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U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

AFRICA REGION

IMPACT WEEK

REVIEW OF ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

FEBRUARY 18-24, 1962

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# ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT REPORTS

FY 1991

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACTS  
FY 1991

I. INTRODUCTION

FEB 11 1992

MEMORANDUM

TO: See Distribution

FROM: AAA/AFR/DP, Margaret P. Bonner *me*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Impact Week

The Africa Bureau has scheduled a series of meetings, collectively designated **Impact Week**, to review the findings of its analysis of the FY 1991 Assessment of Program Impact reports submitted by its Category 1 field missions. You are cordially invited to attend the meetings as indicated in the following schedule:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Room</u>	<u>Reporting Office</u>
February 18, 1992	10:00 - 11:30 a.m.	1205	AFR/ARTS
February 19, 1992	2:00 - 3:30 p.m.	1406	AFR/ARTS
February 20, 1992	9:30 - 11:00 a.m.	1406	AFR/ONI
February 21, 1992	2:00 - 3:30 p.m.	6941	AFR/SWA & AFR/CCWA
February 24, 1992	2:00 - 3:30 p.m.	6941	AFR/EA & AFR/SA
February 24, 1992	3:30 - 4:00 p.m.	6941	DP Wrap up

It is expected that the reporting offices will, at a minimum, cover the points outlined in the guidance (copy attached) on API review circulated in mid-December 1991. The one deviation from that is that the wrap up will identify the most salient results emerging from the discussions, and will not consider process issues.

Impact Week represents a key step in the Bureau's progress in using performance information responsibly. It is intended to help illuminate and identify key substantive lessons about development in sub-Saharan Africa and our ability to impact on that development. It is also an opportunity to assure AFR/W that the mission-level performance information is being used by the field missions to make sound management decisions. This will reinforce the decentralization of authority to the field level by enhancing the confidence that managers have the information they need, and are using it to make informed decisions.

In addition to these major substantive concerns, POL/CDIE has requested that Geographic Offices identify those missions within their subregions that appear to have complete or nearly complete program performance information systems in place, and are thus able to track the performance of all country program elements against the objectives contained in their field-A.I.D./W management contract. POL/CDIE is looking for "exemplary cases," which, in the case of the Africa Bureau would mean missions with a completed, agreed-upon management contract in place, measurable indicators and actual data reported against those indicators (including goal and subgoal level, as well as key assumptions, as covered in Parts 2 and 1 of the API, respectively).

After presenting its report during impact week, it is expected that each office will draft and send a **cable to the field** summarizing its findings and conclusions. The cables should be sent **no later than March 31, 1992**, in order to inform the ABS process.

#### Attachment - API Review Guidance

#### Distribution

AA/AFR, SSpangler	DAA/AFR, JHicks
DAA/AFR, RCobb	AA/AFR, SBrent
AFR/EA, DLundberg	AFR/SWA, TBork
AFR/CCWA, MGolden	AFR/SA, LDean
AFR/ARTS, JWolgin	AFR/ONI, PGuedet (Actg.)
AFR/MRP, JJordan	GC/AFR, ESpriggs
AA/POL, ELSaiers	POL/CDIE, JERiksson
POL/PAR, RMaushammer	OPS/PRC, LRogers
FA/B/CD, LMarshall	LEG, JFredericks

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# FY 91 GUIDANCE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

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## FY 91 GUIDANCE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

### I. INTRODUCTION

This guidance supersedes all previous API guidance. It draws on the FY 90 API experience and the observations made by the several AFR/W offices that reviewed the FY 90 APIs. This guidance has also benefitted from the input of Mission Directors' comments and suggestions.

### II. BACKGROUND

Under the Development Fund for Africa (DFA), the Africa Bureau has been mandated to improve the impact of its development programs in the region. The DFA gives the Bureau the flexibility to program its resources to the countries and sectors where these resources can make the most difference. The Bureau is attempting to concentrate resources where the potential for measurable and sustainable results (or impact) is greatest.

The DFA has also challenged the Bureau to develop systems/processes for Missions and AFR/W to regularly assess program impact at the country and regional levels, and to report on this impact. The Assessment of Program Impact (API), a yearly exercise for all Category I Missions, was introduced for this purpose (90 STATE 215400) as part of a larger effort to improve the country program strategy, monitoring, and impact reporting systems in the Africa Bureau. This effort, which focused on DFA priority (so-called Category One) countries, included the replacement of the CDSS and Action Plan by a unified country program strategic plan (CPSP), replacement of the Semi-Annual Project Implementation Reports (PIR) overview statement, and elimination of formal AID/W review of semi-annual PIRs with a yearly API.

Because systematic impact reporting at the country program level was new to the Bureau, it was intended to proceed carefully in developing the API in order not to create expectations that could not be met. It was early recognized that the depth and breadth of information that could be reported in an API would vary from country to country, especially in the early years. Many Missions do not yet have fully developed program logframes and/or are still working on the articulation of strategic objectives and targets that are truly in their manageable interest. Some Missions are further along than others in developing monitoring

and evaluation systems for the country program and for major project and non-project activities. It was decided, however, that limited API reporting that did not provide a complete reading of country program performance in any given year would nonetheless contribute to our regional information base for DFA reporting. It is expected that API information will be additive from year to year and over time will paint a picture of country program impact.

Further, the Africa Bureau intends, during the 1990s, to move toward further decentralization in its program management. If this is fully successful, once a country's program strategy (i.e., program logframe) is agreed upon as a result of a Bureau review of a collaboratively developed CPSP, the Mission would then assume full authority for the selection, design, and approval for all new project and non-project activity. The API would become the basis for an annual process to (1) assess progress toward the achievement of the program logframe, (2) review the continuing relevance of the country strategy and programs, and (3) as appropriate, given the outcome of the review, modify planned program levels (including cost and personnel requirements). In other words, the API would become the basis of a joint annual review by the Mission and AFR/W of the program quote contract unquote. It would also be a source of information and data (minimizing other program submissions) for other routine documentation and reporting requirements that will be assumed by AID/W, as well as a principal source of information for impact reporting to congress. It is expected that over the next five years the Bureau will move toward this more fully decentralized system once monitoring and evaluation systems are fully established and the Bureau has gained experience with impact reporting through the API.

The AFR/W Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group is studying how it can best support Missions in developing and strengthening systems for assessing country program impact, particularly as AFR/W reorganizes itself and PPC/CDIE takes on new responsibilities. A continuous flow of AFR/W - Mission communication is expected as the API evolves so that its utility as an analytical, reporting, and feedback system on program impact can be continually improved.

This guidance incorporates the standard Bureau terminology on program evaluation. STATE 283555 of 1990 provides a complete definition of these terms.

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### III. The Purposes of the API for FY 1991

#### A. Primary Purpose of the API

In the short to medium term, the API will be the principal vehicle for Category I Missions to report to AFR/W on the performance/impact of their country programs.

The framework for API reporting will be the Mission's strategic objectives, targets, and subtargets (i.e., its program logframe) and the corresponding indicators. The API will be a unique report summarizing information gleaned from monitoring systems and special analyses undertaken by the Mission over the past year (including monitoring and analysis undertaken by the host country and other donors).

In reviewing APIs, AFR/W will be concerned with:

- The extent to which the program is achieving its strategic objectives, targets, and subtargets; and,
- The measures by which program performance is being monitored and evaluated.

#### B. Secondary Purposes of the API

The basis for strengthening the Missions' strategy and program implementation. While not specifically designed as an instrument for program strengthening, the API will furnish information that is useful and, in some cases, critical for improving the effectiveness and impact of country programs. In answering the question of what impact a program is having, preparation of an API will in effect be the first step in determining if a program or strategy revision is warranted. In some cases a Mission would follow up on an API by proposing through a separate cable a type of strategy revision (ranging from revision of one target to the complete program logframe) and a process for revision (e.g., in-country consultation, sector assessment).

Assessment of impact at the regional and sectoral levels. The Bureau will begin to develop a system for regional and sectoral level impact reporting under the DFA, using country API reports as building blocks for analyzing impact at these levels. It is envisioned that the APIs will become a critical, although not the only, source of information for AFR/W analyses at regional and sectoral levels. In the revised AFR/W structure, AFR/ARTs (the planned replacement for AFR/DP/PAR merged with AFR/TR -- analysis, research, and technical support) will play a key role in supplementing Mission-specific impact information

with broader regional and sectoral analysis so that we can better understand and report on what is happening in africa as a whole.

Use of program information. There are several other expectations regarding the information communicated to AID/W by Missions in their APIs. In the initial years of the API, AID/W will be especially concerned with using API information in two ways:

- to facilitate Congressional reporting under the DFA (thereby reducing Mission workload for CP preparation); and,
- to facilitate the exchange of operational program experiences among Missions (lessons learned).

Adjustments to quantified indicators. An annex to the API can be used to document a change in an indicator or a revision to the expected level of achievement, corresponding to a strategic objective, target, or subtarget, for subsequent years. An indicator would only be revised through an API where the overall strategy as well as the specific strategic objective, target, or subtarget continues to be valid. As already noted, if Mission management review or API material indicates that not only is a strategic objective, for example, not going to be accomplished at the level projected, but that AID's efforts are not going to make any difference at all, then the Mission will wish to take other steps to communicate this finding to AFR/W.

Geographic offices have also expressed interest in using the APIs for program and strategy review, dialogue purposes, and broader performance reviews on an experimental basis. The geographic offices wishing to carry out this exercise will communicate directly with their respective Missions.

#### IV. The API format

##### A. A Change from FY 90

The format for the API, which has been the subject of extensive discussions over the last year, implies a more structured document than was the case for the semi-annual PIR overview statement. Consistency in strategy over time, reported through the use of a similar structure, will increase the utility of the document in tracking on a country program level and facilitate impact analysis on the regional level. The API looks at progress to date (in

relation to expectations documented in a CPSP or older action plan) as a critical yet distinct first step in the on-going strengthening of AID assistance at the country and regional levels.

While actual length will vary from country to country, based on breadth and maturity of the program and availability of data, the typical API should be in the 8 to 15 page range, including supporting tables. The section that follows offers more specific guidelines on the appropriate length of each of the three sections that make up the API report. Emphasis should be on substance rather than form, and succinct rather than prolific reports are preferred. It is suggested that Missions study the APIs submitted by other Missions in FY 90 (a compendium was distributed at the Mission Directors' Conference) for ideas and examples.

One new (if minor) requirement for FY 91 is that each API include a one-page graphic form of the program logframe. Mission directors who perused the FY 90 API compendium remarked that this would be helpful in getting a quick grasp of a Mission's program logframe.

A standardized worksheet for Section III of the FY 91 API was developed on the basis of the FY 1990 APIs submitted. What is thought to be the best elements from several worksheets have been retained. The prototype received at least nominal approval from the Mission directors at the 1991 Mission directors conference. A prototype of the worksheet to be used in the FY 91 API is presented below in tabular format.

To make it more comprehensible, information from a composite Mission (MODAPI, developed for the Mission Directors' Workshop) is included. For demonstration purposes, only one strategic objective is reproduced to show the essential elements of the worksheet. Ideally, one strategic objective (SO), related targets, and indicators should all fit on one page to facilitate readers' grasp of logic and linkages.

The one point which is still left open on the prototype worksheet is that regarding sources of information for indicators. Where it is appropriate to do so, Missions may wish to indicate sources for each indicator, rather than sources for clusters of indicators as is shown on the prototype Section III table format.

### Section I: Special Factors Affecting the USAID Program

This section should discuss only those recent unforeseen events or emerging, previously unrecognized or unappreciated, trends that have had or are expected to have an effect (positive or negative) on the Mission's program, or which create opportunities to

PROGRAM FRAME: USAID/MODAFI ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
 REPORTING YEAR: FY 1990

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS	PLANNED AND ACTUAL (1)							
		No.	Baseline Year	FY 90 A/P	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95
<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1</b>									
Increase food production	1. Gross food crop production (million MT) (2)	1	1981	1.6/1.7	2.1(2)	2.5	2.9	3.4	3.8
	2. Area planted in foodgrains (million ha) Source: Annual Ministry estimate	1.25	1978	1.05/1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6
<b>TARGET 1.1</b>									
Intensify smallholder production of food grains	1. Maize production(MT)/ha increases: all smallholders -- women-headed households only	0.9	1989	1.0/1.0	-	1.2	-	-	1.8
					Date are not currently disaggregated by gender				
	2. Smallholder purchases of new maize seed (MT)	2	1989	3.0/4.0	-	7	-	-	18
	3. Smallholder purchases of fertilizer ('000 MT): all -- women buyers only	90	1989	100/100	-	110	-	-	130
					Date are not currently disaggregated by gender				
	4. Use of farm credit (M\$ million): all borrowers -- women farmer borrowers Source: Ministry statistics	45	1989	52/60	-	73	-	-	95
					Date are not currently disaggregated by gender				
<b>TARGET 1.2</b>									
Increase land utilization of estates larger than 30 ha	1. Land utilization increases	-	1990						
	- estates 30 - 100 ha			35/38%	-	39%	-	-	40%
	- estates over 100 ha			20/23%	-	25%	-	-	28%
	2. Effective average estate way rate Sources: (1) USAID: MKANDAWIRE, Jafee and Bertolli, "Beyond Dualism," 1990				Date for effective average estate wage rate not currently collected.				
<b>TARGET 1.3</b>									
Reform and strengthen agricultural institutional framework	1. Agricultural Budget-GOM budget: Recurrent (%)	4.7%	1990	4.7/4.7%	-	6%	-	-	6.6%
	2. Agricultural research budget increases in real terms: Recurrent budget (M\$ million)	-		7.0/7.0	-	8.5	-	-	11.6
	3. Number of smallholds adopt agroforestry techniques				To be statistically monitored				
	4. Proportion smallholder lands devoted to HYV maize Source: Budget documents, 1990/91				To be statistically monitored				

Notes: (1) Reporting year column shows actual (A) and Planned (P) levels.

(2) Assumes fertilizer use increases annually. To be monitored.

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strengthen the program. Under this section a Mission might find it necessary or useful to discuss a change in government policy that affects a particular strategic objective of the country program, a natural disaster that makes attainment of a target impossible, a major new donor initiative related to the Mission strategy, a significant change in the terms of trade where Mission strategy is to promote trade, etc. A more general overview of development issues should not repeat not be presented in Section I.

The experience from the FY 1990 APIs indicates emphasis on the following points. Section I should only deal with the major factors which affect the country. It should also touch on broad themes that do not necessarily relate to specific strategic objectives and targets; it can include major management issues as well. Portfolio descriptions are firmly discouraged. The purpose of this section is to lay the background necessary to understanding Sections II and III of the API.

The FY 90 APIs and discussions with the Mission Directors have led the API Working Group to decide that keeping Section I no longer than one or two pages is good practice.

## Section II: Progress toward Overall Program Goals

Missions should report on movement in the critical country trend indicators that relate to the program goals and sub-goals as contained in the CPSP, CDSS, or recent Action Plan. Where the country program goal is very general (e.g., "support broad-based economic growth"), the selection of indicators should also be based on the portfolio composition, program strategy, and the accessibility of reliable and relatively up-to-date data. Given the emphasis on "people-level" impact in the DFA, it is expected that IMF/World Bank macroeconomic indicators will usually be supplemented by indicators related to household income/consumption, infant mortality, income distribution, etc.

A tabular format with text accompanying is an option for those Missions that wish to present this section in this way. (See, for example, Chad and Cameroon APIs for FY 90.)

Section II, which should not exceed four to five pages, is particularly useful to ensure that the linkages between the strategic objectives, sub-goals and goals are strong and clearly articulated.

### Section III: Progress toward Strategic Objectives and Related Progress Indicators

This is the major section of the API, in which progress should be most closely associated with program strategy and performance. Progress should be measured against the indicators developed by the Mission and endorsed by AFR/W in Program Week or other ECPR level discussions. Performance should be reported for each strategic objective (SO) and target.

Some Missions have chosen to include sub-targets. Criteria for inclusion of sub-targets are twofold: they must represent results (similar to targets), and, second, they should not imply an additional management step.

Reporting on targets of opportunity in Section III should be the exception rather than the rule, simply because of the definition of such targets as somewhat outside of the Mission's principal responsibility for development impact.

The format for Section III is a now standardized worksheet. As noted above, the format was selected by analysis of the FY 90 subMissions and noting what worked and what didn't work. The tabular worksheet is presented here with prototype information for the mythical MODAPI.

The text accompanying the worksheet/table(s) can come before or after the worksheet. In preparing section III, however, Missions are encouraged to balance the amount of text and tables. Missions may want to summarize some of their textual comments in bulletized format based on the program logframe.

#### **B. Fixing a Common Problem: The Baseline Year**

The most misunderstood concept of the APIs from FY 90 was that of the "baseline" year. A clear understanding of baseline conditions is fundamental to any evaluation (or to interpreting any results reported in an evaluation). Yet the results from the FY 90 APIs showed that Missions tended to define their "baseline" year as when their CPSP began and/or 1990. This meant that no understanding of progress to date was communicated. This was especially frustrating when it was well known that the Mission had been working toward a particular objective for some years and had, for example, made substantial progress over the last five years. Therefore, the following guidelines for choosing a baseline year should be observed.

- In essence, we are looking for quantifiable historical data in the quote baseline unquote area. Regardless of when indicators were formally established as part of the country program logframe, the Mission's challenge is to communicate a sense of recent progress (or conditions, or lack of progress) achieved to date. Data from the early 1980s which are related to longstanding efforts in child survival or agricultural research or agricultural extension, for example, could be used to determine a relevant and reasonable baseline year.
- There also seemed to be a tendency to designate one baseline year for all the indicators related to a Mission's entire program. This is not necessary as a Mission's early efforts were unlikely to have begun in precisely the same year for all sectors. It also seems to get in the way of creatively finding sources of information that would give the basis for understanding a trend.
- The baseline year should be determined based on a Mission's experience with the sector for which it is assessing impact. It is, therefore, understandable that different baseline years in the same country program for different goals are perfectly acceptable. Indeed, the most likely scenario should, in fact, be one where most Missions with two strategic objectives involving two or more different sectors will have no less than two baseline years.
- Another likely possibility for the FY 91 API is that Missions will want to adjust their baseline year from 1990 to a more adequate baseline year. However, once chosen, the respective baseline years are to be kept in subsequent reporting years. The process by which a Mission wishes to change a baseline year to a more recent year will have to be developed at some future date, but should only become an issue in future years (at a minimum three years from now).

### C. Indicators

It is suggested that all indicators for a target (or, if possible, a strategic objective) be fitted on one page. This helps those working on the selection of indicators to better keep track of the various targets. Furthermore, it is also useful, especially for AFR/W review, to project into the future, and have expected impact for upcoming fiscal years, say, for FY 1990 (the baseline year) through FY 1995. However, indicators should be used sparingly, as what goes in an API Year One should ideally be included in all subsequent years. Recognizing that many Missions have still not identified a set of indicators with which they feel entirely

comfortable, it is nevertheless recommended that an abundance of indicators be avoided and a great deal of selectivity in the choice of indicators be exercised.

#### D. Frequency of Indicator Analysis

In any one year, due to lack of current data, quantitative reporting at all levels will not be possible. Missions should try, nonetheless, to assess their performance annually, at all levels of the program logframe, with whatever information is available. This effort will also serve to indicate areas where greater investment in analysis and tracking is necessary. In some countries, monitoring systems that provide comprehensive data on all components of the country program logframe are not yet fully established. Missions are expected to report available data while more comprehensive monitoring systems are being established.

In sum, it is perfectly acceptable not to include information on the level of accomplishment (status) of all indicators each year. If, in a particular year, the Mission chooses not to report on a target/indicator (choosing to focus on another set of indicators for example), it is still useful, for AID/W review, for the Mission to provide a discussion at the strategic objective or sub-target level if at all possible.

AFR/W expects variability in the depth and detail of reporting, especially in the early years of the API. Where recent data or analysis is more extensive in one area than in another, this should be reflected in the API. When, for example, a Mission and host country have just completed a demographic and health survey, the Mission may find it useful to discuss in more detail program performance in the family planning or child survival component of the country program strategy than one of its other strategic objectives or targets.

#### E. Data Sources

There is agreement that it is important to identify sources, since the API is used for Congressional and other reporting, credibility is important. Furthermore, for the purposes of consistency in data sources for subsequent years, and so that trends may have some meaning, it is important to give sources wherever possible.

Some of the FY 90 APIs that listed sources only gave sources for information related to strategic objectives. If possible, Missions should attempt to identify data sources by indicators. This enables the reader to get a sense of the type of data information used and the potential degree of credibility that can be associated with the indicators.

## F. Gender Disaggregation

Agency and Bureau mandates regarding the proportional participation of women in AID activities necessitate the ability to report progress on a gender-disaggregated basis. A recent review of the FY 1990 APIs against Missions' Women in Development Action Plans revealed very few gender-disaggregated indicators in APIs, and virtually zero actual information on women. Missions are strongly encouraged to re-examine indicators in light of the women in development mandate, and to identify quantitative and qualitative approaches to maximizing gender-disaggregated reporting at the program level.

## G. Changing Strategic Objectives, Targets, or Sub-targets

Rearticulations of strategic objectives (SO) and targets were allowed only for the FY 90 API. Rearticulation of strategic objectives in the API should not be done in the FY 91 API. If a Mission, while evaluating the content of a draft API, or in working with a program policy assistance (PPA) or a monitoring/evaluation team, decides to rearticulate a SO, that Mission should cable AFR/W upon completion of that rearticulation, and explain, with supporting data, the reasons for those changes. Either the geographic desk or AFR/DP will be responsible for responding to the Missions' proposal as appropriate.

Targets can, however, can still be rearticulated in this FY 91 API. Rearticulations should be included in Section III with appropriate indicators. Missions should bear in mind, however, that rearticulation does not mean redesign. If the change is so significant in magnitude or direction that the strategy is effectively modified, then the cable procedure just described should be followed.

When the program logframe in a CPSP (and any variation thereof) is approved through a Program Week process, the next API is to be based on the new program logframe. Any way the Mission can help to link performance under previous programs to the current program design is encouraged. Any agreement regarding a changed strategic objective, target or sub-target resulting from a program week or other ecpr-level review agreement should be reflected in the API (especially Section III) that same year as well as in subsequent years.

## H. Annex A - Revision of Indicators and Expected Levels of Achievement

It is recognized that in some cases Missions have, understandably, developed quantified indicators of program progress without benefit of indepth analysis of the validity of existing data and the level of improvement attainable over a given period of time. We

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want to avoid the situation where the strategy continues to be valid, but the quantified indicators have become irrelevant, leaving the Bureau and the Mission with no realistic expectations against which to measure yearly progress. This annex to the API can be used to change SO and target indicators (the type of indicator used to gauge performance) and expected levels of achievement (the quantification of the indicator).

Missions are cautioned to use this adjustment provision sparingly and only when they are confident that the underlying strategy (the strategic objectives, targets, and subtargets) continues to be valid. If a major adjustment of measurement is necessary, this might actually indicate that some aspect of the strategy itself warrants review. This strategy review should then be pursued through another process.

## **V. Submittal and Review of the API**

### **A. Schedule for Submittal**

Who and when? The answer continues to be all Category I Missions. API reports are due October 31 of each year. Recognizing that several Missions have not yet done new CPSPs (e.g., Rwanda, Burundi, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Togo), this means that they will have to continue with "proxy" program logframes based on their current portfolios.

### **B. Mission Review of the APIs**

Missions will, of course, develop their own standards and procedures for in-house reviews of APIs. Some Missions will probably find it useful to link API reviews to regular portfolio reviews; others might find a consultative process that involves participation by the host country and other donors a useful approach. Another option might be a two-stage process of internal Mission review followed by review with outside parties.

### **C. The API in Washington**

One recurring criticism from Missions regarding the FY 90 APIs was the lack of response and feedback on API reporting from AFR/W on their APIs. For this reason, the following section is provided to make clear where responsibilities lie. In FY 91, although all geographic offices and several sectoral offices in AFR/TR held reviews, only two geographic offices and some of the AFR/TR offices subsequently sent cables to the Missions summarizing the comments on specific APIs, as well as an assessment and general comments on broader themes concerning all the APIs reviewed. This was felt by most Missions to have

been insufficient. AFR/W reviewers agree but note that, as the quality of information in the APIs improves, it will be possible to provide Missions feedback which will be more substantive and meaningful.

The Washington API review process consists of four elements.

- The first review of the APIs is coordinated by the geographic desks. In FY 90, the desks reproduced the API reports, distributed them to AFR/DP, AFR/PD, AFR/MDI, and AFR/TR, and organized a review/discussion at a country or regional level. For the FY 90 APIs, each country API was reviewed by a small committee of three to five people led by the desk, including AFR/TR, AFR/PD and AFR/DP. Each geographic office director then chaired a meeting to summarize and discuss the impact findings for that region. This same process will be followed for the FY 91 reports.
- Another review process is a technical one, undertaken by AFR/TR for FY 90 and by AFR/ARTS for FY 91. ARTS will continue to organize reviews on a sectoral basis and may select key cross-sectoral issues for review as well.
- A third review is broader, conducted by AFR/DP. All FY 90 APIs were analyzed for possible use of the information for external reporting as well as for general understanding for program performance. Because the AAA/AFR/DP is also the Bureau's WID officer, it is expected that she will chair a review of the FY 91 APIs for wid-reporting purposes.
- The format watchdogs. For the FY 90 APIs, the Working Group which conceptualized the document in the first place also conducted a format review to see what styles of presentation worked best and which did not. Much of this cable is based on the observations of the format group. While the need for this group to continue to play a review role is expected to diminish as the APIs become more standardized, it will probably carry out such reviews regarding the standardized worksheet for the FY 91 cycle.

Feedback to Missions can -- and should -- come from all four sets of AFR/W reviewers. AFR/DP has already used some of the API material for Congressional and other reporting on the DFA. (See the Africa overview in the CP or the new DFA report and the July "DP Notes" for an article describing how this process worked). AFR/TR has begun to use API information in building a Bureau system to review program performance in specific sectors and subsectors.

It is expected, however, that for the FY 91 reviews the geographic office desks will be the most prompt, and their comments will contain inputs from the various Africa Bureau offices which participated at the desk-led review. Missions are reminded, however, that the API report is a reporting document for Missions. While feedback will take on many forms, it is not the principal purpose of the API report.

#### **D. Distribution of the APIs**

The 1991 API Washington review process was criticized both within and without the Africa Bureau as the system laid out above did not operate as smoothly as envisioned. Some officers never saw all of their region's APIs, nor did they see all reporting cables sent out resulting from the geographic desk-led reviews. Finally, although regional meetings corresponding to the geographic offices were held, information was not well distributed within the Bureau.

In part to remedy these distribution problems, compendiums of all FY 90 APIs were printed and distributed in early spring of FY 91. Given the mixed quality of the first-year effort, however, they are being distributed in a limited fashion. Yet, given the high demand to date, we expect to produce compendiums of the FY 91 APIs for internal AID distribution and for all Missions in africa.

#### **E. An Overall Assessment of the API Submission and Review Process**

Despite these glitches, useful lessons were learned and the API is apparently here to stay. As one geographic office director summarized his conversations with Mission Directors about the API: the API report has been accepted; the report makes sense and has value (for management purposes, for Mission portfolio review, etc.); it is a difficult exercise, yet . . . Missions acknowledged that they should focus more on it; and, finally, the collaborative support from AFR/W and AID/CDIE and contractors is essential.

#### **F. Mission Participation in AFR/W Review of the APIs**

It is envisioned that Mission representation at a Bureau review of the APIs for a select number of countries each year might be particularly useful. With careful scheduling, it should be possible to have Mission participation in several of these reviews while imposing no additional TDYs on Missions. In this first year of the API, we requested participation only from Mission staff traveling through AFR/W on other business during the November 1990 - March 1991 API review period. These first reviews with Mission participation were

used primarily to learn more of field experience and problems in conducting impact analysis.

As the API is currently a reporting document, participation in review would most likely be for information and broadening AFR/W staff understanding of the program. If geographic offices selectively move toward experimenting with this as a program review, however, the substance of Mission participation would change accordingly.

## **VI. Supplemental Analytical Support to Missions: Training and Consulting Services**

Several Missions have raised the concern that the evolving impact reporting standards of the DFA and API are not being matched by Agency resources for data collection and analysis. Clearly, a number of avenues need to be established through which Missions, depending on their particular needs, can be supported in generating and analyzing the kinds of information necessary for comprehensive program impact.

The FY 89/90 experience with joint MSI-CDIE-AFR/W teams to work with Missions on program planning seems to have worked well in getting the new CPSP and program logframe concepts off the ground. The Bureau has, therefore, negotiated a new IQC workorder with MSI to continue this assistance and will continue to do so until all Category I countries have had an opportunity to learn and apply the program planning methodology and have had at least one consultancy on the design and development of a program monitoring and evaluation system.

To assist Missions in developing their monitoring and evaluation systems further, however, more assistance may be needed on the nuts and bolts of data collection and analysis, on facilitating the linkage between project and non-project evaluation systems and program information needs, on staff training to improve the capacity to handle quantitative information, and on organizing staff time to actually apply skills in program impact analysis. PPC/CDIE, for example, is competing a new contract for program performance monitoring and this might be a new avenue in the future. It may be necessary to develop additional vehicles specifically to meet these support needs. Mission inputs on what priority needs are and how they might best be met are welcomed.

Limited funding may be available in FY 92 to assist Missions to develop or strengthen impact analysis. Direct hire staff and an existing IQC contractor could provide some assistance. Mission expressions of interest for short-term technical assistance on impact analysis during the next several months are welcome now.

It may be appropriate for AFR/W to provide funding for analytical needs identified through the API, but which cannot be readily addressed directly by Mission personnel or with project/non-project and PD and S resources already available to the Mission. In the future, the Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group will examine the possibility of reserving some PD & S funds for supplemental allocation to Missions based on the conclusions of an API. Further suggestions on appropriate funding mechanisms would be useful.

Africa Bureau staff constraints in providing assistance to the Missions to work through the logframes is another big issue. Until such time as this gap is filled, there may be difficulties in ensuring the quality of logframes, and thus sound APIs. Several of you will shortly receive separate communications to help address this issue in your Missions.

Your contact points regarding training and technical assistance for program planning and monitoring, evaluation, and reporting will be the following, until further notice: Emmy Simmons, Chief (until September 1, 1991) of AFR/DP/PPE; Carlos Pascual who is Emmy Simmons' designated replacement after September 1; and Jean-Paul Paddock, AFR/DP/PPE, who will provide continuity. In addition to slugging cables to the attention of these people, should you need help, all of the above named can be reached at the AFR/DP fax number: 202-647-3364. Even with the departure of Cindy Clapp-Wincek, the Bureau's sparkplug for monitoring and evaluation and reporting activities, (she's gone to pursue a career in the private sector and to spend more time at home), AFR/DP/PPE will continue service, and will work closely with the desks, AFR/ARTS, and AFR/ONI (formerly MDI) to serve the Missions' needs.

## VII. Solicitation of Comments

As always, Mission comments and suggestions are welcome. The Bureau's effectiveness in implementing the DFA is directly based on the program results which Missions achieve. AFR/W staff are looking forward to working closely with Mission staff on the next round of the APIs. —

## LIST OF COUNTRIES

CENTRAL AND COASTAL WEST AFRICA

CAMEROON  
GHANA  
TOGO\*

EAST AFRICA

BURUNDI\*  
KENYA  
RWANDA\*  
TANZANIA  
UGANDA\*

SAHEL AND WEST AFRICA

THE GAMBIA  
GUINEA BISSAU\*  
MALI  
NIGER\*  
SENEGAL

SOUTHERN AFRICA

LESOTHO  
MALAWI  
MOZAMBIQUE  
SWAZILAND

\* NOTE: These six countries did not yet have Washington-Mission agreement on development strategies or performance contracts at the time the API review was held in February 1992.

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACTS  
FY 1991

II. GEOGRAPHIC OFFICE SUMMARIES

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
CENTRAL AND COASTAL WEST AFRICA

FY 1991

- CAMEROON
- GHANA
- TOGO

## CCWA - OVERVIEW OF APIS

CCWA's API review focused on submissions from three Missions: Togo, Cameroon, and Ghana. The quality of reporting was greatly improved from the previous year's submissions. However, there was some difficulty on the part of all of the Missions in that they had not yet finalized their CPSP process.

Ghana's API was reviewed in conjunction with their strategy section of the proposed CPSP. Ghana finalized their CPSP earlier this year. Togo is submitting their CPSP in October, 1992. Cameroon is still operating under a 1988 CDSS, but plans to develop a CPSP under new Mission management. The next API from each of the above Missions will be more focused and better organized as they have or will think through their country strategies.

### SECTOR INVOLVEMENT BY MISSIONS

	CAMEROON	GHANA	TOGO	GUINEA
IMPROVE EFFICIENCY OF MARKETS	X		X	X
IMPROVE EFFICIENCY IN PROVIDING HEALTH/POP SERVICES	X	X	X	X
IMPROVE EFFICIENCY IN EDUCATION DELIVERY		X		X
IMPROVE EFFICIENCY OF AG-RELATED PUBLIC SERVICES	X			
INCREASE EXPORTS		X	X	
NUMBER OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES	2	3	3	3

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
FY 1991

CAMEROON

# OVERVIEW OF ASSESSMENTS OF PROGRAM IMPACT: CAMEROON OFFICE OF COASTAL AND CENTRAL WEST AFRICA

**FY91**

**FY90**

Program Goal	Promote Sustainable, Market-oriented and Broad-based Economic Growth	Data is not up-to-date. API submitted as an interim API.	Promote Sustainable, Market-oriented and Broad-based Economic Growth	Highlights:
Program Subgoal				
Strategic Objective One	Increase the Role and Efficiency of Private Markets	Some efficiencies achieved. Demand declined for fertilizer. Privatization process slowed. Lending to credit unions decreased.	Increase the Role and Efficiency of Private Markets	Average domestic cost of fertilizer declined 16% in 1989. Average delivered price of fertilizer declined 5% in 1989.
Strategic Objective Two	Increase the Efficiency with which Public Services in Agriculture (Food) Research, Higher Agriculture Education and	Some efficiencies achieved in Agricultural Education and Maternal Child Health project. Lack of data impeded measurement.	Increase the Efficiency with which Public Services in Agriculture (Food) Research, Higher Agriculture Education	

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APPR: MG { }

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AID/AFR/CCWA/PSEA:SALLEN:SA  
01/31/92 647-9060  
AID/AFR/CCWA:MGOLDEN

CLEAR: { }

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AID/AFR/CCWA:CROZELL {DRAFT}  
AID/AFR/CCWA:DTHOMAS {INFO}  
AID/AFR/DP:JATHERTON {INFO}  
AID/AFR/ONI:WWEINSTEIN {INFO}

AID/AFR/CCWA:AFORD {DRAFT}  
AID/AFR/CCWA:AYEBOAH {INFO}  
AID/AFR/ARTS:JWOLGIN {INFO}

ROUTINE YAOUNDE

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT - CAMEROON

SUMMARY: AFR/CCWA ANALYSTS HAVE COMPLETED AN INITIAL REVIEW OF THE CAMEROON API. THE REVIEW WAS HELD ON JANUARY 22, 1992. THE API PROVIDED A GOOD EXPLANATION OF THE MACRO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES THAT HAVE AFFECTED CAMEROON AND THE A.I.D. PROGRAM OVER THE PAST YEAR. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS WILL HOPEFULLY BE USEFUL FOR PREPARATION OF THE NEXT API AND AN EVENTUAL CPSP.

1. PROGRESS TOWARD PROGRAM GOALS

A. WHILE THE API EXPLAINED THE MACROECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES OVER THE LAST YEAR, THE API NOTES THAT LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD THE MISSION'S PROGRAM GOALS. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT NONE OF THE API'S DATA SOURCES ARE FULLY UP-TO-DATE. CONSIDERATION OF THIS YEAR'S API AS AN INTERIM REPORT LEADS TO QUESTIONS REGARDING THE EFFICACY OF THE OVERALL PROGRAM STRATEGY. IF THE IDENTIFICATION OF INDICATORS IN THE PROPOSED MEASURES IS DIFFICULT, THEN PERHAPS THE MISSION SHOULD TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT WHAT IT IS TRYING TO ACHIEVE, GIVEN

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THE DIFFICULT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES CAMEROON IS FACING.

2. PROGRESS TOWARD PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

A. WHILE THE COMMITTEE APPRECIATED THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT CAMEROON IS CURRENTLY FACING, THE FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS AND/OR COMMENTS WHICH MAY ASSIST THE MISSION IN PREPARING THE NEXT API AND AN EVENTUAL CPSP.

B. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE ONE: INCREASE THE ROLE AND EFFICIENCY OF PRIVATE MARKETS IN CAMEROON. THIS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE SEEMS RATHER BROAD GIVEN THE COMMODITY-SPECIFIC AND AREA-SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE MISSION'S INTERVENTIONS, E.G. THE FERTILIZER SUBSECTOR REFORM PROGRAM (FSSRP) AND THE PROGRAM FOR THE REFORM OF THE AGRICULTURE MARKETING SECTOR (PRAMS). INDICATOR 4 SHOULD BE INCLUDED UNDER TARGET 1.4.

- TARGET 1.1, LIBERALIZATION/PRIVATIZATION OF FERTILIZER IMPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION MARKETS RESULTS IN INCREASED EFFICIENCY. A STRAIGHTFORWARD MEASURE OF THIS TARGET WOULD BE INCREASED PRIVATE SECTOR IMPORTS OF FERTILIZER. ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE AN INCREASED NUMBER OF PRIVATE TRADERS. INDICATOR 2 SEEMS TO BE A FAIT ACCOMPLI AND THE EXPECTED LEVEL OF ACHIEVEMENT HAS BEEN STRAIGHTLINED ACROSS THE TIME HORIZON.

- TARGET 1.2, LIBERALIZATION/PRIVATIZATION OF INTERNAL/EXTERNAL MARKETING OF ARABICA COFFEE. USAID/CAMEROON SHOULD BE COMMENDED ON INDICATOR 1 WHICH SHOWS MEASURABLE IMPROVEMENT. A DECREASE FROM 100 PERCENT STATE CONTROL OF INTERNAL/EXTERNAL MARKETING TO 60 PERCENT IN ONE YEAR HIGHLIGHTS THE PROGRAM'S SUCCESS TO DATE.

- TARGET 1.3, INCREASE THE ROLE/EFFICIENCY OF COMMUNITY-LEVEL FINANCIAL SERVICE MARKETS. AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, CREDIT UNION MEMBERSHIP FAILED TO INCREASE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL YEARS AND LENDING TO CREDIT UNIONS FROM THE CAMCCUL CENTRAL LIQUIDITY FACILITY DECLINED BY FIVE PERCENT IN FY91. DOES CAMCCUL LEND AT MARKET RATES? IN ADDITION, THE PROPOSED INCREASE IN LENDING TO CREDIT UNIONS APPEARS MINIMAL OVER THE PROPOSED TIME HORIZON. THE MISSION MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE INDICATORS SUCH AS INCREASES IN PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENT AS A RESULT OF THESE LOANS AND DECREASES IN LOAN PROCESSING TIME.

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- TARGET 1.4, INCREASE EFFICIENCY/DIVERSITY OF EXPORT MARKETING BY ESTABLISHING A PRIVATELY MANAGED FREE ZONE REGIME. THE INCREASED EMPLOYMENT INDICATOR IN STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE ONE SHOULD BE PLACED HERE. GIVEN THE CAPITAL-INTENSIVE NATURE OF MOST FREE ZONE FIRMS, IS THIS A REALISTIC EMPLOYMENT PROJECTION? THE INDICATORS LISTED DO NOT APPEAR TO BE INDICATORS OF PEOPLE-LEVEL IMPACT. THE MISSION MIGHT CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE MEASURES SUCH AS AN INCREASE IN EXPORTS OR AN INCREASE IN NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS.

C. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TWO: INCREASE EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH PUBLIC SERVICES IN AGRICULTURAL (FOOD) RESEARCH, HIGHER AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION AND HEALTH (IN 3 PROVINCES) ARE PROVIDED. THE REVIEW COMMITTEE HAD TROUBLE DISCERNING THE PEOPLE-LEVEL IMPACT OF MANY OF THE INDICATORS UNDER THIS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (PARTICULARLY INDICATORS 1 AND 2). MANY OF THE TARGETS THEMSELVES APPEAR TO BE INDICATORS OF ACHIEVEMENT UNDER THIS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE. INDICATOR 4 MIGHT BE BETTER EXPRESSED BY USING TARGET 2.4.

- TARGET 2.1, EXPANDED ANALYSIS AND OUTREACH AIMED AT ENSURING THE VALUE AND ACCEPTABILITY OF IMPROVED TECHNOLOGIES UNDER ACTUAL FARMING CONDITIONS. THE LEVEL OF ACHIEVEMENT UNDER INDICATOR 3 IS STATIC ONE YEAR AFTER THE BASELINE YEAR. ARE THERE NO POSSIBILITIES OF INCREASING THE LEVEL OF ACHIEVEMENT? IF NOT, THIS IS ANOTHER FAIT ACCOMPLI. THERE ARE EIGHT INDICATORS LISTED UNDER THIS TARGET. THE COMMITTEE THOUGHT THAT INDICATORS 4 AND 7 WERE GOOD PERFORMANCE INDICATORS BUT HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE REMAINDER.

- TARGET 2.2, INCREASE GENERATION OF DATA AND ANALYSIS ON SMALLHOLDER AND MODERN AG AND LIVESTOCK SECTORS IN SUPPORT OF SAP. IS THE FOCUS HERE ON THE SMALLHOLDER SUBSECTOR OR ON LARGE-SCALE PRODUCERS? ALL OF THE INDICATORS ARE LACKING RELIABLE DATA SOURCES. DOES THE MISSION PLAN TO REMEDY THIS?

- TARGET 2.4, INCREASE THE CAPACITY OF CAMEROON'S HEALTH SYSTEM TO PROVIDE MORE ACCESSIBLE, INTEGRATED (PHC/MCH) AND HIGHER QUALITY SERVICES AT USER AFFORDABLE PRICES AND AT SUSTAINABLE OVERALL COSTS IN TARGETED PROVINCES. THE LEVELS OF ACHIEVEMENT FOR INDICATOR 2 ARE STATIC AFTER THE BASE YEAR. THE MISSION MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER BREAKING OUT THE INCREASED NUMBERS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PHC/MCH FACILITIES IN ORDER TO MORE CLOSELY OBSERVE WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

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## 4. CONCLUSION.

WE HOPE THAT THESE COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS WILL PROVE TO BE USEFUL TO USAID/CAMEROON IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR NEXT API AND AN EVENTUAL CPSP. WE WILL PROVIDE FORMAL COMMENTS AFTER THE IMPACT WEEK REVIEW DURING FEBRUARY 20-24. THE 1991 API COMPENDIUM WILL ALSO BE SENT TO YOU WHEN IT IS FINALIZED.

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
FY 1991

GHANA

# OVERVIEW OF ASSESSMENTS OF PROGRAM IMPACT: GHANA OFFICE OF COASTAL AND CENTRAL WEST AFRICA

**FY91**

**FY90**

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Program Goal	Promote Sustainable, Market-oriented Economic Growth	Highlights:	Increased National Per Capita Income	Per capita GDP increased 2.3% in 1989.
Program Subgoal	1) Increased Output 2) Enhance the Quality of Human Resource Base		1) Increased Rural Income 2) Improved Worker Productivity 3) Increased Imports	1) Data not available 2) Anecdotal 3) Imports increased 70% 1984-88 4) Anecdotal
Strategic Objective One	Increase Private Sector-led Export Production and Investment	1989: NTEs - \$34.7 million 1990: NTEs - \$62.3 million 1989: Exporters - 1,381 1990: Exporters - 1,729	Help Create Productive Employment in the Private Sector, Especially Agriculture	1984: 5.422 million employed (3.311 million in ag) 1988: 6.314 million employed (4.203 million in ag)
Strategic Objective Two	Reduce the Fertility Rate to 6.1 by 1996	1988: Mod. Cont. use - 5% 1990: Mod. Cont. use - 7% 1960: IMR/132 ICMR/224 1990: IMR/91 ICMR/150	Finance Some of the Costs of the Structural Adjustment Program	CY88: \$21.7 million (\$215 m) CY89: \$21.8 million (\$284 m)
Strategic Objective Three	Improve the Quality of Primary Education	1988: Texts available 10% 1990: Texts available 21%	Reduce Fertility Rate to 6.1 by 1995	1988: 6.4 1990: 6.1 (2nd qtr)
Strategic Objective Four			To establish a Quality, Equitable and Financially Sustainable Primary Education System in Ghana by year 2000	None

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AID/AFR/CCWA:AYWILBURN:AYW  
01/14/92 647-9339  
AID/AFR/CCWA:MGOLDEN

AID/AFR/DP:MBONNER {DRAFT}

AID/AFR/CCWA:CROZELL {DRAFT}

ROUTINE ACCRA

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: INFORMAL CCWA COMMENTS ON FY 91 ASSESSMENT OF  
PROGRAM IMPACT {API}

REF: STATE 329302

ON JANUARY 10, 1992 A MEETING, CHAIRED BY MYRON GOLDEN,  
DIRECTOR OF CCWA, WAS HELD TO REVIEW BOTH THE API AND THE  
REVISED CHAPTER 5 OF THE COUNTRY PROGRAM STRATEGIC PLAN  
{CPSP}. REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE FOLLOWING OFFICES WERE  
PRESENT: AFR/DP, AFR/ARTS, AFR/ONI, GC/AFR, R&D/ED AND  
FHA/FFP/AFR. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE CPSP  
REVIEW ARE INCLUDED IN SEPTEL.

CONSENSUS WAS REACHED DURING THE MEETING THAT THE API FOR  
FY 91 WAS CONSISTENT WITH GUIDANCE ISSUED BY AID/W IN REF.  
IT WAS AGREED THAT THE MISSION'S SUBMISSION MET THE  
REPORTING STANDARDS ESTABLISHED FOR API DOCUMENTS AND THAT  
IT WILL FORM A PART OF THE CCWA REGIONAL REVIEW AS  
SUBMITTED. WE EXPECT THAT RESULTS OF AFR/ARTS' SECTOR  
SPECIFIC REVIEWS MAY BE AVAILABLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE  
REGIONAL REVIEWS.

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AFTER THE REGIONAL IMPACT REVIEW WITH AA/AFR DURING THE WEEK OF FEBRUARY 18-21, WE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH FORMAL COMMENTS. HOWEVER, AS REPORTED IN THE CABLE ON THE REVIEW OF REVISED CHAPTER 5 OF THE CPSP, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION IN AID/W ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF INDICATORS USED IN THE API AND CONSENSUS REACHED THAT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE MISSION TO IDENTIFY APPROPRIATE IMPACT INDICATORS.

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
FY 1991

TOGO

# OVERVIEW OF ASSESSMENTS OF PROGRAM IMPACT: TOGO

## OFFICE OF COASTAL AND CENTRAL WEST AFRICA

**FY91**

**FY90**

Program Goal	Help Achieve Sustainable, Broad-based Economic Growth	Highlights:	Help Achieve Sustainable, Broad-based Economic Growth	Infant mortality reduced to 80/1000 \$4 million in savings through A.I.D.-funded credit union movement
Program Subgoal	Improve the Quality of Life		Improve the Quality of Life	
Strategic Objective One	Reduce Infant Mortality and Fertility	1990: Vaccination Coverage - 30% 1991: Vaccination Coverage - 45%	Reduce Infant Mortality and Fertility	1960: IMR - 160 1983: IMR - 100
Strategic Objective Two	Increase Rural Savings and Volume of Food Crops Stored	1988-1991: Increases in credit union membership (115%) and savings (300%)	Increase Rural Savings and Volume of Food Crops Stored	
Strategic Objective Three	Increase Non-traditional Exports	1989: 0 EPZ firms 1990/91: 11/12 firms enter EPZ 1989: 0 employed in EPZ 1990/91: 500/806 employed in EPZ firms	Increase Non-traditional Exports	

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APPR: MG { }

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AID/AFR/CCWA/PSEA:SALLEN:SA  
 02/05/92 647-9060  
 AID/AFR/CCWA:MGOLDEN

AID/AFR/CCWA:CROZELL {INFO}  
 AID/AFR/CCWA:DTHOMAS {INFO}  
 AID/AFR/DP:JATHERTON {INFO}  
 AID/AFR/ONI:WWEINSTEIN {INFO}

AID/AFR/CCWA:JPADDACK {INFO}  
 AID/AFR/CCWA:AYEBOAH {INFO}  
 AID/AFR/ARTS:JWOLGIN {INFO}

ROUTINE LOME

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT - TOGO

SUMMARY: AFR/CCWA ANALYSTS HAVE COMPLETED AN INITIAL REVIEW OF THE TOGO API. THE REVIEW WAS HELD ON JANUARY 8, 1992. THE API PROVIDED A GOOD EXPLANATION OF THE MACRO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES THAT HAVE AFFECTED TOGO AND THE A.I.D. PROGRAM OVER THE PAST YEAR. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS WILL HOPEFULLY BE USEFUL FOR PREPARATION OF THE CPSP AND THE NEXT API.

#### 1. PROGRESS TOWARD PROGRAM GOALS

A. WHILE THE API EXPLAINED THE MACROECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES, THE API PROVIDED LESS INFORMATION ON HOW THESE CHANGES AFFECTED TOGOLESE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE OAR IS PREPARING ITS CPSP, AND THAT THE OAR DOES NOT YET HAVE AN ESTABLISHED, UPDATED PROGRAM LOGFRAME. ABSENCE OF AN APPROVED LOGFRAME HAS MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR OAR TO PROVIDE IMPACT LEVEL MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS.

THE REFERENCE TO THE "DECADE-LONG PERIOD OF STRUCTURAL REFORM IN TOGO, WHICH RESULTED IN A DECLINE IN REAL WAGES

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FOR MANY WORKERS IN THE 1980'S" APPEARS HIGHLY DEBATABLE. IS THE API SUGGESTING THAT REAL WAGES WOULD HAVE INCREASED IF STRUCTURAL REFORM HADN'T TAKEN PLACE? THE API IMPLIES THAT GROWTH IN GDP HAS NOT OCCURRED AS EXPECTED DUE TO EXTERNAL FACTORS. IS THIS ENTIRELY DUE TO EXTERNAL FACTORS OR WERE THERE INTERNAL FACTORS AT WORK AS WELL?

B. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. THE OAR'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TO INCREASE NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS IS A LAUDABLE ONE. HOWEVER, USING THE PROPORTION OF NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS TO TOTAL EXPORTS AS AN INDICATOR DOES NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT WHAT IS HAPPENING WITH NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS. IF TRADITIONAL EXPORTS DECLINE AND NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS REMAIN STAGNANT, THEN THE PROPORTION OF NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS TO EXPORTS INCREASES, THUS PAINTING A MISLEADING PICTURE. THE OAR MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER USING AN INCREASE IN NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS (IN VOLUME, CFA FRANCS, OR BOTH) AS A MORE STRAIGHT-FORWARD MEASURE AS NOTED IN STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE THREE.

C. POPULATION GROWTH. WHAT EVIDENCE IS THERE TO SUPPORT THE ASSERTION THAT THE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS GRADUALLY DECLINING, PARTIALLY AS A RESULT OF OAR/TOGO'S EFFORTS?

