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UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA

FROM: AFR/EA, A. David Lundberg

SUBJECT: Refugee Local Integration in Somalia - (698-0538)

Problem: Your approval of the Refugee Local Integration activity (698-0538), and the subsequent allocation of \$2,000,000 from deobligated FY 1985 Economic Support Funds to the Bureau for Refugee Programs, is hereby requested.

Discussion: The attached mini-Project Paper (PP) provides the background and rationale for the use of \$2,000,000 in deobligated FY 1985 ESF funds for Ethiopian refugees in Somalia. A more comprehensive UNHCR-prepared paper on this subject, "The Special Programme for Durable Solutions for Ethiopian Refugees in Somalia", is attached if further elaboration on the mini-PP is desired.

The project's purpose is to help some 356,000 Ethiopian refugees locally settle and integrate in southern Somalia as part of the overall UNHCR package of durable solutions, laid out in the above-referenced document. UNHCR will provide a one-time lump sum package of cash and food benefits to assist integrating refugees. Once refugees receive these benefits and turn in their ration cards, they will no longer be eligible for further UNHCR assistance. The goals of this project are to promote stability in the region by resolving a long-term refugee problem and to reduce the resource requirements needed from the international community for refugee care and maintenance programs.

The first year of UNHCR's overall program of integration or repatriation is projected to cost about \$38 million. In addition to the \$2 million proposed herein for integration, State/RP is expected to allocate another \$5 million to the overall program in the current fiscal year. It is anticipated that the large U.S. contribution will leverage the additional donor resources required to achieve the purpose of this activity. Should these resources not be fully available in a timely fashion, the major impact would be to slow down the pace of the effort.

A Congressional Notification for this program went to the Hill on July 25, 1990 and it expired August 8, 1990. During the waiting period, concerns relating to the overall refugee situation in Somalia, as well as some questions on this particular activity, were discussed with staffers, at which time they released the informal hold they had placed on it.

Recommendation: That you approve the attached mini-PP and sign the attached Memorandum of Understanding, indicating your approval of the activity and the allocation of \$2,000,000 in deobligated FY 1985 ESF funds to the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs.

APPROVED

DISAPPROVED

DATE

William Bally
9/6/90

- Attachments: A. Refugee Local Integration in Somalia PP (698-0538) and UNHCR Paper, "Special Programme for Durable Solutions for Ethiopian Refugees in Somalia"
B. Memorandum of Understanding

Clearances:

DAA/AFR:ELSaiers W
AID/LEG:JFredericks(draft)
AFR/DP:JGovan(subs)
GC/AFR:KO'Donnell KFM
AFR/EA:DMendelson DM
AFR/PD:SMeyer SU34
AID/PPC:LMarshall(info)
AID/FM:JHevesy(subs)
State/RP/AFR:MMcKelvey(draft)

AID/AFR/EA:DMendelson:8/24/90:x75568:4300x

AFRICA REGIONAL

Refugee Local Integration in Somalia

(698-0538)

- I. Background
- II. Refugee Programs and A.I.D. Assistance
- III. Project Description and Goals
- IV. Implementation Arrangements
 - A. Roles and Responsibilities
 - B. Follow-On Activity
 - C. Implementation Schedule
 - D. Evaluation Plan

ANNEX I UNHCR Program Document

I. BACKGROUND

Somalia has been host to hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian refugees since the 1977-78 Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia. UNHCR has been providing food and other assistance to these refugees for the last twelve years at an average annual cost of \$40 million and 100,000 MT of food. In the intervening years, additional refugees have arrived from Ethiopia and some repatriation (both spontaneous and organized) has taken place. An Ethiopian/Somali accord signed in April 1988 paved the way for a lasting solution to the entire refugee problem. UNHCR, with the Governments of Ethiopia and Somalia, has developed a program which involves voluntary repatriation to Ethiopia or local integration in Somalia. All of those holding refugee ration cards are to have a one-time choice of the two options. Any who believe that they may still require refugee status will have their claim re-examined by a new eligibility commission. Over 450,000 ration card holders in southern Somalia were registered regarding their intentions. Approximately 69% have opted for permanent settlement in Somalia, 30% for repatriation to Ethiopia and 1% for continued refugee status.

II. REFUGEE PROGRAMS AND A.I.D. ASSISTANCE

The A.I.D. program in Somalia is currently restricted due to Brooke sanctions. However, integration and development assistance through international and private voluntary organizations to refugees and affected local populations is consistent with the A.I.D. Mission's strategy for Somalia. The Country Development Strategy Statement for the period FY 90-92 discusses the predominant USG concern for peace and reconciliation in Somalia; Ethiopian refugees have been a factor both in the causes of ethnic/political conflict and in the armed conflict itself. In previous years, A.I.D. has administered \$12 million in forestry and self-reliance projects with refugees as the beneficiaries. In addition the Mission currently manages a \$4 million refugee settlement project implemented by the PVOs, Save the Children and World Concern, in Qorioley and Lugh respectively. A.I.D. also monitors Food for Peace commodities contributed to WFP for refugees.

III. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Under this project, A.I.D. will transfer obligational authority of \$2,000,000 (from deobligated FY 1985 Economic Support Funds) to the State Department/Bureau for Refugee Programs to help support the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) Refugee Local Integration Program in Somalia.

This \$2 million, combined with other donor resources, will support the principal purpose of the project which is to help some 356,000 Ethiopian refugees locally settle and integrate in southern Somalia as part of the overall UNHCR package of durable solutions. UNHCR will provide a one-time lump sum package of cash and food benefits to assist integrating refugees. Once refugees receive these benefits and turn in their ration cards, they will no longer be eligible for further UNHCR assistance. (Note: A detailed description of the program can be found in the UNHCR Program Document (attached). The goals are to promote stability in the region by resolving a long-term refugee problem and to reduce the resource requirements needed from the international community for refugee care and maintenance programs.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

A. Roles and Responsibilities

Host Government (Somalia): Somalia has agreed to integrate those refugees who freely expressed their desire to remain in Somalia and to grant citizenship to the former refugees. Through the National Refugee Commission, the Government will facilitate provision of the cash and food component of the integration package.

UNHCR is the international organization mandated to carry out durable solutions programs for refugees choosing to repatriate, locally integrate or resettle in a third country. In this capacity, UNHCR is responsible for mobilizing international support for the durable solutions program. UNHCR has appealed for a total of \$60 million for the two year duration of the program. For this project, UNHCR will receive and administer the \$2 million in accordance with its usual accounting procedures. Copies of all program and financial reports will be provided to the United States Mission, Geneva and to the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs in Washington.

Implementing Partners: UNHCR's principal operational partners are the Somali government's National Refugee Commission and The World Food Program (WFP). The Emergency Logistics Unit of CARE (ELU/CARE) will assist in the transportation of the food commodities which form a portion of the settlement package. The World Bank is to assist with the conversion of foreign currency into Somali shillings. As noted above, UNHCR marshalls donor contributions for all components except the food commodities.

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A.I.D.: A.I.D./Washington will conclude a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs that will allocate \$2 million from deobligated FY 85 Economic Support Funds for the purpose of providing support to the UNHCR for the Refugee Local Integration Program in Somalia. One term of this MOU specifies that the A.I.D. funds will be governed by RP's own authorities and procedures, and that RP accepts responsibility for compliance with any applicable statutory restrictions. A.I.D. will notify the Congress of this reprogramming, will consult with OMB, and will undertake the necessary financial accounting actions regarding OYB and apportionment with the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP): RP will receive the allocation of \$2 million; obligate those funds by transferring them to the UNHCR through a letter of contribution specifying the use of the funds; monitor the project implementation in accordance with its usual policies and practices; and report to A.I.D. on the use of the funds.

B. Follow-on Activity

UNHCR's program is designed to cover a two-year period. It is assumed that UNHCR will continue to mobilize support from the international community to assist the local integration of refugees. The Government of Somalia will address itself to development institutions such as the World Bank for any further aid needed to deal with its new citizens. It is also assumed at present that any future contributions by the U.S. Government to this durable solutions program will be covered by funds appropriated pursuant to the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended.

C. IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

The project will be implemented in the third quarter of CY 90 (July 1 - September 30, 1990) subject to the following steps having been completed:

<u>Action</u>	<u>Action Offices</u>	<u>Timing</u>
Congressional Notification	AID/LEG	7/25/90
Consult with OMB (Letter)	AID/PPC	by 8/17/90
Project Paper approved	AID/AA/AFR	by 8/31/90

Conclude Memo of Understanding between A.I.D. and State/RP	AID/GC, AID/FM State/RP	by 8/31/90
Financial accounting adjustments (OYB, Treasury tracker)	AID/DP, AID/FM	by 8/31/90
Letter of Contribution to UNHCR, countersigned by UNHCR	State/RP	by 9/6/90

D. EVALUATION PLAN

No formal evaluation of these project activities separate from the overall refugee integration program is planned. Rather, UNHCR will send copies of all program reports detailing accomplishments to the U.S. Mission, Geneva and to the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs in Washington. U.S. mission staff in Mogadishu will monitor and informally evaluate the activities undertaken under this project in the course of its regular responsibility for monitoring United States Government refugee assistance.

State/RP/AFR:ABNE *Jankin* 7/22/90 : 4128D

Cleared: RP/AFR: MJMcKelvey (draft)
RP/IA: SEMoten (draft)
RP/COMPT: NWRunkles (draft)
AF/E: JLedesma (draft)
L/HRR: JKovar (draft)

AID/DAA/AFR: ELSaiers *EL*
AID/AFR/EA: DMendelson *DM*
AID/AFR/DP: JGovan (draft)
AID/AFR/PD: SMeyer *SM*
AID/GC/AFR: KO'Donnell *KO'D*
AID/FM: JHevesy (draft)
AID/PPC: LMarshall (draft)
AID/LEG: JFredericks (draft)

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
AND
THE BUREAU FOR REFUGEE PROGRAMS,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Allocation of \$2 million in deobligated FY 1985 Economic Support Funds to the Bureau for Refugee Programs (A.I.D. Project No. 698-0538).

Purpose and Authority: Pursuant to Section 632(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) agrees to allocate to the Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP) the amount of \$2,000,000 from deobligated Fiscal Year 1985 Economic Support Funds, for the purpose of providing support for the Refugee Local Integration Program in Somalia coordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).


This program will provide assistance to Ethiopian refugees in Somalia who have chosen to permanently settle in southern Somalia. UNHCR and WFP will provide those holding refugee ration cards, who have chosen local integration as a durable solution, with a one-time lump sum package of cash and food benefits.

This program is in direct support of A.I.D.'s program in Somalia which has supported integration and development assistance to refugees and affected local populations for many years.

Terms and Conditions: Except as A.I.D. and RP may otherwise agree in writing, this allocation is made under the following terms and conditions:

1. A.I.D. shall allocate to RP the sum of \$2,000,000 in a lump sum to support the above - described activity to be implemented with UNHCR. In no event will A.I.D. funding under this Agreement exceed this total.
2. Pursuant to Section 632(a) of the FAA and except as otherwise provided herein, the A.I.D. funds shall be governed by RP's own authorities and procedures. RP accepts responsibility for compliance with any applicable statutory restrictions.

3. RP shall receive the allocation of A.I.D. funds as a Treasury Department Nonexpenditure Transfer Authorization (SF-1151). RP shall assure that the A.I.D. funds are not commingled with funds received from other sources. RP shall keep full and complete records and accounts with respect to the A.I.D. funds, which must be obligated by September 30, 1990.
4. RP agrees to provide to the Office of the A.I.D. Controller and to the Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, monthly reports of obligations incurred and disbursements made against funds allocated under the Memorandum of Understanding on SF-133, Report on Budget Execution, in accordance with Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-34. Funds not obligated or disbursed by RP upon completion of this activity will be promptly returned to A.I.D. RP further agrees to provide a certification that the fiscal report is correct and that said funds were disbursed for the purpose of the program and submit information as A.I.D. may, from time to time, request on expenditures under the allocation and on the progress of the program.
5. In addition, it is further understood that: in the event that the terms of this agreement are not carried out, A.I.D. may terminate this MOU upon sixty (60) days written notice. In the event of such termination, RP shall be reimbursed by A.I.D. for expenditures made and obligations incurred in accordance with the provisions of the termination notice upon to the effective date of this termination. But in no event shall the face amount of the allocation be exceeded. During the said sixty-day period, RP shall minimize expenditures and obligations. Undisbursed funds remaining at the close of the sixty-day termination period will be returned to A.I.D. on an SF-1151.
6. If the foregoing terms and conditions are acceptable, please sign below and return two signed originals of the memorandum for our files.



Walter Bollinger
Acting Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Africa
Agency for International
Development.

Date: 9/6/90

Norman W. Runkles
Comptroller
Bureau for Refugee Programs
Department of State

Date: _____

Cleared: RP/AFR: MJMcKelvey(draft)
RP/COMPT: NWRunkles(draft)
L/HRR: JKovar(draft)
AID/DAA/AFR: ELSaiers h
AID/GC/AFR: KO'Donnell can
AID/AFR/EA: ADLundberg SI
AID/AFR/DP: JGovan (draft)
AID/FM: JHevesy (draft)

State/RP/AFR: ABNE for 7-17-90: 4118D

The Dilemma of UNHCR

UNHCR's position is extremely difficult:

- o They have responsibility for the protection of refugees but care and maintenance is implemented by various partners, primarily ARA but including many NGOs.
- o However, the observations of the Eastern MDTM team were that UNHCR have also become closely and directly involved in the care and maintenance. They have:
 - o designed water supply strategies.
 - o purchased earth moving equipment.
 - o built roads and dams.
 - o installed water storage tanks.
- o But because of their not officially being an implementing agency, the management structures are not sufficiently established to enable these activities to be conducted in the most efficient or cost effective way. They do not have the power or the structure under present arrangements to develop a global view and strategic plans.

We would recommend that if UNHCR is to continue to be involved in implementation, that management, decision making and career structures be instituted to match.

12'

balance of 1989 and early 1990. Another mass re-registration exercise initiated in March 1990 failed and had to be abandoned. As no satisfactory means of counting and registering Somali refugee beneficiaries has yet been found, registration has been affectively suspended at the Aware camps since March 1990 and at Hatisheik since August 1989.

The issue of refugee numbers has continued to be a central conundrum in planning and providing adequate international refugee assistance and protection to the Somali camps.

As 1990 ended, and the member of the Multi-Donor Technical Mission (MDTM) began final preparations for their mission to Ethiopia, intensified conflict throughout Somalia displaced still more thousands of Somalis and created a new dynamic in the refugee situation.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Observations

Following the fall of Siad Barre's regime in Somalia, the Somali National Movement (SNM), exclusively drawn from the Isaaq tribal group, now dominates northern Somalia and controls the main towns of Berbera, Hargeisa and Burao. The SNM claims that the only elements of Siad Barre's Somali National Army (SNA) intent on maintaining resistance to the SNM withdrew to Boroma, and that the SNM drove them out of that town and subsequently pursued them into the surrounding hilly countryside, where skirmishes continue. Boroma is a border town in an area populated by the non-Isaaq Gadabursi, traditional rivals of the Isaaq, and who were associated, as they themselves admit, with the Barre regime.

Gadabursi refugees confirm that the SNM entered and looted Boroma and Dilla on 4 February 1991, then left Boroma to ravage the surrounding countryside. They make no mention of the presence or pursuit of SNA troops, but claim that the Gadabursi are simply victims of retaliation because of their links with the Barre regime.

The effect of these developments, which have created a dynamic situation whose outcome is hard to predict, is twofold: firstly, the Isaaq refugees who make up the vast majority in the Hatisheik and Aware camps, almost to a man and to a woman declared to us their wish to be repatriated, though with certain riders about making a quite sure that stability is here to stay, about the need to clear mines from Hargeisa, and to have an organised repatriation programme linked to the rehabilitation of the infrastructure, particularly of Hargeisa. (The opening of the port of Berbera and the resumption of the livestock export

trade could trigger off rapid economic recovery in the North.) SNM spokesman abroad acknowledge the desire of the refugees to return, but also urge patience pending an organized repatriation programme, and this is the message carried by Hargeisa Radio and picked up by the refugees. The second effect is that the SNM offensive around Boroma and Dilla as caused a new wave of Gadabursi refugees to flee into Ethiopia in the Teferi Ber area*.

At the national level, the SNM refuse to recognize the President and Administration appointed in Mogadishu by the United Somali Congress (USC), and say they will not attend the National Conference called for by the USC in Mogadishu on 28 February. They propose instead a Council of State with representatives of the three main rebel groups which should nominate a transitional government. Among the younger refugees, there was considerable talk of secession, and the wish of the north to break links with Mogadishu. Reports from outside the country indicate, however, that SNM leaders deny that secession is their aim, and speak of federal and confederal solutions. They are in a position of some strength; the south needs the north, for economic reasons, much more than the north needs the south. (We were told by an Ethiopian delegation returning from Djibouti that a USC delegation had passed through an route for Hargeisa a few days ago and was still there.) Nevertheless, there remains the possibility that the movements that have ousted Siad Barre may not only fail to agree among themselves about the formation of a central government, but may start to fight each other, possibly along a north/south divide. Some former members of the SNA, who were among the latest arrivals from Somalia at Darwanaji, told us that they would join the SPM and continue to fight against the SNM. Needless to say, in all our discussions with the refugees, we argued strongly that secession was not a valid option and, from their reaction, we would judge that the Isaaq refugees would settle for a unified Somalia.

The Human Consequences: New Arrivals

One of the negative consequences of the events described above has been an influx of new arrivals. The newest Somali refugees may be divided into four groups. First, many Isaacs who had remained in the northern part of Somalia fled from towns such as Bureau, Sheik and Erigavo, as the SNM moved definitely against the remnants of the SNA. Some nomadic Somalis, who might otherwise have survived the drought condition affecting parts of the north, were also forced to flee. A total of 26,331 new Isaaq refugees were added to the rolls in Darood before registration was again closed. Others await registration at Darood.

[Footnote: *Teferi Ber is known as Aw Barreh is Somali.]

Secondly, the brutal battle for Mogadishu and resulting deprivation put much of the civilian population to flight. Northerners who had fled to the safety of Mogadishu began moving out of Mogadishu in the direction of Ethiopia, through which they ultimately intend to return to northern Somalia. Travelling by lorry and car (most probably into Ethiopia around Ferfer and on to the eastern Hararghe region), these new refugees - again predominantly Isaaq - have reached the three Aware camps, Hartisheik and Degahabur. Many are simply joining relatives already in the camps and surviving on their extended families' generosity as ARA and UNHCR have not yet reached a final decision on how to handle these newcomers. Those who brought funds have been able to purchase food and fuel for their vehicles, in some places depleting scarce supplies and driving up prices.

An initial 2,600 have been registered at Hartisheik. There are reports of 10,000 around Rabasso. 25 lorry-loads of these refugees from Mogadishu reportedly arrived in Camaboker while the MDTM was visiting. The refugee committee in Daror believes there to be as many as 50,000 few arrivals there; but this figure is quite suspect in the absence of screening and registration. The MDTM encountered at Degahabur a group of refugees from Mogadishu said to number between 3,000 and 5,000. A number of these were former UN, embassy and Government of Somalia employees.

Thirdly, as noted above, the outbreak of hostilities between the SNM and the Gadabursi Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) has generated, in recent days, growing number of Gadabursi refugees from Boroma and the surrounding area. By the end of the first week in February, some 24,000 Gadabursi refugees were reported to have crossed into the two Ethiopian border villages of Teferi Ber and Darwanaji. Reported numbers had tripled by the beginning of the second week to 42,000 in Teferi Ber and 30,000 in Darwanaji. By the third week, local authorities were counting 68,000 and 85,000 refugees in Teferi Ber and Darwanaji respectively, and reporting another 10,000 further away at Gogti. These statistics came from heads of households who simply reported their number of dependents without having to appear with the said dependents. The Teferi Ber population was reportedly 72% Gadabursi, 12% Ogadeni, and 16% other. The Dar-wa-naji population was reportedly 70% Gadabursi, 7% Oromo, 5% Ogadeni and 18% other. MDTM members who visited the two sites on 18 February estimated the crowds of refugees to number a maximum of 15,000 in Teferi Ber and 30,000 in Dar-wa-naji.

Mixed in with the newly arrived Somali refugees are returning Ethiopian refugees of unknown number. Returnees, especially those who did not initially plan to return to Ethiopia, may be loath to identify themselves. Some SNM personnel who escaped to Ethiopia are also seeking to blend in as refugees, while others readily identify themselves as soldiers.

Finally, Aisha camp has registered an additional 2,000 Isaaq since the northern fighting escalated and food availability declined.

Conclusions

The collapse of the Barre regime and the SNA has created the chance of peace and stability in the northern region, conditions which could make possible within a time scale of a few months the repatriation to Somalia of the Isaaq refugees, and closure of all the camps at Aware (Camaboker, Rabasso, Daror) as well as Hartisheik A & B. This should be in the context of a repatriation programme.

There is equally a chance that the SNM/Isaaq will, as they claim is their intention, clear out the few remaining pockets of SNA resistance, and make peace with their neighbors such as the Gadabursi and the Darod tribes, thus halting the most recent flight of Gadabursi refugees to Ethiopia and allowing these also to return home in the very near future. Issa/Isaaq relations are apparently holding up, which should make the repatriation of Issa population of Aisha camp possible too. This, with the repatriation mentioned in the previous paragraph, would add up to the repatriation of all Somali refugees originating from the north.

The two previous paragraphs constitute a best-case, but not unachievable, scenario which the international community should promote. But other scenarios must be considered:

- o that the best-case scenario occurs, but is protracted over years rather than months;
- o that the Isaaq may go home, but fail to make peace with their northern neighbors, thus leaving or creating refugees from minority northern tribal groups such as the Gadabursi;
- o that a north-south conflict, or fighting between any combination of SNM/SPM/USC movements, could not only delay repatriation, but touch off new movements of displaced persons; while some might be able to find refuge within Somalia itself, many might flee the country and, with Kenya likely to close its borders, most would end up in Ethiopia.

It seems unlikely, however, whatever problems the SNM has in coming to terms with its immediate northern neighbors (to install regional stability) or with other rebel movements from the south (to promote nationwide stability), that the existing situation, with very large numbers of Isaaq refugees in the present camps, will be very much prolonged.

Both short-term and long-term planning need therefore to be highly flexible, looking at the existing Refugees-in-Ethiopia issue and the Repatriation-back-to-Somalia issue as a single issue: avoiding fixed investment in favour of mobile investment (except where such investment is of an urgent long-term nature which will not be wasted, which will serve other desirable ends and will be indispensable if the best-case scenario does not come to pass.

Finally, we are sure that the international community would welcome the chance to set up a repatriation programme and would probably be ready to support this with some form of rehabilitation programme in Somalia itself. But the international community could only intervene in northern Somalia in response to a request from a recognised Government of Somalia. It could hardly respond to a request from the SNM as long as the SNM remains a movement outside the emergent central government.

Recommendations

- o The international community, including the Government of Ethiopia, should be invited to use whatever effective channels of communication are available to put across to the SNM the message that international community expects an end to hostilities, the establishment of durable peaceful relations with neighbors such as Gadabursi, and the exercise of discipline over the Isaaq sub-clans to prevent retaliation and to bring peace to the whole of the north;
- o Through similar channels the SNM and other Movements are advised of the need to negotiate flexibly with each other to set up a new central government, stressing the danger that if the SNM remains outside such a government the ability of the international community to initiate repatriation and rehabilitation programmes in northern Somalia may be put in doubt.
- o The international community should make clear its desire to promote, within months, a repatriation programme leading to the closure of all Somali refugee camps in eastern Ethiopia;
- o Planning for the future should treat the reception of new arrivals, the running of existing camps, and the development of a repatriation programme as a single operation;
- o A contingency plan be prepared for UN (UNDP/UNHCR?) fact-finding mission to visit northern Somalia as soon as political and security conditions allow;
- o While the possibility exists of complete or large-scale repatriation within a limited time scale, resources should be devoted to preparing for such an event, rather than to improving the existing facilities, except where urgent and long overdue measures with lasting developmental value are needed as a safety net.

MANAGEMENT OF REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

Observations

Assistance to the Somali refugees is provided through the cooperative and complementary efforts of the Government of Ethiopia (principally the ARA and MOH), the UNHCR, other members of the U.N. family (especially the World Food Programme), and a number of non-governmental organizations. Both the ARA and UNHCR maintain a hierarchical structure from Addis Ababa down to the camp level. UNHCR, for example, has a senior program officer for the Eastern Region in Addis Ababa, Sub Offices at Jijiga and Dire Dawa, a Field Office in Aware (all of these are staffed by international UNHCR officers), and Ethiopian national staff in each of the six camps who work with the ARA camp administrators. Budgeted at \$61 million for 1991, the UNHCR/Ethiopia program is the largest one in dollar terms in the world, owing to the nearly full dependence of the refugees on international assistance, to the high costs of distributing water and food, and to the fact that as an extremely poor country itself, Ethiopia cannot afford to cover the administrative costs of the refugee program. UNHCR itself is dependent upon voluntary contributions from the international donor community, which are planned and contributed on an annual basis only. As funds are received or pledged throughout the year, is UNHCR/Geneva able to provide expenditure authority to UNHCR/Addis Ababa. UNHCR is therefore effectively unable to undertake much strategic planning. Though it is generally not an implementing agency, UNHCR has taken on some day-to-day operational responsibilities in Ethiopia; e.g., road improvement/maintenance in the Hartisheik area and dam construction in the Aware area.

