthening Federal Travel Management" was issued in July 1981. From this report, and subsequent discussions, the task force has isolated two areas in which alternate policies and procedures could potentially yield significant staff reductions.

Voucherless Travel

Many of the recommendations in the report concern procedural and systems improvements to reimbursement and voucher processing policies, which may result in cost savings. However, there is one recommendation in this area which the task force finds attractive and believes would lead to significant staff savings if implemented. The recommendation is as follows:

"...That the Secretary of State design and test a simplified travel expense reimbursement system which incorporates on a single form, the travel authorization, payment of travel advance and settlement of the travel costs

for trips in the Continental United States by members of the State Department. If the Test proves that a simplified reimbursement system is feasible, the Director, Office of Management and Budget should convene the oversight agencies and GAO to extend the use of this reimbursement system to all federal travel."

Under such a reimbursement system, a "voucherless" or simplified voucher system could account for funds and at the same time alleviate the cumbersome and staff intensive review, examination and audit process now in effect. One form could be used to authorize the travel, provide for the travel advance, and after the trip become the travel voucher. The appropriate locality based per diem (the lodging-plus method would have to be rescinded) could be calculated on the form and an advance given to the traveler. Once the trip is complete, all the traveler would do would be to sign the form indicating that travel was performed as stated. If there was a change in itinerary, a part of the form could be designated to permit re-calculation and further reimbursement to the traveler or the collection of an overpayment.

On trips where incidental costs such as taxi fares (which are not included in the per diem rate) are incurred, an incidental costs voucher or a public voucher could be submitted to the cashier and payment made immediately out of an imprest fund.

The task force believes that this system should be concurrently tested by AID both in the U.S. and overseas. The system would simplify the voucher process to the point where many costly administrative actions could be eliminated. The task force estimates that up to 50 FN positions overseas, approximately

8 positons in FM, AID/Washington, and an unknown number of secretarial hours could be saved as a result of the full implementation of this system.

Estimated Staff Savings: 58

Estimated Time Frame: 1983 - 1985

Travel Arrangements

The task force also believes that simplification of travel arrangements needs to occur. In this area, there are recommendations in the interagency report which the task force endorses and believes would lead to further staff savings. These recommendations propose increased use of commercial travel offices to arrange and pay for travel services, greater reliance on individual travelers to make their own travel arrangements through and obtain their tickets directly from these commercial travel offices, and reduced use of Government Travel Requests (GTR).

The interagency report states that commercial travel offices should be selected by GSA according to a regional plan, and that agencies should require all travelers to obtain airline tickets and, where possible, hotel and car rental reservations, through the most convenient commercial travel office in the region. Furthermore, the report states that elimination of reservation and ticketing services within government agencies may result in substantial staff savings.

The report also indicates that several agency studies have shown that the GTR is a costly transaction to process for both the issuing agency and the carriers that receive them as payment. Alternative payment procedures including standard billing and payment procedures with the lead carrier or commercial travel office in a region should be pursued.

The task force believes that implementation of these recommendations concerning travel arrangements procedures in AID should begin as soon as possible. The potential staff reductions as a result of these recommendations is estimated to be 10-15 people in AID/Washington, and approximately 10 people overseas. Because of the need to determine the availability/capability of commercial travel offices overseas, the staff savings overseas are inconclusive.

Estimated Staff Savings: 20 - 25

Estimated Time Frame: 1983 - 1985

Delegation of Authority

The task force has reviewed the Summary of Action Recommendations to the Administrator on Proposed Improvements in the Agency Programming and Implementation Process which was prepared by the Kivimae task force in September, 1981. The task force specifically endorses those recommendations in the report that concern increased Delegation of Authority to the field. These include: a) Assistant Administrators be delegated the authority to authorize projects and non-projects with life of project funding not to exceed \$20 million, and that Assistant Administrators be given explicit discretion to further redelegate this authority to their Mission Directors on a selected basis; b) Assistant Administrators be delegated the authority to amend projects to increase funding by 100 percent of the original funding authorization or up to a maximum limit of \$10 million. Projects authorized by the Administrator would be included within this authority; c) Assistant Administrator^s be delegated the authority to authorize new projects with an initial life of project of up to ten years; and d) Assistant Administrators

have the discretion to redelegate all, part or none of their authorities for life of project funding, project amendment and length of project life. Each Assistant Administrator should determine the appropriate levels of redelegation to the field mission under his/her control. These recommendations will have a positive impact on staffing to the extent that reduced AID/Washington backstopping can occur. The task force therefore encourages implementation of these recommendations as soon as possible. While we are unable however to estimate the staff savings which will be generated by the increased delegations to the field, we did include this factor in our consideration of AID/W reductions.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCIES

Office Automation/Modularization

The task force believes that the Agency has not benefitted on a staff saving basis from the investments made to date in office modularization and office automation. Such investments have cost the Agency well in excess of \$1 million in each of the last two years. The task force notes that the major investments of Automatic System for Agency-wide Processing (ASAP) equipment in certain offices have had little positive benefit in terms of a reduction in administrative support staff. In fact since 1978, in several offices there has been a negative impact in the ratios of administrative support staff to professionals (the professional to clerical ratios have decreased; there are fewer professional employees per clerical employee in AID/W). During the past three years, the overall Agency ratio has deteriorated significantly.

The task force believes that little conscious effort has been made by the Agency to achieve reasonable reductions in administrative support personnel in offices where major investments in automated equipment have been made. More importantly the task force is concerned about the planned fourfold increase in the amount of ASAP equipment that will be placed in various central and geographic bureaus in the coming six to ten months. In many instances the installation of this automated equipment will be combined with renovated and modularized space that should permit the various offices to streamline their work flow. We believe the Agency should make efforts to realize some immediate personnel trade-offs for such investments. In 1978, before automation equipment was available on any large scale, the ratio of professionals to administrative support staff was 4:1. It does

not seem unreasonable to restore that ratio as a target, particularly when substantial investments in automation and modularization continue to be made.

Further, the office automation equipment should permit secretaries as well as professionals to perform a host of additional services which should generate other efficiencies across the board.