## 2. PROGRESS TOWARDS PROGRAM SUBGOAL

A. CONSUMER PRICE INDEX. THE CPI USED IN THE API IS FOR LOW-INCOME HOME RESIDENTS ONLY. OAR MIGHT CONSIDER USING THE GDP DEFLATOR OR PURCHASING POWER PARITY DATA, IF AVAILABLE, AS ALTERNATIVES.

B. CEREALS PRODUCTION. ALTHOUGH THIS IS AN INDICATOR WHICH IS IMPORTANT TO TOGO'S POPULATION, IT HARDLY CONSTITUTES A QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATOR. A MORE APPROPRIATE MEASURE MIGHT BE CALORIE CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA.

C. HEALTH BUDGET AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL BUDGET. INCREASES IN THE HEALTH BUDGET DO NOT NECESSARILY SERVE AS A PROXY INDICATOR FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN GOVERNMENT HEALTH SERVICES. IN FACT, REAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES HAVE DECLINED IN TOGO SINCE 1978. THIS ALSO IS QUESTIONABLE AS A QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATOR. A MEASURE OF EFFICIENCY WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE, SUCH AS DECREASED HEALTH COSTS, A LARGER TARGET AUDIENCE REACHED, ETC. AN ALTERNATIVE MEASURE MIGHT BE AN INCREASE IN REAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES. OAR/TOGO HAS A PSI-RUN ACTIVITY WHICH SHOULD ENABLE IT TO MONITOR FERTILITY RATES WHICH WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE AS A QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATOR AT THE SUBGOAL LEVEL.

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## 3. PROGRESS TOWARD PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

A. WHILE THE COMMITTEE APPRECIATED THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES THE OAR HAS TO DEAL WITH, THE FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS AND/OR COMMENTS WHICH MAY ASSIST THE OAR IN PREPARING THE NEXT API AND THE CPSP. WE HOPE THESE ARE USEFUL AND WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THESE FURTHER WITH OAR/TOGO.

B. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE ONE: REDUCE INFANT MORTALITY AND FERTILITY. THE TEXT MENTIONS THAT IMMUNIZATION LEVELS HAVE INCREASED DRAMATICALLY OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS. FROM WHAT TO WHAT?

- TARGET 1.1, INCREASE VACCINATION COVERAGE OF INFANTS 0-12 MONTHS. OAR/TOGO SHOULD BE COMMENDED ON TARGET 1.1. THIS IS AN INDICATOR WHICH SHOWS MEASURABLE IMPROVEMENT.

- TARGET 1.2, INCREASE USE OF ORAL REHYDRATION SALTS (ORS) FOR TREATMENT OF DIARRHEA. HOW DOES THE OAR PROPOSE TO MEASURE THE NUMBER OF DIARRHEA CASES ACTUALLY RECEIVING "APPROPRIATE TREATMENT" IN THE HOME? THE MATRIX INDICATES THAT IN BASE YEAR 1983, ZERO PERCENT OF MOTHERS REPORTED USE OF ORS FOR DIARRHEA TREATMENT. WHAT IS THE SOURCE FOR THIS? THE BASELINE DATA SOURCE IS LISTED AS A 1988 DHS SURVEY.

- TARGET 1.4, IMPROVE PLANNING AND COORDINATION CAPACITY OF MOHP. IS THE INDICATOR APPROPRIATE FOR ACHIEVING THE DESIRED OBJECTIVE? SHOULDN'T TRAINING FIGURE AS AN INDICATOR OF IMPROVED PLANNING AND COORDINATION CAPACITY?

- TARGET 1.6, INCREASE USE OF MODERN CONTRACEPTIVES BY TOGOLESE WOMEN. OAR/TOGO HAS WORKED IN THIS AREA FOR AT LEAST 15 YEARS YET THE BASELINE YEAR IS 1988. WHAT ARE THE LONGER-TERM RESULTS FROM THIS EFFORT? THE OAR MIGHT CONSIDER USING AN OLDER BASELINE TO MAKE USE OF THE RESULTS OF PAST ACTIVITIES. THE NARRATIVE ON THIS TARGET WHICH APPEARS ON PAGE 12 SUGGESTS THAT LOW CONTRACEPTIVE USE SEEMS RELATED TO LACK OF GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT TO INCREASING FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES, I.E. THAT GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IS CRUCIAL IF A DENT IS GOING TO BE MADE IN SOLVING THIS PROBLEM. SHOULDN'T THERE BE AN INDICATOR WHICH CAPTURES GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION, E.G., GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTION TO FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES (TRAINING, PUBLIC INFORMATION DISSEMINATION, SEMINARS), NUMBER OF STAFF TRAINED, ETC.?

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C. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TWO: INCREASE RURAL SAVINGS AND VOLUME OF FOOD CROPS STORED.

- THE TWO ITEMS COMPRISING SO2 SEEM INCONGRUOUS. THE LINKAGE BETWEEN INCREASED RURAL SAVINGS AND THE VOLUME OF FOOD CROPS STORED IS NOT ALTOGETHER CLEAR. THESE APPEAR TO BE TWO SEPARATE OBJECTIVES.

- TARGET 2.1, STRENGTHEN NATIONAL CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT. THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION WHETHER THIS TARGET IS RELATED TO RURAL CREDIT UNIONS OR CREDIT UNIONS COUNTRY-WIDE. ONE OF THE INDICATORS IN TARGET 2.2 IS THE PERCENTAGE OF CREDIT UNION LOANS FOR AGRICULTURE. THE 1991 FIGURE OF 2.4 PERCENT IS ABYSMALLY LOW. DOES THIS MEAN THAT MOST CREDIT UNIONS ARE LOCATED IN LOME AND ARE NOT DESIGNED FOR AGRICULTURAL LENDING? IF NOT, THEN IN WHAT SECTOR DOES MOST OF THE LENDING TAKE PLACE? IN ADDITION, IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE HOW A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN LOANS WILL TAKE PLACE IN TOGO GIVEN THE RELATIVELY HIGH POSITIVE REAL INTEREST RATES THAT ARE IN PLACE WHICH PLACE A PROHIBITIVELY HIGH COST ON BORROWING. EXACERBATING THIS IS THE GOT'S ATTEMPT TO TAX THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN ORDER TO GENERATE SORELY-NEEDED REVENUES. THIS WILL TAKE PLACE IN A SCENARIO WHERE THE OVERALL TAX BURDEN IS RELATIVELY HIGH. IF LENDING SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASES, THEN OAR SHOULD MONITOR THE LENDING RATES AND DETERMINE WHETHER SUBSIDIES ARE BEING PROVIDED. FINALLY, WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE TONTINES IN THIS ACTIVITY?

- OVERALL, ARE THE INDICATORS REALISTIC, E.G. FROM A 35% TO 5% DROP IN DELINQUENCY RATES FOR CREDIT UNION LOANS? ARE THESE TRULY MEASURES OF IMPACT?

- TARGET 2.2, INCREASE IN RURAL STORED AND MARKETED FOOD CROPS. SHOULD ASSESSMENTS OF STORED AND MARKETED FOOD CROPS BE SEPARATED?

- INDICATOR B, INCREASED NUMBER OF TRAINED PRIVATE BUSINESSES SERVING FARMERS IN RURAL AREAS. INDICATOR B SEEMS TANGENTIAL AND UNRELATED TO TARGET 2.2. PERHAPS IT SHOULD BE RESTATED.

- INDICATOR C, PERCENTAGE OF CREDIT UNION LOANS FOR AGRICULTURE. SAME COMMENT AS FOR INDICATOR B.

- FUCEC REPORTS ARE CITED AS THE SOURCE FOR SOME DATA. WHAT IS FUCEC? WHERE AND HOW DOES FUCEC COLLECT ITS DATA?

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D. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: INCREASE NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS.

- TARGETS 3.1, 3.2 AND 3.3 SEEM BEYOND THE OAR'S MANAGEABLE INTEREST. THE EPZ HAS ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED. IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT THE OAR'S ROLE IS VIS-A-VIS THE EPZ. IN ADDITION, THE PROJECTED NUMBER OF JOBS CREATED SEEMS RATHER UNREALISTIC, CONSIDERING TOGO'S LABOR MARKET AND THE CAPITAL-INTENSITY OF EPZ FIRMS THAT HAVE LOCATED THERE. THE OAR SHOULD RETHINK THIS OBJECTIVE IN TERMS OF ITS ROLE AND DEVELOPING IMPACT INDICATORS. IN ADDITION, THE ROLE OF INDICATORS ADDRESSING POLICY, INSTITUTIONAL, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED.

4. CONCLUSION.

WE ARE AWARE THAT THE OAR'S PROGRAM LOGFRAME IS IN A STATE OF TRANSITION. WE COMMEND THE OAR'S EFFORTS GIVEN THESE LIMITATIONS. WE HOPE THAT THESE COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS WILL PROVE TO BE USEFUL TO OAR/TOGO IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR NEXT API AND THE UPCOMING CPSP. WE LOOK FORWARD TO MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE OAR'S PROGRAM IN THE UPCOMING CPSP. WE WILL PROVIDE FORMAL COMMENTS AFTER THE IMPACT WEEK REVIEW DURING FEBRUARY 20-24. IN ADDITION, WE WILL PROVIDE CCWA MISSIONS WITH A COPY OF AN AFRICA BUREAU EXAMPLE OF A 'WELL-PRESENTED' API. THE 1991 API COMPENDIUM WILL ALSO BE SENT TO YOU WHEN IT IS FINALIZED.

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

EAST AFRICA

FY 1991

- BURUNDI
- KENYA
- RWANDA
- TANZANIA
- UGANDA

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
FY 1991  
BURUNDI

OVERVIEW OF THE  
ASSESSMENT FOR PROGRAM IMPACT  
FOR AFR/EA  
BURUNDI

Summary

The Burundi API provides a good explanation of the macroeconomic changes which have affected the country and the program. However, it did not provide much information on how these changes affected Burundians. The API also did not clearly present the goal and subgoals. People level impact was lacking. The mission points out the its current program logframe is in transition because of the lack of an approved CPSP and program logframe. CPSP submission is scheduled for December 1992.

Goal: The goal was unclear so the reviewers were unable to determine any impact.

Sub-Goals: The sub-goals were unclear so the reviewers were unable to determine any impact.

Strategic Objective 1: Increased growth in private enterprise, especially among SMEs, exporters, and in secondary towns - Insufficient data at this time to determine impact at the SO level. However, some indicators under the target level reflected some change (see Significant Results).

Strategic Objective 2: Decrease infant mortality rate - Some improvement at the SO level (see Significant Results).

Significant Results

- o Progress on Strategic Objective 1, Increased Growth in Private Enterprise, has been mixed, with some indicators reflecting small improvements and others with no change. The table belows lists those indicators that show improvements.

	BASELINE YEAR	FY 1989	FY 1990
<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1 INCREASE GROWTH IN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE (Baseline Year)</b>			
# of Employers Country-wide (1986)	1,709	1,884	1,931
<b>TARGET 1.1 MARKETING/EXPORT ORIENTED POLICY &amp; PROMOTIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN PLACE &amp; FUNCTIONING</b>			
Dollar value of imports cleared at non-Buja customs (1989)	0	0	\$1.9 million
Days needed to get foreign exchange (1989)	7	7	3
<b>TARGET 1.2 PRODUCTION &amp; MARKETING OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS INCREASED</b>			
Coffee Exported in Metric Tons (Ave. 84-87)	31,883	29,084	35,501
Fruits, Vegetables & Plants Exported in Metric Tons (1987)	196	384.5	385.4*
Proportion of research tailored to farmer need & consumer demand (Indicator for the Sub-target for 1.2) (1985)	0	30%	60%

\* Based on current trends, mission estimates that this indicator will increase to 571.9 metric tons in FY 1991.

- o The indicators for Strategic Objective 2, Decrease IMR by 25%, show improvement.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2, DECREASE IMR BY 25%	FY 1985	FY 1989	FY 1990
Measles Incidence (#/100,000 children)	811	530	330
Pertussis Incidence (#/100,000 children)	97	17	15
Polio Incidence (#/100,000 children)	.54	.40	.35

#### Strengths in the API

- o Provides good explanation of the macroeconomic changes which have affected Burundi and the program over the past year.
- o Provides easy-to-read matrix listing strategic objectives, targets, indicators and the levels of achievement.
- o Mission provides an honest appraisal of its program logframe.

#### Weaknesses in the API

- o Mission did not provide information on how the macroeconomic changes affected Burundians.
- o Does not clearly present the goal and subgoals.
- o Does not provide a narrative or explanation of the performance indicators.
- o Lacks gender specific data.

#### Suggestions for the Mission

In addition to addressing the above, AFR/EA provided the following suggestions:

- o Add actual and projected information to the level of achievements for the matrix.
- o Under Strategic Objective 1, Increased Growth in Private Enterprise, especially among SMEs, Exporters, and in Secondary Towns, we suggested that USAID further clarify the total value of exports indicator, i.e., by providing a breakdown for public and private. Since USAID is discussing the private sector, the breakdown between public and private will show the order of magnitude and permit the USAID to more easily track the level of progress.
- o Under Target 1-2, Production and Marketing of Agricultural Products Increased (domestic and exports), we suggested that USAID add the value of production of original products as an indicator. The indicators shown in the table such as exports of coffee and exports of non-coffee ag products are only part of total production.
- o Under Target 1-3, Productivity of all Private Exporting Companies and SMEs Increased, we suggested that USAID delete the reference to total value added, public, as an indicator.



Strategic Objective/ Target	Indicators	Level of Achievement										
		Baseline (Year)	FY 88 Actual	FY89 Actual	FY90 Actual	FY 91 Planned	FY 91 Actual	FY 92 Projected	FY 93 Projected	FY 94 Projected	FY 95 Projected	
Object 1-2: Production and marketing of agricultural products increased (domestic exports)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Coffee exported (MT)</li> <li>* Fruits, vegetables, and plants exported (MT)</li> <li>* Value of all agricultural exports (w/ coffee and tea, \$000)</li> <li>* Value of agricultural exports (w/o coffee and tea, \$000)</li> <li>* No. of different agricultural crops exported</li> <li>* Food self-sufficiency ratio</li> </ul>	31,883 (Ave. 84-87) 196 (1987) \$77,122 (1987) \$8,751 (1987) 105 (1985)	36,684 167.3 \$125,133 \$5,960	29,084 384.5 \$73,297 \$7,331	35,501 385.4 \$68,661 \$6,751		571.9***					
	SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce, Service d'Appui aux Exportations (SAE), Ministry of Agriculture, Central Bank							*** projected based on current trends				
Target for 1-2: Productivity of ag research increased to produce relevant technology and agricultural productivity increased	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Proportion of research tailored to farmer need and consumer demand</li> <li>- # of farmer defined and managed research trials</li> <li>- # of private agribusinesses collaborating with ISABU</li> <li>* # of policies recommended by ISABU/MOAL implemented</li> <li>- input/output price reforms</li> <li>- implementing privatization of agricultural parastatals</li> <li>* # of farmers adopting new technologies (in project area)</li> <li>- cultural practices</li> <li>- agroforestry</li> <li>- soil conservation techniques</li> <li>- input use</li> <li>- improved varieties</li> <li>- fertilizers (organic and inorganic)</li> </ul>	0 (1985) 0 (1985) 0 (1985) 0 (1985) 0 (1985) 0 (1985) 0 (1985) 0 (1985) 0 (1985)	10% 30%	60%	80%	2,500	100%	100%				
	SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture, ISABU											
Object 1-3: Productivity of all private marketing companies increased	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Value of all SME exports (U.S.\$)</li> <li>* Value added of SME production (millions of U.S.\$)</li> <li>* Total value added, public and private (millions of U.S.\$)</li> <li>- primary sector (food and export crop production, fisheries, livestock, forestry)</li> <li>- secondary sector (agro-industries, food processing, crafts and leather, mining and energy, other industries, construction)</li> <li>- tertiary sector (transport and communications, commerce, other private sector, public services)</li> </ul>	\$859,000 (1990) \$75.0 \$570.14 (1987) \$232.89 (1987) \$326.27 (1987)	\$518.89 \$216.43 \$326.40		\$859,000 \$75.0							
	SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture, ISABU, ISTEEDU, USAID Formal Private Sector Study											

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Strategic Objective/ Target	Indicators	Level of Achievement									
		Baseline (Year)	FY 88 Actual	FY89 Actual	FY90 Actual	FY 91 Planned	FY 91 Actual	FY 92 Projected	FY 93 Projected	FY 94 Projected	FY 95 Projected
49  Logic Objective 2:  Ease IMR by 25% for children <1 ave. 0.000 during 1977-86)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Measles incidence (#/100,000 children)</li> <li>* Pertussis incidence (#/100,000 children)</li> <li>* Polio incidence (#/100,000 children)</li> </ul> SOURCE: MOH Epidemiology Bulletin	811 (1985)	635	530	330	<330		<330	<330	<330	<330
		97 (1985)	21	17	15	<15		<15	<15	<15	<15
		0.54 (1985)	0.81	0.40	0.35	0.30		<0.30	<0.30	<0.30	<0.30
et 2-1: eased incidence of ine-preventable uses among children r 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Immunization coverage rate                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- BCG</li> <li>- DPT 3</li> <li>- Measles</li> <li>- Polio 3</li> <li>- Tetanus 2</li> </ul> </li> <li>* Mortality rate for children &lt; 5</li> </ul> SOURCE: MOH Epidemiology Bulletin	97.0% (1990)			97.0%						
		86.0% (1990)			86.0%						
		75.0% (1990)			75.0%						
		86.0% (1990)			86.0%						
		56.0% (1990)			56.0%						
et 2-2: ice by 25% mortality to diarrhea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Proportion of diarrhea cases treated with ORT</li> <li>* Mortality rate for children &lt;5 due to diarrhea</li> </ul> SOURCE: WHO (1988)	30% (1988)	30%			35%					
et 2-3: ice by 25% mortality to malaria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Mortality rate for children &lt;5 due to malaria</li> </ul> SOURCE:										
et 2-4: nded use of family ing information and :eo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* % of the 240 public health service facilities offering family planning services (defined as at least one person having been trained in family planning and at a minimum, pills, condoms, and injectables available)                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- MOH-run health service facilities (170)</li> <li>- Other health service facilities (70)</li> </ul> </li> <li>* Percentage of couples using all methods of contraception</li> <li>* Percentage of couples using modern contraceptives</li> </ul> SOURCE: Pathfinder Fund, USAID Population Project Statistics	8.7% (1987)									
		1.2% (1987)			2.0%	5.0%					

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AID/AFR/AFR/RB:BDHOWARD:BDH  
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 AID/AFR/EA:ADLUNDBERG

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 AID/AFR/EA:JHOFFMAN  
 AID/AFR/DP:AKARLYN {INFO}  
 AID/AFR/ONI:WWEINSTEIN {INFO}

AID/AFR/EA:YLEE  
 AID/AFR/DP:JATHERTON {INFO}  
 AID/AFR/ARTS:JWOLGIN {INFO}

ROUTINE BUJUMBURA

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT - BURUNDI

SUMMARY: THE AFR/EA BURUNDI API REVIEW WAS HELD ON JANUARY 14, 1992. THE API PROVIDED A GOOD EXPLANATION OF THE MACRO-ECONOMIC CHANGES WHICH HAVE AFFECTED BURUNDI AND THE A.I.D. PROGRAM OVER THE PAST YEAR. THERE WERE NO SPECIFIC ISSUES RAISED DURING THE REVIEW. THE RESULTING COMMENTS FOCUS ON NOTEWORTHY IMPACTS AND ON CONCERNS AND SUGGESTIONS WHICH MAY BE USEFUL FOR PREPARATION OF THE NEXT API DUE IN SEPTEMBER.

## 1. PROGRESS TOWARD PROGRAM GOALS

A. WHILE THE API EXPLAINED THE MACRO-ECONOMIC CHANGES, THE API DID NOT PROVIDE MUCH INFORMATION ON HOW THESE CHANGES AFFECTED BURUNDIANS. WE WOULD EXPECT TO SEE MORE REPORTING ON HOW THESE CHANGES HAVE IMPACTED ON BURUNDIANS IN THE SEPTEMBER API. AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE MISSION WILL BE PREPARING ITS CPSP FOR A DECEMBER REVIEW, AND THAT THE MISSION DOES NOT YET HAVE AN ESTABLISHED, UPDATED PROGRAM LOGFRAME. ABSENCE OF AN APPROVED LOGFRAME HAS MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR USAID TO PROVIDE IMPACT-LEVEL MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS.

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B. THE PAUCITY OF GENDER-DISAGGREGATED DATA AND ANALYSIS HAS BEEN A SHORTCOMING OF AFR APIS IN THE PAST AND THIS SUBMISSION IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT RECORD. WE ARE AWARE THAT USAID IS IN THE PROCESS OF FINALIZING ITS WID ACTION PLAN WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WILL BE AN ANNEX TO THE CPSP. THE WID ACTION PLAN SHOULD ENABLE USAID TO DEFINE GENDER-RELATED IMPACT INDICATORS AND TARGETS AS APPROPRIATE FOR SECTOR ASSISTANCE.

C. TO ASSIST AID/W IN BETTER REVIEWING USAID'S API SUBMISSION, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE NEXT API FORMAT CONTAIN A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF EACH GOAL AND SUBGOAL. THIS WILL FACILITATE THE REVIEW FOR THOSE UNFAMILIAR WITH USAID'S PROGRAM.

## 2. PROGRESS TOWARD PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

A. WHILE THE COMMITTEE APPRECIATED THE MATRIX WHICH USAID PROVIDED FOR DEMONSTRATING ITS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, INDICATORS AND LEVEL OF ACHIEVEMENT, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE HELPFUL IF THEY HAD BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A NARRATIVE AND/OR EXPLANATION AS TO QUANTIFICATION OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS. FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS AND/OR COMMENTS WHICH MAY ASSIST THE USAID IN PREPARING THE NEXT API AND/OR CPSP.

- WE SUGGEST THAT USAID ADD ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INFORMATION TO THE LEVEL OF ACHIEVEMENTS FOR THE MATRIX.

- STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1, INCREASED GROWTH IN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, ESPECIALLY AMONG SMES, EXPORTERS, AND IN SECONDARY TOWNS. WE SUGGEST THAT USAID FURTHER CLARIFY THE TOTAL VALUE OF EXPORTS INDICATOR, I.E., BY PROVIDING A BREAKDOWN FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE. SINCE USAID IS DISCUSSING THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE BREAKDOWN BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WILL SHOW THE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE AND PERMIT THE USAID TO MORE EASILY TRACK THE LEVEL OF PROGRESS.

- TARGET 1-2, PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS INCREASED (DOMESTIC AND EXPORTS). WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT USAID ADD THE VALUE OF PRODUCTION OF ORIGINAL PRODUCTS AS AN INDICATOR. THE INDICATORS SHOWN IN THE TABLE SUCH AS EXPORTS OF COFFEE AND EXPORTS OF NON-COFFEE AG PRODUCTS ARE ONLY PART OF TOTAL PRODUCTION.

- TARGET 1-3, PRODUCTIVITY OF ALL PRIVATE EXPORTING COMPANIES AND SMES INCREASED. SINCE WE ARE DISCUSSING PRIVATE COMPANIES, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT USAID DELETE THE

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REFERENCE TO TOTAL VALUE ADDED, QTE PUBLIC UNQTE AS AN INDICATOR.

3. CONCLUSION.

WE CONCUR WITH USAID'S ASSESSMENT, AS STATED IN SECTION III OF THE API, THAT THE MISSION'S PROGRAM LOGFRAME REMAINS IN A STATE OF TRANSITION. WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE MISSION'S PROGRAM IN THE UPCOMING CPSP.

4. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH YOU AS WE ALL DEAL WITH THE EVOLUTION OF THE API PROCESS. FYI - EA MISSIONS WILL RECEIVE A COPY OF THE KENYA API WHICH IS PARTICULARLY WELL PRESENTED. 44

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
FY 1991

KENYA

OVERVIEW OF THE  
ASSESSMENT FOR PROGRAM IMPACT  
FOR AFR/EA  
KENYA

**Summary**

In terms of logical linkages of DFA goals, strategic objectives and mission program, Kenya's API is the most complete of the AFR/EA APIs. It followed the Bureau API Guidance to the maximum extent, providing clear performance indicators, targets and achievements. The document is well-written, concise and supported with excellent tables of performance indicators. The mission also has been able to identify some people level impact. The mission also has the advantage of having an approved CPSP and program logframe.

- Goal:** Promote Sustainable Broad-based Economic Growth - Little change over the past couple of years
- Sub-Goal 1:** Reduce Fertility & Population Growth - Significant improvement (see Significant Results)
- Sub-Goal 2:** Increase Production, Employment, Income and Foreign Exchange Earnings - Some improvement in Annual Employment Growth Rate and Foreign Exchange Earnings indicators
- Strategic Objective 1:** Increase Contraceptive Use - Continued improvement (see Significant Results)
- Strategic Objective 2:** Increase Agricultural Productivity & Farm Incomes - Some improvement in the sub-targets but too early to report impact at the strategic objective level
- Strategic Objective 3:** Increase Private Enterprise Employment while Reversing the Decline in Real Wages - Progress at the SO level has been mixed (see Significant Results). Mission has established 1990 as the baseline year at the target level so it is too early to report results.

**Significant Results**

- o Continued reduction in the fertility rate and population growth rate (Sub-Goal 1)

SUB-GOAL 1	FY 1984	FY 1989	FY 1990
Reduce Fertility Rate	7.7	6.7	6.5
Reduce Population Growth Rate	4.1	3.8	3.6

- o Increase in the contraceptive prevalence rate from 17% in 1984 to approximately 29% in 1991 (Strategic Objective 1)
- o Progress on virtually all the Sub-targets under "Improve the Availability of Family Planning Services" (Target 1.1)

TARGET 1.1 IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES	FY 1984	FY 1989	FY 1991
1.1a Increase # of Govt. Health Facilities Routinely Offering Family Planning Services	577	837	926
1.1b Increase # of Private Sector/NGO Service Delivery Points Offering Family Planning Services	181	535	649
1.1c Increase # of Sites Offering Voluntary Surgical Contraception	4	47	58
1.1d Increase % of Sub-locations with Access to Community-based services	10	30	34

- o There has been an increase in private sector annual employment growth rate, under Strategic Objective 3, from 5.2% in the baseline year of 1985 to 7.5% in 1990. On the negative side, however, private sector real wages have been declining.

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**Strengths in the API**

- o East Africa's best API
- o Clear performance indicators, targets, and achievements
- o Incorporated last year's comments and suggestions
- o Improved indicators by eliminating, rearranging or rewriting them

**Weaknesses in the API**

- o Lacks gender specific data

**Questions for the Mission**

In addition to addressing the above, AFR/EA raised the following questions:

- o Under Annex A, Mission discusses why it was unable to use "Increase On-Farm Income" as an indicator under SO2, Increase Agricultural Productivity and Farm Income. We recognize that there is insufficient data to use "Increase On-Farm Income" as an indicator. Yet income is, in a sense, half this strategic objective. We hope in the future that such an indicator may be found to more accurately reflect this strategic objective.
- o Mission discusses women's participation in small and medium-sized enterprises under Target 3.2 and Subtarget 3.2A. Has the Mission had the opportunity to analyze any impact on women under SO2, Increase Agricultural Productivity and Farm Incomes? Is any information available? Are there any appropriate indicators that might reflect this information?
- o With the current political situation, the Kenya Market Development Program and the Fertilizer Pricing and Market Reform Program obligations have been put on hold. Will this affect Target 2.2, Improve Agricultural Market Efficiency?
- o AFR/EA endorsed Mission's continued review of Strategic Objectives 2 and 3.

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AID/AFR/EA:ADLUNDBERG

AFR/EA:YLEE  
AFR/DP:AKARLYN {INFO}  
AFR/ONI:WWEINSTEIN {INFO}

AFR/DP:JATHERTON {INFO}  
AFR/ARTS:JWOLGIN {INFO}

PRIORITY NAIROBI

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: API REPORTING CABLE

1. THE AFR/EA KENYA API REVIEW WAS HELD ON JANUARY 16, 1992. AID/W WISHES TO COMMEND MISSION FOR AN OUTSTANDING API. COPIES OF THIS API ARE BEING FORWARDED TO OTHER AFR/EA MISSIONS AS A MODEL IN PREPARING THIS YEAR'S API.

2. THERE WERE NO SPECIFIC ISSUES RAISED IN THE REVIEW. THE FOLLOWING ARE AFR/EA COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ON USAID/KENYA'S API.

3. UNDER ANNEX A, MISSION DISCUSSES WHY IT WAS UNABLE TO USE "INCREASE ON-FARM INCOME" AS AN INDICATOR UNDER SO2, INCREASE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY AND FARM INCOME. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS INSUFFICIENT DATA TO USE "INCREASE ON-FARM INCOME" AS AN INDICATOR. YET INCOME IS, IN A SENSE, HALF THIS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE. WE HOPE IN THE FUTURE THAT SUCH AN INDICATOR MAY BE FOUND TO MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT THIS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE.

4. MISSION DISCUSSES WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES UNDER TARGET 3.2 AND SUBTARGET 3.2A. HAS THE MISSION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO ANALYZE ANY

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IMPACT ON WOMEN UNDER SO2, INCREASE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY AND FARM INCOMES? IS ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE? ARE THERE ANY APPROPRIATE INDICATORS THAT MIGHT REFLECT THIS INFORMATION?

5. WITH THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION, THE KENYA MARKET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND THE FERTILIZER PRICING AND MARKET REFORM PROGRAM OBLIGATIONS HAVE BEEN PUT ON HOLD. WILL THIS AFFECT TARGET 2.2, IMPROVE AGRICULTURAL MARKET EFFICIENCY?

6. AID/W ENDORSES MISSION'S CONTINUED REVIEW OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 2 AND 3. 44

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
FY 1991

RWANDA

**OVERVIEW OF THE  
ASSESSMENTS FOR PROGRAM IMPACT  
FOR AFR/EA  
RWANDA**

**Summary**

Rwanda's API is excellent in light of the fact that this is the mission's first API. It is well-written and has easy-to-read tables of performance indicators. The mission has been able to identify some people level impact. The mission currently does not have an approved CPSP and program logframe. CPSP is scheduled for review in June 1992.

**Goal:** Sustained broad-based increases in per capita income in rural areas - Difficult to determine progress at this level given the political upheavals of the past year

**Sub-Goal 1:** Decrease total fertility from 8.6 to 8.0 by 1994 - Available data from the Demographic Health Survey suggests that the Total Fertility Rate may have decreased to 7.3. However, we are unable to state for certain that this decrease or the baseline number is correct because work on the DHS was disrupted by the invasion.

**Sub-Goal 2:** Sustained food production at least equal to the population growth rate - Uncertain if there has been progress because of lack of data.

**Strategic Objective 1:** Increase contraceptive prevalence rate from 3% to 15% by 1994 - Significant impact (see Significant Results)

**Strategic Objective 2:** Farmers using new production increasing resource-conserving technologies and practices - Data is insufficient at this time to determine impact

**Significant Results**

- o The contraceptive prevalence rate has increased from 3.7% in 1988 to 10.5%, exceeding the projected rate by 25% (Strategic Objective 1).
- o The number of users of family planning methods has nearly tripled, from 40,000 in 1988 to 119,481 in 1991, exceeding the projected number by 21,000 (Target 1.1).

	FY 1988	FY 1990	FY 1991*
<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1 Increase Contraceptive Prevalence Rate</b>	3.7%	9.62%	10.5%
<b>TARGET 1.1 Increase # of Users of Family Planning Methods</b>	40,000	105,078	119,481

\* As of June 1991

- o Under the Target of Opportunity, Expand employment in new and existing micro, small and medium rural private enterprise, 450 new artisanal jobs have been created and 300 artisans have had their skills upgraded. In addition, there has been the creation of a privately managed artisanal center.

**Strengths in the API**

- o Presents both progress and failures in a clear manner
- o Excellent description of major factors/events going on in Rwanda
- o Goals, subgoals and strategic objectives are explicitly presented
- o Reasonable, quantitative performance indicators to the extent possible with explanations when not possible

**Weaknesses in the API**

- o Some indicators are hard to measure and lack targets.
- o Current program reflects a greater emphasis on the targets of opportunity rather than the strategic objective of agricultural production.

**Suggestions for the Mission**

In addition to addressing the above, AFR/EA provided the following suggestions and questions:

- o We encourage Mission's efforts to ascertain what percentage of these contraceptive users remain as continuing users.
- o Since the API did not contain an indicator for condom use, USAID may wish to consider adding condom use as an indicator for tracking both family planning and AIDS prevention users.
- o Since the USAID program is moving more towards developing SMEs and increasing incomes, we would appreciate receiving a detailed analysis in the CPSP as to how the USAID program intends to sustain people-level impact in this sector and achieve its program objectives given the likely affect continued closure of regional borders and internal strife will have on Rwanda.

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AFR/ARTS:JWOLGIN {INFO}  
AFR/DP:JATHERTON {INFO}

AID/AFR/EA:JHOFFMAN  
AFR/DP:AKARLYN {INFO}  
AFR/ONI:WWEINSTEIN {INFO}

ROUTINE KIGALI

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT - RWANDA

SUMMARY: THE AFR/EA RWANDA API REVIEW WAS HELD ON JANUARY 14, 1992. THE AFR/EA REVIEW COMMITTEE WISHES TO COMMEND THE USAID FOR AN EXCEPTIONALLY WELL-WRITTEN AND THOUGHTFUL API. THE REVIEW COMMITTEE PARTICULARLY APPRECIATED THE FRANKNESS OF THE MISSION'S COMMENTS PERTAINING TO OBTAINING BASELINE DATA AND THE PRESENT POLITICAL/ECONOMIC SITUATION. THE TABLES WERE WELL PRESENTED AND WELL QUANTIFIED WITH GOOD INDICATORS. THERE WERE NO SPECIFIC ISSUES RAISED IN THE REVIEW. FOLLOWING ARE AFR/EA COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ON USAID/RWANDA'S API:

1. THE API PRESENTS BOTH PROGRESS AND FAILURES IN A CLEAR MANNER AND THE REASONS WHY IT FAILED IF IT DID AND WHAT WOULD BE THE NEXT STEP. IT PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR FACTORS/EVENTS HAPPENING IN RWANDA AND THE EFFECT THESE FACTORS/EVENTS HAD ON THE MISSION AND ITS PROGRAM. THE GOALS AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES ARE EXPLICITLY PRESENTED AND THE PROGRESS TOWARD THE OBJECTIVES ARE MEASURED AGAINST THE PROJECTED TARGETS.

2. PROGRESS TOWARD PROGRAM GOALS

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THE API NOTES THAT THERE HAS BEEN QTE MEASURABLE PROGRESS UNQTE ON THE MISSION'S SUBGOAL TO DECREASE THE TOTAL FERTILITY RATE FROM 8.6 TO 8 BY 1994, AND THAT FRAGMENTARY DATA FROM THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEY INDICATES THAT THE TOTAL FERTILITY RATE IS NOW APPROXIMATELY 7.3. WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING AN UPDATE ON THE ACCURACY OF THIS DATA IN THE FY 1992 API. ON THE MISSION'S OTHER SUBGOAL, SUSTAINED INCREASES IN FOOD PRODUCTION AT LEAST EQUAL TO THE POPULATION GROWTH RATE, WE APPRECIATE YOUR FRANKNESS IN STATING THAT LITTLE PROGRESS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MADE ON ACHIEVING THIS SUBGOAL AND THAT MISSION INTENDS TO PROVIDE MORE ANALYSIS IN THE UPCOMING CPSP.

### 3. PROGRESS TOWARD PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

THE API PRESENTS A QUANTITATIVE BASIS OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE AND CLEARLY EXPLAINS WHY IT CANNOT FOR OTHER TARGETS. BY STATING THAT THE MISSION TRIED TO OBTAIN SOME DATA BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL DUE TO THE VARIOUS EVENTS OCCURRING IN THE COUNTRY, THE DOCUMENT SHOWS THAT THE MISSION TRIED TO DO WHAT IT EXPECTED TO DO. THE TWO STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES: INCREASED USE OF CONTRACEPTIVES, AND INCREASE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE TWO SUBGOALS OF THE MISSION PROGRAM. THE MISSION PROGRAM SEEMS TO BE REASONABLE, WELL FOCUSED AND MANAGEABLE. OBSERVATIONS ON THE MISSION'S TWO STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES FOLLOW:

A. INCREASED CONTRACEPTIVE PREVALENCE RATE FROM 3 PERCENT TO 15 PERCENT BY 1994. WE ARE QUITE PLEASED TO SEE THAT THE CURRENT RATE EXCEEDS BY 25 PERCENT THE PROJECTED RATE AND THAT THE ACTUAL RATE IS NOW 10.3 VERSUS A PROJECTED RATE OF 8.3 PERCENT. GIVEN RWANDA'S RAPID POPULATION GROWTH RATE, WE FIND THESE STATISTICS VERY ENCOURAGING, PARTICULARLY IF THEY ARE SUSTAINABLE. WE SUPPORT THE MISSION'S EFFORTS TO ASCERTAIN WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THESE CONTRACEPTIVE USERS REMAIN AS CONTINUING USERS. SINCE THE API DID NOT CONTAIN AN INDICATOR FOR CONDOM USE, USAID MAY WISH TO CONSIDER ADDING CONDOM USE AS AN INDICATOR FOR TRACKING BOTH FAMILY PLANNING AND AIDS PREVENTION USERS.

B. FARMERS USING NEW PRODUCTION INCREASING RESOURCE-CONSERVING TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES. AID/W APPRECIATES THE PROBLEMS USAID HAS HAD THIS YEAR IN OBTAINING DATA ON THIS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE GIVEN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE PROJECT AREA. WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING A PROGRESS UPDATE ON THIS OBJECTIVE IN THE NEXT API.

### 4. CONCLUSION

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WE NOTE THAT THE USAID PROGRAM, PARTICULARLY IN THE SMALL, MEDIUM ENTERPRISE (SME) AREA HAS DEMONSTRATED SOME PEOPLE-LEVEL IMPACT. IN PARTICULAR, THE PRIME PROGRAM HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING THE GOR TO STREAMLINE ITS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR CREATING AND REGISTERING NEW BUSINESSES, PROMOTING DOMESTIC PROCUREMENT FROM SMALL DOMESTIC PRODUCERS AND CREATING ARTISANAL JOBS. SINCE THE USAID PROGRAM IS MOVING MORE TOWARDS DEVELOPING SMES AND INCREASING INCOMES, WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING A DETAILED ANALYSIS IN THE CPSP AS TO HOW THE USAID PROGRAM INTENDS TO SUSTAIN PEOPLE-LEVEL IMPACT IN THIS SECTOR AND ACHIEVE ITS PROGRAM OBJECTIVES GIVEN THE LIKELY AFFECT CONTINUED CLOSURE OF REGIONAL BORDERS AND INTERNAL STRIFE WILL HAVE ON RWANDA.

5. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH YOU AS WE ALL DEAL WITH THE EVOLUTION OF THE API PROCESS. FYI - EA MISSIONS WILL RECEIVE A COPY OF THE KENYA API WHICH IS PARTICULARLY WELL PRESENTED. YY

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04

ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT  
FY 1991  
TANZANIA

**OVERVIEW OF THE  
ASSESSMENT FOR PROGRAM IMPACT  
FOR AFR/EA  
TANZANIA**

**Summary**

The Tanzania API did not follow the format suggested in the API Guidance. The section, Progress toward Overall Country Program Goals, included many different subjects which could be external factors, subgoals, strategic objectives and project performance. It did not present a narrative on the strategic objectives and performance indicators. Since the API did not define the goal and sub-goals, it was difficult to determine whether progress was being made. People level impact was lacking. However, the mission does not have an approved CPSP and program logframe. CPSP submission is scheduled for July 1992.

**Goal:** Goal was unclear so reviewers were unable to determine impact.

**Sub-Goals:** Sub-goals were unclear so reviewers were unable to determine impact.

**Strategic Objective 1:** Increase rural road utilization - While mission reports that it has met most of its indicators, it provided only anecdotal information on potential people level impact (see Significant Results).

**Strategic Objective 2:** Increase birth-spacing practices by men and women - Difficult to determine impact. There was confusion on the baseline indicators and lack of quantifiable indicators on the subtargets.

**Strategic Objective 3:** Improve the number of Tanzanian individuals in public and private sector capable of implementing ESAP - Insufficient data to determine impact

**Significant Results**

- o Mission reports that under its Strategic Objective 1, Increase Rural Road Utilization, that most of its targets established last year have been met. Residents of the Shinyanga area, where the roads have been rehabilitated, report that they have increased mobility; improved crop movement; a better supply of agriculture inputs and consumer goods; increased public transport; and increased marketing choices for agricultural produce.

**Strengths in the API**

- o Provides good explanation of the macroeconomic changes which have affected Tanzania and the program over the past year.

**Weaknesses in the API**

- o The third section, "Progress toward Overall Country Program Goals," includes many different subjects which may be subgoals, strategic objectives and project performance.
- o It does not present a section on progress toward strategic objectives.
- o It is unclear what the goal and sub-goals of the program are.
- o Indicators are difficult to measure and too detailed.

**Suggestions for the Mission**

In addition to addressing the above, AFR/EA provided the following suggestions and questions:

- o What is the impact of corruption on the USAID program? Perhaps a discussion on how to minimize the damage of corruption can be included in the upcoming CPSP.
- o As data becomes available for each fiscal year, we suggested that USAID add actual and projected information to each of the indicators in the matrix.
- o There was some confusion about the baseline indicators under SO2, Increase Birth-spacing Practices by Men and Women, on whether they reflected the comparison point for future progress or the result to be achieved.
- o While we recognize that data may not be available for all indicators at this time, it would be useful in future APIs to quantify as many indicators as possible in order for reviewers to see the progress made from year to year. If an indicator can not be quantified, it would be helpful to the reviewer if the means of measurement could be described in a narrative form.

TANZANIA ACTION PLAN  
PROGRAM OBJECTIVE TREE

ACHIEVE SUSTAINED GROWTH  
IN REAL INCOME AND  
IMPROVE SOCIAL WELFARE OF  
TANZANIAN MEN, WOMEN AND  
CHILDREN

Sub-goal 1  
INCREASE INCOME & EMPLOY-  
MENT FROM AG., COMMERCE &  
OTHER PRIVATE SECTORS FOR  
MEN AND WOMEN

Sub-goal 2  
IMPROVE HEALTH OF  
TANZANIAN WOMEN, CHILDREN  
& MEN

Target of opportunity  
strengthen G.M. capacity  
to effectively manage  
Tanzania's wildlife  
resources

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1  
INCREASE RURAL ROAD  
UTILIZATION

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3  
INCREASE THE NUMBER OF  
TANZANIAN INDIVIDUALS IN  
THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE  
SECTOR ENGAGED IN  
IMPLEMENTING THE ESAP

Target of opportunity  
Increase TAZARA revenue &  
traffic

Target of opportunity  
Enhance the teaching and  
research capabilities of  
the Sokoine University of  
Agriculture

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2  
IMPROVE BIRTH SPACING  
PRACTICES BY MEN AND  
WOMEN

Target of opportunity  
Reduce sexual  
transmission of HIV

TANZANIA ACTION PLAN  
RURAL ROADS

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1  
Increase rural road utilization

Target 1.1  
Develop and implement GOV  
road rehabilitation and  
maintenance policies

Subtarget 1.1-1  
Pursue effective donor  
coordination on rural  
roads policy and imple-  
mentation

Subtarget 1.1-2  
Provide adequate finances  
for road rehabilitation  
and maintenance in a  
sustainable manner

Subtarget 1.1-3  
Increase efficiency of  
road related institutions

sub-subtarget 1.1-2.1  
Increase budget from  
general GOV funds

sub-subtarget 1.1-2.2  
Develop and implement  
revenue generation from  
user fees

sub-subtarget 1.1-3.1  
Constitute responsi-  
bilities for road policy  
and implementation in BOM

Target 1.2  
Improve quality of rural  
roads

Subtarget 1.2-1  
Increase private sector  
capacity to rehabilitate  
and maintain rural roads

Subtarget 1.2-2  
Develop and implement  
sound technical, economic  
and environmental  
criteria and standards  
for road rehabilitation

sub-subtarget 1.2-1.1  
Develop and increment  
efficient and effective  
contracting for private  
sector firms

sub-subtarget 1.2-1.2  
Provide for road  
construction equipment

sub-subtarget 1.2-1.3  
Provide local currency  
for contracting of local  
firms

Target 1.3  
Increase trucking  
capacity

TANZANIA ACTION PLAN

family Planning

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2

Increase birth spacing practices by men and women

Target 2.1  
Improve public sector delivery of family planning services and information to meet demand

Target 2.2  
Improve private sector participation in delivery of contraceptive and family planning services

Subtarget 2.1-1  
Build management and technical ability of public sector institutions

Subtarget 2.1-2  
Increase ability of public sector family planning institutions to meet recurrent costs

Subtarget 2.1-3  
Provide public with information on health benefits of birth spacing

Subtarget 2.1-4  
Improve NGO capacity to augment public sector service delivery and mobilize private sector

Subtarget 2.2-1  
Maintain private for-profit participation in contraceptive delivery

sub-subtarget 2.1-1.1  
Improve data collection and analysis

sub-subtarget 2.1-1.2  
Increase capabilities of service providers

sub-subtarget 2.1-1.3  
Improve supervision

TANZANIA ACTION PLAN

Human Resources

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3  
Increase the number of  
Tanzanian individuals in  
the public and private  
sector engaged in  
implementing the ESAP

Target 3.1  
Improve the technical &  
managerial skills of men  
& women in the private  
sector to take advantage  
of ESAP opportunities

Target 3.2  
Improve managerial &  
technical skills of men  
& women in the public  
sector to direct, manage  
& sustain ESAP

Target 3.3  
Support human resource  
development of  
professional and business  
promotion associations

TANZANIA

Roads, Page 1

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 1	BASILINE INDICATORS	FY 1980 Actual	FY 1981 Actual	FY 1982 Expected	FY 1983 Expected	FY 1984 Expected	FY 1985 Expected	FY 1986 Expected
Increase Rural Road Utilization	<p>a) 1.7 billion mt-km of freight carried by trucking sector (FY 89)</p> <p>b) Cost of transportation amounts to 9 TShs per ton-km. (FY 89)</p> <p>c) Volume of Ag. produce and inputs transported on Baseline rural roads average 8,300 tonnes per annum</p> <p>d) Cost of travel for passengers in the rural areas averages TShs. 19 per km.</p>	N/A	N/A	N/A	a) 3.1 billion mt-km	b) 6 TShs per ton-km	d) 9,300 tons per annum	e) TShs 17 per km
								c) 4 billion mt-km b) 7 TShs per ton-km d) 11,000 tons per annum e) TShs 14 per km
Source	a), b) Data and reports from GOT c), d) USAID Baseline Survey (1980)				e), b) GOT reports / data c), d), e), f) USAID follow-up studies of Baseline			e), b) GOT reports/data c), d), e), f) USAID follow-up studies of Baseline
Target No. 1.1 Develop and implement GOT road rehabilitation and maintenance policies	a) GOT not financing or implementing a plan for adequately rehabilitating and maintaining roads	a) Plan developed and implementation began	GOT implementing plan	a) implement plan	a) implement plan	a) implement plan	a) implement plan	a) implement plan
Source :	a) GOT road work plans and budgeted funds							
Sub-target 1.1-1 Pursue effective donor coordination on rural road policy and implementation	Donors activities in rural roads disparate and non-sustainable	a) Donors met twice and exchanged information, and discussed technical, financial and management issues	a) Continue	a) Continue	a) Continue	a) Continue	a) Continue	Rural road activities sustainable
		b) World Bank trained private local road contractors	b) Continue	b) Continue	b) Efficient / effective road contractors available	b) Continue	b) Continue	Rural road activities sustainable
		c) Donors' rural road activities start to complement.	c) Continue	c) Continue	e) Donors rural road activities complementing fully	c) Continue	c) Continue	Rural road activities sustainable
Source :	USAID review of donors, meetings, agreements and arrangements in rural roads							

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO.1	SABELME INDICATORS	FY 1990 Actual	FY 1991 Actual	FY 1992 Expected	FY 1993 Expected	FY 1994 Expected	FY 1995 Expected	FY 1996 Expected
Sub-target No. 1.1-2 Provide adequate finance for road rehabilitation and maintenance in a sustainable manner.	a) Road expenditure average 5% total of Government expenditure in FY89	a) 7.5%	a) 9.0%	a) 9.5%	a) 10.5%	a) 12%	a) 13%	a) 14%
	b) GOT budget for rural road maintenance amounts to \$3 million in FY89	b) 15 million	b) 16.5 million	b) 16.60 million	b) 17.60 million	b) 18.74 million	b) 18.74 million	b) 19.50 million
	c) Road user charges accounts to \$52 million in FY89	c) 332 million	c) 336 million	c) 366 million	c) 373 million	c) 380 million	c) 388 million	c) 400 million
Source :	a), b) GOT budget* c) DATA from GOT Tax Department							
SUB-SUBTARGET 1.1-2.1 Increase budget from general GOT funds	GOT budget for roads average 7.5% of total Government budget	7.5%	9.0%	9.5%	10.5%	12%	13%	14%
Source :	a) National budget books prepared yearly by MOF							
SUB-SUBTARGET 1.1-2.2 Develop and implement revenue generation (road user fees)	Revenue generation weak in collections and inadequate in amount	\$52 million	\$36 million	\$66 million	\$73 million	\$80 million	\$88 million	strong collection system established and \$100 million collected
Source :	a) Tax and road user charge records from MOF and review of the Tax Department operations.							
Sub-target 1.1-3 Increase efficiency of road related institutions	No central road authority for rural roads	Consolidated Rural Roads Division (RRD) established within the MCW with terms of reference, staffing and approved GOT budget.	RRD operating efficiency improved	RRD operational and efficiency improves	Efficient RRD operational			
Source :	USAID review of MCW organization, staffing and budget for rural roads as well as accomplishments							

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO.1	BASELINE INDICATORS	FY 1990 Actual	FY 1991 Actual	FY 1992 Expected	FY 1993 Expected	FY 1994 Expected	FY 1995 Expected	FY 1996 Expected
<b>SUB-SUBTARGET 1.1 - 3.1</b> consolidate responsibility for road policy and implementation in MOW	a) MOW has started to be responsible for policy and implementation of both trunk and Core rural roads	continue	continue	continue	continue	continue	continue	continue with trunk and expanded rural roads.
Source :	a) MOW data b) MOW evaluation and operations.							
<b>Target No. 1.2</b> improve quality of rural roads	a) In FY 89 no rural road rehabilitation by private firms b) No rural roads rehabilitation and maintenance.	50 kms rehabilitated 4800 kms maintained	100 kms 4084 kms	300 kms 3,000 kms	700 kms 4,000 kms	700 kms 6,000 kms	750 kms 8,500 kms	400 kms* 10,000 kms
Source :	Data from MOW	* Need for rehabilitation decreases as maintenance increases						
<b>Sub-target 1.2-1</b> Increase private sector capacity to rehabilitate and maintain rural roads	a) The private sector owns little road construction equipment and has limited b) Private sector firms awarded no road contracts c) No road contracts awarded competitively	Situation much improved a) 12 % of FX in program utilized for road construction equip - ment and spare parts b) awarded contracts amounting to \$5 million c) 8 local firms awarded road contracts competitively 4 of which were local private firms.	20%	30%	35%	40%	45%	50%
			\$10 million	\$8 million	\$10 million	\$8 million	\$7 million	\$5 million
			Continued to award competitively	Continue to award competitively	Continue to award competitively	Continue to award competitively	Continue to award competitively	Continue to award competitively
Source :	a) USAID CIP data and BOT records b) Review by USAID of Central Tender Board data and data from the private sector.							
<b>SUB-SUBTARGET 1.2 - 1.1</b> Develop and implement efficient and effective contracting for private sector firms	Weak, highly bureaucratic and time consuming contracting procedures, rules and regulations	some improvement	Improved	Improves	Effective and efficient system introduced	continue	continue	continue
Source :	a) MOW road contract records b) Private sector road contract records							

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NO. 1	BASELINE INDICATORS	FY 1990 Actual	FY 1991 Actual	FY 1992 Expected	FY 1993 Expected	FY 1994 Expected	FY 1995 Expected	FY 1996 Expected
SUB-SUBTARGET 1.2-1.2 Provide FX for road construction equipment	Inadequate FX available for road construction equipment	\$5.2 million available	increased by \$12.6 million	-	increase by \$5 million	-	-	Increase by \$5 million
Source :	a) FAAD and PROAG Amendments							
SUB-SUBTARGET 1.2-1.3 Provide local currency for contracting of local firms	Not enough local currency available for contracting with local firms	\$2 million equivalent	13.2 million equivalent made available	\$8 million equivalent	\$8 million equivalent	\$8 million equivalent	\$8 million equivalent	\$8 million equivalent
Source :	Special local currency account with CRRB							
Sub-target 1.2-2 Develop and implement sound technical, economical and environmental criteria and standards for road rehabilitation and maintenance	a) technical data and standards for roads not adequate b) No economic criteria followed for selecting roads c) Environmental issues not adequately addressed.	a) rural roads properly designed.	Continue	Continue	Continue	Continue	Continue	Continue
Source :	a) MOW road selection and design reports	b) ERR greater than 12% c) GOT agreed to consider/address environmental issues.	b) ERR not less than 12% Environmental issues addressed	Environmental issues addressed	b) ERR not less than 12% Environmental issues addressed	Environmental issues addressed	Environmental issues addressed	b) ERR not less than 12% Environmental issues addressed
Target No. 1.1 Increase Trucking Capacity	60 per cent of the FX under the USAID CIP program is utilized for importation of trucks, truck spares and accessories	85%	75%	60%	60%	60%	55%	50%
Source :	USAID data on CIP program.							