The WFP has undertaken to provide some 60% of the total refugee food aid needs through one of its Protracted Refugee Operations. UNHCR must therefore solicit the remainder directly from donors. With the increased demands of new arrivals, the amount of food at present programmed by WFP (though not yet pledged by donors to WFP) will fall short of 60% of total need. WFP/Ethiopia includes a Refugee Logistics Unit and helps run the WTOE (WFP Transport Operation in Ethiopia) which organizes the long haul delivery of food supplies for the Somali refugee camps to a regional staging point at Degehabur. From there, the TOR (Transport Operation for Refugees) managed by GTZ handles deliveries to each of the six camps. TOR allocates commodities from Degehabur based on requests received from the camps and sets priorities in the event of insufficient goods on hand, but has little control (and sometimes little advance notification) about bulk deliveries by WTOE to Degehabur. UNHCR is the largest of WTOE's 36 clients.

UNICEF has provided occasional aid to the Somali refugee camps; e.g., through the NGO Medecins Sans Frontieres, \$19,900 of drugs and \$40,000 for Community Health Assistants, and through Save the Children/U.K. a four-wheel drive vehicle. Regular EPI vaccines and cold chain equipment are also provided by UNICEF on an ongoing basis through the regional MOH offices. If called upon and provided with additional donor resources, UNICEF would be prepared to undertake additional MCH and water provision activities.

From among the NGO community, SCF/UK provides health care and supplemental feeding in Hartisheik A and B. MSF/Belgium performs the same functions in the Aware camps and in Aisha. In addition, MSF/B has a separate activity of strengthening surgery services at the Jijiga hospital which serves as a referral hospital for the Somali camps and of doing some rehabilitation of the physical plant. With respect to the new Gadabursi arrivals, SCF/UK is screening the children under five while MSF/B is doing emergency health care and supplemental feeding for children and pregnant and lactating mothers. OXFAM/UK operates the boreholes at Jijiga which supply the Hartisheik camps and also handles the installation and maintenance of the water distribution systems in the camps. OXFAM hopes to turn over the latter function to ARA by the end of 1991 after sufficient training in repair and maintenance. CARE runs the water tankering operation between the Jijiga boreholes and the Hartisheik camps. OXFAM also installed the water system at Aisha and has begun a distribution from earthen dams system in the Aware camps. Handicap International plans to work with disabled Somali refugees. Tracing and family reunification services (among countries, but not among camps within Ethiopia) are provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Other NGOs which do not have a presence in the Somali camps have also provided occasional assistance; e.g., Lutheran World Federation provided funds to help purchase water from private birka owners in the Aware area after the public earthen dams ran dry. With the exception of CARE, all of the NGOs provide some of their own financial support in addition to what UNHCR provides to its implementing partners. Each NGO engages to a large extent in its own management and program planning; strategic planning is not often undertaken.

While each camp has a Refugee Committee of elders, intellectuals, or other leaders who work with the camp administration to facilitate communication and to address periodic problems, the refugees themselves, unlike in most other refugee situations around the world, provide almost no uncompensated labor or other voluntary assistance to their own communities. School masters have been unable to get parents to help with the erection of temporary classroom structures. Somali truckers, whose POL costs are covered by the international organizations when they deliver commodities, are unwilling to

provide their services to the refugee camps when more lucrative routes are available to them. On the food distribution day that the MDTM visited Hartisheik B, the regularly engaged and compensated refugee porters refused to help move the sugar and CSB that was available for the first time in several months from the warehouses to the distribution sites. Neither the ARA nor the Refugee Committee was able to budget the porters or to find substitute ones.

Conclusions

- o Cooperation between UNHCR and the NGO implementors is very much improved over what it had been in the past.
- o Relations between the refugee committees and camp administrations are generally satisfactory, with the exception of Daror where conflict over the number of new arrivals and suspension of registration has led to palpable tension. While the MDTM was visiting, the refugees staged a mass demonstration and moved the new arrivals' tukuls in front of the administration compound gate in order to press their case.
- o Management and planning for the Aware camps generally and the Daror camp specifically could benefit greatly from a more frequent and regular UNHCR presence.
- o Systematic planning for refugee women and children has largely not been undertaken with the exception of MCH services. There appear to be no unaccompanied minors in the Somali camps. The Aware camps keep all of their program statistics by gender which would facilitate planning. The Hartisheik camps, however, do not.
- o Organization of assistance seems to be working relatively well, as reflected in refugee health, despite the division of labor among several entities within the same sector -- e.g., with OXFAM covering water administration at the source and end use point, with CARE providing transport in between, and with the GOE and UNHCR sharing responsibilities for maintenance of the roads on which the tankers travel; e.g., with WTOE handling longhaul food delivery and TOR handling the shorthaul. However, it may be that greater cost and management efficiencies could be achieved if responsibilities were more integrated and less fragmented e.g., in vehicle (water tanker and food lorry) repair and maintenance.

- o Similarly, UNHCR's inability to plan effectively beyond the year at hand, given its funding structure, would appear to greatly limit the value for donor funds contributed in sectors such as water resource development that are inherently multi-year in nature.
- o The decision to build a new road to the planned Jerrer Valley boreholes rather than to improve the existing road, and the engineering failures of the new road under construction would appear to indicated gaps in UNHCR's decision-making and program management process.
- o The food distribution system for the Hartisheik camps (only a 21 day supply for non-cereal items) recognizes that commodity deliveries have not met targeted deliveries and in fact perpetuates a 25% shortfall in all but cereals.
- o Planning for the Somali refugee assistance program must be seen in the context of a massive drought famine relief effort in Ethiopia and in the context of an overall shortage of humanitarian assistance Africa and world-wide. The firm good pipeline for Ethiopia is expected to run dry in April, thus greatly limiting the possibilities for borrowing of supplies.

Recommendations

- o In view of the difficult position of UNHCR not officially being an implementing agency but at the same time practically having become one in certain areas it is imperative that a clear definition of the responsibilities of UNHCR be made. If UNHCR is to continue to be involved in implementing, management and career structures should be instituted to match.
- o UNHCR international field staff should visit all of the camps at least on a monthly basis to keep lines of communication open and to quickly address any problems. Technical staff in UNHCR/Addis Ababa e.g., the education officer - should also travel regularly to the field if security conditions allow.
- o UNHCR should participate regularly in the Addis Ababa donors group meetings, bringing problems with which it needs donor help to the attention of the group.
- o Donors should consider how to enhance UNHCR's ability to plan strategically in order to obtain better value for funds contributed.

It is recommended that CPA staff further be trained in the specialized area of camp management and organization, particularly in drawing management conclusions from their well kept statistics, participating and involving refugee problems and communicating with refugees. Perhaps UNHCR could involve itself in setting up such a practical course in Ethiopia within the coming months.

REFUGEE REPRESENTATIVE

Observations

The refugee population is neither a faceless unstructured mass nor a primitive organic community. Economic disparities, social antagonies and power structures from their homeland are reflected in the structure of the refugee camps. On the other hand the new situation demands the emergence of new strategic groups.

1. The Refugee Committee

As one development the subject matter of the elders to deal with the administration of the camps is the necessity and the administration of the camps by the administration of the camps. It is conflicting interests are reflected in the administration:

- Adherence to their traditional values the elders always insisted that all tribes and sub-tribes were represented.
- The administrative goals strong has also malitiant intentions.
- Younger people and intellectuals and surely the BME would prefer a purely functional composition.

The Result:

- Members of the RC represent the main tribal and sub-tribal factions as well as the divisions of the camp itself. Naturally that means that prominent and articulate persons are chosen, since no such group will want to lose face by appointing poor and unimportant persons. This reinforces social and economic disparities already existing in the motherland.
- Since the RC has mainly technical duties, younger, educated people tend to be appointed. This however does not mean that the elders necessarily loose their authority. They stress the fact, that they could easily dismiss each single RC-member.
- Refugees of the first hour who started the negotiations and who surely profit most from arising economic opportunities, tend to become a kind of camp "aristocracy".

- The administration rewards cooperative RC-members (this not only in relation to necessary administrative measures, but also in relation to the personal well-being of the administration-members themselves). Such rewards can enhance the standing of the RC-members but they can also alienate them from the community (in Hartisheik A for example, the RC was reappointed following widespread protests).
- The refugees are on the whole strong supporters of the SNM (In the Aware camps the relation of females to males of the active population (16-45) is 1,6. Many refugees said, that those persons are fighting at the front). They represent large part of the popular basis of this movement. The camps themselves have to be regarded as a logistic element the movement can rely on. This gives the SNM a strong influence both through the RC as well as through other channels.

On the whole and under "normal" circumstances this system seems to work in a quite satisfactory way. Cases like Daror, with the heavy influx of new refugees, naturally put pressure on all involved parties.

Crossing complaints and accusations against the administration, the RC or single members of both, as well as against Somali collaborators (often complete with exact indication of date, concerned action, involved amounts of goods, number plates of cars etc.) seem to point at a at the moment and under these circumstances still "functional" level of nepotism.

Marginal Groups

The RC represents a dynamic arena for the power-play of the different strategic groups involved in the camp life. As in most governments this means that the powerless, the marginal often particularly vulnerable groups are not represented. The population in the camp is stratified. While the richest persons have found their way to other camps or at least to urban centers in Ethiopia, a walk through the camp manifests the different economic possibilities: richer and poorer dwellings, fatter and skinnier people, nice dresses and rags. Animals, cars and shops are clearly also not communally owned. Solidarity among different social strata has its limits. The forging of cards in Hartisheik led to an unequal distribution of the rations causing in March 1989 a malnutrition rate of 30% among the children of the poorer people. In times when the food distribution does not work well the security in the camps is endangered and frequent robberies are reported.

Relations between the RC and the Camp Administration

Complaints about the attitude of condescension shown by the Ethiopian administrators, is widespread among the refugees. For a Somali it is already shameful enough to be a refugee, he suffers under the camp situation. To stand in line for food, to receive aid reduces him to be a highly despised beggar (somali: aid). For these reasons he resents being treated in a even paternalistic way.

A few observations shall show the point:

- It is extremely seldom that administrators speak or often even understand the Somali language.
- In Hartisheik (as in other places) the administration in praising the role of the RC stressed the fact, that they are "totally dependent on the RC" and that they seldom deal with single refugees directly.
- RC-members complain that the UNHCR-representative in Aware never directly tries to communicate with them and to witness personally the situation in the camps.
- CARE cared about the RC. They showed them the boreholes of Jijiga explaining them the difficulties. As a result we did not hear a single complaint about the lack of water in Hartisheik, on the contrary all were full of praise for CARE.
- In Aisha RC-members quite naturally seated at our table and ate with us. The collegiality between the administration and the RC clearly eased their relations.
- Refugees, contrary to what the administration often asserts, are quite active. In Hartisheik A for example, the 4 private (probably SNM sponsored) schools accommodate around 8000 pupils (the 2 public schools only around 5000). Private English lessons and koranic classes, a functioning legal system also show a high level of concern at least among certain members of the community (as the teachers).

Whatever one might think of the single complaints, a lot could be won by more communication, a more sympathetic approach and a larger involvement of refugees in all administrative structures and procedures. This would also make better use of the many highly qualified persons present among the refugee population (doctors, electricians, mechanics, engineers, accountants etc.) and complement the employment of Ethiopians from far away places and culturally completely different background.

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Recommendations

If the RC is the only counterpart and source of information and does not reach all marginal and vulnerable groups in adequate way. Special programmes have to be designed to identify and reach these persons (i.e. older persons, disrupted families, sick and disabled persons, women as household heads without external support).

- o The level of "functional nepotism" needs close monitoring so that it does not degenerate in rampant corruption to the detriment of all parties involved.
- o More communication, more direct dealings with refugees, more openness in procedures and generally more involvement of refugees in structures and procedures is needed.
- o More education facilities would improve the self-respect of the refugees. Such a measure could even help during difficult times, when the rations have to be reduced.
- o Somalis are provocative and demanding. Instead of being irritated by this disturbing attitude, one has to consider its cultural background.

To see communication as a bargaining procedure can help: demands have to be countered by equal provocative counter-offers, but the process should not stop there. It is important to go on in sympathetic approach based on mutual respect until agreement is reached, much as bargaining on the market.

- o As a sign of goodwill and openness this report should be handed over to the RC and other interested persons in the camp.

SECURITY

Observations

Within the camps there was no suggestion that security was poor, in that there were no reports of recent incidents in which either refugees or the administration/NGOs were seriously menaced. This was surprising, in that a few months ago reports of the administration being threatened, on occasion with fire-arms, were not uncommon.

Similarly, around the camps there were no reports of recent incidents; indeed the day we left Daror the expatriate members of MSF (Belgium) were returning to the camps some months after being withdrawn because of a series of shooting incidents. A senior member of the Ethiopian government told one of us that, even in

Hartisheik, the situation was such that an application by any international staff member of an NGO to overnight in the camp would now be sympathetically considered. The mission itself overnights in Camaboker, Daror and Hartisheik.

Nevertheless, there is a certain underlying unease. It is not known how many of the refugees themselves are armed, but the general opinion is that, in Hartisheik in particular, arms are concealed. A pick-up full of uniformed SNM guerrillas was seen openly driving through Hartisheik, and we believe this to be a regular occurrence, though this seems less likely to be the case in the Aware camps. SNM influence on the refugees is certainly strong - and messages can be conveyed by Hargeisa Radio, and are carefully listened to, although we cannot claim that the SNM has the power to issue instructions which will be fully obeyed.

Outside the camps, the local people we saw were not carrying arms. Nevertheless, we did not doubt the presence of armed men who could be dangerous in the event of any dispute between the administration, the refugees or the local population, e.g. over the non-employment of Somali trucks, as has happened in the past.

The refugees are concentrated in the camps in huge numbers; the administrators are very few; we were told that GOE security forces in the area had been reinforced (and there is a police station in Hartisheik), although not by how much. Somalis are excitable and inclined to throw stones when annoyed. The small number of non-refugees in the camps must inevitably feel quite strong intimidatory pressures. Pressures are increased by sudden influxes of new refugees, as at Daror, where the tension between the refugees and the administration was evident.

The refugees, largely by virtue of being able to live in tribal/clan/family groups, live in satisfactory security. They are not threatened by hostile attacks across the frontier - except the new Gadabursi refugees concentrated at Teferi Ber/Aw Barreh, some 7 kms from the frontier, who reported occasional mortar bomb fire in their direction, but so far without injury to them. No-one complained to us of a lack of security within the camps, though we believe there may be occasional fights when water is short. There were some allegations of harassment by the Ethiopian security forces, including sexual harassment.

Conclusions

- o The security situation is superficially and probably temporarily satisfactory, but it is fragile.
- o In the event of fundamental new developments, such as a registration/enumeration exercise, or the large-scale movement of refugees and possibly supplies to Somalia from Ethiopia, exceptional security precautions to protect the administration, the refugees and public property will be necessary.

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Recommendations

- o The GOE should be requested to respond favorably to requests from NGOs to overnight in their camps.
- o In future planning for repatriation and allied measures, particularly registration/enumeration, early consultation with the GOE should be undertaken to ensure that adequate security measures are an integral part of any plan.

ENUMERATION, RE-REGISTRATION

Observations

The question of figures of refugees in the camps has been a crucial issue ever since: Donors and International Organizations expressed doubts with reference to double registration with some subsequent reluctance to maintain or even increase the amount of food and non-food-aid.

Therefore a re-registration with the "pen-method" was undertaken by UNHCR in August 1989. It can be considered successful but apparently there was some criticism with regard to people being kept in the sun without protection.

Therefore, in February 1990 a new re-registration with the "dye-procedure" was undertaken. The exercise was stopped before the end of the day as refugees found ways to wash the dye away.

Conclusions

Consequently, the old 1989-figures are still in use for planning purposes. They will have to be revised to justify future UNHCR-appeals for continued or even increased food and cash supply from donors. This applies irrespectively of the possibilities of an early repatriation or not: Donors would not be discharged of the burden of delivering aid when Somalis are back in Somalia as no self-sufficiency there seems on the horizon soon.

To revise figures means certainly re-enumeration. Therefore UNFPA has been requested to come up with a suggestion but which is up to now unknown. There might be also possibilities of having new figures (without being able to be more specific) through the amount of water consumption or via the health or supplementary feeding sector, may be also through remote sensing (i.e. aerial survey).

But not all refugees re double-registered. Therefore it seems most difficult to distribute a replanned amount of food etc. on the basis of old registration cards: At least some families would no longer receive a fair amount of support. Re-registration would comprise re-enumeration.

Recommendations

Therefore a re-registration exercise similar to the one in 1989 is suggested with the following amendments:

- o Appeal to and seek the cooperation of all parties concerned through intense informal and formal discussions by UNHCR, therein (with bilateral donor support) stressing the point that donor fatigue could come to a climax if no cooperation from the refugee side is available.
- o Implement the registration simultaneously in all camps during a season when the sunshine is least intense (but with no rain neither), (seek the advice of the refugees on this point).
- o Employ Somali guards for the camps who are paid for and are registered in advance.
- o Reinforce pens, guard them with military assistance, close them strictly at 09:00 a.m.
- o Call in the whole population of the camps, but have only one procedure as follows:
 - Have a tent at the exit of every pen with a crew of expatriate and ARA/UNHCR staff sitting behind tables and calling in only one family with all its members at a time;
 - Issue one family card (in different colors for different distribution sties) stating the name of the head of family, the amount of dependents, a registration number and a space for punching for every distribution;
 - Seal it immediately in plastic (machines have to work with battery, sun or generator electricity);
 - Families then have to leave immediately the tent, their cards is cross-checked by the solders outside with regard to the size of family;
 - People then have to leave the site which will be kept free from refugees within a demarcated circle of 100 m by the military.

A re-registration would exclude double-registering of refugees but include registration of local population. As numbers are low and as they have supported the refugees at the beginning of the influx this seems a fair price to pay.

Re-registration would be also useful if an early repatriation is possible: The registration card then identifies returnees to whom exclusively assistance in Somalia will then be given.

WATER

Observations

Water is a key issue at all of the camps visited by the Eastern team. Historically the ability of people to survive in the areas concerned has been dependent almost entirely on access to water. The large refugee settlements have imposed great stress on the areas natural resources, particularly water. There are no perennial rivers in the area and all water must come from surface water collection, shallow wells or boreholes.

There are two rainy seasons. One very short one in March and a longer period in July and August. Annual rainfall is everywhere less than 500 mm.

Against these natural odds and faced with the major influxes of refugees over the last two and one half years, UNHCR and ARA, together with the NGOs involved, have made strenuous and sustained efforts to provide the people with enough water to live. Sacrifices have been made by the local people in the area and in particular the town of Jijiga has given up most of its water supply to the Hartesheik camps - not for months, but for years.

In the Aware camps (Camaboker, Rabasso and Daror) the water shortage is most acute. In all three camps the water source is the collection of surface water run off during the two rainy seasons. Dams have been constructed both by UNHCR and by the Ministry of Agriculture. More work is needed to line the dams at Camaboker and Rabasso with an impermeable membrane and to repair the lining at Daror. At present (February 1991) no water is being delivered to the refugees at Camaboker and Rabasso; at Camaboker, the capacity of the storage would not be sufficient to secure a continuous supply throughout the year. At Daror, there is water still available in the dam but at the current uncontrolled rate of extraction by the refugees this meager supply will be exhausted by early March.

At all three camps, filters and tanks and tapstands have been supplied with little regard for their capacity to meet the needs of the camps. These facilities are inadequate and have so far proved to be costly and ineffective.

Equally at all three camps water is available for sale by the refugees who may sell part of their food ration to buy water. There must surely be lessons for ARA and UNHCR if enterprising refugees can find water even when the dams are dry.

In Hartesheik, by contrast, the water supply problems have been solved, albeit imperfectly to the extent that water is being provided within the camp regularly to the refugees. The water source since 1988 has been the four boreholes at Jijiga some 75 kms away. These boreholes were identified early in the programme as being the only short term solution for Hartesheik, but with the proviso that alternative sources should be found as a matter of urgency in the Jerrer valley. Almost three years on, two exploratory holes with a reasonable yield have been drilled in the Jerrer valley; and very recently some water is being taken from one of these. However because of financial constraints on UNHCR, technical, contractual difficulties between UNHCR and EWWCA, and the overstretched resources of EWWCA, production wells have not been started. The construction of an access road to the well field has only just begun. The need for a completely new access road has not been well established and there is a strong case for improving the existing, slightly longer, road for reasons of both speed and cost effectiveness.

Although the Jijiga wells have been cleaned under a joint contract to EWWCA, let by CARE, CXFAM and UNHCR, the town has unquestionably suffered as a result of the extended programme of extraction for the refugees.

The transport of the water to Hartesheik (some 800 000 litres every day) is funded by UNHCR and run by CARE. This 24-hour operation involving over 50 trucks and trailers and a staff of over 200 is efficiently run and well managed. It is not cheap, however. At an annual cost of around US \$ 5 million, every ton (1000 litres) of water costs \$ 15, just in transport, and this figure excludes capital investment. UNHCR have constructed a gravel road from Kebri Beh to Hartesheik, improving accessibility.

Within the camps, the distribution is the responsibility of CXFAM who have developed the system at Hartesheik A over time, from an emergency system with bladders progressively to the system now in place which has centralized storage and pumping to 18 large and 7 small steel tanks with tapstands at each. Unfortunately, the central storage tanks cannot yet be used as UNHCR has not yet built the 3 km access road.

The water system in Hartesheik B is equally well planned and implemented and had the additional advantage of being installed before the camp was occupied.

The total expenditure by OXFAM in Hartesheik has been approximately \$4 million since mid 1988. The investment is now substantially complete and running costs will be low.

By contrast, the planned investment by UNHCR to bring water to the Hartesheik camp is still in its early stages. The overall plan is:

- Stage 1: Production wells at Jerrer valley and construction of the new road from Kebri Beh to the well field. (Likely to take 6 months).
- Stage 2: Construction of pipeline from Jerrer well field to Kebri Beh in a series of pumped lifts, with intermediate storage & pumping stations. (Likely to take 12 months).
- Stage 3: Construction of a pipeline (approx. 20 km) from Hartesheik to Kebri Beh and storage facility at Kebri Beh to enable gravity fed piped water from there to Hartesheik. (Likely to take 6 months).

Stages 2 and 3 represent a major fixed investment of perhaps \$2 - 3 million. If the camps are closed, the pipeline from Kebri Beh to Hartesheik will have little or no residual value for the development of the area and may have a deleterious impact (see Section on Environmental Impact). The pipeline from Jerrer valley to Kebri Beh would however benefit Kebri Beh and the surrounding area and therefore would have some development value.

At Teferi Ber and Darwanaji the influx has been sudden and intense. The response has been exemplary: UNHCR have diverted CARE trucks from the Hartesheik operation and CARE have negotiated with the authority in Lafaiisa to use the borehole there resulting in haulage distance of 37 & 31 km respectively and saving the 37 km from Jijiga to Lafaiisa.

Initially the tankers are supplying direct until bladders are available for storage.

Conclusions

1. The MDTM has concern that the storage capacities at the Aware camps have been over-estimated and do not provide for continuity of supply even at very low consumption rates.

2. The configurations tanks, filters, pumps and distribution points at the Aware camps have been poorly planned and may not work even when completed.
3. Hartesheik has been supplied for too long from Jijiga. The failure to implement the development of wells at Jerrer has resulted in large expenditure on the trucking operation which will have to continue for probably another 12 months.
4. Hartesheik A and B now have the water distribution systems they need subject only to the construction by UNHCR of the 3 km access road to the storage facility at A.
5. The operation at Teferi Beh and Dawaranji has been a good response to a crisis.

Recommendations

Aware Camps

- o Additional water capture and storage dams should be constructed and lined with an impermeable membrane in the Aware camps after simple surveys have been conducted to optimize their locations. If any increase in camp population is considered this must only be done after confirmation from the UNHCR/ARA engineers that water storage can be provided for the extra refugees.
- o The distribution facilities at the dams should be designed to ensure that the output matches the refugee population using them.

Hartesheik Camps

- o The existing road from the Jerrer valley should be improved quickly to enable the water trucks to access the wellfield, and the production wells should go ahead without any further delay.
- o The phasing of the Jerrer valley development should be reviewed regularly as events unfold. It is unlikely that the pipeline from Kebri Beh to Hartesheik will ever be justified as it has no residual value. The pipeline design from Jerrer valley to Kebri Beh could be undertaken but no physical work should be undertaken now until this is complete and until the refugees' future becomes clearer.

Teferi Beh and Darawanji

- o The existing hand dug wells at Teferi Ber indicate the presence of groundwater within 20 metres of the surface. A simple drilling programme would determine the likely yield, if the camp is to remain in its present location.

SUMMARY TABLE (Y) SUMMARY OF WATER SUPPLY AND CONSUMPTION

Camp	Population Census	Likely Population	Water Sources	Transport from Source to Camp	Discharge from Camp	Likely Water Consumed per day
Camaboker	65 000		Dams & private birlas	By motor con. truck with wheelbarrow and with donk	Direct	1.5
Rabasso	24 181				"	1.5
Darror	80 023	60 000	"			1.5
Aware Sub Total	169 204					
Hartesheik A	176 088	120 000	Jiriga b/holes and	By GDB truck	Tap lands, Hartshend camp	1.5
Hartesheik B	60 162	40 000	Jerror Valley B/hole Eb2	Trailer into 10: from land		
Hartesheik Sub Total	236 250	160 000		75 km		
Teferi Ber	68 000	15 000	Lafaiisa b/hole	By GDB truck 16 trailers	Direct from Lafaiisa	1
Darawanaje	85 000	30 000	and established hand dig wells at	diverted from Hartshend fleet	14: from 10: from pumped	
Eastern Camps Total						

General

Whilst we would not recommend the widespread investment in permanent structures or installations at this time of flux, this should not rule out investment where the net saving could be achieved very quickly. The tankering operation from Jijiga is so expensive that there is likely to be a saving over a few months.

LOGISTICS

Observations

General

In logistics, quality will be measured by adequacy, promptitude, regularity and cost-effectiveness. Some factors can only be addressed taking into consideration the Eastern Operation as well as the Western Operation of UNHCR.