By the end of FY 1982, it is expected that several additional offices and bureaus will be housed in one location. Space will be modularized to accommodate the maximum number of professionals and the use of ASAP equipment will expedite the work flow of documentation. While these modest consolidations provide no comparison with the advantages that would be achieved by total consolidation of all AID bureaus and offices in one building, they are a factor in preventing further erosion in the ratio of professionals to administrative support staff.

The task force also feels that further attention should be devoted to the electronic transfer of mail through the use of ASAP equipment. Such action would further reduce staff requirements for the SER Bureau.

In addition to streamlining office operations through the investment of office equipment, and consolidating the various offices and bureaus in one location through concepts such as modularization, there is another area for administrative reduction--telephones and telephone usage. Greater dependence upon professionals to make their own calls and ensuring that a maximum number of lines can be tied to central secretarial units will also achieve further reductions in the need for administrative support personnel.

As more word processors are put in place throughout the Agency, it may be advantageous to establish word processing pools to maximize the benefits from the investment in the equipment. The pooling concept should result in an overall reduction in the requirement for clerk/typists since their services would be shared among offices in Bureaus.

The task force has formed very rough estimates of the savings which would accrue from the options discussed above.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>100 - 150</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982 - 1986</u>

Data Processing Systems

For the past ten years the Agency has favored the development of new data processing systems. Many millions of dollars and countless staff time has been and continues to be devoted to this effort. The glamour and perceived urgency for new systems development seems to have displaced the Agency's need to fully maximize the use of the data systems which have been put in place. New systems development not only requires significant funding resources, but also utilizes large amounts of direct hire staff resources which the Agency needs to sustain its current operations.

The task force believes that the Agency should proceed very cautiously in the development of new automated data systems. Only systems which offer promise for long term, maximum efficiencies should be considered. Further, major efforts should be devoted to the task of improving and perfecting AID's existing systems in order to achieve their maximum benefit. Data systems which are of marginal use to the Agency should be eliminated.

The task force has reviewed the data systems now in place and those being developed:

Economics and Social Data Services

There is a question as to the value to the Agency of devoting staff and computer resources for maintaining a data system that may be more easily and economically obtained from commercial data banks, the World Bank, the UNDP or any number of other public and private sector sources. Another question relates to devoting substantial professional resources in attempting to assimilate primitive baseline social and economic data on Least Developed Countries (which is not available from other sources) and attempting to mix and match this data with more refined information purchased commercially in pre-packaged form. Since the Agency is faced with a reappraisal of the utilization of its personnel and dollar resources, this practice should be carefully evaluated. The costs/benefits to the Agency may suggest that this data system is a luxury the Agency can no longer afford.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>6</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1983</u>

Development Information Unit

At least four separate studies of this data system have been conducted in the past three years. All of the studies agreed that the AID memory bank, the storage processing and retrieval of AID project documents, is a valuable and necessary function. Under pressure from private firms which claim they can provide the service, the Department of Commerce has recently

decided to review the need to maintain its National Technical Information Service. The task force believes that the Agency should seek proposals from the private sector to assume the bulk, if not all of the Development Information Unit's similar memory bank function. This responsibility, however, is but a part of the overall activity of the Development Information Unit. The Unit also serves as a library of information to AID offices and the public. One of the studies mentioned above concluded that the general public (students, universities, contractors, other donors) is a greater user of the library service than is AID. It is highly questionable whether AID should continue to devote staff to maintain this service.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>10 - 15</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982 - 1983</u>

Financial Accounting and Control System (FACS)

The new accounting system which is scheduled for full implementation by December 31, 1982 will replace some 20 automated and manual sub-systems and will be a fully integrated, automated accounting system approved by GAO. An investment of over \$5 million has been made by the Agency in this new system and considerable staff savings should result once the system is on line.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>15 - 20</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1983 - 1984</u>

Mission Accounting and Control System (MACS)

This automated system is in the design stage and is being tested in the Honduras mission. When the system is perfected it will first be put in place in our larger missions and over time will be installed in all missions where it is economically feasible to do so. It is difficult to determine at this stage of development, the range of staff savings that should result from an automated mission accounting system. The range shown below is very rough. Staff savings in 1984 - 1986 could be considerably higher.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>20 - 30</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1983 - 1986</u>

Staffing Ratios

As part of the review for efficiencies, the task force analyzed several generally accepted staffing ratios and compared one organizational unit to another within the Agency. Among the ratios which the task force reviewed were: the number of technical to managerial employees; the number of supervisory employees per AID/W office or bureau; the number of employees per organizational unit; U.S. to Foreign National employees; project planning to project implementation personnel in AID missions; the number of direct hire staff per project; and the number of professional to clerical employees in AID/Washington.

As a result of this review, the task force targeted on the findings related to the AID/W clerical to professional ratio. The statistical data from the RAMPS system suggests that the major investments in the Automatic System for Agency-wide Processing (ASAP) equipment in certain offices have had no positive benefit

in terms of reductions in administrative support staff. Moreover, in several offices there has been a negative impact in terms of the ratio of administrative support staff to professionals since 1978 (that is, the professional to clerical ratios have decreased, there are fewer professional employees per clerical employee Agency-wide). The task force believes that the Agency should take action to achieve a 4:1 ratio in all AID/Washington bureaus and offices. It appears that this could be done through efforts such as modularization, office automation, electronic mail delivery, and more efficient use of telephone services. The staff ratios from the RAMPS system appear as Annex 4.

