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CONCEPT PAPER: NEAR EAST REGIONAL POPULATION PROJECT ISSUES AND PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS

by

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I. BACKGROUND ON PAPER.

Introduction. The purpose of this paper is to identify current and emerging population and demographic issues, and their programmatic implications, that might be addressed in a Near East Bureau Regional Population project.

Specifically, the scope of work required that the consultant undertake the requisite research and prepare a 40- to 50-page paper that would identify issues and their programmatic implications relevant to the Near East and Eastern Europe in the following areas: family planning and health, and demographic trends such as mortality, changing age structures, urbanization, migration and housing, among others. The author was also asked to examine the ways in which the demographic issues related to women's status. Twenty-seven days were allotted for this task.

While the paper was being prepared, A.I.D. separated the Europe Near East (ENE) Bureau into the Near East and Eastern Europe Bureaus. Accordingly, the consultant then prepared two papers: this paper, which identifies issues relevant to the Near East, and a similar paper for Eastern Europe.

Organization. This paper first presents, in Section II, Family Planning and Development, issues and their programmatic implications related to family planning and contraceptive and fertility trends. Section III, Demographic Trends and Development, presents a range of demographic issues and their programmatic implications.

Methodology. The consultant requested that both A.I.D./CDIE and FHI (Family Health International) undertake computer-based literature reviews. The consultant reviewed the relevant documents that resulted from these searches and incorporated the findings into the paper. In addition, the consultant reviewed a wide range of documents from the United Nations, the World Bank, IPPF, other offices at A.I.D., The Population Council, The Futures Group, The Population Crisis Committee and Research Triangle Institute. A bibliography is provided at the end of this report.

II. FAMILY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT.

1. ISSUE: CONTRACEPTIVE REQUIREMENTS, CONTRACEPTIVE DEMANDS, AND COST IMPLICATIONS.

"Our projections indicate that the largest percentage increase in cost will be in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East, regions where contraceptive use will likely increase the most."

Family Health International, 1990

What are the future contraceptive requirements, demands and cost implications in the Middle East? A recent study (Janowitz, et al., 1990) examined these questions for the years 1988-2000. It made the following projections. The Near East will have, in the year 2000

(1) the second highest population growth rate (35 percent) of the four regions examined (Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America);

(2) the second highest percentage increase in married women of reproductive age (41 percent);

(3) the second highest fertility rate (4.27); and

(4) the second lowest projected contraceptive prevalence rate (44.4-47.7).

Nevertheless, the total number of married women of reproductive age using contraception will increase by 97 percent (again, the second highest increase among the four regions).

With respect to cost projections, if contraceptive prevalence were to increase to 44-48 percent to reach the target fertility rate, and using the same method mix as in 1988, costs would increase by 96 percent (US$81 million) to approximately US$170 million. Under a second scenario (which would include a decrease in traditional methods and an increase in modern, more costly methods) costs would increase even more, to approximately US$225 million.

A World Bank study (1990), based on higher projected contraceptive prevalence rates in the year 2000, indicated that the cost requirements in the Maghreb alone would be similar to those of the first scenario described above. Estimated annual costs, between 1990 and 2005 in Tunisia, would increase from US$14 to US$28 million, in Morocco from US$30 to US$73 million, and in Algeria from $31 to $83 million. The study assumed that real contraceptive costs would remain constant, an unrealistic assumption since it is increasingly costly and difficult to reach poor and rural population groups.

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS.

It is unlikely that donor funding can meet these costs in the year 2000 and beyond. The need for donor funding can be reduced by increasing the involvement of the private sector (other approaches such as increasing efficient use of resources and cost-recovery are being addressed by other bureau projects). Four approaches to increased private sector involvement that might be advanced through a regional project (increased local production, employment-based provision of services, public-private sector partnerships and privatization) are discussed below.

1) **Increased Local Production**. A 1991 UNFPA report examined local contraceptive production in 16 developing countries, 4 of which were in the former ENE Bureau region: Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and Philippines. It examined local production of four methods: oral contraceptives; IUDs; injectables; and condoms. Key findings were as follows:

- Although 5 of the 16 countries will soon be almost completely autonomous in terms of contraceptive production capacity, none was a former ENE Bureau country.
- Six nations were found to have inadequate capacity for each of the four methods reviewed, including Egypt and the Philippines.
- As of 1990, the countries identified as having the largest deficits included Pakistan and Turkey for condoms; Egypt and Turkey for IUDs; and the Philippines for oral contraceptives.
- No former ENE Bureau country was found to have a surplus capacity.

Brief observations about local production potential in the four former ENE Bureau countries included the following:

Egypt. In Egypt, the private sector is the predominant source of contraceptives. Egypt has a highly developed commercial pharmaceutical industry. In 1985, the government of Egypt expressed interest in producing all contraceptives locally. Since the late 1960s, three government pharmaceutical companies were set up as joint ventures with Schering, Wyeth and Searle. A 1988 study (UNFPA) concluded that local production of copper-T IUDs was technically and financially feasible, but internal discussion between various government ministries has delayed implementation. Existing levels of condom sales do not warrant full-scale production; local screening and packaging capabilities could be investigated, however.

Pakistan. Condoms and sterile IUDs are not currently manufactured in Pakistan. The 1990 estimated annual condom requirement is quite high (over 116 million) and is projected to reach over 395 million in the year 2000. A.I.D. supplies about 150 million condoms to Pakistan per year. These commodity requirements are more than sufficient to justify some consideration of local condom manufacture. By upgrading and expanding existing facilities, Pakistan has the potential to produce all of its requirements for oral contraceptives and injectables. There is concern that Pakistan's regulatory oversight capability for medical device manufacture be strengthened adequately before these ventures proceed.

Philippines. Currently, there are 4.5 million contraceptive users in the Philippines. However, fewer than half of all users rely on modern contraceptive methods. By the year 2000, the number of contraceptive users is expected to increase to 7.4 million users and just over half -- some 52 percent -- are expected to be users of modern methods. Survey results indicate that current reliance on traditional methods may be due to a lack of access to contraceptives and not to religious opposition to modern methods. One company produces one brand of low-dose orals in limited quantities and is the only contraceptive manufacturer in the Philippines. Local production is far below the estimated 1990 orals requirement of 9.3 million cycles. Although the company currently manufacturing orals in the Philippines has indicated that it does not want to expand capacity, "donor agencies may want to evaluate the acceptability of this company's product and the company's ability to expand production" (UNFPA, 1991). The UNFPA report also observes that technical assistance to upgrade production and improve product quality is needed in the coming decade. Due to limited demand and other factors, local production of injectables, condoms and IUDs may not be desirable in the foreseeable future.

Turkey. Currently, there are approximately 6.5 million contraceptive users in Turkey, and by the year 2000 this number is expected to increase to almost 9.9 million. Although the government of Turkey receives its supplies for orals, condoms and IUDs from A.I.D., it has been informed by the U.S. government that this supply will be phased out over the next five years. A 1990 study funded by UNFPA concluded that although the current demand for condoms and IUDs does not warrant local production at this time, projections suggest that full-scale production may be warranted for condoms by 1994 and for IUDs by 1996. A follow-up study should be done to assess the technical and financial feasibility of intermediate production of these commodities by 1993, leading to full-scale production by the mid-1990s.

A recent trip report (Hardee-Cleaveland, 1991) noted that, with respect to Morocco, a contraceptive manufacturing project may be very successful, since the country has the commercial structure to sell to Algeria and other countries in the region, and it currently has the production capacity to manufacture oral contraceptives.

The UNFPA report (1990) had the following recommendations for possible future donor involvement in local production:

- Regional production facilities should be considered. Most countries are very interested in the possibilities for export of new, locally made products. It might be possible to encourage neighboring country programs to rely on a common format and dosage. This type of interregional cooperation would have the potential to increase production volumes and reduce per-unit prices.

- Institutional capacity to monitor the quality of both imported and locally produced contraceptives is an essential precondition to successful reliance on locally manufactured contraceptives. Donors should consider strengthening regulatory capacity through long-term programs (five to ten years).

- Although there are some prospects for providing technical assistance to initiate production, most of the opportunities for technical assistance are related to upgrading and/or expanding existing quality assurance institutions and production facilities.

- Existing and projected demand for IUDs and condoms in Egypt and Turkey may warrant new, full-scale facilities.

2) **Privatization**. Although two Middle Eastern countries, Egypt and Turkey, rely to a considerable extent on the private rather than the public sector for supply of contraceptives, in many other countries the reverse is true. Thus, there is considerable potential in many Middle Eastern countries to privatize contraceptive supply. The following UNFPA data (UNFPA, 1991) identify the percentage breakdown between public and private sector supply in a number of Near East countries.

Percentages

Country	Public	Private
Egypt	26	74
Turkey	26	74
Morocco	60	40
Lebanon	43	57
Tunisia	77	23
Pakistan	74	26

One approach might be for a regional project to undertake the analytical work required to prepare national privatization strategies in selected countries that would be receptive to this approach. Such an analysis has recently been completed for the Philippines (SGV, 1991). In Indonesia, a comprehensive privatization strategy is currently being implemented (SOMARC, 1990) which might, along with the Philippines analysis, also provide a model for privatization strategies in Near East countries. The two strategies appear to be quite different and thus illustrate the range of analyses and activities that might be undertaken.

In Indonesia, the objective of the strategy is to expand the role of the private sector in the financing of family planning so that the government can expend its resources more efficiently on poorer and

more difficult-to-reach groups. To accomplish this, the strategy has (1) lowered the cost of contraceptives (pills, condoms, IUDs, injections) to reach lower-income groups but still provide a profit to the private sector (the price of popular commercial brands was reduced by 35-60 percent to ensure affordability); (2) increased distribution points significantly to include 2,000 pharmacies, 2,000 midwives and 5,000 doctors (until the breakthrough made by this privatization effort, pharmacies and midwives were not legally permitted to dispense contraceptives); and (3) carried out sales and promotional activities. By the year 2000, the Indonesian government hopes to shift 50 percent of acceptors to the private sector.

The Philippine analysis examined how both family planning and health services might be provided through the private sector. The study investigated how these services might be provided through (1) the expansion of services of an existing health maintenance organization (HMO); (2) the establishment of a community-based HMO managed by a professional management group; and (3) the establishment of a centrally managed network of community clinics. The approach differs from the Indonesia strategy in that the various proposals, although not national in scope, provide more comprehensive benefits. For all three schemes, revisions of the initial concept had to be made in order to improve financial viability. Finally, the analysis of each scheme did not provide a conclusive assessment of sustainability of each venture.

3) **Private-Public Sector Partnerships.** A recent report on public-private sector partnerships (The Futures Group, 1991) briefly outlined a strategy for A.I.D. to work with pharmaceutical manufacturers to encourage them to supply and market contraceptive products in selected countries. The elements of the strategy for A.I.D. would be to (1) phase out availability of the donated product; (2) encourage governments to transfer the source of products to the private sector; and (3) provide funds for private sector use in mass media advertising, market research, public relations activities and training. The elements of the strategy for the pharmaceutical company would be to (1) select a product and ensure a low price; (2) target the product to lower income consumers; (3) guarantee product quality; and (4) work with A.I.D. to develop the market through advertising, distribution, training and promotional schemes. The expected outcome would be a lower product price offset by an increase in volume. Experience in the Dominican Republic, Indonesia and Morocco shows that A.I.D. projects with the private sector increase commercial contraceptive markets. For example, in the Dominican Republic, oral contraceptive sales increased from approximately 140,200,000 cycles in 1985 to 600,100,000 in 1990. Analyses project that orals sales in Morocco will increase from 2,900,000 in 1989 to 5,709,000 in 1993.