Although separate funding is made available for the Western, the Eastern and the Returnee Operations within the country, emergency situations have made it necessary in the past and will make it absolutely necessary in the future to coordinate the efforts on a nation-wide basis. This is as true for the supply of food and non-food items as for the trucking capacity required by UNHCR.

The question of effective logistics is even more difficult to answer due to the difficulties to predict how the refugee population in Ethiopia will look like in the second half of 1991 or even in 1992 and 1993.

Logistics deal primarily with figures for a specific refugee population. The defined food basket and the other items to be delivered, combined with the road network to be plied will lead to the assessment of necessary capacity for supply, storage and trucking capacity. Those supply lines require decisions on transit warehouse capacities, road improvement programmes, and maintenance facilities.

Since the future development is rather unpredictable, the following conclusions are made on the basis that the eastern population of refugees and returnees has to be supplied for at least the next two years. That this could be in the region of Eastern Ethiopia or in Northern Somalia has to be subsequently taken into consideration.

It is therefore not so much the question whether the amount of food or the respective trucking capacity will be required, but that it is provide for at the right place, and most economically.

Hence, one has to look at the essential components that are part of a reliable logistics system (resource mobilization, customs clearance, transport, storage, road maintenance, information systems etc.), and how it can be arranged cost-effective without unnecessarily committing resources to a particular region within the horn of Africa.

It should be rather the overriding aim to be flexible where, how and when those resources are utilized. Emergency preparedness, therefore, should be the governing element of refugee logistics.

This calls absolutely for a mobile approach to the problem of supplies, the warehousing facilities and the trucking capacity.

Specific

Supplies

Clearing - Port handling in Assab and clearing in Addis Ababa and Assab has always been a bottle-neck in the chain of supplies. Any improvement in logistics will make it necessary to speed up administrative and port handling procedures in the port. Subsequently the clearing of commodities by private agencies should be pursued.

Food - The food availability on the given population figures is divided into four major areas

- the food which is in the pipe-line from point of origins to Ethiopia
- goods which are already available in the country and for which transport requests have been issued
- food which is in the transit warehouses
- and items which are already in the camp

Food Items in the Pipe-Line - Two vessels are on the way carrying approx. 5.600 MT of wheat for the eastern refugee population. From Djibouti some 10.700 MT are in the pipe-line. This represents an availability of approx. 81 days. Other items are sufficiently in the pipe-line for a period of 2 to 3 months.

Items which are already available in the Country - The following items are already available in the country and transport orders have been already issued by UNHCR to collect those items from the point of origins in Dire Dawa, Djibouti and Assab. For wheat some 13.000 MT are available which would be sufficient for 65 days. Oil is available in Djibouti and Dire Dawa, sufficient for some 160 days. Sugar is available for 9 days.

Items in Transit Warehouses - In the only transit warehouse available (TOR warehouse in Degehabur) the stock for wheat is for about 5 days, for oil for about 5 days, for sugar for about 10 days.

Items which are already in the Camps - In the camps the following stock position is noticed. In Aware camps there is an average stock of wheat for some 5 to 8 days. Hartisheik at this point in time has a stock of wheat sufficient for 9 days. The supply of oil is sufficient to take care of a period of approx. 14 to 30 days. Sugar is in all camps more than sufficiently available and this is also true for salt. All other items which are falling under the supplementary feeding programme carry a stock of up to 100 days.

Non-Food Items - During the visit in the various camps the need for sufficient supplies of non-food items, like kitchen utensils, water containers, blankets and tents (shelter), was mentioned by the refugees. Although some of those items were available in the camp warehouse, they were not distributed to avoid unrest, because the numbers were not sufficient to supply the whole camp population.

As a result urgently required items are not distributed at all.

Whether this practice is desirable, is doubtful. It is therefore suggested to give it out to groups which report, for example, to the hospital or to feeding centers. For those specific beneficiaries cares should be issued to enable them to collect the items in the warehouse.

In all the camps the need for plastic sheeting, to be used for the water reserve birkas or for tukuls (housing) was raised. It is recommended to identify the need immediately per camp and place orders respectively.

Medical Supplies - At present, TOR is managing the medical warehouse of the UNHCR and is supplying drugs to the western and eastern camps. A UNHCR Technical Mission with members of MSF and ARA recommended that the drugs management be standardized to guarantee fast procurement and common pool distribution between Addis Ababa, Jijiga and Gambella. Various proposals are presently evaluated in order to arrive at a new procurement and distribution system.

It was recommended by TOR to provide one light vehicle each for the speedy supply of drugs for the eastern and western camps.

Water Supplies - The question of water supply for Hartisheik and the Aware camps is elaborated more in detail in paragraph 10. However, for the water supply to the camp of Hartisheik this problem has a logistics dimension since supplies take place with a fleet of water tankers, i.e. from Jijiga to Hartisheik.

It was the observation of the mission, that the efforts of CARE were most appreciated by the refugees. CARE is operating to a large extent a fleet of Mercedes-Benz trucks 1928. The same type and specification of vehicle is used by TOR for food supplies. No cooperation between the two operators regarding maintenance and repair and the supply of spare parts is undertaken so far. Since both projects are entirely financed by HCR, comparative data on operating costs should be generated.

Storage

Transit Storage - The eastern camps of Aware are supplied by TOR from the transit warehouse at Degehabur, which in turn is supplied by WTOE. The capacity of the warehouse at Degehabur has proven to be sufficient.

Camp Storage - The limited storage capacity at camp level is a major constraint of the logistics operation in Camaboker, Rabasso and Daror. Camaboker has a net rub-hall warehousing capacity of 800 MT, Daror has the same capacity while Rabasso has only 400 MT.

Since it is a defined policy of UNHCR and WFP to provide for and maintain stock levels of basic food and non-food items in the camps sufficient for 90 days in the camps, capacity has to be increased by at least 100 percent. This also would require a regular flow of goods in line with the demand pattern. Food then would have to be provided by WFP for a period of 14 months instead continuing with the present practice to calculate the needs on a 12 months schedule. Otherwise, the stocks would be depleted at the end of the year again.

In Hartisheik, 4 new warehouses are presently under construction with a total capacity of 8.000 MT. Those warehouses, relatively far away from distribution centers in Hartisheik A and B, will require substantial trucking capacity to shuttle the food to the refugees. This is a possible conflict of interest in the aim to avoid double or triple handling of the

goods before consumed by refugees. The concept of "just in time delivery" should also be practiced for camp deliveries and major portions of the good should be brought directly to distribution centers. It might have been more advisable to erect instead rubber-hall tents in the various distribution centers and strengthen the concept of various villages within the camp. However, a supply concept is required to avoid as much as possible double handling of the goods and reduce investment or operating cost for the internal transport of goods in the camp.

Distribution in the Camps - The concept in the camps is that the major warehouses are used for the storage of oil, sugar and other items, while cereals are, as far as possible, brought directly to the distribution sites. Except cereals, which are issued every seven days to the refugees, oil, sugar and other items re issued on a monthly basis with a reduced ration for only 21 days.

The system of distribution in the eastern camps is nearly identical. Issuing for 7 days is done twice a week depending on the size of the family. On Wednesdays issuing is effected for families containing of 3, 4 and 5 family members. On Fridays issuing is effected to families containing of 1, 2, 6, 7 and above family members. The refugees are collecting the rations by presenting ration cards.

Every ration card has a serial number which identified together with a number on the back of the card the zone of the camp so that a refugee is not able to obtain the food items in another zone or in another refugee camp. Further the size of the family is punched into the card. The card has also space for punching whenever the ration for particular week has been collected.

In every distribution site at least one ARA staff member is controlling the issuing procedure. He is the one who is punching the ration cards. The ARA staff members are supported by refugee clerks.

The distribution process is monitored as follows:

Representatives of the refugees are lined up in front of the distribution site representing each 20 families of a given size. They are in possession of 20 ration cards and collect the whole ration for the group. In front of the gate one ARA staff is allocated, who is responsible to punch the ration cards before the representatives enter the distribution site. One member of the refugee committee is also standing in front of the gate. Inside the distribution site 2 refugees are controlling the gate. They are also checking ration cards whether punched or not. Within the distribution site porters are piling the food

according to the family size. One further ARA staff is assigned within the distribution site to control that the representative is collecting the right number of bags from the respective pre-arranged pile. Afterwards the head of this group is distributing the grain outside of the distribution site then to the various families.

For every distribution site a schedule is worked out by UNHCR and ARA, as to how many beneficiaries are in one particular zone and how many items altogether are to be distributed in one particular zone. The amount required per period and zone and the total for all the zones is corresponding with the total food needs of the camp within a particular period.

The impression is, that the issuing procedure is well organized and adhered to in all the camps.

Trucking

A substantial trucking capacity is required in the Eastern Programme to provide food, non-food items and water to the camps of Hartisheik, Camaboker, Rabasso and Daror.

The responsibilities are shared between

CARE - Responsible for trucking the water from Jijiga to the camp of Hartisheik

WTOE - Longhaulage operator carrying food items from Assab, Djibouti, Dire Dawa, Addis Ababa to the camp of Hartisheik and the transit warehouse of TOR in Degehabur from where in turn the goods are supplied to the three Aware camps.

TOR - Plying the routes from Degehabur to Camaboker, Rabasso and Daror with shorthaul trucks from the above mentioned transit warehouse.

The food stock levels in the eastern camps are critically low. This is due to the irregular arrival of food from the point of origins, the permanent emergency operation of TOR shorthaul trucks in the east and the insufficient warehouse capacity in the Aware camps.

Emergency Operations

Twenty nine shorthaul trucks are permanently deployed at Degehabur. During the last six months, those trucks were permanently deployed in emergency operations:

- Poor road conditions prevailing between Degehabur and the Aware camps
- Additional influx of refugees
- Additional influx of refugees
- Support for the returnee operation in Babile
- Emergency operation of 5 trucks at Teferi Ber

This creates shortfalls for Aware camps, for the distribution in Hartisheik, and for the new influx of refugees. Therefore, more than three years additional capacity was hired, mostly from Somali truck owners, to fulfil the supply requirements of the camps. The hired trucks are as a rule unreliable, and compared to TOR's operational costs extremely expensive.

Charges are at least 100% higher. To ensure a regular transport between Degehabur, Camaboker, Rabasso and Daror a capacity of 31 shorthauls is required. In addition to that 5 additional shorthauls would be needed for internal camp transport in Hartisheik. Considering the permanent emergency deployment of the fleet, it can be safely stated that 10 more shorthaul trucks are required. To compare figures, the procurement of 10 shorthaul trucks would amount to the expenditures for two months hiring the Somali trucks in 1990.

However, repair and warehouse facilities are containerized or provided for by the means of rub-hall tents. Therefore, the parameter of mobility which are mentioned in the summary are fulfilled.

Truck Availability

For the Eastern Programme, the total hiring cost for trucking capacity in addition to TOR's operation in Degehabur amounted to some 12 million US\$. It is UNHCR's intention to enlarge its own fleet to continuously secure availability of sufficient trucks and to be prepared in case of new extraordinary demands on its contract partner WFP.

It is understood that UNHCR is looking at present into the most economic way to either hire or procure transport capacity.

It should be self understood that peak demands should always be thought to be satisfied by contracted outside capacity and a reduction in transport capacity may be acceptable temporarily as long as the basic food requirements are guaranteed.

Recommendations

Food Availability

There seems to be only sufficient food in the pipe-line covering a period of five months. Considering the time between a successful pledging and the actual arrival of the food in the camps, a dangerous gap is obvious. The international community is asked to take immediately available supplies until the end of the year.

Logistics Situation in Ethiopia

In 1991 there is an acute shortage of trucking capacity in the country (see the draft notes on the current relief trucking fleets and capacities from the UN Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Group, Addis Ababa, 6th of November 1990). Based on the uncertainties on the development in Somalia, this will likely continue in 1992 and 1993. The total hiring cost for trucking capacity in the Eastern Programme are extremely high. UNHCR should look into the most economic way to either hire or procure transport capacity. There is a shortage of Shorthaulage capacity for internal camp transport, within the Aware area, and for other emergency programmes. UNHCR should evaluate the possibility to provide more trucking capacity.

Mobility of Logistics

Since future development is rather unpredictable, approach to logistics should be mobile, containerized installations, provision of rub-hall tents, and flexibility in deploying a dedicated fleet available for refugee operation is of importance.

Availability on Non-Food Items

There is a short supply of non-food items in the camps. Mentioned were inter alia kitchen utensils, water containers, blankets, plastic sheeting and canvases to cover the tukuls. UNHCR should immediately prepare a list of urgently needed items and forward them to Geneva for urgent procurement.

Trucking

TOR and CARE operate identical trucks, TOR for the food operation in the west and CARE for water supply in the east. UNHCR should coordinate the efforts of the two operators regarding maintenance and repair, the supply of spare parts and management and information systems on the two fleets.

Construction of New Warehouses in Hartisheik

In order to avoid double handling of commodities and extensive internal camp trucking capacity, a distribution concept for the camps should be worked out as soon as possible, taking into consideration the presently erected four new warehouses.

ROADS

Observations

Nationally a number of roads have been significantly affected by the increased traffic of the transport operation to the refugee areas.

Cause and effect are very difficult to establish on the primary road network but on the road between Jijiga and Kebri Beh for instance, the degradation has clearly been largely due to the water trucks making 100 trips or more a day.

The issue of responsibility is very difficult but it may be more helpful to look at possible savings arising from road improvements.

In the Aware camps area, the roads mostly are unsurfaced tracks through scrub where the soil is silty and sandy and highly erodible. Graveled roads providing all weather access would be very expensive (several million US dollars) and would take years to construct. In this low rainfall area where access is impossible on relatively few days of the year, a more cost effective solution would be to increase storage on site of essential items such as food.

Hartesheik presents a very different situation. The very large and concentrated population is largely supplied with water as well as food remotely from Jijiga and the road connection is essential. The Kebri Beh to Hartesheik road has recently been upgraded by UNHCR. The road from Jijiga to Kebri Beh is a government road and to date little work has been done on it by UNHCR/ARA/CARE. But the cost of damage and repair to the trucks as a direct result of the road condition is borne by these agencies. The Ethiopian Transport and Construction Authority (ETCA) have many difficulties in meeting their targets not the least of which is the fuel shortage and the improvement of a heavily trafficked road which will be quickly degraded is not necessarily their first priority.

The road being constructed from Kebri Beh to the well field in the Jerrer valley follows a more or less straight alignment down the hill into the valley floor. The reason for this is to enable the road and pipeline to follow the same route. However the road will be very expensive to maintain as it will be subject to erosion; and long unbroken gradients will be less good for the water trucks than the slightly longer existing road which follows the land more closely.

The road access to the Hartesheik A storage facility should be constructed without delay.

Significant improvement of the road conditions could be achieved at little cost by bulldozers and graders without the expense of importing gravel.

Recommendations

- o Whilst it is not the responsibility of UNHCR/ARA to maintain public roads, there is a reasonable argument that on roads where their traffic predominates, some compromise could be sought.
- o No major construction of gravel roads in the Aware area is necessary.
- o The road access to the Jerrer valley should be reconsidered carefully.
- o Some localized improvement of the road access to Teferi Ber and Dawaranji should be considered.

HEALTH, NUTRITION AND SANITATION

Observations

1. Health indicators

In general, the health of the refugee population is good. Crude mortality rates in 1990 ranged from 20/1000/year at Rabasso to 31.2/1000/year at Camabokar. Malnutrition rates (defined as the percentage of children under five years of age below 80% weight for length standards) ranged from 1.2% at Hartisheik A to 4.2% at Aisha in the November 1990 nutritional surveys. As major indicators of health, both of these figures are comparable to figures found in non refugee populations in sub-Saharan Africa. Indicators for new arrivals reflect the arduous conditions associated with travel. A screening survey of new arrivals at Daror showed a malnutrition rate of 12%. It is difficult to

estimate mortality in the new refugees. Claims of 15-30 deaths per day during the period 20 Dec, 1990 to 16 February, 1991, in a group of 15,000 non registered new arrivals at Daror could not be substantiated. Visits to four different burial sites showed a total of 115 graves, and no excess mortality was reported from the health center during that time period. Another group of about 700 new arrivals reported 17 deaths, mostly in infants, during the 25 day journey from Mogadishu (about 9.7/10000/day).

Major causes of morbidity in the camps remain acute respiratory infection, diarrhea, skin infections, eye infections, malaria, trauma and tuberculosis. Major causes of mortality include diarrheal disease (particularly in children under 5), malaria, respiratory infection, and tuberculosis.

2. Infrastructure

Permanent hospital structures are under construction at Hartisheik and will replace tents which have served as temporary facilities. Handicap International is completing a permanent structure at Hartisheik and anticipate the start of operations to provide prostheses and other devices shortly. The first permanent structure to house stores and medical offices is under construction at Aisha.

Referrals of critically ill or wounded patients are made to hospitals in Jijiga or Harar. The surgical program at Jijiga Hospital is being enhanced by MSF/B. Only two ambulances are available to provide transport for the referrals; both are presently out of service, one because of an accident, the other because of maintenance problems.

3. Supplies

With the exception of elixirs and syrups for pediatric use, the supply of pharmaceuticals has been adequate. MSF/B has put forward a proposal to coordinate the management, storage, and distribution of medical stores from Jijiga. A review of one pharmacy in the camp showed records of drugs received and disbursed as well as a running total; monthly inventories were performed.

The water supply to the three Aware camps is critical. Refugees are selling a portion of their ration to buy water. In January, 1990, 200 liters of water could be purchased for 9 birr (US\$4.50) at a distance of 26 km from the camp. By February 15, this cost has increased to 28 birr (US\$14) and the distance to 42 km. The nutritional status of the refugees can be expected to

deteriorate as water becomes more costly, and until the rains begin. The impact of the water shortage is also having a critical effect on health care. For example, at Camabokar, the health center is allocated 200 liters of water per day.

4. Administration and Personnel

The eastern zonal health coordination unit has been created and includes representatives of the MOH, ARA, and the NGOs. Permanent staff have been assigned. The unit meets periodically and serves to coordinate health activities at the six camp.

Health care has been provided in the camps by a combination of Ethiopian, Somali refugee, and NGO (Medecins Sans Frontieres-Belgium (MSF/B) and Save the Children-UK (SCF-UK)). MSF left the Aware camps in October, 1990, for security reasons; they returned February 15, 1991. Health care and nutritional programs were continuously provided in the interim by Ethiopian and Somali staff.

Each of the camps is served by at least one national and one refugee physician, with the exception of Aisha camp which is served only by a refugee midwife and an MSF nurse. A physician visits the camp monthly. Health personnel are currently adequate but allocation of health personnel will require flexibility in light of increasing numbers of refugees particularly at Daror. Community health agents (CHA) and traditional birth attendants (TBA) provide health education in the areas of sanitation and nutrition. CHAs also provide information on mortality occurring outside the health center. The ratio of CHAs to refugee population is about 1:1000.

5. Nutrition

No nutrition surveys have been conducted in the Aware camps since May 1990. Surveys were conducted in the Hartisheik camps as well as Aisha in November, 1990.

The food basket has been adequate with respect to cereals but shortages have been noted in pulses, oil, and sugar.

All children under five (<110 cm), pregnant mothers and lactating mothers are enrolled in a dry supplemental feeding program (SFP) receiving extra rations. Children under five years of age who are less than 80% weight for length (MFL) are enrolled in a therapeutic feeding program, and those less than 70% in a 24 hour intensive feeding program. The therapeutic and intensive

feeding programs are part of the wet supplemental feeding program (WSP). Coverage rates in the SFP were estimated to be between 69-74% at Hartisheik in August, 1990, and between 83 and 87% in the Aware camps in May, 1990. As part of the supplemental feeding program, pregnant women receive folate, iron, and vitamins A and C; children receive vitamin A and C supplements. There is no evidence of scurvy or vitamin A deficiency in the refugees.

Antenatal care is provided through the satellite clinics and includes supplemental feeding, vitamin supplementation, and tetanus immunization. Family planning projects have been unsuccessful for cultural and religious reasons. The incidence of HIV is thought to be extremely low in this population, and there are currently no AIDS education programs.

6. Prevention Programmes

In the past six months 40 maternal-child health or pediatric nurses were trained in oral rehydration therapy (ORT), and ORT stations have now been established in each of the satellite clinics.

Written guidelines for the diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis have been established and, with the exception of the Aisha camp, diagnosis of tuberculosis is based on AFB staining of sputum. Default rates in TB therapy are high. At one camp up to 50% of the TB patients defaulted. A mechanism is now in place using CHAs to find defaulters. There are plans for similar written guidelines for meningitis, cholera, and hepatitis. Notifiable diseases (measles, relapsing fever, meningitis, yellow fever, cholera, typhoid, and hepatitis) are reported weekly by radio to the MOH in Addis. An outbreak of hepatitis with 791 persons affected was reported in Hartisheik A camp between January and March, 1990. There have been no outbreaks of other notifiable diseases, though sporadic cases of meningitis, hepatitis, and typhoid continue.

EPI coverage is estimated to be 80-85% by survey, and all children age 6 months to five years are vaccinated upon arrival in the camps against meningococcal meningitis and measles. Recording dates of immunizations remains inconsistent, with some camps recopying EPI cards without the dates of immunization. Some camps have successfully implemented a dual card system with one copy of the EPI record kept by the satellite clinic and the other by the mother. Cold chain storage of the vaccines is at times problematic due to unreliability of the kerosene powered refrigerator. Only one supply of vaccine is kept in the camps to minimize loss.

7. Sanitation

Sanitation projects such as pit latrines, rubbish pits, and education programs are behind schedule. A target of one pit latrine for five families has not been met, in part due to a lack of cement for construction of slabs to cover the pits. Vector control projects are ongoing and involve spraying larvicidal agents to control insect vectors.

Conclusions

The health of the overall refugee population is good. Health indicators of new arrivals show high rates of malnutrition, and there are suggestions of excess mortality. As these refugees are screened and integrated into the health and nutrition systems these health indicators can be expected to improve.

The shortage of water at the Aware camps is critical. As the situation becomes even more difficult in the next weeks, morbidity due to malnutrition and poor hygiene may increase. The shortage of water currently represents the greatest potential hazard to health.

Continued improvement is seen in nutritional measurements in children under five, though repeat surveys are urgently needed in the Aware camps.

The integration of SFP, EPI, MCH, and health education at the satellite clinics has been extremely successful.

Administrative coordination of health resources and activities between the various governmental and non governmental agencies has improved, and training programs for health workers have been initiated.

Screening and registration of the new arrivals has been slow at times, particularly at Daror.

Recommendations

- o Repeat nutritional surveys are urgently needed in the Aware camps.
- o If the general situation and the water supply improve, the age for inclusion in the supplemental feeding program should be lowered to three years (<90cm).
- o One additional ambulance should be made available for the eastern zone.

- o Health and nutritional screening of new arrivals should be carried out as soon as possible even if registration is delayed. All new arrivals should be informed that access to health care is available regardless of registration.
- o The dual EPI record system (one copy in the satellite clinic, one copy to the mother) should be instituted at all the camps.
- o Written guidelines for diagnosis, treatment, and management of outbreaks of cholera, meningitis, and hepatitis should be completed.
- o The sanitation program, particularly the construction of pit latrines should be accelerated to reach a target of one latrine for five households.

EDUCATION

Observations

Out of a total registered population at school going age (5-16) of approx. 128.000 in all the five camps in the east, only about 7% have access to formal primary education. If the informal private education in Hartisheik is included, this percentage rises to 22,5 in the A and B camps.

The number of female students and teachers is relatively low which partly could be explained by the cultural background of the refugees. However, according to the refugees themselves, female school attendance in Somalia used to be higher and so was the number of female school teacher. This is illustrated by the success the so called family life programmes used to have in Somalia. In these programmes women were the focal points who received functional education, literacy, math, sanitation, nutrition and income earning activities.

No common standardized curriculum for all subjects is used at the schools and text books are only used by the teachers. There is no uniform controlled standard of education.

Qualified teachers are available in all camps, in fact they outnumber the present limited requirements. Salaries UNHCR calls them incentives do not reflect the social position teachers usually enjoy in their society, which gives rise to reassignments and dissatisfaction.

Official adult education and vocational training do not exist in the camps. Some informal private adult education may take place.

Informal educational facilities exist in the camps: numerous Koran schools as well as 4 private schools with 8.000 students in Hartisheik A and 2 private schools with 4.000 students in Hartisheik B. The percentage of school-going children in these camps may therefore be as high as 22,5%.

Selection criteria for enrollment of students are not clear: performance levels at Koranic schools as well as first come first serve systems at registration days seem to be used. Favoritism is likely to exist.

Conclusions

In view of the emphasis always put on the importance of education for refugee children (UNHCR, Bangkok & Pyong Yang declarations) it is distressing to see that Educational facilities in all the camps are inadequate, both quality and quantity wise. Too few schools, totally inadequate buildings, underpaid staff, lack of teaching aids, textbooks, exercise books, pens erasers and other necessary materials are among the most common problems. The absence of a common curriculum, uniformity and inspection adds to these problems, all this causing student and teachers to drop out of the educational system. The main cause for this unsatisfactory state of affairs is the financial crisis of UNHCR which limits the activities of this organization to life sustaining (care and maintenance) activities only. Thus, no longer a separate budget for education exists and no development or even sustenance of educational work can take place. The lack of financial support from UNHCR is not compensated by self-help effort from the parents' side (except in Rabasso and Hartisheik B). They claim their children's education to be the responsibility of the international donor community and UNHCR. ARA educational officers in the Aware and Hartisheik camps complain about the lack of guidance and assistance from the UNHCR educational officer in Addis Ababa. He has not visited the camps during the past months because of the bad security situation and has not yet established a working relationship through correspondence either. In view of all the existing problems and short comings, no plans or ideas exist among ARA-officers, refugee committees and UNHCR as far as vocational training and adult education is concerned.