Estimated Staff Savings:

35 - 45

Estimated Time Frame:

1982 - 1983

VI. REORGANIZATION/CONSOLIDATION/ELIMINATION

IG/Office of Security

The task force recognizes that several approaches to providing security services to the Agency have been attempted in the past. It appears that virtually all investigative background searches are now conducted under contractual arrangements, and that IG/SEC's primary functions include National Agency checks (updates of security clearances), issuance of identification cards and visits to USAID's to check on security and communications facilities. In that AID will be hiring and retaining fewer and fewer employees and that security measures could be handled under contract with State's regional security offices, the task force believes that staff savings in IG/SEC should be forthcoming.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>8</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982 - 1983</u>

PM/Recruitment Staff

Another staff savings that should result from the downward trend in AID's overall personnel level is a reduction in the size of the Agency's recruitment staff. The task force understands, for example, that IDI recruitment is still going on. However, the IDI classes are getting smaller and very little other recruitment is being done. Consequently, the task force endorses an option that PM reduce the size of its recruitment staff.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>5</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982 - 1983</u>

PM/Employee Relations and Services Division

The task force acknowledges that the promotion of employee rights and benefits, retirement programs and awards are important tasks in the Agency. Increasingly, however, much of the promotion and protection of employee rights and retirement programs appears to be done by others outside of PM. On the whole, the task force suspects that the staff is too large for the tasks at hand and should be reduced.

Estimated Staff Savings: 5
 Estimated Time Frame: 1982 - 1983

PM/Training and Development Division

The task force believes that the Training and Development Division is larger than necessary to meet current and projected Agency needs. Factors which suggest that PM/TD is too large are: 1) Limited training money is available - therefore less training will be done and less staff is needed to train and to coordinate training contracts; 2) IDI classes are smaller - as the IDI coordination program is one of the primary tasks of PM/TD, a significant decrease in the number of IDIs should yield some staff savings; and 3) Orientation classes are less frequent and smaller - as the Agency brings fewer and fewer people on board, the need for orientation staff should also decrease. The task force also believes that additional staff savings could be realized if more training were provided on a contracted basis. This option for reduction is offered without reference to a discussion of AID's obligations under Sec. 703 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 which relates to in-service career development. The Agency's plans for meeting this section of the F.S. Act were included in the Secretary of the State's June 2, 1981 report to the President, the Senate and House. This report noted the financial and staffing difficulties AID faces in complying with Sec. 703 and proposed "an incremental approach to the establishment of a modest,

low cost program...". The task force recognizes that the proposal presented here may impact on AID's ability to implement these objectives.

Estimated Staff Savings: 8 - 10
 Estimated Time Frame: 1982 - 1983

PM/Policy Development and Evaluation Division

The task force discussed automation in PM. As noted in Section V of this report, it is suggested that PM explore whether or not the RAMPS system is being utilized to its full potential and what should be done to use the system more effectively. The task force believes that more efficient and effective use of RAMPS should result in additional staff savings.

Estimated Staff Savings: 5
 Estimated Time Frame: 1983

SER/DM

The Agency needs a strong data management unit to advise on systems requirements, provide contractor supervision, coordinate operation of the Agency's existing systems, and to participate in policy and management decisions on automation and systems development. At present, a large extent of systems maintenance ("application maintenance") is contracted out. The task force endorses this policy and recommends that all systems maintenance be procured by contract.

Further, we believe that all new systems development as well as ongoing systems maintenance should be provided by the private sector. The state of the art in automation and computers is advancing so rapidly that it is difficult for AID direct hire staff to stay current. Moreover, AID cannot afford to maintain a large staff of ADP technicians to engage in systems development and maintenance.

This expertise is readily available in the open market on a highly competitive and relatively inexpensive basis.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>15-20</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1983 - 1984</u>

SER/Management Planning

Following long discussions over SER/MP's role in the Agency, the task force concluded that the office's functions do not appear to support this present staff level. The task force could not determine any recent significant management planning initiatives performed directly by the office. The reorganization plans that are submitted to SER/MP appear to be monitored and not analyzed. Very few organizational or management analyses are done by the SER/MP staff; these services are generally provided by contractors. The task force believes that all Agency management analyses could be done on a contractual basis under the direct supervision of client offices. SER/MP's limited coordination and monitoring role is therefore not sufficient to justify its large staff.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>10-15</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982 - 1983</u>

SER/Commodity Management

The task force believes that as a planning and monitoring organization, SER/COM is generally overstaffed. Principally it appears that the surveillance and evaluation staff is too large, and that arrangements could be made to have this function performed under contract. Only those surveillance and evaluation functions required by law should be performed.

The task force believes that the Office of Excess Property could be eliminated. Reliance on other government agencies on a reimbursable basis to provide the

services now being performed by this office is a real possibility.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>10 - 15</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982 - 1983</u>

SER/Contract Management (SER/CM)

The task force believes that the recent policy decision to increase delegation of authority to the field will have an impact on the number of contract actions in AID/W and consequently on the size of the SER/CM staff in Washington.

As the impact is felt, the size of the SER/CM staff should be reduced and contracting officers moved to field locations. We recognize however, that many of the options set forth in this report call for increased use of contract actions which may preclude any overall reduction in SER/CM.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>None</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>N/A</u>

SER/Management Operations (SER/MO)

The task force highlighted one office within SER/MO which could generate substantial staff savings as part of the revision of travel services. These savings were estimated in Section III.

Unless the chronic and seemingly ageless problem of having the Agency housed in many locations in Washington, D.C. and Virginia is resolved, the logistical support units of SER/MO do not offer much potential for further personnel reductions. The printing and graphic arts unit should be eliminated however, with all printing, graphic arts, and related services provided from the private sector.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>15-20</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982</u>

PPC/Evaluation (PPC/E)

The task force supports the evaluation function as a critical element in AID's development assistance efforts. It notes however that the core staff of the Evaluation office has grown substantially in the past two years and is larger than necessary. Each Bureau has an evaluation officer and it appears that there is overlap and redundancy in some of the functions of the PPC/E office and the Bureau offices.

PPC/E growth has been due in large part to its promotion of Agency impact evaluation. A large staff has been established to plan, design and recruit for impact evaluations to be performed. The task force believes that such a large staff is not necessary to perform these functions. As the Administrator has strongly reinforced the Agency's policy on evaluation, Assistant Administrators should now consider the assignment of their senior officers to evaluation teams as a high priority. This will do much to ease PPC/E's burden of recruiting effective impact evaluation teams.