4) **Employment-Based Contraceptive Service Delivery.** This approach might be particularly relevant to the Middle East, given the region's high urbanization rates and efforts to increase industrial growth. In addition, although the percentage of women employed in industry in the Middle East might be low compared to that in other regions, employment-based projects would have the potential to be successful if they were all designed to provide services not only to factory workers but also to spouses. Many employment-based projects are designed in this way.

Employment-based family planning refers to the delivery of contraceptive services through a health clinic located in a factory or other place of business (mine, plantation, or labor union office). Research undertaken to date shows that employee-based programs make sense (Population Reports, 1987). Workers benefit because they can quickly and conveniently get supplies and services that improve family health and save lives. Employers benefit because their employees are healthier and require less employer-funded health care (especially maternity benefits). For example, cost-benefit analysis undertaken at an electrical utility company in Peru showed that for 2,500 married women,

savings could exceed costs by more than two to one in the third year of the program. In that year, the company might save US$25,000.

Employment-based family planning programs are already under way in many locations in Turkey and in a few plants in Egypt and Jordan (Population Reports, 1987). The family planning program at the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in Egypt, begun in 1962, is the oldest in the region. Services are provided through well-staffed, on-site medical facilities. In Turkey, the nation's largest labor organization, the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions, has been establishing family planning programs for union members at social security hospitals and in factories.

The results of the Misr program are highly encouraging. The program serves about 3,000 clients each month; contraceptive prevalence among factory workers is approximately 70 percent and in some villages rates are as high as 90 percent. A 1983 analysis showed that in the Gharbia governorate, where the factory is located, the local population growth rate -- 1.7 percent in towns and 1.5 in rural areas -- is far below the national average of 2.7 annually.

It was not possible to find information on the extent to which there is increasing demand in the Middle East for employment-based services. Field work might be undertaken to analyze this question and, if demand were found sufficient, a regional project might undertake follow-on analyses to identify strategies to link interested firms with local family planning provider organizations (these would be the organizations that would have the capacity to provide family planning services in the factories). It should be noted that the capacity of A.I.D. to provide this type of analytical effort at the present time is limited. The two centrally funded, private sector projects that have been undertaking this type of work are ending. The new S&T private sector family planning project will provide these types of analyses to only a few, previously selected countries.

2. ISSUE: UNWANTED PREGNANCIES.

> **"What are you going to do about unwanted pregnancies in the Middle East? With the declining economic situation and the downturn in remittances from the Gulf, households' economic situations will be getting worse and abortions are going to skyrocket."**
>
> **Senior Population Scholar, UNFPA**

What information is available on unwanted pregnancies and abortions in the Middle East and what are the development implications of unwanted pregnancies? The limited data that are available suggest that abortion rates are rising and that an important development goal would be to bring down the high rates of abortion. Data on abortion trends in the Middle East are very limited, however, and most studies report only the registered abortions in hospitals, not the illegal abortions in the back streets. More comprehensive data on abortion trends are available only for Tunisia and Turkey. Reports on these countries suggest the following:

> Turkey. One 1986 report (Tietz and Henshaw, 1986) stated that the number of abortions in Turkey in 1987 had reached 531,000, which represented an abortion rate per 1,000 of 46.1. Another report (Population Reports, 1980) stated that, on the basis of 11 nationwide or community surveys, the "number of women having illegal abortions is increasing." Between 1963 and 1975, a series of four surveys of nationally representative samples of women found that the percentage of women admitting induced abortions increased from 7.5 to 13.9 percent. A follow-up study indicated that the rate had risen to 18 percent in 1978 (Blane and

Friedman, 1990). The actual prevalence of abortion is probably much higher.

In 1980, the School of Public Health at a university in Ankara published a book entitled Abortions in Turkey, which compiled research findings nationwide. Studies in that publication found that the practice of abortion **was occurring at higher rates than had been previously acknowledged.** Seven out of ten women had at least one abortion. In 1973, the average number of children per woman who had an abortion was 5.7. Thus, those who died from abortions were from the highest fertility group in the country, which meant that each mother who died **left four or five orphans** (Gokgul, 1989). (It was this situation -- the magnitude of human suffering, the increasing number of orphans and loss of life from self-induced abortions -- that prompted the Turkish legislature in 1983 to legalize abortions up to the 10th week of pregnancy.)

Tunisia. One study (Tietz and Henshaw, 1986) presented statistics that showed that in Tunisia, the number of abortions increased from 1,400 in 1966 (abortion rate per 1,000 population = 0.3) to 23,000 in 1988 (abortion rate per 1,000 total population = 3.1).

Some of the development implications of high abortion rates are as follows.

Maternal Mortality. Maternal mortality is defined as maternal deaths resulting from complications of pregnancy and childbirth that occur within a specified time period -- usually considered 42 days after the termination of a pregnancy. To end pregnancies they did not plan to have and do not want, millions of women every year have abortions -- often illegal and unsafe. Because abortion is illegal in many developing countries, the number of maternal deaths can only be roughly estimated. Nonetheless, up to half the maternal deaths in developing countries are thought to result from abortion-related complications, deaths that family planning can significantly reduce (IMPACT, 1986). Studies in Egypt indicate that death from abortion constitutes from 2 percent to almost 10 percent of all maternal deaths (Blane and Friedman, 1990).

Effect on Health Resources. A 1990 study (Blane and Friedman) stated, "...abortion-related complications can have a profound effect on health resources." A study undertaken among women patients at Kasr-el-Aini Hospital in Cairo found that more than 50 percent of the hospital budget was spent on cases of induced abortion. In addition, "extra-complicated abortion cases cost a minimum of 25 Egyptian pounds more to treat than other cases." (Blane and Friedman, 1990, citing Kamal et al., 1973). One official in Pakistan stated that in some urban hospitals "a significant number of beds (nearly 50 percent) in some gynecological wards were occupied by women who have had 'back-street' abortions and were suffering from sepsis" (Blane and Friedman, 1990).

Abortion and Premature Births. Studies undertaken in Eastern Europe, where there is a high incidence of abortion, link abortion and premature births. One study (Klinger, 1970) found that the ratio of premature births among women who had no induced abortion was less than 10 percent; the same figure was 14 percent among those with one induced abortion; and 24 percent after three induced abortions or more.

Long-Term Health Effects of Abortion. A 1989 study (Hatcher et al.) commented, "When complications occur following induced abortion, they can cause a range of medical problems including chronic pelvic infection, which can lead to an increased risk of ectopic pregnancy

and infertility."

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS.

Abortion is a development issue. Abortion is linked to maternal mortality, premature births, chronic long-term health effects and expenditure of health resources. These are development issues that should be addressed through health, family planning and other programs. A regional project might provide training, especially in counseling, that would enable family planning services to target women who have undergone abortions. This is permitted under the law. Recently, A.I.D. clarified the types of activities that are allowed under the law to address the problems that arise as a result of abortion. In a recent court case challenging the Mexico City policy (Pathfinder Fund et al. vs. A.I.D.), Dr. Duff Gillespie, Director of the A.I.D. Office of Population, made a deposition on A.I.D.'s behalf stating that the following activities are permissible.

- A.I.D.-funded NGOs may perform abortions in cases where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term or if pregnancy followed rape or incest;
- A.I.D.-funded NGOs may provide medical assistance in response to septic or incomplete abortions;
- NGOs may use A.I.D. funds to **provide contraceptive counseling and services** to clients who have had spontaneous or induced abortions, including illegal abortions.

The author asked A.I.D./GC staff whether it would be permissible for A.I.D.-funded clinic staff to gather information on women who have had abortions in order to be better able to target contraceptive services to this group. GC staff stated that they believed that this activity would be permissible under the law. An A.I.D.-funded regional project thus might make an important contribution to bringing down the high rates of abortion in the Middle East through training in counseling and by assisting in the design of targeting contraceptive services to women who have had abortions. **Acceptance rates as high as 90 percent have been reported by programs offering contraception to women after treatment for abortion** (Hatcher et al., 1989).

A regional project might also analyze the extent to which health resources are diverted to address complications from self-induced or illegal abortions.

3. ISSUE: POLICY ANALYSIS, WOMEN'S INCOME AND FERTILITY.

"Small changes in policy can have important effects on the opportunities and constraints that determine women's labor force participation. Changes in women's labor market opportunities can, therefore, have significant effects on their reproductive behavior and, ultimately, on a nation's rate of population growth."

Turchi et al., 1991

What kinds of policy modifications might affect women's reproductive behavior and what implications would these have for fertility? A recent paper (Turchi et al., 1991) attempted to answer this question by arguing that development policy in a wide range of areas can affect women's fertility through its impact on their labor force participation. Women's labor force participation has been

found by many studies to be an important determinant of fertility. While "no universal assessment of the influence of paid employment on fertility in developing countries has been made," the evidence does suggest that "increases in paid employment for women can be an object of policy in promoting fertility reduction" (Turchi 1991, citing Joeckes, 1988). One analysis of World Fertility Survey Data from 20 developing countries found that **"female labor force [participation] emerges as the single most important determinant of marital fertility"** (Turchi et al., 1991, citing Rodriguez and Cleveland, 1981). In the Arab world, many socio-economic and demographic factors restrict women's formal labor force participation, which some believe is below 15 percent. Yet even in this region, an analysis of cross-sectional data from 18 Arab countries confirmed the inverse relationship hypothesis, finding that a high participation rate for women was associated with lower fertility and would promote economic growth (Turchi et al., 1991, citing Azzam, 1979).

Turchi et al. (1991) argue that public policy can affect a family's demand for children. They then identify four factors that influence the demand for children: (1) relative preferences for child rearing versus other activities, including work; (2) the opportunity cost of a child as perceived by the parents; (3) the expected economic contribution of the child; and (4) the potential income available to the family. They argue that the perceived opportunity cost of a child is particularly influenced by labor force opportunities and constraints affecting women and that a wide range of policies in areas such as education, legal requirements, and standards for child care, among others, can have a significant impact on a woman's demand for children.

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS.

Turchi et al. (1991) observe that public policy, by raising the standards for and thus increasing the cost of child rearing, can help deter high fertility rates. For example, the education system can be used to cultivate a demand for better educated children, i.e., if successful students are seen to earn higher wages in the labor market. The legal system can be used to raise standards for child rearing activities, to mandate higher minimum levels of education, to raise the age at marriage, and to insure adequate minimum standards for child care and supervision. In addition, public policy, by requiring higher school fees and immunization requirements, can also increase the cost of child rearing.

More broadly, the authors recommend that, if fertility reduction is the desired goal, development planners analyze development proposals to increase labor force participation opportunities for women. For any development project the analyst should ask: "To what extent does this project add to the alternative labor market activities available to women?" For infrastructure projects, an important question is: "Can infrastructure investments be designed in such a way as to make women's labor force options expand?" With respect to proposed education and training programs, the analyst should ask: "How will the proposed education projects affect a woman's potential wage rate? What changes would be necessary to endow women with the power to command higher wages?" With respect to investments in industry and business, the analyst should ask: "If the new investment does not lead to new opportunities for women, how could the form of the investment be altered to increase their opportunities?"

As a first step, field work might be undertaken to identify research institutes and women's organizations in the Near East interested in general policy analysis to affect fertility and expansion of opportunities for women in the workplace. Subsequently, a regional project might provide funding and technical assistance to those organizations interested in, for example, developing more broad-based, country-specific strategies for women's labor force participation and general policy analysis for fertility reduction.

III. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENT.

1. ISSUE: URBANIZATION/MEGA-CITIES.

"Instead of becoming 'engines of development,' cities are heading for total breakdown."

India Today

By the year 2000, 50 percent of the world's population will be living in urban areas. The urban population in developing countries will be double that of the industrialized countries and there will be almost 50 cities in developing countries with populations of over 4 million. In 1985, of the 20 largest cities of the world, 10 were in the less developed regions. By the year 2000, 16 of the 20 largest cities will be in the less developed regions. By the year 2025 nearly 60 percent of the Third World's population will be urban (Singh, n.d.).

Three of the world's "mega-cities" are in the former ENE Bureau region: Manila, Cairo, and Karachi. (Mega-cities are defined as those greater metropolitan regions that, according to UN projections, are expected to have over 10 million inhabitants by the year 2000 [Perlman, 1990]). The magnitude of these changes and the massive numbers of people involved poses a major challenge to development planners. Any effort to address the problems of poverty and development in the Third World must address the problems of urban poverty.

There is a general consensus that the world's cities are in crisis. Singh argues that this crisis is closely linked to the broader world economic crisis. Third World countries were devastated by the slowdown in OECD growth which began in 1979 and the reduction in demand for Third World products. The major effect was sharply reduced economic growth and an overall decline in GDP per capita (which had been growing at 2.7 percent per annum in developing market economies). In West Asia (from 1981-1985), GDP per capita fell at a rate of more than 4 percent per annum.

Singh observes that empirical research has shown that, more often than not, the urban areas have been most immediately affected by the economic crisis. The main reason is that in many countries the balance of payment constraint has forced a curtailment of imports of industrial raw materials, spare parts, etc., which in turn leads to low levels of industrial production and capacity utilization. Although this "import strangulation" has adverse effects on both agricultural and industrial production, to the extent that the latter requires more inputs from abroad, it has usually been affected more directly and more swiftly. Singh observes that in most countries that have experienced a decline in GDP per capita, there has been a decline in real wages, rising unemployment and underemployment and that "poverty can be expected to increase." There are very few data available on poverty levels in the 1980s, but "whatever information is available confirms this hypothesis". Table 1 provides a list of the countries with the most severe cuts in GDP per capita and health and education expenditures. Three of the countries are in the former ENE Bureau region: Tunisia, the Philippines, and Jordan.

Despite the magnitude of the urban crisis, however, the answer does not appear to be spatial redistribution policies to reduce the size of the cities. Whatever their problems, mega-cities are indeed the "engines of growth" in many economies. Table 2 shows that although many Third World cities contained a substantial portion of the country's population, their percentage contribution to the country's GNP is even greater.

Table 1

Countries with the Most Severe Cuts in Per Capita GDP
and Health and Education Expenditure, 1980-83
(percent, annual changes)

	Health 1979-1983	Education 1979-1983	GDP 1980-1985
Africa			
Ghana	-15.8[a]	- 9.5[a]	- 4.4
Malawi	- 9.8[a]	+ 7.0[a]	- 1.0
Sudan	- 9.5	-16.8[a]	- 2.6
Togo	- 7.5	+ 3.3	- 3.7
Liberia	- 6.9	- 0.6	- 7.1
Mauritius	- 6.6	- 7.7	
Tunisia	- 6.4[a]	-16.6[a]	+ 1.4
Latin America	1980-1984 (cum.)	1979-1983 p.a.	1980-1984 (cum.)
Bolivia	-77.7(to '82)	-14.1	-27.5
Guatemala	-58.3	n.a.	-14.8
Dominican Republic	-46.5	- 4.1	+ 1.8
Surinam	-44.2(to '83)	n.a.	n.a.
El Salvador	-32.4	- 8.1	-25.6
Chile	-23.8	+ 0.7[a]	- 6.7
Barbados	-21.3	n.a.	- 5.0
Jamaica	-18.5	-24.1(cum. 1980-85)	- 5.6
Costa Rica	-16.5	-16.5[a]	-12.3
Honduras	-15.2	n.a.	-11.5
Argentina	-13.9	- 8.9[a]	-13.9
Uruguay	-13.4	- 6.1	-12.0
S. and E. Asia			
Sri Lanka	-12.9[a]	+ 1.6[a]	+ 2.5
Philippines	- 1.3[a]	+ 0.8[a]	- 2.7
Middle East			
Israel	- 3.9[a]	- 0.4[a]	- 0.1
Jordan	- 3.1[a]	+ 2.3[a]	+ 1.3

a 1979-82.
b The list extends only to countries for which data is available. Full data is only available for fifteen countries in Africa (out of a possible 38).

Source: Reproduced from UNICEF (1987).

(Singh, n.d.)

BEST AVAILABLE DOCUMENT

Table 2

Cities' Percentage Contribution to GNP

Urban Area	Population Share	Output Measure in %)
Brazil: Greater Sao Paulo (1970)	8.6	36.0 of NDP
China: Shanghai (1980)	1.2	12.5 of GIP
Haiti: All Urban (1976)	24.2	57.6 of NI
India: All Urban (1970/71)	19.9	38.9 of NDP
Kenya: All Urban (1976)	11.9	30.3 of NI
Mexico: All Urban (1976)	60.0	79.7 of PI
Pakistan: Karachi (1974-75)	6.1	16.1 of GDP
Peru: Lima (1980)	28.0	43.0 of GDP
Philippines: Metro-Manila (1970)	12.0	25.0 of GNP
Thailand: Metro-Bangkok (1972)	10.9	37.4 of GDP
Turkey: All Urban (1981)	47.0	70.0 of GNP

NDP: Net Domestic Product. GIP: Gross Industrial Production. NI: National Income. NDP: Net Domestic Product. PI: Personal Income. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. GNP: Gross National Product
Source: Various World Bank.

(Perlman, 1990)

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Below is a very brief summary of some of the major issues facing two of the Near East's mega-cities, Cairo and Karachi. Due to the limited scope of this paper, these issues can be dealt with in only the most cursory fashion. For a more detailed analysis, the reader is urged to review each of the United Nations publications (1990, 1988, 1986) on the mega-cities listed in the Appendix, on which these summaries are based.

Cairo. Egypt is a country facing a severe urban crisis, the dimensions of which are being shaped by rapid population growth and limited habitable land. Cairo, with a population that is expected to reach more than 16 million inhabitants by the year 2000, is expanding rapidly, absorbing more than 1,200 hectares of agricultural land each year. Because of the combination of continued high birth rates, reduction in the rate of external migration (discussed below), and continued high rates of rural-to-urban migration, very high levels of demand will occur for jobs, housing and infrastructure services in the future (United Nations, 1990).

Some of the specific sectoral issues are as follows (Note: housing and urban land are discussed separately below).

- **Employment.** Underemployment and disguised unemployment are serious problems, estimated together at 30 percent.

- **Water Supply/Sewerage.** The urban population share that is not provided sewerage services and that has only limited access to water has grown considerably. Supply is intermittent, water losses are huge, sewerage flooding is frequent and the waste water system is overloaded.

- **Institutional Weaknesses.** These and numerous other sectoral problems in the areas of power, transport, health and education are compounded by institutional weaknesses with respect to urban planning. "The process of urban development planning leading to action plans, programs and budgets has not yet been developed" (PADCO, 1982).

Finally, although the government is moving in the direction of greater cost recovery, the political costs of adjustment may be high. The key question will be how decision makers can implement meaningful reforms without jeopardizing social and political stability (World Bank, 1989) and how they will finance the costs of urban development.

Karachi. Karachi, with an estimated population of 7.5 million in 1987, is Pakistan's largest city. It has been growing at more than 5 percent per annum in recent years and is expected to reach 12 to 15 million inhabitants by the year 2000. Whereas Karachi was the world's 25th largest city in 1985, it is projected to be the 15th largest by the end of the century (United Nations, 1988). Karachi's high rate of population growth has created severe shortages of essential services. Just a few of the significant sectoral issues are as follows.

- **Water Supply/Sewerage.** Only about 40 percent of Karachi households receive piped water, usually for only a few hours daily. According to the Karachi Development Plan, 1974-1985, only 20 percent of Karachi households had sewerage connections. Most sewerage in Karachi continues to be discharged directly into the rivers and surface drains, causing severe pollution and contaminating the underground water supply.

- **Environmental Pollution.** It is estimated that only about one-third of the 5,600 tons of solid waste generated daily in Karachi is adequately disposed of. The remaining garbage lies uncollected and rotting in various localities of the city, creating a serious health hazard. The government has begun to address this issue and hopes to raise collection capacity by 80 percent by the end of the century. In addition, Karachi's large number of small industries produce toxic liquid effluents which are discharged untreated into the surface drainage system. The United Nations report (1988) states that the government has prepared environmental quality control standards, but that "generally...environmental issues have been given a low priority."

Possibly the greatest need in Karachi, as in Cairo, is for financial analyses on revenue generation and cost recovery: the National Human Settlements Policy Study of Pakistan concluded that Pakistan's future investment resource pool may cover only one-third to one-half of aggregate urbanization costs during 1983-2003 (Qutub and Richardson, 1986).

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS.

The author of one of the single best overviews of the problems of urbanization and poverty (Singh, n.d.) concluded his review by underscoring the need for research. He stated, "Although there is a wide body of literature on certain specific questions of urban poverty and other urban policy issues in the Third World, this research is scattered and has usually not been carried out on a systematic comparative basis. Yet comparative research is essential to obtain a better understanding of the issues and policy options which the cities in the Third World could pursue."

He observed that it would be extremely useful to undertake detailed studies of a small number of very large cities in different parts of the Third World using a common analytical framework. Just a few of the areas he recommended concentrating on in such studies include the following:

- problems of labor market structure and the access of marginal groups to employment opportunities;

- existing job creation schemes and the potential for harnessing these to meet the needs of the urban poor for shelter, water, sanitation and other amenities;

- existing arrangements for the provision of social services in the cities and the reforms that will be required for more equitable distribution of such services;

- the position of women in the labor market and at home, the availability of family planning, child care and other services, and the factors that perpetuate exploitation of working women, particularly migrant women in urban areas.

In addition to the excellent analysis cited above, other innovative work on the problems of urbanization and poverty is currently being undertaken by the Mega-Cities Project at New York University. In brief, this research is directed at identifying innovative approaches and solutions to the problems posed by the urban environment. At the same time, the project is not solely research-oriented: An equally important part of its work is directed at identifying and documenting ways to transfer successful innovations. The director of the Mega-Cities project (Perlman, 1990) observes that her research has identified four issue areas worldwide as particularly critical and which therefore are generating a disproportionate number of new approaches and non-conventional efforts. These

areas are

> **Decentralization and Democratization**, i.e., innovations involving greater local participation in planning service delivery, budget allocation and land use decisions and giving women and their organizations a greater voice in urban management.
>
> **Poverty and Environmental Degradation**, i.e., innovations that combine ecological regeneration with community development needs in low-income areas, particularly with regard to water, sanitation, garbage, and food and energy systems.
>
> **Informal Sector**, i.e., innovations that bring credit, training or technical assistance to micro-enterprises or self-help efforts in low income communities.
>
> **Women's Empowerment and Well-Being**, i.e., innovations that give women greater choice and greater access to employment, health, and family planning information and services.

The author, Perlman, includes interesting examples of these innovative approaches throughout her paper but due time constraints, they are not included here.

In brief, the Mega-Cities Project is attempting to find ways to catalyze urban innovations and to reduce the time lag between ideas and implementation. To do this, Perlman notes (1990), "Serious research is needed on the generation, implementation and transfer of innovation."