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. E	BASILINE INDICATORS	FY 1990 ACTUAL	FY 1991 ACTUAL	FY 1992 EXPECTED	FY 1993 EXPECTED	FY 1994 EXPECTED	FY 1995 EXPECTED
Increase birth-spacing practices by men and women.	3% contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR)	N/A	N/A	6% CPR	7.5% CPR	9% CPR	10.5% CPR (--97: 14% CPR)
SOURCE:	Est. extrapolated from 78-'88 intercessal growth rate and URAT3 contraceptive uptake reports.		Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (91); Knowledge, Attitude & Practice (KAP) Study(91)			KAP Study (94)	DHS (95) KAP Study (96)
<b>TARGET 2.1</b> Improve public sector delivery of family planning services and information to meet demand.	Est. 2400 (75%) Clinics with FP counselling and services	Est. 2400 (over 75%)	Est. 2400 clinics offering FP (75%)	Est. 2500 clinics (85%)	Est. 2750 clinics (90%)	Est. 2850 clinics (95%)	Nearly all 3036 in MOH network
SOURCE:	MOH reports	Based on National Family Planning Programme Plan of Operations (Jan 89)	DHS under way	DHS complete			DHS (95)
<b>SUBTARGET 2.1-1</b> Build management and technical ability of public sector institutions	Adequate, qualified staff in place. Timeliness of management decisions. Program is achieving objectives.	N/A	Family Planning Unit fully staffed				Efficient, effective program in operation
SOURCE:	Observations of USAID project managers. Progress reports, training and MIS reports. Evaluation reports.						

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. 3	BASELINE INDICATORS	FY 1980 ACTUAL	FY 1991 ACTUAL	FY 1992 EXPECTED	FY 1993 EXPECTED	FY 1994 EXPECTED	FY 1995 EXPECTED
SUB-SUBTARGET 2.1-1.1 Improve data collection and analysis	Regularity and accuracy of MIS service statistics & supply and logistics information. Use made of statistics by management.	MIS is poor irregular, incomplete inaccurate	N/A	Logistics Mgmt Inf. Sys. Pilot Completed	LMIS Operational in 2 zones	LIMS in 4 zones	Regular, accurate program information available to managers. Information is analyzed and fed back to service delivery points.
SOURCE:	MIS reports. Reports circulated back to field from headquarters.	Plan of Operations of National Family Planning Programme. Background studies for USAID's FPSS Project Paper.					
SUB-SUBTARGET 2.1-1.2 Increase capabilities of service providers.	Medical, paramedic and community-based service providers trained/retrained. Clients and potential clients have confidence in service providers. Reliable supply of contraceptives available to service providers.	ca. 30% of med/paramed personnel trained in FP	ca. 65% trained/retrained	ca. 60%	ca. 75%	ca. 90%	Nearly all 12,000 med/paramed staff trained/retrained. Clients express satisfaction with infusion and services at service delivery points. No supply outages reported.
SOURCE	Training program reports. Survey reports of client attitudes. Timely FIO/Cs, shipping documents, logistic MIS reports.	National Family Planning Programme Plan of Operations.					

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. 2	BASELINE INDICATORS	FY 1990 ACTUAL	FY 1991 ACTUAL	FY 1992 EXPECTED	FY 1993 EXPECTED	FY 1994 EXPECTED	FY 1995 EXPECTED
<b>SUB-SUBTARGET 2.1-1.3</b> Improve supervision.	Training provided for supervisory personnel in clinics. Public Health Nurse in each district designated as FP Coordinator.	N/A	N/A				Trained FP Coordinators assist service delivery staffs in the districts to integrate FP into their MCH and PHC concerns.
<b>SOURCE:</b>	Course syllabus. MOH Order establishing FP Coordinators at district level.						Site visit reports Evaluation reports.
<b>SUBTARGET 2.1-2</b> Increase ability of public sector FP institutions to meet recurrent costs	GOT budget allocations	Establishment costs (i.e., personnel, capital infrastructure) are in annual health budget. No FP costs are in budget.	N/A		Project-funded salaries begin to be picked up by GOT.	Warehouse and office space costs transferred from project to GOT on phased basis. GOT begins to contribute to costs of locally procured commodities.	Salaries, office and warehouse, fuel) commodities fully funded by GOT by 1992.
<b>SOURCE:</b>	GOT Budget						
<b>SUBTARGET 2.1-3</b> Provide public with information on health benefits of birth spacing	IEC materials: radio scripts; curricula for service provider training	Inadequate reliable information available to couples.	KAP study Complete		Increased requests for services, improved continuation rates	Understanding of birth spacing and its benefits improved over 1991 findings.	Both service providers and clients understand health benefits of birth spacing.
<b>SOURCE:</b>		GOT National FP Programme Action Plan	DHS (91) KAP (91)	Monitoring IEC materials and radio programs	Service Statistics Training reports	KAP (94)	DHS (95) KAP (96)

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. 2	BASELINE INDICATORS	FY 1990 ACTUAL	FY 1991 ACTUAL	FY 1992 EXPECTED	FY 1993 EXPECTED	FY 1994 EXPECTED	FY 1995 EXPECTED
<b>SUBTARGET 2.1-4</b> Improve NGO capacity to augment public sector service delivery and mobilize private sector	Availability of fact - listing services to NGOs; training, IEC materials, MIS support, supply - monetary contracep - tive supplies.	N/A	Draft strategic plan for UMATI	Strategic Plan for UMATI complete			Effective, collaborative public - private program of information and services on birth - spacing
<b>SOURCE:</b>	MOH Program reports.						Reports and Field observation.
<b>TARGET 2.2</b> Improve private sector participation in delivery of contraceptive and family planning services	No. of private medical facilities with FP services.  No. of company clinics with FP services.	N/A	N/A	Pathfinder assessment			Nearly all private clinics offer birth spacing and services.  FP in at least 20 clinics for employees.
<b>SOURCE:</b>	Service Statistics		Service availability quizzes of DHS will indicate extent of private participation.				
<b>SUBTARGET 2.2-1</b> Maintain private for - profit participation in contraceptive delivery	Estimated proportion of pharmacies selling contraceptives	N/A	N/A				Pharmacies in most towns stock contraceptives.  Laws and regulations facilitate import and enhance profitability.
<b>SOURCE:</b>	Special surveys import regs and conditions						

## Training

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE	BASELINE INDICATORS	FY1990 ACTUAL	FY 1991 ACTUAL	FY1992 EXPECTED	FY1993 EXPECTED	FY1994 EXPECTED	FY1995 EXPECTED
Increase the number of Tenzesian individuals in public and private sector capable of implementing ESAP	N/A						
SOURCE training completion date							
<b>TARGET 1.1</b> Improve the technical & managerial skills of men & women in the private sector to take advantage of ESAP opportunities		1 EI	16 EI 0 MBA 0 in-country 11 Short-term	16 EI 10 MBA 20 short term	16 EI 2 MBA 240 in-country 20 short term	16 EI 3 MBA 320 in-country 10 short term	16 EI 3 MBA 320 in-country 10 short term
SOURCE training completion date							
<b>TARGET 1.2</b> Improve the managerial and technical skills of men & women in the public sector to direct, manage & sustain ESAP		47 short term	49 short term 1 masters	40 short term 7 masters 3 split PhDs	40 short term 7 masters 3 split PhDs	10 short term 20 masters 2 split PhDs 1 PhD	20 masters 2 split PhDs 2 PhDs
SOURCE training completion date							
<b>TARGET 1.3</b> Support the human resource development of professional and business promotion associations			1 study tour 1 workshop	8 study tours 2 workshops	4 study tours 4 workshops	2 study tours	2 study tours
SOURCE training completion date							

All numbers refer to trainees returning to Tanzania.  
Split PhD - Course work in Tanzania, Research in U.S. or third country.

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AID/AFR/EA:ADLUNDBERG

AFR/EA:MSARHAN {DRAFT}

AFR/DP:JATHERTON {INFO}

AFR/ARTS:JWOLGIN {INFO}

AFR/EA:YLEE {DRAFT}

AFR/DP:AKARLYN {INFO}

AFR/ONI:WWEINSTEIN {INFO}

PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT - TANZANIA

THE AFR/EA TANZANIA API REVIEW WAS HELD ON FEBRUARY 12, 1992. THERE WERE NO SPECIFIC ISSUES RAISED IN THE REVIEW. THE FOLLOWING ARE AFR/EA COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS THAT MAY BE USEFUL IN PREPARATION FOR NEXT YEAR'S API.

1. WE RECOGNIZE THE MISSION IS CURRENTLY PREPARING ITS CPSP AND THEREFORE DOES NOT HAVE AN UPDATED PROGRAM LOGFRAME, HENCE CONSTRAINING USAID'S ABILITY TO MEASURE IMPACT. ONCE USAID'S ASSISTANCE STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVE TREE ARE DEVELOPED, IMPACT INDICATORS FOR THE SELECTED SECTORS SHOULD BE DETERMINED. THESE INDICATORS, ALONG WITH MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS, WOULD THEN BE INCORPORATED INTO THE CPSP THAT IS DUE IN WASHINGTON BY MID JUNE, 1992. THE FINAL STEP IN THIS PROCESS IS FOR USAID TO DETERMINE THE BASELINE DATA FOR FUTURE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRAM IMPACT. TO THIS END, THE MISSION SHOULD ENSURE THAT RESOURCES AND SKILLS ARE AVAILABLE FOR COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA FOR FUTURE API REPORTS.

2. THE SECTION ON SPECIAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE USAID PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS MAJOR POLICY REFORMS BY THE GOVERNMENT

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OF TANZANIA, WHICH IN TURN POINT OUT THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT ARE AVAILABLE TO THE USAID PROGRAM. THE POLICY CHANGES NOTED IN THE API--I.E., THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND THE DECISION TO ALLOW FARMERS TO FORM MEMBER-OWNED COOPERATIVES, ARE CLEARLY IMPORTANT TO USAID'S OVERALL PROGRAM, INCLUDING POSSIBLE PRIVATIZATION/Private Sector Initiate. THE NEXT STEP WILL BE TRANSLATING THESE OPPORTUNITIES INTO QUOTE PEOPLE LEVEL IMPACT UNQUOTE. A QUESTION ALSO CAME UP ON THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON THE USAID PROGRAM. PERHAPS A DISCUSSION ON HOW TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE OF CORRUPTION CAN BE INCLUDED IN THE CPSP. FINALLY, TO THE EXTENT THAT THE GULF WAR HAD CERTAIN IMPACT NOT ONLY ON TANZANIA BUT ON USAID'S OPERATION, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED AS A SPECIAL FACTOR AFFECTING THE USAID PROGRAM IN 1991.

### 3. PROGRESS TOWARD PROGRAM GOALS

A. TO ASSIST AID/W IN BETTER REVIEWING USAID'S API SUBMISSION, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE NEXT API FORMAT CONTAIN A SHORT DESCRIPTION TO CLARIFY THE GOAL AND SUBGOALS UNDER PROGRESS TOWARD OVERALL COUNTRY GOALS AND THAT A SEPARATE SECTION BE ESTABLISHED TO DESCRIBE PROGRESS TOWARD STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. THIS WILL FACILITATE THE REVIEW FOR THOSE UNFAMILIAR WITH USAID'S PROGRAM.

B. IT IS UNCLEAR HOW THE DISCUSSION IN THE FIRST FOUR PARAGRAPHS OF THIS SECTION FIT WITHIN THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE CURRENT USAID PROGRAM. WE RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE CHANGES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERSTAND THAT THEY MAY PLAY A ROLE IN THE FUTURE OF USAID'S PROGRAM.

### 4. PROGRESS TOWARD THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

A. WHILE THE MATRIX OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS WAS USEFUL IN DETERMINING PROGRESS, THE TABLE ITSELF WAS DIFFICULT TO READ.

B. AS DATA BECOMES AVAILABLE FOR EACH FISCAL YEAR, WE SUGGEST THAT USAID ADD ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INFORMATION TO EACH OF THE INDICATORS IN THE MATRIX.

C. THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION ABOUT THE BASELINE INDICATORS UNDER SO2, INCREASE BIRTH-SPACING PRACTICES BY MEN AND WOMEN, ON WHETHER THEY REFLECTED THE COMPARISON POINT FOR FUTURE PROGRESS OR THE RESULT TO BE ACHIEVED.

D. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT DATA MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR

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ALL INDICATORS AT THIS TIME, IT WOULD BE USEFUL IN FUTURE APIS TO QUANTIFY AS MANY INDICATORS AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER FOR REVIEWERS TO SEE THE PROGRESS MADE FROM YEAR TO YEAR. IF AN INDICATOR CAN NOT BE QUANTIFIED, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE REVIEWER IF THE MEANS OF MEASUREMENT COULD BE DESCRIBED IN A NARRATIVE FORM.

5. AID/W ENCOURAGES AND WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT USAID IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT. WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING AN UPDATED PROGRAM LOGFRAME AND MORE DETAILED ANALYSES IN THE UPCOMING CPSP AND NEXT YEAR'S API.

6. FYI - ALL AFR/EA MISSIONS WILL RECEIVE A COPY OF THE KENYA API WHICH IS PARTICULARLY WELL PRESENTED. YY

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
FY 1991

UGANDA

**OVERVIEW OF THE  
ASSESSMENT FOR PROGRAM IMPACT  
FOR AFR/EA  
UGANDA**

**Summary**

The Uganda API provided an excellent description of external factors affecting the country and the program and of "success stories." However, a lack of a matrix for performance indicators made it difficult for the reviewers to determine sub-goals, strategic objectives and targets and the level of achievement against each of these. The Mission was able to identify some people level impact. The Mission was working on the CPSP at the same time it was working on its API.

**Goal:** Sustainable improvements in Ugandans' standards of living - Data is insufficient at this time to determine impact.

**Sub-Goals:** Sub-goals were unclear so reviewers were unable to determine impact.

**Strategic Objective 1:** Increase non-traditional exports - Significant impact (see Significant Results)

**Strategic Objective 2:** Increased contraceptive prevalence - While there has been a slight decline in the population growth rate, the mission was unable to determine the reason. In terms of the contraceptive prevalence rate, the baseline was established at 2.6% amongst married women in 1988/89. The API did not report any changes from the baseline.

**Strategic Objective 3:** Improved coverage and quality of AIDS prevention programs - Some impact reported (see Significant Results)

**Strategic Objective 4:** Increase child survival rates - Infant mortality rates have declined over the past decade from 120/1000 live births in 1980 to 101/1000 during the 1983-88 period. However, under 5 mortality rates remain high at 180/1000 live births (see Significant Results).

**Significant Results**

- o Earnings from non-traditional exports have tripled since 1988 (Strategic Objective 1).
- o The USAID-funded AIDS Information Centre has counselled and tested over 22,000 clients since its opening in February 1990. While counselling/testing does not necessarily result in a change in behavior, a survey of 102 clients, that had an initial negative HIV test, found that less than 20% continued to have multiple sex partners in the six month time frame between their first HIV test and their six month follow up test. (Strategic Objective 3)
- o On the negative side, rates for mortality for children under 5 remain high at 180/1000 live births due to diarrheal disease, nutritional deficiencies, malaria and upper respiratory infection. However, mission expects mortality rates due to diarrheal disease to decrease as a result of availability of locally produced oral rehydration salts. This factory, supported by USAID, was expected to produce approximately 1.65 million sachets of ORS within the first year of operations.

**Strengths in the API**

- o Excellent description of the external factors affecting the country
- o Provision of "success stories" on vanilla production and development of the Sunfola oilseed.


**Weaknesses in the API**


- o Does not provide a matrix
- o Sub-goals, strategic objectives and targets not clearly presented
- o Difficult to determine if program is achieving its goal and strategic objectives
- o Lacks gender specific data

## Suggestions for the Mission

In addition to addressing the above, AFR/EA provided the following suggestions and questions:

- o We need a more precise sense of the dimensions of the AIDS impact and how to correct for it, so that its effects on development indicators such as the child mortality rate are not misinterpreted as a lack of progress - in improving children's access to basic health services, to pursue the ICMR example.
- o The impact focus of non-traditional agricultural production and exports should now turn to replicability and extension now that we have seen the demonstration effects with vanilla and Sunfola oilseed.
- o Beyond launching the contraceptive retail sales program, the API conveys no clear family planning impact. We would not see family planning as the second-ranking objective in the current program.
- o The Mission's API acknowledges that although AIDS awareness has increased tremendously, the impact on behavior (the cornerstone of the prevention program) is less apparent, and more difficult to document because of the long HIV incubation period. Will USAID go beyond monitoring numbers of people seeking counseling, for example, to try to measure resulting changes in sexual behavior?
- o Under SO4, Increase Child Survival Rates, indicators measuring expanded local production, distribution/ access, success of the new retail sales program, proper ORS use, and ultimately reduction in ICMR will be needed to reflect the results of oral rehydration therapy (and similarly for its other associated health sector activities).





- TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY:
- Maintain Biodiversity
  - Provide Relief & Rehabilitation
  - Contribute to Use of ORT to Control Diarrheal Diseases

GOAL: INCREASE BROADBASED RURAL INCOME

INTERMEDIATE  
GOAL: INCREASE AND DIVERSIFY EXPORTS

SUBGOALS: INCREASE FOODCROP PRODUCTION  
INCREASE PRODUCTION FOR EXTERNAL MARKETS

STRATEGIC  
OBJECTIVE: INCREASE THE ACCESSIBILITY OF CURRENT INPUTS  
FOR FOOD PRODUCTION  
-- ??

TARGET Increase the Availability of Inputs for Food  
Production

- SUBTARGETS:
1. Strengthen cooperatives to be viable commercially (X% of cooperative members are women) [CAAS, RER]
  2. Generate improved seed varieties for soybeans, maize and sunflowers [MFAD]
  3. Develop private sector seed production and marketing company [CAAS]

TARGET: Increase the Availability of Short and Medium  
Term Credit for Agriculture and Ag Enterprises

- SUBTARGETS:
1. Increase availability of credit for small farmers  
-- X% of cooperatives provide credit to their members (70% of small farmers belong to cooperatives) (X% of small farmers are women) [CAAS & RER]
  2. Increase availability of credit for medium-sized farmers  
-- Intermediate term credit available to medium-sized farmers from x number of commercial banks in Uganda; x banks outside of Kampala; X% of the commercial banks by 199\_ [RPE]
  3. Increase availability of credit for agroindustry (processing, marketing, and exporting) [RPE, NTE]  
-- x number of commercial banks providing x number of intermediate loans annually to agroindustrial enterprises (X% loan recipients are women-owned/managed enterprises)

STRATEGIC  
OBJECTIVE:

INCREASE INVESTMENT IN CASH CROPPING AND EXPORT  
PRODUCTION ENTERPRISES

- amount invested in small enterprises
- amount invested in medium enterprises
- amount invested in large enterprises

TARGET: Increase availability of inputs for ag  
processing and export crop production [NTE]

TARGET: Facilitate capital investment for medium to  
large farms/enterprises [RPE]


TARGET: Increase the Availability of Short and Medium  
Term Credit for Agriculture and Ag Enterprises

- SUBTARGETS:
1. Increase availability of credit for small farmers
    - X% of cooperatives provide credit to their members (70% of small farmers belong to cooperatives) (X% of small farmers are women) [CAAS & RER]
  2. Increase availability of credit for medium-sized farmers
    - Intermediate term credit available to medium-sized farmers from x number of commercial banks in Uganda; x banks outside of Kampala; X% of the commercial banks by 199\_ [RPE]
  3. Increase availability of credit for agroindustry (processing, marketing, and exporting) [RPE, NTE]
    - x number of commercial banks providing x number of intermediate loans annually to agroindustrial enterprises (X% of loan recipients are women-owned/managed)

TARGET: Establish an exchange rate to create incentives  
for export of nontraditional exports

GOAL

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE



GOAL: SLOW THE INCREASE IN THE POPULATION GROWTH RATE

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: INCREASE CONTRACEPTIVE PREVALENCE TO 9% BY 1995

TARGET 1. Increase availability of contraceptive supplies and services

- Supplies and services are available at X% of MOH medical facilities
- Contraceptives available through xx private outlets

TARGET 2. Increase knowledge of family planning methods

- [All clients of MOH medical facilities can name at least one family planning method]

TARGET 3. Supportive government policies

- ??

STRATEGIC  
OBJECTIVE:

DECREASE THE HIV TRANSMISSION RATE BY x%

TARGET 1:

Increase availability of condoms, information,  
and risk reduction counselling

-- MOH medical facilities provide  
information and referrals on AIDs

SUBTARGET:

A. Increase number of condoms distributed  
through the private sector by xthousand

TARGET 2:

Increase number of people who voluntarily  
modify high risk sexual behavior

-- Number of instances of self-reported  
modifications in high risk sexual behavior

SUBTARGETS:

- A. Develop private peer education capacity  
in urban areas in Uganda
- B. Develop military peer education capacity
- C. Create a confidential testing facility  
for AIDs in Kampala

## TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY

1. Maintain Biodiversity -- assist forest management in the Impenetrable Forest, Kibale Forest, and Rwenzori Mountains.
2. Relief and Rehabilitation
  - Orthopaedic and Physical Rehabilitation for the Disabled
  - Support for Ugandan Orphans
  - Relief in the North, Northeast, and West Nile
3. Oral Rehydration Therapy -- contribute to the use of ORT to control diarrheal diseases by providing for procurement of salts, providing training in their use, and developing local private sector production

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afr/arts:jwolgin {info}  
afr/oni:pguedet {info}

ROUTINE kampala

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: Assessment of Program Impact - Uganda

1. The following issues, concerns and observations have been raised for Mission consideration in AFR/EA-managed review of USAID/Kampala's FY 91 Assessment of Program Impact (API) submission:

2. General Comments

a. The FY 91 API caps the era from FY 87 through FY 91 focused on a relief and rehabilitation program, objectives of which were most recently articulated in FY 89/90 Action Plan and last year's API. Over time, necessary evolution of Uganda program objectives has resulted in some lack of consistency from one document to the next, and has complicated impact-level measurement of progress. Once we achieve new consensus on strategic emphases for the next phase of the Uganda program via the January, 1992 CPSP review, the Mission will have an established, updated program logframe as the basis for program impact assessment. With this perspective on the FY 91 submission, resulting comments focus on noteworthy impacts and on concerns and suggestions which may be useful for

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the next API round.

b. The new CPSP and program logframe will help provide the conceptual and strategic framework for developing specific program indicators, targets and benchmarks for impact assessment. During January Program Week we will identify with Mission representatives ways to complete the transition to performance monitoring, specifically to ensure the field has the resources needed to complete the API framework for the new strategy and to gather and analyze related data.

### 3. Special Factors Affecting the Program

a. The API points out the effect of events not subject to USAID influence - the Gulf War, and the continuing dampening influence of poor relations with Rwanda on cross-border trade and prospects for its expansion. Of the other two factors noted, creation of the private foreign exchange bureaus can be expected to have an important influence on the economy and Mission macroeconomic and export promotion objectives. The forex bureaus' status is precarious, but subject to our influence, and should continue to be our focus among conditions associated with the Structural Adjustment Program until they are on a firm, free market footing.

b. The API makes the important point that the social and economic effects of AIDS impinge on the efficacy of some of the usual indicators and can distort assessment of goal- and program-level impact. Without minimizing its importance, we need a more precise sense of the dimensions of the AIDS impact and how to correct for it, so that its effects on development indicators such as the child mortality rate are not misinterpreted as a lack of progress - in improving children's access to basic health services, to pursue the ICMR example.

### 4. Progress Toward Program Goals

a. The API does a good, balanced job of presenting and documenting progress and impact at the "macro" level, e.g. liberalization of trade and foreign exchange policies and other economic reforms undertaken or in progress, improvements in transportation infrastructure, increases in non-traditional export production and reintroduction of Ugandan vanilla to the world market.

b. The next step, gauging this progress in terms of the

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USAID goal - quote sustainable improvements in the Ugandans' standards of living end quote - is less clearly documented. The API suggests that because of the brevity of the three to four year timeframe of the API, this quote people-level impact end quote has yet to broadly manifest itself. Consistent with the DFA we look to the Mission to take the lead in establishing tangible (quantified) and increasingly direct indicators of improved living standards (e.g., employment and income generations) as the program evolves from rehabilitation to development under the proposed new strategy.

c. The paucity of gender-disaggregated data and analysis has been a shortcoming of AFR APIs in the past and this submission is consistent with that record. (AFR/EA recently met with new AFWID Officer Ms. Wanjiku Muhato, and was pleased to learn Mission is exploring with her the possibility of her help to define gender-related impact indicators and targets for the proposed Education System Program.)

d. The API documents deterioration of the education sector, with focus on basic ed., under section II: progress toward goals. It is not clear why Mission includes this basic education-oriented presentation of data since that has not been a focus of the program and we are not measuring impact in that part of the education sector. (We are aware, of course, that Mission intends to launch a major basic ed. initiative in the future.)

#### 4. Progress Toward Program Objectives

a. Objective: Increasing Agricultural Production and Diversification. The revival of vanilla production, initially on a modest scale, its reintroduction into the international market, and the growth in demand, quadrupling of prices offered participating producers and tripling in vanilla producer association membership are all noteworthy impacts directly attributable to ANEPP and sparked by Ugandan entrepreneurship. The impact focus should now turn to replicability and extension now that we have seen the demonstration effects with vanilla and, similarly, have registered success in the MFAD project with development of the Sunfola oilseed that scores a seven-fold increase in vegoil yield. API observations on the importance of private producer associations in achieving and capitalizing on these breakthroughs are also useful. The frustration of efforts to develop rural credit, and disengagement from that endeavor because of a

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flawed policy context and very weak institutional framework, are important program adjustments USAID is making based on lessons of experience.

b. Objective: Increased contraceptive prevalence. Beyond launching the contraceptive retail sales program, API conveys no clear FP impact. We would not see FP as the second-ranking objective in the current program.

c. Objective: AIDS prevention quality and coverage. API presents a very useful summary of impacts achieved and still to be achieved in this key part of the Uganda program. Establishment of the AIDS Information Center (AIC) in Kampala in 1990 with A.I.D. funding was the first project in sub-saharan Africa to offer free, anonymous HIV testing and counseling. Creation of evidently thriving associated private organizations for counseling, social support, and medical services to AIDS victims (TASO), the Executive Counseling Center, and the Post-Test Club for both HIV positive and negative clients, represent truly outstanding accomplishments in beginning to combat this scourge. The rapid growth of our support for the program from a few hundred thousand dollars in bilateral, central and PL 480 funds in the late 1980s to the Agency's largest bilateral program with a \$12.5 million obligation in FY 91 is notable, as is the fact that a U.S. PVO, the Experiment in International Living, is the recipient of this umbrella grant. The AIC itself is an impressive testimony to the fruits of donor and PVO/NGO collaboration, having been developed by a consortium of donors and international and local institutions including the GOU, WHO, Red Cross, EIL, TASO, The Blood Bank and Inter-Aid. The Mission's API acknowledges that although AIDS awareness has increased tremendously, the impact on behavior (the cornerstone of the prevention program) is less apparent, and more difficult to document because of the long HIV incubation period. Will USAID go beyond monitoring numbers of people seeking counseling, for example, to try to measure resulting changes in sexual behavior?

d. Objective: Increase Child Survival Rates. The Mission is commended for the culmination of its efforts since 1987 to support indigenous production of oral rehydration salts with inauguration in January, 1991 of a private Ugandan producer whose product meets international specifications and, once domestic demand has been met, will be capable of exporting ORS regionally. As the API states, the impact focus now turns to questions of expanding local production, distribution/ access, success of the new

retail sales program, proper ORS use, and ultimately reduction in ICMR. As USAID enters the next program phase with the new CPSP, indicators such as these will be needed to measure the results of oral rehydration therapy (and similarly for its other associated health sector activities).

5. Conclusion. USAID/Uganda's FY 91 API documents strategic impacts in the Mission's key program sectors. Policy breakthroughs in rationalizing the foreign exchange system and liberalizing trade, and sector-specific achievements in promoting non-traditional agricultural exports and combatting AIDS and infant and child mortality merit particular recognition. Common to these accomplishments is that they demonstrate the potential and lay the base for economic opportunity and access to services that increasingly should be reflected in "people-level" indicators of improved living standards. AFR encourages and will support continued Mission steps to develop and refine performance monitoring and impact reporting capability, including generation and interpretation of gender-related information.

b. FYI EA Missions will receive a copy of the Kenya API, which is particularly well presented.

SAHEL AND WEST AFRICA

- I. PROFILE AND OVERVIEW
- II. WRAP-UP CABLE TO REGION
- III. ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

# ***FY 91 API's -- An AFR/SWA Profile***



*February 21, 1992*

I'd like to take a few minutes to provide an overview assessment of our programs in the Sahel. My general remarks will be followed by more detailed assessment of our country programs by the respective CDO. We will not attempt to retrace the technical issues and trends which ARTS and ONI reported on the last couple sessions. Instead I would like to use a "profile" of APIs which we developed to generalize on a some programmatic and management issues and trends.

**REFER TO "PROFILE" TABLE**

First, as you can see from the table, overall progress and PLI in the Sahel have been mixed. To understand why, it might be useful to consider a "typical" Sahelian country program.

**REFER TO SWA PROGRAM LOGFRAME WALL CHART**

In many of the programs, we have a strategic objective for private sector expansion. Much of what we are doing in this regard is helping create the "enabling environment". It is usually macroeconomically focussed, so such efforts are generally difficult to cast in terms of PLI at the strategic objective level. We have made some significant progress in supporting an appropriate macroeconomic framework in those countries where it is a program emphasis (especially Mali and Gambia, and to a

lesser extent to date, Guinea Bissau and Senegal). But we've also seen that such progress does not automatically translate into growth; it is a necessary condition but not sufficient for development to ensue.

There are numerous variations on the theme of the second strategic objective which I have generalized as agricultural development... Missions have increasingly focussed this SO -- either concentrating geographically in areas of higher potential, or more narrowly defining their objective (e.g. specifically focussed on market efficiency, export crops, tree crops, NRM).

We have made good progress in terms of agricultural sector liberalization in a number of countries (most notably Mali and the Gambia; and now apparently Senegal) and in several cases AID has contributed to significant increases in production (e.g. staple grains, livestock and cotton in Mali; onions in Niger; horticulture in the Gambia; and cashews in Guinea Bissau). Nonetheless, such accomplishments are tenuous given the agroclimatic condition of the Sahel. Consequently, agriculture development progress reportable in the API will vary from year to year. Also, most of the agricultural sector indicators being utilized by our Missions are not defined in terms of PLI.

Finally, Missions with strategic objectives in health and family planning (such as Mali and Senegal), or education (again Mali) have reported clear progress and people-level impact. These

accomplishments tend to be more directly attributable to A.I.D.'s interventions than other strategic objectives.

So, we have a very mixed picture in the Sahel in terms of overall progress and PLI.

Returning to our profile summary, SWA believes that Missions are effectively using program monitoring and evaluation information. We have clear examples of its application to policy dialogue with the host country (Mali); its use in restructuring of program logframes (Niger, Guinea Bissau, Senegal), and its influence on the design of new, major interventions (Gambia).

Uniformally, Sahelian Missions are focussing more on results than obligations. This is apparent in terms of the narrower, strategy-specific activities Missions are designing; the occasional delay of obligations of new starts when they are not fully developed; and the regular use of deob authority.

Finally, all of our Missions are seriously developing monitoring and evaluation systems. In fact, the fervor with which this is being approached raises issues about how extensive and elaborate a system needs to be. Also, we need to think about who should be responsible for the collection and analysis of data necessary to assess AID's program--should we be making major investments in strengthening host country capacity, or more narrowly focus on AID's intervention zones? Can we contract out more of the M & E?

In conclusion, overall progress and PLI in the Sahel have been very mixed and will vary year-to-year in the annual API snapshot. While the quality of the API documents was variable, there appears a strong commitment by Missions to the impact assessment system.

## FY 91 API'S -- AN AFR/SWA PROFILE

COUNTRY	Overall Performance			Focus on Results vs. Obligations	Quality of Data (and MER system)	Quality of Management Contract	Staffing Issues	Programmatic Issues
	Progress	PLI	Mgt. Info. Use					
Niger	L	L	H	H	M(H)	M	Yes	Yes
Mali	M	H	H	H	M(H)	M	None	Yes
Senegal	L	L	M	H	H(H)	M	None	Yes
Guinea Bissau	M	M	M	H	M(L)	M	Yes	Yes
The Gambia	M	L	H	H	H(M)	M	Yes	Yes

H = High

M = Medium; mixed

L = Low; also not reported or indiscernable

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DRAFTED BY: AID/AFR/SWA:DDAY:DD  
APPROVED BY: AID/AFR/SWA:TBORK  
AID/AFR/SWA:JGILMORE

AID/AFR/SWA:JATHERTON (INFO)  
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E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS:

SUBJECT: FY 91 API WRAP-UP: OVERVIEW REPORT

1. FIRST OFF, CONGRATULATIONS YOUR FY 91 API

SUBMISSIONS WERE GREATLY IMPROVED OVER LAST YEAR'S AND THE DOCUMENTS COMMUNICATED A STRONG COMMITMENT TO MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF PROGRAM IMPACT. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF AFR/SWA, THE API'S HAVE ENABLED US TO UNDERSTAND BETTER OUR PROGRAMS AND SHOULD SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN AID/W AND THE FIELD. MANY THANKS FOR ALL YOUR WORK.

2. THE INTENSIVE AND PROTRACTED REVIEW PROCESS OF THE FY 91 API'S WAS COMPLETED LAST WEEK. IN THIS CABLE WE WILL OUTLINE THE REVIEW PROCESS AND REPORT ON THE GENERAL AND REGIONAL RESULTS. SEPARATE CABLES ARE BEING/HAVE BEEN PREPARED BY COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT OFFICERS ON THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY API'S AND BY AFR/ARTS ON AFRICA-WIDE TECHNICAL ISSUES AND TRENDS.

3. INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY API REVIEWS WERE ORGANIZED BY AFR/SWA DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY 16-30. OTHER BUREAU OFFICES (DP, ARTS AND ONI) WERE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE, ALTHOUGH THEIR ATTENDANCE WAS LIMITED. THIS WAS LARGELY

BECAUSE AFR/ARTS AND AFR/ONI WERE CONDUCTING THEIR OWN AFRICA REGION-WIDE ANALYSES OF THE API SUBMISSIONS. INPUT FROM OTHER OFFICES WAS MOST COMMON WHEN A BUREAU STAFF MEMBER HAD WORKED OR TRAVELED IN THE RESPECTIVE COUNTRY. THE REVIEWS WERE CHAIRED BY THE COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT OFFICER AND ATTENDED BY THE DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF AFR/SWA, WITH PARTICIPATION OF OTHER SWA OFFICERS. WE ANTICIPATED THAT EACH OF THE SIX SWA COUNTRY REVIEWS WOULD BE SOMEWHAT UNIQUE GIVEN THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF PROGRAM STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION. NONETHELESS, WE

ATTEMPTED TO POSE SOME COMMON QUESTIONS FOR THE ANALYSIS

AND REVIEW OF THE API'S, AS WELL AS TO PERMIT SOME GENERALIZATION OF SWA EXPERIENCE. THOSE QUESTIONS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) ARE THE PROGRAM LOGFRAME AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS CONSISTENT WITH THE MISSION'S "MANAGEMENT CONTRACT" WITH AID/W? IS THE RATIONALE FOR ANY NECESSARY REVISIONS PROVIDED IN ANNEX A? DO THESE CHANGES MAKE SENSE GIVEN WHAT WE KNOW OF THE COUNTRY CONTEXT AND PROGRAM STRATEGY, AND IS THE QUOTE LOGICAL FLOW UNQUOTE OF REVISED STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES/TARGETS SOUND?

(B) BASED ON OUR QUOTE OUTSIDE READ UNQUOTE, DOES THE API CONVEY PEOPLE LEVEL IMPACT (PLI)? IF NOT, COULD THE LOGFRAME BE RESTRUCTURED, DATA BE REPORTED AT A HIGHER (I.E. SUB-GOAL OR GOAL) LEVEL, DIFFERENT INDICATORS BE USED, OR NARRATIVE BE EXPANDED?

(C) TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE PROGRAM ACHIEVING ITS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, TARGETS AND SUBTARGETS? CAN RESULTS BE TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED FOR EXTERNAL REPORTING PURPOSES? IS MORE OR LESS PROGRESS BEING MADE THAN ANTICIPATED? IF PROGRESS ON A PARTICULAR OBJECTIVE OR TARGET IS FALTERING, ARE CONSTRAINTS IDENTIFIED AND EFFORTS TO REDRESS THEM INDICATED IN THE API?

(D) DO ANY PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS HAVE MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS? HAVE STAFFING VACANCIES, SKILL MIX OF PERSONNEL, OR FUNDING DELAYS AFFECTED THE MISSION'S PROGRAM PROGRESS? IF SO, WHAT CAN AID/W DO TO REDRESS THESE PROBLEMS?

(E) WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AID'S EFFORTS? TO THE LAYPERSON, WILL IT SEEM THAT WE ARE DOING SOMETHING WORTHWHILE?

(F) IS THE QUALITY OF DATA IMPROVING? ARE BASELINES IN PLACE, OR HAVE THEY CHANGED? (NOTE: FY 91 API GUIDANCE DIRECTS MISSIONS TO USE THE EARLIEST DATA POSSIBLE).

(G) WHAT SUBSTANTIVE LESSONS HAVE BEEN LEARNED TO DATE IN IMPLEMENTING THIS PROGRAM STRATEGY? ARE THERE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS OR INNOVATIVE APPROACHES USED WHICH WOULD HAVE UTILITY TO OTHER MISSIONS WITH SIMILAR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OR TARGETS?

4. SUB-REGIONAL AND TECHNICAL REVIEWS WERE THEN HELD WITH THE DAA/AFR AND BUREAU OFFICE DIRECTORS DURING A QUOTE IMPACT WEEK UNQUOTE FEBRUARY 18-24. (AFR/DP IS POUCHING TO ALL MISSIONS THE MATERIALS PREPARED BY AFR/ARTS FOR THEIR PRESENTATIONS ON AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY, NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, HEALTH/CHILD SURVIVAL AND FAMILY PLANNING.) THERE WAS NO STANDARDIZED FORMAT FOR THE GEOGRAPHIC OFFICE PRESENTATIONS; IN FACT, THEY DIFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY IN STYLE AND CONTENT. FOR THE SWA REVIEW MEETING EACH CDD PREPARED A COUNTRY QUOTE PROFILE UNQUOTE BASED ON THE API WHICH SERVED AS A OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAM. WE ALSO DID A SUMMARY ASSESSMENT WHICH ASSISTED US IN GENERALIZING ABOUT EXPERIENCE IN THE SAHEL. THESE MATERIALS WILL BE POUCHED TO ALL MISSIONS. THE AFR/SWA PRESENTATION TO BUREAU MANAGEMENT WAS VERY PARTICIPATORY.

(A) IN INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, SWA DIRECTOR TIM BORK NOTED THAT POOR AGROCLIMATIC CONDITIONS AND LIMITED EXPLOITABLE NATURAL RESOURCES, COMPOUNDED BY HIGH POPULATION GROWTH RATES, MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO SHOW IMPACT IN THE SAHEL WHEN MEASURED IN QUOTE GROWTH UNQUOTE TERMS. ON THE OTHER

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HAND, WE HAVE HAD SOME SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN TERMS OF FOOD SECURITY AND DROUGHT AWARENESS IN THE REGION. FEWS AND AGRYMET HAVE HELPED ELIMINATE RECURRENT FOOD CRISES. WHILE PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINED GROWTH REMAIN TENTATIVE, THERE IS GROWING AGREEMENT AMONG DEVELOPMENT EXPERTS AND DONORS THAT EXPLOITING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, ESPECIALLY THROUGH REGIONAL TRADE, CAN PRODUCE ECONOMIC GROWTH.

DIRECTOR BORK INDICATED A NUMBER OF VERY POSITIVE TRENDS:

- ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, ALTHOUGH IMPACT IS IMPEDED BY AN OVERVALUED CFA;
- POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION;
- AFRICANIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS;
- IMPROVED GOVERNANCE, AS A NEW GENERATION OF YOUNG, COMMITTED TECHNOCRATS HAVE COME TO THE FORE; AND
- GROWING CONSENSUS IN THE DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY ON THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL TRADE AND DEVALUATION OF THE CFA.

(B) DEPUTY DIRECTOR JUDY GILMORE ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE SAHEL. DESPITE HELPING CREATE AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT IN A NUMBER OF SAHELIAN COUNTRIES, THERE HAS RESULTED LITTLE INVESTMENT OR ACTUAL GROWTH. IN

PART, THIS IS DUE TO LACK OF EFFECTIVE DEMAND. INTRAREGIONAL TRADE, BASED ON COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, COULD PROVIDE A LARGE ENOUGH MARKET. SUCH A REGIONAL APPROACH MUST INCLUDE THE COASTAL STATES AND WOULD PROBABLY EMPHASIZE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE FOR A SINGLE COMMODITY. AN EXAMPLE MENTIONED WAS LIVESTOCK, WHICH HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A CLUB/CILSS INITIATIVE TO CREATE A LIBERALIZED AND COMPETITIVE MARKET WITHIN THE REGION. RECENTLY, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CLUB/CILSS, AFR/SWA AND THE WORLD BANK HAVE CO-FINANCED THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTION PLAN TO LIBERALIZE TRADE IN LIVESTOCK. EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO REDUCE TRANSPORT COSTS BY DEREGULATION AND TARIFF LIBERALIZATION, LESSEN TRANSACTION COSTS BY REDUCING REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS, AND IMPROVE LIVESTOCK MARKET INFORMATION. SUCH ENDEAVORS REQUIRE GOOD ANALYSIS OF CONSTRAINTS AND COSTS OF BOTH PRODUCTION AND DEMAND.

THE MALI AND NIGER API'S BOTH RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL ISSUES IN PROGRAM STRATEGY, PROJECT DESIGN, DATA COLLECTION AND EVEN POLICY DIALOGUE. DRAWING FROM THE CLUB/CILSS WORK, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GILMORE SUGGESTED THAT A.I.D. NEEDS TO IDENTIFY THOSE AREAS WHERE OPPORTUNITIES EXIST FOR PRODUCTIVE TRADE, AND THEN ASSESS HOW THESE MIGHT BE PURSUED/OPERATIONALIZED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF COUNTRY PROGRAMS AND OUR DIALOGUE WITH HOST COUNTRIES AND OTHER DONORS.

DIRECTOR BORK CONCLUDED SWA INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY ASKING BUREAU REPRESENTATIVES: (1) TO KEEP IN MIND A.I.D.'S SIGNIFICANT, CONTINUING CONTRIBUTION TO FOOD SECURITY AND

DROUGHT AWARENESS IN THE SAHEL REGION--TWO IMPORTANT RESULTS NOT CLEARLY ARTICULATED IN THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY API'S; AND (2) TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON HOW WE CAN BEST IMPLEMENT THE CONCEPT OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION INTO OUR COUNTRY PROGRAMS. HE THEN INTRODUCED THE AFR/SWA COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT OFFICERS (CDO'S) MAKING PRESENTATIONS.

(C) THE API PROFILES WERE USED BY CDO DICK DAY TO GENERALIZE ON SOME PROGRAMMATIC AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND TRENDS IN THE SAHEL.

--OVERALL PROGRESS AND PEOPLE LEVEL IMPACT (PLI) HAVE BEEN VERY MIXED AND MEASUREMENTS OF GROWTH SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO VARY YEAR-TO-YEAR GIVEN SAHELIAN CONDITIONS.

--WE HAVE MADE SOME SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN SUPPORTING

AN APPROPRIATE MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK IN THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE IT IS A PROGRAM EMPHASIS, BUT THIS IS DIFFICULT TO TRANSLATE INTO PLI AND DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY TRANSLATE INTO GROWTH; IT IS A NECESSARY CONDITION BUT NOT SUFFICIENT FOR GROWTH TO ENSUE.

--AGRICULTURAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY FOCUSED BY SWA MISSIONS TO ENHANCE IMPACT, EITHER BY CONCENTRATING GEOGRAPHICALLY IN AREAS OF HIGHER POTENTIAL OR MORE NARROWLY DEFINING THE OBJECTIVE. --WE HAVE MADE GOOD PROGRESS IN TERMS OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR LIBERALIZATION IN A NUMBER OF SAHELIAN COUNTRIES AND, IN SEVERAL CASES, A.I.D. HAS CONTRIBUTED TO SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN PRODUCTION. NONETHELESS, SUCH ACCOMPLISHMENTS ARE TENUOUS GIVEN THE AGROCLIMATIC CONDITIONS OF THE REGION, SO AG DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS ANNUALLY REPORTED IN THE API WILL VARY YEAR-TO-YEAR. ALSO,

MOST OF THE AG SECTOR INDICATORS BEING UTILIZED BY MISSIONS ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY DEFINED IN PLI TERMS.

--SWA MISSIONS WITH STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING OR EDUCATION HAVE REPORTED CLEAR PROGRESS AND PEOPLE LEVEL IMPACT. THESE ACCOMPLISHMENTS ALSO TEND TO BE MORE DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO A.I.D.'S INTERVENTIONS THAN OTHER STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES.

--SWA BELIEVES THAT SAHELIAN USAID'S ARE EFFECTIVELY USING PROGRAM MONITORING AND EVALUATION INFORMATION FOR MANAGEMENT, AS EVIDENCED BY: ITS APPLICATION TO POLICY DIALOGUE WITH THE HOST COUNTRY; ITS USE IN RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM LOGFRAMES; AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE SELECTION AND DESIGN OF NEW, MAJOR INTERVENTIONS.

--SAHELIAN MISSIONS ARE FOCUSING MORE ON RESULTS THAN OBLIGATIONS, AS EVIDENCED BY: MISSIONS DESIGNING NARROWER, STRATEGY-SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES WITH EXTENSIVE MER SYSTEMS; MISSIONS' DECISION TO DELAY, ON OCCASION, OBLIGATIONS FOR NEW STARTS WHEN THEY WERE NOT FULLY DEVELOPED; AND REGULAR USE OF DEOB AUTHORITY.

--FINALLY, ALL SAHELIAN MISSIONS ARE SERIOUSLY DEVELOPING MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS. AT THE SAME TIME, ATTENTION NEEDS TO BE GIVEN TO QUESTIONS OF: HOW EXTENSIVE AND ELABORATE DO THESE SYSTEMS NEED TO BE? SHOULD WE BE MAKING MAJOR INVESTMENTS IN STRENGTHENING HOST COUNTRY CAPACITY, OR MORE NARROWLY FOCUS ON A.I.D.'S INTERVENTION ZONES? CAN WE CONTRACT OUT MORE OF THE M & E REQUIREMENTS?

(D) SUMMARY PRESENTATIONS ON EACH SWA API COUNTRY BY THE RESPECTIVE CDO FOCUSED ON: SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM IMPACT AND CONSTRAINTS; THE QUALITY OF THE MONITORING AND

EVALUATION SYSTEM, INCLUDING DATA AND BASELINES, AND THE APPARENT UTILITY OF THE API SYSTEM FOR PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

DECISIONS (NOTE THAT WE DID NOT/NOT COMMENT ON THE QUALITY OF THE ACTUAL API DOCUMENTS); AND ANY BROAD PROGRAMMATIC OR MANAGEMENT ISSUES.

THESE ISSUES WILL BE INCORPORATED IN A MORE DETAILED REPORT TO EACH MISSION ON ITS API WHICH IS SUBJECT OF SEPTZL.

(E) THE ONE TECHNICAL ISSUE RAISED IN THE SWA WRAP-UP WAS ON CHILD SURVIVAL, HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING. DESPITE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN THESE AREAS, THE SAHEL CONTINUES TO BE THE FARTHEST BEHIND IN AFRICA IN TERMS OF MEETING GENERALLY AGREED UPON TARGETS (EG. IMMUNIZATION RATES).

(F) IN CLOSING REMARKS TIM BORK UNDERSCORED THE NEED

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DRAFTED BY: AID/AFR/SWA:YJJOHN:YJJ

APPROVED BY: AID/AFR/SWA:TJBOBN

AID/AFR/SWA:JGILMORE AID/AFR/SWA:DDAY

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E. O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU 1991 ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT (API) REPORT REVIEW

1. THE API'S WERE REVIEWED AT TWO LEVELS, THE FIRST WAS A COUNTRY REVIEW AND WAS CHAIRED BY THE RESPECTIVE COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT OFFICER (CDO); THE SUB-REGIONAL AND TECHNICAL REVIEWS WERE THEN HELD WITH THE DAA/AFR AND BUREAU OFFICE DIRECTORS. GUINEA-BISSAU'S GEOGRAPHIC API REVIEW WAS HELD ON JANUARY 28; THE SUB-REGIONAL REVIEW WAS HELD ON FEBRUARY 22. AFR/SWA WAS GENERALLY PLEASED WITH ALL

SUBMISSIONS WHICH MADE PREPARATION OF THE PRESENTATIONS AT THE SUB-REGIONAL MEETINGS (WHICH ALSO WERE EXCEPTIONALLY WELL DONE) MUCH EASIER. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS WERE MADE AT G-B GEOGRAPHIC REVIEW.