Recommendations

- o In line with the standing international declarations on the importance of primary education for refugee children real efforts have to be made to expand and improve the educational facilities in the camps. This would do justice to the needs of the children who obviously are very keen to attend classes and could also improve the self respect of the refugee population at large.

- o A separate, limited budget for the development and expansion of basic primary educational facilities in the camps should be drawn up and made available either by UNHCR or any NGO that could involve itself in education. (Ecoles sans Frontieres, IRC, refugee organizations in the West). The amount of financial support needed should be in accordance with realistic requirements, already existing informal facilities and real demand. Expansion in the number of schools should be given higher priority than raising the quality of education.
- o Priority should be given to very simple school building and furniture construction with local materials only (no prefab since this is too expensive and necessitates other facilities like decent furniture as well). Parents and students should be involved in construction. Other priority areas to be addressed are: sufficient supplies of school books and exercise books, blackboard, chalk and acceptable incentives for teachers although not exceeding the local Ethiopian teachers salary of 230 Birr.
- o A milk feeding programme at every school is an incentive for children to attend classes and at the same time contributes to the nutritional status of children who no longer qualify for the dry supplementary feeding programmes (since they are over 110 cm tall).
- o An active policy by ARA and UNHCR to involve an NGO in educational activities in the camps should be pursued.
- o A single curriculum for Somali refugee children should be developed by UNHCR together with the education subcommittee of the refugee committees and ARA.
- o The UNHCR-education officer should liaise on a permanent basis with the ARA-educational officers in the camps in order to stimulate and motivate them as well as to provide them with sufficient information. Together with the refugees themselves practical and workable solutions to problems such as building construction, teachers salaries and curricula development should be developed.
- o ARA does not have an educational unit officer at Addis Ababa level. In view of the large experience, Ethiopia has with education the development of curricula and teaching aids, an experienced Ethiopian counterpart for the UNHCR - educational officer at Addis Ababa level is needed and should be appointed.

- o Clear and equitable criteria should be developed for the - necessary limited - intake of new students at grade 1 and other levels.
- o A vocational training project in for example motor mechanics could be set up on a trial basis in one of the camps after some research has been done as to whether refugees are interested in such a programme. Cooperation with GTZ/TOR and WTOE and private Somali truck owners could be negotiated in order to set up a curriculum and on the job training opportunities. There are enough Somali experts to be enrolled as teachers.
- o A study should be made by UNHCR and ARA together with the refugee subcommittees on education on the way the private schools in Hartisheik A and B are functioning. Lessons could be learned on issues such as privatization of education in the camps, parents contributions, preferences, curriculum development etc.
- o A start should be made to re-establish in the camps the very successful Somali Family Life Programme, complementary to the expansion of primary education for children. This would involve woman and children alike, being the most vulnerable and often neglected groups in a refugee society.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

Observations

Immediate Physical Environment

The Aware and Hartisheik refugee camps are situated in the bushed and wooded grassland belt with sandy or black cotton soils. The Aisha camp is in stepped area with rocky and sandy soils. Surface water is only found during the rainy season and evaporation is high. The influx of refugees did not cause widespread environmental destruction or soil erosion but the impact in the immediate vicinity of the camps is notable: total depletion of bushes and trees and damage to the meager grass cover in an area that is depending upon the camp size and the time it has been there. Larger camps may further a more economic use of fire wood and building materials since the distances that have to be covered to collect it are longer.

At present it seems as if the Aware camps could recover if the refugees leave within a near future. It seems as if roots of trees and bushes are still alive and are putting forth shoots. In Hartisheik the impression is that over vast areas even the roots have been dug up. Therefore more active restoration works need to be carried out there.

A complicating factor for the natural or artificial restoration could be the dams and wells which have been built. These will even in the future attract large numbers of animals and thus contribute to a high pressure on the environment.

The Hartisheik, being a large camp, is deforested within a radius of 10-15 km while the Aware camps are deforested only 5 km around the camps. It seems as if the availability per hectare of construction material and firewood in the Hartisheik camps have been less than around the Aware camps. Another reason could be that, when the camp was erected, 40 trucks were brought in to transport building material from the surrounding bush thus probably resulting in a less than optimal use of the available material.

Socio-Economic Effects

The refugees are putting an unprecedented strain on the regional socio-economic situation, particularly in view of the existing drought and famine that affects about 500,000 people in the region. Problems and constraint in the general relief logistics sector affect both refugees and local population alike. The competition between for example drought victims and refugees in obtaining the scarce resources has probably not yet come to an acute situation. There is, however, no doubt that both the population as a whole as well as the authorities will react negatively if the resources given to refugees are judged to be greater than those given to a needy local population. This judgement is likely to be subjective. It is already now clear that, at least, in the east, the refugees are better off than the majority of the Ethiopian population. When compared to the drought affected part of the population it is probably only the status of the new arrivals and returnees who are in a similar or worse situation.

As far as direct economic impact is concerned, there exist a competition between local people and refugees for scarce goods and resource with is leading to price and salary increases and sometimes to a diversion of competent personnel from central and local authorities as well as the productive sectors of the economy.

Roads

Excessive wear and tear on the roads which in many cases were not constructed to carry the heavy loads that are presently being transported is causing a lot of extra costs in maintenance, partly covered by UNHCR but the Ethiopian authorities also are contributing.

Water

Shortage of water due to the concentration of refugees is a serious problem that affects the local population as well. On the other hand, they also earn by it because they are able to sell water from their birkas which previously was only used for their cattle.

Acceptance

The influx of refugees in the area is mainly confined to tribal and clan boundaries thus tribal tensions do not seem to occur within the communities receiving the refugee influx. The local population in the near villages is sharing its resources with the refugees and seems to be accepting their presence.

Health

Pressure upon the already overburdened, and understaffed health facilities has increased with the influx of refugees. Particularly referral hospitals in Jijiga and Harar are receiving

substantial numbers of refugee patients who overload the manpower and equipment capacities. No additional resources are given to hospitals for the extra influx. UNHCR pulled out of the Jijiga hospital extension project because of lack of funds.

Since the camps have their own albeit limited curative and preventive primary health care systems, these facilities in neighboring villages if existing at all are not affected to the same extent as the referral systems. On the contrary, they might benefit from the sometimes better facilities in the camps.

Conclusions

The effects of the influx of Somali refugees in the East are mostly negative both in physical, environmental aspects as well socio-economic aspects. Some positive effects can however be distinguished: limited increase in employment, larger availability of certain commodities with lower prices as a result, increased trading with spin-off effects for the local population. Negative effects are: increased wear and tear on roads and natural resources (water, fuel wood, trees, grassland) leading to a total depletion of resources near the camps, increased pressure upon referral health systems, inflation leading to price increases of commodities and services.

Recommendations

- o Closer investigation on the environmental impact is necessary.
- o The effects should be considered by the donor community and tackled within their developmental programmes.

Water: Aware Camps

Camaboker

At the time of the mission, there was no water being distributed to the refugees by ARA/UNHCR. The refugees were buying water from private birkas (surface water dams) at a cost of Birr 28 per 210 litre barrel. Lutheran World Federation and ARA have previously supplied the camp with 5770 barrels (1 154 000 litres) and 3200 barrels (640 000 litres) respectively, but no water had been available for issue since 24th January 1991. Water consumption in the camp is thought to be as low as 2-3 litres per person per day, and refugees reported selling food to buy water.

Three earth dams have been constructed.

2 by UNHCR with estimated capacities of 12000 cubic metre
26950 cubic metre
1 by Ministry of Agriculture with estimated capacity of
4500 cubic metre.

On inspection the capacities of the UNHCR dams were considered to be much less than reported. The dams were to have been lined with butyl liners but these were damaged or stolen before they could be installed.

An OXFAM water tank (45000 litre capacity) has been erected by UNHCR on a site near one of the dams with tapstands, providing 36 tap points. Even if the dam were operational and the tank could be filled (no pump is on site) the tapstands are wholly inadequate for the 65000 population.

In any case, the surface water dam capacity, even on UNHCR estimates of 43450 cubic metre would be adequate for only four months following rain which would not provide continuity of supply to the camps.

Rabasso

A situation very similar to Camaboker exists in Rabasso. No water had been distributed by ARA/UNHCR since 19th December 1990 and the refugees were buying the water from private birkas at a cost Birr 10 for 210 litres. Two earth dams have been constructed by UNHCR using heavy earth equipment. They have a total reported capacity of 35 000 cubic metre which for the much smaller population (24 181) at this camp would provide a reasonable security of supply assuming rainfall at two times of the year.

As at Camaboker, an OXFAM water tank has been installed by UNHCR, and again this could not meet the demands of the camp population.

Daror

The situation at Daror is somewhat better in that there is still water in one of the two dams, almost certainly because it is lined with butyl. This dam, which has a capacity when full of 25 000 cubic metre, was constructed by UNHCR.

As at the other two camps around Aware, an Oxfam water tank and tapstands have been installed. In addition, an aquafilter (a rapid filtration unit with chlorinator) has been mounted next to the tank, and two Sykes 50 mm pumps next to the filter.

The whole system is fatally flawed. The pumps should be at/near the water level (perhaps on floating platforms) to enable them to deliver efficiently; the pumps could not deliver the required daily volume of water; the filtration unit probably cannot deal with the daily water volume; the one tank and 36 taps are sufficient for a maximum of 10 000 people and should be limited to 5400; the pipe from the tank to the tapstands is 25 mm even though the OXFAM manual clearly indicates 75 mm is required and such pipe is available from OXFAM in Jijiga.

Hartesheik A & B

The water supply to the camps at Hartesheik has been the subject of continued debate since the A camp was opened in August 1988. Then, a report by OXFAM and UNHCR engineers recommended the temporary trucking of water from the boreholes at Jijiga (installed to supply the town) until new boreholes could be established in the Jerrer valley.

This remains UNHCR's eventual aim, but only in February 1991 was the first water pumped from one of the exploratory boreholes in the Jerrer valley into tankers. Consequently the town of Jijiga has suffered and continues to suffer severe water shortage as three quarters of the water in its boreholes is diverted to the Hartesheik camps. At Jijiga a joint contract has been let by CARE, UNHCR and OXFAM to have the wells cleaned by EWWCA which has improved yields already. Details are given in Table X.

In July 1989, UNHCR signed an agreement with the Ethiopian Water Works Authority (EWWCA) to initiate the Jerrer Valley Water Development Project. The agreement required EWWCA to drill exploratory boreholes between Kebri Beh and the valley floor to enable production wells to be identified, and to construct a new road from Kebri Beh to the well field.

A USSR well drilling project in conjunction with EWWCA also agreed to look for water in the area. Following a magnetic geophysical survey, a total of eight boreholes have been drilled and two, EB1 & 2 in the valley bottom, show yields which would be satisfactory. EB2 is 177.5 m deep, with water struck at 132 m and rising to 83.5 m. This confined aquifer is in the Adigrat sandstone and is recharged from the north (towards Jijiga).

The boreholes EB1 & 2 were drilled between April and September 1990. Only in February 1991 has any water been taken from these boreholes, and then only in the abandonment of any hope that production wells might be drilled soon. The contract between UNHCR and EWWCA, and the agreement between the USSR and EWWCA preclude the direct appointment of the Soviet team by UNHCR and discussions are in hand to have the work subcontracted to the Soviet team by EWWCA.

In the meantime, EWWCA are providing a generator and pump for EB2 (producing 5 litres/second) at a cost of Birr 1000 per day.

The new access road, planned in 1989 was started in January 1991 by UNHCR directly using their own mechanical equipment based at Kebri Beh. The decision has been taken to construct a new road of 20.5 km rather than improving the existing road of 26 km which meets the main road 2 - 3 km from Kebri Beh. The long delay in starting was due to financial constraints, the fuel shortage, and the fact that EWWCA with overstretched resources were contracted to do the work.

The saving of several kilometres on the new road will be more than offset by the additional effort and expense needed to build it and by the greatly increased maintenance which the alignment that has been chosen will require. The decision to go for a new route has not been well thought through.

Transport to Hartesheik and distribution within the camps are by contrast well planned and efficiently run.

The transport operation to truck the 800 000 litres every day to Hartesheik is funded by UNHCR and managed and implemented by CARE. The vehicle fleet includes 52 trucks and 52 trailers, 48 of which are currently in operation. The truck/trailer combinations are of two types with capacities of 9000 l (truck) and 14000 l (trailer) and 14000 l (truck) and 18000 l (trailer) respectively.

The operation run from Jijiga and Kebri Beh, employs 239 staff of whom 63 are truck drivers, who work 12 hour days and seven days a week. The target delivery of 1.2 million litres a day cannot be achieved with the current fleet strength which is partly diverted to Lafaiisa for Kebri Beh and Dawaranjane. Typically 800 000 litres are provided daily to Hartesheik although in early February 1991 deliveries fell to as little as 500 000 litres, which caused widespread concern among the refugees.

The whole CARE operation is costing, in running costs alone, around US \$5 million annually, or more than \$400 000 every month. Every day more than 5000 l of fuel are consumed, and it is estimated by CARE that by the end of 1991, 29 of the trucks will be unserviceable.

Taken as a whole, the CARE operation delivers around 300 million litres of water annually at a cost of \$5 million. This means that every ton (1000 litres) of water costs over \$15, just to transport from Jijiga to Hartesheik, a distance of some 75 km.

In Hartesheik A & B OXFAM have been responsible for the distribution system since 1988.

In Hartesheik A, the system has evolved in several stages namely

- a) Direct distribution from tankers and bladder storage
- b) Installation of 18 galvanized steel tanks (45-95 cubic metres each) around the camp each connected to tapstands and installation of 7 no:10.5 cubic metres tanks at feeding centres. Each of these large tanks has a fixed pump to unload the tankers.
- c) Installation of a network of underground pipes connecting all the tanks to a central (280 000 l) storage and pumping station which will accept the delivery of all the water to the camp. This facility is now completed but cannot be used as the access road of 3 km (which UNHCR have to construct) has not yet been started.

The water system in Hartesheik B is equally well planned and implemented and had the advantage of being installed before the camp was occupied.

There are no queues for water at Hartesheik when 800 000 litres a day are delivered and there is some evidence that 1.2 million litres a day would not be used if it were made available.

The total expenditure by OXFAM in Hartesheik has been approximately \$4 m in 30 months. The investment is now substantially complete and running costs will be very modest.

Teferi Ber and Darwanaje

The rapid response of UNHCR/ARA in the water sector has been to ask CARE to divert resources from the Hartesheik operation to truck in water to Teferi Ber and Darwanaje. Trucks are operating

a shuttle between the camps and Lafaiisa, some 37 km from Jijiga, 31 km from Darwanaje and 37 km from Teferi Ber. Initially the trucks are unloading directly to the refugees but it is planned as at Hartesheik to use 6 bladders as storage to enable each truck to make two trips per day rather one, as at present.

In addition there are a number of well built old stone lined hand-dug wells at Teferi Ber which although yielding only perhaps 5 l/min each, demonstrate the presence of potable groundwater in the immediate vicinity.

MULTI-DONOR TECHNICAL MISSION TO ETHIOPIA
FEBRUARY 11 -23, 1991

S C H E D U L E

EASTERN TEAM

Monday, February 11, 1991

- 8:00 - 8:30 Registration - Hilton Hotel
- 8:30 - 9:00 Opening Address to the Multi-Donor Technical Mission by H.E. Mersha Ketsela, Vice Minister for Internal Affairs
- 9:00 -10:30 Briefings by the Administration for Refugee Affairs (ARA) and other Ethiopian Government Ministries
- 10:30 - 11:00 Coffee Break
- 11:00 - 13:00 Presentation/Discussion by Cecil Kpenou, UNHCR and staff
- 13:00 - 15:00 Lunch
- 15:00 - 17:00 Discussion with UN agencies regarding the refugee situation
WHO, WFP, UNICEF, UNDP
- 18:30 Reception by the GPDRE for the participants of the MDTM at the Ghion Hotel

Tuesday, February 12, 1991

- 8:30 - 10:00 Team meetings chaired by the leading ambassadors
- 10:00 - 10:45 Briefing by GTZ/TOR
- 10:45 - 11:00 Coffee Break
- 11:00 - 13:00 Meetings with Non-Governmental Organizations working in camps
MSF - Medecins sans Frontiers
CARE
SCF/U.K. - Save the Children Fund
SCF/U.S.
Redda Barnen

13:00 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 15:00 Briefing by WTOE
15:00 - 15:30 Coffee Break
15:30 - 16:00 Administrative arrangements for the following day
19:00 - 21:00 Reception for the Eastern Team given by H.E.
M.J.C. Glaze, Ambassador, Embassy of the United
Kingdom

Wednesday, February 13, 1991

6:00 Depart Hilton Hotel for Bole Airport
7:00 Depart for Aware (via Gode) by charter aircraft
11:00 - 12:30 Arrive in Aware
Briefing at the Aware HCR Office
12:30 - 13:30 Lunch in Aware
14:00 Depart Aware for Camaboker
15:45 Arrival in Camaboker
19:00 Dinner and overnight in Camaboker

Thursday, February 14, 1991

7:00 Breakfast
7:30 - 8:00 Briefing
8:00 - 11:00 Inspection of the camp
11:00 Departure for Rabasso
13:30 - 13:45 Arrival in Rabasso and lunch
14:00 - 15:45 Visit to Rabasso camp
16:00 Departure for Darror
19:00 Dinner and overnight in Darror camp

Friday, February 15, 1991

7:00 Breakfast
7:30 - 8:00 Team meetings and briefings
8:00 - 12:00 Visit Darror camp
12:00 Lunch
13:00 - 15:30 Continue Darror visit
15:45 Depart for Aware
17:30 Arrival in Aware
19:00 Dinner and overnight at the UNHCR Sub-Office

Saturday, February 16, 1991

7:00 Breakfast in Aware
7:30 Departure for Degehabour and Jijiga
9:30 - 10:15 Visit to TOR Warehouse, Degehabour
10:30 Depart Degehabour
13:30 Lunch at the National Hotel in Kebri Bayah
15:00 Depart Kebri Bayah for Jijiga
19:00 Dinner and overnight in Jijiga
(Ogaden or Habanna Hotel)

Sunday, February 17, 1991

7:00 Breakfast
7:30 - 9:00 Depart for Hartesheik
9:00 Arrival in Hartesheik
9:15 - 12:00 Briefings/ Visit Hartisheik camp
12:00 Lunch
13:00 - 18:00 Continue camp visit
19:00 Dinner and overnight in Hartesheik

Monday, February 18, 1991

7:00 Breakfast
(Team then divides into 2 or 3 groups. One group
departs for Degaghoñ camp near Aysha. A second
group may proceed immediately to the Jerer Valley
installation.)

8:00 - 11:30 Continue Haatesheik visit

12:00 - 13:00 Lunch

13:00 - 15:00 Conclude Hartesheik visit

16:00 Depart Hartesheik for Jijiga

19:00 Dinner and overnight in Jijiga

(Possible visit to Jijiga wells to observe CARE's
loading operations at night)

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

7:30 Breakfast

8:00 Possible visits to Jijiga wells
Visit to UNHCR Sub-Office/ visit CARE or TOR

9:00 Depart Jijiga for Dire Dawa via Harar

12:30 Check-in for commercial flight ET 627

13:30 Depart Dire Dawa for Addis Ababa

14:30 Arrival in Addis Ababa Bole Airport

MDTM 11-23 FEBRUARY, 1991
PARTICIPANT LIST

EASTERN TEAM

H.E. Mr. M.J.C. Glaze, Ambassador, Embassy of the United Kingdom - Team leader

Mr. Michele Galizia (Switzerland) -- Ethnologist
Teaches at the University of Bern, with specialization in Eastern Ethiopia.

Mr. Peter M. Guthrie (UK) -- Engineering/Logistics
Senior engineer with Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick & partners.

Ms. Margaret McKelvey (USA) -- Refugee Affairs
Director of the Office of African Affairs, Bureau for Refugee Programs, Department of State.

Mr. Stefan Moebs (FRG) -- Logistics

Dr. Francis Riedo (CDC) -- Public Health
Staff member of the US Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia. EPI Specialist.

Mr. Anders Ulin (WFP/WTOE) -- Logistics
Head Monitoring and Reports Department

Mrs. B.M. Ten Tusscher (Netherlands) -- Refugee Affairs
Official in the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with prior experience in refugee matters.

Mr. Gunnar Thunstrom (Sweden) -- Emergency Officer
Staff member of the Swedish Development Agency SIDA based in Addis Ababa

Mr. H Woller (FRG) -- Logistics
Administrator of the GTZ/TOR team

Escort:

Ato Ayalew Awoke (Ethiopia) -- Refugee Affairs
ARA Programme Officer -East

TABLE X - JIJIGA BOREHOLES

B/H	Depth (m)	Depth to Rest Water Level (m)	Draw down (m)	Original Yield l/s	Yield before cleaning l/s	Yield after cleaning l/s
J1	62	24.0	9.1	9	Nil	5
J4	62	24.6	5.4	10	4	6
J5	73	27.0	9.0	16	10	10 *
J6	73	27.0	4.9	12	4	5
				47	18	26

* J5 is not scheduled for cleaning

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APPENDIX

EDUCATION

1. Attendance rates

The total registered population in the Eastern camps is officially put at 376.221 of which 142.972 people are staying in the three Aware camps and 236.250 in the Hartisheik A and B camps. The number of children at school age (6-12) is approx. 48.044 in the Aware camps (33%) and approx. 80.000 in the Hartisheik camps (also 33%). This does of course not include the unregistered population of which it is unknown whether their children can attend school. According to the ARA-education officer in the Aware camps only 3.530 children go to school which is about 7.3%. In the Hartisheik camps 6.13 reportedly are attending classes which is about 7.6%. The number of students per class is about 50-70 according to the teachers. During the visit never more than 30-40 children were found in each class.

Relatively few girls (between 13 and 47% of the enrolled students) attend school, particularly in the Hartisheik camps. This is explained as a consequence of the Islamic religion which does not put much emphasis on education for girls beyond the traditional religious Koran schools which most children between the age of 3 and 5 seem to attend. Also the number of female teachers is very low for the same reason. Women are expected to stay at home and do their household and family duties. In spite of this, the female school attendance rates in Somalia used to be higher and so were the numbers of female teachers.

2. Curriculum

Subjects taught at all schools in the Aware camps are:

English, Arabic, Somali, Amharic: one hour per day
 Mathematics: 5 hours per week
 Natural Science and social science: 3 hours per week
 Physical education: 2 hours per week
 Islamic religion: 2 hours per week

Subjects taught at the Hartisheik camps are more or less the same.

Children hardly seen to have text books, only exercise books. Teachers use text books from either the Somali national curriculum or the old Ethiopian curriculum. Textbooks are now being ordered from Nairobi (British East Africa curriculum). Because of the lack of one uniform curriculum the standards of education vary from camp to camp.

3. Teachers Qualifications

All teachers are said to be qualified and they were tested by the education officers and the school principles before they were appointed. In Somalia they often taught at schools for higher education. School principles are often former school inspectors or directors. Salaries are paid by UNHCR and do not exceed Birr 103 a month which is the same level as paid to guards and sanitation workers. This causes a lot of resentment and demotivation among the teachers who feel they are not being paid according to their former social status in society. Some of them have already resigned and taken up duties at private schools or give lessons at home. School directors receive Birr 150 per month. According to ARA there is a substantial number of qualified teachers in the camps. These resources can be tapped if the number of schools is going to be increased.

4. Adult Education and Vocational Training.

There is no form of formal adult education in the camps. When asked, the education officers preferred to give priority to the development of primary school education first and then possibly secondary education. No ideas or plans were said to exist as far as setting up some form of adult education or adult literacy classes. The same is true for vocational training for which there seems to be a need if one looks at all the youngsters roaming around. For the nomadic part of the population vocational training could be of less importance but for the urban part vocational training like motor mechanics, brick making etc. might be worth developing.

5. School Buildings and Materials

Most classroom blocks are in a very poor condition, having been built by ARA with some parent involvement out of mud, eucalyptus poles and plastic sheeting or jute bags. UNHCR provides black boards and chalk. Plastic sheeting mostly is torn and needs to be changed 5 to 6 times a year because of wear and tear as well as theft. Only in Rabasso the school had benches. Except for Rabasso and Hartisheik B parents do not seem to make much effort to improve the condition of school buildings. They apparently hold the opinion that it is UNHCR's and the international donor community's responsibility to provide education for their children. A recent donor funded consignment of exercise books, pens, erasers, pencils has alleviated the existing shortage in school materials which seriously threatens attendance rates. Parents seem to think it is not worthwhile sending their children to school if they do not have exercise books and pens. No other teaching aids like maps, rulers math sets etc. are available.

6. Informal Education

Every camp has a large number of traditional Koran schools where children from 3-6 go for their religious education. Every such school has 50-70 pupils and one teacher, usually a religious leader or mullah who reads from the Koran. Schools are located in backyards within the settlement areas. No fees seem to be payable by the parents. In Hartisheik A and B privately run schools are existing: in A there are 4 schools with approx. 8.000 students and in B there are 2 schools with 4.000 students. School fees there seem to be about Som. Shilling 1.500 a month although some said they were free of charge. English and math teachers seem to be engaged in giving private lessons as well. They earn 1.5 Birr per child per month.

7. Selection Criteria for Enrollment

Criteria for the selection and enrollment of grade one students were said to be performance levels at Koran school as well as a system of "first come first serve" at the registration day. Many children seem to have well to intellectual parents: they looked well dressed (Particularly the girls) and well-fed. A certain form of favoritism is likely to exist.