The task force also suggests that PPC/E specialize in impact evaluations and withdraw from evaluation activities more appropriately managed by the regional bureaus.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>6</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982 - 1983</u>

PPC/Policy Development and Program Review

The task force discussed PDPR at length. The primary concern was that there should be no redundancy between the PDPR review and the Sector Council review. It was determined that there was very little duplication between the functions,

as the Sector Council reviews selected projects for technological appropriateness and PDPR reviews the projects for adherence to overall Agency policy. However, in view of new Agency policies such as increased AA project approval authority to \$20 million, life of project funding and reductions in the number of projects, there should be a decreased workload for PDPR and eventual staff reductions. It is also suggested that PDPR review project documentation, including PID's, on a selective basis.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>5</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982 - 1983</u>

PPC/Planning and Budgeting (PPC/PB)

The task force noted that several elements of PPC/PB appear to be overstaffed. In the discussion, task force members indicated that due to recent Agency policy changes/proposals, simplified Congressional Presentation procedures have been instituted, fewer CDSS's will be prepared, and greater delegation of authority to the field including life of project funding will occur. As a result, the PPC/PB workload should decrease and staff reductions should be forthcoming.

In addition, task force members questioned the need for the large PPC/PB/PIA staff. The conclusion was that the services provided by PPC/PB/PIA could be acquired under contract with the private sector. This staff could therefore be substantially reduced.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>5-10</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982-1983</u>

S&T Bureau

In its discussion of the S&T bureau, the task force reiterated its concern that there should be no redundancy in functions between the new S&T Sector Councils

and PPC/PDPR offices. The task force noted that in the Agency's past, groups such as the Sector Councils have been formed and then have expanded to include other offices'/bureaus' functions without resultant staff reductions in these offices/bureaus. In view of the overall Agency personnel ceiling constraints now and in the future, any duplication of functions is inefficient and an unacceptable use of scarce resources. Therefore the task force recommends that the implementation of Sector Council activities be conducted with these constraints in mind.

The task force reviewed the recent proposed reorganization of the S&T bureau. The reorganization appears to have created a new layer of senior officials that increases rather than decreases management overhead. The establishment of Directorates for Food and Agriculture, Energy and Natural Resources, Human Resources, and Health and Population when there are existing offices with senior level positions for these activities is duplicative and costly. The task force recommends that all of the proposed layers in S&T be scaled down, i.e., directorates become offices, offices become divisions, etc. Second, the task force recommends that S&T limit the number of deputy positions (and related support positions) to the greatest extent possible.

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>25-30</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982 - 1985</u>

Geographic Bureaus

Some staff reductions are also appropriate in the AID/W geographic bureaus. Acceptance by the Agency of a sector concentration policy will impact on the staffing needs of the bureaus as will some of the other options discussed earlier. The task force felt that additional reductions are possible but due to the different

organizational and program management styles among the bureaus, it is difficult to isolate common areas of redundancy or incidence of overstaffing. Nonetheless, a number of alternatives to the present bureaus' organizational structure were discussed. Some task force members felt that individual country desks were overstaffed and should be consolidated into regional groups. Other members felt that the responsibilities of the desk officers should be folded into the technical and program offices of the bureaus. Still others thought that reductions should be focussed on the development planning offices. No consensus could be reached on where specific staff reductions could be targeted. However, it was agreed that staff reductions should be assigned to each geographic bureau with the actual methods for achieving the reductions left to the discretion of bureau management. Some of the reductions should result from the recent policy of increased delegation of authority to the field; greater use of life of project funding; administrative efficiencies and greater use of automation and modularization. If the proposed changes to AID's policies and procedures are not accepted or are substantially modified and do not add to the estimated staff savings, bureau management will have to take other management actions to reorganize and consolidate to reduce staff.

Estimated Staff Savings: 50 - 75

Estimated Time Frame: 1982 - 1985

Regionalization

In assessing the need for and location of regional service offices, the task force discussed host country access to AID personnel, development effectiveness, delegations of authority to the field, rapidity of program implementation, and management efficiency, as well as cost effectiveness.

In the context of limited Agency personnel resources, adequately staffing individual country missions has become more complicated because of the relatively large number of small countries and newly established AID programs in very poor countries, especially in Africa. The use of regional service organizations in East and West Africa has helped to overcome the inefficiencies of providing many small missions with full staffs of professionals. As such, the REDSO rationale for existence is to minimize in-country U.S. staff and to economize on the cost of field located professionals serving the missions in the region. In addition to providing specialized professionals' skills not otherwise justifiable in an individual mission, a REDSO is also a source for providing staff support to missions in the region that have difficulty staffing up or maintaining a full complement.

The recent expansion of the regional accounting center in Kenya is an example of the economics inherent in regionalization. Although some small increase in the staff of the East Africa Accounting Center in Kenya has been necessary, the need to provide extensive financial management staff in each of the countries serviced has been eliminated.

The task force believes that the basic operating principle, that is, a central, quickly available and area specific repository of expertise which could not be provided at any single post in the region but which is absolutely essential in the field for the timely formulation and implementation of U.S. programs, should be replicated. The task force identified the following areas to be considered for replicating the REDSO concept: Central America (including both a REDSO and a regional accounting center); and all of the Caribbean Programs. Because of the great distances involved in Asia bureau programs, the establishment of a REDSO type operation does not appear feasible at this time. A rough estimate of the staff savings is provided.

Estimated Staff Savings:

25 - 40

Estimated Time Frame:

1982 - 1986

Elimination of Non-Development Related Functions

The task force has developed a number of options for achieving the staff reductions proposed by OMB. Many of the options involve an Agency-wide change or adjustment to AID's method of providing assistance. Most of the options impact directly on field missions and by implication raise corollary considerations for reductions in regional bureau staff as well as PPC, and the S&T Bureau. Other options affect the Agency's administrative and financial management operations.

Under the assumption that AID's basic product is development programs and projects, one of the options that should be considered as the overall size of the Agency shrinks, is that offices and functions in AID/W not directly related to the development process should be reduced in size or in some cases eliminated altogether.