2. GENERAL COMMENTS

A. IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT G-B'S STRATEGY WAS BEING REFINED AS THE API WAS BEING PREPARED. THEREFORE THE REVIEW FOCUSED ON SUGGESTIONS THAT MAY AID THE MISSION IN THE FORMULATION OF A REFINED STRATEGY AND THE API FOR 1992. THE MISSION IS TO BE CONGRATULATED ON THE EXCELLENT

NARRATIVE SECTION WHICH GIVES THE READER A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF PAST AND EXISTING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY. THIS GREATLY FACILITATES A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE EFFECTS THAT THE MAJOR RESTRUCTURING OF THE COUNTRY HAS ON PLI TRENDS AS WELL AS SOME INDICATION OF THE MAGNITUDE AND DIVERSITY OF DONOR ASSISTANCE REQUIRED FOR G-B TO INCREASE AND SUSTAIN ECONOMIC GROWTH TRENDS EXPERIENCED OVER THE 1987-1990 TIME FRAME.

B. GDP GROWTH RATES AND POTENTIAL FOR CONTINUED GROWTH

THE GROWTH RATES AS STATED IN YOUR API (COUPLED WITH A SMALLER POPULATION GROWTH RATE) SUGGEST THAT THE REFORM PROGRAM, ESPECIALLY PRICE LIBERALIZATIONS AND THE REMOVAL OF PRICE CONTROLS HAS HAD THE DESIRED RESULT. IT ALSO APPEARS THAT DIVERSIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY IS PROMISING IN LIGHT OF THE REVENUE DERIVED FROM FISHERY AND WOOD

EXPORTS. WHAT ARE THE MISSION'S VIEWS ON THE GROWTH POTENTIAL FOR THESE SECTORS?

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AFR/SWA IS AWARE THAT THE MISSION AND OTHER DONORS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF COLLECTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA THAT WILL BE SHARED WITH THE GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS OTHER DONORS. THIS NEW DATA SHOULD PRESENT A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ECONOMY PARTICULARLY AS IT RELATES TO THE TRANSITION FROM A SOCIALIST ECONOMY TO ONE WHICH IS DRIVEN BY PRIVATE SECTOR CONCEPTS. WILL THIS NEW DATA BE AVAILABLE IN TIME TO INCLUDE IN THE API TO BE SUBMITTED FOR 1992? IS THERE SOME REASON WHY FISHERY AND WOOD ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE DATA ON AGRICULTURE EXPORTS? WHERE IS THIS DATA NOW RECORDED? WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR FRUITS AND VEGETABLES?

C. COORDINATION OF REGIONAL AND BILATERAL PROGRAMS

THIS ASPECT OF THE AID PROGRAM IN G-B BECOMES INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AS THE PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL TRADE AND THE OPENING UP OF G-B'S ECONOMY (WHICH THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SEEM TO BE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF) ARE HAPPENING CONCURRENTLY. IS THERE SOMEONE IN THE MISSION THAT IS KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE CILSS CEREALS POLICY STUDY AND ACTIVITIES? WILL THIS POLICY ANALYSIS ENHANCE THE MISSION'S STRATEGY? WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THIS POLICY ANALYSIS FROM G-B'S PERSPECTIVE?

3. REFINEMENT OF THE STRATEGY

A. AFR/SWA IS LOOKING FORWARD TO

SION'S

REFINED STRATEGY WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WILL BE SUBMITTED TO AID/W ON THE WEEK OF MARCH 16. IN THIS TIME OF GREATER CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES (FUNDING AND PERSONNEL), THE MISSION SHOULD PLAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO DEFINING A STRATEGY AND PROGRAM THAT IS IN ITS MANAGEABLE INTEREST. THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN INCREASE IN THE PERSONNEL CEILING ABOVE CURRENT LEVELS IS NOT FORSEEN.

B. HOW WILL PAST AID INTERVENTIONS CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONTINUING PROGRAM? THIS QUESTION WAS RAISED IN THE HOPES THAT PAST PROJECTS WILL CONTINUE TO BENEFIT THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY. IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO MENTION IN NEXT YEAR'S API HOW THESE PAST INTERVENTIONS CONTRIBUTED OR CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE TO G-B ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

4. SEPTEL WILL PROVIDE MORE GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE API PROCESS, ITS UTILITY TO DECISION MAKERS, AND POSSIBLE FORMAT MODIFICATIONS.

5. A COPY OF AFR/SWA'S API PROFILES HAS BEEN FOUCED TO THE MISSION. BAKER

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

SAHEL AND WEST AFRICA

FY 1991

- THE GAMBIA
- GUINEA BISSAU
- MALI
- NIGER
- SENEGAL

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

FY 1991

THE GAMBIA

AFR/SWA PROFILE FROM FY 91 API

THE GAMBIA

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AREA	ASSESSMENT	COMMENTS
Overall Performance Progress	Medium	Good on macro; mixed on agriculture and NRM
PLI	Low	"Structural" problem in measuring PLI, especially over the short term
Mgt. Info. Use	High	Lessons learned and SO constraints serve as focus for new designs
Focus on Results vs. Obligations	High	Mixture of NPA and project assistance narrowly focussed on SOs
Quality of Data (and MER System)	High (Medium)	Still developing system in light of strategy refinement
Quality of the Management Contract	Medium	SO #1 beyond manageable interest? Limited PLI in the short term
Staffing Issues	Yes	Ambitious program for 5 USDH; missing PDO and 2 PSCs
Programmatic Issues	Yes	In transition; strategy recently refined; 3 major new starts in FY 91 and 92; family planning and child survival/diarrheal disease control are targets of opportunity.

**GAMBIA PROGRAM STRATEGY**  
(refined per June 1991 review guidance)

**GOAL:**

Increase per capita income

Significant results

-very good policy framework

Constraints/problems

-growth dependent on erratic rain  
-growth outstripped by population.

**SUB-GOALS**

Raise formal sector wages

Increase rural income

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

Increase private sector investment

Increase agricultural exports

Increase value of production on land under improved natural resource management practices

Significant results/impact

- substantial progress on macroeconomic indicators including:
  - \* inflation down from 14.0% to 5.3%
  - \* fiscal deficit reduced from 10.7% to 4.1%
  - \* liberalized exchange rate maintained
- formal sector employment expanding (doubled in 5 years although still small)
- banking reform proceeding, including:
  - \* GCDB privatization
  - \* lending/savings rate margin narrowing

Constraints/Problems

- private sector starting from very low level of organization, capitalization and value added
- small economy

Comments

- near to medium effort (FSR and FAPE)

Significant results/impact

- diversification taking place, with horticulture exports increasing substantially (volume and value)
- new groundnut seed treatment introduced (0 to 28% of area planted in last two years)
- GPMB privatization proceeding

Constraints/Problems

- erratic rainfall (groundnuts off sharply consequently)

Comments

- short to medium term effort (FAPE and ANR)
- need to establish targets and baseline; work underway
- possible agricultural marketing start in FY 93

Significant results/impact

- improved soil and water management practices developed and extended
- innovative community land management plan developed and implemented in one of the national parks

Constraints/problems

- population pressure

Comments

- medium to long term effort (ANR)
- basis for sustainable growth
- need to establish targets and baseline; work underway

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## THE MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK . . . IS THAT ALL THERE IS TO GROWTH?

In 1985, following nearly a decade of severe economic deterioration, the Government of the Gambia (GOTG) embarked on one of the most **comprehensive structural adjustment programs** in sub-Saharan Africa. The initial "Economic Recovery Program" (ERP) was designed to liberalize the economy and expand the role of market forces. Price controls and subsidies were eliminated, a floating exchange rate system was established, government spending was disciplined, interest rates became market-determined, and phased divestiture of public enterprises was initiated. Government policy reform measures which directly affected the agriculture sector included the privatization of input supply and marketing parastatals and liberalization of the agricultural pricing and trading systems. The "Program for Sustained Development," initiated in 1989, was designed to facilitate the transition from stabilization and economic recovery to broad-based economic growth. It is again premised on a market-based economy, recognizing the private sector as the most appropriate and reliable source of productive investment and development in the Gambia.

**A.I.D.** has played a key role in supporting the Gambia's policy reform efforts. From 1987 to 1990, AID's African Economic Policy Reform Program (AEPRP) supported policy changes in the financial sector, including changes in policies dealing with interest rates and subsidies to public enterprises. Policy dialogue under USAID's P.L. 480 Food Aid program played a major role in implementing the ERP between 1986 and 1990. Conditionality under the food aid program was a major factor in the liberalization of the retail rice trade; elimination of fertilizer subsidies and encouragement of private sector fertilizer distribution; elimination of the groundnut export tax; sale of the Gambia Produce Marketing Board's (GPMB) non-productive assets and peripheral activities; and announcement of a schedule to privatize all remaining GPMB assets. Policy reform efforts are continuing under the Mission's Financial and Private Enterprise Program (FAPE, 1991-96) and the Financial Sector Restructuring Program (FSR, 1991-94).

The substantial progress on the macroeconomic framework has brought some **very positive results**. The rate of inflation declined dramatically (from 70% in 1986 to 5.3% in 1991); the current account deficit narrowed progressively; and gross official reserves increased. Most significantly, economic growth averaged over 5% a year from 1986-90. **Nonetheless**, because of the dominance of agriculture in the economy, aggregate growth in the Gambia continues to be strongly influenced by agroclimatic conditions. So, in 1991 when rains started late and finished early, real GDP increased by only 2.3%--actually declining on a per capita basis.

Clearly, the essential macroeconomic foundation for accelerated, broad-based growth has been established in the Gambia. However, recent experience has shown that this alone does not ensure growth.

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PRODUCTION AND RESULTED IN LOWER GDP GROWTH).

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DRAFTED BY: AID/AFR/SWA:DDAY:DD  
APPROVED BY: AID/AFR/SWA:JGILMORE  
AID/AFR/DP/PPS:JATHERTON (INFO)

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TAGS:

SUBJECT: AFR REVIEW OF GAMBIA FY 91 ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM  
IMPACT (API) AND REFINED PROGRAM LOGFRAME

REF. STATE 079286

1. REFTEL PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW REPORT ON THE SIX (6)  
API'S SUBMITTED BY AFR/SWA MISSIONS. THIS CABLE WILL  
PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE API REPORT PREPARED  
BY USAID/GAMBIA, AS WELL AS THE REVIEW OF THE REFINED  
PROGRAM LOGFRAME WHICH WAS CONDUCTED ALONG WITH THE API  
REVIEW.

2. ASSESSMENT OF OVERALL QUALITY OF THE API.

THE NARRATIVE WAS WELL WRITTEN; THE STYLE WAS CRISP AND  
READABLE. IT PROVIDED A GOOD OVERVIEW OF MAJOR  
DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING USAID'S PROGRAM AND WAS  
PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IN UNDERSTANDING THE MISSION'S  
REFINED PROGRAM STRATEGY.

THE DATA TABLES WERE WELL DONE, WITH THE SECTION III  
NARRATIVE EFFECTIVELY AMPLIFYING THE STATUS OF PROGRESS ON  
THE VARIOUS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES (SO'S) AND TARGETS. A

COMMON THEME AFR/SWA FOUND IN REVIEWING API'S WAS THAT  
MOST NARRATIVES CONCENTRATED ON WHAT HAPPENED (OR DID NOT  
HAPPEN) AND WERE SHORT ON ANALYSIS OR EXPLANATION OF WHY  
PROGRESS WAS (OR WAS NOT) REALIZED. FOR EXAMPLE, OUR  
UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN THE GAMBIA ON  
THE MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK WOULD HAVE BEEN ENHANCED BY AN  
EXPLANATION OF WHY/HOW THE RATE OF INFLATION AND FISCAL  
DEFICIT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT DOWN. ONE SUGGESTION FOR  
IMPROVING THE TABULAR PRESENTATION NEXT YEAR: CLEARLY  
INDICATE ON THE REPORTING YEAR COLUMN WHETHER THE DATA IS  
ACTUAL, ESTIMATED OR STILL THE ORIGINAL PROJECTED FIGURE.

3. PROGRESS AND OVERALL PLI.

IN THE REGIONAL API WRAP-UP WITH BUREAU MANAGEMENT,  
AFR/SWA CITED THE GAMBIA PROGRAM AS AN EXAMPLE OF  
EXCELLENT PROGRESS BEING MADE BY A MISSION ON  
MACROECONOMIC POLICIES. HOWEVER, GAMBIA EXPERIENCE HAS  
ALSO SHOWN THAT A SOUND POLICY FRAMEWORK DOES NOT DIRECTLY

TRANSLATE INTO PEOPLE-LEVEL IMPACT (PLI) AND GROWTH CAN  
REMAIN TENUOUS BECAUSE OF EXOGENOUS FACTORS (MOST NOTABLY  
ERRATIC RAINFALL WHICH CAUSED A SHARP DECLINE IN GROUNDWATER

AFR/SWA APPRECIATES THAT IT IS STILL EARLY TO BE ABLE TO  
QUANTIFY PROGRESS BEING MADE UNDER SO'S 2 AND 3. ALSO,  
THE API IS PREMISED ON REPORTING AT A LEVEL ABOVE PROJECT  
OUTPUTS. NONETHELESS, THE MALI API SHOWED THE IMPACT OF  
QUOTE SPICING UNQUOTE THE SECTION III NARRATIVE WITH  
PROJECT LEVEL IMPACT DATA AND DETAILS TO PROVIDE A FEEL  
FOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ESPECIALLY PLI. IN THE CASE OF THE  
GAMBIA, IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO DRAW FROM SOME OF  
THE PRIVATE SECTOR SUPPORT AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  
ASSISTANCE TO DATE TO PROVIDE SOME SENSE OF IMPACT, ALBEIT  
SKILL LIMITED IN SCOPE, UNDER THESE TWO SO'S. (EG. THE EI  
TRAINING SUCCESS STORIES, INCLUDING MAKUMBAYA FARMS, AND  
THE IMPROVED NRM PRACTICES DEVELOPED AND EXTENDED TO SOME  
20,000 FARM FAMILIES UNDER THE SOIL AND WATER MANAGEMENT  
PROJECT).

IN REVIEWING THE GAMBIA API AND THE REFINED PROGRAM  
STRATEGY, IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT THE MISSION IS FOCUSING  
ON BUILDING AND STRENGTHENING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR BROAD,  
BASED, SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH. THE STRATEGIC  
APPROACH, HOWEVER, WILL MEAN RELATIVELY LITTLE PLI IN THE  
SHORT-TERM. PLI IS EVIDENT AT THE SUB-GOAL LEVEL, BUT  
THIS IS TOO QUOTE HIGH UP UNQUOTE THE LOGFRAME TO BE ABLE  
TO BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO A.I.D. INVESTMENTS. SEE PARA 3.A  
FOR SUGGESTION ON REDRESSING THIS PROGRAMMATIC ISSUE.

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4. QUALITY OF THE MER SYSTEM AND ITS APPARENT UTILITY.

A. AFR BELIEVES THAT USAID/GAMBIA HAS/WILL HAVE AN  
EXCELLENT DATA BASE FROM WHICH TO ASSESS PROGRAM IMPACT.  
INCLUSION ON THE API TABLES OF THE DATA SOURCE AND  
RESPONSIBLE USAID REPORTING OFFICE WAS HELPFUL IN  
UNDERSTANDING HOW THE MISSION WAS CONSTRUCTING ITS  
MONITORING, EVALUATION AND REPORTING (MER) SYSTEM. DATA  
APPEARS TO BE WELL USED BY THE MISSION IN DETERMINING  
PROGRAM DIRECTION, AS EVIDENCED BY THE REFINED PROGRAM  
STRATEGY LOGFRAME, AND IN THE IDENTIFICATION AND DESIGN OF  
NEW INTERVENTIONS, SUCH AS THE ANR PROGRAM.

B. QUANTIFICATION OF MER. GIVEN THE STRATEGY REVISIONS  
AND REFINEMENTS DURING THE LAST YEAR, UNDERSTANDABLY  
THERE'S STILL WORK TO BE DONE IN ESTABLISHING THE MER  
SYSTEM. MISSION IS REQUESTED TO QUANTIFY INDICATORS AND  
THE FY 91-95 EXPECTATIONS FOR THEM FOR INCLUSION IN THE FY  
92 API. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU FEEL THAT THIS ASSISTANCE  
WOULD BE USEFUL. CDO WOULD BE PLEASED TO HELP ACCESS HELP  
FROM MSI UNDER THEIR NEW FRISM CONTRACT WITH CDIE.

C. GENDER. A COMMON, GLARING SHORTCOMING IN THE BUREAU'S  
API'S WAS THE LACK OF GENDER-DISAGGREGATED DATA. THIS IS  
AN AGENCY REQUIREMENT, MANDATED BY CONGRESS REPORTING ON  
WOMEN WAS IN EVIDENCE WHERE WOMEN WERE OBVIOUS TARGETS,  
SUCH AS SOCIAL SERVICES, BUT LESS EVIDENT IN ECONOMIC  
SECTORS OR ACTIVITIES. AFR/SWA KNOWS THAT USAID/GAMBIA IS  
CONCERNED ABOUT IMPACT ON WOMEN, BUT CURRENT API DOES NOT  
CLEARLY COMMUNICATE THIS. WE SUGGEST THAT ATTENTION BE

GIVEN TO IDENTIFYING WHICH SO AND TARGET INDICATORS ARE  
APPROPRIATE FOR GENDER DISAGGREGATION. IT WOULD APPEAR  
THAT THE INDICATORS FOR TARGETS 2.1 AND 2.2, AND POSSIBLY  
SO 2 ITSELF, AND INDICATORS FOR SO 3 AND TARGET 3.3 ARE  
APPROPRIATE FOR GENDER DISAGGREGATION.

D. BASELINES. THERE WAS SOME CONCERN EXPRESSED IN THE  
GAMBIA REVIEW THAT BASELINES BE SET EARLY ENOUGH TO  
CAPTURE THE IMPACT OF A.I.D. ASSISTANCE, HISTORIC AND

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CURRENT/PROPOSED. IN PARTICULAR, IT SEEMED THAT USING 91/92 BASELINE FOR TARGETS 2.2 AND 3.3 DID NOT RECOGNIZE/TAKE CREDIT FOR CONTRIBUTIONS OF EARLIER ASSISTANCE UNDER THE SOIL AND WATER MANAGEMENT UNIT (635-0202) AND AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND DIVERSIFICATION (635-0219) PROJECTS. USAID/GAMBIA IS REQUESTED TO CONSIDER THIS AS IT COMPLETES DEVELOPMENT OF ITS MER SYSTEM OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS. ANY MODIFICATIONS THE MISSION DECIDES TO MAKE CAN BE INCLUDED IN THE FY 92 API.

INITIAL ANALYSIS. AFR/SWA SUGGESTS THAT THIS ISSUE BE A PRIMARY CONSIDERATION IN THE REFINEMENT OF SO 3 INDICATORS AND IN THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW ACTIVITIES, SPECIFICALLY IN THE ANR PAAD WORK AND IN FAPE CONTRACTING.

6. IN THE COURSE OF THE VARIOUS API REVIEWS, YOUR CDD DUBBED USAID/GAMBIA QUOTE THE LITTLE MISSION THAT CAN UNQUOTE.

5. PROGRAMMATIC OR MANAGEMENT ISSUES.

C: CREATIVE PROGRAM, STRESSING PRIVATE SECTOR-LED GROWTH WHILE EMPHASIZING NRM AS THE KEY TO SUSTAINABLE, AGRICULTURALLY-BASED ECONOMIC GROWTH.

A. PLI. TO REDRESS THE STRUCTURAL PROBLEM IN MEASURING PLI OVER THE SHORT-TERM, AFR/SWA SUGGESTS THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO WHETHER THERE ARE OTHER INDICATORS WHICH COULD BE USED TO DEMONSTRATE MORE PEOPLE-LEVEL IMPACT. (NOTE: IT IS ACCEPTED BY AFR THAT ALL SO'S DO NOT NEED TO SHOW PLI, SO WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING THAT THE MISSION'S SO'S OR TARGETS BE RECAST TO SHOW PLI).

A: AMBITIOUS--ADDRESSING MACROECONOMIC AND SECTORAL POLICY REFORMS, AS WELL AS MORE TRADITIONAL PROJECT INTERVENTIONS, WITH A VERY ENERGETIC MISSION STAFF.

B. GROWTH GOAL. IN TERMS OF THE PROGRAM GOAL STATEMENT, AFR/SWA STRONGLY ENCOURAGES THE MISSION TO DROP THE

N: NEW--CLEARLY BUILDS ON EARLIER ASSISTANCE, BUT THIS IS A NEWLY REFINED STRATEGY AND BUILT ON THREE MAJOR, NEW STARTS IN FY'S 91 AND 92.

EXPLICIT INDICATION OF 3 PERCENT GDP GROWTH. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THIS NEEDLESSLY RAISE EXPECTATIONS WHILE THE DOWNTURN THIS PAST YEAR DUE TO ERRATIC RAINS SHOWS HOW TENUOUS GROWTH STILL IS IN THE GAMBIZ, DESPITE ALL THE RIGHT POLICY. MISSION MIGHT, INSTEAD, WISH TO INCORPORATE A SPECIFIC GROWTH RATE INTO ITS INDICATORS FOR THE GOAL.

7. YOU MAY CONSIDER THE REFINED STRATEGY AS APPROVED BY AID/W. THE TWO AREAS USAID/GAMBIA IS ASKED TO REVISIT DURING THE NEXT SIX MONTHS ARE: (1) THE INDICATORS-- QUANTIFYING THOSE RELATED TO NEW EMPHASES AND POSSIBLY REVISING SOME TO PROJECT MORE PLI; AND (2) BASELINES, ESTABLISHING THEM IN SUCH A WAY AS TO SHOW MORE HISTORICAL PROGRESS, ESPECIALLY IN THOSE AREAS WHERE A.I.D. HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY INVOLVED, SUCH AS SO 3. ANY SUCH REFINEMENTS AND MODIFICATIONS OF INDICATORS OR BASELINES CAN BE INCLUDED IN THE FY 92 API AND EXPLAINED IN ANNEX A.

OUR CONCERN ABOUT OVERSTATING ECONOMIC GROWTH GOALS WAS REINFORCED BY THE MISSION'S CONCERN WITH THE POPULATION GROWTH RATE. CLEARLY, POPULATION GROWTH MUST BE SLOWED TO ENSURE SUSTAINABLE, AGRICULTURALLY-LED ECONOMIC GROWTH.

8. OUR CONGRATULATIONS TO USAID/GAMBIA FOR THE HIGH QUALITY WORK IT IS DOING, INCLUDING A WELL DONE API AND WELL CONCEIVED PROGRAM LOGFRAME REFINEMENTS. BAKER

C. SUB-GOAL STATEMENT. DURING THE PROGRAM LOGFRAME DISCUSSION, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THE FIRST SUB-GOAL MIGHT BE BETTER STATED AS QUOTE RISE IN FORMAL SECTOR INCOME UNQUOTE. THE EMPHASIS ON WAGES WOULD ASSUME THAT LABOR IS UNDERVALUED, WHILE A FOCUS ON INCOME WOULD PROBABLY BETTER ENCOMPASS THE IMPACT ANTICIPATED UNDER SO 2. ALTERNATIVELY, MORE JOBS CREATED MIGHT BE USED FOR THIS SUB-GOAL. WE WOULD APPRECIATE MISSION CLARIFICATION ON THE CHOICE OF WAGES AND YOUR REACTION TO RECASTING THIS IN TERMS OF INCOME OR JOBS. THIS IS NOT FUNDAMENTAL, HOWEVER, TO YOUR LOGFRAME REFINEMENTS WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE WELL CONCEIVED.

D. TENSION BETWEEN SO 2 AND SO 3. AFR TECHNICAL OFFICERS NOTED THE POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVED NRM OBJECTIVES TO BE UNDERMINED BY SHORT-TERM EFFORTS TO INCREASE AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS. WE WOULD SIMPLY SUGGEST THAT USAID/GAMBIA BE COGNIZANT OF THIS TENSION AND ENSURE THAT THIS IS FOCUS OF ITS MONITORING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM.

E. MER RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS. A FINAL ISSUE OF CONCERN TO AID/W, PARTICULARLY AFR/SWA, IS THE RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION. WHILE NOT DETRACTING FROM THE IMPORTANCE OF A GOOD SYSTEM, WE BELIEVE THAT SMALL MISSIONS LIKE THE GAMBIA NEED TO

CONSIDER HOW TO ENSURE THAT THE RIGHT DATA IS COLLECTED AND ANALYZED WHILE MINIMIZING THE FINANCIAL AND MANAGEMENT BURDEN ON A.I.D. THIS IS PARTICULARLY PERTINENT TO USAID/GAMBIA GIVEN THE SPREAD OF THE PROGRAM STRATEGY. FIRST, GREAT CARE NEEDS TO BE TAKEN IN IDENTIFYING THE EXTENT AND TYPE OF DATA THAT IS MINIMALLY REQUIRED. THEN, USAIDS NEED TO DETERMINE HOW TO BEST UTILIZE EXISTING SYSTEMS, PIGGYBACK, OR CONTRACT OUT DATA COLLECTION AND

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

FY 1991

GUINEA BISSAU

AFR/SWA PROFILE FROM FY 91 API

GUINEA BISSAU

AREA	ASSESSMENT	COMMENTS
Overall Performance Progress	Medium	Price liberalizations and price controls are being removed.
PLI	Medium	PLI measurement is limited in the short term.
Mgt. Info. Use	Medium	Critical studies and analyses have led to a refocussing of Mission program; studies and analyses are being completed.
Focus on Results vs. Obligations	High	Mission is revising program to address private sector training constraints.
Quality of Data (and MER System)	Medium Low	Mission is working to develop baseline data. The system is not currently in place.
Quality of the Management Contract	Medium	SOs are being revised to reflect private sector focus.
Staffing Issues	Yes	Mission needs Program and Exec Officers (USDH) and a Training Officer (PSC).
Programmatic Issues	Yes	Logframe is being revised.

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**GUINEA BISSAU PROGRAM STRATEGY**  
(currently under revision by the Mission)

**GOAL**

Promote economic growth  
that is broad-based, market-oriented  
and sustainable

**SUB-GOALS**

Enable the agricultural sector  
to play the pivotal role in economic growth

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

Expand the role and efficiency of  
the private sector in agriculture

Reinforce a supportive environment  
for private sector growth

Strengthen rural entrepreneurship

Significant results/impact

- 60% of rural households reporting increased income.
- 90% of the cashew trade handled by the private sector.

Constraints/problems

- Lower world prices for cashews, G-B's major export crop
- Political uncertainty
- Poor weather
- Private sector starting from very low level of organization

Significant results/impact

- Price liberalization--increase in Real GDP (2.5% per annum)
- Privatizations--increased trade and investment
- New Investment law passed in 1991--private firms allowed to import/export rice; 60% of rural households reporting increased income.

Constraints/problems

Laws, regulations reflecting market economy have to be congruent with new practices; uncertainty whether changes are permanent--making private sector hesitant to expand further; unavailability of credit for small, medium enterprises; land ownership

Comments (what has changed in 3 years)

- Prices no longer set by government; private firms are allowed to operate vs. government-operated economy (significant accomplishments)
- Democratization (6 political parties now vying for votes in the upcoming presidential elections); all parties committed to full citizen participation and free market mechanism.

Significant results/impact

-- None

Constraints/problems

- Unskilled, unfamiliarity in private sector techniques; no new technology
- 70% of the population is illiterate.
- Lack of capital for credit and expanding businesses

Comments

- Economy was totally state-operated 3 years ago. New way of thinking and operating (including free participation via new skills learned and applied) has to be established.
- Training needs exceed initial projections.
- Africare is providing training to the 450-member Chamber of Commerce (accounting, basic business, etc.)

### **Success with Pricing Policy**

Following independence from Portugal in 1974, and until 1989, the Government of Guinea-Bissau was committed to centrally-planned economic development. The country suffered from an overvalued exchange rate, inappropriate pricing policies and an inefficient marketing system which depressed agriculture production and exports. Recognizing that past policies had failed the Government, with assistance from the A.I.D. funded Agricultural Sector Assistance Program (and other donor assistance), made a fundamental decision to embrace a market-orientation and a development strategy based on agriculture.

One of the first actions of the government was to lower barriers to market entry by removing price controls and allowing private sector firms to import and export especially rice and cashews, the country's primary import and export commodities. These liberalization policies and the reduction of the cashew export tax (approximately 20%) has had three primary effects: 20-35% increase in the price paid to cashew farmers; 30% increase in production of cashews as farmers respond to the improved incentive structure; and private exporters handling 90% of the cashew crop. However, due to the decrease in the world market price, the prices paid to the exporters has remained constant.

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ORIGIN OFFICE AFSW-06 INFO AFW-03 BIFW-01 POSP-01 POAR-05 GC-01 GCAF-02 RDA-01 POP-04 STAG-02 STFN-02 AMAD-01 FABP-02 /031 AB 31/2227Z

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DRAFTED BY: AID/AFR/SWA:YJJOHN:YJJ APPROVED BY: AID/AFR/SWA:TJBORN AID/AFR/SWA:JGILMORE AID/AFR/SWA:DDAY -21879E 312225Z /35

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UNCLAS STATE 180602

AIDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU 1991 ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT (API) REPORT REVIEW

1. THE API'S WERE REVIEWED AT TWO LEVELS, THE FIRST WAS A COUNTRY REVIEW AND WAS CHAIRED BY THE RESPECTIVE COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT OFFICER (CDO); THE SUB-REGIONAL AND TECHNICAL REVIEWS WERE THEN HELD WITH THE DAA/AFR AND BUREAU OFFICE DIRECTORS. GUINEA-BISSAU'S GEOGRAPHIC API REVIEW WAS HELD ON JANUARY 28; THE SUB-REGIONAL REVIEW WAS HELD ON FEBRUARY 22. AFR/SWA WAS GENERALLY PLEASED WITH ALL

SUBMISSIONS WHICH MADE PREPARATION OF THE PRESENTATIONS AT THE SUB-REGIONAL MEETINGS (WHICH ALSO WERE EXCEPTIONALLY WELL DONE) MUCH EASIER. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS WERE MADE AT G-B GEOGRAPHIC REVIEW.

2. GENERAL COMMENTS

A. IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT G-B'S STRATEGY WAS BEING REFINED AS THE API WAS BEING PREPARED. THEREFORE THE REVIEW FOCUSED ON SUGGESTIONS THAT MAY AID THE MISSION IN THE FORMULATION OF A REFINED STRATEGY AND THE API FOR 1992. THE MISSION IS TO BE CONGRATULATED ON THE EXCELLENT

NARRATIVE SECTION WHICH GIVES THE READER A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF PAST AND EXISTING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY. THIS GREATLY FACILITATES A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE EFFECTS THAT THE MAJOR RESTRUCTURING OF THE COUNTRY HAS ON PLI TRENDS AS WELL AS SOME INDICATION OF THE MAGNITUDE AND DIVERSITY OF DONOR ASSISTANCE REQUIRED FOR G-B TO INCREASE AND SUSTAIN ECONOMIC GROWTH TRENDS EXPERIENCED OVER THE 1987-1990 TIME FRAME.

B. GDP GROWTH RATES AND POTENTIAL FOR CONTINUED GROWTH

THE GROWTH RATES AS STATED IN YOUR API (COUPLED WITH A SMALLER POPULATION GROWTH RATE) SUGGEST THAT THE REFORM PROGRAM, ESPECIALLY PRICE LIBERALIZATIONS AND THE REMOVAL OF PRICE CONTROLS HAS HAD THE DESIRED RESULT. IT ALSO APPEARS THAT DIVERSIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY IS PROMISING IN LIGHT OF THE REVENUE DERIVED FROM FISHERY AND WOOD

EXPORTS. WHAT ARE THE MISSION'S VIEWS ON THE GROWTH POTENTIAL FOR THESE SECTORS?

AFR/SWA IS AWARE THAT THE MISSION AND OTHER DONORS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF COLLECTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DATA THAT WILL BE SHARED WITH THE GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS OTHER DONORS. THIS NEW DATA SHOULD PRESENT A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ECONOMY PARTICULARLY AS IT RELATES TO THE TRANSITION FROM A SOCIALIST ECONOMY TO ONE WHICH IS DRIVEN BY PRIVATE SECTOR CONCEPTS. WILL THIS NEW DATA BE AVAILABLE IN TIME TO INCLUDE IN THE API TO BE SUBMITTED FOR 1992? IS THERE SOME REASON WHY FISHERY AND WOOD ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE DATA ON AGRICULTURE EXPORTS? WHERE IS THIS DATA NOW RECORDED? WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR FRUITS AND VEGETABLES?

C. COORDINATION OF REGIONAL AND BILATERAL PROGRAMS

THIS ASPECT OF THE AID PROGRAM IN G-B BECOMES INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AS THE PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL TRADE AND THE OPENING UP OF G-B'S ECONOMY (WHICH THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SEEM TO BE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF) ARE HAPPENING CONCURRENTLY. IS THERE SOMEONE IN THE MISSION THAT IS KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE GIBSS CEREALS POLICY STUDY AND ACTIVITIES? WILL THIS POLICY ANALYSIS ENHANCE THE MISSION'S STRATEGY? WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THIS POLICY ANALYSIS FROM G-B'S PERSPECTIVE?

3. REFINEMENT OF THE STRATEGY

A. AFR/SWA IS LOOKING FORWARD TO

SION'S

REFINED STRATEGY WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WILL BE SUBMITTED TO AID/W ON THE WEEK OF MARCH 16. IN THIS TIME OF GREATER CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES (FUNDING AND PERSONNEL), THE MISSION SHOULD PLAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO DEFINING A STRATEGY AND PROGRAM THAT IS IN ITS MANAGEABLE INTEREST. THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN INCREASE IN THE PERSONNEL CEILING ABOVE CURRENT LEVELS IS NOT FORSEEN.

B. HOW WILL PAST AID INTERVENTIONS CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONTINUING PROGRAM? THIS QUESTION WAS RAISED IN THE HOPES THAT PAST PROJECTS WILL CONTINUE TO BENEFIT THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY. IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO MENTION IN NEXT YEAR'S API HOW THESE PAST INTERVENTIONS CONTRIBUTED OR CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE TO G-B ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

4. SEPTEL WILL PROVIDE MORE GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE API PROCESS, ITS UTILITY TO DECISION MAKERS, AND POSSIBLE FORMAT MODIFICATIONS.

5. A COPY OF AFR/SWA'S API PROFILES HAS BEEN FOCUSED TO THE MISSION. BAKER

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

FY 1991

MALI

AFR/SWA PROFILE FROM FY 91 API

MALI

AREA	ASSESSMENT	COMMENTS
Overall Performance Progress	Medium	Major indicators of economic progress and improved quality of life are moving in positive direction despite inadequate rains, civil disorder and change in regimes. Much of what happens on the macroeconomic level in Mali happens independently of A.I.D.'s investment.
PLI	High	Captures a good balance of process-level and people-level (PLI) impact data. SO #3 specifically reports more fully on PLI.
Mgt. Info. Use	High	Mission in position to generate a considerable amount of highly targeted, useful data on development indicators. They know the broader framework for which it is intended, i.e. policy dialogue, design.
Focus on Results vs. Obligations	High	Well-focussed NPA/Project Assistance directed toward specific objectives. Mission knows what it wants to do and knows what information/data is required. They are using info generated through regional programs.
Quality of Data (and MER System)	Medium (High)	Quality of data in many instances needs refinement. A substantial data collection system is evolving.
Quality of the Management Contract	Medium	SO #2 and #3 fit well within manageable interest. SO #1 falls within the manageable interest to a lesser extent as it is logically defined. Capacity to affect exogenous variables is of concern.
Staffing Issues	No	With 15 USDHs and 13 FSNs, this is still an ambitious program to manage.
Programmatic Issues	Yes	This is a mature program showing such attributes as continuity and consistency of A.I.D. investments. We are concerned that SO #1 may be overwhelmed by the evolving economic situation in the Sahel.


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USAID/Mali

Program Logical Framework



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**MALI PROGRAM STRATEGY**  
(based on May 1988 Action Plan)

GOAL

SUB-GOAL

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Promote economic growth

Improve the quality of life

Increase private sector participation in the economy

Increase incomes in areas of high productive potential

Improve delivery of health and educational services

Significant results

- Export of goods & non-factor services increase 9%; Per capita GDP inc. 7%
- 1% growth in GDP

Constraints

- Poor weather, civil disorder
- Lower world market prices for exports
- Transitional government

Significant results/impact

- Private investment increased 7%.
- GRM privatized/liquidated 72% of its goal.
- Restructuring and other regulatory reforms reduced budget deficit and increased private investment.
- Increases in number of firms obtaining licenses in Bamako due to regulatory reforms, i.e. revisions in the labor code simplifying hiring/firing, revised investment/commercial codes, one-stop window for registering new businesses.
- Due to market conditions and improved licensing procedures, new traders increased participation in the grain trade.

Significant results/impact

- Annual growth rate for value of agricultural production outpaced projected per annum increase.
- Increased incentives for small/medium agri-based enterprises due to elimination of export taxes and simplification of export procedures.
- Total export volume of cotton and livestock increased. Cotton prices increased but livestock prices declined.
- For past several years, staple grain production rate has outstripped population growth rate.

Significant results/impact

- Key child survival indicators show sustainable reduction in infant mortality.
- No. of primary school children completing 6th grade increased by 35%.
- No. of infants vaccinated against major childhood diseases by age one rose from 5% to 41% during 1987-91.
- Improved strategies and training contribute to 123% increase in national contraceptive prevalence rate for 1987-91.
- No. of children enrolled in grades 1-6 increased 4% during 1990-91.
- 1200 teachers/other staff retrained.
- Min. of Education share of government overall budget increased 2%, primary education share increased 2%.

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Constraints/problems

- Civil strife.
- Transitional government.
- Unemployment has risen.
- Consumption demand has declined.
- A poor harvest means decreased amount of available grain and consequently reduced activity in the grain market.

Comments

- Rise in unemployment and decline in consumption demand seen as short-term fallout from economic/political measures which will stabilize and increase investor confidence.
- Record 1991 harvest will bolster grain trade activity. Large traders will satisfy 60% of demand and village associations satisfying the remaining 40% with support from new commercial credit lines.

Constraints/problems

- Favorable climatic conditions critical.
- Market and regulatory principles are still working themselves out.

Comments

- Increases due to: good rainfall, more extensive farming practices by more farmers, technical improvements, institutional reforms, policy changes in cotton and grain sectors.
- Staple grains production growth influenced by favorable climatic conditions and reforms in the irrigated rice sector.
- 10 years support to ICRISAT/INTSORMIL lead to millet/sorghum varieties suitable to Mali climate. Sufficient seed produced to cover 10% cultivated area.

Constraints/problems

- Decline in infant mortality rates must be documented in short/long term through localized/national surveys.
- Within context of structural adjustment government expenditures were reduced.
- Primary school enrollment rate not keeping pace with population growth rate.

Comments

- There is a training demand which far exceeds initial projections is attributable to quality of program.

## Elimination of Export Taxes

Mali's economy is based on the primary sector, principally rural, with a small but growing secondary sector. Approximately 63% of Mali's income is currently generated in the primary sector, consisting mainly of agriculture, livestock and mining.

Private operators are the backbone of the Malian economy. Livestock is a major source of income and food security in Mali. It accounts for a third (1/3) of all export earnings. Under the A.I.D.-funded Policy Reform for Economic Development (PRED) program, all export taxes were suspended in October 1990 and eventually abolished in February 1991, along with quantity and value restrictions. This was intended to improve the exports of cotton and livestock. The direct beneficiaries of this measure would be the small farmers and herders who produce these goods for export. Initial estimates by the Mission indicate that the official livestock marketing cost was reduced approximately 57% (\$20 to \$8.60) per head as a result of elimination of the export taxes. This savings should be reflected in regional market demand during the remainder of the year. However, export receipts will likely grow only moderately this year due to lower world market prices for Mali's principal exports: cotton, livestock and gold.

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APPROVED BY: AID/AFR/SWA:TJBORK  
AID/AFR/SWA:JGILMORE (DRAFT) AID/AFR/SWA:DDAY (DRAFT)  
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E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS:  
SUBJECT: MALI FY 1991 ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
(API) REPORT REVIEW

1. THE MALI API AFR/SWA REVIEW WAS HELD ON JANUARY 30TH FOLLOWED BY A SAHEL WEST AFRICA API SENIOR MANAGEMENT REVIEW ON FEBRUARY 21ST CHAIRED BY DAA/AFR DICK COBB AND ATTENDED BY DAA/AFR JOHN HICKS. AFR/SWA WAS VERY PLEASED AT THE OUTCOME OF BOTH EVENTS. WE WISH TO HIGHLY COMMEND THE MALI MISSION FOR AN EXCEPTIONALLY WELL DONE JOB IN PREPARING THE SUBJECT REPORT. THE MALI FY 91 API REPORT WAS ONE OF THE BEST SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU. FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC COMMENTS AND GENERAL OBSERVATIONS WHICH MAY

BE OF USE TO THE MISSION:

2. CHANGES IN PRODUCTIVITY, PRODUCTION AND INCOME IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR.

A. THE API REPORT PRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT SET OF ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR WHICH INDICATE TO US THAT: (1) A STABLE PROGRAM OF CONTINUED A.I.D. INVESTMENTS OVER THE LONG-TERM HAS BEEN A GOOD STRATEGY, (2) POLICY AND REGULATORY REFORM WORKS IN MALI, (3) WEATHER/ RAINFALL IS CLEARLY A SUBSTANTIVE EXOGENOUS

VARIABLE IN ANY MEASUREMENT OF SUCCESS IN THE AGRO-PASTORAL SECTOR, AND (4) THE USE OF AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY IS A NECESSARY BUT INSUFFICIENT CONDITION TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE BROAD-BASED INCREASES IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY. HOWEVER, POLICY, EFFICIENT MARKETS AND MORE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES ARE ALSO NECESSARY.

B. IT WAS POINTED OUT DURING THE API REVIEWS THAT WHILE INFORMATION ON FOOD AVAILABILITY MAY BE READILY AVAILABLE, A MAJOR SHORTCOMING OF REPORTING ON FOOD SECURITY ISSUES IS THE LACK OF REPORTING ON ACCESS INFORMATION, I.E. PURCHASING POWER, HOME BUDGET ALLOCATION TO FOOD PURCHASES, ETC. WE NEED SYSTEMATIC REPORTING ON THESE VARIABLES TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE WITH REGARD TO FOOD SECURITY.

3. IMPROVEMENT IN THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES.

A. THE API REPORT PRESENTED SOME VERY IMPRESSIVE

INFORMATION REGARDING THE EXPANDED PROGRAM OF IMMUNIZATIONS (EPI) IN MALI, I.E. THE PERCENT OF FULLY IMMUNIZED CHILDREN UNDER ONE YEAR OF AGE INCREASED FROM 5 PERCENT IN 1987 TO 41 PERCENT IN 1991. DURING THE API REVIEW, AFR/ARTS INDICATED THAT DESPITE THIS PROGRESS MALI (AND OTHER SAHELIAN COUNTRIES) LEVELS ARE STILL LOW RELATIVE TO THE REST OF AFRICA. IN ADDITION, EPI SUSTAINABILITY IS AN ISSUE OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN. ALL PROGRAMS THAT ARE TRACKING VACCINATION COVERAGE SHOULD BE REVIEWING DONOR AND HOST COUNTRY FUNDING LEVELS FOR EPI. THERE IS SOME CONCERN THAT DONOR FUNDING FOR EPI MAY NOT BE KEEPING PACE WITH INCREASED COSTS, PARTICULARLY FOR VACCINES.

B. THE API REPORT STATES THAT BASED ON THE MISSION'S MONITORING OF KEY CHILD SURVIVAL INDICATORS THERE HAS BEEN A QUOTE NOTICEABLE AND SUSTAINABLE REDUCTION IN MALI'S INFANT MORTALITY, UNQUOTE. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE A STRONGER STATEMENT OF FACT, IF DATA WERE PRESENTED TO INDICATE IMPROVEMENT IN THE INFANT MORTALITY RATE.

C. THE API DOES A VERY GOOD JOB OF SHOWING THE SYNERGY BETWEEN EDUCATION AND OTHER SECTORS. IT MAY BE INFORMATIVE FOR FUTURE PROGRAM PLANNING TO TRACK THE CORRELATION BETWEEN FARMER INCOMES AND/OR PRODUCTIVITY, AND LEVEL OF EDUCATION.

#### 4. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

A. THE API REPORT INDICATES THAT THE MISSION UNDERSTANDS THE BROADER FRAMEWORK/CONTEXT FOR WHICH THE API DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS IS INTENDED AND THE MISSION IS USING THIS INFORMATION FOR ITS OWN MANAGEMENT PURPOSES, WHICH IS HIGHLY COMMENDABLE. ALSO, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE MISSION IS USING A LOT OF INFORMATION WHICH IS BEING GENERATED REGIONALLY. IT APPEARS THAT A SUBSTANTIAL DATA COLLECTION SYSTEM IS EVOLVING IN THE MISSION'S PROGRAM. THE MISSION HAS BEGUN TO GENERATE A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF HIGHLY TARGETED USEFUL DATA ON DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS.

B. THE MISSION MIGHT CONSIDER MOVING FROM PROCESS TO IMPACT-ORIENTED INDICATORS IN THE HEALTH AND EDUCATION SUBTARGETS, I.E. THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON HOW TO MEASURE FUTURE PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF INCREASE IN ACCESS TO SERVICES, INCREASED PROVISION OF PREVENTATIVE CARE SERVICES AND IMPROVEMENTS IN QUALITY OF CARE.

C. GREATER CLARITY CAN BE ACHIEVED BY AVOIDING CITING AGGREGATE NUMBERS AS INDICATORS OF ACHIEVEMENT OF TARGETS OR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES WHEN THESE NUMBERS DO NOT CAPTURE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. RELYING SOLELY ON SUCH AGGREGATE NUMBERS CAN BE VERY MISLEADING BECAUSE: (1) IT IGNORES ANY ECONOMIES OF SCALE WHICH MIGHT BE ACHIEVED BY A COMBINING OF FIRMS AND AN ACTUAL DECREASE IN FIRMS; (2) IT IGNORES THE DYNAMICS OF PRIVATE BUSINESS, THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF FIRMS THAT FAIL AND SUCCEED OVER TIME; AND (3) IT IGNORES THE SUSTAINABILITY ISSUE, I.E. THE RECOVERY OF LOANS NOT ACTUAL LOANS MADE WOULD BE A MORE ACCURATE INDICATOR OF POSITIVE IMPACT AND PROGRESS TOWARDS THE TARGETS OR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE. WHETHER IT IS SMALL AND

MEDIUM ENTERPRISES (SMES), PRIVATE FIRMS, OR PRIVATE AGRIBUSINESS FIRMS, THE UNDERLYING IMPORTANCE OF PROFITS AND METHODS OF CAPTURING AN INDICATION OF PROFITABILITY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A HIGHLY USEFUL TOOL FOR MEASURING IMPACT AND INDICATING ACHIEVEMENT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS.

D. AT THE API WRAP-UP MEETING, DAA COBB SUGGESTED THAT IT

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MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO HOLD MINI-REVIEWS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES. MALI WAS ONE OF THOSE COUNTRIES MENTIONED BECAUSE OF ITS SUCCESSES AND OUR DESIRE TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THE PROGRAM. THE MISSION MAY WISH TO CONSIDER THIS AFTER THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT IS IN PLACE IN MALI AND PLANS ARE BEING DEVELOPED TO UPDATE/REVISE THE EXISTING CPSP/PROGRAM LOGFRAME FOR A FY 1993 SUBMISSION.

5. AGAIN, TO ALL WHO PARTICIPATED IN PREPARATION OF THE MALI API REPORTS, CONGRATULATIONS ON A JOB WELL DONE.  
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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

FY 1991

NIGER

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## AFR/SWA PROFILE FROM FY 91 API

## NIGER

AREA	ASSESSMENT	COMMENTS
Overall Performance Progress	Low	Decertification; political stall
PLI	Low	Process level impact; limited measurable PLI at this time
Mgt. Info. Use	High	Development constraints and data constraints have led to changes in program and monitoring; Program Week will be a test.
Focus on Results vs. Obligations	High	M & E have resulted in program shifts to address primary constraints.
Quality of Data (and MER System)	Medium (High)	Mission working to improve; good start on appropriate indicators, baseline and monitoring systems
Quality of the Management Contract	Medium	Time for review given dynamic situation
Staffing Issues	Yes	Staff levels being reduced; difficult country in which to work
Programmatic Issues	Yes	New strategy due 2/29; Program Week end of March

8/21

**NIGER PROGRAM STRATEGY**  
(currently under revision by the Mission)

**GOAL**

Increase food production,  
leading to food self reliance  
and increased rural incomes

Significant results

-data base being created  
to better monitor impact

Constraints

-variable rainfall  
-population growth rate of 3.4%  
-continuing GOM imple-  
mentation mismanagement:  
-transitional government.

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

Increase agricultural growth  
on a sustainable basis

Increase the scale, diversity and  
efficiency of agro-pastoral markets

Increase coverage and  
quality of health care

Significant results/impact

-- Dramatic increase (50%) in onion yields and marketed production  
-- Value of wood produced on managed woodlands increased 276%

Constraints/problems

-- Millet and sorghum production and productivity are stagnant.  
-- Decertification of ASDG restricting NRM activities

Comments

-- Mission does not anticipate growth scenario in the next few years.

Significant results/impact

-- Exports of onions quadrupled  
-- Credit union savings quadrupled

Constraints/problems

-- Decertification of ASDG impeding use of counterpart funds  
-- Scarcity of skilled/educated labor  
-- CFA zone

Comments

-- Although difficult to measure PLI, the environment for participation in economic growth is progressing well.

Significant results/impact

-- Couple years of protection increased 17%

Constraints/problems

-- Decertification of NHSS  
-- GON continues to focus on urban rather than rural, and curative rather than preventive

Comments

-- API indicators either modified or dropped

## Success with Purple Onions

The development of any agricultural market in Niger faces constraints. Production is limited by lack of water, lack of irrigation equipment, difficult access to credit, and simple growing practices. Marketing is limited by inadequate storage, packaging, and access to markets and credit. Yet in recent years, onion acreage and production have expanded drastically. The GON's export earnings from onions has increased by more than 50% in the last year alone.

In response to A.I.D.'s EPRP in 1988, the GON has eliminated export tariffs on agro-pastoral products, and streamlined trade regulations. These changes in the onion subsector minimize the traders' transaction costs.

Several market development actions are recommended to add value to the onion subsector. These include market promotion and research, and the development of new market technologies in storage, grading and packaging. Analysis of seed production to help reduce costs and enhance the genetic qualities of Niger's high quality Violet of Galmi onion.

An institutional action recommended to add value to the onion subsector is to modify the GON's data gathering. The Chamber of Commerce linked the payment of a business tax and the collection of data with the one-stop window regulation under the new trade regulations. This has confused exporters and raised barriers to entry for many traders.