Camps and School Names	No. of Students Enrolled		Total Grades	No. of Classrooms	No. of Students per class	No of Shifts	No. of Teachers		Building Structure
	M	F					M	F	
Rabasso	478	914	1-6	8	57	12 (7.30-11.30) (1.30-4:30)	12	3	Poles, plastic locally made benches
Daror	1,500	2,136	1-6	8	132 (?)	12 (")	25	-	Poles, plastic. no benches
Camobaker	311	480	1-6	5	96 (?)	11 (8-12)	14	5	Idem
Hartishek A School	12,414	2,873	1-8	15	90 (?)	12 (8-12) (2-6)	39	5	Idem
Hartishek A School 2	12,032	2357	1-8	15	78 (?)	12 (Idem)	26	2	Idem
Hartishek B	712	905	1-5	10	45	12 (Idem)	19	-	Idem

REPORT ON MISSION TO
WESTERN REGION SUDANESE REFUGEE CAMPS

FEBRUARY 1991

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The western region team of the Multi Donor Technical Mission, as part of its mandate to study the conditions and prospects of refugees and returnees in Ethiopia assessed the needs and requirements of the Southern Sudanese refugees in Western Ethiopia.

Using the general terms of reference of the Mission as a guide, the team reviewed the issues of health and sanitation, logistics, registration and food distribution, social issues and the problems of management and contingency planning.

The overall observations of the team were that, particularly in the health sector, much progress and improvements had been achieved since previous donor visits in 1989 and 1990. The Sudanese camps have now been in residence since 1986 and to a certain extent have developed into functioning micro communities with a vibrant cultural life, some production and market processes and a certain level of social cohesion, particularly provided by the indigenous churches. It was clear that food transportation and distribution had improved since the start of the GTZ Transport Operation for Refugees and the re-division of the camp populations into village entities with satellite clinics, schools and storage facilities was beginning to ease the outreach of the various servicing sectors.

There remain though several areas of concern which require immediate attention. Amongst the priorities are, the water and flooding problems of Itang and Fugnido; the issue of the unaccompanied children, particularly in Itang and Dimma camps and the expansion of the immunization program. A specific health concern was the risk of AIDS transmission in the camps which should be assessed as soon as possible. At the same time the ability and levels of preparedness and contingency planning were felt to be problem areas that need more resources and improvement.

While the best outcome to the problems of the refugees lies in their eventual repatriation and a peaceful political solution to the problems in the Sudan, the team appreciated the endeavours

of the Ethiopian government in their consistent hosting of this community over the years. In this context the review team have made a number of practical recommendations to help improve the management and logistic operations in the camps, increase the levels of sustainability and self sufficiency of the refugees, repair some of the immediate damages to the environment and address a number of health and educational concerns.

METHODOLOGY

This report is based on a mission to Itang, Fugnido and Dimma refugee camps in the Gambella and Keffa administrative regions of Ethiopia. The general terms of reference of the overall mission to look into the conditions, security and prospects of the refugees was further redefined by the team into four distinct sectors:

- Health, Water, Sanitation, Shelter and Nutrition
- Registration, Logistics, Distribution
- Social Issues including Education, Income Generation and Impact on the Environment
- Camp Administration, Management and Contingency Planning.

The observations and recommendations for all the camps will be outlined under each of these subheadings. A primary concern of the team was to make clear the distinction between observations on the immediate basic needs of the refugees and the material and assistance available to meet these requirements and the issues and implications arising out of their long term needs and requirements. It was felt that the requirements and strategies for each of these needs would be different and the report's findings and recommendations would take note on these issues.

BACKGROUND

The number of Sudanese refugees seeking protection in Ethiopia is now estimated at being 403,805.

The original influx began arriving in Ethiopia in 1983 at the onset of renewed fighting between the Southern Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudanese government. Numbers increased from 1986 onwards as drought and deteriorating economic conditions within Sudan exacerbated the conditions already created by civil war.

The Ethiopian government together with UNHCR established four camps to shelter the refugees. These are Itang (June 1983), Dimma (August 1986), Assosa (May 1987) and Fugnido (December 1987). In January 1990 a raid into the Assosa area in Wellega province by Ethiopian based guerrillas displaced this population who disappeared into Sudan to reappear a few months later, in very poor condition in the Itang camp. Most of this group, about 20,000 refugees have now been sheltered in a new section of Itang camp and a further 8,000 are awaiting placement in this camp.

The refugees are coming from the Eastern Equatoria, Lower Upper Nile and Bahar El Ghazal regions of Sudan. The dominant groups are the Dinka and Nuer with the rest being made up of Shilluk, Anauak, Murle, Topasa, Didinga, Uduk and Latuka peoples. Though most are agro pastoralists from the rural areas there are a number of urban Southern Sudanese who form the bulk of the refugee committees in the camps and provide the teachers, health workers and community organizers.

A noticeable feature of these camps is the disproportionate numbers of males and unaccompanied young boys.

It is not clear what the future prospects are regarding these refugees and the implications arising out of their long-term stay in the area. Although the refugees talk of returning to Sudan the impression is that they have come to settle. At the same time the situation in Sudan does not give any hope of a quick solution.

The areas these camps are situated in are in themselves presently marginal and isolated areas of Ethiopia with few government resources and vulnerable ecosystems. Situated within 70-80 miles of the Sudan border the region is comprised of low tropical forest and savanna land criss crossed by rivers originating in the high plateau of Western Ethiopia. Each camp is sited near perennial rivers that constitute the main source of water for the refugees. The Gilo (Fugnido) and Baro (Itang) rivers flood annually during the main rains in July through September. This flooding is particularly acute in Itang where it poses a major health hazard with little attempt at drainage being done. Dimma camp is situated above the Akobo river in less swampy and cooler conditions.

Most of the soils in these areas are of the "black cotton" or vertisil soil and red clay laterite, variety.

When properly managed these soils have shown good fertility and yields. Apart from the resettlement sites, the government has a large cotton plantation near Fugnido and a number of large scale irrigation projects are under construction in this region.

This area of South West Ethiopia is considered as a prime development area with potential for increased cash crop production, minerals and timber exploitation. This has been the basis for the government's decision to resettle large numbers from the drought stricken highlands of Ethiopia into this region during 1985 and 1986.

The host populations of these areas consist of a varied group of pastoralist, agro-pastoralist and horticulturalist societies. Among the major groups are Ethiopian Nuer, Dinka and Anuak societies, the Majanjir, Mabaan, Suri, Nera, Murle and Bale peoples. These communities are characterized by a subsistence economy combining varying levels of livestock management and shifting agriculture. Most have a tradition of moving across the borders in search of grazing and all have a shared history till recently, of little contact and benefit from Ethiopian state structures. The presence of large communities of refugees has increased the levels of competition for resources between refugee, resettler, and indigenous communities.

The competition for resources is most evident in the depletion of the wild life of the area and increased deforestation.

A small number of NGOs, Norwegian Church Aid, Ethiopian Evangelical Church (Mekane Yesus) and JOVC (a Japanese group) are active in the area, experimenting with small scale agricultural and horticultural schemes growing okra, cowpeas, groundnuts, vegetables, sesame and rice.

OVERVIEW REMARKS

The following comments on the consequences and implications of the refugees' presence in Ethiopia are offered as a framework against which the report's observations and recommendations should be read.

The Sudanese refugee camps have been in existence for at least four years and, as opposed to the eastern camps, have a more settled nature to them. There have been considerable improvements in the camps and whilst their situation is still precarious due to the large numbers, especially in Itang, there is never-the-less the beginnings of a discernible viable community.

The camps are remarkably tidy and well kept. The refugees seem to care for their dwellings and take pleasure in embellishing them. There are a variety of economic activities taking place such as handicrafts, beer making, food processing, trading and barter as well as a vibrant cultural life. Organized ceremonial dances, religious ceremonies and regular meetings of community leaders and organizers portrays a feeling of normalcy and traditional village life.

After years of apathetic waiting for repatriation, the refugees according to their representatives seem to have accepted their situation and are trying to make the best of it. They appear willing to change their habits and customs and to adapt to their new environment. For example payments for marriage agreements are deferred and a "credit" system developed for payment on eventual return to their original homes.

It is obvious that this is a period of great social change and transition for the southern Sudanese in these camps. Different ethnic groups are now living closely together cultural norms and traditions are changing and new skills and innovations are being developed and implemented. The implications of all this are not lost on the refugees who are very aware that once they return to Sudan they will have to start from zero to rebuild their societies. There is a strong feeling that the reshaping of society here, in a way is making them into an "avant garde" group.

As with all refugee populations, living standards have to be compared with the levels achieved before immigration and also with those of the neighbouring host populations.

Undoubtedly, these refugees are in some aspects, now better off than they were before. For example as their representatives admit, in their home areas there was only 10% school attendance. Attendance in schools in the camps averages around 50%. There is greater access to and outreach by health and other social services. A certain compensation for the loss of their traditional lifestyle may be justified. Better health and sanitation facilities are even imperative when considering the very high number and concentration of refugees.

The comparison with the local Ethiopian inhabitants is particularly important as the refugees in the Gambella region are said to outnumber them by 2:1. Refugees heavily draw on local resources and may upset an already precarious economic and environmental equilibrium.

It would therefore seem desirable to approach refugee operations and local development strategies in a wholistic and integrated manner. The presence of a large refugee community has positive as well as negative impacts on the local population. Clinics, roads and other infrastructure can be used by guest and host communities alike. As consumers and producers refugees can take part in trade and exchange, and, as such, stimulate the local economy. Development strategies that target both communities simultaneously can capitalise on this potential, and in the design of an integrated approach, aim to make host and guest communities assets rather than a burden to each other. At the same time it is important not to create serious imbalances between the two.

The relatively favourable conditions of the refugees may have some less welcome consequences. It cannot be ruled out that their apparent higher living standards may attract more refugees as well as tempting others to settle down permanently.

The high costs of maintaining the camps and their impact on the environment can hardly be in the interests of the authorities and organizations involved. At the same time the total imbalance in the age and sex ratio of the camps is not conducive to normal society.

Eventual repatriation should always be kept in mind. It is interesting that many of the refugee representatives suggest that international relief efforts should henceforth be concentrated in Sudan itself to prevent further substantial influxes.

To what extent the Sudan People's Liberation Army has a hand in influencing the processes of integration and societal changes in the camps, was difficult to ascertain in such a short trip. Due to the carefully orchestrated nature of the visit it was hard to gain candid comments. It is well known in the area that the SPLA has a strong presence in the border regions. It is also well known that many of the refugees are equally attempting to seek sanctuary from involvement and conscription by the SPLA as well as getting away from the activities of the Sudanese army. There was no way of reaching and discovering the many layers of tensions and complexities that we believe must exist here. To the team the refugees presented a united "neutral" front. Senior leaders denied the existence of SPLA in the area going as far to remark "we only know of John Garang through the BBC".

SECTOR OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. HEALTH AND NUTRITION

Observations and Conclusions

The overall health and nutritional status of refugees in western Ethiopia is satisfactory compared with that of the non-refugee population of Ethiopia. Considerable improvement has taken place among the Assosa group of new arrivals in Itang since the last health review in June 1990. Steady improvement in the organization and delivery of basic health services was observed in all three camps. The following specific findings are presented:

According to mortality surveillance system in the camps, the crude and under-five mortality rates (expressed as deaths/1000/year) during 1990 were as follows:

	<u>Itang</u>	<u>Assosa Group*</u>	<u>Fugnido</u>	<u>Dimma</u>	<u>Ethiopia</u>
Crude death rate	4.7	20	2.3	1.1	21
Under-five death rate	19.4	92	4.5	7.3	45

* Data from the Assosa group comprise May - December only.

The estimate crude death rate for Itang may be lower than the actual rate because the official population (280,000) used in the calculation may be too high. Information on mortality collected during the September joint survey confirmed the relatively high excess mortality experienced by the Assosa group between June-September 1990.

Although the overall death rate in the Assosa group for May-December 1990 is quite high, significant improvement occurred within this period; death rates became comparable with those of the non-refugee population in Ethiopia after October 1990 (Figure 1).

The main reported causes of death in the three camps are malaria, diarrheal diseases, pneumonia, and tuberculosis.

Malnutrition Prevalence Rates

According to the most recent joint sample surveys conducted in 1990, are relatively low in Fugnido (7.3%, July 1990) and Dimma (11%, October, 1990). In Itang, there are two groups of relatively new arrivals - the Assosa group (Group 1), now in Village 6, and Group 2, now in Village 4 - both of whom had high rates of malnutrition upon arrival. The results of consecutive nutrition surveys in these populations during 1990 are shown below; malnutrition prevalence rates are expressed as the proportion of the sample with weight-for-height less than 80% of the WHO/CDC reference median:

	<u>July</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>December</u>
Assosa (Village 6)	36.3%	27.6%	19.8%
Group 2 (Village 4)	45.8%	-	40.9%

In the December survey, both new arrivals and old residents of Village 4 were surveyed; the results showed that the malnutrition prevalence rate among the old group was 20.2%, a surprisingly high rate. It is not clear why acute malnutrition still occurs among old refugees in Itang considering that the general ration seems to be adequate. Therefore, a nutrition survey of the entire Itang camp is planned for March 1991 to clarify the nutrition situation in the old refugee population.

While the malnutrition rate in the Assosa group has decreased steadily since July 1990, the rate in the new arrivals in Village 4 has remained unsatisfactorily high. This may be due to a combination of factors:

- low coverage of malnourished children by the supplementary and therapeutic feeding programs due to inadequate outreach;
- inadequate water supply to this village, resulting in high rates of communicable diseases;
- cultural resistance to wet feeding programs.

During 1990, the general ration distributed to refugees in the western camps has generally been satisfactory, providing an

average energy content of between 2120 and 2495 kilocalories per person per day, according to NCR/ARA distribution figures. It should, however, be noted that serious shortfalls of blended foods, pulses, and oil occurred in Itang, Fugnido, and Dimma during 1990. Without blended foods and pulses, the ration is deficient in essential micronutrient, such as niacin, riboflavin, iron and vitamin C. Refugees in Itang, at least, appear to supplement their ration with fish, and important source of niacin and riboflavin. Oil is an important energy-dense food for weaning-age children and needs to be supplied regularly.

Feeding Programs

Dry supplementary food is provided to all children under 5 years of age in Dimma and Itang, and to all pregnant and lactating women in all three camps. Coverage is high in all groups except Village 4 in Itang (61%). Wet supplementary and therapeutic feeding is provided to malnourished children in all camps; coverage rates in Village 4 (34%) and Village 6 (40%) in Itang are still low according to both enrollment figures and the last nutrition survey in December 1990.

In general, health services have become more decentralized, with improved coverage by prevention and health promotion programs. In Itang, 6 out of 8 villages have functional satellite clinics; in Fugnido, 4 satellite clinics are functioning; and in Dimma, 2 clinics are open and another will open shortly. Budget cuts have affected the construction of clinics and in some camps, satellite clinics are operating out of temporary structures.

Immunization Coverage has improved considerably since late 1990 in most camps. In Itang, whereas less than 500 measles vaccine doses were administered monthly prior to November 1990; in December, 4,286 doses were given. Measles vaccination coverage has been estimated at 72% in the Assosa group (Village 6) and 55% in Village 4. At least 41% of children in the old villages of Itang have been vaccinated against measles since November 1990 alone. Immunization coverage surveys are planned in all camps for March 1991. There were different policies on the age for measles vaccination in the camps in Gambella region (9 months to 5 years) and Dimma (6 months to 5 years).

Other disease control programs that have demonstrated improvement include TB control programs, although the overall number registered and the number of defaulters in the Itang program is still too high.

The Management of diarrhea and dehydration has greatly improved since June 1990. A training program in oral rehydration therapy was conducted in Itang for health personnel in all three western camps. Oral rehydration units were staffed and functional in all health centers and satellite clinics.

The training of community health agents (CHAs) has accelerated in all camps. There are currently 120 CHAs in Itang, and further training is planned for 1991. In Fugnido, there are 27 CHAs and 26 traditional birth attendants (TBAs); in Dimma, there are 40 CHAs (34 recently trained) and 3 TBAs. CHAs are involved in health education with the community, immunization, MCH clinics, and follow-up of feeding center and TB program defaulters.

There is a serious potential for rapid transmission of AIDS in the western camps, in particular Itang. Official population figures indicate that there are 81,000 more men between 15 and 45 years of age than there are women in the same age group. More than 120 prostitutes active in Itang have been identified by the health team, one-third of them were infected with gonorrhea during the last health center check and, thus, are probably not using condoms. These prostitutes appear to have come from many different parts of Ethiopia, and it is quite possible that some are already infected with the AIDS virus.

The non-governmental organization, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Holland, is providing support services in the health sector in Fugnido, and Villages 4 and 6 in Itang. This arrangement appears to be working well; coordination between MSF and MOH/ARA health staff is satisfactory. MSF is also providing surgical assistance to the Gambella Regional Hospital.

The provision of drugs and medical supplies appeared to be relatively adequate. The only shortages noted were procaine penicillin, adhesive plaster, and antiseptics. There were reported to be shortages of polio vaccine in several camps, and

Gambella region had limited supplies of measles vaccine. Cold chain facilities for the storage of vaccines were adequate and well-maintained.

The refugee population in the west is placing certain strains on the local health system. In the area surrounding Itang, there are six small clinics which formerly received assistance from the refugee program; however, this assistance was stopped during 1990. In addition, approximately 20% of inpatients at the Gambella Hospital are said to be refugees, mainly from the Fugnido camp.

2. WATER, SANITATION AND SHELTER

The supply of potable water to refugees in western camps is only satisfactory in Dimma. In that camp, a system has been installed whereby river water is pumped into six tanks where sedimentation, filtration, and chlorination take place. Water is then pumped uphill to six reservoir tanks, from which water is distributed by gravity to 20 points in the camp. When the pumps are operating 10 hours daily, the total water supply is 270,000 liters, an average of 7.7 liters per person per day.

In Itang camp, there are 15 boreholes, of which 9 are functioning. Of the 9 pumps, however, only 4 were operating at the time of this review. Six of the nine pumps in the camp were installed by Africare, the other three are on RRC wells. If all nine pumps were functioning, a total of 1,200,000 liters of potable water would be available (approximately 4.5 liters per person per day). At present, the four functional pumps working for eight hours a day provide approximately 400,000 liters, or 1.4 liters per person per day. This amount, however, is unevenly distributed; the functioning wells mainly supply Villages 6 and 7. Villages 4 and 5 are particularly poorly served, receiving approximately 15,000 liters by tanker three times a day. Both villages are far from the river, and receive less than one liter of potable water per person per day.

In Fugnido camp, one well and a functioning pump provide approximately 24,000 liters daily to the new Village 4, with a population of approximately 12,000 (2 liters per person per day).

In the old village, only one pump was functioning, providing approximately 80,000 liters daily for 70,000 people.

At the time of this review, the adverse health consequences of the poor water supply in Itang and Fugnido were limited to a high prevalence of scabies and chronic skin ulcers, mainly among unaccompanied minors. Nevertheless, both camps are extremely vulnerable to severe epidemics of diarrheal disease during the rainy season. While UNHCR recommends the provision of 15-20 liters of clean water per person per day, this is probably not feasible in the current circumstances. A reasonable goal might be to provide between 5-10 liters a day of potable water (i.e., biologically pure) and to ensure ready access to a further 10-15 liters a day for domestic purposes other than drinking and cooking.

It was not possible to estimate the proportion of households having a latrine in each camp. In Itang, it was stated that latrines tend to collapse during the wet season. It is planned to construct 2,000 ventilated improved pit latrines in this camp during 1991; cement slabs and ventilation pipes will be supplied to those refugees who dig pit latrines. So far, 368 slabs have been cast, although they seem to be very heavy and difficult to transport. Many broken slabs were observed around the camp. Slabs and vents have been installed in 245 latrines.

A total of 175 slabs have been made in Fugnido, and 106 installed. No vents were available. In Dimma, a total of 1,400 latrines have been built for a population of 35,000.

In general, shelter was adequate in all three camps, with certain exceptions. Great improvements were noted in the living conditions of the Assosa group in Itang; the majority of families had constructed new tukuls and each family had been allocated a block of land 20 m x 40 m. In Village 4, however, most new arrivals were still living in tents. The nutrition survey in December 1990 found that an average of 17 persons was living in a tukul or tent among the new arrivals of Village 4.

Housing is still very dense in the older parts of Itang (Villages 1, 2, 8) and the old village of Fugnido. The failure to resolve the water supply situation in those camps is delaying any redistribution of housing into newer, less densely-populated villages.

Recommendations

During the last health and nutrition review in June 1990, many recommendations were made and discussed. Much progress has been made in implementing these recommendations and much improvement has been observed in health and nutrition programs in the western camps. Any repetition of recommendations made last year is simply intended to reinforce those programs.

- o In the event of future large refugee influxes either in Ethiopia or elsewhere, the creation of camps as large as Itang should be strongly discouraged. The problems experienced in promptly responding to the sudden influx of the Assosa refugees last year were directly related to the difficulties in administering and providing services to a camp of 280,000 persons.
- o The proposed decentralization of Itang into eight separately administered villages should be accelerated. Health services should be based in each of the satellite clinics, with the central health center acting only as referral center. Funds should be sought to construct adequate facilities for each satellite clinic in Itang.
- o Families should be moved from the congested old village of Fugnido to the newly laid-out villages as soon as possible.
- o A new water supply system should be installed in Itang as soon as possible, according to the proposal made by OXFAM to pump, treat, and distribute water from the River Baro. This is an urgent priority; the failure to provide adequate potable water in Itang is delaying the decentralization of that camp.
- o Coverage by the supplementary feeding program in Itang, especially the wet program for malnourished children, should be increased through better outreach, case-finding, and follow-up of defaulters, especially in Village 4. Further CHAs should be recruited from among the new arrivals in Village 4 to improve community understanding of the goals of the feeding programs.

- o The overall number of CHAs trained and supported by the assistance program should be consistent with the previously recommended ratio of one CHA to 1000 refugees. In Itang, an additional 80 CHAs should be trained in 1991, while the final number of CHAs should probably await the planned re-registration of refugees and clarification of the population size. The budget for health personnel needs to be modified to include new CHAs.
- o Emergency preparedness plans and treatment guidelines presently being developed should be completed as soon as possible, in particular those relating to epidemics of cholera and meningitis.
- o Immediate action should be taken to assess the risks of AIDS transmission in the camps, particularly in Itang, and to initiate prevention programs focussing on the prostitutes active in or near the camps. Such action should be taken in close collaboration with the AIDS Control Program of the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the World Health Organization.
- o Current intensive efforts to increase immunization coverage should continue, and discussions should be held with the MOH and UNICEF to standardize immunization guidelines in the camps, in particular relating to the age of measles vaccination. UNHCR currently recommends that refugee children be vaccinated against measles at the age of 6 months, with a booster at 9 months. In Fugnido camp, where four cases of neonatal tetanus have occurred during the past 12 months, efforts should continue to achieve 100% coverage of women of child-bearing age with tetanus toxoid. Trained TBAs have an important role in ensuring that women in the camp understand the need for tetanus toxoid immunization.
- o The rapid decentralization of health services in Itang may require a temporary increase in health personnel to staff the satellite clinics. At least four new nurses, including one midwife, should be added to the budget for Itang for a period of one year. Following 1991, efforts should be made to decrease the number of health staff in the central health center to compensate for the increase in staff at the satellite clinics.

- o UNHCR should provide some support (drugs and personnel support) to the six clinics in the Itang area that treat a substantial number of refugees arriving from Sudan.
- o While the current MSF support to surgical services should relieve some of the extra burden caused by refugees seeking treatment at Gambella Regional Hospital, a small allocation of drugs and medical supplies should be provided by the refugee assistance program, based on the actual number of refugee inpatients admitted to the hospital. This is standard in most countries where refugees are utilizing local hospital services.
- o The TB Control Program in Itang should accelerate efforts to ensure that all TB patients complete the recommended treatment course. The treatment defaulter rate is still too high in that camp.

3. REGISTRATION, LOGISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION

REGISTRATION

Observations and Conclusions

The registration system involves a four step process. New arrivals are directed to local government officers at eight entry points on the borders of the two regions of Keffa and Gambella. Following initial screening, refugees are issued with a pass and directed to a designated refugee camp. At the new arrivals section within the camp, the refugees undergo medical screening, vaccination and treatment for any illness. Emergency rations are issued and temporary shelter (tents) allocated. The shelters are overcrowded, reportedly housing up to 17 persons per tent. Subsequently, the screening process is undertaken by a committee composed of UNHCR, ARA and the refugee committee. The refugees are questioned as to their place of origin, reasons for their exodus, route taken to Ethiopia, duration of the trek, incidents en route, clan affiliations, etc. The responses are cross-checked with those of the refugee companions, since refugees usually arrive in groups. At Itang, ARA registration officials

reported an acceptance rate of some eighty percent, while Fugnido reported rare cases of misrepresentations. Those rejected are ones found not to be genuine refugees. Upon endorsement by the screening committee, refugees are assigned to a village within the camp, where the village Administrator enters the particulars such as name, origin, names of family members, date of arrival etc. in a master register. In Dimma, a registration card system is used, while the other camps use a registration book. A ration card and basic non-food items package is issued, including poles for construction of tukuls.

Due to the Regional Government's position regarding non-acceptance of any new influxes of refugees to the region, over two thousand 'new arrivals' remain in the Itang and Fugnido camp reception centers under difficult and unsettled conditions. ARA has identified a new camp site in Kaffa region across the river from Dimma camp, and the new arrivals' fate is linked with securing funding for the installation of camp infrastructure and the construction of a major bridge across the river to provide access to the site. Unless alternative solutions are found the new arrivals are likely to remain in the reception centers over a prolonged period. In addition the refugees themselves appear reluctant to be transferred to a camp as far away as Dimma. During 1990 no new influxes were recorded at Dimma.

The registration methodology in use at the camps appears to be adequate, although the registration documentation is not standardized. There is no system in place for review and checking of population figures which are given as cumulative since the establishment of the camps. The Mission was informed that UNFPA has been requested to devise a census of the population, but no date and no method has been fixed as yet. The mission doubts that the refugee population in the three camps is as large as is being presented.