A regional project might serve as a catalyst for innovative approaches and solutions in the mega-cities of the region. It might provide funding for the Mega-Cities Project to conduct research on issues facing Near East mega-cities. Project staff, for example, could work with local governments to develop and implement an innovative strategy in the four areas cited above for each Near East mega-city, as well as other large cities in the region.

A third, and equally important area for research on the problems of urbanization and poverty, might involve analysis of the private provision of public services. A recent and excellent study on this topic (Roth, 1987), published under the auspices of the World Bank's Economic Development Institute, sheds light on what its author calls this "neglected area" by presenting numerous examples of how the private sector in developing countries is participating in the provision of "public" services, specifically, education, electricity, health, telecommunications, urban transport, water supply and sewerage. Just a few of the many examples in this book include the following:

> **Cairo.** The author notes that the growth of a private taxi and jitney service has improved urban transport. By comparison, the public bus and tram service does not cover its cost and must be subsidized by more than US$50 million per year.
>
> **Yemen.** Between 1975 and 1981, the private sector increased its supply of electricity in this country from 57 to 66 percent. Although costs were high and safety standards poor, the experience demonstrates that the private sector can meet public demand for electricity.
>
> **Pakistan.** Extensive private sector involvement in irrigation occurred in Pakistan in the 1970s. While the government was installing public tubewells, experts from the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics argued that irrigation development should be left to the private sector. World Bank assessments of the subsequently installed private tubewells, which

now account for 80 percent of total irrigation, have concluded that they imposed a relatively insignificant burden on public resources and brought significant financial returns to the farmers.

Thus, analyses of the ways in which the private sector could provide a wide array of public services might assist in the development of new arrangements for provision of services in cities -- arrangements that might improve the quality of services, especially for low-income people, and at the same time reduce budget deficits. The author of the study cited above is now president of The Services Group, a nonprofit organization that helps developing countries implement market-oriented policies.

2. ISSUE: URBAN LAND/HOUSING.

"As developers and speculators tie up large areas of land on the urban fringes, land markets are being transformed into bottlenecks in the development process."

United Nations Center for Human Settlements, 1989
(cited in Brennan)

To what extent are urban land and housing issues development issues? Why are they bottlenecks in the development process? As Brennan observes (1990), although the demand for land is growing -- it has been estimated that rapid urbanization is likely to lead to a doubling in size of built-up urban areas in most developing countries over the next 15 to 20 years -- the supply is limited. Land is the essential ingredient in all urban growth, and thus devising equitable and efficient land development policies is one of the major challenges facing planners and policymakers in Third World cities. Since market mechanisms alone are unlikely to produce an efficient allocation of land use in cities, interventions are required.

Brennan explains that the current situation in land and housing markets has served as an impediment to development in many Third World countries. The fundamental issue in most cities is far more complex than that of a limited supply of urban land. The issue is rather one of rampant speculation and inefficient land use, with large vacant areas in the central city held by speculators, forcing workers to live on the periphery and commute long distances to the central city.

When urban land policies are defective, economic productivity suffers. For example, adequate land may not be available for industrial and commercial activities and the loss of agricultural land in the peripheries of many developing country cities often leads to a significant drop in agricultural production. Doebele (1987, cited in Brennan) has argued that the key problems with regard to urban land markets are how to increase the total supply of land accessible to low-income households and how to make better use of the substantial underutilized land areas found in many large developing-country cities.

With respect to housing, Brennan argues that the stakes are high for developing an effective housing policy, as the sector forms an important part of the nation's real wealth. The value of a country's housing stock is typically larger than the size of its gross domestic product and often represents its largest single component of reproducible wealth, comprising between 30 and 50 percent of total reproducible assets. Rapid urbanization has created enormous pressures on urban housing markets, and in many instances there have been countless examples of wasted resources. The construction of

heavily subsidized, high-standard, high-cost units has been a major failure in many countries. Projects have been devised without taking into account the needs of the target groups.

Some of the specific land and housing issues in the Near East region's mega-cities include the following:

Cairo.

- **Urban Land.** Remittances have been a major factor in fueling the recent rise in land prices. Moreover, an estimated 1,200 hectares of agricultural land have been lost each year to urban encroachment. Land use controls in Cairo have been totally ineffective. Although 1978 legislation declared all agricultural land non-developable, owners have found it easy to proceed with illegal construction and buildings have rarely been removed by the authorities. A 1980 study (Abt Associates) concluded that, unless the Government either created attractive alternative investment opportunities or prohibited private land transactions, the investment demand for land would inflate land prices beyond the means of most Cairo residents.

- **Housing.** With the dramatic rise in land prices, lower income households have been forced out of the formal land and housing market. Rent controls have had major disrupting effects on the housing market. Landlords are allowed to collect up to two years rent in advance ("key money"). The result has been that the increase in the incidence and amount of key money has been at a rate in excess of 30 percent per annum. Because key money can be collected only from new movers, households that have moved into a unit within the previous several years are typically spending two to three times the proportion of their income on housing than are households that have not moved.

Karachi.

- **Urban Land.** Land is one of Karachi's most serious problems. The private sector dominates the land market and land speculation is rampant. Lower-income residents often sell their plots to higher-income households and then move elsewhere, often encroaching on public land. The Government attempts to control speculation by imposing restrictions on the number of plots that can be owned by an individual, but these restrictions are easily circumvented by use of family proxies. Moreover, Karachi's property tax regulations aid investors in holding plots they never intend to occupy. To illustrate the extent of the problem, some 80,000-100,000 of the 260,000 plots developed by the Karachi Development Authority during the 1970s were held for investment and lay vacant 10 years later.

- **Housing.** Demand for housing far exceeds supply. The katchi abadis (squatter settlements) now shelter an estimated 2.6 million residents and have been growing at 10 percent per annum -- around twice Karachi's rate of growth. About one-third of total housing consists of huts and the average number of persons per dwelling was 6.8.

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS.

Brennan (1990) observes that a major reason local administrations in most developing countries have not coped successfully with urban population growth is that they are "flying blind," i.e., "they simply do not know what is going on in their local land markets." Most cities lack sufficient accurate and current data on patterns of land conversion, the number of housing units (formal and informal) built during the past year, infrastructure development patterns, and land subdivision problems, among other issues. Frequently, urban maps are 20 to 30 years old.

For under $10,000, a complete computer installation can now be utilized for conducting a land and housing market assessment. By employing two aerial surveys, the assessment can estimate the current and future supply of developable land, as well as determine the rate and pattern of land conversion attributable to housing demand. A regional project could also support the analytical work required for land registration. Improved land registers, besides being associated with improved property tax systems, can also bring in substantial transaction fees, since approximately 10 percent of property in urban areas worldwide changes ownership each year. Bangkok provides a good example of a successful land titling project, supported by the World Bank. In 1988 alone, the project brought in $200 million in fees.

With respect to housing, Brennan argues that one of the most important areas in which governments need to take a much more active role is in developing housing finance. Few aspects of economic development remain as unexplored and poorly analyzed as the potential of housing to induce financial development and ways to improve the financing of housing. Potential efficiency gains to be derived from well-run and decentralized housing finance systems appear to be large because housing investment represents 12 to 25 percent of total annual investment in most countries. Few developing countries have successful systems of housing finance.

In her concluding remarks, Brennan comments that there are numerous areas for future research. She states that it is important to determine what can be distilled from the past two decades of country projects. What is required are in-depth case studies of successful policy interventions, with attention to how they could be transferred to different economic, social and political contexts. She believes that some studies of this type have already been conducted by international organizations but are for in-house distribution only. In addition, a useful exercise would be to conduct some research on the failures of past research. There are examples of large-scale research projects that have had little to no impact on government policy (e.g., the National Urban Policy Study [NUPS] in Egypt).

3. ISSUE: EFFECT OF LABOR MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES.

> **"Monitoring the overall economic development and the labor markets of the capital-rich (oil exporting) states is therefore a task of importance if external aid institutions are to invest to maximum effect in the capital-poor states of the Arab world."**
>
> **Serageldin, World Bank, 1983**

What are the estimated effects on economic development of changes in labor migration and remittances now that the Gulf war has ended? The rise of expatriate, migrant workers in the Gulf largely reflects the growth of the Middle East oil industry. By 1985, there were more than 5 million migrant workers in the Gulf states, 30 percent of whom were workers from other Middle East states, principally Jordan, the West Bank, Egypt, Yemen and Pakistan. (All references in this section are to

Addleton, 1991 unless otherwise cited.) In Kuwait, the total migrant population was 1.4 million of whom about 700,000 were Arabs. Prior to the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were by far the most important places of employment for Arab workers in the region.

The invasion of August 2, 1990, ended employment and remittance relationships that had been built up over two decades. The considerable importance of remittances for the home countries can be best understood by looking at the relationship of remittances to (1) total aid disbursements for labor-exporting countries and (2) exports and imports of labor exporting countries. The data show (see Table 3) that remittances exceeded total aid disbursements for most labor-exporting countries in the Middle East. With respect to the second indicator -- the relationship of remittances to imports and exports -- the data show (see Table 4) that for Egypt and Jordan, remittances considerably exceeded exports by the mid-1980s and for other countries represented a sizable percentage of exports.

Both Richards and Waterbury (1990) and Addleton (1991) comment on the importance of remittances for the improved well-being of families in the region. Addleton suggests that official remittances tell only part of the story and that unofficial remittances, channeled back home through more informal financial markets offering better exchange rates, almost certainly equalled if not surpassed remittances returned through official channels. Addleton observes, "The Gulf migration became one of the few economic events in the region during the 1970s and 1980s which emphasized individuals rather than governments and in which families rather than the public sector were better off." Richards and Waterbury (1990) note that a substantial proportion of remittances is devoted to direct consumption (such as housing) rather than investment. This is understandable since most migrants are from rural areas, and their income is only one-half to one-third that of urban incomes. If it is true that most remittance income is used to improve the material well-being of families in the Middle East, the question arises as to what the effects will be on family income of the inevitable restructuring of Middle East labor markets. Although the answer at the present time is uncertain, a regional project could make an important contribution if it undertook an analytical effort designed to address this question.

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS.

Addleton correctly argues that donor and government efforts aimed at addressing migrant labor issues need to be concentrated almost entirely on the policy front. For host governments, this means pursuing policies that result in the clearing of markets, the maximization of the use of official channels for remittances, the liberalization of exchange rates (to reduce incentives to use the black market), and the promotion of open markets. A regional project could play an important role in helping missions and governments analyze the steps required to pursue these objectives.

A regional project could assist in analyzing the differential impact of the labor market restructuring process under way as a result of the war. For example, 60 percent of Arab migrant workers working in the Gulf were Egyptians working in Saudi Arabia (Richards and Waterbury, 1990). If Saudi Arabia "rewards" Egypt for her stance in the war by allowing a return or an increase of Egyptian workers, perhaps the long-term effect on remittances will not be as negative as some have assumed. Will Kuwait also reward Egyptian workers because of politics and reconstruction needs? Will Yemeni, Jordanian and West Bank (Palestinian) workers be the biggest losers? Or will they find work in Iraq's reconstruction? Or will Kuwait and other Gulf states reduce the presence of all Arab workers and increase opportunities for less politically sensitive Asian workers? Will most Arab workers then be the biggest losers? Analyses undertaken by a regional project could contribute significantly to helping governments understand these trends and their implications for economic development.