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

FY 1991

SENEGAL

AFR/SWA PROFILE FROM FY 91 API

SENEGAL

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AREA	ASSESSMENT	COMMENTS
<p>Overall Performance</p> <p>Progress</p> <p>PLI</p> <p>Mgt. Info. Use</p>	<p>Low</p> <p>Low</p> <p>Medium</p>	<p>Except in population; progress will be measured against new programs.</p> <p>Limited to date, based on actual report. However, new CPSP objective tree would indicate PLI will be measurable at the strategic objective level in the future.</p> <p>Although MER system for new CPSP is still being developed, Mission has clearly used results of analytical work to decide program direction.</p>
<p>Focus on Results vs. Obligations</p>	<p>High</p>	<p>Extensive use of deobligation authority.</p>
<p>Quality of Data (and MER System)</p>	<p>High (High)</p>	<p>Tentative; awaiting Analytic Agenda. Extensive work on data needs and systems indicates good data of high value for Mission's management. Extensive data will be available; reporting format may need work to effectively communicate to AID/W. Short vs. long term is a question.</p>
<p>Quality of the Management Contract</p>	<p>Medium</p>	<p>May be high if Analytic Agenda defines links from SO #4 to other SOs and Goal.</p>
<p>Staffing Issues</p>	<p>No</p>	
<p>Programmatic Issues</p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Implementation of agricultural sector reforms are key.</p>

# USAID/Senegal CPSP Summary

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**Goal**

Increased Priv. Income from Nat. Resources

**Sub-Goal**

Incr Availability of Nat. Resc. Per Capita

Increased Value of Marketed Output

Increased Value of Home Consumption

**Strategic Objectives**

Decreased Family Size

Increased Crop Productivity in zones of reliable rainfall

Increased Value of Tree Production

Increased Liberalization of Markets

**Targets**

Increased use of modern Contraceptive (Urban)

Increased Contraceptive Use (Rural)

Increased Soil Productivity

Increased Availability of Technology

Plant more Trees

Increased Conservation of Trees

Increased Priv. Sect. Activity

Decreased Government Regulation

**Population**

**Crops**

**Forestry**

**Marketing**



Senegal Program Strategy  
(CPSP approved April 1991)

GOAL

Increase private income  
from natural resources

STRATEGIC  
OBJECTIVES

Decrease  
family size

Increase crop productivity  
in reliable rainfall zones

Increase value of  
tree production

Agricultural market  
liberalization

Significant results

Significant results

Significant results

Significant results

- Urban contraceptive prevalence increased (6.7% in 1986 to 10.4% in 1991)
- Rural women's knowledge increasing (58.1% in 1986 to 75% in 1991)

- Policy framework negotiated, will be established under Multi-Year Title III program.

Constraints/problems

Constraints/problems

Constraints/problems

Constraints/problems

Comments

Comments

Comments

Comments

- Long-term endeavor
- Need to strengthen data

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APPROVED BY: AID/AFR/SWA: TBORK  
AFR/SWA: RDAY (DRAFT) AFR/SWA: JGILMORE (DRAFT)  
AFR/DP: JATHERTON (INFO) AFR/ARTS: DSMITH (INFO)  
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E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS:SUBJECT: AFR REVIEW OF SENEGAL'S FY 1991 ASSESSMENT OF  
PROGRAM IMPACT (API)

THE LAYPERSON (I.E. ONE NOT STEEPED IN THE DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES AND ASSUMPTIONS UNDER WHICH A.I.D. OPERATES) SOME WELL CRAFTED NARRATIVE WOULD BE NEEDED, OR VERY USEFUL, TO PAINT A GRAPHIC AND CONVINCING PICTURE OF HOW E.G. REDUCTIONS IN FAMILY SIZE AND INCREASES IN CROP PRODUCTIVITY AFFECT THE EVERYDAY LIVES OF THE TARGET POPULATION.

7. SWA POINTED OUT THAT THE SENEGAL MISSION IS DEVELOPING A VERY SOPHISTICATED AND COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, INCLUDING AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF HOUSEHOLD LEVEL DATA. IT WAS FELT THAT WHILE THE SYSTEM WILL PROBABLY BE VERY USEFUL FOR THE MISSION'S MANAGEMENT OF THE PROGRAM AND FOR DETAILED PROGRAM EVALUATION, THE PROPOSED INDICATORS MAY BE MORE SOPHISTICATED THAN IS REQUIRED TO MEET WASHINGTON'S ANNUAL API NEEDS. (AS YET NOT WELL DEFINED), AND TOO COMPLEX TO BE EASILY COMMUNICATED AND ASSIMILATED UNDER THE API SYSTEM. THIS IS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT VARIOUS WASHINGTON OFFICES FORESEE DIFFERENT USES FOR THE API REPORTS. AFTER THE ANALYTIC AGENDA IS REVIEWED, WE MAY WANT TO CONSIDER WITH THE MISSION, WITH AFR/DP, (THE PRIMARY USERS OF THE API FOR CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING) AND WITH ARTS, (THE PRIMARY USERS FOR TECHNICAL ANALYSIS) WHETHER A SMALLER SUBSET OF THE INDICATORS SHOULD BE SELECTED FOR A SIMPLIFIED API REPORT.

8. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE ONLY PROGRESS AGAINST STRATEGIC

OBJECTIVES DEMONSTRATED BY THE INDICATORS THIS YEAR WAS UNDER S.O. 1. SWA POINTED OUT THAT THE INDICATORS UNDER THIS S.O. CAPTURED THE RESULTS OF MAJOR A.I.D. INVOLVEMENT IN THE SECTOR BEFORE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW CPSP AND THAT THE INDICATORS UNDER THE OTHER THREE S.O.'S WERE DESIGNED TO MEASURE PROGRESS UNDER THE NEW STRATEGY.

9. WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY TO TALK ABOUT LESSONS LEARNED IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM STRATEGY, THERE IS SOME FEELING IN AID/W THAT METHODOLOGIES FOR SOME OF THE ANALYTIC WORK WHICH HAS BEEN DONE AND IS BEING DONE IN SENEGAL COULD BE VERY USEFUL FOR OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES. WE ARE THINKING PARTICULARLY OF THE MIX OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM WASHINGTON ON DESIGN OF FRAMEWORKS FOR DATA COLLECTION, SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS, AND THE MISSION'S REFINEMENT AND ADAPTATION OF THE METHODOLOGY TO STRUCTURE ANALYZE AND INTEGRATE EXISTING DATA AND DEVELOP FURTHER DATA COLLECTION MECHANISMS. THE MISSION'S USE OF THE GIS RECEIVED A GOOD DEAL OF FAVORABLE COMMENT DURING THE TECHNICAL REVIEWS OF APIS. WE WOULD LIKE THE MISSION TO CONSIDER PARTICIPATING IN A SHORT WORKSHOP WITH WASHINGTON STAFF TO FURTHER DEVELOP POSSIBLE LESSONS. THIS MIGHT BE DONE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE REVIEW OF THE ANALYTIC AGENDA AS DISCUSSED BELOW.

10. AS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED WITH THE MISSION, THERE IS A FEELING HERE THAT NEITHER THE PRISM NOR THE API REPORTS, WITH THEIR PRESCRIBED FORMATS, WERE ADEQUATE VEHICLES TO TRANSMIT THE FULL STORY OF THE EXTENSIVE AND INNOVATIVE WORK THE SENEGAL MISSION IS DOING ON DATA SYSTEMS AND ON

COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE MISSION'S ANALYTIC AGENDA WILL BE A MUCH MORE USEFUL DOCUMENT THAN EITHER THE PRISM REPORT OR THE API REPORT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT AGREED TO AT THE END OF THE MARCH 1991 PROGRAM WEEK, I.E. THAT QUOTE AID/W AND THE MISSION AGREE ON PROCEDURES FOR MONITORING AND EVALUATION AND ON INDICATORS FOR TRACKING PROGRESS, INCLUDING WHAT NEEDS TO BE TRACKED, WHAT DATA SYSTEMS WILL BE REQUIRED AND HOW IT WILL BE DONE. UNQUOTE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE MISSION

1. SEPTEL PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW OF BUREAU API REVIEWS. FOLLOWING ARE SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE REVIEW OF SENEGAL'S API REPORT.

2. SWA APPRECIATES MISSION'S MEMO RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS RAISED IN OUR EARLIER, QUICK REVIEW. THIS CLARIFIED MANY OF THE INDICATORS AND PROVIDED US WITH A BETTER SENSE OF THE ANALYSIS AND DATA COLLECTION WHICH THE MISSION IS

WORKING ON.

3. IT WAS POINTED OUT IN THE REVIEW THAT THE SENEGAL API SYSTEM IS STILL BEING DEVELOPED. MANY OF THE INDICATORS WERE STILL BEING REFINED AT THE TIME THE REPORT WAS SUBMITTED AND MANY OF THE BASELINES HAD NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

4. WE FOUND THE EXPLANATION OF INDICATORS PROVIDED IN THE NARRATIVE TO BE USEFUL. PRESUMABLY, BY THE TIME OF NEXT YEAR'S REPORT, THE NARRATIVE CAN BE SHORTER, WITH LESS NEED TO EXPLAIN THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF THE INDICATORS

AND MORE OPPORTUNITY TO FOCUS ON EXPLANATION AND ELABORATION OF THE PROGRESS DEMONSTRATED BY THE INDICATORS.

5. WHILE THE INDICATORS PRESENTED ARE GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE DECISIONS REACHED AT THE CPSP REVIEW, IT WAS AGREED THAT A FURTHER, MORE DETAILED REVIEW WOULD BE USEFUL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECISION AT LAST MARCH'S PROGRAM WEEK THAT THE INDICATORS WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE CPSP AND THAT THEY WOULD BE REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY AFR/W WHEN COMPLETED. AS FURTHER DISCUSSED BELOW, WE BELIEVE THAT THE BEST VEHICLE FOR THIS REVIEW WILL BE THE MISSION'S ANALYTIC AGENDA.

6. THERE WAS GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT THE INDICATORS FOR THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES COULD, FOR THE MOST PART, MEASURE PEOPLE LEVEL IMPACT AND THAT CHANGES COULD BE CONVINCINGLY ATTRIBUTED TO A.I.D. PROGRAMS. (FYI - ACHIEVING BOTH OF

THESE OBJECTIVES WITH INDICATORS BELOW THE SUB-GOAL LEVEL HAS BEEN A MAJOR, RECURRING PROBLEM FOR MOST COUNTRIES IN API DEVELOPMENT.) HOWEVER, IT WAS ALSO BELIEVED THAT FOR

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REACTION TO OUR JUDGEMENT ON THIS AS WELL AS VIEWS ON  
POSSIBLE TIMING FOR SUCH A REVIEW AND ON THE POSSIBILITY  
AND DESIRABILITY OF MISSION ATTENDANCE AT THE REVIEW. AS  
STATED ABOVE, IF MISSION PARTICIPATION IS POSSIBLE, WE  
WOULD LIKE TO CONSIDER PIGGYBACKING THE WORKSHOP DESCRIBED  
ABOVE ONTO THE REVIEW. BAKER

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FOR: AFR/SWA

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: AFR REVIEW OF SENEGAL'S FY 1991 ASSESSMENT OF  
PROGRAM IMPACT (API); MISSION COMMENTSREF: (A) STATE 85877; (B) STATE 79286; (C) 91 STATE  
273190 (API GUIDANCE); (D) 91 STATE 150010 (CPSP  
REPORTING)

1. USAID/SENEGAL BELIEVES THAT THE 1991 API SUBMISSION -- NOT THE ANALYTICAL AGENDA -- IS THE APPROPRIATE VEHICLE FOR SOLICITING AID/W AGREEMENT QUOTE (REF A PARA 10) ON PROCEDURES FOR MONITORING AND EVALUATION AND ON INDICATORS FOR TRACKING PROGRESS, INCLUDING WHAT NEEDS TO BE TRACKED, (AND) WHAT DATA SYSTEMS WILL BE REQUIRED UNQUOTE. USAID/SENEGAL BELIEVES THAT IT HAS FULFILLED ITS PROGRAM WEEK COMMITMENT TO SEEK WASHINGTON AGREEMENT

ON OUR INDICATORS BY (1) WORKING INTENSIVELY WITH THE PRISM TEAM (AND AFR/ARTS STAFF) LAST AUGUST TO SIMPLIFY AND REFORMULATE THE ORIGINAL LOGFRAME CONTAINED IN THE CPSP AND (2) PREPARING AND SUBMITTING AN API THAT REFLECTS THE WORK OF THE PRISM (AND AFR/ARTS) TEAM.

2. USAID/SENEGAL BELIEVES THAT THE ANALYTIC AGENDA IS THE APPROPRIATE VEHICLE FOR SOLICITING AID/W AGREEMENT ON HOW REPEAT HOW THE MISSION INTENDS TO IMPLEMENT THESE DATA SYSTEMS. WE CONSIDER THAT OUR INDICATORS ARE ALREADY WELL-DEFINED AND APPROPRIATE TO TRACKING PROGRAM IMPACT. WE ALREADY HAVE BEGUN DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING THE REQUIRED BASELINE AND MONITORING DATABASE SYSTEMS.

THE INVESTMENT IN STAFF TIME, EFFORT AND FUNDS IS SUBSTANTIAL. WE DO NOT WISH TO REVISIT ISSUES RESOLVED AT THE CPSP LEVEL OR FULLY EXPLORED DURING THE PRISM EXERCISE. THEREFORE USAID/SENEGAL FORMALLY REQUESTS AID/W CONCURRENCE ON THE PROCEDURES, INDICATORS, AND DATA SYSTEMS NEEDED TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE PROGRAM IMPACT INDICATORS. THESE PROCEDURES, INDICATORS AND DATA SYSTEMS WERE PROVIDED IN OUR API SUBMISSION.

3. OUR ANALYTIC AGENDA WILL SHOW HOW OUR PROGRAM INDICATORS WILL ENABLE US TO MONITOR THE OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS WE HAVE DEFINED. THE ANALYTIC AGENDA WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO DEFEND THE CHOICE OF INDICATORS; HOWEVER, IT WILL SHOW HOW THESE INDICATORS ARE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE THE INFORMATION WE NEED IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING OUR STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS. IT WILL FURTHER IDENTIFY THE KIND OF DATA WE WILL BE

DEVELOPING TO SECURE THIS INFORMATION. WE AGREE THAT, AS OUR DATA SYSTEM COMES ON STREAM, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT ACTUAL PROGRAM IMPACT. WE WILL BE

HAPPY TO WORK WITH AID/W TO DEVISE A SIMPLIFIED FRAMEWORK IF, FOR REPORTING OR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES (REF A PARAS 6 AND 7), SUCH A FRAMEWORK IS DEEMED NECESSARY. KEY USAID/SENEGAL STAFF PLAN TO BE IN WASHINGTON IN LATE MAY AND/OR THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF JUNE. THESE STAFF COULD BE AVAILABLE TO MEET WITH AFR FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THE ANALYTIC AGENDA AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SHORT WORKSHOP BRIEFLY DESCRIBED IN REF A PARA 9. PLEASE LET US KNOW THE AMOUNT OF TIME YOU THINK MIGHT BE NEEDED SINCE OUR FUNDS ARE SEVERELY LIMITED.

4. AS USAID/SENEGAL CONTINUES TO BUILD OUR MONITORING SYSTEM WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN:

A. POSSIBLE CENTRAL RESOURCES THAT MAY BE USED TO HELP MISSIONS COLLECT AND ANALYZE DATA (REF B PARA 7 (B)) INCLUDING SUPPLEMENTAL P&S FUNDING (REF C SECTION VI.E); AND

B. THE CURRENT STATUS OF CDIE'S PLAN TO TRAIN AID STAFF IN PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MONITORING AND IMPACT ANALYSIS.

5. IN RESPONSE TO AID/W REQUEST FOR FEEDBACK ON THE API WRAP-UP OVERVIEW REPORT (REF B), USAID/SENEGAL AGREES THAT THE REAL VALUE OF THE API SYSTEM AND DOCUMENT PROBABLY WILL LIE IN ITS UTILITY TO THE MISSION BEGINNING IN FY 1993 AFTER SOLID DATA ON MOST VARIABLES HAVE BEEN REPORTED. WE BELIEVE THE CPSP/API SYSTEMS COULD EVOLVE INTO USEFUL MECHANISMS FOR ENHANCING FIELD/WASHINGTON DIALOGUE ON BROADER PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, STRATEGY AND

POLICY ISSUES.

6. PLEASE POUCH COPIES OF MALI, MALAWI AND KENYA APIS. SHIRLEY

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

- I. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF GOALS, SUB-GOALS, AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN THE AFR/SA REGION
- II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
- III. STRATEGIC OBSERVATIONS
- IV. MANAGEMENT OBSERVATIONS
- V. ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

## I. GENERAL OVERVIEW

## A. GOAL LEVEL

1. BROAD-BASED ECONOMIC GROWTH
2. INCREASING INCOMES
3. FOOD SECURITY

## B. SUB-GOAL LEVEL

1. IMPROVE FOOD SECURITY
2. IMPROVE HEALTH STATUS
3. REDUCE POPULATION GROWTH RATE
4. INCREASE FARM AND OFF-FARM EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY

## C. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE LEVEL

1. INCREASE THE ROLE OF THE MARKET IN THE PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING OF AGRICULTURE.
2. INCREASE POPULATION WITH THE BASIC SKILLS FOR LABOR FORCE ENTRY.
3. FERTILITY REDUCTION.
4. DECREASE INFANT AND CHILD MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY.
5. CONTROL THE SPREAD OF AIDS.

## II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

- Received 5 out of 6 APIs required to be submitted. Botswana has not been submitted and will be discussed by Syd Anderson.
- The depth and breadth of information reported varies. However, for the majority of the submissions, there has been an improvement in the presentations.
- Generally, the API guidance has been adhered to. The formats have been standardized, however, the substantive content varies.
- Selected presentations have done a good job of establishing different baseline years for different specific objectives (e.g., Malawi: 1984 for Population and Health; 1985 for Agriculture and AIDS).
- Some have done a better job than others in identifying their data sources. Some have an overreliance on government sources for data without a discussion of the reliability of this information. This calls into question the credibility of the data (e.g., Lesotho and Swaziland). Malawi did an excellent job of identifying a variety of data sources that lend themselves to greater credibility.
- There were only a few attempts at gender disaggregation, and those attempts were almost exclusively at the strategic objective indicator level (e.g., Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique)
- In accordance with the 1991 API guidance, Mozambique and Swaziland included in their presentations a discussion of revised indicators/expected levels of achievement, as they continue to refine their targets and indicators.
- Zambia's 1986 CDSS is obviously inappropriate as a basis for assessing program impact, particularly in light of recent developments in Zambia. Zambia's API reflects this as it is written with a view to the future. The Bureau will need to make a fundamental decision on whether or not the Mission does a full-fledged strategy.

- I found the section of the APIs on Special Factors Affecting the USAID Program very well crafted and extremely informative in every case. However, I found the Progress Toward Overall Program Goal and Sub-Goal and Progress Toward Strategic Objectives and Related Progress Indicators presentations mixed and a bit more difficult to assess. The reporting in the former area is too general in some respects to as to be virtually impossible to link the Mission's program to indicator measures. In the latter, the reporting in some cases is tied to project/program results to the point being a PIR.

III. STRATEGIC INFORMATION

A. Results that can serve as examples for testimony, DFA reports, etc.

- In the Malawi API, it was reported that key policy constraints have been lifted by the GOM for 3 public sector health programs supported by the Mission -- family planning, AIDS Control, and Malaria Control. The more supportive policy environment is helping to expedite implementation of Mission projects.

B. Regional Trends That Affect Performance

Relative to the BLS countries:

- Professional and blue collar workers are leaving for better opportunities in South Africa, effectively reducing the skills capacity in these countries for economic development purposes.
- The unsettled political atmosphere in South Africa, as well as the global economic downturn are having a negative impact on foreign investment.
- Returning unskilled labor due to South Africa retrenchment, primarily in the mining sector, is beginning to pose significant human resource/unemployment problems.

Drought

Mentioned in every API, with the exception of Swaziland.

C. Experiences for Other Missions in the AFR/SA Region

- In Malawi, AIDS is slowing the downward trend in infant and child mortality rates. To halt this trend, Missions may need to redouble their efforts to influence the socioeconomic determinants of this problem.

On a more positive note:

- The Governments of Malawi and Swaziland are exhibiting more positive and supportive attitudes toward family planning. Government leaders are publically addressing the family planning and AIDS issues and lifting policy barriers to the implementation of programs to address these problems.

OVERRIDING ISSUES

1. DROUGHT

2. HUMAN RIGHTS

MALAWI

SWAZILAND - TRADITIONAL VS MODERN SECTORS OF GOVERNMENT

3. DEMOCRATIZATION

ZAMBIA

LESOTHO

## IV. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

- A. Some countries are further along in developing their monitoring and evaluation systems than others (e.g., Malawi). However, all are taking concrete steps to get these systems in place. Mozambique, however, will continue to have problems because of the obvious security problems. The refinement of targets and indicators is one indication of working with better data.
- B. As a general statement, I think that all Missions are now beginning to view their country programs as a coherent whole, rather than just a conglomeration of projects and programs.
- C. Has AID/W held up its end of the bargain in providing the Missions with adequate support? I would say yes. However, more will be needed as the process is refined. (e.g., Botswana and Zambia will need additional assistance)

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

SOUTHERN AFRICA

FY 1991

- LESOTHO
- MALAWI
- MOZAMBIQUE
- SWAZILAND

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
FY 1991

LESOTHO

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Lesotho API Review

General Observations

The FY 1991 USAID/Lesotho Assessment of Program Impact (API) is a useful tool for getting a sense of what constraints the Government of Lesotho and USAID face and what economic development progress has been made.

The document clearly articulates the three factors affecting the USAID program: structural adjustment, political stability and drought.

- structural adjustment progress improved generally over the last two years, but was limited in two action areas under USAID's Lesotho Agricultural Policy Support Program (LAPSP): setting a national grazing fee and liquidating the agricultural input supply parastatal (Coop Lesotho).

- political stability has been shaken by a coup, increased unemployment (particularly in rural areas), riots, and strikes. Elections are scheduled for June 1992.

- severe drought dropped agricultural production to, in many cases, their lowest levels in ten years.

GDP and GDP per capita both increased and the infant mortality rate decreased. (The GDP data do not reflect worsening conditions in rural areas.) However, the unemployment rate increased, the contribution of agriculture as a percent of GDP decreased, and several key education and agricultural indicators fell. Some of the downturn can be attributed to the drought. In this context, the USAID program helped stabilize the situation or achieve marginal increases. This is probably all that could be expected under such external constraints.

**Question 1: Does the reporting in the API track with the program objectives and performance indicators agreed upon in the management contract?**

The Mission's API is based on its 1986 Country Development Strategy Statement Update. This was used as the basis for the FY 1990 API and is considered as the "management contract" against which FY 1991 performance should be measured. While preparing the FY 1991 API, the Mission also was developing its first Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP: FY 1992 - FY 1996). The CPSP was review during Lesotho Program Week in December 1991 and contains different goals, objectives, targets and indicators. In this context, while important information can be drawn from reviewing the FY 1991 Lesotho API, the audience should appreciate

that the Mission, with Bureau concurrence, is now working under a different management contract.

The API states "While many of the macro-level indicators for the goal level show positive results, they do not clearly measure program impact in the rural area. The Mission has not modified these indicators or developed any for the sub-goal since the new CPSP establishes a different framework at these levels."

**Question 2: Does the API convey people level impact? If not, why not? What might make a difference (e.g., rearticulating the indicators, changing the objectives)?**

The API conveys people level impact in the fields of education and health. For agriculture, indicators measure production and amount of rangeland no longer being eroded. The new CPSP uses improved indicators which try to measure the impact on farmer incomes.

**Question 3: Can results (for use in CP overview and DFA report) be tentatively identified?**

In the FY 92 CP, work in education through the Basic NonFormal Education Systems (BANFES) project was cited. Between 1985 and 1989, primary school enrollment had increased and the percentage of children completing primary school and passing completion exams rose. The FY 1993 CP will cite USAID's introduction of rangeland management areas (RMAs) as contributing to less erosion of land, an increase of animal weight, and, ultimately, more income for farmers.

**Question 4: Compare the API with the previous year's. What does it say about progress? Compare indicators for the API year with the baseline. Has there been progress? More or less than was planned?**

While gains in access to primary education have continued or been maintained, quality has slipped. This is reflected by a lower percentage of children completing primary school and passing completion exams and an increase in the years required to successfully complete primary school. Under-financing by the Government of Lesotho while enrollment was increasing is partially responsible for the decrease in quality. The recently obligated Primary Education Program is conditioned on greater GOL financing and an increase in the teacher/student ratio.

In agriculture, many indicators reflected a worse situation as a result of the drought. An exception was Pinto bean seed sales, which rose sharply as farmers adopted this legume based on the recommendation of USAID-supported research. Another exception was in a new indicator USAID had added to measure the

responsiveness of institutions to the needs of farmers and agricultural entrepreneurs. Through a USAID project the number of "packages" that examine technical and economic aspects of production and marketing has increased from zero in 1986 to 20 in 1991.

**Question 5: Is the quality of information improving? Are the baselines in place? Have the baselines changed, per the 1991 guidelines, to the earliest year possible?**

All baselines reflect the earliest years: Education - 1985; Agriculture - 1983 through 1987, depending on component; and Health - 1984/1985.

The mission is continuing to improve its impact measurement system, particularly in obtaining better data for future measurement and reporting of increased production of high value crops. Studies to be conducted in FY 1992 include (1) an analysis of GOL census and education data to derive population and school completion projections, (2) a survey to establish a baseline for comparing incomes derived from within the range management areas and the nationwide average, and (3) a training needs assessment and identification of indicators for use in a new training project.

**Question 6: Has the Mission made any requests for information (e.g., on indicators, on measurement methodologies, on progress of other, similar SOs and Targets)?**

The Mission used the services of MSI in September 1991 to develop its new CPSP.

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
FY 1991

MALAWI

## Malawi API Review

General Observations

Malawi's FY 91 API is a well-written, thoughtful document, which offers the reader a comprehensive picture of the situation in Malawi, what changes have taken place in the past year, and both recent trends and what has influenced them. During the past year, Malawi has had to deal with extreme weather conditions, not only affecting agricultural production, but also taking 500 lives and creating homelessness for some 50,000 people. Malawi is directly affected by the civil war in Mozambique, providing land, shelter, education and social services to a million refugees, as well as struggling with tremendously increased transportation costs by having to route cargo through Zambia or Tanzania. On a brighter note, several policy impediments to reform in the agricultural and health sectors were lifted this year, and measurable changes are beginning to take place.

-- The API presented tables showing, over time, progress towards the overall program goal as well as progress toward their five strategic objectives and related indicators.

-- Establishing, where possible, a baseline year of 1985 gives the reader a sense of perspective on change. AID's vision and role in influencing those changes can be seen in the targets established over the 1990 to 1995 period.

Reported Impact

-- GNP grew at an annual rate of 4.8 percent in 1990.

-- Per capita food production returned to 1988/89 levels, after the effects of drought in the 1989/90 crop year.

-- Smallholder farmers were allowed to grow burley tobacco for the first time, about half selling it through the parastatal ADMARC. Initially, they sold it at a loss, but later received additional compensation.

-- There is mixed reporting on the import and foreign exchange liberalization program which began in early 1988. While industrial production growth during 1990 was high, the industrial production index declined in the first two quarters of 1991, due to a decrease in manufacturing output for the domestic market, as well as a seasonal decline in export agricultural processing. The first phase of the program seems to have had a more positive impact than the last.

-- Private enterprise development has been enhanced by GOM policy changes supporting industrial sector growth, the creation of Malawi's third commercial bank, increased business services to be provided by the Investment Development Bank of Malawi, and the

establishment of a trust for ADMARC financial asset management.

-- Malawi's population growth rate remains high, threatening gains in agricultural production, nonagricultural output and institutional health capacity. Contraceptive prevalence, however, has increased dramatically, from an estimated 1% in 1984, to 10% in 1991. There have been significant policy changes and programmatic support by the Government this past year, further facilitating fertility reduction activities.

-- There has been no improvement in the malaria and AIDS profile in Malawi. USAID's PHICS and STAFH programs are addressing themselves to water and sanitation improvements, malaria control and reduction in HIV transmission rates.

### Observations by Strategic Objective

Strategic Objective One -- Increase Foodcrop Production and Productivity

Smallholders were allowed to grow burley tobacco for the first time as a result of the World Bank's Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit Program.

Smallholder purchases of maize seed increased from 1,600 metric tons in 1985 to 4,900 metric tons in 1991. Fertilizer purchases during the same period increased from 69,000 metric tons to 113,000 metric tons. Use of farm credit increased from 16% to 25% of smallholders, again during the same period. Finally, the percentage of smallholders planting HYV maize to the total area planted in maize increased from 8.4% in 1985 to 14% in 1991.

Normally, increased land devoted to planting HYV maize results in increased average yields. In 1989/90 and 1990/91, however, crop yields were flat due to unusual rainfall patterns.

Research in hybrid maize and cassava pest protection has resulted in new high-yield and resistant seeds which will be distributed this year.

The share of smallholder land devoted to cash crop production remained constant from 1985 to 1991. In 1990/91, cotton, tobacco and soyabeans accounted for 85% of the cash crop hectareage planted -- 50% cotton, 25% tobacco and more than 10% soyabeans.

Strategic Objective Two -- Increase Off-farm Employment

Employment in the estate subsector increased by 6.5% per annum from 1985-89, according to a recent survey, with the tobacco industry accounting for about 80% of the increase.

Domestic savings as a percentage of GDP dropped from 13.1% in 1985 to 4.5% in 1989, recovered to 9.8% in 1990, and is projected at

9.9% for 1992.

The ratio of private to public sector domestic credit increased from 0.6:1 in 1985 to 2.3:1 in 1990. Increases in private sector credit over the next three years are expected to continue, but at a slower rate. During the same period, the ratio of private to public domestic fixed investment nearly doubled, from 0.6:1 to 1:1, and is expected to grow to 1.4:1 by 1995.

Projections of the number of SMEs receiving business and technical advisory services increased steadily, from 300 in 1989, to 600 in 1990, and is projected at 1200 in 1992, and 2500 by 1995.

#### Strategic Objective Three -- Fertility Reduction

Important population policy changes have taken place in the past year, such as GOM institution of a maternity leave policy which encourages the spacing of children three years apart. The Government established a national-level organization to promote child spacing, the National Family Welfare Council (NFWC). It has also approved voluntary sterilization activities, the introduction of NORPLANT on a trial basis, radio advertising of condoms, CHWs to resupply oral contraceptives and a Demographic and Health Survey.

Estimates of contraceptive prevalence rates show a significant increase since 1984, from a level of 1% at that time, to 4% in 1988, to as high as 10% in 1991. The mission is currently designing a \$45 million population and AIDS activity, which will, among other things, consolidate a broad portfolio of discrete and disparate population activities into a coherent project.

The mission's new education project, Girls' Attainment in Basic Literacy and Education, is designed to complement fertility reduction activities by encouraging girls to remain in school and improve school achievement.

#### Strategic Objective Four -- Decrease infant and child mortality and morbidity

While infant and child mortality rates have been declining in Malawi over the past several decades, the 1991 levels of 137/1000 and 245/1000 are still unreasonably high. The rate of decline is slowing, due to serious malaria and AIDS in Malawi, as well as poverty, lack of female education and poor access to health services. The mission portfolio includes projects and programs which target these key determinants of infant and child health.

One concern is with the targets established for malaria and anemia. While indicators of reduced rates of outpatient visits and hospital deaths may show a declining prevalence of these afflictions, they do not indicate what interventions are being taken and how effective they are over time. The target is to decrease infant and child mortality caused by malaria, and therefore reduce malaria. Actions indicated would include education; environmental and

preventative measures; early treatment; and training of public health personnel. There should be measures of improvements in those areas. Based on programmatic interventions, projections of increased numbers of children receiving correct dosages of chloroquine or fansidar also need to be established.


#### Strategic Objective Five -- Control the Spread of AIDS

USAID support for AIDS control has as its goal to prevent new HIV infections, particularly among Malawi's youth. Although condom use seems to be increasing steadily (from 0% in 1984 to 9% in 1991), indications of adult HIV infection rates as high as 20% in urban areas and 8% in rural areas. The national HIV seroprevalence rate is now estimated at 9.6%.

The Government of Malawi has established a strong national AIDS control program, which USAID helps support, as well as universal AIDS education in schools, private sector marketing of condoms, and education outreach through the church community.

USAID's new STAFH Project will focus on AIDS prevention measures as well as family planning. It will also address the serious problems of STDs, which help to facilitate the spread of AIDS, focussing especially on high risk population groups.

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Program Logframe: Strategic objective No. 1--Increase Foodcrop Production and Productivity

Objective or Target	Indicators	Baseline a/	Actual		Projected	
		FY 1985	1990	1991	1992	1995
<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. 1</b>						
Increase Foodcrop Production and productivity	1. National average maize production per unit land increases (t/ha) <u>b/</u>	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.4
	2. Gross foodcrop production increases (million MT)	1.8	1.8	2.2	2.3	2.6
Sources: MOA estimates, annual						
<b>TARGET No. 1.1</b>						
Intensify Smallholder Production of Foodcrops	1. Maize production per unit of land increases (t/ha) <u>c/</u>	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.4
	2. Smallholder purchases of HYV maize seed increases ('000 MT)	1.6	3.5	4.9	5.6	7.8
	3. Smallholder purchase of fertilizer increases ('000 MT)	69	105	113	126	166
	4. Smallholder use of farm credit increases (MK million) --approx 10% real increase per year	16	25	25	30	33
	5. Smallholders adopting agroforestry increases	will begin monitoring in FY1992				
	6. % smallholder HYV maize/total maize area increases	8.4	12.0	14.0	16.4	23.6
Sources: (2) National Seed Company of Malawi; (3) Economic Report, various issues; others-MOA estimates, annual						
<b>TARGET No. 1.2</b>						
Reduce Discrepancies in Input and Output prices faced by Estates and Smallholders	1. Private sector/total sales of fertilizer increase (%) <u>d/</u>	42	33	35	38	47
	2. Private sector/total sales of HYV maize seed increase (%) <u>e/ f/</u>	12	18	11	N/A	N/A
	3. Direct smallholder sales of burley tobacco at Auction increase ('000 kg) <u>g/</u>	0	0	0	10	50
	4. % ADMARC price of Auction Floor Burley price increases (%)	N/A	N/A	14	62	65
Source: (1) Ministry of Trade and Industry, SFFRFM, (4) Not officially documented; others--MOA estimates, annual						
<b>TARGET No. 1.3</b>						
Increase Crop Diversification	1. % smallholder hectareage devoted to cash crop increases (10% per year)	7	6	7	8	10
	2. % smallholder cash crops sold through Non-parastatals increases	0 will begin monitoring in FY1992				
	3. % smallholder food crops sold through Non-parastatals increases	0 will begin monitoring in FY1992				
Sources: MOA estimates, annual						
<b>TARGET No. 1.4</b>						
Reform and Strengthen Agricultural Institutional Framework	1. Agricultural budget/GOM budget is maintained - Recurrent (%)	1988 4.5	4.2	4.6	4.6	4.6
	2. Agricultural Research budget increases in real terms - Recurrent (MK m)	4.0	4.4	4.4	4.7	6.0
	3. Fuel expenditures for Extension Services expand in real terms (5%/yr)(MK m)	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.5
	4. Increasingly open discussion of agricultural policies (number of interagency seminars)	will begin monitoring FY 1992				
Source: (1)-(3) Budget documents, various years						

- Notes: a/ Baseline is 1985 unless otherwise indicated  
b/ assumes subsidies are removed, maize prices increased, and targeted food subsidies to vulnerable groups are initiated  
c/ assumes fertilizer use increases annually -- to be monitored  
d/ as of 1987, all estates were allowed to import fertilizer directly for our own use (not for sale)  
e/ assume seed and fertilizer subsidies are gradually removed; also that non-ADMARC outlets are promoted and encouraged  
f/ This ratio has declined steadily since 1988. The Mission and GOM will be exploring the effect of HYV seed subsidies on seed sales. Projections will be made when the causes are better understood.  
g/ ASAP projects that private sector sales of smallholder cash crops increase by 10% by 1995 and 25% by 2000; by 1995, 5 smallholder owned cash crop marketing units will be operating, increasing to 50 such units by 2000. We assumed that each unit handles 10,000kgs.

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Program Logframe: Strategic Objective No. 2--Increase Off-farm Employment

Objective or Target	Indicators	Baseline	Actual		Projected	
		1985	1989	1990	1992	1995
Increase Off-farm Employment <u>a/</u>	1. Employment on estates increases (2% per year)	241,800	331,900		352,215	373,773
	2. Employment in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) increases		to be estimated by survey			
	3. Employment in medium and large enterprises (MLEs) increases	410,667	434,312		449,800	496,600
Sources: (1) Jaffee, Steven, et al, the "Migrant Smallholder", April, 1991. All others from Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues.						

TARGET No. 2.1	
Expand Employment in SMEs	1. Number of SMEs increases (of which female-owned) will report following upcoming survey
	2. Sales of SMEs increase
	3. Average employment per SME increases
	4. Average wage for SME employees increases

Sources: Periodic SME Survey

TARGET No. 2.2						
Expand Employment in MLEs	1. Number of MLEs increases		78,090		82,000	86,250
	2. Sales of MLEs increases (total value of output, '000MK)	37,562	NA		74,700	81,300
	3. Average real wage for MLE employees increases (MK/month)	62.3	48.7			
	4. Index General Industrial Production (1984 = 100)	100.0	112.0	127.7	121.1	131.7

Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues

TARGET NO. 2.3						
Expand Financial Market Resources and Availability to Private Sector	1. Domestic Savings/GDP increases (percent)	13.1	4.5	9.8	9.9	11.1
	2. Private/Public Sector domestic credit increases <u>b/</u>	0.6:1	1.1:1	2.3:1	2.5:1	2.7:1
	3. Gross Domestic Investment/GDP increases (percent)	18.5	21.2	18.2	19.0	19.5
	4. Private/Public Domestic fixed Investment increases <u>c/</u>	0.6:1	1.2:1	1:1	1.1:1	1.4:1
	5. Bank competition - weighted int rate spread decreases - % new lending to SMEs increases					will report following upcoming survey

Sources: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Reports and Accounts, 31st December 1990; Department of Economic Planning and Development, Economic Reports, various issues; NSO, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues; IBRD, Malawi: Policy Framework Paper, 1991/92 to 1993/94, August, 1991.

TARGET NO. 2.4						
Expand and Strengthen Business Support Services	1. No. of SMEs rec'ing business and technical advisory services expands (percent female owned)	NA	300	600	1200	2500
	2. For SMEs receiving BAS/TAS services, sales, employment, and/or average wages increase more rapidly than in SMEs not receiving services	NA	12	20	25	35
	3. Failure rate of SMEs receiving BAS/TAS services reduced	M&E system will be an integral part of upcoming SME support project				

Sources: (1) READI Project, Final Evaluation, August, 1991.

Notes: a/ Off-farm employment defined as off-(one's own) farm and includes other rural agricultural employment, e.g., working on estate, food processing and distribution, etc.

b/ Excluding statutory bodies

c/ Public domestic fixed investment includes investments by statutory bodies, private fixed investment excludes changes in stock

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Program Logframe: Strategic Objective No. 3--Reduce Fertility

Objective or Target	Indicators	Baseline	Actual		Projected
		1984	1990	1991	1995
<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. 3</b>					
Reduce fertility	Reduce total fertility rate	7.6	7.6		6.5
Sources: Actual estimates are based on NSO 1977 Population Census and NSO 1984 Family Formation Survey. Figures for 1995 are EP&D, PHRDU TARGET model projections. They represent program targets and therefore assume rapid fertility decline.					
<b>TARGET No. 3.1</b>					
Increase the contraceptive prevalence rate	Increase contraceptive prevalence rate	1	4-10 a/		19
Sources: 1984 Family Formation Survey, SOMARC baseline Survey Figures for 1995 are EP&D, PHRDU TARGET model projections. They represent program targets and therefore assume rapid fertility decline.					
<b>TARGET No. 3.2</b>					
Increase the supply of child spacing services	1. Increase total number of clients using modern methods of child spacing ('000)	3	35	58	318
	2. Increase no. of clients choosing voluntary surgical contraception	0		1,239	3300
	3. Increase no. health facilities providing child spacing services	3	171	210	300
Sources: (2) and (3) actual are based on Malawi Population Programme Review and Strategy Development Report, Oct. 1991. All others, EP&D, PHRDU TARGET model estimates.					
<b>TARGET No. 3.3</b>					
Increase girls' attainment of literacy and education	Girls as percent of all students enrolled in Standard 4 b/	1988/89	45		50
Sources: Calculated as total enrollment of girls ages 10-18+ divided by estimated population ages 10-19					

Notes: a/ The CPR has not been measured by a nationally representative survey since the 1984 Family Formation Survey. However, based on the 1991 SOMARC baseline KAP survey, we have reason to believe that the CPR is possibly as high as 10% in mid-1991.  
b/ The Mission will develop a better defined, measureable indicator of girl's attainment of basic literacy and education.

Other targets and indicators of family planning program effectiveness are under review for use by the national family planning program and inclusion in the USAID API. One such target is: Reduce high-risk pregnancies. Indicators include: 1) Percent of total births to women under the age of 20; 2) Percent of births to women of 7+ parity; 3) Percent of total births at intervals less than 24 months.

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Program Logframe: Strategic Objective No. 4--Decrease Infant and Child Morbidity and Mortality

Objective or Target	Indicators	Baseline 1984	Actual 1991	Projected 1995
<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. 4</b>				
Decrease infant and child morbidity and mortality a/	1. Reduce infant mortality rate (deaths per 1000)	151	137	128
	2. Reduce under-5 mortality rate (deaths per 1000)	258	245	235
Sources: Baseline is from the Family Formation Survey, 1984. No nationally representative survey of mortality has been done since 1984. Estimates provided for actual are based on MOH/AIDSTECH projections assuming an average between the best and worst case AIDS scenarios. By mid-1992, new survey-based figures will be available from the DHS. Targets are based on MOH/AIDSTECH projections and aim for the best-case AIDS scenario.				
<b>TARGET No. 4.1</b>				
Decrease infant and child mortality caused by malaria	1. Reduce rate of under-5 outpatient visits for malaria b/c/	1986 33	39	N/A
	2. Reduce rate of under-5 deaths in hospital caused by malaria d/	13	19	N/A
	3. Reduce rate of under-5 outpatient visits for anemia e/	N/A	N/A	N/A
	4. Reduce rate of under-5 deaths in hospital caused by anemia d/	12	13	N/A
	5. Proportion of children with diagnosed malaria who receive the correct dosage of the recommended anti-malarial	To be measured in baseline and periodic KAP surveys.		
Sources: (1-4) MOH Health Information System. The first line treatment of malaria is changing from chloroquine to fanzidar. It is therefore difficult to make projections about the future of malaria at this time.				
<b>TARGET No. 4.2</b>				
Increase access to safe water	Access to piped, potable water improves (percent of rural population)	39	41	55 g/
Source: Baseline USAID/Malawi; 1990 UNDP, Poverty in Malawi, Situation Analysis.				
<b>TARGET No. 4.3</b>				
Strengthen institutional capacity of public and	1. Health care budget/total GOM budget increases--recurrent f/	6.73	7.11	9.1
	2. National per capita health surveillance personnel increases		500/8.4mil (1:15,000)	4000/9.7mil (1:2425)
Sources: (1) Budget Statistics, various years; (2) MOH				

Notes: a/ Previous projections of infant mortality reported by USAID/Malawi suggested that the AIDS epidemic would actually cause an increase in infant mortality. In reviewing these projections, it was determined that too large a proportion of the projected deaths had been categorized as infant deaths rather than child deaths. In fact, most of the AIDS deaths will occur after the first birthday and have been recategorized as child deaths. The revised estimates shown here do project a reduction in infant mortality, albeit significantly slower than in the absence of AIDS.

b/ Ministry of Health/MIS, outpatient reporting rate is approximately 70%. Rates given relative to total under-5 outpatient visits.

c/ Outpatient malaria is based on presumptive diagnosis (i.e., not confirmed by laboratory visits).

d/ Ministry of Health/MIS, inpatient reporting rate is about 70%. Rates given relative to total under-5 deaths in-hospital.

e/ Anemia was only added to the outpatient reporting form this past year and data are not yet available.

f/ Consistent with trends in the Malawi Policy Framework Paper, 1991/92-1993/94, this ratio is expected to increase by 0.5% per annum.

g/ By August 1990, Malawi had 7450 drilled bore holes, 3500 protected hand-dug wells, and 55 rural piped water schemes. If all facilities were operational, 3.99 million people would be served. In fact, an estimated 3.09 million people have access to working safe water sources. The projection for 1995 includes all new schemes for the projection period and assumes that all existing schemes are made operational.

Program Logframe: Strategic Objective No. 5--Control the Spread of AIDS

Objective or Target	Indicators	Baseline 1985	Actual 1990/91	Predicted 1995
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. 5	1. Reduce HIV prevalence among urban antenatal clients (percent)	2	22	15
Control the spread of AIDS	2. Reduce HIV prevalence among rural antenatal clients (percent)		(survey pending)	
	3. Reduce HIV prevalence among high risk groups (percent)		62	40
Sources: (1) Urban antenatal women of all ages - JHU project; (2) AIDS Sc't/AIDSTECH, survey pending; (3) STD patients - Kristensen study at KCN. Preliminary targets prepared by AIDSTECH epidemiologist David Sokal, assuming incidence rates are cut roughly in half by control programs.				
TARGET No. 5.1				
Increase condom use	1. Increase percent of men using condoms	0	9	40
	2. Increase total number of condoms distributed and sold annually:			
	free distribution (millions)	0	6	13
	social marketing (millions)	0	N/A	2
Sources: (1) Weighted urban-rural average from SOMARC survey, and adjusted for assumption that lowest income men (who were excluded from the SOMARC survey) constitute 30% of population and are non-users of condoms. (2) Launching of USAID/SOMARC condom social marketing program occurred in August, 1991. Sales are reportedly going well, but at the time of the preparation of these targets, it was too early to reliably estimate sales for the remainder of the current year. A preliminary report indicated sales of approximately 50,000 condoms during the first week of sales.				
TARGET No. 5.2				
Reduce incidence/prevalence of classical STDs	1. Reduce percent of pregnant women infected with syphilis	N/A	11	7
	2. Percent male reported STDs in past 6 months	N/A	14	7
Sources: (1) JHU study of prenatal women in Blantyre. (2) SOMARC survey of "middle income" men, preliminary results. Calculated from crude percent with ulcers in past 6 months plus percent with burning and discharge in past 6 months minus an estimated overlap of 4.7% (absolute).				

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

USAID/S&T/Health and WHO/GPA have only this year begun defining indicators and targets for AIDS control programs. The indicators shown above are preliminary and will undoubtedly be changed and revised over the coming years as objectives and survey methods are refined. It is difficult to set targets at this time, because WHO/GPA has not yet made concrete recommendations for National AIDS Control Programs in this area. The few targets specified above are only meant to be illustrative, since the Malawi National AIDS Control Program has not yet set its own targets for these indicators. As the final targets and indicators are developed, many of them will include a specification of a particular age group - young adults aged 15 to 24 - who are generally at greatest risk of acquiring HIV infection or classical STDs, or who are just approaching the age of greatest risk.

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
FY 1991

MOZAMBIQUE

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**OVERVIEW OF THE  
ASSESSMENT FOR PROGRAM IMPACT  
FOR AFR/SA  
MOZAMBIQUE**

**Summary**

- Goal:** Ensure access for all Mozambicans at all times to sufficient food for a healthy and productive life - stability of food supply used as proxy indicator; availability in urban areas has improved but situation in rural areas remains subject to tremendous disparities. Access issue in urban areas shifting from issue of adequate supplies to one of adequate income + efficient marketing.
- Sub-Goal 1:** Meet the subsistence food and basic health requirements of the absolute poor - some improvement in family income and food security at upper levels of absolute poor but 30% of absolute poor (15% of total population) remains extremely vulnerable.
- Sub-Goal 2:** Increase food supplies through production and trade to levels that meet domestic consumption requirements - striking increase in food supplies through production and trade in urban areas but ration system completely inadequate and largely irrelevant as a food safety net for most vulnerable portion of the population.
- Strategic Objective 1:** Sustain an effective food safety net for the urban poor and those displaced and severely affected by war or natural disasters - ration system is wholly inadequate, developing private sector market is not sufficient, lack of income a major constraint. Rural areas: data constraint.
- Strategic Objective 2:** Reduce, among target population groups, dependence on external food aid to meet subsistence requirements - PVO project is major vehicle, analysis of first baseline data is not yet completed and not enough measurable progress is expected to be seen on a yearly basis to justify tracking annually. Problem too with comparability of the data.
- Strategic Objective 3:** Establish a policy environment conducive to private agricultural production and marketing - first indications of a changing environment are evident, although not universally for all policy issues or equally across all provinces. Impact of policy change: limited production and marketing responses though no reliable aggregate data on private sector share and level of agricultural production and marketing. Per district-level data, private agricultural marketing appears to be increasing. Also, some liberalization of prices and markets. Least visible, measurable change in area of improved land tenure security.
- Strategic Objective 4:** Increase the role of the market in allocating productive resources to private producers - considerable progress in restructuring, privatization, and divestiture of state agricultural enterprises. Also, continued expansion of the list of commodities eligible for foreign exchange allocation but shortage of foreign exchange serves as a constraint.
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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
FY 1991

SWAZILAND

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## Swaziland API Review

General Observations

Swaziland's API submission this year builds on last year's and shows considerable thought and effort on the part of mission staff. There are several observations which might be made, however, which could make next year's submission a solid and useful document.

-- The narrative portion of the API is quite strong and gives the reader a good feel for the Swazi socio-economic environment, as well as progress toward the strategic objectives.

-- The matrix, however, seems too narrow and focusses on inputs and outputs of USAID projects, and not enough on impact.

-- It is not clear from the matrix if Swazi data sources do not exist, or if they were incompletely utilized.

-- Again, reflecting on the matrix, one gets the impression that AID staff just parachuted into the country, are just getting programs on the ground, and that all the changes affecting the concerns of the strategic objectives will be determined by AID inputs alone.

-- The indicators and goals which have been established are totally quantitative, and there are no suggested qualitative measures of impact or change. In some cases, particularly for strategic objective one, the targets or benchmarks have yet to be determined.

-- The impact assessment matrix is highly project-driven, rather than development- or sector-driven. It doesn't reflect other possible factors which might influence projected change.

Reported Impact

-- It is estimated that contraceptive prevalence has increased from 17% to 22% since 1988, and the document discusses probable causes.

-- The proportion of Swazi managers in mid- to senior-level positions increased by 9 percent over the period 1982 - 1988, with AID programming capitalizing on and strengthening that trend.

-- For strategic objective three, USAID served as a catalyst for improved government support of business growth, and for increased dialogue between small and large businesses, as well as between businesses and the government.

-- In commercial agriculture, new marketing opportunities have been explored and linkages established between farmer-producers and marketing firms.

Observations by Strategic Objective

Strategic Objective One -- Increase the contraceptive prevalence rate from 17% to 30%

Based on a USAID-financed survey, the 1988 contraceptive prevalence rate in Swaziland was estimated at 17%. This figure was re-affirmed in a 1990 family health project evaluation. In FY93, the new FP/MCH program will finance a Demographic and Health Survey which will again assess any increase in contraceptive prevalence since 1988. The 30% contraceptive prevalence goal, by 1995, will be measured through a planned national survey.