This option proposes that all management units which are directly related to the development process or exist in support of the development process be left relatively intact, and all other offices and functions be substantially reduced or eliminated to achieve the proposed staff reductions. An illustrative list of these offices or elements of offices is shown below:

Office of Equal Opportunity Programs

Office of the Inspector General

Office of the General Counsel

Office of Financial Management/Accounting Systems Division

Office of Personnel Management/various elements

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

Bureau for Program and Management Services/

Office of Management Planning

Office of Data Management -- Systems Development Division

Bureau for Science and Technology/
Office of Development Information & Utilization

Bureau for External Relations

Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance/
Office of American Schools and Hospitals Abroad

A rough estimate of the staff savings that could be realized from reduction or elimination of Non-Development Related Functions are as follows:

Estimated Staff Savings:	<u>150 - 200</u>
Estimated Time Frame:	<u>1982 - 1986</u>

METHODOLOGY

The Task Force of Personnel Ceiling Reductions for FY 1983 and Beyond was established by the Administrator on September 17, 1981. The task force was charged with identifying options for how the Agency can reduce the size of its workforce and to identify the policy changes, alternative methods of providing development assistance and the adjustments to our programs which will be required given limited staff resources. The task force objectives were to:

- Propose options to achieve personnel reductions in excess of 700 employees;
- Support efforts to reduce the Agency pipeline;
- Minimize the effects of the proposals on annual operating expense budgets;
- Reduce and eliminate duplication in the Agency offices in Washington and overseas; and
- Define, where possible, objective criteria for making staffing decisions at the mission, bureau, and Agency level.

The members of the task force, representing regional bureaus and offices, began meeting on September 28, 1981. The task force report was drafted in late November, 1981.

The options proposed by the task force are based on several sources of information:

1. The Revised Automated Manpower Personnel (RAMPS) System;
2. The AID Handbooks;
3. A survey of Washington offices and bureaus.

The RAMPS system was used, primarily as the basis of information for analyses such as clerical to professional ratios, proportions of management to technical personnel,

the size of various Agency offices, divisions and branches. The RAMPS system is also the source of the Agency's staffing patterns, which formed the basis for much of the task force's analysis.

The second major source of information was the Agency handbooks. From Handbook 17 and various informational interviews, the task force was able to compile a distribution of AID/Washington staff by function. This compilation was critical as the task force reviewed the functions of each AID/W office. It was also helpful in identifying potentially redundant or duplicative functions within the Agency.

The third source of information which the task force used in its analyses was a cursory survey of AID/Washington bureaus and offices. Early in the task force effort, each member of the task force canvassed their respective bureau or office for suggestions, alternatives and recommendations for achieving staff reductions. This survey effort resulted in the five broad areas of analysis for the paper: Program Policy changes, Alternatives to Direct Hire staff, Changes in internal Policies and Procedures, Administrative Efficiencies, and Reorganization/Consolidation/Elimination of functions. The data was also useful in isolating subjects for which the task force should give higher priority (sector concentration, core staff, contracting alternatives, etc.).

The task force also used other sources of information as the various organizational and policy analyses were conducted. These sources of information included: severance pay plans submitted by each mission, the Project Accounting Information System, the Kivimae Task Force Report, and the Kennefik 1980 Portfolio Supervision Report. As background information the task force also reviewed alternatives, findings and suggestions from a wide variety of staff savings analyses conducted in the past.

Throughout the task force effort there was continual discussion about the validity of the various staff saving projections in each option. It is important to note that the projected staff savings are estimates. The projections however, are based on objective unbiased criteria and realistic assumptions.

SUMMARY OF ANNEXES TO THE TASK FORCE REPORT

1. IDCA/AID Workforce Changes, FY 1982
2. USAID Program/Staffing Data.
3. Potential Contract Personnel in USAID Missions and Offices
4. Projected Staff Savings Through Restoration of a 4:1 Professional to Clerical Ratio in AID/W

**IDCA/AID WORKFORCE CHANGES
(FULL TIME PERMANENT EMPLOYEES)
(EXCLUDING TDP & OPIC)**

		<u>Actual</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>
		<u>09/30/80</u>		<u>9/30/81</u>		<u>Change</u>	<u>FTE</u>
						<u>From 9/30/80</u>	<u>Ceilings</u>
ORGANIZATION:							
<u>AID/W:</u>							
ADM		14	+3	17	-9	-6	8
ES		15	-1	14	+1	0	15
EXRL		44	+7	51	+3	+10	54
GC		47	+5	52	-5	0	47
IG		86	+12	98	-2	+10	96
EOP		10	0	10	-1	-1	9
BIFAD		9	0	9	-1	-1	8
FDA		18	+5	23	-7	-2	16
SA		0	+2	2	0	+2	2
PRE		33	+4	37	+14	+18	51
FVA		67	+1	68	+1	+2	69
M (INCL. AID/W COMP.)		785	-48	737	-44	-92	695
PPC (INCL. IDCA)		165	-33	132	-22	-55	108
S&T		300	-31	269	-10	-41	259
AFR		201	-1	200	-20	-21	180
ASIA		118	-4	114	-13	-17	101
LAC		114	-2	112	-9	-11	103
NE		130	-10	120	-3	-13	117
TOTAL AID/W:		<u>2,156</u>	<u>-91</u>	<u>2,065</u>	<u>-127</u>	<u>-218</u>	<u>1,938</u>
<u>OVERSEAS:</u>							
AFRICA	US	466	+9	475	+17	+26	492
	FN	461	-28	433	+67	+39	500
TOTAL		<u>927</u>	<u>-19</u>	<u>908</u>	<u>+84</u>	<u>+65</u>	<u>992</u>
ASIA	US	268	+8	276	-13	-5	263
	FN	546	-36	510	+1	-35	511
TOTAL		<u>814</u>	<u>-28</u>	<u>786</u>	<u>-12</u>	<u>-40</u>	<u>774</u>
LAC	US	291	-8	283	+7	-1	290
	FN	579	-36	543	+6	-30	549
TOTAL		<u>870</u>	<u>-44</u>	<u>826</u>	<u>+13</u>	<u>-31</u>	<u>839</u>
NE	US	211	+11	222	-7	+4	215
	FN	251	-12	239	+21	+9	260
TOTAL		<u>462</u>	<u>-1</u>	<u>461</u>	<u>+14</u>	<u>+13</u>	<u>475</u>
M (INCL. O/S COMP.)		166	-5	161	-16	-21	145
PPC		10	0	10	+3	+3	13
IG		82	-14	68	+5	-9	73
FVA		2	0	2	0	0	2
TOTAL OVERSEAS		<u>3,333</u>	<u>-111</u>	<u>3,222</u>	<u>+91</u>	<u>-20</u>	<u>3,313</u>
RDP		7	-7	0	0	-7	0
GRAND TOTAL		<u>5,496</u>	<u>-209</u>	<u>5,287</u>	<u>-36</u>	<u>-245</u>	<u>5,251</u>