Table 3

Official Remittance Income and A.I.D. Disbursements in Selected Countries, 1983-88

Country	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Jordan						
Remittances	924	1,028	846	984	743	800
Net Aid	787	687	538	564	579	425
N. Yemen						
Remittances	1,084	996	763	527	708	314
Net Aid	328	326	283	257	348	223
Sri Lanka						
Remittances	257	277	266	294	313	320
Net Aid	473	466	484	570	502	599
Bangladesh						
Remittances	661	535	531	606	788	827
Net Aid	1,049	1,200	1,152	1,455	1,635	1,592
India						
Remittances	2,650	2,278	2,456	2,223	2,636	NA
Net Aid	1,644	1,840	1,673	1,592	2,120	1,839
Pakistan						
Remittances	3,116	2,942	2,710	2,676	2,440	2,101
Net Aid	735	749	801	9790	879	1,408

*Based on IMF Reporting for private transfers from all sources, not just the Middle East
**Based on World Bank reporting for disbursement of aid from all sources, both bilateral and multilateral

Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics XLIV:1 (January 1991); World Bank, World Development Report 1990, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990

(Addleton, 1991)

Table 4

Official Remittances as a Percentage of Imports and Exports in Selected Countries in the Near East Region

	1973		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
Egypt	13.4	11.0	13.2	20.5	11.6	29.9	22.1	55.3	20.5	57.9	27.1	105.0	59.1	123.3
Morocco	18.4	23.2	15.7	17.5	18.8	31.2	19.1	39.2	17.1	41.9	23.6	46.6	24.2	45.5
Jordan	16.8	75.9	16.8	52.9	23.5	112.4	39.9	194.1	30.5	169.0	31.2	157.0	25.9	126.3
Sudan	1.4	1.5	0.7	1.4	0.2	0.3	3.8	6.6	3.4	5.6	5.5	12.8	10.4	21.6
Tunisia	13.3	21.6	9.4	11.5	9.2	15.3	8.4	16.2	8.3	16.4	9.5	18.1	9.5	15.1
Turkey	59.2	93.7	38.8	95.7	29.5	99.8	21.5	56.3	18.4	60.9	23.6	47.5	35.5	79.6
YAR	--	--	71.3	0	91.9	--	163.7	--	94.9	--	70.9	--	62.8	--
PDRY	19.2	32.9	10.2	18.8	18.2	34.2	29.0	67.4	34.4	103.5	44.3	132.7	32.2	63.9

	1980		1981		1982		1983		1984		1985		1986	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
Egypt	57.4	91.6	25.4	69.0	27.3	79.5	35.9	114.8	37.0	126.8	--	--	--	--
Jordan	27.8	116.1	29.1	125.8	28.8	124.1	30.4	159.3	36.9	136.7	31.0	107.3	115.8	384.5
Morocco	23.6	41.1	22.5	41.4	19.5	40.7	24.7	44.3	21.7	39.0	25.1	44.2	--	--
Sudan	13.3	38.5	21.4	49.1	8.4	21.5	18.2	39.4	24.1	44.0	16.3	33.5	10.7	3.7
Tunisia	8.5	13.5	8.7	13.2	10.6	18.2	11.1	18.7	9.6	17.0	9.4	14.9	15.5	25.2
Turkey	27.2	74.0	28.7	54.4	24.8	38.1	16.8	27.0	17.5	26.4	16.0	22.1	15.4	22.8
YAR	57.7	--	44.2	--	59.9	--	68.1	--	--	--	29.3	--	--	--
PDRY	21.1	41.5	26.7	62.4	26.9	54.1	29.4	65.2	31.1	74.3	--	--	--	--

Sources: Calculated from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1986, Washington, D.C., and July 1987 Country Tables: remittances from Country Tables (line 77 afd: Private Unrequited Transfers); exports and imports from World Tables (70d and 71d).

(Richards and Waterbury, 1990)

More generally, a regional project might make an important contribution to understanding the overall effects of remittances on economic development. In 1983, a World Bank expert wrote, "No empirical work has yet been done in the labor exporting countries of the Middle East specifically on the use of cash remittances and their overall impact on economic growth" (Serageldin et al., 1983).

4. ISSUE: LABOR FORCE GROWTH.

"If today's unemployed 20 year old is allowed to become a 25 year old unemployed head-of-household, the consequences for society will be serious."

World Bank Study on the Maghreb, Muller and Weissman, 1990

How has population growth affected the growth of the labor force and what are the implications for economic development? The authors of a recent article on this issue (Bloom and Freeman, 1987) underscored its importance when they wrote, "The economies of the less developed countries are about to face perhaps the greatest challenge in their histories: generating a sufficient number of jobs at reasonable wages to absorb their rapidly growing populations into productive employment...this challenge has no precedent in human history."

The authors of a recent World Bank report (Muller and Weissman, 1990) came to similar conclusions: "During the coming decades, employment will be one of the most explosive economic and political issues in the Maghreb." The nature of the problem can be understood by looking at data from the Maghreb in more detail. The following concentrates on the Maghreb due to the need for relative brevity, but problems of labor force growth in other countries of the Near East are roughly similar.

Population Pyramids. The nature of the problem is portrayed by the population pyramids showing age group change from 1990 to 2025 in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (see Figures 1, 2, and 3). The pyramids show that during these years, the bulk of the population will shift dramatically from the 0-10 age group to the 15-45 year-old-age group by the year 2025.

Growth of the Labor Force. The World Bank study cited above indicates that the number of potential entrants to the labor force during the next 15 years is already known because they have already been born. The momentum of past population growth will dramatically inflate the labor force and increase the ranks of the unemployed between now and 2010. "Even a precipitous drop in fertility today would help ease the pressure on the labor market only after this date." In Algeria, the labor force grew by an average of 4.1 percent (1980-87) while total employment grew by 3.8 percent. In Morocco, the growth of the working age population was 3.1 percent (1982-87) vs. 2.6 percent for the overall population. In Tunisia (1985-89), the number of new jobs created was 39,000 per year while the number of new entrants to the labor force was 53,000 per year. Figure 4 shows the projected labor force increases (1990-2010) in these countries.

Unemployment Projections. Table 5 shows projected unemployment rates in the years 2000 and 2010, depending upon the rates of labor absorption in each country. For example, if labor absorption rates do not change, unemployment will be 27 percent in both Morocco and Algeria by the year 2010 and 15 percent in Tunisia. Assuming a rapidly increasing rate of labor absorption, unemployment in the same year will drop to 16 percent in Algeria, 2 percent in Tunisia, and 15 percent in Morocco.

Figures 1

Population Pyramid: Tunisia



Figure 2

Population Pyramid: Algeria



Figure 3

Population Pyramid: Morocco



(Muller and Weissman, 1990)

Figure 4

Projected Labor Force Increases in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco



Source: World Bank Estimates

Table 5

Labor Absorption and Unemployment in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco

	Unemployment Rate (%)					
	Algeria		Tunisia		Morocco (Urban)	
	2000	2010	2000	2010	2000	2010
Stable labor absorption (.6)	25	27	18	15	27	27
Slowly increasing absorption (.7 in 2000)	25	23	18	10	27	25
Rapidly increasing absorption (.7 in 1990, .8 in 2000)	22	16	14	2	23	15

Source: World Bank

(Muller and Weissman, 1990)

The question arises as to where the growing labor force will find jobs. Many analysts divide the labor market into three major sectors: public, private "formal," and private "informal," and most agree that it is the informal sector that will absorb most new labor entrants. A study conducted in Egypt stated that the informal sector there consisted of (1) small-scale manufacturing and handicraft work; (2) artisans such as masons, carpenters and tailors; (3) personal services such as servants, porters and watchmen; and (4) petty services and retailing activities such as car washers, street hawkers and vendors (Abdel-Fadil, 1983).

Richards and Waterbury (1990) note the diversity of estimates as to the size of the informal sector in the Middle East. In Egypt for example, Abdel-Fadil (1983) argues that it is about 16 percent while other analysts believe it is closer to 41-43 percent. A variety of studies, according to these authors, have made diverse estimates for other countries: YAR 70 percent; Morocco 57 percent; Algeria 18 percent: Tunisia 36 percent; Turkey 36 percent; and Iran 35 percent. The authors conclude that, given the rather poor data quality, they would estimate that the informal sector in Middle Eastern countries employs at least one-third to one-half of the labor force. This estimate is roughly comparable to what has been found in studies of other parts of the Third World.

Richards and Waterbury (1990) observe that with the emergence of **infitah** (or "economic opening," a term referring to shifts in state economic policies, arising from disappointment with and problems of state-led growth) in at least five countries of the Middle East (Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria and Iraq), toward emphasis on the private sector and the concomitant diminution in the rate of growth of employment in the public sector, the importance of the informal sector will continue to increase. The question then becomes not just whether jobs will be created but whether jobs that reflect increasing productivity and incomes will be created.

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS.

A number of observers (Richards and Waterbury, Rondinelli and Kasarda, Bromley) have suggested that the focus needs to be on small-scale manufacturing enterprises, with potential for upgrading, rather than on the diverse personal services also frequently encountered in the informal sector. There are at least two reasons for this: in most countries, large-scale, formal manufacturing firms will be able to provide jobs for only a small portion of new labor force entrants at the same time that the public sector is contracting.. Richards and Waterbury (1990) also note that one study in Egypt (Davies et al., 1984) found that "minifactories" were not only more labor intensive but also used capital at least as efficiently as did larger enterprises.

Two recent reports provide a brief outline of the actions donors can take to provide analytical assistance in this area. Rondinelli and Kasarda (1990) provide an overview of the four main strategies toward job creation in developing countries (macroeconomic policies, spatial redistribution policies, human resource development policies and incentives to stimulate private investment) and conclude that they have had "mixed results in generating a sufficient number of jobs."

Given mixed results at job creation to date, the authors argue that governments and donors must "reassess and revise programs to support job creation in urban areas." They must focus on economic growth policies, especially those that promote exports in labor-intensive industries. Most important, the authors argue that there is a growing consensus that public policies "must stimulate the growth of small and medium-scale enterprises and help informal sector activities in urban areas." The case for policies favoring small-scale enterprises rests on "evidence that small units on average use factor inputs (such as labor and capital) more productively than their larger counterparts so that a shift of

resources in favor of small units would yield a net increase in output as well as in the increase of the demand for labor" (Little, 1987, cited in Rondinelli and Kasarda, 1990).

The authors call for the following elements of a research strategy. First, there is a need for better empirical analyses of job creation requirements in developing countries. (Author's note: throughout their analysis, Rondinelli and Kasarda lament the lack of information available on the informal sector and job creation. Further, in their excellent bibliography, there is only one specific reference to a Middle Eastern country.) Second, there is a need for better evaluations and assessments of the impacts of population redistribution and job creation policies. Specifically, policymakers need direct and surrogate indicators of changes in the economically active population and of the capacity to expand employment opportunities to estimate more accurately the number, location and types of jobs that will be needed in urban areas. Few countries have accurate estimates of job creation growth rates. Third, there is a need for better methods of assessing the feasibility of new job creation policies in both the public and private sectors.

Another report (Bromley, 1990) also concludes that existing information is inadequate. "Our capacity to design effective support policies for small enterprises is seriously limited by the lack of appropriate country research and data sources on several important themes." The author identifies six areas for which information is needed to design such policies including gender division of labor; comparable cost-effectiveness criteria for small-scale enterprises; seasonal work; and the effects of stabilization on small-scale enterprises.

5. ISSUE: FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION/GENERAL AND URBAN.

"While the proletarianization of women entails labor control (as it does for men), wage work also provides prospects for women's autonomy -- a not insignificant consideration in a patriarchal context."