The five targets established by the Mission which are expected to influence increased contraceptive prevalence are critical elements of USAID's population portfolio -- the Family Health Services Project, which is giving considerable support to the Family Life Association of Swaziland (FLAS); the new Family Planning/Maternal Child Health Program, which the Mission hopes to obligate this year; and such centrally-funded projects as SOMARC and DHS.

Except for the single baseline estimate of 60% of MOH clinics offering family planning in 1991, all other baseline figures are zero, or have yet to be established. My observation is that, particularly in the cases of a zero baseline, benchmarks throughout the six-year period, and goals for each target, need to be established. For instance, if in 1991 there were no CBD agents and the target is to increase their numbers by 1995, what increase is expected? Thirty in 1992, seventy-five in 1993, one hundred fifty by 1995? Numerical or in some cases qualitative goals need to be established now (why weren't these done last year?) in order to measure project/program impact over time. Measuring results through project evaluations or focus groups is not an impact assessment, but measuring inputs/outputs, from which we're trying to move away.

Strategic Objective 2 -- Increase the number of Swazis who effectively direct, manage and participate in national development.

This strategic objective is being addressed through the Mission's focus on basic education, academic and technical training, business education and economic development training. Clear goals and targets have been established, as well as a program/project strategy to influence these changes. The API notes, however, that they have been unable to identify any indicator of increased management effectiveness of Swazi incumbents that is measurable with available resources. Any ideas put there?

In terms of impact, in FY 92 the mission will have Swazi managers enrolled in 16 short-term training courses, 10 in long-term U.S. training and 120 participating in in-country training. Bachelor of Commerce graduates have increased from 45 in 1990 to 52 in 1992. Three hundred twenty students will have been trained in computer applications for business by the end of FY 92. (In target 2.3.5 --

increasing the number of qualified business faculty, the percentages should also be increasing over time - 60%, 70%, 80% and 100%, or else the indicator needs to be changed to "decreasing the number of unqualified business faculty".) Some thirty leaders will be trained in economic development in FY 92, up from zero in 1990, and eight requests will be received by community development for assistance with business-related activities.

Strategic Objective 3 -- Expand the Swazi-owned small business sector

This is being influenced by the Small Business Development and Commercial Agricultural Production and Marketing Projects. Most of the baselines are to be established in FY 92. Numerical or percentage targets have been established. One observation is that in the case of a country-wide study of small scale enterprises in 1991, gender-disaggregated data was collected, but the goals established are for totals and gender-disaggregated data collection has been dropped in out-years. We should encourage the mission to continue to collect gender-disaggregated data.

Very little impact is as yet being reported in the small business sector, particularly since most of the baseline figures will be determined in FY 92. It seems surprising that there is so little/no country data available, and the mission must rely on USAID project data collection mechanisms. Have all possible country sources been explored?

#### Recommendations

-- In addition to addressing some of the concerns in the observations section, the API should reflect the mission's mandate to collect gender-disaggregated data and to report on gender-specific impact.

# OBJECTIVE TREE OF USAID/SHAZILAND

NOVEMBER 7, 1991

COUNTRY  
PROGRAM  
GOAL

PROGRAM  
SUB-GOAL

STRATEGIC  
OBJECTIVES

TARGETS

TO EXPAND SWAZILAND'S  
ACCELERATING ECONOMIC  
GROWTH INTO A  
PROCESS OF EQUITABLE  
AND SUSTAINABLE  
DEVELOPMENT THAT  
ENHANCES THE QUALITY  
OF LIFE OF ALL SWAZIS

TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY  
-- Promote U.S. Investment  
-- HIV/AIDS Prevention

REDUCE THE  
POPULATION  
GROWTH RATE

INCREASE  
EMPLOYMENT  
GENERATED BY THE  
SMALL-OWNED  
AND/OR MANAGED  
SECTOR OF THE  
ECONOMY

INCREASE  
CONTRACEPTIVE  
PREVALENCE  
RATE

INCREASE THE  
NUMBER OF SWAZIS  
WHO EFFECTIVELY  
DIRECT, MANAGE  
AND PARTICIPATE  
IN NATIONAL  
DEVELOPMENT

EXPAND THE  
SMALL-OWNED  
OR MANAGED  
SMALL  
BUSINESS  
SECTOR

INCREASE FAMILY  
PLANNING SERVICES  
PROVIDED BY THE  
MINISTRY OF  
HEALTH

INCREASE  
COUNSELING  
AND TRAINING OF  
COUNSELORS  
OVER THE COUNTRY

INCREASE  
COMMUNITY-BASED  
DISTRIBUTION  
AND USE OF  
CONTRACEPTIVES

INCREASE FAMILY  
PLANNING SERVICES  
PROVIDED THROUGH  
INDUSTRIAL  
CLINICS

INCREASE  
KNOWLEDGE OF  
FAMILY PLANNING  
AMONG ADULTS  
AND YOUTH

TRADITIONAL  
AND COMMUNITY  
LEADERS MORE  
ACTIVELY  
PROMOTE  
DEVELOPMENT  
ACTIVITIES

IMPROVE  
THE QUALITY  
OF BASIC  
EDUCATION

IMPROVE THE  
EFFECTIVENESS OF  
SMALL BUSINESS  
AND SENIOR LEVEL  
MANAGERS

STRENGTHEN  
BUSINESS  
EDUCATION IN  
TERTIARY  
INSTITUTIONS

INCREASE  
ACCESS TO  
MARKETS

STRENGTHEN  
BUSINESS  
ASSOCIATIONS

INCREASE  
PRODUCT AND  
PRODUCTION  
CAPACITY

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6/11/9

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS	BASELINE (YR)	Planned and Actual					
			1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
<b>Strategic Objective 1</b>								
Increase contraceptive prevalence rate	1. Increase CP rate	17% (1988)	-	-	22%	-	-	30%
	Source: Population Survey							
	2. Increase Couple years of protection (CYP)	19700 (1990)	-	-	-	50%	-	-
	Source: MCH Information Systems (MIS); PLAS							
<b>Target 1.1</b>								
Increase family planning services provided by the Ministry of Health	1. Increase percentage of MCH clinics and outreach sites offering FP	Est. 60% MCH clinics in 1991 (To be revised by 12/91)				100% clinics		
		6% outreach				50% outreach		100% CR
	2. 100% of clinics and outreach sites using integrated FP/MCH protocols	6 with integrated protocols				25% clinics 60% CR		100% clinics 100% CR
	Source: Ministry MIS							
<b>Target 1.2</b>								
Increase commercial availability of contraceptives over the counter	1. Increase number of commercial outlets	0 (1991)				To be generated by SOMARC by 1/92		?
	Source: SOMARC project data							
<b>Target 1.3</b>								
Increase community-based distribution/sales of contraceptives	1. Increase number of CBO agents	0 (1991)				To be generated in project by end of FY 92		?
	Source: Ministry MIS							
<b>Target 1.4</b>								
Increase family planning services provided through industrial clinics	1. Increase CYP in 5 industrial clinics	To be est. 1/92			(baseline)	50% increase		
	Source: Ministry MIS, Project Data							
<b>Target 1.5</b>								
Increase knowledge of family planning among adults under 45 and students	1. Changes in knowledge re family planning and STDs, especially misconceptions.	Focus group assessment				Focus group assessment		
	Source: FBS Project reports							

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OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS	BASELINE (YR)	Planned and Actual						
			1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	
<b>Strategic Objective No. 2</b>									
Increase the number of Senais who effectively direct, manage and participate in national development.	1. Increased proportion of Senais in mid-senior management positions	1990 (65) CSO Nat'l workforce survey	65%	65-66	66-67	67-69	69-72	72-75	
	2. Increased number of children who complete 7 years of primary school on time.	160/1000 (1990)	160/1000	160/1000	baseline 160/1000	170/1000	180/1000	200/1000	
<b>Target 2.1</b>									
Improve the quality of basic education	1. Improved student achievement in grades 1-7 math and English measured by standardized tests.	N/A	N/A	N/A	Pilot test scores for grade 1	Nat'l baseline established for grade 1-2	10% improvement grades 1-2	10% improvement grades 1-5	
	2. Fewer children drop-out of primary school	46% (1990)	46%	46%	46%	42%	38%	36%	
<b>Target 2.2</b>									
Improve the effectiveness of Senai mid-senior managers	1. Increased percent of Senai managers who complete academic and technical training	N/A	N/A	10 Long term Fellows (degree training 6%)	10 STT (US/TC) 10 LTT US 120 In-C (PrAP)	0 STT (US/TC) 10 LTT (US) 120 In-C	0 STT (US/TC) 10 LLT 120 In-C improvement (estimate)	0 STT (US/TC) 0 LTT improvement (estimate)	
	2. Increased number of Bachelor of Commerce graduates	45 (1990)	45	52	52	52	60	129	
<b>Target 2.3</b>	3. Increased number of students studying BBT level (II) at SCOT	0	0	0	0	30	25	25	
	4. Number of students trained in computer applications for business	0	0	0	320	400	500	600	
	5. Increase number of qualified business faculty		40% unqualified	40%	30%	20%	0	0	
<b>Target 2.4</b>									
Traditional and community leaders more actively promote the economic development of their areas	1. Increased number of leaders trained in economic development	0	0	0	30	45	45	65	
	2. Increased number of requests received by CB for assistance with business related activities	0	0	0	0	0	10	10	

1. Growth during 1992-00 averaged 2% per year.

2. Mission has been unable to identify any indicator of increased mgt. effectiveness of Senai incumbents that is measurable with available resources.

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS	BASELINE (FY)	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Strategic Objective No. 3	1. Increase # of Semi-owned small businesses  Source: SSE study*	9110 Women-owned 4690 men-owned (1991)		13,000	14,200	16,000	15,000	15,500
Expand the Semi-owned small business sector	2. Increase in employees of small businesses (within firms)  Source: SSE Study	Ave. 2.72 (1991) (excluding owner)		2.72	2.70	2.80	2.93	3.00
*Defined as having at least one paid employe in addition to the owner and a fixed place of business	3. Increase in number of businesses having 5-50 employes with increased sales or assets  Source: SSE Study, SDD project	Est. 549-1000; to be refined during FY 92			(Refined Baseline)	58	158	258
	4. Increase in gross value of small farms fresh produce sales  Source: CAPD Project	Baseline to be estab in FY 92			82.50	83.00	84.00	
	5. Decrease in national fresh produce imports  Source: HADB Board	23,357 metric tons (1990)			22,002	21,202	20,502	
Target 3.1								
Increase service and production capacity	1. Increase in # of project-assisted businesses with new capital investment  Source: SDD project	To be generated by SDD project FY92-FY93			(Baseline)	58	158	258
	2. Increase in marketable yield per hectare for fresh produce  Source: Contractor	Est. 20 Tons/ha (1990) To be refined during FY 92			25 MT/ha	30 MT/ha	35 MT/ha	
Sub-target 3.1a								
Increase access to institutional credit	1. Increase in project assisted institutional loans extended (to business and farmers)  Source: SDD/CAPD, DUEP, UNAS, Central Bank	Baselines to be estab. in FY 92		303	353 SSEs 3 firms 15 farmers	403 SSEs 5 firms 24 farmers	453 SSEs 5 firms 33 farmers	503 SSEs

\* A country-wide study of Small Scale Enterprises in Ecuador by Jacob Sizauba and Michael A. McPherson, May 1991 (SSE Study)

PLANNED AND ACTUAL (CUMULATIVE)

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS	BASELINE (YR)	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05
<b>Sub-target 3.1B</b>								
Improve business management skills	1. Increase number of people trained			300	900	1,300	1,800	2,300
	Source: SDB, UNDP, SNAS, CAPM projects							
<b>Sub-target 3.1C</b>								
Accelerated irrigated on farm technology transfer	1. Increase in # of farmers adopting new technologies	0		5	65	100	135	
	2. Introduction of new horticultural crops	0			10	15	18	
	Source: CAPM project							
<b>Target 3.2</b>								
Strengthen business associations	1. Increase in paid membership (% of member paying dues)	To be estab. by SDB project FY02			(Baseline)	20%	40%	60%
	Source: SDB project							
<b>Sub-target 3.2A</b>								
Increase services provided by business associations	1. Increase in programs provided to members	To be estab. by SDB project FY02			(Baseline)	40	50	140
	Source: SDB project							
<b>Sub-target 3.2B</b>								
Increase business association initiation and participation in policy dialogue	1. Increase in forums for dialogue	0			0	1	2	3
	Source: SDB project							
<b>Target 3.3</b>								
Increase access to markets	1. Increase in # of regional markets supplied with fresh produce	2 (1991)		2	17	25	30	
	2. Increase in volume of fresh produce supplied by small farmers to domestic markets	Est. 225 MT (Baseline to be refined)			1,500 MT	2,300 MT	3,000 MT	
	Source: CAPM project							
	3. Increase in # of project assisted small businesses offering new	To be generated by SDB project FY02			(Baseline)	150	200	

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OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS	PLANNED AND ACTUAL (CUMULATIVE)						
		BASELINE (YR)	FT90	FT91	FT92	FT93	FT94	FT95
<b>Sub-target 3.3A</b>								
Increase provision of goods and services to large business and COS	1. Increase in # of small businesses with subcontracts to large businesses or the COS  Source: S89 project	To be generated by S89 project FT92				5	10	15
	2. Increase in # of small construction firms having a contract with the COS  Source: S89 project	To be generated by S89 project FT92			(Baseline)	3	6	10
<b>Sub-target 3.3B</b>								
Improve market information for fresh produce	1. Increase the # of farmers receiving market information signalling product quality, quantity and timeliness demand details  Source: CAPM project	0			70	100	135	
<b>Sub-target 3.3C</b>								
Improve marketing chain for fresh produce	1. Increase in the # of sustainable vertically integrated small-owned fresh produce marketing firms  Source: CAPM project	0		0	2	4	4	
<b>Sub-target 3.3D</b>								
Increase supply of fresh produce to specialty markets	1. Increase in sales to specialty/niche markets  Source: CAPM project	Baseline to be est. (March '92)			\$100,000	\$690,000	\$1 million	

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACTS  
FY 1991

III. CENTRAL OFFICE SUMMARIES

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

FY 1991

OFFICE OF ANALYSIS; RESEARCH AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

- AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
- ECONOMICS
- HEALTH AND POPULATION
- EDUCATION

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT  
FY 1991

AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

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# Agriculture and Natural Resources Sector

## API Report: Impact Week

### INTRODUCTION

AND

### BACKGROUND

**Introduction:**

**Purpose:** to present FARA's analysis and conclusions resulting from our synthesis of the information reported in the APIs.

- A. - performance of the sector overall : productivity and Food Sec
- B. - look in detail at the subsector level TDT, NRM, AMA
- C. - trends, Lessons Learned , What seems to be working what not
- D. API Process Itself:
  - at what level are missions reporting?
  - what indicators are being used?
  - what is not being reported?

**E. Next Steps****I. Background:****A. Difficulty in measuring impact in ANR Sector:**

- many intervening variables--rainfall- policy-
- long lag time between intervention and impact: TDT and NRMS
- lack of standard indicators such as IMRs and CPR and DHS

**B. Solution:**

Development of Frameworks for the Sector as a whole and for the subsectors which:

- establishes what leads to what
- necessary and sufficient conditions and suggests indicators particularly the use of intermediate impact indicators.

**SLIDE 1:**

Overall Framework: our conceptual view, organizes our AA and API

- links NRMS and AG
- links On farm-off farm
- interaction among targets absolutely key
- we have SFs and indicator frameworks for each target:

**SLIDE 2: INDICATOR FRAMEWORK**


- based on fields case studies
- intermediate indicators
- missions reporting at higher levels in APIs

**C. SLIDE 3: What are missions reporting**

- 15 APIs: Uganda, Madagascar, Guinea, Togo (MIS)

U\ARTSPUB\FARA\BRIEFS\API

# OBJECTIVE TREE: Agriculture and Natural Resource Sector



INDICATOR FRAMEWORK  
Assessment of Program Impact (API)

LEVEL 5 Impacts: Changes in Productivity, Production and Income

LEVEL 4 Impacts: Bio-physical change

LEVEL 3 Impacts: Changes in Utilization of Ag Technology, Efficiency of Markets, Management of Natural Resources and Environment

LEVEL 2 Impacts: Changes in output from support agencies (Tech Development & Transfer, Markets and Financing, NRMS)

LEVEL 1 Impacts: Changes in Human Resources, Institutional performance and Policy Environment in support of Agricultural sector

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# Africa Bureau Country Mission Agriculture and Natural Resource Subsector Targets

COUNTRY	NO. AO & NR	AO & NR	AGRICULTURE & NATURAL RESOURCE TARGETS DEALING WITH:		
	STRATEGIC	TARGETS	TECHNOLOGY DEV	NATURAL RESOURCE	AGRI BUSINESS &
	OBJECTIVES	(NO.)	& TRANSFER	MANAGEMENT	AGRI MARKETING
Burundi	1	4	1	1	2
Cameroon	2	9	4	0	5
Gambia	3	5	1	3	1
Ghana	1	3	0	0	3
Guinea-Bissau	1	3	1	1	1
Kenya	2	3	1	0	2
Lesotho	1	2	1	1	0
Malawi	1	4	2	0	1
Mali	1	3	1	1	0
Mozambique	3	4	0	0	2
Niger	2	6	2	1	1
Rwanda	1	3	1	1	0
Senegal	3	6	1	3	2
Swaziland	1	1	0	0	1
Tanzania	0	0	0	0	0
Uganda	1	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>21</b>

NB

Details taken from 1991 API Reports.

Uganda did not present any targets in the API report, for any strategic objective.

The total number of Agr and NR targets is 56. However, the summary by subsector does not equal 56 because there were several targets focussing on food security/relief.

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# Agriculture and Natural Resources Sector

## API Report: Impact Week

### Productivity and Food Security

**I. FOOD SECURITY/PRODUCTIVITY****SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS REGARDING AFRICA'S AGRICULTURAL SECTOR****(FIGURE 1 – PRODUCTIVITY PER AGRICULTURAL WORKER)**

- \* CURRENTLY, THERE ARE 2 PROXIES FOR TOTAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY:
  - \* VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT/HA (CONVENTIONAL)
  - \* VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT/WORKER (ALTERNATIVE BY TIMMER AND OTHERS)
  
- \* FOR PURPOSES OF THIS PRESENTATION, WE SHALL FOCUS ON VALUE OF OUTPUT PER WORKER WHICH IS MORE CLOSELY RELATED TO PEOPLE IMPACT. WE WILL BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES AFTERWARDS SHOULD YOU DESIRE.
  
- \* AS CAN BE SEEN IN THE OVERHEAD, THE DECADE FOLLOWING INDEPENDENCE SHOWED GROWTH (1.1% PER ANNUM) FOR THE PERIOD 1961--69. THIS MODEST GROWTH IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE EXPANSION OF TOTAL ACREAGE PLANTED (ESPECIALLY IN HIGH POTENTIAL AREAS) AND THE INCREASE IN ACREAGE PLANTED TO HIGHER-VALUED CROPS WITH EASEMENTS IN THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOLLOWING INDEPENDENCE.

\* DURING THE 1970S AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY FELL BY AN AVERAGE OF 0.35% PER YEAR. THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS NEGATIVE TREND INCLUDED:

- (1) A POLICY AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT WHICH CONSTRAINED PRODUCERS' ABILITY TO SHIFT RESOURCES TO MORE PRODUCTIVE OPPORTUNITIES;
- (2) THE SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN WORLD PRICES FOR AFRICAN EXPORTS (ESPECIALLY COFFEE AND COCOA);
- (3) THE SUCCESSIVE DROUGHTS OF THE DECADE; AND
- (4) THE RECESSION WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE OIL PRICE SHOCKS.

\* THE FIGURES SUGGEST THAT THIS NEGATIVE TREND BOTTOMED OUT IN 1978.

\* THE 1980S DEMONSTRATE GROWTH, BUT AN EXTREMELY LOW RATE OF APPROXIMATELY .25% PER ANNUM WHEN THE DROUGHT OF 1983-84 ARE INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSES, AND SOMEWHAT HIGHER WHEN THESE "OUTLIERS" ARE EXCLUDED.

\* GROWTH IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR DURING THE LATTER HALF OF THE 1980S IS ATTRIBUTED PRIMARILY TO AN INCREASE IN THE PRODUCTION OF NON-STAPLE FOOD COMMODITIES AND IS LARGELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO:


- (1) IMPROVED MARKETING PERFORMANCE (ESPECIALLY THE ALLEVIATION OF REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS);  
AND

- (2) TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION.

- \* THE DATA APPEARS CONSISTENT WITH THE STRATEGIES OF USAID/KENYA AND USAID/MALI, THAT SHORT-TERM PRODUCTIVITY GAINS ARE MOST DIRECTLY ACHIEVED THROUGH THE SHIFT TO HIGHER-VALUED CROPS, BUT THAT SUCH A SHIFT REQUIRES CONFIDENCE IN THE MARKET'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE FOOD COMMODITIES FOR THE PRODUCER'S OWN CONSUMPTION.
  
- \* WHILE THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IS GROWING, IT IS NOT GROWING FAST ENOUGH TO CONTRIBUTE TO BROAD-BASED ECONOMIC GROWTH (NB: THE WORLD BANK ESTIMATES THAT GIVEN THE STRUCTURE OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES AND POPULATION GROWTH, THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR NEEDS TO GROW BY 4.5% PER YEAR TO ACHIEVE BROAD-BASED ECONOMIC GROWTH.

# SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

## Value of Agricultural Production per Ag worker




Source: USDA/ERS, World Agricultural Trends and Indicators 1991

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# SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA



## SUMMARY OF APIS

### FIGURE 2 -- SUMMARY TABLE

#### A. PRODUCTIVITY

- \* A REVIEW OF THE APIS SHOWS THAT VIRTUALLY ALL MISSIONS ARE ADDRESSING PRODUCTION, PRODUCTIVITY, AND/OR INCOME. (THE ACCOMPANYING CHART IS FOR COUNTRIES THAT REPORT DATA ONLY)
- \* THE DATA GENERATED IS USEFUL FOR UPDATING THE WORLD BANK, FAO, AND USDA DATA SETS.
- \* WHEN WE EXAMINED THE DATA AND NARRATIVE, WE FOUND SEVERAL INTERESTING CASE STUDIES SUCH AS THE INCREASE IN EXPORTS IN BURUNDI OR MALI'S INCREASE IN GRAIN PRODUCTION.
- \* THE CURRENT REPORTS, HOWEVER, ARE NOT USEFUL FOR OUR EFFORTS TO SYSTEMATICALLY EXAMINE IMPACT FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS WHICH ARE DISCUSSED IN THE FINAL SECTION OF THIS PRESENTATION.

# African Bureau Mission FY '91 API Reports On Agricultural and Natural Resource Objectives and Targets

## LEVEL IV REPORTING - CHANGES IN PRODUCTIVITY, PRODUCTION AND INCOME IN THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR

Country	Objective or Target	Indicator	Unit	Baseline	88	89	90	91
<b>PRODUCTIVITY</b>								
Kenya	Increase Ag Productivity & Farm Income	Growth of Ag Sector Value Added	%	4.0	na	na	3.4	
Lesotho		Maize Yields	MT/HA	2.2 ('85-'89 mean)	na	na	2.15	
	Maintain Productivity of Mountain Rangeland Resources	Animal Weight Increases	% increases	na		10-22% higher		
		Value of Animals Increase	% increases			15-20% higher		
Malawi	Increase Food Crop Productivity Increase Ag Growth On Sustainable Basis	Maize Yields	MT/HA	1.2 ('85)	na	na	1.0	1.1
Niger		Sorghum Yields	kg/ha	306.6 ('85-'89 mean)	na	na	120	229
		Millet Yields	kg/ha	419.2 ('85-'89 mean)	na	na	241	423
		Onion Yields	kg/ha	22,849 ('85-'89 mean)	na	na	34,293	
<b>PRODUCTION</b>								
Burundi	Agr Production Increases	Coffee Exported	MT	31,883 (84-87 mean)	36,684	29,084	35,501	189
		Fruits, Veg and Plants Exported	MT	196 (1987)	167.3	384.5	385.4	
		Value of all Ag Exports	\$'000	\$77,122 (1987)	\$125,133	\$73,297	\$68,661	
		Value of Ag Exports (w/o coffee & tea)	\$'000	\$8,751 (1987)	\$5,960	\$7,331	\$6,751	
Gambia	Increased Agricultural Exports	Value of Ag Exports		78,810 ('85)	na	na	85,802	125,716
		Volume of Ag Exports (G'nuto)		33,221 ('85)	na	na	19,551	17,284
Guinea Bissau	Major Crop Production Increases	Volume of Ag Exports (other)		6,453	na	na	4,128	5,099
		Rice Production	MT	125.0 ('86)	145.5	161.4	159.6	118.3
Lesotho	Increase Production in Ag sub-sectors	Cashew Production	MT	7.0 ('86)	10.5	13.7	19.2	na
		Vegetable Production	MT	8,700 ('85)			13,800	9,200
Malawi	Increase Food Crop Production Increase Ag Production	Gross Food Crop Production	MT million	1.8 (85)	na	na	1.8	1.8
Mali		Grain Production	MT	1.5 ('81-'89 mean)	na	na	1.76	2.23
		Grain Production Increases Greater than Population Growth	% higher	'81-'89 mean	na	na	+17%	+26%
<b>INCOME</b>								
Burundi	Activity of Private Companies Increases	Value of SME Exports	\$	\$859,000 ('90)	na	na	\$859,000	na
Guinea Bissau		Ag Exports Increases	Value Added of SME Production	\$ million	\$75.0 ('90)	na	na	\$75.0
		Ag Products Exported	\$ million	\$7.3 ('86)	\$13.4	\$10.2	\$13.2	\$13.5
Kenya	Increase Nontraditional Export Earnings	Value of Cashew Exported	\$ million	\$5.2 ('86)	\$9.0	\$7.1	\$11.6	\$10.9
Mali		Non traditional export earnings	\$ million	\$449 ('90)				
	Increase incomes in Area of High Productive Potential	Value of Ag Production Increases	Index	100 ('88)		105	110	114
Niger		Value of Ag Exports increases	FCFA billions	60		76	91	105
	Increase Ag Growth on Sustainable Basis	Value of Wood on Managed Woodland	'000,000 CFA	3.5 ('89)	na	na	5.3	19.95

**B. FOOD SECURITY**

- \* REGARDING FOOD SECURITY, EVERY MISSION THAT IS ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURAL, HEALTH, NUTRITION ACTIVITIES IS CONTRIBUTING TO FOOD SECURITY.
- \* YET THE ONLY MISSIONS WHO ARE GENERATING RELEVANT INFORMATION ARE:
  - \* MOZAMBIQUE -- COMPLETE PACKAGE BUT NOT HOW THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR CONTRIBUTES TO FOOD SECURITY.
  - \* CAMEROON -- PRICE STABILITY AND CALORIC INTAKE
  - \* KENYA -- TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL PRICE STABILITY
  - \* MALI -- PRICE STABILITY
- \* WHILE INFORMATION ON AVAILABILITY IS READILY AVAILABLE, A MAJOR WEAKNESS IS THE LACK OF REPORTING ON ACCESS INFORMATION, I.E. PURCHASING POWER, HOME BUDGET ALLOCATION TO FOOD PURCHASES, ETC. WITHOUT SOME SYSTEMATIC REPORTING ON THESE VARIABLES, OUR ABILITY TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE WITH REGARD TO FOOD SECURITY IS LIMITED.
- \* SINCE FOOD SECURITY IS OUTSIDE THE MANAGEABLE INTERESTS OF THE MISSIONS THIS IS NOT SURPRISING. HOWEVER, THE LACK OF DATA ON CALORIC AVAILABILITY AND CALORIC CONSUMPTION AT A SUB-GOAL LEVEL LIMITS THE BUREAU'S ABILITY TO REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR INTERVENTIONS

# Agriculture and Natural Resources Sector

## API Report: Impact Week

### Technology Development and Utilization

## AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER

Investment In Technology Development and Transfer Activities In  
The Agricultural Sector Contribute To Increased Agricultural Productivity Through

*Increased Utilization of Higher Yielding and Sustainable  
Agricultural Technology*

### API ANALYSIS DISCUSSION POINTS

- \* What Are Missions Doing/Supporting In The Area Of Technology Development and Transfer?
- \* How Is Support For Technology Development Linked To Other Mission Initiatives?
- \* Is Support To National Research Systems Increasing the Productivity of Research?
- \* Is Agricultural Technology Being Developed?
- \* Is Agricultural Technology Being Used?
- \* Are There Changes In Productivity, Production and Income Due To Use of Technology?
- \* Are Mission Indicators Capturing Broad Based Use of Technology?

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**FY '91 API ANALYSIS  
AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER**

TDT Handout No. 2

**FINDINGS - What Are Missions Doing In The Area Of Technology Development**

*(Refer to TDT Handouts nos. 4 & 5 for details)*

Of the 16 Missions submitting an API Report, 11 (2/3's) of the Missions have a Target in the area of Agricultural Technology Development and Transfer.

In 8 Missions the TDT Target is part of, hence contributing to, a Strategic Objective for increasing growth in the agricultural sector through changes in production, productivity or incomes.

Based on Target Statements Of the 11 Missions with a TDT Target,

- \* 4 focus on developing/adapting/transferring technology
- \* 3 focus on institution building
- \* 4 have a dual focus on institutions and technology

Technology Development and Transfer Targets are linked with Targets in the following areas to increase Productivity:

- \* Marketing 9 of 11 Missions
- \* Policy 7 of 11 Missions
- \* Private Sector 7 of 11 Missions
- \* Natural Resource Management 5 of 11 Missions
- \* Export Promotion 4 of 11 Missions

**OBSERVATIONS**

Based on the findings above, it would appear that Missions view agricultural technology as an instrumental component to strategies for increasing agricultural growth.

With 7 of 11 Missions having a focus on institutions there would appear to be a real concern for (a) the capacity of the national systems to produce technology, and/or (b) the productivity of the national systems.

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## FY '91 API ANALYSIS AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER

TDT Handout No. 3

### LEVEL 5 FINDINGS - Changes In Production, Productivity And Income *(Refer to TDT Handout No. 10 for details)*

Notable broad based increases in production and productivity are taking place in cereal crop systems in Malawi and Mali. In Kenya cereal production appears to be stabilizing even in a year of poor rainfall such as 1991.

### LEVEL 3 FINDINGS - Utilization Of Agricultural Technology *(Refer to TDT Handouts No. 8, 9 & 11 for details)*

Technology with the broadest base use, according API Reports, is seed for cereal crops. Use of new bean varieties appears to also be increasing.

Little attention has been given to utilization of processing, mechanical or post harvest technology; or application of technology to non traditional export commodity systems.

Broad based use of technology is not being captured by many of the Missions. The strongest presentations of technology use in API reports include a range of indicators to cover: area, number of households or firms, amount sold, amount used, and/or cost of use.

### LEVEL 2 FINDINGS - Agricultural Technology Development And Release *(Refer to TDT Handout No. 7 for details)*

Six Missions reported progress in the production, adaptation and release of new agricultural technology in 1991. In total there were:

17 new Food Crop Technologies Released, i.e. maize, sorghum, beans.

28 new Food Crop Technologies were moved to Pre-release.

20 new Livestock Production Technologies were released.

12 new Natural Resource Management Practices were released over ten years.

Progress was noted in getting technology produced by International Agricultural Research Centers and adapted/released by NARS.

An increasing amount of technology is being jointly developed with farmer participation and adapted to farmer circumstances.

### LEVEL 1 FINDINGS - Productivity Of National Agricultural Research Systems *(Refer to TDT Handout No. 6 for details)*

None of the Missions reported on productivity of research systems in terms of the rates and efficiency of technology development. Progress was reported in increasing the number of trials conducted with farmers (including women farmers).

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AFRICA BUREAU  
 FY '91 API ANALYSIS

TDT Handout No. 4

MISSION AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER TARGETS

MISSION	TARGET	STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE APPLIED TO
<b>EAST AFRICA</b>		
Burundi	*Increase the Capacity of Agricultural Research to Produce Relevant Agricultural Technology	Increased Growth In Private Enterprise, Especially SMEs
Kenya	*Accelerate Technology Development and Transfer	Increase Agricultural Productivity and Incomes
Rwanda	*Produce and Extend Production Increasing Resource Conserving Technologies and Practices	Increase the Utilization of Production Increasing Resource Conserving Technologies
Uganda	*Not Specified in API	Not Specified in API
<b>SAHEL</b>		
Gambia	*Improve Export Crop Technology Adoption	Increase Agricultural Exports
Guinea Bissau	*Ensure Availability of Research/Technology Packages and Provide Appropriate Technical Packages and Infor	Enable The Agricultural Sector To Play a Pivotal Role In Promoting Economic Growth
Mali	*Increase Staple Grain Sector Productivity (Develop New Technologies and Reform The Research System)	Increase Incomes In Areas of High Productive Potential
Niger	*Build National Capacity to Diversify Crop Production and Improve Research/Extension /Farm Linkages	Increase Agricultural Growth on a Sustainable Basis
Senegal	*Increase The Use of Adapted Technologies	Increase Crop Productivity In Zones of Reliable Rainfall
<b>CENTRAL &amp; COASTAL WEST AFRICA</b>		
Cameroon	*Expand Analysis and Outreach Aimed At Ensuring The Value and Acceptability of New Technologies Under Actual Farming Conditions	Increase Efficiency With Which Public Services In Agric (Food) Research, Higher Education & Health are Provided
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>		
Lesotho	*Improve Responsiveness of Agricultural Institutions To Small Farmers Needs	Decrease Imports and Increase Production of High Value Crops
Malawi	*Reform and Strengthen Agricultural Institutional Framework	Increase Food Crop Production and Productivity

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 FY '91 API ANALYSIS

TDT Handout No. 5

TDT LINKAGES TO OTHER MISSION INITIATIVES

MISSION	OBJECTIVES WITH TDT ALSO INCLUDE TARGETS FOR:						
	Markets	Policy	Natural Resource Management	Private Sector Initiatives	Export Promotion	Financial Markets	University Training
<b>EAST AFRICA</b>							
Burundi	yes	-	-	yes	yes	-	-
Kenya	yes	yes	-	yes	yes	-	-
Rwanda	-	yes	-	-	-	-	-
<b>SAHEL</b>							
Guinea Bissau	yes	-	-	yes	-	-	-
Mali	-	yes	yes	yes	-	yes	-
Niger	yes	yes	yes	-	-	yes	-
Senegal	yes	yes	yes	yes	-	-	-
<b>CENTRAL AND COASTAL WEST AFRICA</b>							
Cameroon	yes	yes	yes	yes	-	yes	yes
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>							
Lesotho	yes	-	-	-	-	-	yes
Malawi	yes	yes	-	yes	yes	-	-

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AFRICA BUREAU  
 FY '91 API ANALYSIS

TDT Handout No. 6

PROGRESS IN INCREASING THE PRODUCTIVITY OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SYSTEMS

MISSION	REPORTED PROGRESS IN PERFORMANCE/PRODUCTIVITY OF RESEARCH SYSTEMS
Lesotho	Soil Analysis Services to Small Scale Farmers Increased Over Baseline Years of '83.
Rwanda	The Number of International Agricultural Research Centers Working On Rwanda Problems Increased.
Cameroon	The 1991 Cost Per Student Trained At the Agricultural College Decreased By 62% From The 1989 Costs.
Cameroon	In 1991 The Rate of Farm-Level Economic and Technical Analyses Increased With 31 being completed compared to 16 in 1990.
Cameroon	In 1991 Women Participation In On Farm Trials Increased, With 30% of The On Farm Trials Being Completed With Women Farmers Compared With 10% in 1990.
Cameroon	In 1991 There Was An Increase In Attention To The Biophysical Impacts Of Technology: 25% Of The Trials Completed Had Statements Regarding Implications For Natural Resource Management.

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FINDINGS

Of the 11 Missions with a TDT Target, none reported progress in affecting the productivity of the research system in terms of the past or present rates and efficiency of Technology Development, Adaptation and Verification.

Progress was made in increasing the services to small scale farmers, and in involving farmers in research in several countries.

Progress was made in developing linkages with the international research community and National Research Systems.

OBSERVATION

The Principal Output From Research Systems Is Technology That Can Be Applied To The Development Of A Production/Marketing Commodity System. *Indicators For Productivity of Research Systems of Particular Relevance Include The Rate and Efficiency of Technology Development, Adaptation and Verification.* And, Given The Importance That Missions Place On Institutional Change of NARS, Greater Attention Could Be Given To Impacts Made On Performance and Productivity of NARS.

PROGRESS IN PRODUCING AND RELEASING AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY

MISSION	REPORTED PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING, ADAPTING AND RELEASING TECHNOLOGY
<b>EAST AFRICA</b>	
Burundi	In 1991 There Was Improvement In Adaptation of Technology Packages To Farmer Circumstances (60% of Research, compared to 0 in 1985, was tailored to farmer needs).
Kenya	In 1991 Progress Was Made In the Development & Release Of SORGHUM AND MAIZE Varieties: 8 Maize and 3 Sorghum Varieties Were Released, which is an increase over '85-'89.
Rwanda	In 1991 6 new technical packages and 12 new bean technologies jointly developed by IARC and NARS were moved to advanced stages of testing/pre release.
<b>SAHEL</b>	
Mali	In 1991 Progress Was Made In IARC & NARS Joint Development and Release of 6 New Sorghum Varieties. Enough New Planting Material Was Produced To Plant 10% of The Cultivated Sorghum & Millet Area. Twelve New Natural Resource Management Technolgies Have Been Tested And Released Over 10 Years.
<b>CENTRAL &amp; COASTAL WEST AFRICA</b>	
Cameroon	In 1991 Progress Was Made In Moving 10 New Food Crop Varieties To Advanced Testing Stages, and Increased Retention Was Noted Among Trial Farmers Of The New Varieties.
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	
Lesotho	In 1991 There Was Progress In Developing and Releasing Livestock Production Packages: 20 New Packages Were Released.

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**FINDINGS**

- \* In 1991 six of the eleven Missions Submitting An API Report Noted Progress In The Production, Adaptation and Release of Agricultural Technology. In Total  
 17 New Food Crop Technologies Were Released – i.e. Maize, Sorghum and Beans; and  
 28 New Food Crop Technologies Were Moved To Advanced Testing and Pre Release; and  
 20 New Livestock Production Technologies/Packages Were Released.  
 12 Natural Resource Management Practices Released Over 10 Years.
- \* Progress Was Also Made In Getting Technologies Adapted To Farmer Circumstances.
- \* In 1991 Progress Was Made In Getting Technology Jointly Developed By IARCs & NARS Released.

**OBSERVATION**

*The Release Of Technologies Is An Important Indicator Of The Potential Opportunities Available In Agriculture To Affect Productivity, If Policy and Markets Are In Place To Take Advantage Of It. Greater Attention Is Needed To Monitor Technology Development And Release Over Time In The Missions With A Technology Development And Transfer Target.*

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PROGRESS IN THE UTILIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY

MISSION	REPORTED PROGRESS IN THE ADOPTION AND USE OF AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY
<b>EAST AFRICA</b>	
Burundi	In 1991 There Was An Increase of 2,500 Farmers Adopting New Technologies In Project Areas. These Include: cultural practices, agroforestry, soil conservation techniques, new varieties.
Kenya	In 1991 There Was Poor Rainfall In Kenya. In Spite Of This Progress Was Made In: HYV Maize Seed Sales Were 18,289 Tons In 1991 vs 18,516 Tons In The Baseline; Maize Area Under HYV Maize Was 56% vs 63% In The Baseline Year; Smallholder Area In HYV Maize As % Of Total HYV Maize Area Was 82% vs 80% In Baseline.
Kenya	The Number of Enterprises Engaged In Exporting Non-Traditional Products Increased (2,000 In '91 vs 1,513 In '90).
Rwanda	In 1991 There Were 18,000 Farmers Using New Bean Technology (The First Major Year of Adoption); and Fish Farming Techniques Were Adopted By Farmers (40% of them Women) In 7 Communes.
<b>SAHEL</b>	
Gambia	In 1991 Approx 28% Of The G'nut ( An Export Crop) Area Was Planted With "Treated" Seed.
Mali	In 35% Of Mali's Herds There Has Been A 55% Reduction In The Outbreak of Contagious Diseases Due to Increased Rates of Vaccination of Rinderpest: 58% were Vaccinated in 1991 Compared To 55% In 1989.
Mali	80% Of The Farm Families In The DHV Area Have Adopted At Least One Of The 12 New NRMs Technologies.
Niger	In 1991 Increases Were Reported In (a) The Area In Controlled Woodland Lots, and (b) The Agri Area With Improved Land Management Resulting From The Use Of New NRMs Practices.
<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA</b>	
Lesotho	In 1991 There Was A Drought In Lesotho. This Had A Major Impact On The Area Cultivated. In Spite Of This, There Were Increases In the Purchase of New Bean Seeds (80 Tons Sold In 1991 vs. 10.5 In '90); The Number Of Improved Home Gardens Increased By 18%; And, 141 Tons Of New Wheat Seed Was Sold Compared To 0 Sold In 1986.
Lesotho	In 1991 Progress Was Made In Improving The Condition Of Rangelands In 53% Of Areas Tested vs 0% In '83.
Malawi	In 1991 There Was Poor Rainfall In Malawi. In Spite of This, Progress Was Made In: Smallholder Purchases of HYV Maize Seed (4,900 Tons In '91 vs 3,500 Tons In '90); Smallholder Purchases of Fertilizer (113,000 Tons In '91 vs 105,000 Tons In '90); Smallholder Area In HYV Maize As % Of Total HYV Maize Area (14% In '91 vs 12% In '90); and % Of Smallholder Area In Cash Crops (Increased To 7%).

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## PROGRESS IN THE UTILIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY

### FINDINGS

Based On API Reports, Progress Has Been Made In The Utilization Of Agricultural Technology In Eight Countries. Three Missions With A TDT Target Did Not Report On Technology Utilization. One of Three Not Reporting, i.e. Senegal, Had Indicators But Did Not Have Data.

Of The Eight Missions Reporting On Utilization Of Agricultural Technology:

- 6 Missions Reported Progress In The Utilization Of Technology Affecting FOOD CROPS;
- 4 Missions Reported Increased Use Of Technologies Affecting SOIL FERTILITY OR SOIL CONSERVATION.
- 2 Missions Reported Increased Use Of Technologies Affecting LIVESTOCK Systems.
- 3 Missions Reported Changes In The Amount Of EXPORT Activities/Technologies.
- 1 Mission Reported Increases In The Use Of New FISH FARMING Practices.

The Technology For Which Utilization Was Reported, To A Large Extent, Focused On Production Technology. Much Less Attention Was Given To Other Types of Technology, e.g. Processing, Mechanical, Post Harvest Technology That May Effect Value Added and/or Production Aspects Of Production-Marketing Systems.

In Lesotho, Malawi and Kenya There Was Poor Rainfall In The Year Reported On Here. Nonetheless, The Use Of Technology Increased or Remained At Comparatively High Levels. This Suggests That Producers Have Confidence That The Technology Made Available Is Viable In The Variable Production Circumstances Of This Area.

### OBSERVATION

Utilization Of Agricultural Technology For Cereals Appears To Be Broad Based In Malawi, Kenya and Mali. Also, Progress Is Being Made With Bean Related Technology In The East African Highlands. It Should Be Noted That Where There Is Broad Based Use Of Food Technology, i.e. Cereal, There Are Reports Of Export or Cash Cropping Increasing.

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AFRICA BUREAU  
 FY '91 API ANALYSIS

TDT Handout No. 10

PROGRESS IN EFFECTING CHANGE IN PRODUCTIVITY, PRODUCTION AND INCOME  
 FROM USE OF TECHNOLOGY

The Use of Agricultural Technology Is A Necessary But Insufficient Condition To Achieve Sustainable Broad Based Increases In Agricultural Productivity. Policy, Efficient Markets and More Effective Management of Natural Resources Are Also Necessary. The Examples Below Are Presented As Indicative of Changes In Productivity, Production and Income Resulting From Initiatives That Technology Is Linked To.

MISSION	TECHNOLOGY USE CHANGES REPORTED	INDICATOR OF PRODUCTIVITY, PRODUCTION OR INCOME		
			'90	'91
Malawi	HYV Maize Seed Use Increases & Fertilizer Use Among Smallholders Increases. (see details in TDT Handout No.8)	Maize Yields Increase (metric tons/hectare)	1.0	1.1
		Gross Food Crop Production (Millions Metric Tons) Stabilizes Over Years With Poor Rainfall Such As '91.	1.8	1.8
		Smallholder Area In Cash Crops Increases (% of smallholder cultivated area)	6%	7%

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Mali	Use of Natural Resource Management Technology Increases In High Potential Zone, Use of Vaccines For Livestock Increases, and Use of New Varieties Of Cereal Crops Increases.	Grain Production Increases (Million Metric Tons)	1.76 ('81-'89) Mean	2.23
		Grain Production Increases More Rapidly Than Population Growth. (% growth in prod)	+17% Higher	+26% Higher
		Value of Agr Production (Index '88=100)	110	114
		Value of Agr Exports Increases (FCFA billion)	91	105

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**AFRICA BUREAU  
FY ' 91 API ANALYSIS**

**INDICATORS USED TO CAPTURE BROAD BASED USE OF TECHNOLOGY**

TDT Handout No. 11

Of particular concern here is whether missions are capturing broad based use of technology with the indicators they are using.

An example of Utilization indicators that effectively captures broad based use is Malawi which reported on amounts of seed purchased, area the seed is used on and use of complementary technology. Burundi and Lesotho are examples of a single indicator being used, which capture an important parameter of utilization, but it is not possible to conclude whether use of technology has been broad based.

MISSION	INDICATOR	UNIT	BASELINE	'90	'91
Malawi	Smallholder Purchases of HYV Seed	Metric Tons ('000)	1.6 ('85)	3.5	4.9
	Smallholder Purchases of Fertilizer	Metric Tons ('000)	69 ('85)	105	113
	Smallholder HYV Maize As Portion of Total Maize Area	%	8.4 ('85)	12	14
Burundi	Farmers Adopting in Project Area	number	0 ('85)	na	2,500
Lesotho	Pinto Bean Sales	Tons	0 ('84)	10.5	80.0

Broad based use of agricultural technology is reflected through a series of measures for:

- (a) area,
- (b) households, firms or farms affected,
- (c) amount of technology sold, transferred or exchanged,
- (d) amount of technology used, and
- (e) cost of use.

No single indicator of use is, at present, able to convey broad based use of technology.

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# Agriculture and Natural Resources Sector


## API Report: Impact Week

### Natural Resources Management

**NRM CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING API REPORTS**

- **NRM/DFA RESPONSIBILITY: ASSIST MISSIONS TO ACHIEVE PEOPLE-LEVEL IMPACTS THAT ARE**
  - o **SUSTAINABLE**
  - o **BROAD BASED**
  
- **ARE INDICATORS IN API REPORTS SUFFICIENT TO MAKE INFORMED INFERENCES AS TO WHETHER IMPACTS ARE SUSTAINABLE AND BROAD BASED?**
  
- **ARE INDICATORS SUFFICIENT TO CAPTURE LESSONS LEARNED AS PER API GUIDANCE?**

# NRM ORGANIZING FRAMEWORK



API REVIEWS: SUMMARY OF UPPER-LEVEL INTERMEDIATE AND  
IMPACT-LEVEL NRM INDICATORS FROM SELECTED MISSIONS

**NIGER:** INCREASES IN REVENUES FROM COMMUNITY-LEVEL NATURAL FOREST MANAGEMENT [NFM] CONCURRENT TO DECLINING ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

PRODUCER-LEVEL CHANGES	1982	1986	1991
COMMUNITY-LEVEL NFM			
-AREA [HA] -- INTERMEDIATE	0	1,500	32,250
-REVENUE [\$] -- IMPACT	0	12,500	75,000

**MALI:** INCREASES IN REVENUE AND ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION IN THE OHV ZONE

PRODUCER LEVEL CHANGES	1979	1991
DIFFUSION OF IMPROVED PRACTICES [INTERMEDIATE]	-THE OHV ZONE CHARACTERIZED BY SUBSISTENT, NON-DIVERSIFIED FARMING SYSTEMS	-8,000 OUT OF 10,000 PRODUCERS IN ZONE USE AT LEAST ONE INTRODUCED TECHNOLOGY *

**LESOTHO:** STATE OF RANGELAND IMPROVED IN FACE OF SERIOUS DROUGHT [DUE TO DROUGHT, YIELDS OF MAIZE AND SORHGUM ARE 55% AND 25% OF NORMAL]

PRODUCER-LEVEL CHANGES	'85/'86	'90/'91	INTERMEDIATE IMPACTS
-PERCENT RANGELAND UNDER MANAGEMENT PLAN	0	6%	COMPOSITE RANGE SCORE INCREASED FROM 88 IN '83 TO 161 IN '90

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USING REPORTED AND \*UNREPORTED LOWER-LEVEL INTERMEDIATE INDICATORS TO ASSESS SUSTAINABLE AND BROAD-BASED IMPACTS

THE NIGER CASE#

PRODUCER-LEVEL CHANGES	1982	1986	1991
COMMUNITY-LEVEL NFM			
-AREA [HA] [INTERMEDIATE]	0	1,500	33,250
-REVENUE [\$] [IMPACT]	0	12,500	75,000
<b>1. AT GUESSELBODI, THE ORIGINAL SITE, VILLAGERS HARVESTING UNDER A SUSTAINED-YIELD MANAGEMENT PLAN ('85)</b>	<b>BASELINE</b>	<b>CURRENT</b>	
-FUELWOOD*	0	68	
-HAY*	0	128	
<b>2. MANAGEMENT COSTS FOR GUESSELBODI FOREST*</b>	PAID BY USAID PROJECT	WOODCUTTER'S ASSOCIATION	
<b>3. FISCAL POLICY FAVORING MARKETING OF WOOD FROM MANAGED LAND INITIATED*</b>	NO	YES	
<b>4. GREATER INVOLVEMENT BY SELF-MANAGED COOPERATIVES IN NRM-BASED ENTERPRISES (1988)</b>			
-NO. OF CO-OPS CAPABLE OF MAKING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ('82)	0	102	
-AMOUNT OF PRIVATE SECTOR LOANS	\$678,000	\$1,704,000	
-NO. OF COOPS INCREASED	70	121	
-NO. OF LOANS INCREASED	88	254	
-LOAN REPAYMENT RATE [%]	95+	96+	
<b>5. GENERAL DECREE PROVIDING GREATER LOCAL AUTHORITY OVER COMMUNITY WOODLAND MANAGEMENT PLANS (1988)</b>	NO	YES	
<b>6. NFM TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS AVAILABLE (1985)*</b>	NO	YES	
<b>7. OTHER DONORS SUPPORTING NFM SITES (1987)*</b>	NO	YES	
<b>8. NATIONAL-LEVEL DEBATE OVER COMMUNITY-LEVEL AUTHORITY TO MANAGE WOODLANDS (1987)</b>	NO	YES	

# SELECTION OF ABOVE INDICATORS BASED ON ANALYTICAL WORK THAT ESTABLISHED PLAUSIBLE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN IMPACT AND INTERMEDIATE INDICATORS; THEY ARE SPECIFIC TO NIGER AND MAY OR MAY NOT BE APPLICABLE ELSEWHERE

Balance of Payments Deficit  
(unweighted averages, % of GDP)

	1980-84	1985-87	1988-90
Concentration Countries	9.3	5.9	4.5
All Other Countries (excluding Nigeria)	7.1	6.9	5.7
Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding Nigeria)	8.3	6.4	5.0

#### IV. DEBT

The external debt burden remains a drag on development. Debt service payments in 1989 equalled \$8.8 billion. This represents approximately 60% of official development assistance. Confidence in African economies is weak at best among potential investors. Long-term private lending continued to decline throughout the eighties from a high of \$4.6 billion to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding Nigeria) in 1980 to only \$2.2 billion in 1989. In contrast to private lending, net official development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa (excluding Nigeria) has steadily increased from \$7.4 billion in 1980 to \$13.5 billion in 1989, but it cannot replace private capital in reinvigorating economic activity and sustained growth in Africa.