Recommendations

The registration documentation should be standardized at all camps, preferably along the lines used at Dimma camp through a serialized registration card system.

- o Ration cards should be reissued as soon as possible and thereafter on an annual basis under the supervision of UNHCR. This should provide the means to check ration card holder responses against personal details available in the master registers in order to screen out any possible multiple card holders and determine the actual number of originally registered refugees still residing in the camps. New ration cards should be color coded according to the village of residence within the camp to facilitate future tracing and spot checks.
- o The Mission endorses the recommendation of earlier missions regarding the need to undertake a full scale census of the camp population and stresses that this should take place at an early date.
- o It is recommended that an alternative site for the Dimma 2 camp be identified at an early date, on the same side of the river as Dimma 1 camp in order to reduce establishment costs. Failing an early resolution of this issue, it is recommended that the reception center populations at Itang and Fugnido be transferred to Dimma 1 camp or Fugnido, where new villages with adequate water supply have been laid out.

4. LOGISTICS

Observations and Conclusions

Food deliveries to the camps are undertaken by the Transport Operation for Refugees (TOR), operating a fleet of UNHCR owned long and short haul trucks under GTZ management assistance. In addition to maintenance facilities at Nekempte, Gambella and Aman, TOR currently also maintains two transit warehouses of 2,000 and 1,200 mt at Gambella and Aman respectively. TOR maintains an efficient transport system and an up-to-date computerised cargo tracking database.

Cereals (maize) are obtained from the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) in Nekempte against a swap agreement arranged by WFP. Other commodities and goods are transported from Assab, Addis Abeba and Wonji.

TOR operates a total of 36 long haul (22 mt capacity) trucks for the Nekempt/Gambella camps maize transport and 10 long haul trucks for the Nekempt/Aman maize transport. Due to the poor condition of the road between Aman/Dimma, TOR also operates 8 short haul trucks of 7 mt capacity on this leg. In addition, 45 long haul trucks are assigned to the transport of supplies from other parts of the country, direct to the Gambella camps and to the Aman intermediate store in Keffa. The mission was able to obtain an average per ton costing of US dollars 140 for the transport operation to the three Sudanese refugee camps, inclusive of a twenty percent supplement to cover vehicle amortisation over seven years.

Road conditions to the camps are reasonably good. Maintenance is undertaken between Gambella and Itang/Fugnido with the use of 9 TOR dump trucks and heavy equipment of the Ethiopian Highway Authority base at Gambella, with UNHCR covering running expenses. UNHCR also owns heavy equipment consisting of grader, loader and bulldozer currently used in combination with 7 TOR dump trucks for the upgrading of the Aman/Dimma road. This is to make it passable for longhaul trucks in order to minimize the need for cargo transfers at Aman. However, although the mission did not pass along the main routes from Nekempte and further, the regional Administrations of Gambella and Keffa both underlined that these roads were not designed to cope with the present level of traffic and are deteriorating due to heavy use.

Food storage capacity at the various camps consisted of the following:

Itang	-	7,000 mt (permanent structures)
Fugnido	-	3,500 mt (Rubhall)
Dimma	-	1,800 mt (3 perm./3 Rubhall)

The above capacities are sufficient for maintaining stocks of 2, 2.2 and 2.8 months respectively. In Itang, TOR has commenced construction of provisional decentralised food shelters at distribution sites in each of the villages, but lacks the funds to construct durable and secure stores on these sites. In Fugnido, foundation work has begun for the construction of three permanent structure warehouses financed by FINNIDA, with a total capacity of 4,000 tons. Upon completion, the existing Rubhall stores can be transferred to village sites to provide decentralised storage.

Storage management at the intermediate stores and those at Itang camp in terms of record keeping, maintenance and pest control was found to be good. However, pest infestations were found at Fugnido and Dimma, and it was reported that ARA storage personnel had neither the experience nor the materials required for pest control. In addition, a considerable amount of spillage was found around and inside the stores at these two camps, apparently caused by poor stitching of the grain bags.

Assuming a serviceability rate of 92% and the turnaround times as reported by TOR personnel, the trucks deployed in the two regions have a capacity of 97,500 tons per annum, while transport requirements for the current caseload of refugees is 96,000 tons. During 1990, some 73,500 tons of food commodities were reported to have been received at the camps by the ARA, while the total requirement of food and non-food commodities for the year was some 89,400 tons.

The above capacity assumes regular availability of supplies and would obviously be reduced should there be interruptions in availability or redeployment to alternative sources at greater distances than the current supply line between Nekempte and the camps. In addition, should there be large influxes during the course of the coming year, it will be necessary to augment the TOR fleet through redeployment of trucks from other areas, commercial hire in the short term, and increasing the fleet size through purchase of trucks, in the longer term.

Current storage capacity at the camps is sufficient to handle refugee requirements as per the planning figure of a 400,000 caseload. This capacity will be considerably augmented with the construction of village satellite stores, enabling each camp to maintain a minimum of two months buffer stock while monthly distribution requirements are delivered directly to the satellite stores.

Recommendations

- o Funding should be provided for UNHCR to support the Ethiopian Highway Authority in the provision of fuel, spare parts and overnight allowances in order to carry out road

maintenance works on the main access routes. This would avoid further serious deterioration to the regional arteries on which both refugees and national populations depend.

- o Funding should be provided for the construction of secure decentralised storage facilities at the Itang camp villages. This would facilitate distribution, reduce handling and losses and enable the maintenance of buffer stocks at the central camp stores in the event of pipeline interruptions.
- o Strict control of maize bag condition and stitching should be undertaken at AMC stores in Nekempte in order to minimize spillage losses both en route and during handling operations.
- o Store management refresher courses should be given to ARA storekeepers, particularly at Fugnido and Dimma. In addition, fumigation materials and insecticide sprays should be provided for application, calling on the technical support of the Emergency Food Security Reserve's Food Security Unit.
- o In view of uncertainties over fuel supply availability for refugee trucking operations and support services, it is recommended that a fuel reserve be established at both the Nekempte nodal point and the TOR storage and workshop facilities in Gambella and Aman.
- o To ensure optimum utilisation of the TOR trucking fleet and a regular flow of supplies to the refugees, closer coordination between WFP, TOR and UNHCR to provide early warning regarding food allocations, delivery schedules and sources of supplies, is recommended.

5. FOOD DISTRIBUTION

Overall food availability during 1990 was good, despite shortfalls which were experienced particularly in pulses and edible oil supplies. Supplies of maize and sugar were by and large adequate. Supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes received priority allocations of commodities in short supply, and the needs for these programmes were fully covered.

The camp Administrators reported the following shortfalls as an average for the year 1990:

<u>Camp</u>	<u>Pulses</u>	<u>Oil</u>
Itang	50%	35%
Fugnido	50%	25%
Dimma	25%	50%

A breakdown of monthly availability of basic ration commodities expressed as percentage of requirements is provided in annex I, based on information obtained from ARA monthly stock movement reports. Annex II provides a breakdown of shipments and dates of arrival in country. In the case of pulses and oil, first deliveries occurred in May and June 1990 respectively.

In spite of the shortfalls experienced, a recent study undertaken by the UNHCR/ARA nutritionists found that the food supplied provided an average caloric intake of 2230 kcal, or 92% of the recommended daily average intake of 2390 kcal. This shows a considerable improvement over previous years. Furthermore, due to the proximity of all camps to perennial rivers, fishing was commonly practiced and provided a supplement to the basic diet.

A total of twenty four diesel operated maize mills of varying but low capacities are available to the refugee camps. At the time of the visit, half were not functioning due to breakdowns and lack of spare parts. Most refugees grind their maize rations using traditional pounding methods, which although time consuming are nevertheless reliable.

The mission was pleased to note that all the refugee cereals requirements were being met from national production, obtained through the exchange of wheat for maize arranged by WFP with the AMC. The arrangement considerably reduced the distance over which grain is transported, while at the same time supporting local production. In addition, the exchange arrangement results in a saving of 59.80 dollars per ton on transportation costs between Addis Abeba and Nekempte and avoids placing excessive pressures on the already overstretched national transport capacity.

It was noted that food incentives to various workers such as warehouse loaders etc. had been paid out in the past, but these food for work rations were composed of the same commodities found in the basic ration and issued in unacceptably large quantities. The practice was discontinued and replaced by payment of cash incentives.

With regard to the system of food distribution being practiced, variations were found between the three camps. The frequency of distribution should be monthly. However, it was explained that due to the low level of supplies of certain commodities on the one hand, and the large quantities of maize to be distributed in Itang on the other hand, distributions actually take place two to three times per month. Food is issued based on a requisition submitted by the ARA village distribution clerk and approved by the ARA distribution supervisor. The quantities requisitioned are calculated on the basis of the number of refugees registered at the village. Surprisingly, there were reported to be no returns to the stores at the end of the distributions, the assumption being that all refugees presented themselves for ration collection. The use of ration cards was observed only in Itang, whereas no such system was in use at Fugnido and Dimma.

Where ration cards are in use, an ARA distribution clerk checks the ration card which indicates the number of family members and instructs the distribution assistant as to the number of scoops to issue. A check mark is made besides the name and card serial number of the beneficiary, which is listed in a register held by the clerk. The distribution is assisted by a member of the refugee distribution committee responsible for the village, as well as volunteer refugees who undertake the measuring out of the rations. Both males and females were observed receiving rations at the distribution in Itang.

In the remaining camps, distribution is undertaken by representatives of the refugee distribution committee, who receive the quantities of food in bulk from ARA and supervise the sharing out amongst groups of refugees. At Fugnido, no ARA distribution clerk was present at a distribution to a group of unaccompanied minors, while in Dimma it was reported that distribution are supervised by ARA officials. It was understood that UNHCR personnel monitor distributions through unscheduled site visits.

Ration distributions are carried out for each commodity separately, so that the refugees are obliged to queue on one day for the maize ration, and on other days for the other commodities. Collection of all available commodities on the same day is not possible under the present practice. The two distributions observed by the mission were poorly organised. The stock of grain was dumped on open ground without pallets or tarpaulin, and each sack was spilled on the ground so that those receiving their ration from the top of the heap might get their full entitlement while those receiving rations from the bottom of the heap receive part of their entitlement in the form of soil and stones.

It is evident that shortfalls in supplies are caused by slow donor reaction to requirements resulting in delayed arrival of shipments. The mission was disquieted to be informed that although the needs for 1991 were communicated to the international community in June 1990, no shipments have arrived in Ethiopia to date. It is therefore likely that further shortfalls will occur during the current year.

There is no consistency in the system of distribution between the three camps, and there appears to be very loose, if any, control over the food once released from the stores. Even where ration cards are being used the current design of the card does not allow for verification of the last date the beneficiary received a ration, or any indication of the quantity or commodities received. The system as currently practiced gives ample leeway for diversions to take place through undertipping by the volunteer distribution assistants. Also false recording of information without the possibility of cross checking with any other records such as the ration card, is possible.

The method by which food is issued is wasteful, resulting in a considerable amount of loss caused by the spillage and scattering of grain. This is particularly the case among the unaccompanied minors who left a trail of spilt grain from heavy containers being carried to their hostels. It is also discriminatory to some individuals among the beneficiaries who receive less than their share of food due to the spilling of grain on bare ground. The lack of tarpaulins and pallets or ground sheets exposes the food to damage by the elements.

Furthermore, the practice of distributing different commodities on different days rather than concurrently, obliges the beneficiaries to unnecessarily waste time that could be more usefully employed in the daily tasks that comprise camp living.

The provision of diesel grain milling facilities with attendant maintenance and fuel supply difficulties does not appear to be a practical and cost effective activity under the circumstances. While the majority of the camp population is able to use traditional methods commonly in use in the Sudan, it would be appropriate to provide alternative less labor intensive and energy consuming means of milling to those sectors of the population who find difficulty with the traditional system due to age or physical condition.

As regards food for work incentives, local values of basic ration commodities are lower than the cost of delivery, due to the large volumes being made available within a small area. Therefore the issue of such commodities as food for work rations must be made at double or triple the basic ration level to provide an acceptable incentive value. The alternative use of scarce and therefore popular and valuable commodities such as tea, sugar and canned meat could provide acceptable incentives in place of relatively scarce cash resources.

Recommendations

- o Pledges and shipments of commodities not available locally should be arranged on a priority basis. For those commodities which are available locally, such as sugar, pulses and faffa, priority should be given to the provision of cash for the purchasing of these commodities in order to avoid delays in shipping, clearance and transport.
- o Efforts should be increased to obtain sufficient oil for the general rations as oil is particularly important for child nutrition.
- o Exchanges of wheat for maize to supply refugee cereals requirements should continue as at present, so long as maize can be made available by the AMC. To this end, WFP should obtain a commitment from the AMC as to the quantities

available for exchange during the current year and endeavor to secure alternative sources, either through imports or purchases on the private market, in the event that the AMC is unable to deliver the required quantities.

- o Ration cards should be re-designed to enable the recording of ration receipts at each distribution cycle within each month. The cards should be colour coded according to the beneficiary village of residence, and reissued on an annual basis. A single ARA or Refugee Committee official should be designated as responsible for initialing the appropriate section of the card confirming ration issue. The introduction of this procedure should be accompanied by a public education effort through churches, community organisations and refugee committee representatives to explain the procedures for use of the card.
- o The ration scale should be posted publicly at each distribution site. Graphic means should be used to ensure comprehension by any illiterate beneficiaries. Closer monitoring should be conducted on the distribution assistants (tippers) to avert the possibility of undertipping.
- o Standardised scoops with pre-determined weights per type of commodity should be issued to all distribution centers to ensure uniformity and fairness to all beneficiaries.
- o Satellite stores at village level should be designed to provide for a distribution shed where all ration items are distributed concurrently and in an organised manner along the lines of store cashier or ticket purchase aisles. In the interim, ARA should ensure provision of plastic groundsheets to prevent dumping food on bare ground and consequent losses to the beneficiaries.
- o Collection and transport of rations by unaccompanied minors should be facilitated through the provision of wheelbarrows to the hostels to ensure secure movement of food and prevent losses through spillage observed under the current system.

- o Overall UNHCR distribution monitoring should be strengthened by the deployment of additional staff. In this respect, the Mission endorses the UNHCR/UNDP request for the financing of UN volunteers and their support costs, to undertake this monitoring.
- o A survey should be conducted to determine the type of commodities which would be acceptable and the cost effectiveness of their provision as food for work incentives in lieu of cash incentives, in terms of delivery and management costs as compared to local availability and value. Where such use is found viable, proposals should be prepared for use as incentives for such activities as teaching, road maintenance, water, sanitation and construction works and afforestation.
- o Hand grinding mills should be tested for acceptability and durability. These should be provided to unaccompanied minor hostels and village zones with significant numbers of vulnerable groups such as the elderly in order to reduce the burden of pounding on these groups.
- o The above recommendations should be applied uniformly at all Sudanese refugee camps.

6. SOCIAL ISSUES:

This section covers social relations within the camp and neighbouring communities, education, income generating activities, the situation of unaccompanied children, impact on the environment and Non Government Organizations.

Social Relationships:

Within the camps, between refugee communities and ARA & UNHCR; with neighbouring communities.

Observations and Conclusions

There appears to be a three layered system of social organization amongst the refugees. The first revolves around the remnants of their individual traditional systems with village chiefs and lineage elders. The second consists of numerous

indigenous church organizations and the third, is the more formalised structure of the refugee committees, made up of representatives of sub committees of health, education and women's affairs.

This committee is the main structure which brokers relationships between ARA/UNHCR and the refugees. Its leadership is of the predominantly male and educated sections of the population. Because women are such a minority and their level of education so low, they hardly exercise any influence or authority on these committees. Their presence is more observable within the church organizations.

Relationships within the camp population appear to be harmonious. Disputes are adjudicated both by traditional leaders and the refugee committee. Relationships between the refugees and ARA and UNHCR are much improved with more active participation and acknowledgement of the refugees' need to have a say in their own affairs.

Official regional government policy and attitude to the refugees is marked by hospitality and willingness to share facilities. Refugees use local schools and clinics and at the same time refugee facilities are open to neighbouring communities. On an informal level there is trade and barter with neighbouring communities. However there is a danger of conflict arising out of the increasing intensity of competition for resources between refugee, resettlement and indigenous communities.

There have been reports of outbreaks of violence between the refugees and neighbouring Anuak groups. Though it was impossible to get real information on this relationship, it is clear that the population imbalance of refugees over locals will result in tension and pressure.

Recommendations

- o The social structures and relationships that exist amongst the refugee communities should be encouraged and built upon in any future development assistance.

- o The church leadership in the camps have asked for closer contacts with their respective church authorities and representatives in Addis Abeba. We recommend that this be given consideration as the churches play a vital role in the processes of stability and cohesion in the camps.
- o Long term development assistance should be targeted to both refugee and local communities to prevent any imbalance in resources.

7. UNACCOMPANIED MINORS

Observations and Conclusions

There are large members of unaccompanied minors in each of the camps. Itang 5200 out of total 280,000 population, Fugnido 16,000 out of 86,000 population and Dimma 20,000 out of the camp's total population of 35,000. A majority of these are boys. Many of them are entering the camps in groups of 20-30 at a time. Traditionally boys of this age are away for large periods of time in cattle camps looking after the community livestock. It would appear that on hearing of attacks on their villages or returning to find their homes disrupted, they leave en masse for the Ethiopian border. At the same time refugees themselves say that priority is given in times of trouble, to send the adult men and young boys - the "wealth" of the community, to seek sanctuary first.

On entering the refugee camps the adult refugees together with ARA/UNHCR have helped construct a series of hostels and schools to facilitate these groups. Children are divided into groups under the supervision of an adult caretaker. It is only in Fugnido that the refugees own assistance and organizations for these children are supplemented by any outside resources and assistance.

In all camps the facilities for shelter, food preparation, access to water, recreation and education are at minimum standards. In addition apart from group contact with the teachers and caretakers, there is very little direct contact with adults on a personal level.

Children are left to cope and provide food and water for themselves, which mean that there are many weakest and youngest who are suffering. The tiny percentage of girls is also very vulnerable.

The difference between those assisted by Swedish Save the Children in Fugnido and those in the other two camps is striking. Redda Barnen provides incentives to full time teachers and caretakers amounting to 103 Birr a month each. They have also provided some school materials from the East Africa School curriculum. Personal histories of the children are gathered. About 1% have been reunited with family members and slightly more fostered. In Fugnido all unaccompanied minors attend school.

All food processing is done by the children themselves, the hardest part of which is pounding maize. A considerable amount of grain is lost due to improper pounding and storage of the grain.

The children in this situation are cut off from any contact with their traditional way of life and are in danger of losing all the survival skills that they would normally be acquiring at this stage of their lives.

The implications for the future of Southern Sudanese Society of having large groups of minors deprived of the normal processes of social development and growing up with minimal adult relationships and supervision, is an issue which must be seriously addressed.

Recommendations

- o It is imperative that the children in Dimma and Itang have a program similar to Fugnido started on their behalf. This would entail hiring of refugees to look after and educate the children as well as compiling personal histories and attending to their psycho-social needs. Other inputs should be designed to be sustainable and replicable by the refugees themselves.

- o NGOs such as those of the Save the Children Alliance have expressed interest in designing programs for these children. The distances between the camps and the members of children involved would entail a division of labour and resources between them. Each organization could be encouraged to support a particular camp. The model already developed by SCF Sweden could be developed to ensure a standardized policy and approach to meeting the needs of the unaccompanied children.
- o Hand grinding mills should be provided for the unaccompanied children's hostels to alleviate at least part of the grinding process. Cooking and eating utensils, blankets and clothing are inadequate and more should be provided.

8. EDUCATION

Observations and Conclusions

The refugees place great importance on education. They have built and started schools, organized in-service teacher training and attempted to provide as normal a school curriculum as possible. In Fugnido 72% of the 25,000 go to school. In Itang 25% of the 66,800 children go to school and in Dimma, 77% of the 26,000 children attend school. A small number from each of the camps attend secondary schools in Gamb 11a and Mizan Teferi.

The refugees also run adult education classes through the various church organizations.

Among the literate adult population there is a great desire to continue some form of formal or informal education, for teaching materials and information and keeping up with world events. There is also a specific desire to have access to materials on the Sudan itself.

Their priority needs are black board paint and chalk, school textbooks (East Africa curriculum if available) teaching aids and materials, exercise books, writing implements and sports and recreational equipment.

Teachers work for three shifts a day, most on a voluntary basis. Many of these teachers are unqualified and have only finished primary school themselves.

In Itang there is a comprehensive secondary school designed for both the refugee and local population. Due to lack of funds it has not been staffed or equipped.

Theoretically agriculture and horticulture exist in the school curriculum but are not taught due to lack of inputs.

The administration in both Gambella and Mizan Tefferi have asked assistance for their secondary schools to which some of the refugees attend and which are very poorly equipped and maintained.

The education of the unaccompanied minors is of particular significance as they are not part of a regular family structure and have particular emotional and social needs.

Recommendations

- o Funds should be found to pay the teachers at the present Ethiopian Ministry of Education rates of 103 Birr per month. Payments should be on a standard scale and graded according to teachers qualifications. The system of payments as used by NGO's and ARA in the eastern camps could be a model.
- o The whole problem of incentives and payments in refugee camps is an issue which should be addressed and a standardized policy arrived at.
- o Materials be supplied as requested to the schools in the camps.
- o Scholarship funds to cover fees and living expenses of the secondary school students should be found.
- o There is a need to provide consistent and regular In-Service and skill upgrading of the teachers in both refugee and local community schools. Teachers would benefit both from new inputs and exchange of ideas and information from the different communities.

- o The Ministry of Education should have as a priority the completion and staffing of the Comprehensive Secondary School in Itang which would make it the second secondary school in Gambella region.
- o Seeds, tools and other inputs should be provided to help schools start school gardens, nursery plots and their own conservation and tree planting activities. In addition if possible, each school should be encouraged to raise some animals to use in teaching about animal health and management and help the students maintain familiarity with livestock.
- o As UNHCR lacks an education sector implementing partner in ARA, it is important to appoint one to liaise educational projects, as has been done in the health sector.
- o Agencies assisting refugee schools should also be encouraged to assist those secondary schools to which refugees are continuing their education.

9. INCOME GENERATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Observations and Conclusions

Income generating activities consist of those organized by ARA and UNHCR such as bamboo furniture making, tailoring, shoe making and carpentry and those traditional activities carried on by local craftsmen and artisans from the former communities. These include blacksmithing, beer making, fishing, boat making, net making and food processing.

The officially organized activities in particular bamboo furniture making, seem to have no relevance to the needs of the refugees nor have a viable market for the finished products. Raw materials such as bamboo and wood are expensive and brought from far areas and there is too much dependence on costly machinery with spare parts problems.

There is a great need for appropriate manufactured goods in the camps. Utensils, containers, indigenous furniture, tools, nets, pottery etc. are in short supply.

The three ingredients for income generation, labour, raw materials and a market are present in this environment. This should form the basis for the design of income generation activities and for vocational training strategies. The way in which the circulation of cash in Itang and Fugnido has sparked off market and local production activities is a significant point.

Vocational training for inappropriate activities is costly and wasteful and relies too much on costly fuel and expensive machinery. Training should be geared to what is useful and sustainable within the context of the host and refugees' original societies.

Recommendations

- o An appropriate technology approach should be the basis for both vocational training and officially organized income generating activities. This would include for example the manufacture of fuel efficient stoves and garden implements.
- o The injection of more cash into the refugee community would help revive considerable local production. Public works such as camp landscaping, drainage construction, re-forestation, road maintenance etc. could be paid on a combination of food and cash for work basis.
- o Both the refugee camps and the local neighbouring communities should be counted as viable market areas and source for raw materials. There is an equal need for locally manufactured goods amongst these villages and local trade and barter systems should be carefully studied as a basis for stimulating enterprises in both communities.
- o Consideration should be given to providing credit to local artisans to initiate their own businesses.

10. HORTICULTURAL AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Two small irrigation schemes have been established with the help of UNHCR/ARA. These are intended both to supplement and diversify the food supply system and perhaps create a market for trade and exchange.

A 20 hectare scheme is operational in Itang Camp divided into plots among 700 families. UNHCR provided a pump at a reported cost of 37,000 Birr and land levelling ploughing and ridging was done using UNHCR tractor and trailer. In Fugnido a similar scheme of 15 hectares has been established and land allocated in parcels to the various unaccompanied minors' hostel.

No statistics on yields were available since the schemes were under the first crop. Refugees were enthusiastic over the possibility of producing food and potential income and requested assistance to enlarge the plots through provision of pumps.

However, there appeared to be difficulties being encountered with the organisation of irrigation schedules, resulting in outbreaks of fighting among the plot holders, and water was reportedly not reaching the lower end of the canals.

Technical advice is provided by Agriculturalists from among the refugee population, as well as ARA and there appeared to be no problem in this respect.

Due to low indigenous population density in the refugee areas, there is potential for expanding horticultural activities in sparsely used land, in agreement with local communities over use rights. This would be undertaken with the purpose of diet supplementation in view of the limited market in the camp vicinities for perishable produce. However, the use of water pumps for irrigation in the context of local situations is not self sustaining and depends on the external supply of unreliable supplies of spare parts and fuel. It is therefore considered advisable to avoid capital intensive methods and focus on labour intensive means for the promotion of this activity.

Recommendations

- o Technical assistance should be provided to introduce the use of shallow wells and hand operated pumps or "Shadouf" methods for irrigating small plots of land initially on a trial basis for demonstration and extension.

- o Discussions with refugees should ensue on the desirability or appropriateness of using ox drawn ploughs. Though animals are not used for ploughing in southern Sudanese culture many have expressed a willingness to experiment with this method.
- o NGOs working in the Gambella region experimenting with adaptable varieties of vegetable, groundnut, sweet potatoes and other produce, could be contacted for technical assistance, resource sharing and training expertise.

11. IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENT

Observations and Conclusions

Refugees are reaching further and further into the surrounding forests and savannah for fuel wood, grass and house building materials.

The new houses, churches and schools they are building for themselves are quite substantial structures and in many cases it is evident that large trees are being felled for this purpose.

The presence of the camps and their fuel and building needs has also stimulated neighboring communities themselves to go further afield to fetch wood and charcoal to sell or barter with the camps.

Both the loss of tree and bush cover and the hunting activities of the refugees has considerably disrupted and eliminated the wildlife in the area.

Refugee use of the natural environment increases the pressure and vulnerability of the local ecosystem which has already been severely damaged by large scale clearing in the re-settlement areas and indiscriminate burning by local communities.

There is little evidence of an environmentally conscious designing of the camps. The "Green belt" areas in Fugnido are a good start but more attention needs to be given both to afforestation and general maintenance, drainage etc. of the camps.

The flooding in Itang and Fugnido camps poses serious problems both in health terms and siting of people's houses and gardens. In addition the River Baro has a break in its banks near the Itang horticultural site that will flood the entire project during the rainy season.

Recommendations

- o Immediate action is necessary in implementing conservation and environment conscious activities both within the camps and local communities.
- o ARA/UNHCR need to have a conservation strategy built into their camp design and implementation process from the beginning of any new settlement site.
- o Refugees should be involved at the onset in landscaping, drainage and afforestation activities. Wood lots for fuel and building materials, nurseries for fast growing locally adaptable tree, grass and shrub species should be constructed and families encouraged to plant around their houses, schools, meeting places and in larger organized activities, in the surrounding area. Refugees are aware of their impact on the area and would be willing to participate in local initiatives.
- o Ministry of Agriculture, local administration, interested NGOs and others should focus as a priority on the implementation of similar conservation activities in this region. Inter-agency cooperation in sharing resources, technical expertise, provision of tools etc. should be fostered to promote a holistic approach to the conservation of this region of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Government has a conservation strategy which should form the basis and backup for an immediate policy and implementation plan for this region.
- o As a complementary activity the making of fuel conserving stoves and other environment conscious implements and materials should be developed within camp and host communities alike.

- o The break in the river bank and other drainage problems of the camps should be attended to before the onset of the next rains.

12. NON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

Observations and Conclusions

A small number of international and Ethiopian Non Government Organizations work and have worked with the refugee camps. These are Africare, Ethiopian Orthodox Church (DICAD), Ethiopian Evangelical Church (Mekane Yesus), Lutheran World Federation, OXFAM, Save the Children (Sweden), Medecins Sans Frontieres and Sisters of Charity.

Presently active are Medecins Sans Frontieres in the Health Sector, Swedish Save the Children and Ethiopian Orthodox Church in Education and Sisters of Charity in children's health.

Medecins Sans Frontieres and Sisters of Charity have expatriate personnel based in Gambella, Swedish Save the Children work through Ethiopian and Sudanese personnel who live in Fugnido.

It is a two hour journey each way to Fugnido which makes regular contact with the camp time consuming and costly. There is no evidence as to why personnel should not stay in the camp.

There are also NGOs who work in the Gambella region (EECMY (Mekane Yesus), JOVC (Japan) and Norwegian Save the Children). These NGOs are doing interesting work in orphan care and education, crop production, water and health. They provide a potential source for technical assistance, resources and training activities.

Recommendations

- o Due to the financial and technical constraints of UNHCR/ARA, a positive invitation should be extended to NGOs to assist in the refugee camps.

- o NGO's should be chosen on the basis of their particular expertise and experience in refugee situations and must bring at least some additional funding.
- o There should be a consistent mechanism and liaison unit within UNHCR/ARA which coordinates NGOs' activities, evolves a common policy for their activities and facilitates agreements with the organization.
- o There should be a standardized agreement procedure for NGO's and UNHCR/ARA which should be recognized by various government bodies so that NGOs can work with more than one government agency.
- o NGO activities should use approaches that are appropriate and sustainable, use local expertise and resources as much as possible and have low overheads. In particular there are enough personnel amongst the refugees themselves who should be trained and employed to run projects within the camps as their own schemes.

CAMP ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING

The official Ethiopian government agency mandated to deal with the issues of refugees and returnees is the Administration for Refugee Affairs (ARA). This is an autonomous unit within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. ARA became operational in January 1989 and in close collaboration with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees operates all the camps in Ethiopia.

Both ARA and UNHCR have a western region programme division unit with a base in Gambella and sub offices in the camps and Mizan Tefferi town.

UNHCR has long been understaffed in the western region and due to financial constraints has not been able to assist in the implementation of a variety of programmes especially in the education, income generating and other social services.

ARA personnel though hard working committed, and coming from a variety of different organizations do not as yet have the necessary expertise in evolving a common disaster preparedness and logistics management policy. The handling of the sudden arrival of the Assosa refugees indicated that such a policy was shortcoming.

As far as is observed there is very little information and data collected on refugees background, socio economic profiles and cultural traditions. Though relations are good between staff and refugees, the magnitude of tasks and problems makes it difficult for staff to appreciate cultural norms and traditional practices that may account for unexpected refugee reactions to camp procedures. e.g. feeding and vaccination programmes.

Although it is obvious that the authorities would like to expand their contingency plans, there are no funds and materials to enable them to do so.

Recommendations

- o Regular and consistent training in logistics, disaster preparedness and warehouse management should be given to personnel in the camps using experiences and expertise developed in refugee camps elsewhere. Both UNHCR and local NGOs should be used to assist in on site training.
- o The processes by which critical technical decisions are made should be opened up and routinized. For example the decision regarding implementation of the water system in Itang was based on bad advice despite contrary recommendations by TSS/UNHCR Geneva and NGOs.
- o Regular and closer monitoring of emergency assistance by UNHCR field staff should be ensured.
- o A mechanism should be developed to assist agency personnel collect background information on refugees and make staff more culturally sensitive.
- o Funds should be found to help expand and implement existing contingency plans. The creation of buffer stocks of food and other materials is particularly important in this respect.

MDTM 11-23 FEBRUARY, 1991
PARTICIPANT LIST

WESTERN TEAM

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Escort:

Ato Assefa Aregahegne, Head of External Relations. ARA

Mr. Ray Tschipanda, UNHCR

MULTI-DONOR TECHNICAL MISSION TO ETHIOPIA
FEBRUARY 11 -23, 1991

S C H E D U L E

WESTERN TEAM

Monday, February 11, 1991

- 8:00 - 8:30 Registration - Hilton Hotel
- 8:30 - 9:00 Opening Adress to the Multi-Donor Technical Mission by H.E. Mersha Ketsela, Vice Minister for Internal Affairs
- 9:00 -10:30 Briefings by the Administration for Refugee Affairs (ARA) and other Ethiopian Government Ministries
- 10:30 - 11:00 Coffee Break
- 11:00 - 13:00 Presentation/Discussion by Cecil Kpenou, UNHCR and staff
- 13:00 - 15:00 Lunch
- 15:00 - 17:00 Discussion with UN agencies regarding the refugee situation
WHO, WFP, UNICEF, UNDP
- 18:30 Reception by the GPDRE for the participants of the MDTM - Ghion Hotel

Tuesday, February 12, 1991

- 9:00 - 10:00 Team meetings chaired by the leading ambassadors
Hilton Conference Rooms
- 10:00 - 10:45 Briefing by GTZ/TOR
- 10:45 - 11:00 Coffee Break
- 11:00 - 13:00 Meetings with Non-Governmental Organizations working in camps
MSF - Medecins sans Frontiers
CARE
SCF/U.K. - Save the Children Fund
SCF/U.S.
Redda Barnen

13:00 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 15:00 Briefing by WTOE
15:00 - 15:30 Coffee Break
15:30 - 16:00 Administrative arrangements for the following day
19:00 - 21:00? Reception for the Eastern Team given by H.E.
M.J.C. Glaze, Ambassador, Embassy of the United
Kingdom

Wednesday, February 13, 1991

7:00 Depart Hilton Hotel for Bole Airport
7:30 Check in at Airport
8:00 Departure for Gambela with ET charter plane
10:00 Arrival in Gambela
10:30 - 11:30 Briefing by local authorities
11:30 - 12:30 Drive to Itang
12:30 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 15:00 Briefing about the camp
15:00 - 16:30 Visit to stores, orphans' village,
village No. 4 and 6
18:00 - 19:00 Recess
19:15 Dinner and overnight in Itang

Thursday, February 14, 1991

7:30 Breakfast
8:30 - 12:00 Visit to the health centre, schools and
agricultural sites
12:30 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 15:30 Visit to refugee settlement villages and cottage
industry workshop
15:30 - 16:30 Group meeting in the canteen
16:30 - 17:30 Drive to Gambella and overnight at the Ethiopia
Hotel

Friday, February 15, 1991

- 8:00 - 10:00 Drive to Fugnido
(Some participants may return to Itang)
- 10:00 - 11:00 Briefing about the camp
- 11:00 - 12:30 Visit to the stores and village No. 4
- 12:30 - 14:00 Lunch
- 14:00 - 16:00 Visit to the refugee settlement villages and
agricultural site
- 16:00 - 18:00 Drive to Gambela

Saturday, February 16, 1991

- 8:00 - 10:00 Drive to Fugnido
- 10:00 - 12:30 Visit to the health centre and youth hostels
- 12:30 - 14:00 Lunch
- 14:00 - 15:00 Team meeting at the canteen
- 15:30 - 17:30 Drive to Gambela
- 17:30 - 18:30 Recess
- 19:00 Reception by Government representatives at the
Ethiopia Hotel

Sunday, February 17, 1991

- 8:30 - 10:00 Flight from Gambela to Mizan Teferi
- 10:00 - 10:30 Briefing by local authorities
- 10:30 - 12:30 Drive to Dimma
- 12:30 - 14:00 Lunch
- 14:00 - 15:00 Briefing about the camp
- 15:00 - 16:30 Visit to stores and refugee settlement villages
- 16:30 - 18:00 Drive to Bebeka and overnight at the Bebeka Guest
House

Monday, February 18, 1991

8:00 - 9:30 Drive to Dimma

9:30 - 11:00 Visit to the health centre and schools

11:00 - 12:30 visit to the new site - Dimma B

12:30 - 14:00 Lunch

14:00 - 15:00 Team Meeting in the canteen

15:30 - 16:30 Drive to Bebeke

17:00 - 18:30 Recess

19:00 Reception by Government representatives and
overnight at Bebeke

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

9:00 - 10:30 Briefings by the team about the entire mission

11:00 - 12:00 Drive to Mizan Teferi

12:00 - 14:00 Lunch

14:00 Depart Mizan Tefari for Addis Ababa by air

Wednesday, February 20, 1991

Writing of the report
A support office is set up at the Hilton Hotel

Thursday, February 21, 1991

Writing of the report
A support office is set up at the Hilton Hotel

Friday, February 22, 1991

Finalization of the report
Presentation of the draft to UN agencies and ARA

18:00 - 20:00 Reception for the MDTM given by the Honorable
Robert Houdek, Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of
the United States of America

Saturday, February 23, 1991

Departure of participants

REPORT ON MISSION TO THE
RETURNEE AREAS

FEBRUARY 1991

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 - 4.2. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPOSED STRATEGY
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The returnee team of the Multi-Donor Technical Mission on Refugees and Returnees, in accordance with its terms of reference, undertook an assessment of the ongoing returnee programmes and of future needs and requirements.

The team was struck by the fact that even in the midst of the inquiry, Ethiopia was experiencing yet another major influx of refugee/returnee populations from Somalia. The size and proportion of each group is not yet entirely clear, but it is evident that both groups constitute a crisis situation with which the GPDRE cannot cope by itself.

Focusing only on returnees, the team estimates that they comprise 20-25% of the new arrivals coming from that part of northwest Somalia close to Boroma. The estimate of the total of new arrivals at Teferi Ber, Darwanaji, and Gogti/Arabia is approximately 80-90,000, of which 25,000 may be returnees. In the southern/southeastern Ogaden area, the team estimates (largely based on preliminary ARA registrations) that 100,000 returnees have crossed (or will arrive in the next few months) from the Belet Weyne region of Somalia at Ferfer/Mustahil/Kalafo. The third large concentration has been crossing into the most southerly part of the Ogaden at Melka Suftu, Dolo, and Dolo Bay. It is believed this group, mostly returnees also, will total about 75,000 by the end of 1991. Thus the team recommends that a planning figure of 200,000 returnees for 1991 be adopted. (The possibility that this number might grow significantly cannot be excluded, but there is insufficient data to make any further projection.)

In the course of its study, the team examined the existing returnee programme operated by the ARA and UNHCR.

Its basic conclusions are that a fair degree of success has been achieved in reintegrating Ethiopian returnees but that the existing capacity, (about 2,000 persons/month) will not accommodate even a significant fraction of the expected 200,000 returnees within the foreseeable future. In addition, the cost per returnee in the existing programme is estimated at Birr 1,000-1,200 (inclusive of food), far too much for any foreseeable funds which are likely to be available in the near future.

Given these basic findings, the team examined possibilities for speeding up the programme and making it more cost-effective. Recommendations for solving the problem within the shortest possible time focus on the elimination of bureaucratic and transport bottlenecks, on reducing the incentive to remain in camps and on the provision of increased start-up support to returnees at the place of their chosen destination. The proposed programme relies essentially on self-reintegration and rehabilitation and does not include specific measures or projects for direct assistance other than an initial start-up grant. Nevertheless, special support to vulnerable groups is also recommended, particularly at the transit camps. This is expected to take the form of water, health and special feeding programmes.

The assistance package to returnees is designed to emphasize the cash grant and de-emphasize food allotments. The formula proposed by the mission team is make a cash grant of Birr 300 for each adult family member (maximum of two), and Birr 250 for each dependant. The average family grant would likely be Birr 1,350. The food package proposed would be one bag of wheat (50 kg) and one container of oil (4 liters) per person, corresponding to a three-month ration.

Transportation of the returnees (and particularly the fuel costs) will be a major component of the overall programme. To achieve a one-year settlement target it will be necessary to move an average of 20,000 returnees per month. /some need to go only short distances (Teferi Ber/Lafe Issa); others, e.g. in the Ogaden area, will need transport for hundreds of kilometres. If an average cost of \$ 1,200 per truck trip is used, with an average of 30 people per truck, the total transport cost for the entire returnee group would be approximately \$ 8 million.

The overall cost of the programme for one year (including food) is provisionally estimated at US \$ 62 million. It is proposed that it be executed by ARA, with the assistance of UNHCR. Regular and close monitoring by ARA/UNHCR as well as by donors is essential and monthly reporting to a special committee of Addis Ababa based donors is recommended.

A central - - and critical - - feature of this plan is that it relies on the initiative and ability of returnees to

reintegrate themselves and create a viable existence. This should be made clear to the returnees from the very first day, particularly those who have lived in refugee camps for the past decade or more. The reintegration process would be greatly facilitated by improvements in the general economic environment. To that end it is recommended that the Government concentrate on speeding up the liberalization of the economy. In addition both governmental and international agencies should give priority to the reintegration areas when planning infrastructure and development projects.

1. INTRODUCTION

Durable solutions to the refugee problem have traditionally centered on voluntary repatriation, local settlement and third-country resettlement. Of these three, voluntary repatriation is considered the preferred solution. Indeed, the Statute of the UNHCR (paragraph 1) calls upon UNHCR to seek "permanent solutions for the problems of refugees by assisting Governments... to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees." Similarly, the Report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on International Cooperation to Avert New Flows of Refugees, adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in 1986, calls upon Member States to respect, as their "obligation": "the rights of refugees to be facilitated in returning voluntarily and safely to their homes in their homelands."

However, the question of how to facilitate voluntary repatriation -- e.g., what types of pre-conditions, safeguards, models, monitoring, administration? has continued to elude policy-makers. Thus, the recent large-scale influx of returnees from war-torn Somalia into Ethiopia has caught governmental, inter-governmental and nongovernmental organizations unprepared. Unlike the situation of refugees, who have existed since the proverbial expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden, that of returnees has little precedent to guide these organizations. There is, for example, no organization especially created to deal with the problem of returnees, in contradiction to refugees (e.g., UNHCR) Limited resources intended for refugees are already stretched thin by compassion fatigue, exacerbated by

a 50 percent increase of refugees during the past decade. Some organizations may view returnees' problems as falling outside their terms of reference. For refugees, they argue, are by definition citizens of the country of origin, hence the responsibility of that country.

The decision of the Ethiopian Government to invite the MDTM to address the problems of both refugees and returnees in Ethiopia, and the decision of the MDTM to accept that invitation, are hopeful signs. Not only is there a possibility of improving the assistance and protection of both categories of people, but also an improvement of the conditions of returnees could not fail to impact favorably on voluntary repatriation as the preferred durable solution.

Perhaps foreseeing the important role that voluntary repatriation will play in Africa, the OAU convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa contains elaborate provisions on voluntary repatriation. Because of its importance and relevance, Article V is reproduced in full:

1. The essentially voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases and no refugee shall be repatriated against his will.
2. The country of asylum, in collaboration with the country of origin, shall make adequate arrangements for the safe return of refugees who request repatriation.
3. The country of origin, on receiving back refugees, shall facilitate their resettlement and grant them the full rights and privileges of nationals of the country, and subject them to the same obligations.
4. Refugees who voluntarily return to their country shall in no way be penalized for having left it for any of the reasons giving rise to refugee situations. Whenever necessary, an appeal shall be made through national information media and through the Administrative Secretary General of the OAU, inviting refugees to return home and giving assurance that the new circumstances prevailing in their country of origin

will enable them to return without risk and to take up a normal and peaceful life without fear of being disturbed or punished, and that the text of such appeal should be given to refugees and clearly explained to them by their country.

5. Refugees who freely decide to return to their homeland, as a result of such assurances or on their own initiative, shall be given every possible assistance by the country of asylum, the country of origin, voluntary agencies and international in intergovernmental organizations, to facilitate their return.

Since Ethiopia is a party to the OAU Convention and, indeed, is the host of OAU, the MDTM has adopted the forgoing provisions as its basic guidelines in matters concerning returnees in Ethiopia.

2. LESSONS FROM PAST EXPERIENCES

2.1 CATEGORIES

Two categories of returnees are distinguished: spontaneous and organized returnees. Very little is known about the spontaneous returnees but most observers expect their number vastly to exceed that of the organized returnees. Information about implementation, results and impact of the various programmes for organized returnees is also limited and the conclusions and experiences reported here are largely based on observations of mission members and discussions with officials, returnees and others residing in the areas of reintegration. Given the limited time available to the mission, it was not possible to access, obtain and digest all of the existing documentation (more detailed information will be found in the following documents: ICARA 1 and 2 reports, UNHCR/IFAD report, July 1989, Barak/RRC completion report, June 1987, UNHCR follow-up survey of returnees, 1988, etc.) and it should be emphasized that the findings and conclusions reported here are likely to be biased and unrepresentative. It is clear that an in-depth evaluation of the returnee programmes by an independent organization such as the Institute for Development Research of Addis Ababa University is urgently required.

Several returnee programmes have been organized in the recent past and the focus in this section of the report is on these programmes. An early programme was the one organized in 1984/5 by UNHCR/RRC (with assistance from LWF) for returnees from Djibouti, several of whom (6000 to 8000 families, about 30.000 persons) were settled or reintegrated in Kelafo, Barak, Shenille, Erer, Adigalla and Harawa in the Ogaden and Dire Dawa regions. The cost of resettlement in projects for irrigated agriculture may have amounted to Birr 2500 per person, excluding overhead costs.

Another programme (UNHCR/ARA) was started in 1986 following an agreement reached between the Governments of Ethiopia and Somalia; a registration exercise was carried out in the Somali camps in 1988 and an initial target was fixed for the return of some 150.000 persons in 5 years. The programme is operated through two returnee reception centers, one in Babile (4500 persons up to February 1991) and one in Negele (15,460 persons so far); a third reception center had been planned for Kelafo but this center has not yet become operational. An assistance package is provided under this programme amounting to Birr 700 in cash and Birr 250 in food for a family of 5, in addition to transport, cooking utensils and some implements. The total cost per family, including overhead, has amounted to Birr 2500 or more (Birr 500 per capita). Village infrastructure (water, health, schools) has also been provided.

The mission is not aware of any in-depth evaluations of these programmes and it is strongly recommended that such evaluations be undertaken soon (section 4.6. below gives further details).

2.2 IMPLEMENTATION ASPECTS

Numerous implementation problems have been reported, most frequently referring to unavailability of transport, food and/or cash. Administrative and bureaucratic delays and complicated screening and checking procedures have also contributed to the shortfalls in the number of persons returned to their areas of origin: some 5000 persons were assisted in each of the last two years against a target and capacity of about 25,000 persons per annum.

Instances of apparently illogical and wasteful practices were also encountered: returnees from Lafe Issa are transported from the border, through Lafe Issa, to Babile reception center and then back to Lafe Issa, a total movement of about 250 km for a distance of 35 km; water is trucked from Harar to Babile to supply the reception center while the water from the Babile springs is trucked to Harar for bottling; UNHCR and ARA zonal offices in Awassa supervise a single sub-office in Negele. Returnees complain about not receiving the support promised at the time of registration; cash support was reduced and food rations do not arrive in time or at all; returnees are kept waiting at the place of reintegration for the receipt of promised food items.

2.3 RESULTS

Two of the earlier resettlement projects (Kelafo and Barak) reached self-sufficiency and were handed over to the Ministry of Agriculture for regular extension assistance after periods of 7 and 3 years respectively. The two projects, although expensive and not without continuing problems related to operation and maintenance have achieved their basic objective, that is, provide a reasonable standard of living to returnees.

Although many who had returned to their areas of origin were interviewed by mission members, it is clear that large numbers, possibly between 30 and 50%, cannot readily be traced any longer, having moved out of the area of reintegration. Among the remaining ones, those interviewed were generally found to have settled down and taken up a normal life, probably not much different from their neighbours. Unemployment, particularly in the initial period of reintegration and among women and the more educated persons, is likely to be high and probably somewhat higher than for the population at large. An unexpectedly large number of returnees was found to have taken up jobs in trade and other services. Reinstallation as nomadic livestock producer (attempts at which were abandoned after 1988) is unlikely to be feasible, unless on a purely kinship basis with the full cooperation of kin and involving redistribution of stock rather than increased animal numbers. This may offer one possible explanation for the greater than expected number of refugees in

the service sectors. Farming appeared to have been taken up by relatively few returnees, the principal reason being the nomadic nature of most returnees, and another the difficulty of acquiring land and oxen. The latter process can take several years. Earlier returnees are clearly better-off than more recent returnees and this can be attributed both to the time necessary to reintegrate completely and establish a sound economic base and to the fact that the earlier returnees received more substantial assistance (Birr 1150 in cash at one stage). There are clear differences in socio-economic conditions between villages and areas and these are reflected in the economic conditions of the returnees. Improvements in overall economic conditions are of significance also. Transport, cash and food assistance alone would take the returnees nowhere without an improvement in the performance of the economy. Job opportunities are better in better-off areas, e.g. urban centres and areas having benefitted from the lifting of restrictions on trade and (private) investment. This is most evident in the Djibouti and Kenya border areas to which many of the returnees were said to have moved to in order to take advantage of better job and business opportunities.

2.4 CONCLUSIONS

It is concluded that the organized returnee programmes, on the whole, have been able to achieve their basic objective, viz. successfully to reintegrate Ethiopian refugees. In quantitative terms, however, the programmes have not been successful since far fewer returnees have been assisted than anticipated. This is only partly due to lack of funds. Complicated and lengthy procedures for screening and checking, and inadequate logistics also explain some of the shortfalls in the number of returnees that has been assisted. The resulting under-utilization of capacity and inefficiencies in programme implementation have combined to increase the cost of reintegration (probably having amounted to birr 1000 or more per returnee over the last two years).

Expensive resettlement in irrigated agriculture, although quite successful in itself, provides a limited solution only. This does not imply that proposals for projects like the Mustahil

gravity irrigation and Berek 2 projects should be rejected out of hand; rather, they deserve serious consideration in the context of separate programmes and the team supports the recommendations made to this effect in the UNHCR/IFAD report.

It is further concluded that the programme needs to be streamlined and simplified in order to handle much larger numbers of returnees; more extensive reliance on market forces and existing opportunities will be necessary, implying that people are allowed the choice to be moved to areas other than their areas of origin. Conversion of non-cash assistance to cash and single, lump-sum, assistance rather than staggered delivery of food rations is also to be preferred. The final result of the programmes is greatly affected by the overall economic environment. Lifting of further restrictions on private investment and trade, easing of administrative and infrastructural constraints and improvements in the provision of basic commodities will be of decisive importance to the final result of the returnee programmes.

3. PRESENT RETURNEE SITUATION

Since the first weeks of 1991, the eastern half of Ethiopia has been struck by a new wave of refugees/returnees which nearly equals that of mid-1988. It is impossible to state the precise number of newly arrived returnees due to the following main reasons:

- difficulty with registration
- mix of returnees and refugees
- continuous movement of people, especially in the Ogaden region from one area to another which is likely to result in double counting.