V. Moghadam, United Nations University, 1990

What are the main current and projected features of female participation in the Middle East labor force and what implications do these have for economic development? While most analyses point to relatively low rates of female labor force participation in the Middle East (e.g., 6 percent in Jordan and 7 percent in Egypt; Joeckes, 1991), these same studies are quick to underscore the likelihood of considerable underestimation of female participation, as well as the dubious nature of the data collected (World Bank, 1989; Joeckes, 1991). For example, a World Bank (1989) report observes that the Labor Force Survey in Pakistan gave a total of 11.9 percent for female labor force participation for rural and urban areas but noted "It is simply not plausible that about 90 percent of the women in Pakistan, where large numbers of households subsist in absolute poverty, perform only household chores that do not contribute to household income." As an example of the diversity of estimates on female labor force participation, and in contrast to the 7 percent estimate for Egypt cited above, a 1988 study (Hatem, citing Murcos, 1978 and Al-Ahram, April, 1984) stated, "In 1971, working women constituted 7 percent of the formal labor force, excluding women in agriculture. By 1981 this figure doubled to 14 percent." (We should note that even a title of one publication raised questions about the reliability of the data on this topic. The title was, Is Female Labor Force Participation Really Low and Declining in Pakistan? A Look at Alternative Data Sources. This was published by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics [PIDE] in Islamabad.)

The main features of female labor force participation in the urban sector appear to be as follows.

Current Female Labor Force Participation Rates/Urban Sector (Note: the agriculture sector is discussed below.) Table 6 shows the range of female labor force participation in the non-agricultural sector during the 1980s. Participation rates ranged from a low of 9 percent (1980) in Jordan and 11 percent in Oman (1980) to a middle range of 23 percent in Morocco and Tunisia (1982 and 1984, respectively) to a high of 46 percent in the Philippines (1987). The latest data for Yemen and Egypt show them both at 16 percent (1980 and 1984, respectively).

Projected Female Participation Rates. Table 7 presents some projections. Under the "stagnating" scenario, female labor force participation in 2010 in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco will be the same as it was in 1990: 21 percent; 8 percent; and 20 percent, respectively. Under the fast growth scenario, the participation rates for women in 2010 for Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco will be 40 percent; 20 percent; and 40 percent, respectively.

A More Dynamic Interpretation? One author (Moghadam, 1990) presents a somewhat more dynamic interpretation of female employment. The most salient points he makes are as follows:

- Since the 1970s, there has been both increasing recorded urban female labor force participation, especially among working mothers in the age groups 25-44, and greater unemployment and underemployment. Although all regions of the world saw a rise in the rates of labor force participation, the largest proportional increase was reported for the Middle East at 53 percent (ICRW, 1980).

- The 1960s import-substitution industrialization strategies of countries like Iran, Egypt, Turkey and Algeria opened up employment opportunities for women, mainly in the civil service, but also in state-run factories or in private sector industrial plants receiving state support.

- Transnational corporations, in search of cheap labor, provided employment for women mainly in Mexico and Southeast Asia, but Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey were also affected. Free production zones were established in Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Democratic Yemen, Egypt and Tunisia (Froebel et al., 1980). By 1980, the total female labor force employed in the industrial sector was 40 percent in Tunisia (ILO, 1985) and in Morocco it was nearly 30 percent.

- In Syria and Tunisia in the 1970s, female labor increases topped those of men (ILO, 1985). Female unemployment also increased at the same time. In 1980, the female share of unemployment was generally higher than their share of employment (ILO, 1985).

- The positive relationship between female education and non-agricultural employment is marked throughout the Middle East. Census data reveal that each educational level is reflected in a corresponding increase in the level of women's non-agricultural employment, and in lower fertility (Chamie, 1985).

Table 6

Range Female Labor Force in the Non-Agricultural Sector during the 1980s

		Total Labor Force (000)	Percent Female
Low-Income Agricultral Economies			
Nepal	1980/ILO	432	15
	1981/YLS	479	14
Bangladesh	1980/ILO	6,331	7
	1981/YLS	11,175	19
Middle-Income Transitional Economies			
India	1980/ILS	80,303	19
	1981/YLS	69,501	12
Pakistan	1980/ILO	11,540	13
	1980/FAO	—	—
	1981/YLS	9,132	5
Sri Lanka	1980/ILO	2,546	24
	1985/YLS	2,684	27
Indonesia	1980/ILO	24,072	33
	1985/YLS	27,613	37
Philippines	1971/FAO	—	—
	1987/YLS	10,936	46
	1980/ILO	8,457	43
Yemen*	1980/ILS	1,205	16
	1977-83/FAO	—	—
Egypt	1980/ILS	6,139	13
	1984/YLS	7,116	16
Middle-Income Industrializing Economies			
Thailand	1980/ILO	6,864	42
	1984/YLS	7,799	43
Morocco	1980/ILO	3,093	22
	1982/YLS	3,167	23
Tunsia	1980/ILS	1,240	22
	1984/YLS	1,216	23
Jordan	1979/YLS	360	8
	1980/ILO	579	9
	1985/FAO	—	—
Oman	1980/ILO	141	11

*Democratic People's Republic of Yemen and Arab Republic of Yemen are combined in the ILO estimates for 1980. FAO agricultural census conducted only in the Arab Republic of Yemen.

Sources:
1. Date and source: ILO 1980 estimates from International Labor Office (1986), Table 3. YLS figures from censuses or labor force surveys as reported in International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years, Table 2. FAO figures are enumerations of household and hired workers employed on agricultral holdings in national censuses of agriculture, as reported in U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (1971, 1981), various census bulletins.
2. Sex ratios (males per 100 females age 10 and over) calculated from United Nations (1988), Table 7.

(Dixon-Mueller, 1990)

Table 7

Female Participation Rates and Labor Force Projections, 1990-2010

	1990		2010			
			Scenario 1**		Scenario 2**	
	Part. Rates (15+)	Number Active Women (000)	Part. Rates (15+)	Number Active Women (000)	Part. Rates (15+)	Number Active Women (000)
Tunisia	21%	520	21%	875	40%	1,900
(Index)		(100)		(168)		(365)
Algeria	8%	570	8%	1,075	20%	2,700
(Index)		(100)		(189)		(474)
Morocco	20%*	1,500	20%	2,600	40%	5,200
(Index)		(100)		(173)		(347)

* Estimated

** Scenario 1 refers to stagnating female participation rates, Scenario 2 refers to fast increasing participation rates.

Source: World Bank Population Projections and Estimates.

(Muller and Weissman, 1990)

Researchers have begun to examine the question of the relationship between women's work and economic development. As a result, there is a now wide array of empirical evidence that shows that economically active women, especially those who have a degree of control over the income they earn, bring a wealth of benefits to their families and to the larger society. Briefly, contributions of employed women to economic development are as follows:

Lowered Fertility. The relationship between work and fertility was discussed above.

Improved Child Nutrition. Numerous studies show that women are more likely than men to spend the income they earn on food for their children. Blumberg (1989) summarizes nine such studies conducted in developing countries worldwide. One study undertaken in the former ENE region -- the Philippines (Senauer, 1988) -- showed that "as the wife's estimated wage rate rose both she and her children did relatively better in terms of intrahousehold allocation of calories...On the other hand, as the husband's wage rose, both he and his wife did relatively better, whereas the allocation of calories to the children declined." All of the studies summarized showed that the mother's income is more important for child nutrition and welfare than the husband's.

Improved Child Health and Welfare. There are numerous studies that show a relation between a mother's income and her children's improved health status. One such study undertaken in Pakistan (Mubarak, 1990) compared working women employed by the Women's Work Centers (where the women did sewing and weaving, among other activities) with non-working matched controls. The study showed that (1) working women's families had significantly higher immunization rates, 73 vs. 55 percent, and shorter duration of illness, 5.9 days vs. 8.8 days, than did the controls; and (2) more working than non-working women supported contraception, 100 vs. 74 percent, desired equal education for sons and daughters, and had a dominant role in family health decision-making, 48 vs. 12 percent. The study concluded that the working women "have a different set of beliefs and practices than non-working women and this may be one important factor responsible for the lower morbidity of their children."

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS.

A regional project might provide the analytical work needed to develop country-specific strategies aimed at increasing the productivity and undertaking training of urban and rural working women **in both the formal and informal sectors.**

The importance of country specificity is underscored by the varying degrees of female seclusion both within societies and among countries. Nevertheless, it is possible to design such strategies even for countries that have a fairly high and uniform degree of female seclusion, as outlined by the study Women in Pakistan: An Economic and Social Strategy (World Bank, 1989). Assuming interest on the part of governments, a regional project might undertake the analytical work required to develop similar strategies for other countries of the region, and then proceed to undertake the even more detailed analytical work that would be needed after the strategy itself is outlined. For example, the Pakistan strategy for women in the urban economy (the strategy focused in particular on women doing textile work both in women's "work centers" and in their homes) outlines a range of constraints to women's greater productivity such as

Marketing. Lack of marketing outlets and exploitation by middlemen, especially because of the segregation norm.

Credit. Lack of access to institutional credit and lack of schemes that cater to women in the urban informal sector. (Experience in India and Bangladesh indicates that women in this group have repayment rates close to 100 percent.)

Input Supplies/Technology. Because of segregation, women are very dependent on middlemen and moneylenders for the supply of raw materials and inputs.

Training. There is a need for training in the high growth areas, rather than in the traditional areas like embroidery.

Thus, once a strategy for women in the urban sector is developed, a regional project might undertake the additional analytical work needed to address each of the types of constraints listed above.

6. ISSUE: FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION/RURAL SECTOR.

What are the main features of female labor force participation in the agricultural sector and what are the implications of these features for economic development? The main features of female labor force participation in the agricultural sector are as follows.

Female Participation in the Rural Labor Force. The data from Table 8 show considerable variation with respect to the proportion of females in the total agricultural labor force in Near East countries. What is even more interesting is that the data show considerable in-country variation depending upon which international agency collected the data. Thus, it is not possible to summarize the contents of the table briefly. Column three (percent female of the agricultural labor force), however, provides a good understanding of these variations. Just as an example, data gathered by the ILO in 1980 in Pakistan show an 8 percent female participation rate in agriculture. Data gathered for the same year by the FAO show a 43 percent participation rate, whereas data gathered in 1981 by the Yearbook of Labor Statistics (YLS) show a 3 percent female participation rate. Similarly in Jordan, data gathered in 1979 by YLS show a 1 percent female participation rate, whereas 1985 FAO data show a 34 percent female participation rate.

It should be noted that a recent report on Pakistan (World Bank, 1989) stated that "women are already far more active in the rural economy than is generally observed. Contrary to the common middle-class notion that women are 'just housewives' ... various surveys show that women contribute 25-45 percent of the labor in the rural economy including agriculture, livestock and cottage industries."

Projections for the Future. Whatever the exact proportions of females in the agricultural labor force, these proportions are declining in all of the Near East countries. On the other hand, the absolute numbers of persons who depend on agriculture for their livelihoods will continue to grow in all countries except Jordan (Dixon-Mueller, 1991).

Female Participation in Agriculture and Economic Development Implications. An important developmental consequence of the failure to recognize the economic role of

women in the rural sector is that they continue to operate at very low levels of productivity. "They face systematic barriers in access to productive inputs and services. Thus their opportunities for raising their productivity -- and so increasing both household and national income -- are very limited" (World Bank, 1989).