As a result of more vigorous export growth, debt relief and improving economic management, the concentration countries perform better in servicing their debt than do all other countries. Actual debt service payments equalled 23% of export value in 1989 as compared with an ex-ante debt service to export ratio of 40%. This contrasts with actual payments of 20% of export value in all other countries and an ex-ante debt service to export ratio of 51%. The concentration countries cannot yet meet all of their debt servicing requirements without debt relief and rescheduling, but they are now able to meet well over half of their payments (23/40) while all other countries are struggling to make 40% of their debt service (20/51).

Nonetheless, debt service remains a burden for poor African economies. The debt burden continues to grow as deferred interest payments are capitalized. The concentration countries had an average debt to GDP ratio of 1.05 in 1989. This is better than the 1.19 ratio for all other countries, but is still a high level of indebtedness by any measure. To further reduce the debt burden, the U.S. has agreed that the Paris Club may adopt the so-called Trinidad terms for debt reduction and rescheduling proposed by the U.K. These terms would eliminate up to \$46 billion of the currently outstanding \$176 billion in sub-Saharan African debt.

## V. INVESTMENT

Investment declined as a proportion of total economic activity through 1985-87, but has begun to increase again in 1988-90. Data on private investment are incomplete, but they point to a "wait and see" attitude on the part of many African and foreign investors. In part, African governments must demonstrate their commitment to the liberal market policies they have recently put in place before investors will perceive a sufficiently stable economic environment. Also, many investors are waiting to see how the political upheavals of transition to multi-party democracies will affect the security of investment. Whatever the reasons, investment is recovering only slowly. The economic recovery of recent years is real but still fragile. Future growth will depend on the reactions of small and large investors to the changing political and economic environment.

### Gross Domestic Investment (unweighted averages, % of GDP)

	1980-84	1985-87	1988-90
Concentration Countries	19.0	18.5	20.1
All Other Countries	23.5	19.4	18.9
40 African Countries	21.1	19.0	19.5

Gross domestic investment increased among concentration countries in the most recent period, but continued to decline among all other countries. Since growth rates of GDP were significantly higher among concentration countries, it appears that the efficiency of investment was greater than it has been in all other countries.

## VI. FISCAL POLICY

Average fiscal deficits of the concentration countries are lower than the fiscal deficits of other African countries. Excluding Cameroon, an oil exporter and coffee and cocoa producer which has gone from a strong surplus position during the oil and commodity market boom to a steep recession-induced deficit, the concentration countries have reduced their average fiscal deficits from 5.5% of GDP in 1983 to 5.0% of GDP in 1990. In general, however, fiscal deficits are not greatly different from the earlier period. They are lower than the worst deficits attained in 1981 and 1982, but they have crept back up from the smallest deficits achieved in 1984 and 1985. African governments must further reduce their fiscal deficits if they are to achieve a stable economic environment.

Government Budget Deficit  
(unweighted averages, % of GDP)

	1983	1990
Concentration Countries (excluding Cameroon)	5.2 (5.5)	5.0 (5.0)
All Other Countries	6.7	7.3
Sub-Saharan Africa	5.9	6.1

Growth of Gross Domestic Product  
(median values, % per year)

	1980-84	1985-87	1988-90
Concentration Countries	1.7	2.8	4.5
All Other Countries	1.8	2.6	1.6
40 African Countries	1.7	2.8	3.6

Comparison of median values of GDP growth rates shows that half of the concentration countries grew at acceptable rates in 1988-90 whereas the median growth rate for all other countries failed to increase. The median growth rate for the 40 African countries in the sample have increased from the low rate which caused per capita incomes to fall in the early part of the decade to a rate which will slowly bring about improvements in average living standards in this decade.

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

FY 1991

HEALTH AND POPULATION

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API Strategic Objectives and Targets in the HHR Sectors

Country	Number of HHR Strategic Obj.'s	No. of HHR Targets	No. of Targets dealing with:				
			Child Survival	Family Planning	AIDS	Basic Ed.	Training
Botswana	1	2	0	0	0	2	0
Burundi	1	4	3	1	0	0	0
Cameroon	1	2	.5	.5	0	0	1
Gambia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ghana	2	7	0	1	0	6	0
Guinea	2	5	0	3	0	2	0
Guinea-Bissau	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Kenya	1	2	0	2	0	0	0
Lesotho	2	5	1	0	0	4	0
Malawi	3	8	3	2	2	1	0
Mali	1	2	.5	.5	0	1	0
Mozambique	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Niger	1	3	2	1	0	0	0
Rwanda	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
Senegal	1	2	0	2	0	0	0
Swaziland	2	11	0	5	0	1	5
Tanzania	2	5	0	2	0	0	3
Togo	1	6	5	1	0	0	0
Uganda	2	6	1	1	4	0	0
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>10</b>

HHR S.O. & Target Summary by Geographic Region

Eastern(5)	7(5)	18(5)	4(2)	7(5)	4(1)	0(0)	3(1)
Southern(5)	8(4)	27(5)	5(3)	7(2)	2(1)	8(4)	5(1)
Sahel & West(5)	3(3)	8(4)	2.5(2)	3.5(3)	0(0)	1(1)	1(1)
Coast & Cent(4)	6(4)	20(4)	5.5(2)	5.5(4)	0(0)	8(2)	1(1)
<b>TOTAL (19):</b>	<b>24(16)</b>	<b>73(18)</b>	<b>17(9)</b>	<b>23(14)</b>	<b>6(2)</b>	<b>17(7)</b>	<b>10(4)</b>

(#) = number of countries reporting

Agency for International Development  
Washington, D.C. 20523

MEMORANDUM

February 13, 1992

TO: Jerry Wolgin, AFR/ARTS

THROUGH: Cameron Bonner, ~~AFR/ARTS/HHR~~

FROM: Hope <sup>HK</sup>Sukin, Laurie <sup>U</sup>Ackerman, AFR/ARTS/HHR

SUBJECT: Review of Logframes and Indicators Related to Child Survival and Health in the FY 1991 APIs

OVERALL TRENDS AND FINDINGS

IMPACT

Seven out of ten countries monitoring infant mortality reported substantial declines in the infant mortality rate (IMR) during the 1980s. This decline in all countries was attributed to the increase in vaccination coverage. However several countries including Uganda, Burundi, Malawi and Kenya expressed serious concern about the impact of AIDS on child survival gains. Kenya stated that the IMR decline, seen in the 1980s, is leveling off and that a rise is expected in the 1990s. In addition to AIDS, the resurgence of malaria as a major contributor to infant and child mortality in countries like Malawi and a decrease in donor support for EPI as already noted by Burundi may contribute to a rise in infant and under-five mortality rates in many countries in Africa during the 1990s.

Some Missions are reporting on the decreased incidence of vaccine preventable diseases. This is a major step forward in assessing the real impact of EPI programs. In Lesotho, measles morbidity dropped from nearly 7,400/100,000 in 1985 to 400/100,000 in 1990. Measles incidence in Burundi declined from 881/100,000 in 1985 to 330/100,000 in 1990.

One of Malawi's targets is decreasing infant and child mortality caused by malaria. The Mission reports that the rate of under-five deaths in hospitals caused by malaria has actually increased from 13% in 1986 to 19% in 1991. At the same time malaria hospital admissions have increased 189% during the last eight years. (The population increased 28% during this period). The Mission's strategy is to raise the profile of malaria as a critical health problem through policy dialogue, to increase human and financial resources to this problem, to bring in U.S. expert technical assistance and help Malawi build systems and institutions that will identify, implement and evaluate a malaria

control program "which will have measurable impact on mortality and morbidity levels as quickly as possible. This information is presented to show that the Mission's focus and level of effort may indeed justify such an ambitious target and identified indicators.

### PERFORMANCE

#### Vaccination Coverage

Many countries reported on continuing increases in vaccination coverage. Niger reports an increase in measles vaccine coverage from 15% in 1989 to 37% in 1991. In Mali, the percent of fully immunized children under one year of age (the correct statement of the indicator) increased from 5% in 1987 to 41% in 1991. In Cameroon, measles vaccine coverage doubled from 15% in 1990 to 37% in 1991. Although UNICEF has called the global immunization effort a success in terms of a majority of countries reaching 80% coverage, it should be noted that most Africa Bureau Child Survival emphasis countries have not reached even 50% coverage.

Again this year the one word of caution that must accompany even the substantial improvements in coverage is sustainability. All programs that are tracking vaccination coverage should be reviewing donor and host country funding levels for EPI. Burundi reports that "access to immunizations was reduced as financial assistance from key donors was reduced". There is worry among the international community that donor funding for EPI may not be keeping up with increased costs, particularly for vaccines. Since vaccines can only be purchased with foreign exchange, most African countries will be hard pressed at this time to replace donor funding. New initiatives are being planned which will assist countries use local currencies to purchase vaccines through a special in-country revolving fund.

Burundi and Malawi have also reported on the percent of reproductive age women vaccinated with two doses of Tetanus toxoid (TT). Mali reported that in 1990, the government liberalized it's TT vaccine policy to include all reproductive-age women rather than only pregnant women. In 1991, 11.4% of all reproductive-age women had received two doses of TT vaccine. Yet, with a global goal of neonatal tetanus elimination by 1995, a great deal of work remains to be done in Africa.

#### Oral Rehydration Therapy (ORT)

As the second component of A.I.D.'s original twin engine child survival strategy, several countries, including Togo, Uganda and Lesotho, can now report on multiple years of ORT program implementation. In Lesotho the percent of child diarrhea cases treated with oral rehydration salts or homemade sugar-salt

solution at home and in the health centers increased from 42% in 1987 to 69% in 1990. In Togo the percentage of mothers using ORS for diarrhea treatment increased from 0% in 1983 to 30% in 1991.

### Malaria

Several Mission Child Survival programs, including those of Burundi, Togo and Malawi are now focusing on malaria treatment. In Togo the percent of children 0-4 years receiving standard treatment rose from 10% in 1983 to 76% in 1990. Malawi will also be reporting on a standard treatment indicator in their next API.

### PROGRESS (Systems Targets)

Many Missions including Malawi, Togo, Niger and Mali report on progress in the areas of strengthening the institutional capacity of Ministries of Health and their clinic infrastructure to deliver effective, efficient, quality and sustainable health care services.

Niger reports on the number of primary health care facilities offering a full range of maternal and child health services (including family planning) that increased from 114 in 1989 to 144 in 1991. Mali reports that the number of village pharmacies fully stocked with essential drugs and contraceptives increased from 0 in 1990 to 5 in 1991 and the number of private practitioners increased from 9 clinics (Bamako) in 1990 to 20 clinics (Bamako) in 1991. Cameroon will be reporting in 1992 on the increase in revenues generated by community financed health centers. As these programs develop, the indicators should shift from progress to others that are more oriented towards performance. For example, beyond clinics being fully staffed and equipped Missions might track population access or services delivered.

### COMMENTS ON INDICATORS

#### Impact

#### Infant and Child Mortality

Missions with child survival programs should be reporting both on infant (under-one) and child (under-five) mortality rates, since many child survival interventions administered in the child's first year of life actually impact on morbidity and mortality of the child in the second and third years of life.

The Demographic and Health Surveys provide Missions an excellent tool for assessing infant and child mortality. Some Missions identified other methods to assess infant and child mortality rates as part of local surveys and surveillance systems that they were using to track changes in between DHSs. The

collective experience with these methods should be reviewed by A.I.D./W, documented and shared with other Missions.

### Reduction in Vaccine-Preventable Diseases

In all countries with EPI programs, data should be collected on disease incidence. CDC and others have developed and tested low-cost methodologies to assess disease incidence. ACSI-CCCD countries are implementing these methods and reporting on disease incidence. A cable should go to the field advising Missions of the existing methodologies, costs and technical assistance available. With CCCD phasing out of countries such as Togo, Burundi, and Swaziland, Missions need to be vigilant that health information systems will continue to provide basic coverage data.

### Reduction in Deaths due to Diarrhea

The Burundi Mission indicates that they will measure reduction in deaths due to diarrhea -- the highest order impact indicator for a diarrheal diseases control program. For this indicator, CDC recommends a facility based data collection system which would track and measure trends. DHS also has a verbal autopsy module which asks mothers to cite the illness her child had previous to his/her death.

### Performance

#### Vaccination Coverage

Vaccination coverage should by now be a standard reporting indicator and Child Survival programs must report on vaccination coverage to the Agency's Health Information system. However it is unclear in several APIs if the Mission is describing the standard reporting: under one population. This needs to be clarified.

#### ORT

Most Missions are reporting at the performance level, e.g., Togo reports that 30% mothers report the use of ORT for diarrhea treatment -- up from 20% in 1990. Percentage of diarrhea cases treated correctly with ORT at the home or facility is considered a good performance indicator. However, Missions should separate this indicator into two: reports of effective use at the home and reports of effective use at the facilities. Mothers bringing children with diarrhea to the health facility should always be asked about what they have done at home.

#### Malaria

Several Missions report on effective treatment of malaria. This is an appropriate indicator. This information is obtained through observation and/or record review.

## Progress

### Health Systems Strengthening

As was the case last year, these are the weakest indicators. Missions are reporting on a wide range of indicators from the staffing of a Ministry of Health planning directorate to the number of clinic consultations by type of service. Missions need to think more about what are the expected outcomes of their systems-strengthening activities and improve their target statements. If clinics are being fully staffed to provide effective malaria, ORT treatment and family planning services, effective treatment of these diseases and family planning services should be stated as targets and reported on. Progress indicators may be the appropriate ones at the start of a new program, but Missions should indicate that they will be assessing impact at the performance level in out years.

### STRUCTURE

The API frameworks presented varied considerably.

- \* Togo presented a straight-forward one with sustainable broad-based economic growth as its goal and reduction of infant mortality as a strategic objective. Six targets followed which reflected the objectives of individual components of their child survival/health program. Performance indicators ranged from effective treatment of diarrhea disease, mothers reporting on ORT use to Ministry of Health statistical reports being published on time.
- \* In Niger the goal was focused on increases in food self-reliance and increased rural income. The sub-goal focused on structural adjustment. One of the strategic objectives is to increase coverage and quality of health care delivery systems. Infant mortality is used as the indicator to measure impact of the strategic objective. Three targets consist of developing Ministry of Health sustainable cost recovery and containment policies and readjusting resource allocations to health service delivery; improving health service delivery in a range of services, eg. malaria, diarrheal diseases control, and increasing family planning services. The indicators selected to assess the targets combined both process, number of centers, with performance indicators such as vaccination coverage. The Niger reflected a investment-in-systems approach that many Missions are taking.

Missions, with assistance from AID/W, must define these systems indicators better.

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CHILD SURVIVAL IN THE AFRICA BUREAU  
FY 1991 APIS

**TRENDS AND PERFORMANCE**


- \* Infant mortality declines are reported in most countries, but gains are threatened by AIDS, resurgent malaria and donor fatigue in immunization. Kenya advises that, "...infant and young child mortality rates are levelling off and likely to rise in the next several years".
  
- \* Substantial progress has been made in immunization, both in terms of increasing coverage and disease reduction; but, the Africa region is still far from the universal goal of 80% coverage. Program sustainability is a major concern.
  
- \* Control of Diarrheal Diseases (CDD) programs have turned out to be more complex to implement and slower to show impact than originally anticipated. However, several Missions do report impact on increasing the effective treatment of diarrhea disease by mothers and health workers. We should expect some Missions to report on reduction of diarrheal-related mortality in FY 1992/93.
  
- \* As promoted in the DFA action plan, the APIs indicate that child survival has gone beyond the "twin engines" of immunization and oral rehydration therapy. Based on a better understanding of the causes of infant and child mortality in many African countries, Missions are now addressing other major and sometimes more important contributors to mortality, including malaria. (See Table 2)
  
- \* Integration of child survival with family planning and HIV/AIDS control is becoming common and missions are turning their focus to "systems development" as a means for achieving sustainable impact. This welcome development is creating new challenges in child survival measurement, tracking, attribution and focus.
  
- \* Several countries that reported on child survival in their FY 1990 APIs, are no longer reporting on child survival. In some instances, this is commensurate with program changes and decreases in child survival funding (e.g., Senegal). In a few cases (e.g., Swaziland) it appears that the Mission is still working in child survival but no longer reporting on it.

FY 1991 Assessment of Program Impact  
Africa Bureau Child Survival Reporting

COUNTRY	IMMUNIZATION	ORT	MALARIA CONTROL	WATER AND SANITATION	SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
Burundi	x	x	x		
Cameroon	x				x
Lesotho	x	x			
Malawi			x	x	x
Mali	x				x
Mozambique	x	x		x	
Niger	x				x
Togo	x	x	x		x
Uganda		x			
TOTAL	7	5	3	2	5

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# PREVENTING CHILDHOOD DISEASES: DPT 3 Vaccination Coverage Rates, Countries With A.I.D. Health Assistance



SOURCES: The primary sources of data are WHO, DHS, CDC and A.I.D. Missions.


CIHI/ISTI, 5/91

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9-11

# PREVENTING DEATHS DUE TO DEHYDRATION

## Regional ORT Use Rates: Countries Receiving A.I.D. Assistance



SOURCES: The primary sources of data are WHO, DHS and A.I.D. Missions.

CIHI/ISTI, 1/92

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# LESOTHO

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS	BASELINE No. (YR)	FY 90	ACTUAL FY 91
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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3

Improve health and productivity of population

TARGET 3.1

Decrease childhood morbidity

A. Childhood morbidity due to measles

7362 (1985)

1378 (1989)

415 (1990)

B. Paediatric admissions at National Hospital

338 (1984)

72 (1989)

79 (1990)

Source: Ministry of Health (MOH)

SUB-TARGET 3.1.1

Increase vaccination coverage for children

A. Percent of children 12-23 months, vaccinated with BCG, DPT, Polio and Measles

49% (1984)

61% (1988)

69% (1990)

Source: MOH

SUB-TARGET 3.1.2.

Increase appropriate treatment of childhood diarrhoea

A. Percent of childhood diarrhoea cases treated at home or in health centers with ORS/SSS

42% (1987)

69% (1990)

Not yet available

Source: MOH

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1987

OBJECTIVES	INDICATORS	Baseline # (Yr)	Planned and Actual (1)						
			FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993	FY 1994	FY 1995	
Strategic Objective No. 3									
Increase the Coverage and Quality of the Health Care Delivery System	1. Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)= # of infant deaths/1000 live births  Source: GON Analysis of 1988 Census	(1989) 160-200		160-200					
Target No. 3.A									
Develop GON/MOH Sustainable Cost Recovery and Containment Policies and Readjust Resource Allocations to Health Service Delivery	1. Number of primary health care facilities implementing a cost recovery system	0 (1989)	0	0	15	15	55	225	
	2. Number of primary health care facilities with staff fully trained and equipped to implement standard treatment protocols	0 (1990)	0	0	15	55	125	225	
	3. Annual number of consultations MOH/PHC facilities (000's)	(1990)							
	a) curative b) pre-natal c) well baby	5376 227 373	5376 227 373	5560 235 385	5840 260 425	6130 285 470	6435 315 515	6755 345 570	
	Source: MOH Health Info System								
Target No. 3.B									
Improve Health Service Delivery in Nutrition Education, Malaria Treatment and Prevention, Immunization, Blindness Prevention, and Increase Population Reached by Child Survival Interventions	1. Number of PHC facilities offering a full range of MHC services, including Family Planning	114(1989)	125	144	160	200	240	300	
	2. Percent of children fully vaccinated	16(1989)	16	17	25	45	60	75	
	Source: MOH Health Info System								
Target No. 3.C									
Increase Family Planning Service Delivery at Sustainable Rates	1. Increase in use of modern contraceptive methods (couple-years of protection)	(1989) 12,500- 13,500	28,000	33,000	45,000	64,000	85,000	120,000	
	Source: MOH Health Info System								

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## MORTALITY REDUCTION

<b>Strategic Objective:</b> Reduce infant and child mortality	<b>Indicators:</b> Decreased IMR and CMR	<b>Data Collection Methods</b> - Surveys
<b>Target:</b> Reduced incidence of vaccine-preventable and other diseases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Measles cases/100,000 children</li> <li>- Incidence of lameness from polio</li> <li>- Hospital admissions/facility visits for malaria</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Routine reports</li> <li>- Surveys</li> <li>- Sentinel Surveillance</li> </ul>
<b>Sub-target:</b> Increased Vaccination coverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Percent infants fully vaccinated</li> <li>- Percent women rcvd 2 doses TT</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Routine reports</li> <li>- Surveys</li> </ul>
<b>Target:</b> Increase effective treatment of malaria, diarrheal disease and other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Percent cases of under-five malaria/diarrhea treated according to standard protocol</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Record review</li> <li>- Observation</li> </ul>
<b>Target:</b> Improved community (family) practices for children's health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Percent families/mothers using ORT to treat children with diarrhea</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interviews</li> <li>- Surveys</li> </ul>
<b>Target:</b> Increase the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of health care services.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased preventive health care visits to health facilities</li> <li>- Percent of health care expenditures covered Internally</li> <li>- Percent of population with access to health care facilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Record review</li> </ul>
<b>Sub-Target:</b> Increased resources allocated to (preventive) health care	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ratio of first line health workers to population</li> <li>- Increase in budget line item allocated to (preventive) health</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Record review</li> </ul>
<b>Sub-Target:</b> Increased cost recovery generated through health care delivery system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Amount of revenue generated through health care system</li> <li>- Percent of expenditures paid for with recovered funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Record review</li> </ul>
<b>Sub-Target:</b> Increased flow of information in health care decision making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Percent of facilities submitting required reports in a timely manner</li> <li>- Time between data collection and reporting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Routine reports</li> <li>- Observation</li> </ul>

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COMBINED

<b>Strategic Objective:</b> Increase health care services coverage, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability	<b>Indicators:</b> - Increased preventive health care visits to health facilities - Percent of population with access to modern health care services - Percent of health care expenditures covered locally	<b>Data Collection Methods</b> - Record review
<b>Target:</b> Increased resources allocated to (preventive) health care	- Ratio of first line health workers to population - Increase in budget allocated to (preventive) health	- Record review
<b>Target:</b> Increased cost recovery generated through health care delivery system	- Amount of revenue generated through health care system - Percent of expenditures paid for with recovered funds	- Record review
<b>Target:</b> Increased flow of information in health care decision making	- Percent of facilities submitting required reports in a timely manner - Time between data collection and reporting	- Routine reports - Observation
<b>Target:</b> Decreased infant and child mortality	- Decreased IMR - Decreased CMR	- Surveys
<b>Sub-Target:</b> Reduced incidence of vaccine-preventable and other diseases	- Measles cases/100,000 children - Incidence of lameness from polio - Health facility visits/admissions for malaria	- Routine reports - Surveys - Sentinel Surveillance
<b>Sub-Sub-target:</b> Increased Vaccination coverage	- Percent infants fully vaccinated - Percent women rcvd 2 doses TT	- Routine reports - Surveys
<b>Sub-Target:</b> Increase effective treatment of malaria, diarrheal disease and other	- Percent cases of under-five malaria/diarrhea treated according to standard protocol	- Record review - Observation
<b>Sub-Target:</b> Improved community (family) practices for children's health	- Percent families/mothers using ORT to treat children with diarrhea	- Health facility interviews - Surveys

## IMPROVING SERVICES

<b>Strategic Objective:</b> Reduce infant and child mortality through improvements in health care services coverage, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability	<b>Indicators:</b>  Decreased IMR and Decreased CMR	<b>Data Collection Methods</b>  - Surveys
<b>Target:</b> Reduced incidence of vaccine-preventable and other diseases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Measles cases/100,000 children</li> <li>- Incidence of lameness from polio</li> <li>- Hospital admissions/facility visits for malaria</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Routine reports</li> <li>- Surveys</li> <li>- Sentinel Surveillance</li> </ul>
<b>Sub-target:</b> Increased Vaccination coverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Percent infants fully vaccinated</li> <li>- Percent women rcvd 2 doses TT</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Routine reports</li> <li>- Surveys</li> </ul>
<b>Target:</b> Increase effective treatment of malaria, diarrheal disease and other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Percent cases of under-five malaria/diarrhea treated according to standard protocol</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Record review</li> <li>- Observation</li> </ul>
<b>Target:</b> Improved community (family) practices with respect to children's health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Percent families/mothers using ORT to treat children with diarrhea</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Health facility Interviews</li> <li>- Surveys</li> </ul>
<b>Target:</b> Increased resources allocated to (preventive) health care	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ratio of first line health workers to population</li> <li>- Increase in budget allocated to (preventive) health</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Record review</li> </ul>
<b>Target:</b> Increased cost recovery generated through health care delivery system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Amount of revenue generated through health care system</li> <li>- Percent of expenditures paid for with recovered funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Record review</li> </ul>
<b>Target:</b> Increased flow of information in health care decision making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Percent of facilities submitting required reports in a timely manner</li> <li>- Time between data collection and reporting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Routine reports</li> <li>- Observation</li> </ul>

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## CHILD SURVIVAL DATA FROM APIS

## VACCINE PREVENTABLE DISEASE REDUCTION

COUNTRY	INDICATOR	BASE YEAR	CURRENT YEAR
Burundi	Measles incidence per 100,00 children	881 (1985)	330 (1990)
Lesotho		7,400 (1985)	400 (1990)

## VACCINE COVERAGE RATES

COUNTRY	INDICATOR	BASE YEAR	CURRENT YEAR

## ORT USE RATES

COUNTRY	INDICATOR	BASE YEAR	CURRENT YEAR
Lesotho	Mothers using ORT for children with diarrhea	42% (1987)	60% (1990)
Togo	Mothers using ORT for children with diarrhea	0% (1983)	30% (1991)
Uganda			

## EFFECTIVE MALARIA TREATMENT

COUNTRY	INDICATOR	BASE YEAR	CURRENT YEAR
Burundi			
Togo	Children 0-4 years receiving standard malaria treatment	10% (1983)	76% (1990)

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## CHILD SURVIVAL

## BACKGROUND FOR API PRESENTATION

COUNTRIES	UNDER-5 MORTALITY (1)	APIS	CHILD SURVIVAL REPORTING	FY91 FUNDING '000		
				CS	HLTH	AIDS
Botswana	85			32		21
Burundi*	182	X	X	46	114	23
Cameroon*	146	X	X	688	215	710
Chad*	214			470	330	
Gambia*	271	X		60		
Ghana	137	X		535		1,338
Guinea*	240					
Guinea B*	246	X				
Kenya	106	X		786	261	
Lesotho	127	X	X			
Madagascar*	174					
Malawi*	251	X	X	1,346	1,647	
Mali*	281	X	X	5,404	2,357	
Mozambique*	230	X	X	12,571	7,811	
Niger*	219	X	X	1,933	804	
Rwanda*	196	X				
Senegal*	213			286	858	
Swaziland*	164	X			350	
Togo*	144	X	X	2,994	647	188
Tanzania*	166					
Uganda*	161	X	X	2,000	3,450	9,600
Zambia	120					

(1) All countries in bold type exceed an under-five mortality rate of 120.

\* All countries with \* are on UNICEF's very high U5MR, State of the World's Children, 1992.

MEMORANDUM

7 February 1992

TO: Jerry Wolgin, AFR/ARTS  
THRU: Ron Bonner, AFR/ARTS/HHR  
FROM: William Lyerly, AFR/ARTS/HHR

SUBJECT: Review of Logframes and Indicators Related to HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control in the FY 91 APIs

### Summary

Conclusions based on a review of APIs from Missions having a major focus on HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control are presented below. Only two USAID Missions, Uganda and Malawi, had included HIV/AIDS prevention and control as Strategic Objectives in their Country Program Strategic Plans (CPSP). Therefore, this review compares/contrasts the Uganda and Malawi APIs for HIV/AIDS prevention and control and presents an overview of the current state-of-the-art in assessing program impact in HIV/AIDS prevention and control.

### Background

Utilizing a combination of Agency AIDS Prevention and Control, Development Fund for Africa, Health and Population resources, as well as local counterpart funds, A.I.D. has funded AIDS Prevention and Control activities in 38 African countries since FY88. As the Africa Bureau has gained experience in HIV/AIDS prevention and control, the following activities have evolved to become key elements: monitoring the HIV/AIDS problem; increasing government and public awareness of the problem; assisting African countries with the development and implementation of AIDS prevention programs; and conducting applied research aimed at improving preventive measures.

FY 91 APIs that focussed on HIV/AIDS prevention and control were received from two USAIDs -- Uganda and Malawi. Although Uganda and Malawi had major HIV/AIDS programs in FY91, numerous other Missions in Africa had conducted large-scale HIV/AIDS programs but had not established specific targets for assessing HIV/AIDS program impact. This illustrates an important deficiency in the current API program in that the impact of many of our Mission's HIV/AIDS prevention and control activities are not being assessed by the API process because HIV/AIDS activities in those countries are implemented as important "targets of opportunity" and not as "Strategic Objectives." If the current API process cannot accommodate an expansion of scope which will collect and evaluate impact assessments from all USAID-funded HIV/AIDS activities in the Africa region, then perhaps a coordinated, complementary assessment

process should be established to capture additional country assessments of impact and "success stories," utilizing the REDSO-based Regional HIV/AIDS Advisors.

### Impact and Trends

Congressman Burton stated during a recent Hearing of the African Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs that "AIDS will be the major political and health issue of the 1990's in Africa." HIV/AIDS threatens to halt or reverse the social and economic gains (including child survival and human resource development) made in many African countries. Enormous drains on the health care systems are only the tip of the iceberg. AIDS kills people in their most productive years. This affects the trained labor force of a country, making investment in education unproductive as the young and educated become infected. Per-capita incomes could eventually decline in the most severely affected countries. Families are disrupted, children become orphaned, and the aged are left without support.

AIDS is already the leading cause of death in some urban centers of Africa. In many African cities, current HIV-infection levels could cause a doubling or tripling of the total adult mortality rate and a 50 percent increase in the child mortality rate during the 1990's. HIV is spreading to rural areas and may become the leading cause of death among all young and middle-aged African adults by the end of the decade. As HIV infection levels continue to increase rapidly throughout Africa, infection rates of 25-30 percent of urban-dwelling adults currently are not uncommon in many African capital cities. Rural adult infection rates are already at or exceeding 10-15 percent in several countries.

Given the already observed and projected impact of HIV/AIDS in their respective countries, the Uganda and Malawi Missions recognize that HIV/AIDS is a "major factor to be reckoned with in considering the long-term prospects for growth". Therefore, both Missions have developed excellent HIV/AIDS prevention and control programs in a relatively short period of time in an attempt to counter the growing HIV/AIDS threat in their countries. However, both Missions also recognize that measuring the impact of their HIV/AIDS prevention and control programs is extremely problematic.

Two of the major reasons for this difficulty in assessing HIV/AIDS program impact are the nature of the disease itself and our preventive approach (in the absence of an effect drug or vaccine for use in Africa). Even if the transmission of HIV in Uganda and Malawi was stopped completely in 1991, the number of newly developing AIDS cases would not decrease for at least ten years due to the long incubation period of the virus. The major challenge of our HIV/AIDS prevention programs is that during the "latent" years, while individuals are infected with HIV but have yet to develop clinical manifestations of disease (AIDS), those people are not identifiable or detectable, other than by HIV

surveillance testing, but are potentially infectious to others.

It is for the above-stated reasons that most attempts, thus far, to evaluate the effectiveness of our HIV/AIDS programs have focussed on process indicators (such as the number of condoms used or distributed or number of people trained) rather than outcome indicators. The Uganda and Malawi Missions, however, are to be commended for developing their API program in such a way as to benefit from newly emerging results of HIV/AIDS indicator studies which are discussed later in the "Impact Indicators" section.

#### Logframe Linkages

HIV/AIDS will remain a major problem in Africa for the foreseeable future, probably of crisis proportions in some affected areas. Political leadership and governments in most of Africa now recognize the dimensions of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and its growing adverse impact on development, and are beginning to organize efforts toward prevention and control. Increasingly, bilaterally supported programs in maternal/child and reproductive health and family planning play a critical role in mobilizing local efforts and resources for HIV/AIDS prevention and control.

Although both the Uganda and Malawi programs include child survival and family planning activities, as well as HIV/AIDS prevention and control, there were no explicit linkages between child survival, family planning and HIV/AIDS developed in the logframe. However, in the narrative sections of both country's APIs, those linkages were discussed in detail.

#### Selected Country-Specific Examples

The HIV/AIDS-related Strategic Objective (Number 3) in Uganda is "Improved coverage and quality of AIDS prevention programs." The Uganda API states that "the most dramatic impact of AIDS prevention efforts to date has been a tremendously increased awareness of the causes of AIDS transmission among the entire Ugandan population," which surveys consistently show rates (even among school children) of 90 percent or more. However, the Mission acknowledges that it has not yet been documented that awareness has led to the kinds of behavior changes which will lead to a measurable decrease in HIV transmission.

A unique HIV/AIDS intervention, developed under USAID/Uganda funding, is the AIDS Information Center (AIC). The AIC, which began full operations in February 1990, is the first major HIV counselling and testing program in Africa and is now being replicated elsewhere in the world. AIC data suggests that combining HIV testing with intensive counselling and on-going group support may affect sexual behavior in a way which would slow HIV transmission. Current data shows that during initial client contact, more than 40 percent of men and women seeking HIV testing

indicated that they had multiple sexual partners. However, in a group of 102 individuals who initially tested HIV-negative who sought repeat testing after 6 months, less than 20 percent noted that they had continued to have multiple sexual partners in the interim. As the Mission states, "while this may be a highly-motivated and self-selected group, nevertheless it may indicate the effectiveness of this intensive combination of HIV testing, counselling, and on-going support groups."

USAID Malawi's HIV/AIDS-related Strategic Objective (Number 5) is "Control the Spread of AIDS". The goal, however, is "to prevent new HIV infections, particularly among the nation's youth." According to the API, "Recent evidence of an increase in condom use offers the first glimmer of hope that there has been some progress towards attainment of this goal." Extrapolating results from an April 1991 SOMARC survey, approximately 9% of men may be using condoms as compared to nil use in 1985. The Malawi API also argues that a dramatic increase in general knowledge of AIDS (from negligible levels in 1984 to virtually universal knowledge in 1990/91) illustrates program achievement. An additional target (Number 5.2) to "reduce incidence/prevalence of classical STDs" as a proxy for HIV was established, but the measurements of 1990/91 will serve as the baseline for future comparison. In 1990/91, the percent of pregnant women infected with syphilis was 11 percent and the percent of males reporting STDs within the past 6 months was 14 percent. This state-of-the-art approach to impact measurement is further discussed in the "Impact Indicators" section.

Although the Malawi API additionally tracks HIV/AIDS indicators such as reducing the HIV prevalence among urban antenatal clients, among rural antenatal clients, and among high risk groups, baseline percentages have just been measured in two of the three sentinel groups (i.e., 22 percent HIV prevalence among urban antenatal clients and 62 percent among high risk groups). This form of sentinel surveillance will allow changes in the incidence of "seropositivity" to be observed over time. However, relatively major resource investments are required to maintain the surveillance "infrastructure" over time.

The impact of an important HIV/AIDS intervention, policy dialogue/policy reform, was described in both the Uganda and Malawi APIs but no attempt was made to quantify its impact. The Uganda Mission stated that the Government response to HIV/AIDS, with USAID support, has included the formation of a new multisector AIDS Commission to coordinate the efforts of public and private sector implementors and donors, the expansion of public education programs, and private sector marketing of condoms. However, the Mission further states that Government ambivalence toward aggressive promotion of family planning and AIDS condom messages, due to pressure from the clergy, has caused some confusion in program implementation. This example illustrates the importance of policy reform as an HIV/AIDS intervention for which it is very difficult to develop a direct measure of people-level-impact.

One implementation issue raised in both countries was that logistical problems have constrained the availability of condoms and HIV test kits due to the exponential rise in demand for these commodities.

Both USAID Missions indicated that they were very closely following the HIV/AIDS impact indicator development activities discussed in the following section, and that they are intending to modify their API programs to reflect the latest recommendations for HIV/AIDS impact assessment from A.I.D./W.

### Impact Indicators

Although USAID is on the "leading edge" of the international effort to develop appropriate indicators for assessing the impact of HIV/AIDS prevention and control activities, much more research and validation must be completed before appropriate, implementable indicators are developed and fielded for assessing people-level-impact. In our first efforts to attempt to evaluate the efficacy of HIV/AIDS control programs, a set of standardized country level indicators has been proposed. These proposed program indicators have evolved from an ongoing effort of collaboration between USAID, AIDSCOM, AIDSTECH, CDC, and the WHO/GPA (See Attachment). The proposed country level indicators are:

1. **Knowledge of Preventive Practices** (The percentage of the population aged 15-24 who can cite at least two effective ways to protect themselves from HIV infection)
2. **Sexual Behavior** (The number of sexual partners reported during the previous month)
3. **Condom availability** (Using a national audit of condoms distributed/sold)
4. **Condom use** (Number of times condoms used in the previous month)
5. **STD clinical management** (Percent of clinical facilities providing diagnosis and treatment in accordance with national guidelines)
6. **STD prevalence/incidence** (The percentage of men reporting penile discharge, burning on urination or a genital sore in the previous 6 months. The percentage of women attending antenatal clinics with a positive syphilis test)
7. **HIV prevalence** (Among women attending antenatal clinics)

To determine the validity and practicality of using these proposed indicators, field testing was performed in Jamaica with the cooperation of the Ministry of Health and the USAID Mission.

Results of this field test are still being assessed. It is anticipated that a similar field validation exercise will be conducted in Africa in the near future. However, there are no current R&D/Health plans to fund an African field test of the proposed indicators. Therefore AFR/ARTS is exploring possible opportunities to duplicate the Jamaica study in an African country or countries to validate the appropriateness and practicality of the proposed indicators for use in an African context.

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COUNTRY LEVEL HIV/AIDS  
PREVENTION PROGRAM IMPACT  
INDICATORS

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM THE  
JAMAICAN FIELD TESTING  
EXPERIENCE

22 November 1991

INTRODUCTION:

In order to evaluate the efficacy of AIDS control programs, a set of standardized country level indicators has been proposed. These are:

1. Knowledge of Preventive Practices (The percentage of the population aged 15-24 who can cite at least two effective ways to protect themselves from HIV infection)
2. Sexual Behavior (The number of sexual partners during the previous month)
3. Condom availability (Using a national audit of condoms distributed/sold)
4. Condom use (Number of times condoms used in the previous month)
5. STD clinical management (Percent of clinical facilities providing diagnosis and treatment in accordance with national guidelines)
6. STD prevalence/incidence (The percentage of men reporting penile discharge, burning on urination or a genital sore in the previous 6 months. The percentage of women attending antenatal clinics with a positive syphilis test)
7. HIV Prevalence (Among women attending antenatal clinics)

To determine the validity and practicality of using these proposed indicators, field testing was performed in Jamaica with the cooperation of the Ministry of Health and the USAID mission. Results of this field test are still being assessed but preliminary findings were recently presented at the AIDS Prevention Conference in Rosslyn, Virginia. This report will briefly summarize some of the issues that arose while conducting the field testing. Comments and recommendations are also presented. It should be stressed that these are only initial findings and further field testing and refinement of the indicators will take place over the next six months.

RESULTS:

In order to measure the seven indicators, four different survey methodologies were used.

A. Sentinel Serosurveillance.Method:

HIV and syphilis seroprevalence were determined for women aged 15-24 years attending antenatal clinics in urban and rural areas.

Problems/Comments:

This was performed with relative ease compared to the three other surveys. There had been considerable discussion as to which diseases to monitor and the most appropriate diagnostic tests. If syphilis is used as the indicator disease for STD's, should VDRL/RPR testing be utilized and then confirmed with MHATP/TPHA tests? Other possible STD's that could be used instead of syphilis include chlamydia, HSV-2, etc. However, the diagnostic tests for these diseases are generally not available in LDC's.

In countries of low prevalence, testing specific populations who engage in " high risk " activities rather than Antenatal Clinic attenders should be considered, e.g. STD or TB patients.

B. Community Survey.Method

A pre-tested interview instrument was administered to men and women between 18 and 24 years, in both urban and rural settings. Information was gathered to assess knowledge of preventive practices. To gain information on STD incidence/prevalence, men were asked to report on a history of penile discharge, burning on urination or the presence of a genital sore during the previous month. To gain condom information, men and women were asked to report on frequency of condom use by stating, "Always, Sometimes, or Never used " during the previous six months. Information was also solicited on type of partner where a condom was used, i.e. married/in-union versus all others. To determine average number of sexual partners, men and women, aged 15 to 24, were asked to report whether they had slept with 0, 1, 2, or 3+ partners during the previous month.

Problems/Comments:

It was felt that determining the sex of the interviewer and the distribution of types of partners is critical to assess the validity of the information obtained. The current recommendation is to use a 15 to 24 age group,

though this may vary from country to country, based on local information on the identity of "at risk" populations.

Women were reluctant to admit to past episodes of STD's and/or identify where they sought treatment.

There was a tendency to under-report sex acts with casual partners when reporting on sexual behavior and condom use over the previous month.

There were few positive responses from men concerning the history of genital sores. This may be country specific, relating to prevalence of genital ulcer disease (GUD) or this may be a less noticeable or memorable symptom for men than discharge and burning upon urination.

It was not possible to gain plausible information on source of STD treatment nor was reliable information obtained on self-treatment of symptoms.

Sampling methodology remains undefined. Choosing cluster sampling versus using random sampling techniques based on existing census data may have to be country specific.

### C. STD Facility Assessment

#### Method:

To assess the quality of STD treatment, several specific indicators were used. This information was gathered using a facility review and a standardized case management observation instrument. In facilities with adequate outpatient records, a chart review could potentially be used.

Clinical sites were assessed on whether guidelines were available for treatment and counselling; were there stocks of gloves and condoms at the site; and was there access to laboratory support services. Direct observation of patient care was used to assess whether the provider asked for the following information: client symptoms; a history of previous STD's; the health of the partner; recent use of medications; and a history of drug allergies. To assess education/counselling of the patient, the provider was evaluated to determine if the client was told to send their partner for therapy; was information given to reduce number of partners; were instructions given on condom use; and were client questions dealt with.

#### Problems/Comments:

Using a single summary indicator as a measure of the quality of STD treatment was felt to be of limited value. Rather a series of indicators should be used.

The methodology used in the field test was more appropriate for public sector STD clinics and less useful for health care sites where STD's are treated in a general outpatient setting and for private clinics. Different approaches will be required to evaluate the three levels of

STD service provision: public sector, formal private sector and informal private sector.

Selecting a sample of facilities for evaluation should be determined by the volume of STD clients served.

Three levels of STD care will need to be assessed. At the national level, the existence of a written national policy on STD's; national STD management guidelines with policies for counselling; training activities; availability of condoms and therapy; and the existence of a surveillance system. At the health facility level, there should be an assessment of how patients with STD's are identified and diagnosed; availability of equipment, supplies, condoms and laboratory services. At the level of the individual health care provider, the treatment of a single disease (gonorrhoea, syphilis) would be monitored by using observation of patient care versus chart review.

The patient's access to the prescribed drug for treatment after being diagnosed was not assessed, nor were protocols for partner notification.

D. National Condom Audit:

Method:

Two indicators were assessed: the total number of condoms distributed/sold in the previous year; and the % of outlets having an uninterrupted supply of condoms in the past month. For public and NGO sectors, available records were reviewed and site visits with interviews were conducted. For the commercial sector, a retail audit was performed.

Condom sales and distribution were expressed on a per capita basis to facilitate interpretation of data.

Problems/Comments:

It was considered more important that distribution was assessed at the level of the end user, rather than at the level of the donor or outlet/wholesaler.

The "stock-out" indicator was not valid in some public health sites because nurses faced with diminishing stocks would often decrease the number of condoms distributed.

**GENERAL COMMENTS:**

It was clear to those who performed the field testing that further refinement would be necessary before final decisions could be made on a set of global indicators. There was also a consensus that the final indicators should allow for country and program specific adaptation.

All who participated in the development of the indicators realized the importance of insuring that the indicators should be simple and inexpensive to perform and give worthwhile information both to the AIDS control program

and to the donor community. The measuring of the indicators should ideally be done by locally available staff and not require significant external consultant time or expertise.

The final results of the Jamaica field testing will be presented in January to the Ministry of Health of Jamaica for feedback on the usefulness of the information to the National AIDS Control Program.

The World Health Organization Global Program on AIDS has been given the task to further develop the global indicators and will perform a second field test, probably in Africa. Further information will be disseminated as it is obtained.

ANNEX

STAFF INVOLVED WITH DEVELOPING AND FIELD TESTING PROGRAM INDICATORS

John Novak, AIDSCOM  
Susan Middlestadt, AIDSCOM  
Bill Smith, AIDSCOM

Susan Hassig, AIDSTECH  
David Sokal, AIDSTECH  
Marc Ostfield, AIDSTECH

Jennifer Bryce, CDC  
Kathy Parker, CDC

Bob Hogan, GPA  
Gary Slutkin, GPA  
Mary Ann Neil, GPA  
Michel Carael, GPA  
David Heyman, GPA

Bill Lyerly, AID Regional Bureaus  
Nicholas Studzinski, AID Regional Bureaus  
Sharon Benoliel, AID Regional Bureaus  
Julia Terry, AID Regional Bureaus

Peter Figueroa, Ministry of Health, Jamaica

Jeff Harris, USAID, AIDS Division  
Julie Klement, USAID AIDS Division  
Bob Bernstein, USAID, AIDS Division

Agency for International Development  
Washington, D.C. 20523

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MEMORANDUM

January 31, 1992

TO: Mary Wolgin, AFR/ARTS

THRU: Ron Bonner ~~AFR/ARTS/HHR~~

FROM: Glenn Post, AFR/ARTS/HHR *GP*

SUBJECT: Review of Logframes and Indicators Related to Family Planning in the FY 91 APIs

Summary

Conclusions based on a review of APIs from missions having some focus on family planning (FP) are presented below. Although indicators and achievements vary, trends in a number of countries are encouraging. Finally, USAIDs are beginning to show hard evidence of family-planning program success broadly in Africa.

Logframe patterns differ considerably. Several countries demonstrate an integrated approach to the HPN sector whereby family-planning achievement is one of several HPN strategic objectives or targets.

The Kenya "supply/demand model" is presented as an outstanding API framework for family planning that makes appropriate use of process-type indicators as well as impact indicators. Whereas the Kenya model logframe linkages are clear and compelling, it is suggested that linkages in some of the other APIs would benefit from further review, especially where indicators presented for the same target reflect different levels of achievement or where success in one indicator may be a pre-condition for success in another.

Total fertility, modern contraceptive prevalence and couple-years of contraceptive protection are recommended as impact indicators. Comparing achievement in urban areas with that in rural areas may provide important additional information.

### Background

FY 91 APIs that focus to some degree on family planning were received from thirteen USAIDs--Burundi, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda. Family planning played a varying role in the different countries' logframes. The types and status of FP programs in the countries also differed substantially as did the indicators established or planned. In virtually all instances, the APIs reflect considerable thought and attention, and present a good picture of progress in meeting program objectives. Further, the APIs have proven to be most useful to AID/W in preparing the Congressional Presentation, in responding to Congressional Q and As and in reporting on the DFA. For example, the increasing contraceptive prevalence in Rwanda, decreasing fertility in urban Senegal and declining population growth rate in Kenya were all cited based on information contained in the API.

### Impact and Trends

Fertility in sub-Saharan Africa, with its traditional value on fecundity, remains the highest in the world by a considerable margin. Yet trends are encouraging. It is only in the past few years that A.I.D. has been able to demonstrate a decline in the total fertility rate. Since the early 1980s, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Botswana have all experienced fertility declines of more than one child per woman. While strong program efforts continue in these countries, signs of fertility decline are also beginning to become manifest in other A.I.D.-assisted countries. For example, Senegal is now the first West African nation to show a decline in fertility, particularly in urban areas, where A.I.D.-supported services are concentrated.

The fertility declines in Africa clearly are related to increasing use of modern contraceptives. A number of other countries--including Ghana, Rwanda and Malawi--are now showing new evidence of increasing contraceptive prevalence, indicating finally that our family planning efforts in Africa are having broad people-level impact. Given A.I.D.'s intensive efforts to deliver high-quality services in these and other countries throughout the region, along with an increasing attention to monitoring impact, it is likely that these positive trends will continue.

### Logframe Patterns

Nine of the thirteen countries addressed family planning at the strategic-objective level or higher. Kenya, Rwanda and Swaziland had subgoals related to fertility reduction and/or population growth. Burundi, Cameroon and Niger addressed family planning only at the target level, while Mali dealt with FP at the subtarget level, apparently reflecting in these countries a highly integrated program wherein family planning is considered an aspect of primary health care rather than a more focused program with greater concentration on fertility reduction. Malawi and Uganda, two of the countries dealing with family planning at the strategic-objective level, have additional HPN strategic objectives (relating to HIV/AIDS and to child survival). The Malawi/Uganda logframe pattern also reflects an integrated approach to the sector but with greater concentration on family planning than indicated in the Burundi, Cameroon and Niger logframes.

### A Model API Logframe for Family Planning

Among the various ways USAIDs structured their APIs related to family planning, the Kenya "supply/demand model" is particularly rational and useful. This model is structured as follows:

The Kenya subgoal is to reduce fertility and population growth, while the strategic objective is to increase contraceptive use (as indicated by contraceptive prevalence and couple-years of contraceptive protection). The two targets, improving the availability of family planning services and increasing the demand for contraceptive services relate respectively to supply and demand. Supply subtargets include increasing the number or percentage of FP contraceptive service delivery points (public, NGO, private-sector, surgical and community-based services as well as social-marketing retail-sales outlets). Demand subtargets include decreasing the proportion of non-pregnant women citing lack of knowledge of contraceptive use as a constraint to using family planning and increasing the proportion of women knowing where IUD and sterilization services can be obtained.

Ordinarily, API logframes should avoid process-type indicators in favor of impact indicators. However, given the logframe linkages and the clear progression from the subtargets to targets to strategic objective and subgoal in the Kenya API as well as USAID's attention to documenting higher-level program impacts (population growth rate, total fertility rate and contraceptive prevalence), it becomes extremely useful to monitor process-type indicators, as the mission does under its family-planning supply subtargets.

USAID Kenya has also developed an excellent logistic-management information system to help monitor contraceptive trends and has planned periodic Demographic and Health Surveys to demonstrate program impact.

USAID Rwanda developed a framework similar to the Kenya model and deserves to be commended as well. Under the strategic objective to increase contraceptive prevalence, however, the Rwanda logframe includes an additional level--a target to increase the number of contraceptive users--which probably is superfluous. Without this target, the two subtargets relating to improving access (supply) and increasing demand for services would then move up to targets.