USAID PROGRAM/STAFFING DATA

ACTUAL ON-BOARD EMPLOYMENT 9/30/81

	5 YEAR AVERAGE OYB**	PIPELINE AS OF 6/30/81	NO. OF PROJECTS	USDH	FNDH	TOTAL
BUREAU FOR AFRICA						
680 BENIN	2,509.7*	7,149	5	0	0	0
633 BOTSWANA	11,318.0	27,789	22	11(a)	7	18(a)
695 BURUNDI	3,938.0*	7,151	5	7(a)	6(a)	13(b)
631 CAMEROON	11,139.8	16,789	25	27	20	47
655 CAPE VERDE	2,88.2	13,732	9	8	3	11
675 CENTRAL AFR REPUBLIC	1,000.0*	314	6	0	0	0
677 CHAD	0	1,721	14	0	2	2
679 CONGO	1,306.8	261	3	0	0	0
603 DJIBOUTI	2,064.0	3,463	5	1	2	3
653 EQUATORIAL GUINEA	1,000.0*	416	2	0	0	0
663 ETHIOPIA	0	0	3	0	5	5
635 GAMBIA	5,032.4	12,266	9	6	6	12
641 GHANA	6,213.8	20,541	17	23(a)	33(a)	56(b)
675 GUINEA	2,720.4	7,035	3	2	3(a)	5(a)
657 GUINEA BISSAU	1,892.8	5,813	7	(c)	(c)	(c)
681 IVORY COAST	0	188	3	31	22	53
615 KENYA	33,657.2	62,649	32	31	67(b)	98(b)
632 LESOTHO	9,344.4	20,736	23	10	12	22
660 LIBERIA	32,789.0	28,453	28	23	41	64
612 MALAWI	5,208.6	11,058	7	3	4	7
688 MALI	12,915.0	21,836	23	27	32(a)	59(a)
682 MAURITANIA	6,220.0	10,389	12	18	21(b)	39(b)
642 MAURITIUS	20,00.0*	300	4	0	0	0
683 NIGER	13,579.8	24,734	17	22(a)	10	32(a)
620 NIGERIA	0	831	3	0	2	2
696 PANAMA	3,991.2	7,269	10	7	3	10
658 SAO TOME/PRINCIPE	1,580.0*	1,670	1	0	0	0
685 SENEGAL	16,749.0	25,860	24	20	19	39
662 SEYCHELLES	1,104.0	1,430	3	0	0	0
636 SIERRA LEONE	2,369.4	3,719	7	4	4	8
643 SOMALIA	24,526.8	34,007	10	19	22	41
650 SUDAN	63,747.6	104,973	21	17	15(a)	32(a)
645 SWAZILAND	6,799.2	17,343	15	13(a)	10	23(a)
671 TANZANIA	13,950.6	37,236	23	22	28	50
693 TOGO	2,217.8	4,029	7	4	2	6
617 UGANDA	2,300.0*	530	3	3	1	4

ACTUAL ON-BOARD EMPLOYMENT 9/30/81

	5 YEAR AVERAGE OYB**	PIPELINE AS OF 6/30/81	NO. OF PROJECTS	USDH	FNDH	TOTAL	
BUREAU FOR AFRICA (cont'd)							
686	UPPER VOLTA	11,093.6	23,921	20	21	15	36
660	ZAIRE	14,057.8	22,578	20	22	10(a)	32(a)
611	ZAMBIA	21,971.8	14,745	8	5	5(a)	10(a)
613	ZIMBABWE	49,475.0	957	7	6	0	6
618	REDSO-EAST AFR	0	0	0	29	10	39
625	SAHEL REG PROGRAM	21,996.4	41,977	43			
690	SOUTHERN AFR REG	22,063.0	34,236	9			
698	AFRICA REGIONAL	48,074.6	54,199	44	(d)	(d)	(d)
BUREAU TOTAL				442(e)	442(f)	884(g)	

* Less than five years program averaged.

** Includes functional, ESF and Sahel assistance; excludes PL 480, ASHA, HIG.

- (a) Includes one part-time employee.
- (c) See Cape Verde.
- (e) Includes five part-time employees.
- (g) Includes seventeen part-time employees.

(b) Includes two part-time employees.

(d) See Ivory Coast/Kenya.

(f) Includes Twelve part-time employees.

USAID PROGRAM/STAFFING DATA

					<u>ACTUAL ON-BOARD EMPLOYMENT 9/30/81</u>		
		5 YEAR AVERAGE OYB**	PIPELINE AS OF 6/30/81	NO. OF PROJECTS	USDH	FNDH	TOTAL
BUREAU FOR ASIA							
388	BANGLADESH	80,903.4	129,940	23	39	73(a)	112
482	BURMA	6,500.0*	4,138	1	5(a)	2	7
386	INDIA	48,520.0	217,290	8	15	48(b)	63
497	INDONESIA	75,578.6	317,737	57	66(a)	95	161
489	KORLA	0	5	1	0	1	1
367	NEPAL	13,118.2	277,998	17	28(b)	63	91
391	PAKISTAN	162,500.0*	11,922	8	12	35	47
492	PHILIPPINES	69,684.8	144,129	38	47(c)	105	152
383	SRI LANKA	38844.6	93,717	16	20	26(c)	46
493	THAILAND	27,462.0	46,255	22	27(a)	67	94
879	SO PACIFIC REGIONAL	3,459.6	2,113	4	3	0	3
498	ASIA REGIONAL	18,490.8	20,273	21	1	1	2
BUREAU TOTAL					<u>263(d)</u>	<u>516(e)</u>	<u>779(f)</u>

* Less than 5 years' program averaged.