Table 8

Characteristics of Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Labor Force, Rural and Urban Sex Ratios, Asia and the Near East

	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)		(5)	
		Agricultural	Agricultural LF		Nonagricultural LF		Sex ratios (age 10+)	
Country	Date & Source	LF as percent of total LF	total (000)	percent female	total (000)	percent female	Rural	Urban
Low-Income Agricultural Economies								
Nepal	1980/ILO	93	5,707	36	432	15	104	117
	1981/YLS	91	6,244	36	479	14		
Bangladesh	1980/ILO	75	18,802	6	6,331	7	106	135
	1981/YLS	60	16,429	1	11,175	19		
Middle-Income Transitional Economies								
India	1980/ILO	70	185,017	31	80,303	19	104	117
	1981/YLS	63	153,015	24	69,501	12		
Pakistan	1980/ILO	55	13,875	8	11,540	13	113	120
	1980/FAO	--	16,852	43		--	--	
	1981/YLS	55	11,291	3	9,132	5		
Sri Lanka	1980/ILO	53	2,912	29	2,546	24	102	111
	1985/YLS	48	2,438	34	2,684	27		
Indonesia	1980/ILO	57	32,180	30	24,072	33	97	98
	1985/YLS	55	34,198	35	27,613	37		
Philippines	1971/FAO	--	11,954	30		--	--	
	1987/YLS	47	9,858	25	10,936	46		
	1980/ILO	52	9,076	24	8,457	43	103	92
Yemen*	1980/ILO	66	2,225	10	1,205	16	n.a.	n.a.
	1977-83/FAO	--	1,759	48	--	--	106	--
Egypt	1980/ILO	46	5,158	4	6,139	13	103	106
	1984/YLS	40	4,719	21	7,116	16		
Middle-Income Industrializing economies								
Thailand	1980/ILO	71	16,717	49	6,864	42	98	94
	1984/YLS	70	18,195	48	7,799	43		
Morocco	1980/ILO	46	2,595	14	3,093	22	98	100
	1982/YLS	43	2,380	16	3,167	23		
Tunsia	1980/ILO	35	668	20	1,240	22	103	102
	1984/YLS	28	475	20	1,216	23		
Jordan	1979/YLS	10	46	1	360	8		
	1980/ILO	10	66	2	579	9	107	108
	1985/FAO	--	133	34	--	--		
Oman	1980/ILO	50	140	3	141	11	98	94

LF = Labor Force

Sources:
1. Date and source: ILO 1980 estimates from International Labor Office (1986), Table 3. YLS figures from censuses or labor force surveys as reported in International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years, Table 2. FAO figures are enumerations of household and hired workers employed on agricultural holdings in national censuses of agriculture, as reported in U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (1971, 1981), various census bulletins.
2. Sex ratios (males per 100 females age 10 and over) calculated from United Nations (1988), Table 7.

(Dixon-Mueller, 1990)

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An important related observation in a recent report (Dixon-Mueller, 1991) is that in those countries where females may play an important role in agricultural production (depending upon which data set, between 25 and 48 percent) -- Yemen, Philippines and Pakistan -- the value of agricultural production per worker is quite low (Yemen, $631; Philippines, $993; and Pakistan $638 compared, just as an example, to Tunisia, $1,834). The need for strategies to increase productivity per worker, especially female workers where they constitute a significant proportion of the rural labor force, and overall output in these and other Near East countries, is clear.

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS.

Dixon-Mueller (1991) outlined a comprehensive, regional approach for increasing women's productivity and output in the rural sector. The author outlines a wide range of activities that could be undertaken to achieve these objectives, including the following:

> **The Development of Agribusinesses.** This would hold great promise for employing women workers and raising their productivity and incomes.
>
> **Natural Resources Management Programs.** The success of these programs depends heavily on women's participation because of women's special roles in collecting fuel, water, wild foods and medicines and animal fodder and their specific crop-tending responsibilities.
>
> **Agricultural Planning and Analysis.** The capacity of virtually all planning agencies to undertake gender-specific analyses needs to be strengthened with intensive training, case study material, and organizational support.
>
> **Rural Infrastructures.** It is essential that planners analyze ways in which women's access to vital infrastructures, especially markets and irrigation, is constrained and how these obstacles can be overcome.

The author includes many more detailed and practical recommendations than just those listed above and makes the important observation that "each of these recommendations need to be adapted to the particular circumstances of each country. Priorities will differ depending upon structural and social conditions, state policies, the nature of domestic and international trade and markets, environmental and agricultural potential and other factors." A regional project could provide analytical support, both by assisting in adapting the recommendations to each country and by analyzing the ways in which the relevant recommendations might be implemented in each country.

7. ISSUE: EDUCATION TRENDS/FEMALE EDUCATION.

> **"The worst off are rural girls in low-income societies. This lack of female education in rural, low-income societies may be a principal manifestation and reproducer of underdevelopment."**
>
> **World Bank, 1990**

What are the major trends in education in low-income countries, and the Middle East region in particular, especially with respect to female education, and what are the development implications of these trends? An excellent World Bank report (1990) on education and development presents

a wealth of data to answer this question. It assumes the importance of investments in education, opening by stating quite emphatically that "all countries should be striving to increase student learning and to equalize access to knowledge..." (p.1). "There is now a persuasive body of theoretical and empirical evidence that investment in the formal education and training of the labor force plays a crucial role in economic development" (p.3). The key statement in this regard is the following: "The results of these studies suggest that in both developed and developing countries, educational investment has been one of the most important factors contributing to economic growth; that expenditures on education contribute positively to labor productivity; that the economic pay-off to spending on education -- from both a private and public standpoint -- is high, in absolute terms and compared to other investments; and that increased education of parents -- especially mothers, has an important impact on child health and reduced fertility at all levels of economic development" (p.3).

There are two key general educational trends on which decision makers should focus. (1) While enrollment in low income countries was expanding for over 25 years, by the 1980s there was a significant drop in enrollment growth. The result of the slowdown is that low-income countries are still far from achieving even universal primary education. (2) The slowdown in enrollment is an important issue in the lowest income countries.

Table 9 lists the 10 developing countries with the largest populations of out-of-school children in 1985 and their projected out-of-school populations for the year 2000, based on two scenarios of enrollment growth. In 1985, 31 per cent of all the world's 6- to 11-year-olds and 61 percent of all out-of-school children that age lived in these 10 countries. The table shows that **three of these countries are in the Middle East region: Pakistan, with 70 percent out of school (ages 6-11) in 1985; Afghanistan with 85 percent; and Egypt with 33 percent.** By 1985, 100 million school-age children in developing countries were not in school. Most were in rural areas and about 60 percent were girls.

Table 9

Out-of School 6 to 11 Year-Olds in Low-Income Lower-Middle-Income Countries

			Projected for 2000			
Category	*Actual 1985*		*2% Enrollment Growth*		*5% Enrollment Growth*	
Total Out-of-School	**87**	**(21%)**	**129**	**(25%)**	**52**	**(10%)**
Selected countries:						
India	22.5	(25%)	12.6	(12%)	0.0	(0%)
Pakistan	11.0	(70%)	19.0	(76%)	13.0	(52%)
Bangladesh	6.7	(45%)	6.1	(35%)	0.0	(0%)
Ethiopia	5.5	(81%)	9.7	(87%)	7.9	(71%)
Nigeria	4.1	(26%)	14.6	(50%)	3.0	(10%)
Afghanistan	2.7	(85%)	4.8	(89%)	4.4	(81%)
Sudan	2.3	(68%)	4.4	(77%)	3.0	(53%)
Egypt	2.3	(33%)	2.8	(30%)	0.0	(0%)
Tanzania	2.0	(46%)	4.9	(64%)	2.5	(32%)
Uganda	1.4	(49%)	2.9	(60%)	1.4	(29%)

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to out-of-school children as a percentage of the population of primary school-age children (6 to 11 years old).

(World Bank, 1990, Education and Development: Evidence for New Priorities)

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Decision makers should focus on four key trends with respect to female education (Behrman, 1990).

(1) Female enrollment rates for primary and secondary schools were lower in 1965 and 1970 in all of the Asia and Near East countries than for their respective group means (the author does not define this term), with the exception of secondary schools in Sri Lanka and Singapore.

(2) Enrollment rates in Asia and the Near East generally increased more rapidly for females than for males between 1965 or 1970 and 1987 **but there are important exceptions to this generalization, primarily in Middle Eastern countries.** The exceptions at the primary school level are the Yemen Arab Republic, Egypt and Algeria. Exceptions at the secondary school level were Tunisia, Algeria, Pakistan, Morocco and Egypt.

(3) In 1970, the persistence rate to grade four in countries in Asia and the Near East tended to be relatively low and lower for females than for males. Persistence rates to grade four increased substantially between 1970 and 1987. In the relatively few countries for which data are available, the increases tended to be larger for males than for females.

(4) Female illiteracy rates exceed the overall rates in every country in the Asia and Near East regions. Female illiteracy rates are high in the Asia and Near East regions in comparison to the rate for all developing countries.

Specific findings with respect to the development implications of investing in education are as follows (World Bank, 1990):

Productivity. There is evidence that higher education results in higher productivity. Table 10 summarizes these studies.

Rates of Return. Although empirical estimates of rates of return to educational investment are usually uncorrected for ability, class and unemployment differences, these rates still provide important insights into the relative economic payoff to education. The estimates suggest that "the highest overall social rates of return to education (in urban areas) are generally **in the lower-income, agricultural economies and in the marginally industrialized economies and that the highest payoff to education in these lower income and middle income countries is at the primary level."** Despite the tendency for the average rate of return to education to fall with economic development, rates stay high compared to alternative investments.

Female Education. Women's enrollment in primary and secondary education is lower than that of men by at least 10 percentage points in 66 of 108 countries. Among geographic areas of the world, the **female-male gap is highest in the Middle East/North Africa** and the lowest in Latin America.

Rates of Return to Female Education. In numerous developing countries, it has been shown that the rate of return to investing in women's education is as high or higher than investing in men's education, even as measured by income differences alone, without accounting for fertility and child health effects (see Table 11).

Table 10

Education and Productivity:
Selected Empirical Studies in Developing Countries

Study	*Data Base*	*Results*
Patrick and Kehrberg (1973)	Five agricultural regions in Brazil in 1969, individual farmers	Education has a positive and significant effect. Value added in agriculture in modernizing areas, but not in traditional and already modern areas.
Pachico and Ashby (1976)	Four agricultural regions in Brazil in 1970, individual farmers	Additional productivity associated with more education much higher in the two modernizing zones, where additional, non-educational inputs are available.
Lockheed, Jamison, and Lau (1980)	Survey of 18 studies, meta-analysis	A farmer with 4 years of education had an average productivity 8.7 percent higher than one with no education. With complementary inputs, return was higher (13 percent).
Jamison and Lau (1982)	Survey data on types of farms, education of farmer, physical inputs, and outputs in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand	Effect of education on output is positive, significant, and quantitatively important.
Jamison and Moock (1984)	Data on prices of farm inputs and outputs in Thailand	No significant effect of education on prices farmers receive for output or or paid for inputs.
Jamison and Moock (1984)	Survey of 683 rural households in 2 of Nepal's 75 districts.	Significant effect of education on farmer efficiency only in wheat production. Ability and family background controlled for.
Puller (1970)	Survey of workers in two electrical machinery factories in Bangalore, India, 1970	In-plant vocational training yields higher productivity increases than institutional vocational education.
Berry (1980)	Survey of productivity studies on urban workers	Results of such studies are inconclusive.
Min (1987)	Survey of workers in Beijing, China auto factory	Workers with vocational education have 7 percent higher productivity than workers with academic education. More years of education not significant.