USAID Rwanda also includes a third subtarget to improve the quality of FP services--an important area of concern that could be subsumed under the supply target (or sub-target). However, useful family planning quality-of-care indicators unfortunately are not well developed at this time. This is an area that AFR/ARTS potentially could address through its analytic agenda.

USAID Swaziland also developed an excellent API framework that fits neatly into the family planning supply/demand model.

#### Logframe Linkages

The Kenya, Rwanda and Swaziland APIs demonstrate eminently logical links in progressing from improving the supply and demand aspects of family planning services and information to increasing contraceptive prevalence to decreasing fertility and population growth. A number of other USAIDs, however, may need to review their logframe linkages, for example:

The USAID Burundi API, under the target of increasing family planning information and services, lists two indicators relating to couples using contraceptives and one indicator relating to the proportion of health-service facilities offering FP services. This latter indicator may indeed indicate provision of FP services but it reflects a lower level of achievement than the two contraceptive-prevalence indicators, i.e., it could be considered a pre-condition to increasing contraceptive use.

Similarly, under the USAID Cameroon target to increase the health system's capacity to provide more accessible, higher-quality services at affordable prices, the indicators include increasing contraceptive prevalence, increasing contraceptive sales and increasing the number of facilities offering supervised FP information and services. While all three indicators would reflect achievement of the target, it is questionable whether the latter one (increasing the number of facilities offering FP information and services) logically should be at the same level

as increasing contraceptive prevalence since increasing the number of facilities is probably a pre-condition (i.e., a lower-level indicator) necessary to achieving increased contraceptive prevalence.

Likewise USAID Malawi's target to increase the supply of child-spacing services seems to be lower level than (a pre-condition to) achieving the target of increasing contraceptive prevalence.

#### Selected Country-Specific Examples

The USAID Ghana API is to be highly commended for including an excellent discussion of the programs's progress toward achieving impact in family planning. The Ghana API also deserves credit for including a target indicator relating to the establishment of a National Population Secretariat (one of the indicators for the target to increase the use of family planning methods). This indicator recognizes the need in Ghana to coordinate and plan population activities. The logframe implies that the indicator reflects increased use of modern family planning methods (i.e., achieving the target); the text states that similar national population councils have been effective in implementing population policies in other countries. However, the justification would be strengthened if the mission could describe exactly which constraints the Secretariat would address and how alleviating those constraints would increase the use of modern family planning methods in Ghana.

The USAID Malawi API deserves credit for a broad cross-sectoral approach. Recognizing the link between female education and fertility reduction, the Malawi mission developed the target to increase attainment of girl's literacy and education under the strategic objective to reduce fertility.

The USAID Uganda API does not cover the level below the strategic objectives. Therefore, the targets and target-level indicators and benchmarks still need to be elucidated.

#### Impact Indicators

Except for Niger, all missions reported that they are tracking modern contraceptive prevalence rates. Several missions (including Niger) are tracking couple-years of contraceptive protection (CYPs). These two indicators have been selected by CDIE for tracking on a worldwide basis through their PRISM system. We consider it essential that all USAIDs with family planning programs track modern contraceptive prevalence rates as an indicator of program impact. Where programmatically relevant, a breakdown by urban/rural residence is also valuable.

Reporting on CYPs is extremely useful as an interim measure. However, condom sales, which can increase CYPs substantially, may have little to do with family planning (particularly if the condoms are not used regularly). Data on this indicator, if possible, should be developed so as to permit reporting CYPs by method.

At a higher level, it is most useful in assessing program impact and for reporting to Congress for USAIDs to track total fertility rates at least periodically (e.g., through Demographic and Health Surveys).

#### Urban/Rural Achievement

Breaking down total fertility rates by urban versus rural residence, an approach taken by the Senegal and Uganda missions, can provide further valuable insight into program impact and constraints, particularly where the rates differ significantly.

Under the strategic objective of decreasing family size (as indicated by the total fertility rate), the Senegal mission developed one target to increase the use of modern contraceptives in urban areas (as indicated by urban contraceptive prevalence) and another target to increase contraceptive awareness in rural areas (indicated by knowledge of modern contraceptive methods in rural areas), reflecting the different foci of the USAID program in urban and in rural areas. In the API text, the Senegal mission presented the striking differential in urban versus rural levels and trends in total fertility rates (urban decrease from 6.5 to 5.4 compared with rural decrease of 7.5 to 7.1). This information is effective in demonstrating program impact and is useful for Congressional reporting as well. (However, for the sake of simplicity, the mission chose to present only the total fertility rate--not differentiated by urban/rural residence--in the API logframe.)

The Uganda API narrative also distinguished between urban and rural trends in total fertility, which is helpful in understanding the family planning situation in that country.

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

FY 1991

EDUCATION

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MEMO

Date: 2/14/92 (revised 3/04/92)  
 To: Jerry Wolgin, ADIR/ARTS  
 Through: Ron Bonner, ADDIR/ARTS <sup>C.B.</sup><sub>J.A.</sub>  
 From: Julie Rea, ARTS/HHR <sup>J.R.</sup>  
 Subject: APIs / Analysis of Basic Education reporting

SUMMARY:

We have received APIs on basic education programs in five category one countries: Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali and Swaziland. Outstanding are reports for Guinea and Botswana, but other reports from these countries suggest how their APIs will evolve.

The results to date relate primarily to the building of institutions and systems for improving basic education outcomes (acquisition of the lifelong learning skills, e.g. reading, writing and arithmetic). In other words, the results tell us about the success of supplying inputs, such as teacher training and textbooks, but little about the impact of inputs on student learning. Even the more mature second generation initiatives in Swaziland and Botswana show limited impact on student achievement. This suggests that: 1) We are used to measuring inputs, not outcomes; and 2) that system-wide results in terms of student achievement require long-term (decades) of judicious, coordinated investment by host countries and donors.

This set of APIs raises five key concerns about the way we are measuring impact:

- 1) There is a lack of uniform indicators from country to country (such as, to measure efficiency, number of years to produce a primary school graduate), which makes it difficult to compare impact between countries.
- 2) API reporting on education is skimpy in countries where education is a target (Swaziland and Malawi) rather than a strategic objective (Mali, Ghana and Lesotho). Also, there is no API reporting for key education countries which are category II, such as Namibia and Benin. Therefore, APIs, and also PRISM, only give a partial picture of the Bureau's, and Agency's, management of basic education.
- 3) There is considerable range in education targets from one country to the next. In one country, the USAID program aims to increase primary school completion from 11% to 80% over a six year period (Ghana). In another, the primary school completion rate is expected to increase less than 1% over a seven year period (Lesotho). Do these differences reflect the realities of the countries we are working in, the predilection of various design and

review teams, or what? Answering this question should inform our future program design.

4) While all of our basic education programs aim to enable African education systems to enhance student learning, only a few are readying to measure success in these terms. Perhaps all programs should do so, granted that results will take a long time to evolve.

5) Although all of our basic education efforts strive to provide a foundation for progress in other sectors, such as health and agriculture, and for progress with development processes, such as democratization and promotion of the private sector, some sets of Mission program indicators and objective trees depict education as isolated from these other efforts. We need to explore the value of indicators, and baseline data, which enable us to measure the synergy between education and other sectors. Malawi and Mali APIs provide examples of such indicators: Mali measures parent contribution to primary schooling as an indicator of private sector development; Malawi tracks girls' primary school enrollment as a precondition for reduced fertility. What can these combinations of indicators tell us about effective program planning? Where we want to reduce fertility, should we assure girls' primary education? Where we aim to expand access, should we assure private sector involvement in school construction and operation?

#### METHODOLOGY FOR API ANALYSIS:

We have reviewed the APIs by fitting indicators into four broad categories of education need espoused by international educators: relevance, quality, equity, and efficiency. These categories suit this API review exercise in that they include, in one way or another, all the kinds of impact our basic education programs aim to address.

The World Education for All Background Document offers the following category definitions:

**"Relevance:** This implies that the results of basic education must be evaluated in terms of how well the learner is prepared for immediate life survival (including employment), effective participation in society, and further learning. (NB, Implicit in relevance is community and private sector participation in shaping the education process.)

**Quality:** This aspect of learning activities has traditionally been defined in terms of the inputs to a programme, institution, or system....(The definition and analysis of learning quality has relied excessively on input and output measures, without a clear understanding of how the available inputs are transformed into the desired outputs.)

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**Equity:** Participation in basic education has increased impressively over the last thirty years but with varying degrees of equity in pupil access to and continuation in programmes, as well as in learning achievement. Most commonly, individuals suffer from learning inequities because of their poverty, gender, location, religious, linguistic, or ethnic identification, and physical or mental disability.

**Efficiency:** The effectiveness of a learning activity refers to how well its goal is accomplished; efficiency refers to how well the goal is accomplished relative to the resources spent....Efficiency is not identical with reducing costs. Although cost containment may result from an efficiency analysis, an appraisal of a learning activity may well conclude that greater expenditure is needed (for it to be effective)."

**Cross-sectoral synergy:** To the above categories we would add one of cross-sectoral synergy. This category concerns whether or not Missions are measuring basic education impact in terms of progress in other sectors. A first clue to this is the Mission objective tree. A study of indicators across sectors provides additional information. Understanding cross-sectoral synergy informs program planning, and contributes to an efficient allocation of limited resources.

#### ORGANIZATION OF API ANALYSIS:

A chart summarizing analysis findings precedes the discussion of country-specific reports. Suggestions for improving the API process, and a description of related ARTS/HHR future work, conclude this analysis.

## CHART SUMMARIZING API ANALYSIS:

Country	Cross Sectoral	Relevance	Quality	Equity	Efficiency
<u>Ghana</u>	<p>Strategic Obj.: Improve the quality of the primary education system</p> <p>Lacks linkages with other SOs</p>	missing	<p>Ambitious targets for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- % literate, numerate primary completers</li> <li>- availability learning materials</li> <li>- criterion reference test dev. and results</li> <li>- teacher training</li> </ul>	<p>rural vs. urban</p> <p>% budget for primary ed.</p>	<p>% budget for education</p> <p>% budget for primary ed.</p> <p>% staff trained in administration</p>

Country	Cross Sectoral	Relevance	Quality	Equity	Efficiency
<u>Lesotho</u>	<p>Strategic Obj:</p> <p>Increase portion of population with basic skills for labor force entry</p> <p>Lacks linkages w/other strategic objectives</p>	missing	<p>Modest targets:</p> <p>- student/teacher ratio</p> <p>- % primary school completers</p> <p>- system for curriculum reform in place and working</p> <p>- teacher training</p> <p>- improved primary school leaving test.</p> <p>implementation of tests</p>	<p>No mention of rural/urban:</p> <p>- % girls and boys enrolled%</p> <p>- % schools with 7 classes</p> <p>- % spending primary education</p>	<p># yrs. to produce primary school graduate</p> <p>% gov't spending education</p> <p>% for primary</p>

Country	Cross Sectoral	Relevance	Quality	Equity	Efficiency
<u>Malawi</u>	<p>Target, increase girls' attainment of literacy and education, under S.O. reduce fertility</p> <p>Education indicator for prog. goal.</p> <p>Good link.w/ other sectors.</p>	<p>Ties in with program goal. Otherwise no indicators.</p>	No reference	<p>girls enroll. tracked under SO 3, fertility</p>	No reference
<u>Mali</u>	<p>Strategic Obj.:</p> <p>Improve the delivery of health and education services</p> <p>Well integrated with other S.O.s</p>	No indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- # of teachers trained</li> <li>- student/teacher ratio</li> <li>- availability of books</li> <li>- Nothing on student achievement!</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- girls enrollment</li> <li>- number of new places available at primary level.</li> <li>- % spending on primary education</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-%repeaters</li> <li>- level of parent contribution to schools</li> <li>% gov't spending on education, and for primary</li> </ul>

Country	Cross Sectoral	Relevance	Quality	Equity	Efficiency
<u>Swazi-land</u>	<p>Target, improve the quality of basic education under Strategic Obj., increase # Swazis involved in directing and managing national development.</p> <p>Good synergy with other Strategic Objectives.</p>	No mention	<p>Achievement test results</p> <p>Reduced dropout rates</p>	no indic.	<p>Explicit in data on dropouts and achievement test results</p>

Country w/o API	Cross Sectoral	Relevance	Quality	Equity	Effi- ciency
<u>Botswana</u>	S.O., in- creased trainable workforce	% class- rooms w/ new curricu- lum.  Education indica- tors for other SO, increased employ- ment for Batswana in off- farm and non- mining employ- ment.	%teachers trained in new curricu- lum & student achieve- ment results	girls' & boys' perfor- mance on crite- rion refer- enced tests	no indica- tors

Country w/o API	Cross Sectoral	Relevance	Quality	Equity	Efficiency
<u>Guinea</u>	<p>Target, - increase quality and enrollment, under Strategic obj., human resources for sust. ec. growth</p> <p>No linkage to pro. goal, increased soc. and ec. well-being all Guineans; % primary school completers would be good?</p> <p>Literacy used as indicator for sub-goal, increase Guinean role in defining/managing soc. &amp; ec. dev.</p>	<p>No linkage with agric. S.O., but linked to management S.O.</p> <p>No linkage with private sector. Pri. sch. enroll. serves as indic. for tgt., incr. fam. plng. awareness &amp; service delivery, under SO incr. family ability to determine size.</p>	<p>spending on non-salary inputs</p>	<p>% girls enrolled in school</p> <p>% spending on primary education</p>	<p>% of regions w/ improved financial and administrative systems</p>

The above suggests the following trends by category of analysis (for the five countries with APIs only):

**Cross-Sectoral:** There are encouraging signs that Missions are beginning to see aspects of education, such as parent investment in schools (private sector) and girls' enrollment (family planning) as indicators for monitoring impact in other sectors.

**Relevance:** In general, there is little attention to this in the APIs. However, we know basic education countries are working on this in various ways (in Swaziland, our project is developing tests for gauging a student's work aptitudes, and in Mali there is curriculum development to make learning more relevant to skill needs for life outside the classroom). Maybe there just isn't room to report on these kinds of initiatives in the APIs.

**Quality:** There is a great deal of emphasis on quality, especially on inputs. At least three countries propose to include data on achievement type test development and results. This should prove very informative, and would seem useful for every country to do.

**Equity:** All countries, with the exception of Swaziland, are paying attention to gender issues. One country is following rural vs. urban, and regional inequities (Ghana). All countries should at least pay attention to gender.

**Efficiency:** All countries, with the exception of Malawi, track efficiency in one way or another. This would seem a very appropriate concern for all countries. Number of years to produce a primary school graduate would seem a valuable indicator of efficiency to include in all education APIs.

#### COUNTRY-SPECIFIC API ANALYSIS:

##### GHANA:

- Cross-sectoral: Improving the quality of primary education systems is one of the Mission's 3 strategic objectives. The other two, reduce fertility rate, and increase private sector led exporting and investment, rely on basic education for success. However, the API is without indicators to track this synergy. To guide future program planning, the Mission might consider collecting baseline data to this end, such as % of male and female contraceptive users who have completed primary school, or % of export producers and investors with the same characteristic.

- Relevance: There are no indicators to gauge this. If we added the indicators suggested above, we would have something. As it is, the Mission reports on education as if it is isolated from employment, effective participation in society, and further learning.

- Quality: There is an ambitious strategic objective indicator

target (from 11% literate and numerate graduates in FY 89 to 80% in FY 95), with indicators for tracking the supply of inputs (teacher training, instructional materials, learning materials, development of criterion referenced testing). If all inputs become available as expected, the target seems realistic. (NB, need to eliminate numbers in indicator column, and just include under FY 95.)

- Equity: The target indicators for improving access in areas of Ghana with low enrollments seem doable, given the Government's demonstration of effectiveness and commitment in setting up preparatory pilot projects in FY 91. (Targets are moving from 0/a 30% primary school enrollment in these areas in FY 89 to 50% in FY 95).

- Efficiency: Two sets of indicators track this. One concerns government budget for education. Why does the % of MOE budget decrease from 42% in FY 91 to 38% in FY 95? If the actual amount of the education budget is growing, the API should state this. As for the education budget disaggregated by level, it would be informative to have the primary education section disaggregated by category of spending (teacher salaries, etc.) to be able to differentiate between recurrent and development costs. The indicator for basic education instructional materials suggests this may be happening already.

The other set concerns rationalizing the school administrative system. This focuses on inputs (number of staff trained). It would be informative to have some indicator of the results of this training (such as more timely submission of reports by staff, better processes for identifying and resolving classroom level problems). This would allow us to determine staff training's role in helping to reach the strategic objective goal of having 80% of primary school completers literate and numerate. The target of closing the gap between spending as projected in the budget, and actual spending, reflects the process of improving education planning and administration.

An indicator which would be informative to add would be number of years to produce a primary school graduate.

- Summary: Ghana is reporting well on education impact. It is assessing the delivery of inputs, as well as resulting outcomes (achievement). Missing are indicators which would help us monitor the role of education in attaining targets for the other strategic objectives (reduced fertility and increased exports).

#### Lesotho:

- Cross-sectoral: The API narrative does refer to the synergy between education, and other sectors, such as family planning

("Without some reduction in the population growth rate, it will be difficult to make headway in the subgoal of enhancing the human resources base.").

Education is one of three strategic objectives. There are no education indicators for strategic objectives in agriculture and health. To inform future program planning, the Mission might want to begin to report on the synergy between education and other sectors (such as % of adults with primary education who use family planning, etc.). The Demographic Health Survey (DHS) would be helpful in this regard.

- Relevance: There seem to be no indicators of relevance, as defined earlier in this paper. Such indicators could include information on attempts to involve communities and the private sector in the education process.

- Quality: The indicators for quality are only partially helpful. It is good to see the numbers of pupils per classroom has decreased, but why has the number of pupils per teacher increased? The indicators on progress in setting up systems for curriculum reform and dissemination, and for teacher training, and improvement of the primary school leaving test, are helpful because they indicate progress in improving quality. However, one would expect more measurement of results, e.g. reports which show increases in student achievement, given AID's approximately decade long assistance to the education sector. Perhaps these exist, and we just need to tap them.

- Equity: The indicators here reflect progress in expanding access for both girls and boys to schools with all classes available (1-7). Lacking is data which would give a picture of any regional and rural/urban disparities which may exist, and/or evolve.

- Efficiency: The efficiency indicator of number of years to produce primary school graduates is very informative, though dismaying (why has it increased in from 12.8 in FY 90 to 14.1 in FY 91?)

The indicators for tracking government spending on education, and specifically for primary schools, are informative. It would be constructive to have the data disaggregated by category of spending for primary schools (learning materials, etc.).

- Summary: Lesotho's objective tree and API indicators in other sectors seem not to reflect the synergy between education and broad development. The API does offer a store of baseline data which should inform the Mission's future program planning.

**Malawi:**

- Cross-Sectoral: Education is a target under SO 3, to reduce fertility. Along with information on health and agriculture, Malawi includes data on literacy rates and education expenditures (broken down by development and recurrent budgets) as indicators of reaching its program goal of enhancing the well-being of the average Malawian household. It would be even more informative if the Mission disaggregated education spending by level, and within levels, by category. Nevertheless, the indicators the Mission has chosen to monitor goal attainment reflect a vision of synergy between sectors. (Other APIs, with the exception of Mali and Guinea ((at least as suggested by CPSP)), seem to provide no indicators for program goal attainment.)

In terms of strategic objective indicators, there are none which relate to education for SO 1, increase foodcrop production and productivity. Why couldn't there be something akin to, "Increase level of education among estate workers and smallholder producers by - %"? (Also, it would be helpful to disaggregate data by gender to see whether women are getting a fair share of benefits!).

For SO 2, increase off-farm employment, it would be interesting to track over five years the level of education for Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) players (owners and employers), by gender. Some effort is made to track the gender of SME owners, and SME owners receiving technical advisory services.

For SO 3, reduce fertility, there is an effort to increase the % of girls enrolled in standard 4; persistence and completion rates as well would give a better idea of how much education girls are getting, and, over time, of how different doses of education affect fertility (i.e., does a woman with four years of education bear fewer children than a woman with just two?).

For SO 4, decrease infant and child morbidity and mortality, there is not a single education target. It would be informative to add an indicator which would track the correlation between level of maternal education and rate of infant and child morbidity and mortality. The Demographic Health Survey likely could supply this.

For SO 5, control of the spread of AIDS, again there is no mention of education. Wouldn't it be meaningful to track the level of education of AIDS victims? Any information on the introduction of AIDS messages into the primary school curriculum would be constructive.

- Relevance: Malawi wins high points for seeing education as relevant to its overall program goal of increasing the well being of the average Malawian household.

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- Quality: There is no reporting on quality, because it is not required, as education is not a strategic objective. This is also true for efficiency. Such reporting likely will appear in basic education program evaluations, but not APIs, unless AID/W requires this.

Wouldn't it be informative to have the API report on how many years it takes to produce female and male primary school graduates, over the life of the program?

- Equity: Tracking girls' enrollment under SO 3 is a step in the right direction.

- Summary: Malawi's reporting on education is scant because education is not a strategic objective. However, Malawi does signal the development importance of education by making it an indicator (literacy rate, education expenditure) of program goal attainment, and an indicator (girls' primary school enrollment) of progress in reducing fertility.

Malawi could use more education indicators for monitoring the impact of education on its other strategic objectives.

It would be helpful if Malawi would include an objective tree in its API.

Mali:

- Cross-sectoral: Mali does an excellent job of showing the synergy between education and other sectors. The API includes education as an indicator of progress towards the program goals of improving economic growth and quality of life. Under SO 3, improving delivery of health services, one finds the performance indicator of number of the primary school children completing the 6th grade. The API includes private contribution to education as a means of assessing the SO of increasing private participation in the economy. There is nothing on education for SO 2, increasing incomes in areas of high productivity potential. For instance, it might be informative for future program planning to track the correlation between farmer incomes and/or productivity, and level of education.

- Relevance: There are no indicators for this, apart from those cited for other strategic objectives. Implicit relevance is suggested by the indicator for increased parent participation in school improvements (one expects parents to demand and contribute to relevance).

- Quality: The indicators for numbers of teachers and other staff trained are informative. Would it be helpful to disaggregate this data by gender? Useful too are indicators for student/teacher

ratios, and textbook use. Missing is any indicator on student achievement, a must for assessing whether quality inputs are helping. Mali is collecting such information through its monitoring and evaluation component, and might include it in the API.

- Equity: Indicators on girls' enrollment are helpful. Providing a range seems realistic. Also, data on expanded access is informative.

- Efficiency: Might it be better to show number of students repeating, as well as %? This would give a better picture of progress. Data on level of community contribution to school funding is helpful. Information on budget restructuring, and share to primary, are useful for analysis. Disaggregation of primary education budget would be an added boon. Data over LOP on years required to produce a primary school graduate would be useful.

- Summary: Mali has done a fine job of beginning to track the impact of our basic education assistance on the education sector, and on other sectors as well (private sector, and health). It is doing much in terms of relevance, equity, and efficiency that fails to surface here (for instance, curriculum reform via in-service teacher training).

In general, the API seems to aim to speak to the general public, not just to AID (see the inclusion of a map). Presenting baseline indicators with target indicators, for LOP, and in chart form, as Ghana has done, would be helpful.

#### Swaziland:

- Cross sectoral: As with Malawi, basic education is a target in Swaziland, this time under a strategic objective to increase the number of Swazis who effectively direct, manage and participate in national development. One sees in the objective tree synergy between education and strategic objectives, e.g., that of reducing fertility (or increasing contraceptive prevalence rate), increasing Swazi-owned businesses, and increasing Swazi participation in national development.

As baseline data for tracking impact into the late 90s, it would be helpful to include level of education indicators under SO 1 (fertility) and SO 3 (Swazi owned businesses).

- Relevance: No indicators appear here, probably because basic education is a target, rather than a strategic objective.

- Quality: Quality is implicit in standardized test results, and reduction in level of dropouts.

- Equity: There are no indicators for this. Disaggregating the above data would help to either highlight or dispel any equity related issues.

- Efficiency: Efficiency is implicit in data on dropout and student achievement. It would be informative to add repeater rates, and years required to produce primary school graduate.

- Summary: Swaziland seems to be prepared to report on results (i.e., achievement), not just inputs and processes. Their objective tree reflects the synergy between education and development in all sectors. As with Malawi, reporting is not as complete as it would be if education were a strategic objective rather than a target.

#### API PROCESS IMPROVEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS:

Suggestions are that we:

- 1) Given that the APIs provide only a partial picture of what we are accomplishing in any given sector, create some other kind of yearly analysis process conducive to a more complete understanding of sectoral activity.
- 2) Devise a way to assess cross-sectoral development impacts evident via API reports.
- 3) Study the issue of attribution, especially in the case of our NPA programs, where results often depend on our success in pooling our resources with those of other donors to effect change. For instance, in Mali, we are providing only 3 million of 12 million dollars which is supposed to support the Government's giving a greater share of the education budget to primary education, and a lesser share to higher education.
- 4) Urge Missions to disaggregate as much API data by gender as possible; this will help us to assess better the effect of our assistance on bolstering women's role in development.
- 5) Require APIs to include program objective trees, to facilitate our understanding of the linkages between program components.
- 6) Get APIs in and analyzed next year before we launch CP drafting (APIs inform CP).
- 7) Assemble a packet of APIs covering any given sector, and distribute it to each concerned country, to encourage sectoral cross-fertilization; this would be in addition to the summary cable ARTS will send for each sector.

**NEXT STEPS:**

The Education APIs provide valuable baseline data which ARTS can use in its ongoing work with Missions to develop a model for measuring education program input and outcome trends across Africa.

For measuring inputs, we are developing minimal standards for what we call "fundamental quality schools", and suggesting that Missions report on progress in meeting these standards, which include such things as level of teacher training, availability of textbooks, and quality of infrastructure. Reference to these standards abound in this set of APIs.


For measuring outcomes, AFR/ARTS/HHR is seeking to use achievement tests in reading, writing, and arithmetic. APIs for Lesotho and Ghana refer to such tests. Both measurement systems will allow us to analyze by and across countries how well inputs are contributing to desired learning outcomes in Africa.

We are in the process of vetting in Missions this model for measuring inputs and outcomes in the field, and expect it will be operational by the end of FY 92. As a result of this model, we expect countries to begin to report on common themes in the education sector. This uniformity of indicators should facilitate our API analysis, and our DFA reporting to Congress.

	Cross-Sectoral	Quality	Equity	Efficiency	Relevance	Budget
Ghana	Education linkages to other S.O.s lacking	ambitious targets: %literate lrng matl impr test teach trg	↑ rural vs urban enrolls	↑% budget for primry  ↑% staff trained in mgt/admin.	not mentioned	↑% budget for educ
Lesotho	Education linkages to other S.O.s lacking	modest targets: S/T ratio % compltr cur refrm impr test teach trg	↑ % ♂ & ♀  ↑ % schools with 7 grades	↓ # yrs to produce graduate	not mentioned	↑ govt spending on educ
Malawi	Ed target under ↓ fertility  Ed part of prog goal & linked to other areas	not mentioned	♀ enrolls tracked under SO 3, fertility	not mentioned	relates to prog goal, but no indicator	
Malawi	Ed is a S.O. & well integrated with other S.O.s	↑teacher trg, ↓S/T ratio & ↑# books  no student achieve #s	↑♀ enroll  ↑# primry school places	↓ repeater rates  ↑ parent participation & contribs	no indicator	↑ govt spending on educ & % to primry
Swazi	S.O.: ↑# Swazis involved devt (good synergy); target to imprv quality of educ	↑ achieve test results  ↓ dropouts	no indicators	↓ dropouts  ↑ completers	not mentioned	

COUNTRIES WITHOUT APIS

Botswana	S.O.: increased trainable workforce	↑ % teachers trained in new curric  ↑ student achievemnt results	improve ♀ and ♂ performance on criterion refernced tests	no indicators	↑ classes w/ new curriculum  Ed data in other SO: ↑ off & on farm employmnt	
Ghana	S.O.: increased primary enrollments & quality	↑% spending for non-salary ed inputs	% girls enrolled in school	no indicators for improved finance & admin. systems	no links to other SOs: pop, ag & natl resources	



## API Reporting

### DFA Target 3.3: Expanded Skills and Productivity on the Job

#### Summary

After reviewing the API's submitted, tentative conclusions drawn are as follows:

- o aggregation across Missions at target and indicator levels is difficult conceptually as the types and purposes of human resource interventions are very different,
- o indicators at all levels are almost exclusively process oriented,
- o establishing causality between a training and/or human resource intervention and demonstrating development impact within the 5 year CPSP time horizon with quantifiable targets and indicators is very problematic.

Two Missions have tentatively identified DFA Target 3.3 at the Mission Strategic Objective (S.O.) level. Swaziland has chosen a strategic objective that involves primarily a strategy of human resource development around training. Tanzania is using a scattershot approach to human resource development and training and is funding both long-term academic and technical and in-country training. Lesotho's strategic objectives uses the phrasing of DFA 3.3 but, in fact is concerned with basic education. It is not really a good example for DFA S.O. # 3.3 because it lies beyond the 5 year scope of the CPSP in terms of possible impact.

At the target and indicator level Mali, Tanzania, Burundi, Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Togo, Niger and Rwanda are reporting on a variety of human resource interventions, mostly training. We are also aware that some Mission's have made significant investments in training although this does not show up in API reporting, e.g. Kenya and Zaire. Guinea, while not

preparing an API per se, has outlined an interesting and innovative approach involving training as a strategic objective that contributes to the achievement of their strategy. This was included in its January 1992 re-drafted "CPSP and Indicators Exercise under the rubric of improved performance of public sector to promote private sector growth and manage public sector functions." It is an interesting approach as training conceived and implemented will be aimed at causing an attitudinal change as well as providing for skills development of top policy-makers in public administration. The proposed training interventions will provide the means to remove a key constraint to the performance of top policy-makers.

As a general comment, Mission API reporting for DFA Target 3.3 was disjointed and sparse. Indicators tend almost exclusively to be process-oriented, (i.e., number of people trained) and do not address issues of impact at either objective or target levels. This is not a surprising outcome. First, it is difficult to assess impact conceptually as a training intervention is but one of many that together are requisite inputs in a causal relationship leading to development impact. Second, it is difficult to compare or aggregate indicators across Missions. Training in one instance may involve academic or technical training for the formal wage sector as a means to build institutional capacity in a government ministry or university, (e.g. Cameroon in ag. research). In another API (Guinea-Bissau), training is directed at teaching rudimentary technical or management skills for informal sector or rural community development.

### Background

It was recognized during the ATLAS Project design and during a series of 1990 meetings of the Bureau "Productivity Working Group" for DFA Strategic Objective 3 (Long Term Increases in Productivity) that there was an analytical gap with respect to DFA Target 3.3 - "Expanded Skills and Productivity on the Job." Mission reporting for last year's initial round of API's also confirmed the need for a more rigorous analytical framework. Fourth Quarter 1991 was established as a deadline to develop a methodological approach and framework with respect to training and development impact that would assist Missions and the Africa Bureau in reporting under DFA Target 3.3.

As a result, an experimental framework and methodology to evaluate training impact have been developed and discussed within the Bureau and with outside experts. Paraphrasing from that

report describes the difficulty that Missions' faced in arriving at meaningful impact indicators:

...because impact on target populations is produced by an array of inputs, including but not limited to AID training and other resources, impact indicators are defined at a level beyond the project or program level. Having defined impact as quality of life improvements at the target group level, then training can never be a sufficient condition for producing impact. It can be an important element in the array of inputs; the framework and methodology and framework then goes onto to describe how this can be set out and impact demonstrated vis a vis training.

### **Trends in API Reporting**

There are no apparent trends that can be gleaned from API reporting other than Missions continue to use process not impact indicators as a rule and report on a wide variety of disparate types of training interventions. Aggregation and or analyses are not very meaningful, relevant and possible across APIs. A proposal to revise the indicators and general approach of DFA Target 3.3 to improve API reporting was developed by AFR/TR and discussed at the 1990 Mission Director's Conference. Based upon the present API reporting for the target, the Bureau and Missions may wish to reconsider a reformulation of either the target and indicators or the relevance of the existing framework for API reporting.

Some examples from current API reporting point some of the short-falls in the existing framework.

In Cameroon, the Mission has as S.O. # 2, "increasing the efficiency of public services in ag. research, education and health." While one of the interventions, i.e. agricultural research was clearly part of an institutional capacity building approach, other training interventions were scattered across a wide variety of areas and for a multitude of purposes. Indicators developed under this S.O. were process oriented and thus made it difficult to make a plausible association between the training intervention and development impact. Comparisons were also difficult to make due to the apples and oranges nature of the interventions.

Under a capacity/institution building approach for example in ag. research, the Mission chose as a "program target," a more economically relevant student education provided at lower sustainable cost per student at the University of Cameroon at Dschang. As an impact indicator, per cent of graduates hired by the private (as opposed to public sector) is used as a proxy for efficiency and effectiveness. There clearly is no prima facie evidence that a person hired in the private sector as an

individual or within a group will be necessarily more efficient and/or productive than the public sector. It is easy to understand the inference and the program approach of supporting private sector development in their choices of targets and use of available data for indicators and uses of education and training. It is less clear that training leading to private sector development is any more effective than that intended for the public sector. Moreover, a baseline of agreed situation specific impact indicators would need to be agreed to by all parties (USAID, Ministries/Firms and participants) in advance of the training to measure impact. There is no evidence reported that this was accomplished.

In Tanzania, the Mission is undertaking a variety of training interventions involving substantial resources for off-shore academic and technical training. As a Mission-level S.O. USAID Tanzania has chosen "increasing the number of Tanzanian individuals in the public and private sector capable of implementing IMF supported reform policies and measures (i.e. ESAF)." The issue is whether or not increasing the numbers, i.e. of AID financed participants is a reasonable selection for mission-level strategic objective - will this alone have or cause impact and how can this be measured? The phrasing of the S.O. and subsequent targets is again process oriented in increasing skill levels through increased numbers trained.

Another aspect of Tanzania's training portfolio appears under S.O. # 2, "increase birth spacing practices by men and women." As a sub-target, the Mission cites "build management and technical ability of public sector institutions." The baseline indicator is "adequate qualified staff in place and program achieving objectives." In the out-years, the Mission proposes monitoring family planning units' staffing levels and efficiency and effectiveness of programs. Absent an agreed upon set of indicators at the outset, it will be impossible to monitor progress or determine training impact either during implementation or at completion of the CPSP timeframe. It also is not clear that trained staff alone is either an important constraint and/or that the Mission will provide appropriate training (technical vs managerial) and that key work units have been identified as recipients. Absent a critical mass and concentration of efforts, it is difficult to envision that AID's intervention, including training will ensure efficient program delivery.

#### **A Critique of Missions' Best-Efforts**

Perhaps the best effort underway to integrate human resources development and training into the Mission CPSP and API framework is the case of Swaziland's reporting. The Mission

chose as a strategic objective, "Increase the number of Swazi who effectively direct, manage and participate in national development." The accompanying indicators are (1) increased proportion of Swazi in mid-senior management positions and (2) increased number of children who complete 7 years of primary education on time respectively. Targets 2.2 - Improve the Effectiveness of Swazi mid-Senior Managers and 2.3 - Strengthen business education in tertiary institutions- rely heavily on process indicators while 2.1 - Improve the quality of basic education- is better defined in terms of impact indicators.

A few comments outline briefly some of the theabove mentioned points.

First, the targets around training are lacking indicators for demonstrating and tracking impact. They focus primarily on intermediate measures, i.e. the number of people in training, trained, and/or in senior management positions. Specifically, these are the indicators:

- 2.2-1 - increase the percent of Swazi managers who complete academic and technical training,
- 2.3-2 - increase number of Bach. of Commerce graduates,
- 2.3-4 - number of students trained in business computer applications,
- 2.3-5 - increase number of business qualified faculty,
- 2.6-1 - increase number of leaders trained in econ development.

Second, for the education activities, USAID/Swaziland does include indicators of student learning and the number of dropouts in their Mission-level monitoring. These are appropriate impact-level indicators.

#### Lessons Learned

- o Training may not be appropriate in a Mission's strategic objective framework or as a target. It is not appropriate in terms of an projecting an outcome and is even very limited as a means of demonstrating progress, let alone impact during the 5 year span of CPSP's.
- o The development of impact indicators for training will most likely be "situation-specific," require detailed planning by the Mission and involvement of various actors involved in the training process, and has significant management and cost implications.

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- o A compromise approach for most API reporting around DFA 3.3 as a mission S.O. and target may be to focus on ensuring the appropriate pre-conditions are met to make training effective and rely on process indicators to demonstrate progress and impact.

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

FY 1991

OFFICE OF OPERATIONS AND NEW INITIATIVES

- DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE
- PRIVATE SECTOR (INCLUDES ARTS REPORT)

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ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

FY 1991

DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

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SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA  
AND THE ASSESSMENTS OF PROGRAM IMPACT, FY 1991

I. Observations, Trends and Impact

- Political changes/Transition to democracy creating uncertainties and opportunities
- Political liberalization and political liberalization going on simultaneously in most countries
- A.I.D. support for D/G in Africa is broad, evolving but APIs do not pick this up
- Can say little on impact to date

II. Conclusions

- Impact and results not picked up through APIs, need to ask for more information in APIs or get it elsewhere; same issue for most cross-cutting themes
- Still unclear in bureau how and if support for democracy and governance (ie decentralization or legal environment) should be at strategic objective level
- Bureau should focus on integrating D/G themes in those areas where most S.O.s focussed: private sector/markets, agriculture production/rural income, and family planning.
- Bureau needs to focus on project level indicators and results and track these as new "stand-alone" D/G projects are approved but outside of API tracking. We will be held accountable; plus, extremely risky.
- More openness and transparency; hearing more, especially rural, voices; more and better accountability; broader participation at local levels -- all of these should have significant PLI although will be difficult to measure.

Drafted: AFR/ONI/DG:WHammink;2/20/92

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM IMPACT

FY 1991

PRIVATE SECTOR (INCLUDES ARTS REPORT)

SUPPORT FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN AFRICA  
AND THE ASSESSMENTS OF PROGRAM IMPACT, FY 1991

I. Observations

- \* The APIs gave an interesting overview of how individual countries were doing against CPSP strategic objectives. However, the narratives would be more useful if they provided more detail, including more analysis and an statement about how they assess their own progress toward goals under CPSP.
- \* The APIs, rather than being assessments of impact, as the name implies, are rather summaries of country's progress.
- \* The best APIs were those which analyzed program success and then tried to tie success with individual programs or projects to more global progress in country. Mali, Kenya and Ghana all did this well.
- \* Most APIs were weak vis-a-vis the private sector. They did not provide much real analysis, and often the narratives were skimpy. Some just went through a pro forma exercise.

II. Trends

- \* All APIs were written within DFA guidelines, and almost all missions stated their goal to be "sustainable broad-based economic growth".
- \* Most missions have done private sector strategies, or are thinking of it. Most who are engaged in private sector development have chosen structural reform as their first step. Many have small enterprise programs. Fewer are doing institutional capacity building--ie: banking institutions, or support for business associations. Still fewer provide direct, firm-level assistance.
- \* Most missions have private sector activities. The missions in Africa have more than 100 programs or projects with private sector elements, and the Private Sector Office is now backstopping nearly 100 activities.
- \* Most private sectors share constraints--bad government, environment, resource poverty, and illiteracy.

III. Conclusions

- \* Each country has particular factors influencing their programs, successes and failures. This leads to two conclusions. First, the real evaluation of a mission's program needs to occur in the field, not Washington: it

is important that missions provide their interpretation of API data to DP. Second, no one approach to private sector development is indicated, but each should be adapted to country particularities.

- \* To make APIs more useful as impact documents, they need to tie progress in a country to specific elements in the mission program.
- \* More attention needs to be devoted to good narratives, which explain and interpret the data. Rather than an assessment against a logframe which may be overquantified or rely on data whose accuracy is questionable, the focus should be on narratives. Narratives should explain how the program has gone, what impact missions think they have had, problems they have encountered, and what revisions they plan to make to correct for such problems. The data should be used to illustrate and support the narrative, not the other way around.

Mike E. Sarhan  
AFR/ARTS/EA  
01/03/1992

**Privatization and Private Sector  
Some Observations from 1991 APIs**

The following observations are based on my review of the 1991 **Assessment of Program Impact** reports submitted by 15 USAID missions in Africa. Ten of the 15 USAID missions reported varying degree of involvement with privatization/private sector issues.

**Burundi:** According to the 1991 API, the enabling investment environment in Burundi has led to a 210% increase in capital investment in the private sector between 1988 and 1989, compared to 167% increase from 1987 to 1988. In comparison, capital investments in parastatal operations decreased by 94.2% from 1988 to 1989 (compared to increase of 370% between 1987 and 1988).

**The Gambia:** The 1991 USAID/Gambia API reports the following:

- The Gambia Produce Marketing Board (GPMB)--the largest parastatal in the Gambia--has been a target for privatization since USAID/G Title II (Sect. 206) program was negotiated in 1986. Full privatization is now expected in August 1992, in compliance with the condition precedent for the recently USAID/G authorized **Financial and Private Enterprise** program. According to the API, the Government of Gambia (GOG) has contracted (in September, 1991) with the African Management Services Company (AMSCO) to manage GPMB until privatization. These decisive actions, according to API, sharply increase the probability of timely privatization of GPMB.
- The Gambia Commercial and Development Bank (GCDB) is also being privatized by GOG. According the API, GOG has published the prospectus for sale of the bank (in June, 1991)--ahead of the time expected by USAID/G and the World Bank. Privatization of the GCDB is one of the major objectives of the USAID/G's Financial Sector Restructuring (FSR) program. At least one offer from a regional bank has been received. Indications suggest that the privatization process may be completed somewhat earlier than anticipated in the FSR.

**Ghana:** The following four items were reported in the USAID/Ghana 1991 API as indication of progress in the privatization/private sector efforts:

- The Seed Industry: In September, 1991, two hundred and fifty privately-run, vertically integrated seed (maize and rice) companies were operating in Ghana, compared to no private sector companies operating in 1989.
- The Fertilizer Industry: The number of individuals registering as wholesales and retailers has escalated during the past three years:
 

1989	100
1990	638
1991	1,160

However, there is no indication in the API of the volume of transactions handled by the private companies (seed) or the registered individuals (fertilizers), a better indicator of the relative importance of the private sector.

- The Government of Ghana sold off 1/3 of the fertilizer held in government stockpile and is committed to selling the remainder.
- The Government of Ghana has requested assistance in privatizing some of the assets and operations held by the retail fertilizer parastatal (FASCOMS). However, the API is not clear on the status or timing.

The API states that while the USAID Mission in Ghana is authorized to make a final grant to tie up the loose ends in the seed and fertilizer, no additional commitments will be made in this area, in accordance to AID/W guidance.

**Guinea-Bissau:** No specific examples of privatization efforts were reported in the 1991 USAID/G-B API.

- However, the report indicates that the liberalization measures taken by the Government of Guinea-Bissau have helped lower barriers to market entry. Introduced measures included price de-control and permitting private sector firms to import and export commodities. As a result, 90% of all cashew crop export was handled by private traders.

**Kenya:** According to the information in USAID/Kenya 1991 API, the role and position of the private sector has declined. For example, the private sector contribution to Kenya's GDP has decreased from 62.7% in 1988 (baseline) to 60.3% in 1990. However, the following relevant information was reported:

- Under the USAID/Kenya-funded Fertilizer Pricing and Market Reform Program (FPMRP), the Government of Kenya (GOK) minimized its role in marketing fertilizer and abandoned fertilizer price controls and import license allocation. The API reports that GOK has limited itself to monitoring the types and volume of fertilizer imported into Kenya.
- Under the FPMRP, the Kenya National Fertilizer Association (KNFA), which consists of 25 private importers and distributors of fertilizer was established. According to the API, KNFA has considerable influence on fertilizer allocation, pricing and transportation issues nationwide.

**Lesotho:** According to the USAID/Lesotho 1991 API, promoting privatization of parastatals is one of the key elements of the 3-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) negotiated with the IMF in 1991.

- The ESAF agreement include a benchmark for liquidating Coop Lesotho (a major agricultural supply parastatal). It should be noted that the privatization of Coop Lesotho is also a major action under the USAID/Lesotho funded Lesotho Agricultural Policy Support Program (LAPSP).
- The API indicates that although the Government of Lesotho (GOL) has taken some preliminary steps leading to privatization of Coop Lesotho, actions to finalize the process remain to be completed. Under the LAPSP agreement, the privatization process must be completed before May, 1993.
- However, the API failed to discuss the relationship between this target date and the ESAF benchmark, or to discuss how the Mission intends to reconcile the objectives and targets under the two agreements.

**Madagascar:** No API was submitted for 1991 and, according to a Cable received for the USAID/Madagascar, the Mission does not expect to have much impact information available before May, 1993.

**Malawi:** According to the USAID/Malawi 1991 API, a parastatal (ADMARC) has been the dominant force in the marketing of agricultural commodities in Malawi for many years. This position has been due, in part, to Government of Malawi's (GOM) subsidization of seeds sold through ADMARC, leaving private traders unable to compete in the marketplace.

- The API contains no discussion of any planned actions to privatize ADMARC, however, the report indicates that the issue of subsidy will be explored with the Government of Malawi under the Agriculture Sector Assistance Program (ASAP).
- The API reports that the GOM has introduced policy reforms to support private sector growth, including: reducing licensing requirements; business registration; and incorporation procedures. Furthermore, the GOM agreed to allow the Investment Development Bank of Malawi to provide services such as letters of credit and transaction in foreign exchange, which were not previously allowed.

**Mali:** The 1991 API report submitted by the USAID/Mali Mission contains a relatively large number of items related to privatization and the private sector. However, the real impact, and the role of USAUD/Mali (only one of several donors) in the privatization process is not as clear (the attribution question?). The following is a brief list of items critical to the private sector development and growth:

- The World Bank has concluded a \$49.5 million Public Enterprise Privatization Project (1991). No details on what is in the agreement or target dates.
- During 1991, the Government of Mali (GOM) has liquidated and privatized 21 of 29 parastatals/firms, with conditions for the remaining 8 nearly satisfied. The API does not give details on the status or target dates for completion of the privatization process.

- Both Investment and Commercial Codes have been revised to facilitate the establishment of private businesses and to give industries certain tax benefits in order to foster growth.
- Recent pharmaceutical reforms revoked the import monopoly of the Malian parastatal (PPM), thus leading to the privatization of 83 of 98 PPM-operated wholesale outlets nationwide.
- The number of community-based primary schools increased, some formed entirely by private donation (some with matching public funds). According to the API, privatization of the education, where communities hire and pay teachers salaries, is becoming widespread in Mali (thus, filling a void in public-financed basic education).
- GOM has recently implemented a plan to divest itself from several livestock parastatls. The long-term impact of this action is to increase rural income, a USAID/Mali objective.
- Privatization reforms introduced by the GOM in March 1991 liberalized conditions for private health care practitioners (physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and technicians) to establish private practices.
- Private sector participation in the economy increased since 1989. For example, private investment increased for FCFA 75 billion in 1989 to FCFA 80 billion in 1991, and is expected to amount to FCFA 90 billion in 1992.
- Elimination of the export tax has prompted exploratory visits by U.S. investors interested in joint ventures in the livestock and livestock products area.

**Niger:** According to the USAID/Niger 1991 API, privatization is not high on the Government of Niger agenda, due to political reasons. For example, although the Economic Commission has looked at structural adjustment issues and recommended that the Prime Minister re-negotiate World

Bank/IMF programs, the privatization of parastatals and other societies will not be considered and will be frozen for now.

- However, it appears that the role of the agricultural supply parastatal in providing fertilizers to farmers in Niger has decreased significantly. This conclusion is based on the fact that fertilizer usage has continued at the same level while the amount supplied by the parastatal decreased, suggesting that the private sector must be supplying farmers.

**Rwanda:** The USAID/Rwanda 1991 API gives no specific actions or program promoting privatization of a specific parastatal. However, the report indicates that, with USAID/Rwanda support, the Government of Rwanda (GOR) has introduced regulatory changes to encourage the private sector to expand.

- Changes include the simplification of registration of new businesses, elimination of mandatory studies, and decentralization of trade licenses. In addition, the USAID/Rwanda Mission continued to support three private organizations assisting small and medium-sized enterprises.

**Senegal:** According to the USAID/Senegal 1991 API:

- One of the performance indicators under the Mission's Strategic Objective number 3 is the level of assistance to the Government of Senegal (GOS) to increase the percent of total agricultural products marketed through the private sector from 46% in 1991 to 56% by 1994.
- In addition, USAID/Senegal strategy has two targets: (1) increase private sector activities (indicator: number of wholesale cereal traders), and (2) deregulation.
- Although, currently, one parastatal in Senegal has "legal" monopoly over rice marketing, and other parastatals play a dominant role in marketing other agricultural commodities, the USAID/Senegal program's objective is to eliminate such monopolies, as well as all

legal barriers to entry. However, the API states that the Mission has no a priori target regarding the number of traders that would reflect a completely competitive situation.

**Swaziland:** The USAID/Swaziland 1991 API presents no specific examples regarding privatization. However, the report states that the environment for private sector development has changed.

- At the top level of Government, there has been a recognition of the need to support the private sector and a willingness to use donor assistance to foster private sector development, using no-government mechanisms.
- The Problem in Swaziland seems not to be between the private sector and parastatals, but more between the Swazi-owned (small) businesses and the Large (mostly foreign-owned) firms.
- USAID/Swaziland will focus on providing training for managers to increase the number of Swazi in management position. The Mission expects that its dialogue with the private sector on management training will help to change the prevailing attitudes that limit upward mobility for Swazi managers.

**Tanzania:** The following privatization-related items were reported in the 1991 API submitted by USAID/Tanzania:

- The decision of the Government of Tanzania (GOT) to adopt a package of banking reforms, including permitting private banking, is, according to the Mission, one of the most important policy changes since the current reform program was initiated in 1986.
- The GOT changed its policy to allow farmers to form member-owned cooperatives (first time since 1976).
- Despite GOT actions to end state control in the financial sector and farm cooperatives, there has been no rapid move towards privatization of more than 400 parastatals.

However, a cotton gin is being privatized, and a sugar mill has become a joint venture (with majority share still held by GOT). Another example, is the recent agreement between GOT and U.S. multinational Cargill to take over the oil seed plant parastatal.

- Private firms rehabilitated 100 kms of roads, the target amount, double last year's,

**Togo:** The USAID/Togo 1991 API does not provide information on any on-going privatization efforts. However, the report indicates that the USAID/Togo AEPRP project, which ended in 1990, had as its goal to encourage the private sector to take over from the Government Togo Grain Marketing Board (TOGOGRAIN) which was to have disappeared under the second World Bank Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). This, apparently has not yet been achieved, but the API gives no details on its status.

**Uganda:** The USAID/Uganda 1991 API lists the following Privatization-related items:

- The Government of Uganda (GOU) has permitted the establishment of privately-managed free market for foreign exchange (similar to Ghana's Forex Bureaus).
- The success of Vanilla (non-traditional export) and Sunfola (high-oil content sunflower) operations illustrate the importance of having private organizations, such as cooperatives, helping organize production for the market as well as the importation of inputs.
- GOU has recently permitted private farmers cooperatives to export coffee directly, this will clearly encourage the growth of such organizations in the future. The elimination of the monopoly of the Coffee Marketing Board (operating since 1969) was based on many factors, including studies and analysis provided by USAID/Uganda.
- Locally produced ORS are being distributed through a private pharmaceutical distribution company, and advertising for the product is done by local private firms (i.e., this is an example of privatization of social services).