** Includes functional, ESF and Sahel assistance; excludes PL 480, ASHA, HIG.

(a) Includes one part-time employee.

(b) Includes three part-time employees.

(c) Includes two part-time employees.

(d) Includes ten part-time employees.

(e) Includes six part-time employees.

(f) Includes sixteen part-time employees.

USAID PROGRAM/STAFFING DATA

				ACTUAL ON-BOARD EMPLOYMENT 9/30/81			
	5 YEAR AVERAGE OYB**	PIPELINE AS OF 6/30/81	NO. OF PROJECTS	USDH	FNDH	TOTAL	
BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN							
511	BOLIVIA	7,982.6*	68,740	31	16	63	79
513	CHILE	0			0	0	0
514	COLOMBIA	0	131	5	1	3	4
515	COSTA RICA	27,861.0	36,326	20	15(a)	18	33(a)
517	COMINICAN REPUBLIC	22,743.6	28,869	21	21	34	55
518	ECUADOR	8,353.2	12,561	18	10	19(b)	29(b)
519	EL SALVADOR	80,856.2	32,712	42	14	38	52
520	GUATEMALA	9,817.6	48,361	23	12	35	47
504	GUYANA	3,835.2	34,150	12	11	20	31
521	HAITI	10,216.2	21,782	30	25(a)	44(a)	69(f)
522	HONDURAS	34,950.6	83,703	41	31	32	63
532	JAMAICA	43,203.0	21,407	17	20	25	45
524	NICARAGUA	23,973.5	22,016	28	6	34	40
525	PANAMA	9,342.2	52,001	26	20	52(b)	72(b)
526	PARAGUAY	3,835.7	8,662	14	4	12	16
527	PERU	27,282.0	78,052	47	22(b)	58(b)	80(a)
538	CARIBBEAN REG	41,455.8	65,009	38	21	29(a)	50(a)
596	ROCAP	10,850.2	14,762	12	11	23	34
598	LAC REGIONAL	17,138.2	5,062	27	2	4	6
BUREAU TOTAL					<u>262(d)</u>	<u>543(e)</u>	<u>805(g)</u>

* Less than 5 years' program averaged.

** Includes functional, ESF and Sahel assistance; excludes PL 480, ASHA, HIG.

(a) Includes two part-time employees.

(b) Includes one part-time employee.

(c) Includes three part-time employees.

(d) Includes eight part-time employees.

(e) Includes seven part-time employees.

(f) Includes four part-time employees.

(g) Includes fifteen part-time employees.

USAID PROGRAM/STAFFING DATA

ACTUAL ON-BOARD EMPLOYMENT 9/30/81

	5 YEAR AVERAGE OYB**	PIPELINE AS OF 6/30/81	NO. OF PROJECTS	USDH	FNDH	TOTAL
BUREAU FOR NEAR EAST						
306	AFGHANISTAN	0	10	0	0	0
233	CYPRUS	11,500.0	121	0	0	0
263	EGYPT	810,000.0	1,618,253	68	123(a)	212(a)
271	ISRAEL	785,000.0	10,832	1	0	0
274	JORDAN	47,660.0	116,921	25	16	22(b)
269	LEBANON	4,375.0*	5,197	10	4	5
604	MOROCCO	9,917.2	19,531	16	16	19
272	OMAN	8,750.0*	4,919	18	2	0
150	PORTUGAL	26,250.0*	36,979	9	5	18(c)
152	SPAIN	7,000.0*	0	0	0	0
276	SYRIA	0	281,714	18	8	19
664	TUNISIA	0	48,270	21	14	27(c)
277	TURKEY	214,600.0			0	0
279	YEMEN	20,112.4	29,186	17	28	43
153	YUGOSLAVIA	0				
298	NEAR EAST REGIONAL-DA	3,499.6			2	1
296	NEAR EAST REGIONAL-ESF	8,594.8				
BUREAU TOTAL				218(a)	243(d)	461(e)

* Less than 5 years program averaged.

** Includes functional, ESF and Sahel assistance; excludes PL 480, ASHA, HIG.

(a) Includes four part-time employees.

(b) Includes one part-time employee.

(c) Includes two part-time employees.

(d) Includes five part-time employees.

(e) Includes nine part-time employees.

**POTENTIAL CONTRACT PERSONNEL IN USAID MISSIONS AND OFFICES
EMPLOYMENT AS OF JUNE 30, 1981**

SUMMARY

<u>BUREAU</u>	<u>GROUP I</u> Chauffeurs Librarians Maintenance Janitors Warehousemen					<u>GROUP II</u> Mail Distribution Communication Records Travel & Transportation Computer					<u>GROUP III</u> Secretaries				
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>0-5 YEARS</u>	<u>5-10 YEARS</u>	<u>10-15 YEARS</u>	<u>OVER 15 YRS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>0-5 YEARS</u>	<u>5-10 YEARS</u>	<u>10-15 YEARS</u>	<u>OVER 15 YRS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>0-5 YEARS</u>	<u>5-10 YEARS</u>	<u>10-15 YEARS</u>	<u>OVER 15 YRS</u>
Africa	73	40	3	7	23	70	59	4	1	6	58	44	13	1	0
Asia	70	17	7	22	24	67	22	9	12	24	67	30	5	10	22
Latin America	26	4	5	4	13	63	41	3	7	12	103	53	13	11	26
Near East	<u>28</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	<u>197</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>63*</u>	<u>232</u>	<u>147</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>279</u>	<u>170</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>50</u>
GRAND TOTAL ALL GROUPS	<u>708</u>	<u>392</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>158</u>										

* Of this group of Foreign Nationals with over 15 years of service, 10 have 16 or fewer years of service and are included in the total of 132 cited in the paper. The total can be reconciled by adding together the 0-5 year total (75), the 5-10 year total (26), and the 10-15 year total (33); subtracting 12 Foreign Nationals from Indonesia who have already been converted to contract since June 30; and adding 10 Foreign Nationals from the over 15 year total column. (75+26+33=134; 134-12=122; 122+10=132). This means that 53 Foreign Nationals in Group I will not be effected by this action. Missions which have Foreign Nationals in the "Over 15 Years" column who have 16 or fewer years of service are highlighted on the following pages by an asterisk (*).