However, indicative figures provided by the ARA/HCR (and occasionally adjusted on the basis of NGO reports) are given below by region:

a) Hararghe Region

As of mid- to late February 1991 the mission believes some 20-25,000 people have crossed into Teferi Ber and probably the same number into Darwanaji. Perhaps another 20,000 arrived at the

Gogt/Arabia area. However, at Kebri Bayeh there is probably another group of 18-20,000, mostly returnees from the "eastern" camps in Somalia. The total of 80-90,000 persons then comprises both returnees and refugees. No formal registration had taken place but ARA/HCR had started registering the above into returnee and refugee groups. It is assumed that over 70% of the above population could be Somali refugees who could well depart soon. The mission saw about 20,000 people at Darwanaji receiving food & water rations and about the same number at Teferi Ber. The condition of the people at the above places did not appear to be critical. In both places, they had access to food and water, and in Darwanaji, they also could participate in the local market.

b) Ogaden Autonomous Region

The number of returnees in the desolate and distant-from-the capital Ogaden are even more dramatic. In this area the returnee/refugee ratio is reversed. During the briefing by the Chief Administrator of the region at Gode on 13 February 1991, the number of registered returnees was stated as 56,715 while the number of refugees was put as 8,762. (The above figures appear quite conservative because the number of returnees at Mustahil alone was reported as 55,000 on February 14 (of which some 35,000 were registered) while the number of refugees were put at 35,000.) The Mustahil returnees are reportedly spread over five sites namely Mustahil, Burkur, Shebelle, Ulasan and Lababor. The mission visited the site around Mustahil where about 5,000-7,000 people were seen camped among bushes and trees along the Wabe Shebelle river spread over an area of one kilometer. There were clear cases of malnutrition among the young, particularly. The mission also saw about 5,000 returnees in the Kelafo township in similar living conditions as in Mustahil. The daily death rate was indicated by local authorities to be 3-5 people. The predicament in the Ogaden region is further compounded by significant lack of rainfall during the past three years. At present, the condition could be characterized as on of growing famine.

c) Borena Region

Further to the west, the number of returnees reported by ARA/HCR at Dolo, Softu and Moyale as of February 13 was 51,827 all of whom had been registered. This figure also includes a minimal number of refugees. There are reportedly a large number of unregistered people as well; no precise figure was available. The mission could not, due to time and logistical constraints, visit Dolo and Suftu sites but it was gathered that most of the above people are living under the open sky at those locations areas. As of mid-February about 50 people had been reported to have died.

How large is the returnee burden? (This part of the mission report must arbitrarily exclude from its considerations the obviously intertwined refugee aspect.) The mission has more confidence in the figures for the Teferi Ber region than elsewhere because a number of NGOs have been supplying food, water, and medical assistance in addition to the provisional registration by the ARA. There has been less opportunity to verify the numbers in the Ogaden. The figure adopted for the purposes of the present report and to project for the full year is 200,000 persons for 1991. The breakdown by entry-point is assumed to be:

	<u>mid-February</u>	<u>Total 1991</u>
Teferi Ber/Darwanaji	25,000	28,000
Mustahil, Gode, Kelafo, Burkur	50,000	72,000
Dolo, Suftu, Moyale	65,000	100,000
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	140,000	200,000

This tracks closely with UNHCR's planning figure for 1991 which is 206,000 returnees while the interim planning figure for immediate food needs has been fixed at 140,000.

4.1 **General considerations**

The basic objective of the returnee programme proposed here is identical to that of previous programmes, viz. the successful reintegration of former refugees into Ethiopian society.

There are, however, several reasons why the strategy for achieving this objective must be different from the past. First, the number of returnees is much larger than before. Many have already arrived in the country having lost most of their meager belongings and the urgency of reintegrating them is therefore now much greater. Second, although the returnees have become de facto residents and, as such, may not qualify for assistance under existing international agreements and conventions, many have not returned voluntarily and might have preferred either to remain in Somali refugee camps for an indefinite period of time or to have opted for local integration in Somalia. It is assumed that these options have now been closed however and that the only realistic -and indeed preferred- option is to reintegrate all returning Ethiopians in the shortest possible time. The arrival of returnees has had negative environmental effects in many of the areas of reintegration. Water shortages, soil erosion and deforestation are evident. In certain sites the settled returnee population is larger than the indigenous population and, given the traditional way of sharing resources within the family clan, the standard of living of the indigenous population has consequently declined. Such negative effects would certainly increase with the arrival of large numbers of new returnees, exceeding the absorptive capacity of areas which, frequently, are marginal at best. Finally, the capacity of the existing programme, estimated at about 2,000 persons per month, must be substantially increased if the expected number of 200,000 returnees is to be cleared within a reasonably short period of time, and if escalation of the cost of maintaining a large number of persons in camps is to be avoided. The cost of past and current programmes, estimated at Birr 1000-1200 per returnee, also needs to be reduced if total costs are to be kept within reasonable limits.

Given these various challenges and constraints, the perceived need is for a strategy geared towards overcoming reluctance and suspicion on the part of the returnees, of the residents in receiving areas and of the authorities as well. The overall strategy should aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating the refugee dependency habit, create a more cost-effective approach to the problem, and seek to reduce negative environmental effects. This suggests that a rapid and widespread distribution of returnees is imperative, that permanent camps should not be allowed to appear and that conditions in the temporary camps should be sufficiently austere to stimulate people to move out as

early as possible. Detailed control and regulation of the movements of returnees is neither feasible nor desirable and a more indirect approach is better suited to the urgency and size of the task ahead. Costs must be kept to a minimum, administrative interference reduced and unnecessary movements back and forth eliminated.

The core element of the proposed strategy is to continue with the established and successful practice of providing returnees with a cash grant enabling them to construct a house, buy the necessary implements and acquire a minimum of productive assets; the size of the proposed grant is Birr 1000-1500 per family, to be determined on the basis of family size. Food rations covering the first three months are also recommended but monthly distribution to widely dispersed sites is impractical as well as undesirable from the point of view of stretching the period of dependency and this is not recommended. Transport would preferably be based on payment of the cost of transport directly to the persons concerned; in case of unavailability of private transport, WTOE, TOR, IOM or one of the Government transport organizations may be contracted by the programme. Assistance must be initially provided for the most vulnerable groups, who may not be able to stand on their own feet without additional assistance. Supplementary feeding and health care facilities should be provided in the transition camps, while improvements in basic health, water and nutritional programmes in some of the receiving villages should also be envisaged as follow-on measures. Organizations such as UNICEF, WFP and UNDP, and NGOs seeking to assist in development should be encouraged to focus on the returnee areas.

Coping with the existing problems is such an enormous task that it is considered that activities other than the rapid reintegration of returnees should not be planned for the time being. Longer term development problems must not be neglected, however, and it is recommended that assistance in identifying and formulating projects and programmes in the most affected areas of reintegration be provided to the regional offices of the MOA and of the Planning Commission. Suggestions for possible long-term development activities in these areas are provided in annex 3.

4.2 SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROPOSED STRATEGY

4.2.1 Objectives

The objectives of the proposed programme are to reintegrate the returnee population as quickly as possible so as to avoid dependency, deterioration of the nutritional and health situation and to reduce long-term costs of reintegration.

4.2.2 Means

The means for achieving this objective are:

- Reduction of the clearing procedure to a strict minimum
- Increase of the transport capacity
- Increase of the cash grant together with a simplification of the food component of the assistance package, and
- Limitation of the food assistance in the border transit camps to a comparable level to that outsided the camps (one meal per day or half rations), excluding vulnerable groups)

4.2.3 Steps

a) Screening

Immediate screening is proposed to take place on the basis of 3 criteria:

- i) Separate returnees from refugees (refugees to be transferred to refugee camps)
- ii) Separate returnee group into documented and undocumented persons
- iii) Separate the documented group into those which can be moved immediately and those families with members in serious/critical medical or nutritional situation who cannot be moved.

According to UNHCR figures, the present number of returnees is 200,000. It is likely that 165,000 returnees possess adequate documents (i.e. proof of Ethiopian birth).

It is further estimated that 70% of the returnees will be able to move immediately provided transport can be arranged without delay and the reintegration package is available; the remaining 30 % are expected to belong to the vulnerable groups.

b) Time-table

After the initial screening, the group of documented and able and willing persons is to be moved directly to the locations where they wish to be reintegrated. This group is expected to consist

of 115,000 persons. Assuming a monthly transport capacity of 40,000 (Annex 4), the transportation of this group will take 3 months. Documented persons in critical condition (about 50,000) should be moved to transit camps, where they will receive special treatment (supplementary and/or therapeutic feeding, medical treatment) before being transported. It is assumed, that this group could be reintegrated after a period of 4 to 5 months. Undocumented persons should be held at the present bordersites and provided with limited assistance (except for the vulnerable group). It is recommended that the GOE accelerate the clearing procedure in order to move these persons after the 5th month, when transport capacity will be available. Persons in critical conditions from this undocumented group could be moved to the transit centers as soon as space is available. At this rate the whole operation would take 8 to 12 months.

c) Transit camps

Temporary transit camps are expected to be set up some walking distance from the border where returnees can be received, screened and, if necessary, treated. They are expected to consist solely of tents. The provisional cost estimate, including water supplies, blankets and plastic sheets is Birr 5 million. The Genale camp, which is presently located on the edge of the Genale river should be relocated to a reasonable distance from the river, in order to avoid river pollution and a high incidence of malaria epidemics.

Health and medical supplies: Annex 5

d) Returnee Assistance Package

In order to stimulate reintegration, it is proposed to increase the assistance package to 300 Birr each for a maximum of two adults per family and to 250 Birr for each dependent; the total for an average family of 5 would amount to 1,350 Birr in cash. The food package would be reduced and simplified to 1 bag of wheat (50kg) and 1 tin of oil (4l) per person, corresponding approximately to a 3 month ration (108 Birr/person). The food package could be increased for returnees desiring to

resettle in areas such as the Ogaden, where food shortages are experienced.

4.3 FOOD AND FOOD LOGISTICS

Food supply is the immediate need for the returnees. There is acute shortage of food of all types in the Ogaden, especially at Mustahil, Kelafo, Gode, Korah, Shilabo, Welwel and Wader awrajas. The situation is further compounded by continuous drought in the region. The RRC distributed 7.5 kgs of wheat per family to selected distressed returnees at Mustahil under its drought relief programme. WFP supplied faffa (40 MT) reached a fragment of the returnee population in the Ogaden and that was about the only food that many families were using to feed the severely malnourished children during the mission's visit.

Food supply at Dolo and Melka Suftu is also reported to be precarious. WFP made available, at the beginning of February, some 1,155 mt of food commodities which could not be transported due to fuel shortage.

The situation at Teferi Ber and Darwanaji is not good but better than the Ogaden and Borena regions. Most of the newly arrived returnees and refugees were receiving WFP supplied food rations borrowed from the refugee programmes. Moreover, at least foodstuffs were also available in the local markets, albeit at very high prices (Birr 3 to 4.5/kg of wheat).

Provision of food alone will not be sufficient. Without supply of fuel and placement of trucks food will not move. Hence it is most urgent to make fuel supply and logistics arrangements.

Food requirements for returnees

As the number of potentially vulnerable people is quite large and in a deteriorating state of health, food should be provided in the following forms (detailed figures in Annex 4):

- a) Gruel kitchen facility for all once a day. Half of the daily ration entitlement could be used to prepare this food.

- b) Supplementary and/or therapeutic feeding for children under five years of age, lactating and pregnant women.
- c) Dry ration for families.

Storage

There are adequate storage facilities available at Gode, Kelafo, Mustahil and Negele for storing immediate food supplies. The conversion of half of one of the sheds at Negele into storage should be done immediately; it involves minimal costs. However storage facilities are totally lacking at Dolo and a Rubhall store needs to be setup there immediately.

Food Logistics

Food logistics also pose a very serious problem. Movement of already allocated food items is still held up due to acute fuel shortage. Urgent steps should be taken to start or improve food movement and distribution.

As immediate steps, it is suggested that an airlift of food commodities be started to Gode and Kelafo. The HCR sub-office in Dire Dawa indicated immediate availability of three trucks to be allocated exclusively to the Ogaden operation. This should be done immediately. WTOE could also be contracted for supply of food to the Ogaden region while the Ethiopian Red Cross Society could be contracted for transport in the Borena region. Moreover, there is currently an under-utilized trucking capacity in the country due to fuel shortage. Supply of fuel should be secured to take advantage of this opportunity. Efforts should be made to secure loan of fuel from WTOE while pursuing other supply possibilities.

Trucks carrying food might be used to carry returnees on their way back to their integration areas. The mission understands there are problems of insurance and other technical concerns for some trucking operations, but believes this idea should be explored. Transport costs from Assab to final destination are estimated on the basis of US \$ 350/mt.

4.4 TRANSPORTATION

If bureaucratic impediments can be eliminated, the principal bottleneck to the returnee operation will be transport to take them to their areas of origin. There is a serious lack of logistical and handling capacity on the part of both ARA and HCR to cope with such large influxes. In the Ogaden, returnees are mostly being transported on an adhoc basis, depending upon fuel availability, by trucks belonging to Somali nationals who have also crossed into Ethiopia. A few returnees are trying to move on their own. There are absolutely no HCR facilities at present to move these people to their places of origin. Total absence of fuel in the region is preventing any kind of movement.

For the eastern returnees (Teferi Ber and Darwanaji) movement to integration areas is also restricted due to shortage of transportation facilities. The situation for the Southern returnees (Dolo, Suftu) is also fraught with transportation difficulties. HCR has an operational fleet of 18 trucks at Negele out of which six need some minor repair and maintenance to be put on the road. The other 12 trucks are reportedly at Dolo although no clear plans to move returnees from Dolo has been mentioned by authorities.

It is clear that neither the ARA nor the HCR has the capacity or the resource to undertake large scale movement of the returnees from the points of entry to their places of integration. There is an urgent need to mobilize vehicles for quick movement of the newly arrived returnees. Since most of the truck fleet in Ethiopia is standing idle, it would seem possible to reach a target of 40,000 returnees transported per month, if fuel and cash were up to be made available by the donors; 1,350 journeys per month would be required, assuming 30 persons transported per trip. All food transport should be used to transport returnees on the return trip. Assistance may also be sought from WTOE, TOR, Government transport organizations and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

4.5 ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

The Government agency responsible for returnee affairs and for implementation of the programme is the ARA. It is assisted by those organizations already helping out in the refugee program:

- WFP for food
- WTOE and TOR for transport and fuel
- CARE for water supply in the East
- MSF for health assistance
- OXFAM for emergency health and water assistance

ARA should make an immediate assessment of the capacity of these agencies to be involved in the returnee programme. It is recommended that consideration be given to the creation of a special task force within the Ministry of Internal Affairs to act immediately on the proposed clearance procedures.

Funds are to be channeled through the UNHCR and it is recommended that UNHCR make a particular effort to accelerate transfer and disbursement of funds and assist ARA in over-all management, reporting and monitoring.

4.6 FURTHER STUDIES, MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The programme is unique in the sense that it relies heavily on the ability and willingness of returnees to reintegrate themselves. Experience with this approach is limited, not just in Ethiopia but in other countries as well and it is important therefore that

- a) a more thorough evaluation of the ongoing programme and of returnee experiences over the last 3 to 4 years be undertaken as a matter of urgency; and
- b) future returnees are followed over a period of time in order to determine the results of the proposed programme. Follow-up visits on a quarterly basis to a selected number of returnees are proposed to record what happens to returnees after arrival at the chosen sites, to determine whether and to what extent reintegration is successful and to identify factors which facilitate and/or hinder reintegration. The mission recommends that the resources and personnel of the University of Addis Ababa

might be usefully involved in the monitoring phase. An independent organization such as the Institute for Development Research should be requested to undertake these studies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- o Ethiopian returnee influx from Somalia since the Beginning of 1991 constitute a new and critical problem for the GDPRE. The requirement is to absorb or integrate as much as 200,000 people in this year. The international community should acknowledge the existence of this development.
- o An austere budget for transportation and assisting this returnee population is estimated to be \$ 62 million. The international community should take note of this as well.
- o In addition to the need for external funding to meet this extraordinary set of problems, there will be a requirement for the GDPRE to display flexibility and creativity in the rapid processing of the returnees, if reintegration is to succeed.
- o International organizations and NGOs can and should participate in the latter stage of the returnee program by targetting the areas of return/reintegration with their development and infrastructure projects.
- o Cash grants to the returnees should be maximized, permanent facilities to process them should be minimized, and food grants should be made only on a one-time basis.
- o The returnees should be made to understand their responsibility for the program's success, i.e., that the program is largely one of self-reintegration.

MDTM 11-23 FEBRUARY, 1991
PARTICIPANT LIST

TEAM ON RETURNEES AFFAIRS

(BABILE LEG)

H.E. Mr. Francis Filleul, Ambassador, Embassy of Canada
Team leader

Mr. Willem Keddeman (Netherlands) - Economist
Senior economist in Agriculture and Rural Development,
Netherlands Economic Institute. Has worked several times in
Ethiopia.

Mr. J. Lammers (EEC) -- Refugee Affairs
Humanitarian Aid Monitor with several years of experience in
refugee matters in Ethiopia.

Dr. Luke Lee (USA) -- Refugee Affairs

Mr. Markus Wespi (Switzerland) -- Agronomist
Participated in several missions and development projects in
Ethiopia. Also has experience in administration and
education.

Escort:

Ato Tsegaye Meheretu (ARA) -- Returnee Affairs
ARA Programme Officer for Returnee Affairs

(GODE/KELAPO LEG)

Mr. Jim Borton (UNDP) -- Food Logistics

Mr. Felice Dindo (ICRC) --

Dr. Olle Jeppson (Sweden) -- Public Health
Former representative of Save the Children Fund (Sweden) in
Yemen. Has experience with refugee matters in Mozambique.

Mr. John Egan McAteer (USA) -- Refugee Affairs
Refugee Coordinator of the US embassy in Addis Ababa.

Mr. Mohammed Saleheen (WFP) -- Returnee Affairs
Officer in charge of the Returnee Program at WFP

(NEGELE/MOYALE LEG)

all of the above and

Ms. Helle-Marianne Vadmand (UNDP) -- Development
(for Mr. Jim Borton)

11

MULTI-DONOR TECHNICAL MISSION TO ETHIOPIA
FEBRUARY 11 -23, 1991

ANNEX 2

SCHEDULE

SOUTHERN TEAM

Monday, February 11, 1991

- 8:00 - 8:30 Registration - Hilton Hotel
- 8:30 - 9:00 Opening Address to the Multi-Donor Technical Mission by H.E. Mersha Ketsela, Vice Minister for Internal Affairs
- 9:00 -10:30 Briefings by the Administration for Refugee Affairs (ARA) and other Ethiopian Government Ministries
- 10:30 - 11:00 Coffee Break
- 11:00 - 13:00 Presentation/Discussion by Cecil Kpenou, UNHCR and staff
- 13:00 - 15:00 Lunch
- 15:00 - 17:00 Discussion with UN agencies regarding the refugee situation
WHO, WFP, UNICEF, UNDP
- 18:30 Reception by the GPDRE for the participants of the MDTM at the Ghion Hotel

Tuesday, February 12, 1991

- 9:00 - 10:00 Team meetings chaired by the leading ambassadors
- 10:00 - 10:45 Briefing by GTZ/TOR
- 10:45 - 11:00 Coffee Break
- 11:00 - 13:00 Meetings with Non-Governmental Organizations working in camps
MSF - Medecins sans Frontiers
CAFE
SCF U.A. - Save the Children Fund
SCF, U.S.
Redda Barnen

13:00 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 15:00 Briefing by WTOE
15:00 - 15:30 Coffee Break
15:30 - 16:00 Administrative arrangements for the following day
18:30 Reception given by John Egan McAteer, Refugee Coordinator, U.S. Embassy for the returnee team

GODE TEAM ONLY

Wednesday, February 13, 1991

6:00 Depart Hilton for Bole Airport
7:00 Depart for Gode (together with Aware group)
9:00 Arrival in Gode
Depart immediately for Kelafo
12:30 Arrival in Kelafo
Curtesy call with local authorities in Kelafo
13:00 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 17:00 visit returnee reception center, tour returnee sites nearby if time permits
19:00 Dinner and overnight in Kelafo

Thursday, February 14, 1991

7:30 Depart by automobile for Mustahil
11:00 Arrival in Mustahil
View the returnee /refugee gathering areas
14:30 Depart for Kelafo
17:30 Arrival in Kelafo
Dinner and overnight

Friday, February 15, 1991

7:30 Breakfast
8:30 Depart Kelafo for Gode
Visit returnee sites en route as time permits
15:00 Depart Gode via chartered aircraft for Addis Ababa
17:00 Arrival in Addis Ababa

13:00 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 15:00 Briefing by WTOE
15:00 - 15:30 Coffee Break
15:30 - 16:00 Administrative arrangements for the following day
18:30 Reception given by John Egan McAteer, Refugee Coordinator, U.S. Embassy for the returnee team

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View the returnee /refugee gathering areas
14:30 Depart for Kelafo
17:30 Arrival in Kelafo
Dinner and overnight

Friday, February 15, 1991

7:30 Breakfast
8:30 Depart Kelafo for Gode
Visit returnee sites en route as time permits
13:00 Depart Gode via chartered aircraft for Addis Ababa
17:00 Arrival in Addis Ababa

BOTH GROUPS

Saturday, February 16, 1991

6:00 Depart Hilton for Bole Airport
7:00 Depart Addis for Negele by chartered aircraft
9:30 - 10:30 Arrival in Negele
Curtesy call on local authorities in Negele
10:45 - 11:55 Visit of Negele Returnee Reception Centre
12:00 - 13:30 Lunch in Negele
13:30 - 17:30 Visit of returnee areas around Negele
(Gura-Harabala, Meassa, Bitata
19:00 Dinner and overnight in Negele

Sunday, February 17, 1991

7:00 Breakfast
7:30 - 9:30 Drive to Udet
9:30 - 10:30 Visit of returnees in Udet
10:30 - 13:00 Drive to Moyale
13:00 - 14:00 Lunch in Moyale
14:00 - 15:00 Drive to El-Leh
15:00 - 16:00 Drive to El-Gof
16:15 - 16:45 Visit returnees in El-Gof
17:00 - 17:45 Drive to Moyale
19:00 Dinner and overnight in Moyale

Monday, February 18, 1991

7:00 - 7:30 Breakfast in Moyale
7:30 - 8:15 Drive to Tuka
8:15 - 9:00 Visit returnees at Tuka
9:00 - 11:30 Drive to Finchawa
11:30 - 12:30 Visit returnees at Finchawa
12:30 - 13:15 Drive to Hageremariam
13:15 - 14:30 Lunch at Hageremariam
14:30 - 17:30 Drive to Awassa
19:00 Dinner and overnight in Awassa

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

8:00 Breakfast in Awassa
8:30 Depart Awassa for Addis Ababa
13:00 Arrival in Addis Ababa

ANNEX 3

Possible Developmental Projects in Areas of Reintegration.

Livestock and Range.

Staff of the South Eastern Rangeland Development Project in Yabello considered that the carrying capacity of the rangelands in Borena region and probably also in Eastern Hararghe and the Ogaden Region has already been exceeded and that degradation of the rangeland due to overgrazing is already serious. Development of new water points for animal watering purpose should therefore not be considered and restocking programs to rehabilitate nomadic pastoralists should not be envisaged, unless they involve a redistribution of animals within the group or between families. This is not to say that the number of persons supported by livestock production or the incomes could not be increased. Some (limited) scope exists for crop and pasture production increases and a fairly considerable scope exists for increased offtake and marketing. These possibilities should be explored further.

Agriculture and irrigation

There exists a certain agricultural potential along the rivers Dawa, Genale and Wabe Shebelle where returnees could make a semi-nomadic living. Sites have been identified in the Dire Dawa (Barak 2), Ogaden (Mustahil) and Borena (Melka Willo, Bagelma, Melkahulu, Melka, Genale camp and Melka-Dida) Regions but more detailed investigations are needed to determine size of area, absorptive capacity, project costs, feasibility, etc.

It is recommended that in all the regions where returnees are to be reintegrated irrigation projects be identified and formulated for submission to donors. Special attention should be given to irrigation techniques to be proposed in view of reducing dependency on fuel and spare part supply (i.e. solar or animal driven pumping systems should be considered.)

Erosion control and afforestation

In some of the returnee areas, where rainfed agriculture is possible, it has been observed that due to the massive arrival of returnees indiscriminate clearing of former bushland and forest has been undertaken, rapidly leading to erosion (e.g. in Djamouk near Moyale). The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) should give special attention to those areas and mandate development agents to guide returnees in their bush clearing activities (e.g. leave horizontal uncleared strips between farms). Afforestation programs applying food-for-work or cash-for-work methodology could absorb returnee manpower and help to cope with erosion problems and firewood shortage. Ethiopia has a long experience with this type of programme (e.g. WFP project 2488) and some preliminary proposals have already been formulated by agents of the MoA in the Hararghe, Sidamo and Borena regions; these proposals could be implemented within a relatively short period of time.

Rehabilitation

An interesting and successful way of rehabilitating the farmers through a loan scheme on a revolving fund basis has been implemented in the Tuka service cooperative (SC) with the assistance of FAO's Freedom from Hunger Campaign. This experience could be duplicated in other SC's with a considerable number of returnees. An inventory of SC's in returnee areas should be compiled. The number of actual members and probable new returnee members as well as the management capacity should be investigated. Agencies capable of and willing to implement and monitor such a rehabilitation program should be identified (MoA is ready to provide training, supervision and auditing). An indicative cost of 300 to 400 Birr per member could be taken as a planning figure. Out of the total of 44 SC in the Borena Region 20 could be able to manage such a revolving fund. Total cost for Borena Region: 8 Mio. Birr

Resettlement schemes

Even if all the above mentioned development activities were implemented it would not be possible to reintegrate all returnees within their area of origin without affecting severely the environment. We therefore recommend that studies be made to resettle volunteers in schemes outside the area of origin (unit preferably within the same tribal area). For such schemes the GOE could make available state farm areas.

Planning and Implementation

It is obvious that the above mentioned mid/long term development programs must be addressed to returnees as well as to the indigenous population. They have however become necessary and need to be given priority because of the returnee problem and thus must be considered as part of the overall returnee program, even though these programs lie beyond the duties of the UNHCR.

It is recommended that the donor community assist the regional offices of the MoA and of the Planning Commission in identifying and formulating the above mentioned projects if such a request should be addressed to them, and to support their implementation if formulation turns out to be satisfactory.