(World Bank, 1990, Education and Development: Evidence for New Priorities)

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Table 11

Rates of Return to Education by Gender

Country	*Year*	*Educational Level*	*Men*	*Women*
Australia	1976	University	21.1	21.2
Austria	1981	All	10.3	13.5
Colombia	1973	All-urban	18.1	20.8
		-rural	10.3	20.1
Costa Rica	1974	All	14.7	14.7
France	1969	Secondary	13.9	15.9
		University	22.5	13.8
	1976	Secondary	14.8	16.2
		University	20.0	12.7
Germany	1974	All	13.1	11.2
	1977	All	13.6	11.7
Great Britain	1971	Secondary	10.0	8.0
		University	8.0	12.0
Greece	1977	All	4.7	4.5
Japan	1976	University	6.9	6.9
	1980	University	5.7	5.8
Peru *	1985	Primary		12.0
		Secondary, Gen.		8.0
		Secondary, Tech.		8.5
		University		15.5
South Korea	1971	Secondary	13.7	16.9
		University	15.7	22.9
	1976	All	10.3	1.7
	1980	All	17.2	5.0
Sri Lanka	1981	All	6.9	7.9
Portugal	1977	All	7.5	8.4
Puerto Rico	1959	Primary	29.5	18.4
		Secondary	27.3	40.8
		University	21.9	9.0
Taiwan	1982	Primary	8.4	16.1
Thailand	1971	All	9.1	13.0
Venezuela	1984	All	9.9	13.5

* E. King, "Does Education Pay in the Labor Market? Women's Labor Force Participation, Occupation, and Earnings in Peru," The World Bank, September, 1988 (mimeo).

Source: Psacharopoulos (1985) "Returns to Education: A Further International Update and Implications," *Journal of Human Resources* XX:4.

(World Bank, 1990, Education and Development: Evidence for New Priorities)

Female Education and Children's Health. Although the exact mechanism through which education acts to affect child health is unclear, there is an unequivocal schooling effect, which is distinct from the effect of income differences, on child health. Improved child nutrition and health, in turn, play an important role in school achievement and attainment. Women's education is therefore crucial to breaking the vicious cycle of poverty being reproduced through poor child health and low levels of educational attainment (see Table 12).

Table 12

Education, Mortality, Nutrition, and Fertility: Selected Empirical Studies in Developing Countries

Study	*Data Base*	*Results*
Arriaga and Davis (1969)	Secondary data on Latin American mortality rates	Prior to 1930, mortality decline was closely related to improvements in living standards rather than medical breakthroughs.
Cochrane, et.al. (1980)	Secondary data on mortality rates, by country	Literacy seems to be most important variable explaining life expectancy, even higher than number of physicians per capita. One additional year of mother's schooling results in reduction of 9 per thousand in infant mortality. Effect of husband's education about one-half of wife's.
Cochrane (1979)	Review of existing studies	Increased education tends to decrease fertility. Decrease is greater for the education of women than of men and in urban rather than rural areas. But education is likely to increase fertility in countries with the lowest level of female literacy up to completed primary schooling. In societies with higher levels of female literacy, education lowers the demand for children by altering perceived costs and benefits.
United Nations (1983)	Data from the world fertility survey of 22 developing countries	Confirms negative influence of women's (and husbands') education upon marital fertility, desired family size in 20 out of 22 countries. But levels of national development and level of family planning program efforts enhance or mitigate the strength of the education-fertility relationship. Differential fertility by education is highest in the countries with highest levels of development. The negative relationship between education and fertility is stronger in urban areas than rural. Ethnic or regional differences in the education-fertility relationship are not of primary importance.
Zachariah & Patel (1984)	Fertility decline in India, 1961-1981	Although family planning practice can account for 90% of fertility decline, family planning input variables -- manpower, budget, etc. -- were much less important than socioeconomic factors such as female education and children's health in explaining the practice of family planning.
Fertility Survey of Thailand (1977)	Individuals in Thailand	For all women married less than 20 years, education is uniformly inversely related to fertility.
Cravioto & Delicardi (1975)	Survey in Southwestern Mexico	No significant difference in parental education between well-nourished and malnourished children.
Christiansen, et al. (1974)	Bogota, Colombia	Significant positive association between parental education and children's nutrition.
Gans (1963)	Lagos, Nigeria	Children's weight of literate mothers was greater than illiterate mothers.
Graves (1978)	Kathmandu, Nepal	Mothers with no schooling had more malnourished children than those with schooling.
Levinson (1974)	Rural Punjab, India	Literate mothers had smaller percentage of third-degree malnourished children.

(World Bank, 1990, Education and Development: Evidence for New Priorities)

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PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS.

Behrman (1990) recommends various types of analyses and activities that might affect both the demand for and the supply of education in developing countries. With respect to activities to increase demand, he suggests that it might be of value to undertake some pilot projects that attempt to measure the impact in different country contexts of loan programs for poor households for female education, with careful monitoring and controls. He also recommends pilot projects for day care programs (because girls are the main babysitters while parents work or when siblings are ill). A Colombian community day care program, for example, is said to have enabled approximately 200,000 girls and an equal number of women to attend school or work, with estimated coverage of 1.5 million by 1992. With respect to analyses to understand demand, he suggested the following might be undertaken: (1) analyses that examine how increasing the access of women to labor market options increases their demand for education and (2) analyses that examine the extent to which improved health of younger children and infants would increase school attendance for older girls.

With respect to activities to increase the supply of education (and he notes that in some contexts like Pakistan the impact of such activities is likely to be substantial), he observes that programs under way in the developing world suggest that female access to schooling can be improved by incorporating such factors as (1) satellite feeder schools in remote areas for the initial grades; (2) flexible hours and hours that do not conflict with other activities; and (3) greater flexibility in seasonal patterns.

One of the most important observations in both the Behrman and the World Bank reports was that, whereas vocational education is less effective than general education, informal, business firm-based training and short courses appear more cost effective. If this view is correct, it may imply that a selective strategy is desirable, with emphasis on generic pre-employment training in low-income countries (where business firms usually have very little training capacities) and a focus on training related to new technologies in business firms or industry-connected contexts in middle income countries.

8. ISSUE: WOMEN'S LEGAL STATUS.

> **"In many countries of the Near East, control or choice is a feature distinctly absent from every aspect of a woman's life, from the most practical of concerns -- how to expend her labor -- to the most intimate of concerns -- how to express her sexuality. While there are many mechanisms that effectively constrict women's control over their lives, key among them is law."**
>
> **Freedman, 1991**

How does law in the Middle East constrict women's control over their lives and what are the development implications of lack of female autonomy? The author of an excellent paper on women and the law (Freedman, 1991) observed that for women in the Middle East, the rule of law begins in the home. Unlike most Western countries, the author continues, where matters such as marriage and marital relations, divorce, custody and inheritance are governed by secular laws written by the legislature and enforced by the state, in virtually every country in the Near East, these matters of private life are governed by a separate body of "personal status law" derived from religion and customary practices and often enforced by religious rather than secular authorities. In theory, the personal status law often carves out specific rights for women. In practice, though, personal status law, by dictating the terms of women's economic, social and sexual relationship within their homes

and families -- where the most basic conditions for an individual's participation in society is set -- has become a force **that severely restricts women's ability to control their lives.**

The author argues that it is important for development purposes to understand whether the law gives women -- including married women -- full legal capacity. Can women sign contracts...own property...obtain credit...become guardians of children...testify on an equal basis with men in a court of law? Are women allowed to be elected to political office? Can they purchase contraceptives without their husband's permission? Are they entitled by law to equal pay and equal employment opportunities? Is the value of their work in the home legally recognized? Do government programs recognize women as sole or joint heads of households or do they direct benefits designed to assist families solely to men?

In those countries in which the answer to many of these questions is no, the consequences for development are unfavorable. Freedman presents the results of an interesting study by the Australian demographer, John Caldwell (1986). Caldwell ranked 99 Third World countries by per capita GNP for the year 1982. He then ranked these same countries by their infant mortality levels (infant mortality being generally accepted as the best single indicator of a country's health status). Those countries whose ranking on infant mortality was 25 or more places **above** their ranking by GNP were termed "superior health achievers." Those countries whose ranking on infant mortality was 25 or more places **below** their GNP ranking were termed "poor health achievers." As Freedman observes, Caldwell's list of superior and poor health achievers is instructive (see Table 13). **Eight of the 11 poor health achievers are countries in the Near East region.**

Freedman comments that Caldwell then set out to explain why countries placed as they did by looking at a range of indicators such as literacy, education, family planning, culture and political history, among others. He concluded that two critical factors explain what makes countries both superior and poor health achievers: (1) female autonomy; and (2) equitable distribution of social resources and services. Caldwell explains that female autonomy means more than female status; it means the right and confidence to make decisions and to take control over the conditions of one's life and that of one's children.

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS.

While there should be no attempt to impose Western legal standards in these countries, field work might first seek out those women's organizations working in the Near East that are working to advance women's legal rights within an Islamic context, as well as women's understanding of those rights so that they have the "confidence to take control of their lives." After identifying such organizations, Freedman suggests that A.I.D. might provide funding to them in areas such as the following:

> **Legal Literacy Programs.** These are programs designed to assist people to become "literate" about the law, so that they might understand (1) how the substantive law, directly and indirectly, affects their lives and (2) how the legal system can be mobilized to improve the conditions of their lives.
>
> **Women's NGOs.** In many countries, women's organizations are undertaking legal research as a basis for advocating law reform at the national level.

Law Clinics. In some countries, an effective strategy for providing legal services to women has been to set up law clinics in affiliation with other types of organizations that service women. Legal services and legal literacy efforts have been successfully affiliated with family planning programs in countries as diverse as Indonesia and Colombia.

Table 13

Exceptional Mortality Levels Relative to Income Levels, 1982: Rankings separated by at least 25 places as measured by infant mortality rankings

Country	Per capita GNP ($)	mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	Ranking of infant mortality relative to income	Expectation of life at birth (years)	Ranking of life expectancy relative to income
Panel A Superior health achievers					
(Kerala)	(160-270)	(39)	(+75)	(66)	(+73)
Sri Lanka	320	32	+62	69	+61
China	310	67	+46	67	+61
Burma	190	96	+39	55	+38
Jamaica	1.330	10	+37	73	+32
India	260	94	+36	55	+33
Zaire	190	106	+31	50	+23
Tanzania	280	98	+31	52	+22
Kenya	390	77	+31	57	+22
Costa Rica	1.430	18	+27	74	+29
Ghana	360	86	+26	55	+19
Thailand	790	51	+25	63	+14
Unweighted averages	501	64		61	
Panel B Poor health achievers					
Oman*	6.090	123	-70	52	-57
Saudi Arabia*	16.000	108	-61	56	-50
Iran*	6.465	102	-52	60	-37
Libya*	8.510	95	-50	57	-47
Algeria*	2.350	111	-48	57	-32
Iraq*	6,465	73	-35	59	-39
Yemen A.R.†	500	163	-34	44	-32
Morocco†	870	125	-32	52	-18
Ivory Coast†	950	119	-28	47	-37
Senegal†	490	155	-27	44	-30
Sierra Leone†	390	190	-25	38	-25
Unweighted averages					
All countries	4.462	124		51	
*Oil producers	7.647	102		57	
†Non-oil producers	640	175		45	

SOURCES: World Bank. 1984 and Krishnan. 1985.

(Freedman, 1991)

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Appendix

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