POTENTIAL CONTRACT PERSONNEL IN USAID MISSIONS AND OFFICES

AFRICA

GROUP I

Chauffeurs
 Librarians
 Maintenance
 Janitors
 Warehousemen

GROUP II

Mail Distribution
 Communication Records
 Travel & Transportation
 Computer

GROUP III

Secretaries

COUNTRY	GROUP I					GROUP II					GROUP III				
	TOTAL	0-5 YEARS	5-10 YEARS	10-15 YEARS	OVER 15 YRS	TOTAL	0-5 YEARS	5-10 YEARS	10-15 YEARS	OVER 15 YRS	TOTAL	0-5 YEARS	5-10 YEARS	10-15 YEARS	OVER 15 YRS
Botswana	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Burundi	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
Cameroon	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Cape Verde	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chad	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Djibouti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
Ethiopia	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0
Gambia	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	1	0	0
Ghana	3	0	0	0	0	3	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	7	3	4	0	0
Kenya	11	6	0	2	3*	14	10	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lesotho	1	1	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	0
Liberia	15	1	1	0	13*	4	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Malawi	1	1	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	6	5	1	0	0
Mali	4	3	1	0	0	6	6	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Mauritania	3	3	0	0	0	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Niger	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	6	1	1	0
REDSO/EA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	1	0	0
REDSO/WE	3	3	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Senegal	6	4	0	2	0	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Somalia	6	5	0	1	0	4	4	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	0
Sudan	5	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	3	3	0	0
Swaziland	1	0	1	0	0	5	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tanzania	4	1	0	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Togo	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uganda	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0
Upper Volta	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0
Zaire	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zambia	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	<u>73</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>

POTENTIAL CONTRACT PERSONNEL IN USAID MISSIONS AND OFFICES

ASIA

COUNTRY	GROUP I Chauffeurs Librarians Maintenance Janitors Warehousemen					GROUP II Mail Distribution Communication Records Travel & Transportation Computer					GROUP III Secretaries				
	TOTAL	0-5 YEARS	5-10 YEARS	10-15 YEARS	OVER 15 YRS	TOTAL	0-5 YEARS	5-10 YEARS	10-15 YEARS	OVER 15 YRS	TOTAL	0-5 YEARS	5-10 YEARS	10-15 YEARS	OVER 15 YRS
Bangladesh	2	0	0	0	2	7	3	2	0	2	17	12	1	0	4
Burma	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fiji	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	2	0	0	1	1	10	5	0	1	4	9	1	0	0	8
Indonesia	25	12	5	5	3*	26	8	4	2	12	8	4	2	0	2
Korea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nepal	4	1	0	1	2	6	5	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	1
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	1
Philippines	20	2	1	9	8*	6	1	1	4	0	13	5	2	3	3
Sri Lanka	4	2	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	9	8	0	1	0
Thailand	13	0	0	5	8*	11	0	1	4	6	7	0	0	4	3
TOTAL	<u>70</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>22</u>

POTENTIAL CONTRACT PERSONNEL IN USAID MISSIONS AND OFFICES

NEAR EAST

COUNTRY	GROUP I Chauffeurs Librarians Maintenance Janitors Warehousemen					GROUP II Mail Distribution Communication Records Travel & Transportation Computer					GROUP III Secretaries				
	TOTAL	0-5 YEARS	5-10 YEARS	10-15 YEARS	OVER 15 YRS	TOTAL	0-5 YEARS	5-10 YEARS	10-15 YEARS	OVER 15 YRS	TOTAL	0-5 YEARS	5-10 YEARS	10-15 YEARS	OVER 15 YRS
Egypt	13	10	3	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	29	27	1	1	0
Jordan	1	0	0	0	1	5	5	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0
Lebanon	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Morocco	1	0	0	0	1	4	1	1	1	1	2	2	0	0	0
Portugal	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	1	0	0
Syria	3	1	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0
Tunisia	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	8	3	3	0	2
Yemen	6	1	5	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	0
TOTAL	<u>28</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>

**POTENTIAL STAFF SAVINGS UNDER A RESTORATION
OF PROFESSIONAL TO CLERICAL RATIOS**

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>Admin.</u> ^{1/}	<u>Other</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>Potential Staff Savings Under A 4:1 Ratio</u>
Bureau for Program & Policy Coordination	30	94	3.13	6
Bureau for Africa	50	156	3.12	11
Bureau for Near East	32	91	2.84	9
Bureau for Asia	29	85	2.93	8
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean	31	81	2.61	11
All Other Bureaus/Offices	<u>222</u>	<u>1,183</u>	5.61	<u>0</u>
 GRAND TOTAL	 <u><u>395</u></u>	 <u><u>1,690</u></u>		 <u><u>45</u></u>

^{1/} Includes Personnel Clerk Typists, Employee Development Clerks, Employee Development Clerk Typists, Clerks, Clerk Typists, Clerk Chauffeur Typists, Program Operations Asst. Typists, Clerk Stenographers, Secretaries, Secretary Stenographers, Secretary Typists, Procurement Clerk Typists, Supply Clerk Typists, Transportation Clerk Typists, and Shipment Clerk Typists.

NOTE: This data from the RAMPS system includes full-time employees only (including IPAs and Details-In). Consequently, it does not reflect part-time employees who are often in administrative support positions and whose omission from this data may make individual bureaus or offices appear to have a more favorable administrative to clerical ratio than is accurate.

